



Friday, 21 December 1951, at 3 p.m.

*Palais de Chaillot, Paris*

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*Chairman* : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Complaint of aggressive acts of the United States of America and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as instanced by the appropriation of one hundred million dollars to finance the recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and a number of other democratic countries, as well as outside the territory of those countries (A/C.1/685) (*concluded*)**

[Point 69]\*

**GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)**

1. Mr. VAN GLABEKKE (Belgium) said that after the very detailed statements by the French and Canadian representatives and the explanatory remarks of the United States representative, his delegation had decided to waive its right to make a statement, in order to save time.
2. He merely wished to state that his delegation would vote against the USSR draft resolution.
3. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that the intention of the Mutual Security Act and of the amendment thereto was to give an opportunity to those who escaped from tyranny to join the effort for the defence of freedom. If other purposes had been attributed to the Act, the Committee should conclude that the accusations were not plausible, because they were incompatible with the character of the people of the United States. Unless the accusations could be proved with evidence of overt acts of aggression, it was necessary to accept the purpose as set forth in the Act and the official explanations.
4. The evident purpose of international communism—an instrument of the Soviet Union policy—was to subvert all non-communist governments. Political and military cadres were trained for the purpose and controlled by Moscow. In such circumstances all free governments should uphold the purposes of the Mutual Security Act and the amendment to it.

5. The Chinese delegation would vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/685).

6. Mr. MELAS (Greece) said that the Committee should examine the qualifications of the complainant and the likelihood of the complaint.

7. The Soviet Union representative had accused the United States of planning to do precisely what the Soviet Union had done in Greece. The results of the armed aggression against Greece, which could have been stopped at any time by the Soviet Union, had caused greater ruin than the fascist and nazi attacks. Greece had only been saved by the assistance received from the United Kingdom and the United States while the Soviet Union was busy training the attackers.

8. The motives of the United States were beyond question. After the war the United States had offered economic assistance to all war-ravaged countries without exception. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been established only to protect the free nations of Europe against aggression.

9. It was not possible to give credence either to the qualifications of the complainant or to the nature of the complaint.

10. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) said that the Soviet Union complaint was concerned with a paragraph of the Mutual Security Act adopted by the United States Congress, but the Soviet Union representative had gone much further in calling upon the Committee to condemn the course of United States policy towards the Soviet Union since the end of the war.

11. It was evident that the phrase of the Act quoted in the complaint was only a pretext for a new propaganda offensive. There was no evidence of any desire on the part of the Soviet Union to improve its relationships or to solve any problems either within or outside the United Nations. Rather the Soviet Union and its satellites had exacerbated the situation and obstructed possible solutions. The speeches made in the Committee had been designed to justify the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

12. That policy had been directed for three years against Yugoslavia which had been subjected to every sort of pressure by the Soviet Union and had been forced to appeal to the General Assembly<sup>1</sup>. In presenting its complaint in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee the Yugoslav delegation had proposed no more than that the normal usages in international relations should be followed by the States named in the complaint. That proposal had been rejected by the Soviet Union bloc. The actions taken by the Soviet Union had included economic blockade, propaganda in favour of the overthrow of the Government, espionage and terrorism, the concentration of troops near the Yugoslav borders, the provocation of frontier incidents, and the organisation of emigrés to infiltrate into Yugoslavia as agents of the Soviet Union. When the Yugoslav Government had protested to the Government of the Soviet Union, the reply stated that the Soviet Union would continue as before.

13. The Yugoslav delegation regarded the Soviet Union complaint as a cynical attempt to represent the Soviet Union as a pillar of international law and the principle of non-intervention.

14. If the Soviet Union had been anxious for normal relations it could have accepted the appeal of the General Assembly in the Yugoslav case<sup>2</sup>. The draft resolution submitted to the First Committee was mere propaganda in the cold war and the Yugoslav delegation would vote against it.

15. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) said that he sometimes received the impression that those supporting the draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/685) were acting under instructions to use the General Assembly as a platform for propaganda. The Committee would take the complaint more seriously if the communist governments indulged in fewer of the subversive activities which had been described in a series of statements. Nor did the denunciation of political exiles or other leaders who had refused to bow to force add strength to the case of the Soviet Union. Mr. Lloyd believed that an important aspect of the pursuit of peace was in the field of propaganda. Progress could be made towards a settlement if all could succeed in lowering the temperature of their propaganda. The draft resolution might be examined with that thought in mind.

16. The Mutual Security Act had been drawn up in wide terms. It had, however, been given an official interpretation in the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from which Mr. Lloyd proceeded to quote. Attention also should be given to the statements made by the United States representative concerning the status of remarks of members of Congress and the relationships between Congress and the executive branch of the Government in the matter of the interpretation of legislation. The representative of the United States had stated on behalf of his Government that there was no intention to train or equip foreign legions for the invasion of other States and the overthrow of their governments and had also agreed with the thesis that such training would constitute an aggressive act.

17. The Act would enable refugees to participate in the defence forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Those forces would only take part in military operations in the event of aggression by the Soviet Union. When it

was clearly understood that the free nations of Europe would not submit to subjugation, there would be better prospects for peace.

18. Mr. Lloyd believed that the complaint had been given a full examination and shown to be without foundation. It would be better for the Soviet Union to withdraw it. If that were not done, Mr. Lloyd trusted that it would be rejected by a large majority.

19. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the positions of the representatives, opposed to his draft resolution, were not surprising since those representatives belonged to the aggressive "Atlantic bloc" or were in the same camp. The reason for those slanderous speeches was that the Soviet Union was the main and insuperable obstacle on the road to a new war which the "Atlantic bloc" had chosen. The Mutual Security Act was another step on that road.

20. The statements made in defence of that Act were ludicrous. It was stated here that the Act was not designed to be implemented and that it would never be applied, but it was known that laws were not written for no purpose. They were not written with the intention of not putting them into force. Laws were designed to be implemented and served as the framework for future action or at times to legitimize action which had already been taken and that applied to the Act of 10 October 1951 and to the amendment to that Act introduced by Mr. Kersten, member of the United States House of Representatives.

21. The representative of the United Kingdom had claimed that the proper interpretation of the law was to be found in the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that he had quoted from the Congressional Record a variety of statements made by members of Congress and officials, and other statements, and no attempt had been made to show that those quotations were wrong. Those quotations constituted evidence and it was futile to assert that no evidence had been given. It had been claimed that the views expressed were those of individuals and were not the policies of the Government. However, those men were the authors of the law and it was a legal principle that in establishing the meaning of a text the intention of the law-makers should be examined. No opinions of members of Congress which differed from those he had quoted, had been presented. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that those views were in fact shared by the other members of Congress.

22. Mr. Vyshinsky regarded those quotations as *prima facie* evidence, having probative value since they had never been disavowed. The Committee would be well advised to read again the Congressional Records to which he had referred in his previous statement.

23. There was no necessity to rush through the debate. It could well continue to allow counter-evidence to be produced if the United States had any.

24. Basing itself on the evidence in the records, the Soviet Union delegation had succeeded in proving a number of points. First, the amendment to the Mutual Security Act, and therefore the Act itself, was designed to finance the recruitment of persons and groups from among so-called refugees from the Soviet Union and the people's democracies with a view to organizing them into armed groups to serve the aggressive plans of the "Atlantic bloc". Secondly, the formation of such military units and the recruitment of individuals, including not only escapees but also persons still residing in those countries, was being done in order to establish striking forces disposed about the perimeter of the Soviet Union whose purpose would be to overthrow

<sup>1</sup> See document A/1946.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 355th meeting.

the régimes and destroy the social structures of the countries concerned. Thirdly, the military formations and individuals would be maintained on the territory of the United States and of other states of the "Atlantic bloc" and even in the territories of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies. Fourthly, the military formations were to be national detachments with appropriate distinguishing insignia. Fifthly, the military formations were to be included in the NATO army and, presumably, eventually in the European army, as national legions. Sixthly, in addition to those military formations, various persons and groups of persons were to be used for terrorist activities in the people's democracies. Those six conclusions were based firmly on the official records of the United States Congress and no word had been said to disprove them.

