UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-FIFTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
24th meeting
held on
Friday, 2 November 1990
at 10 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF TBE 24th MEETING

Chairman : Mr. RANA (Nepal)

CONTENTS

Consideration of and action on all disarmament agenda items (continued)

This record is subject to correction.
Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section. Room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza. and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/45/PV.24
7 November 1990
ENGLISH

LO-63148 2686V (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 66 AND 155 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON ALL DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with its programme of work and timetable, this morning the Committee will embark upon the second phase of its work, namely, consideration of and action on draft resolutions under disarmament agenda items 45 to 66 and 155 and the decisions to be taken thereon. As the Committee was informed at the previous meeting, the first part of this phase of the work of the Committee will be devoted to the introduction of draft resolutions and any comments on them.

In this context, I urge all delegations that wish to introduce or make comments on draft resolutions to put their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible.

Beginning on Thursday, 8 November, the Committee will take decisions on draft resolutions on the various agenda items.

As I stated earlier, it is my intention, on Tuesday, 6 November, to present to the Committee a paper containing my suggestions regarding the clusters grouping together the draft resolutions and draft decisions on the basis of which the Committee will take action on them.

It is my understanding that the Committee is in agreement with the proposals I have just outlined. If I hear nothing to the contrary, it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I call first on the representative of Italy.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy): I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to outline the position of the 12 member States of the European Community concerning regional disarmament, an issue on which, as a result of co-operative and fruitful consultations with Peru, Pakistan and other countries, a specific draft resolution is introduced.

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

As the Twelve stated during the general debate, concrete results in regional arms control negotiations, by increasing mutual confidence, are conducive to progress in global arms control and disarmament, thereby strengthening international peace and security.

The Twelve believe that the adoption of regional arms control and disarmament measures is one of the most effective ways for States to contribute to the general arms control and disarmament process. Therefore, the attainment of stability and security for all the participating States so that an appropriate balance of forces in all regions can be established should be the main objective of the aforementioned process. The States of each region should find their own path to the conclusion of regional arms control and disarmament agreements, taking into account the specific characteristics of their region. Transparency and openness are vital requirements in order to strengthen mutual confidence and overall security.

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

The Twelve have welcomed the promising indications emerging from different regional contexts. In my previous general statement on behalf of the member States of the European Community, besides the European developments, I cited in particular those in southern Africa and Central America. Unfortunately, a very serious crisis in the Gulf region is giving rise to grave concerns, to which the international community is giving an appropriate response through the United Nations. It is necessary to ensure that the overall positive circumstances prevailing in the world, resulting also from the growing awareness of the importance and possible benefits of regional disarmament, will not be disrupted as a new order of international relations is taking shape.

As the Italian Foreign Minister recalled in the General Assembly on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community:

> "the time has . . . come to begin reflecting on the introduction in the Middle East of a collective system capable of guaranteeing stability, security, economic and social development.*' (A/45/PV.6, D. 34)

The search for regional security structures and measures to encourage stability and peace should, without wishing to transfer a specific model to other regions, be pursued in order to promote principles forming a basis for enhancing stability at the lowest possible level of military forces, curbing the praliferation of weapons of mass destruction and encouraging economic and social progress.

The Twelve also regard positively the recognition, within the framework of the Disarmament Commission, as reflected in the report approved at the 1990 session, that "the regional approach to disarmament is one of the essential elements in global efforts" (A/45/42, para. 34. auotinu para. 11 of report on agenda rtem 8) and cannot be disregarded. Therefore they would like to associate themselves with those who have proposed that the question of regional disarmament be considered among the items on the working agenda of the Disarmament Commission in 1991.

(Mr. Neurotto Cambiaso, Italy)

The adoption by consensus of resolution 44/117 B, on regional disarmament, at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly is further testimony to the general resolve to stress the importance, and expand the international awareness, of regional disarmament. At the current session the First Committee is demonstrating greater awareness of the importance of a regional approach.

Transparency, openness and predictability at the European regional level are shedding new light on confidence and security in the region. The process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is disclosing new prospacts for our region as the Paris summit meeting to be held in November is being actively prepared.

Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter explicitly calls on States to encourage regional disarmament arrangements. The Twelve recall that provision and they stress that disarmament should be a concern of all countries and not only of great Powers, military alliances or specific regions. All countries must, therefore, feel actively involved in the disarmament process and must contribute to greater overall security by various means, in particular by reductions of armed forces at the regional level.

