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Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Friday, 25 January 1957, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. BELAUNDE

(Peru)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces  
and all armaments: conclusion of an international convention (treaty)  
on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen  
and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament  
Commission [22] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Walker	(Australia)
Mr. Kuznetsov	(USSR)
Mr. Hoch	(France)

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REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS: CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (DC.83; A/C.1/783, 784; A/C.1/L.160, L.161, L.162, L.163, L.164) [Agenda item 22] (continued)

Mr. WALKER (Australia): In the light of past experiences it is not surprising that the main accent in the early part of 1956 in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, in the Commission itself, and in the exchanges which took place between the heads of the United States and Soviet Governments, should have been concentrated not so much on comprehensive plans or provisions of a disarmament treaty, but rather upon such first steps as might be feasible immediately.

In our view this accent on what might be practicable under present circumstances, was the right one. If it is so difficult to achieve political settlements in present conditions, I believe it is right to think that the prospects of achieving political settlements could be enhanced by initial steps in the disarmament field, creating an atmosphere of greater confidence between the great nations of the world.

For this reason and because, also, of the intrinsic merit which we saw in them, the Australian Government welcomed the proposals put forward by the United States in the Disarmament Sub-Committee last year concerning initial steps for demonstration of inspection methods, for joint technical study, and for first levels of reduced armaments. We felt at the time that the approach adopted by the United States was a realistic one and that the United States proposals offered the best basis for discussion and further negotiation.

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At the same time, in the Sub-Committee last year a revised comprehensive programme was put forward jointly by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom. This Anglo-French paper, a "proposed synthesis" of major plans previously submitted in the Sub-Committee, outlined a comprehensive disarmament agreement in three stages. The final stage, which included the prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, was to be carried out after certain outstanding political questions had been settled. There has been no doubt in our mind that the Anglo-French paper represents a magnificent achievement in terms of welding together in a fair way, which would safeguard the security of all, the main measures which would be required in working out a full-scale disarmament programme. The United Nations owes a great debt to the brilliant work of the representative of France in this field, Mr. Moch, who was so largely responsible for the conception of the proposed synthesis and for the intricate dovetailing of its provisions. Australia certainly supports the proposed synthesis as the ideal towards which the United Nations must strive.

Numerous comprehensive plans have also been submitted over the years by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has expressed itself on various matters which might be undertaken as part of a first-phase programme. It has also announced from time to time various reductions in the Soviet armed forces. I shall return to consider the Soviet position in greater detail a little later in this statement.

As I have said, during 1956 the accent was concentrated largely on first-phase aspects of disarmament, on so-called "confidence-building measures". The discussions in the Sub-Committee, and later in the Disarmament Commission, following the United States first-phase programme, showed that the Soviet Government was not prepared to look at these proposals as part of a package, and, instead, concentrated criticism of a marked hostility and bitterness against the various parts of the United States first-phase proposals.

The situation since last July has no doubt precluded any serious work in the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee. But, as I see it, we in this Committee have been facing a new situation in which the great Powers have asked us to consider primarily not a comprehensive programme which, recent experience indeed has shown, would be idealistic in present circumstances, not even a first-phase programme of which the parts would form an integral part of the whole, but, instead, to

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consider various projects which bear upon disarmament, projects which might be adopted in some cases singly, and in other cases as part of a small series of related proposals. For example, the Soviet proposals which appear in document A/3366 of 17 November 1956, and which the Soviet representative repeated in his statement before this Committee on 14 January, appear to me -- and I am able to say no more than this -- to fall into this category; that is to say, the seven Soviet proposals contained in that document are all offered separately and the implementation of no single one seems to be explicitly tied in with the implementation of any other, although there is a very general mention of over-all control as the last proposal in the Soviet list. Again, the United States proposals which Mr. Lodge put forward on 14 January, and which are now set out in document A/C.1/783, are also mainly individual proposals, although the proposals concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons tests are quite closely linked together -- and indeed, rightly so.

I hope that the Committee will permit me time to make a few brief comments on the Soviet Union proposals contained in document A/3366 which, I take it from the statement of the leader of the Soviet Union delegation, remain the basis of the Soviet Union's position as it is being presented to this session of the General Assembly.

The first Soviet proposal deals with the reduction of the number of men under arms.

The Australian attitude towards reductions of military power is a straightforward one; we consider such reductions a good thing in principle, although we have considerable doubts as to the real effect of mere reductions of manpower in relation to modern weapons development. We do not think that reductions of numerical strengths of armed forces should be regulated in isolation from the reduction of the equipment of war which the armed forces of the various great Powers have at their disposal. We feel that reductions of manpower should be considered further in the Sub-Committee in relation to equipment of war, and methods will have to be devised for controlling the weapons aspects of this problem. This, of course, may be done in various ways. Some suggest that budgetary and financial controls might prove satisfactory and sufficient.

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Our feeling, however, is that in the present state of tension in the world, announced reductions would not create any real feeling of confidence unless policed by direct observations carried out under proper conditions by an effective international control organ. Budgets have a habit of being peculiarly imprecise and indefinite, and expenditure which appears intended for one purpose can, in different ways, easily be directed to other purposes. The Soviet budget provides a notorious example of this.

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From Australia's point of view it is also essential that any acceptable disarmament formula fixing the size of armed forces should take into account essential strategical considerations in addition to economic, political and demographic factors. This is particularly important to a country like Australia in view of its size, geographical location and population, and by reason of our dependence on the security of sea and air communications with other countries, particularly the sister nations of the British Commonwealth. Particular notice, we feel, should be taken also of the effect of any reductions on the balance of forces in Asia where Chinese manpower might easily become an overwhelming factor in a vast area where no other great Power maintains large standing forces.

Regarding the unilateral reductions of armed manpower which have become the specialty of the Soviet Union, I must confess that we find it difficult to take these at their face value. Even if these reductions were strictly carried out, their real value, considering the development of modern weapons, is hard to determine. I fear also that the Soviet announcements of unilateral reductions are suspect because they often seem designed primarily for propaganda advantage. In our view, unilateral action in the reduction of forces is no substitute for an internationally controlled system of disarmament. No outside authority is in a position at present to verify within the Soviet Union the actual extent of the reductions. No outside authority is in a position to estimate their real military and economic significance. Some authorities consider that the reductions are evidence that the Soviet Union is concentrating on the development of new and highly efficient weapons and that technical developments making this change possible allow the Soviet Government to divert manpower from its armed forces into labour-hungry industries and other activities.

To sum up on this point, then, I do not think that the Committee need be too impressed by manpower reductions in the armed forces if these are not subject to international verification and control, and essentially because the relationship between numerical strength and modern weapons has by no means been worked out on any secure and authoritative basis. The special position of military manpower in Asia will have to be considered, and smaller countries should not be rushed into any formula for the size of their armed services, irrespective of their geographical and other circumstances. In short, this whole question of military manpower and

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the effect of reductions in the forces of the great Powers and the subsequent reductions which might be possible for smaller Powers, needs to be studied much more thoroughly and comprehensively in the Sub-Committee and in the Disarmament Commission. In saying this I understand, of course, that Europe in present conditions is perhaps the most crucial area, but it is by no means the only important area where another great war could start.

The second Soviet proposal is concerned with limitations on nuclear weapons and the ending of tests. The Soviet document does not link this second proposal regarding nuclear weapons with its first proposal on reductions of military manpower, unless the words "within the period specified" do so; perhaps they do. However, it should be perfectly obvious to everyone that if the second Soviet proposal were implemented communist military manpower would be predominant both in Europe, through the forces of the Soviet Union itself and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, and in Asia also by virtue of the enormous standing army maintained by the Chinese Communist regime, without the non-communist countries having at their disposal the atomic and hydrogen weapons which they regard in present circumstances as essential to their security. Indeed, it seems to me plain commonsense that at the present time the atomic weapons possessed by the Western Powers are their main counter to the strength of the Communist Powers in conventional weapons and armed forces. Proposals for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons at this moment would seem, unfortunately, to be beyond our reach, unless and until such proposals are accompanied by simultaneous and major reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces to agreed levels, carried out with an agreed timetable and under an effective system of international control and verification.

The third Soviet proposal, which relates to the question of foreign troops maintained in Germany, is one that may well require study by the Powers concerned. It seems to me that any large-scale reduction of forces in Germany would have to be seen as part of a programme in which the future settlement of the German problem, as well as the future position of the Soviet Union in relation to other countries of Eastern Europe, would have to be taken into account. It is, therefore, a proposal with wide political implications which it is difficult to see can be dealt with effectively in the Sub-Committee.

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The fourth Soviet proposal deals with the reduction of troops in Europe under the NATO and Warsaw treaties. Here again the Soviet proposal has such wide implications that it hardly seems to me to be a matter that can properly be studied under the specialized heading of disarmament. A considerable reduction of the forces stationed in NATO countries and of the Soviet forces in Warsaw Treaty countries seems to beg the whole question of some agreement being reached on the question of European security. Such reductions would need to be undertaken in the context of an agreement on European security, and under conditions of fully effective international verification and control.

Regarding the fifth Soviet proposal that foreign military, naval and air bases in the territory of other States should be liquidated within two years, I should merely like to comment that there seems to me to be all the difference in the world between foreign troops stationed in NATO countries, where the forces are there with the full consent of the country concerned and subject to control by agreement with that country, and Soviet forces stationed in Warsaw Treaty countries, where the Government of the country concerned has practically no control over those Soviet forces and must stand in fear of their being used as they were in Hungary should the so-called "sovereign" authority in the country concerned wish to take action unpalatable to the Soviet Union.

