

Consideration of and action on all disarmament agenda items (continued)

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
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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 66 AND 155 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON ALL DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

<u>Mr. MORENO</u> (Italy): I wish to make some comments, on behalf of the twelve Member States of the European Community, on item 56 **(1)** of the agenda, concerning the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The Twelve have repeatedly demonstrated their determination to pursue and support any endeavour to strengthen the role of the United Nationsin promoting disarmament, mutual confidence, and international peace and security. The United Nations is the key forum for world-wide discussion of all problems related to the pursuance of the objectives of international peace and security. The Twelve are convinced that the United Nations must play a central role in the quest for disarmament: its moral and political authority has recently been reinforced by the increased awareness of the international community's need for an institution capable of taking effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace, and to ensure that international law is applied.

(<u>Mr. Moreno, Italy</u>)

The newly acquired effectiveness and cohesion of the United Nations bring **new** hope for positive developments in all the various fields of **multilateral** co-operation and, from this standpoint, **in** the field **of disarmament**, which plays an essential role in the efforts to create enduring peace and security. These efforts not only should be responsive to events, but should also be **aimed** at having a positive influence by improving the prospect8 for international peace and **security**.

The Twelve consider that the First Committee should continue to be the principal organ of the General Assembly entrusted with the consideration of disarmament and related questions of international security. In this respect., the Twelve support and favour the continued search for ways of fully implementing the recommendations included in resolution 42/42 N. of 30 November 1987, on the rationalization of the work of the First Committee. I should like also to express our support for your parsons1 efforts, Mr. Chairman, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of Ovr work and improving methods and procedurea.

As a consequence, the Twelve continue to believe that the First Committee should aim at achieving results in terms of quality rather than quantity, focusing on the search 'for formulas which would gradually draw positiona closer. with the aim of favouring consensus.

At the 1990 session the Disarmament Commission Was able to prove Row effective the improvement of its working methods can be in facilitating the adoption of a number of recommendations by consensus, including the recommendation on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We confirm our commitment to the reform process under way and believe that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should play a constructive role as a deliberative forum for debate and in-depth study on many arms control and disarmament issues.

(<u>Mr. Moreno, Italy</u>)

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The Twelve are aware of the need to implement urgently those reform measures relating in particular to the agenda. They strongly favour efforts aimed at facilitating consultation8 on this question before the beginning of the organisational session scheduled for December 1990. The Twelve expect a single consensus draft resolution on the United Nations Disarmament Commission to be presented for adoption at our present session as further recognition of the renewed importance attached to the role Of this body.

The Twelve stress their support for the Conference on Disarmament, since it is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body in the framework Of the United Nations. T&e Conference remains an indispensable forum in the disarmament field.

Apart from the **special** importance we attach to the negotiation8 currently under way on a global ban on chemical weapons, we consider **that** valuable activity has been carried out on other **agenda** items, in particular through the **resumption** during **the 1990 session** Of **the activities** of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on a nuclear-test ban.

The Twelve are also satisfied with the efforts being carried out by it8 member8 aimed at improvement Of the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, since they are aware Of the need to adapt it to the new challenges emerging on the internationalscene. All the delegations which participated in the consultation8 acknowledged that they had *been* positive and constructive and were a proof of the. Conference's wish to improve it8 functioning and continue close monitoring of further development8 on the issue. Although some concrete results *have* already been achieved with regard, inter alia, to the revision of its calendar, further consultations are to be expected during the 1991 session of the Conference.

The Twelve al80 recognise the valuable assistance provided by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in co-ordinating the activities of the relevant United Nations bodies, which should benefit further from the strengthening of its role.

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(<u>Mr. Moreno, Italy</u>)

The Twelveregard the studies conducted by the United Nations as very useful and instrumental to the more advanced consideration of various aspects of disarmament and to the achievement of *a greater* general awareness of the subject. Such activities should, in our view, continue.

In this connection, the Twelvewelcome the outcome Of the studies, respectively, on the role Of the United Nations in the field Of verification and on nuclear armaments, which were concluded by a document approved by consensus. They also express their satisfaction with the progress made by the <u>ad hog</u> group entrusted by the Secretary-general with the study on international *transfers* of conventional **arms**.

Lastly, the Twelve also wish to express their appreciation of the valuable research carried out by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and of the programme of fellowships on matters of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Austria, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.46.

<u>Mr. MANDS</u> (*i*thetrie): to introduce the draft resolution (A/C.1/45/L.46), entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and preparations for the Third *Review* Conference of the Parties to the Convention*@. I do 80 on behalf of the 58 sponsors, namely, the delegations of Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brasil, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Csechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, the Netherlands, Dew Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines. Poland, Portugal,

(Mr. Jandl, Austria)

Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo. Turkey, the Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and my own country, Austria.

