



# General Assembly

Sixty-ninth session

## First Committee

**18**<sup>th</sup> meeting

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New York

Official Records

*Chair:* Mr. Rattray ..... (Jamaica)

*In the absence of the Chair, Ms. Vladulescu (Romania), Acting Chair, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.*

### Agenda items 87 to 104 (continued)

#### **Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items**

**The Acting Chair:** We will now hear from the remaining speakers on the list for the cluster on regional disarmament and security.

Before we proceed, I remind all delegations taking the floor to kindly ensure that they deliver their statements within the time limits of five minutes for those speaking in a national capacity and seven minutes for statements on behalf of several delegations. Circulated texts that could not be delivered within that time frame can be posted on the Committee web portal, QuickFirst.

**Mr. Mwewa (Zambia):** Allow me once again to thank the Chair and his Bureau for the total commitment they have exhibited in steering the deliberations of the Committee.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.17).

It is gratifying to note that, at present, 53 African countries have signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba. As of May, 38 of those countries had ratified the Treaty in order to reaffirm their total commitment, strengthen non-proliferation, promote complete disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and enhance regional peace and security.

I wish to reiterate that Zambia ratified the Pelindaba Treaty on 28 June 2010. In doing so, the Government embraced the initial step taken by resolution 1652 (XVI) on the consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone, which was adopted in 1961, and the subsequent adoption of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa in July 1964. Zambia welcomes the efforts being made by countries of other regions to strengthen nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties.

Recognizing the importance of establishing a world free of nuclear weapons, Zambia continues to operate within the framework of the Treaty of Pelindaba in order to contribute to freeing the African continent from developing, producing, acquiring and testing nuclear weapons. In addition, Zambia is working with the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa by enhancing, strengthening and protecting nuclear safety and the security regulatory infrastructures.

Zambia will fully support the African Commission on Nuclear Energy by ensuring compliance with the obligations under the Treaty through the application of peaceful nuclear safeguards and consultations at the regional and international levels. In addition, Zambia

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embraces Protocols I, II and III to the Treaty, which call on nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against any party to the Treaty, prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone, and prohibit the use of nuclear weapons for terrorist activities.

With regard to nuclear science and technology, Zambia will endeavor to support the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the importance of bringing the other members of the international community into the treaty. Zambia calls upon those countries that have not signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so in order for the treaty to attain universality.

**Mr. Grima** (Malta): Allow me to begin by extending my warmest congratulations to the Permanent Representative of Jamaica on being elected to preside over this important Committee, and by commending him for the professional manner in which he is conducting our proceedings.

Located at the cultural crossroads of the Mediterranean, Malta has consistently sought to act as a bridge between the countries to the north and south of the Mediterranean. Over the years, Malta has sought to promote the broadest possible dialogue among the countries of our region on the various issues affecting our common security. Malta continues to support closer regional dialogue as a key to regional development, integration and security, as manifested by its continued support of regional organizations and initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean, the Western Mediterranean Forum and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, which Malta hosts, and which serves to facilitate dialogue among parliamentarians in the Mediterranean.

Development in the Mediterranean and the numerous security challenges facing our region continue to a large extent to inform and shape Malta's foreign policy. The security challenges in the Mediterranean are far-reaching. How they will be addressed will have a profound impact, not only on the entire region itself, but beyond. The powerful forces that have been unleashed throughout the Mediterranean make the need for further steps to strengthen security and cooperation in the region not only necessary but urgent.

The nature and extent of irregular migration and the smuggling of human beings in the Mediterranean are increasingly turning that phenomenon into a serious threat to the security of the entire region. Most recently, we have witnessed tragic events related to the smuggling of human beings across the Mediterranean, resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives. Malta calls on the international community to provide a more coherent and robust response to these challenges. We believe that closer cooperation is called for among the countries of origin and destination in the region. Transit countries also need to play an integral role in addressing and resolving this challenge. Addressing this problem quickly and effectively will help save lives, improve security in the region by restricting the unregulated movement of persons, and reinforce regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Malta has continued to intensify its cooperation with the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, taking a multifaceted approach to address the issue of migration in Malta, in particular its humanitarian aspects.

The deteriorating situation in Libya is a concern not only for that country and its people but also for the wider region. Malta believes that the worsening situation there could have serious ramifications far beyond Libya's borders. A protracted conflict in Libya will make an already dire humanitarian situation worse, increasing the challenges resulting from migration and turning Libya into fertile ground for terrorists and extremists. It is important that stability be achieved in Libya so that, with the help of the international community, the country can start building State institutions, and to that end we recognize the democratically elected Parliament there as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people. We also believe that the Libyans need to gather around a common political project through an inclusive process of national reconciliation. Malta supports all initiatives being taken by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and believes that disarmament and national reconciliation are prerequisites if Libya is to move forward.

The threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and by the numerous foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is another major concern. Malta recognizes the political urgency and necessity of countering ISIL's advance, and therefore fully supports the efforts of the coalition against ISIL. Although military intervention will be important in helping the

Kurdish and Iraqi forces fight ISIL, Malta believes that the wider political and regional context should also be addressed.

Progress towards democracy and freedom in the Mediterranean has inevitably been uneven. As the people of the region have found, the pursuit of liberty and justice has often come at a tragically high price. Malta supports its neighbours in their endeavours to establish functioning democracies based on the principles of justice, freedom and the rule of law. In that context, we are honoured to host the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, inaugurated on 18 June.

Malta works in concert with its partners in the European Union (EU) to further its own and the EU's non-proliferation goals. We welcomed the entry into force in December of the landmark Arms Trade Treaty. Its success and relevance will depend on its effective implementation and universalization. Malta therefore joins the EU in urging those States that have not signed or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

Almost half a century ago, in the belief that devastation would be visited on all humankind by a nuclear war, the international community adopted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which required good-faith negotiations aimed at achieving total nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international controls. Almost 50 years later, that provision remains largely unfulfilled. The catastrophic effects that could result from the use of nuclear weapons make it essential that we move forward urgently with nuclear disarmament.

With that overall objective in view, Malta supports establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and implementing confidence-building measures worldwide, particularly in the Mediterranean region. We support concrete, practical measures for implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, which calls for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We firmly believe in the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, which would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and instil confidence in the region. We fully support the tireless efforts of Ambassador Jaakko Laajava to facilitate the holding of a conference that could pave the way for the establishment of such a zone as soon as possible.

**Mr. Onanga Ndiaye (Gabon)** (*spoke in French*): Since this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor in the Committee, I would like to join previous speakers in congratulating the Chair on his leadership of the Committee and the other members of the Bureau on their work.

I would also like to associate myself with the statement delivered previously by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.17), as well as with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States.

Gabon's position on disarmament issues remains of a piece with its foreign policy in general, committed to multilateralism and convinced of the central role of the United Nations as the Organization best equipped to represent the peoples of the world and ensure better control of the security issues and concerns of our time. I take this opportunity to recall my country's commitment to the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body dedicated to general and complete disarmament.

The end of 2014 will see the entry into force on 24 December of the Arms Trade Treaty, only a year after its adoption. Gabon welcomes that event and the momentum that has marked the ratification process, and hopes to see the Treaty's future effective implementation. It represents a significant success crowning years of attempts to improve regulation of the international arms trade and fill gaps in the international legal system by establishing common rules and principles for the area.

Gabon welcomes the results of the most recent Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, while hoping that further efforts can be made to arrive at a legally binding international instrument for tracing and marking small arms and light weapons (SALW), because, as the Committee is aware, Africa is still more affected by such proliferation than any other region in the world. My country continues to urge the international community to put special emphasis on regional and subregional cooperation in order to address the issue of supply and demand and to curb cross-border movements. I recall that in our Central African subregion, the spread of SALW in all their aspects is not only a persistent threat

to peace, economic development and the improvement of democratic processes, but also a major obstacle to good governance and a security environment conducive to sustainable development.

In that regard, Gabon commends the work of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) in support of African States, including mine, which had the pleasure of hosting a workshop for francophone African States on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) that has enabled two States to submit reports to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Gabon also welcomes the cooperation between UNREC and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the support provided to States to implement it. We appreciate UNREC's support to the ECCAS secretariat in developing a guide on harmonizing Central African States' legislation with regional and international instruments such as the Kinshasa Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty and the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

In order to respond to all those challenges, Gabon will continue to promote confidence-building measures at the regional level, including through the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. Over the past few years, the Committee has used subregional and international instruments to promote the development of normative and legal frameworks for peace and security in the subregion. In that area, it constitutes a source of assistance for ECCAS countries, serving as a forum for exchanges and discussions on improving and promoting our efforts to address national, subregional and international challenges, including combating terrorism and arms proliferation, maritime piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, and the problem of industrial poaching in the subregion. The latter has become both an ecological and economic challenge, a transnational crime and a threat to our States' security, as the President of the Gabonese Republic noted in his address to the General Assembly during the general debate at its sixty-ninth session (see A/69/PV.10).

The work of the Committee is increasing the visibility of the interests of Central Africa in terms of security as well as solutions proposed by members

of the international community. In that regard, I welcome the opening, on 11 September in Yaoundé, of the Interregional Coordination Center for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea to combat the resurgence of maritime crime, in conformity with Security Council resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), and the recommendations of the Yaoundé Summit held in May and June 2013.

In conclusion, looking forward, the Committee will pursue its work at its thirty-ninth ministerial meeting, to be held from 1 to 5 December in Bujumbura. We will continue to draw heavily on our own resolve to work towards revitalizing, owning and ensuring cooperation among the States members of our economic community in the field of security. That is the purpose of the biannual resolution on confidence-building measures at the regional level presented by Equatorial Guinea on behalf of the States members of our economic community.

**Ms. Yee (Myanmar):** My delegation would like to thank the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, its Regional Disarmament Branch and the three United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament for their efforts towards global disarmament, international peace and security. Despite the fact that different regions have different priorities and approaches, the three United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament have been effective liaisons between international policymakers and practitioners at the national, subregional and regional levels.

The Regional Centres play an important role not only in promoting disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms-control measures at the regional level, but also in disseminating and sharing concepts, ideas and best practices through the medium of national and regional disarmament forums. They also contribute to the strengthening of durable peace and sustainable development in the regions concerned. We are glad to observe that Member States, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the donor community are enabling the Regional Centres to take community-based approaches while maintaining their current activities in the respective regions.

I take this opportunity to extend our thanks and appreciation to the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific for organizing a workshop in Myanmar on building the national capacity

to combat illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The workshop took place in Nay Pyi Taw this year and was a success.

