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Chairman:

Mr. RANA

(Nepal)

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General debate on all disarmament agenda items

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AGENDA **ITEMS** 45 TO 66 **AND** 155 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

Mr. JANDL (Austria): **Under** agenda item 55, the First Committee is considering question 8 of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. With **regard** to the forthcoming Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of ~~the~~ Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which will be held in 1991, it **seems** to be appropriate to say a few words on the prospects for the biological weapons convention and on biological weapons in general.

The 1972 biological weapons Convention is generally regarded as a very important instrument, since it is the first real disarmament treaty in its field. It goes far beyond the relevant provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which was merely a treaty on arms control. To date, approximately 110 States are parties to the Convention. This is indeed impressive, but we must not forget that a considerable number of countries - in fact, more than 50 - are still not parties. We hope, therefore, that those States which have not yet acceded to the biological weapons Convention will do so in the near future, so that the goal of universality may be achieved.

With regard to the current biological weapons **régime** as set up pursuant to the Convention itself, the two Review Conferences, in 1980 and 1986, and the meeting of experts in 1987, we can identify three main **elements**: definition, verification and co-operation.

The first, definition of the prohibited substances, is certainly a very **technical one**. That is why I do **not want** to go **into** the details of **this** question. Let me just **say** that, **in** the light of the rapid progress achieved in the

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biosciences, the so-called biotechnical revolution, the steadily continuing adaptation of the definition of the prohibited substances **and** agents is of the utmost importance. If this problem is not tackled **in** a globally satisfying manner, we have to fear the diminution of confidence in and respect for the Convention.

The second element of the **biological** weapons **régime** is the issue of verification, **which** is certainly the most important and the most crucial one. It is often stated that the biological weapons Convention, in spite of its achievements and its significance as one of the first genuine disarmament treaties, is incomplete, as it lacks verification provisions. True, there is **no** such real verification mechanism as in other disarmament instruments, but it would be too **superficial** to deny that there are **certain, even if very** vague, possibilities related to the field of verification. I should add, however, that the present provisions in the treaty and the Final Documents of the Review Conferences are not sufficient and should, in the Austrian view, be amended by measures of genuine verification.

The treaty stipulates in its **article V** that:

"The States Parties **..undertake** to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions **of** the Convention."

(resolution 2826 (XXVI). **annex**)

It goes without saying that this language is rather weak, since it does not comprise any legally binding factor; everything is left to the political will of the States parties. Furthermore, there **is no** provision as to who should be informed about the **findings** or what sanctions should be imposed.

At the Second Review Conference, in 1986, **and** the meeting of **experts**, in 1987, very important provisions were established on confidence- and **security-building** measures. These contain mechanisms for the **exchange** of data **on** certain types of

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laboratories, on **the** abnormal outbreak of infectious diseases, and on other matters. Research should generally be unclassified and information should be given on symposiums and conferences, as well as on publications. In the light of the significance of such measures, some experts-even consider the confidence- and security-building aspect of the biological weapons **régime** to be its fourth element.

To date, not more than 27 countries have participated in the exchange of data; this is only about one fifth of the total number of States parties to the Convention.

The field of co-operation constitutes the third element of the biological weapons **régime**, the focal point of which is undoubtedly the question of transfer of technology, in particular, **biotechnology**. The Convention provides for the right of States parties to participate in **the** fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information. Furthermore, the treaty stipulates that its implementation should avoid hampering economic or technological development with regard to peaceful activities. The separation laid down between research for hostile and that for peaceful purposes is one of the central points, **although** there is also **the** dilemma that the results of research for peaceful purposes could easily be applied for purposes of weapons and warfare.

The regulations with regard to the transfer of information and technology make it obvious **that** there is also a strong element of the North-South dimension, which must not be overlooked. As in many fields of disarmament, technology **whose** proliferation **should** be prevented is not necessarily for hostile purposes only. A wide spectrum of this know-how and these techniques **can** also be used **for peaceful** development. Developing countries feel rightly uneasy about the various restrictions which make it impossible for them to get access to the relevant technology.

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Let me now focus on the prospects for the biological weapons régime, in particular with a view to the Third Review Conference, in 1991. I should like to concentrate on three elements, namely, exchange of data, co-operation and verification.

The exchange of information constitutes, in our understanding, a very important and precious confidence-building measure. By eliminating mistrust and fear and providing for openness and transparency one can create increased understanding and confidence, which has a positive influence on the security situation and is hence conducive to disarmament. Based on this conviction, Austria and many other countries have always been advocates of such security-building measures and continue to invite other States to participate as much as possible in such undertakings, because this would have a favourable impact on the international security situation, both regionally and globally.