Since my delegation had the honour to present its views on the question of bacteriological weapons in general and the biological weapons Convention in particular in its rather comprehensive statement of 29 October 1998, I shall not go into the details of the matter as such, but will merely concentrate on the draft resolution at hand.

As representatives are aware, since Austria presided over the Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention, in 1986, it has always introduced the relevant draft resolution in the First Committee. This year also we have, together with the Australian and the Dutch delegations, prepared the draft resolution, which builds mainly upon the text of last year's resolution 44/115 C, which was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 15 December 1989.

(Mr. Jandl, Austria)

The preambular part of the draft resolution, which remain8 basically unchanged, recalls the fact that the General Assembly, in 1971, commended the biological weapons Convention, takes note of the confidence-building measures agreed upon at the Second Review Conference, acknowledges the *need* that further consideration be given to the implementation of the Convention, and finally confirm the common interest in strengthening the authority of the Convention and co-operation among Member States.

In operative paragraph 1, the draft resolution reflect8 the outcome of the formal meeting of 23 October 1990 of the States parties to the Convention. In the light of the request by the majority of States parties to hold a Third Review Conference in 1991, the said meeting decided to convene a preparatory committee, open to all States parties, at Geneva from 8 to 12 April 1991. Just for the sake of information, I should add that the Said meeting of 23 October also reached an informal understanding that the Third Review Conference itself would take place at Geneva from 9 to 27 September 1991. This date and the venue have, Of Course, to be decided upon formally by the preparatory committee.

Operative paragraph 2 of **the** draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to provide such services as may be necessary *for* the **Review** Conference and its preparation.

In operative paragraph 3 the text recalls the decision of the Second Review Conference that the Third Review Conference should consider, **inter alia**, the **issues** set out in article XII of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference.

The draft resolution further addresses a very important confidence- end security-building measure that was agreed upon by the Second Review Conference, namely, the exchange of information. It reiterates its oall upon all States parties to participate in this undertaking and asks the Secretary-General to lend his assistance in this matter.

(<u>Mr. Jandl, Austria</u>)

In its final paragraph the draft resolution calls upon all States that are not yet parties to the Convention to ratify it or accede to it without delay.

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I should like to express my delegation's gratitude to the delegation8 of Australia and the Netherlands for their helpful advice and co-operation in the drafting of the text. I should, furthermore, emphasise Our gratitude to the 57 delegation8 that I mentioned at the outset of my intervention as having found ----themselves in a position to sponsor the draft resolution, thereby providing most valuable support.

My delegation, together with the 57 other sponsors, is convinced that the text of this draft resolution is a suitable, encouraging and propitious one. I therefore express the hope that the First Committee will adopt the draft resolution, as it has adopted similar draft resolutions in previous years, without a vote.

Mr. AL. NASSER (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic): Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time in this Committee, allow me on behalf of my delegation to extend to you our congratulations on your election, and I also wish to congratulate the members of the Bureau on their election. I am sure that your experience and knowledge will ensure the success of the Committee's work.

I shall take up the subject of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle tart. Today, that question is of particular importance for several reasons. Among those reasons is the fact that the general situation with repard to disarmament gives reason for hope that considerable progress will be achieved in that area, thanks to the international détente which has paved the way towards an understanding between blocs and groups of States which, only yesterday, were living in a state of perpetual confrontation. Another reason is the eruption of the Gulf crisis, which has demonstrated the great importance of freeing the Middle East of the nuclear threat.

(<u>Mr. Al-Nasser, Oatar</u>)

While international détente ha8 led to the extinguishing of hotbeds of tension in various parts and region8 of the world, the Middle East is going in the opposite direction. The longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict is today far from resolution or settlement. The new confrontation in the Arab Gulf is aggravating the rampant tensions in the region. Just exactly as the Secretary-General stated in the introduction to his report concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free Zone in the 2diddle East in document A/45/435,

"A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East most certainly deserves such a qualification for more than one reason. The most obvious of them is that the Middle East is politically still unsettled and militarily volatile."

Every year since 1974, the General Assembly has recommended, and very often unanimously, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free some in the Middle East. Those recommendations included fundamental provisions whereby all the parties directly involved in the conflict were called upon to look into the taking of all practical and urgent measures necessary for the implementation of the proposal relating to the establishment of such a region and to declare, until such a region is established, that they will desist from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons. They were also called upon not to allow any third party to place nuclear weapons on their territory, and were urged to place all their nuclear installations under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to declare their acceptance of the establishment of such a nuclear-weapon-free Some and to deposit their declarations with the Security Council for consideration by the Council.