The Disarmament Fellowship Programme organized annually by the Office for Disarmament Affairs is of significant benefit to developing countries in terms of capacity-building. Speaking from my own experience as a Disarmament Fellow in 2013, this programme is very beneficial to us young diplomats embarking on a lifelong career to work, with devotion and dedication, for the cause of disarmament. We believe that the programme should continue and be expanded, both vertically and horizontally, for the benefit of diplomats and future decision-makers on the issues and institutions involved in non-proliferation, disarmament and international security. In that regard, My country looks forward to having another opportunity to send more participants to the programme.

As we all are aware, the Regional Centres' activities rely on extrabudgetary voluntary contributions by donors. The work of the Centres is demand-driven and conducted at the request of Member States. The Centres therefore need sustained voluntary budgetary contributions from States Members of the United Nations, other interested organizations and individuals to meet the staffing requirements and the cost for the Centre's basic administration and missions. Only when Member States and other donors provide additional voluntary funding are the Regional Centres able to fully sustain their activities.

In that regard, it is very appropriate that the Secretary-General, in his reports on the Regional Centres, has called upon countries of the respective regions and beyond to make voluntary contributions to the Centres so as to ensure the sustainability of their activities and operations and to enable them to fulfil the mandates entrusted to them by the General Assembly. We firmly believe that maintaining and revitalizing the Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament can contribute in no small measure to the activities of the United Nations in promoting the stability and security of Member States.

I wish to conclude by reiterating Myanmar's continued support for the work of all the Regional Centres, particularly the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

**Mr. Azizi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to associate myself with the statement made

by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.17).

The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East continues to be part of my country's strategic approach to the promotion of peace, security and stability in that volatile region. Unfortunately, despite all international efforts, no progress has been made so far towards the establishment of such a zone. It is crystal-clear that the aggressive and expansionist policies of the Israeli regime, its large arsenal of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons and its non-adherence to international law, norms and principles are the only obstacles to the establishment of such a zone. Peace and stability cannot be achieved in the Middle East if that irresponsible regime, with its massive nuclear arsenal, continues to threaten the region and beyond, or if, outside of the treaties banning weapons of mass destruction, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it continues its underground nuclear-weapons programme and defies the repeated calls of the international community to comply with international norms and principles.

Against that backdrop to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the international community has no choice but to exert maximum pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT as a first step. A number of General Assembly resolutions and the Final Documents of successive Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirm the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT, as well as the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The full and prompt implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decision on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East are clear commitments undertaken by the international community, in particular the sponsors of the resolution. Neglecting that commitment can only embolden Israel to remain a source of threat and instability by flouting the aspirations of the international community.

The failure to convene the 2012 Conference on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East due only to Israel's objections is the product of long-standing inaction with regard to these commitments. This unwelcome development seriously challenged the

integrity and credibility of the non-proliferation regime and the consensus agreements of successive NPT Review Conferences.

At the same time, the expressions of deep concern over this issue and the strong calls for an early convening of the Conference, voiced by the overwhelming majority of political groups, States and civil society during the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the next NPT Review Conference, the IAEA General Conference, the High-level Meeting and general debate of the General Assembly, the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and here in the First Committee made it crystal clear that the establishment of such a zone, proposed by Iran in 1974, continues to enjoy strong international support.

Iran was among the first countries to announce its readiness to participate in the Conference, and it will continue to maintain this policy. However, what we expect from such a conference is not merely a gathering of the countries in the region. An agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the NPT in the Middle East should be the highest priority at any such conferences. The Islamic Republic of Iran has spared no effort in supporting meaningful steps aimed at making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and will continue its strong support for the establishment of such a zone.

**Mr. Samvelian (Armenia):** Armenia attaches great importance to regional disarmament, in particular the efforts of the United Nations aimed at establishing international and regional security and stability and an atmosphere of confidence. We are convinced that disarmament and arms control, together with confidence, transparency and reciprocity, are vital aspects of collective security.

For decades, the United Nations and regional organizations have played a crucial role in building confidence among neighbouring States in order to overcome enmity and mistrust among those who must learn again to live together side by side. The Government of Armenia strongly advocates in favour of United Nations efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels in order to foster peace and security throughout the world. We have consistently supported the General Assembly resolutions relating to peace and

security at the international, regional and subregional levels in order to avoid sowing mistrust among the States of the region as that could lead to armed conflicts in the future.

In that context, Armenia welcomes the adoption on a regular basis by the Committee and subsequently by the General Assembly of the resolutions on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional contexts as an important opportunity to examine the challenges related to confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels, identify the sources of dormant tension and seek solutions. Armenia has always been a staunch advocate of regional cooperation in every possible sphere. The reasoning is simple and well justified. Even when there are problems between the countries of a particular region, any cooperation — be it small- or large-scale, short- or long-term — indisputably contributes to confidence-building. Guided by that principled approach, Armenia makes every effort to advance confidence-building in the South Caucasus, utilizing such frameworks as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as through bilateral relations.

Armenia has also demonstrated its readiness and will to initiate projects aimed at the development of regional cooperation in various fields. Unfortunately, the prevailing situation in the region and the ill-perceived political motivations of some do not allow the taking of practical confidence-building steps in the field of disarmament. Even worse, we have seen an extremely dangerous arms race looming at the subregional level, combined with aggressive military rhetoric. Other developments in our region have demonstrated yet again that the use of force can in no way bring a last solution to existing conflicts. There is no alternative to conflict resolution besides political compromise stemming from negotiations based on States parties making the ultimate commitment not to use force.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that Armenia remains fully committed to its international obligations on arms control and disarmament. We believe in the viability and efficiency of United Nations instruments in enhancing trust and confidence-building and promoting regional dialogue and cooperation. In this context, let me recall the statement made by

Ms. Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, which fully reflects my country's position on the issue before us:

“Some might say that real progress in disarmament must first await the resolution of political disputes between key States, in particular those with the largest arsenals. Such a view, however, ignores the many contributions that progress in disarmament can make in building mutual trust and confidence between States. We all know that disarmament is not done out of philanthropy alone — it is widely recognized as a highly effective and reliable means to enhance national security and to strengthen international peace and security overall.”

**The Acting Chair:** I call on the representative of Algeria to introduce A/C.1/69/L.54.

**Ms. Benhabouche (Algeria)** (*spoke in French*): I take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the skilful manner in which the Chair has led the debates of the First Committee at this session.

On the issue of regional disarmament, Algeria has made its commitment to the promotion of regional peace and security a permanent feature of its foreign policy and a cardinal principle on which its international action turns. That is why Algeria continues with determination to support and assist actions aimed at promoting and encouraging dialogue and cooperation and strengthening security within its traditional affiliation and solidarity frameworks, in particular in the Mediterranean region, which is the crossroads of several regional groupings.

The Algerian delegation welcomes the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region”, contained in document A/69/169, which sets forth information provided by some Member States on the steps they have taken to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region. My delegation wishes to thank the Governments that have made contributions within the context of the implementation of resolution 68/67.

At the African level, Algeria welcomed the entry into force in 2009 of the Treaty of Pelindaba on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. That legal instrument is a major contribution to the denuclearization of and security in Africa and

around the world. It is therefore an essential factor in strengthening peace and security in North Africa and in the Mediterranean region.

Generally speaking, my delegation welcomes today the role being played by the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, and in particular the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. Indeed, as pointed in report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/69/133, the United Nations Regional Centre in Africa is continuing to implement its programme of work on conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, weapons of mass destruction, information and outreach and cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union.

Given these achievements, Algeria wishes to express its full support for the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. As the challenges and dangers that threaten the stability of the African continent may have repercussions for the Mediterranean region, the situation prevailing in the Sahel region is a source of concern due to terrorist threats and the illegal traffic and trade in weapons. It is therefore imperative to intensify efforts and strengthen cooperation among the States of the subregion in their fight against terrorism. They also require substantial assistance and support from the international community to strengthen the Sahel countries' capacity to cope with this scourge.

The international community is aware that when it is slow to find lasting solutions to crises, they deteriorate in an alarming manner, taking on proportions and dimensions that are difficult to manage. Algeria, which today cultivates the virtues of democracy, reconciliation and development for its citizens, seeks to be an exporter of stability and security. It does so by ensuring that its territory is secure. Indeed, Algeria, which is directly exposed to the fallout of the ongoing crisis in Libya, is contributing to the establishment of an inclusive national dialogue that promotes national reconciliation and enables the consolidation of legitimate institutions and the mobilization of all means and resources to rebuild that country.

Regarding the situation in Mali and in the inter-Malian dialogue process initiated by Algeria, the various Malian actors have committed to finding a definitive solution to the Malian crisis on the basis of a preliminary agreement platform.

In line with its active Mediterranean policy, which is based on the principles of cooperation, friendship, good-neighbourliness and mutual respect, and as has become a tradition in recent years, Algeria has the honour at this sixty-ninth session to submit to the First Committee, under item 102 of the agenda, a draft resolution entitled “Strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region”. The draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/69/L.54.

**Ms. Higgle** (New Zealand): New Zealand’s statement today focuses on the activities of the Regional Centres of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. We continue to value highly the contribution made to regional peace and security by the United Nations Centre based in our part of the world. We are particularly appreciative of the Kathmandu centre’s ongoing focus on activities to support the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). We were delighted to be able to assist with funding and to participate in the dialogue meeting held in the Philippines in November 2013, which facilitated a very good exchange among Asia-Pacific colleagues on the ATT.

We also valued the Centre’s involvement in the meeting we hosted in Auckland, New Zealand, in December 2013 to assist with the conclusion of the model legislation that New Zealand, together with the Small Arms Survey, has been working on for well over a year now. We are confident that the Centre will be able to make excellent use of our now-completed model in all its contacts on the ATT with regional partners. We are very pleased to have been able, again this year, to assist with funding to support the Centre’s activities. We look forward to the meeting being hosted next month in Cambodia.

Allow me at this point to pay both a personal tribute and an official one, on the part of my country, to the departing Director of the Centre, Ms. Sharon Riggle. Ms. Riggle has brought clarity of focus and real momentum to the Centre. Her commitment to ensuring that the centre adds real value to its region and that it meets the needs and ambitions of its regional stakeholders has been outstanding.

Although New Zealand’s primary focus will continue to be on the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, we are pleased to have contributed in recent years to the work of both the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in

Latin America and the Caribbean and, last year, the Trust Fund for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. We know that those Centres, too, do vital work on a broad spectrum of disarmament- and arms control-related activities and, as with our own centre, we particularly value their work on the ATT and on disarmament education.

**Mr. Jabrayilov** (Azerbaijan): Azerbaijan aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.17). I would like to make a few additional remarks in my national capacity.

Regional disarmament and security are central to sustainable peace and stability. Every year, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition cause the deaths of and injuries to hundreds of thousands of people, including women and children. Their illicit trade and excessive accumulation adversely affect regional and international security and stability. In that regard, we would like to highlight the importance of conventional arms-control regimes as important instruments for ensuring stability, predictability and transparency in the military sphere.

