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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, A/C.1/676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/688) (continued)

[Item 18]*

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. H. S. MALIK (India) said that the eleven-Power joint draft resolution followed from the General Assembly resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for peace".
2. In the voting upon the latter, the Indian delegation had abstained as it had been unable to agree to the recommendations in sections C and D regarding the maintenance of national units of armed forces for service with the United Nations. It had taken the view that the provisions relating to collective measures would put undue emphasis upon the enforcement rather than upon the possibilities of co-operation offered by the United Nations. Recent statements made in connexion with the draft resolution had confirmed the Indian stand.
3. According to Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, it was the Security Council which could decide upon measures to maintain or restore peace and security. The recommendations of the General Assembly would not have the same binding effect on States Members and if they are carried out by some States and not by others, particularly, if they were opposed by a great Power—there would be danger of war.
4. The Indian delegation was also influenced by the hopefulness of two recent developments : progress in the negotiations for armistice in Korea and the decision to establish a Disarmament Commission. At a time when the world hoped for a reduction of tension, the Indian delegation considered it inopportune for the United Nations to adopt a proposal that might increase mutual suspicions.
5. It would therefore abstain from voting on the eleven-Power draft resolution. With regard to the Soviet Union draft resolution, it reserved its position.

6. Mr. SALAH-UD-DIN (Pakistan) said his delegation had supported resolution 377 (V) and appreciated the results of the work of the Collective Measures Committee.

7. It was fortunate that the Committee had not attempted in its report to deal with any specific situation but had concentrated rather on outlining methods and techniques which might be useful in the event of aggression. Nothing would be more welcome than the resolution of the deadlock in the Security Council, but until that was achieved, alternate means were required.

8. Pakistan continued to adhere to the views expressed by its Foreign Minister in the debate on the "Uniting for peace" resolution, to the effect that although primary responsibility for peace and security had been conferred upon the Security Council, the responsibility of the United Nations did not conclude with the failure of the Council to take a decision ; rather, such failure cleared the way under Article 10 for the General Assembly to make recommendations involving the use of armed force.

9. The Pakistan delegation was satisfied to hear the view that support of the conclusions of the report would not bind any Government to any specific action in any case.

10. It was also pleased to observe that the amendment, sponsored by eight Middle-East States (A/C.1/690) to the effect that a tenth operative paragraph be added and also the amendment proposed by three Latin-American delegations, modifying paragraph 1 of the operative part (A/C.1/689, point 2), had been accepted by the sponsors.

11. The Pakistan delegation would support the revised text of the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1).

12. With regard to the Soviet Union draft amendment (A/C.1/688), the Pakistan delegation did not favour paragraph 1 of the operative part. With regard to paragraph 2 of the operative part, it would be pleased if the Security Council, at a periodic or other meeting, could succeed in removing international tension.

13. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) said the debate had seemed quite simple before the speech of the Soviet Union representative.

14. That had hardly been a contribution to the reduction of tension with its stock phrases about "monopolistic imperialists" and "aggressive Anglo-American blocs".

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

That speech had seemed rather like an attempt to sow discord amongst friendly States with its reference to the Schuman plan as a sinister anti-British move. The Soviet Union representative seemed to have become increasingly petulant about the organization of defence against aggression, but after the experience with Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler, the free nations of the world wished it to be clear that they would not allow themselves to be divided and overcome piecemeal.

15. No one contended that the defence programme did not involve great economic burdens, but the fact that they were prepared to bear those burdens should emphasize their determination to resist aggression. On the other hand, they were anxious to proceed to the balanced reduction of all types of armaments.

16. The procedure of using the United Nations as a propaganda platform was discrediting the Soviet Union. It appeared to be the intention of the Soviet Union that no progress should be made in the improvement of international relations.

