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AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989, A/C.1/992; A/C.1/L.490)

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Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568, A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. BOMBA (Central African Republic) (*translated from French*): Like the successful moon landing by the three astronauts of Apollo 12, the acceptance by the two super-Powers at this stage in our debates of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an event of capital importance from the point of view of international co-operation and relaxation of tension. In these historic circumstances, the delegation of the Central African Republic would like to address its warmest congratulations to the United States and the Soviet Union on having begun the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks at Helsinki on 17 November. It welcomes and appreciates at its true value this long-awaited event, which marks an important step forward towards real disarmament, and it hopes that the results will take the form of useful and specific acts which will help to reduce the nuclear threat hanging like the sword of Damocles over the world.

2. In my statement, which will be brief, I would like to make some general comments on the items now under consideration by the First Committee. The Government of the Central African Republic has, as you know, always been concerned with the vital question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the necessity to halt nuclear and thermonuclear testing in all environments and the related and no less vital problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

3. Being aware of the danger of the frantic nuclear arms race and of the proliferation of such weapons and the pollution of the atmosphere, my delegation has not failed to associate itself with the statements made by other Member States calling on the great Powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue their efforts with the sincere purpose of establishing an effective system for control of nuclear and conventional weapons which would be applicable to all existing and future atomic Powers.

4. In that spirit my country, as will be remembered, acceded on 22 December to the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and a year later ratified the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

5. We hope that in the near future the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests will be made universal and comprehensive.

6. My delegation has read with great interest the documents and the Secretary-General's report on disarmament questions and it has listened carefully to the various statements and conclusions of the speakers. As it wishes to avoid going into detail, it will endeavour in its general statement to place the emphasis where it belongs.

7. My delegation is convinced that world peace can never come from rapidly expanding arsenals of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. That is why, through the voice of our Foreign Minister in the debate in the plenary Assembly, we declared that all Nations should unite and impose not only the systematic destruction of atomic weapons but also general and complete disarmament, under effective international control [1784th plenary meeting, para. 186].

8. In other words, general and complete disarmament is an essential condition for international security. It is in that spirit that we must remove every risk of total destruction. Hence my delegation would emphasize the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a key instrument for the establishment of the necessary mutual trust and for any substantial reduction in the risk of a nuclear war. We hope that the final acceptance of that Treaty by the United States of America and the Soviet Union will make it possible for other States to sign it so that it may enter into force as soon as possible.

9. As regards the question of underground nuclear tests, my delegation cannot insist too strongly on the importance of having the General Assembly call on the nuclear Powers to put an end to tests of that kind.

10. We listened with great interest to the statements of the representatives of Sweden [1695th meeting] and Canada [1692nd meeting] on the techniques for detection and identification from afar of subterranean explosions and seismic phenomena, and we believe that it may not prove impossible to resolve the problem of inspection that has always stood in the way of an agreement in this matter. Thus we believe that the time has come for the Committee on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to come to an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

11. The delegation of the Central African Republic supports draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1 to 3, concerning the exchange of seismological information with a view to prohibiting all tests.

12. Another question which, in our opinion, is of great importance for disarmament is that of denuclearized zones.

13. The delegation of the Central African Republic is particularly appreciative of the efforts on the part of the United Nations that led to the denuclearization of the Latin American nations. We believe that the General Assembly should continually affirm the concept of denuclearized zones in Africa and other parts of the world, thereby helping to reduce the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

14. I come now to the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It must be confessed that the mere idea that these weapons might be used is a terrifying one, because of their deadly toxic effects and of their great variety, as the experts have effectively pointed out in paragraph 375 of their report:¹

“Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live.”

15. In view of this, it is essential that the Committee on Disarmament should prepare as quickly as possible a treaty prohibiting the manufacture and stockpiling of such weapons and should invite States that have not yet done so to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

16. In this connexion, we whole-heartedly support the experts' report on this complex question and all the recommendations it makes regarding these abominable weapons.

17. As for the prevention of the extension of the arms race in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, my delegation will support all efforts for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of such weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, for it regards it as a happy initiative to reserve for peaceful purposes the immense resources of the sea-bed, which are the common heritage of mankind.

18. In conclusion, my delegation believes that disarmament is a universal problem, one that interests the international community as a whole. All nations should therefore work for that objective. And so my delegation hopes that the commemoration next year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of our Organization will provide an opportunity for the nuclear Powers to take a decisive step along the road to genuine and comprehensive disarmament.

19. Mr. HSUEH (China): This is probably one of the more eventful years in the field of disarmament. The world has witnessed during the current year historic events which may well become milestones in man's serious efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons and to avert the scourge of war. Substantive proposals have been worked out at Geneva and elsewhere containing measures designed to promote progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

¹ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.1.24).

ment. Considerable preparatory work has also been done to pave the way for the adoption of other measures to achieve the same end. While, as a result, we have a heavy agenda before us in this Committee, we cannot but feel encouraged by all these welcome developments.

20. We regret only that we have not been allowed sufficient time to give all the subjects involved the thorough and detailed study that they deserve. Some important proposals have been submitted only shortly before their consideration in this Committee. Consequently many delegations, including my own, did not even have the time to consult their respective Governments and to formulate detailed views on these proposals. However, I shall attempt at this stage to state the general position of my Government on the various subjects under discussion, reserving the right to speak again on the details when the occasion arises.

21. One of the historic events to which I have referred is the inauguration of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which took place on 2 September 1969 at Mexico City. As a result of six years of tireless and ingenious efforts on the part of Latin American statesmen, the dream of establishing a nuclear-free zone on their continent has now come true. That happy event, which has won the praise and admiration of all nations, is no doubt a lasting contribution to the promotion of disarmament and peace for the whole world. Having followed closely and with great interest all the steps leading to the establishment of the Agency, my Government had the honour of being represented in an observer capacity at the inaugural session of the General Conference. I recall that two years ago I had occasion to express in this Committee the sense of gratification of my Government on the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. It is now again my pleasant duty to extend, in the name of the Government and people of the Republic of China, my sincere congratulations to the Latin American countries on their achievement. While the peoples of other regions may not be fortunate enough to do the same, as I pointed out two years ago, the systems perfected in the Treaty of Tlatelolco serve nevertheless as a shining example for the solution of related problems in other contexts.

22. Another historic event in the field of disarmament has taken place only recently. I refer to the strategic arms limitation talks now in progress at Helsinki. The importance of these talks to the future of mankind, which can hardly be over-emphasized, has been mentioned by practically all the speakers preceding me. Whether the world will be relieved of the dangerous tension resulting from the nuclear arms race, whether this planet will be made a safer place for man to live in, and whether the vast resources now spent in the manufacture of more and more destructive weapons will be diverted to the improvement of the well-being of all peoples—all these questions will be answered in a large measure by the outcome of the Helsinki talks. Indeed, the world has come to a crossroads at Helsinki.

23. I am sure we are all gratified that the two major nuclear Powers are now taking the first step to carry out their pledge under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to limit their nuclear armaments. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the well-deserved

tribute paid to them for the momentous decision they have made to undertake this serious endeavour, and in particular to the United States for its initiative in proposing the talks. We fully realize the awesome responsibilities that history has placed on those engaged in the negotiations. At this stage there appears to be very little that others can do to contribute to the successful outcome of the talks, but surely there is a great deal that all of us can and should do at the same time to bring the world closer to the security of arms control and disarmament. In this connexion the ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by all the three depository Governments is a significant development which will no doubt hasten the coming into force of the Treaty.

24. While I am on the subject of the Helsinki talks, I should like to draw attention to one or two matters that my delegation believes to be of importance. First, as has been well recognized, the establishment of a reliable and adequate system of international inspection and control is the key to the implementation of measures related to disarmament. It is hoped that in the substantive negotiations following the Helsinki talks such a system will be thoroughly discussed and worked out. The solution of this central problem would not only make the limitation of strategic arms possible, but would also lead to progress in other disarmament measures.

25. Secondly, as long as nuclear weapons exist, even at a reduced level, there cannot be full confidence of safety for all nations, especially the non-nuclear-weapon States, against possible nuclear attacks. The concept of a "nuclear umbrella" received a great deal of attention during the discussion of the non-proliferation Treaty. It is therefore hoped that the negotiators at the strategic arms limitation talks will keep in mind the security requirements for all regions of the world. It is in that light that my delegation reads the pledge given by both parties in their public statements not to seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests and the security of third parties.

26. Let me now turn to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232].² The first thing that strikes any reader of the report is the change of the name of the Committee which has become all too familiar to the members of this Committee. No one is really nostalgic about the old name; some, who appear to believe that any change is better than no change, may even welcome a new name; but many are concerned, procedurally or otherwise, over the manner in which the membership of the Committee on Disarmament has been expanded, with the result that its name has been changed. Much has already been said on that subject. My delegation is not sure whether or not this expansion of membership might have given rise to the problem of over-representation in the case of some political groups and geographical regions. The world is not as triangular as some would have us believe, and certainly not equilaterally triangular. In the view of my delegation, the requirement of numerically equal representation for all sides on the Committee can be over-stressed at the expense of the quality of its membership. The recent expansion of membership of the Committee on Disarmament has called attention to this problem.

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

27. The Committee has done a great deal of work this year on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. This question has so far eluded solution because of the unresolved problem of identification and verification of underground explosions. No one has produced concrete evidence that all such explosions can be verified without on-site inspection. Whether any scientific device has been found that can detect underground nuclear explosions as distinct from seismic disturbances is a purely technical question, which cannot be resolved by a political debate or a political decision. On the other hand, whether on-site inspections should be allowed to verify underground explosions is a political question which involves nothing but a political decision. Those who refuse to make a positive decision on this political question and are thus responsible for the delay in the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty may have their domestic reasons and should perhaps be shown generous understanding. However, it would seem ungenerous of them to turn round and blame others for the delay and to confuse world opinion by asserting that a technical and scientific question should be determined by a political decision.

