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**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989, A/C.1/992-994; A/C.1/L.490) (*continued*)**

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**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):**

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the Economic and Scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

1. Mr. HUSSAIN (India): Once again we are engaged in a discussion of the crucial subject of disarmament, which each year, as armaments multiply, gains in importance and urgency. As rapid technological advances are made, especially in nuclear technology, the gap between the nuclear-weapon Powers and the rest of the world becomes wider and wider, and so also the ever-increasing serious threat to international peace and security. Never before in history, as mentioned by the Foreign Minister of India in the general debate, has the "concentration of enormous power in the hands of a few nations" led "to a division of the world into spheres of influence, in which might alone becomes right in the relationships between States". He added: "It is imperative that this [slow but steady] drift towards a new and unequal balance of power be halted and reversed" [1775th plenary meeting, para. 126]. It is in that context that my delegation views the problem of disarmament.

2. Ten years ago, by its historic resolution 1378 (XIV), which was unanimously adopted, the General Assembly expressed the hope "that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" would "be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time". Little or nothing was done to implement that resolution. Last year, in General Assembly resolution 2454 B (XXIII), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was again specifically asked to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and urgently to analyse the plans already under consideration and others that might be put forward to see how, in particular, rapid progress could be made in the field of nuclear disarmament. But, as we are

all aware, in the year that has elapsed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has failed even to consider, let alone make progress in, this matter.

3. The work which the Committee began in 1962 on the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament could not proceed beyond the stage of agreement on the preamble and the first four articles, and even that agreement was subject to certain crippling reservations by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Since 1964 no further negotiations have been undertaken on this fundamental question, which, it now seems, is relegated to some dim and distant future.

4. My delegation suggested in Geneva that progress in this regard would be facilitated if the United States and the Soviet Union, in the light of various suggestions which had been put forward, and many developments which have since taken place, were to submit revised versions of their draft treaties, which had been presented in 1962. That has not been done. Instead, efforts are concentrated on non-armament measures and proposals for what has come to be called "arms control". This is a retrograde step from the position obtaining in 1962. Military expenditure has doubled during the sixties, and, as pointed out by the Secretary-General, the expenditure on arms and military preparations has increased from \$120,000 million in 1962 to \$200,000 million this year. All this has resulted only in strengthening the monopoly of the nuclear-weapon Powers and increased insecurity of the world.

5. There has been much talk about collateral measures. However, it needs to be borne in mind that no individual collateral measure can have any meaning, much less any chance of success, unless it is conceived of as part of a general process of total disarmament. Efforts have been made to assert that collateral measures already concluded—to which repeated reference is made—represent concrete progress towards disarmament. Those measures, however, have been purely preventive in their nature and purpose, and for the majority of the world's population they do not represent progress towards disarmament, for they do not bring the benefits that were expected to accrue from disarmament.

6. The urgent need for nuclear disarmament has been the subject of many General Assembly resolutions, but the fact is that negotiations on measures of actual nuclear disarmament, as distinct from non-armament measures, have been at a virtual standstill. There has been a great deal of talk about giving the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. However, as the representative of Sweden pointed out [*1695th meeting*], discrepancies between priorities stated and results obtained seem to be the rule rather than the exception. That tendency is well illustrated by the lack of any progress towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban, which is the key to both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The view has been repeated here and elsewhere that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a major step in the history of disarmament. It is difficult to accept that view, since the non-proliferation Treaty is essentially a non-armament measure and does not in any way curb galloping vertical proliferation. The attempts to curb horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in no way alter or curb the

hegemony of major nuclear-weapon Powers, and it is vertical proliferation which continues to menace the security of mankind. In defence of this situation it has been said that radical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament are not possible unless they are carried out by all nuclear Powers and not by only some of them. However, we are not told what steps are being taken by the principal nuclear-weapon Powers to find a solution to this problem.

7. The progressive, qualitative and quantitative proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems has continued unabated. It is, therefore, a matter of some satisfaction that the hope expressed in General Assembly resolution 2456 D (XXIII), calling for the early commencement of the bilateral talks for the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms, has been fulfilled in that at least preliminary talks began at Helsinki on 17 November 1969, though it must be added that it has taken a year and a half for this step to be taken. My delegation joins other delegations in expressing the earnest hope that the talks will lead to an early and successful conclusion. While their success could provide an impetus to agreement on other arms control measures, leading to the eventual cessation of the nuclear arms race, both the Soviet Union and the United States have warned us that it would be unwise to expect quick results. It is also to be borne in mind that the other major nuclear-weapon Powers are not parties to these talks, as is also the fact that the objective of these talks is limited to the further growth of arsenals of Powers already over-armed in the interest of preserving the strategic balance, and for financial reasons. Considering these facts, we cannot accept the view that, pending the successful conclusion of these talks, disarmament negotiations such as in the Committee on Disarmament or in the General Assembly or in other forums should be suspended or be regarded as of no consequence and that no urgent steps need to be taken towards, for example, a comprehensive test ban, the absence of which means the continuation of the development of more and more dangerous nuclear weapons. International peace and security is not the exclusive concern of the two Powers engaged in these talks but the common responsibility of the entire international community. It is a matter of interest not only to those engaged in these talks but also to those who would suffer destruction as a result of armed confrontation which would make no distinction between the two combatants and the mere spectators. The whole question of disarmament and even of nuclear disarmament is broader and larger in scope than nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. My delegation would, therefore, like to endorse the suggestion made by those previous speakers who called for the establishment of a very close relationship between the strategic arms limitation negotiations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

8. My delegation also agrees with other delegations that have expressed support for the suggestion contained in the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General<sup>1</sup> that, pending progress in these talks, it would be helpful if the United States and the Soviet Union stopped all further development of new offensive and defensive strategic

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 30.

systems, whether by agreement or by a unilateral moratorium on each side. For that reason, my delegation, along with eleven other delegations, has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.490, appealing to the United States and the Soviet Union to agree as an urgent preliminary measure on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems.

9. Inseparably linked with the question of the limitation of strategic nuclear weapon development is the ending of underground nuclear weapon tests, to which the Government of India has always attached the highest importance. General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), adopted in 1962, condemned all nuclear weapon tests and asked that they cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water contained a definite promise of ending underground tests. Seven years have passed and cessation of underground tests is nowhere in sight. On the contrary, this period has been marked by an increasing frequency of nuclear explosions, with all their recognized ill-effects. As my delegation has stated before, the partial test ban has continued to remain singularly partial. It has not been adhered to by all the nuclear-weapon States, and the continued atmospheric testing has not only increased the levels of radio-activity but also rendered the future of the treaty uncertain. Moreover, violations of the partial test ban treaty have occurred through the venting, as a result of certain underground tests, of radio-activity which has spread outside the territory of the testing State. There is a serious apprehension that these violations might become even more frequent, as weapons of megaton yields are tested underground for the purpose of developing and testing newer and more destructive weapon systems, including warheads for anti-ballistic missiles.

10. India was the first country to press for a suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests and has consistently been of the view that, whatever might be the differences on the question of verification, all nuclear-weapon tests should immediately be discontinued. Negotiations could then be undertaken to resolve the outstanding differences with a view to making the present partial treaty a comprehensive one. Of this there is a scientific and technical aspect, in which much progress has been made, but even more important is the political aspect, and it is now evident that it is only the lack of political will which has stood, and still stands, in the way of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

11. General Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII), in its paragraph 4, asked “as a matter of urgency” the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. The Indian delegation, therefore, welcomed at Geneva the initiative of the Swedish delegation in submitting, in document ENDC/242 [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>2</sup> annex C, section 6] suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, which helped to focus attention on the specific problems, including that of the need for on-site inspections, involved in a comprehensive test ban. We expressed the view that that draft

treaty provided a realistic basis for negotiations on formulating a comprehensive test ban for universal adherence. It is imperative that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should now make renewed efforts towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is also important that until such a treaty is concluded, all nuclear-weapon States should suspend further nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, and that those States that have not done so adhere without further delay to the partial test-ban treaty. With this conviction, we have sponsored, along with the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, draft resolution A/C.1/L.486, which we hope will receive the unanimous approval of this Committee.

12. While we do not believe that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should await the perfection of seismic detection and identification techniques, we favour the intensification of co-operation for an international exchange of seismological data. Resolution 2455 (XXIII), in the sixth paragraph of its preamble, recalled the need to take into account “the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, a voluntary exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for a national evaluation of seismic events”, and, in its operative paragraph 3, expressed the hope that “States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data”. The Indian delegation therefore welcomed the submission, by the delegation of Canada, of a working paper, contained in document ENDC/251/Rev.1 [*ibid.*, section 15] on a request to Governments for information about exchange of seismological data. Undoubtedly, an effective scheme for the unrestricted exchange of high-quality seismic data on a world-wide basis, coupled with centralized means for collating and reducing them for quick and reliable interpretation, leading to accurate estimates of location, depth and the nature of seismic sources, will help to remove to a very great extent, if not fully, the remaining reservations as to the effectiveness of seismic means of verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty. As was brought out at the meeting last year of the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), such a step would be only an extension of the principle of international co-operation which has been the main feature of seismological research and development. The Government of India would agree to provide the information required in respect of their one array station and four observatories with standardized seismographs. The financial implications and logistic support required for such an arrangement will, however, have to be examined carefully. The Government of India would thus be ready to co-operate actively in any system of seismological data exchange, provided it is an effective one, based on equal participation and full co-operation of all concerned. On this understanding, the Indian delegation has co-sponsored, along with fifteen other delegations, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3.

*Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.*

13. Believing in a step-by-step approach for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the Indian delegation has repeatedly stressed that a cut-off in the production of

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

fissionable materials for weapon purposes would constitute a significant advance towards a complete stoppage of the further production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, as several delegations have already stated, can no longer be cited as a reason for not reaching an agreement on this measure, since an agreement on controls, as elaborated in the non-proliferation Treaty, already exists and the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of inspection by IAEA could be made the same as those of the States not having nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, to be hoped that this issue will receive priority and be related to the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

14. I should now like to deal with the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. My delegation welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological weapons and the effects of their possible use,<sup>3</sup> as a valuable contribution in support of efforts towards the elimination of such weapons. My delegation agrees with the suggestion made by several delegations that the report should be widely distributed throughout the world in as many languages as practicable, so as to contribute to a general public awareness of the profoundly dangerous results that would follow if those weapons were ever to be used, and that an aroused public opinion would compel Governments to work for the earliest effective elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We generally agree with the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his thoughtful and well-considered foreword appended to the report, and in particular with the three recommendations mentioned at the end of his foreword.

15. The first essential step for the General Assembly is to renew the appeal to all States for strict observance of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol,<sup>4</sup> and also to appeal to those States that have not so far acceded to the Protocol to do so soon in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Protocol and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

16. It is equally necessary, as suggested by the Secretary-General, for the General Assembly to make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents, including tear gas and other harassing agents, which now exist or which may be developed in the future.

17. In the context of use in war it is impossible and unjustifiable to distinguish between lethal and non-lethal chemical agents. The Protocol concerns itself with use in war between States and it does not concern itself with internal use of those agents within the scope of municipal law relating to civil commotion or riot control. The argument that it is not possible to refrain from use in war, against an enemy, of agents which have been adopted for peacetime use against one's own population as being clearly more humane than other means is untenable for two

reasons. Firstly, tear gas and other incapacitating agents are used internally to disperse rioting mobs or to capture criminals; in war they are used not only to incapacitate or immobilize but thereafter to destroy the enemy more easily and effectively with conventional weapons, which is hardly humane. My delegation agrees with the conclusion reached in paragraph 4 of the report, which states:

"It is true that a considerable effort has also been made to develop chemical agents which have as their purpose not to kill but to reduce a man's capacity to fight. Such agents are used by civil authorities of a number of countries in order to suppress disorders and to control riots, but when used in warfare they would inevitably be employed as an adjunct to other forms of attack, and their over-all effect might be lethal."

18. Secondly, it may be possible theoretically to draw a distinction between tear gases and poisonous gases, but on the battlefield escalation from tear gas to more harmful substances would be difficult to resist or control. It is quite possible that an irritant agent will cause death on a battlefield. In the eyes of an enemy that has access to lethal chemical weapons, there may be little difference between the use of a lethal gas and the use of an irritant that increases the lethality of other weapons. In the heat of battle the two may be quite indistinguishable.

19. Furthermore, when this matter was discussed in Geneva, my delegation also drew attention to the fact that in regard to the nature of the chemical agents which are prohibited under the Geneva Protocol, parties to the Protocol have already subscribed to a uniform construction during their discussions under the League of Nations from 1930 to 1932. The British Government, in a memorandum submitted to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, stated:

"Basing itself on this English text, the British Government have taken the view that the use in war of 'other' gases, including lachrymatory gases, was prohibited."<sup>5</sup>

The French Government, which was the depositary Government of the Geneva Protocol, agreed and stated categorically:

"I. All the texts at present in force or proposed in regard to the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases are identical. In the French delegation's opinion, they apply to all gases employed with a view to toxic action on the human organism, whether the effects of such action are a more or less temporary irritation of certain mucous membranes or whether they cause serious or even fatal lesions.

"II. ...

"III. The French Government, therefore, considers that the use of lachrymatory gases is covered by the prohibition arising out of the Geneva Protocol of

<sup>3</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

<sup>4</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

<sup>5</sup> Minutes of the second part of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (League of Nations publication: 1931.IX.1), p. 311.

1925. . . . The fact that, for the maintenance of internal order, the police, when dealing with offenders against the law, sometimes use various appliances discharging irritant gases cannot, in the French delegation's opinion, be adduced in a discussion on this point, since the Protocol . . . in question related only to the use of poisonous or similar gases in war."<sup>5</sup>

20. A number of other members of the Preparatory Commission—Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Spain, the Soviet Union, China, Italy, Canada and Turkey—agreed with the British and French interpretation, concurring that it was not possible to distinguish between lethal and non-lethal gases for purposes of war.

21. Furthermore, in a unanimous report by a Special Committee of the 1932 Conference the prohibition was defined to encompass all substances "whether toxic, asphyxiating, lachrymatory, irritant, vesicant, or capable in any way of producing harmful effects on human or animal organism, whatever the method of their use".<sup>6</sup> The Disarmament Conference by a resolution adopted on 23 July 1932, without dissent, accepted that recommendation of the Special Committee. It may be noted that the United States, which was not a party to the Geneva Protocol, expressed the view that while the use of tear gas for local police purposes should be allowed, the United States agreed that its use in war should be prohibited.

22. For those reasons my delegation has, along with the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Jamaica, sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.489 and Add.1, which declares as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol, the use in international armed conflicts of all chemical and biological agents of warfare. The clear and comprehensive definition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents is derived from the report of the Secretary-General, in the composition of which he was assisted by fourteen distinguished scientists from different parts of the world, including the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This declaration should dispel for the future any uncertainty about the scope and nature of the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol and recognized rules of international law. It needs to be stated clearly that it is neither possible nor desirable that to meet the military doctrine or military requirements of any State, whether it is or is not a party to the Protocol, any exception should be made to the comprehensive prohibition of all chemical agents envisaged under the Geneva Protocol and recognized rules of international law.

23. The third recommendation of the Secretary-General calls upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenals of weapons. This is a matter of urgency because these weapons are cheaper than nuclear weapons to produce and to deploy, and it is easier to conceal their development than

that of nuclear weapons. Some thirty countries are said to have the potential to develop them into lethal weapons. So it would seem necessary, and it is generally agreed, that we should proceed to elaborate a convention or conventions supplementary to the Geneva Protocol to deal with the problem of development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. What, however, we are not agreed on is whether we should be dealing with both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in one convention or two conventions, and if in two conventions, whether separately or simultaneously, or with bacteriological (biological) weapons now and chemical weapons later.

24. It is the firm view of the Indian delegation that both types of weapons should be dealt with together or simultaneously, and we remain unconvinced that bacteriological (biological) weapons should be dealt with first, and chemical weapons dealt with later.

*Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

25. It was pointed out by us in Geneva that both bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons are classified as weapons of mass destruction, and since they alone exclusively exercise their effects on living organic matter—human beings, animals and plants—they need to be dealt with together. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 19 of his report, has stated that:

"All biological processes depend upon chemical or physio-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent, could, tomorrow . . . be treated as chemical."

26. Bacterial toxins, for example, have been classified as either biological or as chemical agents in different international instruments and publications. There is thus an intimate link between bacteriological (biological) and chemical agents and, indeed, the development of the latter is facilitated by the former. While it is true that chemical weapons have been used and bacteriological (biological) weapons have not been used, since 1925 both have been dealt with together in international agreements since the First and Second World Wars; so also in the respective drafts of a treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States<sup>7</sup> and the Soviet Union<sup>8</sup> in 1962.

27. The 1966 and 1968 General Assembly resolutions and the Secretary-General's report deal with both weapons together. The means of delivery of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents are practically the same, and in the armed forces of many countries the same services deal with both of them. Further, if bacteriological (biological) weapons are to be dealt with now and chemical weapons left for a later consideration because of difference of opinion over the definition of chemical weapons, it will intensify the chemical weapons arms race and would seem

<sup>6</sup> Report of the Special Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons (League of Nations publication: 1932.IX.46), p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, section F; for the text of the amendments, *ibid.*, document DC/205, annex 1, sections E and F.

<sup>8</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.



to legitimize it, particularly since these weapons have been used in the past. That would be unfortunate because as the Secretary-General has noted in paragraph 15 of his report:

“The ... threat posed by chemical weapons today derives from the existence of new, and far more toxic, chemical compounds than were known fifty years ago.”

28. Finally, a separate treatment of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons would lead to the weakening of the Protocol because it would appear that the Protocol was deficient and only partially valid. It would be difficult to justify to world opinion why bacteriological (biological) weapons, which have never been used against mankind, should be dealt with first and chemical weapons, which have been used several times with disastrous results, dealt with later at some future unspecified date.

29. For those reasons we share the view expressed by a number of delegations that the General Assembly should ask the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and on the elimination of existing stocks of such weapons, taking into account the need for both weapons to be dealt with simultaneously and for the agreement to contain necessary provisions for its effective implementation and verification. For that purpose the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should take full account of the draft convention submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union [A/7655] and the draft convention on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare submitted by the United Kingdom [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20], as well as other suggestions which have been made in Geneva and during the current debate here.

30. The keen interest in the sea-bed evinced by the major maritime Powers, from the point of view both of economic exploitation and of defence, is indeed significant. Vast numbers of personnel are engaged in exploration, research and experimentation, and increasingly enormous sums of money are being spent on oceanographic programmes. India is vitally interested in this problem because the Indian Ocean is one of the earth's four largest oceans, namely; the Pacific, the Atlantic, the Indian and the Arctic. The Indian Ocean covers 28,350,000 square miles, one seventh of the planet. India participated in the international Indian Ocean expedition, which lasted six years, from 1959 to 1965, and in which thirty nations participated and forty research ships sailed 4 million miles across the Indian Ocean. The Indian delegation, therefore, actively participated in Geneva in the discussions concluding with the submission by the United States and the Soviet Union of the draft treaty contained in annex A of the Committee's report. As there was no time to discuss this revised draft, the Indian delegation reserved its position for discussion here, where we would have the benefit of the views of other Members of the United Nations.

