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CONTENTS

Agenda items 29, 104, 30 and 31:

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons;

(c) Report of the Secretary-General

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General;

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General;

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General 1

Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*continued*) (A/C.1/988, A/C.1/989, A/C.1/991):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7741-DC/232);

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655);

(c) Report of the Secretary-General (A/7575)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/L.485)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): We have before us for consideration in this Committee, as agenda items 29 and 30, the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232],¹ which contains the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it from 18 March 1969 to 30 October 1969. It is on every count an impressive document, representing as it does the results of serious efforts and intensive consultations by members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament over a long period of time. The Nigerian delegation feels honoured to have made some contribution to these efforts and feels that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament deserves to be congratulated for improving on the form and content of its report to the current session of the General Assembly. It is worth noting that the present report provides valuable data which should assist in an objective appraisal of the work of the Committee this year.

2. While my delegation shares the views of those who feel that it would have been more helpful if the report had been made available early enough to give delegations more time to study its content and to consult with their Governments before the beginning of the debate on this important subject, we nevertheless appreciate some of the reasons for the delay. We therefore recognize that it would be difficult to expect a full and meaningful debate on the various important items and draft treaties contained in the report within the short time available to this Committee during the current session. My delegation would nevertheless like to focus attention on those aspects of the report which we consider deserve closer scrutiny.

3. In August 1969 the Committee changed its name from the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, commonly called the ENDC, to the Conference of the Committee on

¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

Disarmament or the CCD. This change of name was no doubt due to the increase in membership of the Committee from 18 to 26. The views of my delegation on the subject of enlargement and on the procedure adopted to implement it were made unmistakably clear both informally and at the formal meeting of the Committee on 31 July 1969, and those views are clearly on record in document ENDC/PV.424. While we have no objection to the countries nominated by the Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee—and indeed we welcome them, for they are without exception countries with which Nigeria has the most cordial relations and for which we have the most profound feelings of admiration and respect—we nevertheless felt, and still feel, that despite the historical circumstances leading to the establishment of the Committee there is a compelling political obligation as a result of its subsequent development for wider consultation and for seeking the prior endorsement of the General Assembly before embarking on the expansion or the enlargement of the Committee. We note that the objective as stated in the report was:

“... to reach agreement on a group of countries that would give the enlargement geographic and political balance and at the same time preserve the Committee as a small and effective negotiating body”. [A/7741-DC/232, para. 10.]

While we heartily welcome this objective, my delegation has doubts about the equity of balance, both geographic and political, which has resulted from the expansion. We continue to express the hope that it should be possible to have at least one more member from East, Central or West Africa in the enlarged Committee.

4. It will be recalled that by resolution 2373 (XXII) the General Assembly approved a treaty elaborated by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the main purpose of which is the prevention of an extension of nuclear know-how to non-nuclear-weapon States. The non-proliferation Treaty, as it came to be known, is not strictly a nuclear disarmament treaty, but it was our hope that it would pave the way toward real nuclear disarmament measures. Article VI of the Treaty specifically calls upon nuclear Powers to “... pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. It is, therefore, with regret that we note that the non-proliferation Treaty itself has yet to be ratified by some of the major Powers whose participation is essential to its entry into force and to its effectiveness, and that the Committee is unable to report any concrete progress in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2445 (XXIII) on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. In this connexion, we would wish to thank the Swedish delegation for its initiative and commendable efforts on this subject [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 6]. It remains our hope that the difficult problem about verification could be resolved in time for a draft treaty to be presented by the Committee to the next session of the General Assembly.

5. The Nigerian delegation has submitted recommendations to the Committee designed to overcome some of the difficulties on the question of verification which represents,

in our opinion, the greatest stumbling block to concluding a comprehensive test ban. Our views, we are glad to note, are reproduced in the present report [*ibid.*, section 9]. We are convinced that the chances of an agreement can only be enhanced if progress is made in the current bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States. In this regard, we are happy to note that at long last the USSR and the United States have agreed to commence bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. This is long overdue and the reason we particularly welcome the present development and why we would venture to hope and wish that this effort, which represents a glimmer of hope, will usher in some measure of progress in this all-important subject.

6. We appreciate of course that such talks will involve protracted negotiations and for that reason we support the Secretary-General's appeal for a moratorium on the development of these weapons pending the conclusion of an agreement. We also suggest that the initiative of the Soviet Union for a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons² be pursued seriously, if only as an interim measure.

7. I should now like to turn to the question of the comprehensive test ban. We have already expressed our disappointment over the lack of progress and venture to suggest that progress would be to some extent dependent on the commencement of the current bilateral talks. Nevertheless, we feel that any steps that would lead to a greater knowledge of the effectiveness and credibility of seismological methods of identification of underground explosions would go a long way towards helping to resolve the intractable problem of verification. That is why the Nigerian delegation welcomes the initiative of the Canadian delegation in its working paper of 23 May 1969 proposing the means of achieving an effective world-wide exchange of seismological data [*ibid.*, section 14]. This would, as the Canadian delegation rightly points out, call for an increase in the present system of co-operation in this field. My delegation therefore supports the proposal contained in draft resolution A/C.1/L.485, which Nigeria is co-sponsoring, proposing that a request should be sent to Governments for information regarding the extent to which they are prepared to co-operate in ensuring the success of this scheme.

8. We are also gratified to note that the Government of the United States, in accordance with its promise in December 1968 [1630th meeting] to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, is inviting all States to participate in the evaluation of seismic data resulting from the Mesa Verde formation experimental explosion on the understanding that the experiments will not involve development or testing of nuclear weapons and that the data obtained will be made available to all interested States without discrimination. It is our fervent hope that these and other steps taken in the direction of improving knowledge of seismic detection and identification capabilities will contribute in no small way to resolving the problem of verification in a comprehensive test ban.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 96, document A/6834.

9. We cannot conclude our remarks on the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty without drawing attention to the need to reconcile the prohibition placed on non-nuclear-weapon States in regard to all experimental nuclear explosions in the non-proliferation Treaty on the one hand and the need to provide, for research purposes, the right to undertake tests intended for peaceful purposes in a comprehensive test ban, on the other hand. It is our hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will give serious consideration to this matter.

10. I now come to the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare. We commend the initiative of the Government of the United Kingdom in submitting a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and especially for submitting a revised version on 26 August 1969 [*ibid.*, section 20] after taking into consideration some of the general remarks made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the subject. However, in the opinion of my delegation the draft convention does not meet the fundamental requirement that such a convention should also cover a prohibition on chemical methods of warfare if it is intended to strengthen or reinforce the Geneva Protocol of 1925.³ For this reason we are of the opinion that the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and on their destruction proposed by the USSR and eight other countries [*A/7655*] offers a more appropriate basis for elaborating a convention on this subject. It is rather unfortunate that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the forum for initiating disarmament negotiations, did not have an opportunity of studying the nine-Power draft with a view to submitting recommendations to this Committee.

11. Unfortunately it is hardly likely that within the short time available the draft can receive the very serious study and attention it deserves. For example, we should like to see some of the provisions negotiated in the British draft embodied in the USSR draft, which, as I mentioned earlier, because of its wider coverage, provides a more acceptable basis for a convention on the subject. Article 1 of the nine-Power draft prohibits the development, production and acquisition of weapons but not their use. It is not inconceivable that, in spite of the obligation to destroy the existing stocks of such weapons, the ingredients and parts which could easily and rapidly be transformed into such weapons could be retained. We are all familiar with examples of poisonous agents, where the base elements are harmless in themselves and could be stored separately not as weapons but as components, which become lethal and capable of use for chemical warfare when mixed together. We also have examples of certain types of bacteria which similarly are by themselves harmless when stored for prophylactic uses but could rapidly multiply under suitable conditions and be used as weapons for germ warfare. These characteristics, which are mainly peculiar to chemicals and germs, are of particular significance when one is reminded that some of the signatories to the 1925 Geneva Conven-

tion have made certain reservations regarding the right to use such prohibited weapons in certain circumstances.

12. Another point that will require further examination is the method of ensuring the observance of the provisions of the treaty mentioned in article 4 of the nine-Power draft. If the principle of self-inspection is to be accepted, then we would suggest that in the case of a dispute the provision in article 6 merely to "consult" and "co-operate" in finding a solution would need to be strengthened.

