



INDEX UNIT **MASPE**

Wednesday, 11 December 1951, at 3 p.m.

16 JAN 1952

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668/Rev. 1, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/677) (continued)

[Item 66]*

International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)

[Item 16]*

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF SUB-COMMITTEE 18 (A/C.1/677)

1. The CHAIRMAN called upon the President of the General Assembly to address the Committee in his capacity as Chairman of Sub-Committee 18, established by the First Committee at its 461st meeting.
2. The PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY read the letter he had sent to the Chairman of the First Committee transmitting the memorandum he had prepared as Chairman of Sub-Committee 18. He also read the conclusions of the memorandum.
3. He took the opportunity of expressing publicly his thanks to the four members of the sub-committee who had explained their points of view on each of the important problems before the sub-committee with complete frankness. He also thanked them for the pains they had taken to make it possible to submit a unanimous report. He hoped that the cordial atmosphere in which the sub-committee had worked would be maintained in the First Committee's debates.
4. The CHAIRMAN on behalf of the members of the First Committee thanked the President of the General Assembly for his exertions in conducting the negotiations

in the sub-committee. Having regard to the difficulty of the problems submitted to the sub-committee, the results it had achieved constituted positive progress.

The President of the General Assembly withdrew.

5. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the general debate on the first two items of the Committee's agenda was closed. The memorandum prepared by the Chairman of Sub-Committee 18 did not contain any proposal for an amendment.

6. He therefore felt that the best course would be to discuss the draft resolution (A/C.1/667), paragraph by paragraph, together with the corresponding amendments submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/668/Rev.1).

7. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the Chairman's suggestion regarding the procedure to be adopted.

8. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) suggested that the First Committee might wish to hear the comments of the members of the sub-committee. While such comments would, of course, be in order during the discussion of the preamble of the three-Power draft resolution, it might be of advantage to the Committee to hear the comments of the members of the sub-committee before proceeding to examine the tripartite draft resolution and the USSR amendments, paragraph by paragraph.

9. The CHAIRMAN agreed that the Committee would be interested to hear the comments of the members of the sub-committee. He felt that such comments could be presented during the discussion of the preamble of the three-Power draft resolution and the USSR amendments.

10. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) understood from the Chairman's ruling that he would be in order in dealing with the whole of the memorandum submitted by the President of the General Assembly.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

11. He wished in the first place to express his own thanks and those of his colleagues, the representatives of the United States and France who had participated in the work of the sub-committee, to the President of the General Assembly for having served as Chairman of the sub-committee. He felt that in thanking the President for the courteous, tactful and constructive manner in which he had presided over their deliberations he was speaking for all the members of the sub-committee. Mr. Lloyd also to pay a tribute to the members of the Secretariat who had done their work efficiently and expeditiously.

12. The sub-committee's discussions had been marked by good temper and frankness; there had been no wrangles over procedure and they had brought out the points of agreement and of potential agreement as well as the points where disagreement persisted. The discussions had certainly done no harm; in fact, they had done positive good and he therefore thanked the representatives of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria for their initiative in proposing the sub-committee.

13. The First Committee had now to take stock, dispassionately and factually, of the sub-committee's work in order to avoid raising false or unjustified hopes.

14. The President's memorandum, reflecting the discussions in the sub-committee, clearly brought out three fundamental points of disagreement between the position of the three western Powers and that of the USSR.

15. The first was the Soviet Union proposal for an immediate ban on the atomic bomb to be followed later by the setting up of an international control organ. The Soviet Union delegation rejected the conception of stages put forward in the tripartite draft resolution. Nevertheless, the USSR proposals also involved a succession of stages to achieve the purposes envisaged, the first being the General Assembly decision to prohibit atomic weapons and establish an international control. Mr. Vyshinsky maintained that that decision would create a moral, political and legal obligation on Member States not to use atomic weapons and to stop manufacturing them. However that might be, such a decision by the General Assembly would not of itself bring such a system of control into existence. The working out of a control system would be the task of the proposed commission and would be the second stage in the USSR plan.