17. The present debate was concerned with the consideration of the methods which the United Nations might follow collectively in the event of aggression. The report of the Collective Measures Committee merely presented a list of possibilities. The Soviet Union representative had produced no valid reasons why a body of sovereign States should not study such matters. There had been considerable talk about Korea and the Soviet Union representative had attempted by the manipulation of figures to show that the resistance against aggression in Korea was not a United Nations undertaking.

18. The representative of the Soviet Union had attempted to make the question of collective measures another issue in the cold war and to maintain that any who supported the plan were merely taking sides in an argument between the great Powers, and not furthering a system of collective security. If those tactics were successful, it would never be possible to attain an effective system. Was that the objective of the Soviet Union?

19. The Soviet Union representative had discussed the alleged infringement of the powers conferred on the Security Council in the United Nations Charter. However, the fact that Article 24 spoke of "primary" responsibility implied a secondary responsibility. Under Articles 10 to 12 of the Charter, that responsibility fell on the General Assembly. In any event, there was the right of individual and collective self-defence against aggression.

20. There had been no talk about transferring any power of the Security Council. The "Uniting for peace" resolution had merely brought out the responsibility which the General Assembly should exercise when necessary. If the Soviet Union desired seriously to help relieve tension, it could join in voting that the United Nations was against aggression and was prepared to study practicable steps towards collective security.

21. With regard to the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/688), it would appear that it was a further effort to persuade Members to abstain on the eleven-Power draft resolution by convincing them that it was a part of the East-West struggle. Mr. Lloyd did not believe that any useful purpose would be served at the present stage by referring the negotiations in Korea to the Security Council. The difficulties in the negotiations were of a kind which could best be settled between commanders in the field. Their transfer to the Security Council would mean delay and complication. Furthermore, if the purpose of the proposal was to bring the armistice negotiations into a

body where the Soviet Union veto could prevent any decision, it was all the more to be opposed.

22. The other suggestion made by the Soviet Union was that the Security Council should, at a periodic meeting, consider measures to relieve tension. Mr. Lloyd agreed that the Security Council should bear in mind the advisability of holding a meeting under Article 28, when it appeared expedient. At the present time, however, it was evident from the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union that such a meeting would only provide another platform for abuse.

23. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the discussion of the question of collective measures had shown that a large number of delegations opposed the eleven-Power draft resolution, especially its operative paragraphs. The negative attitudes had concentrated on paragraph 1 of the operative part, which would have approved the conclusions of the report of the Collective Measures Committee.

24. Many delegations had been unable to conceal their lack of satisfaction with the report and the draft resolution, as could be observed from the amendments which had been presented. The United States would have foisted what it described as moral and political obligations on the United Nations Members but the scheme had been a total failure and the United States, as the main sponsor of the draft resolution, had quickly accepted the amendments. It was clear that the majority of Members was not prepared to accept the basic idea of the original draft which had accordingly been left out of the revised version. Even some of the Latin American delegations had failed in their subservience.

25. Mr. Vyshinsky failed to understand why, if the proposals of the Collective Measures Committee were as wonderful as had been claimed, their sponsors had been prepared to abandon so promptly the proposal that they be confirmed.

26. Arguments had been presented with a view to showing that the collective measures proposed would preserve peace and prevent aggression. The representative of France had asserted that the "Uniting for peace" resolution had filled a gap which had appeared in the Charter. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that the so-called procedure of filling the gap consisted of arrogating to the General Assembly and to an executive military authority the functions of the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee. Moreover, the executive military authority could be a single State which then could exercise an unqualified dictatorship. The representative of France tried to represent the liquidation of the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee as action which was in accordance with the Charter. Although the representative of France had claimed that the Security Council and Military Staff Committee would retain all their rights and prerogatives, it should not be forgotten that they also had been allocated very important duties and obligations. It had not been necessary for the draft resolution actually to abolish those organs, because the report would transfer their powers and functions to other organs.