13. A third point of particular importance to developing countries like mine is the need to be protected, after taking on the obligation of becoming parties to such a treaty, from the more highly industrialized countries by a deterring provision which obliges States party to the agreement to come to the assistance of victims of an attack.

14. These are merely preliminary comments to illustrate points on which the nine-Power draft might be usefully improved. We have refrained from such comments on the British draft because of our conviction that the draft only deals with a part of and not the whole subject to which our attention has been drawn in the very useful, thought-provoking and commendable report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968.⁴

15. It is our view, therefore, that the very welcome initiative of the nine-Power draft convention should, together with the British draft, be referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for urgent, careful study and harmonization with a view to enabling the Committee to submit at the next session of the General Assembly a draft convention on the prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare.

16. In the meantime, my delegation would strongly support the proposal that consideration should be given to the recommendation in the foreword to the report of the Secretary-General regarding the renewal of an appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

17. We would also appeal to those who have expressed reservations on acceding to the Protocol to withdraw their reservations. We are not sure whether a United Nations affirmation could, by itself, constitute an authoritative interpretation of the scope of the Protocol, but we would support any steps which could be taken to ensure that agreement is reached as soon as possible to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and biological agents and their use for purposes of war. In this connexion the Nigerian delegation wishes to invite the attention of representatives to the working paper of 26 August 1969, submitted in the form of a draft resolution to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, section 30]. We believe that it forms a basis for working out an interim

³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

⁴ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

arrangement pending the elaboration of a treaty. We would also recommend for adoption a revised draft resolution on the lines of the Canadian draft resolution of 26 August 1969 [*ibid.*, section 31], taking into consideration the USSR initiative which came after the Canadian delegation had presented its proposals. The draft resolution proposes that, as we have recommended earlier, there should be a further study of the British draft convention—and, we now propose in addition, of the USSR draft convention—by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and a report on progress should be made to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. We should also like to see a plea in the resolution asking those States which, on acceding to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, made certain reservations, to withdraw those reservations.

18. Turning now to the question of the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes, we note that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted a considerable amount of time to discussing a draft treaty for prohibiting the use of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof for military purposes, and that the Co-Chairmen submitted a bilaterally agreed draft treaty on the subject at the closing stage of the session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232, annex A].

19. The views of the Nigerian delegation were made very clear during the debates at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and, while appreciating the effort that the Co-Chairmen have made to try to accommodate the views and suggestions of many delegations, including Nigeria, we cannot but draw attention to certain misgivings which we have about the present draft.

20. We had hoped to see a treaty that would prohibit the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, from the sea-bed. Failing that, Nigeria suggested a concession which would permit coastal States to install weapons of a purely passive defensive character beyond the 12-mile zone. The present scope of prohibition, which is limited to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, is tolerable only if it is a first step towards a more comprehensive prohibition in the near future. Although our experience of the non-proliferation Treaty does not allow for too much optimism in that regard, we would at least prefer to support the Swedish proposal that, as in the non-proliferation Treaty, the third preambular paragraph of the draft which urges “continuing negotiations concerning further measures” be included in the operative part of the treaty.

21. Because of the limited scope of prohibition, the treaty can be of significance only to the nuclear Powers, since we, the non-nuclear Powers, and especially those of us who have signed the non-proliferation Treaty, have already undertaken under the terms of that Treaty not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. The Treaty merely curbs the nuclear arms race amongst nuclear Powers without providing future comfort for non-nuclear Powers that have accepted the obligations of the non-proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, in a spirit of co-operation and in the belief that a limited prohibition treaty is better than none at all, the Nigerian delegation would accept the proposed scope of prohibition if that is the general consensus.

22. The limited scope of the Treaty, however, intensifies the importance of the need for a “security zone” extending from the outer limits of the 12-mile coastal band where coastal States could enjoy exclusive defensive rights. We believe that such a provision is particularly essential in a limited prohibition agreement to safeguard the legitimate security interests of coastal States. We agree with the Canadian delegation in its brilliant summary of the situation when its representative said in Geneva:

“...if provision were not made for a coastal State security zone... foreign States would be permitted to install even offensive conventional weapons on a relatively permanent basis immediately beyond the limits of the defined narrow coastal band.” [*ENDC/PV.424, para. 24.*]

23. We have some misgivings about references to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in articles I and II as we believe that to be a rather devious method of stating the limit of the area beyond which the prohibition should apply. We are particularly concerned about what would be the position of signatories to the prospective treaty who are not signatories to the Geneva Convention. This is a subject that would perhaps require further study particularly as there are also some coastal States which do not claim territorial waters as wide as 12 miles.

24. We cannot ignore, moreover, the wider concept of the work of the Sea-Bed Committee whose mandate, as stated in resolution 2467 A (XXIII), enjoins it, among other things

“...to study further... taking into account the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament, the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor without prejudice to the limits which may be agreed upon in this respect.”

It is the view of my delegation that whilst efforts are being made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to improve on the present draft treaty, the Sea-Bed Committee could take advantage of the opportunity to study the implications of the draft treaty in so far as it affects its mandate. We recognize that the Sea-Bed Committee—and this was made quite evident in the debate on the sea-bed item in this Committee recently—has been studying the elaboration of the legal principles and norms which would promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of the sea-bed and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. In this connexion, we cannot but take note of the first preambular paragraph of the draft treaty which states as follows:

“The States Parties to this treaty,

“Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes...” [A/7741-DC/232, annex A].

We should be careful to ensure that there is no conflict between the concepts involved, that is, between the simple

recognition of the “common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes” and the other concept, which my delegation has consistently supported, which sees the progress of the exploration and the peaceful uses and exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor, in a wider and more comprehensive context of the entire area, being the “common heritage of mankind”, the resources of which can only be exploited and used for the benefit of all mankind, taking into account the special needs and interests of the developing countries.

25. I have in the course of my statement expressed our views on all questions raised in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I have commented on the form and content of the present report, touched upon the enlargement of the Committee and the method adopted, and dealt with the progress or lack of progress on nuclear disarmament since the non-proliferation Treaty. I have expressed our disappointment over the lack of progress on the question of the comprehensive test ban, but have expressed the hope that the commencement of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States will stimulate progress on the subject of the limitation of strategic weapons. I have given our frank views on the proposed draft convention on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, and have commented on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes. Finally, we cannot conclude this statement without drawing attention to the proposal made by the Secretary-General in his introduction to the annual report⁵ that Members of the United Nations should decide to dedicate the decade of the 1970s as a disarmament decade. We support that proposal and, like him, hope that during that decade concerted and concentrated efforts will be made to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament.

26. These are all, severally and collectively, serious subjects which touch upon the very survival of man. They are subjects which must continue, and I believe rightly, to arouse the maximum concern in each of us, whether we are developed or developing countries, big or small nations. We all share a common concern that progress must be made, in spite of ourselves and the present difficulties. The results of failure are too alarming to contemplate. We all have a duty to continue to urge upon those nations that have it in their power to do so to move us back from the brink of anxiety and fear, nearer to safer grounds where, without the constant fear of mutual annihilation, we can move forward together in progress and security.

27. My delegation pledges its utmost co-operation in that endeavour and we shall continue to work seriously and patiently with other delegations in the continuing search for progress.

28. Mr. VAKIL (Iran): We are beginning our annual discussion on disarmament; a major, indeed a predominant, responsibility of the United Nations. As has been true for several years past, the report of the negotiating body in

Geneva set up in 1961 is before us, this time under the name of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232].⁶

29. Only last year I gave voice to my sense of growing distress over the dwindling role of the General Assembly in the domain of disarmament. The report which is before us has strengthened my opinion that we must have a new look at the involvement of the United Nations in the treatment of the disarmament question.

30. As usual, there is little time to consider the substance of the report. In order to take up as little of our time as possible, I thought it necessary to raise a seemingly procedural question at the outset: the arbitrary increase in the membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

31. There is no need for a lengthy history of the changes in the treatment of disarmament in our Organization over the past 25 years. There have been many changes of forum in that time. It is not unfair, I believe, to say that we had two persistent aims in those changes: the first was to rescue disarmament from the Security Council, where its progress had come to a dead-end; the second was to bring to bear such weight as the General Assembly possessed on the States whose agreement was needed before there could be progress in disarmament.