28. In those circumstances my delegation believes that the preparatory procedure proposed by Canada [*ibid.*, *annex C, section 15*] concerning international exchange of seismological data, the seismic investigation proposal made by the United States in connexion with Project Rulison [*ibid.*, *section 16*], and other proposals concerning seismic research and experimentation will be helpful to the understanding of the problem and will facilitate a scientific judgement as to whether and how far the national means of control is adequate for monitoring violations of the ban against underground nuclear tests. If it is found to be inadequate for that purpose at the present stage of scientific development, then the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests can be realistic only if other measures are provided to achieve the purpose. It is hoped that the Committee on Disarmament will continue its useful work on this question and report the progress of its deliberations to the General Assembly.

29. This question is really a part of the question of inspection and control, which, as I have said earlier, should be thoroughly discussed and solved at the strategic arms limitation talks. My delegation is hopeful that a satisfactory solution will be forthcoming as a result of the talks.

30. Another major proposal considered by the Committee on Disarmament is the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, *annex A*]. While the last revised text was submitted only on the eve of the adjournment of the Committee, many aspects of the draft treaty had been carefully examined and discussed by its members throughout the session.

31. My delegation would like to make a few general comments on the draft treaty. In the first place, the purpose of the treaty, which is to prevent a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, is a highly commendable one. There is no doubt that the sponsors of the treaty have taken the initiative in good faith and with imagination and foresight. The treaty is obviously designed

to serve the interests of all mankind, including of course those of the sponsors.

32. Secondly, comparing the last revised text with the earlier ones, my delegation finds it a substantial improvement upon those that preceded it. A number of useful suggestions brought forward during the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament have been incorporated in this revised text. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to members of the Committee, whose expert contributions have greatly facilitated the work of this Committee.

33. Lastly, with the exception of article III, on which divergent views still exist, the draft treaty seems to be generally acceptable to a large number of delegations. While on the one hand it may be more convenient for many Governments to be allowed a longer period of time than the remaining few weeks of the General Assembly to consider the text in detail, it may also be desirable on the other hand for the General Assembly to take advantage of the momentum generated by the enthusiastic discussion of the subject in this Committee, as well as in the Disarmament Committee, to hasten the completion of this important piece of work.

34. Turning to the details of the draft treaty, my delegation is in favour of the idea of having the rights of a coastal State over its continental shelf protected against interference in the course of verification of activities on the sea-bed. The formula to achieve this purpose, proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom in his statement before this Committee last week [*1694th meeting*], is acceptable to my delegation.

35. We are also impressed by the suggestions concerning the procedure of verification made by the Canadian delegation in its working paper on the provisions of article III of the draft treaty, which was circulated this morning as document A/C.1/992 and which was introduced by the representative of Canada in this Committee [*1703rd meeting*]. While my delegation has not yet been able to examine the working paper in detail owing to lack of time, it is our preliminary view that this new text is not only an improvement upon the original suggestions contained in the Canadian working paper submitted to the Committee on Disarmament [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 35*], but also appears to have taken into account the points of view put forward by various delegations in the course of the present debate, including the United Kingdom proposal I have just mentioned. My delegation feels that the new Canadian text deserves our serious consideration.

36. Another major issue considered by the Committee on Disarmament relates to the prohibition of chemical and biological warfare. We have before us not only the Secretary-General's report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their possible effects,³ for which my delegation should like to thank the Secretary-General and his experts, but also a number of concrete proposals designed to eliminate the dangerous kind of warfare resulting from the use of such weapons.

³ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.I.24).

37. While believing that the prohibition of both chemical and biological weapons should receive equal attention, my delegation finds convincing the explanation given by the representative of the United Kingdom with regard to his proposal for the conclusion, as a first step, of a treaty limited to the prohibition of biological weapons. As has been pointed out by a number of speakers preceding me, the draft treaty submitted by the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, section 20] has the advantage of extending the prohibition to cover not only the use of biological weapons but also their production and acquisition. If I understand it correctly, the treaty represents a forward and yet an intermediary step in the sense that it obligates the contracting parties to work out a similar system of prohibition to be applied to chemical weapons of mass destruction.

38. There are other proposals on this question, some of which have been submitted only very recently. There has not been enough time for the various delegations to study them carefully. Since the Committee on Disarmament has not concluded its consideration of this subject it would seem desirable to refer all the related proposals back to that Committee for further study and report.

39. In the meantime, the Geneva Protocol of 1925,⁴ to which a large number of Governments, including my Government, have become parties, remains in force as an effective instrument banning the use of those weapons. The recent announcement made by the United States Government of its decision to ratify the Protocol, accompanied by the statement that it will not be the first to use either lethal chemical weapons and incapacitating chemicals or lethal biological agents and weapons, is a welcome move that strengthens the prohibition contained in the Protocol.

40. In this general statement I have not discussed some of the subjects which are listed on our agenda and are also of importance. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall seek other opportunities to express the views of my delegation, if necessary, when we come to the specific discussion of those subjects.

41. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I have asked for the floor in order to present the working paper submitted by Brazil on article III of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof [A/C.1/993], which has just been circulated.

42. The delegation of Brazil has studied with interest the working paper submitted this morning by the delegation of Canada [A/C.1/992]. Although it represents considerable and welcome progress in relation to article III of the joint Soviet-United States draft [A/7741-DC/232, annex A], it contains in our view provisions less clear and positive than those included in document CCD/270 of 8 October 1969 presented by Canada at Geneva [*ibid.*, annex C, section 35]. In particular, we feel that the role to be played by the coastal State in verification procedures is now presented in a rather vague form. Actually, the language contained in the

last sentence of paragraph (2) of the proposed article in the Canadian working paper gives no recognition whatsoever to the fact that the coastal State has sovereign rights on its continental shelf.

43. As a matter of fact the position of the coastal State is reduced to the role that any other party in the region or any other interested country could play, so that the coastal State is put on the same footing as any other State party regardless of the rights and interests which it has on the continental shelf adjacent to its coast. This undifferentiated treatment may give rise to a series of disputes and misunderstandings. Furthermore, paragraph (6) of the Canadian working paper prejudices the scope of the rights enjoyed by the coastal State on its continental shelf, a question still unresolved in international law.

44. The Brazilian delegation therefore decided to submit a working paper based on the Canadian document presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which was considerably more explicit and precise regarding the points that I have just mentioned. We hope that our initiative will serve the purpose of increasing the possibility of arriving at a generally acceptable draft treaty in the interests of nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike.

45. As a last word I wish to make it quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that the proposals contained in document A/C.1/993 are presented in the form of a working paper because we are intent on complying with the clarification and ruling you made at the 1701st meeting of the Committee on 26 November. Nevertheless, we reserve our right to move the same proposals in the form of formal draft amendments, under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, as soon as that is procedurally feasible.

46. Mr. SHAW (Australia): The First Committee, in dealing with a wide range of complicated disarmament issues, is discussing some of the most important items on its agenda. All nations, both large and small, have a vital interest in the control of the arms race. Disarmament and arms control measures are a necessary element in our efforts to establish peace and to safeguard the right of States to exist side by side free from fear and threats to their national independence. Discussions in other Committees of the General Assembly, and during the year by its various standing Committees, will be influenced by the long-term success of our efforts to make progress towards disarmament. To be effective these disarmament measures must be widely accepted, widely respected and widely carried out under appropriate procedures.

47. It is against that background that we come each year to the First Committee to discuss what further steps the United Nations can agree to take. As the Australian Minister for External Affairs pointed out in his statement in the general debate on 22 September 1969:

“Sometimes the discussions in the United Nations, unproductive as they might seem, are an alternative to more violent acts. Sometimes, too, though the movement might seem to be at the speed of a glacier, there is undoubted movement. Disarmament and arms control provide an example. On disarmament the international community moves by fits and starts, rather than by

⁴ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

steady advance; but there is indeed movement, and it is vital for the future of mankind that it should continue.” [1759th plenary meeting, para. 93.]

48. In our discussions in the First Committee we attempt to advance on those matters which are ready for agreement. We hope that by the conclusion of this session of the General Assembly we shall be able to say that we have made some significant progress. Even if no startling achievements prove to be possible, we must continue to move forward on a broad front.

49. Before I speak on individual disarmament topics in detail, I should like to state that the Australian Government welcomes the opening of talks by the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at preventing further escalation in the development and deployment of strategic arms. A balanced and verifiable agreement on the limitation of strategic arms would bring great benefits to us all. The Australian Government looks forward to progress in the negotiations and will watch developments with the closest interest and attention.

50. I also should like to say that the delegation of Australia appreciates the comprehensive report prepared by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on its activities [A/7741-DC/232].⁵ This report shows that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the most appropriate body for detailed disarmament discussions, and its painstaking work facilitates the tasks of this Committee.

51. We are also indebted to the Secretary-General, to the members of his groups of experts and to the Secretariat, who have prepared such a volume of important new material on the various issues under consideration.

52. I turn first to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A]. Australia has supported efforts in the United Nations, and in particular in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to draft and negotiate an effective treaty to institute such a system of arms control.

53. In examining the proposals which have been put forward by the two Co-Chairmen, and the comments that have been made upon them, we keep in mind that the main aim of the treaty should be effectively to prevent an arms race in weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. It is in regard to these weapons that the greatest danger to mankind lies at this stage. The treaty should be as equitable as possible in the obligations it imposes upon parties and it should make a real contribution towards advancing the security of States. The treaty as finally negotiated should be capable of attracting widespread adherence if it is to fulfil the purposes for which it is designed.

54. Throughout discussions on disarmament issues in this Committee runs one consistent theme. This relates to the question of adequate verification. Emphasis was placed on this point in the joint statement of agreed principles for

disarmament negotiations made by the United States and the USSR on 20 September 1961. The relevant paragraph—which is paragraph 6—of the agreed principles commences as follows:

“All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations.”⁶

It is therefore fundamental that a treaty regarding arms control on the sea-bed must contain provision for adequate verification so that parties can feel confident that other parties are respecting their obligations.