The consecutive resolutions adopted by the General Assembly included provisions and conditions which continue to be fundamental prerequisites for the establishment of such a nuclear-weapon-free some in the Middle East. However, we all know the circumstances of the region which stem from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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(<u>Mr. Al-Nasser, Oatar</u>)

Nore specifically, they stem not only from the possession by Israel of a nuclear capability but also from the actual possession by Israel of nuclear weapons, The information that is available to all from numerous sources establishes those facts. The policy of silence regarding the possession by Israel of nuclear weapons does not mean that Israel does not posse88 those weapons. Indeed, all the expert8 are categorical on considering that Israel is without a doubt a nuclear state. Consequently, Israel is the source of a threat that ha8 no place in the Middle East, if we wish that that region should meet the requirements of becoming a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Israel has two reactors: one is under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards end subject to the Agency's inspection procedures. However, the other, namely the famous Dimona reactor, whose secret was divulged by the Israeli technician Vanunu 10 The Sunday Times of London two year8 ago, is not subject to international inspection. According to the international information available, that reactor is the source of the material8 from which Israel manufacture8 it8 nuclear weapons. As the Secretary-General also states in his aforementionsd report, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free some in the Middle East requires that all nuclear installations in the region be placed under the appropriate international safeguards, either through accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency,

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$(Mr. \lambda 1 - Nasser, Oatar)$

This applis8 only to Israel since all the other State8 in the region with nuclear installation8 have already placed their facilities under IAEA safeguards. All the States parties that are expected to be members of the tone, with the exception of four State8, are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The four State8 excepted are the Waited Arab Emirates, Algeria, Oman and Mauritania.

My delegation, which ha8 consistently supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free somes because of the contribution that that makes' to the process of disarmament in general and nuclear disarmameat in particular, fully supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free some in the Niddle Bait. At the same time, however, my delegation is aware of the difficulties surrounding the establishment of such a some and arising from Israel's nuclear armament end its refusal to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards a8 is required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free some in the area.

We are all well aware of the positions of the parties concerned with regard to the establishment of such a some and we know that as long as there is no fundamental change in the circumstances of the region, in other words, unless Israel accedes to the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and places it8 installations under the IAEA safeguards and thereby respects it8 international obligations and responsibilities, the project will remain a dead letter.

The Secretary-General's report on the establishment of the some deserves our serious consideration. Allow me to express the great appreciation of my country far the Secretary-General's effort8 in drawing up this report. The report now shows us, after 60 many years, the approach to take to find a solution to the problem and to achieve the final goal, namely, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free some in the Middle East.

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(Mr. Al-Nasser, Oatar)

We are aware of the limits of the report end know full, well that the establishment of such a sone is a political act that depends on the parties which will make up the zone when it is created. However, the report include8 certain proposals and measures, elements which, if adopted, would allow us to achieve that goal. Those elements of the report shed light on certain problem8 and issues involved in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone while taking into account the specific circumstances of the Middle East.

We also wish to thankall the experts for their effort6 aimed at clarifying some of the problems. This is a step toward8 achieving the ultimate goal, which is to contribute to nuclear disarmament and to consolidate security and peace throughout the world.

The CHAIRMANNAIL on the representative of Germany, who will introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/45/L.13 and A/C.1/45/L.36.

Mr. NITTREVON WAGNER (Germany) r to introduce two draft resolution6 today, and I shall do 60 one after the other.

First, I should like to speak today on agenda item 60 (g) and introduce, on behalf of the delegation8 of Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Prance, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, Togo, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and my own delegation, draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.36, entitled "Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate type8 of confidence-building Measures".

Two years ago, in its resolution 43/78 H, the general Assembly endorsed without a vote the guidelines for confidence-building measures that had been worked

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(<u>Mr. Ritter von Wagner</u>, <u>Germany</u>)

out by the Disarmament Commission. These guideline8 are a standing invitation to all States of the world to implement such measures on a global or regional level. A review of development6 over the past iWO years leads us to conclude that this invitation has been accepted and that the guidelines have been implemented by a great number of States all over the world. Confidence-building measures have proved to be of increasing importance. This is particularly true for confidence-building measures agreed and implemented on a bilateral, subregional or regional level. Let me give the Committee some examples,

In Africa confidence-building measures are being developed in the framework of the Organization of African Unity a8 well a8 between the State6 members of the Economic Communities of Central African and Western African States. In reviewing the last two years mention must be made of the signing in 1989 of the Treaty instituting the Arab Maghreb Union. It represents a major step toward6 enhancing stability and co-operation in the Maghreb area and building confidence among the State8 members of the Union.