31. Our basic approach is that in the interest of mankind, the exploration and the use of the sea-bed and ocean floor should be strictly for peaceful purposes, that there should

be international co-operation for this purpose, and that exploitation should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of geographical location of States, taking into account the special interests and needs of developing countries. We therefore need to consider all proposals keeping those criteria in mind. Having said that, my delegation, to begin with, would like to recall that the discussion began in Geneva on 18 March 1969 with the presentation by the Soviet delegation of the draft of a treaty prohibiting the use for military purposes of the sea-bed [*ibid.*, section 4], but what we are now considering here is the limited prohibition of only the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. My delegation expressed the view in Geneva and still maintains that the treaty should not limit its prohibition only to weapons of mass destruction and should, in principle, extend to all weapons, and to military bases and fortifications, and to other installations and structures of a military nature which, *inter alia*, could pose a threat, particularly to the security of coastal States.

32. We therefore find the nature of the prohibition envisaged in article I of the draft sea-bed treaty to be greatly limited, and agree with the statement in the third preambular paragraph of the need to continue negotiations for further measures leading to the exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race. In that connexion, the Swedish delegation made the modest proposal [*ibid.*, section 36] that the commitment contained in the third preambular paragraph be introduced in the operative part of the treaty, thus constituting a parallel to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Swedish delegation has renewed this proposal in document A/C.1/994, and we strongly support it because a partial treaty must at least be combined with a firm pledge to strive towards a more comprehensive one; otherwise it risks having the effect of passively legitimizing all other activities than the one explicitly mentioned.

33. A number of delegations have expressed dissatisfaction with the first paragraph of the preamble, which recognizes the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed, but makes no reference to resolution 2467 A (XXIII), which affirmed that exploration and exploitation must be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States and taking into account the special interests and needs of developing countries. We share the view of other delegations that this paragraph needs amplification on these lines.

34. For the purpose of defining the length of the maritime zone, a very large number of delegations have strongly objected to the reference in article I to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone<sup>9</sup> as unnecessary, needlessly complicated, and even prejudicial to the position of those States which are not parties to the Convention. It is necessary to replace this by an unambiguous reference to the 12-mile maritime zone as in article I of the Soviet draft [*ibid.*, section 4], which avoids reference to the limits of other zones over which coastal States enjoy or exercise rights or competence. In

<sup>9</sup> Signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958. (See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.)

this context, it has also been suggested by several delegations that the disclaimer clause contained in article II, paragraph 2 of the draft sea-bed treaty, needs to be mentioned independently and clearly in a separate article before the articles of the preamble. We agree with this view.

35. However, our greatest concern is with the unsatisfactory provision for verification in article III. My delegation has serious doubts whether the "right to verify" provided for in paragraph 1 of article III could be effectively implemented by the procedure of consultation and co-operation mentioned in paragraph 3 of article III. We notice that the provision made in article 2 of the Soviet draft [*ibid.*] that all installations and structures on the sea-bed "shall be open" for verification has been dropped, and so also the provision made in article III of the United States draft [*ibid.*, section 12] for the freedom "to observe activities of other States on the sea-bed". These changes would greatly restrict the "right to verify", leaving total discretion to the nuclear-weapon Powers to do what they liked without any regard to the apprehensions of coastal States. Article III does not specify what the "right to verify" entails for nuclear-weapon Powers and for non-nuclear-weapon coastal States to ensure, to the satisfaction of all concerned, the observance of the prohibition contained in the treaty. How can the right to verify be exercised if a nuclear-weapon Power is entitled not to disclose its activities on the sea-bed or permit access to its sea-bed installations? How does one know what is emplaced, unless the proximity of approach and observation, of a kind which would be adequate enough to ascertain whether or not nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction have been emplaced, is assured? To leave the matter to the total discretion of a suspected nuclear-weapon State is not good enough. It is said that paragraph 3 of article III contains an undertaking "to consult and co-operate"; but the extent and the nature of this consultation and co-operation are not specified, and in the circumstances the right to verify may be further restricted in practice. It is not stated what would happen if this procedure did not produce results to the satisfaction of the coastal State concerned. It therefore seems to us necessary that the principle of some kind of international verification on the sea-bed is essentially sound and should be reflected in the treaty.

36. The leader of the Canadian delegation at our 1692nd meeting, enumerated the requirements of a viable verification article as follows:

"First, that verification procedures must be devised which would generate the legal right of all States party to the treaty to initiate the verification process and to obtain assistance, if necessary, through appeal to an international organization, and not have to rely solely on the goodwill of the two nuclear Powers. . . .

"Secondly, we have said that in certain cases close physical inspection, if necessary with the help of States with advanced underwater nuclear capabilities, would be necessary to provide assurances of effective verification, and we have asked that this contingency should be provided for in the treaty.

"Thirdly, the treaty should contain a clear provision to ensure that in carrying out verification on the continental

shelf full account should be taken of the special rights and interests of a coastal State in connexion with possible military activities on its continental shelf, and indeed of the interests of all parties in this region of any suspected violation." [1692nd meeting, paras. 125-127.]

37. My delegation agrees with these basic requirements for an acceptable verification article and generally supports the proposals for the provisions of article III contained in document A/C.1/992 submitted by the delegation of Canada. And it is our view that certain other elements, contained in the Brazilian working paper A/C.1/993, also deserve careful and serious consideration.

38. It is the hope of my delegation that the concern regarding verification and other matters that I have mentioned, and which are shared by a very large number of delegations, will receive the earnest consideration of the sponsors of the draft treaty and that the necessary changes will be made before it can be offered to the world community for acceptance.

39. With regard to item 31 of the agenda relating to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, we have before us three valuable reports submitted by the Secretary-General, contained in documents A/7568, A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2 and A/7678 and Add.1-3. The report concerning the contribution of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries [A/7568] provides authoritative information on the vast possibilities which are available and those which are in the process of development, and which could be exploited to enable developing countries to make more rapid development than has been possible so far. My delegation would like to support the recommendations of the group of experts contained in paragraphs 258 to 262 and in particular those relating to increased multilateral technical assistance and the finding of such assistance. The group rightly stated in paragraph 261: "Major nuclear projects such as power plants, however, require financing far beyond the reach and scope of IAEA and UNDP". The report goes on to say in paragraph 262:

"The group expresses the hope that international sources of finance, especially IBRD, will review the position taken so far on the prospects, criteria and conditions for financing major nuclear installations, bearing in mind not only the immediate benefits from initial projects, but also the long-term contributions that such projects could make to developing countries."

40. As regards the establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear exploration for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control, the views of the Government of India are stated in paragraph 18 of document A/7678. In our opinion IAEA is fully competent, under the provisions of its statute, to undertake that responsibility, and that responsibility can and should be discharged by IAEA and that should be done on a non-discriminatory basis and upon request by Member States. It needs to be made clear that in conformity with article XI of the statute of IAEA all non-nuclear-weapon States members of IAEA have the right to share equally in the benefits to be derived from the functioning of the

service. We agree with those delegations that believe that no condition can legally be imposed on the categories of recipients of assistance from that service, beyond that of the membership of IAEA. We have expressed the view in Geneva and in Vienna that, after and in the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty, a separate international agreement would need to be negotiated for regulating the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would legislate the purposes for which the explosions would be permitted, and lay down the conditions under which they would be conducted.

41. Before I conclude, I should like to say that the concept of the close interrelationship between economic development, disarmament and security is now fully recognized by the world community. That is reflected in resolution 2499 (XXIV) adopted on 31 October 1969, endorsing the call of the Secretary-General for the proclamation of a disarmament decade which will coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade, and in this respect the competent bodies of the United Nations have been entrusted with the task of presenting concrete proposals to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session. The Secretary-General has expressed the hope that the members of the General Assembly could establish a specific programme and time-table for dealing with all aspects of the problems of arms control and disarmament. Broad outlines, of course, already exist in the numerous resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the preliminary agenda adopted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 15 August 1968. The Indian delegation has pointed out both in Geneva and here that that agenda was adopted without assigning priorities to the specific measures of nuclear disarmament or priority *inter se* between the items listed under the other three categories. The Indian delegation does not agree with the view that the Committee should not be rigid in its priorities which, in this context, would amount to saying that we should not have any priorities at all. We feel that some order of priorities is necessary, and once some order of priorities has been established and also recognized as being indicative of the political will to reach agreement, an improved organization or better mechanics of work would follow automatically. Then and only then will the goal of general and complete disarmament be reached in the shortest possible time.

42. Mr. PARDO (Malta): My delegation will not attempt to comment in detail on the work of the Conference on the Committee of Disarmament. We are not members of the Committee and the short report of the Committee contained in document A/7741-DC/232<sup>10</sup> does not provide us with a sufficient basis to enable us to evaluate the reasons for the apparently changed priorities that have resulted in the submission to the General Assembly of the draft convention on chemical and biological weapons [A/7655] and a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed [A/7741-DC/232, annex A] rather than, as we would have expected, in the submission to the General Assembly of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Nor are we able from document A/7741-DC/232 to understand the reasons why several, apparently

constructive and technically well-founded, suggestions on measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race were not accepted by the Co-Chairmen. We shall therefore confine the major portion of our remarks to a general survey of trends in the field of armaments on the basis of which we hope to reach a few conclusions and to make a few suggestions.

43. Serious estimates of world military expenditure, excluding mainland China, for 1968 range approximately between \$185 thousand million and \$195 thousand million at current prices and official exchange rates. Those figures by themselves are not very meaningful, and if comparisons between different groups of countries are attempted, the results are often not consistent with other data. More significant therefore, are estimates over a period of years based on constant prices related to world national products and based, for purposes of comparison, on estimated defence purchasing power parity exchange rates. Several such rates have been elaborated using different methods. We shall use, unless otherwise stated, the defence purchasing power exchange rates elaborated by Benoit and Lubell and used in the excellent *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969*,<sup>11</sup> from which we have also taken most of the data we shall quote on trends in military expenditure. Using the Benoit and Lubell exchange rates and constant prices, world military expenditure was estimated at about \$155.5 thousand million in 1968 as compared to \$95.6 thousand million a decade before. Since 1960 world military expenditure has thus been rising at a rate of about 6 per cent per annum compounded at constant prices.

