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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 30th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. RANA (Nepal)
later: Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 66 AND 155 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON ALL **DISARMAMENT** AGENDA ITEMS

Mr. NEGROTTI CAMBIASO (Italy): On behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, **I** wish to make some comments on agenda item 55, on the subject of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, on which specific draft resolutions are under consideration.

The idea that recourse to such weapons could still be considered by some countries a military option for intimidation and aggression is repugnant to the Twelve and represents the clearest proof of the need to achieve a multilaterally **binding** and verifiable commitment to eliminate such weapons from the face of the Earth.

The member countries of the European Community wish to stress their undiminished **resolve** to achieve as speedily as possible the total elimination of chemical weapons world wide through the early conclusion and implementation of a multilateral and verifiable convention of a universal nature dealing with the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and with their destruction.

The Twelve note with satisfaction the agreement on non-production of chemical weapons and drastic reduction of their respective chemical-weapon stockpiles, which was signed by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in June in Washington. The agreement has already provided the Geneva negotiations with a constructive impetus in various respects. The Twelve hope that the agreement between the two major possessors will soon be implemented. At the same time, they wish to encourage other States possessors of chemical weapons to declare themselves as **such**, as a further step towards confidence-building and transparency, to **make**

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their contribution to the multilateral negotiations taking place in Geneva and to declare their intention to be among the original signatories of the convention.

The Twelve are firmly convinced that, if the future ban is to be really effective and achieve its objective of freeing mankind from the danger of such a scourge, it will need to be global, comprehensive and verifiable.

Since the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Twelve have resolutely maintained their commitment to and their efforts to reach such an agreement in the shortest possible time. With regret, they note that progress in the negotiations has not matched the expectations raised by the Paris Conference of January 1989, not only in their respective countries but in the whole international community. At this stage the Twelve **recognize** the need for a vigorous collective effort to bring these negotiations to their conclusion at the earliest date.

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The Twelve are fully **aware** of the diversity and the complexity of the problems to be solved. **At** the same time they have taken note with interest of the idea of a ministerial session of the Conference on Disarmament to be held at a suitable time to overcome the remaining obstacles and conclude negotiations.

The Twelve do not underestimate the complex problems which must yet be resolved. One of these is related to the setting-up of an effective verification system. In order to acquire universal adherence it is essential that the means of verification, to be put at the disposal **of the** future international **organization,** **be** sufficiently reliable so as to provide all States with the degree of confidence necessary to ensure enforcement of the total ban.

As the Paris Conference and the Canberra meeting helped to highlight in 1989, **all the** members of **the** international community are equally responsible for showing and substantiating their commitment to the total and speedy elimination of chemical **weapons.** The Twelve feel encouraged by the increase in the number of countries **taking** part, as observers, in the negotiations. They believe that more active participation by observer countries can contribute greatly to the attainment of universal adherence from the outset which represents an outstanding priority to ensure the effectiveness of the convention. The Twelve **have** already stated their intention to be among the original signatories to the convention and to promote its early entry into force.

The Twelve have been particularly concerned to note the tendency towards the proliferation of such weapons in recent years. They have firmly condemned their use **in** the recent past, which **has** caused unspeakable suffering and emphasised the **danger** to regional stability and general security. Similarly they deplore the recent threat of use. **Such** events reinforce the vital importance of upholding the 1925 Geneva Protocol **for the** Prohibition of the Use in **War** of Asphyxiating, **Poisonous or Other Gases,** and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, The Twelve

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, T + -)

recall in this context the reaffirmation of the commitment to **this** Protocol made at **the Paris Conference** in 1989.

Pending **the** signing of the **convention** the Twelve **have** adopted measures **to** control the export of some chemical substances which could be used for chemical weapons. A wider alignment of such controls is desirable.

The **Twelve** member States of the Community express their satisfaction at **the** dialogue which has **developed** between Governments and industry representatives. More recently, **the** meeting held in Geneva **in** June provided a useful **opportunity** to reaffirm the **constructive** commitment of the chemical industry, already **expressed** at the Canberra Conference in September 1989, to work **together** with Governments and continue to contribute to **the** achievement of the ban.

