

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



LIMITED
A/C.1/PV.824
21 January 1957
ENGLISH

Eleventh Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 21 January 1957, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. BELAUNDE

(Peru)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission [22] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Ullrich	(Czechoslovakia)
Mr. Bryn	(Norway)
Mr. Sawada	(Japan)
Mr. Wei	(China)
Mr. Sandler	(Sweden)
Mr. Piccioni	(Italy)
Mr. Jakobsen	(Denmark)
Mr. Serrano	(Philippines)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.824. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.

REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS: CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (DC.83; A/C.1/783, 784; A/C.1/L.160, L.161, L.162) [Agenda item 22]

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall read out the complete list of speakers: Czechoslovakia, Norway, China, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, Philippines, Canada, Netherlands, Austria, Iraq, Iran, Bulgaria, Nepal, Byelorussian SSR, El Salvador, Albania, Australia, Poland, Ceylon, Brazil, New Zealand, Ukrainian SSR, Iceland, United States, the Soviet Union, India and France.

I call on the representative of Syria on a point of order.

Mr. TARAZI (Syria) (interpretation from French): With the permission of the Chairman, I should like to raise a point of order. During last Wednesday's meeting he pointed out that the list of speakers would be closed on Friday on 6 p.m. But it was understood at that time that the Committee would meet again on Thursday morning, and that is why my delegation did not put its name down on the list at that time. We thought that there would be a meeting on Thursday. I suggest that the list of speakers should be closed now.

I do not know whether this point of order is or is not proper at this time. I leave it to the Chairman of the Committee to decide.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): When I announced that the list of speakers would be closed on Friday, I also said that that date would stand whether or not another meeting was held. However, out of courtesy for the representative of Syria, I shall make an exception and include his name on the list of speakers.

Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia): It may be opportune to recall the fact that, during twelve years of discussions of the problem of disarmament, the General Assembly twice reached a unanimous decision. The first time was in 1946 and the second time in 1954. We are recalling these two unanimous decisions of the General Assembly, not for the sake of their historical curiosity, but because we think that they can serve as a valuable lesson. Both these resolutions, conceived one from the other over the span of eight years, set forth -- and in some passages even by the same wording -- an extensive and comprehensive disarmament programme the components of which, since its inception, have been: the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and effective international control.

In both these resolutions, the great Powers and other Members of the United Nations stated unanimously their support for a comprehensive disarmament programme and agreed on the basic principles underlying such a programme. If we are to evaluate the situation which has developed in the course of the negotiations on the question of disarmament, we must answer the question: what has been realized from the programme set forth and what are the real reasons hindering its realization?

It is known that the aggressive circles in the Western countries -- above all, the monopolist circles of the United States of America -- have always been hostile to the idea of disarmament and have for many years frustrated any agreement aimed at the elaboration of concrete disarmament measures. Those are the circles which unleashed the cold war, denounced by the overwhelming majority of peace-loving peoples all over the world as dangerous both to world peace and the development of friendly co-operation among nations.

Thanks to the efforts of peaceful forces in the whole world, an important turning point occurred in the international situation during the last three years. After the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Conference of Heads of Government of the four great Powers in 1955 and the Bandung Conference of the Asian and African countries, a certain relaxation of international tension was observed and the idea of peaceful coexistence among States with different social systems have gained ever-increasing support.

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

Thanks to the joint efforts of the peaceful forces, the policy of cold war was dealt a heavy blow. The monopolist circles in the Western countries have been forced to retreat but, as the facts show, they have never given up their policy of negotiating "from positions of strength". We are witnessing at present the fact that the forces hostile to peaceful co-operation among nations are pushing forward anew. The ruling circles in the Western countries -- above all in the United States of America -- are in ever-increasing measure fomenting the cold war and proclaiming again the policy of "positions of strength" which in the past has caused so much harm and was also preventing the attainment of any disarmament agreement.

If we are now discussing the disarmament problem we cannot pass these facts over in silence. It is the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation that, in connexion with the disarmament problem, it is not possible to overlook such events as the armaments race, preparations for war or overt violations of peace. For instance, the armed aggression of the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt, accompanied by the intensified war propaganda in some countries of the North Atlantic Pact, has brought again into the forefront the danger of a world conflict.

Foreign interference in the affairs of the Arab countries and plans of a new colonialism for their subjugation, expressed in the so-called Eisenhower doctrine -- which foresees also military intervention in the Middle East Area -- represents a further serious danger to the security of nations and entails further aggravation of the international tension. The dangerous developments in this part of the world, together with the increased armaments race in the Western countries, makes the solution of the whole complex problem of disarmament still more urgent. The experience that the stockpiling of weapons cannot but lead to war adventures has been confirmed again.

The attacks of aggressive forces against peace are not confined to the area of the Near and the Middle East. Only recently, attempts to disturb peace in Central Europe have been repelled. A dangerous development is taking place in Western Germany, to which a special role has been assigned in the plans of the ruling circles of the United States of America.

EIG/mlw

A/C.1/PV.824

5

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

It is certainly not by mere coincidence that the Government of the United States of America is now increasing the expenditures on armaments. The budget estimates of the United States for 1958 are themselves a picture of the policy of negotiating "from the positions of strength", the policy of threats and retaliation. The expenses going directly for armaments will rise in 1958, as compared with the budget for 1957, by two billion dollars.

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

From the message of President Eisenhower to Congress it follows that of each dollar in the United States budget sixty-three cents goes to armaments and military aid, with added emphasis being given to atomic armaments. In his message, President Eisenhower stresses that the military strength of the United States represents the bulwark of world peace and freedom. What else can these words mean than a new confirmation of the policy of maintaining a position of strength, the policy of interference and the attempted domination of the world? The policy of fomenting the cold war anew, the policy of maintaining a position of strength and creating a further build-up of armaments, is incompatible with the desire for disarmament shared by the peace-loving peoples throughout the world.

We consider that the policy of the United States, supported by the Western Powers, is the main reason for the present unsatisfactory situation of the negotiations on the question of disarmament. The reasons for this situation were aptly characterized, for instance, by a member of the United Kingdom Parliament, Barbara Castle, who, after the meeting of the Disarmament Commission in July 1956, wrote in the London weekly Tribune:

"America does not want disarmament... It is now clear that, not only can the West have a disarmament agreement any time they want, but it is going to be very difficult to find any more excuses for not having it. For two years the Americans, with the shuffling connivance of the British Government, have been fighting an effective rearguard action against disarmament".

The documents of the recent disarmament discussions in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee prove the correctness of this evaluation. They testify to the fact that the Western Powers are retreating successively from their own proposals formerly submitted and tenaciously sustained by them and thus are making any progress impossible in the disarmament question.

True as it is that the negotiations on the question of disarmament are continually encountering obstacles, this fact must not discourage us from searching untiringly for all possibilities to reach progress on the way towards its solution. This recognition has recently led to a new approach to the disarmament problem. If it is not possible to achieve the realization of a comprehensive disarmament programme, it is necessary to seek solutions for partial questions

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

and thus endeavour to reach step by step an ultimate agreement on all important problems of disarmament.

We, of course, would prefer a comprehensive agreement on a universal disarmament programme which would embrace both measures for reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and provisions for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, as well as an effective control on compliance therewith. We are of the opinion that such an agreement would be in accordance with the principles set forth in the two resolutions unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and would fully express the demands and aspirations of nations.

In view of the impossibility of reaching this today, it is important to make at least some partial steps on the way towards disarmament. They would undoubtedly strengthen the confidence among nations and in this way, in turn, create better conditions for the realization of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

In the course of the past year, an important development in this direction has been recorded during the disarmament discussions. When, owing to the policy pursued by the Western Powers, the negotiations on a comprehensive disarmament programme came to a deadlock, the Soviet Government submitted a number of proposals for the solution of various important aspects of the disarmament problem. The Soviet proposals of 27 March, 14 May, 12 July and 17 November 1956 include a number of measures which make it possible for the parties to agree, first of all, on such steps to be undertaken on which there prevails conformity of views.