25. There was additional evidence as well, such as the dropping from the agenda of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the draft code relating to offences against the peace and security of mankind. As had been recognized by Mr. Kersten and his colleagues, paragraph 6 of article 2 of that code, if adopted, would have made it difficult for the United States Congress to adopt the Act of 10 October.

26. Not only had no facts been submitted, but there had been no attempt to make a different analysis of the documents cited by Mr. Vyshinsky. In the face of that, it was contended that the Soviet Union had submitted no evidence. The truth would speak for itself, and those representatives who brushed the evidence aside remained convinced of the validity of the USSR thesis though they would vote against it.

27. Mr. Mansfield's repetition of the text of the amendment and of its alleged purpose had confirmed that the appropriation was intended to finance escapees who were to be formed into military units. The refugees or escapees were to have come from the USSR and the countries of the people's democracies. Thus, there was no longer any question of the United States helping the needy and the sick. The people to be assisted were to be mercenaries of the "Atlantic bloc".

28. Though Mr. Mansfield had stated that the law would never be used by the United States for the purposes which the USSR delegation had alleged, Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the law had only those purposes. Mr. Mansfield had played on words such as "aggression", "defence", and so forth in stating that the military formations which would be hostile to the USSR and to the countries of the people's democracies would be used at the discretion of the "Atlantic bloc" after joint consultation and in order to counteract aggression. The reverse process of prior consultation might have been more appropriate, if the United States had any respect for their fellow members in the "Atlantic bloc".

29. The attempt to represent the complaint as an attack against the United States and as designed to undermine the defensive measures of the "Atlantic bloc" had failed. The law was still a violation of international law, and for that reason, Mr. Austin, in his letter to Mr. Kersten, had called for a change in international law, which must be revised since the old principles were no longer suitable, though the new standards were to take the form of the cloak and dagger. The "Kersten amendment" translated into law, meant the liquidation of the old principles of international law, thus leading not to law but to lawlessness.

30. That was one of the stages on the road to aggression to which the "Atlantic bloc", led by the United States, had committed itself. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky observed that the question as to the defensive nature of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization had already been raised and settled, but the Act and amendment of 10 October 1951, the sense of which had been fully established by the authentic and authorized interpretations of its authors and sponsors, alone were unquestionable proof of the aggressive character of that organization. The amendment was aggressive because it was intended to foment diversionary activities in another State. The fact that such an amendment was needed to translate into reality the intention of the "Atlantic bloc" was the best evidence of the fact that NATO itself was aggressive in nature.

31. It was quite unprecedented that in time of peace a State which maintained normal diplomatic relations with another State should openly form and organize, on its territory, military formations consisting of citizens of other State's, citizens who had accidentally found themselves on the first State's territory, with a view to exploiting such formations in a war against the very States of whose citizens they were formed. Once the United States had taken such a step, it had been necessary to modify international law.

32. It was monstrous to compare, as the United States representative had done, the measures taken by the United States Government to the aid furnished to the Soviet Union by foreigners who had fought in the Red Army during the war against the aggressor. To enlist foreigners to help resist invasion by an aggressor was one thing; it was altogether another when a State formed and organized foreign citizens in peace time, when there was no attack and no danger of attack, and bribed them to take arms against their own people. Moreover, assistance by foreigners could be accepted by a State which had been subjected to invasion and attack, but only if war had already broken out. In time of peace, the Government of the United States appropriated money for the formation of diversionist, terroristic bands and military formations from "refugees" who were traitors, though there were among them unfortunate persons who were deluded or starving. The United States had been dropping those people by parachute over the USSR and the countries of the people's democracies for the purpose of committing various crimes against the governments in those countries. That was an unheard of crime against peace and international law and against normal relations between States.

33. It was one thing for the United States to offer shelter and the opportunity to settle to those who wished to do so and who would thus be prepared to defend the United States against attack. But the Act complained of was the recruiting of refugees under the camouflage of self-defence to fight against the States from which they had fled. The objectives set in the amendment were even more far-reaching, as Mr. Kersten had recognized. Action of a terrorist character was to be undertaken in the territories of the States from which those persons had fled, at the orders of the intelligence and military organizations of the United States.

34. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky noted that Mr. Mansfield had asked whether the USSR would harbour in its territories communists who had expressed a desire to defend it. The answer could be found in a conversation which Generalissimo Stalin had had with Mr. Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard news papers. Mr. Vyshinsky quoted the text of the questions by Mr. Howard and of the replies given by Mr. Stalin relating to point 4 in the exchange of communications in 1933. Mr. Stalin had made it clear that the right of asylum in each country was not in question and that the issue was that the officials of both countries should not intervene in the internal affairs of the other. Apparently, the right of asylum was interpreted more widely by the United States, which had



allowed Russian white guard emigrés on its territory to conduct propaganda against the USSR while enjoying the financial support of American citizens, and sometimes even permitting groups of terrorists. The USSR for its part, would never shelter on its territory any terrorist, no matter against whom his activities might be aimed.

35. The point that emerged from the answer given in 1936 by Mr. Stalin was that the United States Government and officials had no right to assist elements whose declared purpose it was to fight against the Soviet structure and to overthrow the Soviet State, regardless of the fact that such elements had not the slightest chance of success. In particular, such officials should not finance political emigrés in such sinister activities by drawing on official funds of the treasury of the United States. That was the point which Mr. Mansfield and his supporters did not wish to understand.

36. Some of the defenders of the United States position, and Mr. Mansfield in particular, had not shrunk from a clear distortion of the truth in an attempt to bolster their position. Mr. Mansfield said that in 1917 all allied and neutral missions in Petrograd received a circular to the effect that the Soviet Union Government deemed it expedient to maintain diplomatic relations not only with governments but also with revolutionary socialist parties whose objective it was to overthrow existing governments. There had never been any such note. The only note about the organization of the new government concerned the USSR request of 8 November 1917 for a democratic peace without reparations, addressed to all warring nations and their governments. Similarly, Mr. Mansfield had distorted the quotation from the editor of *Pravda*, Mr. Suslov, omitting the fact that the methods called for were determined by the objective, namely, the struggle for peace. Again, in a quotation concerning the Marshall Plan, Mr. Mansfield had distorted the sense of the statement made by Mr. Zhdanov by uniting two quotations out of context.

37. The main point, however, was that Mr. Mansfield had failed to note that the USSR position had been that the Marshall Plan resulted from a new expansionist course followed by the United States and directed against the USSR, the countries of the people's democracies, and other countries all over the world. The expansionist programme of the United States recalled the defeat of the expansionist programme of the fascist aggressors. The measures resorted to in order to exact from various countries the legitimization of illegally required positions throughout the world were among the reasons adduced by Mr. Zhdanov for the negative attitude of the USSR toward the Marshall Plan, which had been a failure, since it had not achieved its objective.

38. The attempt to represent the committees for peace as instruments of the foreign policy of the USSR was absurd. The fact was that the yearning for peace and the avoidance of a new world war was the natural desire of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The foreign policy of the USSR, which sought the same objectives, namely, the strengthening of peace and the removal of the threat of a new world war, enjoyed the confidence of millions because it corresponded to the hope of the broad masses who were convinced that the forces of peace would defeat those of war. It was still more absurd to assert that the committees of peace were built on machinery for direct action. The direct action was the determination of the people to prevent a new world war. That terrified the organizers of such a war who wanted to get still larger profits from war industries.

39. In connexion with Mr. Mansfield's reference to Korea, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the question of aggression in Korea had been discussed in detail by the First Committee

during the fifth session of the General Assembly, at which time no denial had been made of the truth of the facts and documents produced by the USSR which had indicated the systematic manner in which aggression had been unleashed and intervention had occurred on the part of the United States in the internal affairs of Korea. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled various documents which he had cited, including letters written by Syngman Rhee and the South Korean ambassador to the United States and various statements made by South Korean and United States officials, all of which had made it clear that plans had been drawn up long in advance.