The sixth Soviet proposal recommends reduction of military budgets as a corollary to other action. This sixth Soviet proposal would obviously be a satisfactory development if we could with confidence look forward to the conditions which I have outlined regarding the earlier Soviet proposals being fulfilled. As it stands, I do not consider that this assertion that the military expenditures of States should be reduced has much real meaning since it is plain that the Soviet Union is not prepared to embrace either the necessary control measures or to reach the essential political settlements which would make the previous proposals practicable.

The seventh Soviet proposal relates to international control of disarmament. The first part of this Soviet proposal seems to me to be such an over-simplification as to be almost incredible. Surely those of us who have taken part in the disarmament debates in this Committee and have followed the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee over the years have realized the crucial nature of effective international control. Mr. Moch has emphasized this



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for us time and time again. The United States has produced most detailed papers setting out how a control organ might be organized and what its powers and methods of operation might be; and yet here we have a proposal from the Soviet Union which blandly states that strict and effective international control should be established with all the rights and functions necessary for these purposes. And then, in the second part of this seventh proposal, the Soviet Union brings forward Mr. Bulganin's plan for ground observation posts -- as if this were all there is to it. Ground observation posts at key points are obviously of some value, but they are only a tiny part of what a truly effective control organ would have to undertake.

All I can say is that this last Soviet proposal seems to render frivolous even those parts of the foregoing Soviet proposals which I have indicated as being in my view worthy of further study, either by the Sub-Committee or by the Powers concerned.

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I do not doubt that, if we probe this Soviet proposal at all, we shall find that the Soviet Union still stands by the position it has adopted over the years that the control organ must be subject to the Security Council -- and we all know what that means: a control organ which would be completely frustrated by the Soviet veto whenever the Soviet Union considered that the control organ was recommending action unpalatable to the Soviet Union and its allies.

In the Soviet letter of 17 November and also in the Soviet Union representative's speech before the First Committee, it was stated that the Soviet Union was willing to consider the question of employing aerial photography within "a vast area of Europe" -- that is to say, to a depth of 500 miles west and east of the "demarcation line" between the present armed forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Treaty countries -- if the respective States accepted it. This, of course, is a qualified acceptance of the principle of mutual aerial inspection, and it depends upon the acceptance of a programme of aerial inspection of an area covering the territory of a fairly large number of States, all or most of which would presumably have to agree to such aerial inspection if the system were to be to any extent reliable. While I do not feel that this limited Soviet proposal measures up at all to the imaginative plan put forward by President Eisenhower -- which has now come to be known as the "open skies" plan -- I feel that this suggestion by the Soviet Union representative is one which can and should receive thorough technical examination in the Sub-Committee; if the results of that technical examination are promising, the political aspects of the suggestion might also be considered.

The Soviet Union delegation has also submitted two draft resolutions, the first (A/C.1/L.160) calling upon all States to discontinue atomic and hydrogen weapons tests forthwith, and the second (A/C.1/L.161) a procedural draft resolution. The procedural draft resolution has, of course, now been overtaken by the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) submitted by a group of countries, including Australia. It is therefore unnecessary for me to refer to the Soviet Union procedural draft resolution, except to say that it seems to us rather premature to consider holding a special session of the General Assembly at the present stage of negotiations among the great Powers -- especially since the next regular session of the General Assembly is scheduled to commence in about eight months,

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at which time the Assembly will, of course, reconsider the disarmament question in the light of the further work to be undertaken meanwhile by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

Regarding the Soviet Union draft resolution on the banning of the atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, my delegation must oppose it in its present form. I have stated quite plainly that we regard the possession of these weapons as the prime deterrent to any temptation to make aggressive use of the present overwhelming predominance of communist military manpower. We believe that, in the present condition of the world, some tests must be continued for a time if the security of the free world is to be safeguarded.

The Australian delegation is quite prepared to consider the possibility of some limitation of tests, although we do not feel that the complete elimination of tests can be considered outside the context of progress in other aspects of the control of nuclear weapons and materials -- or, indeed, in our part of the world, independently of progress in conventional disarmament under full control.

An important proposal (A/C.1/L.162) has been put forward by the delegations of Canada, Japan and Norway. The Australian delegation welcomes this proposal and feels that it is based upon a correct approach to this difficult problem. We believe, however, that the form and precise role of machinery for registration of tests explosions with the United Nations will require further study and elaboration, particularly through private discussions among the Powers most directly concerned. For this reason, we welcome the suggestion that the three-Power draft resolution should not be put to a vote at this session of the Assembly, but should be referred, along with the other proposals, to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, for further study and report to the General Assembly, as provided in the draft resolution which Australia and some other delegations are sponsoring. I might add that while we think that the best way to handle this matter might indeed be the one suggested in the three-Power draft resolution, that is, by making use of the United Nations radiation committee and the United Nations Secretariat -- and the Secretariat is presumably in a position to provide continuing service in this field, whereas the radiation committee meets only intermittently -- we feel that these matters, too, require further study before the precise method of operation can be finally determined.

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I have commented in some detail on the latest proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and on the three-Power draft resolution. I have indicated some of the general considerations which Australia must bear in mind in considering disarmament problems as a whole. The Soviet proposals have, of course, been before us for the last two months, and this has facilitated comment upon them. On the other hand, the proposals set forth in Mr. Lodge's statement and now consolidated in the United States memorandum (A/C.1/783) have been before us only for the last week or so, and my Government has not had sufficient time as yet to consider them. I should, however, like to express my personal reactions to them; in some instances, of course, the considerations which I have outlined as governing the Australian approach to the Soviet proposals also apply, generally, to the United States proposals which cover similar ground.

The first United States proposal is to the effect that all future production of fissionable materials should be earmarked for non-weapons purposes, under effective international inspection and supervision. This seems to us to be a good thing on which to make a start in tackling the immensely complicated problems of weapons control in the nuclear field. We all recognize the impracticability of checking all the fissionable materials produced in the past or all the existing stocks of nuclear weapons; but, plainly, if an effective system of inspection and supervision of current production could be established, this would be a highly significant step and could lead, as suggested by the United States, to the next phase of their first proposal, in which transfers could be made from past production to internationally supervised national or international non-weapons use of such nuclear materials. This is a matter requiring further technical study, both in the disarmament Sub-Committee and, presumably, in the International Atomic Energy Agency, shortly to be established.

The second United States proposal depends upon putting the first into effect in a secure manner. Assuming that this were done, the United States proposes that we should agree to limit, and ultimately to eliminate, all nuclear tests explosions. This also seems a realistic approach, which we think should be further examined by the agencies I have mentioned, as well as by national Governments. Meanwhile, it has not been possible for the Australian Government fully to consider the problem posed by methods for giving advance notice of and registering all nuclear tests, or for providing for limited international observation of them.

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The third United States proposal concerns a first-stage reduction, under adequate inspection, of conventional armaments and armed forces. The reservations which, in speaking about the Soviet proposal on this subject, I expressed about the concept of limiting military power by manpower levels also apply here. But, subject to those reservations, I think that Australia would agree with the sort of approach suggested by the United States, and particularly with the emphasis on inspection techniques and the verification of reduction commitments.

The fourth United States proposal concerns the control of the propulsion of objects through outer space and similar programmes. I think that the Australian attitude towards bringing such objects under international control is likely to be positive, as, I am sure, will be the case in most countries. Here again, however, I am sure that my Government would need to be in no doubt whatever about the efficacy of the proposed control system, before agreeing to participate in such an approach to the problem.

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The fifth United States proposal concerns guarantees against major surprise attack. We certainly share the concern expressed by Mr. Lodge in this connexion, and I think that the approach developed in his statement and in the United States memorandum may prove the most fruitful. I think the Committee will certainly feel that on this matter there is a possibility of some agreement being reached, and I think the matter should be most seriously studied in the Sub-Committee, and perhaps thereafter, if the examination in the Sub-Committee seems to warrant it, by other States directly concerned in such progressive installation of inspection systems in and over their territories.

I have done my best to comment on the material which I understand is the material which is primarily before this Committee this year. This has not been an easy task in present circumstances, when international crises have interrupted the smooth working of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, and when Governments themselves have of late been so preoccupied with immediate problems. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the subject matter of our debate this year should be somewhat less far-ranging than it has been in the past. For our part, we prefer that the United Nations should try to deal with practical problems of disarmament rather than strive to attain agreement in principle with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive basis, which subsequently turns out to be empty when we get down to hard facts.

I wish that we could feel confident that the Soviet Union was this year putting forward its proposals in all good faith. I must confess that we find it difficult to have such confidence, and it seems to me that most of the Soviet proposals are "loaded" and contrived either for propaganda advantage or as traps in which to catch the Governments of the free world, who, naturally enough, long for peace and security without having to spend large proportions of their revenues on armaments.

Disarmament proposals are something like cheques drawn on credit. One has to feel that the cheque in question -- that is, the particular proposal -- is backed by a Government which will honour it in good faith. I doubt whether the time is yet here when we can say with all confidence that the Soviet Union has such credit in relation to this disarmament matter and that other countries in the United Nations should honour these cheques simply at their face value.

