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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/1944, A/1947 and A/C.1/698)

[Item 67]*

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. VYSHINKSY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the proposals presented by the Soviet Union relating to measures to combat the threat of a new war and to strengthen peace (A/1944, A/1962) had been the main subject of his interventions in the general debate at the beginning of the session.
2. In the intervening two months the First Committee had dealt with questions which were related to the present item, which was quite natural because they were merely the constituent elements of the broader topic. Mr. Vyshinsky proposed now to discuss not individual measures but a system of closely-connected measures. That was the significance of the Soviet Union revised draft resolution (A/C.1/698).
3. At the outset of the work of the present session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union delegation pointed out that the Organization faced a number of problems and that the major problem which required an immediate solution was the elimination of the obstacles in the path to peace and co-operation : it was the removal of the threat of a new war.
4. At the beginning of the session the Soviet Union had indicated that the economic and political situation of the world had deteriorated since the end of the fifth session. The main reason for the worsening situation was the aggressive policy of the "Atlantic bloc" headed by the United States. The Soviet Union had predicted that those governments which hoped to gain advantage by making their policies subservient to those of the United States would find themselves in growing difficulties. Events had shown that the United States itself had not been an exception in the matter of economic deterioration.
5. Mr. Vyshinsky presented information from the fourth quarterly report of Mr. Charles E. Wilson, United States Director of Defense Mobilization which indicated that military deliveries were running at the rate of 2,000 million dollars worth per month. Mr. Wilson had promised that the peak would be reached in 1953 when war production expenditures of the United States would reach a rate of 4,000 million dollars a month. Thus there has already been a gigantic increase in the war production programme and the production of armaments and armed forces, the building of all types of military bases' land, naval and air, in all corners of the globe. These matters were of great interest to the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies because it was no secret that the armaments were directed against them. Mr. Vyshinsky gave figures from the report dealing with the aviation, metallurgical and steel industries and noted the statement by Mr. Wilson that 1952 would see greater shortages of civilian goods.
6. Such developments were welcomed by the monopolies whose profits had risen in 1951 to an annual rate of 46,200 million dollars—seven times the rate of 1939. Meantime the cost of living and rates of taxation rose while social welfare programmes were shelved. The official United States cost of living statistics showed an increase of 88.6 per cent over the pre-war figures. There had also been a tremendous increase since the Korean war began. Mr. Vyshinsky referred to articles in a number of journals and newspapers dealing with the growing problem of unemployment, especially in the automobile and textile industries in the United States. Even the farm incomes had taken a downward trend from the 1946-1949 level.
7. The ruling circles of the United States had predicted an improvement in the situation beginning in 1950 and although there had been a boom it had only led to a deterioration of the situation. Again promises of improvement were being made based on the theory that an expansion of armaments industries would lead to prosperity. That was the basis of the economic policy of the United States and of its foreign policy as well.
8. The increases in war production had led to civilian shortages, inflation, and higher taxes. The "Atlantic bloc" governments were beset by economic difficulties and their people with destitution. Even Mr. Wilson had recognized that the armaments race would soon leave little material for civilian production.
9. With regard to the military programme of the United States the President's State of the Union message had set forth three objectives : a rapid increase of the United States armed forces and its programme of military assistance ; the

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

expansion of armaments industries; and the extension of steel and aluminium producing industries, electrical power facilities and other heavy industries on which war production is based. On those objectives Congress was prepared to spend about 85 per cent of its total appropriations including nearly 57,000 million dollars for the Department of Defense, over 7,000 million for the Mutual Security Act and over 4,000 million for the enlargement and construction of military bases.

