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**VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 28th MEETING**

Chairman: Mr. Roche (Canada)

**CONTENTS**

- CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ITEMS [51 TO 69,  
139, 141 AND **145**] (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

**AGENDA ITEMS 51 TO 69, 139, 141 AND 145 (continued)**

**CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)**

**Mt. FUGLIESE** (Italy) : On behalf of the **delegations** of Australia, Belgium, **Canada, France,** the Federal Republic of **Germany, Japan** the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and of my own delegation, I have the honour to **introduce** draft **resolution A/C. 1/43/L.27** on the prevention of an **arms race** in outer space.

The **issue** of the prevention of an **arms race** in outer space **plays a** very **important** role in the debates of this Committee and of the Conference On Disarmament. We believe that **this is** rightly **so because arms control issues** related to space have a very **significant bearing** on international **stability** and therefore on international **peace** and **security**. There **is** no doubt that the international **community** has an important role to **play** in the prevention of an **arms race** in outer space.

We also reaffirm in **this** context our view that the exploration and **use of** **outer space** should be carried out for the benefit of all countries, **irrespective** of their degree of economic or scientific development.

The delegations sponsoring this **draft** resolution **are** convinced that space **activities can make an** important contribution to international peace and **security** and to **arms** control and disarmament. They believe **also** that **arms** control issues **concerning** nuclear and space **arms** must be **considered** in their interrelationship in order to facilitate **agreements** that would enhance **strategic** stability.

There **seems** to be no **doubt** that a **great responsibility** towards mankind as a whole falls on the two major space and nuclear Powers in the search for effective and verifiable agreement<sup>8</sup> on the prevention of an **arms** race in outer space and its termination on earth, and that they should continue their efforts in this direction.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

The **text of our draft** resolution **reflects** a **realistic** approach to **this complex** problem and **seeks to** address the item in a **pragmatic** and **concrete** way. It **takes** into **account** the efforts **made so far** in the multilateral field and **expresses** the **conviction** that **further efforts** should be made. It **calls** attention, however, to the progress made in the bilateral **negotiations** between the United **States** of **America** and the USSR and underlines **the fact** that **significant** progress in the multilateral domain **is** dependent on **basic understandings** achieved in the aforementioned bilateral **negotiations**.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

The **relative emphasis** that the sponsors of draft **resolution A/C.1/43/L.27** have **placed** on the bilateral talks **does not detract from** the essential role the General **Assembly** and the Conference on Disarmament can and **must** play in the **area** of preventing an **arms race** in outer space. Our delegations believe that the multilateral and the bilateral **processes may be** mutually **complementary**. We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament can contribute **to** the consideration of **issues** related **to** the prevention of an **arms race** in outer space. The Conference on Disarmament has **for some years** done **useful** work on the **subject**. **Substantive** questions have **been** identified. Relevant aspects of the legal **régime** of **arms control** and **outer space have been considered** and proposals have **been** brought **forward**. In that spirit the sponsors of the draft resolution have also welcomed the agreement reached in 1988 **on** the re-establishment of an **ad hoc** committee to consider our consideration of that question.

The **work** undertaken **during** 1988 **by** the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an **arms race** in outer space again showed the complexity of the problems under consideration, the numerous approaches **of** many individual **States to** the **issue** and the major disagreements that exist, and various **interpretations** of terminology. It is clear that **the subject** of the prevention of an **arms race in** outer space **remains** extremely sensitive. To attain the positive **goals being aimed at it is therefore necessary** to maintain a constructive and **realistic** approach. Polemics, finger-pointing and premature initiatives must be avoided if a **productive** environment is to be generated and maintained. We **must also** carry out a thorough **analysis** of the area in order to **obtain** full knowledge and arrive at the interpretation **suitable** for supporting **our** endeavour. We believe it is advisable for **that** purpose, to **re-establish**, at the **beginning** of the 1989 session **of** the Conference on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

in Outer Space, ensuring that all efforts are made for the continuation and intensification of substantive work. We are convinced that the approach followed during 1988 was a constructive and realistic one,

That is the background against which the sponsoring delegations would like the draft resolution to be viewed by other interested delegations. The draft resolution is not intended to conflict with other draft resolutions on the subject. Rather, it is the expression of a sincere will to co-operate.