Azerbaijan continues to support measures to ensure the adequate marking of and record-keeping for small arms and light weapons and to strengthen cooperation in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons. In that regard, Azerbaijan remains committed to the effective implementation and further strengthening of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We also welcome Security Council resolution 2117 (2013), the first on small arms and light weapons.

We recognize the substantial progress achieved at the third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo in June 2014. Azerbaijan is not a party to the Ottawa Convention, due to the continuing occupation of our territories and the unfortunate need to use landmines as a measure to contain any possible resumption of hostilities.

At the regional level, Azerbaijan contributes to collective efforts by sharing information, submitting reports and receiving on-site inspections, evaluation and observation visits under, inter alia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna

Document 2011 on confidence and security-building measures, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the OSCE Document on principles governing conventional arms transfers.

Regional disarmament and security are of special importance to conflict-affected zones, which continue to serve as concentration points for uncontrolled arms and provide fertile ground for transnational organized crime and other illegal activities. One such point is the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the territories around it that are still under the Armenian occupation. The territories have become a black hole in the zone of application of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). Moreover, the region has become a key transit point for the illegal trade in arms, which has taken on proportions that threaten the security of my country.

Azerbaijan remains legitimately concerned about the growing security threats and proliferation risks. In the light of emerging proliferation threats, and due to my country's geographic location, we attach the utmost importance to the prevention of the use of our territory as a transit route for illicit nuclear trafficking. In close cooperation with our international partners and in line with international standards, we have developed a comprehensive national export-control system with a solid legislative basis. To date, the system has proved to be a reliable mechanism in the prevention of illicit trafficking, including nuclear trafficking.

The current situation, in which hundreds of pieces of treaty-limited equipment belonging to a State party have been illegally deployed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan in gross violation of the CFE Treaty provisions, is unacceptable from a legal point of view. The fact that the occupied territories of Azerbaijan have provided Armenia, the occupying Power, with an opportunity to use those areas as repair facilities and, moreover, to transfer and hide treaty-limited equipment from the international control regimes, deserves serious attention and should be addressed in a comprehensive and impartial manner.

The off-budget expenses for the needs of the armed forces deployed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan are yet another piece of evidence of Armenia's militaristic and annexationist aspirations. Armenia has been intensively building up its military presence and capability in the Nagorno Karabakh

region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The available data indicates that since the occupation the numbers of uncontrolled and unaccounted-for arms in those territories have consistently increased. We would once again like to take this opportunity to call on Armenia to stop violating its arms-control commitments and affirm its adherence to them by its deeds. As a first step, it would be reasonable to expect the Armenian delegation to come back with a full report on its armaments inventory and future procurements.

In conclusion, I would like to say that Azerbaijan's strategy is aimed at liberating all its occupied territories and thereby restoring our State's territorial integrity, returning the forcibly displaced population to their homes and establishing durable peace and stability in the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the entire South Caucasus.

**Mr. Spinellis** (Greece): Since this is the first time we have taken the floor, we would like to thank the Chair for the dexterity he has shown in handling the deliberations of the First Committee. Today we would like to make a statement regarding regional nuclear safeguards, safety and security.

Greece is a signatory to and a strong proponent of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear material, activities and related facilities. At the same time, we place particular emphasis on nuclear safety and security. We consider those two areas to be intertwined components of the foundations of a country's legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. While nuclear safety and security are both global challenges, Greece would like to point out the need for responsible and transparent national efforts, as well as strengthened regional cooperation, in order to bring power production all over the world into compliance with the highest international nuclear safety standards and the relevant nuclear security guidance and fundamentals developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In that spirit, Greece has signed and ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. Furthermore, and in view of the direct association between the

natural habitat and the environmental impact that the establishment of a nuclear plant could have in a region, in 1991 Greece signed the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, ratifying it soon after, in 1998. We believe that countries that produce nuclear energy or aspire to do so in future should follow transparent operational practices regarding the transboundary natural habitat. Furthermore, during our rotating presidency of the European Union for the first half of 2014, Greece worked diligently to reach an agreement among member States on amending the European Directive on Nuclear Safety, which is designed to oblige member States to establish and maintain a national framework for nuclear safety.

As the Secretary-General noted in his opening remarks at the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security held on the margins of the general debate on 22 September 2011, the effects of nuclear accidents respect no borders, and, as the recent tragedy in Fukushima, Japan, has taught us, we must continue to take all the necessary measures to ensure that in an increasingly demanding energy market the necessary international nuclear safety standards and security architecture are implemented. Protecting people and the environment from ionizing radiation released by accident or human intention is of paramount importance to our country.

Regarding nuclear safety, Greece, as one of the 13 countries contaminated by the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident in 1986, is no stranger to fallout from nuclear accidents. As a consequence, we are especially sensitive when it comes to applying the important elements that help to achieve a strong nuclear-safety culture. Furthermore, with regard to nuclear security, Greece would like to point out that the fundamental concepts of nuclear security current today were conceived and developed through practical experience gained during the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, which was the first major public event covered by a comprehensive nuclear security plan under an extensive project of cooperation between the IAEA, the United States, France and our Government.

The application of internationally developed IAEA nuclear safety standards and security measures, accompanied by international peer reviews, has become particularly crucial in our time. My country is following with great concern current developments and tensions in the political environment, both globally and especially in our region of the Near East and Eastern Europe, that

have resulted in an especially volatile environment that requires additional precautions, particularly regarding the safety and security of current and future nuclear installations.

In conclusion, nuclear power has not been an option for Greece's national energy grid, but as more and more countries in the region are beginning to express a strong interest in nuclear power, we would like to reiterate our firm conviction that nuclear safety and security are two sides of the same coin, and that we should approach all nuclear technology developments related to energy production in a comprehensive manner, by taking all necessary precautions in order to ensure the maintenance of all three relevant areas of non-proliferation — nuclear safeguards, safety and security.

**The Acting Chair:** I give the floor to the representative of Nigeria to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.61 and A/C.1/69/L.59.

**Mr. Udedibia (Nigeria):** My delegation would like to introduce two draft resolutions today, the first of which is a draft resolution entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services" (A/C.1/69/L.61). The second of the draft resolutions, which we will introduce on behalf of the African Group, is entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (A/C.1/69/L.59).

Turning to the first draft resolution, the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme was established by the General Assembly at its first special session dedicated to disarmament, in 1978. Its main objectives include raising awareness of the importance of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and building and enhancing the capacity of officials from Member States, especially developing countries, to enable them to participate more effectively in international disarmament deliberative and negotiating forums. In the 36 years since its inception, the Fellowship Programme has trained more than 800 Government officials from more than 160 Member States in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, thus contributing to the process of deliberation and negotiation on key disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

The United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme is organized and conducted by the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Its usefulness has been widely recognized and is highly regarded by Member

States. Each year, between 20 and 25 young diplomats and Government officials participate in it and undergo a very enriching learning experience. It is also commendable that the composition of the participants in the Programme has achieved a good geographic and gender balance, and especially worth noting that many developing countries have benefited from participating in the programme.

The draft resolution reaffirms the decisions contained in annex IV to the concluding document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly (A/S-12/32), and also records our appreciation for all the Member States and organizations that have consistently supported the Programme through the years, thereby contributing to its success, particularly the Governments of China, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan and Switzerland, for their continuing extensive and highly educational study visits for the Programme participants in 2013 and 2014. It also expresses our appreciation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Asser Institute and the Monterey Institute of International Studies for organizing specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in their various areas of competence, thereby contributing to the Programme's objectives.

The draft resolution also commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the Programme continues to be carried out, and requests that the Secretary-General continue to implement the Programme annually within its existing resources, and report thereon to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session.

The unanimous backing for this biennial resolution on the Disarmament Fellowship Programme demonstrates the strong support it enjoys among all Member States. The resolution has always been adopted without a vote. It is the hope of my delegation that it will be similarly adopted at this session. We hope for the Programme's continued success and therefore seek Member States' support in adopting the draft resolution this year without a vote, as has always been the case.

I would also like to conclude very briefly by introducing a second draft resolution, this time on behalf of the Group of African States, on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The draft resolution welcomes the continental dimension of the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in response to the evolving needs of African Member States and the region's new and emerging challenges in the areas of disarmament, peace and security, including maritime security. It also welcomes the Regional Centre's undertaking to provide capacity-building, technical assistance programmes and advisory services to the African Union Commission, subregional organizations and African Member States on the control of small arms and light weapons, including on stockpile management and destruction, the Arms Trade Treaty and issues related to weapons of mass destruction, as detailed in the most recent report of the Secretary-General (A/69/133).

The draft resolution welcomes the Regional Centre's contribution to continental disarmament, peace and security, in particular its assistance to the African Union Commission in the elaboration and implementation of the African Union Strategy on the Control of the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and its action plan for implementing the Strategy, and in the formulation of the African Union common position on an Arms Trade Treaty, as well as its assistance to the African Commission on Nuclear Energy in its implementation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba.

The draft resolution welcomes the Regional Centre's efforts to promote the role and representation of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms-control activities. It notes with appreciation the Regional Centre's tangible achievements and the impact of the assistance that it provided to Central African States in the formulation and implementation of the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly — the Kinshasa Convention — as well as the substantive support provided by the Centre to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, to Central and West African States in the elaboration of their respective common positions

on the Arms Trade Treaty and to West Africa on the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

The draft resolution urges all States, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to enable the Regional Centre to carry out its programmes and activities and meet the needs of African States.

The draft resolution on this subject has always been adopted by consensus, and it is therefore the hope of my delegation that we will do the same at this session. We therefore urge Member States to adopt it by consensus, as they have always done in the past.

**The Acting Chair:** At this stage, I would like to remind delegations to kindly limit their statements to five minutes when speaking in a national capacity and to seven minutes when speaking on behalf of groups.

We have exhausted the list of speakers for the cluster on regional disarmament and security.

Before proceeding to the next cluster, I shall call on those who have requested the floor in exercise of the right of reply. In that connection, I would like to remind all delegations that first interventions are limited to 10 minutes and second interventions to five minutes.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): It is very nice to see you in the Chair today, Madam.

Regrettably, the United States delegation's statement once again made unsubstantiated, unproven accusations against Russia. It is a great pity that our colleagues were evidently careless in their study of our response to certain earlier anti-Russian pronouncements, which to a large degree went beyond the bounds of our collegial relations here in the First Committee. In that respect, I should like to add the following remarks.

