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Chairman: Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/670) (continued)

[Item 66]*

International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)

[Item 16]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. DE PIMENTEL BRANDAO (Brazil) deprecated propaganda speeches which made no constructive contribution to the solution of the problem of regulating armaments. He pointed out that both the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) and the amendments proposed by the USSR (A/C.1/668) were designed to relieve the peoples of the burden of armaments and the fear of war, so that resources might be liberated for reconstruction and economic and social development.

2. The methods suggested by the two drafts differed, however. The joint draft resolution offered a coherent and co-ordinated plan for the universal reduction of armaments and armed forces to levels adequate for defence and for the establishment of a system of effective international control of atomic energy. The USSR draft proposed the absolute prohibition of atomic weapons, strict international control of that prohibition and reduction by one-third of the armaments of the five great Powers within a year.

3. The joint draft resolution was both wise and practical. First, it provided for safeguards to ensure that the agreements reached were carried out ; and, secondly, it sought to set up an organization and a procedure. The USSR amendments, on the other hand, although calling for strict international control to enforce the prohibition of atomic weapons, did not mention control to ensure general disarmament.

4. The directives which the tripartite draft resolution proposed to give the disarmament commission could be summarized as follows :

- (1) Reduction of armaments and armed forces to levels adequate for defence ;
- (2) Progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis ;
- (3) Verification based on international inspection ;
- (4) Control of atomic energy on the basis of the United Nations plan ;
- (5) A system of safeguards against possible violations ;
- (6) Signature of a treaty which would have to be ratified by the great Powers ;
- (7) Formulation of criteria for the reduction and limitation of armaments ;
- (8) Formulation of specific and quantitative limits for each State ;
- (9) Elaboration of methods for determining the composition of national armed forces within the agreed limits.

5. The USSR amendments were less definite and merely stipulated :

- (1) That the control organ should work within the framework of the Security Council ;
- (2) That the census of conventional armaments should be effected merely by means of a declaration within a period of one month ; the organ of control would decide whether inspection should be carried out ;
- (3) That there should be immediate inspection of the production and stock-piling of atomic weapons.

6. The USSR draft amendments were thus less comprehensive than the three-Power draft. Nevertheless, with good will and proof of good faith, agreement might be reached.

7. In that connexion, the Brazilian delegation, while honouring the generous motives which had inspired the delegations of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria to submit their joint draft resolution, could not but recall that the four great Powers had already met for the same purpose without result.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

8. In view of all those factors, if the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670) were adopted, it would have to be subject to the understanding that :

(1) Any agreement reached by the four Powers would be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations ;

(2) In seeking such agreement the four Powers would bear in mind the various views expressed by the members of the First Committee in the course of the debate.

9. Mr. FRANCO FRANCO (Dominican Republic) said that his delegation could not remain indifferent to the serious problem dealt with in the proposal of France, the United States and the United Kingdom. The settlement of that vitally important question was of particular concern to the small Powers, which were equal in law, but seemingly limited in interests. It was to be hoped that the solution would be as complete and effective as possible.

10. It had at all events been generally realized at San Francisco in 1945 that one of the prerequisites for any joint effort was good faith. That axiom should be kept continually in mind. The true aim of the United Nations was to establish, organize and maintain peace in all its fundamental aspects. That could only be achieved by ensuring the international solidarity, co-operation and security necessitated by the co-existence and interdependence of nations. History was there as an imperious reminder that peace could only be brought about through the reconciliation of divergent interests. Since 1946, mankind seemed to be moving towards an abyss. A policy of mystery, isolation, coercion and violence had caused the atmosphere of mutual confidence prevailing in 1945 to disappear, and given the signal for the armaments race.

11. It was undeniable that the negotiation of regional agreements, rearmament, the organization of forces, in short the whole defensive effort, had in existing circumstances become factors as indispensable to the maintenance of peace as were good will and a spirit of conciliation.

12. It was obvious that general and global disarmament was an ideal which could not be achieved in the near future. Nevertheless the tension might be diminished if an agreement could be reached on a sufficiently effective plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced, progressive and controlled reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.

13. The three-Power plan was of great value and significance and should be accepted forthwith at least as a point of departure. All amendments proposed now or hereafter should be examined objectively in the light of it. With that plan it should be possible to achieve an international disarmament convention.