The Twelve attach **equally** great importance to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of **the** Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological **(Biological)** and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. **The** Twelve, while welcoming the fact that the Convention has now **more** than 100 parties, **renew** their call **upon** all those States which have not ratified or acceded to it, to do so without delay, thus contributing to the strengthening of international confidence in **this instrument**. To this end, they have strongly urged, through appropriate initiatives, the countries non-parties to the Treaty to ratify or **accede** to it before **the** Third Review Conference, next year. In anticipation of that event they underscore the importance of compliance with the confidence-building **measures** introduced at the Second Review Conference in 1986 **and** look forward to their further strengthening and expansion.

The Twelve finally consider that the present **régime** could be improved **through** greater co-operation **among** the parties to **the Convention**, **as** Well **as** giving due consideration to any further **new** measures at **the coming review** Conference.

Mr. ZIPPORI (Israel): I have asked to **spea**k in order to **make a** few comments on draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.1** regarding item 49, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in the region of the Middle **East**". I should like once again to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General Akashi, the officials of the Disarmament Division, and especially **the** three independent experts for providing us with a very thoughtful and useful study in document A/45/435.

As requested by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has given much thought to "the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle **East**", some of which are crucial **from** Israel's point of view.

The study dwells on **the** precariousness of Israel's situation, and this is what **it says** in paragraphs 97 **and** 98:

"... **there** are indications that Israel's relative conventional strength may be diminishing. In this connection, one factor that should be pointed out is the acquisition by potential opponents of ballistic missiles with a relatively long range and high accuracy. This gives those States a **means of** striking at a longer distance and enables **them** to participate in a conflict, even if their territory does not directly abut **on the opponent's**. As its population is small and becoming smaller in proportion to those of the other nations in the area, Israel has also become more vulnerable to a situation of prolonged warfare leading to a high number of casualties among its civilians or **its** military.

"Against **this** background, it is appropriate to point **out** that Israel's security position is characterized by three features that cannot but play a part in determining its attitude towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone : **the** relatively small size of its **territory**; the sustained hostility between **itself** and the **great majority** of States of the **region**; and **the** fact

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that it has no military allies in the region and that the one State that might support it in a conflict is geographically remote." (A/45/435, **paras. 97-98**)

Let me amplify these statements. Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria continue to espouse the unconditional liquidation of Israel. **I** say these threats are unconditional and have nothing to do with the solution of any problem, and certainly not with a resolution of the Palestinian problem. These countries just wish to destroy Israel and their designs are backed up with a massive military potential. We have tried in vain to alert the General Assembly over the years to the existential **problems** which Israel faces. It is possible that the General **Assembly** will appreciate the force of Israel's warnings in the light of recent experiences with Iraq. The international summons required to meet the Iraqi threat certainly illustrates the massive character of the threat we have to **face** from Iraq **alone**.

The study further dwells on the need to deal with all security issues separately, but concurrently, and not with the nuclear aspect alone. This is what it says in paragraph 151:

"The close relationship - **the** 'linkage' - among all the elements that affect security is well known. **Nuclear** capabilities are linked to chemical weapons, chemical weapons to conventional arms, conventional arms to political conflict. And all these threads are woven into a seamless fabric of fear and insecurity. If the area is to become and remain truly nuclear-free, then **this** fabric **must** be cut into pieces and dealt with piece **by** piece. The problem is much too complex and unyielding for **any** comprehensive settlement to solve all at once. Yet all the separate elements **must be** worked on concurrently, for it will not be possible to settle any one piece of the problem **unless** it is clear that progress is being made on the other pieces as well. A radical transformation, step by step, must be **effected** in the military and **political**

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relationships of the entire area. The **peoples** of the Middle East must **develop** confidence that the political conflicts that surely will long remain are going to be settled - and settled equitably - without resort to force or the threat of force." (ibid. para. 151)

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

That statement underscores what we believe to be true. A credible nuclear-weapon-free **zone** can only be one in which the threat or use of force of any kind are ruled out.

Lastly, I wish to draw the attention of the First **Committee** to the insistence of the study on the need to create confidence. It states

"Confidence must be built on all sides: confidence that declarations of a desire for a just and lasting peace are not merely a smokescreen, confidence that military solutions to political problems are excluded, confidence that military postures that are perceived as threatening can be avoided or adjusted. Renunciation of hostile acts and of threatening, **inflammatory** declarations would do much to increase confidence as well. Most important of **all, there must** be progress in solving the fundamental conflicts in the region. Without such progress, technical **measures** in the nuclear area or on other security problems will hardly be given serious thought, **much less** will **they** be developed to provide a meaningful barrier to tension and even **war.**"

(A/45/435, para. 110)

We believe that the creation of confidence is the **inevitable** precursor to any credible arrangement in the Middle East. The first step can, in our view, be only **one: the ready** acknowledgement of Israel's place in the Middle East and the cessation of warlike threats and actions on the part of **Arab** leaders. we can certainly **not** countenance a denial of our existence as a basis on which trust **can** be built.