Ms. THEORIN (Sweden): I have asked for the floor today in order to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.14, entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons".

The timing of this study, which I had the honour of chairing, was very auspicious. The study on nuclear weapons, which is contained in document A/45/373, was drafted and negotiated while the winds of change were becoming stronger and stronger in world politics. It was adopted a month after the Washington summit meeting, when the framework of an agreement was signed which provides for deep cuts in various categories of the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the Soviet Union and for continued negotiations on further cuts and effective

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

limitations on qualitative improvements in both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

The study was adopted within a month after the meeting of the highest representatives of the Warsaw Pact States in Moscow, who stated their unanimous opinion that the ideological enemy-image had been abolished. Furthermore, as it happened, the report was adopted on the very same day as the Meeting of Heads of State or Government of member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) declared that the Atlantic community must reach out to the countries of the East which had been its adversaries in the cold war and extend to them the hand of friendship. So - if only by chance - the study managed to capture this crucial sequence of events, including the NATO London communiqué, on which the ink had barely dried when the United Nations study was unanimously adopted.

I should like only to highlight some points where the study either contains new and important elements or fails to provide information that would have been desirable. I shall do this very briefly, going through the study chapter by chapter but omitting the first chapter, which is simply an introduction.

Chapter II describes existing nuclear weapons, and most of the text is basically the kind of information that one will find in any major weapon directory. However, the last section deals with procedures for the release and handling of nuclear weapons, which is important in relation to the risks of accidental nuclear war. There is some new information here - for instance, about the Soviet Union's screening of personnel.

Past and current trends in the technical development of nuclear-weapon systems are treated in chapter III. The qualitative development of nuclear-weapon systems continues. Some other features of this development mentioned here are the transition from liquid-fuel to solid-fuel missiles in different countries, mobile

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

basing and stealth technology. There is also an enumeration, although not an evaluation, of some "exotic" weapon technologies associated with the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Chapter IV deals with nuclear doctrines. This is the topic of many academic papers and books, and I believe that the most important thing about this chapter is that it gives an account of doctrines in the various nuclear-weapon States which must be regarded as authoritative. particularly when seen in conjunction with the statements from these States, which were submitted to the study end which are reproduced in appendix I.

Chapter V, which discusses the development, production and testing of nuclear weapons, is one of the central areas of this study. One reason is that environmental and other problems associated with weapon production and testing have been increasingly brought to public attention during the present era of receding East-West confrontation. One reason is that the framework - both technically and politically - for a continued non-proliferation régime depends on a thorough understanding of the parameters of development and production processes. With regard to the latter aspect, the cost of acquiring nuclear weapon8 is an important factor, and one that the study has not been able to investigate fully. That was also the case in 1980, as this particular subject is extremely complex. On the other hand, the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions is adequately covered by the present study. The conclusion here is that the peaceful nuclear explosion technique is generally impracticable.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Regarding the health and environmental effects of the production and testing of nuclear weapons, iaformation from United States sources is readily available. However, the study also contains some important information in this area from the Soviet Union - information that has not been disclosed previously, so far as I know. Unfortunately the problem of the environmental effects of testing in the Pacific by *France* had to be left largely unresolved.

Chapter VI examines the effects of the use of nuclear weapons and the consequences of nuclear war. This chapter is less prominent here than was the corresponding one *in* the previous study. I think it was felt that the description of nuclear war was less important because the threat was seen to be receding. Also, the Group was reluctant to embrace and adopt the findings of any academic studies regarding the consequences of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, the report contains a fairly comprehensive summary of the results published during the 1980s on medical and environmental effects, including what is referred to as a nuclear winter.

Chapter VII is called "Nuclear Weapons and International Security". It is unavoidable that the views on this matter are divided, that some States regard nuclear weapons as au instrument for security while others see them as a threat and as an obstacle to real, long-term security, These differing views are reflected in this chapter. Another matter that is dealt with is the general problem of proliferation, which may well become more urgent in the future, and in this context the report expresses concern about the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Two other issues that receive particular attention in this chapter are the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and the risk of accidental war. On the first point, the report notes that naval nuclear arms pose special problems and that there are increasingly critical views on the no-called neither-confirming-nor-denying policy. As for accidental war, in Spit8 of the

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

safety measures described in chapter II, the study identifies both technical and human factors that may contribute to making this risk greater than sero.