The significance of this new approach to the disarmament problem has been given a high appreciation on the part of a number of States. During our discussion, this matter was dealt with in detail, for instance, by the representative of Yugoslavia. In the course of last year's session of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, the representative of Canada gave to this new approach the following appreciation:

"A limited agreement could, nonetheless, serve to stabilize the military situation and strengthen the prospects for wider political settlements. It would, particularly if accompanied by adequate control measures, develop a firm basis for more far-reaching measures of disarmament. It would in itself have a political impact likely to produce a favourable

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

atmosphere for the negotiation and settlement of wider political issues. These settlements, in turn, would make possible further progress in disarmament. (DC/SC.1/PV.82, page 6)

It is necessary to stress, in this connexion, what is to be understood under limited measures for disarmament. At this point it is opportune to recall again the lesson drawn from the resolutions of the General Assembly of 1946 and 1954, when it was possible to harmonize the points of view of all Members of the United Nations, the great Powers included, in unanimous decisions. Limited measures must not disregard any of the three basic components of the solution: reduction of armaments and armed forces, prohibition of atomic weapons and effective control. Under limited measures we include proposals the realization of which can be helpful to the solution of the disarmament question in its whole scope, can contribute to the relaxation of international tension and can promote the process of restoring the necessary confidence among nations. It is surely not possible to include among limited measures of disarmament efforts aiming only at the establishment of control and inspection, having no connexion whatsoever with disarmament.

The proposals submitted here for instance, by the representative of the United States tend also to a solution of certain partial questions; but their main and foremost objective is, as already appears at the first glance, the establishment of control and inspection measures, disarmament measures themselves being limited in both scope and range.

The fact that the United States proposals omit completely the question of prohibition of weapons of mass destruction cannot be considered otherwise than a step backward, even from the point of view of the course and the results of the negotiations on the disarmament problem up to now.

This essential shortcoming of the United States proposals is the more serious in view of the fact that one of the most pressing issues of disarmament, which calls for a solution without delay, is precisely the question of prohibition of nuclear weapons. One of the reasons why it has not been possible up to now to reach any agreement on the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme is the fact that the Western Powers, and notably the United States, originally categorically rejected acceptance of the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

NR/am

A/C.1/PV.824
9-10

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

Later they declared that they were ready to consent to the prohibition of these weapons, but only at the ultimate stage of a comprehensive disarmament programme, only after the agreed reduction of armed forces and armaments had been effected to the extent of 75 per cent. When the Soviet Union had acceded to this demand, the Western Powers went back on their own proposals.

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

When it became clear that the Western Powers were not willing to accept the prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, the Soviet Union submitted a new proposal to the effect that the big Powers should undertake a solemn obligation to refrain in their international relations from the use or threat of force, and that they should also assume an obligation not to resort to the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons. But this proposal has not been accepted, either.

In these circumstances, there was a danger that the discussions on disarmament as a whole would continue to be deadlocked if no other solution could be found. At this juncture came the initiative of the Soviet Union, which we welcome. In the interest of achieving progress in this matter, the Soviet Union advances a proposal to solve the two fundamental problems of disarmament, namely, the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, independently of each other.

It was in this spirit that the Soviet Union, on 17 November last, submitted separate proposals on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, with the discontinuance of their production, the banning of their use and the complete destruction of stockpiles of such weapons as well as their elimination from national armaments.

As a first step toward achieving this objective, the Soviet Union proposes the immediate cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

We fully support this proposal, which corresponds to the demand of the broad masses of the people in all countries and which has already been given official support by a number of States. Leading scientists, politicians and social organizations of various countries are continually and ever more urgently pointing to the concrete danger threatening mankind if the atomic tests are continued. The official publication "Nuclear Explosions", elaborated on the initiative of the Government of India, has, for example, come to the following conclusion -- and I quote from page 126 of that publication:

"If further tests, even on the present scale, are continued, then the possibility cannot be dismissed that, at the end of a decade or so, the radio-strontium body-burden may exceed the permissible burden by an appreciable factor causing a noticeable rise in skeletal injuries and other untoward effects. These are first likely to appear in populations having a comparatively low standard of nutrition."

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

The effects of the explosions of atomic weapons are far from being limited by national boundaries. The whole of mankind is exposed to the danger resulting from continued explosions. That is also the reason why the demand for immediate discontinuance of the tests of atomic weapons is of such paramount importance.

The realization and the control of the prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons is, in the present state of science, feasible without any difficulties. No special control system is necessary for the control of this prohibition, since modern technical means can without difficulty discover and locate tests of nuclear weapons in any part of the world.

Czechoslovakia has repeatedly stood up for the demand for banning the tests of nuclear weapons. The National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic, in its declaration of 1 August 1956, expressed its full support of this demand. The Czechoslovak Government will continue its efforts to see that the banning of tests of nuclear weapons becomes a reality.

It is to be regretted that the newly submitted proposals of the United States do not contain this demand. On the contrary, they provide only for a certain limitation of the tests of nuclear weapons, and moreover they subordinate these inadequate measures to preliminary conditions, thus impeding a speedy conclusion of an agreement in this matter, so vital for all mankind.

In his statement in our Committee, the representative of Japan stressed the extraordinary urgency of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the cessation of tests. His appeal for the immediate discontinuance of tests of atomic weapons should be listened to carefully in view of the fact that it is voiced by the representative of a country which knows from its own experience the terrific consequences of an atomic war. We regret that the conclusions flowing from the statement made by the representative of Japan have not been reflected in the draft resolution co-sponsored by the Japanese delegation.

The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes the fact that, during the last year, the negotiations on the question of disarmament have brought the different positions on some points closer together, as, for instance, on the vital question concerning reduction of armed forces and armaments. We refer in particular to the question of levels to which the armed forces should be reduced. We wish to believe that this time the Western Powers will not again retreat from their position.

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the different positions have been brought closer together also on another point which in past years had been the subject of considerable controversy, namely, the question of control. The proposal for control measures to provide against a surprise attack, which had previously been submitted by the USSR, is gaining ever wider support. In its most recent proposal, the United States accepts the principles underlying the Soviet proposal of establishing a system of ground inspection and control.

Steps have also been undertaken to break the deadlock caused recently by the insistence of the United States upon the aerial survey plan as a preliminary condition for achieving any agreement on disarmament, although this proposal by itself solves neither the problem of control nor that of preventing aggression. In the interest of facilitating the speediest possible conclusion of an agreement on disarmament, the Government of the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to consider the question of employing aerial photography, within the area of Europe where there are located the principal armed forces of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty countries, to a depth of 800 kilometres to the west and the east of the demarcation line between these forces -- provided, of course, that the countries concerned agree.

This area of aerial surveys would embrace the whole of the territory of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government stated publicly on 1 December 1956 that it supports the proposals submitted by the USSR on 17 November and that, in the interest of reaching an agreement on disarmament, it is fully prepared to express its consent, recognizing that a reduction of armaments would considerably lessen the danger of war and make possible the adoption of such measures without compromising the interests of the security of our Republic.

The people of Czechoslovakia are deeply interested in seeing to it that Europe should cease to be a focus of tension and that permanent conditions for a calm and peaceful life should be ensured to the peoples of Europe. The security of Czechoslovakia has always been closely connected with the security of Europe.

HA/ns

A/C.1/PV.824
14-15

(Mr. Ullrich, Czechoslovakia)

The reaching of an agreement on some partial questions of disarmament would favourably affect the stabilization and further strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

The policy of remilitarization of West Germany, arming the West German armies with atomic and nuclear weapons and integrating them into the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the existence of a broad network of military bases on the territory of States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, make the measures in the field of disarmament in Europe particularly pressing.

In the course of the negotiations on the question of disarmament, numerous proposals had been put forward calling for the adoption of measures aiming at the strengthening of peace and security in Europe through partial solutions of the disarmament problem. The General Assembly now has before it the proposals of the Soviet Union for a reduction of the armed forces stationed on the territory of Germany, for a considerable reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed on the territories of the NATO countries, and of the Soviet armed forces stationed on the territories of the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty, for the liquidation of the military bases on the territory of other States and for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

The realization of these proposals would contribute substantially to the tranquillization of the atmosphere in Europe and would also create favourable conditions for the peaceful unification of Germany on a democratic basis.

A great contribution to the creation of a healthier atmosphere would also be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. Such a pact, to which both the Soviet Union and the United States would be parties, would quickly change the international atmosphere and would help to relax the tension in the world. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty clearly expressed their willingness to conclude such a pact.

The Czechoslovak Government attaches great importance to the question of disarmament and, guided by the will to contribute concretely to the solution of this problem, it reduced its armed forces in 1955 by 34,000 men and in 1956 by 10,000 men. Along with this reduction expenditures for national defence were decreased by 7.9 per cent compared with 1955. Such steps, also undertaken by other peace-loving countries, testify to the fact that the problems of disarmament can be solved and that the decisive factor for their successful solution is the good will of the Governments to reach agreement. If such steps in the field of disarmament which were undertaken in the past years by some peace-loving countries were to be followed by a similar initiative on the part of other countries as well, and in the first instance by the three western Powers, they would lead to the relaxation of tension in the world and create favourable conditions for a successful settlement of the disarmament question as a whole.

