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Palais de Chaillot, Paris

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Chairman : Mr. Finn MØE (Norway).

**Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, A/C.1/676 and A/C.1/688) (continued)**

[Item 18]\*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil) said the draft resolution submitted by the Brazilian delegation jointly with ten other States Members (A/C.1/676) was a modest but constructive contribution to collective security. It was in keeping with the purposes and principles proclaimed in General Assembly resolution 377 (V), and with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The authors of the draft had thought it wise to concentrate on reaffirming a number of principles by which they had been guided in their work and which were the foundations of United Nations action over the previous six years. Such tenets and principles, closely linked as they were to the peace and security provisions of the Charter, could not be rejected without seriously jeopardizing the cause of peace. Furthermore, the problem of collective security was closely bound up with that of disarmament, and the discussion that was developing was the natural sequel to that which had taken place during the preceding weeks. Only a genuine spirit of collaboration among all States Members could create the proper atmosphere for the removal of the causes of fear and anxiety which accounted for the prevailing world crisis. A negative attitude on that matter, like the attitude adopted by the representative of the USSR, could only be deplored, for it closed the door to any interchange of ideas on a subject which was of vital interest to all nations.

3. General Assembly resolution 377 (V), entitled "Uniting for peace", represented a further effort to make the enforcement of peace a reality. The failures of the past did not predetermine the future. The modern world, physically unified by new techniques, was tending more and more to become a single world. The revolution brought about by technique largely facilitated the application of measures of collective security. So long as military power remained unevenly distributed, any attempt to organize collective

security could be hampered by any great Power. Nevertheless, recent history had twice proved that the community of peace-loving nations was stronger than the aggressor.

4. The prevention of war, however, was only a negative ideal, which would not be enough to resolve the delicate problems of the age. Their solution must be sought in a continuous effort to reconcile political and economic ideologies. That was why the Collective Measures Committee had postulated the principle that the United Nations should endeavour to reach a peaceful settlement of disputes and where necessary should call upon the parties concerned to prevent an aggravation of the situation. Furthermore, the Committee had stated that, simultaneously with the application of collective measures taken in connexion with a breach of the peace, the United Nations should continue to seek a peaceful settlement. Military measures by the United Nations were admissible only when they were the sole means of defending security, and should be regarded as quite exceptional.

5. Chapter II of the Committee's report (A/1891) contained a comprehensive enumeration of political measures which might also serve the purpose of keeping public opinion informed and mobilizing it in support of United Nations action. Mr. Muniz proceeded to refer to certain definite recommendations and conclusions specified by the Committee which stressed more particularly the need for co-operation between the States Members. In his view, the report constituted the fullest programme of collective measures ever prepared. It was, however, only a draft scheme of which the details were to be filled in later.

6. The representative of Brazil explained that his delegation would vote on the joint draft resolution in accordance with its acknowledgement that the times demanded that tangible shape should be given to the collective measures referred to in the Charter and in General Assembly resolution 377 (V). The principles on which collective security was to be based should also be reaffirmed. Still, the future task could only be accomplished if all nations were resolved to collaborate peacefully.

7. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said the Australian and United States representatives at the 476th meeting had spoken very much to the point when dealing with the report of the Collective Measures Committee.

8. By contrast, Mr. Vyshinsky's reply at the 477th meeting had been wholly negative and had given prominence to the Korean affair and the North Atlantic Treaty. There was

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

no mystery about the connexion between the Korean affair and collective measures, on the one hand, and the North Atlantic Treaty on the other. The Korean question was certainly a United Nations matter. In dealing, as it had the right to do, with the various problems arising out of the Korean aggression, the United Nations had been able to observe how awkward it could be if the texts did not contain express provisions, and it had assessed the difficulties due to inadequate preparedness. The North Atlantic Treaty had been negotiated and concluded within the limits of the Charter. Its Article 5 referred to Article 51 of the Charter. The resolution on uniting for peace also contained two references to the arrangements for mutual defence governed by Article 51 of the Charter.

9. No one would think of denying that continuous agreement and collaboration between the five permanent members of the Security Council had been regarded at San Francisco as the basis of world peace and security. But those fundamental conditions no longer existed, a circumstance ascribable to the very country whose representative was professing to restore those conditions to their original purity. It was that country's delegation which, by frustrating the action of the Security Council some fifty times through its use of the right of veto, was responsible for the precarious state of international relations. When Mr. Vyshinsky defended the sacrosanct rule of the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Council, he had not, unfortunately, explained the strange use to which his country had put the rule. According to the Charter, the Security Council admittedly had the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace, but it might well find itself unable to make any decision, through the wilful act of a single one of its five permanent members. The Military Staff Committee could also be rendered impotent, like the Security Council to which it was subordinate. The Members of the United Nations had conferred the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace upon the Security Council in order to ensure rapid and effective action. But the determination to maintain international peace and security was the concern of the whole Organization. Accordingly, if it seemed likely that the Council would be prevented from discharging what was primarily its responsibility, the Organization had a duty to do something to forestall the consequences of such inaction.