10. The programme of the United States was related to the problem of strengthening peace and friendship among nations. Within the 7,000 million dollar appropriation for the Mutual Security Act there was included an amount of 100 million for subversive activities against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies. Such policies were not exactly those of a good neighbour. The facts which had been brought to light by the Soviet Union had revealed the aggressive purposes of the ruling circles in the United States who were bent upon achieving a world hegemony. The figures for effectives under arms given by the President of the United States showed that from a total of two and a half million at the beginning of 1951 the number had already reached five and a half million. The report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers showed that up to the end of 1951 over 50,000 million dollars had been spent on the armed forces, the military assistance programme, atomic weapon production and stock-piling of strategic materials all of which was directed against the peace loving nations. The United States had turned to a war-time economy which was a function of its foreign policy.

11. The basic doctrine of the United States foreign policy was that situations of strength should be created. The application of that doctrine had revealed its failure. Economically speaking the Marshall plan which was a part of that policy had suffered total collapse. The economies of the "Marshallized" nations had deteriorated and, as an example, Mr. Vyshinsky referred to the recurring Government crises in France which he said derived from the economic instability of the Government and the national economy. Naturally it was true that many individual profiteers had benefited from the Marshall plan but the people as a whole had suffered injury. The prospects for 1952 under the new mutual security programme were no better.

12. In his New Year's Eve speech the Secretary of State of the United States had commented on what he described as economic progress of the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Acheson had also expressed some satisfaction with the defence situation in Europe but he did not conceal the fact that he had seen some dangers in the economic and financial problems that existed. Indeed, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had announced that his country was on the verge of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Secretary of State the main task of the United States in Europe was rearmament. He had given his support to the Schuman and Pleven plans.

13. In that same speech, reviewing the situation in the Near and Middle East the Secretary of State of the United States had made pleasant remarks about Greece and Turkey but had overlooked difficulties elsewhere in that area. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that the plan for a Middle East Command had collapsed. While rejecting the urgency of putting an end to the war in Korea, the United States regarded as urgent the assumption of responsibilities in the Near and Middle East with a view to creating another so-called area of strength, responsibilities which had taken

the form of threats and the use of armed force in that area. Similar responsibilities were involved in the military events in Korea, and had been invoked by the aggressive forces in the United States of America to justify and cover up their aggressive policy with respect to the Chinese People's Republic.

14. The third area with which the Secretary of State had dealt was the Far East. The war in Korea, according to Mr. Acheson, had led to great transformation and changes, which meant nothing but destruction of human beings, razing of towns and destruction of the country. Mr. Acheson had cited events in Korea to justify the so-called collective measures. He had also praised the armistice negotiators although it was well known that the policy of the United States was to impede the negotiations by the introduction of irrelevant conditions. Mr. Acheson accordingly had depicted a gloomy prospect for the Korean situation in 1952.

15. The United States continued its aggressive foreign policy despite the warning of many individuals who exposed the recklessness of measures that endangered peace. Those policies were the reason for need for measures to remove the threat of war and strengthen peace.

16. The Soviet Union could not refrain from criticising the aggressive "Atlantic bloc". In the past it had indicated that the character of that alliance was based on principles which were far removed from those of the Charter of the United Nations. The Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union had issued a statement in that connexion in January 1949 and events since that date had confirmed the aggressive character of the pact. It was now clear that organizations, such as the western union in Europe, the Organisation of American States, and the various agreements in the Mediterranean, in Scandinavia and South-East Asia were all connected with the objectives of NATO which was the instrument of the United States for attaining world hegemony.

17. The true purposes of the "Atlantic bloc" had now been revealed, especially in the Near, Middle and Far East. It was clear that those purposes were entirely incompatible with the Charter. The foreign policy of the nations of the "Atlantic bloc" which were based on rearmament and the atomic weapon, had nothing in common with the objectives of the United Nations.

18. At the present time measures to combat the threat of a new war would not be possible unless the fighting in Korea was brought to an end. An early armistice there was a major condition for the removal of the threat of a new war and the re-establishment of peace and security among nations; only cynics would insist upon doing nothing to aid the negotiations. A precondition was the abandonment by the United States of its expansionist policy in Korea.

19. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the report of General Wedemeyer on his 1947 mission in which recommendations had been made to establish Korea as a buffer state which would be permanently neutralized. A similar theory had just been brought up by Walter Lippmann in an article of 3 January 1952, and had been produced as a proposal of principle for the settlement of the Korean problem. Mr. Vyshinsky believed that Mr. Lippmann had come close to what he had been told to propagandize, he had given a certain amount of publicity in order to prepare the ground in case the Panmunjon negotiations should break down and to prepare new and even more absurd conditions for a cease-fire than had been presented in the past.

20. Notwithstanding the assertion of the representatives of the United States and United Kingdom, there had been no progress in the negotiations in Korea started at the initiative of the USSR some six months previously. The representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Chinese volunteers had submitted proposals which would have ended the Korean conflagration. Those proposals had called for a cease-fire and for an immediate end to all military action. Though it was difficult to see how exception could be taken to such a proposal, there had nevertheless been objections. Nor had the proposal for demilitarization of areas to be evacuated by the two sides been accepted, though it was a humane and practical measure. The proposals had also called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, but that had been bitterly opposed by the United States Command.

21. Recalling that the original USSR initiative had called for joint withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the United States objections to such a course had represented a clear departure from the basis on which the negotiations had been undertaken. The United States had proposed a line north of the battle line which would have deprived North Korea of 13,000 square kilometres of territory. The United States bombing had continued and there had been provocation around Kaesong, which had been attacked from the air and invaded by South Korean troops under the United States Command.

22. The Press had indicated that the North Korean territory which the United States sought to obtain possessed rich tungsten resources. Tungsten was a major obstacle to a cease-fire in Korea, as oil caused difficulties in some other parts of the world.

23. The United States had made unreasonable and unfair proposals regarding the exchange of prisoners and the question of military airfields. According to the United States, North Korea was not to be allowed to build or repair any airfields except a certain number to be devoted exclusively to civilian purposes. Meanwhile, United States bombing of the airfields had been continuing.

24. The whole record showed how unjust it had been to postpone the consideration of the Korean question and how right was the USSR position that it was a sacred duty to end the war in Korea and prevent the possibility of other wars breaking out elsewhere. Mr. Vyshinsky was unable to grasp the logic of those who talked of their desire for peace and at the same time rejected the proposal that the Security Council should assist in the negotiations in Korea. Some attention should be paid not only to the USSR proposals but also to the 595 million persons who had signed the appeal of the World Peace Council, which was directed to the same end.

25. Contrary to what had been said, it was known that the USSR could not end the fighting in Korea by one word. General Ridgway, on the other hand, could do so.

26. Mr. Vyshinsky had dealt with the matter of Korea because of his delegation's desire to ensure peace and to prevent a new war. They should extinguish all conflicts rather than "pour gasoline on the flames". Other measures adopted by the General Assembly, such as the creation of the Interim Committee, and, at the present session, the balanced reduction of armaments, and collective measures, had been stillborn. The Korean affair was a live and urgent issue.

27. Reference had been made to the military bases built and established by the United States all over the world. Citing figures in that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky noted that there had been no mention of the matter in the

resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the reduction of armaments and armed forces although the question of military bases was even more important than the number of United States armed forces which had been increased as a means of coping with unemployment. A law adopted on 28 September 1951 by the United States Congress had appropriated funds for the reported purpose of establishing new or expanding existing bases around the world, including a ring of secret airfields around the USSR. As was admitted by United States officials, the United States, under the guise of assisting other countries, was building up bases in the territory of those countries. The same sort of activity had admittedly come under the heading of occupation expenses in Japan.

28. The role assigned to the United States military bases in the United Kingdom had been to permit delivery of atomic bombs to the heart of the USSR. The United States Air Force had six active bases and some 20,000 men in the United Kingdom. He asked the United Kingdom representative whether it was not true that Royal Air Force bases were also being turned over to the United States. Mr. Churchill had said that the most momentous step taken by the Labour Government, with the support of the conservatives, had been the establishment of the immense and growing network of United States military bases in England from which atom bombs could be dropped on the USSR,—though in that statement Mr. Churchill had claimed that such action would be only for reasons of defence.