27. It had been claimed that the proposed measures were necessary and would be used only in an emergency after the Security Council had failed to take the necessary decision. Such a statement was meaningless. Who was to decide what sort of decision was necessary and in which cases the lack of a decision would serve as an excuse for action by another organ? According to the Charter, the competence to judge such matters resided in the Security Council itself and had been given form in Article 27, where the principle of unanimity had been laid down.

28. It had been claimed that the Security Council had been paralysed and was unable to take appropriate decisions. The truth was that attempts were being made to paralyse the Council. However, it was unthinkable to plan to take decisions which would impose obligations upon States without their concurrence. There might be some criticisms of the use of the veto, but it was an essential procedure.

29. As Mr. John Foster Dulles, in his book *War or Peace*, had intimated, there might come a time when the United States could not count on a majority in the Security Council and when it would want the veto itself. In that connexion Mr. Dulles had also cited the United States trusteeship over the Pacific Islands, stating that no great Power could accept being bound in advance by any action which might harm its interests as long as the Security Council might act in an arbitrary manner.

30. Moreover, the right of veto was to be found in various organizations whose most active members were those who criticized the principle of the right of veto granted to permanent members of the Security Council. In organizations such as the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Pact, or the Schuman and Pleven plans the principle of the veto was implicitly or explicitly recognized. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that in those organizations the very countries which most criticized the veto in the Security Council themselves insisted upon the principle elsewhere. The reason for their criticism was that the principle of the veto in the Security Council prevented a policy of *diktat*. Because the principle could not openly be opposed, however, it was said that it had been abused. Yet, how was it possible to abuse a principle when circumstances required recourse to it and when the use of it was permitted by the Charter itself?

31. The defect of the "Uniting for peace" resolution was that according to its text the most important questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security would be dealt with by the General Assembly where, since there were no safeguards, it was possible to take decisions which instead of lessening international tension or settling questions in dispute would aggravate tension and increase the number of points of friction. In its official commentaries, on the United Nations and the Charter presented in 1945 to the British Parliament, the Foreign Office rightly stated that the General Assembly could not take decisions relating to security except as it was requested to by the Security Council. Nevertheless, in disregard of the explicit wording of Article 12, it was proposed to bestow upon a new organ extensive powers which were exclusively within the province of the Security Council.

32. In the circumstances, many who had voted in favour of the "Uniting for peace" resolution regretted having done so. It must not be forgotten that before any sanctions could be taken, there must be impartial examination of the actions complained of. It was difficult to speak of objectivity in the current situation. Moreover, if there were supposedly defects in the Charter, Article 109 showed the constitutional way in which it could be amended.

33. It was said that the USSR had aggressive intentions. What was happening in the Far East and elsewhere, indicated where there were such intentions. Considerable forces were necessary for such a purpose and that was why the bait was being offered.

34. It had been said that the USSR was opposed to the system of collective security, and in that connexion an attempt had been made to divide USSR policy into two periods: the first that of Litvinov; the second that of his

successors as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. That view was without foundation. Reviewing the USSR's efforts to secure an effective system of collective security during the days of the League of Nations, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the policy of appeasement followed by the United Kingdom and France toward the aggressors, in the attempt to direct hitlerite aggression against the USSR. The libel that Litvinov had been replaced as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs because he had followed a policy of strengthening collective security was originated by American journalists and repeated by Mr. Lloyd. The policy followed by the USSR, which had not been ready for war, had enabled it to defeat the aggressor.

35. The USSR had never opposed collective security, but opposed the measures called for by the joint draft resolution which could only increase international problems and facilitate the preparation of war. It was said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not aggressive, but there was much evidence to indicate beyond any doubt that it was directed against the USSR. The fact was indeed openly admitted.

36. Certain representatives who had supported the "Uniting for peace" resolution were now convinced that it had nothing to do with peace and that it concealed aggression and the violation of the sovereignty of other countries by governments which played a leading part in the "Atlantic bloc".

37. In that connexion Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the statement made at the 480th meeting by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, who had cited facts in the Middle East which were in flagrant contradiction with the essentials of peace listed by the General Assembly. The Egyptian representative had said that countries of the Middle East were considered by the imperialist Powers as areas to be exploited and as strategic bases. A similar situation existed in the Far East, in all Asia and in certain European countries.