55. During the past few years the General Assembly and its Committee on the sea-bed have devoted considerable attention to a wide range of issues affecting the sea-bed and ocean floor. We have expressed our views as a member of that Committee on matters relating to the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. We believe, however, that in the consideration of a treaty on the disarmament aspects of the sea-bed, it is important to ensure that the text as finally negotiated should be separate from and without prejudice to other questions affecting the seas and the sea-bed, such as those of territorial limits, exploration and exploitation of resources.

56. With the foregoing considerations in mind we have followed closely and sympathetically the negotiations at Geneva for an effective treaty to institute a system of arms control on the sea-bed and ocean floor. The text which emerged from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and which was presented to us by the two Co-Chairmen seems generally to meet our requirements and its objectives are acceptable to Australia. Confirmation of this initial attitude and a decision regarding signature will depend on the outcome of studies which are continuing. In furtherance of these studies it may be necessary to seek clarification or assurance on certain of the terms of the draft treaty before we can make a final decision.

Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

57. In this connexion we note that in the course of debate in this Committee and even this afternoon, proposals have been put forward by a number of delegations for amendments to the draft submitted by the Co-Chairmen. These suggestions and other proposals which may be submitted will have to be taken into account in determining Australia's attitude towards the treaty.

58. If, in the meantime, it is decided to proceed by means of a resolution which would commend the treaty to Governments and express the hope for the widest possible adherence to the treaty, the Australian delegation would support such a resolution.

59. I turn now to the question of chemical, bacteriological and biological warfare. First of all I should like to welcome on behalf of my Government the statement made by

⁵ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

⁶ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

President Nixon on 25 November, details of which were conveyed to us on that day by the United States Permanent Representative, Ambassador Yost [1698th meeting].

60. There have been a number of significant developments in the consideration of chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons during 1969. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has given detailed preliminary consideration to the wide range of important issues involved. It has had before it, in particular, a useful draft convention introduced by the United Kingdom for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, and that draft has given an impetus to our discussion [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20].

61. In accordance with resolution 2454 A (XXIII), the Secretary-General appointed a group of experts which has prepared a detailed report on *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*.⁷ During the course of the General Assembly we have been presented with a further draft convention by nine delegations on the prohibition of the development, storing and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of such weapons [A/7655]. The fact that we have so much material covering the many complex issues involved in this subject in different ways must, however, induce caution as to what steps we recommend that the General Assembly should take on the question of chemical, and bacteriological and biological weapons at this stage.

62. The Australian Government approaches its consideration of this question as a party to the 1925 Protocol banning the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. Australia ratified that Protocol in 1930. In discussions in this Committee in recent years we have supported the need for a detailed review of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons questions and we maintain that view.

63. The report prepared by the experts appointed by the Secretary-General is a worthwhile foundation for the discussion of further action regarding chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The experts' report provides in a form suitable for widespread dissemination basic information about chemical and biological agents. It describes the form and growing range of such agents which are available today as a result of the advance of science in the years since the negotiation of the Geneva Protocol.

64. The report sets out the varying effects of those agents on man, animals and plants. It illustrates the difficulty of creating an effective chemical and bacteriological weapons system as distinct from that of developing the agent itself. It also illustrates the virtual impossibility, at this stage of technology even with unlimited resources, of providing a system of effective defense against an attack by those weapons. The report significantly points to a further complication in that the man-made agents concerned have civilian applications, for example, in medicine, agriculture and industry, that are more important than any military application they may have.

65. The report has described and posed the problems. Important questions remain for further consideration. What

agents should be prohibited and how should the prohibition be subjected to appropriate international control? Clearly there is a range of deadly substances which should be banned. Then there is a "grey area" where difficulties of interpretation are likely. Further, there are a number of substances such as riot control agents and herbicides that are not lethal in normal circumstances, that are widely used throughout the world, and that have important civilian applications. We do not consider it practical or desirable to forbid the use of this latter class of agents at this stage. We believe that it would be a wiser course to request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to start with the readily identifiable deadly agents, but we must also realize the fact that in some cases the use of non-lethal agents in warfare may be more humane than, for example, the use of conventional weapons that could kill greater numbers of people, civilians and military personnel alike.

66. We believe that in seeking to institute an effective form of control of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons two major problems will have to be solved. The first, to which I have referred, will be to define the threshold at which the control will come into force, that is the substances which it will cover. The second will be to define an effective and acceptable means of verification. The report of the Secretary-General's group of experts does not try to answer those questions and indeed such answers were not called for in its terms of reference. While speaking on the issue of control I would note that the draft convention introduced by the nine Powers in document A/7655 makes no reference at all to that important aspect. I have already referred to our support for the joint United States-USSR statement of 1961 on the importance of effective international control.

67. We believe that further informed consideration of all the aspects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is necessary. This will be a long process and we agree with those many delegations which think that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should, as the appropriate forum, continue its detailed considerations of the whole subject. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should consider where the Geneva Protocol should fit into whatever system of control may be thought necessary. Australia continues to support the Geneva Protocol which has performed a useful function.

68. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament contains two general proposals concerning the handling of this question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The first of these would call for observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol, would invite all States to accede to that Protocol and would make recommendations concerning further study of the chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons question in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The Australian delegation commends such an approach to this complex question, and has therefore joined in sponsoring the draft resolution circulated today in document A/C.1/L.491.

69. A further proposal was contained in document ENDC/265 [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30], now embodied in draft resolution A/C.1/L.489. This proposal suggests that the General Assembly should take up the

⁷ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

recommendations contained in the introduction to the Secretary-General's report. Some appropriate comments were made on those recommendations by the United Kingdom representative in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at the 418th meeting on 10 July 1969. We share his reservations about the suggestion that the General Assembly should interpret the Geneva Protocol so as to include such agents as tear gases, herbicides and defoliants. We do not regard those agents as being banned by customary international law. We made known these views in our statement to the General Assembly on 20 December 1968 [1750th plenary meeting].

70. We believe that it is for the parties to the Geneva Protocol to determine what that Protocol means. As a party to the Protocol, Australia cannot accept that its scope is that set out in documents ENDC/265 and A/C.1/L.489. We would caution against attempts to have the General Assembly interpret the Protocol by way of asking the parties to endorse a particular interpretation. We hope that delegations whose basic aims we share in this field will agree on the need to move forward by general agreement.

71. It follows from what I have said that we cannot accept the recommendation in the foreword to the experts' report on this particular point and we would be unable to accept a resolution which directly or indirectly supported that recommendation.

72. As a general comment on this question of chemical and biological warfare, I should point out that Australia's interest in the question of chemical and biological warfare is for defensive purposes only. Our studies are directed towards maintaining a scientific awareness of the effects of chemical and biological warfare agents, the means for their detection and preventive measures against them. We have an absolute prohibition on experiments using microbiological agents. Our only work in this field consists of keeping ourselves informed of the current state and future trends of work being done elsewhere in the development and deployment of microbiological agents. We have a small research programme for chemical defence. There is no testing ground in Australia for either chemical or biological warfare purposes. As I have already said, we have acted at all times in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Protocol.

73. I refer next to questions regarding a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban treaty and the exchange of seismic data. The delegation of Australia notes that, despite continuing efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it has still not been possible to elaborate a draft treaty for the comprehensive banning of nuclear weapon testing under effective provisions of verification and control. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament records a number of suggestions and recommendations concerning a comprehensive test ban. Australia's support for a comprehensive nuclear test ban has long been established. We have constantly supported the view that any comprehensive test ban, if it is to be accepted and workable, must contain provisions for adequate verification.

74. There is no doubt that in recent years the developing science of seismology has made a substantial impact on

discussions on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Australia was one of eight countries which participated, at the invitation of the Government of Sweden, in a meeting at Stockholm in 1966 to discuss seismic data exchange.⁸ Since that time the Governments of Sweden and Canada, in particular, have promoted efforts in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and later in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to utilize seismic data as an adjunct to efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban. Australia welcomed those initiatives and is therefore glad to join in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3. The proposal contained in that document should provide a useful means of ascertaining both the degree to which countries may wish to contribute to a seismic data exchange and the extent of their interest in receiving such information.

75. We believe that we can supply the information referred to in the annex to the draft resolution and would consult further Australian contributing stations on the precise manner in which co-operation might be possible. We hope therefore to give a response to the Secretary-General's inquiry once the draft resolution is adopted.

76. I turn briefly to the question of verification and control and in particular to the suggestion made by the United States delegation to this Committee at its 1968 session [1630th meeting] that peaceful underground nuclear explosions should be used as a collateral means of obtaining better international understanding of the limits and capabilities of seismic technology. We support that approach. Australian seismic stations were aware that the United States intended to conduct its Project Rulison explosion on 10 September. Of nine Australian stations contacted regarding this case only one station, namely, that at Charters Towers in Queensland, was able to make an identification of what they called "a very doubtful event". Given that the announced force of the United States experiment, which was conducted in a medium of sandstone or shale, was forty kilotons, it is clear that if Australia had had to rely on national means of detection in this case there would have been great difficulty in ascertaining whether or not a nuclear explosion had taken place. Copies of relevant seismograms have been sent as requested to the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey to assist in its assessment of the experiment.

77. As a result of our own experience and of the technical information available to us, we remain unconvinced that a comprehensive test ban could be concluded effectively at this stage without some provision for on-site inspection. Notwithstanding developments in seismic capability, we do not believe that seismic data can satisfactorily be used to detect and verify all significant underground nuclear explosions. We believe that the results of the recent meeting of the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute confirm the correctness of that view.

78. I now refer to one aspect of the comprehensive test ban to which others have already addressed some remarks. The right to make use of peaceful nuclear explosions for development purposes must be properly recognized in a

⁸ Conference on Seismic Detection, held in Stockholm from 23 to 27 May 1966.

comprehensive test ban treaty. If such a treaty is to be acceptable and workable, it must allow for the conduct of such explosions under appropriate safety and safeguards arrangements.