I wish to conclude by expressing the most fervent hope that the efforts made by the sponsors and their intention to avoid controversy and promote co-operation and understanding will be favourably received. We are open to co-operative efforts by others.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) : The year 1988 has seen the twentieth anniversary of the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, which recognized the completion of the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) . It is also three years since the Third Review Conference on the Treaty, and, in accordance with the wish of the parties expressed in the final document adopted at that Conference, it is time for the three depository Powers to start the process of convening the Fourth Review Conference, which is to be held in 1990. In compliance with that duty the United Kingdom, on behalf of the three depositories, convened a meeting of parties to the Treaty on 25 October, over which Ambassador Badawi of Egypt presided. That meeting agreed that the Fourth Review Conference should be held at Geneva in the August-September period of 1990. It also agreed to form a Preparatory Committee on the same basis as that which prepared the Third Review Conference, that is, an open-ended committee formed of parties to the Treaty serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

represented in the Conference on Disarmament, as well as any party to the Treaty that may express its interest in participating in the work of the Preparatory Committee. It was agreed that the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee should be held from 1 to 5 May 1989. Different views were expressed as to the appropriate venue for that meeting, and discussions among the parties on that question still continue.

The parties also agreed that a draft resolution should be placed before this Committee requesting the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation. I have the honour to present that draft resolution now, document A/C.1/43/L. 45, on behalf of 47 States parties to the Treaty. The text of the draft resolution contains no more than I have just outlined. It is completely procedural, and it is the hope of the States parties to the NPT that the Committee will agree to adopt it without a vote, as was the case with the very similar resolution adopted for the same purpose at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Mr. AL-KITTAL (Iraq) : I should like to make a few remarks concerning agenda item 54, "The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, " It is our view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would strengthen the drive towards nuclear-arms control and disarmament and would also enhance the confidence-building process. With a nuclear-free zone we are one step further away from the arms race and the possibility of war and one step closer to peace and security.

(Mr. Al-Kittal, Iraq)

We are **also aware** that the creation of a nuclear-free **zone** acquires **special** importance in special **regions** owing to circumstances and characteristics of **those regions**. The Middle East **is** one such region, and that **is** why we **support** the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in the Middle East. Now, one may ask what **is** needed to **achieve this** goal?

(Mr. Al-Kittal, Iraq)

To **respond objectively and realistically to such a question**, one **should** identify the **existing** facts in the region which **are** relevant to the creation of a **nuclear-weapon-free zone**. These facts can be summed up as follows.

First, there are **nuclear weapons** in the region. **Israel has introduced the weapons**, and it **is** the only party which **possesses such weapons**.

Secondly, all **parties** which have **nuclear programmes of any size** in the region have **acceded** to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). **Israel remains** the only exception,

Thirdly, the only **significant** nuclear facilities **capable of producing nuclear material usable** for the manufacturing of **weapons** are **those located in Israel**. **These facilities are not under international safeguards**.

Those **are** important **facts** that **deserve to be kept clear and ready in our minds**. I say that because I believe **awareness of them** will leave no room for ambiguity **as to the process** of identifying the **necessary conditions** for the establishment of a **nuclear-weapon-free zone** in the Middle East. **As a matter of fact**, we believe that the only practical way to **establish that zone is to take practical steps to correct the situation** I have **just** outlined. In our opinion, **this requires** the following action.

