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Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7639, A/7681, A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)

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(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the decision taken at the 1686th meeting, as set out in document A/C.1/984/Add.1, the Committee will now begin the general debate on the items relating to disarmament.

2. I should like on behalf of the Committee to express appreciation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for having submitted its report [A/7741-DC/232]¹ by 31 October, in response to the request made by the First Committee.

3. Before calling on the first speaker in the general debate, I should like to make a brief statement.

4. Today in the First Committee we begin a most important discussion on the disarmament problem. That problem is the subject of four agenda items and covers a very large range of topics and measures of disarmament and arms control. We are very happy to welcome today the Secretary-General, whose long-standing interest and deep commitment to disarmament we all appreciate. The latest expression of his views is contained in the chapter on disarmament in the introduction to his annual report,² wherein he set forth with clarity and precision a number of important measures which ought to be taken in this field. I think I can assure the Secretary-General that all of the suggestions he put forward will be most seriously considered during our discussions.

5. By an extraordinary, perhaps I should also say happy, coincidence we begin our debate on the same day as the opening in Helsinki of the preliminary bilateral talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the

¹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

United States of America to “undertake negotiations to slow down the strategic armaments race”.

6. It will be recalled that last December the General Assembly in its resolution 2456 D (XXIII) urged the two nuclear Powers to commence these talks at an early date. In September 1968 the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, foreshadowing that action by the General Assembly, also expressed the conviction that negotiations between the two nuclear Powers should aim at and lead to negotiations among all such Powers.

7. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all Members of the United Nations when I express their deepest and most earnest hopes for the success of the strategic arms limitation talks, which are known as SALT. These bilateral talks could prove to be the most important international conference since the Second World War. Their outcome—and we dare think only in terms of success and not of failure—could be decisive for the future of all humanity. We know that these talks will be difficult and delicate. I would venture to hope that in the discussion which opened today in Helsinki and in the talks to follow in the days to come the two great Powers might be able to agree as a preliminary measure to suspend further work on the testing and development of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems as called for by the Secretary-General, whether by formal or tacit agreement, by reciprocated unilateral moratorium by each side, or by other parallel action.

8. Among the important questions which we shall be dealing with here in the First Committee are a draft treaty to prevent the arms race from spreading to the sea-bed and ocean floor, the question of chemical and biological weapons, the question of a comprehensive test ban and the various aspects of the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

9. There are a number of other matters which are raised in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General which will also be discussed in our debate.

10. The fact that the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament succeeded in agreeing on a joint draft treaty [A/7741-DC/232, annex A] at Geneva for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed and ocean floor and have indicated that they are prepared to consider further modifications here augurs well for progress in our work. In this context it is necessary to bear in mind that time is of the essence because the explosion of technology is making new weapons systems feasible, which in turn gives the arms race a life and momentum of its own, making it increasingly more difficult to achieve our goal of disarmament.

11. Our discussions on the question of chemical and biological warfare have been greatly facilitated by the report of the Secretary-General³ and by the fact that

³ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

concrete texts of draft conventions and of draft resolutions have already been submitted for consideration either at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or in this Committee. The same is true for the problem of the test ban and of the exchange of seismic information.

12. As regards the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, we are grateful to the Secretary-General for having prepared for us the three reports called for by the General Assembly last year [A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2, A/7678 and Add.1-3, and A/7568].

13. I have already mentioned the question of the commencement of the SALT talks and the Secretary-General's call for a moratorium on the further development of strategic nuclear weapons systems. We shall also, I am sure, have a useful and fruitful discussion on his suggestion for the establishment of a disarmament decade.

14. I am confident that when we deal with all these important questions and others which may arise during the debate, our discussions will proceed both on a very high level and also in considerable depth. We have a great opportunity during this session to take a number of specific and concrete steps towards further curbing the arms race. The decisions we take here will also provide the guidelines for the negotiations in 1970 at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

15. We have a vast amount of work to be done without very much time left. I am confident, however, that with co-operation and goodwill and by confining our statements to the business at hand without raising extraneous matters we can complete our work in good time and thus help to advance the cause of disarmament and peace.

16. Mr. YOST (United States of America): We are deeply honoured by the presence of the Secretary-General at this opening of our annual debate on the question of disarmament. Also, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that we welcome the important statement you have just made and shall examine it with great attention.

17. Many of the representatives here may remember that when Bernard Baruch presented to the United Nations 23 years ago the United States proposal for an international atomic development authority, in order to ensure the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear power, he opened his statement⁴ by saying: “We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead.”

18. So much has been said through the years on the control of nuclear and other weapons that a danger exists of our minds being dulled to its real significance, to its overriding necessity. Let us hope and pray that this will not happen, because this is truly one of the questions on which all our lives depend.

19. Although for essential practical reasons the main negotiating forum on disarmament questions is elsewhere, the General Assembly has important powers and responsibilities concerning this subject, deriving from the Charter

⁴ See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, No. 1*, first meeting.

itself. In the exercise of these powers it is customary for the Assembly, through this Committee, to debate every year the issues and principles that must govern the continuing search for effective measures of arms control. In past years our debates here have given rise to resolutions of great value in guiding the negotiators of such major agreements as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

20. I mention these well-known facts only to stress how serious these debates are and how essential it is that we never view them as a matter of routine.

21. This year we meet at a time when both the need and the opportunity for progress in arms control are greater than they have been for some time. The variety and breadth of activity currently under way in the disarmament field and related areas should be heartening to all of us who believe that armaments, nuclear and non-nuclear, must be made subject to effective control. New opportunities exist to take significant steps toward that goal.

22. The favourable developments to which I refer are, in brief, the following.

23. On this very day, as you, Mr. Chairman, have pointed out, bilateral talks are opening between the United States and the Soviet Union on limiting strategic armaments. The prospects are now favourable for early entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A regional organization has been established, in accordance with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, to help ensure compliance with that Treaty. Significant work is continuing at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on controlling chemical and biological weapons. A draft treaty to prohibit emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed [A/7741-DC/232, *annex A*] has been developed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and presented to the General Assembly for discussion.

24. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been enlarged by eight countries whose participation will, we are confident, contribute to maintaining it as a vital forum for disarmament negotiations.

25. Practical ideas are being elaborated on the international exchange of seismic data in order to gain increased understanding of the seismic characteristics of underground nuclear explosions, and thus to advance the search for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

26. In a related area not directly of a disarmament nature, intensive work is under way in the International Atomic Energy Agency on problems relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly those matters which were addressed by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States of 1968.

27. I should like to discuss each of those areas of progress.

28. As we are all aware, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun today in Helsinki one of the most serious and important negotiations ever undertaken in the field of arms control and disarmament. Those negotiations will be for the purpose of curbing the strategic arms race and they will include consideration of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

29. The importance of those negotiations can hardly be over-estimated. Their subject is the most powerful, the most devastating, and the most expensive weapons ever devised and manufactured. They will involve the vital security interests of both participants.

30. As evidence of the great seriousness with which my Government approaches these talks, I wish to quote briefly at this point from the message which President Nixon has addressed today to the United States delegation in Helsinki:

"You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an American delegation. . . . You will begin what all of your fellow citizens in the United States and, I believe, all people throughout the world, profoundly hope will be a sustained effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic forces but to reverse it.

"I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task . . . I am nevertheless hopeful that your negotiations with representatives from the Soviet Union will serve to increase mutual security.

"I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defence responsibilities. I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals."

31. To that quotation from President Nixon let me add the following statement made on 13 November 1969 by our Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, in a speech discussing the significance of the Helsinki talks:

"Under present circumstances an equitable limitation on strategic nuclear weapons would strengthen the national security of both sides. If this is mutually perceived—if both sides conduct these talks in the light of that perception—the talks may accomplish an historic breakthrough in the pattern of confrontation that has characterized the postwar world."