What now is the task of the General Assembly in the question of disarmament? In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the General Assembly is now faced with an important decision. It is necessary to ensure the establishment of appropriate conditions in order to enable in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee a careful study and thorough examination of all proposals which have been put forward up to now.

Even at the previous session of the General Assembly many representatives pointed to the fact that the Disarmament Commission restricted itself more or less to a formal role in the negotiations on the problems of disarmament. The course of the deliberations, and especially their results, clearly demonstrate that neither the Disarmament Commission nor its Sub-Committee utilized all the possibilities which in our opinion existed for achieving progress. One of the underlying causes of this situation, we believe, is the inadequately representative composition of both these important organs of the General Assembly. We agree with the opinion that it is necessary to enlarge the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, and thus to create better conditions for their future work. In discussing disarmament problems it is necessary to strengthen the voice of Asia and that of other unrepresented or under-represented areas.

We should also not overlook the fact that the General Assembly itself has so far not played a part in the negotiations which would correspond to its significance.

The broad range of proposals submitted to the General Assembly offers the possibility that, with the good will of all participating countries, the General Assembly can effectively enhance progress in the negotiations on disarmament. It is our belief, however, that both the existing possibilities and the importance and urgency of the disarmament problems require the General Assembly to devote one of its sessions exclusively to these problems.

The nations expect and ever more urgently demand that the United Nations make all possible efforts for reaching the goal upon which the hopes of peace-loving people all over the world are fixed, namely the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the restoration of confidence among nations.

Mr. BRYN (Norway): Listening to and taking part in a disarmament debate is no new experience to most of us in this room. Disarmament is a problem dealt with in many bodies and at many levels, in technical commissions and at summit conferences. It is the key problem of the United Nations; and it is a problem for the man in the street.

I am stating the obvious in order to underline the fact that progress made in the solution of the disarmament problem at this juncture, any progress, cannot fail to have a beneficial effect on most other problems that are troubling us at the present time.

There is no denying that most of us sense a feeling of frustration each time we have to turn our thoughts towards the disarmament question. And yet, is it being unduly optimistic to say that there is a new element in the situation? Is there not a growing realization throughout the world, in all countries, on all sides of "curtains" of this or that description, that the time has come to show progress, to act and to act now?

The United Nations Organization is here to give words and expression to that feeling on the part of the peoples of the world. And new facts demand something more than old and well-worn words and ideas.

My delegation has listened with the greatest attention to the previous statements in this debate, and particularly to those of the representatives of the great Powers. We are, of course, very much aware that the question of disarmament is primarily the responsibility of those Powers, as was stressed by our Foreign Minister, Mr. Lange, in the general debate.

As regards the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, I shall limit myself to saying that I hope it was not the final word but was perhaps meant for the opening skirmish.

I do not think that I am doing an injustice to other Governments and individuals when I say that, for the introduction of new elements in the situation, fresh and vigorous thinking, we have to thank President Eisenhower and the American Government more than anyone else.

My delegation thinks very highly of the statement made by Ambassador Lodge a week ago on behalf of the United States Government, not only for its specific proposals but also for its general tone and spirit and its obvious intention of avoiding controversial and acrimonious debate.

My delegation has studied with care the five main points made by Mr. Lodge in his intervention and I would like to comment very briefly on some of them.

First, an early agreement that all future production of fissionable materials should be used or stored -- under international control -- exclusively for non-military purposes is logically the centre of the whole disarmament complex.

The fact that control of the implementation of such an agreement does not seem to present any serious technical problems -- in contrast to the control of the existing stockpiles -- makes it natural and necessary that control of future production be given priority over reduction of existing stockpiles.

The suggestion made by the United States Government that when the production of nuclear materials has been put under control information will be available which may render possible and acceptable, as the next step, reduction of existing stockpiles, is in the view of my delegation sound. In fact this suggestion is, as far as we know, the first one to point a way out of the dilemma of the uncontrollability of the stockpiles, a dilemma which during the last few years has seriously hampered progress in the disarmament discussion.

The offer by the United States Government that under such circumstances generous, progressive transfers of fissionable material will be made to peaceful uses holds out a promise that the tremendous accumulation of potential destructive power will be turned into an equally tremendous power reserve to be used for the progress and well-being of mankind.

Now, second, to turn to the problem of control. The principal parties concerned seem to have moved closer together on this vital problem. Even if many details remain to be worked out, there is agreement in principle that strict and effective international control must be established of the fulfilment of disarmament obligations. In fact this was a main point made by the representative of the Soviet Union in his speech.

The immediate task in this sphere seems then to be to concentrate on working out the details of the control measures required for the first and limited stage of the disarmament process. On the background of the existing agreement in principle and of the recent reduction of the gap between the opposing views of methods and scope of the control system, my delegation is hopeful that elements from all the existing proposals concerning control measures could now be combined in such a way as would be acceptable to all for the purpose of the first stage of disarmament.

Let me then move to a third point. I am sure the aim of achieving an ultimate ban on all nuclear test explosions is common to all of us. In this connexion may I say that we do appreciate the willingness expressed by the representatives of several great Powers to work out promptly and as a first step methods for advance notice and registration of nuclear tests. Inasmuch as my Foreign Minister, Mr. Lange, raised this question in his statement in the general debate, I shall have to ask the forbearance of this Committee for going into it in some detail. I would also take this opportunity to present the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162) submitted jointly by Japan, Canada and Norway, and circulated to delegations.

In the disarmament debate in this Committee during the tenth session of the General Assembly Norway's representative, Mr. Finn Moe, pointed out that nuclear test explosions in the large category can be traced without an elaborate, on-the-spot system of control. In view of the fact that disagreement about the scope and the functions of the control-system for several years has been one of the major factors holding up progress in the disarmament talks, the Norwegian Government has examined carefully what the prospect might be for isolating the question of these test explosions from the general complex of disarmament problems. The primary purpose of such a move would be to break the deadlock of the disarmament discussion. We have deemed and still deem it likely that agreement to limit, control or even only register such future explosions will have a beneficial effect on the general atmosphere in which the disarmament discussion takes place. That is a consideration of a general nature. A more special preoccupation of my Government is the increase of nuclear radiation registered in Norway as well as in other parts of the world. The figures published in this connexion caused concern in my country and also drew some international attention. Let me here repeat what Mr. Lange said on this matter in the general debate:

"It is far from me to want to exploit" the concern shown by public opinion in my country and in many countries "for any scare propaganda. It seems that the genetic effects from radioactive fall-out, from tests carried out at the present rate, are not, for the time being, giving rise to great anxiety, even though the differing opinions among scientists on this subject are in themselves disturbing. Gravest concern has, however, been expressed among scientists as to the effects of radioactive materials taken up in food

materials and thereby entering human bodies. This effect of the fall-out may, as I understand it, represent a danger in a future close enough already to warrant serious consideration today of precautionary measures".

(A/PV.598, page 32)

The wishes of my Government should, therefore, be clear enough. I draw the attention of this Committee, furthermore, to the fact that the delegation of Japan is one of the sponsors of our draft resolution. The people of Japan, if any, has the right to be preoccupied with radioactive fall-out. In a tribute to the good sense, moderation and realism with which the Japanese Government is treating these difficult matters, I wish to use this opportunity to offer my congratulations to our Japanese colleague for his speech the other day.

We have already in existence the United Nations Committee on radiation, which keeps under observation the facts of the radiation and fall-out situation in the world. Our proposal would, if accepted by the parties concerned, enable this Committee also to estimate, to a certain extent at least, the future radiation and fall-out.

We have no doubts that the States concerned will pay attention to these data and estimates, based on the best available scientific methods, and adjust their testing programmes accordingly. The data themselves and the fact that world public opinion knows of these data will in this particular case be a good enough control system.

The fact that the proposal before the Committee does not contain any recommendation for limitation or ban on future tests does not indicate, of course, that we are not as anxious as any nation to see such agreements ultimately established between the great Powers. We respect and understand, however, the reasons given for wanting to reach those ends by a step by step method. We ask for support for our proposal even from those who do not think it goes far enough; we ask for support in what we believe to be the constructive spirit of not discarding what is attainable, even if not quite satisfactory, for what is obviously not acceptable today by those immediately concerned. One step forward is better than continued deadlock.

