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Chairman : Mr. Finn Moe (Norway).

Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/1944, A/1947, A/C.1/698 and A/C.1/699) (continued)

[Item 67]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) stated that he did not propose to discuss the question of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the question of Korea any further in view of the fact that the former had been admirably dealt with by the Norwegian representative at the previous meeting and that the Peruvian representative had put forward with extreme clarity at the same meeting the position in connexion with the latter.
2. Neither did he intend to reply to the propaganda speeches made by certain representatives on both questions. He wished only to recall the Haitian representative's observation at the 488th meeting that armaments were the symptoms, and not the cause, of international tension.
3. The representative of the United Kingdom would confine himself to explaining why his delegation was of the opinion that the problems raised by paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698) should be referred to the Disarmament Commission.
4. He rejected as completely untrue the assertion he had heard, and which had been published in certain organs of the Press, to the effect that the western Powers had rejected the USSR proposals. The United Kingdom delegation was, on the contrary, as it had indicated in plenary meeting, ready to examine the proposals in good faith, and it had no intention of burying them, as the Byelorussian representative had alleged at the 489th meeting. It was of the opinion that the work of Sub-Committee 18 of the First Committee had constituted a modest step forward and that the proposals put forth by the USSR representative should be considered as another product of the conversations which had then taken place. The USSR representative had in fact stated that the proposals were being made in order to bridge the gap between the parties as far as possible. However, it would be wise not to raise false hopes and to bear in mind the fact that no sudden or dramatic solution was likely.
5. The most recent USSR proposals would require careful scrutiny. Two points in them called for immediate comment.
6. The first was with regard to the simultaneous declarations, conventions or agreements on the ban on atomic weapons and the setting up of an international control organization. As the French representative had already recalled (488th meeting), similar draft resolutions had already been submitted by the Soviet Union in 1948, 1949 and 1950. The United Kingdom delegation considered it necessary to emphasize that any proposal providing that declarations and conventions should be simultaneous did not meet its wishes. The fundamental position of the United Kingdom was that an agreement on all types of armaments and armed forces should be concluded and an effective control organization established before any particular weapon could be banned. Under the USSR proposal, the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the institution of international control would be "put into effect simultaneously". That wording left room for doubt as to the meaning of the phrase "put into effect". The new Disarmament Commission was the body best qualified to consider whether that formula constituted an advance towards the western Powers' position.
7. The second dealt with the constitution, scope, methods and powers of the control organization or organizations and called for careful examination. The United Kingdom delegation believed that the organization to be established should control all armaments and armed forces, that it should control atomic energy as well as atomic weapons and that it should have the widest powers. The question of such powers gave rise to problems on which substantial differences of opinion and of interpretation might exist, for example, with regard to the right to make inspections and investigations into breaches of the conventions. It would have to be decided whether such investigations could only be made on a *prima facie* case of a breach being established, on suspicion of a breach, or when neither a *prima facie* case nor a suspicion of a breach existed. Those problems had been discussed in Sub-Committee 18, but would require further detailed scrutiny.
8. Mr. Vyshinsky had himself referred to the question of the permanent stationing of inspecting staffs. The United

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

Kingdom delegation held the view that it would be necessary to have such staffs permanently stationed at certain places. It would have to be decided whether the inspection staff could exercise their powers of control in places other than officially acknowledged armament plants. That sort of problem was linked with the question of domestic sovereignty because the officers of the control organization could not carry out their inspection without some interference in the domestic affairs of States. The delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, in their draft resolution on the question of disarmament (A/C.1/667/Rev.1), recognized that such interference should be reduced to a minimum.

9. The USSR, in its revised draft resolution, while recognizing the authority of the international control organization to proceed to a "continuing" inspection, formulated the restrictive clause that it would not be entitled "to interfere in the domestic affairs of States". That wording made it necessary to define what constituted "the domestic affairs of States". If such a definition were unduly rigid, it might rob the efforts of the control organization of any efficiency from the very beginning. The USSR representative himself had expressed very pronounced views as to the exclusive purview of the domestic jurisdiction of States.