44. Although developing countries account for less than 15 per cent of total world expenditure on armaments, military expenditure by those countries has been rising at a rate of nearly 8 per cent a year since 1960. That is faster than the world average and substantially more than the increase in their gross national product over the same period. Thus, more than the total increase in the gross output of developing countries, taken as a whole, over the past decade has been invested in military spending.

45. That conclusion conceals substantial differences between groups of countries. In South America, for instance, average increases in military expenditure were of the order of 2 or 3 per cent per annum until the last couple of years, when they have averaged about 10 per cent. In Africa, military expenditure has been rising by an average of 7 to 8 per cent per annum over the past ten years. In South Asia, although military expenditure has doubled in the past decade, there has been some reduction from the peak reached in 1966. On the other hand, in the Middle East such expenditure has been rising steadily by an average of 13 per cent per annum for a generation and the trend has accelerated to over 20 per cent per annum in the last three years. In some Middle Eastern countries, more than 30 per cent of the gross national product is now allocated to defence purposes, a truly oppressive burden which cannot long be sustained without either bankruptcy or an explosion.

*Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.*

<sup>10</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

<sup>11</sup> Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.



46. The expenditure of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on armaments accounts for somewhat less than 85 per cent of world military expenditure; of that, somewhat less than two thirds is expended by NATO countries and somewhat more than one third by Warsaw Pact countries. Here again, expenditure has been rising, but on the whole more slowly than in developing countries. In NATO countries, in general, the major increases in expenditure occurred before 1963; in the last five years military expenditure has risen less than 5 per cent in NATO countries, other than the United States, and in some, including the Federal Republic of Germany, real military expenditure has fallen. In Warsaw Pact countries, on the other hand, acceleration in military expenditure has increased since 1966 and is still continuing. Most remarkable is the trend in military expenditure of East Germany, which has been rising at the rate of nearly 14 per cent per annum at constant prices for the past twelve years, a rate that has accelerated in the last four years to spectacular 27 per cent average increase per annum. Total military expenditure of East Germany is now second only to that of the Soviet Union among Warsaw Pact countries and its *per capita* expenditure is more than double that of the Soviet Union at official exchange rates.

47. In general, from an analysis of trends in defence expenditures over the years, it can be concluded that since the war they have risen, globally at least, at the same rate as world output and in some countries the rise in military expenditure has far exceeded the rise in gross national product. Thus, defence spending is a major factor for the delay in meeting the expectations of people everywhere for an improvement in standards of living. Secondly, arms competition or the arms race is not confined to the major Powers or to countries adhering to military blocs, although these still account for the bulk of defence expenditure. Thirdly, the arms race as reflected in increasing expenditures for defence is tending to spread to areas where military expenditure was previously small and stable and thus forcing countries, which would prefer not to increase their military expenditure, to change their attitude. Support for this conclusion comes from the proliferation of major weapon systems. For instance, ten years ago one country in the developing world possessed long-range surface to air missiles, and in 1968 there were nineteen countries. Ten years ago four developing countries owned supersonic military aircraft, which are now owned by thirty-two countries in all continents. Fourthly, defence expenditure trends show an action-reaction pattern; substantial defence expenditure increases by one important nation or group of nations are usually followed by equal, if not larger, increases by other nations or groups of nations. This carries arms competition to a new and higher plateau of expenditure, but leaves the world strategic arms balance and regional balances of power virtually unaltered.

48. In the post-war world, increases in military expenditure are not attributable, in the main, either to increases in world stocks of existing arms—although there have been increases in some types of arms—or to increases in the size of the armed forces which have expanded globally by only 15 per cent over the past decade. Indeed, in most technologically advanced countries the size of the standing armed forces is stable or is tending to fall slightly. Increases in defence expenditure are principally due to the accelerating technological arms race. Technologically less advanced

countries are acquiring at an increasingly rapid rate more sophisticated, more complex and hence more costly conventional weapons.

49. Improvement in the performance capabilities of conventional weapons is not, however, the main area of competition between technologically advanced countries, particularly the major Powers. The latter are engaged in a desperate race for technological supremacy on the frontiers of knowledge.

50. The race is conducted at three levels: first, upgrading the capabilities of existing advanced weapons systems; secondly, development of new types of weapons systems; and, thirdly, search for new environments in which new or improved weapons systems can be used.

51. The main thrust in the nuclear field, as in the field of chemical and biological weapons, or in that conventional weapons, is not for the technologically most advanced countries the indefinite quantitative increase in stocks of existing weaponry, but rather increased capability.

52. In the nuclear field, this is reflected by improvements in range, accuracy in delivery, increased payload and multiplication of independently targeted warheads within the same payload. Thus, the fact that the actual number of nuclear weapons may be increasing slowly is misleading since it does not reflect in any way the immense increase in the destructive capabilities of each weapon. Furthermore, several of these technical advances, such as the development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), greatly complicate the adoption of credible and effective arms control measures. At the same time, the discovery of the ultracentrifuge process of enriching uranium, and the construction of the first plants using that process pose a long-term threat to the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in its present form, a threat aggravated by the fact that revolutionary breakthroughs are expected in the near future in the field of controlled nuclear fusion, a field in which major Powers are deeply engaged. The development of a 'mobile, fission-free thermonuclear explosive is likely to accompany or to evolve from these developments in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. When controlled fusion devices become operational, and that is possible within the next five years, control of fissile materials will be insufficient for the control of nuclear weapon production.

53. The Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water does not appear to have been very successful in reducing either the number of nuclear weapon tests—there have been more nuclear weapon tests in the five years since the ban than there were in the five years immediately preceding the ban—or the threat of unacceptable levels of radioactive contamination in the atmosphere since France and mainland China have continued their atmospheric tests at increased levels. Between 1966 and 1968 France exploded no less than thirteen nuclear devices above ground at the Tuamotu Islands, causing substantially increased atmospheric radioactivity in its Polynesian possessions and detectable increases in radioactivity in a vast area from Australia and New Zealand to South America. During the same period increased radioactivity from the six Chinese

tests has been detected in Japan, Europe and the United States. At the same time, the yield of underground nuclear tests is increasing, giving rise to the problem of venting which, when radioactive debris is carried beyond the borders of the State under whose jurisdiction the explosion is conducted, constitutes a clear but seldom remarked violation of the Moscow Treaty.

54. The danger of contaminating our environment is not confined to nuclear weapon tests. The rapidly expanding and proliferating programmes for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes constitute a danger that is all the greater because it is comparatively unremarked by public opinion. One facet of this danger; nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, has been the object of attention at the international level; another facet, however, has aroused surprisingly little interest even in the International Atomic Energy Agency. I refer to the danger of nuclear reactors. When these have been functioning for some time they store radioactivity greatly in excess of that released by a powerful nuclear bomb. In the case of a nuclear bomb exploded in the atmosphere, the radioactivity ascends into the stratosphere and the active products are widely distributed and diluted before being returned to earth. A gently seeping nuclear reactor, on the other hand, can put its radioactive poison under a stable inversion layer and concentrate it in deadly fashion on some hundreds of square miles. No less an authority than Dr. Edward Teller has stated:

“Nuclear reactors do not belong on the surface of the earth. Nuclear reactors belong underground. They should be provided with sufficient and safe interlocks, so that, even in the case of accident, the radioactivity will be confined and will not be widely disseminated.”

55. Sweden has demonstrated that progress can be made in this field at no very great expense. But international interest and effective international action on safety regulation, particularly important where many heavily populated States occupy a comparatively small area, have been lacking. We hope that States having access to forums denied to us will forcefully take up this important question.

56. From this very brief review there can be no doubt, I think, that we can conclude, first, that it is important and indeed imperative to take steps to obtain the full co-operation of all nuclear-weapon-States in preventing atmospheric pollution and, secondly, that events have overtaken our consideration of nuclear arms control measures, both here at the United Nations and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and that they threaten the viability of the few results that have been achieved to date.

57. In the field of chemical and biological weapons the emphasis in technologically advanced countries is not so much to increase the quantities of chemical and biological agents stockpiled but to diversify them, and to improve their capabilities and the predictability and dependability of their action, and of the weapons systems for their delivery.

58. We welcome the excellent report of the Secretary-General<sup>12</sup> on the subject which clearly brings out the

variety of chemical and biological means of warfare, their dangers and the virtual impossibility, particularly on the part of technologically less developed countries, to adopt effective measures against sophisticated and massive attack. We whole-heartedly support all initiatives that can effectively lead to the elimination of these weapons from the arsenals of all States.

59. We are glad that the Committee on Disarmament found time to give some consideration to this extraordinarily difficult and complex subject and we congratulate the United Kingdom for having submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare [*ibid.*, annex C, section 20] which attempts to take into realistic account the problems in this field. We cannot pretend that the attempt has been entirely successful. Who is to judge whether there exists independent peaceful justification for the production of any given quantity of microbial or other biological agents? And how is one to apply in practice the prohibition in article II (b) of the draft treaty when there are no agreed standards for the quantities of biological agents that may be required for peaceful purposes? How can one in practice ascertain whether a State, party to the treaty, is acting in breach of its undertakings in view of the secrecy surrounding research in this field in some countries? These are a few of the questions that come to the mind of my delegation. Nevertheless we commend and support the United Kingdom effort as a thoughtful and constructive step to strengthen existing constraints on biological methods of warfare.

60. The proposed convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on their destruction, submitted by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Ukrainian SSR [A/7655], is a document with far more ambitious goals than those of the British draft treaty. We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has now come to see the force of the arguments put forward by my delegation two years ago on the need to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol.<sup>13</sup> We also welcome the stated purpose of the draft convention. Its contents, however, could probably have been improved had it been submitted in the first instance for consideration by the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with normal procedure.