**First**, the immediate removal of existing **nuclear-weapon stockpiles** from the region, taking into account that **Israel is** the party in **possession of those stockpiles**;

Secondly, the undertaking by all **parties** not to manufacture or in any way acquire **nuclear weapons or explosive devices**; **all parties** in the region except **Israel** are committed to this goal **by their adherence to the NPT - it is for Israel to do so** and without further delay;

Thirdly, the **placing** of all nuclear facilities **in the region under international safeguards**; **this can be achieved only if Israel accepts, as do the**



(Mr. Al-Kittal, Iraq)

other parties in the region, to submit all its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard;

Fourthly, the undertaking by all parties not to accept the deployment on their territories of nuclear weapons that belong to other States and not to join a military alliance if a nuclear-weapon State is party to that alliance. Israel is the only party in the region known to have a strategic alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

An important consideration in this regard is that such practical steps should have no negative effect on the right of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful applications.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): It is my honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.40 on item 51 of the agenda of the General Assembly, "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

The draft is sponsored by the delegations of the following countries: Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico. Its first preambular paragraph contains an impressive list of the 15 resolutions approved by the General Assembly relating to the signing and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

In the second preambular paragraph attention is drawn to the fact that:

"within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which 23 sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties".

In the third preambular paragraph the following is added:

"... it is not fair that the peoples of some of those territories are deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion in this connection".

The fourth preambular paragraph recalls that

"three of the States to which Additional Protocol I is opened - the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America - became parties to the said Protocol in 1969, 1971 and 1981 respectively".

The draft resolution ends with three operative paragraphs, the last of which, as is customary in such cases, decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of the next session of the Assembly. The two previous paragraphs, which faithfully reflect the feelings of Latin America, are drafted as follows:

"Deplores that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

"Once more urges France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, Since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it".

In conclusion, I believe it appropriate by way of epilogue to recall certain facts that should be borne in mind in connection with this subject: that last year

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

saw the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its two Additional Protocols; that there are already 23 States parties to this Treaty; that Additional Protocol II is in force for the five States which possess nuclear weapons and to which the Treaty has been opened; that Additional Protocol I, as is stated in the draft resolution I am introducing, is already in force for three of the four States to which it is open; that France is the only one of these States that has not yet become a party to this instrument, though France signed it on 2 March 1979, that is more than eight years ago; that, as has so often been said at the United Nations, it would not be right for the peoples of the territories situated within the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco - over which the States to whom Additional Protocol I has been opened, to use the terms actually found in the Treaty "de jure or de facto have international responsibility" - to be deprived of the benefits deriving from the Treaty "without having had an opportunity to express their opinion on it".

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan) : We have asked to speak today to introduce two draft resolutions sponsored by Pakistan. The first, which has also been sponsored by Bangladesh, relates to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and has been circulated in document A/C. 1/43/L.5. The second deals with the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and has been circulated in document A/C. 1/43/L. 18. Our interest in these two issues stems from Pakistan's unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and its deep concern over the grave threat which humanity faces as a result of the existence of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has always supported and pursued a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament. In our view all disarmament measures, whether global, regional or bilateral, interim or of a collateral nature, deserve support. Pending the realization of the vital objective of nuclear disarmament we believe that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represents an important collateral measure that can make a significant contribution towards preventing nuclear proliferation and in providing a measure of security to non-nuclear-weapon States of the region concerned.

In paragraph 61 of the Final Document. of its first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly unanimously recognized the need to encourage the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world, with the ultimate objective of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The immediate objective for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a specific region would be to insulate it against the threat of nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail, as well as to prevent the geographical spread of nuclear weapons, and thereby contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The first special session also called upon the nuclear-weapon States to give undertakings to respect strictly the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to refrain from the use or threat of use of

nuclear **weapons against** the **States** in **each** a **region**.

The Movement Of Non-Aligned **S** tatea **has also support ed** the concept of nuclear-weapon-free **zones**. The political declaration issued at the **conclusion** of the Eighth Non-Aligned **Summit** Conference held in **Harare** in **September** 1986, called, inter alia, for the **establishment** of nuclear-weapon-free **zones** in different **parts** of the world with the objective of achieving, ultimately, a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

The **establishment** of nuclear-weapon-free **zones** in various **regions** of the world is by no **means an end** in itself nor is **it a substitute** for a global, general and comprehensive **approach to Disarmament**. However, nuclear-weapon-free **zones** **constitute an important** partial **measure**, in a **step-by-step** approach, to general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Additionally, they derive their relevance **from** being important confidence-building **measures**.