10. In conclusion, the representative of the United Kingdom thought that the First Committee should decide by almost unanimous agreement that it was not in a position to examine in detail such complicated questions, and that those questions should be referred to the Disarmament Commission. The USSR proposals would constitute an excellent basis for the commission's work.

11. Mr. LIU CHIEH (China) thought that the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698) dealt in part with questions the Committee had already discussed.

12. He could not accept the argument advanced in paragraph 1 to the effect that participation of a State in NATO was incompatible with membership in the United Nations. It was true that his delegation had always held that regional arrangements, by concentrating attention on the security of one particular region, might deprive collective security of its universality. The members of the First Committee would, however, appreciate that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the result of the fears of the post-war period and of the aggressive character of Soviet Union policy. NATO was not, as the USSR representative claimed, an instrument of aggression. Regional arrangements concluded in accordance with the United Nations Charter for the purpose of self-defence could not be regarded as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

13. Paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution dealt with the Korean question, of which the Committee had decided (486th meeting) to defer discussion pending a successful outcome of the truce negotiations. It should, however, be emphasized that the USSR draft resolution disregarded the United Nations objectives in Korea; the immediate objective was to combat the aggression which had been committed in that country, while the long-term objective was the establishment of a free, independent and democratic Korea.

14. As regards paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution, which set out the USSR position on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the international control of atomic energy and disarmament generally, the main points in those paragraphs were already contained in the amendment submitted by the USSR delegation (A/C.1/668/Rev.2) to the draft resolution on the regulation, limitation and

balanced reduction of all armaments and all armed forces submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The various points of the amendment had been rejected by the First Committee at its 471st meeting. After studying the concessions which the USSR representative claimed he had made, the Chinese delegation considered that they were neither fundamental nor important enough for the Committee to reconsider its decision.

15. The wording of paragraph 3 did not make it clear whether the USSR delegation had merely re-stated the position it had taken in 1948, when it accepted the principle of the simultaneous adoption of a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and of a convention on international control, or whether it meant that the prohibition of the atomic weapon would come into effect as soon as the international system of control had come into operation. If the latter interpretation was correct, some progress had been made. Differences of opinion would, however, remain as to the exact meaning of the words "international control of atomic energy". The differences raised questions of a legal nature which the Disarmament Commission should study carefully.

16. The inclusion of the words "inspection on a continuing basis" in paragraph 6 of the USSR draft resolution, instead of the words "periodic inspection" undoubtedly constituted a concession. But the reservation to the effect that the control organ should not be entitled "to interfere in the domestic affairs of States" gave rise to the apprehension that the USSR was prepared to accept only partial inspection, whereas the United Nations plan provided, with certain reservations, for universal inspection.

17. Moreover, the United Nations plan recommended a number of guarantees. It would permit atomic energy to be used for peaceful purposes only after prior permission had been obtained, and would submit atomic energy plants to supervision by an international organ. The USSR had not accepted those measures.

18. The Chinese delegation accordingly supported the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States to the effect that paragraph 6 should be studied by the Disarmament Commission.

19. In the final paragraph of its draft resolution the Soviet Union called upon the five permanent members of the Security Council to conclude a peace pact "and to combine their efforts for the achievement of this high and noble aim" and called upon all other States to join in the pact. What higher and nobler aim was there than that already proclaimed in the United Nations Charter? If the purposes and principles of the Charter were disregarded and violated, as they often were by the policy of the USSR, was there any reason to believe that peace and security could be achieved by implementing the new pact proposed by the USSR?

20. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) considered that, although the USSR proposals did represent a step forward by comparison with the USSR proposals submitted two months previously, they did no more than re-state almost *verbatim* a proposal put forward by the USSR delegation on 2 October 1948.¹

21. In the circumstances it was difficult to decide whether any real progress had been made. Did that progress relate both to the continuing nature of control and to the principle of simultaneous prohibition and control? What was the extent of the reservations prohibiting interference in the

¹ See document A/C.1/310.

domestic affairs of States? The First Committee was unable to answer such questions categorically.

