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First Committee

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Official Records

Chair: Mr. Rattray (Jamaica)

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

Agenda items 87 to 104 (continued)

General debate on all disarmament and related international security agenda items

Mr. Aboulatta (Egypt): Mr. Chairman, I should like to congratulate you once again on your election to preside over the First Committee and your predecessor, Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, the Permanent Representative of Libya, on presiding over the sixty-eighth session. Likewise, I should like to extend our congratulations to the other members of the Bureau on their election. Let me assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

At the outset, I should also like to associate Egypt with the statements delivered by the representatives of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States, and the statement delivered on behalf of the Group of Arab States (see A/C.1/69/PV.2). I am honoured to present the following brief remarks in my national capacity.

As nuclear disarmament remains our highest priority, the starting point in this regard should be the implementation of resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. It charts a road map towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The First Committee should be ready to contribute its part in deliberating on the implementation of that road map. In this regard, we welcome the issuance of the Secretary-General's report containing the views of

Member States, especially with regard to the elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.

The call has been for the negotiation of that convention in the Conference on Disarmament as the sole negotiating forum on disarmament affairs. We look forward in this regard to an informed discussion of this seminal report. A clear, substantive and procedural road map needs to be developed in this regard to ensure a substantive outcome that contributes substantially to the objective of the international community to free the world from nuclear weapons, especially as we approach the seventieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations. Our discussions in the First Committee provide a timely opportunity to invigorate the disarmament machinery with that road map, which includes the convening, no later than 2018, of a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard.

Egypt welcomes the continuing momentum in reviving the international debate on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the incompatibility of their possession and use with governing principles of international humanitarian law. We support the call of the Nayarit second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons for the development of a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to actively take part in the third Conference in Austria. As possessors of

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nuclear weapons, they bear a special responsibility in avoiding any possibility of what would be a catastrophe.

The universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a step towards achieving nuclear disarmament. The speedy establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones adds impetus to efforts aimed at achieving the wider objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. The international community has recognized the urgency of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Yet, despite these repeated calls, we are still faced with a lack of progress in the implementation of both the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan on the Middle East.

It is in this context that the 2010 action plan itself recognized that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remains valid until its objectives are achieved, a call that needs to be fully upheld and implemented in an accelerated mode that compensates for the time lost. Egypt, along with members of the League of Arab States, has spared no effort in contributing its part to providing the necessary support for taking forward the process of the establishment of the zone, as further demonstrated by the letters compiled in the note by the Secretary-General (A/68/781).

The First Committee also provides a timely opportunity to translate the collective commitments into concrete steps of implementation as we approach the 2015 NPT Review Conference. We should recall here that the 2010 action plan is the floor and not the ceiling. The 2015 Conference is hence the platform not only for evaluating the implementation of the 2010 commitments and accelerating the implementation for those remaining, but also serving as the launching pad for new, forward-looking commitments on nuclear disarmament.

This session of the First Committee is the first following the completion of the 50 required ratifications for commencing the process of the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which was adopted by vote at the General Assembly. I take this opportunity to reiterate that Egypt is well aware of the effects of illicit trafficking in conventional weapons. We are fully committed to exerting all efforts to combat and eradicate the illicit trade in arms. We urge all countries that decide to accede to the ATT to implement it in good faith in order to achieve its purpose and goals. We

will be following closely the developments regarding the accession to, entry into force and implementation of the Treaty in order to determine our final position.

The efforts of the international community should continue to fill in the remaining gaps. We continue to call for addressing the elements of overproduction and the ever-increasing stockpiles of conventional weapons within major arms exporters and producers. We still believe that every effort must be exerted to bring production and stockpiles in major arms-producing States under international scrutiny. International accountability is the only guarantee against the possible abuse of the existing imbalance between major arms producers and the rest of the world.

We had proposed related confidence-building measures within the deliberations at the last session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission that would help to address areas of concern relating to conventional weapons. Those measures also include the need to address protracted threats to international peace and security. In this regard, there is no more profound threat to peace and stability, international law, international humanitarian law, human rights law, and to the core principles of the United Nations Charter itself, than the crimes of aggression and foreign occupation that employ conventional arms arsenals to threaten and dominate peoples and deny them their most basic human rights.

The gaps are widening by the advancement in conventional weapons. Egypt reiterates that technology should not overtake humanity. The potential or actual development of lethal autonomous weapons raises many questions about their compliance with international humanitarian law, as well as issues of warfare ethics. Regulations should be put in place before such systems are to be developed and/or deployed.

Egypt is fully committed to the full and effective implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We commend in this regard the professional chairmanship of Ambassador Zahir Tanin, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations, demonstrated at the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States held in June 2014.

Mr. Chairman, we trust that your able stewardship of the activities of the First Committee will lead us to progress further on a balanced agenda of disarmament

and international security both on the fronts of weapons of mass destruction and conventional armaments. We reiterate our support to you in this regard and stand ready to contribute our part.

Mr. Zambrana Torrelío (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me to begin, Sir, by congratulating you on your election and by wishing you every success in your work at the head of the First Committee. We are convinced that, under your leadership and guidance and with the support of your team, we will achieve excellent results that will promote and further our quest for international disarmament, peace and security for our peoples. We assure you of the full support of my delegation in that task.

Bolivia would also like to associate itself with the statements delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.2) and by the representative of Costa Rica on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (see A/C.1/69/PV.8). My delegation would like, however, to make a few comments in its national capacity.

World disarmament standards are extremely important to achieving development, improving the quality of life and above all ensuring the survival of Mother Earth. Conflicts have already cost the loss of an incalculable number of lives. Weapons of mass destruction — be they chemical, nuclear or biological — the stockpiling of such weapons, and illicit transfers of conventional weapons endanger peace, international security and the planet itself.

I should like to talk about nuclear weapons in particular because these are the most inhumane devices that have ever been invented and their fatal impact extends for decades. They are the only weapons that have been invented by human beings that have the capacity to completely destroy life on this planet, and existing stockpiles have the capacity to do so many times over.

The General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session recognized the Treaties of the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as international instruments that have contributed to freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas of nuclear weapons, as stated in resolution 67/55. The General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session in 2013 reaffirmed the binding force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and urged States parties to

comply strictly with its provisions. In resolution 68/39, the General Assembly also urged States parties to implement the plan of action adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference in a faithful and timely manner in order to make progress across all pillars of the Treaty and to move further towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

Regrettably, despite these official United Nations documents and, worse still, despite the fact that the NPT — the main international agreement on nuclear disarmament — entered into force more than 40 years ago, a small group of privileged States continue to maintain their nuclear stockpiles, in contravention of the provisions of the Treaty. The members of this small group of States happen to be permanent members of the Security Council. The Plurinational State of Bolivia regrets the fact that, more than four decades after the entry into force of the NPT, its commitment to humankind has not yet been fulfilled.

In accordance with its political Constitution, Bolivia is a peaceful State that promotes a culture of life and the right of peoples to peace, which moves us to deplore and reject all actions that endanger global peace and the security of States. Bolivia believes that we must move towards the priority objective of nuclear disarmament and to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. In that respect, Bolivia calls on the States of the world to respect life and the rights of Mother Earth, and particularly urges the small group of nuclear-weapon States and others to cease such activities.

Bolivia reiterates and insists that if the goal is to build a world of peace so as to ensure the survival of our peoples, the international community must reaffirm the need to move towards the priority objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. It is neither defensible nor sustainable for some States to argue that nuclear weapons are essential, legitimate and open-ended guarantees of their security and that of their allies, while others do not have the right to acquire such weapons to protect themselves in service to their own perceived security needs.

A single State with nuclear weapons will encourage others to seek to acquire them, and so long as such weapons exist it is inconceivable that they will never be used some day, be it accidentally, by error in calculation or deliberately. That would be a catastrophe. The elimination of nuclear weapon is the only way to guarantee peace. We must remember at all times that the

ongoing risk of their use is a threat to the entire world. The Plurinational State of Bolivia firmly believes that it is possible to build a peaceful world that will allow peoples to live together in harmony and guarantee and maintain their right to peace, sovereignty and self-determination. But we also believe that the concept of international security has been misinterpreted to mean international policing with the aim of exerting unilaterally control of the world.

The mandate of our peoples is far removed from the aggressions that have been committed in the name of security and peace. We must adopt practices and new visions that respect human rights and the right to peace. They must come from our peoples and their different ways of resolving internal and international conflicts, and they must seek to ensure peaceful coexistence among the many peoples of the world. That is why the Plurinational State of Bolivia has been working on the basis of the “living well” paradigm as a new political, economic and social model that promotes respect for life and guarantees respect for peace based on dialogue and harmonious coexistence among peoples. Bolivia believes that the people of Mother Earth are challenged to make this millennium one in which we respect and disseminate the culture of life and peace so as to build a society that is fair, plural, united, equitable and egalitarian with social justice based on respect and equality among all. That is how we shall avoid catastrophic humanitarian consequences and progress beyond the current moral anomie.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mr. De Macedo Soares (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean): I have the honour to address the First Committee in my capacity as Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). It is a special pleasure to work under the guidance of a very distinguished diplomat of Jamaica, one of the 33 States members of the Agency, of which more than one third are Caribbean States having specific security concerns and very determined positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Since the start of my term of office I have been working for an increased participation of the Caribbean in the endeavours of OPANAL.