32. Those statements testify to the extraordinary importance which my country attaches to the talks that opened today in Helsinki. We are encouraged to hope and believe that our Soviet counterparts also approach this task with great seriousness of purpose and are prepared, as we are, to be reasonable and flexible in dealing with the profound complexities of this problem. We would be unwise to expect quick results but we must be patient and persistent, determined and indefatigable. Neither participant, in its own interests and those of the world community, can permit itself to fail.

33. Whatever the difficulties, the effort is supremely worthwhile. This is true not only because of the inherent value of strategic arms limitation itself. It is true also because progress on this central problem can provide impetus in other arms control areas as well. In particular, it might well exert a favourable impact on the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban. It could also improve the outlook for an agreement to cut off the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials and to transfer some of the existing stockpiles of those materials to peaceful uses.

34. I should now like to review where we stand with respect to multilateral international agreements, beginning with the non-proliferation Treaty, and then turning to other projects that have been the subject of consideration at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

35. The outstanding achievement of the Geneva Disarmament talks so far is the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The principal purpose of that Treaty is, of course, to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons among nations and thus to lessen the risk that the world will ever suffer the catastrophe of nuclear war. It has, however, additional major purposes. Many members of the Committee on Disarmament, as the current report of the body of this Assembly shows, have expressed the conviction that the treaty's entry into force will stimulate progress in negotiation of effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. The treaty will also serve the purpose of facilitating the worldwide dissemination of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

36. As the Committee will recall, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was overwhelmingly commended by the General Assembly in June 1968 and opened for signature on 1 July 1968. To enter into force, the Treaty must be ratified by the three nuclear-weapon parties and 40 other States. So far it has been signed by 91 countries, 22 of which have deposited their instruments of ratification. We are especially heartened by the prospect that several important additional countries are expected to sign the Treaty in the near future. My Government has been discussing for some time with the Soviet Union the question of depositing our own instruments of ratification jointly and simultaneously, an act that would be symbolic of the mutual understanding which made the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons possible. We hope this may soon occur. As more and more signatory nations complete their ratifications there is good reason to believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will enter into force in the near future.

37. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is without doubt a major step in the history of disarmament. Even in advance of its entry into force, the steps toward that goal—its negotiation, its endorsement by the General Assembly, and the signatures and ratifications already received—have done much to create favourable conditions and a favourable atmosphere for progress on other aspects of disarmament. Certainly Article VI of the Treaty weighed substantially in the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to initiate strategic arms

limitation talks. In addition, several of the problems involved in negotiating a sea-bed arms control treaty were materially simplified by the fact that similar problems had been faced and successfully resolved during the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

38. I turn now briefly to three sub-items on the agenda of this Committee which had their origins in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. These are the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the results of the Conference [*A/7767 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2*], his report dealing with the provision of peaceful nuclear explosion services through IAEA [*A/7678 and Add.1-2*], and the experts' report on the role nuclear technology can play in the advancement of developing countries [*A/7568*]. Many of the resolutions that were adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States⁵ reflected the natural desire on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States to be assured of continuing access to the benefits of this promising new technology, and provided helpful guidelines to be kept in mind in the years ahead.

39. We have been impressed over the past year by the efforts of the Secretary-General and IAEA to be responsive to many of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and we wish to commend the quality of the reports now before us. The Agency now has under way an intensive re-examination of the composition of its Board of Governors in order to make that body more representative. It has produced a thoughtful summary of many of its activities which are directly relevant to the views expressed at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. With the full participation of all interested member States, IAEA has gone a long way in defining its prospective responsibilities in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions.

40. The tasks that lie ahead in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not easy and will not be quickly finished. However, substantial progress is being made. We believe that the activity of the past year has borne out our assertion at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly that the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States can be carried out more effectively by working through existing bodies than by creating new mechanisms. We continue to believe firmly that this is the case. The United States will devote its best energies to future efforts in this complex and demanding field.

41. During the past year there has been a marked increase in proposals to limit chemical and biological weapons. At the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament there was much thoughtful discussion of this subject. Several proposals have been introduced which seek to reduce the likelihood that chemical and biological weapons will ever be used. The most detailed and carefully thought-out of these measures is a draft convention introduced at the Conference at Geneva by the United Kingdom to control not only the use, but also the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20*]. In addi-

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2.*

tion, during the present session of the General Assembly, a draft chemical and bacteriological weapons convention [A/7655] was introduced by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

42. An extremely valuable contribution to this subject is the report of the group of consultant experts to the Secretary-General on chemical and biological weapons⁶ which was transmitted on 30 June 1969. This report indeed makes clear the need for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to conduct a detailed and comprehensive examination of all the arms-control proposals for chemical and bacteriological weapons.

43. As President Nixon indicated in his address before the United Nations General Assembly on 18 September 1969 [1755th plenary meeting], the United States supports the development by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, for consideration in this Assembly, of arms-control initiatives in the chemical-biological field. On several occasions the United States has reiterated its support for the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.⁷ We share the concern of our fellow Members of the United Nations over the dangers of uncontrolled development and possible use of chemical and biological weapons and we shall be prepared to work with others at Geneva on any proposals that offer the prospect of reliable arms control in this field. We shall have more to say on this subject later during this debate.

44. We are gratified by the continuing efforts at Geneva over the past year towards an adequately verified, comprehensive nuclear test ban. President Nixon, in his messages regarding the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in March and July, stated that the United States supports the conclusion of such a comprehensive test ban, and urged efforts to achieve greater understanding of how compliance with it could be verified. To this end, my Government has taken steps to implement the seismic investigation proposal which our delegation presented in this Committee on 5 December 1968. Seismic recordings of our peaceful nuclear explosion, Project Rulison, on 10 September 1969, are being analysed in the United States and, we trust, elsewhere. Discussion of those analyses in the relevant technical and scientific forums should contribute to a more complete understanding of seismology and of its potential for identifying underground nuclear explosions.

45. With the same end in view, my country has welcomed the recent important Canadian initiative regarding a worldwide exchange of seismic data [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 15]. The United States is prepared to lend its support to the type of exchange envisaged in Canada's proposal and plans to participate to the fullest possible extent.

46. For some years, the United States has been seeking agreement on a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for use in weapons and a transfer of agreed

amounts of those materials to safeguarded peaceful uses. At Geneva in April 1969 we modified our earlier proposals to provide that inspection under such an agreement would be accomplished solely by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This change was introduced in order to facilitate further negotiation of a broadly acceptable agreement, for which the safeguards provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty would serve as a guide. We remain convinced that such an agreement would be a major contribution to the control of nuclear armaments, and we hope for early progress on it.

47. The principal achievement at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year has been the development of a draft treaty to prevent emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. The text of that draft treaty appears as annex A of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly. To assist the Committee in its consideration of this draft treaty, let me now review briefly how the draft evolved and why we believe it affords a good basis for achieving a worth-while arms-control measure.

48. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament began its intensive consideration of a sea-bed arms-control measure in March 1969. During the succeeding months, detailed discussion took place on all of the principal issues: on the scope of the prohibition, that is the weapons and facilities which should be prohibited; on the area of the sea-bed to which the prohibition should apply; and on the procedures for verification.

49. There were many different views among members of the Committee, including the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union. However, it proved possible for these two delegations to resolve their differences, and on 7 October 1969 they submitted an agreed draft for the consideration of the Committee. Further intensive discussion took place in the Committee in which members candidly pointed out defects in the draft and made suggestions for improvements.

50. As a result of those discussions, the two authors of the draft presented on 30 October 1969, a revised draft, containing improvements which had been suggested by the proposals of many members. It is this revised draft of 30 October that now lies before this Committee.

51. In this statement I do not wish to review in detail every provision of the draft treaty. I should merely like to offer some thoughts on its basic approach.

52. The principal effect of the treaty would be to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed beyond the maximum contiguous zone. Thus the treaty would have a limited application.

