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CONTENTS

	Page
Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891 and A/C.1/688) (<i>concluded</i>)	173
Proposal to postpone the consideration of item 5 on the Committee's agenda.	174

Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891 and A/C.1/688) (*concluded*)

[Item 18]*

VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE USSR (A/C.1/688) AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO

1. The representative of YUGOSLAVIA requested that the three parts of the amendment submitted by Brazil, France, the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/693) be voted on separately.

It was so decided.

2. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the preamble of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688).

The preamble was adopted by 43 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

3. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that at the preceding meeting paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution submitted by his delegation had in effect been voted upon.

4. Therefore, he saw no necessity for voting on the amendment calling for the suppression of that paragraph (A/C.1/691).

5. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no objections, the amendment to suppress paragraph 1 of the operative part (A/C.1/691) would be regarded as adopted by the same vote by which paragraph 1 had been rejected when it had been presented, at the preceding meeting, as an amendment to the eleven-Power draft resolution, that is, by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

It was so decided.

6. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first part of the amendment submitted jointly by Brazil, France, the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/693) to suppress the words "without delay" in the first sub-paragraph of

paragraph 2 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution.

The amendment was adopted by 32 votes to 6, with 18 abstentions.

7. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second part of the joint amendment (A/C.1/693), calling for the addition of a phrase after the words "between countries", at the end of the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 2.

The amendment was adopted by 33 votes to 7, with 16 abstentions.

8. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution, thus amended.

The first sub-paragraph as amended was adopted by 43 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

9. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third part of the joint amendment (A/C.1/693) to suppress the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution.

The amendment was adopted by 40 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions.

10. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR draft resolution as a whole, thus amended.

The draft resolution as amended was adopted by 50 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

11. Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico) stated that his delegation had voted in favour of the amendments to the USSR draft resolution not because they did not believe that measures should be taken by the United Nations to bring the Korean hostilities to a conclusion, but because they considered that the matter would more appropriately be examined by the First Committee when the item came up on its agenda. At that time consideration could be given to the best method of assisting the armistice negotiations as well as of achieving the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

12. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had voted against the amendments because they would only weaken the resolution and make the possibility of a solution through the Security Council

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

less likely. On the other hand, he had voted in favour of the resolution as a whole because it still proposed the convening of a periodic meeting of the Security Council under Article 28.

13. The Soviet Union would try to give reality to that proposal and seek the settlement of those questions whose solution was necessary for the abatement of tension.

14. The Soviet Union, moreover, had voted for the resolution because the preamble had been accepted and because it confirmed the fact that the Security Council had the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and that no other organ had a corresponding responsibility.

15. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) said his delegation had voted for the preamble of the draft resolution and for the amendments as they regarded the idea of periodic meetings as sound and, in appropriate circumstances, useful. The best way to indicate that such a meeting might be useful would be to take steps in the General Assembly to put an end to propaganda speeches and show that such a meeting might bear fruit.

16. Faris EL-KHOURY Bey (Syria) said that he had abstained on the amendments but voted for the resolution as a whole.

17. He believed that periodic meetings of the Security Council had been designed for critical times and crucial questions. The present state of affairs and the problem of Korea certainly qualified. Moreover, the General Assembly was competent under the United Nations Charter to make recommendations to the Security Council. When a great Power proposed a periodic meeting it was unwise to reject the proposal. The Syrian delegation therefore had tried to avoid the weakening of the resolution.

18. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said his delegation had voted against the amendments as it believed a periodic meeting would be timely and that the Korean question was one on which the United Nations should not be silent. Moreover, Poland had voted at the 485th meeting in favour of the abolition of the Collective Measures Committee.

19. Nevertheless Poland had voted for the draft resolution as a whole since it still called for a periodic meeting and since the adoption of the preamble confirmed the primary responsibility of the Security Council for peace and security.

20. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said that interpretations which had been given to the preamble called for comment. The preamble did not state that the Security Council had the sole responsibility for peace and security; it rather referred to the provisions of the Charter. It was for that reason France had voted for the preamble of the draft resolution.

21. Mr. COHEN (United States of America), in explaining his vote, said he agreed with the views of the representative of the United Kingdom. The United States Government hoped that there would be evidence given by the Soviet Union of the possibility of the usefulness of a periodic meeting.

22. With regard to the interpretation of the preamble, Mr. Cohen agreed with the representative of France that the Charter gave primary but not exclusive responsibility for peace and security to the Security Council.

23. Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina) said that his delegation had abstained from voting on the draft resolution although it believed that the General Assembly was competent to make recommendations to the Security Council, particularly when the question of functions was involved. However any recommendation made should be specific in nature, and the draft resolution had not pointed to any particular objectives.

24. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) said her delegation had voted for the Soviet Union draft resolution because it had constituted an important step in the direction of peace. Although the amendments had weakened it, its importance could not be lessened. Accordingly the Czechoslovak delegation had voted for the resolution as a whole.

Proposal to postpone the consideration of item 5 on the Committee's agenda

25. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) suggested that the Committee agree to defer consideration of the problem of the independence of Korea.

26. The views of the United States in that regard had been given during the discussion of the report of the Collective Measures Committee. The United States did not believe that the settlement of military questions at Panmunjom would be facilitated by a debate of political problems which had been before the United Nations since 1947.

27. The Committee found itself in an odd situation. A government which was not participating in the armistice negotiations and which had insisted from the beginning that the United Nations should have nothing to do with Korea maintained that the armistice negotiations were deadlocked. The United States Government which was participating directly in the negotiations under the authority of the United Nations was not aware that the discussions had broken down. Possibly the Soviet Union was better informed as to the intentions of North Korea and China; the course of the armistice negotiations would make that point clear.

28. Mr. Gross moved that consideration of the Korean question be postponed, on the understanding that when the armistice negotiations were successfully concluded or if developments in Korea revealed a need to reconsider the decision, the Committee should take the matter up.

29. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the representative of the United States had gone beyond the bounds of a procedural discussion by making insinuations about the Soviet Union.

30. The essential question was a procedural one. It had been proposed that the question of the independence of Korea be postponed as it appeared to be inconvenient for some governments to have that topic considered. The proposal for a postponement was no more than a manoeuvre to have the question of independence removed entirely from the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

31. There was some connexion perhaps between armistice negotiations and a political discussion because the independence of Korea was threatened with occupation by the troops of the United States and its allies. That circumstance made it all the more necessary to discuss the matter. But essentially the military and political questions were entirely unconnected and there was no real reason which would warrant the postponement of a political discussion.

32. Furthermore, no indication had been given of how long it was intended to defer the consideration of the question. The item had been included in the agenda on the initiative of the United States; many delegations were anxious to discuss it. All members of the Committee recognized the importance of the matter, and the Soviet Union desired to know how long it was intended to postpone it.

33. The question also arose of what the Committee should deal with in the meantime. Apart from the artificial ques-

tions relating to new members and the slanders of the Kuomintang clique, all the other items were involved with the Korean question.

34. It was unthinkable therefore to agree to an indefinite postponement and the Soviet Union objected to the United States motion.

35. Faris EL-KHOURY Bey (Syria), pointing out that the question had been discussed by the General Assembly over a period of four years, doubted whether speeches could contribute to a solution under the existing circumstances. It would be necessary to wait and see what happened in Korea before further consideration could be useful.

36. The representative of Syria, therefore, favoured the proposal to postpone consideration of the item.

37. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia) opposed the motion to postpone consideration of the question. The General Assembly should not renounce its right to contribute to a settlement of the Korean question, with the understanding that there was no intention of transferring the negotiations from Korea.

38. At a time when attempts were being made to transfer to the General Assembly powers which were exclusively those of the Security Council, the original and proper powers of the General Assembly itself were to be weakened simultaneously by the same delegations which wanted to prevent the General Assembly from considering a question which they themselves had some time ago placed on its agenda.

39. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil) favoured postponement since it was an elementary principle of diplomacy that while negotiations, especially those dealing with military matters, were in progress, there should be the least possible interference. It would be dangerous to discuss the question at the most critical stage of the negotiations for the end of hostilities and the conclusion of an armistice. Even the USSR had held that the negotiations for a cease-fire and an armistice should be carried out by the military leaders on the spot.

40. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) pointed out that the task of the First Committee was principally to assist in the maintenance and thus in the restoration of peace. It was unfortunate that difficulties in the armistice negotiations in Korea coincided with the raising of the political side of the Korean question, and the more the question was considered in the political sense the more difficulties there were likely to be. Citing the headings of the various sections into which the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881) was divided, Mr. Lloyd asked how any reasonable person could argue that the discussion of such matters could be viewed as a contribution towards the success of the negotiations for an armistice.

41. He concluded that it would be better to postpone discussion of the Korean question for the time being.

42. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the proposed postponement could only have a deleterious effect upon the work of the General Assembly. Though he had opposed the order of consideration adopted by the Committee, he felt that that order ought to be adhered to, once it had been adopted.

43. The proposal to shelve consideration of the question had not been supported by adequate arguments. There appeared to be some contradiction among the views of the supporters of the proposal as to how successful were the negotiations in Korea. It was said, on the one hand, that he war in Korea was that of the United Nations, while, on

the other, everything was being done to prevent the United Nations from discussing the question. If there was to be no interference in the negotiations for a cease-fire, why had the question been included in the agenda and given its position in the agenda of the Committee?