Yesterday we heard the intervention by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

(see A/C.1/69/PV.8), in the framework of which OPANAL is a specialized agency dealing with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is the sole regional international organization devoted to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Latin America and the Caribbean brought to world peace and security an inestimable and truly innovative contribution. A space equivalent to 20 million square kilometres, which is home to about 600 million people, has been kept free of nuclear weapons.

Since 1967, the General Assembly saluted this exploit that inspired four other regions which decided to follow the same political and strategic attitude, totalling today 116 States. Latin America and the Caribbean may not be a Shangri-La, but it is important to note that no significant crisis affecting world peace and security has arisen there for many years. No new United Nations peacekeeping operation has been established in the region since 2004. Not a single country in the region is party to any military alliance based on nuclear weapons.

These are credentials for Latin America and the Caribbean to be increasingly active and outspoken in the debates and initiatives in favour of a world free of nuclear weapons. In this sense, the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean is not an inward-focused association limited to keeping its realm without nuclear weapons. Member States are conscious that their duty and interest is to increase pressure to open the way to serious negotiations, including on a convention to ban nuclear weapons. That was clearly stated in the Declaration by OPANAL member States issued on 26 September on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Through this and other actions, OPANAL is demonstrating its wish to join with the other nuclear-weapon-free zones in a major movement to break the long stalemate in nuclear disarmament negotiations and the paralysing so-called priorities of the nuclear-weapon States. It is of special importance that the forthcoming third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia are to take place next year. The first two such Conferences were led by OPANAL, and we are glad that this time Indonesia is coordinating the preparations for the Conference.

We expect that the third Conference will not only reiterate the unanimous positions of its 116 participating countries, but also adopt new coordinating arrangements in order to make its influence more permanent, including

concerning the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially and more urgently in the Middle East. We also hope that in future the First Committee will include in its structured debates segment a panel on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

We may sound overambitious and somewhat unrealistic. Perhaps it is because we believe that human beings are equal everywhere. Therefore, we cannot admit that nuclear-weapon States have a more sound judgement than the huge majority of States that have categorically reiterated their desire and commitment to achieving a world without weapons of mass destruction, the worst being nuclear weapons. Perhaps it is because we believe in investing our resources in the promotion of development and well-being. Perhaps it is because we are increasingly worried about the present trends, and I can mention an example of that.

Since the States possessing nuclear weapons are engaged in modernization and upgrading programmes in their arsenals, it is appropriate to consider that after some decades a new nuclear arms race is going on. This is a momentous development, for the nuclear arms race was one of the distinguishing aspects of the Cold War, a page of world history that we believed had definitely been turned.

The Chair: We have now heard from the last speaker for the general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items allocated to it, namely items 87 to 104. The Committee has thus concluded this phase of its work. In the course of the debate, which involved seven meetings, we listened to a total of 107 statements, demonstrating the high level of importance that First Committee delegations continue to accord to matters of disarmament and international security.

High-level exchange

The Chair: Before we proceed with our thematic discussions, in keeping with the indicative timetable for this phase adopted by the Committee, we will first have a high-level exchange with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other high-level officials on the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament and the role of international organizations with mandates in this field. This will focus on the sub-theme “Increasing capacities to address weapons of mass destruction”, which is intended to make the exchange more interactive. A concept paper on the sub-theme was brought to the

attention of all delegations and the panellists last week through circulation on QuickFirst.

I now warmly welcome our panellists today: the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Angela Kane; the Deputy Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Her Excellency Ms. Grace Asirwatham; the representative of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Geoffrey Shaw, who is the Director of the Agency’s New York Office; and the representative of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Mr. W. Randy Bell, who is also the Director of the International Data Centre Division.

I will now give our panellists the floor to make their statements. Thereafter we will change to an informal mode to afford delegations the opportunity to ask questions. I urge our panellists to kindly keep their statements concise so as to ensure that we have adequate time for an interactive discussion on the subject.

Without further ado, I now invite the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Angela Kane, to address the Committee.

Ms. Kane (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs): With the exhortation by our Chair to keep it concise, I will read an abridged statement, but we will post the entire statement on the website. Of course, I welcome the opportunity to participate in this high-level panel, and while we all have many different responsibilities, all of the organizations represented on this panel really share a common cause. We are all working to strengthen international peace and security through activities related to the elimination and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Our existence as international organizations is living testimony to one indisputable fact: our member States recognize that they require such organizations to achieve their common aims. It is therefore essential that we perform our mandates as efficiently and effectively as possible, especially given the stakes involved in the acquisition, proliferation or use of all types of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.

In terms of capacity for action, the primary responsibility rests where it always has, with the Member States. It is their policies, laws, regulations, plans, budgets, votes and institutions together that determine what is possible to achieve in disarmament

and non-proliferation. Skilled and highly motivated secretariats of international organizations certainly have their contributions to make, but they alone cannot substitute for the capacities and political will of member States. When these State policies and priorities are in alignment, great progress is possible through multilateral cooperation, as we have seen in the very existence of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and five regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Any mismatch between these domestic instruments and a country's international commitments, however, presents a problem that ultimately each country must itself resolve. Commitments to negotiating in good faith on nuclear disarmament, for example, are not discretionary, but are a solemn responsibility of all States. This suggests that the first place to look in understanding the lack of progress in disarmament or in non-proliferation rests on the degree of harmony between domestic policies and international responsibilities, more so, I believe, than with the structures or procedures of these international organizations.

Let me now discuss some specific recent instances when the United Nations has contributed to this great common cause and is strengthening its capacity for action. My first case concerns how we handled allegations that chemical weapons had been used last year in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Our response depended very heavily upon the General Assembly's far-sighted vision in 1987 to mandate the establishment of the Secretary-General's mechanism to investigate claimed uses of chemical and biological weapons. It was this mechanism that was used to confirm that chemical weapons had been used in Syria. Conducting such an investigation was certainly not easy, as I can personally testify to as a member of the international team that visited Syria to make the necessary arrangements for the inspection.

The Secretary-General's report of the United Nations fact-finding mission to investigate these allegations, which he submitted in December, was certainly not the end of the story. He informed the

General Assembly on 13 December that there was room for strengthening and improving the mechanism, and suggested holding a lessons-learned exercise. Its focus, he said, should be on enhancing the preparedness of technical teams and enabling partner organizations to work more effectively under their common mandate of the mechanism.

I should like to underscore here that the United Nations has not simply reacted passively to external events. In 2006, before the most recent events, the General Assembly encouraged the Secretary-General to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigations of alleged use. In 2007, he convened two informal meetings of an international group of technical experts to update the appendices to the guidelines and procedures and ensure their consistency with state-of-the-art scientific standards.

Currently, a lessons-learned exercise is well under way, in partnership with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the World Health Organization and outside experts. The first phase was successfully concluded earlier this year following a meeting of a core group of experts in Glion, Switzerland. Participants identified four broad categories of lessons learned that required further study, relating to the activation of the mechanism, forging strategic partnerships, training and information sharing, and maintaining the unity and consistency of the overall mission. We began earlier this month to explore the first two of these issues.

I should like to emphasize that this lessons-learned exercise has much broader significance than just an assessment of the experience of implementing chemical weapons investigations and disarmament in Syria. These lessons very much relate to the world community's recognition of a taboo against the use or very existence of chemical weapons anywhere. This work will help us to reach our common, long-sought goal of achieving a fully global ban on such weapons and their total elimination.

My second example today relates to our efforts to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which is marking its tenth anniversary this year. I view that resolution as much more than an initiative focused just on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their acquisition by non-State actors. By identifying these dangers, the resolution

also implicitly recognized the inherent risks associated with all such weapons. To this extent, it has helped in the larger process of delegitimizing all weapons of mass destruction, which, let us not forget, was a class of weaponry identified by the first General Assembly resolution in 1946, for their total elimination.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs has helped to advance the goals of this resolution through three types of activities: facilitating national implementation; enhancing cooperation among international, regional and subregional organizations; and building effective partnerships with key stakeholders including civil society and industry. We help national implementation through our country visits and dialogues, through national round tables and peer reviews, and through various forms of technical assistance intended to strengthen national capacity.

We have cooperated very closely with other intergovernmental and regional organizations to advance the goals of that resolution. This is being pursued largely through national visits and regional meetings involving the exchange of information, assistance in training, and the provision of technical information and support. We are also actively at work to deepen cooperation with non-governmental organizations, industry, academic and scientific communities in support of 1540 goals. I will not summarize all of this work on this occasion since the material is freely available on our web site. Once again, I view this work as fully consistent with our mandated ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. As I said, it helps in the wider process of delegitimizing all weapons of mass destruction and this will I believe support our wider common cause.