I would like to add a word or two of a more technical nature. Our original intention was to suggest that only such nuclear test explosions as would cause measurable radiation active fall-out outside the country concerned should be registered, the word "measurable" then to be taken to mean measurable through the methods for collecting such data as recommended at the time by the United Nations Committee on radiation. This formula would in our opinion have the obvious advantage that it eliminates conflicts about what types and what size of explosion should be registered. It could also be argued that tests which have no effect outside the country conducting them are really not an international problem.

However, it seems that some -- and perhaps all -- of the Powers directly involved would be willing to make the obligation to record tests in advance unconditional. So much the better. But, of course, there would be no way to check up on compliance as far as concerns those tests which have no international effect, except through an on-the-spot international observation system. On this problem I will confine myself to repeating that we do not believe that a possible lack of agreement about on-the-spot control should be allowed to prevent establishment of a registration system.

(Mr. Bryn, Norway)

As to the question of what kind of information should be given when future tests are registered, it seems reasonable to expect that such registration should give at least the following data:

- (a) The upper limit of the total quantities of fissionable products which are expected to result from the test.
- (b) A rough indication of the period during which the maximum fallout is expected.
- (c) A rough indication of the geographic area which is expected to be most exposed.

So much about this particular problem. I apologize once more for having taken so much of the Committee's valuable time. To conclude, let me recapitulate the main points I have tried to make in this intervention.

First, we believe that an early establishment of a system for registration of future nuclear test explosions will be beneficial for the future security and well-being of mankind. When and if the facts of the radiation situation are established, it is inconceivable to us that the Powers concerned will continue such tests beyond the limit where the health and security of peoples may be threatened. We believe also that an agreement of this type will constitute an important factor in breaking the deadlock in the disarmament discussion and in re-establishing such mutual trust as will render further progress towards general disarmament possible.

Secondly, we are hoping for an early indication on the part of the Soviet Union that it accepts the proposal by the United States that establishment of control of future nuclear production channeled to purely peaceful purposes must have priority over any plan for reduction of existing stockpiles. Or, to phrase it differently, that the Soviet Union give up their insistence that nuclear disarmament should be arranged in one big uncontrollable step and not gradually, and, at that, to a certain extent controllable.

Thirdly, we hope that the Powers directly concerned now will be able to work out the details of a control system for the first stage of disarmament and not let disagreement and uncertainty about later stages prevent the first stage from being implemented. We believe that the setting up and getting into motion of a

(Mr. Bryn, Norway)

disarmament machinery will in itself be an important factor towards creating that mutual trust which is indispensable for carrying a planned disarmament to a successful close. We note with great satisfaction that this view was expressly endorsed by Mr. Lodge in his statement last week.

May I return finally to the theme I touched upon at the outset. Is there any hope that we may make progress in the disarmament question this year? The need for it is self-evident. World public opinion expects it. Provided everybody concerned turns to all the proposals which are on the table, without prejudice and feelings of prestige, and looks upon them with fresh eyes and in a spirit of understanding rather than mistrust, then we think there is a hope. And the hope lies perhaps primarily in the same public opinion which has a curious tendency to assert itself in the end and against odds. Statesmen and Governments can disregard it only to their own detriment. Bearing this in mind, my Government looks with real expectations to the coming deliberations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and those of its Sub-Committee.

Mr. SAWADA (Japan): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor once more. I asked to speak again in order to comment on the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162) which my delegation had the honour to submit together with the delegations of Canada and Norway. I shall be very brief, however. I already had occasion a few days ago to convey to this Committee the position of my Government on the question of disarmament, and the delegate of Norway has explained just now most precisely and elaborately, the intention and purposes of the draft resolution.

In my previous statement, I endeavoured to emphasize the ardent hope of the Government and people of Japan for the prohibition of production and use of nuclear weapons, and the need of an arrangement, at the earliest possible date, on a practicable and effective measure of disarmament. In particular, I urged that the Members of the United Nations should agree now to launch on an attempt, even on a limited scale, to exercise international supervision on test explosions of nuclear weapons, since they are currently affecting not only the health and welfare of human beings but also the economic and industrial life of nations.

(Mr. Sawada, Japan)

The danger of nuclear explosions is partly known, but mostly unknown. It is a fact that the deposit of radioactivity from fallout, detectable in human bodies and foodstuffs, has been increasing in recent years. Scientists and medical experts warn us that fallout, on the ground gets into the food chain, thereby accumulating in human bodies. Even though it may be contended that the current level of the amount of deposit does not cause any direct injury to human health and safety, no one can tell for certain the ultimate effects of increasing deposits of radioactivity on future generations. Moreover, from the genetic point of view, what matters is that the whole population of the world is exposed to increasing fallout.

Whatever may be the political circumstances in which we live, and admitting that no direct physical damage is proved at the present moment, we cannot afford to leave the current situation unrestrained. It is our ordained duty, I submit, to protect, as best we can, the safety and well-being of future generations, for which we ourselves are responsible.

It is now known that the fallout which is ejected into the protosphere will be deposited on the surface of the earth within a relatively short period, falling down with rain or with air current. But the fallout exploded into the stratosphere takes years before it reaches the earth's surface, spreading extensively over the globe. If fallout is ejected in the sea, it will remain there and spread with the sea currents.

The reserach conducted by the Shunkotsu-maru, a research ship of the Japanese Government, subsequent to the test at Bikini, has proved that the fallout dropped in the sea has spread widely in the ocean along the current, thereby contaminating fishes and entering the food chain. It is no exaggeration to say that humanbeings are now constantly exposed to radioactive dangers from all directions. My Government was very pleased that the United Nations organized the radiation committee and instructed it to study the radiation effects on the human being. I wish to stress that the study should be pursued intensely by the United Nations with the full co-operation of all the countries concerned.

In my previous intervention I set forth the views of my Government on test explosions in the light of overall disarmament. I made it clear why we have to concern ourselves, at this stage, primarily with the aspect of radioactivity,

(Mr. Sawada, Japan)

rather than with the types of bombs or the total energy which they may produce. What is proposed in the draft resolution is the absolute minimum to which we have to agree and, I submit, on which we can agree, as an immediate step, for the sake of the existence and welfare of mankind.

Turning now to the text of the draft resolution, it is proposed to establish a system of registration with the United Nations of all tests of nuclear explosions. In my preceding statement, I referred to the previous notification of all tests. I wish to add that the registration should be made well in advance, and that relevant information should be supplied to the fullest possible extent.

(Mr. Sawada, Japan)

Paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General and the Radiation Committee to keep the total actual and expected radiation in the world under constant observation, through the operation of a system recommended in the preceding paragraph. It is believed that such observation should be based both on accurate information on the amount of fall-out ejected into the stratosphere, the protosphere and the sea, and on a study of the general level of radioactivity throughout the world. It is important that the United Nations should study both the short-term and the long-term aspects of the problem. Only on the basis of accurate information and authentic study could the United Nations and the States concerned proceed with whatever preventive measures were deemed fitting to a particular occasion.

Ours is a provisional proposal, pending an over-all agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The moral intention behind it is self-evident. I do not have to reiterate the concern of my country or any other country over the danger of radioactivity, or the genuine desire for the early elimination of nuclear warfare. The draft resolution, indeed, contains nothing more than a proposal which constitutes the duty of each nation in the civilized world. With the support of moral pressure behind it, our joint proposal will, I trust, be upheld by all the Members of the United Nations.

Mr. WEI (China): Disarmament has become the most compelling problem of the world today, because of the progress already made and now being made in nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and in long-range guided missiles. The words of the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, before the Disarmament Commission on the urgency of the situation deserve our special attention. On 16 July 1956, at the Commission's sixty-first meeting, he stated:

"We cannot afford to let much more time go by. The long-range guided missile is already looming on the scene. When it becomes a standard weapon, no nation will have more than fifteen minutes to get ready to defend itself and to hit back. Already, the time approaches when several nations may have atomic weapons, when atomic artillery may be the normal equipment of any force, when any skirmish anywhere in the world could blaze up into a

(Mr. Wei, China)

nuclear conflagration. We must act before these deadly missiles are poised in hidden nests ready to strike -- and before the problem of nuclear control becomes too diffuse and too unstable to handle". (DC/PV.61, page 2)

In spite of the strenuous efforts of the United Nations, the world lost a rare opportunity for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the years immediately following the Second World War. Now we have to face this new and more serious challenge.

Stockpiles of fissionable materials have been built up in a number of countries, and they are beyond any international technological control. The danger of such stockpiles was made amply clear to the General Assembly during our last session. I do not need to go into it again. One way to remove this danger is the voluntary transfer of these stockpiles to peaceful uses.