Chapter VIII is the longest chapter - an encouraging sign, perhaps, as its title is **Nuclear-Arms Limitation and Disarmament". Most of its sections contain straightforward accounts of the existing treaties and ongoing negotiations in this field, with references to some of their pitfalls and shortcomings, as well as to some aspects of verification. The manner in which the text is organised leads me to hope that it could serve as a handy reference manual.

The last two sections, however, are perhaps the most interesting ones, and to my mind they merit more attention than they have been given. They deal. respectively, with confidence-building measures and with nuclear weapons in relation to international law. These two topics may well be the growth areas for future multilateral efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament, which should continue in parallel with bilateral limitations on strategic weaponry, The study points out that throughout the international community there is a manifest conviction that a major nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world.

During the last decade the nuclear-weapon Powers have stated clearly their determination to avoid any nuclear conflict. We may recall both the solemn declaration in 1985 by the former United States President, Mr. Reagan, and President Gorbachev that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and the statement by President Mitterrand that "nuclear weapons are weapons of non-use". The United States and the Soviet Union, furthermore, have stated that they are not solely responsible for reducing the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war - that other Stat88 too should contribute to the attainment of this objective. The study underlines that most countries in the world consider an early sad to

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

nuclear testing by all States in all environments to be an essential step towards preventing the qualitative improvement and the development of new nuclear weapons and also towards contributing to the goal of non-proliferation.

The study devotes great attention to the issue of non-proliferation. It emphasises that the nuclear-non-proliferation régime is as important as ever and that strict observance of that régime continues to be of fundamental importance. Both global and regional efforts are needed if the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be avoided. These include efforts to strengthen further the non-proliferation régime in all its aspects.

Three nuclear-weapon States participated in the work of the group of experts that assisted the Secretary-General in the preparation of the study. These were France, the Soviet Union and the United States. Nine non-nuclear-weapon States - Argentina, Bulgaria, Egypt, Indonesia, New Zealand, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Venezuela - also took part.

At one stage in the preparation of the study each of the five nuclear-weapon States was requested to provide a concise account of its nuclear doctrine. All five responded to this request. Appendix I to the report contains summaries of the respective nuclear doctrines of the five nuclear-weapon States.

In the main text of the report, chapter IV is entitled "Doctrines and Strategies Concerning Nuclear Weapons'*. One section of this chapter examines the "Relationship between nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons and deterrence@*. This section also provides an account of the very latest developments, ending with a quote from the declaration of the highest representatives of the Warsaw Pact, when they gathered in Moscow on 7 June 1990, and a rather lengthy quotation from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) communique of 6 July.

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

The Warsaw Pact declaration not only expressed the unanimous opinion that the ideological image had been overcome but also stated:

*'Confrontation elements contained in documents of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation that were adopted in the past are no longer in line with the spirit of the time."

As I mentioned at the beginning, in the London declaration the Heads of State or Government announced:

"The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the cold war and extend to them the hand of friendship.**

It is fascinating to compare the respective Eastern and Western texts, drafted only a few months apart, as they provide a good illustration of the leaps forward the world has taken in recent months.

The Secretary-General's report notes that the recent momentous changes in the world have diminished the threat of nuclear confrontation and have made it possible to start a real process of cutting back nuclear weapons. In fact, the two main nuclear-weapon Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union - are engaged in far-reaching disarmament negotiations, which they have agreed should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

Let me summarise: the report of the Secretary-General provides technical data and statistics on existing nuclear weapons; it accounts for trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems: it analyses doctrines and strategies concerning nuclear weapons; it describes the development, production and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as the effects of the use of nuclear weapons and the consequences of nuclear war; it assesses nuclear weapons and international security; it comments on nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament; it examines the

(Ms. Theorin. Sweden)

legality of nuclear weapons; and it outlines a set of political conclusions for this new era.

I commend draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.14, which is merely procedural, for adoption by the Committee without a vote.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Denmark to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.20.

Mr. JAEGER (Denmark): As this is the first time I have spoken in the Committee, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of this important body. My congratulations go also to the other Committee officers.

On the first day of our substantive work, the representative of Italy made a statement on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community. The common statement of the Twelve reflects, of course, basic Danish views on the evaluation of the work of the Committee and on the various disarmament items referred to in that statement. I shall therefore restrict my remarks today to a few issues on our agenda.