32. I shall spare the Committee a tedious recital of the facts of international political life which made the hopes for disarmament dependent on agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. To act upon recognition of the facts was a realistic and responsible discharge of our duties: it was not nor could it justifiably be pictured as an act of abdication.

33. In 1961 the super-Powers presented their first joint statement of principles.⁷ Thereafter, at the request of the United Nations—I repeat, at the request of the United Nations—they laid before the General Assembly an agreed recommendation on the composition of a Disarmament Committee. The General Assembly, having no alternative, endorsed that recommendation in its resolution 1722 (XVI) and placed the facilities of the United Nations at the command of the Eighteen-Nation Committee then established.

34. The General Assembly had been seeking for years to promote agreement between the super-Powers in order to permit the Organization to get on with its disarmament business. The 1961 arrangements were made in the belief shared by all—the only reason which could justify those arrangements—that the new disarmament negotiation forum, although not a United Nations subsidiary organ, was an instrument of the United Nations none the less. As such, its work was to proceed in the context and orbit of the United Nations. It is for that reason that since 1961 the principal focus of disarmament discussion in this room has been on the report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

⁶ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, paras. 42-46.

35. A case can be made that the membership of the Disarmament Committee was determined by the General Assembly when it endorsed the agreed recommendation made by the Soviet Union and the United States in accordance with resolution 1660 (XVI). Consequently, changes in the composition of the Committee require the concurrence of the General Assembly. That is the formal side of the matter.

36. The argument for holding that the composition of the Committee was and remains a matter for the United Nations is contained in the language of resolution 1660 (XVI) defining the standard to which the agreed recommendation of the two Powers was to conform. Resolution 1660 (XVI) required the two Powers to recommend a negotiating body with a composition "which both they and the rest of the world can regard as satisfactory".

37. The language of resolution 1722 (XVI), in which by endorsement the Assembly concurred in the agreed recommendation, throws additional light on the basis for the requirement of United Nations agreement to the composition of the Committee. Before limiting the number of those who were to be members of the Disarmament Committee to eighteen, the Assembly found it necessary to say that "all States have a deep interest in disarmament negotiations".

38. It was recognized at the time that there must inevitably be something occult about the selection of the members of a committee of limited composition. Nevertheless, as I have already noted, the General Assembly by unanimous vote endorsed the recommended selection as "satisfactory to the rest of the world".

39. The Disarmament Committee has now been enlarged by the agreement of the Co-Chairmen, who made no prior inquiry of the General Assembly whether it continued to regard the Committee in its new composition as satisfactory. Indeed, the Co-Chairmen did not even put that question to the members of the Disarmament Committee itself. It is true that after the decision had been taken the Co-Chairmen invited the other members of the Committee to express their views on the enlargement. Coming after the decision, however, these opinions could change nothing, even though many members of the Committee expressed dissatisfaction with the by-passing of the United Nations. The position now is that there is a Disarmament Committee acting within a framework developed by the United Nations which lacks the endorsement of the United Nations. This action of the Co-Chairmen marks a further stage in their tendency to sever disarmament from the body of the chief responsibilities of the United Nations.

40. The relations of the two Powers involve problems peculiar to themselves, but they are of the utmost moment to the rest of us. The solution of their problems may be sought first in discussions between the two Powers, but the answers must remain incomplete if the search for them is conducted in entire isolation from the United Nations. The vital interests of the rest of us in disarmament cannot find adequate expression or satisfaction in a two-Power forum.

41. I am anxious that there should be no misunderstanding of the position. However one describes the formal

relation of the negotiating body at Geneva to the United Nations, and whatever formula is used to characterize their legal relation, it is beyond dispute that there is a close substantive and organizational connexion between the responsibilities of the United Nations and the disarmament activities at Geneva. The existence of this connexion needs more than lip service. Indeed, it rules out any implication that in 1961 the General Assembly gave the Soviet Union and the United States plenary power to organize and reorganize the Geneva disarmament mechanism at will.

42. None of this is to say that those States are not free to agree on measures for the regulation, limitation and reduction of their armaments and armed forces. Such an outcome is our most devout hope. If in their opinion the task of reaching agreement between them could be made easier by seeking aid and counsel outside the United Nations, there was nothing to hinder them. This was not the course they took. They came to the United Nations, an Organization of which they are Members and which has acknowledged responsibilities regarding disarmament. They did not seek out the assistance of other States privately, so to speak; they applied to the United Nations and their application was made within the framework of the United Nations programme for general and complete disarmament.

43. Had it been otherwise, the question must have arisen how, in view of the separation of the two-Power negotiations from the general effort to achieve disarmament, the United Nations was to organize the latter. No such question arose because both the fundamental lines of negotiation and the nature of the negotiating mechanism were made matters of agreement with the United Nations. Only when that agreement had been obtained could the new effort at Geneva begin.

44. What was to be achieved was a scheme of general disarmament not merely of the super-Powers but of the entire world. In a system of equal and independent States, two of them, no matter how powerful, could not reserve to themselves a task with which only the United Nations was empowered to deal on the general behalf. Consequently, the activity at Geneva must be regarded as an activity on behalf of international society as a whole and one to be conducted *ad referendum*. This means that the results of the Geneva negotiations were to be reported periodically to the United Nations and that final agreements on measures of disarmament must be submitted for approval to the United Nations where the necessary procedures for the consideration and possible assumption by States of the obligations involved could be instituted.

45. It will hardly be challenged that States are not prepared to assume international obligations when they have been excluded from association with the process of formulating them. Yet elaborate systems of obligation touching complicated matters and involving perilous vital interests are difficult to work out in large assemblies. When they are conducted in small bodies, as they must be, it is necessary to observe punctilious respect for the forms of negotiation established with general assent.

46. The Geneva negotiating Committee has, without previous consultation with the United Nations or even within the Committee itself, been increased in number. A decision

of the United Nations has thus been overturned without an opportunity for the Organization to consider whether its interests require an enlargement of the Committee or are well served by the enlargement that has been made. The General Assembly has had no opportunity of considering whether by this enlargement the Committee has undergone a change of basic character into a conference of individual States representing their own interests. This is another example of the take-it-or-leave-it choices with which we have recently been faced more than once. We may accept or reject what is offered but have no voice in formulating the terms of the offer.

47. It is difficult to accept the suggestion that the addition of eight new members will make it easier to bring about an agreement between the super-Powers which could not be reached in a smaller body.

48. The vital point, however, is that a decision affecting the central responsibility of the United Nations has been taken without its consent. If the United Nations is not to become a rubber stamp with only a *pro forma* role in disarmament, it ought not to accept this result.

49. This experience suggests that we ought now to give thought to ways of enabling the United Nations itself to play a more influential role and one that is more responsive to the needs and concerns of the vast majority of States with regard to the intertwined problems of disarmament and security. The Geneva body may continue to be useful, though its record suggests that it has already achieved the purpose of assisting the super-Powers to come together. The Soviet Union and the United States have increasingly found independent routes to each other, most recently at Helsinki. I should like to add here an expression of our gratification at this development and of our sincere hope for a favourable outcome.

50. Our wish to facilitate communion between them was founded on the need to see the United Nations programme of disarmament prosper. It was a mistake to put all our eggs in the Geneva basket, however, for it made progress too dependent on super-Power initiatives in hatching them out. At the very least there is need for a parallel development of United Nations resources for scrutinizing at more leisure and with more informed judgement what Geneva lays before us.

51. As my Foreign Minister indicated in the general debate [1776th plenary meeting], we applaud the Secretary-General's suggestion to name the coming decade for disarmament. Associated with a revival and reorganization of existing machinery which has been allowed to rust too long, dedication of the coming 10 years to disarmament might stiffen flagging faith in the United Nations and lend credence to the brave words we shall doubtless speak as we mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of our Organization next year.