The United States has recently set a good example in this respect. At the Conference on the Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency, held at the United Nations Headquarters here last autumn, the United States announced that it would make available to the Agency 5,000 kilogrammes of nuclear fuel, uranium-235. In addition, it would continue to make available to the Agency nuclear materials that would match in amount the sum of all quantities of such materials similarly made available by all other members of the Agency, and on comparable terms, for the period between the establishment of the Agency and 1 July 1960. Other countries with stockpiles of nuclear materials should be urged to make similar offers. Thus, the existing stockpiles of fissionable materials may be progressively reduced.

Since it is technologically feasible to control the future production of fissionable materials, my delegation is in favour of the United States proposal that all such production should be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. This is one sure way to limit the arms race in the nuclear field. It will make possible the estimation of stockpiles of fissionable materials from past production and bring such stockpiles under international control. It will also strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is being organized. Under the provisions of the Statute of the Agency, atomic activities with the aid of the Agency, and the nuclear materials produced therefrom, would be subject to international control. But the fissionable materials produced in the facilities of the atomic Powers are still not under any

(Mr. Wei, China)

international control. At the Conference, my delegation advocated international control of all fissionable materials related to the Agency. It is significant that the Statute was unanimously adopted by the **eighty-one** participating countries. For the first time in history a system of international inspection and control was accepted on such a comprehensive scale. Since all the atomic Powers voted for the Statute, I earnestly appeal to them and their representatives round this table to accept for themselves the same measures of international inspection and control which they consider to be necessary for the other countries.

Without the assistance of science fiction, one can visualize the potentialities of guided missiles and earth satellites. My delegation certainly hopes that they will be developed through international co-operation solely for scientific and peaceful purposes. At the present stage of development, agreement on their international control should be possible. Let us try to reach agreement on this point before it is too late.

(Mr. Wei, China)

In our negotiations for disarmament, be they in the General Assembly or in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, first priority should, however, be given to measures against the possibility of great surprise attack. Any agreement on such measures and their implementation will create the mutual confidence that is necessary for disarmament.

Moreover, potential surprise attacks are great threats to national security and existence. An atomic or thermonuclear surprise attack on the lines of the one we suffered in China on 18 September 1931, which is known as the Mukden incident, or such a surprise attack as the Pearl Harbor attack of 7 December 1941 must be prevented. If the common people of the world could be consulted, I am sure that they would with one voice say to the members of this Committee, "Whatever you may or may not do, you must leave no stone unturned in order to prevent a surprise attack in this thermonuclear age."

No modern war is fought with one single type of weapon. The control of any one type of weapon will not eliminate the threat of surprise attacks. For the security of all nations, a system of international inspection, including comprehensive aerial and ground inspection, can be devised and put into effect. This is the best assurance against the possibility of surprise attacks.

The Soviet Union has at least expressed some interest in aerial inspection. I will leave it to the representatives of the countries within the 1,600-kilometre zone to express their views concerning the Soviet choice of their particular countries for experimentation. But I maintain that the confidence-building measures as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 914 (X) should be pursued without delay.

My delegation does not attach any great significance to the mere reduction of the numerical strength of armed forces. There are several factors to be considered. For technical and economic reasons, a number of countries have already reduced the number of men in their armed forces. These reductions do not necessarily mean disarmament. Through systems of training, rotation and reserves, a country can build up a reserve force several times the permitted manpower in the armed forces. These men in reserve may be mobilized in a very short time.

(Mr. Wei, China)

When men are removed from the armed forces and put to work in factories to produce more weapons of war or build up war potential, the net result is rearmament instead of disarmament. Similarly the disbandment of excessive military personnel without reducing the total military strength is not disarmament. This is also true of the disposal of obsolete weapons or other military equipment.

For over ten years the debate in the United Nations on disarmament has produced no practical result. The principal difficulty lies with the problem of control. Unless the Soviet Union is willing to accept necessary measures of international control, there is no hope for any agreement on either general or partial disarmament. I have carefully examined the recent Soviet proposals on disarmament, but I cannot find any change in the Soviet position on control. In fact, there is only one sentence on control. It reads as follows:

"In the seventh place, proposals are submitted providing for the establishment of strict and effective international control over the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations." (A/C.1/PV.821, page 31)

Strict and effective international control is what we all want, but the measures of control acceptable to the Soviet Union in the past are neither strict nor effective. For example, the Soviet-type international control organ would not be given any enforcement or corrective powers. Further elucidation by the Soviet representative is needed in order to know what the present position of his Government is on the question of control.

Regarding the forum of negotiation, the Soviet Union has formally proposed the calling of a special session of the General Assembly for the solution of the disarmament problem. My delegation regards the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to be the proper forum for the examination of the various proposals, at least for the near future. One great difficulty in disarmament debates is the injection of propaganda into a subject which is by itself very complex and serious. For this very reason, the General Assembly created the Disarmament Sub-Committee with the hope that its deliberations, being in private sessions, might be freed from further complication of propaganda. The proposal of the Soviet Union goes against the experience of the United Nations.

(Mr. Wei, China)

Science and technology do not wait for the statesmen of the world to reach agreement on disarmament. While the representatives argue around the conference table, military science speeds ahead with ever increasing acceleration. If the world, especially the free world, is to survive, immediate steps must be taken to adopt the necessary measures against the possibility of great surprise attack and for the control of the modern weapons of war. If we simply mark time by counting noses in the armed forces and comfort ourselves by thinking that progress is being made on disarmament, it will soon be too late. In this nuclear-missile age, no national pride and sovereignty should be permitted to prevent the establishment of a world community wherein all science and technology as well as all the resources are used for the betterment of human livelihood.

In order to bring about this disarmed world, two proposals deserve our special consideration. One is the set of guiding principles contained in document DC/87, jointly submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the other is the set of proposals contained in document A/C.1/783, recently presented to this Committee by the representative of the United States. They both have the general support of my delegation.

Mr. SANDLER (Sweden): I remember with pleasure from last autumn the cordial and very co-operative spirit that, in this very room, dominated the conference which created the International Atomic Agency, a most encouraging example for our work in this Committee.

It is of course unrealistic to expect to see, as a result of our deliberations, a resolution implying the solution of the disarmament problem. But we have now an opportunity to present here our desiderata for further consideration in the special disarmament organs, and also an opportunity to stress the necessity of embarking upon disarmament and perhaps even to indicate the general character of some initial steps -- as an all-or-nothing-policy obviously has failed.

I should like to mention some of the desiderata, partly belonging to a later stage, that I have especially in mind.

RSH/mz

A/C.1/PV.824
39-40

(Mr. Sandler, Sweden)

First, without going back to the story of the past and welcoming concessions already made from various sides, I venture to express the general hope that in the forthcoming efforts of compromise the necessary concessions may coincide, both regarding items and timing.

(Mr. Sandler, Sweden)

Secondly, something must be done about the continuation of the tests of nuclear weapons. The situation is not so harmless, as it is usually presented. It takes years before the radiation effects of the fallout from the stratosphere can be measured, as was stated a few minutes ago by the representative of Japan. It is not sufficient to establish such effects on an average as there may be considerable local differences. This has recently been verified through measurements in Scandinavia. Such a dangerous fission product as Strontium-90 can concentrate in grazing cattle and from them pass over into milk and human bones. From the genetic point of view there is unanimity among scientists that every increase in the sum of radiation is harmful, and it is the sum that counts. The most important thing we know now is that we do not know. And indeed we know all too little about those genetic consequences. But at a time when we know more, in what way could we undo the harm possibly done today?

The Assembly has appointed a scientific Committee for assembling and evaluating radiation data. In my view there exists ample reason to ask for a standstill, a moratorium in the testing of nuclear weapons, until that Committee has reported its findings and the Assembly has acted upon them. I am asking for consideration of such a temporary step.

Thirdly, I repeat my suggestion of last year in this Committee concerning research work with a view to discovering hidden nuclear stockpiles. This scientific work ought to be concentrated, at an appropriate time, in a technical organ of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

Fourthly, in order to implement any planned reduction -- big or small -- of the conventional armed forces, measures must be taken to ensure effective collaboration of China, as has been earlier pointed out in the intervention by the Yugoslav representative.

Fifthly, a more substantial conventional reduction -- I am not thinking here of a first step -- raises the question: to what kind of armaments should it apply? Are the further reduced forces to be equipped with atomic artillery and other nuclear weapons? If so, what countries will be so equipped? The answer to the important questions submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom may in due time require rather difficult technical considerations.

(Mr. Sandler, Sweden)

Sixthly, fully approving as necessary the establishment of a feasible control system from the very beginning I must state, as I have done before, that the so-called "other weapons of mass destruction" -- still waiting after ten years for a concrete and agreed upon definition -- have to be taken more seriously into account in a realistic control planning.