The issue of co-operation, in particular the transfer of technology, demonstrates the influence of the North-South constellation even on questions of disarmament. Developing countries are concerned that the biological weapons régime, in particular a strengthened one, would impose further restraints on the transfer of biomedical research results to the developing world, thereby hindering the chances of building their industries and, hence, impeding their deserved and desired development, especially in very promising fields. They fear that this could widen the gap that already exists between North and South. Their concerns deserve our careful attention. Special attention, and maybe special actions or regulation, will be necessary in the future in order to create favourable conditions for what it is hoped will be universal accession to the biological weapons Convention. It will be one of the most important tasks of the Third Review Conference to address this question. Only very broad accession can thwart efforts

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to circumvent the regulations of the biological weapons **régime**, which **might** take the form of transferring activities to countries not parties to the Convention. A **régime** under which certain groups of countries would feel excluded would not have **the** necessary **arms-control** effect.

The most crucial issue with which the Third Review Conference will have to deal is certainly the problem of verification. Austria and many **other** countries feel that the Third Review Conference should address this question, since the Final Document of **the** Second Review Conference - in its article XII - also speaks about the possibility of creating future legally binding improvements in this **area**.

Certainly, as was also pointed out in the Final Declaration of the Second **Review** Conference, there are divergent views on basic questions of the verification of the biological weapons Convention. Austria is aware of these problems. **Nevertheless**, many proposals have been made so far by experts, diplomats and academics. A considerable number of brochures and books have recently been **published** containing significant information and concrete suggestions. They deserve to be studied very closely and carefully. With **a** reasonable amount of goodwill, it should be possible to achieve a consensus on verification provisions at the Third Review Conference.

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In respect of a possible future verification **régime**, Austria is of the opinion **that** the possibility should be explored of establishing a mechanism to carry out surveillance of laboratories and research centres and to monitor possession of bacteriological and toxin agents. Also, there should be certain minimum guarantees against possible violations of the convention. The proposal to set up a control agency deserves careful attention, since an international organisation of that kind would be in a position to establish the relevant safeguards.

As members will be aware, my delegation has, since it presided over the Second Review Conference, always submitted to the First Committee the draft resolution on biological weapons. This year too, together with **the** Australian and Netherlands delegations, we have prepared a draft resolution in this field. As we feel that the text is a very reasonable one and takes into account the various opinions States have on the matter, we do hope that as 'many countries as possible, **particularly** those States parties to the biological weapons Convention, will find themselves in a position to join with us in sponsoring the draft. We also hope that, as in previous **years**, the text **will.be** adopted by consensus.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary): In **the** general debate of this Committee, it has repeatedly been stated that the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive and global prohibition of chemical **weapons**, and on the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, continue to be the most promising area of activity in multilateral disarmament. Nevertheless, **it** has also been said that the favourable political climate, which **is the** result of a number of factors, **has** not been made manifest in a major step forward in the negotiating **efforts**. Many of us had expected that **the** bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, on the cessation of the production of chemical weapons **and** the radical reduction of their chemical **weapon stockpiles** with the aim of eliminating

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them totally if certain international requirements are met, would provide further incentives to speed up the multilateral negotiations.

Regrettably, this has not been the case; rather, it has led to further differences between the negotiating parties. My delegation would prefer the bilateral agreement to be **viewed** in a different light and with a much more positive attitude: perhaps we should recall that for many long years it was the Soviet-American confrontation that stalled the multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. It is difficult to understand why it is that today, when relations between the two super-Powers are **characterized** by co-operation instead of confrontation and they are making strenuous efforts to solve long-standing problems such as the issue of a ban on chemical weapons, there is still no real progress being made in the multilateral field.

There is some justification to the claim that experience shows that it is always the last few steps that are the most difficult in a marathon negotiation, and I fear that our endeavours are not the only ones where **this** is the case. This year's work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has brought to the surface a **number** of sensitive political issues which are of fundamental importance to the future chemical weapons convention. It is regrettable that after years of intensive negotiations, the list of issues still outstanding remains rather long. It includes questions of verification, that is, **ad hoc** and challenge inspections; universal adherence to the future convention; assistance in the case of a chemical attack; sanctions; safeguarding the peaceful uses of chemistry; and the difficulties associated with the composition and function of the Executive Council. I do not intend to address all these issues, as there is an appropriate **forum** for doing so. Instead, **I** would rather touch upon a number of questions which **are of** interest to us and to which we attach great importance.

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One such issue is, of **course**, that of verifying compliance with the future convention. For some years, the dividing issue in respect of verification has been not whether we should have it or not, but rather how much verification is desired by the negotiating parties and is acceptable to them; that is, the issue' has naturally been focused on confidence in verification measures. In the course of the negotiations. several interesting proposals have been put forward which also appear to be workable. In fact, the different types of verification - routine, **ad hoc** and challenge inspections - represent a package which, in our view, would create a system which would meet the verification **requirements** of a convention on **chemical** weapons. Of course, there needs to be additional discussion of these **issues**, but we believe that the path taken by Chairman of the **Ad Hoc** Committee, **Ambassador** Hyltenius. is the right one and should be pursued.