I think that the speech of the Soviet representative in this Committee showed what I mean. The major portion of his statement was devoted to the most outrageous attacks upon the United States and the associates of the United States in the various security organizations to which the United States belongs. This concentration of enmity against the United States seems to me to be a give-away of the Soviet Union's real motives, which would seem to be to secure by all means possible the dismantling of the western security organizations through whittling them away and persuading the peoples concerned to abandon the burden which security involves in favour of paper guarantees and promises from the Soviet Union.

I certainly do not think that we should abandon our talks with the Soviet Union upon disarmament. Amidst all the propaganda which the Soviet Union devotes to disarmament, there is at times some substance, even if it is only the substance of fear and not always that of good will.

The Soviet Government no more wishes to have its people suffer from bombardment from hydrogen bombs or intercontinental ballistic missiles than any other Government does, but in the light of the past discussions of this disarmament problem, we as yet see little good will, little real desire to co-operate, and no offer of any real agreement based on good faith.

I would not wish to end my remarks on a despondent note. Australia, as a member of the Disarmament Commission, and as a country devoted to the cause of world-wide and enduring peace among nations, will continue to bend all its efforts towards discovering ways to agreement. The lead must come from the great Powers, but whenever we are able to indicate paths which promise fruitful results, we shall do so in good faith.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The basic conclusion which may be drawn from the exchange of views which has taken place in the Political Committee is the fact that, as before, the problem of ending the arms race, of reducing armaments and armed forces and prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons remains a central international problem which is of the greatest significance for reducing international tension and strengthening universal peace. No procrastination can be allowed in this problem of taking practical measures for disarmament.

If all the States, and, in the first place, the States possessing the greatest military power, were to set themselves the task of really agreeing on ending the intolerable burden of armaments and of working out a comprehensive disarmament programme, we need have no doubts that such a task would be successfully concluded. True to its policy of peace and the peaceful settlement of international problems, the Soviet Union has consistently supported an end to the arms race and a reduction of armaments of the conventional type and armed forces, which would create the possibility of eliminating the threat of a new war. It is prepared to co-operate in this noble cause with all the States which aspire to this.

The Soviet Union considers it proper to dwell briefly on this question, on which, in its view, the further attention of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee should be focussed, and to make some observations in connexion with the discussion which has taken place.

During the discussion, reference was made to the resolution adopted on 4 November 1954. This resolution, resolution 808 (IX), has a special importance inasmuch as it was jointly submitted by the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and the Soviet Union and inasmuch as it received unanimous support in the General Assembly. The adoption of this resolution constituted recognition of the fact that for the effective solution of the problem of disarmament it was necessary to proceed along a course that would lead to a considerable reduction of armaments, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of effective international control over the implementation of these measures.



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This is the goal to which States should aspire and primarily the members of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

A study of the proposals made by the United States delegation during the course of the present discussion shows that these proposals circumvent such an important question as the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. However, this question is the most timely of international questions, the solution of which vitally affects the people of all countries. Stress is placed in the United States proposals not on reaching agreement for the complete elimination or prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, but on the establishment of a cumbersome system of inspection and observance of the future production of fissionable materials. In this connexion, one cannot fail to note the reports in the American Press to the effect that in United States official circles consideration is being given at the present time to the question of the creation and stationing on the territories of other States of United States military units specially equipped with atomic weapons. It is clear that with such an approach to the question of nuclear weapons the threat of an atomic war cannot be removed and it will hover over mankind, poisoning relations between States and sowing alarm among the peoples concerning the prospects for peace.

At the same time, one cannot help admitting that the need to reach agreement on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons has become even more urgent. Further delay in concluding such an agreement does not reduce but increases the threat of a destructive atomic war. If all countries possessing atomic weapons really attempt to eliminate the threat of an atomic war, then in such a case there is no reason not to take the most drastic step in this matter without further delay, namely, to reach agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons. It is precisely to this goal that our efforts should be directed both within the United Nations as well as outside it. We have the possibility before us of taking the first real step towards settling the problem of the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and that would be to prohibit or to discontinue tests of such weapons. I would recall that as early as 1954 the Government of India submitted a proposal for the ending of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons to the United Nations Disarmament

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Commission. A proposal for discontinuing atomic and hydrogen tests is now supported by a number of countries and meets with ever-increasing support from a number of countries, including the public opinion of a number of countries, among them the United States and Japan.

The Soviet delegation had submitted a draft resolution providing for the immediate cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons to the United Nations. At the same time, it is proposed to solve this question independently of reaching agreement on the problem of disarmament as a whole. Attention has already been called here to the fact that the implementation of the decision for the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons does not require the establishment of a complicated control system. There can be no doubt that under modern scientific conditions thermo-nuclear explosions, wherever they are carried out, can be registered by the appropriate apparatus. This is recognized by authoritative specialists, particularly in the United States. Unfortunately, the proposals made by some representatives of Western countries, as well as the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Canada, Japan and Norway, do not testify to an attempt on the part of those countries to put an end to the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. These proposals merely amount to taking a decision to notice being given of tests planned by States and registration with the United Nations of such tests in advance. An attempt is made at the same time to depict this as some kind of progress, as a step which allegedly would get the problem of disarmament out of its impasse. But is it not clear that the registration of nuclear test explosions would not reduce the dangerous consequences of the explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs? No one could seriously consider that as a result of registration of nuclear explosions the danger of radioactive fallout or contamination would thereby be reduced.

The Soviet delegation in this connexion would like to emphasize once again that a radical solution of the problem is the immediate cessation of tests of nuclear weapons and, as has already been pointed out, there are the necessary conditions and prerequisites for such a decision. A decision to stop such tests would eliminate one of the sources of existing apprehensions among the peoples. The taking of that step alone would have a favourable influence towards making the whole international situation more sound. Having eliminated one of the

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reasons for the alarm of the peoples concerning their future, such a decision would promote the strengthening of international confidence and would prepare the ground for further steps in the direction of disarmament. It would be a great harm to the cause of peace and international co-operation if the United Nations was unable to utilize existing possibilities for the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

The question of inter-continental missiles and various long-range guided missiles was touched upon in the Memorandum of the United States and in the statements of some representatives. The development of rocket techniques increases the threat of atomic war and makes its consequences even more dangerous. Therefore the interest in this problem and the desire to find a solution to it is perfectly understandable. At the same time, one cannot help seeing that the threat to international security is caused not by tests of inter-continental missiles and other missiles -- not by the missiles themselves -- but by the warhead, the atomic and hydrogen weapons with which they may be equipped.

Is it not clear that the danger of atomic weapons is not reduced by the fact that they are delivered to their targets by aeroplanes and not by missiles? Considering the question of inter-continental missiles one cannot help noting also the fact that the proposals for establishing control over the development of these missiles at the same time passes over in silence such questions as the military bases from which it is possible to launch rockets with a similarly effective range. Planes stationed at such bases may also carry atomic and hydrogen weapons. Thus the proposal to establish control over the development and testing of inter-continental missiles cannot eliminate the threat of an atomic war. The only correct course by which to save mankind from the threat of an atomic war is a decision for the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Some delegations, and particularly that of the United Kingdom, have favourably regarded suggestions that during the discussions on disarmament in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, priority should be given to the question of control and not to the question of reaching agreement on the part of States on ending the arms race, reducing armaments and armed forces and prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Soviet Union has attached and continues to attach great importance to the question of international control over the reduction of armaments and armed forces and also to the prevention of surprise attacks by one State on another. This is borne out by the Soviet Government's proposals of 10 May 1955, 27 March 1956 and 17 November 1956, which provide for the establishment of broad and effective international control possessing all the necessary rights and functions for the observance of the fulfilment by States of the obligations which they have assumed in disarmament.

An important step in bringing views closer together on disarmament was the declaration of the Soviet Government concerning its preparedness to consider the use of aerial photography in a certain zone in Europe. Like many other countries, the Soviet Union holds the view that international control cannot be considered in isolation from real disarmament measures. It is quite natural that control should be an integral part of a disarmament agreement providing for a concrete programme for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It is not difficult to understand that a different approach

would divert attention from the real problem of disarmament and could not promote a successful solution of the problem. Without agreement for the reduction of armaments, the control organ could do exactly nothing, for it is the States which must disarm and not the control organ. The States, and not the control organ, must carry out the demobilization of servicemen and the reduction of armaments.

The experience of many years shows that negotiations on disarmament get into a deadlock whenever an attempt is made to consider the question of control in isolation from the question of real measures for disarmament. Dealing with the question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, the Soviet delegation would like to recall the proposals submitted by the Soviet Government for the purpose of finding a solution to this problem. In these proposals a reduction within two years of the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to 1.5 million men for each country and to 650,000 men for France and the United Kingdom, under appropriate effective control, was proposed. At the same time, the Soviet Union proposed that within the first year the armed forces of the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union should be reduced to 2.5 million men for each country and 750,000 men for the United Kingdom and France. It should be pointed out in this connexion that the Western Powers made similar proposals at an earlier stage and accordingly, in our view, there is every reason to agree on this particular question. Therefore, one might have expected that such proposals would meet with support, all the more since in recent times the need for a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments has become even more urgent.