22. The Belgian delegation therefore supported the proposal that the USSR draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission. It hoped that the USSR delegation would accept that proposal, in view of the fact that it had already supported a similar proposal by the Czechoslovak delegation (A/C.1/683, point 3).

23. Mr. van Langenhove would refrain from discussing the Korean question since the Committee had decided to postpone consideration of it. The paragraphs of the USSR draft resolution which called for the condemnation of the North Atlantic Treaty and the conclusion of a peace pact in which the great Powers would take the initiative, were merely outworn propaganda items.

24. The fundamental cause of international tension was to be found in the alarming expansion of the USSR in the previous ten years. In the course of history, similar political manifestations of imperialism had always provoked a defensive reaction on the part of the States whose independence they threatened.

25. Mrs. SEKANINOVA - CAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia) thought that the USSR representative's proposals provided fresh evidence of the peaceful policy of the USSR. That policy aimed at eliminating the prevailing international tension and creating a real basis for understanding. It was founded on a profound analysis of the causes of that tension and contained recommendations which alone could remove it.

26. The North Atlantic Treaty, which was presented to the world as a defensive pact, had become the basis of the foreign policy of the United States and its partners. The treaty determined the relations between the United States and the countries of peace and democracy against which it had been concluded. It also determined the relations between the United States and the other members of the "Atlantic bloc". It was the cornerstone of a whole system of "blocs" agreements and pacts which had been or were being concluded in the Near and Middle East and in the Pacific, all directed against the USSR, the people's democracies and the national liberation movements of peoples still under foreign domination. The aggressive character of the treaty which had been apparent from the very outset, had been accentuated in recent years. Its conclusion represented the abandonment by the western Powers of the policy of co-operation at the end of the Second World War. That change of policy had had repercussions in the United Nations itself, where the unanimity of the five great Powers was now considered a thing of the past.

27. It was claimed that the North Atlantic Treaty was a regional arrangement under Article 52 of the Charter which, however, clearly required "that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations". The treaty, which in article 5 provided for military measures without the sanction of the Security Council, was clearly in conflict with the Charter.

28. The North Atlantic Treaty was not designed to settle regional problems; it was intended to serve the post-war policy of the United States which was directed against co-operation among nations and at preparing for a new war. The reference to Article 51 of the Charter was unsubstantiated; article 51 clearly showed that only an armed attack against a Member State gave the right to self-defence until the Security Council had taken the necessary measures. Moreover, the signatories of the treaty included States which were not members of the United Nations; that, too, was in contradiction to Article 51 of the Charter.

29. The activities of the "Atlantic bloc" and the statements made by its official spokesmen proved that the North Atlantic Treaty was aimed at the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, and was designed to secure world domination by the United States of America. It was characteristic that hostile activities which grossly violated the United Nations Charter and the fundamental principles of international law, were linked by the United States Mutual Security Act to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

30. The North Atlantic Treaty was not only fundamentally different from the treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, but was also inconsistent with the agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and France and between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom; those agreements expressly prohibited participation by either signatory in any coalition aimed against the other party. The aggressive purpose of the treaty was emphasized by the remilitarization of West Germany and by the inclusion of the former aggressor in a bloc directed against the peace and security of nations. The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, which had been concluded while the western Powers had been attempting to turn Hitler's aggressive tendencies against the Soviet Union and which the representative of Haiti had mentioned, had postponed Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union and enabled it to make the preparations which had saved Europe. Any example chosen from the USSR's foreign policy clearly showed that its sole purpose had always been the maintenance of international peace and security.

31. The United States was attempting to create a network of war bases spanning the whole world. Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was governed by a single criterion. How could the countries concerned serve the aggressive aims of the United States? Could they provide soldiers, raw materials and bases? At the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers held in Paris, in 1951, the United States representative, supported by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, had opposed the inclusion in the agenda of the questions of United States military bases on foreign territory and of the North Atlantic Treaty.