It is also evident that to implement disarmament treaties presupposes a certain amount of initial confidence **on** which to build when applying the various means of verification. Hungary's objectives in putting forward its confidence-building initiative at last year's **session** of the General Assembly were to contribute to the atmosphere of the negotiations and to promote the notion of **creating this** initial spirit of **trust**. Pursuant to that initiative, we presented the members of the Conference on Disarmament with detailed data on the Hungarian civil chemical industry compiled in conformity with the provisions of the draft convention on chemical weapons. It is **our** conviction that initiatives of that and other **kinds** aimed at building confidence have a role to play in our negotiating efforts*

There is another **aspect, of** relevance to the convention, to which I would like to draw your attention, The draft convention, as it stands today, **does** not sufficiently address the **issue** of the relationship between **States** parties and

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countries remaining outside the convention. This leads us to the sensitive and important issue of proliferation. Currently, there **are** no draft provisions in the rolling text which would regulate the transfer **of** chemicals and chemical technology to States which decide not to join the convention. The international community has repeatedly expressed concern over the danger represented by the spread of chemical weapons. We believe that the existing, partial non-proliferation measures outside **the** provisions of the convention, though important, are not effective enough.

These measures should be incorporated in the future legal instrument, together **with** such additional measures as are required. Naturally, this should be done on a non-discriminatory basis for States parties to the convention, and the peaceful uses of chemistry should **not** be barred to them in any way. In our view, the future chemical weapons convention could be undermined in the longer run if States **remaining** outside the convention enjoy the **same** rights as States parties to it, which will have accepted considerable obligations.

If one tries to sum up the years of negotiations on chemical weapons, it is the time factor which is most immediately striking. It is difficult to explain to the **international community** why it is that after two decades of negotiating, with repeated instances of the use of chemical **weapons** in certain areas of conflict, **with** terrible effects, we are still not in the position of having a ban on chemical weapons. The irresponsible **threats of** the use of chemical weapons in the present crisis in the Gulf also add to the arguments for a ban **on** chemical weapons at the earliest date.

If we are to preserve the credibility of our efforts, we all must display increased political will to conclude **our** work. The proposed meeting **of** the **Conference** on Disarmament at the foreign minister level - if it is properly **prepared** - could be a forum **for** demonstrating that **increased** political will. We

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pledge our full support to the **endeavours** of the Chairman of the **Ad Hoc Committee** on **Chemical** Weapons in holding consultations on this and other relevant subjects. In our view, a failure to sign the convention in a year, or **two**, will be a clear indication of total failure, and **we** might as well give up the notion of ridding mankind of **the** threat this horrible means of waging war represents.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman,

I am well aware that speakers must refrain from offering congratulations to the officers of the Committee, but I trust you will allow me, exceptionally, and as a former **Chairman** of the Committee, to **express** to you my pleasure at seeing you preside over our debate at this session of the General Asssmbly. **On** my own behalf and on behalf of my delegation, I pledge you our full co-operation in ensuring the success in your work. **We** should also like to **thank** all the delegations that have made very generous comments about my chairmanship of the First Committee at the last session of the General Assembly.

As has **frequently** been stated in the course of this debate, the First Committee at the present **session is** being held against a favourable background. **That background** has been enhanced by a climate of understanding and co-operation within which the relations between the two major nuclear Powers are being pursued **and** by the atmosphere of profound **and** significant changes taking place in Europe.

This positive development in the international political **climate has** helped to bring about **the** important events in the area of disarmament that have taken place recently. In the past year the two major nuclear Powers have continued to make progress in reducing their nuclear arms. They have done so by implementing the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range **Missiles.**

In this context we note with satisfaction that the United States has completed **the destruction** of all of its shorter-range nuclear forces and that it is proceeding to the destruction of longer-range and land-based cruise missiles.

Other efforts in the nuclear disarmament field that we welcome are the negotiations that are taking place **on the treaty** between the United **States** and the Soviet Union to reduce strategic weapons. When this instrument is completed it

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will be one of the most important instruments that has ever been adopted in the field of nuclear disarmament. We take note of the statement that was made by the Director of the United States Agency for Arms Control and **Disarmament** to the effect that once this treaty **has** been signed **the** two super-Powers will continue to negotiate **new** agreements on additional reductions in their offensive strategic weapons.

As others have said **in** the course of **this** debate, we too recognise that these measures are important steps towards compliance with the obligation under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which the nuclear Powers undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, Full compliance with **this commitment** seems, however, to be far off. Those steps must be followed by other, stronger and bolder steps leading to full compliance with this provision. To this end it is necessary for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake substantive negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament with a view to adopting concrete multilateral measures leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Although responsibility for nuclear disarmament continues to rest on the shoulders **of** the nuclear-weapon States, this question continues to be a source of legitimate concern **for** the rest of the international **community**, inasmuch as it affects the global security of the planet.