61. The deficiencies of the proposed convention are numerous and some are fundamental. Thus reference is made only to weapons, not to methods of warfare. This leaves States free to produce component parts of weapons, including chemical and biological agents, from which weapons could be manufactured very quickly. Secondly, there is no attempt to define the prohibited weapons even in the most general terms, although this can easily be done. Thirdly, not only is there no provision made for a verification procedure but there is not even a public complaint procedure. The proposed article 6 merely states that: “The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise . . .”. This does not constitute

<sup>12</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

<sup>13</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

even minimal deterrence to would-be violators. Finally, no attempt is made to provide even the most general security assurances to countries against which chemical or biological weapons are used or are threatened.

62. To my delegation, those deficiencies in the proposed convention are fatal, however commendable the stated objective may be. There is, moreover, a further point worth mentioning which is not covered by the draft convention; that is, the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons. We are sure that that omission is due to an oversight. Nevertheless the omission is grave and assumes quite fundamental importance in view of the fact that in adhering to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Soviet Union reserved the right to use chemical and bacteriological weapons against non-party violators of the Protocol and against their allies, even those, presumably, who might be adhering strictly to the principles and objectives of the Protocol.

63. Despite its deficiencies, the Soviet draft convention does contain a few useful concepts not included in the United Kingdom draft treaty, such as the provisions in article 4. We would thus be inclined to suggest that both the United Kingdom and the Soviet drafts be referred back to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and that it be invited to continue its work on the elaboration of an effective international convention strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the basis of the United Kingdom draft treaty, which is immeasurably superior to the Soviet draft, but incorporating such provisions of the Soviet draft as may appear appropriate.

64. Perhaps, however, the most expeditious way of relieving the world of the fear of these most odious weapons is unilateral action by States. We warmly welcome, in that connexion, the recent statement by President Nixon renouncing on behalf of the United States the use of lethal biological weapons and of all methods of biological warfare; the decision to dispose of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons; and the reaffirmation of the renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons. Those are indeed positive and constructive steps which we hope will be imitated by the Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. Such a decision would be all the more welcome since it is known that the Soviet Union probably maintains the largest stocks of chemical and biological weapons in existence in the world today.

65. It would be churlish to make any suggestions with regard to the implementation of President Nixon's historic decision. Nevertheless, we would express the modest hope that the United States will find a way to dispose of its bacteriological weapons under international supervision. This would not only constitute a precedent of great significance in disarmament negotiations but might also reassure public opinion that disposal is being effected, without danger of future contamination of any part of our environment.

66. One of the characteristics of the arms competition between the major Powers is the development of new classes of weapons systems. I shall briefly refer to two of these which have not as yet received attention either in the

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or at the United Nations.

67. The first is radiological warfare, of which there are two branches. The first branch concerns the destruction caused by radiological agents that are a by-product of nuclear explosions. As you are aware, although all nuclear explosions have some radiological effects, there are very great differences of degree between the effect produced by different kinds of nuclear explosions. Thus, nuclear weapons may be developed to increase death and injury through radioactive fall-out by, for instance, encasing bombs with cobalt. That is probably the sole type of nuclear warfare in the context of weapons now available which could bring about the destruction of mankind in its literal, physical sense. However, the type of radiological warfare just described is perhaps best considered in the context of measures for the control of nuclear weapons and I shall not mention that branch of radiological warfare further.

68. The second type of radiological warfare concerns the manufacture, stockpiling and use of radioactive agents independently of nuclear explosions. These might derive from radioactive by-products of reactors for peaceful purposes and could be used tactically or strategically, for instance in the form of radioactive dust or pellets, to contaminate a given area. Although that use of radioactive agents does not appear particularly important militarily, given the numerous other types of weapons systems available, it is technically feasible and we believe it may be worthwhile to draw attention to it.

69. The optical maser or laser, light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation, is a comparatively new scientific development with many important potential civilian and military applications. The laser is a device that produces a new kind of light—coherent light—which has predictable properties that can be controlled in a manner comparable to microwave frequencies and radio signals. The present military applications of lasers are mainly in the field of radar and communications but their military importance is rapidly increasing. Lasers are already playing a crucial role in the development of controlled nuclear fusion devices, to which I have referred, and, should a more intensive utilization of outer space be attempted, it is not impossible that their unique characteristics could be of outstanding strategic importance. Since lasers are particularly suited for military use in outer space or on celestial bodies with an attenuated atmosphere, they could become the preferred primary armament of manned spacecraft and, of more immediate relevance perhaps, they could be mounted in arrays on orbiting space stations so that their cones of lethal striking power completely covered an assigned sector of the earth. This may appear a remote possibility. Nevertheless my delegation has reason to believe that both laser and outer space technology have advanced sufficiently to make it advisable to initiate negotiations for appropriate amendments to article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, bearing in mind that while lasers in outer space could be used as terrible weapons of mass destruction they have also a wide and expanding range of peaceful uses.

70. We hope that our suggestion will be taken up by a State member of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space and in the meantime we have respectfully submitted a modest draft resolution on that subject [A/C.1/L.494].

71. Thus, the advance of technology is making possible the extension of arms competition between the major Powers to environments previously immune. We have mentioned outer space: a similar process is taking place at an accelerated rate in ocean space. In the latter environment the first tentative constraint on unlimited militarization is the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the United States and the Soviet Union [A/7741-DC/232, *annex A*], which is now before us for consideration.

*Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

72. My delegation has examined that treaty with care in the light of the known characteristics of the marine environment, and also of such information as is available to us with regard to the nature of the main threat against which the international community should guard. It may be useful to give a few details in that connexion.

73. Until very recently, only the surface and the upper layers of the sea, to a maximum depth of some 300 to 350 metres was, or could be, used for military purposes; also, mines could be anchored or laid and submarines could find a temporary resting place on the sea-bed of shallow seas. The capability of divers was limited. A new dimension in the utilization of ocean space for military purposes is now being revealed by technology. The revolutionary and still experimental techniques of fluid breathing may enable man within less than a decade to survive usefully at depths in the range of 4,000 metres; deep diving submersibles capable of cruising near the ocean bottom at depths in excess of 2,000 metres have been launched and they will be valuable for scientific purposes, but even more so for military purposes. The undersea long-range missile system, the development of which is being prepared, will consist of a force of specially configured submarines armed with advanced long-range ballistic missiles capable of penetrating thousands of feet of water and landing on targets thousands of miles away. Such a force will require broad, parallel supporting facilities in the form of sea-bed installations for fuel and supply depots, repair facilities, utility systems and power generation. The technical capability also exists to drill into the ocean floor to develop self-contained underground complexes. According to a well-known expert:

“...using only the tools and techniques known to today's raw material industry, manned installations of a large size containing a one-atmosphere, shirt-sleeve environment can be built today on much of the world's continental shelf region; and with a modest extension in undersea vehicle capability large manned installations can be established on almost any location on the continental slopes, the deep ocean floor and on seamounts and ridges”.

Direct access to such complexes, the first of which is scheduled to be completed within five years, will be obtained through a lock system.

74. In the context of the above briefly outlined capabilities, plans and developments, it is clear that the concept of a treaty to impose some constraint on the military utilization of the deep seas and of the ocean floor is timely. It is, however, equally clear that the draft treaty [*ibid.*] before us does not address itself to the main threat. The general trend of weapons development in ocean space is towards mobile systems or at least towards systems capable of movement and this, for obvious reasons.

75. Fixed military scientific installations on and under the sea-bed will be needed and they will be developed not, however, so much for the specific purpose of launching, testing or using nuclear weapons but rather to service, directly or indirectly, mobile systems and for a variety of other purposes without direct connexion with the use of nuclear weapons. Since neither mobile nuclear systems nor those types of fixed military installations which are likely to be developed in the near future are prohibited under the present draft treaty, the latter loses in our eyes some of its urgency; but not however its significance as a first step towards what we hope will be fruitful negotiations to ensure a more comprehensive reservation of the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. That objective has exceptional significance in our eyes since we believe that for a variety of reasons, pressures are increasing to transfer a major part of nuclear arms capability from land to ocean space. Thus, we attribute considerable importance to the inclusion in the draft treaty of an additional preambular paragraph, stressing that the ultimate objective of arms control and disarmament negotiations in the environment to which I am now referring is the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof, which are part of the common heritage of mankind. We strongly support the suggestions made by Sweden in document CCD/271 [*ibid.*, *annex C, section 36*]<sup>14</sup> to add to the draft treaty an additional article by which the parties would pledge themselves to continue negotiations in good faith on further measures relating to a more comprehensive prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes.

76. Another reason for the significance of the draft treaty, in our eyes, is that the patterns adopted with regard to basic definitions and essential procedures may well constitute significant precedents in the event further arms control agreements are negotiated.

77. Clear definitions are absolutely vital to the viability of any arms control agreement and to avoid subsequent controversy on its interpretation. In that perspective we cannot conceal our disappointment at the comparative vagueness of article I of the proposed treaty. That article clearly prohibits the emplacement in a very wide but controversially defined area of the sea-bed of:

“...any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons”.

78. Unfortunately, that form of words does not define the nature of the prohibited activities with sufficient precision

<sup>14</sup> Also circulated as document A/C.1/994.



to avoid misunderstanding and controversy. My delegation, in this connexion, has serious doubts whether the term "weapons of mass destruction" is sufficiently precise to be appropriate for use in a formal international instrument dealing with such a delicate subject as arms control. Is a magnetic mine, deposited on the sea-bed, which could blow up a ship containing 10,000 people, a weapon of mass destruction or not? Are radiological weapons, weapons of mass destruction? What about chemical and biological weapons, particularly those producing lethal effects or mortality in fish? Are installations, the principal purpose of which are to service nuclear submersibles, to store parts of nuclear weapons or to provide facilities for the assembly of such weapons, prohibited under the draft treaty? We do not know and clarification on those points has not been forthcoming.