14. To be effective, the implementation of such a convention must be subject to international inspection. The control organ would have to be set up in a spirit of realism ; in carrying out its task it must not be impeded by excessive susceptibilities as to national sovereignty. The principle of the indivisibility of international security must not obscure the right and duty of national self-defence ; but the inspecting body must be completely international and independent of all partisan influence.

15. The delegation of the Dominican Republic would support the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/667).

16. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the slow pace of the debate was an indication of the delegations' desire to face their heavy responsibilities.

17. He had sought to find in the statements of the three Powers, and the oratorical strategy of the USSR representative, encouraging points of resemblance between the two arguments.

(1) Both sides affirmed that disarmament was necessary, and that truth should be kept in mind throughout the discussion.

(2) Both sides demanded strict international inspection. It remained to be seen whether both sides interpreted " strict " in the same way.

(3) The principle of a single disarmament conference was also advocated.

18. There was of course no agreement on the structure or the working of the inspection machinery. It would, however, seem possible to reach some agreement on the disarmament commission's role. In any event, the principle of the juridical unity of the disarmament plan must be accepted, for, if one part of the convention were to be rejected, the rest would inevitably become void. Finally there remained the principle of a census.

19. The USSR draft amendments were marked by emphasis on a sensational and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons. The three Powers, on the other hand, were willing to prohibit atomic weapons, but had no faith in the effectiveness of a mere declaration. They rightly considered that the prohibition could not be separated from effective inspection.

20. The USSR delegation was opposed to the principle of stages, and seemed to fear that, once begun, the undertaking would not be completed. Yet, as the representatives of the western Powers had said on many occasions, the process was one and indivisible through all the stages.

21. In conventional armaments, the tripartite plan proposed criteria for a reduction of armaments which were wiser and more flexible than the one-third reduction the Soviet Union proposed.

22. It might be possible to take up the Australian representative's suggestion (452nd meeting) that the disarmament conference should deal with both atomic and conventional weapons. That was a question on which the western Powers had not yet given their opinion.

23. Other recent suggestions deserved study. Nevertheless, there remained a deep gulf between the two " blocs ". The crucial point was : was the USSR willing to accept on its territory the inspection and verification implicit in the prohibition of atomic weapons ?

24. The USSR delegation proposed the creation of a control body within the framework of the Security Council. If that meant that any decision would be subject to the unanimity rule, that is, to the veto, the control body would be impotent.

25. Mr. Belaunde was convinced of the deep desire of the peoples of the United States, Great Britain and France for peace. The western Powers had nothing to gain by a conflict. On the other hand, the progress of USSR influence since 1945 on the " friends " by which it sought to surround itself made the entire world uneasy, and the small Powers especially so.

26. The delegation of Peru would support the proposal of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670) that the four great Powers should seek a basis for agreement among themselves.

27. Mr. GONZALEZ (Venezuela) said that since 1946 the United Nations had considered the disarmament question every year, without ever reaching an agreement. During that time international relations had constantly deteriorated, the sense of insecurity had increased and the West had been forced to take part in an armaments race the reasons for which were often misunderstood by public opinion.

28. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 had formulated recommendations on the limitation of armaments, but less than ten years after the second of those conferences, war had broken out between States which were even bound by the same civilization. After 1918, the League of Nations had been born; there had been the agreements on naval disarmament signed in Washington in 1922, and in London in 1930, and the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1932. The Disarmament Conference had failed in 1933. In 1934, Japan had denounced the Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armaments, and rearmament and war had followed once more.

29. In the circumstances, it might well be feared that the fatal cycle would begin again. The Venezuelan delegation would therefore support any attempt to regulate and reduce armaments, such as the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667).

30. It was obvious, nevertheless, that unless the joint draft resolution brought about agreement among the four great Powers, it would remain a dead letter; it was therefore necessary above all to restore mutual confidence. That was one of the tasks of the small Powers.

31. The Venezuelan delegation viewed with sympathy the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Syria and Pakistan (A/C.1/670), which sought to make possible a new exchange of views among the four great Powers, and hoped that the recent developments in Korea would be a good omen and would make it possible for an agreement to be reached.

32. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) wished to state in the first place that the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/667) did not indicate clearly when atomic weapons were to be prohibited; it would be a question of trusting the word of the western Powers, as Mr. Acheson had asked (447th meeting). Mr. Acheson had added that the proposed disarmament commission should base its work on the Baruch plan, although it was well known that that plan did not provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

33. It could thus be concluded that the United States ignored the will of the peoples of the world, who had demanded the prohibition of atomic weapons and strict control over that prohibition.

