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Chairman: Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/670) (continued)

[Item 66]*

International control of atomic energy: report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)

[Item 16]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) first pointed out that Mr. Acheson's statement (447th meeting) that the plan presented by the three western Powers (A/C.1/667) was a great new opportunity for world peace had shown itself to be unfounded. But the discussion would at least have had the merit of showing who had wanted peace and the means to safeguard it, and who had been inspired solely by demagoguery.

2. The United States delegation had also claimed that the three-Power draft resolution contained something new. In point of fact, the so-called disarmament plan of President Truman and Mr. Acheson had proved an unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvre. He quoted extracts from the *Washington Post* and the *Christian Science Monitor* to show that even the United States Press had realized that public opinion had not been misled by President Truman's so-called disarmament plan. That was why it had been necessary to revise and alter the proposals.

3. The three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) could not be understood unless the following three points were taken into account:

- (1) The foreign policy of the United States of America;
- (2) The propaganda effect the three-Power draft resolution was intended to produce;
- (3) The knowledge of its authors that that plan could not serve as the framework for real disarmament.

4. The draft resolution meant no more than that the United States of America had come to realize that world opinion ardently desired peace. They had therefore submitted a propaganda plan for peace.

5. Was it necessary to recall that at the very moment when Mr. Acheson had been proposing his disarmament plan, Chancellor Adenauer had been invited to Paris to reconstitute the *Wehrmacht*, against the wishes of the German people? At the very same moment Mr. Acheson had also been preparing the speech he was to make in Rome on the rearmament of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty organization and on the sanctions to be applied to recalcitrant States. It was not surprising, therefore, that there had been some talk of the paradox of proposing disarmament at a time when rearmament was going on on a bigger scale than ever before in time of peace.

6. The representative of Poland stated that the plan submitted by the three western Powers was not a disarmament plan. It passed over the fundamental questions. It made no mention of the immediate ban on the use of the atom bomb, although the fact that more than 500 million people had signed the Stockholm Appeal proved that the peoples of the world were in favour of such a ban. As regards the control of atomic energy, the plan submitted by the three Powers relied on the considerations previously set out in the Baruch plan, namely to ensure for the United States of America the monopoly of atomic energy and the control of the atomic energy reserves of the other States. The ban on the use of atomic energy for military purposes and the question of its control had been relegated to the background and wrapped up in nebulous formulas which subjected those problems to vague conditions. That being so, the adoption of the three-Power draft resolution would merely mean an extension of the network of the United States bases round the Soviet Union and an increase in armament expenditure and a concentration of atom bombs in the United States.

7. Moreover, the three-Power plan laid down conditions for the reduction of armaments which would result in making the control of atomic energy serve the interests of the United States of America. The plan provided for disarmament to be accomplished by stages; but only the

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

...age, relating to the census, was regarded seriously. In other words, once it had obtained the information it wanted, the United States of America would be able to go on rearming. Furthermore, the criteria suggested by Mr. Acheson for the reduction of armaments, and particularly the fixing of a ceiling, would give an overwhelming majority to the States of the "Atlantic bloc" and the Pan-American States, as compared with populous States like India and China.

8. It was not irrelevant to point out that when the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch, had invoked at the 454th meeting the authority of Lenin, he had distorted the meaning of the quotation by failing to mention the context.

9. It was not easy to believe in the sincerity of the views put forward by the three western Powers in their draft resolution when, at that very moment, the States of the "Atlantic bloc" were pursuing an encirclement policy against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, and were envisaging the creation of a new *Wehrmacht*, and when the United States was preparing to supply its partners in the "Atlantic bloc" with atom bombs.

10. How could Mr. Acheson claim that the present international tension was due to the alleged mystery in which the Soviet Union and the people's democracies veiled themselves when the United States Press inveighed against the fact that in 1951 as many as 39,000 scientists, artists and athletes from the Soviet Union had taken part in international meetings abroad and when the United States Government did not allow its own citizens to visit the Soviet Union?

11. Mr. Wierblowski declared that there was no doubt that the fight of the masses for peace was daily gaining strength in all countries. Unquestionably it was that firm attitude of the peoples which had obliged the United States of America to conceal its intentions.

12. The United States representative affirmed that by attending the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers in the spring of 1951, his country had provided clear proof of its desire for peace. It was common knowledge, however, that it was the Soviet Union which had requested that a conference of foreign ministers be convened and had forced the three western Powers to come together, and that it was their refusal to discuss the aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty which had made it impossible to convene the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

13. The figures quoted by the United States representative were not convincing. For, even if 1946 had seen the demobilization of land forces in the United States of America, it had also seen the development of air-power, of United States bases abroad and of atomic weapons, all in connexion with the theory of a lightning war. In reality, the United States' intentions were no more peaceful in 1951 than they had been in 1946. When the United States of America had first dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima, President Truman had stated that the secret of the bomb would not be divulged. Ever since, the United States of America had used the bomb as a weapon of blackmail to support its foreign policy. And it was for similar reasons that Mr. Acheson still continued to oppose a ban on the atom bomb.

14. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had again submitted proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for a strict control of that prohibition. Those proposals placed all States on an equal footing. The supposition was justified that any country which rejected them

wished to reserve to itself the possibility of using the atom bomb.

15. Mr. Jessup had tried to distort the USSR proposal which, in fact, provided for the simultaneous prohibition of the atom bomb and the establishment of control of that prohibition, and thus avoided a waiting period during which States might take advantage of the absence of control. Moreover, the Soviet Union's proposal provided that the convention would apply to all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not.

16. The three western Powers recognized that the world was being crushed under the burden of armaments. Nevertheless, in recommending a plan to be carried out in stages, they were doing nothing to lighten that burden. The USSR, on the other hand, was proposing a concrete plan for the reduction of the armaments of the five great Powers within a period of one year, and also envisaged the establishment of an international organ under the Security Council.

17. It was obvious to all that appropriate control of the reduction of armaments and of the prohibition of atomic weapons would have to be established. In that connexion, it was worth recalling that during the inter-war period the United States had opposed the effective control of disarmament and had recommended simply reliance on good faith. The present three-Power proposal did provide for control of the reduction of armaments, but offered no genuine solution of the problem since the leaders of the United States had said that, if the control plan they had proposed was adopted, the final decision would rest with the Senate of the United States.

18. In presenting its amendments (A/C.1/668) to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) the USSR had once again demonstrated its desire for peace. Its amendments could transform the three-Power draft resolution into a genuine proposal for disarmament. If they were rejected, the three-Power draft resolution would merely be an expression of the power politics and rearmament policy of the "Atlantic bloc".

19. The representative of Poland recalled that disarmament had already been considered on a number of occasions by the United Nations, although the problem had never before been so urgent. If the First Committee's discussion resulted in the adoption of a concrete disarmament project, it might mark the beginning of a new period of co-operation. Failure would, however, have repercussions on every aspect of the work of the United Nations. The USSR amendments could give the debate clear and unmistakable significance, provided the United States allowed the other States the possibility of expressing their views freely.

20. Mr. OCAMPOS (Paraguay) said that the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) was, in the opinion of his delegation, a constructive contribution to disarmament and international peace and security. It had, in any case, the merit of being well-timed psychologically, for it restored hope to the peoples of the world at a time when international tension had reached a culminating point.

21. Some slight degree of confidence was obviously essential if international tension was to be relaxed. Immediately after the war the western Powers had substantially reduced their armaments, thus demonstrating their good faith and their desire for peace. That desire, however, had been taken for weakness—even for a type of weakness inherent in capitalism—and an attempt had been made to take advantage of it. The western Powers had thus been

compelled to rearm, and that rearmament was the underlying cause of the existing tension.

22. A new effort to achieve disarmament was being made by abolishing the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments, which were to be replaced by a single body, the disarmament commission. The new disarmament commission would have to make proposals; but principles for its guidance would have to be laid down so as to avoid unnecessary discussion. Such directives should not overlook the final objective—total disarmament, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the elimination of any aggression.

23. Obviously, the ideal method would be for the great Powers simultaneously to accept the prohibition of atomic weapons and the limitation of their armaments within the framework of an international control system. In the absence of such agreement, the facts would have to be faced, and the armaments race would have to be considered dispassionately. In that situation, disarmament could only be achieved by stages within the framework of a control system covering armaments of all types. The draft resolution submitted by the three western Powers had the merit of being realistic.

24. The delegation of Paraguay supported the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) and hoped that it would provide the basis for new endeavours to achieve peaceful co-operation in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

25. Sirdar Mohammad NAIM (Afghanistan) said that Afghanistan, which had itself suffered from invasion and aggression during the nineteenth century, understood and had a wholehearted appreciation of the value of peace and freedom.

26. The subject before the Committee was of the greatest importance to the future of mankind. There was still time to choose whether the world was to continue on the road to destruction or to lay the foundations of a better future. The three-Power proposal for the limitation of armaments and the Soviet Union's amendments had shown that, although new elements had been brought forward, common ground was far from having been reached. Though everyone desired peace, political tension had nevertheless reached a dangerous and culminating point. It seemed inevitable that the armaments race would drag the world into war and result in the end of civilization.

27. Unfortunately, the debate had not yet led to any narrowing of the gap between the opposing points of view. For that reason Sirdar Mohammad Naim supported the proposal of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670) for the establishment of a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to prepare a draft resolution for consideration by the First Committee.