At the same time, in the United States memorandum the proposal is confined to reducing armed forces to 2.5 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union and to 750,000 men for the United Kingdom and France; and the implementation of these reductions would be made dependent on such cumbersome and complicated requirements that the carrying-out of this control might be protracted over an indefinite period. As regards a further reduction of conventional armaments, the familiar assertion is made in the memorandum that that is impossible, unless the most important political questions are settled which at present divide the world. On this score several delegations have rightly stated that if we wait for a settlement of political questions which are in dispute and condition the solution

of the problem of disarmament upon their settlement, we can never get out of the vicious circle and the solution of the problem of disarmament will never make any progress. It is not difficult to see that the United States proposal does not lead to a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the Western Powers, as required by United Nations decisions.

The Soviet delegation would like once more to remind the members of this Committee that the Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on all questions of the disarmament problem simultaneously and to conclude appropriate agreements to that effect. At the same time the Soviet Union considers it appropriate to reach agreement on the taking of some partial measures independently of a general or comprehensive agreement and without waiting for the conclusion of such an agreement. In this connexion, the Soviet delegation would like to recall the proposal of the Soviet Government for the reduction, under appropriate control, in 1957 by one third of the forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed in Germany and we would also like to recall the proposal for a considerable reduction in 1957 in the size of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed on the territory of member States of NATO and of Soviet troops stationed in the Warsaw Treaty countries. The carrying out of such measures would no doubt bring about an improvement in relation not only among the European States, but would also promote a reduction of tension and the strengthening of international confidence.

It is not fortuitous that these proposals of the Soviet Union found a favourable response among broad sections of public opinion, not only in Europe but outside Europe as well.

The Soviet delegation would like to dwell for a moment on the question of enlarging the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. As has already been pointed out, one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Disarmament Commission and especially of the Sub-Committee's work is their one-sided and small membership -- this refers especially to the Sub-Committee.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

As is well known, in addition to the Soviet Union, the membership of the Sub-Committee is made up of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Canada, all of which are active participants in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. As the work of the Sub-Committee has demonstrated, the Western countries participating in it are connected with the implementation of NATO plans and have not shown the necessary desire to reach agreement on the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

At the same time, in this Sub-Committee, which is called upon to consider a problem of vital importance to all countries, the problem of disarmament, other countries besides the USSR which are not members of NATO are not represented.

The present one-sided composition of the Sub-Committee makes it difficult for it to fulfil the important tasks entrusted to it. This does not correspond to the interests of the United Nations or to the interests of peace.

On the basis of these considerations, and also taking into account the views expressed by a number of delegations, the Soviet delegation has submitted a draft resolution calling for the enlargement of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for the purpose of making it more objective and more inclusive. This draft resolution proposes to increase the membership of the Sub-Committee by adding to it India and Poland. As regards the Disarmament Commission, it is proposed that those two countries and also Egypt and one of the Latin American countries be added.

In proposing India for membership in these bodies we are taking account of the fact that India is demonstrating great initiative in regard to questions of disarmament. In particular, we note its efforts designed to solve the question of a prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons.

We are convinced that the proposed increase in the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee is in keeping with the interests of the United Nations. It would ensure the possibility of these bodies working more actively and effectively and enable them to solve the tasks entrusted to them more fruitfully, to promote confidence among States, to end the arms race and to take concrete measures for disarmament, in which all the peoples of the world are vitally interested.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Today the First Committee has before it a draft resolution which has been submitted on behalf of twelve countries. Among the co-sponsors are the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The submission of an agreed draft resolution is a favourable and positive development. It became possible because of the fact that, in the course of the negotiations, goodwill and a desire for co-operation were demonstrated. This once again indicates the usefulness of the method of negotiations, which is the only way to reach agreements which correspond to the interests of all parties concerned.

A solution of the disarmament problem, the most important international problem, requires the mutual efforts of all Members of the United Nations and, in the first place, of the States which have the greatest military power. The Soviet Government, in submitting its proposals of 17 November 1956, took for its part an important step towards reaching agreement on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union henceforth will also exert all its efforts for a most rapid solution of the problem of disarmament. The Organization of the United Nations must assist in every way in a solution of the problem of disarmament and thereby fulfil its duty to the peoples who ask for a lessening of international tension and the strengthening of international peace.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should have called upon the representative of India next, but I am told that Mr. Menon is unable to speak this morning. Since we have to close the general debate, the Indian delegation has agreed that Mr. Menon will take his turn to speak during the debate on the resolutions themselves. To continue with the general debate, I shall call upon the last speaker in the general debate, who is the representative of France.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): Before setting forth the views of the French delegation, I should like to say a few words of explanation and also of apology.



(Mr. Moch, France)

A number of representatives have expressed surprise at the fact that not all the members of the Sub-Committee spoke at the beginning of this general debate, and I am particularly grateful to the representative of Iran for the terms in which he chose to express his disappointment.

In postponing my statement, I was not guided by vanity, nor by embarrassment, nor by irreverence; I did so out of special consideration for the members of the First Committee who are not also members of the Disarmament Commission. We must remember and declare that the Disarmament Commission is an authorized agency of the General Assembly and that the Sub-Committee is an authorized agent of the Disarmament Commission.

What are our terms of reference? They are two-fold and can be summarized in a few words: to give an account and to take into account. If I had given an account, I could only have repeated what has already been said after the three opening speeches, which were summed up by the representative of Canada in the manner that we have come to expect of him.

Since my colleagues have carried out the first part of the Sub-Committee's mandate, it is my duty to take into account what has been said here and to try to adapt the Sub-Committee's future work to these ideas. How could I do so without first having listened to my old colleagues and to my new colleagues -- to whom I extend a special welcome -- not only attentively but with great interest? Most of the representatives here have brought us, if not new elements, at least new accents whose chorus can only make us more aware of our responsibilities within the Sub-Committee. At the same time we are encouraged by the fact that so many competent men are counting on our efforts.

I owe a second apology to the older members of this Committee. I feel that I should recall the past briefly for the benefit of the newer members.

This debate has begun in an international atmosphere less favourable than that of 1954 or even that of 1955. It is our duty, however, to bring our debate to a successful conclusion, and it is our right to remain optimistic. Our attitude is guided by the two following reasons.

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(Mr. Moch, France)

First of all -- and there is nothing paradoxical about this observation -- whenever our discussions are more difficult as a result of existing tensions, they should be carried on with even greater ardour, intelligence and faith, for every technical agreement, however limited, is likely to ease political tension somewhat and restore a minimum of confidence. On the other hand, each failure may result in increasing international difficulties. The French delegation, in keeping with its consistent attitude in this respect, will spare no efforts towards mutual understanding.

Secondly, an understanding of points of view is gradually taking place, although still much too slowly to please us. This understanding is clear even to those who skim through the debates of the past ten years in seeking an over-all view, not by studying temporary incidents but by viewing the general trend and the general shape of the curve, not the momentary fluctuations.

I shall attempt later on to demonstrate this second point. I wanted to mention it now, however, because it is an encouraging sign and it does justify the French position, which has always sought compromise.

It is hardly necessary for me to recall the obvious fact that sovereign and, unfortunately, suspicious nations will not implement a disarmament plan unless it has been freely accepted and not imposed by a majority vote. A non-unanimous vote would be tantamount to rejection. Consequently, it is our common duty to reach agreement among all parties concerned, to understand the points of view and motives of everyone, in other words constantly to seek compromise. Our delegation has been guided by these principles since the very beginning of our deliberations. I can certify as much, in any case, for the period since 1951, when I assumed the task, which has been uninterrupted since then, of conducting these negotiations on behalf of France. I do want to mention this point to many of our colleagues who, perhaps unwittingly, have under-estimated our efforts.

In welcoming our new colleagues, those who were not able to follow, as our older members have been able to, the lengthy stages of past deliberations, I should like to give a brief survey of these attempts at conciliation.

My colleagues will recall how in the beginning we disagreed on everything, or at least on almost everything. Of the project advocated in 1951 by Messrs. Dean Acheson and Selwyn Lloyd and myself, not a single point was accepted by the Soviet delegation. We in turn approved of nothing, or almost nothing, contained in the plan presented by Mr. Vyshinsky. The only result of that session was the establishment of a committee presided over by Mr. Padilla Nervo, the then President of the Assembly, and including Messrs. Jessup, Lloyd and Vyshinsky, as well as myself, which proposed to replace various bodies that had been dormant for quite some time by the present Disarmament Commission. This Commission came into being under most disturbing circumstances in a period of division and tension. It is worth while to recall this fact today in these times

of pessimism, a pessimism which I would term somewhat juvenile since it is alien to all or part of our initial difficulties.

In April 1952, the Soviet plan, which had been submitted to the preceding Assembly, was submitted to the Disarmament Commission; also submitted was a United States plan comprising five stages on the gradual disclosure and inspection of current armaments prior to undertaking any disarmament; and, on 24 June, a preliminary French plan was submitted comprising three stages, with overlapping measures borrowed from the different fields of publication, reduction of conventional weapons and nuclear bans.

The principles set forth at that time are still valid. Any disarmament plan in order to meet with unanimous approval must fulfil at least one condition: it must during each of its stages increase the security of all parties concerned, and not that of one party at the expense of the others. This is obvious today, but it was not obvious in 1952. At that time, the superiority belonged to the Western nations in the atomic field and to the Soviets in the field of conventional weapons. Among the former, some advocated postponing nuclear disarmament until the end of operations, while the Soviets placed it in the forefront. Hence our efforts to reach a synthesis and our suggestion that both types of operations be carried out simultaneously along with a number of others,

On 11 November 1953, we submitted a more complete text based on the preceding, together with a proposal to set up a limited committee empowered to meet in closed session. This became our five-Power Sub-Committee, which convened in May 1954.