53. We see the following virtues in this limited approach. First, the treaty will cover nuclear weapons. It is technically possible for these devastating weapons to be fired from silos or other emplacements under the water. An effective ban on such emplacement would prevent extension of the nuclear arms race into this new dimension. As we know from experience in such matters, prevention before the fact is far easier than removal after the fact.

⁶ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

⁷ *Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare*, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

54. Secondly, the treaty will prohibit the only weapons which it might be militarily advantageous to station on the sea-bed. It would be extremely expensive to emplace any weapons on the bottom of the ocean. Only weapons of mass destruction could have enough significance militarily to warrant the expense.

55. Thirdly, the treaty is simple. Because of the limited scope of its prohibitions, verification can be based on existing rights under international law, including especially the right of observation. Let me interject at this point the following unequivocal assurance: the draft treaty is not intended to affect, and in fact will not affect, any State's position regarding its rights under international law except, of course, for the basic prohibitions of article I, which will constitute a new and desirable constraint on the freedom of action of parties to the treaty. A disclaimer clause is included in the draft treaty to make perfectly clear that, except for this constraint, the rights of States, or their recognition or non-recognition of claims of rights, will in no way be prejudiced.

56. Fourthly, the treaty will constitute a step in our continuing efforts to end the nuclear arms race. Another area, representing almost three quarters of the earth's surface, will be kept free of emplaced nuclear arms, as is the case with Antarctica and outer space.

57. This last point warrants further comment. We do not urge international agreement on the sea-bed arms control treaty merely because it is simple, or merely because it may be concluded this year rather than next. We urge it because it would vastly extend the area of arms control. By any standard this makes it eminently worth while.

58. Critics have frankly asked whether the actions this treaty would prohibit are actions that any State ever intends to take. The premise of such questions seems to be that an arms control measure is worth-while only if it stops an arms race that has already begun or prevents an arms race which is about to begin. This premise in our view cannot be sustained.

59. In 1963, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1884 (XVIII) opposing the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction around the earth. This concept was later embodied in the "no bombs in orbit" clause of the outer space Treaty of 1967. When those measures were being developed there was no arms race in the sky and nobody knew whether there would ever be one. It was enough that the technical possibility existed. I think that all of us today are glad that we did take steps early, when it was possible to do so, to forestall the risk that weapons of mass destruction might be put into orbit. Who can say that if we had not done so, such weapons would not be even now constantly passing over our heads?

60. Let me be clear: it is already within our capability to emplace nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and such action would not be without some military advantages. For example, nuclear weapons emplaced under hundreds of feet of water could constitute a deterrent force which would be difficult for an adversary to eliminate with offensive missiles. Also, such weapons would be relatively far from populated areas. It would be rash indeed to say that, in the

absence of an effective treaty prohibition, Powers possessing this capability would not make use of it.

61. In addition to its value as an arms control measure, this draft treaty will also help to ensure that the vast areas of the sea-bed remain available for peaceful economic exploitation for the benefit of all of mankind. Let no one doubt that a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed could have a profound effect on the prospects for complete and free co-operation in its peaceful exploitation.

62. I have stressed that the present draft sea-bed treaty constitutes a limited step but one that is worth-while. I need scarcely add that prospects for further measures of arms control relating to the sea-bed would not be foreclosed by the present draft treaty. On the contrary, the preamble contains a clear affirmation that parties would continue negotiations concerning further measures to exclude the sea-bed from the arms race. Moreover, the text contains a provision calling for a treaty review conference five years after its entry into force. At that time, if not sooner, the parties will be able to assess whether further prohibitions are possible and desirable.

63. What should be the next step in bringing a sea-bed treaty closer to conclusion? As the United States delegation made clear at Geneva, we expect the draft treaty to be reviewed carefully in this Committee of the General Assembly. The sea-bed Committee is also considering implications of the treaty within that Committee's terms of reference. We do not believe that this draft, as far as it was developed at Geneva, necessarily represents the last word as a treaty ready to receive broad international support. For our part, we shall listen with care and understanding to the comments made here and will be prepared to consider further modifications, if they should seem called for, to meet concerns of the international community.

64. I have reviewed briefly all of the areas in which important activities are taking place in the field of disarmament. Although there are a number of hopeful signs, we recognize that progress is far from being as rapid as most of us would wish. However, much work that can lead to concrete achievement is under way. We believe that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be asked to continue urgently next year all of its efforts in the fields where more progress might be possible. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will of course profit greatly from the guidance established in the deliberations of this Assembly.

65. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has recently been strengthened by the addition of eight new members: Argentina, Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. It is particularly gratifying that these countries have begun their participation in the Committee's work. They have already contributed their share of valuable ideas and we are confident that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will derive much benefit from their participation.

66. Indeed, my Government wishes to pay tribute to all the members of the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to express our thanks to them for their helpful, constructive, patient—and I emphasize patient—efforts to

bring about progress at Geneva. Progress is slow but progress must and will come. We look forward to resuming early in 1970, with the utmost seriousness and sense of shared responsibility, the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

67. Speaking of 1970, I should like to take the liberty, in conclusion, of repeating to the Committee a remark I made on this subject in the plenary Assembly last month in regard to preparation for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. I said:

“... we must pursue with much more energy and realism our common responsibility to check the dangerous and costly arms race. There are now more than enough nuclear weapons in the world to destroy every living thing on earth. No nation can or will disarm unilaterally but prompt, effective and collective means of checking the arms race, particularly as regards weapons of mass destruction, are long overdue. Nor is the need for disarmament limited to the great Powers and nuclear weapons. All the wars now being fought are being fought with conventional arms; it is the ever-mounting burden of conventional armament which weighs on the poorest nations and is one of the most serious impediments to their economic, social and political development”.
[1788th plenary meeting, para. 49.]

68. Let us all then, great Powers and small Powers, nuclear armed or conventionally armed, take a solemn and a common resolve to mark our twenty-fifth anniversary by substantial agreements to control, limit and reduce the armaments of all of us. By so doing we may indeed, and at last, “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace”, “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”, “live together in peace with one another as good neighbours”, and “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.

69. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): First of all, may I welcome the presence at this meeting, as we begin our consideration of disarmament questions, of the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant. His presence today at the opening of our debate shows his constant and sustained interest, together with that of the United Nations as a whole, in the problems of disarmament.

70. We also welcome the important statement you have made today, Mr. Chairman, on the occasion of the opening of the debates on disarmament questions in the First Committee, which evidences your deep and constant interest in the problems we are about to consider today.

71. This year the beginning of the consideration of disarmament questions in the First Committee coincides with the tenth anniversary of one of the General Assembly's decisions which by every right belongs among the most important acts in the entire history of the existence of the United Nations. On 20 November 1959, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, supported by many peace-loving States, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 1378 (XIV), which declares that “general and complete disarmament is the most important question facing

the world today” and “calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution to this problem”.

72. This decision of the General Assembly gave expression to the general understanding and recognition of the fact that in the present age disarmament is a most important problem, on the solution of which depend the vital interests of all peoples, large and small, as well as the future of mankind. The solution of this problem is directly linked to the fulfilment of the main task of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter, namely: “... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and to ensure that peoples shall “... live together in peace with one another as good neighbours” and unite their “... strength to maintain international peace and security ...”.

73. In recent times there have been enormous changes in the world in the military and technological fields, turning nuclear and rocket weapons into even more terrifying and destructive methods of warfare. A nuclear missile conflict under present conditions would bring in its wake the death of hundreds of millions of people, the annihilation of whole States, contamination of the earth's atmosphere, and the destruction of invaluable treasures of civilization and culture. A warning to this effect was contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the effects of the possible uses of nuclear weapons,⁸ prepared by a representative group of scientists and specialists of various States. The scientific and technological revolution, opening up unprecedented prospects for the use of the mighty forces of nature for the benefit of mankind, might also be directed to purposes of annihilation of people and destruction of treasures accumulated over centuries.