Among Asian nations the confidence-building **process is** gaining ground and becoming **more** specific. Two recent example8 of particular importance are the **establishment** of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation and, especially, the 1989 agreement between India and Pakistan on non-attack upon each other's nuclear facilities.

In Latin America the value of confidence-building measures had been long recognized. In 1989 the five countries members of the Andean Pact agreed in their Galapagos Declaration on the undertaking to institute or improve confidence-building measures aimed at the establishment of practical procedures, including: prompt bilateral consultations for avoiding or resolving frontier

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(<u>Mr. Ritter von Wagner</u>, <u>Germany</u>)

incidents; the exchange of information and regular meeting8 between their armed forces, including meetings at the level of their military high **commands**; end co-operation by their armed **forces** in development project8 of mutual interest.

This agreement represents a major effort for confidence building in the region, Argentina and Brazil took the political decision to promote and expand their economic integration and intensify their peaceful nuclear co-operation on the basis of openness and mutual confidence. In the General Assembly Argentina has launched an initiative for confidence-building measures in outer space.

As to developments in Europe, I mayrefer to draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.37, with France as one of its sponsors, entitled "Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe". The United Nations has been playing a crucial role in the process of promoting the concept of confidence-building measures and analysing appropriate measures for different regions or subregions in the world. This year's United Nations meetings on confidence- and security-building measures in Asia - in Kathmandu, Nepal - and on conflict resolution, crisis prevention and management and confidence-building among African States - in Arusha, Tanzania - contributed significantly to focusing attention on confidence-building measures appropriate to and practicable in the respective regions. JVM/8

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(Mr. Bitter von Wagner, Germany)

As laid down in the 1989 guidelines, confidence-building measures are conceived of as a broad concept. Confidence reflects a set of related factors of a military as well as of a non-military character, and a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them with confidence. This includes confidence building *in* the political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural fields. At the same time, confidence-building measures in the military field alone are already of high value end should be a focus of our attention.

Traditionally, sovereign States have pursued their security autonomously either on their own or in conjunction with close allies, but rarely by trying to co-operate with potential adversaries in fields relating to security. Times are changing. Today States are discovering, without in any way renouncing sovereignty, that national security can also be bolstered by measures taken, not against, but in co-operation with, potential adversaries. In this regard, confidence-building measures are of particular relevance. Disarnament agreements cannot materialise overnight. They require a high degree of co-operation in the field of security, which necessitates a solid basis of antecedent co-operative efforts to build trust. Like no other means, confidence-building measures are capable of performing this task. By breaking the pernicious cycle of distrust, arms build-up and tension by substituting a new cycle of understanding, confidence and stability, they pave the way for new co-operative structures of security, among which arms reduction agreements will figure prominently,

In applying this line of thinking, States of the two major military alliances have alrasdy succeeded in transforming their relationship to an extent that would have been inconceivable only a few years ago. In their London Declaration, Heads of Stats and Government of the North Atlantic Council made it clear that they no

(Mr. Bitter von Wagner, Germany)

longer regarded the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and **Eastern** Europe as adversaries but as fellow architects of the new Europe to which they extended the **hand** of friendship, **and** they proposed that co-operation within the framework of the *Conference* on Security and Co-operation in Europe be institutionalized in order to provide a forum for broad political dialogue in a more united Europe.

Let *me reaffirm* that wherever **disarmament** and arms control are at issue in the world it must be borne in mind that **confidence** building paves the way to disarmament, and in turn **disarmament** generates **confidence**. This cycle of reason should be **set** in motion world wide.

I would like now to introduce the second draft resolution, on "Science and technology for disarmament", contained in document A/C.1/45/L.13. For technical reasons this draft has been introduced without listing all the countries that wish to join in sponsoring it. We are grateful for the support given us and would welcome the broadest sponsorship possible for an item which, in our view, deserves particular attention. The draft resolution calls in essence for increased common efforts to make the best possible use of those scientific and technological achievements that improve the tools for the *effective* and reliable implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements, <u>inter alia</u>, for verification of compliance and for weapons disposal.