79. Having raised the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a comprehensive test ban, I should like to turn to the coverage of this question in documents A/7568 and A/7678 and Add.1-3, which emerged from our examination last year of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.⁹

80. The report by the group of experts [A/7568] acknowledges the work which IAEA is already undertaking in this field. The special report prepared by the Secretary-General [A/7678 and Add.1-3] deals with the establishment within the framework of IAEA of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control. We note that IAEA has itself produced a useful and concise statement of the progress that it has made in its consideration of such a service. My Government supports in particular the conclusions contained in paragraph 13 of the report of the Board of Governors. We agree with the evolutionary approach suggested in that paragraph, namely, that we should commence with the exchange and dissemination of information. We note that the Agency could, both under its statute and under its present operational arrangements, perform the functions of the appropriate international body referred to in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As stated in our reply to the Secretary-General's request for information [ibid., para. 7], we agree that that would be logical. Paragraph 4 of the report of the Board of Governors [ibid., para. 13] properly recognizes that States may obtain the benefits of such explosions under bilateral arrangements.

81. On the matter of peaceful explosions, the Australian representative at the General Conference of IAEA said on 26 September 1969 that he agreed with the analysis contained in IAEA document GOV/1320. The Agency should not be entitled to intervene, adjudicate or arbitrate in matters of peaceful explosions unless asked to do so by both the countries concerned. The Director-General's view was that the Agency should let its role in this new field evolve rather than determine it in advance. Australia supports that view. Our representative added that because of the early state of technological development IAEA should have more time to make a full practical appraisal of its potentialities.

82. We are still in the exploratory stage in our consideration of the various related problems arising from the potential application of nuclear energy to economic development, some of which were the subjects of recommendations by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. IAEA and the relevant specialized agencies should continue to act in their particular fields of competence. The Australian delegation would support a resolution to that end.

83. The foregoing are the general considerations of the delegation of Australia on the main aspects of the disarmament

questions now before the First Committee. We may wish to speak further in respect of particular proposals.

84. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): Disarmament is one of the basic and essential elements of international security and, therefore, of peace. These three problems—disarmament, security and peace—are very closely interlinked. It would be difficult and futile to imagine even that a lasting and satisfactory solution could be found to the problem of maintaining international peace and security which was not founded on effective disarmament measures that would encourage and lead directly to general and complete disarmament.

85. Any security based on the force of arms is unstable, and this is even more true of a security system that is based on the arms race, for such security is essentially variable, reversible and unpredictable. Constant and patient efforts to maintain peace and international security cannot therefore be successful unless they are implemented by real and effective disarmament measures which must necessarily and inevitably lead to general and complete disarmament.

86. The consideration of the question of disarmament in the course of the present session of the General Assembly is taking place in very special circumstances. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization submitted at the beginning of this session, the Secretary-General stressed that "In the field of disarmament . . . there is the frightening prospect of a new arms race in the field of nuclear weapons, involving anti-missile defence systems and missiles with multiple warheads",¹⁰ while "the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons . . . remains unsigned by a number of States which are potential nuclear Powers".¹¹

87. In the meantime the two great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, having announced on 1 July 1968, the date on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature, that they had agreed to hold in the very near future discussions on strategic arms limitation and were continuing their efforts to agree on specific points concerning the opening of such discussions.

88. At the same time, in fact since March of this year, negotiations have been going on between the two Powers, as part of the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, with the object of reaching an agreement on a treaty for the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

89. It is perfectly true, as some delegations have already stressed in their statements in this Committee, that in these circumstances the work of the Committee on Disarmament, including the preparation of its report to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and, consequently, the discussion in the First Committee of the question of disarmament, has been delayed. However, this

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 27.

delay was also due to the fact, as everyone recognized, that much preparatory work was called for in order to ensure the preparation of certain preliminary provisions for a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7744-DC/232,¹² annex A].

90. Thus, despite the unavoidable delay in the opening of the debate on disarmament, we are happy to note that the discussions between the two great Powers have resulted in a number of conclusions to be reached on the matters I have mentioned which they were discussing. The opening of the Helsinki talks on strategic arms limitation seems to hold out hopes of highly important developments in the present state of international relations.

91. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria does not want to dwell on the significance of those important conversations. Others much more competent to do so, particularly the representatives of the two Powers involved in those discussions, have already put these matters to us with authority and in full knowledge of all the facts.

92. The submission of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof is of course another constructive element on which I should like to make a few comments in the course of this statement.

93. At the very time when the discussion of disarmament was to begin in the United Nations, the two great nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, signed simultaneously, as they had told us they would in advance, the documents ratifying the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This marks an important step towards the implementation of that important international instrument and at the same time it is another effort made on the road to disarmament. Other States should consider following their example, in particular those States that the Secretary-General has referred to as "potential nuclear Powers". That would certainly facilitate the efforts of the United Nations to encourage new achievements in the field of disarmament. By creating a better atmosphere, this Treaty, opposed by some and defied by others, for the moment, at least, stands as the main obstacle to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and at the same time it is the most important measure thus far adopted for promoting a channelling of efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

94. Much attention was, during the same period, focused by the two Co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on the problem of the enlargement of that Committee, and new countries have joined the Committee in order to add their own imaginative efforts to those of the countries that had been working in the Committee since its inception, namely, Argentina, Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria warmly

congratulates the new members. It will make it its duty to co-operate as closely as possible with them in order to help the Committee to achieve useful and effective results. At the same time we should like to congratulate the two Co-Chairmen on their sensible choice and on having successfully agreed on the other points I have mentioned.

95. The addition of eight new States to the membership of the Committee will no doubt make it better able to reflect the distribution of forces in the world today. The political reasons that were present at the time of the creation in 1961 of a specific negotiating organ in the field of disarmament still exists and therefore it was imperative that the membership of the Committee should be expanded in accordance with the principles which were at the basis of its own creation, namely, parity representation of States belonging to the two main political and military groups, with appropriate representation of the non-aligned countries. We are gratified that the new members of the Committee have already proved their worth; they have participated actively in the work and have brought a breath of fresh air into the disarmament negotiations.

96. The fact that consultations continued until the end of the second half of October enabled the new members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take an active part immediately in the discussion of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. That draft treaty, submitted at the first meeting held by this Committee on the question of disarmament, attracted general attention because of the opening statements made by the two Co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament [1691st meeting]. There can be no doubt that that is the most important document in the report of the Committee on Disarmament.

97. The discussion in the Committee on Disarmament and in our own Committee on the use for exclusively peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor has allowed us to view the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed in all its dimensions and complexity. The different stages through which the preparation of the draft treaty went, the divergencies at the outset and the contribution made by practically all delegations to the formulation of the final text, all show the will of the members of the Committee to achieve definite results.

98. Though it has not met with adamant opposition, the draft treaty has, nonetheless, not always been appreciated at its true worth by some delegations. Our delegation would certainly have wanted this draft to provide for measures that would make it possible to eliminate from the entire sea-bed not only nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction but also armament of any sort. It realizes, however, that the socialist countries were not the only ones negotiating this treaty. The views and positions of the other partners in the negotiation had to be taken into account.

99. When we study the final text submitted to us there are, however, certain elements which must be borne in mind and which will allow us better to grasp the scope of the disarmament measures included. The first paragraph of article I of the draft prohibits the emplacement or emplacement on the sea-bed and on the ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof of any objects with nuclear weapons or

¹² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

other weapons of mass destruction. Thus a barrier is put up against the utilization of the sea-bed for the emplacement of the most destructive weapons along the greater part of the earth's surface.

100. In the light of the third paragraph of the preamble, that provision of the draft treaty has special importance. It constitutes a stage that will help to exclude the sea-bed and the ocean floor, as well as the subsoil thereof, from the arms race and will enable us to pursue negotiations for the adoption of other measures that must lead to the complete and unconditional demilitarization of the sea-bed. That is entirely in accordance with the basic position advocated by the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

101. For that reason and in order to ensure speedier progress in the demilitarization of the sea-bed, it may perhaps be useful to turn the promise contained in the third paragraph of the preamble into an obligation by including in the text of the draft treaty a provision that would reflect the idea precisely expressed in the third paragraph of the preamble.

102. At the same time, it is important that we should not lose sight of the fact that according to the text of article I, paragraph 1, the signatory nuclear Powers, which we must not forget are alone in a position to place nuclear weapons on the sea-bed or on the ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof, should renounce any idea of doing so in the future. It has been tried in vain here to minimize the importance of such a decision by the facile explanation that this is not a case of disarmament, since the sea-bed and the ocean floor are regions where as yet no weapons are installed. Need I then recall the old saying: "Prevention is better than cure"? It might in fact prove fatal for humanity if measures were not taken here and now to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Furthermore, such a decision would allow us not only to safeguard this very important area in the life of man from the race in the most dangerous weapons but also to reserve the future exploration and exploitation of the entire region for the benefit of the whole of mankind.

103. I should like also to stress the importance of paragraph 2 which is aimed at avoiding any abusive interpretations of the measures provided for in the future treaty and any efforts made, on the basis of the treaty, to undermine, or make claims opposed to, existing law. As has been stressed, the treaty makes no claim to lay down new legal norms concerning the principles governing the definition of the territorial waters and other concepts of a similar nature. Therefore, it will not complicate but, on the contrary, will facilitate the solution of problems connected with the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor by all States, great and small.

104. Once adopted, signed, ratified and put into force, this treaty will contribute to the creation of a better atmosphere for progress in the cause of disarmament. It will help to create such an atmosphere for the adoption of other measures on nuclear disarmament which have long been discussed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the past, particularly such important measures as the cessation of underground nuclear tests. The importance

of that question has been sufficiently emphasized. Taking into account the possibilities that exist, thanks to international co-operation, for organizing a voluntary exchange of scientific information in order to provide a better scientific basis for a study, at the national level, of seismic phenomena, the General Assembly, at its twenty-third session, asked the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to prepare as a matter of urgency a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear weapon testing.