74. In the past 10 years there has been a sharp increase in the burden of military expenditures which are borne by the working people of many countries. If at the beginning of the 1960s expenditures for military purposes in the whole world amounted, according to the estimates of experts, to about \$120,000 million, this astronomical sum is more than three times higher than the expenditures for public health services in the whole world. The enormous military budgets of States are proof of the fact that, in conditions where in many parts of the globe people suffer from hunger and disease, there is an incredible waste of colossal material resources and means for purposes of war. This still more strongly bears out the significance of the problem we are about to consider here, namely the problem of disarmament.

75. Unfortunately, we must note that the key problems of disarmament still remain unsolved, that the military budgets of States continue to increase at a rapid rate, although many efforts are made both in the General Assembly and in the Disarmament Committee to halt and reverse the arms race. In this connexion we cannot but stress that continuation of the arms race imposed by imperialism threatens mankind with even graver dangers. It is difficult, even impossible, to foresee the possible effects on the life of peoples and the possible consequences of

⁸ *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons*, United Nations publications, Sales No. E.68.IX.1.

rivalry between missile and anti-missile means of warfare if such rivalry should be undertaken by certain circles in the West under the influence of the notorious military-industrial complex.

76. Further perfecting of chemical and bacteriological weapons also represents a great danger. This problem, as was already emphasized by the head of the Soviet delegation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement to the General Assembly [*1756th plenary meeting*], has become acute and important in the light of the research being carried out in some countries, which has resulted in the creation of extremely virulent destructive chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. Their use could have extremely grave consequences for mankind. Awareness of the growing threat of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was a motivating stimulus to the adoption of measures that would safeguard peoples from such a danger and strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.⁹ Some steps have been taken to this end, both by the General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee and by the group of scientists which, under the direction of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, compiled a report.

77. In view of the special significance, urgency and increasing timeliness of the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Soviet Union, together with a group of other socialist countries, submitted for the consideration of the present twenty-fourth General Assembly an item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons".

78. In conformity with the agreement reached among the co-sponsors of this item, the delegation of Poland will present a detailed explanation of this proposal of the socialist countries. As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, we intend to make a separate statement on the entire body of questions connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons included as a separate item on the agenda of the present session of the General Assembly.

79. The Soviet Union views disarmament as an effective means for ensuring a system of international security which would exclude the possibility of resorting to force to settle disputes between States. By the very nature of their social system, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries do not and cannot have any economic or any other interest in the arms race. There is no military-industrial complex in the socialist countries.

80. In order to complete the vast tasks which the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist countries have set themselves, firm and lasting peace is necessary, a peace without any arms race, without atomic bombs and missiles. That is why the great founder of the Soviet State, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin proclaimed the slogan: "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism".

⁹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925.

81. The Soviet Union has sought consistently and persistently to obtain the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, and advocates the implementation of partial measures in the field of disarmament, as it does general and complete disarmament.

82. Needless to say, the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament presupposes the participation in a treaty on such disarmament by all States of military importance and, above all, by all nuclear States.

83. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to all measures aimed at restraining the strategic arms race. If we were to succeed in checking the race for such arms, all States—and not only those possessing such weapons—would stand to gain.

84. As you have already mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as did the representative of the United States, today in Helsinki preliminary consideration began on questions relating to talks between Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the checking of the strategic arms race. You were quite right, Mr. Chairman, when you pointed out that a positive result of these negotiations would undoubtedly further the strengthening and maintenance of peace all over the world and would contribute to the halting of the nuclear and missile arms race. The Soviet Union, as was recently declared publicly and officially by the leaders of the Soviet State, is striving to achieve precisely those results during the Helsinki talks.

85. In recent years a number of measures have been taken in the field of limitation of the nuclear arms race. As is well known, as a result of the efforts of many peace-loving States in the struggle for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the first gains have been won.

86. A few years ago the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was concluded. This Treaty to a certain extent limits the possibilities for perfecting nuclear weapons and reduces in substantial measure the danger of radioactive contamination of our planet, which is a serious threat to the life and health of mankind.

87. The Moscow Treaty was followed by the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which prohibited the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth and in outer space, on the moon and other celestial bodies.

88. We note with satisfaction that both these Treaties are in force as operative international agreements.

89. Finally, we hope that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will soon enter into force. This Treaty is another important step towards the limitation of the nuclear arms race. As was stressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement on 19 September 1969 [*1756th meeting*] at the present session of the General Assembly:

"From the point of view of the interests of peace it is important to ensure that the widest possible circle of

States accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially those that possess the material and technical resources for creating nuclear weapons or may reach that level relatively soon.”

90. The Secretary-General, U Thant, in the introduction to the booklet prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appealed to all countries which have not yet signed the Treaty to do so. He stressed his firm belief that it is in the best interests of the world community that the Non-Proliferation Treaty enters into force in the near future with the universal participation of all States of the world.

91. The conclusion of the three above-mentioned important treaties in the field of nuclear arms limitation serves to confirm that measures in the field of disarmament are feasible, that they can be achieved, but this requires energetic and persistent efforts on the part of States and peoples.

92. What has been done is only a beginning. The three Treaties referred to are a point of departure, so to speak, for further progress towards the realization of the most important task—nuclear disarmament.

93. It seems essential, first of all, to go into the questions relating to the solution of this problem.

94. On the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament the item on further effective measures for cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament occupies an important place. Since the very beginning of the appearance of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has consistently and persistently advocated that atomic energy be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that nuclear weapons be outlawed. Now, too, we continue to favour this solution.

95. The position of the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear disarmament has been set forth, as is well known, in the Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated 1 July of last year, concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament.¹⁰ The Memorandum declared the willingness of the Soviet Union to enter into negotiations on the full cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, reduction of the stockpiles of such weapons, and the subsequent full prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. The Soviet Government proposed that all other nuclear Powers immediately begin such negotiations. In doing so, the Soviet Government was guided by the fact that during such negotiations agreement could be reached both on an entire group of measures leading to the destruction of nuclear weapons and on some of them directed towards that end.

96. The Soviet Union is ready, as in the past, to discuss these extremely important questions with the representatives of other Governments, and first and foremost with those of the nuclear Powers. We are also ready right now to begin carrying out partial measures directed towards full

nuclear disarmament and to immediately work out and conclude the necessary international agreements to that end.

97. It goes without saying that radical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament are possible provided that they will be carried out by all nuclear Powers, and not only by some of them.

98. One of the measures for restraining or narrowing the sphere of the nuclear arms race which was actively discussed in the Committee on Disarmament this year was the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. [A/7741-DC/232,¹¹ annex A.] The discussion of this question in the Disarmament Committee, which was of a fruitful and constructive nature, showed that there was a broad understanding of the importance and timeliness of excluding wide stretches of the sea-bed from the sphere of the arms race. This task acquires particular timeliness today when practical exploration of the sea-bed has begun and poses the threat that this new sphere of human activity may be used for military purposes.

99. Many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have observed that unless effective measures in this field are taken in time, now, it will be much more difficult to adopt them in the future. The representative of the United States also drew attention to this situation in his statement today.

100. It is easy to imagine what may happen unless barriers are created to block the extension of military activities to the sea-bed and the ocean floor. What would happen if the arms race were also extended to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, which represent about five-sevenths of the earth's surface? It would mean that the international situation and military activities would become even more tense. Even apart from the political significance of this situation, from the influence it would have on the state of international relations, one can see that from a technical standpoint, the chances of military conflicts arising would be greatly multiplied.

101. The emplacement of military objects on the sea-bed and the ocean floor by many competing States would substantially expand the field of military contact between them and therefore the possibility of even unintentional clashes, each of which would be capable of setting off a chain reaction and starting a conflict of a global nature.