Seventhly, most welcome is the proposal presented in the United States memorandum to act in time, namely, now, in order to secure the utilization of outer space missiles exclusively for peaceful purposes. This is of a special urgency in view of the rapid and most dangerous development in this domain and the beginning, very shortly, of the geophysical year, during which the first earth satellites will be launched.

Finally let me say this: The urgency of taking some initial steps in both sectors of armaments, conventional and nuclear, has manifested itself in the so-called fourth-country problem. That problem can in the near future be transformed into a many-countries problem. From a balance of terror we may then enter into an age of terror without balance.

Mr. PICCIONI (Italy) (interpretation from French): This is the first time that the Italian delegation has had the honour of participating in the debate on disarmament in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and it would like, without going into the details of the work of the Disarmament Commission which we have always followed with great interest, to express our general point of view on a problem which, in Italy as elsewhere, gives rise at the same time to so much hope and to so much concern.

The point of view of the Italian Government as regards the disarmament problem has been repeatedly stated in public statements by its most prominent representatives, but I believe, nevertheless, that it is my duty to recall it here before the representatives of the Member States of the United Nations, in order to illustrate fully our position during this very important debate.

Italy, which loves peace above all else and which has so often given proof of its desire to engage in pacific co-operation with all peoples, considers that the rearmament of the West is a sad but inevitable sacrifice which is necessary in order to safeguard the independence of the free world and to maintain peace by discouraging any aggression.

This is a very great and painful sacrifice for a country like ours, which needs to devote all its resources to the solution of its economic and social problems.

For that reason, we cannot fail to regard most favourably any serious proposal which would grant us a respite in the armaments race and which would gradually bring us to the total elimination of this grim necessity.

It is well known in the light of the many declarations of our Government, our statesmen and our parliamentary bodies that Italy, within this framework, would wish in the first place for the achievement of any measure which would do away with the frightening threat of atomic and hydrogen bombs, these horrible engines of war which can in a few minutes destroy mankind itself. Any serious, practical and loyal measures designed to repel these atrocious threats will always be welcomed with the greatest favour by the Italian Government and will be accorded warmest support by that Government.

But it is obvious that the disarmament which we so ardently desire should not be a surface disarmament, for such disarmament, concealing bad faith, would give rise merely to new and even graver dangers. Real disarmament cannot be based exclusively on an exchange of diplomatic documents, but it must find its source in a revival of human conscience and in the development of their mutual understanding.

Thus we are convinced that the perilous armaments race, which we have been witnessing these past years, is not in itself the cause of international tension. On the contrary, it is the international tension itself, due to the policy of threat and intimidation practised by the Soviet Union, which has constrained us to set up the necessary defensive organization for the protection of our freedom.

(Mr. Piccioni, Italy)

Consequently, in order to achieve the purpose which we have set ourselves we must, first of all uproot the causes of political tension in reaching a fair and gradual solution of the main outstanding political problems that divide us. We cannot embark upon the course of disarmament flippantly, leaving the road encumbered with outstanding and dangerous problems, since these problems would then arise behind us. Their solution would be at the mercy of those who would have concealed their aggressive designs.

Among these problems, I would like to quote one which is of special importance to Italy. How, I ask myself, can we really believe that there can be serious and effective disarmament unless the problem of German unification is solved, and solved fairly? It is really incredible that, twelve years after the end of the war, justice cannot yet be rendered to the German people which has made so many sacrifices and is therefore entitled to unification. How can it not be seen that this flagrant injustice is, in itself, a grave source of trouble and international tension?

There is no denying that the solution of the political problems which constitute the sad "left-overs" of the last war is obviously a difficult one, but we believe that nothing is impossible to the peoples and the Governments of goodwill, and that with goodwill acceptable solutions for all problems can be gradually achieved. It is for this reason that we have confidence in a gradual disarmament achieved by successive stages and -- this is the most important point -- each stage being accompanied by a solution of certain political problems and thus by an increase of international mutual confidence.

The question of control is closely related to this mutual confidence. Without control, disarmament can hardly be conceivable and the Italian Government believes that this control should be as effective, as realistic and as extensive as possible and that it should be put into effect gradually, while disarmament becomes more concrete along parallel lines and with close synchronization between the two.

I have never been able to understand why, if the interlocutors are in good faith, they wish to place certain limitations upon these controls. The acceptance of the broadest possible inspection, both by land and air, would in my belief

constitute the best possible proof of goodwill and reciprocal sincerity. As regards, in particular, the system of air inspection, Italy has deemed it useful to carry out recently practical experiments which have duly shown that, on a technical level, this system can give very effective and valuable results.

Thus, mutual confidence first, then the gradual solution of outstanding political problems and effective control -- these are the essential elements, the fundamental premises which, in the belief of the Italian Government, are required in order to embark upon a course of disarmament. I would like to add even a fourth condition which comes, perhaps, before all others, namely, that the negotiations should not be transformed into an arena for one-sided demagogic propaganda. In saying this, I am thinking with some measure of concern about the attitude taken by the Soviet delegation, whether in the Sub-Committee, the Disarmament Commission or even here in this Committee. I have listened with the closest attention to the statement of the Soviet representative, but I had a feeling of discouragement in listening to it. I have long searched among the violent outbursts in which he has engaged for some new elements, some indication that might give us the right to hope, but I fear that my search has been in vain. Nevertheless, I express the hope that a more profound and thorough study of the Soviet proposals in the Sub-Committee might reveal a few positive elements; for all chances of an agreement, however small, must be followed and encouraged so long as they are not contrary to the principles which we regard as fundamental for disarmament.

On the other hand, it is encouraging for us to note that belief in the principles to which the Government of Italy attaches so much importance is shared here by several delegations. We believe that we hold views in common with the majority of participants in the work of the Disarmament Commission and that they are largely shared by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

As regards the work of this Committee, I would like to refer to the intervention of Mr. Lodge and Mr. Noble. The delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the Italian delegation, believe a solution of the political problems and the re-establishment of mutual confidence are

(Mr. Piccioni, Italy)

inseparable elements in this over-all problem of disarmament. The above-mentioned delegation, as well as the Italian delegation, believes that disarmament is also inseparable from control and that every stage of disarmament must be accompanied by a parallel stage of control. The realistic nature of the American proposals stems from the gradual approach which they wish to take in regard to each problem. We agree with them on this, because it is only by acting without improvisation, and gradually, that we will be able to do a good job.

My delegation has especially focussed its attention on the American proposals regarding nuclear energy. I believe that the implementation of a prompt transfer to pacific uses of the nuclear energy destined, or already used, for making bombs, would be an unprecedented success and would raise the greatest hopes for peace throughout the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency which was recently set up would thus become a formidable instrument of social well-being, of collective prosperity and of world peace.

On the other hand, the American proposals include immediate gestures of goodwill which we fully endorse and which would serve to create rapidly the atmosphere which is required for the implementation of a progressive disarmament programme. It is in this spirit that the United States delegation has proposed that, during the negotiation of the envisaged nuclear agreements, there should be already an exchange of information on nuclear experiments, as well as some degree of control over the latter. It is with this purpose in mind that the United States delegation points to a first stage that can be put into effect immediately, of reducing conventional armaments and suggesting that all countries co-operate in the proportional reduction of armed forces.

(Mr. Piccioni, Italy)

In this connexion, I can assure you that the Italian Government is prepared to give favourable consideration to any proposal which would regard a limitation of its own armaments, within the framework of a general agreement and taking into account the particular geographical and strategic conditions of Italy.

The Italian Government is not at present a member of the Disarmament Commission; however, it would always be glad to lend its support, within the framework and the spirit of the United Nations, to all efforts that might be made by the countries most imbued with goodwill in order to promote our common endeavour.

The Government of Italy believes that the problem of disarmament is one of the most compelling problems facing the United Nations, since peace and understanding between peoples constitute the very basis of the Charter, and it is only within the United Nations that this problem can be solved in a universal manner and a manner that would give all countries the necessary safeguards.

This work and these studies must, of course, be carried out in the first place by the Commission and its Sub-Committee, since they are the agencies set up for that purpose. We ardently hope that the work of the Commission and the Sub-Committee will lead to such rapid progress that it will justify the calling of an extraordinary session of the General Assembly devoted to the problem of disarmament, as was suggested by the Soviet delegation. But we believe that at this stage it would be premature to express ourselves immediately on the timeliness of the calling of such a session. An extraordinary session, unless adequately prepared, could give rise to vain hopes, serve the cause of tendentious propaganda and thus harm the cause that we wish to promote.