52. Our power may be small, but our resources are not puny. Useful results have been obtained through expert committees appointed by the Secretary-General at our request to study nuclear weapons and chemical and bacteriological warfare. The Secretariat can play a more helpful role in providing us with information. Above all, if

these aids can be geared to the work of a Disarmament Commission functioning through working groups, the necessary expertise can be developed within the United Nations to lend weight to disarmament proposals originating at Geneva or Helsinki or elsewhere. Parallel efforts cannot be avoided; it is our view that they are to be welcomed.

53. Finally, I should say that it is by no means my view that what has come out of Geneva has not been of great value. It did assist the super-Powers; and it provided some of us—too few, I am sorry to say—with valuable experience, insight and opportunities to influence matters. We hold the States that the Co-Chairmen chose for membership in the Geneva body to be highly qualified and we are gratified that Pakistan, with which our association and co-operation are very close, is among them. Its recognition is well merited. Whatever transpires at Geneva, a new look at arrangements here is needed. Those who have served at Geneva could—and I expect that they will—make valuable contributions in our midst.

54. My delegation is consulting others concerning the matters I have touched on in this statement. These consultations may result in more formal suggestions to be laid before this Committee at a later stage.

55. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): As I mentioned yesterday, at the 1691st meeting, I shall in the course of this statement consider, in the following order, which seemed to me the most logical one, although it does not of course prejudge their relative importance in any way, these five questions: nuclear-weapon-free zones; nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; the cessation of nuclear weapon tests; chemical and microbiological weapons; and, finally, a moratorium in connexion with the strategic arms limitation talks.

56. I shall begin, then, with nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the introduction to his annual report, the Secretary-General of the United Nations expressed the following view:

“In what has been on the whole a less productive year for disarmament, there has been one ray of light. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has been ratified by the requisite number of countries and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America has now been established. . . . The continuing efforts and the steady progress made by the States of Latin America, which have now come to fruition, are deserving of the highest admiration and praise. They have given an exemplary demonstration of what can be achieved, given the moral commitment, careful planning and persistence. They have successfully taken a first important step towards disarmament and the expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and have given the world some novel ideas in the field of control. I am hopeful that the system established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco will provide a model for other nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as for additional measures of global disarmament.”⁸

57. As the representative of the State which is the depositary of that Treaty and which also serves as the

⁸ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 39.

headquarters of that Agency—known as OPANAL, its acronym in Spanish—so highly praised by U Thant, I shall try to bring up to date the information which I have been providing to this Committee over the years.

58. It will not be necessary for me to speak at too great length this time, for among the annexes to the report of the Committee on Disarmament there are two—namely, the working paper entitled “Establishment of nuclear-free zones” [A/7741-DC/232,⁹ annex C, section 5] and the “Report on the first session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)” [ibid., section 33]—which contain all the information that could be desired on the matter. Moreover, the complete text of the 17 resolutions adopted by the General Conference has recently been circulated as a General Assembly document [see A/7681].

59. I shall therefore confine myself to bringing out a few of the main points covered in those documents.

60. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Tlatelolco, is already in force for 14 of the 22 signatory States.

61. The totally nuclear-weapon-free zone aimed at by the Treaty would comprise an area of a little over 20 million square kilometres in which, at the present level of population density of the countries concerned, some 260 million people would be living; even now, it covers more than 5.5 million square kilometres with a population of about 100 million.

62. The permanent organization provided for in the Treaty began to function officially with the opening in Mexico City, on 2 September last, of the first session of its supreme organ, the General Conference, at a solemn ceremony honoured by the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

63. Of the 17 resolutions adopted by the Conference, resolution 2 (I) is intended to encourage the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with a view to accelerating the economic and social development of the countries of Latin America; another, resolution 11 (I), is designed to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements between the member States and IAEA, while yet another, resolution 1 (I), relates to the status of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which is, of course, open for signature by nuclear-weapon States.

64. In this last resolution, which was adopted by acclamation, the General Conference recalled the urgent appeals addressed to the nuclear Powers, twice by the General Assembly of the United Nations and once by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol in question “as soon as possible”; it expressed its conviction that the obligations entailed by the Protocol for the nuclear-weapon States “are essentially nothing more than the application to a specific case of the general obligations laid down in the Charter of the United

Nations, which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to ‘fulfil in good faith’, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter”; it deplored the fact that, despite the many declarations by the nuclear Powers concerning the support that should be given to any nuclear-weapon-free zone established on the initiative of the States within that zone, the Protocol, which was opened for signature almost three years ago, has so far been signed by only two of those Powers—the United Kingdom and the United States—and has not yet been ratified by any of them; it expressed its conviction that “if such a situation persists, it will be necessary for the General Assembly of the United Nations, as it does each year with respect to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and as it did at its twenty-first session with regard to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States”, to review the status of implementation of its resolutions 2286 (XXII) and 2456 B (XXIII); lastly, in accordance with the foregoing, the General Conference once again urged the nuclear-weapon Powers “to comply fully with the appeals made to them by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States”, and also called upon the members of OPANAL to take action, in the following terms:

“Calls upon the States members of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, if by 30 June 1970 Additional Protocol II has not yet been signed and ratified by all nuclear-weapon States, jointly to propose the inclusion of the following item: ‘Status of the implementation of resolution 2456 B (XXIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)’ in the agenda of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.”

65. It also seems to me very appropriate in this connexion to point out that the General Assembly, in resolution 2499 (XXIV) adopted on 31 October and entitled “Celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations”, decided to appeal “to all Member States to give urgent consideration to the ratification of, or accession to, a number of multilateral instruments which have been adopted, endorsed or supported by the United Nations and which have not entered into force for lack of sufficient ratifications or accessions”, and I should stress that among the documents cited in that resolution is the list transmitted by the Secretary-General to Member States [A/7712], section III of which includes, under heading No. 3, Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

66. It is to be hoped that the nuclear Powers will decide to heed the Assembly’s appeal by making the contribution once more demanded of them by the organ which is the voice of the international community and one of whose Presidents, who served with the greatest distinction in that high office, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, Corneliu Manescu, stated on 2 October 1969 in the last general debate in the plenary:

“In our view, one of the ways of decreasing the danger of the use of nuclear weapons would be to establish denuclearized zones in different parts of the world, that

⁹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

measure being accompanied by adequate safeguards on the part of the nuclear Powers. In this respect, the international community has already had the benefit of the positive experience of the Latin American countries, whose collective thinking is embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco." [1775th plenary meeting, para. 87.]

67. I shall now turn to the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

68. In resolution 2456 C (XXIII), adopted on 20 December 1968, the General Assembly, after observing that the use of explosive nuclear devices for peaceful purposes will have an extraordinary importance and recalling "the statements made at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee by the representatives of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament", requested the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with Member States and the other States specified in the resolution, and with the co-operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of those specialized agencies that he might consider pertinent, a report on the establishment, within the framework of IAEA, of "an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international control", which from now on I shall refer to as the "Service".

69. Only 46 States, or just over one third of those consulted by the Secretary-General, have transmitted their views to him; that is one reason why the report which has been referred to this Committee for consideration [A/7678 and Add.1-3] is not of the same excellent quality as we have become accustomed to, for it consists merely of a compilation of the replies received, with a very short introduction.

70. Moreover, since a good number of those replies merely express approval or support for the idea of establishing the international Service and most of the others do not state any views on what should, in our opinion, be regarded as fundamental aspects of this question, we feel that it would be impossible at this session for the Committee to embark on the drafting of a special international agreement for the establishment of the Service. In view of the little time available to us, it may not even be possible to begin defining the general principles and norms which such an agreement must take into account.

71. Consequently, my delegation will shortly be initiating consultations with the 23 other delegations which along with us were sponsors of last year's draft resolution, with a view to reaching a conclusion as to the most appropriate procedure that could be adopted on this occasion.

72. The best procedure might be to ask the Secretary-General to carry out such further consultations—this time not on so broad a subject as before, but on a number of specific points—as would make it possible to clarify the views of Governments regarding the basic problems that will have to be resolved if the Service is to fulfil the intended purpose of having, as stated in the preamble of General Assembly resolution 2456 C (XXIII), to which I referred earlier, a multilateral body "in order that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions might be made available, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world".

