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Chairman : Mr. Finn MØE (Norway).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, A/C.1/676/Rev.1, A/C.1/694/Rev.1 and A/C.1/688) (*continued*)

[Item 18]*

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENTS THERETO (*continued*)

1. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines) stated that he would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Arab countries (A/C.1/691) to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688). The Collective Measures Committee had important work to do and he hoped that the USSR would, at some future time, see its way clear to participate in the work of that Committee.

2. He would also support the amendments submitted by Brazil, France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/693) which would make less mandatory in nature the recommendation addressed to the Security Council in the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution.

3. However, he was unable to accept the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution. His country was keenly interested in the success of the negotiations in Korea and could not support any move which might jeopardize those negotiations. If it were possible for the Security Council to discuss the matter with some hope of constructive results, that could be done without adopting a proposal of as peremptory a character as that of the USSR.

4. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) recalled that he had provisionally noted the acceptable character of the revised eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1), with reservations concerning the provisions dealing with the action to be taken by individual governments for earmarking forces for United Nations service. In view of the debate, however, it was clear that to support or oppose the joint draft reso-

lution would be tantamount to taking sides in the current conflict and might involve increasing the division in the world.

5. That would be in direct conflict with the path of mediation followed by his country, and he would therefore abstain from voting on both the joint draft resolution and on the USSR draft resolution.

6. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-ČAKRTOVÁ (Czechoslovakia) would vote against the revised eleven-Power draft resolution which was based on the illegal "Uniting for peace" resolution and the report of the Collective Measures Committee, and which involved the transfer to the General Assembly of powers exclusively within the province of the Security Council.

7. The proposal was part of the United States plan to transform the United Nations into an instrument of its aggressive policy, in order to ensure the participation of nations which were not members of "aggressive blocs" in that policy. The aggressive blocs led by the United States were now to be directly linked to the United Nations. The aggressive character of the proposed measures, which were directed against the USSR and the countries of the peoples' democracies, was perfectly clear, and they must be rejected as harmful to world peace.

8. Stating that she would support the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688) Mrs. Sekaninova-Čakrtová said that the Czechoslovak delegation considered the illegally established Collective Measures Committee as contrary to the interests of world peace. A periodic meeting of the Security Council, called for by the USSR proposal, was an urgent and practicable measure to lessen existing tension. It was, moreover, a measure explicitly provided for by the Charter. Opposition to such a proposal would be evidence of unwillingness to seek agreement.

9. The assertions of the United States to the effect that the USSR made no efforts to reach unanimity among the great Powers in the face of that renewed evidence of its constructive policy could be understood only in the light of the continuing efforts of the western Powers to substitute dictation for co-operation. The debate had once more demonstrated the hypocrisy of statements made by the representatives of the "Atlantic bloc" nations, who feared nothing more than the lessening of tension.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

10. Speaking of the statement of the United States representative, she said that the sincerity of those who claimed to wish for an early armistice in Korea would be shown by the attitude they adopted toward the proposal to promote an early and successful conclusion to the negotiations in Korea.

11. Mr. CASTILLO ARRIOLA (Guatemala) said that his delegation had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/695) to paragraph 2 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1). The amendment called for the insertion of the words "and to the extent to which in their judgment their capacity permits them to do so" in paragraph 2 after the words "constitutional processes".

12. The representative of Guatemala pointed out that the amendment was intended to bring paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution into line with paragraph 3 of the same text, as well as with the resolution adopted at the fourth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held in Washington in March and April 1951.

13. The delegation of Guatemala would support the revised joint draft resolution if that amendment were incorporated; if not, it would be forced to abstain.

14. Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina) repeated that his delegation considered paragraph 6 of the revised joint draft resolution to be unnecessary, since it would be illogical to create inequality of obligations between Members of the United Nations on the basis of whether or not they adhered to regional arrangements. While the activities of regional arrangements should be in harmony with the action and policy of the United Nations, they dealt mainly with matters of a regional or local nature.

15. With reference to the scope of the undertaking involved in the adoption of the joint draft resolution, he said that if it were possible to distinguish between recommendations of an optional or binding character in connexion with resolutions of the General Assembly, it must be concluded that optional matters were all those expressly set forth as such in Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Charter and, in particular, in Article 18. Moreover, in view of the distinction made by the Charter regarding the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII, there could be no confusion between the meaning of the word "recommendation" and that of the word "decision" when the latter referred to certain measures or action taken by the Security Council.

16. Mr. WILSON (New Zealand) said that though his delegation had previously called attention to the fact that the Security Council had up to then omitted to call a periodic meeting under Article 28 of the Charter, both the calling and timing of such a meeting were matters wholly up to the Security Council to decide.