Another important event that has taken place recently is the approval **by the** United States Senate of the ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground **Nuclear** Weapon Tests of 1974, and the Treaty on peaceful **underground** nuclear tests, of 1987. These are, without any doubt, important steps that should promote the early conclusion of a treaty completely banning nuclear **tests**.

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However, we are concerned that there are some who feel it is still necessary to carry out nuclear tests, arguing that, **as** long as it is **necessary** to use nuclear deterrence in defence, these experiments cannot be abolished. This approach compels us to recognise that notwithstanding the important progress we have mentioned, the day is still far off when mankind will be completely-free of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, for as long as those weapons continue to exist the **risk** of a nuclear disaster will not disappear.

In this context the Conference on Disarmament must begin to play a decisive role. An important step in this direction is the long-hoped-for decision by the Conference on Disarmament, after an interruption in the substantive **work on the** question, to restore the Ad Hoc Committee so that it can deal specifically with item **1 of the Conference** agenda, on a nuclear-test ban. Regrettably, the mandate given to the Ad Hoc Committee does not satisfy the expectations of countries which, like Venezuela, believe that the fundamental task of the Conference is to negotiate concrete measures on agenda items.

A complete **ban on nuclear tests is**, in the opinion of **our** delegation, a short-term goal and the first step in the direction of putting an end to the qualitative improvement **in** nuclear arms, thus contributing to curbing **vertical** proliferation. Venezuela is convinced that a complete ban on nuclear tests must be sought by all possible means. Together with five other **States**, we have taken the initiative of introducing an amendment to the 1963 Moscow Treaty. The idea was to extend to underground nuclear tests the limited ban which is set forth in that treaty. We are sure that the **amendment** conference to be held in January of next year will fully achieve the objective of converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty concerning nuclear tests. That conference, like other review conferences, must show a spirit of constructive **compromise**,

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setting aside radical **and** intransigent positions. **The** benefits of a constructive spirit which has been felt in the disarmament negotiations between the two Powers has not yet, unfortunately, been extended to outer space. Efforts to prevent the arms race in outer space continue to encounter the ssme obstacles today as they have in the past. This is confirmed when we observe that the talks on space questions being carried out by the Soviet Union and the United States continue to be circumscribed within the relationship between offensive **and** defensive weapons **and** are oriented **to** achieving an agreement that will authorise the emplacement of defensive strategic systems.

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In this area, the Conference on Disarmament was once again unable to record progress because of resistance to the efforts made by almost all countries to adopt serious measures aimed at ensuring that outer space would not become another arena for an arms competition.

We continue to believe that one way to achieve this objective would be to modify article IV of the outer space Treaty so that the partial ban in that Treaty may become the total prohibition of weapons in outer space.

Another important event in disarmament which has taken place recently in the bilateral sphere is the agreement between the **United** States and the Soviet Union in June this year on the destruction of their chemical weapons arsenals and the cessation of the production of such weapons. We are confident that that agreement will give a final push to negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament.

However, we are concerned by the fact that the agreement contains certain flaws which stand in the way of achievement of the objective of a total ban on chemical weapons. Venezuela attaches priority importance to agreement on a multilateral instrument of a universal and non-discriminatory nature establishing a general and complete ban **on** chemical weapons.

The events **which** have recently darkened the world scene show that, notwithstanding the efforts made in the past and the commitments entered into, there remains a danger of armed conflicts occurring in which chemical weapons might be used. **The** images of armies equipped with protective masks against chemical weapons, which had seemed to be a warning reminder of monstrous events in the past, have again appeared before the eyes of mankind. The **presence** of soldiers wearing **gasmasks** and their distribution to civilian populations in countries neighbouring the conflict zone increase our perception that the horror of chemical warfare is **no** longer a remote danger but **an** imminent **threat for** which one must be prepared

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without even knowing if the equipment will provide adequate protection against a means of warfare as cowardly and treacherous as chemical weapons.

This makes it necessary for the Conference on Disarmament to speed up its work and give priority to its efforts to conclude its excessively lengthy work, which has already lasted more than a decade, on the draft convention prohibiting and totally eliminating chemical weapons. We agree with those delegations which say that the time has come to make these efforts universal, opening participation to all countries during the final stages of preparation of **the** Convention. An important role is being played by consultations which have taken place in recent years within the framework of the First Committee to give information on the matter to States which are not members of the Conference on Disarmament. But it is time to think about a special session of the General Assembly aimed at the conclusion and signing of the convention as a way of ensuring that all countries in **the** world become parties to it and assume all the commitments and obligations involved in the prohibition of the use and production of chemical weapons **and** the total elimination of existing arsenals of chemical weapons. Similarly, we believe that the proposal to hold a ministerial meeting of the Conference on Disarmament next year devoted to the subject of chemical weapons is an initiative that should help eliminate the obstacles that still stand in the way of negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

In the same context a regional seminar for Latin America and the Caribbean on chemical weapons is to be held in Venezuela in April next year. The central objective of that seminar will be to familiarise Governments with the scope, purposes, objectives, verification machinery that is to be established and, in general, all legal and technical aspects of the future convention on chemical weapons in order to facilitate the internal administrative and legislative

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procedures that will have to be followed for the early ratification, entry into force and implementation of this important instrument. It is hoped that participating Governments will appoint officials from their foreign ministries or other governmental bodies who, in one way or another, will be able to participate in the adoption of decisions relating to the approval and implementation of the complex provisions of the convention on chemical weapons.