32. In his speech at the 487th meeting, Mr. Vyshinsky, the head of the Soviet delegation, had cited additional facts which had left no doubt as to the real state of affairs. American sources themselves provided ample evidence. Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakrtova quoted a number of articles in *The New York Times* and *Colliers* and statements by the United States Department of Defense and the Navy Department to the effect that the United States had military bases all over the world, and that even as early as 1945 the American authorities had planned to achieve a position which would enable them to dominate the world. The recently concluded peace with Japan was designed to legalize the domination of the United States over Japan and over the military bases it maintained there, which represented a direct threat to China. The aid given to Chiang Kai-shek and the occupation of Taiwan (Formosa) served similar purposes. In addition, the United States maintained a large number of air bases in Spain and its colonies, in Libya and the Middle East and in the French territories in Africa. As indicated in an article published on 28 March 1951 in the *Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung*, a key position had been given to West Germany, where the dark forces of nazism were preparing a new attack. But world public opinion would not be misled by United States efforts to represent such aggressive preparations as a peace policy. The main purpose of the Schuman and Plevin plans was to make the war industry of

the Ruhr a principal arsenal of aggression in Europe, and to form the Nazi hirelings of West Germany into the core of the so-called European army. The French newspaper *Le Monde* had very rightly said that Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) was faced with English reticence, the lack of enthusiasm of certain small nations, and the fear of countries such as France of seeing their economies ruined and their social conflicts renewed or aggravated.

33. The Marshall Plan, which had at first been presented as a plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe, had long ago been exposed as an instrument of United States aggressive and expansionist policy. Since the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty it had been openly transformed into a programme for the militarization of the European economy. The result was inflation, reduction of civilian production and a decline in the living standards of the working people—phenomena which themselves created a danger to peace. To that must be added the interference of United States imperialism in the normal economic relations between nations, for example, in trade relations between the United Kingdom and eastern Europe. It would also be recalled in that connexion how the United Kingdom representative had had to give way in 1951 to United States pressure in the matter of economic sanctions against China.

34. As far back as 1949, the USSR Government had drawn the inevitable conclusions from the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, and had since then, in conformity with the principles on which the United Nations had been founded, combated United States attempts to undermine the United Nations. It was in accordance with those principles that the USSR delegation had called upon the General Assembly to declare participation in the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of military bases in foreign territory incompatible with membership in the United Nations. The USSR proposal before the Committee was intended to serve the interests of all nations, even those whose Governments participated in the North Atlantic Treaty whether they were among the members who led or those who were led. The United Nations was threatened by the aggressive "Atlantic bloc" in two ways: indirectly, by virtue of the fact that the character of a Member State's contribution to the activities of the United Nations was determined by the nature of its policy; directly, because the leaders of the "aggressive blocs" were now trying illegally to link those blocs, which had been created in circumvention of the United Nations, to the Organization itself.

35. The treaties of alliance concluded by Czechoslovakia were based on friendship and mutual assistance, on respect for the sovereignty of States and on a common effort for peace. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and that of Czechoslovakia proceeded from the principle that there could be co-operation between different economic and social systems, provided that there was mutual respect and equality. For those reasons the delegation of Czechoslovakia fully supported paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution regarding the North Atlantic Treaty.

36. Paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution related to Korea. The United States had failed in its efforts to convince the world that North Korea had committed an act of aggression against that part of Korea ruled by the Syngman Rhee puppet government. The postponement of the discussion on the question of the independence of Korea, at the demand of the United States delegation, had once again proved that the United States Government was opposed to peace negotiations, and planned to reduce all Korea to the status of a United States colony, to exploit Korea's resources by United States monopolies, to use the country as a base for aggression against the People's Republic of China and

to exploit the war in Korea in order to stimulate the armaments race. The United Nations Command in Korea was doing everything in its power to slow down the truce negotiations taking place there by committing provocative acts and by submitting unacceptable demands such as the occupation of Kaesong, the exchange of prisoners of war according to a procedure contrary to set practice, and the establishment of United States air control over Korean territory.