44. It appeared desirable in the existing situation to consider the non-military problems involved in the question of the independence of Korea.

45. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) considered that it had been made clear during the discussion on the order of priority of agenda items that consideration of the political aspects of the Korean question should be subordinated to the attempt to reach a cease-fire. Any fruitful and tranquil examination of the problem of Korea must be based on peace in the Far East. Moreover, while agreement was likely on the comparatively simple question of an armistice, it was unlikely to be extended to the wide field covered by the political aspects of the question.

46. He therefore supported the motion to postpone consideration of the question, which should not be interpreted as a wish to avoid discussion.

47. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) stated that whatever the result of the conversations in Korea might be, it would not remove the basic problem of unification of the country. Moreover, the General Assembly had requested a report from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and should take a decision on the future of that body. The Panmunjom negotiations were of an exclusively technical and military character.

48. For those reasons he would not be able to support the United States proposal.

49. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines) said that the keen interest which his delegation had in the success of the negotiations in Korea led it to support the motion to postpone discussion.

50. Weight should be given to the views of members who were participating in the United Nations action. Pointing out that the negotiators in Korea had themselves finally agreed to confine discussion to purely military matters, he said that that decision must have been based on the fact that discussion on political questions might have imperilled the negotiations.

51. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) supported postponement of the consideration of the report of the Commission for the present. It would be unwise to risk any hindrance to the restoration of peace in Korea.

52. Mr. BATLLE BERRES (Uruguay) said that the First Committee could not take any decision lightly, particularly in view of the fact that the military command in Korea was acting on behalf of the United Nations to restore peace. Its views must be considered in any decision to be taken. The USSR view would be inconsistent with support of the United Nations Command in Korea. It must be made very clear, however, that the postponement was not due to lack of interest.

53. Mr. FRANCO-FRANCO (Dominican Republic) supported the proposal for postponement since discussion at present could only increase the difficulties of the current negotiations.

54. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) did not see how a discussion in the First Committee could assist the negotiations in Korea which were being held up by difficulties of a military nature. The need to separate political from military questions, moreover, had been made clear from the outset of the negotiations for an armistice.

55. He therefore supported the proposal to postpone discussion of the Korean question.

56. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Committee should first be told for how long it was proposed to postpone discussion of the Korean question. Was it to be for an indeterminate period, as had been suggested, or was a time limit contemplated?

57. He could not agree with the view that postponement should continue while the war was still in progress. There was no compulsion to discuss the military aspects of the question of the independence of Korea. Those who felt that the consideration of political questions might encourage a cessation of hostilities and assist in the successful conclusion of negotiations, had the right to discuss and settle such questions in the General Assembly, which had previously dealt with the matter.

58. Though the Security Council was primarily responsible for dealing with matters of peace and security, he did not deny that the General Assembly also had a responsibility and should deal with the question since it was said that the Security Council was impotent. Mr. Vyshinsky found it hard to understand why discussion of the political aspects of the question would involve intensification of the war and why the war would stop if fewer efforts were made to assist bringing about a cease-fire. To the argument that there was no evidence that the discussion of the question would be fruitful, it must be replied that there was no means of knowing in advance. Moreover, it was incorrect to identify the success of one's own interests with the fruitfulness of a discussion, or vice versa.

59. The thesis of those who called for postponement appeared to be that speeches were bad and that the problem should be solved by force of arms. It was said that there should be no interference with the negotiations. Yet a war was going on in Korea, in which the advantage was on one side only because the North Koreans and Chinese were only warding off the attacks and raids which were being carried out in spite of the negotiations for a cease-fire. That was not the sort of serene atmosphere which the United Nations should encourage.

60. Citing the arguments used by the representative of Chile, Mr. Vyshinsky said that though his delegation had opposed the establishment of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the report of that body must be examined to see whether the USSR attitude had been justified by subsequent events and whether the Commission had fulfilled its allotted task. As the report of the Commission stated, an international effort was required to get Korea out of the pass to which it had been brought. That effort was obviously one to be undertaken by the United Nations, and since there was opposition to the Security Council dealing with matters primarily within its responsibility, the USSR was willing to have the General Assembly consider the matter.

61. Yet it was contended that General Ridgway should be left to deal with the matter unhampered. The example of the question of war prisoners, which according to all existing conventions and the whole practice of international law should be settled by an "all for all" exchange, showed what that could lead to and what General Ridgway's instructions were, namely, to prosecute the aggression.