38. The question of aggression was naturally germane to the current discussion. The need in that respect was to secure a definition of the concept of aggression. Recalling the USSR proposal to that effect at the fifth session,¹ which had been disposed of by being sent to the International Law Commission, Mr. Vyshinsky noted that that Commission had said that aggression could not be defined since it could assume so many different forms and that omission of any one of those forms could help an aggressor. But it was hardly necessary to imagine all aspects of aggression. History had clarified the most characteristic aspects of wars of aggression and those should be formulated in such a manner as to serve as a guide for the common security of nations.

39. In that connexion he recalled that a USSR proposed definition had been adopted by a committee of the League of Nations in 1933 and he enumerated other analogous facts demonstrating the practicability of such a definition. Mr. Vyshinsky mentioned, in particular, clauses of the final act of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace which met at Buenos Aires in 1936, and of the Inter-American Mutual Defence Pact signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the task of defining aggression was incumbent upon the General Assembly. The question as to whether a State was or was not an aggressor would be settled by the Security Council.

40. Turning to the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Vyshinsky said that study of the report of the so-called Collective

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes*, Agenda item 72, document A/C.1/608.

Measures Committee and of the debate on that report showed that the existence of the Committee was unjustified if effective measures of collective security were really to be drawn up. Even if the proposed measures were considered to be intended to maintain peace, it was clear that no attention had been given to measures of a preventive character.

41. It was not denied that the work of the Committee was intimately linked to the aims of the aggressive "Atlantic bloc". It was hardly to be expected therefore, that the results of that work could do anything but reflect those aims, which could be seen from the existing situation in the world.

42. The Middle East Command which had been proposed to various States of that region by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey was an example of the flagrant contradiction between all the protestations heard and the actual facts. According to those proposals, the forces of those countries were to have been placed under allied command. Allied forces were to have been stationed in the area and were to have been given bases and facilities. In addition the command was to have been linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

43. Such proposals, hardly compatible with the statements made in the Committee, had naturally been rejected by the Middle East countries. The sole justification given for the proposals had been that those countries were to be defended against USSR aggression. If there was any threat to those countries, however, it certainly came from those who claimed to defend them. The putting into effect of the plan proposed would reduce the Middle East countries to a colonial position.

44. The position of the United Kingdom in relation to the Middle East in general and to Egypt in particular was hardly compatible with the "Uniting for peace" resolution, with the supposed aims of the system of collective measures—both ardently supported by the United Kingdom—or with the affirmations of peaceful intentions made by its representatives.

45. Dealing with the second part of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution, which had been called an operation designed to conceal efforts to frustrate the actions of the General Assembly regarding the Korean problem, Mr. Vyshinsky said that a periodic meeting would play a considerable role in leading to a settlement of all outstanding issues.

46. Fear had been voiced in particular regarding the proposal that the Council should assist in bringing the negotiations in Korea to a successful conclusion. It was essential, however, to deal with the most acute problems first. The negotiations in Korea had been going on for six months, without very considerable progress. It was not proposed to shift consideration of the matter to the Security Council, but to invite the Council to consider the question of the methods which could be selected by the United Nations in order to assist the successful conclusion of those negotiations. That could hardly be regarded as involving a collapse of the negotiations.

47. Recalling the initiative taken by the USSR in the Korean question, which had led to the conversations, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the USSR proposal was intended to provide additional assistance to break the deadlock in Korea, and was not an alternative to the Panmunjom conversations which should continue.

48. No matter how profound the various divergencies of view might be, Mr. Vyshinsky was convinced that a periodic

meeting of the Security Council would be fruitful and would produce positive results.

49. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that the modifications contained in the revised joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676/Rev.1) clarified, but did not weaken, the basic objectives of the proposal.