My delegation maintains the view that technology as such is neutral and that, although it has a momentum of its own, its use and development occur only under human direction. With human guidance, technology can and should be a crucial element in the effort to establish a new, more co-operative stage in international relations. The better use and application of technological means and methods related to arms control and disarmament in mutual and collective co-operation

(Mr. Bitter von Wagner, Germany)

constitute a desirable and indispensable step in this regard. In order to exploit to the full the potential of technology and arms control as agents for positive change, we deem it important to give this interrelationship special attention. My Government wishes to do this by taking into account the individual characteristics of efforts related to arms control and disarmament, such 'as treaty-specific verification provisions, noting the difficulties in assigning specific responsibilities to a multilateral organisation not directly related to a specific arms control endeavour, The aspect of science and technology deserves particular attention, beet expressed by broad sponsorship. It would be very much welcomed if delegations that feel the same way would express this feeling by joining in sponsoring our draft resolution. We welcome any support for this draft.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.33.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects has been the subject of many international activities and, despite the fact that there is en awareness that these weapons are imperilling the existence of mankind, very little has been done to eliminate them from the face of the Earth.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.33, entitled "Nuclear-arms freeze" - namely, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Peru and Mexico - continue to be convinced of the urgency of putting an end to the perfecting of nuclear weapons, deeming this an indispensable measure for curbing the nuclear-arms race. The qualitative improvement of these weapons neutralises the **positive** effects of the agreements on weapons reduction inasmuah as there continues to be an increase in the destructive capacity of the remaining weaponry,

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(Mrs. Carvalho, Mexico)

Improvements in East-West relations should encourage and speed up the process leading to the adoption of concrete measures to ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In operative paragraph.1 of the draft resolution, an urgent appeal is addressed to the two major nuclear Powers to reach agreement on en immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would provide for a stoppage of any further production and, at the same time, a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for their manufacture.

Although this measure is not an end in and of itself, we are convinced that . joint action on the part of nuclear-weapon States committing them to a total nuclear-arms freeze would contribute to enhancing the confidence of States and would create a more favourable and secure international atmosphere.

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(<u>Mrs. Carvalho, Mexico</u>)

The sponsors of draft resolution **A/C.1/45/L.33** again appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to announce a **total** nuclear-weapon free28 in a declaration that would include the prohibition of testing, production and emplacement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. as well as the cessation of the **production** of fissionable materials for such weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Colombia, who will introduce the draft decision contained in document A/C.1/45/L.3.

<u>Miss URIBE DE LOZAN</u> (Colombbs) (interpretation from **Spanish): I have the** honour to introduce the draft decision regarding **agenda** item 56 (j) of the General Assembly, concerning international **arms trauefere**.

The draft decision, contained in document **A/C.1/45/L.3**, is designed simply to include the item concerning international arms transfers on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly at the next session, when the report on the study that is currently being made on all aspects relating to **this** very important **issue will be** submitted to Governments for their consideration.

However, **I** should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express our pleasure at noting the growing awareness on the part of many Governments concerning the problem of international arms transfers, as indicated not only in **the debates** at **this** session of the General Assembly but also in the replies they **have** sent to the Secretary-General,

There can be no doubt any longer that the matter of international arms transfers gives rise to many and various concerns in the international **community**: the current **crisis** in the Middle East; the destabilising **role** of **conventional** weapons; **the** increasing impoverishment **of the third** world; the external **debt** of **many countries**, to a large **extent** attributable to **militarisation**; **and** the constantly increasing violence in some **areas** of **the** world are only a *few of* the factor& related to the **arms** trade,

(<u>Miss Uribe De Lozan</u>, <u>Colombia</u>)

It is increasingly obvious today that peoples want peace, that they prefer methods other than war to resolve their disputes, and that weapons not only have not solved their problems but have impoverished them and, in many cases, future generations. It is time for the limiting of arms transfers to become a shared responsibility in our efforts to bring about global **security** and to **internationalize** disarmament. It is time to understand that there is a tremendous potential for the increasing of resources devoted to human development through curbing and reducing **arms** transfers.

If crises serve any purpose, it is to jolt our consciences. **1** Crisis we are experiencing is sufficient, as we said a few days ago, to make us take stock, move towards reflection and change, and make a serious effort to curb the production of weapons, eliminate the unscrupulous trade in them and put an end to the utilitarian mentality that has caused the current situation.

For those of us in the United Nations that have assumed responsibilities with regard to international arms transfers, either as co-sponsors of the relevant **resolutions** or as participants in the group of governmental experts currently studying the item, all the opinions expressed so far constitute a valuable contribution to this consideration and also **an** important stimulus for the complex work we have undertaken.

We should like also to avail ourselves of this opportunity to **thank** the Secretariat for its invaluable support and advice **in** this undertaking.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.