Indeed, in order to bring the negotiations on disarmament to a rapid conclusion, it is, above all, necessary to strengthen the authority and the prestige of the United Nations, which constitute fundamental elements for the building of reciprocal confidence among peoples -- an indispensable premise for disarmament. So long as the urgent recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations remain unanswered, so long as certain countries refuse to attend its meetings, uncertainty and concern remain, alas, justified. But we do not wish to despair; we wish to believe that these obstacles will be overcome and that the United Nations will succeed in bringing to the peoples of the world the message of peace that they have been waiting for so long and that after so much suffering and horror they are fully entitled to receive without further delay.

Mr. JAKOBSEN (Denmark): We in my country are fully aware of the very limited role a small nation like Denmark is able to play in the great problem of disarmament. What we can offer to disarm is very little and cannot be felt as a danger by anybody. To us, since the Nazi occupation, one thing has been clear: that the defence of the ideals which to us make life worth living must be built on the principle of collective security.

It is obvious to us that the North Atlantic Treaty, in which we sought our security, is not in opposition to the United Nations. On the contrary, we have wanted a collective security system, through the United Nations, including all the countries in the world. Because of obstruction by some countries, it has not yet been possible to establish such a world-comprising system. We feel that we have had to do, on a regional scale, what we should have preferred to do for all the world.

Therefore, we see in the North Atlantic Treaty not an opposition to the United Nations but, on the contrary, a part of the United Nations going further, according to the Charter, than it has so far been possible for the United Nations as a whole to go.

As a small country with no outstanding problems outside our frontiers, we have only one wish: to live in peace. Therefore, and because we do not want a military burden heavier than absolutely necessary, we are longing for disarmament.

We want peace, but not at the cost of freedom. We had hoped for a détente in the world. We are sad that this hope is a little more slender today than only three months ago.

We are anxiously in favour of the most far-reaching disarmament; but we are a little cautious to act as advisers in questions of defence for those without whose help we could not defend our own freedom.

Therefore, I am sure that whatever the big Powers could agree upon in the question of disarmament would be welcomed heartily by my people.

Reading the proposals made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France and by the Soviet Union, we feel that it should not be impossible to find a common ground. That is no wonder: military burdens are pressing the East and the West; how much richer would we not have been, all of us, without those unproductive burdens?

(Mr. Jakobsen, Denmark)

And -- what should speak still more urgently to our hearts -- we are living today in a period when an all-out war might mean the final destruction of mankind.

This debate on disarmament began with some acrimonious accusations. In my opinion, the real differences in the mutual proposals do not correspond to the harshness of language in the speech made by the representative of the Soviet Union. If there is any bad omen, it is this tone, not the proposals themselves. Therefore, I sincerely hope we shall not return to this tone and I sincerely hope that what matters is the rather constructive proposals themselves.

It is to be foreseen that no big, decisive steps will be reached at this session and that the new, constructive propositions will have to be studied more thoroughly in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. But I believe it would be most fortunate if at any rate some small positive result would come out of our deliberations at this session so laden with sharp antagonisms -- perhaps not something very important in itself but of some happy significance as a beginning, some small thing that this eleventh session might show to a scared humanity.

The greatest of all problems before us is that of the tremendous new atomic weapons: hydrogen bombs, intercontinental missiles, long-range submarines, as pointed out by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and others. We are over-optimistic if we hope for full control of these weapons immediately, but perhaps a small step in a very limited field may be taken now.

A proposal made by the Foreign Minister of Norway evoked more than ordinary attention in the plenary meeting not because it meant a great step forward but because he seemed to point to something very realistic and feasible: a system for registration with the United Nations of nuclear test explosions.

All of us would like to go much further: to the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. That would immediately raise the question of control, with the likely result that nothing would happen now.

I have noted with great interest the words of the representative of Yugoslavia, who said that we are more in need of "modest progress" than of "overambitious blueprints". I completely agree. And I would consider the draft resolution put forward by Canada, Japan and Norway as such a small and modest step, especially suitable for gaining the support of an overwhelming majority of this Committee.

Every thinking being in the world must be concerned about the question of radioactive fallout. Science knows too little about the consequences for mankind. But that is perhaps a reason to be more, not less, careful. And it is not enough to be concerned about our own security. The health of coming generations rests upon this generation as the heaviest of all our responsibilities. On the question of the genetic effects, science knows still less. But here, too, that is a reason to be more, and not less, careful. Mankind today is not so brilliant that we can afford to make it less.

It has been a general trend in this debate that we ought to concentrate on modest progress rather than on overambitious schemes. I completely agree. Great steps forward are best. But small steps which are taken are better than great steps which are only talked about.

Therefore, my Government will give its fullest support to the three-Power draft resolution.

Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): We face once more, for the eleventh successive year, the familiar but still unresolved problem of disarmament. In the intervening years, there has been an inevitable change in historical circumstances -- a change which has necessarily raised a host of new questions and called for modification of methods and plans in our incessant quest for a solution.

The central fact, however, remains: basic agreement among the big Powers has not been reached and no practical steps have been taken toward the fulfilment of our aim of reducing armaments, under effective international control, in the interest of world peace and security.

This conclusion, at any rate, is patent in the current report of the Disarmament Commission. During the past year, three separate disarmament proposals were presented at the meetings of the Sub-Committee: the Anglo-French synthesis of 19 March; the Soviet Union's proposal of 27 March; and the United States draft of 3 April for the first phase of a comprehensive plan, embodying earlier proposals for the creation of technical exchange missions and the establishment of demonstration test areas.

In all these proposals, there are elements that are new and suggestive, leading us to the hope that they might again be pursued with fruitful results. But on the key issues of control, phasing and nuclear disarmament, it seems clear that the explorations in the Sub-Committee have not led the big Powers to fresh terrain from which it would be possible to obtain a more advantageous view of the entire problem. In a word, the deadlock is still a deadlock.

The situation, I think, is not merely unfortunate; it poses a grave peril to our stability and peace. This grave peril has been only too grimly emphasized during the year just past, when the Middle East and Central Europe erupted in the most dangerous display of national passion since the Korean war. In the Middle East, at least, prompt action by the Assembly stemmed the tide of war. But we cannot too supinely hug the illusion that a small conflict would not turn into a general atomic war and bring into play its awful arsenal of horrors.

Three factors contribute to the growing sense of urgency in our search for a solution to the problem of disarmament:

First, the crushing weight of armament expenditures which nations have to bear to safeguard their security and which, if released for constructive and peaceful ends, would bring immeasurable abundance to millions of people in the world.

Second, the tremendous pace of scientific development in nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, which is rapidly bringing us to what has been called the perilous "point of no return", whence it would be impossible to recede and undo what has been done in the armaments race.

HA/gd

A/C.1/PV.824
58-60

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

Third, the fear that the existing tensions in scattered parts of the world would, by some unforeseen provocation or unfortunate concatenation of events, reach a snapping point and ignite a world conflagration.

The combined effect of these three factors should bring to all nations, particularly and imperatively to the big Powers, a compelling realization that a continued deadlock in the disarmament negotiations would leave the whole of mankind sitting nervously at the edge of doom.

Disarmament therefore must succeed: there is no other alternative.

As a new Member of the Security Council and incidentally of the Disarmament Commission, the Philippines cannot shy away from its own share, however modest, of the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. In the intricate context of disarmament problems, we propose to pursue no more than an humble role, to wit, to delineate the areas of agreement or disagreement among the big Powers, to encourage mutual trust and promote approximation of divergent views, to pave the way for a fresh approach to intractable issues, and to help build a climate of confidence in the discussion of specific proposals. It is along these friendly and narrow avenues that our efforts will be canalized.

Frustrating as our experiences have been for the last ten years, they have yielded certain valuable lessons which may help us to reorient our basic attitudes towards our continued quest for solution. If any appreciable progress is to be expected, the Powers principally involved should attune their renewed efforts to the following fundamental criteria.

First: Discussions of existing proposals and offers of new ones ought to be made in the spirit of good faith and high realism, devoid of acrimony and propaganda.

Second: Proposals are to be examined with objectivity and with an eye to possible and progressive approximation of divergent views.

Third: Possibilities of agreement should be assessed and evaluated by stages, from the minimum to the maximum, so that the confidence gained on initial and limited agreements could provide the basis for gradually increasing areas of agreement.

Fourth: While the existing impasse on the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons continues unresolved, the settlement of political questions could proceed hand in hand with the gradual reduction of conventional armaments and military expenditures. This procedure rests upon the principle that, in the interim, if no immediate prospects exist for removing the weapons of mass destruction, the security of the world must temporarily be maintained by eliminating the existing sources of tension so that such weapons, even if possessed, would find no cause for application.