10. That was precisely what the United Nations had done through the "Uniting for peace" resolution which provided that, in the event of failure on the part of the Security Council, the General Assembly would immediately consider the threat to the peace or the act of aggression which had occurred with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members. By this resolution, the General Assembly had, moreover, established a Collective Measures Committee and had directed it, not to set up military forces, but merely to study methods which might be used to maintain peace and to report thereon to the sixth session of the General Assembly.

11. The conclusions contained in that report which had been submitted to the First Committee added nothing either to the Charter or to General Assembly resolution 377 (V). They were conclusions of a technical nature and related only to means of carrying out decisions which could be used by the Security Council or, failing the Council, by the General Assembly. In the joint draft resolution it was proposed that the Collective Measures Committee should be directed to continue its studies for another year. It appeared reasonable to extend the mission conferred upon the Collective Measures Committee in 1950, as it had been unable to make an exhaustive study of the question.

12. The French Government, which was a co-sponsor of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676), supported the conclusions contained in the report.

13. Mr. Chauvel then took up the draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/688), and commented particularly on paragraph 1 of the operative part in which it was formally proposed to abolish the Collective Measures Committee. The answer to that would be given by the First Committee through its vote on the eleven-Power draft resolution, which had been tabled first. The meaning of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution, in which a periodic meeting of the Security Council was proposed, was less clear. Everything depended upon the spirit in which that proposal had been made. The USSR representative might, perhaps, have avoided some confusion if he had waited until the Committee had taken up item 5 of its agenda (A/C.1/666/Rev.1) before submitting his proposal.

14. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) said his delegation had whole-heartedly supported the "Uniting for peace" resolution at the General Assembly's fifth session in order to give expression to its desire for forestalling any possible abuse of the veto. The choice before the General Assembly had been either to content itself with a state of affairs in which the United Nations was powerless in the majority of cases of breaches of the peace or acts of aggression; or else to devise methods and procedures by which it would be able at least to make recommendations for the implementation of the principles of collective security whenever the Security Council was unable to perform its primary responsibilities. The proposed methods and procedures had been embodied in General Assembly resolution 377 (V) which had, *inter alia*, established the Collective Measures Committee whose report was now under consideration.

15. The problems with which that Committee had to deal were many and complex. His delegation agreed, as the Collective Measures Committee itself had suggested, that its term should be renewed for another year.

16. Noting a number of points raised by the Swedish representative, he said that the latter had referred to the mutual or collective defence pacts and had compared them with the structure of world-wide collective security envisaged by an organization like the United Nations. Sweden's reluctance to join in defensive treaties and alliances revealed an attitude very similar to that of the Netherlands until the outbreak of the Second World War. It appeared certain, however, that what had still been possible in the Second World War was no longer possible. Neutrality was becoming impracticable.

17. Reference had been made during the discussions in the First Committee and at plenary meetings of the General Assembly to the allegedly aggressive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The best reply to that criticism was to point to the policy of neutrality which in the past had been pursued by several countries of western Europe and had finally brought them to disaster. The signatories of the treaty knew by experience the scourge of modern war and the horrors of occupation and were determined to defend themselves as effectively as possible if another act of aggression occurred. They had concluded a pact for collective self-defence in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter. Articles 43 to 45 of the Charter envisaged a wider system of collective self-defence which, unfortunately, had failed to materialize. It was because of that failure that Article 51 now offered the possibility of regional collective self-defence.

18. There was no question of disregarding the functions of the Security Council. Article 51 of the Charter itself

recognized the right of collective defence only until the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain peace. Unfortunately, however, the veto could prevent action by the Security Council. Those considerations justified the regional defence agreements and General Assembly resolution 377 (V) adopted in 1950, the purpose of the terms of which was to develop a wider system of security to which regional agreements would have to be subordinated. The Netherlands Government supported the principles underlying that resolution.

19. As regards assistance in support of the recommendations of the Security Council or the General Assembly for the restoration of peace Mr. von Balluseck pointed out that his country had already provided units to assist the United Nations action in Korea. He also pointed to his country's contribution to the forces for the collective defence of the western world.