While the United Nations and the international organizations have increasing capacities to deal with weapons of mass destruction, there is one area where this is conspicuously lacking. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, we have seen tremendous new interest and better understanding of the humanitarian impact of any use of nuclear weapons. The international conferences in Oslo and Nayarit, Mexico, made invaluable contributions in this regard. Most relevant to the topic of this panel, the discussions underscored that it would be unlikely that any State or international body could adequately address the immediate or long-term humanitarian consequences of any use of a nuclear weapon.

The recent study undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research at the request of the United Nations Development Programme and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs further underscored that the United Nations is unlikely to be able to offer much humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear weapon detonation. It confirmed what we have long known: that prevention is the only plausible policy response. As the next step in this ongoing discussion, I look forward to the third humanitarian conference to be held in Vienna in December. I hope all States decide to attend this conference, which should deepen our collective understanding of the risks, consequences and legal framework pertaining to any use of nuclear weapons and to the legacy of nuclear testing.

Today I have addressed only three capacity-related issues. I have no doubt whatsoever that the institutions represented on this panel today, including the United Nations itself, have much to offer in assisting in the achievement of agreed multilateral goals of disarmament and non-proliferation. In his last annual report on the work of the Organization (A/4800), which was issued in 1961, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld stated that the United Nations faced two alternative futures. It could limit its role to serving as, what he called the “static conference machinery”, or it could serve as a “dynamic instrument” in the service of the global interest. He left little doubt which future he preferred. The same choice is before us in the field of disarmament. I trust we will choose wisely.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the Deputy Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Ms. Asirwatham (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the Chair of the First Committee and to thank you for the opportunity for the OPCW to share its views on the disarmament of chemical weapons over the past year.

When I last briefed this Committee (see A/C.1/68/PV.10), the OPCW had just embarked on a historic mission to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons in partnership with the United Nations. This was an unprecedented challenge. Never before had a major arsenal of weapons of mass destruction of any sort been removed from a country at war and destroyed in such compressed time frames. Now only one year later we can point to significant accomplishments by this mission.

After delays occasioned largely by the security situation in Syria, all declared chemicals, some 1,300 metric tons, were removed from Syrian territory on 23 June. Since then, the destruction of all category-1 chemical weapons, totalling 1,040 metric tons, was completed before the end of August. Eighty-eight per cent of the remaining category-2 chemicals, largely toxic industrial chemicals, have been destroyed at commercial and government facilities in Finland, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom. In total, some 98 per cent of Syria's declared chemicals have so far been destroyed.

That is a remarkable achievement by any measure and any standard, let alone in the context of such a rare and testing opportunity. It is vital, therefore, that we draw lessons from this experience if we are to respond to future opportunities in the right way, with the right resources. First and foremost, the Syrian mission has proven the resilience of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. It provided a ready-made, tried and tested vehicle for ridding the world of a major chemical arsenal with full verification.

Secondly, our success has been underpinned by an extraordinary collective international effort. The willingness of more than 30 of our States parties to provide both in-kind and financial assistance was crucial, as was our partnership with the United Nations in dealing with logistical and security challenges that our inspectors had previously not had to deal with. That collaboration has been continuing since the closure of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission on 30 September through new arrangements negotiated with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

Finally, working together we were able to overcome obstacles by coming up with innovative technical solutions. These included facilitating sea-based destruction through the installation of two field-deployable hydrolysis systems on board the ship Cape Ray, and the use of GPS-mounted cameras for remote verification at sites in Syria to which the Joint Mission was unable to gain physical access. There still remains important work to be done in finalizing arrangements for the destruction of chemical-weapon production facilities in Syria. The OPCW is working closely with the Syrian Government, UNOPS and commercial contractors to get destruction under way as quickly as

possible. We are continuing to follow up allegations of chlorine gas attacks in Syria through the work of the fact-finding Mission established by the Director-General in April this year.

Following a serious incident on 27 May in which an improvised explosive device destroyed an armoured vehicle transporting members of the Mission, arrangements were made for witness testimonies to be collected in a safe location outside Syria. That has been done, and the second report of the Mission was issued on 10 September. Disturbingly, it concludes, with a high degree of confidence, that chlorine was used as a weapon systematically and repeatedly in three villages in northern Syria.

Clearly, the challenge in Syria compelled us to surge the capacities of both the OPCW and our States parties, but we were able to do so in a highly effective way by virtue of the OPCW's well-practised verification regime and contingency planning. That said, as important as this Mission has been, we have not lost sight of the need to address new and emerging challenges, challenges that we all face in relation to the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. The confirmed use of chemical weapons near Damascus in August last year made it clear that our success can be only as broad as our reach. Accordingly, we have refocused our efforts with States parties to achieve universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention, efforts that are now bearing fruit.

Myanmar is well advanced in its ratification process. We hope also that Angola will follow through on its commitment to accede, especially in view of its election to the Security Council for the 2015-2016 term. We are hopeful that South Sudan might soon be in a position to re-engage with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Other States not parties have been less responsive to our outreach, but we will nonetheless continue to engage them bilaterally and through international forums, especially the United Nations. More broadly, the OPCW continues to make good progress. To date, 85 per cent of declared chemical weapons have been verified as destroyed, and industry inspections have continued apace at 241 per year. But with the goal of a world free of chemical weapons now very much within our reach, we must now do more to make our disarmament gains permanent. That means ensuring we have mechanisms in place to prevent the re-emergence of such weapons in the future.

To this end, we have worked with our States parties to improve national implementation of their Chemical Weapons Convention obligations, especially in ensuring that they have relevant legislation in place. The Technical Secretariat has increased its focus on training specialists in emergency assistance and continued to develop tailored activities in relation to assistance and protection and international cooperation on the peaceful uses of chemistry in all regions. We are also looking to expand our cooperation with other international organizations to develop new synergies. For example, verification challenges in Syria saw the OPCW consult closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the employment of remote technologies and other techniques.

The overarching message from all this activity is that we need to build more, better and more broadly based capacity to underwrite global non-proliferation efforts. And we need to do that in a holistic way that shows the clear security and economic benefits of international cooperation in this area. At the same time, the OPCW has sought to broaden our community of stakeholders, not only to monitor advances in science and technology through more effective partnerships with science and industry, but also to nurture practices of responsible science through education.

The OPCW-The Hague Award was also instituted earlier this year, funded through the Nobel Peace Prize money, as a vehicle for recognizing achievement in advancing the goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The year 2015 will mark the centenary anniversary of the first large-scale use of chemical weapons near Ieper in Belgium during the First World War. We will work closely with States parties, other arms-control and disarmament organizations, civil society and academia, to use this anniversary to highlight the important ongoing work in preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Certainly, the changing strategic environment will only serve to sharpen our focus whether and how new advances in science and technology and communication might challenge the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or on how to address the proliferation risk posed by non-State actors.

The role of the United Nations and its support to the OPCW remain a key element of our multilateral success. We hope that valuable lessons can be learned about the need to be responsive, flexible and innovative in rising to such opportunities in the interests of advancing global

peace and security. We also hope that these lessons can lead to a better appreciation of the challenges facing the OPCW as we shift from disarmament-focused activities towards strengthened non-proliferation efforts. Finally, we hope that these lessons can serve as an example for disarmament efforts further afield.

The Chair: I now call on the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Shaw (International Atomic Energy Agency): I must say that it is a pleasure once again to participate in this panel discussion. Since 1957 the IAEA has worked to bring the benefits of peaceful nuclear science and technology to its member States, in areas as diverse as industry, human health, agriculture, and water management. Nuclear techniques are being used to address development challenges such as improving childhood nutrition, improving access to electricity and increasing food security. Just this week, IAEA Director General Amano announced that the Agency would provide specialized diagnostic equipment to help Sierra Leone in its efforts to combat the ongoing Ebola outbreak. Later, this support is planned to be extended to Liberia and Guinea. In his statement to the IAEA General Conference last month, Director General Amano asked nations to recognize the important contribution of nuclear science and technology to sustainable development as they formulate the post-2015 development agenda.

Since 1957, the IAEA has also worked hard to prevent the misuse of nuclear science and technology and the spread of nuclear weapons. By implementing safeguards, the IAEA independently verifies the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about their nuclear programmes. Safeguards provide credible assurances that States are fulfilling their international obligations, and also serve to detect any misuse of nuclear material or technology, thereby alerting the world to potential proliferation. Safeguards are therefore a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Safeguards agreements are currently in force with 181 States, of which 173 are non-nuclear-weapon States with comprehensive safeguards agreements under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, 12 non-nuclear-weapon States have yet to conclude and bring into force NPT safeguards agreements with the Agency. For these States, the IAEA cannot draw any safeguards conclusions. The Agency

continues to urge them to conclude their comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible.