40. It had been said that the Act of 10 October 1951 was merely theoretical and that no provision had been made for its implementation. Several days previously, however, the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR had considered the case of two American diversionists, Osmanov and Sarantsev, displaced persons who had parachuted from an American aircraft in the region of the Moldavian SSR. Those persons had been furnished with false documents, weapons, vials of poison, tools for diversionist and terrorist activities and large sums of money. Were those the standard equipment of the aircraft from which they had bailed out, as the State Department claimed in the case of the United States transport aircraft forced down over Hungarian territory by USSR fighters? The parachutists had admitted that they had been enlisted from a displaced persons camp by American counter-intelligence in West Germany, and had thereafter been dropped in Greece, whence they had been sent to Soviet territory. Osmanov and Sarantsev, who had admitted their entire guilt, were to have proceeded, after the fulfilment of their criminal tasks, to the city of Kars in Turkey, where they were to have met American intelligence officers.

41. That was but one example of the so-called defensive activities of members of the "Atlantic bloc". Similar facts listed in the notes of the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, as well as of Czechoslovakia, made it clear that the law of 10 October was not only theoretical. It could not be denied that the Act was in operation and was being enforced for the purposes set forth by the USSR delegation.

42. The USSR therefore urged the adoption by the Committee of its draft resolution (A/C.1/685).

43. Mr. MANSFIELD (United States), in connexion with the statement made by Mr. Vyshinsky, repeated the quotation which he had made previously from the note sent out by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the allied and neutral missions in Petrograd on 3 December 1917 to the effect that the Soviet power considered diplomatic relations necessary not only with governments but also with revolutionary socialist parties seeking the overthrow of existing governments. The source of the statement was *Izvestia* of 3 December 1917 as quoted in the works of Leon Trotsky (*Works of Leon Trotsky*, Moscow, 1925, part II, pages 141 and 142).

44. Mr. Mansfield also pointed out that there were disagreements in the world outside the Iron Curtain, whereas there was never any deviation in the voting inside. Mr. Vyshinsky had referred to documents, but he had not referred to the official report which synthesized the viewpoints of the members of committees when they met to reconcile their difference after the passage of legislation by both Houses of the United States Congress.

45. In connexion with Mr. Vyshinsky's reference to the Marshall Plan, Mr. Mansfield declared that that plan had been one of the most generous gestures in the history of mankind.

46. The sole purpose of the amendment in question was to permit refugees to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The act would be administered by the President of the United States for that purpose. The United States Government and people had no apologies to make for giving that opportunity to refugees from USSR tyranny or for the arrangement to defend the North Atlantic area, which, despite what Mr. Vyshinsky had said, was a defensive, not an aggressive, arrangement.

47. He called for a roll-call vote on the USSR draft resolution.

48. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that Mr. Mansfield had previously referred to a note, dated 8 November 1917 under the old style calendar, which had advised governments of the establishment of the new Soviet Government. In that note there was nothing similar to Mr. Mansfield's quotation. What Mr. Mansfield had thus cited was not a note of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, but a communication to the peoples of the world, an appeal of a type common at that time, when the United States had not recognized the USSR Government, which deemed it essential to take all measures to establish peace. The document referred to was not a note of the Commissar.

49. Mr. Vyshinsky asked whether Mr. Mansfield denied the authenticity of the records of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives. The records of the Foreign Affairs Committee included the opinion of authoritative Congressmen, among them the authors of the amendment, who were entitled to give the meaning of the amendment and of the Act into which it had been incorporated.

50. Mr. MANSFIELD (United States) replied that in considering a bill, the United States Congress called for witnesses to be heard on various aspects of it before it was agreed to by the committee in question. Thereafter, the bill was brought to the House of Representatives or Senate for consideration by the entire membership. A bill very rarely emerged from both the House and the Senate in exactly the same form, and conferees were therefore appointed from both Houses to work out a bill acceptable to the majority.

VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE USSR (A/C.1/685).

51. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/685).

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Bolivia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Against:* Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Australia, Belgium.

*Abstaining:* Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan.