An important aspect of the negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament, and **one** which has not yet been taken up in connection with chemical weapons, **is the** question of the financing of the **future** organisation concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons. As progress is made on negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee it becomes increasingly necessary to consider this matter because of the complexity and magnitude of the organization to be set up and the financial burden **which** its functioning will impose on States parties to the future convention.

We have repeatedly stressed the need **for** the clear definition of the principles that will serve as parameters in apportioning the costs of the functioning and operation of the **organization**. In our opinion, the main criterion to be taken into account is equity. by which I mean that those **countries which** possess chemical weapons or have a chemical industry capable of producing them, to which will fall the major responsibility concerning the verification system, should bear the main financial burden of the organization. Countries not having either **chemical** weapons or the intention of acquiring them, of which **Venezuela** is one, should make only a symbolic contribution in support of the international effort to abolish these weapons.

Next year the Review Conference of the bacteriological weapons convention will take place. That important meeting should lead to the adoption of **strict and** efficient verification machinery that will prevent any risk of violation of the provisions of the Convention,

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We attribute great significance to **the** progress that has been made in the **European** area on **conventional** disarmament. We are confident that very soon a treaty will be concluded **reducing** to equal levels **the** forces of **the** North Atlantic **Treaty Organization** (NATO) and of **the** Warsaw Pact and providing for **the** destruction of the surplus armaments. **We welcome the efforts in the negotiations** On Confidence- and security-building measures Within **the framework** of the **Conference** on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which should lead to the development of new principles of regional security that are not based on superiority of weapons or armed forces.

Now that significant progress has been made in **the** process of nuclear disarmament and serious movement has begun towards reducing **the levels** of armaments and armed forces **in Europe**, the region in which traditionally **the** greatest volume of weapons and **troops** has been concentrated, it would **seem** that **the time** has come **to undertake** in **other** regions Of **the** world similar **efforts to** reduce weapons and military expenditures.

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Conventional disarmament at the regional level should be the subject of more **specific** treatment with a **view** to the implementation of concrete measures to curb the unnecessary build-up and international transfer of weapons. That would **be** a way of helping to prevent **the risk** of regional **conflicts**, alleviating tension and creating conditions more conducive to the consolidation of peace **and** security throughout **the world**.

Another topic that we should continue to discuss in great depth is the implementation of scientific and technological **advances** in **the** production of weapons. **This** question has **been the subject** of two General Assembly **resolutions** **and** it should continue to appear on the disarmament **agenda** as a means of bringing together all **relevant** information to identify **the** measures that should be adopted by the international **community** to **deal** with this costly and disturbing trend in the production of weapons,

The use of military resources and technology in efforts to protect the environment is a new subject that deserves special **attention**. **The** US8 in efforts by countries to preserve the natural environment **of** military resources and of the **sophisticated** technology **hitherto** devoted to **the** production of weapons has a potential that has not yet been fully assessed. However, it could be of **significant** assistance in combating the threat the world **faces** as a **result** of the acts of aggression against the **ecosystem**. In this area we are **prepared to** co-operate with other delegations which **have begun** to express **their concern** and **which feel** that the time has come **for** the **United Nations** to take an **interest** in the relationship **between** disarmament, **development** and the **environment**.

The First Committee of the General Assembly **has** a fundamental role to play **in** this **new era** in international relations, The United Nations finally has begun to carry out **the** mission for which **the** Organisation **was** originally **conceived**. **Changes** that have **taken place** in the **international arena** have made it possible for the

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Organisation to play its **proper** role as the institution **responsible** for ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

The First **Committee** plays an important part in fulfilling that responsibility through its efforts to promote disarmament and **contribute** to the consolidation of international security. This **task** should be greatly facilitated by the strengthening of the **Organization** that has **taken** place in this post-cold-war **era** or post-confrontation **era**.