102. The emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed is also dangerous because of the possibility of accidents whose consequences could be catastrophic for mankind. An accident with nuclear weapons in the ocean can lead to radioactive contamination of wide stretches of water. Sea currents can spread contaminated water far from the place of the accident and the marine resources used by man will become contaminated and therefore dangerous to mankind. No less a threat would be posed by an accident with other types of weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical and bacteriological types of weapons.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7134.

¹¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

103. The military utilization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor is not yet fully developed, but even in the very near future the situation may change. The task now is not to let the moment pass, but to see to it that the arms race is not extended to this wide area of our planet. It is easier to prevent what is not yet begun than that which is already being carried out.

104. This is precisely the task set by the draft Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, which has been submitted to the General Assembly by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

105. What are the basic features of this draft Treaty?

106. The essence of the agreement, the fundamental obligation of the parties to the treaty, is contained in article 1. That article provides for prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof

“... of any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons”.

107. Thus the draft provides, first of all, for solution of the most important part of the problem of demilitarization of the sea-bed, namely, the prohibition of the emplacement of the most dangerous types of weapons there. Therefore, in our view, the most important part of the problem is solved: a major step is taken towards complete exclusion of the sea-bed from the sphere of the arms race. Moreover—and we attach great importance to this—paragraph 3 of the preamble to the proposed draft Treaty proclaims that the States Parties to it are

“*Convinced* that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race”

and are “... determined to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to this end”. The Soviet Union, for its part, is always ready to carry out this important provision of the draft Treaty.

108. An important provision of the draft Treaty on the sea-bed is that pertaining to the definition of the zones of activity of the agreement. From the very beginning of negotiations on the draft Treaty the Soviet Union took the position that its application should be extended to the whole area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the 12-mile offshore zone, considering that most coastal States have territorial waters within those limits. The draft Treaty which is now under consideration by the First Committee refers precisely to a zone 12 miles in width. It speaks of the maximum width of the contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,¹² whose width, according to article 24, paragraph 2, of the Convention, is 12 miles. With regard to

the principle underlying the definition of the outside limit of the 12-mile offshore zone, this is set forth in the text of the draft treaty itself which proposes that the above-mentioned Geneva Convention and international law be followed as guides.

109. The draft Treaty also prohibits the emplacement by States parties of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in the 12-mile contiguous zone of other States whose territorial waters are less than 12 miles in width. This prohibition is contained in article 1, paragraph 2.

110. Speaking of the zone of application of the draft Treaty, I should like to mention one important feature. When working out the text of this agreement we took into account the fact that the Treaty, by its contents in reference to zones of activity, touches upon a series of problems involving the interests of many States. At the same time, the objectives set forth in the Treaty are particularly clear-cut and concern only those tasks stated in the title itself. Hence article II, paragraph 2, of the draft Treaty specifically stipulates, and I quote:

“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of the rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor.”

Thus the Treaty in no way claims to establish any new legal norms relating to the principles of the definition of the width of territorial waters and so forth, and will not complicate the solution of problems connected with the activities of States in the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans. On the contrary, having significantly limited the possibilities for military use of the sea-bed, the Treaty creates more favourable conditions for the peaceful use of this wide area of our planet.

111. An important component part of the Treaty is the provision stipulating a system of control over its observance. This problem is of no small importance since the parties to the Treaty are interested in having complete confidence in strict respect for all its provisions. The provisions of the draft treaty pertaining to verification and control include

“the right of States Parties to verify the activities of other States Parties on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone ... if these activities raise doubts concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty ...” [Ibid., article III, para. 2.]

The draft treaty provides that verification shall be carried out without interference in the activities of States on the sea-bed and without in any way infringing on their rights recognized under international law, including the freedom of the high seas. It also provides for consultation and co-operation among the parties in order to remove any doubts concerning the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Treaty.

¹² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

"In the event that consultation and co-operation have not removed the doubts and there is serious question concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, States Parties to this Treaty may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council." /Idem, *para. 3.*/

112. In considering the provisions pertaining to control the representatives of many countries came out in favour of having the Treaty provide for the right of appeal to other parties with a request for assistance in the practical implementation of verification of fulfilment of the Treaty. This provision is accordingly set forth in article III, paragraph 2, of the text of the draft Treaty.

113. Thus the control system provided for in the draft Treaty ensures the effective verification of the implementation of the Treaty and the equal right of each State to take part in carrying out verification, without thereby raising any obstacles to non-prohibited activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

114. In working out the draft Treaty on the sea-bed, the representatives of many States expressed the wish that, by analogy with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the sea-bed would provide for the possibility of reviewing in the future, at a special conference of the States Parties, the question of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the development of technology for the exploration of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. This wish is reflected in article V of the draft Treaty, which provides that

"Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized."

Such a conference can also decide the question of whether and when an additional review conference to examine the operation of the Treaty shall be convened.

115. These, briefly summarized, are the most important provisions of the draft Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. This draft is based on the desire to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to the activities of States in connexion with the sea-bed. The draft Treaty on the sea-bed is based on the conviction, expressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, that the prohibition of military utilization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor is in the interests of the maintenance of peace in the whole world and of reducing the arms race, and contributes to the easing of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between States. The conclusion of such a Treaty would be an essential prerequisite for the development of international co-operation in the exploration of that environment for peaceful purposes.

116. We should like to express the hope that the draft Treaty submitted to the First Committee will meet with wide support and approval from the Member States of the United Nations, and that as a result it will soon become possible to open it for signature by States which would wish to become parties to it.

117. The Committee on Disarmament devoted considerable attention to another measure in the nuclear field, namely, the question of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests; in other words, completion of the task three-quarters of which was accomplished through the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in three environments.

118. The Soviet Government, as is well known, is ready to reach agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests based on the use of national means of detection for control over that prohibition.

119. Attempts to delay acceptance of a positive decision with regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests, under the pretext that international control and inspection are necessary, are only an expression of the fact that certain countries which are carrying out an intensive programme of underground nuclear weapons tests have so far taken a position of opposition to the achievement of agreement on this important question. In view of the availability of modern seismological means of detection, practically speaking not a single country—and the experience of recent years clearly and convincingly confirms this—can secretly explode nuclear weapons underground without incurring the risk of being exposed in violation of an international agreement.

120. All that is necessary for reaching agreement on the question of the cessation of underground experiments with nuclear weapons is the political will to put an end to such tests once and for all.

121. In connexion with the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, the question was raised in the Committee on Disarmament of an international exchange of seismological data. The Soviet delegation in the Committee on Disarmament at that time set forth in detail the position of the Soviet Union on this question, and we also consider it useful to reaffirm that position here at this session of the General Assembly.

122. The Soviet Union is prepared to exchange its national seismological data on a voluntary basis with other parties to a Treaty on comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, as well as to take part in international exchange of such data, including such participation within the framework of the proposal for a "detection club".

123. However, we consider that participation in the international exchange of seismological data must in no measure impose upon the parties to such exchange any obligations concerning the carrying out of international inspection on their territories, and that the evaluation of the data collected must be made not by any international body but by each State for itself.

124. The Soviet Union considers that the development of modern science and technology has reached such a level as

to permit the carrying out of control over the fulfilment of an agreement on prohibition of underground tests with the aid of national means, which would give all States assurance that this agreement was being fulfilled in good faith. Of course, if anyone wishes to continue underground nuclear explosions, then many artificial obstacles can be piled up on the path to an agreement, including those of a scientific and technical nature, to justify that negative position. The history of the many years of negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests has repeatedly given examples of the way in which those who wished to delay a solution of the problem of nuclear testing have often acted precisely in that manner.

125. If, on the other hand, States have a firm desire and determination to put an end once and for all to dangerous underground nuclear weapon experiments, there is every possibility for the conclusion of an international agreement to that effect and for its subsequent implementation.

126. The Soviet Union also supports the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. This is one of the urgent measures which should be carried out in such a way that the creation of nuclear-free zones would effectively limit the area of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and fully solve the problem of the prevention of their direct or indirect dissemination.