The number of States with additional protocols in force continues to rise. It now stands at 124. That is very encouraging because the additional protocol is an essential tool for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in a country. For this reason, the Agency continues to encourage all States to bring additional protocols into force as soon as possible.

The global nuclear landscape continues to change. Verification challenges are growing and becoming more complex. More nuclear facilities and material are being placed under safeguards. New nuclear facilities are becoming ever more sophisticated, making the implementation of safeguards more challenging. And this global trend is expected to continue.

Safeguards implementation will need to continue to evolve to address these new challenges. Over the past 12 months, the Agency has engaged extensively with member States on the conceptualization and development of safeguards implementation at the State level. The State-level concept involves implementing safeguards in a manner that considers a State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the State's safeguards agreement. It does not entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of either the State or the Agency, nor does it involve any modification in the interpretation of existing rights and obligations. It is applicable to all States within the scope of each State's safeguards agreement. The Agency is also ready to contribute to the verification of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and, upon request, international verification of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements.

Let me turn to nuclear security. Responsibility for ensuring nuclear security lies with national Governments, but the central role of the Agency in helping to strengthen the global nuclear security framework is widely recognized. The Agency has established internationally accepted guidance that is used as the benchmark for nuclear security. The Agency helps States draft integrated nuclear security support plans to apply this guidance. Other services provided include expert peer review missions, specialist training and human resource development programmes. Upon request, the Agency helps countries to properly protect nuclear and other radioactive materials, as well as the

nuclear facilities in which they are housed. This work covers a broad range of activities from supplying radiation detection equipment for countries to use at ports and airports and providing specialist training, to helping protect major public events against nuclear terrorism. Demand for these services is growing. For example, the Agency provided nuclear security training to nearly 3,000 people in the year to June, an increase of 37 per cent over the previous year.

The most important area of unfinished business in nuclear security remains the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. There has been real momentum in recent years towards its entry into force, which is one of the most significant measures that States should adopt to strengthen nuclear security. All countries that have not yet done so are therefore encouraged to adhere to the amendment.

The next IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, which will take place in December 2016, will be an important opportunity to review progress achieved and to map out the Agency's future work. I would also note that the Agency actively works with other United Nations entities, including the Group of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and through the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force to build capacity in member States and within the United Nations system to prevent terrorists and other non-State actors from accessing nuclear and radiological material, and to build preparedness and response mechanisms for dealing with radiation emergencies.

In conclusion, the IAEA delivers concrete results, and our work is valued by our member States. We will continue to pursue our multifaceted objectives in a balanced manner in the coming years. By helping States to benefit from peaceful nuclear science and technology, by exercising credible and effective verification and by promoting effective nuclear security, the Agency is making a tangible contribution to international peace and security.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Mr. Bell (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization): On behalf of Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo, allow me first to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the First Committee of this sixty-

ninth session. I also wish to express my appreciation to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for convening this important exchange. I am particularly pleased to address this Committee on the sub-theme of increasing capacities to address weapons of mass destruction.

As has been reported to this Committee in past sessions, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has reinforced the international norm against nuclear testing to a degree where any violation of this norm is immediately met with universal condemnation at the highest level. Although the CTBT has not yet entered into force, with one notable exception the Treaty has succeeded in keeping the world nuclear-test-free for more than 15 years.

The permanent cessation of nuclear testing has been a goal of the international community for a generation, and we are closer now than ever to finally closing the book on this dangerous and destabilizing, yet once common practice. The strength of the non-testing norm, and the well-understood consequences for a State that would surely accompany any violation of this norm, provides a deterrent factor that has helped to prevent both horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as vertical proliferation of more sophisticated weapons among the nuclear-armed States.

We must acknowledge the role that the Treaty's verification regime has played in this process. The non-testing norm does not exist in a vacuum. In order for States to have the necessary confidence to adhere to the CTBT, there needs to be credible assurances of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by all States. This is multilateral arms control in its purest form, the very tenet of cooperative security in international relations. A credible and trustworthy verification system to monitor compliance with the Treaty, paired with a reliable enforcement mechanism, is a baseline requirement for any State contemplating ratification of the Treaty.

Therefore, with the technical and financial support of member States, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) has for nearly two decades been arduously building up the Treaty's International Monitoring System, which is now almost 90 per cent complete. Though the system is not yet fully complete, the detection threshold of the International Monitoring System today has proved to be well below what was originally envisaged by the Treaty negotiators.

The International Monitoring System is the most sophisticated and expansive global multilateral arms control monitoring system ever conceived and represents more than \$1 billion of investment by member States in the furtherance of international peace and security. The capabilities of the verification system have been demonstrated time and time again. The successful detection of all the announced nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is testament to that fact. The system has also proved its value in improving response capabilities to international disasters, as in the case of the tsunami early warning and the tracking of radioactive dispersion during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident.

Moreover, the development and testing of technologies and techniques utilized in the Treaty's on-site inspection regime are well under way. The integrated field exercise starting next month in Jordan will serve as a major benchmark in assessing the readiness of the Treaty's on-site inspection capability. Upon the Treaty's entry into force, this final verification measure will provide credible assurances that no State could be confident in carrying out a clandestine nuclear test in violation of the Treaty.

These capabilities represent an unparalleled return on investment for our member States, an investment that must be protected if the objectives of the Treaty are to be fulfilled. It is imperative that this investment be protected. The CTBTO aims to achieve this on the technical side by maintaining and completing the verification regime, while working hard to build technical competencies across all member States.

Technical capacity-building is essential, especially for developing countries. It not only creates value for some States that may not see the immediate benefits of adhering to the Treaty or participating fully in the establishment of the verification regime, but also builds a knowledge base in the scientific and technical aspects of the Treaty that will strengthen its implementation and enforcement. All of this comes together in our series of global science and technology conferences, which help to keep our regime at the cutting edge of verification science. More broadly, the work we do in outreach and education to policymakers, academics, civil society and the media through our integrated capacity-building approach also helps to protect the investment made in the verification regime.

However, this should not be the work of the organization alone. A growing risk to this investment

is treaty fatigue. Even with the 183 States signatories to the Treaty and 163 ratifications secured, the longer it takes for the Treaty to enter into force, the more our common investment is at risk. As time continues to pass without substantial progress towards entry into force, there is an increased likelihood that States will not be inclined to honour their commitments to the Treaty or to the Organization. The consequences of the CTBT unravelling in this manner are very grave. Not only would this see the end of an equitable verification regime that has all but ended nuclear explosions in this century, but it would also have a disastrous effect on efforts to promote disarmament and curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Now more than ever, leadership is needed, especially among the eight remaining States listed in annex 2 of the Treaty whose ratifications are required for entry into force. In this regard, it has been encouraging to see the United States clearly demonstrate its commitment to achieving this through unprecedented political, technical and financial support to the CTBTO and the build-up of the verification regime. In recent discussions with Secretaries Kerry and Moniz, as well as with a number of high-ranking officials, the Executive Secretary was left in no doubt of United States intentions to promote ratification of the CTBT.

Likewise, recent engagement with China and Israel gives reason for cautious optimism. The Executive Secretary's first visit to China last year was a notable milestone. With the backing of Minister Wang Yi, China decided to provide data from its monitoring stations to the CTBTO. That was a major step forward, which brings us closer to the completion of the verification regime, improves our detection capabilities in the region, and enhances overall confidence in the system.

As we reach out to these annex 2 States, we also continue to work with other member States towards the full universalization of the Treaty. Each new ratification — the most recent of those being that of the Republic of the Congo just last month — helps secure the future of the CTBT.

As noted in the Chair's concept paper for this meeting, the success of our common endeavour requires continued mobilization of personnel and resources, as well as the cooperation of Governments, various agencies, civil society and other actors. I would add that real governmental leadership also means never missing an opportunity to present the case for non-proliferation and disarmament. All too often, chances are not seized

and potential connections are not made. In the case of the CTBT, missed opportunities serve to foster treaty fatigue. More generally, they give rise to cynicism on the international community's commitment to build a safer, more secure world.

I look forward to discussing possible approaches to enhancing our common efforts to increase capacities in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction.

The Chair: In keeping with the established practice of the Committee, I will now suspend the meeting to afford delegations an opportunity to have an interactive discussion with our panellists through an informal question and answer session.

The meeting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 4.50 p.m.

Agenda items 87 to 104

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items

The Chair: The Committee will now continue with thematic discussions, which will run from 16 to 28 October for a total of 11 meetings. In accordance with established practice, this phase will focus on thematic discussions on specific issues grouped under the following seven agreed clusters: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction; outer space (disarmament aspects); conventional weapons; regional disarmament and security; other disarmament measures and international security; and disarmament machinery.

