

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**



FIRST COMMITTEE 449th
MEETING

SIXTH SESSION

Wednesday, 21 November 1951, at 10.30 a.m.

Official Records

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

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Chairman: Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Carlos Blanco (Cuba), the Vice-Chairman, presided.

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943 and A/C.1/667) (*continued*)

[Item 66]*

International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (*continued*)

[Item 16]*

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) said that the expectation which such a promising introduction as that of the draft resolution presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/667) would justify was immediately dispelled by the emphasis placed thereafter on the complexities and difficulties involved and on the necessity for well thought-out and unprecipitated stages. The draft resolution failed to make it clear when and how the transition from the first stage of disclosure and verification to the actual regulation, limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments, announced in the title of the draft resolution, would take place. Mr. Acheson had attempted to cover that point, after it had appeared that a decision as to the adequacy of information received about other countries would rest with the very countries which owned the most dangerous weapon, by saying that the transitions to a further stage would be a matter of administrative decision for the so-called commission controlling and administering the disarmament agreement. Apparently, one commission was to consider the possibility of progress and stages up to the possible convening of the disarmament conference, which in turn would establish another commission which would be the only one with a right to decide on the various stages. At the same time, the resolution did not propose any measures which would really implement the limitation and reduction of armaments.

2. In view of the stress placed by the French delegation (447th meeting) on secrecy as a cause of international tension and fear, it was strange that the draft resolution did everything to preserve secrecy as long as possible, leaving disclo-

sure as regards atomic weapons, the real cause of fear throughout the world, to the remote last stage. Moreover, the sponsors of the proposal had made it clear that they still had not abandoned the old Baruch-Lilienthal-Acheson plan which neither provided for nor foresaw prohibition of atomic weapons and was completely out of date as regards its attempt to keep the presumed monopoly of atomic weapons for the United States, as the recent words of Generalissimo Stalin had made eminently clear.

3. Nobody would be misled by proposals based on such a plan, demanding acceptance by all countries as an indispensable prerequisite, nor by the suggestion that that plan should serve unless or until a better or no less effective system could be devised. Reference could have been made to the proposals aiming at a real and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, an effective international control and the immediate putting into effect without stages of such prohibition and control. Proposals to this effect had been repeatedly submitted to the United Nations.

4. The draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States did not even mention a question so important to disarmament as that of military bases. Analysis of the proposal showed that the sponsors did not want to achieve limitation and reduction of armaments but wanted instead to carry on the senseless armaments race and their preparations for a new war.

5. Not only were the proposals conditioned by complicated and equivocal reservations which prevented the prohibition of atomic weapons, but in addition they were conditioned by the vain hope that the United States aggression in Korea would achieve its criminal objectives. If the ruling circles of the United States were sincerely concerned with disarmament and world peace, they would first have to cease their aggression in Korea.

6. Moreover, the three-Power draft resolution did not take into consideration the principal responsibility of the great Powers in regard to peace and security and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

7. After stressing the universal demand for peace, Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakartova concluded that the real objective of the three-Power proposal was to mislead world public opinion and to drown the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons in a flood of words.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

8. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) observed that while it might seem absurdly unrealistic to talk about disarmament while fighting against aggression was in progress, consideration of the question was nevertheless wise since, if agreement could be reached on limitation of armaments, that very agreement would contribute to the easing of political tension and simplify the solution of some of the political problems dividing the world. On the other hand it seemed clear that disarmament negotiations were not likely to be successful, without attempting at least the beginning of political settlement. An obvious essential was to stop the fighting in Korea, which had begun with the North Korean aggression, condemned as such by the vast majority of the United Nations. A settlement in Germany and Austria and elsewhere was also desirable.

9. Mr. Pearson considered that the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) provided a solid foundation for progress in the vitally important field of effective disarmament. It was difficult to believe that any member of the Committee could object to the principles of that proposal though there might be differences of opinion over its details. It was perfectly obvious that the draft resolution could not go into all the details involved.

10. He therefore hoped that the principles embodied in the proposal would be adopted and the new disarmament commission would be established to begin its work at once.