One subject traditionally of great interest to Denmark is the issue of conventional disarmament, which appears on the agenda as item 56 (d). Over the years, Denmark has taken a number of initiatives in the United Nations to promote discussions on general guidelines and principles for conventional disarmament, which could be a positive contribution to global as well as to regional efforts.

In 1984, an expert group under Danish chairmanship completed the United Nations study on conventional disarmament, which constituted the first effort - in the United Nations or elsewhere in the international community - at a comprehensive consideration of the subject of conventional arms and armed forces as a whole.

This year the Disarmament Commission, after having considered the problem of conventional disarmament at four consecutive sessions, succeeded in finalizing a substantive report on the issue. The Disarmament Commiszion report, which was the result of intensive and strenuous efforts in a working group chaired by Ambassador S. G. Mellbin, is a new and important document for the process of facilitating possible measures in the field of conventional-arms reduction and disarmament. It is our hope that the report will make a constructive contribution

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

to continuing efforts to expand the area of consensus in the field of conventional disarmament.

With the vast expenditure on conventional armaments and forces all over the world, conventional disarmament is a problem of a truly global character. The United Nations therefore has a special and important responsibility to put this issue high on the agenda of its disarmament deliberations.

As it has done for a number of years, Denmark has this year submitted a draft resolution on conventional disarmament (A/C.1/45/L.20). The draft resolution welcomes the substantive and comprehensive report of the Disarmament Commission with regard to the question of conventional disarmament and endorses the reconnnendations contained in that report. It also takes note of the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission that, taking into account the priorities in disarmament set out in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the subject of conventional disarmament should continue to be actively pursued in the United Nations. We hope the First Committee will be able again this year to adopt the draft resolution without a vote.

I want now to comment on another very important issue on our agenda: the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Over the years, Denmark has urged and supported efforts aimed at the early conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments, by all States, and for all time. While not an end in itself, a comprehensive test ban would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament, especially by impeding the development of new generations of nuclear weapons. It would also enhance the attractiveness of the non-proliferation rkgime to non-nuclear-weapon States. For those reasons, Denmark has for many years joined in sponsoring the draft resolution submitted by Australia and New Zealand on this subject, this year as document A/C.1/45/L.41.

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

The Conference on Disarmament, in whose work all five nuclear-weapon States participate, is in our opinion the proper forum for multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. We therefore welcome the Conference on Disarmament having succeeded this year in reaching agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban, and we hope this will open the way to further progress. The work carried out by the Conference's ad hoc group of seismic experts is a useful contribution to solving the verification problems connected with a comprehensive test ban.

We welcome the recent ratification of the two bilateral threshold treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we urge the two parties to continue and intensify their bilateral step-by-step negotiations on nuclear testing.

We deeply regret the Soviet underground nuclear testing that took place at Novaya Zemlya on 24 October. We urge the Soviet Union to refrain from future nuclear testing at Novaya Zemlya, and thus to show due consideration for the vulnerable Arctic environment and its inhabitants.

The convening in January next year of the amendment Conference for the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 is an indication of the impatience of a large number of States over the lack of progress in the efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, As already mentioned, Denmark considers the Conference on Disarmament to be the appropriate forum for negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, but we shall participate constructively in the amendment Conference.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Won-Proliferation Treaty ended without consensus on a final document. We regret that disagreement on the question of a comprehensive test ban - highly important as it is - resulted in blocking agreement on a substantial final document which would have reflected valuable progress in a number of other areas, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban are both vital issues which should be pursued vigorously,

(Mr. Jaeger, Denmark)

but in doing so we should avoid allowing one cause to do disservice to the other. Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on a final document, the Review Conference was marked by a generally constructive and positive atmosphere, and it confirmed the strong international support for the Treaty, which is important in relation to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty after 1995.

Let me finally mention the agenda item on naval armaments and disarmament. The role of naval forces must be examined in an overall military and political context. In consequence of well-known geographical asymmetries it is obvious that the principle of undiminished security has special importance with regard to naval disarmament. Openness, transparency and objective information are important for naval as well as for other areas of disarmament. A deepened international discussion is called for in appropriate multilateral forums with a view to establishing the necessary pre-conditions for the further development of confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament also in the area of maritime forces.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.32.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Resolving the problem of general and complete disarmament has been a concern shared by all since the very foundation of the Organization; it has been the object of constant attention in all forums dedicated to the quest for international peace and security.