127. The Committee on Disarmament also examined other items, including the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, hearing a number of statements pertaining to the problem of general and complete disarmament.

128. If we draw the balance, we cannot fail to say that although until now the Committee unfortunately has not succeeded in finding a solution to the basic problems of disarmament, its work has positive aspects showing a degree of progress in the solution of individual problems and, specifically, in the matter of the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for purposes of war, a question which has been examined in the Committee at various sessions during 1969.

129. During this year the membership of the Disarmament Committee has increased. At the present time, 26 States are represented in it. The change in the number of members is explained by the fact that since the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament the number of Member States of the United Nations has increased and the extent of the tasks before it has grown and become more complex, and therefore so have the problems discussed in it. In these conditions it became necessary to expand the membership of the Committee in order to ensure a more complete and comprehensive study of disarmament questions. At the same time, in expanding the membership of the Committee the intention was to maintain the principle underlying it when it was established in 1961 and reflecting the realities of the present-day world, namely, that of equal representation of the States of the two main military and political groups, with due representation of the non-aligned countries. It was also intended to preserve the character of the Committee on Disarmament as a negotiating body. During the detailed consultations which were held over a comparatively long time between the Co-Chairmen of the Committee and many States, these principles served as the main

criterion for settling the problem of expansion of the Committee.

130. As a result of the expansion of the Committee on Disarmament, Hungary, Mongolia, Japan, the Netherlands, Argentina, Morocco, Pakistan and Yugoslavia became new members.

131. The work of the expanded Committee on Disarmament has shown that these new members are making an extremely useful contribution to the consideration of disarmament problems. This is borne out by all the debates on disarmament, and especially by the discussion of the draft Treaty submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

132. In conclusion, allow me to say that it is incumbent upon the First Committee to develop and consolidate such useful work as was accomplished in the Committee on Disarmament. In our view, this is the task before the Committee. It is a complex task, but a noble and practically feasible one if the representatives of all countries will act in a spirit of good will, constructively and with a sense of high responsibility for the consolidation of peace and the strengthening of international security. What the peoples of the world expect of the General Assembly are tangible results in limitation of the arms race and practical assistance in disarmament.

133. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): Mr. Chairman, first of all I have great pleasure in saying that my delegation fully endorses the eloquent sentiments that you expressed at the beginning of this meeting. We earnestly hope that the very important bilateral SALT talks on strategic arms limitation which began today in Helsinki will be crowned with complete success.

134. Twenty-three Latin American delegations at the 1651st meeting, our first working meeting on 10 October last, urged the Committee to adopt a schedule of work which would allow it to give the items on disarmament the consideration their importance warrants. As our Chairman rightly observed at the time, their concern was shared by all members of the Committee, and it has now been largely rewarded. We are not starting our deliberations on disarmament questions at the beginning of November as would certainly have been preferable, but at least we are doing so in mid-November and not in December, as was justifiably feared might be the case.

135. The fact that the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament were receptive to the expressed wishes of this Committee and agreed that the Committee on Disarmament should conclude its 1969 session on 30 October has certainly earned them our sincere appreciation. Our special gratitude goes, too, to the members of the Committee secretariat, who have spared no effort to ensure that the Committee's report and the many annexes were ready on 31 October, thus enabling them to be reproduced and distributed as a General Assembly document [A/7741-DC/232]¹³ as early as 3 November.

¹³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

136. Nevertheless, we do feel it necessary to say that, in the view of our delegation, it would be very helpful—and I would even venture to say indispensable—both for the orderly proceedings of the Committee itself and especially for the work of the General Assembly on disarmament questions, if the Committee were to draw up a calendar for its yearly sessions which was fairly stable. For example, it might begin its work on the third Tuesday of January, and close its session no later than the third Tuesday of September when, as we all know, the General Assembly begins its regular sessions.

137. If this were done, the Committee's work could be planned in an orderly fashion so that it would not have to cope with situations like the one it faced this year when it was manifestly impossible for its members—or at least for the vast majority of them—to take a position on a draft Treaty, the final text of which had been circulated only hours before the closing meeting. It would also ensure that the Governments and delegations of the many States which are not members of the Committee had a minimum of four weeks in which to study, with the care the subject certainly requires, the report and any other documents transmitted to them annually which must be examined in the light of the voluminous verbatim records of the meetings.

138. After the somewhat unusual procedure followed in 1967 with regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and now being followed with regard to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A], we could not reasonably expect even the delegations of States members of the Committee to be prepared to express considered views which had been carefully weighed on an instrument received hardly a week ago, particularly since the report of the Committee covers several other questions of particular importance which have been allocated to the First Committee and is an essential basis for the consideration of those questions.

139. For these reasons, I feel compelled to refrain from voicing any final views on the draft Treaty in this statement. I reserve the right of my delegation to do so at a later stage, when we have been able to complete our study of the text and the amendments submitted or which may be submitted, and to listen to the representatives of the States that did not participate in the Geneva debates, and to learn the results of the deliberations now taking place in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.

140. Furthermore, apart from the usual substantive questions dealing with disarmament and related measures, the current report of the Committee raises other matters of a constitutional or functional nature which are of particular significance. It would be impossible to deal adequately with all these matters in one intervention. Today, therefore, availing myself of the right that the Committee, at the suggestion of the Chairman, expressly granted to all its members at the 1,686th meeting on 12 November, I shall merely deal with the subjects I mentioned last, the most important of which is the procedure adopted in respect of the enlargement of the membership of the Committee.

141. The calm and objective analysis I intend to make of these questions will be devoid of polemics and its sole object—to which I particularly draw the attention of the members of this Committee—will be the constructive one of helping to pinpoint the action required to restore and preserve the atmosphere of goodwill and co-operation which should always prevail in both the Committee and the General Assembly and which can be maintained only by complying with certain basic standards derived from the letter and spirit of the resolutions and rules of United Nations bodies.

142. In the statement which I trust I shall be allowed to make tomorrow, I shall deal with the five other substantive questions to which I earlier referred, namely, nuclear-free zones, peaceful nuclear explosions, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, chemical and biological weapons, and the question of a moratorium in connexion with the bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic arms which began today in the Finnish capital.

143. With regard to the expansion of the membership of the Committee, I think we should first of all recall that it was pursuant to two resolutions of the General Assembly, resolution 1660 (XVI) and resolution 1722 (XVI), adopted on 28 November and 20 December 1961 respectively, that the Disarmament Committee was established with a membership of 18 nations.

144. In the first of these resolutions, the General Assembly urged the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on “the composition of a negotiating body which both they and—and here is the point that must be stressed—“the rest of the world can regard as satisfactory”. The Assembly further expressed the hope that such negotiations would be started without delay and would lead to “an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly”. The resolution also requested those Governments “to report to the General Assembly, before the conclusion of its sixteenth session, on the results of such negotiations”.

145. In the second of the resolutions I mentioned, the General Assembly, after a number of preliminary considerations, among which was the express recognition that “all States have a deep interest in disarmament negotiations”, endorsed “the agreement that has been reached on the composition of a Disarmament Committee” and agreed that the Committee should be composed of the following 18 members: “Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America”.

146. The Committee began its work on 14 March 1962 and in that year it submitted the first of its regular reports to the General Assembly and began to receive, in the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, numerous requests and directives concerning matters within its competence.

147. Some time later, beginning about three years ago, it became evident—particularly in the debates of the First

Committee during the twenty-third session of the General Assembly—that it would be desirable to enlarge the membership of the Committee in order to make it more representative of the international community.

148. Doubtless influenced by that trend, the Co-Chairmen of the Committee held talks which, to judge from the report we are considering, were fairly lengthy, even though the other members of the Committee were kept in ignorance of the outcome until 23 May 1969, when, at an informal meeting of the Committee, a statement was circulated by the Co-Chairmen, the full text of which is reproduced in the penultimate annex to the report [*ibid.*, annex C, section 37].