73. It would be premature at this point to try to expound the full scope of what I have referred to as "basic points". I shall merely state that the first problem that will definitely have to be solved will be which States should be invited to become members of the Service, and the second will be, what structure, powers, functions and objectives the Service should have.

74. So far as objectives are concerned, I should like to add that, in our view, the aim should be to enable the Service to respond effectively to the need for ensuring that this new application of nuclear energy—nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—will help to reduce the economic and social gap between what are figuratively called "the peoples of the North" and "the peoples of the South", and not to misconceive it as one more organ or agency designed to provide services on a strictly commercial basis.

75. The potential significance of the Service in that connexion is obvious in the light of the information contained in the report of the Board of Governors of IAEA, annex III to the report of the Secretary-General, on the possible applications of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, and in the other report, also referred to our Committee, on "Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries", which contains among its conclusions the following:

"The Group is well aware that the main potential benefits deriving from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are that they make presently inaccessible resources economically exploitable, and that they may make some otherwise impossible civil engineering projects economically feasible. Their economic advantages therefore appear obvious." [A/7568, para. 228.]

76. Moreover, since this application of nuclear energy is still in an experimental stage, it is probable that there are as yet no vested interests of the kind which so frequently undermine true international co-operation, namely, co-operation aimed at "the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations", in keeping with the provisions of Article 55 of the Charter.

77. As a warning of the serious consequences which may result from the widening economic and social gap to which I referred earlier, I should like to note that, according to the last report by the President of the World Bank, projections of the current situation indicate that by the end of this century *per capita* income in the United States may reach approximately \$10,000, while the figure for Brazil would be \$500, or one twentieth of that amount, and that for India would be \$200, or one fiftieth as much. I apologize for being unable to give figures for other countries, because those are the only ones mentioned in the report of the President of the World Bank. The gradual elimination of such immense disparities is undoubtedly one of the key factors in building stable and lasting world peace. As I said before, the proposed Service must make its contribution in that regard.

78. I come now to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

79. One of the disarmament measures to which the General Assembly has addressed itself in many forceful resolutions in recent years is the urgent need for suspension of underground nuclear weapon tests.

80. In pursuance of the provisions of the most recent of those resolutions, resolution 2455 (XXIII), adopted last year, the Geneva Committee devoted a number of official and informal meetings to the consideration of this matter. Statements were made by many representatives and various proposals, suggestions and recommendations, which are cited in the Committee's report [A/7741-DC/232], were examined.

81. Even though, unfortunately, the Committee was unable to prepare the draft treaty once again requested of it by the General Assembly in the resolution which I mentioned, we believe that the work it has done this year nevertheless represents progress, however modest, in that important task.

82. A working paper in the form of a draft treaty, which appears in the annexes to the report [*ibid.*, annex C, section 6], was submitted to the Committee by the Swedish delegation on 1 April 1969. Among the several significant innovations embodied in that document, stress should be placed on those relating to a possible verification system to ensure full observance of the treaty, once it has been concluded.

83. The Committee also received valuable documentation on the question of an exchange of information so as to make possible a scientific evaluation of seismic events; this, of course, can be of decisive importance in supervising the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. Especially deserving of attention in this connexion are the working papers, suggestions and observations submitted by many delegations, including those of Canada, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Sweden, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, all of which are cited in the report of the Committee and which indicate that the early establishment of a world-wide exchange of seismic data facilitating the conclusion of the treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests is feasible.

84. From the start, Mexico has recognized the tremendous importance of this question, as is evidenced by the dozens of statements it has made on it both in this Committee and in the Geneva Committee. My country has always maintained that the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was never thought of as an end, but merely as a beginning, the immediate sequel to which should be the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in all environments. This belief of ours is not based on speculative interpretations, but on the actual text of the preamble to that Treaty, which refers expressly to the intention of the original parties "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and to the determination of the Governments of those parties to "continue negotiations to this end".¹⁰

85. The solution to what seems to be the only serious outstanding problem with regard to conclusion of the

treaty, namely, the problem of verification and control, is quite different from what it was when the Moscow Treaty was signed on 5 August 1963. The technique of remote monitoring and identification of underground nuclear explosions and seismic events has made significant progress, as indicated in the studies submitted to the Committee to which I referred earlier. Hence, our position on the matter can be summed up in the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, speaking in the general debate on 24 September, when he stated:

"...it might not be impossible to overcome the problem of on-site inspection which has always held up agreement. True, it is still theoretically possible that the one observation may be confused with the other below a certain magnitude; but international relations must be based on actual possibilities, not on absolute data. Perfection does not belong to the world of politics. The risk of detection would be so great that it is hardly conceivable that either party would take the foolhardy decision to violate the treaty." [1763rd plenary meeting, para. 10.]

86. We therefore consider it imperative that the General Assembly should again urge the Geneva Committee in the strongest terms to proceed without delay—taking very much in account the new material contributed by the delegations I have mentioned in this part of my statement, and especially those of Sweden and Canada—to the elaboration of the draft treaty for the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests which we have been awaiting for so many years.

87. In addition, we consider that whatever resolution we now adopt should also repeat, in the terms best suited to stress the urgency of the situation, the Assembly's earlier exhortations to States which have not adhered to the Moscow Treaty to do so without delay, and emphasize mankind's increasing concern at the continuation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

88. On the question of chemical and biological weapons, which has also been referred to the First Committee, it seems to us logical to refer first to the report of the Secretary-General, entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use*.¹¹

89. As will be recalled, this report was prepared with the assistance of a group of qualified experts and consultants appointed by the Secretary-General himself, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 2454 A (XXIII), the antecedents of which were the suggestion put forward by U Thant in September 1968 in the introduction to his annual report and the recommendation made by the Geneva Committee in its 1968 report.

90. This excellent report, on which we hope that the General Assembly will be able now to adopt a resolution similar to resolution 2342 (XXII), which was adopted with respect to the report circulated in 1967 on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, is no doubt the most authoritative statement in existence on the subject referred

¹⁰ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

¹¹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

to in its title, namely, “chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use”

91. Since all representatives will have read the report in question by now, I shall simply state that my delegation finds the conclusions which emerge from this expert study to be fully justified; of those conclusions, we feel that the following should be stressed.

92. The weapons in question stand in a class of their own. The mere thought of their being deliberately used is horrifying, for some chemical and microbiological agents are potentially unconfined in their effects, both in space and in time, so that their large-scale use could have a deadly and irreversible effect on the balance of nature.

93. The potential for developing an armoury of chemical and microbiological weapons has grown considerably in recent years, not only in terms of the number of agents, but also in terms of their toxicity and the diversity of their lethal effects, which, while they can in some cases be confined geographically, would in many other cases spread well beyond the target zone without any possibility of predicting either the duration or range of such effects or the changes they could generate.

94. This class of weapons is extremely expensive to produce and, moreover, no system of defence, even in the richest countries in the world, whatever its cost, could be completely secure against them. The possible use in war of chemical and microbiological weapons entails a very serious risk of escalation, both in the use of more dangerous weapons belonging to the same class and in the use of other weapons of mass destruction. In the light of these considerations, the experts were able to reach an extremely well-reasoned general conclusion, the substance of which is summed up as follows in paragraph 375 of the report:

“Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability. A particular danger also derives from the fact that any country could develop or acquire, in one way or another, a capability in this type of warfare, despite the fact that this could prove costly. The danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to the developing as it does to developed countries.”

95. The Secretary-General, after giving the study and the conclusions of the group of experts his “earnest consideration”—as he stated in the foreword to the report, no doubt bearing in mind that the report was unanimous and that the group was composed of 14 experts of various nationalities from countries in four different continents—urged, in the said foreword, that the Members of the United Nations should undertake the following three measures in the interests of enhancing the security of the peoples of the world:

“1. To renew the appeal of all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925;

“2. To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future;

“3. To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons.”

96. The Secretary-General's report was transmitted to the Geneva Committee on 7 June, and the delegations of the non-aligned countries, including Mexico, prepared a working paper dated 26 August 1969, which appears among the annexes to the Committee's report [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30]. The working paper contains a draft declaration regarding prohibition of the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare which we venture to hope may receive general approval in the First Committee.