29. In the same way, the United States had established a growing network of bases in Japan which was operated under American officers and engineers. Citing various details in that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky said that those bases were close to the USSR and its friends in the Far East who were legitimately concerned. Another instance was that of the military air base built by the United States in Greenland north of the Arctic Circle. Those bases, according to the Press, would enable the United States to launch an atomic attack against all the major areas of the USSR.

30. The facts he had adduced showed the feverish preparation of the "Atlantic bloc" for a new war. The tension in international relations was becoming ever greater, and it was essential to reduce armaments and armed forces so as to lead to the settlement of existing problems and to co-operation among the nations. All States should submit information, not only on their armed forces and armaments, as provided in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 358th plenary meeting (A/L.25) but also on war bases on foreign territories.

31. Mr. Vyshinsky noted that there had been a number of objections to the USSR proposals for the reduction of armed forces and armaments, to the effect that since the same ratio between the USSR and other countries would remain, the USSR would retain its position of superiority and there would be no alleviation of tension. Mr. Vyshinsky said it was not true that the USSR enjoyed such superiority. The Soviet Union had demobilized thirty-three age classes since the end of the Second World War. That amounted to a tremendous reduction, whereas in 1951 alone, according to Mr. Truman, the United States effectives had been increased by more than one million, and now amounted to three and a half million apart from two million in the reserve and in the National Guard.

32. Not only had the tremendous moral effect which would have resulted from adoption of the USSR proposal been disregarded, but history provided grim warnings of the dangers of the theory that war could be avoided by means

of a balance of forces. In any case, the armed forces of the "Atlantic bloc" were such as to make pointless the assertion that those forces were to be increased to a level which would enable dealings on a footing of equality. Mr. Truman had said that an effective fighting force had been created which would prevent any hostile armed force from reaching the Atlantic.

33. Dealing with the revised draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/698), Mr. Vyshinsky noted that the time limit for the convening of the world conference had been changed to 15 July 1952, and would thus allow ample time for the necessary preparation. That draft resolution dealt with a question which was of exceptional significance, that of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and of the establishment of an international system of control to supervise the enforcement of that prohibition.

34. Recalling the proposals advanced previously by the USSR, he noted that the western Powers and their supporters had argued that as long as the system of control had not begun to function, the prohibition would remain illusory. In order to remove that obstacle, the USSR had reworded its proposal so that it now contained the provision that the General Assembly would proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of the prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition and international control would be put into effect simultaneously. Moreover, the revised USSR proposal provided that the international control organ would have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, though it would not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

35. He recalled that the question had been discussed in Sub-Committee 18 of the First Committee, where it had been agreed that inspection on a continuing basis did not mean the stationing of inspectors in factories on a permanent basis. In the sub-committee the USSR had proposed the principle of periodic inspections.

36. Those proposals, which met the primary objections voiced by the western Powers, represented a tremendous step forward towards the reaching of agreement on that most vital question. If accepted they would open the door to fruitful work and would lead to alleviation of tension and the elimination of the horrors of atomic war.

37. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) said that his delegation would consider the draft resolution submitted by the USSR with great care. To the extent that that proposal might represent an attempt to reopen matters already settled by the General Assembly, if it did involve such an attempt, he would oppose it. To the extent that the proposal offered the possibility of advancing, his delegation would welcome it and would consider it suitable for consideration by the Disarmament Commission, to which the United States, also intended to submit proposals.

38. The USSR representative had again raised the Korean question, wilfully ignoring the decision of the First Committee to postpone its consideration of the matter (486th meeting). It was not necessary to repeat the clear and explicit reasons for which his delegation had proposed that postponement. The USSR representative had gone even more deeply than before into questions under discussion in the military armistice negotiations in Korea. That representative had thereby emphasized the danger and the irresponsibility of any attempt to discuss those issues and had proved that it was impossible for him to deal with the matter without going into the military questions at issue.