105. It is significant to note that at present the great majority of delegations are deeply convinced, despite statements to the contrary by some Powers, that the technical question of control should no longer constitute an obstacle to the cessation of underground nuclear weapon testing. As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, among others, pointed out in the Committee on Disarmament, politics are at the root of this problem. That view, supported from the outset by the socialist delegations, has now been forcefully reaffirmed by a very large number of delegations. The position of Bulgaria on this important problem is well-known, but we would wish to reiterate our conviction that a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests can be concluded on the basis of control possibilities, with the use of national means of detection offered to us by science, and through an effective organization of scientific and technical apparatus for the detection and identification of the nature of seismic phenomena.

106. The progress achieved in that field during the last few years is a true guarantee against any violation of such an international treaty, for it is now beyond question that at the present sophisticated level of instruments for detection of seismic phenomena, it would be impossible for anyone to carry out an underground test in violation of an agreement that was concluded. Scientifically speaking, all the requisite factors are present for the conclusion of an agreement which, in turn, would clear the way for other disarmament measures and open up new prospects in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. All that is needed, in fact, is the political will to reach such an agreement. Therefore, those who thus far have opposed such an agreement should reappraise their position. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria hopes that the General Assembly will endorse that position and do everything necessary to prepare the ground for such an agreement.

107. On the agenda of the present session there is an item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons". Since the People's Republic of Bulgaria is one of the sponsors of a draft resolution on that item [A/C.1/L.487], we shall speak separately on that question. At the present stage, however, we should like to make some comments and, particularly, express our satisfaction at the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*.¹³ That report is an important scientific document, prepared by a team of qualified experts who acquitted themselves of their task with a remarkable sense of responsibility. An integral part of the report is the introduction by the Secretary-General

¹³ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

making recommendations on the basis of the appropriate conclusions reached in the report by the experts. As we gather from the records and the report of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232], as well as from the discussion that has taken place here, the recommendations of the Secretary-General on the reaffirmation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as an instrument of international law, and also on the need to prohibit and to do away with chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, have all been supported by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations. The socialist countries, including my own, have taken those recommendations into consideration in submitting their draft convention [A/7655] which was introduced by the delegation of Poland [1693rd meeting]. Although we shall revert to this question later, we nevertheless wished to make known already our views on the report and the recommendations of the Secretary-General.

108. Statements on a number of other specific measures, such as the prohibition of the utilization of nuclear weapons, have been made by some representatives who spoke earlier. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has always been in favour of any collateral measure that might contribute to the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, which is the ultimate goal of the deliberations on this matter, as laid down in 1959 in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). That resolution was, as we know, adopted on the proposal of the Soviet Union, though some appear to be forgetting this, or at least try to give that impression.

109. It has been pointed out that some Powers were paying little attention to general and complete disarmament. Mention has been made of the fact that there has been a change in the terminology used and that certain expressions such as "disarmament" and "general and complete disarmament" have been replaced by the words "limitation of armaments" and "control of armaments".

110. Lately it has become habitual for certain delegations to throw the whole responsibility for this change in the terms used on the super-Powers, in order to avoid in that way having to state more definitely and specifically where the responsibility lies. This will not help to achieve the aim pursued in the discussions on disarmament, namely, general and complete disarmament.

111. When the responsibility of the great Powers is mentioned in a general way, there is of course a tendency to avoid—gracefully perhaps—placing that responsibility where it truly lies. Such a procedure may be the easiest one for a few delegations; they can thus give their own public opinion the impression that they are taking an adequately clear position on the general and complete disarmament questions and, at the same time, avoid offending the susceptibilities of certain circles only too well known as "the military and industrial complex". But they miss the aim being pursued: to oblige those circles and the countries acting in that way to re-examine their policies and their attitudes, since those are the main obstacles to disarmament.

112. In substituting such terms as "arms limitation" and "arms control"—which have become habitual among certain

Western delegations, particularly that of the United States—for the term "general and complete disarmament", such delegations are turning a deaf ear to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on general and complete disarmament which are the basis for the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

113. In the last statement of the United States representative, in fact, such expressions were used in every case where the United States policy on certain specific measures of disarmament or general and complete disarmament as such had to be defined.

114. The socialist countries, which want a just and stable peace, have always done their utmost, since the beginning of the disarmament negotiations, to advance the efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, which is the basic and fundamental element of international peace and security.

115. If they have none the less agreed to concern themselves with partial solutions and collateral measures, that was because of the unwillingness of certain Powers to follow the course of general and complete disarmament, a course which we are sure would have led to important results in this field.

116. Faced with that attitude of the Western Powers and the situation resulting from such an attitude, the socialist countries have regarded some partial methods as useful results which might well create an atmosphere conducive to an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

117. For the People's Republic of Bulgaria, as for all socialist countries, general and complete disarmament is not only the ultimate goal of all disarmament negotiations and of all the partial measures adopted to prepare the way to reach it. It is also an objective, an immediate objective, to achieve which we must work unrelentingly, since, as has been repeatedly stated in the course of this discussion, the world situation today is beset with tensions and dangers threatening peace and the whole of mankind.

118. It is for that reason that we have always insisted on the need for giving priority to the question of general and complete disarmament and to certain measures which have a direct bearing on it today, rather than to delay the solution of these problems through the elaboration of lengthy long-term programmes. The need to achieve tangible results as speedily as possible must force us now to concentrate on the most important measures so that we can then immediately go on—and we have in mind the immediate future—to solutions which will allow us not only to begin reducing the stockpiles of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, but also to achieve the goals of general and complete disarmament, and thus to contribute to security and the stabilization of peace, the prerequisite for the economic and social development of all countries, in order thus to ensure the necessary conditions for the accelerated economic and social progress of the developing countries.

119. Mr. OTEMA ALLIMADI (Uganda): Let me start by expressing our appreciation of the important decision made and announced by the President of the United States of

America on Tuesday, 25 November 1969, to the effect that the United States once again promised that it will not be the first to use lethal chemical weapons; that that renunciation is to be extended to being the first to use incapacitating chemicals; and that the United States will renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare, and will take steps to dispose of the existing stocks of bacteriological weapons.

120. A few words of praise for such statesmanship in the interest of mankind would be appropriate here. My delegation hopes that the United States Senate will not only consent to the formal ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, but will also advise against the use of tear gas and herbicides in warfare. That, in our view, would complete the observance of the Protocol.

121. The most crucial and urgent problem of contemporary international peace and security is that of disarmament—general and complete disarmament. The traumatic experience of two world wars within half a century and of numerous other local wars ever since the fall of Hitler's nazism has not sufficiently awakened the conscience of our world to the horrors of armed conflict. Man's destructive capability has reached a new and incredible depth with the possession of nuclear arms. Since 1945, the noble objectives of arms control and disarmament have been earnestly pursued, while, at the same time, the mad race of rearmament continues at an even more accelerated pace and more than half of the world's resources are still devoted to military ambitions. The dark and ominous cloud of the total destruction of the human race and its civilization looms heavily over our planet unless we take drastic and meaningful steps to disarm ourselves.

122. It is against that background that my delegation was delighted to see the two nuclear super-Powers come together at Helsinki to explore means of reducing armament and halting the arms race. May I join you, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary-General, and many other representatives here in expressing our wishes for success and our hopes for the talks on strategic arms limitation now in progress.

123. My delegation has read with interest and attention the current report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232]¹⁴ and would like to express deep appreciation to the Secretary-General and the members of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament for such excellent work. Furthermore, may I express, through you, Mr. Chairman, our appreciation of the invaluable contribution to the field of research and the dissemination of information on armaments and disarmament made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The Institute's *Yearbook*¹⁵ points out something that has always been of utmost concern to my delegation, namely, the stockpiling of conventional weapons on the African continent. The *Yearbook* reveals that military expenditure in Africa rises between 7 to 8 per cent every year. This rise is attributable partly to the unfortunate state

of affairs in the Middle East and partly to the militarization of southern Africa. The developing States of Africa are justifiably alarmed by the exorbitant investment in arms by the southern African régimes. This phenomenon of militarization constitutes a real threat to international peace and security. The countries thus threatened are forced to cut deeply into their living standards by diverting much needed resources to their defence against aggression by the racist southern African régimes.

124. I should like now to take up the issue of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Uganda is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and it has always supported the two General Assembly resolutions—resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968—on this matter. However, the Protocol as it now stands remains unsatisfactory because it does not outlaw the development, production or stockpiling of these weapons. It only prohibits their use in war. That is why my delegation will support all the proposals placed before this Committee aimed at putting an end to the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons.

125. Consequently, my delegation welcomes both the United Kingdom draft convention and the draft Security Council resolution [*ibid.*, annex C, section 20] and also the nine-Power draft resolution calling for a new international convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological weapons [A/7655]. The United Kingdom draft is a positive step in the right direction but it needs further study for possible improvements. My delegation hopes that it will be possible for the United Kingdom to see the need for making this draft more comprehensive so as to include chemical weapons. The proposals of the United Kingdom could then eventually be adopted as part of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of both bacteriological and chemical weapons.

126. My delegation also welcomes the Soviet and United States draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A]. This is an extremely important draft treaty which needs thorough examination. For one thing, the treaty does not prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor within the contiguous zone. My delegation is of the view that any emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on any part of the sea-bed and the ocean floor is undesirable and contrary to the efforts being made by this same Committee to reserve the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. My delegation would therefore like at this stage to make an informal proposal that any action on this draft treaty should be deferred until the next session of the General Assembly so as to enable various Governments to consider fully and offer suggestions on the proposed treaty. Instead, the Committee should, in our view, adopt a resolution prohibiting any military activity on the sea-bed and the ocean floor until an appropriate treaty has been concluded.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

¹⁵ *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969* (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.).