The armed anti-constitutional coup in Kyiv that took place in February has led to horrendous disorder in Ukraine and deaths on a massive scale among the civilian population. Everyone already admits that, despite the fact that at the beginning access of most Governments in Europe and America to that information was simply blocked. In our view, rather than laying the blame for what has happened on others, the sponsors of the coup should have done everything in

their power to strengthen the ceasefire regime in south-eastern Ukraine. In that context, the question arises as to what the United States has done. The United States has effectively controlled everything going on in Kyiv of late, and in the south-east, in Donetsk and Luhansk, with the continuing shelling by Ukrainian forces, peaceful residents, women, the elderly and children, are dying.

As regards the arrangements mentioned by the United States representative — we heard references to the Open Skies Agreement and the Vienna Document, which, incidentally, many of those here today, sadly, have never been near — we are shocked by our American colleagues' irresponsible manipulation of the public. Russia has shown unprecedented openness; all the inspections and monitoring flights over Russian territory have been conducted in full. The results of those inspections have been officially acknowledged within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and they confirm that no heightened military activity whatever has been emanating from Russia. Nor has there been any movement of forces across the border. The continuing baseless accusations addressed to Russia can therefore be seen only as irresponsible manipulation of the public. Needless to say, that does not increase our respect for or trust in a theoretically respectable Government such as that of the United States.

**Mr. Samvelian** (Armenia): I would like to assure the Committee that I am not about to engage in a lengthy or meaningful polemic with the representative of Azerbaijan concerning the unfounded allegations made about my country. No one is new to Azerbaijan's persistent and continued attempts to disseminate anti-Armenian propaganda, false accusations and harsh, hostile military rhetoric.

While the rest of the world is dealing with economic and financial difficulties, worrying about development goals and whether they have the resources to address their needs, the Azerbaijani leadership proudly and loudly threatens Armenia with war in Nagorno Karabakh by declaring that our State budget — in Azerbaijan's version — is almost 10 times higher than Armenia's actual budget. Our military spending alone, apparently, is about 30 to 50 per cent higher than Armenia's entire State budget. I am not sure that this is something to be proud of, although I am not going to comment on it.

Since the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was mentioned in Azerbaijan's statement, I just have some brief remarks to make everything absolutely clear to the representative of Azerbaijan. There can be no possibility of a military option for resolving the Nagorno Karabakh issue. There is none. It has been tried and failed. Compromise and realism are the only real options. The path that Nagorno Karabakh chose for itself more than two decades ago is irreversible. It has succeeded in assuring its own self-defence; it has proceeded to set up self-governance mechanisms; it controls its borders and its economy. Formalizing that process is a necessary step towards stability in our region. Dismissing all that has happened in the past 20 years or more, as Azerbaijan does, and petulantly insisting that things must return to the way they were, is unrealistic and disingenuous.

**Mr. Jabrayilov** (Azerbaijan): I am obliged to take the floor again to refute the Armenian representative's baseless accusations against my country and to respond to his speculations about issues that are part of a negotiation process.

First, I am sure that everyone here is perplexed to hear the use of force condemned by the country that itself used force to occupy the Azerbaijani territories and whose destructive behaviour is the main reason for the current impasse in negotiations. Armenia flagrantly violated its international legal obligations by using military force to occupy the territory of Azerbaijan, carry out ethnic cleansing there and establish in the occupied territories its ethnically constructed subordinate separatist entity. The relevant resolutions of the Security Council have condemned the occupation of Azerbaijan's territories, reaffirmed Azerbaijan's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the internationally recognized borders, and have demanded the occupying forces' immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal from all of Azerbaijan's occupied territories. The General Assembly and other intergovernmental organizations have adopted a similar position.

Secondly, the representative of Armenia expressed concerns about an imputed increase in its military budget. Suffice it to say that a comprehensive analysis of the population, territory, annual budget and gross domestic product of Armenia vis-à-vis its annual military expenditures and personnel, and the quantity of armaments produced and foreign military assistance received, show that Armenia is the most highly

militarized country in the South Caucasus. Armenia regularly conducts large-scale military exercises in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan that are attended by the President, the Minister of Defence and other high-level Armenian officials.

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now take up the list of speakers for the cluster on "Outer space (disarmament aspects)". All delegations taking the floor are reminded that the time limit is five minutes when speaking in a national capacity and seven minutes for statements made on behalf of several delegations.

**Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia): I am honoured to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on the disarmament aspects of outer space. NAM recognizes the common interest of all humankind and the sovereign rights of all States in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes, and emphasizes that preventing an arms race in outer space, including a ban on deploying or using weapons there, would eliminate a grave danger to international peace and security.

The abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. NAM remains seriously concerned about the negative security consequences of the deployment of strategic missile defence systems, which could trigger an arms race. We remain equally concerned about developments related to anti-ballistic missile systems and the threat of the weaponization and militarization of outer space, and reiterate our call for starting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a universal, legally binding instrument for preventing an arms race in outer space. NAM calls for a universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach within the United Nations to the issue of missiles. Any initiative on the subject should take into account the security concerns of all States and their right to the peaceful use of space technologies.

NAM underscores that space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite communications, earth observation systems and satellite navigation technologies, provide indispensable tools for arriving at viable long-term solutions for sustainable development and can make a very effective contribution to efforts to promote the development of all countries, conserve natural resources and enhance preparedness for the consequences of disasters and

their mitigation. In that regard, and while emphasizing the importance of ensuring that space science and technology are available to all interested countries, NAM stresses that they should be utilized in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the promotion of international peace and security.

**Mr. Elshandawily** (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): I make this statement on behalf of the States members of the Group of Arab States that are members of the League of Arab States.

The Group aligns itself with the statement made just now by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The States of the Arab Group believe strongly that the use of outer space should be reserved for exclusively peaceful uses and that the legal instruments to that end can only help strengthen the positive and peaceful use of outer space and its regulation. Those instruments are important because they also contribute to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other military activities in outer space. I would mention, by way of example, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, among others.

Despite that, we all recognize that the international legal instruments regulating weapons in outer space are insufficient, because the current system has not been able to stop such an arms race. Therefore, the States of the Arab Group would support the establishment of a committee, in the context of a comprehensive and balanced programme that would be multilaterally negotiated, to prevent a weapons race in outer space in all its aspects.

The deployment of weapons in outer space would have serious consequences for the entire world and negative impacts on all States, whether they have the technological capabilities to launch satellites into orbit or not. Almost 3,000 satellites have been launched into outer space, forming a complex telecommunications network. The deployment of weapons in outer space could give rise to an interruption in satellite services, thereby leading to global disaster, with negative impacts for our societies and economies. Given that situation, the Arab Group believes that the international

community should seek to begin negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit all weapons in outer space. The Arab Group will always support any initiative or decision on the prohibition of an arms race in outer space. The Arab Group also stresses the need to use outer space for exclusively peaceful uses and calls on all States to abide by their commitments undertaken to that end.

**Mrs. Sweeb** (Suriname): I speak on behalf of the States members of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

UNASUR members share a common interest in promoting and expanding the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, for the benefit and interest of all States and as the province of all humankind. The world we live in strongly depends on space-based resources, which provide services that are indispensable in a number of areas. We are therefore committed to the enhancement of the multilateral legal framework concerning the preservation of a peaceful, safe and secure environment in outer space. As a result, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a matter of urgency.

UNASUR members believe that it is in the best interest of the international community to start negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prevent the placement of any kind of weapon in outer space. There is widespread recognition of the impending danger resulting from an insufficient legal basis to deal with the problem of weapons in space. Let me recall that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on our agenda for a long time. More than 30 years ago, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament was called upon by the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, to consider the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. Despite concrete exchanges between 1985 and 1994, a lack of consensus since then has precluded an adequate consideration of this fundamental issue by the Conference.

UNASUR members recognize that transparency and confidence-building measures can foster mutual understanding, political dialogue and cooperation among States. In that regard, we welcome the report of the group of governmental experts established by resolution 65/68. We appreciate that the group recognized that transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities can form the basis for the consideration of concepts and proposals for legally

binding obligations. Furthermore, UNASUR members have been following with great interest discussions on a possible international code of conduct on outer space activities, which is sponsored by the European Union (EU). While we recognize the efforts conducted by the EU, we believe that the initiative would benefit from an effective multilateral approach and mandate.

In the same vein, we welcome the draft resolution introduced for the first time during this session of the First Committee, on no first placement of weapons in outer space (A/C.1/69/L.14), which we understand would constitute another important confidence-building measure related to outer space. UNASUR members reiterate, however, that while political commitments and voluntary arrangements are welcome, they cannot be a substitute for legally binding measures imposing firm and long-term obligations on all States.

Expressing our continuing concern with the possibility of an arms race taking place in outer space, we reiterate our call on all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to provide the conditions for the early adoption of a programme of work, which should include the establishment of a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, hence paving the way for the negotiation of a legally binding instrument preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the observer of the European Union.

**Ms. Ganslandt** (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States. Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

The EU and its member States have a long-standing position in favour of the preservation of a safe and secure space environment and peaceful uses of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. Strengthening the safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities is of common interest. It contributes to the development and security of States. The prevention of an arms race in outer space and the need to prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict are essential conditions for the strengthening of strategic stability.

Space assets, operated by an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental entities, offer the world enormous benefits unimaginable just a few decades ago. Today, those benefits are accompanied by significant challenges stemming from dangerous orbital debris and thus the potential of destructive collisions, the crowding of satellites, inter alia in geostationary orbit, the growing saturation of the radio frequency spectrum, and the threat of deliberate disruption or destruction of satellites. Those challenges call for the serious and timely involvement of States to ensure greater safety, security and sustainability in outer space.

Against that background, the European Union attaches great importance to the development and implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures as a means of strengthening security in the peaceful use of outer space. In December 2013, the adoption without a vote by the General Assembly of resolution 68/50, on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, reflected the widespread support for the need to develop a regime encompassing such measures. The General Assembly welcomed the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities and encouraged Member States to review and implement the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the Group's report (A/68/189). The European Union was pleased to note that, in the conclusions and recommendations of its study, the Group endorsed efforts to pursue political commitments, such as a multilateral code of conduct to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space.

Following resolutions 61/75 and 62/43 on transparency and capacity-building measures in outer space activities, and in response to the request of the Secretary-General to Member States for concrete proposals on transparency and confidence-building measures, the EU introduced, in September 2007, the proposal for a voluntary code of conduct aimed at promoting transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. On 5 June 2012, at a multilateral meeting in Vienna, the European Union presented a draft for an international code of conduct for outer space activities. The EU has subsequently held three rounds of open-ended consultations on the draft in Kyiv, Bangkok and Luxembourg, in which

some 95 States Members of the United Nations have participated. The European Union has informed the Secretary-General of those developments on the code.