28. Finally, the representative of Afghanistan stressed, as the representative of Lebanon had already done, the fact that one of the causes of existing difficulties was the increasing poverty of a large part of mankind, which led to the struggle between classes, divided society, and might well plunge the world into disaster. Disarmament alone would not be sufficient to achieve genuine and lasting peace. It was equally essential and urgent to take action to end the misery and poverty of the oppressed part of mankind.

29. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) considered that there must be some common ground between the United States, France

and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the USSR on the other hand. That view had been confirmed by the words spoken at the 455th meeting by the representative of the United States.

30. However, the manner in which the debate had developed hardly encouraged the hope that the great Powers might reach agreement. The delegation of Indonesia would be to some extent reassured if the representative of the USSR could indicate, as had been done by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, the points on which he believed an understanding might be reached.

31. It emerged from the debate that one of the main difficulties was the choice of the procedure to be followed to achieve the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed forces and armaments. If no agreement could be reached on such questions of procedure, it was to be feared that the solution of all other problems would remain impossible.

32. There was, however, common ground even on that very delicate problem: both parties were determined to prohibit atomic weapons and were equally determined to reduce armaments and armed forces. Mr. Palar believed that the greatest stumbling-block was mistrust. The Soviet Union believed that atomic weapons were an instrument of aggression which might be used by the United States in order to subjugate the Soviet Union, whilst the western European countries feared the Soviet Union's preponderance in conventional armaments. The only way of achieving a solution was by mutual concessions.

33. Discussions such as those which had taken place in the First Committee did not, perhaps, create a favourable atmosphere. Accordingly, the delegation of Indonesia supported the proposal, submitted by the representative of India, to appoint a sub-committee which would investigate the possibilities of harmonizing the three-Power proposal with such amendments as had been or might subsequently be proposed.

34. The delegation of Indonesia would support the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria if the Committee deemed it necessary to ask the President of the General Assembly to act as chairman of the proposed sub-committee. It was anxious to know, however, whether in the opinion of the two parties themselves there were any possibilities of agreement which might serve as a basis for the work of such a sub-committee.

35. ANDRAOS Bey (Egypt) said that in his previous statement (450th meeting) he had stressed two points. In the first place, there was some common ground between the three-Power proposal and the proposal of the Soviet Union, and, for that reason, items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda (A/C.1/666) should be examined simultaneously with item 5. The second was that the prohibition of the atom bomb should be considered as a reality, and not as a remote and utopian ideal. These two points had been included in the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670).

36. In reply to the representative of China, who had accused him of not following his own reasoning far enough to demand the prohibition of all armaments, and to the representative of Lebanon, who had expressed the same idea when he said that even without weapons men would fight, if need be with their fists, the representative of Egypt pointed out that the Committee was not considering a proposal to outlaw war. The point at issue was to secure

some measure of disarmament if that was possible. If war could not be prevented, at least its risks and damages should be limited.

37. In any event, the Committee had before it the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. But had the proposed consultations any prospect of success? To tell the truth, the delegation of Egypt felt some scepticism on the matter. As, however, it wished to see constructive work done and to give its support to any efforts to achieve positive results, it would support the draft resolution. It wished to suggest to its sponsors, however, that a time-limit might be set for the work of the proposed sub-committee. In addition, it should be noted that any vote taken in the sub-committee would not be on even terms, since there were three Powers against one.

38. Pointing out that what he had to say was of a general character, Andraos Bey declared that two ideas had emerged in the course of the debate. The first was that before the task of disarmament could be usefully undertaken, it was necessary either to achieve moral disarmament or to solve the problems at the root of the existing tension. Was it not precisely because of the prevailing atmosphere of tension and suspicion and because of the fear of armed conflict, however, that efforts were being made to limit the risks of war by disarmament? The second idea was that if

armaments were reduced the economies thus effected could be used for humanitarian aims. That idea, noble and just though it might be, was nevertheless liable to complicate matters: the most urgent thing was to secure disarmament itself. It was, moreover, doubtful whether opinion was yet prepared to accept such an idea, though it clearly conformed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

39. In conclusion, the representative of Egypt stressed how important any results achieved by the United Nations in the field of disarmament would be, not only for the peoples of the United Nations, but also for those not yet represented in the Organization.

40. Mr. PHARAON (Saudi Arabia) said that the draft resolution presented jointly by the representatives of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria constituted the only possible way of achieving fruitful results. It was drafted so clearly and simply as to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding. The Committee would make an error fraught with grave consequences if it did not forthwith give the resolution its full support. The only effective solution was an understanding between the great Powers. If that was not achieved, the world would be irrevocably dragged along towards a new world conflict.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.