16. It might be noted in passing that the USSR amendments proposed that the commission should submit, to the Security Council, by 1 February 1952, a draft convention on, among other things, the international control organ. That date was completely unrealistic. The very matter had been discussed for five years in the United Nations without agreement being reached. Even when the convention had been approved and ratified, there would be further delay before the international control system could be put into operation. The physical establishment of the international control organ would therefore be the third stage in the USSR plan.

17. It was clear that during the period between the declaration of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment and entry into operation of an international control organ, the security of the world, so far as atomic weapons were concerned, would depend solely upon the promises of governments. In view of the lack of mutual confidence among the great Powers, that was unacceptable to the three western Powers.

18. The discussions in the sub-committee had in no way served to bridge that particular gap.

19. The second matter upon which there was disagreement was that the USSR proposals in effect separated atomic weapons from conventional armaments. That separation was unjustified in view of the fact that the devastation caused by flying bombs, guided missiles or other conventional weapons could be as heavy as that caused by atomic attack. The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of conventional armaments must take place concurrently with the establishment of an international control system for the prohibition of atomic weapons. According to the USSR proposals, the western Powers would in effect surrender their chief weapon of defence, leaving to the USSR the use and possession of arms that could serve aggressive purposes. Conventional armaments and atomic weapons must be dealt with together. Both categories must be subject to control. The only difference was that the control of atomic weapons must lead to their abolition.

20. The third fundamental difference between the views of the three western Powers and those of the USSR was the proposal to reduce armaments by one-third. So long as it was not known from what levels of strength the great Powers were reducing their armament and to what levels the reduction would be effected, the proposal was arbitrary and not a contribution to peace. It would ensure to the USSR the maintenance of its supremacy in conventional armaments, thus exaggerating the existing state of disequilibrium and accentuating insecurity. The secrecy surrounding the armed forces of the Soviet Union was in itself a cause of the present tension.

21. With regard to the area of agreement, the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that the four Powers had agreed that a new commission should be established, and that it should be called the "Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission". That commission, consisting of the twelve members of the former Atomic Energy Commission, would submit proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or convention. The draft treaty would be submitted to a world conference.

22. A substantial and useful measure of agreement had been achieved upon those points.

23. The discussions in the sub-committee had also revealed a number of points of potential agreement.

24. For example, the four Powers agreed on the need for an international control organ for all armed forces and armaments, although they were not altogether agreed on the functions of such an organ.

25. With regard to inspection, the three western Powers favoured a system of continuing control. The translation of the word "continuing" into Russian by a word meaning "permanent" had given rise to misunderstanding. Continuing inspection did not, of course, imply permanent supervision of the operations of war factories except, it was true, in the case of atomic energy.

26. With regard to the nations which would have to ratify the convention before it could become operative, there seemed to be a considerable measure of agreement in the sub-committee in the proposition that certain particularly powerful nations would have necessarily to ratify it.

27. The question of the date on which the proposed commission should make its report had also given rise to

discussion. The three Powers would probably now be ready to fix a date for at least the first report of the commission.

28. Summing up the result of the sub-committee's work, it could be said that on the credit side there was the agreement that discussion of the problem should be continued. To that end, a United Nations commission was to explore means to regulate, limit and reduce armaments and, concurrently, to control atomic energy with a view to the prohibition of atomic weapons. In that connexion, and as a further step towards co-operation, it should be emphasized that the three western Powers were ready to accept any plan for atomic energy control that was better or no less effective than the plan already adopted by the majority of the United Nations.

29. The sub-committee's work had undoubtedly helped to lessen the international tension. While it was true that on some essential points disagreement subsisted between

the three western Powers and the USSR, progress had been made in other fields ; above all, the four Powers had agreed upon the machinery which they wished to use, within the framework of the United Nations, for the further discussion of those questions.

30. The three Powers would carefully study the memorandum of the Chairman of Sub-Committee 18 and consider what amendments should be introduced into their draft resolution, in order to embody in it the points upon which agreement had been reached.

31. The CHAIRMAN proposed that at its next meeting the Committee should examine the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667), paragraph by paragraph, and the USSR amendments, taking into consideration the memorandum from the Chairman of Sub-Committee 18. The preamble of the draft resolution would be discussed first.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.