37. The United States was transporting fresh troops from Japan to Korea. The United States Air Force was continuing its brutal bombardments. Clearly, if the United States genuinely desired peace, it would adopt a more serious attitude. It would not impose its views by continuing to commit acts of aggression.

38. The Czechoslovak delegation supported the USSR proposal on the solution of the Korean problem because it was a realistic proposal, which could restore peace by guaranteeing the independence of Korea and the freedom of the Korean people. Mankind would be grateful to the Soviet Union for the policy it had pursued from the beginning, a policy which was designed to secure peace in Korea and which was the origin of the truce negotiations.

39. The Czechoslovak delegation welcomed the USSR proposal contained in paragraph 3 of the draft, that the General Assembly should proclaim the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of that prohibition. That proposal represented an important advance towards the strengthening of international peace and security. It clearly stated that the prohibition of the atomic weapon and international control should be put into effect simultaneously.

40. From the very beginning of the United Nations, the USSR had time after time submitted practical proposals for the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and for control over the enforcement of the prohibition. Its proposals had been systematically sabotaged by the western Powers. For example, they had secured adoption, at the present session, of a resolution postponing indefinitely the prohibition of the atomic weapon and again advancing the Baruch plan which made no mention of the prohibition of the atomic weapon. That fact threw much light on statements recently published in the United States press to the effect that the United States armed services were demanding ever greater quantities of atomic products.

41. Paragraph 4 of the USSR draft resolution related to the reduction of the armaments of the great Powers, and was based on the fact that the great Powers had both special responsibilities and special obligations.

42. The USSR representative had shown that the armed forces of the "Atlantic bloc" States were greater than those of the USSR, which had demobilized thirty-three age-groups since the end of the war and was engaged in peaceful construction. The representatives of the western Powers claimed that the armed forces of the USSR were superior to their own, in order to justify an armaments race of which the consequences were already seen to be disastrous.

43. Steps should be taken to stop the armaments race, to prohibit atomic weapons, to establish control over that prohibition, and to reduce all armaments, so as to re-establish confidence and peace. The representatives of the western Powers should reflect on a statement appearing in the *Wall Street Journal* to the effect that the European peoples were said to be concerned at the extent of western rearmament, because they did not believe in an imminent

attack by the Soviet Union, but feared that the United States might blunder into war.

44. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the USSR draft resolution dealt with the data on armaments and armed forces which States were to submit and with the establishment of an international control organ. It was indicated in those paragraphs that inspection should be carried out on a continuing basis, but that the international control organ should not, of course, be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

45. Paragraph 7 provided for a world conference, to be convened before 15 July 1952, to study all the problems connected with a reduction of armed forces and armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control over the observance of that prohibition.

46. Under the terms of paragraph 8 of the draft resolution, a peace pact between the five great Powers, which all other peace-loving States could join, would be an important step towards peace.

47. The United States feared peace. That had been demonstrated again in connexion with the recent armistice negotiations in Korea, which had caused a panic in the United States because they might mean the end of the arms race. In that respect the *Wall Street Journal* might again be quoted. It had expressed regret that the United States was automatically rejecting all USSR proposals, which were having a telling effect on the world.

48. Recalling the statement of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs at the fifth session of the General Assembly to the effect that the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia consisted in promoting international co-operation, Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakrtova gave her unreserved support to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698) which made it possible to find a solution to all the problems threatening peace. She asked the Committee not just to defer the draft resolution, but to adopt it.

49. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) said that the USSR draft resolution contained a series of proposals, of which some had already been repeatedly discussed and rejected by the General Assembly. Others presented certain new features but appeared to reflect the same basic position. The continued and repeated submission of rejected proposals made it increasingly difficult to preserve an objective spirit and was not conducive to useful and serious discussion.