34. On the other hand, the USSR had submitted proposals (A/C.1/668) for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the regulation and reduction of all types of armaments and for supervision of those measures within the framework of the Security Council. That was a practical and expeditious plan, providing in the first instance for a reduction in the armaments of the five great Powers who were primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and who, at the same time, had the greatest armaments.

35. If the USSR proposals were accepted, they would lead to an immediate relaxation of international tension, a reduction of military budgets and, therefore, further construction for peaceful ends. The "Anglo-Saxon bloc" had rejected such realistic proposals in defiance of the clearly expressed views of the peoples of the world.

36. In an interview published in *Pravda* on 6 October 1951, Prime Minister Stalin had said that the USSR was in favour of the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of production of such weapons, control over their prohibition and the use of existing atomic bombs for peaceful purposes. The plan set forth in the tripartite draft resolution was intended on the contrary to increase the production and stock-piling of atomic bombs in the United States, for aggressive ends. Those ends, of course, were concealed behind general declarations on disarmament.

37. It was no secret, in fact, that the rulers of the United States wished to drop atomic bombs on the USSR. That had been admitted by government officials. Moreover, the great trusts made considerable profits from atomic bombs, and the United States Government has already appropriated \$ 6,500 million for the production of atomic energy.

38. The United States was trying to pin responsibility for the armaments race on the USSR. It had been given the lie by the USSR proposals, under which the competent commission would be required to submit to the Security Council by 1 February 1952 a draft convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the utilization of existing atomic bombs for civilian purposes and the establishment of control over the prohibition of atomic bombs.

39. Paragraph 4 of the operative part of the three-Power draft resolution referred to the stages in which the reduction of armaments should be carried out, and in that connexion Mr. Acheson had said (447th meeting) that the transition from one stage to the next would be a simple administrative matter. That view was clearly unacceptable, since the transition would affect the vital interests of States and would therefore be a political matter. Moreover, the United States position in that respect was unacceptable because it relegated the prohibition of atomic weapons to the background.

40. Under the terms of the tripartite draft resolution the disarmament conference would meet as soon as, in the judgment of the commission, any part of its programme was ready for submission to governments. That approach might well delay the calling of the conference, whereas the USSR amendments rightly provided that the conference should be called not later than 1 June 1952.

41. Those who claimed that the measures set forth in the tripartite draft resolution were defensive left out of consideration the development of the United States air force and navy, the expansion of the network of American bases around the USSR and the conclusion of a series of aggressive pacts with the States adjacent to the USSR and the peoples democracies. Mr. Jessup had claimed at the 455th meeting that the United States had no more than a million and a half men under arms. He should be reminded that President Truman had told Congress that the United States had more than doubled its effectives and that there were to be three and a half million men under arms, not including two million in the reserve. Thus the United States army was expanding every year; and for aggressive ends, since it was a matter of common knowledge that no country wished to attack the United States.

42. As against that, the armed forces of the Soviet Union were no greater than they had been before the war and were only half the size of the combined forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. That conclusively demonstrated the aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty. The plan for an "Atlantic army", which was to comprise sixty divisions by 1952, had been formulated in Brussels in December 1950. The recent efforts at Rome

to expand that army flatly contradicted the speeches on disarmament of Mr. Acheson, Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman, and the draft resolution they had submitted (A/C.1/667).

43. Most of the small States had clearly said that in the final analysis a reduction in armaments depended on agreement between the five great Powers. In addition, the representatives of Egypt, Iraq and Ethiopia had said that atomic weapons should be prohibited at once. Some representatives had said that there was nothing new in the USSR proposals. It was true that the USSR had submitted them on a previous occasion; but they were so important and urgent that it was impossible to pass them over in silence. Other representatives had expressed the view that a reduction in armaments by one-third was insufficient. Such a measure would be a first step, which would enable additional reductions to be made in the future.

44. The peoples of the world had declared for the prohibition of atomic weapons, for strict supervision over that prohibition and for a reduction in armaments. Adoption of the USSR amendments would make those aims possible.

45. The tripartite draft resolution was a propaganda manoeuvre intended to drown, in a sea of words, the problem of disarmament. Its object was to make any practical measure of disarmament impossible by introducing the ideas of census and stages and by imposing conditions.

46. The Byelorussian delegation supported the USSR amendments (A/C.1/668). Without them the three-Power draft resolution would fail to solve the problems of disarmament, prohibition of atomic weapons and supervision of that prohibition.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.