17. Moreover, he believed that one of the main intentions of the provision for periodic meetings was to provide an opportunity, between sessions of the General Assembly, for discussions between members of governments. Such a meeting might have less importance during a session of the General Assembly, when such opportunities existed. There was no need to press for an immediate meeting.

18. Therefore, the representative of New Zealand supported the amendment to the USSR draft resolution submitted by Brazil, France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/693).

19. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the general debate on the report of the Collective Measures Committee had proved that the existence and recommendations of that

Committee were incompatible with the Charter and constituted an attempt to transfer to other organs of the United Nations matters exclusively within the competence of the Security Council which, according to the Charter, must operate on the basis of the unanimous co-operation of the great Powers. Attempts to depart from the principles of the Charter could only contribute to a further deterioration of the international situation. As a first step towards returning the Organization to its original purposes, it would be appropriate to abolish the so-called Collective Measures Committee and to make it clear that the Security Council was indeed the primary organ charged with the examination of problems relating to international peace and collective security. The USSR draft resolution provided for such a decision.

20. In addition, in order to strengthen international peace and security and to achieve a lessening of tension, it also called in the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 for a periodic meeting of the Security Council which, according to the Charter, was the organ on which it was incumbent to take steps leading to a relaxation of tension. It was incorrect to say that such a meeting would lead to an aggravation of the situation, since tension had resulted not from attempts to seek agreement, but from the attempts of some to impose their will on others.

21. The amendment submitted by Brazil, France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/693) to the USSR proposal sought to confuse the issue and to leave the door open to evasion of the attempt to reach agreement among the great Powers.

22. Dealing with the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Wierblowski said that the need to restore peace in Korea was evident and that it was difficult to understand why some delegations wished to avoid making efforts to that end. The USSR proposal obviously would not obstruct the conversations in Korea—which in any case had not proved particularly successful to date—but would facilitate and expedite them.

23. The representative of Poland would therefore support the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688), which contained practical proposals capable of facilitating the solution of the issues which complicated the political situation.

24. Sirdar Mohammad NAIM (Afghanistan) recalled that his delegation had voted in favour of the "Uniting for peace" resolution and the establishment of the Collective Measures Committee.

25. However, he would be obliged to abstain on paragraph 2 of the revised joint draft resolution, as various factors would make it difficult for his Government to envisage for an indeterminate period the setting up of armed forces for use outside its territory.

26. With that exception, he would vote in favour of the revised joint draft resolution which incorporated the amendments sponsored by various delegations including Afghanistan.

27. The representative of Afghanistan would also vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution with the amendment submitted by the delegations of the Arab countries (A/C.1/691).

28. Mr. BELLEGARDE (Haiti) would vote in favour of the revised joint draft resolution. The attitude that had prevailed in the revision of that text was one which ought to prevail generally in the United Nations, and, in particular, in the Security Council. The Council could fulfil its functions only if it were possible to reach some agreement in it, either by one side accepting views of the other side

or by compromise. Stressing the diametrically opposed views of the USSR on the one hand, and of the majority of the Security Council and of the General Assembly on the other, regarding the origin and nature of the conflict in Korea, he pointed out that, unless the USSR was prepared to recognize that its views were erroneous, it was highly unlikely that the meeting it proposed would settle anything.

29. Since it was said that a periodic meeting would offer some glimmer of hope, however, the representative of Haiti would support the amendment of Brazil, France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/AC.1/693), to the USSR draft resolution, but would vote against paragraph 1 of that draft to abolish the Collective Measures Committee. He would also support the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1).

30. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil) stated that the meeting of the sponsors of the eleven-Power draft resolution and of the amendments to it had not resulted in agreement on the amendment submitted by Colombia and Chile to paragraph 6 of the joint proposal.

31. The sponsors of the eleven-Power draft resolution and the Mexican delegation had reached agreement on the following wording to replace the Mexican amendment to paragraph 6: "within the constitutional limitations and the other provisions of those bodies and arrangements".

32. U MYINT THEIN (Burma) said that one reason why his delegation which had taken part in the work of the Collective Measures Committee had not been a sponsor of the draft resolution was that it had wished to hear the views of delegations which had not been represented on the Committee.

33. The Burmese delegation believed collective measures were necessary and would support the draft resolution although it would find it necessary to abstain on some parts, such as paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part. It welcomed particularly paragraph 10. In giving support to the draft resolution, the delegation of Burma wished to make it clear that it was not aligning itself with any "bloc" but only promoting collective security.

34. With regard to the Soviet Union draft resolution, the Burmese delegation could not support paragraph 1 of the operative part. It would, however, support paragraph 2, particularly in view of the statement of the Soviet representative that the Security Council should not take over the negotiations for an armistice but merely assist in a settlement.

35. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) observed that the private meeting of the authors of the joint draft resolution, and the authors of amendments had been unable to reach agreement upon the eighth paragraph of the preamble or on paragraph 6 of the operative part of the draft resolution. Chile and other Latin-American States had already undertaken certain commitments which bound them to give priority to the problem of continental defence and the provisions of the two paragraphs in question appeared to run counter to that obligation.

36. Chile accordingly wished to maintain the amendments proposed to the eighth paragraph of the preamble (A/C.1/689, point 1) and to paragraph 6 of the operative part (A/C.1/692). If the amendments were rejected Chile would vote against the corresponding paragraphs but it would vote in favour of the resolution as a whole with specific reservations.

37. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that no satisfactory explanation had been given for the proposal to delete the words "without delay"

from the sub-paragraph of the Soviet Union draft resolution calling for a periodic meeting of the Security Council.

38. It would appear that the authors of the amendment desired to substitute wording based on the thesis that there might be tense situations in which it would be inappropriate for the Security Council to make any attempt to remove the tension. On the contrary, any attempt to re-establish friendly relations, even in unfavourable conditions, should be welcomed. The amendment denied the expediency of a periodic meeting under Article 28 at the present time and asserted that such a meeting would be useless and would be used only for propaganda purposes. The mere fact that there were diametrically opposed points of view need not prevent progress in negotiation, as was evidenced by the discussions on the armistice in Korea. Similarly, there could be helpful discussions in the Security Council and there was no basis for objections such as those which had been voiced by the representative of Haiti.

39. If the amendment was adopted, the Soviet Union proposal would lose the possibility of being useful in abating tension; the time would never come for reducing international tension, as the supporters of the amendment wanted it to continue. The authors of the amendment might well go even further and assert that any meeting whatsoever of the Security Council and indeed of the General Assembly would only be used for propaganda purposes, and would be unnecessary and untimely. In fact they intended to delude public opinion and to shelve the periodic meetings of the Security Council and any agreements that might be reached. Any delegation which wanted the Security Council to resume its influence would be unable to accept the amendment. It was essential for the Security Council to work for the removal of elements which were impairing friendly relations. It was accordingly important not to delete the proposal that the question of Korea be examined in the first place. No topic was of greater urgency.

40. The basic motives which governed the United States in resisting any move which would lead to the general reduction of tension and in particular the settlement in Korea had been revealed in the 29 December 1951 issue of the *Wall Street Journal*. An article in that paper had dealt with the concern of the Government over the general apathy towards rearmament and the fear that there would be even less enthusiasm if an armistice was achieved in Korea. That was the reason why the Soviet Union proposal was being opposed and why there were rumours of an imminent attempt to postpone or even remove the Korean question from the agenda of the General Assembly.

41. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) stated that the test he had applied to the proposal of the Soviet Union was whether it would help or hinder the negotiations in Korea. Considerable progress had been made towards an armistice and the only important point which appeared to be outstanding was the matter of the construction and repair of airfields during the armistice period. That was a military problem which would best be discussed by commanders in the field. A political discussion in the Security Council, in which no doubt the question of who had been the aggressor would arise, would be certain to result in the postponement of the armistice negotiations.

42. With regard to the remainder of the Soviet Union draft resolution, any attempt to reduce tension would be welcomed and, in appropriate circumstances, a meeting under the terms of Article 28 would doubtless be valuable. The decision should however be left to the Security Council itself. Other ways existed by which tension could be reduced

if there was a will to do so. Something could have been done and still could be done to that end in the current session of the General Assembly itself.

43. Mr. CORDOVA (Mexico) said that the representative of Chile had stated the reason why the joint amendment to the eighth paragraph of the preamble (A/C.1/689, point 1) was still being pressed.

44. Mr. Cordova wished to point out in addition that there was a problem in paragraph 4 where the Spanish text did not appear to correspond to the English text which was the correct one, as it corresponded to the text of the joint Chilean, Colombian and Mexican amendment.

45. With regard to paragraph 6 of the operative part, he pointed out that the new text enjoined respect for the limits of constitutional status and other limits, including the geographical ones, which bound the activities of regional bodies such as the Organization of American States. The reservations with which the Mexican delegation had met the previous text had been due to the fact that it had not clearly defined the precedence of regional arrangements and bodies and that it had seemed to establish some automatic obligation to co-operate with the United Nations.

46. With regard to the new wording of the text, in which several delegations had collaborated, the Mexican delegation felt that it was essential to make it perfectly clear that no decision of the General Assembly, even though it was merely a recommendation, could be construed to mean any abrogation of the powers of the Organization of American States, a body set up specifically to strengthen mutual understanding among the American countries and to settle their disputes, and one which had been of great service to the cause of world peace.

47. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) said that the Soviet Union representative had attributed statements to him which he had not made. Mr. Quevedo's previous remarks had been to the effect that at the present stage the intervention of the Security Council in the Korean question was unlikely to expedite negotiations in view of the tactics of the Soviet Union. In any case, regardless of any Assembly recommendations, the Council itself must decide on its programme of meetings and its agenda.

48. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the paragraph in the preamble concerning regional agreements stated that they "can and should" constitute an important contribution to collective security. It was Mr. Belaúnde's view that such arrangements actually do constitute an essential element but nevertheless he would abstain from voting on the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico.

49. With regard to paragraph 6 of the operative part, the changes which had been made on the initiative of Mexico had made the amendment submitted by Chile and Colombia (A/C.1/692) unnecessary. The Peruvian delegation would support the new version of paragraph 6 (A/C.1/694/Rev.1).

50. With regard to the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/688) the Peruvian delegation believed that it would be inadvisable to transfer negotiations of a military character to the political forum of the Security Council. It would accordingly vote in favour of the amendment which Brazil, France, the United States and the United Kingdom had submitted to that draft resolution (A/C.1/693).

51. Mr. BATLLE BERRES (Uruguay) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the eleven-Power draft resolution. The amendments which had been submitted to that draft resolution unfortunately appeared to weaken the obligations which all nations should assume reciprocally in order to ensure peace and oppose aggression.

VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE ELEVEN POWERS (A/C.1/676/REV. 1 AND A/C.1/694/REV.1) AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO

52. Following a statement by the CHAIRMAN regarding the method of voting, the representatives of CHILE, ARGENTINA, MEXICO and COLOMBIA requested that a vote be taken on point 5 of the joint amendment (A/C.1/689) in view of the differences between the English and Spanish texts.

53. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) proposed that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/688) should be voted on first in view of the fact that it proposed the abolition of the Collective Measures Committee. Accordingly, its adoption would eliminate the need for voting on the eleven-Power draft resolution.

54. Mr. Vyshinsky moved that the Committee decide on his motion according to the terms of article 130 of the rules of procedure.

55. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion of the representative of the Soviet Union.

The motion was rejected by 41 votes to 6, with 12 abstentions.

56. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that his delegation wished to submit paragraph 1 of the operative part of its draft resolution (A/C.1/688) as an amendment to the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1).

57. Since that amendment was the furthest removed in substance from the draft resolution, it should be put to the vote first according to article 129 of the rules of procedure.

58. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment submitted by the representative of the USSR.

The amendment was rejected by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

59. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689, point 1) to the eighth paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution.

The amendment was rejected by 24 votes to 13, with 17 abstentions.

60. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS requested that the first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution be voted on separately.

61. The representative of ECUADOR asked that the eighth paragraph of the preamble should also be voted on separately.

62. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1).

The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 52 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.

63. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the eighth paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1).

The eighth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 44 votes to 9, with 2 abstentions.

64. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the remaining paragraphs of the preamble of the draft resolution.

The remaining paragraphs of the preamble were adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

65. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1).

Paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

66. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment submitted by Guatemala (A/C.1/695) to paragraph 2 of the operative part.

The amendment was adopted by 33 votes to 7, with 18 abstentions.

67. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 2 of the operative part thus amended.

Paragraph 2 as amended was adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

68. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution.

Paragraph 3 was adopted by 49 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

69. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA asked if, in the English text of the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico to paragraph 4 (A/C.1/689, point 5), the word "rules" could be replaced by the word "processes".

70. The representatives of CHILE, COLOMBIA and MEXICO accepted the change in the translation.

71. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico proposing a new text for paragraph 4 of the operative part (A/C.1/689, point 5).

The amendment was adopted by 39 votes to 5, with 13 abstentions.

72. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 5 of the operative part.

Paragraph 5 was adopted by 51 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.

73. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment

submitted by Chile and Colombia to paragraph 6 of the operative part (A/C.1/692).

The amendment was rejected by 34 votes to 6, with 17 abstentions.

74. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the revised text of paragraph 6 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/694/Rev.1).

The revised text of paragraph 6 was adopted by 49 votes to 8, with 2 abstentions.

75. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote successively paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1).

Paragraph 7 was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

Paragraph 8 was adopted by 49 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 9 was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with one abstention.

Paragraph 10 was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with one abstention.

76. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote as a whole the draft resolution submitted by the eleven Powers (A/C.1/676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/694/Rev.1) as amended.

The draft resolution as amended was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

77. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) proposed that the vote on the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688) be postponed and that the meeting adjourn.

78. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion for adjournment.

The motion was adopted by 21 votes to 16, with 17 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.