At a meeting of this Sub-Committee on 11 June 1954, the French delegation, in close co-operation with the United Kingdom delegation, returned to its previous texts, now jointly sponsored by both delegations. Rejected at first by the Soviet delegation and then re-examined in private talks in Paris, these texts were finally accepted right here on 30 September 1954 by Mr. Vyshinsky as a basis for discussion. The introduction of a joint resolution by the five members of the Sub-Committee raised our hopes; this was followed by two unanimous votes in its favour in the Commission and then in the Assembly. That day it appeared to us that a great step forward had really been taken. Mr. Kuznetsov was quite right in reminding us of this very important agreement.

The Sub-Committee met again in February 1955, digressed somewhat from its subject, returned to the issue by examining a Franco-British plan on 8 March, a Soviet counter-plan on 18 March and a Franco-British compromise text on 19 March. On 10 May the Soviet reply to the last compromise suggestions reached the Sub-Committee. That was an extremely important document, showing progress on the technical aspect of disarmament but introducing various political conditions and certain new concepts with regard to controls. It truly deserved to be carefully examined by our Governments. Furthermore, the Big Four Conference was going to be held in Geneva in July, which was in a few weeks. The Sub-Committee wisely postponed its next session until after that Conference.

While I can attest to the valuable and moving human contacts that were made at that Conference, I can state that no progress was made with regard to disarmament. Marshal Bulganin reiterated the Soviet proposals of 10 May, with very small variations, while his colleagues presented some new ideas: President Eisenhower's plan for aerial inspection and exchange of military documents; a French project for financial supervision, with part of the savings to be allocated to a fund for aid to under-developed countries; and a British suggestion for inspection on both sides of the line of demarcation. All these suggestions were finally referred to the Sub-Committee.

(Mr. Moch, France)

From August to October of 1955, the Sub-Committee merely marked time. There are two reasons for this stalemate, one which is principally technical and the other which is more political.

The first reason proceeded from the impossibility of verifying closely enough the quantities of nuclear materials produced prior to the institution of controls. May I stress here -- and please forgive me for doing so -- that I have constantly called attention to this danger. As early as 4 April 1952, long before the atomic age became the thermonuclear age, I told the Disarmament Commission that "the difficulty of ensuring an effective system of control increases with the volume of fissionable materials already produced". As time goes on, the risks of concealment and the danger of not being able to detect traces of production will be terribly increased. Let us therefore act before we reach that point of no return beyond which it will no longer be possible to stop or even to slow down the atomic arms race, because the peoples of the world will no longer have the indispensable minimum of confidence in any system of control which is necessary if such a system is not set up at the proper time. I then inferred from this fact the necessity of foregoing all intransigence in order to establish as soon as possible a system of control that would be more than a simple statement, which had been proposed on the one side, but less than a transfer of property, which had been insisted upon by the other.

Taking up and developing this concept three years later, the Soviet delegation derived from it conclusions of a political nature, based not so much on inspection as on the means calculated, in its opinion, to restore confidence, and the United States delegation countered by adhering only to the Eisenhower Plan, rejected at that time by Moscow. Hence, a new deadlock for all of us.

The Geneva conference on atomic energy taught a great lesson to those of us who were there and to those who read the reports, namely, that scientific progress is simultaneous in all countries, despite secrecy, barriers and curtains. During the conference of the four Foreign Ministers a few days later, no headway was made toward our objective. During the last session of the General Assembly, the French delegation made a new effort toward a synthesis tending to separate what was immediately possible from what was temporarily impossible, a synthesis based on the formula: "No control without disarmament, no disarmament without control, but progressively all disarmament that can currently be controlled." The

(Mr. Moch, France)

resolution of 16 December 1955 constitutes a setback compared to the previous resolution, since it was not approved unanimously.

But that resolution started a new stage in our work. Until that time we had been seeking an over-all solution, logical and general enough to attract the French. Some of our colleagues, especially the representative of Canada in the Sub-Committee, seeing our failure, wondered whether it would not be better to limit our first ambitions to somewhat more restricted objectives. The resolution reflects their views inasmuch as it charges the Commission with a two-fold mission, a general one and a specific one.

We were somewhat upset at first by this second method, which is wholly pragmatic. The preference of us French was still for an over-all plan of the Franco-British type. Isolating a single component always involves the risk of giving it a very different value from that which it would have in a general context. But, above all, France wants headway to be made. That is why I proposed to the Sub-Committee on 9 April 1956 that we all abandon our general plans, that we break them up into their component parts, that we seek a specific agreement on each of these component parts -- provided, needless to say, that the combination of these separate parts, at the end of our efforts, should form a reasonable whole acceptable to all. Speaking of the method we had suggested, I said:

"It represents an important, weighty and even painful concession on our part, since we are conceited, or simple-minded, enough to believe in our plan, in its doubly general nature covering all fields and all stages. This plan embodies the ideas we have been consistently advocating since 1952...". (DC/SC.1/PV.78, pages 9 and 10)

This concession, confirmed in July before the full Commission, remains valid. We are prepared to study limited solution if general decisions remain beyond our common grasp.

Now, three plans have been laid before the Sub-Committee: The Franco-British plan of 19 March 1956, upon which the representative of Australia passed a judgment this morning which I shall take very much into account, a plan which was general both in its nature and in its timetable; the Soviet plan of 27 March, which was partial in its nature, since it was aimed almost mainly at conventional disarmament, but which includes isolated nuclear measures as well as others meant

(Mr. Moch, France)

as possible substitutes; and, lastly, the United States plan, also partial as to its timetable but general as to scope, which marked the end of the proposal for "shelving" old plans which had been made the previous year. No reconciliation of views was reached, and the new method I suggested, of discussion of the component parts, was not explored.

The Disarmament Commission, which met in July, made no headway, either. The last attempt which we made at conciliation -- which, furthermore, was concerned merely with procedure -- was rejected by four votes to four, with four abstentions. This certainly constitutes the maximum of disparity possible among twelve voting members. The final resolution, for which we have to thank our present Chairman, Mr. Belaunde, was adopted by ten votes in favour, with the Soviet delegation voting against and the Yugoslav delegation abstaining.

Since that time, three new attempts have been made. On 11 September, a message from Marshal Bulganin to President Eisenhower mentioned the possibility of separating the prohibition of nuclear weapons from the problems of disarmament taken as a whole. The Soviet proposal of 17 November 1956 was repeated here on 14 January by Mr. Kuznetsov, who supplemented it with comments, which I will not take up again. On the same day, Mr. Lodge elaborated a group of measures, some of them new, proposed by the United States.

These are the documents submitted for our consideration. In view of their number and complexity, it is impossible to analyse them thoroughly in a Committee composed of eighty nations. We can only make general viewpoints known and refer the entire question to the Sub-Committee for study by means of a resolution on procedure which I earnestly hope will be, as in 1954, unanimous, and I am as happy as the representative of the Soviet Union at the unanimity that I trust will be found in the Committee this afternoon.

I now come to the second part of my statement. Here I should like to use the same method which I suggested in vain last April, that is, to abandon all previous plans, to isolate their component parts in a logical order, take them up, and examine the points on which complete or partial agreement is reached and the points that are still disputed.



(Mr. Moch, France)

Our colleague, Mr. Lester Pearson, with his usual wisdom, already went into this question. We all heard his statement with great interest, and he has made the task easier for me.

These elements can be divided into five groups: general questions; those relating to the conventional field, those concerning the nuclear field; controls and, finally, miscellaneous questions. I should like to examine these groups of questions one after the other

Among the general questions, the questions of principle, three seem to demand close examination. Should we seek an over-all plan encompassing all the fields and the whole timetable of operations? Should we only define a first stage? Or again, should we limit ourselves still further to giving first priority to isolated measures?

Numerous replies have been given to this query. The Soviet Union, like France and the United Kingdom, has for a long time favoured a general convention. In the absence of an agreement of that sort, it suggested, in March 1956, a partial plan including various possibilities. Since the end of the shelving of previous documents, the United States has issued proposals limited to the first stage, sometimes including in these proposals measures which, while decided upon during that stage, would not be applied until a later date. Our colleague, Mr. Brilej, during his all too brief stay on the Disarmament Commission, as well as in our Sub-Committee on 16 January, proved to be a firm supporter of partial solutions, providing they are immediate and controlled. I have already pointed out that France, which in principle favours the general plan, agreed to discuss partial or even isolated measures, with the sole reservation that these measures, separated from their initial context, should not, as a result of their isolation, assume a value different from the one they had when placed in an over-all plan.

It appears, therefore, that there is a disagreement on this first alternative, but a disagreement which can be resolved. The representatives of Yugoslavia, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Austria, Egypt, Australia this morning -- and I apologize if I did not cite other representatives by name -- have already stressed their preference for what could be called "something now, rather than everything later or perhaps never".

(Mr. Moch, France)

The second difficulty can be defined as follows: in the case of a more or less general plan, is the transition from one stage to the next, or from one operation to the next, automatic or not?