Many participants have suggested progressing from a consultative to a multilateral negotiating phase, in which the draft developed during the open-ended consultation process, to which many nations have contributed and which remains open to further changes, would serve as the basis. A number of participants have noted the need for United Nations endorsement of the future code of conduct.

The EU, guided by the concern about the long-term safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities and an eagerness to implement the consensus recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts, is committed to contributing to the conclusion of the multilateral process on the international code of conduct for outer space activities. We have received significant positive feedback and broad interest on the initiative for an international code of conduct for outer space activities, with several Member States requesting more time to study our proposal for a resolution calling for the commencement of negotiations. Some have also pointed to the cross-cutting nature of the issues of long-term safety, security and sustainability of outer space. We are ready to move the process from consultations to a negotiating phase in an inclusive and transparent manner, and are currently consulting with Member States on how to reach that phase.

**The Acting Chair:** I call on the representative of the Russian Federation to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): All of us here are in favour of ensuring equal, indivisible security for all States, without exception, and supporting global stability. Therefore, it is our common duty to not merely react to current problems in that sphere, but to courageously and actively work to overcome, identify and neutralize threats prior to their acquiring a catastrophic and unprecedentedly complex nature, as has been the case with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

To prevent a similar situation in outer space, Russia has consistently supported international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space, and has promoted by its actions, and not just in words, the maintenance of outer space open and free for peaceful use in the interest of all humankind. We are recurring sponsors

of the draft resolution presented to the First Committee every year on this subject, alternately by Egypt and Sri Lanka. We view that draft resolution as a sound basis for further tangible steps in this sphere.

To that end, we were the first in the world, back in 2004, to assume political commitments on an initiative called “no first placement of weapons in outer space”. The initiative has already been officially supported by the following States: Armenia, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan. This year, the group of States sponsors, which already comprises 29 countries, has presented a new draft resolution to the First Committee, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space” (A/C.1.69/L.14).

We stress that the draft resolution does not impose any additional commitments on States. It is effectively a call to dialogue, urging all Member States to consider the possibility of globalizing a very important initiative, namely a political commitment to no first placement. If all States were to assume such a political commitment, we would have a joint political guarantee that outer space will remain free of weapons.

The draft resolution also draws the attention of the members of the international community who recognize the threat of the weaponization of outer space to the importance of further joint and even more responsible steps in this sphere, specifically a swift launching, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, of substantive work on a draft legally binding international treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. In June 2014, together with China, we submitted an updated draft treaty that included the comments and proposals of interested States. We are ready for further dialogue with all States without exception.

We hope that the draft resolution on no first placement will be supported by all Member States, since we all share equal responsibility for the fate of humankind. The adoption of the draft resolution by the First Committee and subsequently the General Assembly plenary would create additional opportunities for developing discussions on other important issues related to improving transparency and confidence in outer space activities and ensuring their security and long-term sustainability.

Russia is ready to continue work on the European Union’s proposed code of conduct in outer space. In particular, we would draw our partners’ attention to the

fact that comprehensive support for the draft resolution on no first placement could, in our opinion, create a atmosphere conducive to that end, since many of the comments made on the draft code were not heeded by the European Union. For example, if we are going to have a serious conversation on developing such a code, then the first question we must answer is: will weapons be prohibited in outer space or not? I note that that is not just Russia's opinion or that of the First Committee. Members can take a look at draft resolution A/C.4/69/L.2, currently before the Fourth Committee. Paragraph 11 of that document urges

“all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space as an essential condition for the promotion of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”.

We believe it necessary to continue the work under way at the United Nations on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space. We welcome the 17 October consideration by the Fourth Committee of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (A/68/189). In the draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures that was prepared by Russia, China and the United States of America, we propose that the First Committee hold, during the seventieth session of the General Assembly, a joint meeting of the First and Fourth Committees to consider threats to the security and sustainability of outer space activities. We hope that the discussion will reinvigorate work on this important subject. We trust that, at this session, the draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures (A/C.1/69/L.15) will be adopted by consensus by the First Committee.

In conclusion, we again urge all States to demonstrate a sense of responsibility and support the draft resolution on no first placement, which is, in effect, a successor document and a direct result of our resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which all of us support almost unanimously every year.

**Mrs. Ledesma Hernández** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Cuba shares the view that the legal regime applicable to outer space must be consolidated and strengthened and underlines the importance of

complying with existing legal commitments. All States are entitled to use and explore outer space for peaceful purposes to the benefit of scientific and economic development.

Our country supports the prevention of an arms race in outer space and transparency and confidence-building measures in space-related activities. An arms race in outer space would represent a serious threat to international peace and security. We therefore believe that it is appropriate and necessary to further strengthen and develop international transparency and confidence-building measures on outer space.

Negotiations on a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects should be undertaken without further delay. The Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for such negotiations. In that regard, the updated draft treaty on the subject, which has been submitted by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, is a good starting point.

The draft resolution on no first placement of weapons in outer space (A/C.1/69/L.14) is a new initiative, and our delegation is pleased to sponsor it. We recognize the importance of promoting an international compromise to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space and thus prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure its peaceful use. We value the adoption of specific international measures for greater transparency on space activities, including prior notification, verification and monitoring, as an important contribution to efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.

**Mr. Buck** (United States of America): I am pleased to address the First Committee's thematic discussion on outer space today. How we work together to ensure space security and sustainability is key to our discussion. I am reading out an abridged version of our statement, but we will be circulating the full version subsequently.

The United States is especially concerned about the continued development and testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons systems. Although some States have advocated for space arms-control measures to prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space, their own development of terrestrially based destructive anti-satellite capabilities is destabilizing, could trigger dangerous misinterpretations and miscalculations, and could be escalatory in a crisis or conflict. The world has seen the long-lasting environmental effects of

China's intentionally destructive 2007 direct-ascent anti-satellite missile flight test, which generated long-life debris in low-Earth orbit. Despite explanations and claims to the contrary, China's 23 July non-destructive flight test of an anti-satellite missile interceptor, designed to destroy satellites in low-Earth orbit, was also troubling.

The United States has long indicated its willingness to consider space arms-control proposals and concepts that are equitable and effectively verifiable and enhance the security of all nations. However, the revised draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, submitted by Russia and China to the Conference on Disarmament earlier this year, does not satisfy those criteria. As the United States has noted in our analysis submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, which was published as document CD/1998, the draft treaty, like the earlier 2008 version, remains flawed for numerous reasons, including its lack of verifiability, failure to address terrestrially based anti-satellite systems and the potential for a breakout capability. The United States is convinced that many outer-space challenges confronting us can be addressed through practical, near-term initiatives, such as non-legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs).

One such way forward was demonstrated by the study on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures by the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. The Group's report (A/68/189) endorsed voluntary, non-legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures. Consensus was achieved in July 2013, and the report's recommendations were endorsed by the full General Assembly in resolution 68/50, which the United States sponsored along with other Group participants, including Russia and China.

The United States also welcomes the decision by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to consider the Group's report during its fifty-eighth session, to be held in June 2015. Reflecting the importance we place on the Group's report, the United States is sponsoring the follow-on draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities (A/C.1/69/L.15), which supports further consideration of the Group's recommendations at a joint ad hoc meeting of the First and Fourth

Committees next year, during the General Assembly's seventieth session.

The Group's report also made a very important contribution by establishing criteria for evaluating the validity of transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities. In applying those criteria, the United States notes that some TCBM proposals mentioned in the Committee fail to satisfy the Group of Governmental Experts' criteria. Russia's initiative for States to make declarations of no first placement of weapons in outer space fails to meet the Group of Governmental Experts' criteria. We conclude that the no-first-placement initiative has three basic flaws. First, the no-first-placement pledge does not adequately define what constitutes a weapon in outer space. Secondly, other parties would not be able to confirm effectively a State's political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space. Thirdly, the no-first-placement pledge focuses exclusively on space-based weapons — such as the co-orbital anti-satellite weapon once flight-tested and deployed by the former Soviet Union. It is silent with regard to terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons, which, as previously noted, constitute a significant threat to spacecraft.

Fortunately, constructive proposals for space TCBMs exist that satisfy the Group of Governmental Experts' criteria. For example, over the past two years, the United States has actively participated in deliberations on the European Union-proposed international code of conduct for outer space activities. We now look forward to working next year with the European Union and the international community in an inclusive process to finalize a code of conduct.

Sustaining the space environment is critical for all humankind — for our aspirations, our economic development, our environment, our security and our well-being. If we are serious about maintaining the space environment for future generations, we must develop and implement pragmatic and effective measures on a timely basis that remedy concrete problems, and reject those initiatives that are problematic, ineffective or irrelevant to protecting the security and sustainability of the space environment.

**Mr. Ruiz Blanco** (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): Interest in outer space is increasing, not only from the point of view of the State, with issues such as safeguarding national security, but also from the

private perspective, with the dizzying developments in telecommunication, geo-referencing and other areas. It is important to recognize the enormous benefits for the progress of humankind represented by the civilian use of outer space technologies and any related resources that may be found there.

My country supports technological developments in outer space and believes that such scientific advances must remain within the framework of the peaceful use of outer space. In that regard, it is very important to regulate the use of outer space to ensure, first of all, that it is used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of humankind; secondly, that such activities are sustainable and safe; and, thirdly, that all States are afforded free and equitable access to space and its benefits.

Colombia recognizes the importance of the treaties prohibiting the placement of any weapon of mass destruction in outer space and their installation on celestial bodies, such as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies — the Outer Space Treaty — which while prohibiting the placement of any weapons of mass destruction in outer space and their installation on celestial bodies also establishes the basic principles for its peaceful use and equitable access; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

All States should enjoy the same rights in outer space, both now and with respect to the equitable and responsible use of outer space by future generations. The preservation of an outer space free from an arms race is the duty of all States, both those with proven space capabilities and those that are currently developing programmes to attain such capabilities.

Today there are major concerns on this issue, including the difficulty of monitoring activities in outer space and the risk that they are not of a peaceful nature. The challenge facing the international community is to regulate the use of outer space. That is why Colombia will continue to advocate for the reactivation of the Conference on Disarmament, where issues as relevant to international peace and security as the prevention of the arms race in outer space are discussed.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress that Colombia has a presidential office for the development

of the country's space programme, which aims to lead and promote a Colombian space programme through plans and projects that broaden the benefits of space technology and generate a new area of industrial development and knowledge for the country. With that goal in mind, we have been making progress in formulating a Colombian space policy that includes aspects such as national sovereignty, autonomy in space work, research, technology, innovation and scientific development, the development of the productive sector, international cooperation and emergency management, among others. This policy is accompanied by an action plan that seeks to optimize the benefits of space technologies with real impact on the lives of Colombians.