97. The purpose of the draft is that the General Assembly, after recalling, *inter alia*, that “chemical and biological methods of warfare have always been viewed with horror and been justly condemned by the international community” and that such methods of warfare are inherently reprehensible because their effects are “uncontrollable and unpredictable and may be injurious without distinction to combatants and non-combatants”, should condemn and declare as “contrary to international law the use in international armed conflicts” of any chemical agents of warfare and any biological agents of warfare, specifying the substances, living organisms and infective materials derived from them, in both categories, which would be covered by that condemnation.

98. Two other documents have also been referred to our Committee, namely, the “draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons” [A/7655], submitted to the Assembly by nine delegations, and the “revised draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare”, which was submitted to the Geneva Committee by the United Kingdom delegation and which appears among the annexes to its report [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20].

99. Both drafts are intended to supplement the prohibitions contained in the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹² through the adoption of provisions to prevent not only the use, but also the production, acquisition and stockpiling, of the weapons to which they would apply. They differ in scope, however, since the nine-Power draft covers both chemical and microbiological weapons, while the United Kingdom draft applies only to the latter.

100. My delegation, as it said in Geneva and repeated during the general debate in the plenary, favours the first approach, which is more comprehensive. We shall listen

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

with great interest to the statements which the sponsors of both drafts will be making in this Committee. We should like to submit, however, that the most appropriate procedure with regard to those drafts would be to request the Geneva Committee to study them, as has always been done in similar cases, with a view to combining them into a single draft which one would hope we might be able to consider at the next session of the General Assembly.

101. I come now to the fifth and last of the topics which I said at the beginning I would deal with in this statement, namely, the possibility of an agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union on a moratorium applicable to the testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapon systems, both offensive and defensive.

102. As I said at the beginning of my statement yesterday [*1691st meeting*], we fully share the view expressed by the Chairman of this Committee when he observed at the same meeting that the strategic arms limitation talks which have just begun in Helsinki between those two nuclear Powers are perhaps the most important since the end of the Second World War and that their success or failure may be decisive for mankind.

103. We therefore believe that it is the inescapable duty of all of us to ask ourselves how the General Assembly can most effectively contribute to the success of those talks, which will assuredly require perseverance, determination and, above all, time for the study and solution of the arduous, complex and vital problems involved.

104. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion on the matter, it seems to us essential that certain points which are fundamental should be properly clarified.

105. The first point derives from the premise that any objective analyst or observer, whatever his nationality, must necessarily come to the following conclusion, which has been repeated time and again by the most authoritative experts on the subject: the existing nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers are reckoned in tens of thousands of megatons and are many times greater than would be required for mutual deterrence against a surprise attack, since even though, weapon for weapon or strategic system for strategic system, they may not be exactly equal, neither could attack the other with any shred of hope of surviving the inevitable devastating reprisal.

106. Hence, the responsible statesmen of the two nuclear Powers now engaged in talks in the Finnish capital seem to have reached a conclusion similar to that expressed last week by the Secretary of State of the United States when, after observing that "competitive accumulation of more sophisticated weapons would not add to the basic security of either side", he emphatically declared:

"Militarily, it probably would produce little or no net advantage. Economically, it would divert resources needed elsewhere. Politically it would perpetuate the tensions and fears that are the social fallout of the nuclear arms race. . . .

"Under present circumstances an equitable limitation on strategic nuclear weapons would strengthen the

national security of both sides. If this is mutually perceived—if both sides conduct these talks in the light of that perception—the talks may accomplish an historic breakthrough in the pattern of confrontation that has characterized the postwar world."

107. However, while it appears to us that what I have been discussing will, as I said before, be accepted as axiomatic by any objective analyst or observer, it is also an undeniable fact that there are in both countries influential groups which still consider practical the impossible dream of being able instantaneously and totally to annihilate the adversary. What the outcome of such dreams would be is described in a masterly manner in the Secretary-General's introduction to his last annual report, in which he states:

"Plans being discussed at present for anti-missile defensive systems and for missiles with multiple warheads generate a renewed sense of fear, insecurity and frustration. The product of the awful alphabet and arithmetic of ABMs (anti-ballistic missiles) and MIRVs (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles) can only be the acceleration of what has been described as the 'mad momentum' of the nuclear arms race."¹³

108. Apart from the inevitable danger inherent in any unrestrained armaments race, especially in the case of nuclear weapons, that "mad momentum" entails another danger, equally serious or more so; this is that it may complicate the problems of verification and control to such an extent as to render futile and impossible any effort to reach an agreement for the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

109. Since, as I have already pointed out and as everyone, I think, must agree, the difficult negotiations which have barely entered their preliminary stage will require a considerable time to bear fruit, as we all certainly hope they will, my delegation considers that the most constructive step the General Assembly could take in this connexion would be to appeal to the Governments of the two nuclear States engaged in the negotiations to put into effect, say, a two-year moratorium, which could be extended, if necessary, covering any testing and deployment of strategic nuclear weapon systems, offensive or defensive, which have not yet become operational.

110. As long ago as August of last year, Mexico had informal consultations with several other members of the Geneva Committee on this question, as a result of which the President of my country said in his annual report to the Congress of the Union on 1 September:

"Mexico has stressed the urgent need for an early start to the negotiations between the atomic Powers for the limitation and reduction of the nuclear armaments production race, since, in addition to constituting a serious danger for world peace, it diverts resources that should be used to alleviate the wants which afflict two thirds of mankind.

"Still more recently, we pointed out in the Committee on Disarmament how urgent and timely it was for the

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 28.

United States and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the matter.

"We proposed specifically that both the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly could and should address an urgent appeal to those Powers to accept a two-year or three-year moratorium, extendible if necessary, on any new measures that might change the precarious balance which now appears to exist."

111. My delegation has been extremely pleased to see that the Secretary-General of the United Nations takes a similar view on this point, as is clear from the introduction to his annual report, in which we read the following:

"... pending progress in these talks, it would be helpful if they stopped all further work on the development of new offensive and defensive strategic systems, whether by agreement or by a unilateral moratorium declared by both sides. Little or nothing would be lost by postponing decisions to embark on the development and deployment of new nuclear weapon systems in order to explore thoroughly the possibilities of agreement: a very great deal might be lost by failure or refusal to do so. I am sure that the peoples of the world would breathe a sigh of relief if the Governments of these two States were to avoid taking any decisions which might prove to be irreversible and which might further escalate the nuclear arms race."¹⁴

112. We believe that, by taking a decision of this kind, the General Assembly would not only be contributing effectively to the success of the bilateral talks between the two great nuclear Powers, but would also be fulfilling its duty to the peoples of all Member States; for it should never be forgotten that what is at stake in any nuclear confrontation, the danger of which increases tremendously with unrestrained escalation, is the very survival of mankind. Only recently, at the end of October, the New York press reported some of the conclusions of the nineteenth Pugwash Conference,¹⁵ which was held in the Soviet Union and was attended by many of the ablest scientists in the West and in the East, and summarized certain of its conclusions as follows:

"Concern was expressed that world populations had become numbed to the nuclear threat and should be reminded of the consequences of all-out war. It was agreed that a large part of the population of the Northern Hemisphere would be killed outright. Only a small percentage of mankind lives south of the Equator. With the putrefaction of human, animal, bird and vegetable remains on all sides, it was considered doubtful that many of those who survived other effects could long endure."

113. It is such authoritative descriptions as this that make one think how right that person was who said that the few survivors would envy the fate of the dead.

114. For all the reasons I have stated, my delegation intends to resume here the consultations it initiated in

Geneva, with a view to examining the possibility of submitting to the Assembly a draft resolution along the lines I have indicated which could receive the unanimous approval of all Members.

115. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland): Taking the floor in the general debate on disarmament the Polish delegation intends to concentrate today on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and to introduce, on behalf of the sponsors, the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/7655].

116. Before taking up this subject I should like, however, to make some brief general observations concerning the current state of disarmament negotiations, while reserving my right to elaborate on them at a later stage.

117. Since the twenty-third session of the General Assembly a number of developments in the field of disarmament have taken place at an increased pace, developments which, in the view of the Polish delegation, could exert a favourable influence upon the future course of disarmament negotiations.