50. Stressing the usefulness of the constructive comments and criticisms that had been made, he added that his delegation considered that paragraphs 238 and 240 of the report of the Collective Measures Committee should be reviewed to make it clear that the Commander of United Nations armed forces would be responsible for the administration of relief extended to the whole area of the command.

51. He would not enter into the arguments put forward at the fifth session during the debate on the "Uniting for peace" resolution. The essential concept reflected in the that resolution had been that the United Nations could not be permitted to become impotent simply because of the inability of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree.

52. Action directed by the Security Council could not be frustrated by a minority of small States; action recommended by the General Assembly could not be frustrated by a small minority of States, large or small. All would like to see the permanent members of the Council work together to maintain peace and security on the basis of unanimous agreement but the USSR had never been willing to agree with other Powers except on its own terms.

53. Until it indicated some willingness to work on a reasonable basis, the United Nations must have at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security. The USSR opposed efforts to create a system of collective security, but offered no constructive suggestions which held out any hope of their willingness either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council to work with other States to create that system. On the contrary, Mr. Vyshinsky had attempted to sow dissension among those trying to develop such an effective system.

54. Everything possible was being done by the United States and others to clear the way to agreement, but there had been little or no evidence of co-operation from the Soviet side. There were ruling classes and internal contradictions within the Soviet system which appeared to block the way. The dictators of the proletariat and the elite of the party maintained an iron discipline over the masses which far exceeded that of the despotism which they had supplanted, and had given priority, when necessary, to the preservation and extension of their own power over the interests of the people and even of the peace of the world.

55. The corruption engendered by that system had taken, among other forms, that of the open falsification of history. The USSR account of the origin of the Korean war was a falsehood which impugned the good faith of the nine members of the Security Council who had voted for the 25 June resolution, as well as that of the fifty-three States which had supported the United Nations action to repel aggression in Korea. Seven Members of the Organization had been represented on the United Nations Commission on Korea which had reported to the Security Council that it was North Korea which had launched the armed attack. The USSR representative had also indulged in falsehood in claiming that only eight countries were participating in the United Nations action in Korea. Mr. Cohen listed seventeen countries which had combat forces fighting there under the United Nations flag. Hospital units had been sent by four other countries.

56. Citing further details of assistance, he concluded that the response to the first great collective effort in history to repel an act of aggression had been encouraging and successful. The accomplishment could not be concealed. Nor was it possible to conceal the shabby rôle of those who had assisted the aggressors and who had tried to sabotage that collective effort to defend a small country against a brutal attack.

57. Turning to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688), Mr. Cohen said that everyone knew that the Security Council could not perform its functions as long as the USSR made no effort to reach unanimity with the other permanent Members and exercised without restraint its power of veto. The attempt to re-transfer the critical problems of Korea to the Security Council was an attempt to prevent any progress or solution which was not in conformity with the Soviet will.

58. The United States had always been prepared to discuss measures to remove tension, but he did not think that world peace would be advanced by having the Foreign Ministers listen in the Security Council to statements such as those made in the First Committee by the Foreign Minister of the USSR. The members of the Security

Council could call a periodic meeting whenever they believed that their deliberations might be helped by one. In any case, the General Assembly should not urge such a meeting unless there was real reason to hope that it would really reduce and not aggravate tension.

59. The Secretary-General, in his annual report (A/1844/Add.1) had said that he had not renewed the suggestion for periodic meetings in his 20-year programme for peace in the belief that aggression in Korea should first be ended and that the proposal should then be considered in the light of prevailing conditions.

60. Stressing the United States desire for an early armistice in Korea, Mr. Cohen said that it was difficult to see how public discussion in the Security Council, not in immediate contact with the negotiations in Korea, could do anything but impair and delay the negotiations. He did not believe that the settlement of the military issues involved in the armistice would be facilitated by debate of the political issues involved in the peace settlement. The mere suggestion of the transfer was calculated to delay and confuse the progress of the talks.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.