127. My delegation's fears over the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have not been completely removed. It will be recalled that Uganda was among the twenty-one States that abstained on General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, regarding this Treaty. Our reasons were and still are that the Treaty aims at disarming the unarmed while not providing adequate safeguards for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States from attack by the nuclear-weapon States. We felt and still feel that the peace and security of the world are threatened equally by vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. The best assurance of security for both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States is simultaneous prevention of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. My delegation would also like to see genuine interest on the part of nuclear-weapon States in transferring potential benefits from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions to non-nuclear-weapon States which are already parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. The Secretary-General's report on this question of the contribution of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries [A/7568] – a report that my delegation welcomes with great appreciation – points out, *inter alia*, that 95 per cent of the proved low-cost ore reserves in demand as fuel for nuclear power plants are to be found in developing countries. It further points out that a number of developing countries could avail themselves of nuclear power at an economically justifiable rate if medium-sized plants were developed. Two or three States whose size and population singly could not justify the launching of such projects could join together and carry out such projects on a regional basis. My delegation is of the view that, as a preliminary stage to transferring nuclear energy and technology to the developing States, an international survey team could be set up within the framework of one of the United Nations agencies to prospect the uranium potential of various developing countries. The record of the United Nations Development Programme in pre-investment projects marks it out as the most suitable agency, with the assistance of IAEA, to carry out such a survey.

128. As regards the establishment within the framework of IAEA of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, my Government is in complete agreement with this proposal. However, we should like to see recruitment into the said service of persons from developing countries, with the main aim of enabling such persons to gain practical experience in the application of nuclear explosions. Such a service should carry out experimental projects in order to locate areas where nuclear energy could be utilized to the advantage of developing countries.

129. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the question of broadening the representation on the Board of Governors of IAEA so as to reflect equitable geographical distribution is now being dealt with as an urgent matter.

130. On the question of the enlargement of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation, along with many others which have already spoken, feels that Africa is still under-represented in the Committee. We sincerely hope that it will be possible for Africa to obtain one extra seat on the Committee when the question next comes up for review. Similarly, my delegation expresses

regret that France has not yet been able to occupy its seat on the Committee on Disarmament. We continue to hope that it will reconsider its reasons for non-participation in order to be able to render its valuable contributions on the all-important question of halting the arms race. Regarding the participation in the disarmament discussions of the People's Republic of China, my delegation's stand has always been clear and consistent. Any durable security arrangements require the participation of all nuclear-power States if they are to be meaningful and effective. This Organization cannot blame the People's Republic of China for its non-participation in the disarmament talks while this same Organization continues to isolate that State from other international activities.

131. Finally, my delegation pledges its full support for the noble aims being pursued by the Disarmament Committee in the interests of world peace and security. We encourage the Committee to rededicate its efforts to the halting and reversing of the senseless arms race so that, together with all men of peace around the world, it may usher in a new era of veritable peace and security for all mankind. The pronouncements of the super-Powers in the last few months make us hopeful that there is still a chance for mankind to turn away from the course of self-destruction. For this reason, we believe the draft resolution on international exchange of seismic data, submitted by a number of delegations in document A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3, will receive full acceptance from the nuclear-weapon States.

132. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria): Describing United Nations action in the field of disarmament, Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, whose dedication to the cause of humanity has become a legend, stated in her eloquent address on 20 November that the year "1969 bears all signs of becoming but an intermediate year" [1695th meeting, para. 136]. In our view, no description of our work in this session could be more expressive. Actually, we are wavering between fear and hope. There are pessimistic and optimistic prognostications as to the attainability of general and complete disarmament. We rightly fear a nuclear holocaust in the future; but our present, for that matter, is none the less marked by ruthless suppression of the legitimate struggle of peoples for their right to self-determination, and by the use of napalm, phosphorus bombs and defoliants against innocent peoples and their resources. While plausible efforts are being deployed to obtain strict observance of certain clauses of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, other clauses are actually being flagrantly violated.

133. This is indeed an intermediate year, between disappointment and encouragement. The lack of significant progress by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is mitigated by developments that augur well for tangible progress. Such is the beginning, at Helsinki, of talks between the two main nuclear Powers on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. True, the talks are only bilateral at this stage, but the fact that they have started at all encourages the hope that they will eventually become extensive and deep. It seems quite certain now that the road to disarmament has to pass through the phases of limitation of armaments, and prevention of their spread, leading progressively to complete disarmament.

134. Among the encouraging developments, also, is the ratification by two more nuclear Powers of the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Yet, without the restoration of the legitimate rights in the United Nations of the Chinese People's Republic—and here I join in the eloquent words of the representative of Uganda, who has just preceded me—and without the alleviation of the justified misgivings of France, together with the parallel resolution of the question of non-proliferation not only in width but in depth, we fall short of attaining our final goal.

135. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is therefore called upon, more than ever before, to help in making this “intermediate year” an assured beginning of change—of change for the better. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has now an expanded membership. We congratulate the new members on the confidence that has been placed in them and we trust that, together with their colleagues in the Committee, they will discharge their heavy responsibilities in the spirit of safeguarding the future of mankind. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament cannot be successful in that noble task if tension is not removed from the international scene. Tension is most certainly here to stay if the rights of peoples to self-determination and independence continue to be suppressed; if the territories of sovereign States are still occupied by force; and if acquiescence to faits accomplis, complicity with expansionism, and condonation of disregard for United Nations resolutions still prevail over right and justice.

“Power has not brought about complete security for any nation, however powerful or super-powerful. If force and power have failed to bring about the desired goal of security, there is no reason why we should not explore other paths and avenues, the avenues of justice and equality.” [1653rd meeting, para. 29.]

136. Those were the words used by His Excellency Ambassador Araujo Castro of Brazil when he addressed us on the item of the strengthening of international peace and security, words that had everywhere the most favourable echo. Indeed, disarmament cannot be achieved if justice, equality and goodwill are absent, or if the need for arms remains imperative. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament cannot be blamed for failure to accomplish much if no effective measures are taken to improve the climate of international relations, to remove distrust and tension and to enhance the rule of law.

137. Still, once the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament commits itself to proceed from this intermediate stage on to the definite path of disarmament, it will find ready and at its disposal resources, a consolidated structure, available data, pertinent studies and documents and far-reaching terms of reference. It will have an inventory of items and problems to tackle, a ready list, so to speak, of priorities. Such a list clearly emerges from its previous work and from our debates and resolutions.

138. First, on limitation, it faces the dual task of putting the results of the strategic arms limitation talks into their larger framework, that of the limitation of all arms, the reduction of stockpiles, and the acceleration of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the accomplishment of that task, it has simultaneously to give serious attention to the principle

of universality and the obstacles its application meets, on the one hand, and to non-proliferation in depth, on the other. That is no easy task, but deeper analysis of the impediments may yield suggestions for solutions. This is all the more true since in other domains solutions seem already to be gradually emerging. For instance, in the matter of banning the use of chemical and biological weapons and observance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, greater adherence to the Protocol seems within reach. Of equal importance is the increasing awareness of the need for a comprehensive ban on the production and stockpiling of those weapons. The Secretary-General's report¹⁶ and the efforts exerted and the contributions offered by many delegations, in particular those of the Soviet Union [A/7655], the United Kingdom [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20], Hungary, Poland and Mongolia [A/C.1/L.458], present the most promising premises for the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol and the formulation of a convention on the banning of production and stockpiling. Surely the mounting awareness, resulting from the now abundant data, of the deadly dangers of these weapons creates for the Committee an atmosphere propitious for action. Awareness is indeed the best guarantee that differences on detail will be composed and a comprehensive convention on all these weapons, chemical and biological, including tear gas and harassing agents, will be drafted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We have reached such progress in this respect that fragmentation of the ban is not warranted.

139. A statement by the United States delegation points to the acceleration of universal acceptance of the ban, although it is regrettable that acceptance is sometimes tainted with reservations, with the result that there is not any early end in sight to the use of certain devastating agents such as those used against the heroic people of Viet-Nam and the resources vital for its economic survival as an independent nation.

140. In the context of both limitation and prevention, the demilitarization, so to speak, of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof is of paramount interest. What the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union and the United States [A/7741-DC/232, annex A] offers is an important aspect of this demilitarization, that of denuclearization as a first step. It falls to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to enhance this process, to tackle the controversy on territorial limits under national jurisdiction that naturally arises in the context of demilitarization, and to make this demilitarization international. The suggestion made by the delegation of Sweden for the addition of clauses for further negotiations for a more comprehensive prohibition [ibid., annex C, section 36] is a good step in that direction.

141. Closely related to this is the item on the denuclearization of geographical zones, as illustrated by the contractual treaty between fourteen Latin American States. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may see fit to make a detailed exposition of the over-all possibilities open in this respect. In this connexion the ratification of

¹⁶ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

the non-proliferation Treaty by the German Democratic Republic and the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is favourably disposed to sign the Treaty now—which we have learned from recent news in the press—are significant steps towards the denuclearization of the highly sensitive zone of Central Europe. One can safely maintain that the military denuclearization of developing regions can most effectively help in harnessing nuclear energy for badly needed pacific purposes. This is an important factor on which the delegation of Algeria, in its intervention this morning [1703rd meeting], pertinently placed special emphasis.

142. Regarding the dynamics of nuclear disarmament and the question of banning all tests and making the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water more comprehensive, the need is still felt for making the ban universal and overcoming the problems relating to verification. In this context, rather than relating the various points of view, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may deem it appropriate to give, in what is called a businesslike fashion, a synthesis of the scope and substance of the obstacles standing in the way of the universalization of the ban and the internationalization of verification. These are indeed desirable ends, but how can we attain them, how can we devise concrete measures that would raise no objections, otherwise legitimate, on the grounds of national sovereignty or security? That is the crux of the matter and it has to be dealt with realistically. A thorough analysis would ultimately lead to the elucidation of ways and means to overcome the obstacles blocking progress one by one. In such an analysis the technological progress in the detection of tests and the exchange of seismological data may prove crucial in overcoming the impasse. Our gratitude goes to the delegations of Sweden, Canada and India, among others, for their unrelenting efforts in this field.