118. As will be recalled, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, at its session this year, has accomplished and reported to the General Assembly substantial progress in the form of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. During its session this year there was also a useful exchange of views on other issues before the Committee, particularly the question of an underground test-ban treaty.

119. On 1 July the Secretary-General submitted his report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use*¹⁶ which as we all know, was prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts and in keeping with the terms of General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII). Members of the Committee on Disarmament welcomed and approved both the report and the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in the foreword to his report, which they considered to be a suitable basis for the Committee's work relating to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

120. Finally, let me observe that in the intervening period the USSR and the United States reached an agreement to open bilateral strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki. We have all learned with satisfaction that the talks opened yesterday, and I am sure that in wishing the Helsinki negotiators every success in fulfilling their extremely important task I am expressing a sentiment widely shared in this Committee. The opening of talks on curbing the strategic arms race goes a long way towards meeting the hopes of peoples everywhere. Any progress in these talks may well become a major factor in easing international tension, representing another important step towards the solution of other problems of nuclear disarmament and

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

¹⁵ Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held at Sochi, USSR, from 22 to 27 October 1969.

¹⁶ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

contributing to the achievement of general and complete disarmament—the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts, a goal which has been reaffirmed in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

121. While taking note with satisfaction of the above-mentioned developments we cannot, on the other hand, lose sight of those elements of the international situation which are hardly conducive to the pursuance of disarmament negotiations. In the Far and Middle East the forces of aggression continue to resort to war and occupation. The forces opposed to any meaningful disarmament have not surrendered; they continue dreaming up strategic military scenarios tailored to the specifications of the policy “from the position of strength”, a policy which cannot be reconciled with disarmament efforts. The arms race continues unabated and requires exorbitant financial outlay, wasting away vast economic and human resources frozen in arms manufacturing industries. All this makes the problem of disarmament an issue that transcends the framework of military technical considerations, an issue that has come to be regarded as one of the key questions of economic and social development of the contemporary world.

122. The peculiar nature of the arms race as well as the character of the weapons of mass destruction, particularly dangerous to mankind, compel us to grant absolute priority in the disarmament negotiations to the halting of this arms race, to the reduction and total elimination of those weapons. What is at stake is the reduction and elimination of a threat of war that could be waged with the use of weapons of mass destruction capable of exterminating entire nations as well as destroying man's civilization. At stake, therefore, is the restoration of a sense of security and purpose to individuals and nations by freeing them from that all-pervading sense of threat.

123. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare represent a particularly inhuman variety of weapons of mass destruction. That is why their use as well as the use of other weapons of mass destruction has been prohibited as a crime against peace and humanity and has come to be regarded by the international community as a gross violation of the generally recognized rules of international law. Desirous of the total elimination of the danger arising from the fact of the mere existence of those weapons, the Governments of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted to the General Assembly on 19 September a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/7655]. It is my privilege to introduce this draft to the Committee on behalf of the sponsors. By proposing the adoption of new provisions in addition to those already existing, which prohibit the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the draft convention aims at the complete elimination of these weapons from military arsenals. It represents a continuation of efforts by the Socialist and other countries in search of radical measures relating to those weapons. It is an important step towards general and complete disarmament.

124. To indicate some of the past initiatives of the Socialist States in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons I should like to recall first the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the USSR at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 15 March 1962.¹⁷ The measures envisaged in that draft for the second stage of disarmament included the destruction of stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the prohibition of their production.

125. On the initiative of Hungary the General Assembly on 5 December 1966 adopted resolution 2162 B (XXI) which stressed the importance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹⁸ and urged all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Protocol and to abide strictly by its stipulations.

126. The People's Republic of Mongolia joined the efforts related to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons by suggesting within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 31 July 1969 that the General Assembly appeal to all Governments which had not yet done so to accede to or to ratify the Protocol in the course of 1970, the forty-fifth anniversary of the conclusion of that document.

127. For its part Poland, too, did not spare efforts to contribute to the search for a solution to the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. On 30 July 1968 at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [385th meeting] the Polish delegation proposed that the Secretary-General should be asked to prepare, with the assistance of competent consultant experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use. Acting on the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and on the initiative of Canada, Poland and a number of other States, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2454 A (XXIII) requesting the Secretary-General to prepare such a report. In accordance with the terms of that resolution the report was prepared and issued on 1 July 1969 and was favourably commented upon by the Committee on Disarmament.

128. In taking this initiative Poland was motivated first and foremost by a desire stemming from the basic premises of its foreign policy, as well as its historical experiences. For the tragic experiences of my nation during the Second World War are still very much alive in the minds of my countrymen. As a result of nazi genocide, when the invader had no hesitation in resorting to the use of poisonous chemical agents to exterminate the inmates of Auschwitz and other death camps, millions of Poles perished.

129. It was with deep satisfaction that Poland welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use. We consider that the report, like the earlier

¹⁷ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, section 3.

¹⁸ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons,¹⁹ will not only help make public opinion aware of the dangers involved in these weapons but, in accordance with the formulation of resolution 2454 (XXIII), will constitute a valuable contribution to the consideration of the problems connected with chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The conclusions of the report confirm the necessity of elaborating a convention along the lines proposed in the nine-Power document [A/7655].

130. The report also confirms the classification of chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare as weapons of mass destruction. The report's conclusion in this regard has been arrived at through an analysis of the characteristic features of these weapons and the effects of their use. Two such features stand out. The first is that these weapons have their deadly effects not only on military personnel but also, and to an even greater degree, on civilians. The second is that, as stated in paragraph 371 of the report, chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons "stand in a class of their own as armaments which exercise their effects solely on living matter".

131. The dangers inherent in these weapons can be even greater and one should bear in mind that their use can conceivably involve the risk not only of vertical escalation, as far as the quantity and toxicity or virulence of agents used are concerned, but also of employing other types of weapons of mass destruction. Paragraph 374 of the report states:

"Once any chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapon had been used in warfare, there would be a serious risk of escalation, both in the use of more dangerous weapons belonging to the same class and of other weapons of mass destruction."

On the basis of such considerations and classification the authors of the report have reached a conclusion, which has been endorsed by the Secretary-General in his foreword, on the necessity of taking further steps in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, in particular the prohibition of development, manufacture and stockpiling as well as the total elimination of these weapons from military arsenals. If those objectives were to materialize, the report concludes, the prospects for a greater sense of security and peace throughout the world and general and complete disarmament would brighten significantly.

132. Acting in the spirit of the conclusions of the report, Poland submitted a working paper at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 22 July seeking to underline the significance of the report for strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol and for further consideration of methods whereby those weapons could be eliminated through a ban on their development, manufacture and stockpiling [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 21]. Moreover, in its working document Poland laid stress on the need for accepting the recommendation contained in the foreword by the Secretary-General as the proper basis for further

negotiations relating to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

133. We are deeply convinced that the General Assembly should express its appreciation and gratitude to the Secretary-General, the consultant experts and the members of the Secretariat for their contribution to the preparation of this authoritative and comprehensive report. The Polish delegation for its part is prepared to co-operate in the drafting of an appropriate resolution regarding the report.

134. The exchange of views on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons so far has revealed the existence of a consensus among States not only on the need for ensuring a strict and universal observance of the Geneva Protocol but also on the necessity of taking further steps towards the ultimate elimination of those weapons. As was demonstrated in this year's general debate, that task has been accorded priority by a majority of States. Thus, favourable ground and opportune conditions have been created for an early conclusion of a convention such as that now proposed by the socialist countries.

135. The high priority for further measures relating to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is stressed by the extent of the gravity of the dangers inherent in the arms race involving weapons of mass destruction. It is not only their annihilating power that poses a threat to mankind. The very existence of such weapons, as clearly stated by the Secretary-General in his report, represents a constant threat of the outbreak, whether by accident or design, of a most devastating conflict. The arms race involving weapons of mass destruction, among them chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, cannot but have adverse political, economic and moral effects on the entire international community.