I would like to take this opportunity to call for the future sustainability of outer space as a significant component of the peaceful development of all countries, regardless of their current ability to install elements for peaceful or military use beyond the Earth's atmosphere. We should make every effort to safeguard outer space as an area of peace.

**Mr. Shen Jian** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The security of outer space is vital to the existence and development of humankind. The relationship between space security and space development should be properly addressed in exploring and using outer space. The equal rights of all countries to the peaceful uses of outer space should be ensured. At the same time, the sustainable peace and development of space should be guaranteed.

With increasing activity in the use of outer space, the risks of the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space are increasing, and space security is facing growing uncertainties. It is in the common interests of all countries to ensure the peaceful use of outer space and to prevent its weaponization and an arms race therein. The General Assembly has, for consecutive years, adopted resolutions by an overwhelming majority on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, calling for negotiation on a relevant multilateral agreement in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). That fully demonstrates the shared aspiration of the international community to prevent the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space.

China is committed to maintaining peace and security in outer space. In 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the CD a draft treaty on the prevention

of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects. In June 2014, China and Russia submitted an updated version of the draft treaty that took into account the comments and proposals of interested States and the evolving situation in outer space. We hope that the CD will begin substantive work on the basis of the updated draft as soon as possible.

China welcomes draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, entitled “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”, which was initiated by Russia. We believe this is an important effort to prevent the weaponization of outer space. The aim of the draft resolution is in line with the ultimate goal of negotiating a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. China will sponsor the draft resolution with Russia and other countries.

China attaches importance to transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space activities. Appropriate and viable TCBMs are conducive to enhancing mutual trust, reducing misconceptions, regulating outer space activities and maintaining outer space security. TCBMs can be complementary to the process of preventing the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space. However, they cannot substitute for the negotiation of an outer space arms-control treaty.

The report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (A/68/189) issued last year is the balanced outcome of pragmatic and thorough discussions by the members of the Group, which took into account proposals from all interested parties. It deserves study and implementation by all parties on a voluntary basis.

China participated constructively in the multilateral consultations led by the European Union on the draft international code of conduct. In order to conclude an international code of conduct that will be universally acceptable and effective, there should be an open, equitable and inclusive negotiation process with a clear mandate and rules of procedure within the United Nations framework. The international code of conduct should focus on the peaceful uses of outer space, and should not undermine the right of all countries, particularly developing countries, to the fair use of outer space. Moreover, it should not dilute the work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Chinese Government would like to express its regret with regard to the comments made by the United States delegation. The representative of the United States referred to an event related to the disruptive anti-satellite system. That comment was very subjective and lacked any theoretical basis. We do not agree with his comment with regard to our experiment.

Outer space is the common heritage of humankind. China is ready to work closely with all parties to promote the benefits of the peaceful uses of outer space, and to maintain the sustainable peace and common security of outer space.

**Mr. Hossain** (Bangladesh): Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement under this cluster made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.18). I would like to make the following points in my national capacity.

It has long been established that outer space is the common heritage of all humankind and must be explored and utilized exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of present and future generations of all peoples. Space is no longer the exclusive preserve of a few developed States. Today developing countries are also tapping into space technology for various purposes. Their reliance on space assets and their applications will only grow in the coming days. The benefits of a peaceful and predictable space environment are therefore clearly evident.

With increasing human activity in outer space, the risks of the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space are on the rise. But it is in the common interests of all countries to ensure the peaceful uses of outer space. Alarmed at the prospect of the weaponization of outer space, successive sessions of the General Assembly have adopted resolutions calling for the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a legally binding international instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Bangladesh believes that the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including a ban to deploy or use weapons therein, can avert a grave danger to international peace and security.

Like many other States, Bangladesh is concerned about the pressing problem of space debris, which threatens all nations' space-related activities. The proliferation of space debris for a long period of time constitutes a serious and imminent threat. There is an urgent need to develop appropriate norms against the creation of additional space debris, whether by

accidental or deliberate action. We also believe that the responsibility for clearing space debris primarily rests with those States whose actions created the debris in the first place.

Bangladesh has always attached great importance to transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) with regard to the use of outer space. We believe that appropriate and viable TCBMs are conducive to enhancing mutual trust, reducing misperceptions, regulating outer space activities and maintaining outer space security. In that regard, we appreciate the European Union's efforts to promote a draft international code of conduct for outer space activities. But we believe that, as a voluntary outer space TCBM, the international code of conduct should focus on the peaceful uses of outer space and should by no means dilute the work in the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Such measures are complementary to a legally binding international instrument that takes into account all the complexities and different perspectives on space security.

Finally, we believe that the draft treaty presented in the CD by China and the Russian Federation in 2008, and updated in June, may be a viable basis for talks to begin on a legally binding instrument. In view of the rapidly advancing space technologies of today and of the dangers that may arise if those technologies go unregulated, it would be in the interests of all countries — those with technologically advanced space programmes and those with no space programmes — to arrive at a legally binding agreement that prevents the weaponization of outer space. We hope that the negotiations for such an agreement, to which our delegation remains committed, will soon commence in the CD.

**Mr. Syrymbet** (Kazakhstan): I thank you, Madam, for this opportunity to present my delegation's position at this important debate on outer space and space security.

As a member of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, Kazakhstan believes that the growing importance of and robust expansion in outer space activities should compel us to review outer space from the security and disarmament perspectives. Moreover, the space environment has also become extremely fragile and vulnerable to overexploitation in an unsustainable manner.

The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China jointly prepared a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, which Kazakhstan endorses fully. However, several severe political hurdles and the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament have impeded all attempts to achieve a binding international agreement. My delegation also supports draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, submitted by the Russian Federation and China, on no first placement of weapons in outer space. We are also of the strong conviction that there must be transparency and confidence-building measures supported by legally binding arrangements.

Kazakhstan is convinced that placing weapons in outer space will result in an advantage for the few. Even more dangerous, action by some countries with advanced space warfare technology can result in non-proliferation by other countries also wanting to acquire it, as happened in the nuclear field. Past experience has proved that such military action can be concealed, thus becoming a major breach of international security. Presently, more than 130 countries possess sophisticated space programmes, or are developing them. We need to ensure that such dangerous weapon systems do not undermine the existing structure of agreements on arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear missile sphere.

Kazakhstan has no intention of pursuing the development of space weapons or of deploying them in outer space, now or in future. On the other hand, my country — which hosts the Baikonur Cosmodrome, the first and largest of its kind, on its territory — is actively developing a national civilian space programme, which includes the creation of the Baiterek Space Launch Complex. This will enable my country to become part of the world market for space services and to access the latest technologies within the norms of international collective security.

In July 2005, Kazakhstan acceded to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Although not a formal member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Kazakhstan is strictly following all regulations in its export policy, and hopes to be accepted as a member of the MTCR in the near future.

In conclusion, we must learn from the lessons related to nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Kazakhstan therefore reiterates that our common goal must be to ensure that outer space remains a sphere of cooperation, free from weapons, for humankind to use for peaceful development and advancement.

**Mr. Halter** (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): At a time when access to outer space and its utilization have become strategic challenges for a majority of States, the security of space activities is facing various threats. Space debris accumulating in Earth's orbit can endanger space systems, but that is not all. Thanks to the evolution of technology, the number of ways to intentionally disrupt the operation of space systems, render them entirely inoperative or take control of them is increasing, even when such capacities are not being purposely developed. Moreover, as we have seen in the recent past, the destruction of orbiting satellites, whether deliberate or accidental, threatens to massively increase the amount of space debris, thereby fuelling the vicious circle by increasing the risk of collisions in orbit. Finally, stability in space is closely linked to the stability of inter-State relations on Earth. In that context, Switzerland believes we must intensify multilateral talks on examining ways to strengthen the existing norms. While transparency and confidence-building measures are an important complement to those norms, they do not render the drafting of an international, legally binding treaty to address the current challenges any less necessary.

It is important to keep the dialogue alive in the Conference on Disarmament so as to make progress on these issues. One element in that process is Russia and China's presentation of a new version of the proposed treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. In Switzerland's view, such a treaty must ban any kind of aggressive act against space systems, since the placement of weapons in space is only one aspect of the issue. Beyond the difficulty of defining what constitutes a weapon in space, more attention should be paid to addressing the risk of attacks on space systems from the ground, such as deliberate interference with communications signals and anti-satellite weapons. The development and testing of the latter in particular should be prohibited, along with the mere possession of such weapons. Moreover, the issue of verifying the draft treaty's implementation has yet to be tackled; further work is needed on that.

In this forum last year, the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities submitted its report

(A/68/189), whose recommendations were discussed this year in the Conference on Disarmament as well as in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has set itself the task for 2015 of examining how to integrate the recommendations into the guidelines it is drafting on ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. Switzerland believes the disarmament community should also continue to consider how the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts can be implemented. As of next year, that could be accomplished by continuing the work being done on the issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

Furthermore, in line with the report of the Group of Governmental Experts, Switzerland believes it is important that the disarmament and space communities work together to ensure the long-term security and sustainability of space activities. The international instruments currently being developed should be drafted in coordination between the two communities in order to ensure their consistency and complementarity. That is why Switzerland supports the proposal of the Group of Governmental Experts to set up joint meetings on the topic for the First and Fourth Committees, which could begin next year.

From that viewpoint, the European Union-led process for developing an international code of conduct for outer space activities has made it possible to bring the disarmament and space communities together in a very positive way. Switzerland, which took part in the process, welcomes the idea of a political instrument designed to ensure the security and stability of outer space activities. Such an instrument should take a holistic approach, including both civilian and military activities, as is the case with the current version. The space community should also continue to be involved along with the disarmament community. Switzerland believes that formal negotiations should be launched and conducted in as inclusive a manner as possible in order to ensure that support for the final document is as universal as possible.

The disarmament and space communities have a shared interest in and responsibility for ensuring that outer space can continue to be utilized peacefully in the long term in order to ensure the prosperity and security of future generations.

**Ms. Kim Hye-jin** (Republic of Korea): Since the space age began, more than five decades ago, the use and exploration of space for peaceful purposes has increased exponentially. Achievements in exploring space have driven technological development in space science and its other practical applications, thereby improving our daily lives. However, the rapid growth in the number of space actors, and the expansion of their activities, has led to congestion and increased competition in space. The international community now faces the urgent task of ensuring a safe and secure space environment. It is imperative that all States use space responsibly and in a peaceful, transparent and safe manner, in accordance with the relevant international norms governing activities in outer space.

In that regard, it is deplorable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to abuse the right to the peaceful uses of outer space as a pretext for developing its ballistic missile programme, which poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region and beyond. The relevant Security Council resolutions and presidential statements clearly demand that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not conduct any launches using ballistic-missile technology. Any launch of ballistic missiles of any kind by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea constitutes a clear violation of the Security Council resolutions prohibiting such activities.