143. The logical conclusion that one can draw from a quick review of these priorities is that the formulation by the General Assembly of what Mrs. Myrdal termed “the future mandates” of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament does not present insurmountable difficulties. If the process of consultation is activated, the resolutions of the General Assembly at this session may prove instrumental in bridging the gap between promises and fulfilment, as the Secretary-General rightly pointed out. We must strive hard to heed his sincere appeal to tackle anew the complicated but not insuperable problems of disarmament. There are draft resolutions already submitted, such as the draft of the socialist countries on a convention for the banning of production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons [A/7655] and the three-Power draft on the report of the Secretary-General on these weapons [A/C.1/L.488], that must command wide acceptance. We wish to endorse them fully. We are certain that our present session will be marked by unanimous resolutions born out of active and frank consultations. The representative of France, Senator de Chevigny, reminded us that it is incumbent on the nuclear Powers to come to agreement, which presupposes a stubborn search for a deep and lasting relaxation of tension. Let us hope that the results of our work this year will also be geared to that worthy end.

144. Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): May I be allowed to devote my statement today

to a serious and urgent problem—the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons—which is quite rightly at the centre of our Organization’s attention and that of the entire world community.

145. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, although it considers the solution of the problem of disarmament in the nuclear weapons field as one of the most important and urgent tasks, also gives due importance to those measures whose adoption would exclude other nuclear weapons as well from the life of human society. We have in mind, specifically, the solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, which are rightly considered at least as dangerous as nuclear weapons.

146. At the same time, we realize the complexity of the whole problem. Nevertheless we still consider that we have all the necessary prerequisites for its effective solution in the very near future. Some of the documents on this question which have been submitted for discussion may provide particularly useful assistance in this matter.

147. First of all, I should like to draw attention to the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use.¹⁷ The Czechoslovak delegation has already welcomed and expressed its views on that report in the course of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. However, we should like here to express again our appreciation of this work accomplished by the Secretary-General and all the authoritative international consultant experts, including a Czechoslovak scientist, and also by the Secretariat staff, who took part in preparing that report. Having carefully studied it, we have arrived at the conviction that it was worked out conscientiously and with a high sense of responsibility and is a document which examines the problem of the weapons referred to above from many standpoints and with a profound knowledge of the facts. Moreover, all three recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning what must be done as soon as possible in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons are of great value.

148. In the course of our Committee’s work a number of delegations have already spoken in detail about the various conclusions of the above-mentioned report and the recommendations of the Secretary-General, and have stressed the importance of this document. The Czechoslovak delegation fully concurs in that appraisal.

149. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, from the very beginning of the discussion of the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, has held the view that our approach should be based above all on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. We are therefore glad to note that this international document has been given high consideration in the report of the Secretary-General. On the basis of the provisions of a number of international treaties, the Protocol confirms that the use of chemical and

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

bacteriological (biological) weapons “has been justly condemned by the public opinion of the civilized world” and is quite rightly regarded as a codification of a norm of international law already in operation. The Protocol has sufficiently demonstrated its viability and effectiveness over its almost forty years of existence.

150. The report of the Secretary-General draws attention to the fact that:

“... the existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 may have helped as a deterrent to the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in the Second World War, even though the belligerents in that conflict had developed, produced and stockpiled chemical agents for possible use.”¹⁸

151. In view of the importance of the Geneva Protocol, and in the interests of its consolidation, it would, however, need to receive general and universal recognition. It is true that in recent years its importance has been underscored by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations adopted General Assembly resolutions 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, which called for strict observance by all States of the principles and purposes of that Protocol. However, the fact is that to this day less than half of the States Members of the United Nations have acceded to the Protocol. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, this is an inadequate appreciation of the significance of that extremely important international document.

152. We therefore fully support the recommendation of the Secretary-General that an appeal should be addressed again to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. To that end, the draft resolution submitted by the Polish People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic [A/C.1/L.488] requesting the General Assembly to call upon all States to accede to the Protocol in 1970 on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signature and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations is a correct and concrete reflection of that appeal.

153. If, now, one great country—I refer to the United States of America—has declared its intention to ratify the Geneva Protocol, this is not only proof of the fact that appeals to take such a step are not in vain, but also that world public opinion is becoming increasingly strong on the need to eliminate chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from military arsenals. We should like to believe that other States, too, which have still not acceded to the Geneva Protocol, will review their position and will contribute, by their positive decision, to the strengthening of the principles contained in this international document.

154. In this connexion, we should like to emphasize that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, like a number of other States, strongly advocates a comprehensive interpretation of the Geneva Protocol, and therefore cannot agree to a restrictive interpretation of it concerning the prohibition of the use of this type of weapons. Such attempts can only

result in diminishing the significance and effectiveness of this document and, in the final analysis, may seriously jeopardize it.

155. We therefore believe that the recommendation of the United Nations Secretary-General, aimed at strengthening the principle that the prohibition stemming from that international document applies to the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents—including tear gases and other harassing agents now in existence or which may be developed in the future—will be adopted.

156. The Czechoslovak delegation maintains the view that the correct and, at the same time, quickest way to solve the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons consists in a comprehensive settlement of it, covering the entire field of these weapons of mass destruction. We do not consider it correct to divide this problem, which has thus far been dealt with as a single whole. Otherwise, we would be exposed to the danger of unnecessary delays in our negotiations which would have a negative effect on the comprehensive prohibition of the use, production and stockpiling of this type of weapons. We do not see any logic in settling only one part of this matter, namely, the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons.

157. Any separation whatsoever of the two types of weapons could even lead objectively to a weakening and violation of the effectiveness of the Geneva Protocol. The arguments advanced in support of the proposal to divide the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons did not, in our opinion, carry sufficient weight of a scientific and political nature.

158. It seems to us that a comprehensive solution of this problem is justifiable and entirely natural. The fact is that what we are discussing are chemical and bacteriological (biological) types of weapons, which have a great deal in common not only with respect to their methods and the effects of their possible use, but also to some aspects regarding their production. From that standpoint the two types of weapons undoubtedly have a great deal in common. This finding is reflected in the report of the Secretary-General, which states:

“All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reaction, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge advances, be treated as chemical.”¹⁹

The character of the two types of weapons also has some common features: first of all, their small size, the difficulty of defence against them, and the fact that they are comparatively easy to obtain.

159. We believe that these facts were the basis for the joint prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol of the use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons, and that the corresponding documents of the League of Nations, as well as the resolutions of the General Assembly, are also unambiguously based on this link and fully recognize and reaffirm it.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

160. Some very weighty arguments were advanced in favour of that position at our 1695th meeting by Mrs. Myrdal, a minister and the representative of Sweden. A number of other delegations have adopted a similar point of view on this question. For example, Ambassador Khatri, the representative of Nepal, stated in this connexion:

“... there is a traditional link between biological and chemical weapons dating back to the Geneva Protocol. We do not think that it would be wise to separate the two and to deal only with biological weapons. That would be like an attempt to ban atomic weapons while doing nothing about thermonuclear weapons.” [1694th meeting, para. 17.]

161. A comprehensive solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is also implied in the report of the Secretary-General and in his recommendation that an appeal be addressed to all countries to reach agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to ensure their effective elimination from military arsenals.

162. From the discussions held in this Committee so far, it is clear that a majority of delegations favours a comprehensive approach to the solution of the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and assesses the respective recommendations on that basis. Thus, for example, Ambassador Castro, the representative of Brazil, stated on this subject:

“According to the British proposal we should first dispose of biological weapons, leaving the question of chemical methods of warfare for a later stage. The arguments for that procedure put forth by the British delegation at Geneva and in New York have not been convincing enough to rally a significant number of supporters. Both methods of warfare, chemical and bacteriological, have traditionally been considered in the same context, as, for instance, in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

“The Soviet draft (A/7655) is comprehensive in scope and in that respect would merit a higher priority in our consideration as far as our final goal is concerned.” [1692nd meeting, paras. 26-27.]

163. The prohibition of further development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles is one of the problems of highest priority before us, and one which we must solve without delay. A great deal of highly responsible work awaits us in that direction. Not only do enormous stocks of these appalling means of destruction already exist at present, but in a number of countries further perfecting, production and stockpiling of them is under way.

164. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament already expressed its view that we should now see to it that the prohibition of the use of the two types of weapons of mass destruction, chemical as well as bacteriological (biological), be supplemented by a document by

which these agents would be completely outlawed. Czechoslovakia has accordingly co-sponsored the draft resolution of nine socialist countries on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction [A/7655].

165. The draft convention submitted by the socialist States is a direct and logical addition to and continuation of the Geneva Protocol. The draft extends the ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to the sphere of the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, calling for the destruction of the existing stockpiles.

166. Moreover, the draft convention in question is very simple in substance and should not raise any difficulties in the solution of the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. In our opinion, a solution of this problem on the basis of that draft would be a considerable contribution to the efforts of many States towards the attainment of effective measures in the field of disarmament.

167. We should like to believe that through the joint efforts of all States we shall be able to solve the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in the very near future.

168. Our present discussions should help to attain that objective through the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.487, of which the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is a co-sponsor. This is a draft which, we feel, reflects the views of a majority of the delegations as stated in the course of the work in our Committee to the effect that the solution of this problem must be based on a comprehensive consideration of both types of weapons. The draft convention stresses, in particular, the need for the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction, fully taking into account the draft convention contained in document A/7655. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should speedily carry out negotiations in order to bring about agreement on the text of such a convention and submit a report on the results of its work to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

169. We therefore trust that the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of nine socialist countries will be received positively in this Committee and approved by a majority of its members.

Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.

170. Mr. BUFFUM (United States of America): At the outset I should like to express the deep gratification of the Government of the United States at the fact that just this morning the Federal Republic of Germany has signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That, of course, represents a very welcome development. We are also very pleased to note that yesterday the Government of Switzerland signed the Treaty as well. That means that ninety-three countries have now signed this important

document. As members know, the Soviet Union and the United States have already completed their ratification processes and expect to deposit their instruments in the very near future. We hope that several other nations will soon take comparable steps.

171. In our discussions to date we have addressed ourselves primarily to the important questions of disarmament and arms control. This afternoon, however, I wish to draw the Committee's attention to the three reports before us which found their origin in the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. They include the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the results of the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States [*A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2*]; his report dealing with the establishment within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency of an international service for providing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes [*A/7678 and Add.1-3*]; and finally, his report on the contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries [*A/7568*]. In our view, those three documents merit the most careful attention of the members of this Committee. They reflect credit on both the Secretary-General and the agencies, notably IAEA, that assisted in the preparations.