Three ideas were expressed. Our Soviet colleagues have almost always asserted that they were in favour of such transitions being completely automatic. Whenever their plans comprised two stages, they scheduled each of these stages to last one year. They assumed, as a well-established postulate, that the first stage would be completed by all the participants at the end of the first year and that the second would start immediately.

The Franco-British plans were based on the idea that transitions would be semi-automatic: the transition from one stage to the next would be subject to two certified statements by the head of the international control organ, namely that the preceding stage had been correctly carried out by all parties and that the control organ was in a position to verify the next operations. France worked out a rather intricate procedure allowing for delays to be granted, in an emergency, to States acting in good faith. Details on this procedure can be found in Annex 22 to the Second Report of the Disarmament Commission, document DC/71, page 3. The United States has reserved its position, as Washington has proposed plans confined to the first stage.

The question has merit only if we do not give up the idea of establishing a general plan. In that case, I want to state quite clearly, agreement on any formula of complete automatism seems difficult to reach; for no Power will agree in good faith to carry out operations of disarmament if it is proved that another Power, liable to threaten the first, has not carried out its operations on disarmament. This is obvious, but it must be included somehow in a conventional treaty.

The third question of a general nature is the following: Is it advisable to inter-relate measures concerning conventional and nuclear weapons, or should be consider them separately?

(Mr. Moch, France)

The concept of inter-related measures or dovetailing measures, worked out by our delegation in 1952, has been constantly defended by us, and has gained the support of the other members of the Sub-Committee. However, the difficulty of reaching a general agreement has resulted in a certain tendency to consider the measures separately. For our part, we consider, with Mr. Noble, with the same reservation as on the first question, that a limitation of nuclear weapons does not provide complete security unless it is coupled with the limitation and control of conventional weapons. This idea was also stressed by the representative of Australia in his statement this morning.

I come to the question of problems pertaining to the conventional field. The first question concerns the levels of armed forces at the end of the first stage. We have agreed on two figures: 2,500,000 and 750,000 men, applicable to the permanent members of the Security Council. This has been definitely established. However, no agreement has been reached as regards the other Powers, other than those members of the Security Council. Various methods have been suggested, but they deal only with the ceiling to be applied to the forces, a ceiling which is explicit in the Soviet texts and dealt with more vaguely in the Franco-British proposals. The question of determining the total armed forces of each State, below this common ceiling, has not as yet been taken up.

As for the final levels, and not the levels at the end of the first stage, an agreement was reached between France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union regarding the permanent members of the Security Council. No suggestions were made by the United States since its projects were confined to the first stage only, and nothing was said regarding other Powers.

In determining these total levels, however, quite a number of subsidiary questions were left unanswered: What should these totals consist of? In our opinion they should comprise only the active forces of the army, navy and air force, as well as police forces organized on a military basis. This is a complex problem which requires thorough study, considering the differences in the organization of the various armed forces.

Then too, there is another question, that of apportionment of the total effectives of a given country among the various branches of its armed forces which has not as yet been solved. Each State has different needs: an insular Power

(Mr. Moch, France)

needs a strong navy, as the representative of Australia said, which is not required by countries without any coastline. Should each State then be left free to determine this apportionment? Would this not entail the risk of dangerous specialization if in one country, for example, the lion's share were to go to bombardment aviation? But if this decision is not left entirely to the country concerned, which criteria should we adopt? This question has not been settled.

Moreover, just what do we mean by the determination of national levels? When a State has trained reserves, there is a risk of rapid remobilization, and our colleague Mr. Wei very wisely drew our attention to this. The levels should therefore lead to a parallel limitation of armaments. This was again mentioned by Mr. Walker this morning. Their real significance is to provide a basis for calculating these armaments, and also to determine exactly those which should be maintained and controlled, as Mr. Sandler observed.

(Mr. Moch, France)

On this point we seem to have come to a tacit understanding, but this tacit understanding conceals numerous difficulties, for it will be necessary to determine the quantities of the principal weapons, aircraft units, and naval tonnages corresponding to the manpower of each country. The problem can certainly be solved. I shall not, at this point, undertake to outline it; it is up to the experts in our respective delegations to propose solutions.

The limitation of manpower and armaments involves a reduction in military credits. On this point a fundamental agreement has been reached. But what will this reduction amount to? It would be too simple to imagine that it will be proportional either to cuts in manpower or to cuts in armaments. The cutting out of a thousand men will result in savings that can be calculated but which will vary considerably from one country to another. The scrapping of guns will not bring any immediate gain but will reduce future replacement orders. It is not easy to determine required budgetary cuts on the basis of such measures. In any case, the problem has not yet been examined.

However great these difficulties may be, they appear trifling when we take up those pertaining to the nuclear field. There are at least four sorts of conceivable prohibitions: prohibition of test explosions, prohibition of manufacture, prohibition of use and prohibition of stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

First of all, with regard to test explosions, there is agreement on principle, but not on implementation. The Soviet Union proposes immediate and complete prohibition, but with no mention of controls. France agrees to such prohibition with controls, provided it is linked eventually with prohibition of manufacture because, if other countries continue to produce bombs, France will, regretfully, have to set aside its own fissionable materials for that purpose and will have to make a few tests. The United Kingdom contemplates limitation rather than prohibition and is ready to discuss it, even quite apart from any plan of disarmament. France does not make the same reservation with regard to limitation as it does with regard to prohibition. We would accept limitation even without linking it to prohibition. The United States contemplates a period of declaration and partial international control, which could be very soon, before stages of limitation and prohibition, both of which would be controlled.

(Mr. Moch, France)

The problem is not simple -- and I am sorry that excessive fatigue has made it impossible for Mr. Krishna Menon to be here this morning and to have spoken before me -- because certain tests, either very small explosions or more powerful and important ones that are set off under water and at great depths might completely escape detection. On this technical question I cannot agree with Mr. Krishna Menon, as I told him immediately after his statement in the Disarmament Commission last summer; surely he will not have forgotten that. And I do not agree with what Mr. Kuznetsov has just said in this connexion, when he maintained that all explosions could be detected. Our experts are unanimous on this question. Explosions can be made which cannot be detected.

Finally, it should be possible to set off an explosion for a scientific purpose under international control. This is the problem. But the common element in all the proposals formulated, the very minimum which must be achieved without delay, is found in the suggestion worked out by the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway and supported in such moving words by the representative of Japan -- the only victim so far of the ghastly effects of nuclear explosions -- and then, with great persuasive force, by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. The French delegation makes these proposals its own; we consider them as a first step, as a minimum to be taken with all speed -- I would say, immediately.

In the same connexion and with the same care, my delegation will study the suggestion of Mr. Sanders, representative of Sweden, for a moratorium on tests, which would necessitate the setting up of an international scientific control organ, as well as the suggestion of the representative of the Philippines on the localization of test explosions.

The prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear materials for military purposes is controllable. On this point there is agreement on principle. But, if France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been able to reach an understanding on the timing of this prohibition within a general plan of disarmament, agreement has not been unanimous on the date, and the problem comes up again if we must resign ourselves to a partial plan. Furthermore, a new United States proposal has been placed before us.

(Mr. Moch, France)

The prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction has a character all its own. It constitutes an act of faith and cannot be controlled. It is one of those moral prohibitions which have value only if complete confidence prevails between States, while the principal difficulty is to create that confidence. Hence we have a disagreement on principle: the Soviet Union demands moral prohibition and wants it to be absolute; France and the United Kingdom have accepted it, at least during the first period, only on a conditional basis, except in the case of defence against aggression -- a solution which, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, has the two-fold defect of raising the problem of criteria of aggression and of legalizing the use of that weapon.

There is also disagreement with regard to the retention of stocks of nuclear materials of military purity. The Soviet Union wants immediate transformation of these to peaceful uses. The United States does not agree to this except as an ultimate goal to be reached by stages to be determined. The problem is still further complicated by the impossibility, already indicated and today universally admitted, of detecting these stockpiles with sufficient precision. The quantities which might escape all controls are sufficient today to cause large-scale destruction. We have, by too long intransigence, gone far beyond this "point of no return" which I indicated anxiously almost five years ago. And in the course of this debate Mr. Pearson of Canada reminded the Committee of my views.

Controls raise many difficulties, too, even though in this field the situation has been gradually improved. Today there seems to be agreement on the four following points: gradual setting up of the control organ and its extension on the basis of the operations to be verified; setting up of the control organ at the latest before the operation to be verified is begun; powers of the control organ adapted to its various functions; setting up of teams, fixed and mobile, of international composition, and also under international direction. We would find it rather difficult on this last point to subscribe to a view according to which a State can act as a delegate of the international Organization.

But a brief determination of principles is not enough. The setting up of a control organ, its attributes, its safeguards, its powers of inspection, its rights in cases of established infractions, its relations with the States and with the Security Council, and many other points must be spelled out in detail. While the USSR has limited itself to general proposals -- which, furthermore, are gradually coming closer to ours -- it has never disclosed its opinion on the far more detailed studies submitted by the western Powers, as mentioned in the statement of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, to which I shall refer later. These furnish the elements of a specific doctrine, the final drafting of which should be left to experts, after the Sub-Committee has adopted the principles. The Committee will understand if I do not go into any detail here but confine myself to recalling these documents, which are:

Annexes Nos. 16, 21, 22 and 24 of the second report (DC/71) of the Sub-Committee, which are of French origin;

Annex No. 23 of the same report, which is of United Kingdom origin;

Annex No. 4 of the first report (DC/53) of the Sub-Committee and Annex No. 20 of the second report, together with Annexes Nos. 3 and 4 of the third report (DC/83), all of which are of United States origin;

Annex No. 8 of the third report of the Sub-Committee, which is of Franco-British origin;

And Annex No. 14 of the Sub-Committee's second report which originated jointly from France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.