11. The good faith of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was questioned in the USSR draft resolution (A/1962). As current Chairmann of the North Atlantic Conference, Mr. Pearson declared that the effort to build up power for collective self-defence and the hope to achieve agreement on effective disarmament through the United Nations were two parts of the same policy, designed to ensure peace and security for all.

12. Far from preventing or making more difficult the type of agreement sought in the joint draft resolution, the confidence gained by Member States by the increase of their defensive strength through collective action should make it easier for them to negotiate a settlement of political difficulties which if achieved, would make some of that military strength unnecessary. That course, however, was only a second best, much less desirable than the universal collective security which it was still hoped to achieve through the United Nations, and one step of which would be acceptance of and acting upon the joint proposal.

13. It was precisely because the strength of the western Powers was increasing that the latter took very seriously the proposal before the Committee, and hoped to avoid wasting on armaments the resources which could be used to raise the standard of living of peoples throughout the world.

14. The Canadian delegation attached the greatest importance to setting up without delay the necessary machinery for disarmament negotiations either in the form envisaged by the joint proposal or in some other form. It supported the idea of finding certain general criteria for the maximum size of armed forces and the maximum percentage of national production that any nation could devote to equipping its forces, in each case with a ceiling.

15. It was desirable that the proposed disarmament commission's terms of reference should not preclude nor prejudice consideration, within the agreed principle, of any serious and practicable proposals that might be put forward from any quarter. The question of an arms census and of verification on a continuing basis must also be dealt with at the beginning, but that need not imply postponement of

consideration of other important questions, and could well include the question of military bases abroad. The commission could create committees to deal simultaneously with these various aspects of the over-all problem.

16. It was impossible to take very seriously resolutions involving only paper declarations. The crux of the matter lay in effective guarantees and controls which would give to all parties the assurance that any treaty which was negotiated would be carried through. Governments responsible for the security of their peoples could not accept any undertaking to disarm merely on the strength of unilateral statements from other governments that they too would disarm. Reduction of armaments could be achieved, therefore, only if independent international bodies for the continuing inspection and verification of each government's action could be created. The acceptance of such adequate international controls with limitations on its sovereign power was the test of whether a government was or was not sincere in making a proposal of the kind under discussion. If agreement could not first be reached on the questions of inspection and control, there would be no agreement on any effective limitation of armaments or on prohibition of any armaments.

17. The whole purpose of the United Nations control, applied fairly to all countries, was to ensure that there could be no bad faith on anybody's part, and that it would be possible to proceed from the easiest to the most difficult stages with a minimum of delay. Stages were inevitable, since no effective disarmament agreement could be implemented overnight. Moreover, the advance represented by each step involving a certain risk would simultaneously promote the growth of confidence. It was of course essential that the stages should be carefully planned so as to provide an equitable balance of risks and safeguards on the two sides into which, unfortunately, the United Nations was currently divided. Once this realistic principle was accepted, the USSR delegation, if it was seriously interested in disarmament, could make its own suggestions concerning appropriate stages in the disarmament commission.

18. Mr. PAIAR (Indonesia) recalled that when the joint draft resolution was first introduced, many people who believed in the sincerity of the three Powers, wondered whether the USSR would accept the proposal contained therein. Mr. Acheson's able speech at the 447th meeting might have opened the way to a common meeting ground or to the possibility of an exchange and reconciliation of ideas in certain fields.

19. There were three points which clearly showed the common meeting ground of the two parties. First, both parties had now agreed that the Security Council should play a decisive role in the efforts towards the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces; secondly, the proposed regulation and limitation should be considered in a world conference which would include all the nations desiring to participate; and thirdly, there could be no more doubt that both parties agreed on the necessity of the prohibition of atomic weapons. Certainly, the methods envisaged by both parties for realizing the ultimate achievement of their objectives were not always the same but the goals remained definitely the same.

20. The people of the world realized that they should not allow their expectations to rise too high because many unfavourable circumstances could influence, endanger and even halt developments into the desired direction. However, they hoped that their expectations would prove in the near future to have been justified.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.