50. The Australian delegation's main objection to the USSR resolution was that it was not designed to reduce international tension. The adoption of declarations which merely reflected the symptoms of the hostility between the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds would do nothing to diminish that tension. Repeated attempts by the western Powers to reach agreement with the USSR had so far failed because the USSR was apparently incapable of adopting an attitude of compromise. For example, it had insisted in the United Nations that resolutions which it opposed, although adopted by the great majority of members, were "illegal". Although in such circumstances it was naturally difficult to make progress towards a settlement, attempts to do so would continue.

51. The North Atlantic Treaty and the rearmament of the western countries were the result of the fears inspired by the policies pursued by the Soviet Union since 1945. Those fears had been increased by the aggression in Korea. Australia recognized the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty, since regional arrangements were provided for in the Charter. It would be easy to reply in kind to the proposal that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization should be declared incompatible with membership in the United Nations; for example, to propose that support of aggression in Korea be declared incompatible with such membership. Such a declaration might be made with more justice but would do no more to relieve the present strained situation.

52. It had been the consistent aim of the United Nations to end the fighting in Korea as soon as possible. Countries like Australia were only too anxious to get their forces home. The slow progress of armistice negotiations was primarily caused by the obstructive tactics of the North Koreans and Chinese Communists. The best contribution which the USSR could make towards an armistice would be to use its influence with those authorities to instruct their negotiators to show a less obstructive spirit.

53. The First Committee had already decided not to open a discussion on Korea which would inevitably touch on military matters. He reminded the Committee however, with respect to the location of the armistice line, that the military negotiators had agreed, after long discussion, that the line should be based on the positions occupied by the forces of both sides and not on the 38th parallel. Any attempt to reopen that issue was therefore regrettable.

54. It had also been agreed by both sides that the withdrawal of foreign troops was a political matter. The United Nations position was that it could not be discussed in isolation from other aspects of general political negotiations. That position was without prejudice to the United Nations intention not to keep forces permanently in Korea. Its attitude on the question of withdrawal had already been made clear in 1950.

55. The General Assembly had recently adopted at its 358th meeting a resolution establishing a Disarmament Commission to study all the proposals which might be submitted. The commission would naturally study the USSR proposal. The representatives of the three Powers had also signified that they would give full consideration to the USSR proposal, particularly to those parts which might contain new points.

56. Some explanation of those points would be required, particularly in connexion with the simultaneous putting into effect of the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the control over that prohibition, with inspection on a continuing basis and with non-interference in the domestic affairs of States. The Disarmament Commission would be able to conduct its study in a quiet atmosphere and with the assistance of experts.

57. For that reason, his delegation would support the three-Power proposal to refer the disarmament aspects of the USSR resolution to the Disarmament Commission.

58. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly already provided for a disarmament conference and set out the necessary steps which should precede it. A conference convened at some automatic date might only be harmful; and it was unwise to commit oneself to such a conference without some assurance that the ground for it would be adequately prepared.

59. The peace pact referred to in the USSR draft resolution would not contribute towards reducing international tension, because merely setting out the symptoms of a disease could not cure it.

60. The Australian delegation would therefore vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698) and would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the three Powers (A/C.1/699), in the hope that a full discussion in the Disarmament Commission would render it possible to reach an agreement.

61. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said that his delegation had always adopted an attitude calculated to promote conciliation between the great Powers. Consequently, although it had been in favour of many of the collective security measures proposed in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 459th plenary meeting, as the great Powers had not reached agreement concerning them it had abstained from voting to avoid taking sides.

62. The delegation of Indonesia would adopt the same attitude towards the USSR draft resolution. It would vote for any proposal figuring in that draft upon which the great Powers were agreed and would abstain from voting upon ones over which they were at variance.

63. The problem of agreement between the two " blocs " was a long-term one which required time, patience and sacrifice for its solution. The USSR draft resolution ought to be considered in that light. The two concessions it contained certainly figured well for the work of the Disarmament Commission.

64. Mahmoud FAWZY Bey (Egypt) observed that the USSR draft resolution covered as wide a range of questions as the whole of the United Nations Charter. Those questions should be considered in relation to the events that had aggravated the international situation.