Those eleven documents together represent a sixty-seven page volume which has never been answered by the USSR, except partially through the intermediary of our colleague from the Ukrainian SSR on 22 January.

The forms of the control organ will vary and will be adapted to the tasks assigned to it. Provision will have to be made for the examination of military blueprints, for fixed control points, and for mobile ground and air force teams.

An agreement has been reached on the control of military blueprints and on the principle -- but not on the number and distribution -- of fixed control points. This raises a comparatively delicate problem if we want to avoid what was noted in Korea, where the traffic to be inspected bypassed the main control stations and large arteries by using secondary harbours and roads.

The question of mobile teams has given rise to much controversy. We believe that they will play an important part in avoiding either the reconversion for military purposes of enterprises intended for peace-time production, or the substitution of non-controlled raw materials for materials subject to verification. Among many possible examples, the following are typical. First, the production of tubes and guns in plants producing locomotive axles. I assure the Committee, as a technician in this field, that the transformation necessary to switch from the manufacture of one to the manufacture of the other is a matter of a few hours. Second, the manufacturing of explosive glass shells, which was done on a very large scale in France in 1914-1918 when we lacked steel, and which provoked the irony of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, doubtless because he did not know that almost all the French light artillery, after the Battle of the Marne, was equipped with shells of that type.

Here, in parenthesis, I should like to say briefly to our Ukrainian colleague that I do not wish to embark in this Committee on any kind of polemic attack, and that I have listened carefully to, and then afterwards read, his statement. I agree with him on establishing as the aim of the control organ the surveillance of the implementation of disarmament -- but, it should be understood, the whole of that surveillance without any gaps whatever.

I agree also that the financial control must bear not only on the budget voted by the legislative bodies but also on its effective implementation and use by the Governments.

Furthermore I agree that the control organ must be given the sole task of proving -- and perhaps of taking certain strictly conservative measures -- leaving the task of decision to a different organ.

I cannot, however, agree with him on two great a limitation on the list of the aims of the control organ. In order to be able to verify the correctness of the statements made by States, the international organ must have access to installations other than those dealt with in the statements themselves, because if an infraction is committed, if a State is acting in bad faith, where will it commit that infraction? Where would it give proof of bad faith? Certainly it would not do so in a plant that it had itself declared to the control organ. Obviously, the infraction would take place elsewhere than in the declared establishments, and I have just given two examples which took place not with the intention to commit a fraud but because it was necessary. Guns would be made clandestinely not in the armaments factories which were subject to control but in plants producing locomotive axles. Glass shells would be manufactured in such a way as to evade the control exercised over steel shells, and so on. It is unpleasant to call it "official espionage" -- an expression which has been used. These investigations are necessary. They correspond to the general character which the control must have if it is to inspire confidence, and I am convinced that our Soviet colleagues will in the end recognize this because logic prevails upon all of us.

Our colleagues raise the objection also that the control organ can block any disarmament plan in the event of a violation of the treaty, but in that case the blocking would not be brought about by the control but would be the result of the attitude of the defaulting State. I would put the following question to the representatives of the Soviet Union and the other Soviet Socialist Republics: would they agree to proceed with their disarmament if the control organ provided them with proof of a serious violation of the provisions of the treaty by their co-contracting parties? Obviously they would not, and therefore that possibility must be foreseen.

These differences with regard to interpretation are important, but I do not doubt that we shall find formulas of technical agreement on these problems which will be satisfactory to all.

Nuclear control will necessarily be permanent and will be essential -- whether or not we succeed in disarming -- because of the increasing use of reactors. We are in complete agreement on this in principle. But we have not yet worked out the various methods of applying it in practice, and our work will have to be coupled with that of the International Agency and various other institutions.

I should like to emphasize the importance of these problems. Either disarmament will be effectively controlled, or there will be no true disarmament. Thus unilateral reductions in manpower will amount to very little unless they are internationally verified and accompanied by a concurrent destruction of weapons. Likewise, the Soviet representative uses a formula which describes our constant concern extremely well when he accepts "the establishment of a strict and effective international control over the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations." He should further explain to us just how these verifications would be handled in fields proclaimed by himself and by others to be uncontrollable, such as the moral ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction, or the transformation, within a fixed period of time, of the total quantities -- unknown and unverifiable -- of the stocks of nuclear materials; he should also explain to us how control operations will be reconciled with the principle of absolute automatism in the implementation of the plan, etc.

There remains aerial inspection, which has been the subject of so many discussions. I should like to examine this question quite dispassionately.

Having been present when President Eisenhower first presented his plan in Geneva, I recognize that this plan, separated at first from all disarmament measures, had as its ambition to restore international confidence by providing against surprise attacks, thus leaving the door open for future negotiations on disarmament. It did not, in its initial form, fit in with our concept, which was equally far removed from control without disarmament and disarmament without control. The Soviets, after careful consideration, categorically discarded this plan, as I had immediately foreseen would be the case and as I indicated right away to our American colleagues, who will, I am sure, remember that.

(Mr. Moch, France)

But the situation has changed considerably since Geneva. The aerial reconnaissance plan has been linked with Marshal Bulganin's plan for setting up fixed ground posts and incorporated in a disarmament plan of which -- in the opinion of our United States colleagues -- it has for a long time constituted the essential element. The Soviet Union, however, has remained adamant in its refusal.

On 10 July last, before the Disarmament Commission, I made an attempt at compromise. After analysing the trend of future wars towards increased nuclear devastation and replacing conventional build-ups, I said -- and I ask the Committee to excuse me for making this long quotation:

"... so long as this method [of aerial inspection] remains effective, priority must be given to its application in the sensitive sectors where concentrations of conventional forces are normally to be effected. This amounts to proposing regular aerial reconnaissance over Western Europe and along the border between the two worlds in Scandinavia, ... and in the Middle East. If we add -- for the sake of reciprocity rather than effectiveness -- a zone in America equal in size to the .... area of the Soviet Union which is included in the sensitive sectors, we can imagine a compromise between the 'all' proposed by one side and the 'nothing' proposed by the other, with possibilities of subsequently extending the photographed sector."

I then said -- and this indicates the ground that has been covered:

"Need I add that, for the time being, this solution -- which follows logically from an analysis of the profound role of aerial inspection -- has little or no chance of being accepted? It will no doubt appear excessive to the Soviet representative ... and inadequate to the United States representative ... I ask both of them, however, to think it over. Has either one of them retained the hope of leading the other to share his views completely? Both of them know better than to attribute to each other the attitudes of poker players."

(Mr. Moch, France)

They know that they both express views strictly defined by their Governments. If, therefore, neither of them can rally the other to his point of view, there is no other choice than to accept the indefinite interruption of all disarmament ... or to seek a compromise solution such as the one I have outlined ... ".

(DC/PV.55, page 23-25)

I developed this same thesis during private talks in Moscow a few weeks ago. It was rejected at that time, as the Franco-British plan of 11 June 1954 had been rejected when it was first presented. Like the latter plan, it was subsequently re-examined and accepted as a basis for discussion in the Soviet proposals of 17 November 1956. In his brilliant opening statement, Mr. Noble, with whom I agree on all points, has stressed the limitations and obscurities of these new proposals, according to which the Soviet Union delegation is prepared to examine the question of aerial inspection in a limited area, without making it clear whether it is prepared to accept the principle of such inspection. Mr. Kuznetsov repeated this morning the formula of being prepared to examine the question; I should like to consider that as an acceptance in principle.

I would add to the remark made by the United Kingdom Minister of State a comment on the technical inadequacy of these Soviet proposals. The important thing, in fact, is not to draw two lines at an equal distance from the dividing line, or to choose this distance in such a way as to include on one side the whole of Western Europe, except Spain, Portugal, Brittany, Cornwall and Scotland, and on the other side the people's democracies and, so far as the USSR is concerned, only a narrow region of swamps. The problem, rather, is to include all the territories in which secret concentrations -- whether of land forces or air power -- might be dangerous, even though other more remote regions may be included, in order, as I have already indicated, to ensure a proper balance. That was my purpose in suggesting that the preliminary demarcation of these sectors should be entrusted to military experts with maps and coloured pencils. My concern is the same as that expressed by Mr. van Langenhove in his interesting statement of 15 January.

It matters little, however, that my compromise of a few months ago has been temporarily distorted. A certain advance is none the less being made as regards principles: we are no longer confronted with an absolute refusal on the part of the Soviet Union even to consider aerial inspection.

(Mr. Moch, France)

Similarly, Mr. Lodge told us, in his detailed statement of 14 January, that the United States proposes:

"the progressive installation of inspection systems which will provide against the possibility of great surprise attack. The United States is willing to execute, either as an opening step or as a later step, the complete proposal made in the summit conference at Geneva by President Eisenhower." (A/C.1/PV.821, page 7)

This proposal raises much hope, since it paves the way for progressive implementation.