In chapters IV and V of the study, the Secretary-General **makes a number** of specific proposals. I shall not discuss them in detail at this stage. Some do, and some do not, in **our** view, meet the contingencies **of the** situation, Let **me,** however, impress on the Committee the reference to the **establishment** of a **nuclear-weapon-free zone:**

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"Realistically, however, such **azone** can be realised only step by step in a process extending over years, a process in which all States would work to create a total environment in which no State feels its security is threatened. **A zone** can be even more effective in this regard than the NPT, essential as that instrument and its IAEA safeguards system are. **A zone** can, for example, involve even **more** extensive and rigorous verification procedures; it can establish additional constraints on peaceful nuclear activities; it can provide for an extensive **system** of positive and negative security guarantees; it can prescribe even **more** difficult requirements for withdrawal than the **NPT.**" (ibid.. para. 109)

The study is careful in not assigning an order of priorities to its recommendations. In our view, it is manifest that the **most** elementary confidence-building measures, which I mentioned before, need to precede the negotiation of any credible arrangement. Israel's legitimacy in the Middle East needs to be acknowledged by its neighbours and threats to its existence must cease, **Next**, a nuclear-weapon-free zone needs to be negotiated between the States of the region, and such negotiations need to be paralleled by negotiations on other issues which threaten the security of the States of the region, especially those that derive from the sheer quantity and quality of arms deployed.

The situation between Israel and its committed **Arab** adversaries is not symmetrical. They threaten Israel unconditionally and **thereby** aggravate the prospects for the solution of any problem. For its part, Israel has never threatened any Arab **country**.

There is no doubt in our mind **that** it is we, above all, who need to be reassured.

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

We are asked to vote on draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.1**. Despite its misgivings on the modalities spelt out in it, Israel will join the consensus, as it did in previous years. Israel wants a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and **wants such a zone** and the negotiations leading to it to do away with the danger of further wars of any kind, altogether.

Rather than taking issue with the various paragraphs in detail, let me state once again the modalities which we believe to be essential. First, with regard to free and direct negotiations between the States of the region, we have said, and state again, that we stand ready to begin discussion with any State of the region willing to do so. Secondly, with regard to reliance on mutual arrangements - including inspections - we cannot confide our security to international supervision, which is at the **mercy** of political contingencies, has not prevented a single local war and is likely to break down every time there is tension. I doubt that inspectors of the International Atomic **Energy** Agency will be permitted to visit **Iraq** nowadays.

Those conditions, which imply a cessation of wars, are, in our view, **indispensable**. The detached observer may not care, but **we** happen to be the direct object of evil designs, and are right to be wary.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Yugoslavia to introduce draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.26**.

Ms. SUKOVIC (Yugoslavia): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.26**, entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament", on behalf of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, **Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia**, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, **Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Viet Nam** and my own country, Yugoslavia.

(Ms. Sukovic, Yugoslavia)

I should like to inform the Committee that Bolivia and Pakistan have now joined the list of sponsors.

The sponsors attach the greatest importance to the **work** of the Conference on Disarmament. They are convinced that in the present international climate, when substantive progress is being made on bilateral and regional levels, the Conference has acquired even greater importance as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and that multilateral efforts and bilateral negotiations should complement each other. That is why the sponsors consider that the Conference should be most directly involved in negotiating the priority issues of disarmament, and particularly those concerning nuclear disarmament. However, the report submitted this year by the Conference to the General Assembly shows that this is not yet the case.

As a result, the sponsors of the draft resolution note with regret that the Conference was not able to commence negotiations on the nuclear issues on its agenda. In the last two preambular paragraphs, expectations are expressed that the Conference, in view of the positive current progress in some fields of disarmament, will be in a position to reach concrete agreements on disarmament issues to which the United Nations has for years assigned the greatest priority and urgency. The sponsors also consider that in the present international climate a new impetus to negotiations on disarmament at all levels is needed.