79. The provisions contained in article III are another major weakness in the proposed treaty. We have already stated our views on this point in the sea-bed Committee. Briefly, we believe that it is vital to distinguish clearly between the concepts of observation, verification and inspection. The right of observation may be exercised freely by any State, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, in the context of the freedom of the high seas. Verification, by which term I mean external inspection of sites and facilities, should be conducted, if at all possible, under the circumstances, with the participation of the representatives of one or more States of the region, or of the coastal State, if the installation in question is on the internationally recognized continental shelf of a State. Specific provision should be made for the inspection, under international auspices, of the interior of installations on the purpose of which serious and justified doubts have been raised. Finally, in our view, it would be useful to make provision for a recognized international system of reporting activities which give rise to serious doubts.

80. We realize that it is very difficult to elaborate entirely satisfactory solutions to the problem of realistic procedures for the verification of suspicious or dubious activities in the marine environment. Nevertheless, we believe that the provisions of article III can be improved. We should like, in this connexion, to express our appreciation for the thoughtful and constructive working paper submitted by the delegation of Canada [*ibid.*, section 35]. That working paper attempts to grapple with some of the baffling problems of verification, and we generally support the concepts contained therein.

81. As we have already indicated, questions of definition and of verification procedures are not merely technical points for my delegation; they have a particular importance for us and affect our attitude on the substance of the draft treaty, since they may constitute precedents for the future.

82. From our brief review of developments in the field of armaments there emerges with startling clarity the ineffectiveness of action taken or proposed in recent years at the international level to control competition in arms and to reduce the present level of armaments. We have also noted that the few positive results achieved in recent years in disarmament and arms control issues at the international level, of which the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in

Outer Space and under Water are the most important, are seriously endangered by the advance of technology and by its changing nature. Thus, French and Chinese atmospheric tests contaminate our atmosphere, and in so far as they achieve that result they defeat one of the major purposes of the test ban Treaty. At the same time, the ultra-centrifuge process of uranium enrichment and the development of fission-free thermonuclear explosives will, within less than a decade, make the provisions for the control of fissionable material, embodied in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty, of virtually marginal relevance for the purposes of that Treaty.

83. This does not mean that my delegation doubts the value of these Treaties, particularly of the test ban Treaty, or the usefulness of the discussion of disarmament issues in the forums provided by the United Nations system. However, it does mean that we believe that the continued viability and effectiveness of these Treaties is already gravely undermined and that the international debate must be based on a clearer awareness of the nature of the difficult and complex problems with which we are attempting to deal.

84. I have stated that arms competition is, for many developing countries, a major obstacle, in a few cases the major obstacle, to economic development and to the improvement of living standards. This is so because in those countries arms competition takes the form of an increase in the number of men under arms, an increase in the quantity of locally-produced arms, and an increase in the purchase of more sophisticated weapons from abroad. The economic consequences of this form of arms competition are almost entirely negative. As the local scientific, technical and industrial base is strengthened, widened and diversified, and as national wealth and resources increase, the character of the arms race and the nature of its effect on the national economy tend gradually to change. For the most technologically advanced Powers, arms competition takes place at the frontiers of knowledge and technology, and could perhaps be considered as a means, easily acceptable to public opinion for ideological, political or military reasons, to strengthen their own scientific advance and world technological dominance.

85. Modern science and modern technology are increasingly ambivalent, in the sense that both scientific and technological advance usually have equally important peaceful and military applications. Indeed, in an increasing number of cases the same techniques may be used for peaceful or for military ends. It is only the end-product, and sometimes only the use to which the end-product is put, which enables us to distinguish between the two. This is true in the nuclear field, in chemistry, bacteriology or microbiology, in the field of laser technology, and in many others. Thus, arms competition, while absorbing enormous resources that could be used in the improvement of living standards, may also be viewed as an investment, which otherwise would not have been made so quickly or so massively, in advanced technology; the economic and political returns of which can be enormous to the originator country.

86. This aspect of the strategic arms race at the level of major Powers merits detailed analysis and is, we believe,



relevant to a deeper understanding of the nature of disarmament negotiations.

87. We would wish to draw a few conclusions from what we have just stated.

88. In the first place, we cannot be content to consider the question of arms control and disarmament in isolation: there are close and deep links between civilian and military technology of which we must be aware if we are to evaluate intelligently the arms control proposals submitted to us. Indeed, it would be useful if, in future, consideration of arms control questions were to take place against the total relevant scientific and technological background.

89. Nor can we consider arms competition as equally undesirable for all countries as much depends on the circumstances. There are political circumstances that, for instance, may compel a ruinous arms race unless the underlying political problem is solved. There are also other circumstances in which arms competition may be useful to mobilize resources for the acquisition of a lasting monopoly of advanced technology that may pay spectacular economic and political dividends in the future.

90. In the second place, the nature of scientific and technological advance immensely complicates the elaboration of credible and effective safeguards against violation of arms control agreements. I have already referred, in this connexion, to the fact that the safeguards contained in the non-proliferation Treaty are being made obsolete by the advance of technology.

91. That is but one example; many more could be cited. For instance, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between multiple re-entry vehicles and multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles with the means now available, without far-reaching inspection procedures, yet the capabilities of the two systems differ enormously. Such problems make the credible and effective control of strategic arms competition in most significant fields virtually hopeless, unless the Soviet Union and the United States, together with other nuclear-weapon States, are willing to submit to far-reaching effective and objective procedures of international control. Such an expectation will be unrealistic until the entire approach of the international community to problems of vital common concern changes.

92. Of course, we do not mean to imply in any way that the strategic arms limitation talks which have been initiated in Helsinki are useless, or are headed inevitably for total failure. On the contrary, the omens appear favourable, and we interpret these talks, from the strictly disarmament point of view, positively as an attempt, on the part of the major Powers, to pass from the phase of uncontrolled arms competition, which has dominated the post-war world, to a phase of controlled arms competition, which would permit a greater percentage of the annual increase in gross national product to be fruitfully allocated to satisfying the expectations of increasingly restive populations. This would imply some relaxation in the technological arms race and the adoption of arms limitations measures in some fields, but sufficient competition would remain to maintain the technological and military advance already acquired over other countries.

93. Since the negotiations in Helsinki are being conducted on the basis of the traditional political postulate of rather narrowly interpreted national interest, they cannot be expected to lead to spectacular progress on the road to general and complete disarmament. At most we can expect some progress in arms control and some easing of tensions. If successful, however, the strategic arms limitation talks may be of truly historic significance in laying the foundation for an advance from the concept of coexistence to the concept of co-operation. This advance, in our opinion, must eventually take place—if enlightened self-interest prevails—in view precisely of the global and revolutionary technologies that have been developed. It is only in the framework of a policy of peaceful co-operation, gradually extended to States, both participating and not participating in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, that the vexing problems connected with nuclear disarmament and with our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control can be solved. However, the co-operation of the strong, to be acceptable to the weak, cannot be based on a narrow conception of the national interest and on the maintenance of a *status quo* that denies the fundamental rights and the human dignity of others; but rather the strong, in co-operation, should give the example in leading all towards a new world order of co-operation, peace and justice, by translating, in the true spirit of internationalism, the basic principles that professedly guide their internal policies. This may require painful adjustment, the difficulties of which we do not underestimate, of many of the present policies and time for ruling political circles to draw the necessary far-reaching but obvious conclusions from contemporary scientific and technological developments.

94. While the strategic arms limitation talks are, in a sense, defining the broad sphere of its useful competence for the next quinquennium, there is much work that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can appropriately undertake. We would only mention some avenues along which valuable progress appears possible in the near term.

95. We believe that, in the field of measures relating to nuclear weapon control, good results could be obtained in the coming year from the examination of an international system for the exchange of seismological data, not so much in the context of establishing a new international agency as within the framework of an existing international body or under the control of the Security Council. Some possibilities may also exist for the reaching of agreement on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests to those below a certain magnitude. We are, however, reluctantly, still of the opinion that it is unlikely that agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty can be reached in the immediate future, although we strongly support both the concept and several of the constructive proposals to that end that have been suggested in the Committee on Disarmament. Another matter which we believe the Committee on Disarmament could usefully consider is the possibility of an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests under the sea-bed and under the ocean floor. The lack of such a prohibition is an obvious lacuna in the Moscow test ban treaty and one that could be filled with relative ease. That would represent a small but positive step towards a comprehensive test ban treaty that would probably be possible of achievement next year.

96. In the field of non-nuclear and other collateral measures, I hope that the Committee on Disarmament will continue its consideration of international agreements on chemical and biological methods of warfare supplementing and strengthening the general prohibition contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. I have already mentioned our preference for the present United Kingdom draft [*ibid.*, section 20] refined by the inclusion of some elements of the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union and other States [A/7655]. We should also welcome a strengthened Security Council resolution to accompany such a treaty. We hope that it will be possible materially to improve several of the provisions of the draft treaty on the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed [A/7741-DC/232, annex A]. A new subject to which the Committee on Disarmament might find time to give some attention, without prejudice to its existing priorities, is the possibility of reaching agreement on the control of radiological methods of warfare independent of nuclear explosions. We do not think that such an agreement would touch upon a particularly sensitive military nerve. At the same time, the exercise would be interesting from a technical point of view, since it would afford members of the Committee on Disarmament the opportunity to exercise their ingenuity in devising credible control procedures adapted to the subject matter and within the limits acceptable to technologically advanced countries.

*Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.*

97. Apart from substantive work, there is much that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can do to improve its organization and procedures. The scope of disarmament negotiations has widened in the last few years and in some ways has become more complex. We feel that appropriate conclusions should be drawn from these incontrovertible facts by adjusting the length of the Committee's sessions, intensifying work during sessions and strengthening the Committee secretariat. In view of the widening scope of the Committee's work, we are in general agreement with the decision to enlarge the Committee by the addition of eight members, and we are sure that the new members will make an important and constructive contribution to the Committee's work. Nevertheless, the method selected by the Co-Chairmen to give effect to the enlargement has, in our view, shown an unfortunate insensitivity to the feelings of others, an insensitivity that so often characterizes their actions in other matters, both large and small.

98. Now that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament comprises twenty-six members, we hope that the organization of its work can be improved, for instance by the establishment of flexible working groups to permit simultaneous, and perhaps more effective, consideration of a greater number of urgent matters. The procedures in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament also need adjustment.

99. Two years ago, I wished to listen to a friend of mine who was going to deliver a statement at the formal meeting of the then Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. I was informed, in horrified tones, that those meetings were secret and that no "outsiders" were allowed to attend them. That is nonsense. There is no particle of reason for

preventing duly accredited permanent representatives to the United Nations from attending the formal meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, since not only are secret matters not discussed at those formal meetings, but also the business transacted therein is widely known in Geneva within hours and in New York within days. I wish to state frankly that we will not tolerate, without strong protest, further continuation of such an absurd and discriminatory practice.

100. At the present time, States not represented at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may submit memoranda to the Committee on matters connected with disarmament, but their representatives may not make explanatory oral statements. Here again we believe that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament procedures require substantive improvement. We have no doubt that the States members of the Conference and their representatives in Geneva are wise, competent and motivated by zeal for progress in the field of disarmament. The many constructive suggestions and proposals mentioned in paragraphs 21 to 58 of document A/7741-DC/232 testify to that fact. But States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament do not have a world monopoly of zeal, wisdom and competence; non-member States may, occasionally, also be able to contribute constructive suggestions on matters under active consideration by the Conference which are of common and vital concern to all of us. We see no reason why representatives of non-member States should be prevented from orally explaining, with, of course, the consent of the Co-Chairmen and of representatives on the Committee, and on an occasion that does not disrupt the normal schedule of work, the suggestions that their Governments may wish to submit officially to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that our suggestion would increase the interest of member States in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and might sometimes result in the submission of ideas that could usefully be followed up by representatives on the Committee.

101. The continuing work of the United Nations on questions concerning arms control, arms limitation and disarmament should not be limited to the Geneva arms negotiations and connected matters. It should also include continuing work of a technical nature at Headquarters. We have in mind, particularly, three types of activities which it would be feasible to request the Secretariat to undertake and which would probably prove valuable to all States, including the major Powers. Those activities are:

102. First, to maintain and publish a chronology of disarmament negotiations and to bring periodically up to date the useful publication entitled *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965*<sup>15</sup> which was issued a few years ago. The updated publication could well include the text of resolutions on disarmament questions adopted by the United Nations. Such a publication would eliminate the need for much tedious research and would, we believe, be of value to most delegations.

103. Secondly, we believe that the Secretariat could appropriately initiate the systematic monitoring, on the

<sup>15</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. 67.1.9.

basis of accessible information, of major scientific and technological developments relevant to disarmament negotiations, and periodically, perhaps every two or three years, report thereon to the General Assembly through the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. This could provide invaluable background for the understanding of disarmament problems to small and unsophisticated countries, like mine, and might even be of some assistance to countries members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

104. Thirdly, we should like to see the Secretariat at Headquarters engaged more actively in assistance to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to the General Assembly in technical matters. We have in mind, for instance, the elaboration and submission for approval to the General Assembly of draft definitions of terms in common use in disarmament negotiations and in our discussions here. Many of the terms we use suffer from an unfortunate lack of precision which sometimes even extends to the draft treaties submitted for our consideration. This is particularly unfortunate in matters relating to arms control. We ourselves would dearly wish to be able to form a precise concept of such common terms as “weapons of mass destruction”, “conventional weapons”, and many others, and we feel that their internationally agreed definition might facilitate constructive negotiations at all levels.

105. Another area in which the Secretariat could do useful work is the elaboration and submission for our approval of an internationally acceptable definition of what constitutes military expenditure, and of more precise defence purchasing–power exchange rates, covering all countries, than are presently available. Such technical data would be of immense value to my delegation, and probably even of some value to delegations much larger than ours, in evaluating developments in the field with which we are now concerned.

106. The undertaking of these activities would require strengthening of the Headquarters Secretariat for disarmament affairs, in the context of which some further geographical diversification of staff at the higher professional level might perhaps be found to be appropriate.

107. I have spoken for more than an hour and I realize with dismay that I have not said a word on the subject of co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a topic that engaged the earnest attention of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States last year.<sup>16</sup> I would be abusing the Committee's patience were I to do more than to state the position of my delegation on some aspects of that matter. Briefly, there is no question in our view that nuclear States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty have undertaken a legal obligation in article IV to co-operate in:

“...the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world”.

They have also undertaken the legal obligation, under article V, to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty participate on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures in the potential benefits from peaceful application of nuclear explosions. These obligations are the heart of the non-proliferation Treaty.

108. It was in the light of those obligations assumed by nuclear States that I read with interest the three reports, documents A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2, A/7678 and Add.1-3, and A/7568, submitted by the Secretary-General on matters that found their origin in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and in our discussions last year. Document A/7568 is useful. Document A/7678 and Add.1-3 also contains some useful suggestions. At the cost of appearing a little unkind, I had expected that we would receive from the Secretary-General something more than document A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2 which comments upon, warms over and cooks in bureaucratic sauce, information basically available from other United Nations sources, including the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency itself. When the non-proliferation Treaty is ratified and comes into force, there will be a legal obligation on the part of nuclear States to promote the development in all their aspects of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The question arises as to how this obligation can be fulfilled effectively to the reasonable satisfaction of non-nuclear States, bearing in mind the principles of prompt and flexible response to the needs of Member States, which require maximum concentration of resources and minimum administrative complexity, both for the United Nations system and for the member States themselves? Surely, in order to take useful decisions effectively implementing the obligations States have assumed in the non-proliferation Treaty, we need to have before us a document analysing, first, the probable needs for assistance in this field on a global basis; secondly, the resources required to meet the needs in a reasonable manner; and thirdly, the type of machinery that would be used for the purposes of international co-operation in promoting the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. I can do no more now than make a very few comments on each of those points.

109. With regard to the first point, we have no evidence that, either in the International Atomic Energy Agency or anywhere in the United Nations system, effective work has been done to estimate and to differentiate between the serious needs of member States in the field of the application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. It is not sufficient to provide us with tables showing assistance targets of IAEA or requests for assistance received, accompanied by data on the value of assistance approved, and to assume that the first sets of figures represent global needs while the difference between the two sets of figures represents the shortfall between present resources and global needs. Serious needs of member States vary enormously in their character, in accordance with the circumstances of different countries. For some, the assistance immediately required may be in training persons in basic theoretical and technical concepts on the utilization of nuclear energy. For others, more sophisticated and diversified training and fellowship requirements are needed. These include for some countries the need for assistance in

<sup>16</sup> Held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968.

establishing or expanding indigenous facilities for the teaching of or research in subjects connected with the utilization of nuclear energy. Then we have countries that need assistance in obtaining equipment and fissionable materials. Finally, for a few countries the main requirement is financial assistance for the erection of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. Nor should we forget the need for participation in those unofficial but extremely useful forums, from which most developing countries are excluded, where scientists exchange information and experiences. This range of needs should be properly analysed and their financial implications should be estimated.

110. We now come to machinery. Are the obligations assumed by States under the non-proliferation Treaty to be interpreted as being fulfilled by a minor strengthening of existing IAEA programmes, supplemented perhaps by a few more programmes, insufficiently financed, insufficiently integrated and with limited impact? That is apparently what is suggested in paragraph 6 of document A/7677 and Corr.1. If we followed that course, we would be repeating once again the mistakes so often made in the past. The stuffing of a cake with a few more raisins or with larger raisins does not change the cake or improve its taste or nutritive value significantly. Surely we should take the opportunity of the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty to examine the feasibility of establishing an integrated fund catering to the whole gamut of needs of member States for international co-operation and international assistance in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including assistance in fissionable materials or assistance with regard to arrangements for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The IAEA regular programme of technical assistance, financed from voluntary contributions, could, with advantage, be consolidated in such a comprehensive fund, together with such other relevant services undertaken by IAEA in the field, now provided from its assessed budget. The fund itself could be financed from assessments on a basis similar to the financing of the United Nations. That would translate into international practice both the obligations undertaken by States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and the well-known aphorism "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his needs". Finally, the location and control of the proposed fund within the United Nations system should be the subject of careful analysis, which unfortunately we do not have the time to undertake now.

111. Briefly, the alternatives could be summarized perhaps as follows: placing the fund under the control of IAEA, the United Nations Development Programme, or perhaps even the Security Council. Only a document that discusses meaningfully the subjects I have outlined so sketchily and hastily can provide us with a sure foundation for useful action. We regret that we do not have such a document.

112. The most technologically advanced countries, with much ingenuity and after much effort, have succeeded in breaking the seal of the charmed bottle and releasing the genie of revolutionary scientific advance, who now towers in front of us obscuring the skies. We cannot put the genie back into the bottle, but those who have released him can make him serve us all faithfully and well. If they continue to give the genie discordant and contradictory commands,

he, in his anger, will destroy both them and us. If they agree to command in unison, the genie will bring us all scarcely imaginable spiritual and material benefits. There is but one national choice.

113. I would reserve the right of my delegation to speak again on the draft resolution submitted for our consideration, which we have not yet had the time to study carefully.

114. Mr. ANDRADE (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a preliminary statement; I shall be brief.

115. I believe that it is fitting to begin my statement by commenting on certain favourable events which have occurred during the First Committee's debate on an item whose dramatic implications for the fate of mankind have been very ably described in the numerous previous statements which, when taken together, in the opinion of my delegation, give a very complete picture of the major trends of contemporary thought on the main subject under discussion.