62. Mr. Vyshinsky cited paragraph 71 of the Commission's report, to the effect that the Commission had decided that, in the circumstances, it had been transformed into a commission for giving all the support it could to the operations of the United Nations forces. He added that the matter was quite clear. The report was so scandalous and the facts

were so obvious that it had been decided that it would be best to avoid discussion.

63. It must be ensured that the question was not removed from the agenda and that it would be considered by the First Committee and by the General Assembly so that the facts might be brought to light and so that the attitude of the United Nations, if it was to remain true to its Charter, might be defined.

64. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) said that while the resolutions of previous sessions of the Assembly demonstrated the importance of the question of the rehabilitation, reconstruction and unification of Korea, it was obvious that as long as there was no armistice in Korea, it would be almost impossible for the United Nations to pursue the discussion of the matter with any chance of success. The atmosphere which had characterized the discussions of the Committee strengthened the doubts expressed about the repercussions which a debate in the Committee might have on the negotiations in Korea.

65. He therefore supported the proposal to defer discussion for the time being.

66. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) said that the nature of the statement of the representative of the USSR had again revealed the difficulties which would be faced in any meeting at which serious efforts might be made by others to reach just and lasting settlement of outstanding issues.

67. The simple question was whether the negotiations in Korea would at present be facilitated by a discussion of the questions entered into by the USSR representative. The armistice negotiations were of such crucial importance that even debates far more restrained in nature should be avoided. The negotiations had reached a stage at which they could not possibly be facilitated or helped by a discussion such as that suggested by the USSR representative's statement.

68. Only those wilfully and deliberately bent upon misconstruing and perverting the objectives and motives of those who had been loyal supporters of the United Nations action could regard the suggestion that the armistice negotiations should be permitted to continue unhampered yet a while as anything but a serious effort to find a political settlement. The fireman's hat and attire ill fitted the representative of a government which, since June 1950, had poured fuel on the flames.

69. Faris EL-KHOURY Bey (Syria) would accept the USSR view if it could be shown how the discussion would assist the unification and independence of Korea. It was obvious that nothing would be solved by resolutions calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country. It would be better to give the negotiators a chance to reach an agreement which would be in the interest of all.

70. He therefore agreed that consideration of the question be postponed until the agenda of the Committee had been exhausted, it being understood that discussion would be resumed earlier if an armistice were concluded in the meantime.

71. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) pointed out that the armistice negotiations were a consequence of the efforts which the General Assembly had been making since January 1950, in the face of many depressing experiences. If the Assembly followed the illogical course of discussing the matter at the present stage, it would risk jeopardizing the success of the negotiations which must be the primary objective.

72. He expressed concern at the attitude of the USSR in view of its effect upon the eventual conclusion of an armistice.

73. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) considered that the United States proposal illustrated the negative approach of the United States Government to the negotiations in Korea. Stating that the United States authorities had been more than worried over the fact that conversations had to be started at all, she cited a statement made by General Marshall and an article in the Press which indicated the concern of the American authorities lest the cessation of hostilities in Korea retard the rearmament programme.

74. The proposal to defer consideration was intended to avoid any possibility of helping the conversations in Korea to reach an early and successful conclusion.

75. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) explained that he opposed the proposal to postpone discussion; the argument that discussion might obstruct the negotiations in Korea led to the conclusion that the USSR desired to obstruct those negotiations in opposing the motion for postponement and would obstruct them in any case. All that had happened so far was that the USSR was exploiting the situation for propaganda purposes.

76. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) said that the nature of the statement of the USSR representative had strengthened his conviction that the early restoration of peace in Korea would not be served by debating the future of that country at this stage. The acceptance by all parties of the view that the cessation of hostilities must precede a discussion on the

political settlement was an important achievement which all should strive to maintain.

77. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the order contemplated by the United States representative was first to attain the military objectives of the United States in Korea and then to open negotiations, once victory was supposed to have been won.

78. Analysing Mr. Gross' statement, he said that it was hardly appropriate to say that the USSR, which had provided the initiative for the negotiations in Korea, was adding fuel to the flames kindled by the United States.

79. He also noted that there had been no answer to the question as to how long the discussion was to be postponed.

80. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) said that his delegation, which was directly interested in bringing an end to the hostilities in Korea, considered that a political debate in the First Committee would be prejudicial to the negotiations for an armistice, and he would therefore support postponement of the discussion of the Korean question.

81. The CHAIRMAN stated that a vote would be taken on the United States proposal to defer consideration of item 5 of the Committee's agenda (A/C.1/666/Rev.1) with the understanding that the Committee would revert to the question should an armistice be concluded.

The proposal was adopted by 47 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.