20. His delegation would vote in favour of the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/676), but would oppose the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688) as it might well do away altogether with the new approach to collective security.

21. In conclusion, he said that according to the preamble of the joint draft resolution, it was one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression. Under Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, however, it was one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, and collective measures were but the means to the attainment of that end.

22. Accordingly he believed that the first paragraph of the preamble might be worded as follows :

“ *Reaffirming* that under Article 1 of the Charter it is one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and that the first-mentioned means to that end is to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. ”

23. Mohamed SALAH EL DIN Pasha (Egypt) congratulated the Collective Measures Committee on its work and said that the comments he would make should be interpreted not as a criticism but as a contribution to the common task.

24. The Committee had given prominence to the provision of enforcement measures, but had not given sufficient attention to preventive action to protect peace. However, the fundamental concept of the Charter of the United Nations remained “ to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. ” According to Mr. John Foster Dulles the “ *Uniting for peace* ” resolution had had to give expression to two general principles : first, that the dangers of aggression capable of engendering a world conflict were ever present ; secondly, that the best preventive measure was effective collective resistance to aggression. Those were lasting truths. Undoubtedly, the danger of a new world war existed, but a conflict was by no means inevitable. The best method of withstanding aggression was to build up a bulwark of peace strong enough to discourage it. Several earlier speakers had expressed the same idea.

25. It was hardly necessary to recall that on 30 March 1951 the Egyptian representative on the Collective Measures Committee had said that the need to build up moral and material strength great enough to discourage any kind of aggression had not been sufficiently emphasized<sup>1</sup>. Early in 1951, Mr. Acheson, speaking to his own country and to the whole world on the American radio, had defended the same thesis.

26. The representative of Egypt then quoted the principles stated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which recurred in the first paragraph of the preamble of the “ *Uniting for peace* ” resolution 377 (V), and regretted that certain States Members of the United Nations, though voting for those purposes and principles, had not acted in conformity with them.

27. Failure to conform to officially adopted principles was frequent in the Middle East ; the attitude of certain imperialist Powers, the United Kingdom particularly, could hardly be considered as contributing to peace. Indeed those Powers were the main source whence were derived all dangers to peace. Egypt and the other countries of the Middle East which were members of the Arab League were doing their utmost for the cause of peace and had with that aim in view signed a pact of collective security which was in conformity with the Charter. That pact could truly be defined as being regional and defensive in character.

28. On the other hand, owing to the short-sighted action of several Powers, the United Kingdom particularly, the Middle East was faced with a very dangerous situation. No one could claim that the acts of aggression which were continually being committed on Egyptian territory were conducive to international peace and security. Nor could the attempt of certain Powers to place the Middle East before the *fait accompli* of a so-called allied Middle East command be so described. That attitude was not at all in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. The peoples of the Middle East would adamantly refuse to be mere pawns in the international game, but would yet remain faithful to the Charter and willing to co-operate, within the framework of the United Nations, in building up world peace and security.

29. The text of the “ *Uniting for peace* ” resolution presented a striking contrast to certain salient facts, such as the maintenance by the United Kingdom of armed forces in the valley of the Nile, the events in Palestine which flagrantly violated the undisputed rights of the Arab refugees, and the statute of the City of Jerusalem which, despite the decisions of the General Assembly, had not been internationalized.

30. Together with the delegations of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, Egypt had submitted a draft amendment to the eleven-Power joint draft resolution. This draft amendment (A/C.1/690), respecting the letter and spirit of the draft resolution, proposed to add to the operative part the following paragraph :

“ 10. *Recognizes* that nothing in this resolution shall be construed to permit that any measure be taken in any State without the free and express consent of that State ”.

31. Concerning the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/688) the delegations of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/691) to delete paragraph 1 of the operative part.

32. If this amendment were adopted the draft resolution might be brought into line with the eleven-Power draft resolution and with what would seem to be the view of the First Committee as a whole.

33. The delegation of Egypt would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the delegations of Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689) to the joint draft resolution.

34. In conclusion the representative of Egypt expressed the hope that the conduct of the great Powers in the international field would in future conform more closely to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

<sup>1</sup> See document A/AC.43/SR.3.

35. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) associated himself with the tribute paid to the Collective Measures Committee and its Chairman, Mr. Muniz. The Committee's report was a valuable compilation which might usefully be referred to in case of need.

36. Mr. Malik echoed the Egyptian representative's comments on the Middle East and on the defence requirements of that region, and also spoke of the need for the United Nations to give effect to the resolutions which it had adopted on the organization of collective security.