136. This sense of insecurity breeds international tension, while the development and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents in itself fails to impart any proportionate compensatory advantage to security. Ironically, however, the vicious logic of the arms race accounts for the uncanny chain of events whereby the existence of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is being used to justify their proliferation, both "vertical" and "horizontal", while this in turn cannot but further aggravate what is already a grave threat to international peace and security. It is precisely with a view to arresting that dangerous spiral that the draft convention now before us has been submitted by its authors.

137. The draft proceeds from the premise that the primary objective for States in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should be to ensure the strict and universal observance of the existing prohibition of their use contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The preamble to the draft convention, emphasizing the importance of the Geneva Protocol as an instrument embodying the generally recognized rules of international law, calls upon all States to comply strictly with those rules. It also makes reference to General Assembly resolutions 2162 B (XXI) and 2454 A (XXIII) which condemn all actions contrary to the said Protocol.

138. The draft convention fully takes into account the conclusions of the Secretary-General's report, which states

¹⁹ Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1).

in paragraph 7 that the Geneva Protocol contributed to the establishment of a "custom and hence a standard of international law" and that "the existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 may have helped as a deterrent to the use of chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapons in the Second World War." The report has therefore confirmed *opinio juris* regarding the universally binding nature of the prohibition of use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons contained in the Geneva Protocol.

139. The draft convention further proceeds from the premise that chemical and bacteriological weapons should be dealt with jointly, that identical obligations and prohibitions should apply to both those weapons. Thus, article 1 of the draft provides for an undertaking by States Parties to the convention not to "develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or stockpile chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" while article 2 incorporates an undertaking by the parties to destroy within an agreed period of time or to divert to peaceful uses all stockpiles of such weapons. Such a joint approach to the chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, which has gained wide support in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, takes into account the close and direct link existing between chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. I am happy to note at this juncture that the representatives of Brazil and Mexico in their statements in this Committee today have expressed similar opinions. This close link accounts for the fact that the two types of weapons are indissolubly associated with each other in the public mind, and that they are dealt with jointly not only in international law but also, and most significantly, in strategic doctrine and army field manuals everywhere. This close relationship stems from the military and technical characteristics of these weapons which, as is well known, constitute one integrated weapon system. The Secretary-General in his report makes an eloquent case for a joint approach to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons when he states in paragraph 19 that:

"All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge advances, be treated as chemical."

140. It will perhaps be not entirely irrelevant to recall that the same attitude towards chemical and bacteriological weapons was followed in the disarmament efforts of the League of Nations. The 1933 Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, held under the auspices of the League, produced a draft convention on the Prohibition of Chemical, Incendiary or Bacterial Warfare which was approved at the first reading. The unfortunate fact that neither that measure, which sought to further elaborate and complement the Geneva Protocol of 1925, nor other disarmament efforts of the League came to fruition owing to the determination of certain Powers at the time to follow a policy of intensive armaments rather than of disarmament, does not detract from the value of the approach cited.

141. I wish to recall, furthermore, that all documents containing the terms of reference for further negotiations in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons proceed from the premise of their joint consideration;

for example, General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, as well as the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament approved on 15 August 1968, and contained in its report to the General Assembly *ibid.*, para. 14/. For all those reasons we do not find any justification for an approach which would depart from the concept of the joint consideration of chemical and bacteriological weapons followed in the Geneva Protocol and in subsequent international practice. Uniformity of prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons implies the need for introducing, likewise, a uniform prohibition applicable to the entire process preparatory to their use, that is to say, research and development, actual manufacture and stockpiling.

142. I should like now, in the concluding part of my statement, to examine briefly the main provisions of the draft convention before us. I would stress first that the implementation of the provisions of article 1 would amount to a total prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It would also exclude all possible loopholes by banning the acquisition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons otherwise than by development or production. This indicates that the convention is meant to be an effective instrument for preventing the dissemination of those particular types of weapons. Article 3 envisages additionally an undertaking by States Parties to the convention not to assist, encourage or induce any particular State, group of States or international organizations in any actions pertaining to research and development, production, stockpiling or acquisition in any other manner of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. By proposing the prevention of any indirect acquisition of those weapons the wording of article 3 was meant to make the provisions of article 1 fully watertight. This is particularly so in the light of a further provision in article 4 which provides that the above obligations should apply to the activities of States within and outside their territories.

143. Secondly, article 2 of the draft convention provides for an undertaking to destroy within an agreed period of time or to divert to peaceful uses all stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. That undertaking does not depend on any pre-condition or on prior implementation of any other stipulations of the draft convention. Articles 1 and 2 of the draft convention are therefore inseparable and their objective is the elimination of any possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

144. Thirdly, appropriate means of ensuring that States comply with their obligations under the convention are also envisaged in the text before us. Article 4 confirms the principle of the international responsibility of a State for compliance with the convention by "legal and physical persons exercising their activities in its territory and also by its legal and physical persons outside its territory". This is not a new concept, as the principle of the international responsibility of States for compliance with a prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction has been recognized in other international instruments. Furthermore, article 5 of the draft convention provides for the early adoption and enforcement by States, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, of the necessary legislative

and administrative measures pertaining to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to their destruction. Because of the importance of its subject matter and the need to enforce compliance with its provisions, the draft convention, like other well-known international instruments of this type, envisages the need for supplementing the international obligations by States parties with corresponding national legislative and administrative measures.

145. Fourthly, article 6 offers further means of ensuring compliance with the convention's stipulations. It provides for consultations and the co-operation of the parties in solving any problems that could conceivably arise in the application of the terms of the convention. This article offers broad possibilities of co-operation among States in the implementation of the obligations under the convention. The draft convention leaves to States parties to the convention the freedom of defining the principles and scope of such consultations and co-operation, depending on the requirements arising in the course of and in connexion with the implementation of the convention.

146. Fifthly, the draft convention sets no limits on the duration of the obligations provided in it. We feel that this is an approach perfectly in keeping with the character of the weapons in question and the only appropriate approach corresponding to the objective of the convention, namely, the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from military arsenals once and for all as barbarous weapons of mass destruction.

147. Sixthly and finally, the final clauses of the text, which are largely patterned upon other similar disarmament treaties concluded recently, give expression to the principle of universality, for only the widest participation of States in the convention can really make it fully effective.

148. The arguments which I have advanced indicate that the draft convention submitted jointly in the General Assembly by the socialist States represents a suitable basis for the conclusive consideration of this question by the Committee. Our discussion should lead to the adoption of a convention which would eliminate for ever chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Such an instrument would represent an effective disarmament measure within the specific field of weapons so singularly dangerous for man and his future. It would greatly contribute to the cause of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, this measure would certainly not fail to advance the cause of the codification and progressive development of international law. The measures which we now propose to the

United Nations would make it possible to divert resources and the human ingenuity thus saved to the more worthy purposes of economic and social development and the fight against hunger and disease.

149. We are confident that the cause of such a convention would be well served if all States refrained from any action in the military, political or legal sphere that could detract from the effectiveness of the existing rules embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or adversely affect the prospects of the widest possible application of the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of those weapons of mass destruction.

150. We strongly oppose the attempts to justify the chemical and bacteriological (biological) arms race by the requirements of the military-strategic doctrine of mutual deterrence which, in fact, derives from the cold war concept of the balance of fear. We also deplore and firmly oppose the arguments propounded in certain countries to persuade the people to learn to live with chemical and bacteriological weapons just as, years ago, they were urged to learn to live with the nuclear bomb. We are convinced that such designs are contrary to the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII), one of the objectives of which is to make the peoples of the world aware of the dangerous consequences to mankind of the use of such weapons and which recommended that Governments should take appropriate measures to acquaint public opinion with all the facts about chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

151. We consider that the proposed draft convention represents a concrete, realistic and radical measure which could free mankind from the haunting spectre of the weapons "of quiet death", a measure which could eliminate agents of destructive and inhuman warfare the effects of which, to use once more the words of the report of the Secretary-General, are both unpredictable and uncontrollable.

152. In concluding, my delegation would like to appeal to all States on behalf of the delegations which are sponsors of the draft convention to join them in their efforts to bring about the complete elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from the military arsenals everywhere. I wish to express my firm conviction that our draft will gain the wide support of the members of the First Committee and that it will be acted upon favourably by the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.