149. In the statement, the Co-Chairmen, after briefly recalling the background of the subject, informed the members of the Committee that they had tentatively agreed “on two countries, Japan and the Mongolian People’s Republic, which they could jointly recommend as additional members of the Committee”. They added that they had also agreed that the enlargement of the Committee could not be confined to those two countries since it was imperative “to give the enlargement geographic and political balance” and that they would therefore continue their efforts to reach agreement. They went on to state the following:

“The Co-Chairmen would like the views of the Committee on whether it would be appropriate to invite Japan and the Mongolian People’s Republic to participate in the summer session, scheduled to start 3 July 1969.”

150. In reply to that express request of the Co-Chairmen, the secretariat of Foreign Affairs in Mexico, in a memorandum dated 2 June, the text of which appears *in extenso* in the document I previously cited, stated the views of the Government of my country concerning the recommendation of the Co-Chairmen.

151. In that memorandum the Government of Mexico, after stating that it had no objection to the two candidates proposed and, indeed, believed that both States could “make a valuable contribution to the Committee’s work”, expressed its position regarding the procedure to be adopted in respect of the enlargement of the Committee in the following plain and unequivocal terms:

“The Government of Mexico considers, however, that the inclusion of those States in the Committee should not take effect until:

“(a) The Co-Chairmen have reached agreement, in consultation with the representatives of the eight non-aligned States members of the Committee, to suggest the simultaneous addition of two other States belonging to this category, in order to preserve the balance which at present exists in the Committee and which has proved very advantageous for its work;

“(b) The United Nations General Assembly has been informed and has had an opportunity to endorse the agreement reached by the Co-Chairmen concerning the enlargement in question, as it did in 1961 by means of

resolution 1722 (XVI), in which the members which at present compose the Committee are specifically mentioned. This procedure appears to be essential in the light also of the provisions of resolution 1660 (XVI), which was also adopted in 1961 and which constitutes the immediate antecedent to the establishment of this Committee.”

152. When the Co-Chairmen, disregarding that specific opinion, which they themselves had requested, and which, I know, was shared by a number of other members of the Committee, invited the Governments of the two above-mentioned countries to send their respective delegations to participate in the 416th meeting on 3 July 1969, the representative of Mexico, on express instructions from the Mexican Foreign Office stated, after warmly welcoming the representatives of Japan and Mongolia, that he considered it essential to place on record “the position of principle which the Government of Mexico has upheld, and continues to uphold, in regard to the enlargement of the Committee” [*ibid.*]. Our representative in Geneva added: “This is all the more necessary because up to now there has been nothing in the documents of the Committee to explain the presence among us of the aforesaid delegations” [*ibid.*]. The representative of Mexico then read out the full text of the two documents to which I referred earlier, namely, the statement circulated by the Co-Chairmen on 23 May and the memorandum of 2 June from the Mexican Foreign Office.

153. The representative of Mexico concluded his statement by stressing the following:

“The Government of Mexico agrees that the function of the two Co-Chairmen is absolutely essential for the smooth running of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; but at the same time it takes the view that, as far as the admission of new members to the Committee is concerned, their function should be confined to making recommendations to the General Assembly. In its resolution 1660 (XVI) the General Assembly expressed ‘the hope that such negotiations’—that is, those to take place between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of the composition of the Committee—‘will be started without delay and will lead to an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly’. I emphasize the word ‘recommendation’. The recommendation, by its very nature, has to be made before admission by the Assembly. Making a recommendation is not equivalent to an *a posteriori* report that the Committee has been enlarged in one way or another. We believe that, although there are differences between the present situation and that which prevailed in 1961, basically the procedure for establishing or enlarging the Committee is the same.” [*Ibid.*]

That is what our representative said in the Committee in Geneva.

154. When later, at the 424th meeting on 31 July, at the invitation of the Co-Chairmen, the delegations of six other States—Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia—took their seats, the delegation of Mexico, which most cordially welcomed the newcomers as it had those who came before, again placed on record its

reservation on the procedure adopted in the following terms:

“The position of the Government of Mexico in regard to the enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been and continues to be that which was explained by my delegation at the meeting on 3 July. Furthermore, we consider that the fact of the adoption on one occasion of a procedure that seems to us inappropriate and incorrect, in order to bring about the entry of new members into the Committee, is not a sufficient reason to justify, nor to induce us to accept, the use of the same procedure on another occasion.” /Ibid./

155. I think I should add that, as is evident from the record of the 424th meeting of the Committee, the delegation of Mexico was not alone in expressing disagreement with the procedure followed: six other delegations expressed a similar position with varying degrees of emphasis.

156. Finally, at the 431st meeting on 26 August, when the new name of the Committee was used officially for the first time, the representative of Mexico, after recalling our objection to the procedure adopted for the enlargement of the Committee, spoke as follows:

“We do not think that it is essential to change the name now, before giving the General Assembly an opportunity to pronounce its opinion both on the enlargement of the Committee and the name itself.

“I have no objection as regards the name itself, suggested the other day by the Co-Chairmen, but I should like to have it put on record that my delegation takes exception also to the name being changed now before allowing the General Assembly to pronounce its opinion on the subject.” /Ibid./

157. What I have just summarized as concisely as I could sufficiently demonstrates, as I said in this Committee on 23 October 1969, why we are still convinced that the General Assembly at its present session “will have to take a decision on these questions, since it was the Assembly that set up the Committee in 1961 under resolution 1722 (XVI), which is closely linked with resolution 1660 (XVI) which was adopted earlier.” /1664th meeting, para. 200./

158. In addition to the question I have just dealt with, which I described as a constitutional matter, I should like today to touch upon two other matters relating to one of the aspects of how the Committee functions. They have to do with the method followed so far in preparing the report that the Committee transmits to the General Assembly each year. I think the members of the Committee, including Mexico—together with the Co-Chairmen, of course—should try to improve that report in future. I am compelled to raise these matters here because the statements contained in paragraphs 10 and 17 of the report are not accurate and, unfortunately, my delegation’s efforts to set the record straight in Geneva were unsuccessful.

159. In the first of these paragraphs, paragraph 10, we read, *inter alia*:

“The question of the enlargement was discussed at informal plenary meetings of the Committee on 23 May

1969 and 31 July 1969; in addition, members of the Committee expressed their views concerning the enlargement and the procedure adopted for its implementation at a formal plenary meeting on 31 July 1969.” /A/7741-DC/232, para. 10./

160. Now what I read out is accurate in respect of the discussions held at the informal plenary meetings on 23 May and 31 July 1969. It is accurate also in so far as those members of the Committee which so wished expressed their views regarding the enlargement and the procedure adopted for its implementation by the Co-Chairmen at the 424th formal meeting on 31 July [424th plenary meeting]. But what is not true—and here the text of the Co-Chairmen is certainly misleading—is that this was done only at that meeting.

161. As I have already indicated, the delegation of Mexico entered its reservations concerning the enlargement procedure in three separate statements, made at the 416th, 424th and 431st meetings of the Conference, held on 3 July, 31 July and 26 August 1969 respectively. The principal and most comprehensive of these statements was the first, on 3 July, a date which for some inexplicable reason is omitted from the paragraph to which I am referring.

162. In Geneva my delegation repeatedly approached the Co-Chairmen requesting that they rectify that omission so that paragraph 10 would accurately reflect what had occurred. In view of the adamant refusal of the Co-Chairmen to accede to that reasonable request, however, the delegation of Mexico had no alternative but to incorporate in a document the full texts of the three statements to which I have several times referred and to have that document annexed to the report. We believe that in this way we have gained a better understanding of our position. We would have been quite satisfied, however, if paragraph 10 had been amended—and this was all we asked—so as to include the two missing dates and a reference to the fact that the delegation of Mexico had made a number of statements at the meetings held on those dates. The refusal of the Co-Chairmen has probably redounded to the benefit of those representatives who may be interested in the matter, since now they can easily consult the full texts of our statements in the penultimate annex to the report without having to look up the records of three separate meetings.