37. Technical evolution had reached the stage when universal collective security measures were necessary for the safety of great and small nations alike. Obviously such measures were particularly vital to small countries like Lebanon.

38. The policy of Lebanon, which was a member of the Arab League and of the United Nations, was to offset the meagreness of its resources for warding off aggression through participation in the regional collective security system of the Arab League and in the universal system of the United Nations. Accordingly it welcomed the development of any system of collective security measures under the Charter of the United Nations.

39. As a rule, an act of aggression would be determined by the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter. Clearly, however, if the five permanent members of the Security Council were unable to agree in determining an act of aggression, although in point of fact aggression had occurred and war was raging, the determination of such aggression must be done outside the Council, which meant by the General Assembly. That was the fundamental premise of the "Uniting for peace" resolution which the General Assembly had adopted at its fifth session.

40. Lebanon had joined with the delegations of Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen in submitting an amendment (A/C.1/190) to the eleven-Power draft resolution. The proposal made therein was clear and his delegation hoped that it would be unanimously adopted.

41. It was also one of the sponsors of the joint amendment (A/C.1/691) to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688), since it held that the Collective Measures Committee should be permitted to continue its work.

42. His delegation considered that the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689) added precise and therefore useful elements to the joint draft resolution, although points 4 and 5 of that amendment contained certain ambiguities.

43. His delegation wished, however, to make one important reservation affecting the operation of any system of collective security measures: Lebanon could not participate in a system of collective security to which any State which Lebanon had not recognized was a party.

44. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines) said he had been pleased to note that in the course of discussion sober and judicious views had been expressed concerning the content of the report of the Collective Measures Committee. He had, however, been dismayed by the virulence of certain criticisms levelled at a report which marked a step forward in the organization of a system of collective security.

45. The Collective Measures Committee had approached its task circumspectly and its report was the first study of collective security in the history of international organizations. It was by no means perfect but it opened the way for future progress.

46. Most of the criticisms which had been voiced were groundless, because the Committee did not contemplate

in its report any specific situation, it did not attempt to prevent the Security Council from taking action, and it did not give a final and conclusive list of measures for repelling an act of aggression.

47. In its report the Committee did not deal with a particular act of aggression committed by a known aggressor. The USSR delegation had refused to participate in the Committee's proceedings and hence it was perhaps difficult for the USSR representative to believe that the report was not directed against his Government. But even if the USSR had participated, the report, which was impartial and objective, would have been no different. It was conceived in general terms and was not aimed against an act of aggression committed by one particular Member of the United Nations. It should be noted for instance that certain suggested procedures would have very little effect *vis-à-vis* the USSR. Expulsion from the specialized agencies would not greatly affect the USSR, but it would have very serious consequences for States which participated in the work of many such agencies. Nor would the USSR be greatly touched by such economic and financial measures as an embargo, which would have serious effects on the United Kingdom, to mention only one case.

48. Furthermore, the Committee's report as well as the "Uniting for peace" resolution explicitly recognized that it was the Security Council which was primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the setting up of an armed international force in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. However, if the Security Council was unable to act when aggression had been committed, the General Assembly would become responsible for maintaining peace. The Security Council had merely the primary, not the exclusive, responsibility of maintaining peace. That fact was emphasized by the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter regarding the right of individual or collective self-defence until the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Accordingly, States had an acknowledged secondary right to take the necessary measures in such circumstances.

49. The committee in its report presented a provisional and therefore not definitive list of measures to counteract aggression. Studies conducted on the subject by the Committee might possibly be of use to the Security Council. It was plain that the measures contemplated could neither promote nor provoke aggression. Their sole defect was, on the contrary, that they did not adequately guarantee the efficacy of collective action in cases of aggression, and hence it was the object of the eleven-Power draft resolution to reinforce such action by reminding the Members of the United Nations of their continuing obligations.

50. His country placed its hopes in a system of collective security in which it had a greater interest than any other country, for it did not possess the means of defending itself unaided against aggression from without. It had suffered the Japanese invasion and after the war had had to defend itself against internal aggression. Nevertheless it had participated in the collective military action taken in Korea. All that showed that his country was supporting a system of collective security through contributing the blood of its sons and the funds which it had had to spend on national defence.

51. Mr. CORDOVA (Mexico) considered that the establishment of a system of collective security was a matter of the greatest importance to the United Nations and to the maintenance of international peace and security. Mexico supported any institution likely to counteract aggression. There would be no *raison d'être* for the United Nations



if it did not make every effort to counteract violence if its ultimate objective were not to repress the individual use of violence by States and if it did not try to place at the exclusive disposal of the common interests of all States the collective strength resulting from the combination of the forces of all Member States.