The progress in bilateral negotiations or in Small **regional** disarmament forums is no substitute for **the** role of the multilateral disarmament bodies of the United Nations system. This **is** particularly **true** in **the case** Of the **Conference** On Disarmament whose **role**, rather than being weakened, should **be strengthened** and **expanded** to **ensure** that **the benefits** of the **agreements** reached at **other** levels are **enjoyed** by **the entire** international **community**. These agreements have revived the hope that **the** efforts of **the** United **Nations**, which have so far been **slow**, and frustrating **because** of their meagre results, will finally **lead** to some progress towards specific results which will lead to effective disarmament **measures** on a universal scale. **Here we completely agree** With **the statement** made by **the** Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vladimir **Petrovsky**, that

"The disarmament process must be globalized to include all types of weapons and to extend to all countries and regions." (A/C.1/45/PV.4, p.6)

This global approach to all disarmament questions is **the** approach that for many years now has been part and parcel of the **efforts concerning the** comprehensive **programme** of disarmament. This particular initiative is now more relevant than ever **before because** of the favourable circumstances that **prevail** in international relations and **the atmosphere** of **understanding** that **now exists between the two** principal nuclear Powers, It should **now be possible** to **overcome** obstacles and **reservations** that some **countries have raised** to negotiations on a comprehensive

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programme of disarmament, the primary goal of which should be precisely to endow the international community with a comprehensive disarmament plan that will make it possible to achieve the goal of **general** and complete disarmament as called for by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The purposes and objectives that have brought us together in the Committee are better defined and more relevant now than ever before, and **this** is an **expression** of the **unswerving** aspiration of the international community. The auspicious international **circumstances** brought about **by** the East-West rapprochement, and **further enhanced** by the disappearance of the ideological confrontation that **has** divided the world since the last war, should **make** the disarmament efforts of the **international community more productive**. We must take advantage of this new international situation with constructive determination and respond **with** specific action to **mankind's** new expectations concerning the role of the United Nations. Those of us **who** are dedicated to contributing to the efforts of the **Organization** in **the area** of **disarmament** must not allow those aspirations to be frustrated.

~~The~~ **CHAIRMAN**: opportunity to reiterate our deep appreciation of Ambassador **Taylhardat's** able and wise guidance of the work of the Committee last year.

Mr. SHARMA (Nepal): While congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on your **election**, I wish, **on** behalf of our delegation, to express to the members of the First **Committee** our deep appreciation of this honour and privilege.

We wish **also** to congratulate Mr. Ronald Morris of Australia, Mr. Sergei **Martynov** of the **Byelorussian Soviet Socialist** Republic and Mr. **Modem Lawson-Betum** of Togo on their respective elections as Vice-Chairmen and **Rapporteur** of the First **Committee**.

(Mr. Sharma, Nepal)

The most **potent** symbol of the changing times and attitudes has been the **unification** of Germany, within the framework of a more secure Europe. The process of openness and democratisation has spread beyond Central and Eastern Europe to countries **in Latin** America, Asia and Africa. Their positive impact on bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States and **on** negotiations on **reductions of** conventional forces and weapons in Europe is already evident. Nepal shares the profound satisfaction at these positive developments. The tone **and content of statements** during the general debate bear witness to **the** observation of the Under-Secretary-General@ Mr, Akashi. that the First Committee is holding its **first truly post-cold-war** session. As always, the Committee has an ambitious agenda before it; but hopes of capitalising on the positive trends in international relations have never been higher.

An obvious **area** of concentration for us is the strengthening of **the** inherent **complementarity** of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. The **awesome military** Power of the two super-Powers makes continuing dialogue between them **an** imperative, but disarmament and security are areas in which each nation, whether large or small, has a vital stake. If peace and security are to benefit all, arms control and disarmament need to be the product of a global co-operative **effort**. The propitious climate of international relations offers an unprecedented **opportunity** for ending **the** crisis of confidence in the ability of multilateral forums, **with the** exception of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1990 session, to pursue the objectives of disarmament.

(Mr. Sharma, Nepal)

In making this comment I have in mind the report of the Conference on Disarmament(A/45/27). My delegation shares the general feeling that the report does not offer much ground for optimism. We realise of course that arms control and disarmament are immensely complicated matters and do not lend themselves to quick solutions. We do not expect miracles overnight; however, we do expect signs of some forward movement in regard to all items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Except for the crucial negotiations on a global convention on chemical weapons, the Conference on Disarmament seems to have made very little progress. The progress in negotiations on chemical weapons, too, has not been up to the expectations of the international community. In this regard, I refer to the statement made by the representative of Hungary this morning. This unhappy trend must be reversed if confidence is to be maintained in the Conference as the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament.

Conventional disarmament will soon reach a milestone with the signing of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Many speakers in this debate have cautioned against the complications that this welcome development might add to the already vexed issue of the transfer of conventional arms. My delegation joins in the appeal that weapons that have become surplus as the result of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe should not be transferred to other regions of the world. We welcome the Secretary-General's proposal for the establishment of an international arms transfer register as a step towards curbing what has been seen as a burgeoning trade.

The significance of changes in Europe go far beyond arms control and force reductions. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process is steadily leading Europe - traditionally the most heavily armed region of the world - to a new security system. While each region has its own peculiar security considerations, the CSCE process is a strong reminder that regional and subregional

(Mr. Sharma. Neval)

approaches to confidence-building measures can go a long way towards removing the mistrust that underlies the arms race.