As I announced during our organizational meeting on 3 October, the time limit for statements during the thematic segment is five minutes when speaking in a national capacity and seven minutes for statements on behalf of several delegations. Delegations taking the floor are encouraged to use that opportunity to introduce draft resolutions and decisions, where applicable, and I hope that all delegations were able to meet the deadline of 12 noon today for submitting their drafts to the Secretariat for processing.

In keeping with the indicative timetable for our thematic discussions this year, the Committee will now take up the cluster on disarmament machinery, starting with a panel discussion. I now warmly

welcome our panellists on this cluster: first, the President of the Conference on Disarmament and the Permanent Representative of Malaysia, His Excellency Dato Mazlan Muhammad; the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and Permanent Representative of Croatia, His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Drobnyak; the Chairman of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and President of the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, who is also the Head of the International Centre for Democratic Transition, Mr. István Gyarmati; and finally, the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Ms. Theresa Hitchens.

We will first hear statements from our panellists. Thereafter, we will change to an informal setting for an interactive question-and-answer session. Once again, I urge our panellists to keep their statements short.

I now give the floor to the President of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. Muhammad (Malaysia), President, Conference on Disarmament: Let me congratulate you, Sir, on your appointment as Chairman of the First Committee, and also congratulate the other members of the Bureau. Allow me also to express my appreciation to you and the Bureau, as well as to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Angela Kane, for having invited me to participate in today's panel discussion on disarmament machinery.

Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), I should like to take this opportunity today to share with you and other colleagues here on the work of the CD as well as the report of the CD which will be submitted to the General Assembly.

I should also like to state here that it is an honour for my country, Malaysia, and for me personally, to assume the presidency of the CD, it being the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. It is a responsibility that we undertake and discharge very solemnly. Our effort in finalizing the report and the resolution of the CD is testament to our commitment to this important body.

I should also like to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues and the six CD presidents for their invaluable support and cooperation during my presidency. The membership of the presidency of six this year was an interesting one, with representation from three regional groups. I believe that we worked

well together, contributing to the work of the CD this year. Malaysia assumed the presidency of the CD on 18 August. This is the second time that we have assumed the presidency since joining the Conference in 1999. As the final President of the 2014 session, my main task was to negotiate and finalize the report of the CD to the General Assembly, as detailed in the rules of procedure.

I wish to thank all delegations for the constructive spirit and flexibility shown during the negotiation of the report. Despite the initial differences in positions on a number of issues, we were finally able to bridge those differences due to the constructive engagement and flexibility shown by delegations. I am certainly hopeful that this constructive spirit will continue into the new session of the CD next year. The report of the CD is presented in document CD/2004.

Despite the Conference being unable to adopt and implement a programme of work, as called for by the General Assembly in resolution 68/64, the 2014 session of the CD was still filled with activities. The momentum started even before the current session began, with the work of the Informal Working Group during the intersessional period as mandated by decision CD/1956/Rev.1. During those discussions, there was a growing understanding of a dual-track approach for the CD in 2014.

On the first track, the Informal Working Group, with a mandate to produce a programme of work, was to be re-established. On the second track, substantive discussions would be commenced through a schedule of activities on all items on the agenda of the Conference. This parallel approach was supported by many delegations and led to the establishment of both mechanisms in the CD this year.

The first track, namely the Informal Working Group with a mandate to produce a programme of work, was re-established on 3 March by decision CD/1974. Ambassador Luis Gallegos of Ecuador and Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia reprised their roles as co-Chair and Vice co-Chair, respectively. The Informal Working Group held three informal meetings during the session. As the session drew to a close, the co-Chair and the Vice co-Chair prepared a report on the work of the Informal Working Group in which they highlighted that despite numerous consultations on the different proposals to take the work of the CD forward, the proposals did not receive the support of all delegations. As there was no agreement on the

content, the report of the Informal Working Group that was prepared in the personal capacities of the co-Chair and Vice co-Chair was submitted by me to the CD on 2 September. Let me take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Gallegos and Ambassador Woolcott for their tireless efforts and dedication in steering the work of the Informal Working Group.

On the second track, which is the schedule of activities, the CD took a decision on 26 March to have a series of structured and substantive informal meetings on all items on the agenda of the Conference. These informal meetings were chaired and coordinated by Ambassador Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser of Egypt on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on nuclear disarmament; by Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; by Ambassador Matthew Rowland of the United Kingdom on agenda item 3; by Ambassador Marta Maurás of Chile on agenda item 4; and by Ambassador Mikhail Khvostov of Belarus on agenda items 5, 6 and 7. Let me take this opportunity to thank the five coordinators for their efforts in chairing the informal meetings.

Pursuant to decision CD/1978, which established the schedule of activities, the reports of the five coordinators, which were prepared in their personal capacities and finalized by the President under his responsibility, were submitted to the Conference during the Kenyan presidency. Many delegations welcomed the informal discussions under the schedule of activities. The informal nature of the meetings provided a forum for an open and constructive discussion on all the issues on the CD agenda.

Another important development this year was the proposal from the Acting Secretary-General of the CD, Mr. Michael Møller. On 20 May, Mr. Møller suggested options that could be explored to improve the functioning of the Conference. The Acting Secretary-General provided four proposals: first, to consider negotiations on areas of common ground with a view eventually to producing framework conventions to which substantive protocols may be subsequently negotiated and added; secondly, to explore issues for which voluntary, politically binding regimes may be negotiated; thirdly, to consider the establishment of a subsidiary body to examine and make proposals on the improvement of the working methods of the Conference; and fourthly, the holding of an informal

Conference on Disarmament-Civil Society Forum, hosted by the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament. There was a good discussion in the CD on all four proposals given by Mr. Møller. The proposals on a framework convention and politically binding regime were explored in the discussions of the Informal Working Group. Unfortunately, there was no agreement among delegations on these two proposals.

Regarding the proposal on the establishment of a subsidiary body on the improvement of the working methods of the Conference, there was certainly support among many delegations on this matter. However, due to limited time this proposal could not be developed further this year. Perhaps there would be value for the CD to revisit this proposal if the Conference is unable to adopt a programme of work early next year.

On the final proposal regarding the informal Conference on Disarmament civil society forum, it was recently announced by the Acting Secretary-General that the event would be held on 12 December in Geneva on his own initiative. Preparations for the event are currently under way. I am confident that many delegations are looking forward to participating and engaging with our colleagues from civil society. I feel that this event is timely as it would provide an opportunity for the CD to tap into the ideas, experience and knowledge of civil society, which could perhaps lead to further progress in the Conference.

Despite the number of positive developments in the CD this year, the fact is that the Conference is still unable to commence substantive work. Eighteen years have passed without progress. That is certainly an issue that concerns the international community, including the Secretary-General himself. In his address to the Conference during the first plenary of the 2014 session on 21 January, Mr. Ban Ki-moon called upon the CD to live up to the international community's expectations and to make good progress this year.

As another CD session concludes without adopting a programme of work, we need to reflect on what has happened and what needs to be done for the CD to commence its substantive work. We would not do justice to the good work that has been done in this session, or indeed in past sessions, if the CD were unable to build upon the work done, in particular the informal discussions under the schedule of activities and the work of the Informal Working Group that was held this year. The proposals by the Acting Secretary-General are also worth exploring and may have the

potential to unlock the current stalemate in the CD. I hope that this positive momentum can continue on to the next session with a view to further progress being made in the Conference.

In my experience this year, the presidency of six mechanism has certainly proved to be useful to provide continuity in the work of the Presidents of the CD. I am confident that the incoming presidents next year will be just as progressive and productive in carrying the work of the CD forward. I look forward to having consultations with the incoming President from Mexico, as well as other delegations, with a view to exploring and exchanging ideas on how to progress in our efforts to commence substantive work in the 2015 session.

Before ending, allow me to take this opportunity to thank all delegations for their assistance and cooperation extended to me during my presidency, especially on the negotiations on the report of the CD as well as the draft resolution to the General Assembly. Let me also thank the Acting Secretary-General and the Secretariat for their hard work and dedication throughout my presidency. I wish all of you the very best in the work that lies ahead.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Mr. Drobnyak (Croatia), Chair, United Nations Disarmament Commission: Let me congratulate you, Sir, on assuming this important post. I will try to be brief and rather simple.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), as we know, is a very specific subsidiary body of the General Assembly — that is, of the universal membership — and operates solely on the basis of consensus. This is at the same time the strength of the Commission and also its weakest spot.

Consensus-based decision making should remain a golden rule of the UNDC, and any possible changes in this work of the Commission should not, in the Chair's strong opinion, be called into question. On the other hand, operating on a consensus basis in such a sensitive and highly complex field as is disarmament requires the necessary degree of pragmatism and flexibility on all sides. But on one issue there seems to be full consensus. Member States are concerned about the lack of any success in the Commission's work in this century and its consequent decreasing relevance.