52. Methods of resistance to aggression might vary but they should in any event have an international character, so as to prevent coercive action being at any time subordinated to the individual will of any single State or any single group of States.

53. Though Mexico favoured the establishment of measures of collective security, it had not been able to associate itself with the eleven sponsors on the joint draft resolution because their text omitted some points, which his country considered important. For that reason it had, jointly with Chile and Colombia, submitted an amendment (A/C.1/689) to the eleven-Power draft resolution.

54. The object of point 1 of that amendment was to mention that regional arrangements formed an important contribution to the security system of the United Nations and that regional bodies had a life of their own, independent of the Organization.

55. The object of point 2 was to emphasize the technical and provisional character of the measures contemplated in the Committee's report. Mexico was unable to adopt the conclusions of the report in their entirety, not only because the report was provisional and incomplete but also because some of the measures contemplated did not correspond to the Mexican point of view.

56. Point 3 gave expression to an idea which was shared by the authors of the draft resolution. It also reflected the point of view of the American States as stated at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Washington. Point 4 also reflected a view expressed at the Washington conference and should not meet with serious objection.

57. His delegation attached particular importance to point 5 of the joint amendment the object of which was to relieve States of the moral obligation, created by paragraph 4 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution, to change their legislation. The present text had the very serious drawback that it claimed to impose on Member States at least a moral obligation to review their legislation, both constitutional and ordinary, so as to ensure the prompt and effective implementation of the collective measures of the United Nations. The intention appeared to be that Member States should make ready to amend their laws with that object in view. Such an obligation could not be accepted by the Mexican Government which regarded the amendment of its laws as a sovereign right not liable to subordination or compromise of any sort.

58. He reserved the right to submit observations of substance on paragraph 6 of the operative part of the draft resolution (A/C.1/676) in due course.

59. Faris EL-KHOURY Bey (Syria) supported the statements made by the representative of Egypt concerning the attachment of the Arab States to the regional collective security pact concluded among the members of the Arab League. The Arab States wished for common association in order to defend themselves and wanted other States to respect their right of association.

60. The eleven-Power draft resolution and also the "Uniting for peace" resolution were in conformity with the purposes of the United Nations as mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations. While it was true that the methods for maintaining peace

were described in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and that primary responsibility was vested in the Security Council, yet, if the Council were paralysed, it could not be claimed that there was no alternative but inaction to meet aggression. Since the General Assembly had given the Security Council a mission, the Assembly could relieve it of its task if it failed to perform it. Those had been the considerations underlying General Assembly resolution 377 (V). By creating a remedy to cover the case of the Security Council's being unable to act, that resolution gave the Council in fact an opportunity to resume its activities.

61. The recommendations contained in the joint draft resolution were not imperative. In any event, in existing circumstances, Syria would not be able to place armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations because it needed all its armed forces to defend its territory against an aggressive neighbour. Consequently, whatever support Syria might give to the eleven-Power draft resolution, Syria would not consider itself bound by that resolution if it were adopted.

62. The representatives of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia had stated that the Security Council was the only organ qualified to order sanctions and to resort to the use of force. That statement was correct. For over five years, however, the Security Council had been incapable of taking any action of the kind. At San Francisco the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America had plainly stated that the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council was a vital condition for the functioning of the United Nations. The small States had acquiesced and had given the Security Council wide powers. The Council, however, was paralysed; that being so, either the United Nations had to be liquidated or some solution found. Such was the purpose of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) which did not, however, rule out the possibility of the Security Council's resuming its functions and applying, among other provisions, the terms of Article 43 of the Charter relating to the establishment of United Nations armed forces.

63. The representative of Syria expressed the hope that the great Powers would again consult together with a view to reducing the international tension.

64. The delegation of Syria supported that part of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/688) which referred to the convening of periodic meetings of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the Charter; indeed, it considered that those provisions ought to have been observed in the past.

65. His delegation considered that the amendment of Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689) to the joint draft resolution was sound, for it stressed the importance of the power of States to form their own decisions.

66. Syria, jointly with the other Arab States and certain Asiatic States, had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/690) to the joint draft resolution, the effect of which would be that no system of collective security could be set up without prior negotiation with the States directly affected. It was to be regretted in that connexion that the western Powers had thought fit to establish a Middle East command without even consulting the States in the area.

67. His own country and the other Arab States were firmly attached to the principle of regional collective security under the Pact of the Arab League and also to the principle of collective security under the Charter of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.