This is an objective pursued by the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament. The extremely fruitful discussions in an unofficial setting on **confidence-** and security-building measures in Asia held at the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific in **Kathmandu** in January of this year is an example. The meeting was the first step towards generating interest in confidence-building measures **(CBMs)** and confidence- and security-building measures **(CSBMs)** and in actually examining the various options that could be applied to the Asia-Pacific region. A beginning has been made and my delegation hopes that the useful exercise will continue.

Disarmament negotiations require a will for dialogue, accommodation and co-operation. **They represent a** recognition of the fundamental rights of all States to security and peace, The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament **emphasized** how important it was for all States to abide by their obligation **under the Charter if anything** lasting was to be achieved through disarmament, **If** mistrust and the arms race have a mutually reinforcing relationship, only a legal order that encompasses the **entire** community of nations **can** provide a framework for effective multilateral co-operation. The rule of law, impartially administered and enforced, alone will guarantee peace **and** stability for all. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to **the** delegation of Singapore for the thoughtful elaboration of this theme in a statement made in this Committee.

I have not even touched on many important items on the **Committee's** agenda. **However, I** cannot end my statement without expressing **Nepal's** support for multilateral efforts to meet the challenges of arms control and disarmament, The persistent threat of nuclear weapons, **the** disquieting proliferation of chemical

(Mr. Sharma. Nepal)

weapons capabilities, the massive transfer and accumulation of sophisticated conventional weapons and the disturbing proliferation of sophisticated technologies of mass destruction, make the United Nations the only forum capable of meeting these challenges. The improvement in the political climate could prove precarious if these issues remain unattended. To maintain and increase the momentum of disarmament, there is also growing pressure on the developing countries not only to make constructive proposals but also to prove by practice what we preach.

Finally, I wish to place on record my delegation's appreciation to the Department **for** Disarmament Affairs and to the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs for their mos:: valuable services in meeting the growing demands on the United Nations in the fields of arms control, disarmament and international security, notwithstanding the limited resources at their disposal.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Emirates) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation, Sir, is particularly happy to see you presiding over his session of the Committee's work. I should like to take the opportunity to convey to you, and to the **other** officers of the Committee, our warmest congratulations.

We meet at a time of significant progress in **the** area of international relations, particularly with regard to political co-operation between the two super-Powers and the positive transformations taking place in Eastern Europe. All this has had a very clear and pronounced impact on disarmament efforts and has brought the world out of the cold-war era into an era of co-operation and peaceful coexistence in which the role of the United Nations has become essential and effective.

This **new** and positive climate has reflected positively on the handling of international and regional problems. We **can** very easily imagine, had the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait taken place in a cold-war context, how it might have led to a Third World War. we can also imagine how the world could have **Been divided**

(Mr. Hassan. United Arab Emirates)

on viewing that issue. To imagine what could have been is to become aware of the significance of the new international circumstances under which it has **been** practicable to use the United Nations machinery, particularly that of the Security Council, in a **unique** and single-minded fashion, in facing up to this **aggression**.

The second fact which we should not ignore is that this new spirit has not prevented a brutal force from perpetrating acts of aggression. This fact highlights the **danger** of amassing weapons, either by the super-Powers or on a regional level.

My delegation has *spoken* of this problem on various occasions because armaments and arms expenditures obstruct development in the third world and continue to be a fundamental source of armed conflicts in the world.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Emirates)

While Iraq's aggression against Kuwait is the outstanding example of the barbarity of armed force and the temptations of **aggression**, the other example is Israel which continues to employ its vast and sophisticated military arsenal in committing acts of aggression against the Arab peoples and in **exterminating** the Palestinian people, the perpetual target of its occupation, acts of murder and displacement.

We are surprised at the postures of certain States which continue to strengthen Israel's military arsenal regardless of the dangerous consequences that arise from such actions, **with** regard to peace efforts in the Middle East and of the fact that Israel is the only country in the region that has **consistently** refused to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Israel possesses all the weapons of mass destruction and was the first to introduce them into the Middle East region. In Africa, the South African **régime** is another example of the use of military force and is the principal cause of instability in southern Africa. The racist **régime** uses military force to destabilise neighbouring African States and to terrorise the black majority within its own borders in pursuit of its policy of apartheid, which is an affront to human dignity and an insult to international public opinion.

It is clear from the foregoing examples that the stockpiling of weapons and their use for aggressive ends has pernicious results and promotes the pursuit of illegal goals. We cannot hope to find any political stability or any security in any region of **the** world that is afflicted with the amassing **of** military **arsenals** by **régimes** that abuse their power and use their weapons **for** purposes of hegemony, aggression and domination.