39. Noting that the USSR representative had also given his views as to the origin of the Korean hostilities, Mr. Gross repeated that everyone knew that the aggression against the Republic of Korea had been launched by the North Korean authorities and had later been assisted by the Chinese communist authorities. He cited a telegram reproduced in the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea¹ to which the USSR avoided reference, to the effect that, on the basis of reports on the hostilities and of direct observation on the parallel over the forty-eight hours prior to hostilities, the Commission had judged: (1) that the North Korean régime was carrying out a well-planned and concerted invasion; (2) that the South Korean forces had been deployed on a wholly defensive basis, and (3) that the South Korean forces had been taken completely by surprise as they had had no reason to believe that invasion was imminent. The facts spoke for themselves, and could not be disposed of by impugning the integrity of the members of the Commission.

40. In referring to the defence preparations which the United States Government and citizens had been forced to undertake, the USSR representative had spoken of a switch from a peace-time economy to a war-time one. Mr. Gross was grateful for the fact that the USSR representative admitted the fact that the United States had reverted to a peace-time economy following the Second World War. The decision to switch to a defence economy had been taken very reluctantly to meet the threat which concerned all save a small group of the Members of the United Nations.

41. Mr. Vyshinsky's reference to the remarks made by Mr. Acheson had distorted a statement which did not throw the slightest shadow of doubt on the intentions of the United States to find a peaceful solution in Korea. Every member of the Committee knew that the United States sought to end the hostilities in Korea, in the first place, to end the bloodshed which had been thrust upon it and, in the second place, to eliminate the obstacles which those hostilities presented to the endeavour to promote the United Nations objectives of the independence and unification of Korea.

42. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) agreed with Mr. Vyshinsky that the defence programme had caused the western Powers economic difficulties. The fact that they were prepared to undertake such an effort and to bear such a burden, however, was evidence of the value they placed on their freedom and of their determination not to be mopped up one by one by any aggressor. The cause of their efforts was to be found in the armaments, the propaganda and the foreign policy of the USSR, and, in particular, in the USSR's aiding and abetting of aggression in Korea. The western Powers were determined to rearm in order to speak to the USSR on the basis of equality.

43. As for Mr. Vyshinsky's reference to the facilities provided in the United Kingdom for the United States Air Force, Mr. Lloyd said that his countrymen did not regard it as in any way derogatory to their dignity and independence to have their United States friends on United Kingdom soil to assist in their defence.

44. It might be concluded that Mr. Vyshinsky's speech had been intended to halt the defence effort of the western Powers. If that effort were stopped it would be possible for the USSR to strike out from its internal lines with overwhelming power. That was the reason why the western

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16*, para. 9.

Powers found it necessary to build up their defences everywhere.

45. Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks on Korca could hardly be regarded as helping the success of the negotiations. The discussion of technical and military matters in such an atmosphere in fact amounted to pouring gasoline on the flames.

46. Concerning the question of military bases, Mr. Lloyd pointed out that it had never been disputed that all such bases would come within the purview of any system of international inspection, disclosure and verification.

47. The new USSR proposals regarding the atomic bomb would be examined with care. It was not clear whether they were new proposals or were a reformulation of the old position of the USSR. He noted that Mr. Vyshinsky had already spoken of simultaneity before the current session

but had gone back on those words. If the USSR proposal envisaged effective international control, that proposal should be considered, and it would be a good beginning for the Disarmament Commission if they represented an advance.

48. He had thought that the question of control being on a continuing basis had formed part of the area of agreement enlarged by Sub-Committee 18.

49. There had been no advance, apparently, with regard to the principle that the control system should be applied to all arms and armaments and armed forces.

50. In conclusion, Mr. Lloyd repeated his readiness to examine any proposal submitted in good faith. The proper place for consideration of such proposals, however, was in the Disarmament Commission.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.