Pakistan **shares** with the **other States** of the **South Asian** region a **deep** **commitment** to the objective of **keeping** our area **free** of nuclear **weapons**. All the **States** of **South Asia** have made unilateral declarations, at the highest level, that they will not acquire or develop nuclear **weapons**. We **believe**, therefore, that appropriate conditions exist in the **South Asian** region to carry forward the objective of transforming it into a nuclear-weapon-free **zone**.

**Pakistan's** commitment to nuclear non-proliferation **has** been demonstrated by various **proposals** it has **made** over the **years** to ensure the permanent denuclear **ization** of **South Asia**. We believe that a regional approach, with each State **accepting** equal and non-discriminatory **obligations**, is the most **feasible** and effective **means** to prevent the **spread** of nuclear **weapons** in our **region**. We are therefore in favour of **exploring** all **avenues** to find an **agreed basis** for **promoting** any arrangement to ensure nuclear non-proliferation on an equitable and non-discriminatory **basis**.

We remain hopeful that the **adoption of** our **draft** resolution (A/C.1/43/L.5) will encourage the **Statee** of our **region to** enter into **consultations for the** establishment **of a** nuclear-weapon-free zone in South **Asia**.

The draft resolution is on the same lines as the corresponding **resolution 42/29** which was adopted **by the** General **Assembly** last **year**. Its preambular part, inter alia, recognizes the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free **zones as** one of the **measures** which can contribute most effectively to **the objective** Of nuclear non-proliferation and general and complete disarmament. The operative part of the draft resolution urges the south **Asian States** to continue to make all possible **efforts to** establish **a** nuclear-weapon-free zone in **South Asia** and, **pending that, to** refrain from any action contrary to this objective.

The draft resolution also requests the **Secretary-General** to ascertain the **views of** the regional **as well as** other concerned States and **to promote consultations** among them with **a** view to exploring the best possibilities of **furthering** the efforts **for the establishment of a** nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in South Asia.

We hope that the draft resolution will receive **widespread** support in the First Committee and in the General Assembly.

The second resolution (A/C.1/43/L.18) deals with the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States **against** the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is aware of the fact that the most effective assurance against the nuclear threat remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. However, until the objective of nuclear **disarmament** is achieved the critical importance of **credible** guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States cannot be over-emphasized. Such **assurances** have become all the more essential since meaningful **progress** on nuclear disarmament **does not** appear to be in sight.

(Mr. Kamml, Pakistan)

In this context Pakistan **has** actively participated in the **search** for a **viable** and acceptable international agreement. It **is a source** of deep disappointment for **us that** while there **are** no **objections**, in principle, to the concept of negative **security assurances**, the Conference on Disarmament **has** failed to register **any** progress on negotiating an internationally binding legal instrument **on the subject**. We therefore consider it important that the **General Assembly** call upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts towards reaching an agreement on a formula which would enable it to **elaborate and conclude effective** international arrangements to **assure** non-nuclear-weapon States against the **use** or threat **of use** of nuclear weapons.

The unilateral **declarations made by some** nuclear-weapon States on this subject do not adequately meet the **concerns** of the non-nuclear-weapon States. **Those declarations** reflect the security **concerns of the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves**. My delegation **continues** to believe that **assurances to** non-nuclear-weapon States, in **order to be** effective, **must be** unconditional and of a **legally binding** nature.

Draft resolution **A/C.1/43/L.18**, submitted **by my** delegation, **has** been prepared **along the lines** of the resolution adopted last year. In **its operative paragraphs** it appeals to **the nuclear-weapon States** to demonstrate the political will **necessary** to reach agreement of **a legally binding** character. It **is** the hope of **my** delegation that the draft resolution will receive the unanimous **support** of **this** Committee.