This year, another three-year UNDC cycle has ended without any outcome with regard to concrete recommendations on specific disarmament issues as mandated by the General Assembly. In spite of the significant effort, the 2014 substantive session produced no results, though at the moment it seems that we might have a result. I have to say that significant work has been done in the working group on conventional disarmament issues, chaired by our Norwegian colleague.

So after the substantive session produced no results, in September the Chair called for an informal meeting of the Commission. During that informal meeting, creative ways aimed at restoring the relevance and efficiency of the UNDC and possible courses of action were debated. Proposals included adding a third agenda item to the substantive session agenda so as to streamline part of its work in the areas where progress is possible. It was also proposed to invite experts on disarmament, as appropriate, including those at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, to contribute and if need be participate in the session.

In the context of possible choices of topics of the third agenda item, a number of diverse proposals were earmarked, addressing factors affecting global strategic stability. Let me just list in no particular order some of the proposals: cybersecurity; supply and demand of sensitive nuclear materials; biological and chemical weapons verification; the influence of new developments in the military field of conventional disarmament; and the issue of outer space. On this issue, proposals ranged from the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities as a follow-up to resolution 68/50, all the way to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. These are just some of the ideas presented in the course of the year.

The Chair's own paper specifically prepared for that meeting in September has received support from a number of member States. Still, considering the importance and imperative of consensus-based work of the Commission, there was not sufficient ground to officially endorse or institutionalize the changes regarding the agenda items for the next substantive session's triennial cycle. I would say that we have started to move in the right direction, but we are still some distance from the finishing line.

The problem for UNDC at this juncture is the deadlock in the linkages between the two issues on the

agenda, the first, nuclear, and the other conventional disarmament. So far it has not been possible to have any decision, recommendation — or proposal, to be more precise — in one field without having the same in the other. So while the UNDC is fulfilling its deliberative role, it is unable to meet its recommendations and proposal-making role.

What to do about it? The logical way out of this mutually reinforcing deadlock would be to move forward in the areas where progress is possible through a more focused approach and adding new areas, for example, outer space is just one of the proposals. When it comes to the deliberation cycle, according to some member States the option to shorten it to a two-year cycle should also be considered. With all this in mind, the Chair and the UNDC Bureau are in the process of introducing a draft resolution on the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the First Committee that will differ to some degree from previous resolutions on the matter. I think it has just been introduced.

The goal of the new resolution is to pave the way — or lay the foundation, if you will — for results-oriented work of the 2015 substantive session. Let me just earmark some important points regarding the incoming draft resolution on the UNDC matter. The language is different to a certain degree, not only more action-oriented, but the draft resolution also tries to radiate the readiness of the membership for a gradual constructive change. It stresses the need for a focused and results-oriented discussion on agenda items. There is a paragraph on inviting, as appropriate, experts from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to prepare background papers and, if need be, present their views at the invitation of the Chair, subject to the pre-approval of the Commission.

Then there was an attempt to specify the agenda, and the third agenda item, but at this particular stage consensus was not able to be reached on this issue and considering that this particular resolution must be adopted by consensus — and here I stress that the resolution on the UNDC report must be adopted by consensus — so the UNDC Bureau will propose more general language in the hope that the UNDC will be able to define and fine tune the 2015 substantive session agenda in the coming months. The final draft presented by the Bureau nevertheless encapsulates, I hope, the new spirit and willingness for positive change. The enthusiasm for UNDC seems not to be at the highest point at the moment. I as the Chair am still waiting

for candidates to fill vacated posts, starting from the UNDC Chair. I do not know who will be my successor, but we are also waiting for the Chairs of the working group.

Let me conclude by saying that the Chair will end its mandate this year encouraged by the rising willingness to revitalize the UNDC work and to bring back its relevance and effectiveness. That is what I was able to capture and hear throughout the year when speaking with colleagues during formal and informal meetings. Though we did not reach this goal in 2014, as the Chair I dare to say that we took a small step forward, and I use this opportunity to thank all colleagues, member States and everyone for their support and cooperation throughout the year.

The Chair: The Committee will now hear from the Chair of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.

Mr. Gyarmati, Chair, Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters: I have chaired the Advisory Board since the beginning of this year and can report very quickly on the results and discussions we had in the course of 2014. I can be very brief because Committee members have before them the report of the Secretary-General (A/68/206), which includes the report on the activities of the Advisory Board.

We have basically dealt with three issues, two substantive issues that we discussed as the Advisory Board, one relating to unmanned aerial vehicles and the second one on new verification technologies. We had two rounds of discussion and some intersessional work, including some studies which came up with some proposals to the Secretary-General. I am very happy to report that this morning when I met the Secretary-General he approved the United Nations recommissioning a study on unmanned aerial vehicles, and a study will be prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The third issue that we have been dealing with was how to stabilize UNIDIR. We were trying to find a new Director since the outgoing Director, Theresa Hitchens, is unfortunately leaving. This attempt took a lot of time, and I will come back to the results in a moment.

As we look forward to 2015, the Secretary-General approved three topics for the Advisory Board to discuss. One is the use of arms control as a means of managing conflict. The second is the humanitarian consequences of nuclear use, and the third is arms control and

non-State actors. we will discuss these three issues and come up with some recommendations for the Secretary-General after our second meeting in July.

What has occupied the Board in its role as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR has been the situation of UNIDIR. Members know that UNIDIR is a very strange member of the United Nations family. It is a United Nations institution. It is not financed from the regular budget and is a research institution. That makes for a rather interesting situation of how to ensure compliance with United Nations rules and procedures yet at the same time to maintain the independence of research.

As I said, the Director is leaving, so we need to find a successor. After long discussions, the Secretary-General decided that the new Director would be appointed for one year so that there would be somebody to manage the transition. The Secretary-General expects UNIDIR and the Board of Trustees to come up with solutions to stabilize the situation of UNIDIR in the course of 2015. The post of Director would then be readvertised, and the new Director would take over in a situation where we would hope to have a stable, self-sustained institution that could concentrate on substance and not on institutional issues.

What are the issues that need to be addressed as UNIDIR? I do not want to bore members with too many details, but there are of course the financial issues and how to raise the necessary funds for UNIDIR. These are the issues everybody knows of, but we also have to address some administrative and legal issues that arise from the ambiguous situation of UNIDIR being a United Nations institution but at the same time not being financed from the regular budget and also having to deal with independent research and to produce the results of independent research. Our firm desire, as we were instructed by the Secretary-General, is to go through all the open issues, or issues that can be seen as problems for the smooth functioning of UNIDIR and offer some solutions to the Secretary-General.

We are very grateful that the Government of Switzerland has offered to help by offering the funds to commission an independent needs assessment for UNIDIR. That will help us tremendously to have a clear picture in addition to what we hear from the Director and the staff on the issues surrounding UNIDIR. We expect that this independent needs assessment research will produce results for the first meeting of the Board

of Trustees in 2015, which will be held in Geneva at the end of January.

Let me conclude by expressing our sincere gratitude and thanks first of all to the Secretary-General. Without his personal involvement and commitment, it would have been extremely difficult if at all possible to manage the issues that were in front of both the Advisory Board and the Board of Trustees. Susana Malcorra in the Office of the Secretary-General was most helpful to us, and also of course, Ms. Angela Kane, who has been our friend and everyday contact in our work. I could not imagine a better colleague and friend than Angela.

We are looking forward to a very busy year next year, and I hope that when I come to report to the First Committee next year I will be able — and I am pretty sure I will be able — to report that the work to stabilize and make UNIDIR a self-sustaining institution within the United Nations family so that we will be able to continue to provide very valuable independent research for the United Nations will then be a very concrete report on how we managed to create these conditions for UNIDIR.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Ms. Hitchens, Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: May I congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on your appointment to this post. I once again am glad to have the opportunity to address the Committee and provide a brief update on the activities and status of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) during the past year. As many members know, UNIDIR was created in the wake of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as an autonomous institute under a General Assembly mandate. Under our Statute, the Institute is designed to undertake independent research, analysis and educational activities with the aim of promoting informed participation by member States in efforts towards disarmament, arms control, peace and security.

In the past year, the Institute has been very busy as have all of the members of the Committee, with the rather intense pace of work in a number of fields. At the same time, as members know, the global security situation has been under near-constant stress, raising considerable challenges to progress on many levels. Nonetheless, UNIDIR has continued to uphold its long-standing record of providing relevant, informative

and useful research and analysis to Member States, and we have greatly appreciated their support and encouragement regarding the benefits of our activities to Member States and the disarmament community at large.

As many members also know, this will be my last appearance before the First Committee as UNIDIR Director. I should therefore like to deviate a little from standard reporting of activities of our programme of work, which can be found in our annual report that is available on our website. I want to focus a little more on macro-issues and the lessons that I and the Institute have learned over the past six years.

From my time here, I know that the key advantage of UNIDIR's existence is our ability to work objectively, largely outside of political constraints, and yet provide a linkage between Member States and United Nations processes. I have been heartened over the years by the strong political support from Member States for the Institute's independence, and for that I thank them. I would also like to thank the members past and present of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and our Board of Trustees for their strong support of the Institute's independent status and for me personally, including in some very challenging times.