116. The resumption of the disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which are the guests of the hospitable people and Government of Finland, and the discernible, though limited, progress achieved there are a first bright spot in an otherwise gloomy picture. The world is making great strides in the conquest of space, yet shrinks from acting to ensure the survival of the human race, which is confronted with a choice of either achieving a definite and effective agreement between the nuclear Powers on general and complete disarmament, or being wiped out in a nuclear confrontation whose ultimate consequences are no longer a matter for conjecture. The delegation of Colombia hopes that both the Soviet Union and the United States will act with a keen awareness of their historic role in these negotiations and realize that it is not only their special interests which are at stake, but that the issues transcend the desires of the two great nations which in the latter half of the twentieth century have the greatest responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world. Here my delegation wishes to quote from the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Colombia in the General Assembly this year:

"...we are returning to that path from which we should never have strayed; the view that international order is not the task of any particular State, but is the collective duty of the community". [*1768th plenary meeting, para. 23.*]

117. Another nuclear Power, the United Kingdom, which suffered cruelly from the horrors of war and demonstrated to the world its indomitable courage, has brought us encouraging and exemplary news *via* its representative, Lord Chalfont, the decision of his Government to ratify, in the immediate future, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). My delegation, which represents a Latin American country that advocates and is working for the political and economic integration of our continent, thinks that it is entirely appropriate to endorse the request, repeated by a number of speakers, that that Treaty and its additional



Protocol be speedily ratified by other nuclear States. Latin America should preserve its reputation as a peace-loving region, and our countries must eschew any action to equip themselves with modern means of mass destruction, thereby joining the arms race which now holds men in the grip of fear and uncertainty about their own fate.

118. It might also be appropriate to say that we welcome the recent statements by the President of the United States announcing the decision of his Government to renounce certain types of chemical and biological warfare. To appreciate the importance of progress in this area, one need only read with the attention that it deserves the part of the Secretary-General's important report which refers specifically to the report of the group of scientists who studied the implications and appalling consequences of this kind of weapon. One cannot fail to be encouraged by any positive step taken by the major Powers in this area.

119. After these preliminary considerations, my delegation wishes to make a few comments on the group of items before us. As the Secretary-General of our Organization has stated himself, disarmament talks, even when they have moved forward, have done so remarkably slowly. Furthermore, regrettably many countries have decided to postpone ratifying a number of conventions and treaties whose purpose is to ensure peace, such as the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and the Moscow Treaty of 5 August 1963 Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. In the course of the debate the representatives of Sweden, Mexico and Brazil—the latter two being Latin American countries which are members of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva—mentioned the tendency of the so-called “super-Powers” to disregard certain valuable suggestions made by various States as a contribution to the draft treaty submitted by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. It would be highly desirable for that position to be modified in order to expedite agreements on so complicated a subject.

120. In an effort to contribute to the practical outcome of our deliberations, I should like to set forth briefly Colombia's position on the extensive agenda before us.

121. Disarmament leading to peace has been one of the oldest ideals of mankind, and distinguished thinkers and statesmen have devoted a good part of their lives to this noble effort. Ever since the time, in the eighteenth century, when Richard Price in England proposed the creation of a universal senate to arbitrate disputes between the Powers of the day, or when Jeremy Bentham advocated the reduction of standing armies and the establishment of a confederate force to which every State would contribute a certain number of troops, disapproval of war as a means of settling international conflicts has been growing throughout the world. These objectives will continue to be unattainable unless general and complete disarmament can gradually be achieved first. I am certainly not saying anything new about the position of my Government, which was set forth earlier this year in the Security Council by the President of Colombia, and in the general debate by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when I stress the importance which my delegation attaches to item 29, “Question of general and complete disarmament”. It is our belief that the promotion

of this objective, the great complexity of which is compounded by the sophistication of the nuclear weapons being stockpiled, is a matter of growing and vital necessity. Disregarding for a moment the question of economic development, we must all join in this common undertaking on an equal footing; it must not be left only to those nations possessing incredible arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.

122. Colombia has reiterated this position on a number of occasions and, in particular, the President of my country stated at the special meeting of the Security Council on 16 June this year:

“The simple physical consequences, not of the use of atomic weapons but merely of their testing, can affect the lives of millions of people who are not involved in the rivalries of the major Powers. On the basis of that circumstance alone we have the right to demand and obtain full guarantees that these weapons will not be used, and, furthermore, it justifies the efforts of the Security Council and the Geneva Conference. One cannot help wondering whether, even with all these efforts, it is not time that the Security Council or the General Assembly intensified its activities to regulate disarmament and put an end to the testing of new forms of destruction whose danger is evident. ‘Peripheral’ negotiations on nuclear weapons are not sufficient. Chemical warfare and bacteriological warfare are spoken of in a frighteningly natural manner. We all know that the talents of people occupied in the arms race could better be used in the service of mankind's well-being, and that immense financial resources are invested in the manufacture of weapons. The strategy of terror—an absurd alternative to juridical organization—is seen on all sides. Without being Utopian, one can envisage that the small and medium-sized nations could well take the initiative so that the Council might give more systematic attention to Article 26 of the Charter and, in accordance with Article 1, take the necessary collective measures to prevent what constitutes a real threat to peace; a threat that not only affects one groups of nations that might eventually be involved in a war-like situation, but is also a threat to the general peace of the world.”<sup>17</sup>

123. It is because of these considerations that my delegation attaches great importance to the decision of Secretary-General U Thant to declare the next decade of the Organization a “Disarmament and Development Decade”. One need only dwell for a moment on the Secretariat's estimate that \$200,000 million is devoted annually to the production of armaments to realize what a help it would be for the so-called “developing” nations if these enormous resources were used to develop the most backward areas of the world.

124. It would be highly desirable if whatever agreements are reached in Helsinki were to include some provision for a genuine reduction in the production and installation of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive. In our opinion, the problem is not merely one of limiting the

<sup>17</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969*, document S/9259 and Corr.2.



“horizontal” proliferation of nuclear weapons; there must be “vertical” control as well.

125. As Ambassador Yost said, the outstanding achievement of the disarmament talks in Geneva was the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I believe that I am speaking for many distinguished representatives here present when I say that we must go further forward and that now is the time to do so. It is essential for the Treaty to be signed by all nuclear States which have not yet done so and by others in order that there will be the required number of signatures for the Treaty to enter into force instead of remaining a dead letter as so many others have done in the international arena. We are also pleased that in this respect we agree with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, who said in his statement to the General Assembly:

“From the point of view of the interests of peace it is important to ensure that the widest possible circle of States accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, especially those that possess the material and technical resources for creating nuclear weapons or may reach that level relatively soon.” [1756th plenary meeting, para. 166.]

126. On this specific point, I think it might be appropriate to mention once again the part of the introduction to the Secretary-General’s annual report which deals with general and complete disarmament. It leaves little doubt about the overriding need to achieve considerable progress in this vital area. I quote from that document:

“Far from making progress towards limiting and reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, the world seems poised on the verge of a massive new escalation in the field of nuclear weaponry. Plans being discussed at present for anti-missile defensive systems and for missiles with multiple warheads generate a renewed sense of fear, insecurity and frustration. The product of the awful alphabet and arithmetic ABMs (anti-ballistic missiles) and MIRVs (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles) can only be the acceleration of what has been described as the “mad momentum” of the nuclear arms race. The development of such new weapons would greatly magnify and complicate the problems of verification and control of any measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The notion of ‘superiority’ in such a race is an illusion, as that notion can only lead to an endless competition in which each side steps up its nuclear capabilities in an effort to match, or exceed, the other side until the race ends in unmitigated disaster for all. As the spiral of the nuclear arms race goes up, the spiral of security goes down.”<sup>18</sup>

127. The draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>19</sup> annex A] deserves to

<sup>18</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 28.

<sup>19</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

be highly commended. We agree with the general view that the deadly and suicidal arms race should be kept from the sea-bed but we are disturbed by the fact that the text of the draft treaty was submitted to delegations somewhat belatedly, depriving them of an opportunity to give it the thorough, unhurried consideration which a document of such far-reaching legal implications deserves. Accordingly, my delegation agrees with many other delegations which have suggested that the draft treaty should be fully discussed at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, thus giving Governments a chance to state their views on the many questions dealt with therein. That does not mean that Colombia cannot now say that it is in favour of the suggestions relating to the provisions of article III set forth in the working paper submitted by the distinguished delegation of Brazil [A/C.1/993].

128. Our debate has brought into the open man’s indignation at the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Such weapons are an outrage to any civilized conscience and on this point we must take a definite stand. We are pleased that this Committee has attached the necessary importance to this item and we trust that the important draft resolutions before us—all of which advocate a ban on these weapons—may be combined into a single draft resolution that will unequivocally condemn the use of weapons which have such terrible effects.

129. Ever since 1962, the United Nations has been adopting resolutions on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. In spite of this, no definition or complete agreement has been reached on a matter which directly affects world peace. It is quite obvious that progress here has been conspicuously slow, owing to the failure of the two super-Powers to reach a political agreement on substantive issues.

130. In an effort to seek a way out of the impasse to which U Thant has referred in this connexion, my delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/L.490, submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. We feel that it would greatly promote the cause of peace.

131. Since the First Committee will complete its debates in a matter of days, I think it is appropriate to turn our discussions to practical matters and appeal respectfully to those who have the immense responsibility of giving expression in positive resolutions to our major concerns.

132. The attainment of peace is also a problem of conscience, decision and hope. My country will join in any effort made in so lofty an enterprise, which will determine the fate of mankind and also determine whether we shall have a world free from the yawning economic and social gaps which are today causing such alarming unrest.

*The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.*