*The draft resolution was rejected by 39 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.*

52. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) stated that the General Assembly had no reason for intervening in a matter which

was the subject of diplomatic negotiations, and that it was clear that the USSR complaint was an issue to be dealt with in accordance with the principles of international law.

53. Moreover, the delegation of Peru had long believed in the legality of the North Atlantic Treaty. It also believed that the charges levelled against the United States were not proven. He had therefore voted against the USSR draft resolution.

54. Mr. AL GHOSSEIN (Yemen) stated that his delegation believed that complete non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states should be basic in international relations, but did not believe that understanding between States could be achieved through branding any State as an aggressor unless there was ample justification for such condemnation. His delegation had therefore abstained from voting.

55. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines) had voted against the USSR draft resolution because it was obvious that the act of assisting persons who had gone outside the territorial jurisdiction of the USSR, and other countries, did not constitute interference in the domestic affairs of those countries. The organization of such refugees in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did not constitute an act of aggression. Neither was it a violation of the principles of the Charter or of the agreement of 16 November 1933 between the USSR and the United States. It must be evident to all men of peace and goodwill that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was of purely defensive nature.

56. Moreover, the USSR was guilty of that of which it accused others. The USSR was intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries; in the Philippines there was currently a communist armed uprising traceable to the USSR and Communist China.

57. Mr. FRANCO FRANCO (Dominican Republic) had voted against the USSR draft resolution because the text of the Act and the statements of the United States representative made it clear that there was no foundation for the USSR complaint.

58. The purpose of the Mutual Security Act was to strengthen the defences of free peoples and the collective security system, one of the fundamental aims of the United Nations. It tended, moreover, to alleviate the hardships of millions of victims of the policy of expansion rife throughout eastern Europe. It represented a legitimate and natural measure of self-defence against the disturbers of international politics whom everybody could identify.

59. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) had voted against the USSR draft resolution because the USSR complaint, in his view, was due to a general world tension which should be treated by the fostering of friendly relations rather than by condemnation.

60. Thus, it was known that there were Iraqi rebels on Soviet soil who had been armed and trained, but his delegation had never brought up the issue.

61. Mr. HOOD (Australia) stated that the course of the debate had shown quite clearly that there was nothing in the USSR complaint except the opportunity to make a series of irrelevant charges about other matters. Furthermore, the actual terms of the proposed resolution had been so immoderate as to rule it completely out of court.

62. The Australian delegation had therefore voted against the draft resolution.

63. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) explained that his delegation had voted in favour of placing the USSR complaint on the agenda of the sixth session of the General Assembly

because, according to the terms of the United Nations Charter and in particular of Article 35 thereof, the Assembly was competent to deal with it. It had, however, voted against the USSR draft resolution because the text of the Mutual Security Act did not, as the debate had shown, warrant the charge of the Soviet Union that it amounted to aggression and to interference in the internal affairs of other States. Nor had it been proved that the application of the Act had led to aggression or to interference in the affairs of other countries.

64. The statement made by the representative of the United States in the name of his Government made it clear that the interpretation to be placed on the Mutual Security Act was that it was not aggressive nor intended to be the means of intervening in the internal affairs of any State. The statement also represented a pledge by the United States that it would never use the Act for those ends.

65. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) stated that he had voted in favour of the USSR draft resolution because the indisputable evidence adduced in support of it had not been disproved in any manner by the members of the "Atlantic bloc".

66. Mr. HRSEL (Czechoslovakia) had voted in favour of the USSR draft resolution.

67. The discussion had clearly indicated that the United States Act in question legalized espionage and diversionism in the countries of the people's democracies. The Czechoslovak people, which was working for the maintenance of peace throughout the world, was fighting with all its strength against the inciters of a new war and would not allow its great aim of peaceful construction to be destroyed by anyone. It consequently protested against the law enacted by the United States.

68. Mr. ARGUELLO (Nicaragua) had voted against the USSR proposal on the basis of the arguments presented by the United States representative and in the absence of any evidence provided by the sponsors of the proposal.

69. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) had voted against the USSR draft resolution because the charges levelled by the USSR, even if accepted as true, were of the same nature as those put forward against the USSR itself, charges which it had not been able to answer.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.