163. Although this matter might seem to be minor, the principle at stake is, we believe, fundamental and can be stated in the form of a question as follows: Is it within the powers of the Co-Chairmen of the Committee, when preparing the report which they transmit each year to the General Assembly of the United Nations on behalf of the Committee, to record what has occurred with regard to a question with which they decide the report should deal and to mention certain facts if they feel like it and omit other equally relevant facts of the same kind, even though those facts were substantiated and are irrefutable and in spite of the express request of one delegation that they be included? In other words, should the report reflect the whole truth or only part of it? I believe that these two questions are of the type usually called rhetorical, there being only one, self-evident answer to them.

164. A similar case is that of paragraph 17 of the report which reads as follows:

“In pursuing its objectives, the Committee benefited from the examples and experience provided by measures like the Antarctic Treaty that were achieved before the Committee came into existence and also by the results of more recent disarmament negotiations, which include the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

165. At first glance it seems surprising to find that the international instruments from “the examples and experience” of which the Committee has “benefited”, according to the Co-Chairmen, included all those relating to disarmament and collateral measures concluded from 1959 to the present day with the sole exception of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed on 14 February 1969.¹⁴ This omission overlooks the fact that the latter Treaty is the only one designed to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in densely populated areas and also that it is the only one to have established an effective international control system which includes its own permanent supervisory organ and has a series of innovative features, including “verification-by-challenge”.

166. The omission is all the more surprising when we remember that the report we are considering has two annexes, totalling 65 pages, which deal with the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that, apart from three statements by the delegation of Mexico on this subject, the records of this year's meetings contain references by a number of other representatives to the Treaty and to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. It becomes even more surprising in the light of certain other facts and opinions which I would like now to illustrate with a number of examples.

167. Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains the following provisions:

“Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or *force majeure*.”

168. Article III, paragraph 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was transmitted to the General Assembly by the Disarmament Committee precisely one year later, on 14 March 1968, and which appeared as an annex to resolution 2373 (XXII), adopted

by the General Assembly on 12 June of the same year, includes the following provisions:

“Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. . . . Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.”

169. Any objective and unprejudiced observer, after a simple comparison of these two texts which are so similar as to be almost identical and are separated in time by a mere 12 months, will surely conclude that it would be truly surprising if the second, to quote the Co-Chairmen, had not “benefited from the examples and experience” provided by the first.

170. To go further, the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from such a comparison is strengthened by the express statement made by none other than one of the two Co-Chairmen with the tacit assent of the other. At the 357th meeting of the Committee, held on 18 January 1968, Ambassador Fisher, introducing the revised draft treaty on non-proliferation, spoke as follows:

“In formulating the draft article III which we are presenting today, we have been guided by several principles regarding treaty safeguards and safeguards agreements.” [ENDC/PV.357, para. 55.]

171. It is obvious that the Co-Chairman whom I have quoted can only have been referring to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was the only treaty in existence at the time that provided for the application of the IAEA safeguards.

172. Finally, it is worth recalling what U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, stated in this respect on 2 September of this year:

“The Treaty of Tlatelolco preceded the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by more than a year and exceeds it in the scope of its prohibitions and its control features. Both Treaties have a similar goal, but the former Treaty goes beyond the latter in also prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the area of the nuclear-free zone. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has already created some precedents in the field of control. The provisions of the Treaty concerning the application of the IAEA safeguards system were officially recognized as having provided the basis for a somewhat similar provision in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Your Treaty also establishes a form of ‘complaints procedure’ which has been used as a guide in other draft instruments and which may become an important model for adaptation to other treaties in the field of arms control and disarmament.” [A/7681, appendix.]

173. In the light of what I have just stated, the case of paragraph 17 of the Geneva Committee's report is similar to

¹⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 91, document A/C.1/946.

that of paragraph 10, which I analysed earlier, and raises the same query—one which I summed up by asking whether the annual reports of the Committee should be prepared in such a way as to reflect the whole truth or only part of the truth.

174. As in the previous case concerning the statements on the procedure for enlargement, the delegation of Mexico in Geneva repeatedly urged the Co-Chairmen to rectify the flagrant omission in paragraph 17. Its efforts again met with defeat, however, and it therefore had to content itself with making a statement, which can be found in the record of the 448th and final meeting of the Committee, held on 30 October, in which it declared, *inter alia*, that:

“...it comes as a great surprise to the delegation of Mexico that, in the face of concrete and irrefutable facts, the establishment of which is far from being a subjective evaluation, it has not been possible to make specific mention of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in the report which the Committee is to submit to the United Nations General Assembly as being one of the instruments from the example and experience of which the Committee has benefited”. [CCD/PV.448.]

175. Before concluding, I should like to add a few general considerations that seem to us of particular relevance with regard to the constitutional and functional questions I have been dealing with in this statement.

176. My delegation holds in the greatest esteem all the Ambassadors, whether from the United States or from the Soviet Union, who have successively served as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Committee. In order not to prolong the list unduly, I will mention only Ambassadors Foster, Fisher, Smith and Leonard of the United States and Ambassadors Tsarapkin and Roschin of the Soviet Union. We are likewise very appreciative indeed of the extremely valuable service they have rendered the Committee and the cause of disarmament by their perseverance and indefatigable efforts. I would also like publicly to express to them our appreciation for the affability and unfailing courtesy they have always shown in their relations, both personal and formal, with all the members of the Mexican delegation who have passed through Geneva since the Committee was first established.

177. Having said this, I feel obliged to state with equal frankness—for I believe that ultimately it can only redound to the benefit of the Committee's work—our conception of the scope of their functions as Co-Chairmen of that body. We believe that the Co-Chairmen should be Co-Chairmen and nothing more.

178. Naturally, when they act as the representatives of their countries, the Co-Chairmen have every right to defend

the views of their Governments with tenacity and vigour, and to criticize or reject any of the views of the other Governments which they find objectionable.

179. But when they act as Co-Chairmen, that is to say, as officials responsible for ensuring the smooth running and orderly conduct of an international body of the stature of the Geneva Committee, the practical results of that most important function—which can well be decisive for the outcome of the work assigned to the Committee—will, in the end, depend upon the far-sightedness, impartiality, discretion and sense of proportion with which they act. It would not be advisable to behave as though the General Assembly of the United Nations were a subsidiary body of the Committee. Nor would it be advisable to become convinced that the relationship between the Co-Chairmen and the Committee was the same as that which Louis XIV regarded as existing between himself and the French State.

180. If there is a will to do so, it should not prove difficult to rectify what can be rectified as regards the concrete problems I have reviewed. On the question of the enlargement of the Committee, the General Assembly might adopt a resolution similar to that adopted in 1961, and my delegation intends in due course, together with other delegations, to submit a draft on the subject, which, we trust, will command general approval. As for the method or procedure to be adopted for the preparation of the Committee's report, it is the duty of all member delegations to co-operate with the Co-Chairmen when the meetings resume in Geneva—and I wish to announce here and now that my delegation will be particularly eager to do so—so that the necessary decisions and action can be taken by common agreement in order to avoid a repetition of cases like those I have dealt with at this meeting.

181. I believe that my analysis can only increase the effectiveness of that “negotiating body” which was set up under two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1961 and to which the Assembly itself entrusted, as it does again each year, the task of trying to solve the arduous problems of general and complete disarmament, beginning with nuclear disarmament, and of other related measures. These questions, although of primary interest to the so-called super-Powers, are also of deep interest to “all States”, to quote General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI)—a resolution which, I take the liberty of recalling, was adopted by acclamation, on the proposal of Mexico, by the First Committee at its 1218th meeting on 13 December 1961, and was based on a draft resolution co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. These questions are also very closely bound up with the vital interests of all the nations of the world.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.