With the rapid proliferation of space technology and its serious nature, there is a growing need for strengthening existing norms and rules on outer space in order to reflect new developments. Furthermore, given the cross-cutting impact of space activities and space-space services on every kind of activity on land and sea, whether civil or military, it would be prudent to take a holistic approach to enhancing existing outer-space norms in order to cover all the relevant implications and consequences. In that regard, the Republic of Korea believes that strengthening transparency and confidence-building measures is a meaningful step forward. In particular, we commend the General Assembly's adoption in December 2013, of a resolution (resolution 68/50) on the most recent report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (A/68/189), which lays a solid foundation for further calibration of the space regime.

To that end, my delegation also supports international efforts to develop an international code of

conduct for outer space activities. Such a code should be universal, pragmatic and flexible. It is worth noting that the drafters of the code have done well to incorporate the suggestions of the Group of Governmental Experts, and the Republic of Korea fully supports its adoption as soon as possible.

Lastly, my delegation would like to emphasize the importance of close cooperation and dialogue among various forums, including the Conference on Disarmament, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the First and Fourth Committees and the International Telecommunication Union. It is important that their respective expertise and experience be leveraged in order to maximize positive synergy among them.

In conclusion, the Republic of Korea would like to reiterate its strong commitment to the peaceful and sustainable use of space for the benefit of all humankind. We will continue to make our contribution to the realization of that goal.

**Mr. Hansen** (Australia): Australia welcomes the growing attention paid in recent years to the important subject of space security. Globally, the reliance of all nations upon the space environment continues to increase. Whether as major space-faring nations, emerging space actors or space users, we all need access to the space environment to pursue our daily lives and for our social, economic, scientific and technological development.

But this immensely valuable access is under threat. Preventing the proliferation of space debris and building a solid foundation of transparency and confidence in the space domain are two common challenges we all must face. Therefore, our ongoing deliberations on space security — whether in international or regional settings — have recognized the need for immediate action to protect the safety, security and sustainability of the space environment.

Australia firmly supports efforts to develop space transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that are practical and verifiable and contribute to lessening mistrust. We were pleased once again to co-sponsor the useful draft resolution (A/C.1/69/L.15) on TCBMs in outer space, under the lead sponsorship of China, Russia and the United States.

Australia has also been pleased to see important strides forward on space TCBMs, which have been

led by the body of work produced by the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, and the development of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space's guidelines on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. We stand ready to work with others as a first priority on the implementation of those useful recommendations.

Among the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts, we particularly welcome its endorsement of the development of a multilateral code of conduct to encourage the peaceful use of space. We see value in developing and reinforcing norms for responsible behaviour in space to ensure a safe operating environment for all nations' space assets. We also note the Group's findings that voluntary political undertakings could form the basis for legally binding agreements.

The proposed international code of conduct is a practical initiative in response to the Secretary-General's call for space TCBMs. Concluding and implementing the code would address the real and imminent threat posed by space debris to all our space-dependent activities.

Australia considers the code's focus on the pressing problem of space debris entirely appropriate. Scientists and practitioners alike have warned that, if the growth of debris is not arrested, our access and ability to reap the benefits from the space environment will be heavily curtailed, and for a very long time.

We have seen good progress made on the proposed code over the past two years. Since the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, two rounds of open-ended consultations have provided an opportunity for all nations to participate in discussions on the shape of the proposed code.

The proliferation of space debris is a major issue for our Indo-Pacific region. We therefore applaud the continued attention to the issue by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). A second ARF space security workshop was held this month at the initiative of Indonesia, Japan and the United States. It usefully built on the first ARF workshop, co-chaired by Viet Nam and Australia in December 2012, raised further awareness of the problem and discussed what ARF members could do about it.

Australia is very concerned about the development and deployment of anti-satellite missiles. In the worst-case scenario, as occurred in the recent past, the testing of such missiles will create further space debris, thereby endangering all space assets. Nor is such testing conducive to international peace and cooperation in the space domain, as it runs counter to the international community's efforts to build transparency and confidence with regard to space activities. We also believe that any initiatives that seek to deal with the non-weaponization of space and discourage the threat of force against space objects should, at a minimum, include in their scope ground-based anti-satellite weapons, which pose the most pressing threat to space infrastructure.

Now as before, Australia urges the international community to focus on practical, achievable steps that we can take together to address real threats to space activities, including the urgent problem of space debris. Such a focus will yield real benefits for all humankind.

**Mr. Riquet** (France) (*spoke in French*): France associates itself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/69/PV.18).

Space is essential for modern life. Its peaceful applications are numerous and range from telecommunication and land, air and sea navigation to meteorology. Of course, space is just as fundamental to international security. However, our ability to use it is threatened by the deterioration of the space environment.

One of the earliest challenges to the sustainability of space activities is the proliferation of space debris. Several events occurred in recent years that have led to an alarming increase in debris, resulting particularly from accidental collisions between space objects and deliberate acts of destruction. The destruction of a single satellite as the result of an experimental rocket launch from the ground considerably worsened the proliferation of space debris. However, the existing mechanisms are not adequate for preventing such events. The problems we face are security problems in the broad sense, which require a comprehensive response that encompasses both civilian and military aspects. It is in our common interests as current and future space-faring nations to promote the principle of the responsible use of space in civil and military space programmes.

France remains committed to preserving the safety of space activities and to the development of space activities for peaceful purposes. They must take place in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, in particular the freedom of access to space for peaceful purposes, the preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit and respect for the right of States to self-defence.

As it has had an opportunity to express on numerous occasions, France shares the goal of preventing an arms race in space. France is not opposed in principle to the drafting of an instrument and the development of an initiative to achieve that aim as part of a work programme approved by the Conference on Disarmament.

France takes note of the efforts of Russia and China to promote discussions within the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of the weaponization of space. I would recall France's views on the conditions for the development of a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We all aspire to seeing this type of instrument provide real security gains. To that end, it should be complete, precise, universal and credible.

Seeking a treaty is likely to be of necessity a long-term process. But the rapid degradation of the space environment calls for urgent and pragmatic responses based on immediately applicable measures. That is why we support promotion in the short term of responsible practices and the development of voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures based on flexible mechanisms for coordination and consultation.

France participated actively in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, whose report on the subject was adopted by consensus last year (A/68/189). Lastly, we fully support the drafting of an international code of conduct on outer-space activities. France welcomes the interest in such a code, as testified to by the participation and substantive exchanges that took place during the consultation process in Luxembourg in the spring. In France's view, this political initiative constitutes a pragmatic stage in our attempts to strengthen security in space. We associate ourselves with the current efforts to bring the initiative to a successful conclusion, and we call on all interested States to remain ready to move on negotiations on its text in order to achieve our shared

goal of implementing rapid and pragmatic responses when regulating activity in space.

**Mr. Herráiz España** (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): Spain associates itself with the statement on this subject delivered earlier by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/69/PV.18).

Every State is increasingly dependent on space. Technological advances in the sector, along with economic development in many regions around the world, have enabled a growing number of nations to have an interest in gaining access to the opportunities that outer space affords and the capacity to do so.

Spain has always taken a position in favour of maintaining a safe environment in outer space while enabling it to be used peacefully on an equitable basis acceptable to all. That peaceful use depends on the responsibility of every stakeholder in the field. In that regard, the increased accumulation of space debris and waste is unquestionably an ever more relevant concern that we must respond to.

I would also like to stress how essential it is that we continue to work on establishing a set of confidence-building measures that outline recommended steps for the various stakeholders' actions. We should emphasize the importance of the work being done by the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. I would also like to point out that, as on previous occasions, my country is a sponsor of this year's draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (A/C.1/69/L.15), presented by the Russian Federation, the United States and China, which underscores the need for such measures. We stress the importance of further developing international instruments within that framework. The conclusions and recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts endorse the efforts being made in that area.

The initiative launched by the European Union to establish a code of conduct for outer space activities is clearly very important, and progress has been made on it in recent years with the active participation of more than 70 States. The open consultations in Kyiv, Bangkok and Luxembourg have provided very positive opportunities for considering delegations' various positions from an open and participatory perspective. We believe the code of conduct would be a valuable step forward in strengthening understanding among the various actors

and in ensuring the sustainability of outer space. In our opinion, if it involves the participation of the largest possible number of States, particularly those with a greater presence in the area, the code would represent a major step forward in establishing a system for the responsible and peaceful use of outer space by all.

**Mr. AlAjmi** (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation would first like to express its support for the statements delivered earlier on behalf of the Arab Group and by the representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Applied science and technology in the field of outer space, such as geo-surveillance, naval satellite technology and telecommunication, have contributed to countries' development efforts aimed at improving people's standards of living, preserving natural resources and providing early warning in cases of disaster, as well as other applications, all of which is helping to find long-term solutions in the area of sustainable development.

Outer space has become essential to modern life and civilization. Kuwait is therefore convinced that we can achieve its exemplary use only through multilateral negotiations that reflect the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations by emphasizing the need for the peaceful use of space and ensuring a global participatory environment that ensures that certain States do not arrogate to themselves the right to take unilateral measures that could lead to an arms race in outer space. That could lead to exceptional challenges that could affect modern life, with negative repercussions for development generally, as well as eroding trust among States, particularly in view of the absence of international regulations prohibiting such an arms race, despite the existence of instruments such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. None of them alone, however, can prohibit an arms race in space. We therefore believe it is incumbent upon us to begin serious negotiations towards a comprehensive, non-selective and legally binding instrument that would ban the deployment of weapons in outer space. My delegation also supports the establishment of a committee within the Conference on Disarmament that would be responsible for studying this important issue within a comprehensive and balanced framework.

**Mr. Mehdi** (Canada) (*spoke in French*): Canada believes that activities in outer space play a more and more important, indeed essential, role in the daily lives of millions of people around the world. Like others, we think it is in every country's interests to ensure that the outer space environment remains safe, stable, sustainable and secure. Canada welcomed the General Assembly's adoption, in December 2013, of resolution 68/50, and applauds all efforts to implement transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, as recommended in the 2013 report (A/68/189) of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. As the report mentions, a multilateral code of conduct is one of the ways to promote the responsible and peaceful use of outer space. The international code of conduct for outer space activities could serve as a useful tool for all countries engaging in space activities, or that will do so in future, in order to establish best practices on mitigating space debris, enhancing transparency, sharing information to avoid collisions, and establishing the principle of non-interference in the outer space activities of other countries.

A voluntary instrument such as the international code of conduct is intended to be a pragmatic short-term step to build momentum with regard to space security efforts and facilitate longer-term efforts to negotiate legally binding instruments on responsible space activities. For those reasons, Canada will continue to work with other countries to improve the draft code of conduct in order to finalize the text. As those important discussions progress, it is essential that States refrain from actions that endanger or destabilize the space environment, such as the development or testing of anti-satellite weapons systems, especially those that are generating debris.