Around these basic criteria, I now propose to offer to this Committee my Government's brief but humble views on the third report of the Disarmament Commission.

Thermonuclear Tests: Before us is a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.160) of 14 January 1957, tabled by the Soviet Union, calling upon "the States conducting atomic and hydrogen weapons tests to discontinue them forthwith". Ever since the Government of India submitted its proposal to this effect on 2 April 1954, the cessation of thermonuclear experiments has been the subject of growing interest both within and outside the United Nations. My Government is keenly aware of the grave apprehensions with which such experimental explosions are viewed in many quarters of the world and of the existing division of thought among scientific authorities on the extent of the hazards to which mankind is exposed by such tests.

On the one hand, however, in the view of some Powers, the question of the cessation of these experiments constitutes no independent issue. It is necessarily connected with the broad problem of nuclear disarmament. Unless an effective system of control on the production of nuclear weapons can be found, termination of thermonuclear tests would expose to grave peril the security of the country observing the agreement, to the advantage of the country that can continue them in secret.

On the other hand, it is claimed that agreement on the cessation of thermonuclear tests is perfectly feasible as no such tests could be conducted anywhere in secret. Unhappily, there is at the moment no known consensus of expert opinions on the truth of this claim.

In the present state of mind of the Western Powers, borne of their understandable concern for their national security, immediate cessation of atomic tests does not now appear feasible. Since such tests can therefore be expected to continue for some time, the possibility of agreement should be explored on other aspects of this issue.

The Western Powers and the Soviet Union may, for the moment, agree on a common testing ground beyond which area experimental explosions by any of them would be banned. Atomic tests within this common area may be made subject to previous notice and registration and limited, equalized or proportioned amongst them per calendar year or for a period of years.

The United Nations Radiation Committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency may constitute part of an international machinery which may be set up to ensure that such tests are conducted within the area and in conformity with the conditions agreed upon. It may also be entrusted with the responsibility of minimizing the effects of radiation, and possibly of converting the disclosable results of the tests to peaceful uses.

Confidence-Building Proposals: The menacing events of the past few years which have brought the relations of the big Powers almost to a snapping point have fortunately also brought upon them an inescapable sense of realism in dealing with disarmament problems. This is reflected in the introduction in the Disarmament Commission of limited proposals designed to build mutual confidence from which they could proceed to larger areas of agreement. In this category fall the technical

exchange missions and demonstration test areas proposed by the United States. The "open skies" plan of President Eisenhower, accepted in somewhat vague terms by Premier Bulganin to apply to a depth of 800 kilometres between the Warsaw and the NATO countries, may also be catalogued in this category. We are happy to note that on these confidence-building proposals, the outlook for agreement has brightened considerably.

On the particular issue of aerial reconnaissance, an area other than the corridor between the Warsaw and the NATO countries may be explored for possible agreement, provided that genuine parity exists as far as the depth of the area and the quality and extent of military objects of aerial photography are concerned. We leave also to the big Powers the advisability of considering anterior or posterior exchange of military blueprints as a necessary concomitant of such aerial inspection.

Clearly, the choice of site is a matter of negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It could of course be assumed that it should be a less sensitive area than Central Europe. I must, however, here stress that the initial steps would be crucial and could determine whether or not future stages could be undertaken with any confidence of ultimate success. There is thus the need for guarding against any setbacks during this trial period, since this would undoubtedly jeopardize future experimental programmes of wider scope.

Comprehensive Disarmament Proposals: The over-all disarmament proposals presented, on the one hand, by the Western Powers and, on the other, by the Soviet Union, are contained in the records of the Disarmament Commission. They have been threshed out year after year in that body and particularly in its Sub-Committee, happily with painstaking care and unhappily, on some occasions, with recriminations.

My delegation feels it would not be profitable at this stage to review those proposals. It is enough to state that the deadlock which has existed from the beginning remains as obstinate as ever. Although considerable approximation of views is discernible on the question of a ceiling for armed forces and on the principle of reduction of conventional armaments by stages, the major issues, especially in connexion with nuclear weapons, remain intractable. We can only here express the hope that the Powers principally involved would give fresh impetus to their efforts to narrow their differences and explore new avenues of

BS/an

A/C.1/PV.824
64-65

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

approach. I have said once and I repeat it again that: "the way to great ends is necessarily long and arduous. There are no short-cuts to the age-old dream of a weaponless world." It is at least a hopeful sign that while basic issues remain unsolved, there has been a progressive crystallization of opposing proposals and that both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have not slammed the door to a fresh quest for solution.

Guided Missiles and Earth Satellites: It has been aptly said that, except for the sporadic outbursts of local wars now and then, the present peace of the world rests not so much on the traditional balance of power as on the "balance of terror". The possession of, and continued race for supremacy in, weapons of mass annihilation by the United States and the Soviet Union have brought upon them a sense of mutual fear.

But peace dictated by fear is neither a happy nor an easy one. Its danger lies in the possibility of miscalculation. In times of great stress and high tensions, the temptation to strike first, in an ill moment of miscalculation, may prove irresistible. This is the jeopardy that attaches to the peace maintained on an equilibrium of terror.

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

Now, even this present equilibrium of fear between the two great Powers appears threatened by new scientific developments in the outer space of the earth. These developments embrace experiments on earth satellites, inter-continental ballistic missiles and space platforms. Already, the United States has announced its experiment on an earth satellite for the 1957 International Geo-Physical Year. It is now commonly admitted that through inter-continental ballistic missiles their possessors could wage a remote control war of devastating proportions. Through an earth satellite rotating in the upper air on a fixed gravitational path, global photography is possible, and other destructive potentialities could be readily envisioned.

We are heartened by the United States proposal to subject these new experiments to international inspection and control with a view to devoting them exclusively to peaceful purposes. The proposal becomes doubly heartening in the light of the fact that a meeting of minds could be more feasible at this early stage of these scientific developments, in contrast to the desired control of thermonuclear weapons where the difficulty of agreement lies in the inadequacy of the means to cope with the tremendous advance already made in nuclear science.

My delegation therefore expresses the hope that this proposal of the United States would be considered separately from the problem of over-all disarmament on nuclear weapons and would meet with the prompt affirmative response of the Soviet Union.

Summarizing the views of my delegation on the question before this Committee, I suggest:

First, that on the issue of cessation of thermonuclear tests, if termination of such tests is not deemed feasible at the moment, possibility of agreement should be explored on the designation of a common area where such experimental explosions could be held; previous notice and registration of such tests; their limitation, equalization or proportionment among the big Powers in any calendar year or period

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

of years; and the setting up of a supervising international machinery which would also be entrusted with the responsibility of minimizing, wherever scientifically possible, the effects of radiation. As part of this machinery, in whatever manner that may be agreed upon, the United Nations Committee on radiation and the International Atomic Energy Agency may be considered;

Second, that the big Powers should promptly explore the possibility of agreement on the existing confidence-building proposals, such as technical exchange missions, demonstration test areas, ground control posts, and limited aerial reconnaissance;

Third, that while deadlock continues on the all-embracing proposals for disarmament, efforts should be continued towards a wider approximation of divergent views; and

Fourth, that on the matter of inter-continental ballistic missiles, earth satellites, space platforms and other forms of scientific development in the outer space of the earth, the United States proposal for international control or experiments thereon, with a view to devoting them exclusively to peaceful purposes, should merit enthusiastic approval by the big Powers.

In addition, in order to facilitate a clearer delineation of antagonistic proposals, I suggest the revival of the Australian-Philippine plan of 1954 which, if I remember correctly, was referred to the Disarmament Commission, and in which we asked for the preparation of a statement summarizing in an objective and methodical form the various disarmament proposals submitted thus far, leaving to this Committee the discretion to determine whether such a statement should be prepared by the Secretariat or by the Disarmament Commission itself.

And, finally, I suggest that a non-voting member be added to the Disarmament Commission with a view to introducing a neutral and conciliatory element into that body which would help facilitate agreement on certain aspects of various disarmament proposals. It is my view that the Secretary-General fits this description and that, if acceptable, he could act as permanent Chairman of the Commission.

What seems to be a void in the Commission is the non-existence of a personality around whom diverse efforts at disarmament may merge and blend. The Secretary-General, enjoying as he does the trust and confidence of all Member nations and

FGB/ld

A/C.1/PV.824

68

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

being truly an international servant with an admittedly international prestige, would, in my view, be the ideal person to preside over the deliberations of this Commission and of its Subcommittee.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.