**Mr. THEORIN (Sweden) :** I have **naked to epeak today under the agenda item "Verification in all its aspects"**, in order to introduce, on behalf of the States represented in the Six-Nation Initiative - Argentina, Greece, **India, Mexico, Sweden** and Tanaania - draft reeolution **A/C. 1/43/L. 2**, entitled **"Verification within the United Nations"**.

The **process of diarmament affects the vital security interest8** of all States. The brief **history of post-war confidence-building and diarmament negotiations** hae amply **demonstrated the significance of verification measuree**. By their very **scope and nature, major diarmament agreemente, particularly those on weapons of mass destruction**, have global conequencee.

The **international community therefore has a stake in all major disarmament agreement8** and a fundamental interet in the verification of compliance **with them**. All nations concerned have a legitimate aepiration to **be** in a position ta ascertain **that such agreements are strictly** complied with. The critical importance of verification of, and compliance with, **arms** limitation and diarmament agreements **is** now univereally recoqnized.

The reality, however, **is that** countries **hsve quite** different **capabilities** in **terms** of national technical **means** of verification. International verification arrangements are one **way** to even **out such** differences. Inter **national** verification **is not** meant to replace bilateral or other verification measures already ngreed upon, **but** to complement them.

The United Nations **has** a central role and primary **responsibility** in the sphere of **disarmament**. It **stands to reason that** the United Nations should be **entrusted** with a corresponding role and responsibility in the **f ield of verif ication**.

**At the special ministerial meeting** devoted to disarmament **issues** of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held on the eve of the **third special session** of



(Ma. Theor in, Sweden)

the General **Assembly** devoted to disarmament (**SSOD III**), the **concept** of A **multilateral** verification **system** within the **United Nations** was **endorsed**.

When a propoeal for such a system was presented at **SSOD III** we noted with **great satisfaction** that other **countries** interested in the field of **verification** **stated** that it was a **most** welcome initiative.

In his **address** at the opening of **SSOD III**, the **Secretary-General** affirmed that:

"This is an area in which the **United Nations** might be able to make an importan: contribution. The **United Nations** might be able to help apply, by all the means accepted by the parties concerned, the **verification measures** provided for in **multilateral** treeties. The **United Nations** might be Able to co-ordinate international debates on **queations** related to **verifioation**, to provide technical **advice** And to carry out reeearoh. **Generallly** epeaking, the **partioipation** of our Organization in the **search** for qenarally **accepttable** And effective verification measures for **observance** of the aqrcamente and the **expansion** of the f uno tions of informs tion and advice might make it possl ble in the future to create, under **its auspices**, ver ification machinery."

(A/S-15/PV. 1, p. 28)

In faot, the **United Nations** already performs An important role in the **field** of verification, inter Alla, in relation to alleged violations of the **Geneva Protocol** Of **1925** And of other rules of **customary** international law **prohibiting** the **use** of chemical and **bacteriological** or **toxin** weapone. Such a role **is** also envisaged in the Treaty **on the** Prohibition of the Emplacement of **Nuclear Weapons** And Other Weapons of **Mass** Deetruction on the Sea-Red and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and the Convention on **the** Prohibition of the **Development**, Production And **Stockpiling** of **Bateriological** (**Biological**) and **Toxin** Weapons and on Their Deetruction of 1972. Furthermore, it **may** be recalled that in 1987, the

(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

Disarmament Commission agreed that the United Nations should examine the possibility of compiling and managing a verification data base.

It is against this background that draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.2 endorses the principle of a multilateral verification system within the United Nations as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament and in a nuclear-free world. Also, the Secretary-General is requested to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, including preparations for an outline of a multilateral verification system within the United Nations, and to submit a comprehensive report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session in 1990.

Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire) (interpretation from French): Allow me first of all, Sir, to praise the efforts you made since your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee to assist it in the progress it has made.

Having begun the stage of submission of draft resolutions for consideration and adoption, I wish, on behalf of the African Group and as its Chairman for this month, to introduce three draft resolutions produced by it.