Having in **m:nd** the fact that in this year's report of the **Conference** on Disarmament special attention is given to the efforts made to improve the functioning of the Conference, I should like to submit an amendment to draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.26**, adding a new paragraph at the end of the preambular part, and in that way encourage the Conference to continue its efforts in that direction. It reads as follows:

(Mr. Sukovic, Yugoslavia)

"Taking note with **satisfaction** of the relevant paragraph⁸ of the report of the **Conference on Disarmament on** the **progress** toward⁸ improved and **effective functioning** of the **Conference on Disarmament**, *and expressing the* hope that the **progress** will **continue** in all **aspects** of it⁸ **work**".

In the operative part of the draft **resolution**, after **reaffirming the role** of the Conference on Disarmament as the **single** multilateral negotiating forum of the international **community**, the **sponsors** note the **progress** made in the **negotiations** on the elaboration *of a* **draft** convention on a **comprehensive and effective** prohibition of all chemical weapons and **urge** the **Conference** to intensify it⁸ **work** with a view to completing negotiation⁸ on such a draft **convention as soon as possible**.

(Ms. Sukovic, Yugoslavia)

After noting the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban, the General Assembly would, in paragraph 4, call upon the Conference to strengthen its work, to further its mandate through substantive negotiations, and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, and would urge the Conference to provide negotiating mandates to ad hoc committees on all agenda items.

In the remaining operative paragraphs, the General Assembly would request the Conference to submit a report on its work to it at its forty-sixth session, and would decide to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Before concluding, I should like to express our appreciation to all delegations for their constructive co-operation as co-sponsors of draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.26**, as well as to other delegations which offered their views. At the same time, I should like to stress that my delegation, together with other sponsors, is continuing consultations with all interested delegations in the hope that the draft resolution will receive the widest possible support so that it may be adopted without a vote.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Pakistan, who will introduce draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.18**.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution sponsored by Bangladesh and Pakistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (**A/C.1/45/L.18**).

We have been encouraged by the recent positive trends in the international political climate and the various initiatives that have been taken in the field of disarmament. Nevertheless, regional conflicts and tensions continue to exist in many parts of the world, endangering peace and security. The relevance and importance of our proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

South Asia **cannot** therefore be over-emphasised. This draft resolution, which has been motivated by the sponsors' abiding commitment to the process of the universal elimination of nuclear weapons, also reflects the realistic **assessment** that, pending the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world, it would be advantageous to keep as **many** regions of the world free **of** nuclear weapons as possible. The creation of such zones has been recognised in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as an important interim measure pending general and complete disarmament, which remains the ultimate goal and objective of all States.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has also lent its support to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free **zones**. The Declaration adopted at the conclusion of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State **or** Government of the **Movement** of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September 1989, expressed support for the establishment and **strengthening** of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, which could contribute significantly to the strengthening of international security.

The sponsors **recognize** the vital importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the **move** towards general and complete disarmament. Such zones are not an end in themselves. Nor are they intended as a substitute for, but **rather** as a complement to, the global and comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament. They also serve as an important confidence-building measure. Furthermore, our shared goal of universal nuclear disarmament would receive an impetus from the establishment of such **zones**.

We believe that **the** necessary conditions exist in South **Asia** to enable the countries of the region to **move** towards the **objective** of a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in South Asia. All countries **of** the region **share** the **commitment** to keep the area **free** of nuclear weapons. They have made unilateral declarations, at the highest

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levels, pledging themselves not to acquire, develop or manufacture nuclear weapons. They have supported all international efforts for nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of these awesome weapons of mass destruction.

Pakistan's views on the subject are contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/45/462), dated 11 September 1990, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

Pakistan, for its part, has time and again declared its intention not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. The proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is thus also an earnest of Pakistan's sincere desire to keep our region permanently free of nuclear weapons. Over the years we have made a number of other proposals to ensure the permanent denuclearisation of South Asia. It is our firmly held belief that a regional approach would be the most effective means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in our region, with all States of the region accepting equal and non-discriminatory obligations. It is in this context that Pakistan has proposed a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia and the convening of a conference on non-proliferation in South Asia on the basis of equitable and non-discriminatory principles.

Draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.18, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, has been prepared along the same lines as resolution 441109 adopted with the overwhelming support of the States Members of the United Nations last year. In its preamble the conviction is reiterated that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures that can contribute effectively to the objective of non-proliferation and will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In the preamble the General Assembly

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

would recall the declaration8 **issued** by Government8 **of South Asian States** affirming their **undertaking** not **to** acquire **or manufacture** nuclear weapon8 and to devote their **nuclear programme6 exclusively** to the **economic** and social advancement of **their peoples.**

In the operative part, **the concept of** a nuclear-weapon-free **zone in** South Asia **is endorsed,** and the State8 **of South Asia** are urged to continue to **make** all **possible** effort8 to **establish** a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in South **Asia** and to refrain, in the meantime, **from** any action **contrary** to that **objective.** The Secretary-General **is requested** to **ascertain** the view8 **of** the State8 of the region on the issue **and** to promote **consultations** among them with a view to exploring the **best possibilities** of **furthering** the effort8 for the **establishment** of a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in South **Asia.**

It **is our hope** that **the adoption of** the draft **resolution** will **provide** further **encouragement to** the State8 in **our region** to move toward8 the **establishment** Of a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in South **Asia.** We therefore hope that the international community **will** once again **lend its** broad **support** to the draft **resolution.**

The CHAIRMAN: I now call **C.1** the representative of Sweden, who will introduce draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.49**.

Ms. THEORIN (Sweden): International tensions are rapidly subsiding, as is the threat of cataclysmic global warfare. This reassuring state of affairs is, however, paralleled by a growing realisation of the urgency of addressing other **equally** debilitating global problems. These include hunger, poverty, illiteracy and environmental deterioration, which constitutes a fundamental barrier to a decent future for mankind. Against this background, the potential **for** utilising human resources allocated to military activities to protect the environment, in **both** developing and industrialised **countries**, merits further exploration, particularly in the present international climate.

I have asked to speak today in order to introduce draft **r.** solution **A/C.1/45/L.49** on behalf of the delegations of Austria, **Brazil**, Bulgaria, the **Byelorussian SSR**, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Suriname, **Venezuela**, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

The object of this draft resolution is to chart potential uses, for environmental endeavours, of assets such as know-how, technology, infrastructure and production currently allocated to military activities.

Pursuant to **this** draft resolution, the Secretary-General would be requested, making use of existing **resources**, to **carry out** a study of such uses and to transmit the study to **next** year's session of the General Assembly. Examples **of** such military assets, which may be either **high** technology or low technology, or know-how, are: satellite technologies, **for** example in the field of remote sensing, with potential applications in, **for** instance, agricultural monitoring and planning; research capacity in, for instance, laboratories and computer facilities to detect and remedy environmental degradation; military equipment, personnel and know-how

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

for **the** handling and disposal of **toxic**, radioactive or otherwise harmful materials, including **the** destruction of weaponsr organisational capacity to train, educate and **mobilize** manpower; personnel, know-how and military **equipment** for national or international disaster relief: existing **networks** of the military sector, universities and **other** institutions for the dissemination of information and **data**; and industrial and technological capacity in the fields of **energy**, transportation, emission control and field engineering.

In view of the accelerating preparations for the 1992 United **Nations** Conference on Environment and Developmeat, it is envisaged that the Secretary-General **may** make relevant findings of the study available to the Preparatory Committee without awaiting formal endorsement of the study **by the** General Assembly.

Speaking now on behalf of my **own** delegation only, I would like to take this opportunity to elaborate a little **further** on the thinking underlying the draft resolution.

It stands to reason that the military sector is well equipped for solving certain categories of environmental problems, including both natural catastrophes and other types of large-scale disasters, or the handling **and** disposal of highly toxic, radioactive or otherwise harmful substances. Actual examples of national provisions **for** such functions are numerous.

As far as research and development are concerned, I would like to mentioa here **that** in Sweden there is **already** an incipient Centre fur **Environmental** Research, **in** which the **National Defence** Research Establishment, the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, the **National** Institute of Occupational Health and the University of **Umea** co-operate.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

By their very nature, environmental problems tend to be multi-disciplinary. Therefore, the study of current environmental problems may require co-operation between different types of scientific competence. In the light of what has been said before, there are issues in which military research and development have a distinct comparative advantage, which has been the rationale for the co-operative undertaking in environmental research in Sweden.

Also, aside from the Centre for Environmental Research, there is pertinent Swedish experience of how military research and development assets, or techniques developed in the military sphere, may be utilized for environmental purposes, including studies, which in turn may provide guidance for improved protection of the environment.