(*spoke in English*)

The difficulty in connection with legally binding measures is to find a means of overcoming the dual challenges of accurate definition and effective verification. While Canada remains committed to preventing an arms race in outer space, these issues remain a serious challenge. Given their complexity, these matters clearly require a greater understanding and deliberation before new legally binding mechanisms can be considered.

Unilateral declarations of States' intent not to place weapons in space are also of limited value in the absence of clear and usable definitions and effective verification. Such declarations pose the risk of building a false sense of confidence, particularly as such proposals do not address the dual-use nature of technology or other assets that can be utilized to deliberately cause damage to space infrastructure.

It is important for all States to be forthcoming with regard to their space policies and programmes, as well as the goals and principles that guide their outer space activities. That in itself is an important transparency and confidence-building measure. Acknowledging this fact, Canada's space policy framework, which will guide outer space activities in the coming years, was announced publicly in February 2014.

Canada recognizes the constructive role of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in enhancing transparency and confidence-building measures. Canada continues to contribute actively to various working groups and initiatives within the Committee. As an example, experts from around the world, including from Canada, are contributing to the work of the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. Canada remains committed to the production of a final set of guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space.

In conclusion, it is in the interests of all nations to adopt transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, as recommended in the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts. As the international community works to ensure that space does not become a theatre of conflict, it is hoped that States will refrain from destabilizing activities, make their intentions in space clear and act responsibly, especially with respect to limiting space debris. The goodwill and hard work of all countries is necessary at this point to ensure the safety, sustainability, stability and security of space for all humankind.

**Mr. An Myong Hun** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Outer space today is subject to the potential threat of becoming part of armed conflicts in the world as a result of the attempts by a specific State to militarize outer space. Outer space has turned into a place where advanced science and technologies are abused and a huge amount of financial resources are misused in the pursuit of military and strategic aims. Programmes

for militarizing outer space that could lead to an arms race are openly carried out. Tests for developing space weapons are undertaken, and even the manufacture of space weapons and aircraft for promptly striking any target on the ground are part of those programmes.

A clear example of that fact is the development of the missile defence system associated with the space weapons programme being pursued by the United States under the pretext of countering a ballistic missile threat from others. If the manoeuvres being carried out under the pretext of missile threats from others are justified, the peace and security of the world cannot be assured at all.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains consistent in opposing the militarization of outer space. The international community has so far spared no effort to prevent the militarization of outer space and the arms race therein. Those efforts have resulted in the establishment of some systematic mechanisms and in the adoption of important United Nations resolutions designed to prevent an arms race in outer space. However, the existing international legal systems cannot by themselves comprehensively and effectively prevent the placement of weapons and an arms race in outer space. Establishing a new legally binding framework for the comprehensive and effective prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming increasingly urgent, in consideration of the present reality in which certain important agreements for such purposes are either nullified or not properly implemented.

The comprehensive prevention of an arms race in outer space would constitute fundamental conditions not only for removing the danger of an arms race in outer space and guaranteeing the rights of all States for its peaceful use but also for securing world peace. It is therefore urgent that the international community establish at an early date a new legal framework to comprehensively and effectively prevent an arms race in outer space.

In that regard, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is of the view that, given its nature and purposes, the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects jointly presented by China and the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament in 2008, including its updated version in 2014, could serve as a positive

initiative for preventing an arms race and ensuring world peace. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will remain opposed to the placement of any weapons in outer space, and welcomes and supports initiatives aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space.

In conclusion, to clarify our position once again, it is the legitimate right of a sovereign State to peacefully explore outer space for the purposes of peacefully developing outer space. It is an unpardonable infringement upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to regard our satellite launches as violations of Security Council resolutions. Outer space development is not the exclusive right of a certain State. Despite the fact that our satellites for peaceful purposes are officially registered with the United Nations through a legal procedure, the intention of hostile elements in regarding them as a threat is as clear as day — it is to deprive the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the right to satellite launches for peaceful purposes.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will continue to exercise its legitimate right to peacefully develop its capabilities in outer space, the common property of humankind, and will continue to launch applications satellites to serve the building of its economic power.

**Mr. Ammar** (Pakistan): The delegation of Pakistan aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement under this cluster.

In recent years, space has no longer been considered an exclusive preserve of a few developed States. Today developing countries are tapping into space technology in diverse areas ranging from meteorology and disaster management to economy and telecommunication. Their reliance on space technology will only grow further in the years to come.

Our endeavours for over three decades — at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I), the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and in the General Assembly — have focused on one key objective, that is, ensuring that outer space remains free of arms and weaponization. It is time to reaffirm the commitment that led us this far towards the realization of that objective.

If history is any guide, monopolies of the few cannot last for long. It is therefore an urgent imperative

that the international community prevent the possibility of weaponizing outer space. Further delays will be counter-productive. Let us avoid the mistakes made in the case of chemical weapons, which witnessed decades of production before the Chemical Weapons Convention was concluded.

The final document (resolution S-10/2) of SSOD-I includes more than 30 paragraphs that relate to the dangers of an arms race and about the urgency of preventing an arms race in its various aspects. Paragraph 80 specifically recommends undertaking appropriate international negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The CD has long been seized of the issue, and the General Assembly has recognized for over two decades that the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger to international peace and security.

The development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and their integration into space assets has added a worrying dimension to the issues relating to outer space. An arms race in, and the weaponization of, outer space would not only endanger the peaceful uses of outer space, but also aggravate the intensity of conflicts on Earth, with potentially disastrous consequences for international peace and security. Therefore, it is essential to redouble our efforts in developing a comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory agreement that addresses concerns arising from the development, deployment and proliferation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

The rapid growth and change in space technologies has widened gaps in the existing international regime pertaining to outer space, including the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Moon Treaty of 1984, which necessitates the conclusion of a legally binding treaty to fill the gaps. It is against that backdrop that Pakistan has consistently opposed the weaponization of outer space and called for negotiations in the CD on this contemporary issue of interest and concern.

There is a considerable body of existing knowledge on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Much work has already been done in the CD by the ad hoc committees on this subject from 1985 to 1992. Moreover, the draft text submitted jointly by the Russian Federation and China in 2008, commonly known as the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, and the revised draft treaty,

introduced by the Russian Federation and China in the Conference on Disarmament on 10 June 2014, also provides a useful basis to commence negotiations. We therefore see no impediment to starting negotiations on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space in the CD.

Pakistan, along with a number of other States, has sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.14, introduced by the Russian Federation, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. This is a clear reflection of the importance we ascribe to this issue. The draft resolution urges an early start of the substantive work at the CD. We have made similar calls on different occasions, being cognizant of the importance of the issue. We are also sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, to be submitted by the delegation of Egypt.

Despite the growing dangers of the weaponization in outer space and its attendant repercussions for international peace and security, some States continue to oppose the commencement of negotiations on this issue in the CD. There can be no other explanation for such opposition except that those States seek to protect their monopoly on this technology and maintain their full-spectrum dominance.

On the other hand, there has been a growing lament expressed about the CD’s deadlock in the past four years. Some States have found it convenient to attribute the stalemate to one of the four core issues on the CD’s agenda. The facts speak for themselves, and one inconvenient fact is that the CD, despite the overwhelming support for negotiating a legal instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, has been prevented by a handful of States from doing so. The international community must therefore ask for a clear expression of the underlying reasons due to which those States oppose negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Those States should acknowledge their responsibility in perpetuating the CD’s deadlock on this issue.

We note that efforts are under way to conclude a code of conduct for outer space activities. We have been participating actively in the open-ended consultations of the international code of conduct for outer space activities. While we see value in such efforts, we also believe that such initiatives should be pursued in an inclusive, universal and participatory manner, taking into account the security interests of all States.

We also take note of the report and recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space (A/68/189). We agree that transparency and confidence-building measures should be implemented to the greatest extent practicable and in a manner that is consistent with States’ national interests. While those proposals and initiatives can be useful interim steps, they cannot and should not obviate the quest for a legally binding treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the CD. Notwithstanding the usefulness of the interim steps, the only way to secure a weapon-free outer space is a legally binding treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the CD.

**The Chair:** We have heard from the last speaker under the cluster “Outer space (disarmament aspects)”.

I shall now call on those representatives who have requested the floor in exercise of the right of reply. I would like to remind all delegations that the first intervention is limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention to 5 minutes.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that the United States delegation touched on the theme of anti-satellite weaponry. Indeed, such a problem exists; we have been discussing it with the United States for several decades. It is no secret to anyone that anti-satellite technology and anti-missile technology are virtually identical. It seems our fruitful dialogue on preventing the unilateral and completely unrestricted intensification of the global anti-ballistic missile system by the United States could facilitate a solution to all the problems relating to anti-satellite systems. If the United States is willing to engage in such a discussion at the United Nations, that would be welcomed.

Moreover, for some reason, some delegations in the First Committee have started to actively discuss the issue of a draft code of conduct in outer space. It is effectively an attempt to substitute our in-depth dialogue on developing a legally binding agreement on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space with some kind of simplified discussion on a draft code of conduct on outer space activities. We all see that the sponsors of that document are avoiding addressing the main problem, which is preventing an arms race in outer space and the deployment of weapons in outer

space. That is in contradiction to the task that we all set before us in the First Committee.

If the sponsors of the draft code believe that the main problem is space debris, then I will not argue with them. However, the direct way to address the problem is not just through a general debate in the First Committee, but rather through targeted work in the forum that was specifically established for that purpose, that is the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Fourth Committee. There is every reason to believe that the experts working on outer space issues at the United Nations can give an exhaustive response to all issues pertaining to the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed code of conduct on outer space activities for peaceful purposes.

We do not understand why we are wasting the First Committee's valuable time with discussions of issues that are not specifically related to space activities and issues that are outside the scope of our activities, such as the issue of space debris. I doubt that any of my colleagues in the First Committee will disagree that we already have enough problems on our plate, whereas the problem of space debris has nothing whatsoever to do with the First Committee.

**Mr. Buck** (United States of America): In view of the time, I will be brief.

In listening to the statements of my Russian colleague, I simply would reiterate that we are struck by the fact that the Russian and Chinese proposal of the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects does not address terrestrial-based anti-satellite systems, and we still wonder why.

**Mr. Shen Jian** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I will be brief as well.

In the course of this debate, some colleagues, including the representative of the United States, spoke about terrestrial-based anti-satellite systems. I hope that representatives will carefully read our draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects. Article II clearly states that we would not resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects. Therefore, this basically prohibits the use or threat of use of terrestrial-based weapons against outer space objects.

*The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.*