Between the "all" and the "nothing" of last year, a way out of the deadlock is beginning to appear. Of course, we shall need a specific text, which will be drafted by the Sub-Committee. Once such an agreement has been drawn up, its signatories will have done much to advance the cause of peace.

I come now to the miscellaneous questions.

Many other problems have been raised, which I shall group together under this heading. I shall mention only the principal ones.

An idea was advanced by the United States delegation which, although we have all been concerned with it for quite a long time, has been developed in a new and striking form. It concerns missiles travelling through outer space. The most deadly weapon of a push-button war obviously would be the missile with a hydrogen-bomb warhead, which could cross the widest oceans in less than an hour, guided by radio or radar or drawn towards the target by homing devices. Theoretically, the missiles which use oxygen as a fuel to propel themselves into the atmosphere can be intercepted, although the probability of doing so is rather small. But those which carry their own fuel in the form of liquid oxygen can enter outer space, and travel at such speeds and climb to such heights that it is inconceivable that they can be stopped.

The United States proposes that we halt this new form of arms race in time by launching such missiles for scientific purposes only, and under international control. France has carried out studies on these matters, and also has its firing platforms, and it is fully prepared to channel the research in which it is engaged in that direction and to agree to give up utilizing the stratosphere for military purposes, provided that an adequate system of control can be established. France likewise accepts the British proposal concerning "offensive submarines", to use Mr. Noble's terms.

Other problems were raised which are political in nature, such as the geographic limitation of manpower, either in Germany or in the two regions covered by the NATO and Warsaw Pacts, abandoning bases on foreign territory, and so on. In our opinion, these problems are beyond the competence of our Committee. A disarmament treaty, which must necessarily be universal, can fix the total of the armed forces, but not their geographical apportionment. Such an apportionment can be determined only by agreements between the parties directly concerned.

The same holds true for problems such as those of European security and a non-aggression pact between the NATO Powers and those of the Warsaw Pact, which rest with the States in these two groups alone.

Let there be no misunderstanding. By pointing this out, I do not mean to minimize these difficulties or to deny that solving them would make it possible to move ahead on the road to disarmament. Our technical negotiations on a disarmament agreement must keep pace with the quest for a solution to political

disputes, without dwelling on which came first, the chicken or the egg, as Mr. Kuznetsov reminded us. But seeking several objectives simultaneously does not imply that the parties to the case are identical. One does not see how the eighty Powers gathered here, though they are all fully qualified to draw up the general rules of universal disarmament, could take the place of the twenty member States of the two European regional pacts and formulate a European security pact.

As I have, just as others, especially the representative of Poland, enumerated the points of agreement of disagreement with regard to disarmament, I shall refrain from attempting to sum up this balance sheet. In my opinion, the last plan of the United States marks a great step forward towards a rapprochement, since it is limited, according to our formula, to everything that can be controlled at present.

Similarly, certain elements of the Soviet proposal, taken out of their polemical context, make it possible to hope that between "all" and "nothing", something is becoming possible. It is enough for me to note that an understanding has been reached in some fields during recent years, and that there has been a rapprochement of views in others. It is the duty of the Sub-Committee to continue its task, to broaden the area of positive results and to solve the difficulties and differences, one at a time. It will not fail.

Before concluding, I should like to express an opinion on some of the new ideas put forward during the present session. With regard to the technical proposals submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union, the French viewpoint has been explained point by point during the preceding analysis. I recall them only to emphasize the extent to which these proposals will enable the Sub-Committee to make new efforts towards a synthesis.

The Soviet representative also suggested three innovations, enlarging the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and the convening of a special session of the General Assembly to take up the question of disarmament.

Although this does not constitute a final position, I should like to caution the Political Committee against expanding the working bodies. The composition of the Disarmament Commission is based on that of the Security Council, with one additional member. It would be desirable not to derogate from this principle and



to increase the number of members on the Commission only in accordance with the number of members on the Security Council. As for the Sub-Committee, I hope that its membership will remain as limited as possible, since that is the condition for effective work. It does not matter whether one State or one region is in the minority, because no majority vote is conceivable within the Sub-Committee. I trust that I shall be forgiven for saying exactly what I think and for expressing the opinion of a man who has spent more than thirty years in a very large assembly and in its smaller committees and who, for more than eight years, has participated in the work of the Government as a whole and in its limited inter-ministerial committees. I have always noted that the amount of work done decreases very rapidly as the number of participants increase. Because I hope that the Sub-Committee will achieve maximum results, I should prefer that its membership be not increased. I apologize to those colleagues of mine whose countries were named as candidates by the representative of the Soviet Union.

The idea of a special session of the General Assembly is interesting, but I think, with our Italian colleague, Mr. Piccioni, as with the representatives of New Zealand and Iraq, that it comes too early. No effective, practical concrete work would ever be accomplished by a committee of eighty. When five of us agree, and then twelve of us agree, it will be time enough to convene either a special session of the General Assembly or a special disarmament conference. But at the present stage of our work it would be better, in my opinion, to postpone such a decision and to leave it to the Disarmament Commission to make known its view at the appropriate time.

Mr. Noble made three practical suggestions on the reduction of conventional weapons, on the priority to be given to the study of a control system and of certain of its provisions, and, finally, on the limitation of test explosions. I spoke of these earlier, and I repeat them now merely to say that I fully agree with all these proposals as well as with his excellent statement as a whole. I could adopt that entire statement as my own, excepting only the opinion he expressed about the representative of France.

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A/C.1/PV.828  
69-70

(Mr. Moch, France)

The representative of the Philippines has suggested that we return to an Australian-Philippine proposal of 1954, which requested an objective and methodical account summarizing the various proposals which have been presented. This is a mammoth task which I have performed many times for myself, but I doubt whether the Secretary-General or Mr. Protitch would consider themselves qualified to do it. No doubt they would encounter objections from all sides. Each side would feel that his point of view had not been exactly reflected by the Secretariat. If the Commission undertook to present it, it would have to devote much precious time to it and, instead of discussing future issues, it would reopen lengthy debates on the interpretation to be given to the old texts. I do not think that this would be entirely desirable.

(Mr. Moch, France)

Likewise, I do not believe that it is necessary to select a neutral chairman -- our Secretary-General or any other person -- for the Sub-Committee; first, because all the preliminary work will have to be done in the Sub-Committee, which does not necessarily meet in New York, and, moreover, because the problem is always the same: we have to achieve unanimity, to obtain the support of all members for an extensive or limited project -- that is to say, we have to convince the various Governments concerned of the necessity of concessions, to make Governments understand that these concessions have to be made. That is the function of the representatives of these Governments and not that of a neutral person that is not in direct contact with Governments.

I have come to three conclusions after these considerations. My first conclusion is that strong pressure has been exerted here on all the members of the Sub-Committee by the representatives of the medium-sized and small Powers in an effort to achieve at least partial agreement. Our Governments demand that we come to an understanding and I am thankful for this. A number of new ideas have been advanced which the Sub-Committee will have to study attentively while returning also to many older ones, with the firm resolve to overcome past obstacles.

My second conclusion is derived from the first: it is inconceivable that a single person among us, knowing the effects of modern weapons, would wish that his Government would become engaged in total war. It is inconceivable that a single one of our Governments would accept the idea of becoming involved in the cataclysm or of contributing, even in a minor role, towards its provocation.

My third conclusion is actually derived from an assumption: to avoid such a perspective we need disarmament and, at the same time, the assurance that beyond the frontiers disarmament will be concurrent -- that is to say, that a complete and effective control is being exercised which will contribute towards restoring international confidence, at least to the degree that this can be achieved by the reduction or limitation of arms.

(Mr. Moch, France)

Three points consequently are reached: the elements, now available, of any plan of disarmament, the common will to avoid catastrophe and the necessity, therefore, to achieve the treaty and to provide for its strictly enforced supervision. We are all agreed on these points, whatever our dissensions on other subjects, political, social, philosophical or religious, may be.

Thus if we are sincere an agreement is possible. Being possible, it becomes a necessity. We have lost many long years. During the past ten years the peoples of our countries have been squandering fantastic resources in military expenditures which might have created considerable well-being in this world. The main military budgets -- I have not been able to add them all up -- amount to a total figure of about 80,000 tons of gold, that is to say, in a single year at least four times the value of all the precious metals accumulated in all the banks of issue and treasuries of the universe. Shall we thus continue to waste human endeavour without any other counterpart than the risk of catastrophe?

I cannot believe it, and that is why I am confident that our Sub-Committee, once our work has been placed before it, will -- at long last -- submit a draft agreement. The French delegation, tomorrow as yesterday, will redouble its efforts to this end. I do not think there is any need for me to reassure the representatives gathered here that this is so.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With the statement that you have just heard, the general debate is now finished. We will take up the draft resolutions that have been presented at our 3 o'clock meeting this afternoon.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): I understand that in spite of the fact that I spoke at such great length this morning, I will be permitted to speak later on during the course of the discussion on the draft resolutions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Naturally. The representative of France has the right to speak when we discuss the draft resolutions.

I must remind the Committee that this next debate is a limited and concrete debate on a specific subject. Since a draft resolution which might be adopted unanimously has been submitted by all the nuclear Powers, plus a few others, I have the hope that we will be able to conclude our debate this afternoon and vote on the draft resolutions also. If we are not able to do so this afternoon, then I will be forced to call for a night meeting in order to avoid a Saturday meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.