One such endeavour, which is already the subject of international collaboration, is the tracing of toxic discharges, a capacity which is dependent both on the ability to detect and identify toxic substances and on techniques to follow their paths from the source.

Sensors developed for military purposes may be put to use in environmental research. Here I have in mind, for instance, special forms of radar which are capable of looking through dense foliage and even to some depth in the ground, and infra-red sensors which may detect very slight colour changes and thereby give early indications of changing growth conditions for crops and other types of vegetation.

As with the verification of compliance with international disarmament agreements, the need for a system for the reliable collection and transmission of large quantities of data for the verification of international environmental agreements is expected to grow. Expertise acquired under military auspices may have a role here.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Military **resources** for toxicological research **are** also being put to use to study both organisms occurring in nature, such as blue-green algae, and new substances introduced by human activities. In part related to this line of research there is also a study, conducted by a group on combustion research, of the emissions from waste combustion, in particular various nitric oxides.

It is universally **recognized** that disarmament and the protection of the environment are two of the key challenges facing the international community in the **1990s**. Each of these two major issues is, in its own right, a top priority internationally at present: disarmament, in part thanks to the radically improved international climate: the environment, accentuated by the preparations for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. This has been decisive for **the** timing of **the** submission of **this** draft resolution.

In order to avert possible misunderstandings, let me, before I conclude, clarify **that the** draft resolution is not directly geared towards **institutionalized** conversion per se. The language of the draft resolution is meant not to prejudge **eventual** institutional rearrangements; it is meant to be neutral with regard to structural implications.

The ambition of the sponsors of the draft resolution is to chart potential environmentally beneficial uses of resources, such as know-how, technology, infrastructure and production, currently allocated to military activities. In the light of the radical changes in the international atmosphere in the past year **or** two, it is a **very** modest ambition.

I hope that the proposal will elicit broad support. I commend draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.49** for adoption by the Committee.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): We thank the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, for her excellent introduction of draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.49**, entitled "Charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment"*, of which Mexico is one of the sponsors.

The issue of the redirection of resources allocated to weapons production has been the object of consideration by the United Nations for several decades and has attracted increasing attention from its Members in the light of the improvement in the international political situation.

(Mrs. Carvalho. Mexico)

In 1962 the General **Assembly** adopted resolution 1837 (XVII), entitled "Declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament", which states:

"Convinced that disarmament and the conversion of huge resources to peaceful uses would open up vast opportunities for the development of peaceful co-operation and trade among States on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, that the expansion of international economic exchange and mutual assistance would be beneficial to all countries, both big and small and both economically less developed and highly developed . . ."

Industrial over-capacity in the arms field should be seen as a threat to international peace, for it entails increased arms exports, particularly to areas of conflict, and consequently a diversion of resources from development.*

We believe that the activities carried out within the United Nations system should take **greater** account of the relationship between disarmament and development. Such an approach needs to be global and aimed at giving greater security to the world. However, in recent years there has been growing concern about conditions on our planet and about the need to achieve development without undermining the environment.

An appropriate strategy for the future should contain solid foundations to enable us to reach the twenty-first century in improved **circumstances**; in so doing, we shall have to focus on three essential interrelated problems - namely, disarmament, development and the environment.

* Mr. Martynov (**Byelorussian** Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mrs. Carvalho, Mexico)

Politically it is possible to attain the first of these elements. Prospects for significant reductions in weapons and armed forces lead us to hope that the resources released as a result can be redirected towards development - development that will offer a better life to all without added risk to the environment, whose deterioration to a large extent has been attributed to the industrialized countries.

To facilitate an exchange of opinion and experience on the conversion of resources and to begin **as** quickly as possible a study of potential uses of resources currently allocated to military activities for promoting the protection of the environment is an initiative that will certainly contribute to efforts already under way to attack the major world problems.

That is why Mexico has joined the sponsors of draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.49**.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Russian): I now call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that the following countries have become sponsors of the following draft resolutions: **A/C.1/45/L.12**, Ghana; L.13, Hungary; L.15, Ghana and Senegal; **L.21/Rev.1**, Brazil and Argentina; L.22, Chile; L.23, Chile; **L.30**, Ghana; **L.31**, Mauritius; **L.38**, Czechoslovakia; **L.44**, Norway; **L.46**, Costa Rica; L.51, Senegal; and **L.53**, Hungary.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.