I have also come to the even stronger conviction over the years that UNIDIR is truly a unique organization for a number of reasons beyond its autonomous nature. UNIDIR's mandate is to provide Member States with data and analysis in order not only to prepare them for negotiations, but also to assist States in translating those negotiated commitments into practical implementation actions. Our research is not just for research's sake but is designed to innovate, to have impact and to solve problems — that is, we try to move knowledge to action.

A key example of that is the work that UNIDIR has been doing for a number of years to address concerns of member States and within United Nations organizations about waste, redundancy and even agencies working at cross-purposes when developing and implementing programming and response in complex environments in the field. UNIDIR's multi-year project on evidence-based design has focused on developing an evidence-based approach to reintegration programming with the aim of improving local-level effectiveness in post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding efforts.

In 2013, working with the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, which comprises more than 20 United Nations agencies, the project developed a design tool prototype for use by United Nations staff and partners that is being piloted in the field this year. But as we quickly found, the process of using evidence-based design to ensure effective impact in programme planning has relevancy beyond reintegration programming. We are looking to extend our work to other processes and partners. That is a very clear example of research with impact, of moving knowledge to action.

UNIDIR further has a unique ability to help build capacity at both the policy and the practical levels within Member States and regional organizations, as well as United Nations agencies. A key example of this work is our ongoing project on facilitating effective use of the international small arms control standards. UNIDIR has developed a self-assessment software tool for use by agencies and Member States in implementing the standards. In the latest phase of the project, UNIDIR is working to build the capacity of United Nations agencies and regional organizations in the use and integration of this software tool in their own programming and training activities in order to establish a global network of institutions that are capable of providing tailored training on the tool to their beneficiaries, including States. These capacity-building activities will create a sustainable model for long-term use and dissemination of the software and enable training institutions to serve as a force multiplier in bringing the international small arms control standards to the fore.

In addition, UNIDIR's broad mandate allows it to take on tasks that cut across the narrower mandates of many other United Nations organizations. A key example of this unique role can be seen in the recent study "An Illusion of Safety: Challenges of Nuclear Weapon Detonations for United Nations Humanitarian Coordination and Response", which was undertaken in cooperation with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme.

The study examined both planning and response mechanisms of the United Nations-coordinated humanitarian system — which is led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and involves a whole mosaic of actors and agencies — to arrange plausible illustrative nuclear-weapon detonation scenarios. The study scopes specific issues that warrant further policy and operational

attention in order to enhance civilian protection from nuclear weapons. Finally, it actually suggests steps that the humanitarian system could take to better plan for such eventualities and reinforces the importance of nuclear weapons never being used again in populated areas, whether deliberately or accidentally. The fact of the matter is that this study could not have been done by any one of the agencies involved, as the issues crossed the individual mandates of those agencies. It is again a primary example of UNIDIR's added value.

Finally, UNIDIR is unique in that our mandate calls upon us to look ahead at emerging challenges to international security, to anticipate risks and seek preventative measures before a serious crisis erupts. Our long-standing work to elucidate the challenges of space and cybersecurity and methods to meet those challenges is an example of our dedication to this mandate. Another example is our ongoing project on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies, where we are exploring the basic issues that must be unpacked in order to underpin good policy-making in the future.

On all these issues, UNIDIR's conferences, research work and policy-oriented capacity-building continue to help provide diplomats and policy-makers with the foundational understanding of the many complexities involved so that they are better able to make effective decisions about how to balance security risks with the societal benefits of these technologies. As these few examples illustrate, UNIDIR's value added comes from us being part of the United Nations system yet apart from it, and thus able to develop knowledge-based responses to the range of security challenges that lie before us. Again, I am in no doubt that UNIDIR's work is contributing every day and will continue to contribute to the important work that all Members do. It is my firm belief that if UNIDIR did not exist, the General Assembly would have to invent it all over again.

UNIDIR has traditionally been a lean and mean organization relying on a small number of specialized institutional staff responsible for the Institute's vision, management and day-to-day operation, as well as a variable pool of high-calibre researchers and analysts who undertake the substantive project work. I want to take this opportunity to thank the Institute staff, every one of them, for their dedication to the institution's mission, to their work and to the goals of disarmament, arms control, peace and security. As both institutional and research staff are often working under short-

term contracts with very little job security, I can only applaud their nerves of steel and their willingness to sacrifice for the cause.

As most members know, UNIDIR's many activities are funded strictly by voluntary contributions, and I would also therefore first like to express my gratitude to all Member States that have funded UNIDIR's operations, especially during this time of financial constraint. I am keenly aware of the budgetary stresses all Members face, and I appreciate all their efforts to support the Institute. I am also keenly aware, however, that UNIDIR more than ever requires care and feeding from Member States.

In many ways, UNIDIR has been a victim of its own success. The Institute's ability to continue to survive and produce quality materials and outcomes desired and appreciated by Member States despite chronic underfunding has in fact made it a bit more difficult for UNIDIR to find long-term solutions to its funding situation. Donors have become accustomed to very high value for money. Member States as a whole also have an expectation that UNIDIR will contribute analysis and support to a range of disarmament processes without compensation. For example, the rotating Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament often call upon UNIDIR experts for analysis or to prepare briefings, yet this work is not paid for. Indeed, as Member States over the past several years have seen, as their own internal resources for peace and security analysis dwindle, UNIDIR is being called upon to do even more. Unfortunately, the gap between expectations and financial support continues to grow.

There are several problems at play. First, UNIDIR's goods and services are at a unit price disadvantage to non-United Nations think tanks, research centres and non-governmental organizations, because its status as a United Nations organization encourages certain financial and opportunity costs. Indeed, the costs of doing business as a United Nations organization have risen over time as the services formerly provided by the Organization to UNIDIR in exchange for programme support costs — what we pay the United Nations — have been eliminated or are now offered on a cost-recovery principle. At the same time, as internal rules and regulations have changed more and more, staff time is being required simply to function within the system, even as the Institute has been forced to downsize institutional support staff because of the lack of unearmarked funds.

It is clear that securing voluntary contributions to fund project activities is not at the heart of the financial difficulties. UNIDIR's annual voluntary contributions have continued to rise steadily, if slowly, since its inception. In 2009, when I arrived, voluntary contributions were slightly more than \$2.3 million. By 2012, that sum had risen to approximately \$3.7 million, and in 2013 voluntary contributions were at \$2.7 million. Member States obviously value UNIDIR's work; otherwise this would not be the case.

Rather, a key part of the systemic issue has been the shift in Government funding patterns away from institutional support to highly restricted funding for specific projects. Over the past year, about 85 per cent of the funds coming to UNIDIR have been earmarked for project work, often with stipulations that limit the amount that can be spent on the so-called overheads or institutional staff functions that are required for administration and oversight of the projects themselves. That has created a disconnect between the desire of Member States for UNIDIR to take on new projects and activities and the institution's internal capacity to develop, manage, evaluate and disseminate the results from those projects and activities. While UNIDIR receives a very small subvention from the regular budget that was initially designed to cover institutional staff costs, that subvention for many years has covered only the costs of the Director, and barely that now, despite the many resolutions adopted by Member States and the Board of Trustees to increase it.

The lack of non-earmarked funding creates several operational concerns, and one of them — as I am sure many here have heard me say a million times — is my regret at the lack of capacity to carry out rapid-response research in educational activities — to turn things around and to do something new quickly. There is simply no pool of funds to accommodate non-project-related activities, nor do we have the ability to keep a standing research staff to undertake such activities. Furthermore, the Institute struggles mightily to address its full mandate under the constraint that most funding is tied to specific projects that are underwritten by a handful of donors. Lack of institutional and macroprogrammatic resources and a narrow donor base inevitably mean that some issues near and dear to the hearts of some Member States regrettably get less attention in the Institute's agenda than they should.

Obviously, this situation is a problem that, if left uncorrected, will certainly undermine the efficiency

of the Institute and make the job of the new Director extremely difficult. That is one of the reasons for the transition plan as we go forward. One way to help would be for Member States seriously to take up the issue of increased funding from the United Nations regular budget. Although I know this would be a laborious and highly political process, an expanded donor base will also be critical in the future. So I want to urge all non-donor States to step up and contribute to the cause, no matter at how small a level. I and the members of the Board are more than willing to discuss with any Member State at any time how UNIDIR's future can be more fully secured.

Nonetheless UNIDIR remains determined to do its part to forward the cause of disarmament, non-proliferation, peace and security with all of Members. I am really glad to have had the opportunity to serve such an important institution as UNIDIR.

The Chair: I will now suspend the meeting for an interactive discussion with our panellists through an informal question-and-answer session.

The meeting was suspended at 5.40 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m.

The Chair: The Committee shall now take up the list of speakers on the disarmament machinery cluster.