Respect for the values, norms and principles of international law and the **United Nations Charter** is the only way in which **States** and peoples, both large and

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small, can achieve Peace, security and stability. Had Iraq observed the principles of the Charter, it would never have invaded a small and peaceful neighbour, it would never have expelled a people from its land and it would not have pillaged the goods and properties of those people or destroyed their economy. We firmly demand respect for the United Nations Charter and observance of its letter and spirit, as well **as** respect for the norms and rules of international law, in the interest of national, regional and international peace and security, so that any people can live in peace and security and contribute to the development of **civilization**, which, in the end, is the heritage of all mankind.

My country welcomes the ongoing changes in Eastern Europe, and **wishes the** peoples of those countries every success in **revitalizing** the economies. We also commend the efforts of every State that has started to reduce its military forces and cut its military expenditure. We hope that all the **other** States that possess armaments in excess of their security needs will destroy their surplus weaponry and cut their military expenditures, since it has been demonstrated that the possession of an enormous military potential does not result in peace, **security** and stability in any way but, rather, creates heavy pressures on the security of all States and Peoples.

We do not wish for the elimination of excess armaments in any one *region or* continent to be achieved at **the expense of other** regions and continents. That is to say, we do not wish to see the transfer of **excess** weaponry from one region to the other. Weapons are a source of **concern**, a means of destruction and a drain on resources in every region, whether in East, West, North or South, both in the developed and the developing countries.

The illicit arm trade is a violation of national and regional sovereignty **and** is a form of terrorism. It too **drains** the financial resources of developing countries. Therefore, we hope that all countries that manufacture and export

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weapons can work out and implement a convention on the illicit arms trade, in co-operation with other States, the United Nations and the competent **specialized** agencies.

We condemn all **unethical** transfers of radioactive and toxic waste from the industrialised world to other countries in Africa and the Middle East as well as the dumping of such materials on the high seas, since such acts contradict fundamental human **values** and civilised norms. We call upon all States **that** export such wastes to deter their companies that export such poisons. The United Nations can play a vital role **in** this respect and protect the developing countries from this **danger**.

We welcome all bilateral efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate certain categories of **armaments** such as intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and welcome the ongoing negotiations **on** strategic long-range missiles and their reduction by 50 *per* cent. We hope that a convention **will** be signed very soon so that new negotiations may begin with a view to achieving further **arms** reduction. We sincerely hope that the two super-Powers will not replace the armaments that have been eliminated with new weaponry.

We also consider it essential that the other nuclear Power⁸ enter into negotiations to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Such negotiations should not be confined to the United States and the Soviet **Union**. We welcome the multilateral **efforts** in Europe to reduce conventional **forces in** that continent and **to** establish a climate of confidence-building and security **there**. We also believe it important for Europe to begin to reduce its military arsenals, which far exceed its security **needs**. This should **be** done in other regions and continent⁸ as well.

Naval armaments have an enormous destructive potential, and, therefore, **reductions** in conventional weapons should include naval **armaments**, thereby helping to promote a climate of security for **both coastal** and land-locked States,

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As for **chemical weapons**, the agreements reached so far between the United States and the Soviet Union on the dismantling of chemical-weapon stockpiles represent a great victory in the struggle to eliminate those unethical weapons. We welcome the statements made in Paris and Canberra on chemical weapons, and hope that an international convention will be concluded on the prohibition of manufacturing, **stockpiling** and using such weapons. A linkage should be established between the banning of chemical weapons and the banning of other weapons of mass destruction.

Outer space is the **common** heritage of mankind. We call for the **demilitarization** of outer space and for a ban on the placement of armaments, **lasers** and other **high-frequency** weapons in that environment. Are Earth-based weapons of mass destruction not enough? Why must outer space be transformed into a theatre for mass destruction? We demand that outer space be kept free from all weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Emirates)

It is act acceptable that any State or group of States should use outer space to threaten mankind and thereby endanger the future of space exploration and the contribution it could make in the service of man and his civilisation.

My delegation has consistently called, with other States of the region for a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Unfortunately, Israel continues to be a source of destabilisation, as it is the only country in the region which possesses nuclear weapons. It also contributes to the atmosphere of instability through its nuclear collaboration with the racist **régime** of South Africa, the pariah of the international community.

My country reiterates its call for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and security. The peoples of that important region want to be free from all outside threats, We must therefore remove all obstacles to the 1991 convening of the **Colombo** conference.

The United Nations has long played an important role in the maintenance of **peace** and security, particularly in the areas of arms reduction and complete disarmament. We commend the **Organization's** tireless and intensive efforts in that respect and welcome the efforts of the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary for Disarmament Affairs, as well as the efforts of all the agencies with responsibilities in this field. We hope these praiseworthy efforts will continue so we can preserve the climate of coexistence between the super-Powers and accelerate disarmament efforts intended to lead to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

To be sure, the First Committee has **a** leading role to play in this. We support the efforts to **rationalize** the work of the Committee, and hope that draft resolutions can be combined. As for draft resolutions on which there is **consensus**, once adopted, they should be implemented.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.