172. In our view, they are indicative of two very significant developments. First, they reflect a growing awareness on the part of many countries of the enormous role that the peaceful atom can play in improving our lives. Secondly, they reflect the legitimate desires of the non-nuclear-weapon States to be assured that they will not be deprived of the benefits of this promising technology if they renounce the right to manufacture nuclear explosives as provided for by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My Government attributes the highest importance to the undertakings in articles IV and V of the non-proliferation Treaty favouring peaceful atomic development and international co-operation. We believe that our sincerity is evident from the extensive programme which we have had under way for several years to share our most up-to-date advances concerning the peaceful atom with other countries.

173. Since the inception of the atoms for peace programme the United States has declassified and broadly disseminated information on the peaceful uses of the atom to other nations. We have assisted in the establishment of foreign nuclear centres by making available twenty-six reactor and sixty-three equipment grants. The nuclear centres established around these research reactors have been instruments in promoting and expanding general scientific development and co-operation in many of the countries, in addition to furthering nuclear science. We have also trained roughly 6,300 foreign scientists in our atomic laboratories and have entered into several technical exchange agreements in fields of mutual interest. In addition, we have undertaken a major programme to ensure that ample amounts of enriched uranium are available to foreign countries, under attractive conditions, to satisfy the needs of their nuclear power programmes. The United States has committed itself, under suitable agreements, to supply, through enrichment services, approximately 540,000 kilograms of enriched uranium to foreign countries.

174. Our Export-Import Bank, moreover, has long followed a policy of financing foreign nuclear power plants. The Bank has authorized twenty-one loans totalling over half-a-billion dollars for nuclear facilities or materials in eleven countries. Of these, eighteen loans have been for nuclear power projects totalling 5,000 megawatts in installed capacity. Lastly, we have for some time had an extensive programme for assisting IAEA through the provision of funds, information, equipment, expert advice and free fissionable materials.

175. I mention those facts simply to emphasize the extent of the commitment of my own Government to nuclear co-operation and to note that many of these actions have been in line with the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.²⁰ As we have indicated on previous occasions, we intend continuing this programme and strengthening it further wherever practicable. Others undoubtedly will also do their share. It is useful to note in this connexion that one of the reports before us states that "The concerted international effort that has already been made to spread the peaceful uses of atomic energy probably has no parallel in other branches of modern technology" [*A/7568, para. 32*].

176. We remain convinced that the greatest progress in international co-operation can be achieved by working within established mechanisms and strengthening them wherever feasible. I am referring here, in part, to the important responsibilities which are already vested in IAEA. We are encouraged that over the past year there has been a broad reaffirmation by many States both here and at Vienna of the principle that IAEA should continue to be the focal point for fostering international co-operation in the area of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We would urge the General Assembly to reaffirm that principle by the manner in which it disposes of the three reports now before us.

177. Those documents realistically summarize the considerable contribution that the peaceful atom can make towards scientific, medical and industrial progress. At the same time they forthrightly reveal that not enough funds are available to meet all the meritorious demands.

178. The United States Government considers that the basic solution to this problem rests to a large degree with the countries concerned. It will depend in the first instance on the priority assigned to meritorious nuclear projects when nations formulate their over-all plans of national development. It will also depend in large part on the development of a greater appreciation and awareness by all interested parties, including appropriate financial institutions, of the near and potential long-term contributions of this technology. We might bear in mind in this connexion that it has been estimated that by 1980, a bare ten years from now, the total installed capacity of nuclear power throughout the world will be approximately 320,000 megawatts. Further, it will require the broad-scale financial support of all of the member States of IAEA for the Agency's programme for technical assistance. I am pleased

²⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17.

to report to this Committee that my own Government fully intends to do its share in this regard over and above the very substantial contributions that we have already made to the IAEA technical assistance programme. More specifically, we now have before the United States Congress a proposal which would enable us to increase the level of our contribution to the IAEA technical assistance programme.

179. Against that background I should like to make some more specific comments on the three reports now before us.

180. First, there is the report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2]. The United States regards the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the recommendations of that Conference as a very informative and comprehensive document. Both the achievements of the past year and the problems yet to be solved are reviewed in a straightforward fashion. As Ambassador Yost noted in his general statement [1691st meeting], IAEA already has several activities under way that are in keeping with the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. For example, the Agency is now reviewing on an urgent basis the composition of its Board of Governors and every effort will be made to submit a suitable statutory amendment to the next IAEA General Conference in order to achieve a broader and more equitable representation. My Government intends to give its active support to the achievement of that objective.

181. Another area where continued progress is being made concerns the field of safeguards to detect unauthorized diversions of nuclear materials. A careful reading of the report before us shows that the Agency safeguard system already contains many features which are designed to avoid any disruption of normal industrial activities. In addition, a continuous effort is being made, through studies and research, to achieve greater simplification. In my country alone we are spending approximately \$4 million this year in various developmental efforts which are designed to make safeguards more efficient and less intrusive. We shall continue to share the results of our experience with other nations.

182. Another important area which concerns the resolution of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States proposing the establishment of a fund of fissionable materials within IAEA deserves comment. That question was considered both by the IAEA Board of Governors and by the recent General Conference and it was noted that the quantities of fissionable materials already available to the Agency have far exceeded the demands. Nevertheless, some nuclear Powers, including the United States, have indicated that when this fund needs replenishing they will be prepared to consider making additional quantities available. In our own case we have stated that we would expect to supply such additional amounts under terms comparable to those which apply to our bilateral agreements.

183. I have already discussed the question of financing, but it should be noted that under the leadership of Ceylon and several other developing countries the recent IAEA General Conference adopted resolution GC (XIII)/RES/256

which directed the Agency's Director-General to make a comprehensive study as to how the problem of financing nuclear projects can best be solved. Under this study the Agency is to assess the likely capital and foreign exchange requirements for nuclear projects in developing countries for the next decade and to study ways and means to secure financing for such projects from international and other sources. The effective carrying out of this study is going to require the full co-operation of the principal financial institutions that may be involved.

184. To sum up, my Government believes that the Secretary-General and IAEA have made every effort to be responsive to the actions taken last year by this Assembly and we believe that they should be commended for their actions. Many of the problems which have been identified are of course not soluble overnight and they will involve continuing efforts on the part of IAEA and the other interested agencies. We should like to encourage those organizations to keep the General Assembly informed of their further progress.

185. The second report deals with peaceful nuclear explosions [A/7678 and Add.1-3], and I should like to comment first on the proposition of establishing, within the framework of IAEA, a service to ensure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States. This of course is a new and unexplored area and one where much further work needs to be done. We are impressed, however, by the fact that a very promising beginning has been made and we believe that the steps already taken are fully compatible with the statements made in 1968 that studies relevant to the implementation of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty should begin even before that Treaty comes into force.

186. We are also pleased to note that most States appear to share our view that IAEA is the appropriate body to deal with this subject. This has been evidenced not only by individual comments but also by the fact that the recent IAEA General Conference approved, without objection, resolution GC (XIII)/RES/258 expressing its confidence that the Agency is fully competent to deal with this subject. We note that the conclusions of the Secretary-General's report also indicate that the technical expertise and statutory authority of the Agency to handle the problem have been convincingly supported.

187. In our view, the Agency has already gone very far in defining the prospective responsibilities which it can assume in this field. We believe that it should be commended for this effort and urged to continue its studies. We would expect that in the months ahead the Agency will give particular attention to fostering the exchange of information in this field, to examining the responsibilities which it might assume in performing the international observation called for in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty and to considering a number of other important questions.

188. We believe that we are dealing here with an exciting new technology, and we share the Secretary-General's optimism that the awesome power of nuclear explosions will be harnessed in the not-too-distant future for the benefit of all mankind. We believe, however, that it must be recognized that this technology is still in an experimental

stage of development, and for this reason we endorse the concept expressed in the Secretary-General's report that this subject should be approached on an evolutionary basis.

189. My own Government, for its part, will do its best to keep IAEA informed of technological progress in this field and I might say that we were encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union recently transmitted to IAEA information on its own activities concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.

190. As we have stated many times, we shall provide, under attractive conditions and pursuant to article V of the non-proliferation Treaty, a peaceful nuclear explosion service when such a service is technically and economically feasible. Moreover, our charges will be kept as low as possible and they will exclude the sizable costs which the United States has incurred up to now in developing its nuclear explosive devices. Additionally, we expect that our charges to foreign customers would be no greater than the charges to domestic American consumers.

191. In conclusion, I should like to commend the Secretary-General for the very fine report submitted on the contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries [A/7568]. This document, which was prepared by a distinguished group of experts and with the help of IAEA, describes in a realistic fashion the various significant contributions that can already be made by the peaceful atom and the even greater possibilities for the future. It also describes in detail steps that a developing country would normally have to take to realize some of these benefits.

192. Looking at the short term, the report discusses in a succinct and yet informative fashion the numerous contributions that can be made, for example, through the use of radioisotopes. We are also alerted to the potential advantages of nuclear power. The point is made that, even if the first nuclear plant in a country may not be able to comply with the stringent requirements of competitiveness, it may nevertheless still be justifiable if it is the first unit in an economically sound, long-term nuclear power programme.

193. Additionally, the report reviews both the great promise and the further experimental work that will be required to derive the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear-powered desalting plans. We are also reminded of the important point that the introduction of nuclear technology into a developing country depends on the state of its scientific and technological infrastructure. Hence great stress is placed on the necessity of establishing an adequate educational base and developing additional nuclear centres in such countries. Lastly, the report contains a very forthright and useful summary of the prospects as well as the problems associated with the adequate funding of projects in these fields.

194. All in all, we believe this should prove a very useful and valuable document, most particularly to officials responsible for national development. We therefore commend it for careful review by all Members of this Organization.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.