All delegations taking the floor are reminded that the time limit is five minutes when speaking in a national capacity and seven minutes for statements on behalf of several delegations.

I call on the observer of the European Union.

Mr. Vrailas (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member States. The candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia and Albania; the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

We are a strong supporter of the United Nations and effective multilateralism. The role and contribution of the United Nations disarmament machinery, the components of which are mutually reinforcing, remain crucial and irreplaceable. Deliberative and negotiating bodies set up under the auspices of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to

disarmament need to improve their performance and reach results in line with their agreed mandates. Recent positive developments in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, such as the success of the Arms Trade Treaty and the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, demonstrate that deliberations and negotiations in these fields can produce results.

We believe that the First Committee should serve as a forum for open and relevant exchange, able to deal with current challenges to our collective security and develop concrete measures to this end. It should concentrate its efforts on the most pertinent and topical issues, rather than maintain the practice of proceeding in a formalistic manner and simply updating previously adopted resolutions. In order to alleviate its heavy agenda and make it more relevant, we believe that the possibility of biennializing or triennializing more resolutions in a balanced manner should be contemplated. We welcome the initiative of the Chair to convene an informal meeting to discuss possible further improvements regarding the panel discussions as a positive step in this direction. We support further increase of the efficiency, utility and interactivity of the panels and we presented concrete suggestions in this respect.

The Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with its mandate, has the crucial role to negotiate multilateral disarmament treaties. We are disappointed that it did not succeed in commencing its substantive work, including negotiations. This year, however, we have noted some encouraging developments. The re-establishment of the Informal Working Group to assist in developing a programme of work and the structured discussions under the schedule of activities allowed for constructive and open debate. We hope these exercises can be built upon further.

We would also like to reiterate our long-standing commitment to the enlargement of the Conference. We underline the importance of continuing consultations on the expansion of its membership and strongly support the appointment of a special coordinator in this respect. Consistent with our engagement with civil society, we would welcome enhanced interaction between civil society and the Conference, thereby allowing a broadened contribution of non-governmental organizations and research institutions in an inclusive manner, to the work of the Conference.

For the European Union, the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, remains a clear priority. National security concerns, while legitimate, can and should be addressed as part of the negotiation process rather than as a prerequisite. We appeal to delegations to show flexibility. We call on all Conference on Disarmament member States to start negotiations on such a treaty without delay and to begin work on the other issues on the agenda, in line with the adopted programme of work (CD/1864). We call on all States possessing nuclear weapons that have not done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

We welcome the constructive discussions at the two meetings in 2014 of the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The fact that the experts of a number of EU member States participate in the Group of Governmental Experts reflects our keen interest in and commitment to this issue. We look forward to the report of the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts and the meetings in 2015 to further substantively advance the issue.

We also share the frustration that, since 1999, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) has not been able to fulfil its mandate properly and has failed to agree on any recommendations. For the EU and its member States, it is important to take a sincere look at the way the existing working methods of the UNDC have been utilized, in particular regarding its current agenda, which is overpoliticized.

We welcome and strongly support the initiative of the UNDC Chairman to invite member States to submit proposals on how to revitalize the work of the Commission, including the possibilities regarding modification of the substantive agenda. We also believe that the Chair's concept paper on possible ways forward for the next three-year cycle is an excellent basis for further discussion. In that regard, we expressed our views at the informal meeting of 8 September, and we support the UNDC resolution proposed by the Chair as a tangible means of increasing the chances of success in the next three-year cycle. We are looking forward to engaging constructively in the discussions.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a trusted element of the disarmament machinery, invested with a unique mandate to conduct independent research and analysis on issues relating to disarmament and security which requires a high degree of expertise. The EU and its member States highly value UNIDIR's activities in conducting independent research in disarmament and security. We have financially supported the important work done by the Institute on numerous occasions.

Ms. De Jesus Ferreira (Angola): It is a great honour on behalf of the Republic of Angola to participate in this meeting of the First Committee at its sixty-ninth session. As this is the first time that Angola is taking the floor, we would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the First Committee and to express our readiness to cooperate with the Committee.

The Republic of Angola recognizes the fundamental role of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, mainly in achieving the growing need for electrical energy in the development of our planet and its contribution to the treatment of cancer, the vaccination of cattle and the control of pests in agriculture. For these reasons, Angola hopes that the work of the Committee will be able to identify new challenges and propose solutions to overcome differences, as well as proposals on nuclear safety and on building trust in the hard work that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) faces in the establishment of ever-closer cooperation among all its members.

In our humble opinion, the discussions around this topic occur in a period that calls for greater attention on nuclear control and disarmament. The presence of delegations from various member States demonstrates the importance they attach to this issue as well as the importance of the international community signing and ratifying existing international instruments in order to contribute to the elimination of the total use of devices of mass destruction, as is the case with nuclear weapons.

In the particular case of Angola, we would like to mention that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is under administrative treatment by our National Assembly and later on for publication. The case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is also under analysis by the Ministers concerned for accession and subsequent ratification.

We believe that the current disarmament situation in the world requires harmonized coordination among Member States in the face of the challenges posed by the threat of the use of nuclear weapons and for the prevention of threats that States face today in this area. We believe that there is still a need to ensure that each State is willing to help and give its best both nationally and internationally to restructure and adopt the instruments to achieve the harmonization and implementation of comprehensive nuclear disarmament programmes with a view to guaranteeing peace and international security.

Angola does not have any nuclear installations in its territory and does not have any plans to acquire them in the National Development Plan for 2013-2017. Rather, it foresees projects related to the use of radioisotopes, linear particle accelerators, and a variety of X-ray devices in different activities, especially in the field of human medicine and animal health.

To conclude, we reaffirm that the Republic of Angola attaches great importance to keeping the use of nuclear energy as an additional resource in our planet Earth in the name of progress and development. For this purpose, the IAEA should, through safety and security instruments, continue to play a crucial role in contributing to peace and international security, always seeking the benefit of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): I am presenting a shortened version of my statement, the full text of which has been distributed. Pakistan shares the concerns over the lack of progress in the United Nations entire disarmament machinery. In our view, this deadlock is the result of existing strategic realities. We must recognize that progress by the disarmament machinery requires upholding the principle of equal and undiminished security for all States. There can be no discrimination, selectivity or exceptionalism in the context of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

It is regrettable that one of the key components of this machinery, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been deadlocked for more than a decade on all issues on its agenda. Indeed, on the issue of nuclear disarmament, the *raison d'être* of the CD, there has been no progress over the past 30 years. Some of the major nuclear-weapon States, despite their claims of supporting the goal of nuclear disarmament, have paid only lip service to that goal. In the CD, they have consistently opposed the start of any negotiations on

nuclear disarmament. Their argument is that this objective can only be achieved through a step-by-step approach. However, in our view such a step-by-step approach does not really contribute towards nuclear disarmament as it envisages only agreements that amount to non-proliferation measures.

For instance, in our view one such step — the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty — does not contribute to nuclear disarmament but only prevents further nuclear testing. And let us not forget that the major nuclear-weapon States were ready to negotiate and conclude that treaty only after having conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests and really did not require any further nuclear testing. They have thus made a virtue out of necessity.

Similarly, some major nuclear-weapon States and their allies are now promoting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), arguing that this is the only ripe issue on the CD's agenda. Since these major Powers already possess huge stocks of fissile materials and therefore do not require any more fissile material for weapons purposes, they are ready to make this so-called sacrifice. However, such a ban on future production would be only a non-proliferation measure at best, with no contribution whatsoever towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

In our view, if we are to adopt a meaningful non-proliferation and disarmament measure relating to fissile materials, there ought to be a fissile-material treaty that not only bans future production but also reduces or at least puts under international safeguards the existing stockpiles of fissile materials. Only such a fissile-material treaty can address and protect the security interests of all States and contribute towards

nuclear disarmament. Some States have asserted that national security concerns can and should be addressed during the negotiations in the CD on an FMCT. We could not agree more, so long as these States apply the same logic to the other three core issues on the CD's agenda: nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

If there is any issue on the CD's agenda that is actually ripe for negotiations, it is a treaty on negative security assurances. Such a treaty would not threaten or undermine the security of any nuclear-weapon State. At the same time, no nuclear-weapon State can take the morally reprehensible step of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State. Moreover, virtually every nuclear-weapon State has in some form or another already extended an assurance against the use of its nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State.

Outer space is the common heritage of all humankind. It is a zone that should be used only for the benefit of all nations. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the international community and the members of the Conference on Disarmament in particular to negotiate a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

It is a matter of some satisfaction that, after several years of stalemate, the CD did succeed in 2014 in agreeing on a schedule of activities involving substantive discussions on all agenda items in a balanced and equitable manner. While not amounting to negotiations or pre-negotiations, these discussions in our view prove useful in highlighting the various aspects of each of the agenda items and to further strengthen our conviction that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate venue to hold such discussions.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.