Responsibility for achieving this goal was formally assumed by the Members of the United Nations in 1961. Resolution 1722 (XVI), entitled @'Question of disarmament", deemed it

> "essential that negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control be resumed at the earliest possible time" (resolution 1722 (XVI), II. first preambular paragraph)

(Mrs. Carvalho, Mexico)

and recommended that the Disarmament Committee,

"as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles [by the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic8 on disarmament negotiations] . . . agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control". (para. 2)

(Mrs. Carvalho, Mexico)

That comprehensive approach to disarmament gained momentum during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. The Final Document of that session establishes that:

"The Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality." (resolution S-10/2, para. 109)

It has been clear since then that negotiations on the programme should be carried out simultaneously with negotiations on partial disarmament measures. A programme of that kind should be formulated to facilitate disarmament negotiations in all their aspects and always in the interests of the international community.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.32 - Indonesia, Myanmar, Peru, Sri Lanka and Mexico - entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" believe that the improvement in East-West relations has created conditions in which efforts to conclude a comprehensive disarmament programme should again be undertaken. Past achievements in the elaboration of the programme now deserve reconsideration in the light of the new, more positive international atmosphere. If it was possible to begin negotiations in the middle of the cold war, then most assuredly the present situation should make speedier progress possible.

We believe that it is now time to ask the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the beginning of its session in 1991, and that that Committee should be asked to continue its work with a view to resolving pending problems and concluding negotiations as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Hungary, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.16.

Mr. GAJDA (Hungary): On behalf of the sponsors, the delegations of Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sweden and Hungary, I have the honour today to introduce to the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.16, on the prohibition of the development, production, rtockpiliag and use of radiological weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament har been considering the subject without interruption since 1982, both in plenary and in a subsidiary body. In the course of those years, the Hungarian delegation in Geneva has always paid marked attention to the question and tried its best to contribute to the solution of the problems involved. That attitude is only natural for a country like mine, and the reasons behind our position are known so well that they need not be repeated here.

As an acknowledgement of that particular interest in the subject, the Hungarian delegation had the honour twice in the course of those years to hold the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. The state of work in the Committee is described in detail in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, and therefore needs no repetition now. My task, consequently, can be limited to a few brief comments with a view to highlighting the development6 in 1990.

This year again the Conference set up the Ad Hoc Committee at the very beginning of its session, and the subsidiary body in turn decided to continue the same method of work a8 had been adopted in 1987 and followed ever since then. Under those "dual-track" arrangements, two contact groups were set up, one to consider the prohibition of radiological weapon8 in the original or traditional sense, and the other to deal with issues relevant to the prohibition of attacks

(Mr. Gajda, Hungary)

against nuclear facilities. The two groups, co-ordinated by representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively, pursued their work along the lines of the previous year with the aim of seeking solutions for outstanding key issues on both tracks.

I feel it important to underline here that the main objective of the Committee, and consequently of the two Contact Groups, was further to develop the texts on the key elements for a convention in both fields. In fact, that means that the groups sought single formulations wherever alternatives still prevailed. Particular attention was paid to aspects of verification and compliance.

If I may attempt to assess the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1990, I can venture to state that there has been some movement in certain areas. Contact Group A has succeeded in eliminating most of the footnotes from the previous text and in drafting common texts from previous alternatives for, inter alia, "scope", "peaceful uses" and "verification". The Group has also succeeded in formulating the preamble, Political differences, however, continue to prevail on some key issues, requiring further efforts.

Contact Group B, in spite of strenuous efforts, had fewer results to report this year. Attempts to find solutions for the basic differences of view in the area of scope were given particular attention, but the alternative approaches to the convention on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities are still being maintained. That lack of agreement, in consequence, continues to affect the consideration of various other elements.

In draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.16, which I am submitting now, the General Assembly would duly note whatever results have been achieved in the Ad Hoq Committee on Radiological Weapons, and once again request the Conference an

(Mr. Gajda, Hungary)

Disarmament to continue its substantive negotiation on both of the important subjects under consideration, The draft does not fail to emphasize the necessity of promptly concluding those negotiations. With that aim in mind, the General Assembly also notes the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee rhould be re-established at the beginning of its 1991 session.

In conclusion, I only wish to express the sincere hope of the sponsors that the draft resolution will again this year be adopted without a vote.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the fact that only two delegations were inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon, I propose, with the Committee's permission, to cancel this afternoon's meeting. In the meantime I urge and encourage delegations to inscribe their name8 on the list of speakers to introduce or comment on draft resolutions as early as possible.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.