65. Leaving aside for the moment the question of the North Atlantic Treaty, he would confine himself in connexion with the allied Middle East Command referred to by the USSR representative, to reminding the Committee of the statement made by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the 480th meeting, condemning the attempts of certain governments to confront the States of the Middle East with the *fait accompli* of an allied command. Salah-el-Din Pacha had added that such a *diktat* would not constitute a regional agreement, but a settlement of problems without reference to the views of the States concerned. The States of the Middle East could clearly not countenance such a system and would continue to abide by the principles of the sovereign equality of nations as laid down in the United Nations Charter. It appeared, however, that the United States and United Kingdom Governments were unwilling to give up the idea of an allied Middle East Command. That was certainly not the point of view of Egypt.

66. Egypt had always maintained that the creation of military bases upon foreign territory could only result from an express agreement, freely entered into between the States requiring them and those upon whose territory they were established. Egypt had not given its consent to the maintenance by force upon its territory of military bases of the United Kingdom.

67. Egypt had always been in favour of Korean independence and unity. It therefore hoped for the cessation of hostilities, the conclusion of an armistice and the prompt withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korean territory. The real source of the Korean conflict was the existence of foreign interests in Korea and the consequent infringements which had occurred ever since 1945. History showed that such infringements had always resulted in wars. The time was past when mankind could consent to being divided into spheres of influence. The fundamental rights of peoples and nations could no longer be infringed, with the consequent risk of dragging the world into new wars.

68. The delegation of Egypt had already given its views on all the questions dealt with in paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution. Nevertheless it felt that the USSR proposal should be examined afresh, and was in favour of the procedural solution proposed in the draft resolution of

the three western Powers (A/C.1/699), to the effect that the proposals contained in paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission for examination.

69. The United Nations Charter was itself a peace pact. The USSR proposal for a peace pact might therefore appear superfluous. However, Egypt felt that no opportunity of strengthening peace should be lost and was consequently, in favour of paragraph 8 of the USSR draft resolution.

70. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) drew attention to the importance of the USSR draft resolution at a time when the armaments race was endangering international peace and security. The Soviet Union was striving for the maintenance of international peace and security, but the obstinate opposition of the United States had obliged the USSR and the people's democracies to persevere in the search for means of removing the threat of a new war and consolidating peace and friendship among the peoples.

71. Without rejecting the USSR proposal, the United States and the United Kingdom had engaged in manoeuvres to prevent its consideration by the First Committee, without giving any reasons for that attitude. The representative of the United Kingdom had stated that the Soviet Union draft resolution called for additional study, but at the same time he proposed to defer consideration of it indefinitely. In view of the fact that the United Nations committees were not particularly busy, there was no doubt that the proposal of the three western Powers to defer consideration of the USSR draft resolution was tantamount to shelving it.

72. The representative of Brazil had stated at the 488th meeting that the new USSR proposal was only slightly different from the Soviet Union amendments to the draft resolution on disarmament submitted by the three western Powers. The differences were on the contrary substantial, as had been recognized by the representatives of the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium and others.

73. To pave the way for an agreement, the Soviet Union had explained its point of view on the prohibition of atomic weapons, control of the enforcement of that prohibition, and the reduction of armaments. Those proposals, the importance of which could not be denied, should not be referred to the Disarmament Commission without the General Assembly's having previously laid down directives.

74. When the representative of the three western Powers had submitted their draft resolution on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) they had urged that the General Assembly should give the Disarmament Commission clear and definite instructions.

75. The representative of the United Kingdom in particular had opposed at the 469th meeting the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/680) for referring to the Disarmament Commission all the proposals that had been submitted, and he had maintained that the First Committee should state its position on the fundamental problems. Nevertheless, that did not prevent the representative of the United Kingdom from adopting at the present time a completely opposite attitude so far as the USSR draft resolution was concerned, or from asking that that draft resolution be referred to the Disarmament Commission to avoid its being considered by the General Assembly. Such an attitude was of course inadmissible.

76. Paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution established a close connexion existing between the prohibition of atomic weapons and control to enforce that prohibition.

In that respect, the United States proposals had tented to separate the two problems and to advocate the establishment of a system of control before the prohibition of atomic weapons was proclaimed. The representatives of the three western Powers and a number of others, including the representative of Peru, had recently stated that there would be no disagreement provided that there was no interval of time between the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control of the enforcement of that prohibition. The delegation of the USSR, therefore, in order to eliminate divergencies of view and enable joint decisions to be reached, had introduced a new clause which gave satisfaction to the western Powers. The delegation of the Soviet Union had suggested, indeed, that the prohibition of atomic weapons should come into force at the moment when States had signed a convention to that effect and when the system of control had begun to operate.

77. Thus, the decision to be taken by the General Assembly would not mean the immediate cessation of the production of atomic weapons. It would nevertheless have considerable moral force, just like the convention on the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gases, and would constitute an important check on the actions of those who wished to use atomic weapons.

78. The three western Powers had stressed the need for a system of inspection on a continuing basis. Mr. Lloyd, for example, had said at the 463rd meeting that the inspection of atomic energy enterprises would not be permanent but should be on a continuing basis. The USSR was not opposed to the principle of inspection on a continuing basis and, in order to reach an agreement on that subject, it had introduced into the draft resolution a clause providing that the international control organ should be authorized to carry out inspection on a continuing basis. It was evident, however, that the rights of the inspectors would not be unlimited and that, in particular, they would not deal with matters unrelated to atomic energy.

79. Furthermore, the international control organ should not interfere in the domestic affairs of States. The representative of the Netherlands had expressed the view that that restriction reflected a desire on the part of the USSR to render the task of the inspectors more difficult. That fear was without foundation, although the USSR would never tolerate the establishment of a system of control which was not regulated by a convention and which might make the economy of a State dependent on another State or group of States.

80. Thus, thanks to the attitude of the USSR, there were no further major obstacles to the proclamation of the prohibition of atomic weapons by the General Assembly at the sixth session.

81. The representatives of the western Powers and the representative of Peru now claimed, however, that there

were fresh difficulties, and were asking the Soviet Union to accept the United States point of view on the reduction of armaments. The western Powers wished to discredit the USSR proposal, although it was obvious that that proposal, rendered necessary by the acceleration of the armaments race and the aggressive policy of the United States, was in the interests of peace and of all the peoples of the world.

82. The representatives of the Netherlands and of Norway had stated that the North Atlantic Treaty was not of an aggressive nature but that it had been established in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The North Atlantic Treaty did indeed refer to the Charter of the United Nations. That, however, was a mere façade intended to conceal the treaty's aggressive purposes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been established as a substitute for the United Nations, as was obvious from the fact that it was participated in by States that were not Members of the United Nations and from the fact that the Soviet Union and the people's democracies were being left out of it. It was not true that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was subject to the decisions of the Security Council, for Article 5 of the treaty provided for the use of armed forces without the Security Council's authorization. Furthermore, Article 9 allowed for the establishment of an "Atlantic council" and a "European military staff committee" both of which possessed greater powers than those of the Security Council. It followed that the attempt to represent NATO as an application of the United Nations collective security system was a mere betrayal of the Charter. The United Nations had been established precisely to prevent the formation of aggressive military unions such as NATO. The only link between the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was the common dependence of both bodies on the United States of America. Moreover, the history of the treaty proved that the purpose of NATO was to conduct an aggressive policy towards the USSR and the people's democracies. It was for that reason that paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution should be adopted.

83. The Ukrainian delegation protested against the unfounded statements of the representatives of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

84. The USSR draft resolution provided the basis for co-operation among peace-loving peoples. The Ukrainian delegation supported it unreservedly and was opposed to the draft resolution submitted by the three western Powers unless the Disarmament Commission received from the General Assembly precise directives as to the way in which it should consider the USSR draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.