These are the drafts found in documents A/C.1/43/L.72, A/C.1/43/L.31 and A/C.1/43/L.41 dealing respectively with the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, implementation of the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa and the nuclear capability of South Africa and the United Nations regional centre for peace and disarmament in Africa at Lomé.

(Mt. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya,  
Zaire)

The **placing of** item 64 K on the **agenda** of the forty-third **session** of the General Assembly by the Group of African States is in **response to** the **serious concern expressed** by the **Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity** during their twenty-fourth summit meeting, held in **Addis Ababa** from **25 to 28 May 1987**, with regard to **a new** phenomenon which has been **occurring** over the **last two years in Africa**. This **is** the spreading practice of the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in African countries by transnational **corporations** and other enterprises of the **industrialized** countries - **wastes** which they cannot **dispose of** within their own territory or in the **countries** in which **those wastes** are produced

How **can** such a practice be explained? How can there be continents dedicated to improve the quality of life and the environment while **others** are exposed to radioactive **elements** of nuclear and industrial **wastes** which are harmful and dangerous to mankind, marine fauna and **those ecosystems** on which the survival of **mankind** depends?

Under what **logic** or what ethics can the pollution of **a** continent be allowed, **a** continent which is **so** full of hope and resources **as** Africa and which, in **addition**, **produces** numerous commodities and raw materials which are used by **those same** industrialized countries in their industrial and manufacturing **processes**?

**Although** the **collusion** of certain **Africans** in **this** operation **has** been acknowledged, the crime of dumping these wastes continues and that **collusion** in no way **absolves its** authors.

Thus, the **Heads** of State and Government of the **Organization of African Unity** have decided to undertake vigorous action to ban the **dumping** of these **wastes** in Africa.

(Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya,  
Zaire)

The African Group has therefore been entrusted with the task of presenting a draft resolution whose main points are as follows. It condemns all practices of dumping nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; demands that such dangerous, immoral and illegal practices cease forthwith; urges all Member States to ensure \*effective control of a transboundary movement of nuclear and industrial wastes; requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the matter and adopt a convention prohibiting the dumping of nuclear and radioactive wastes in the territory of other States; and requests the Secretary-General of our Organisation, in consultation with the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to submit to the General Assembly a report at its forty-fourth session on this question in all its aspects, including the adoption of a convention to ban the dumping of such wastes.

I am submitting this draft resolution in accordance with the following resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU): CM/Res.38 (III), on the denuclearisation of Africa, adopted in Cairo in 1964, and CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII-23), on the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, adopted in Addis Ababa last May.

I hope that the reasons I have given, Mr. Chairman, are sufficient to enable YOU to have the draft resolution adopted without a vote. Here I recall that the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency has already adopted its resolution GC (XXXII) /Res.490 on the question.

The second draft resolution (A/C.1/43/L.31) consists of two parts:  
A, "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa" and  
B, "Nuclear capability of South Africa". The two parts are linked by South Africa's persistence in acquiring that capability, thus frustrating the Declaration

(Mr. Bagbeni Adelto Nzengeya,  
Zaire)

on the Disarmament Commission of Africa, whose aim is to keep Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In fact, the SAFARI research reactor, the Koeberg power reactor and the Phoswep hot oil complex give clear proof of South Africa's nuclear capability and have persuaded the International Atomic Energy Agency to impose safeguards on those installations, which contain nuclear material. But South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant is still not covered by Agency safeguards; the Agency is waiting for South Africa's adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons before concluding a safeguards agreement with that country.

South Africa is an important exporter of uranium and has a well-developed nuclear programme and capability. Its adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty raises difficulties, which that country puts in the form of conditions. The problems are: first, rights and privileges under Article IV of the Treaty, particularly regarding the exchange of equipment, material and technology; secondly, possibilities for South Africa, if it adheres to the Treaty, to trade in nuclear raw materials - uranium - as do all other producers, subject solely to the application of Agency safeguards or similar safeguards; thirdly, the existence at present of discriminatory national legislation in a number of countries which are signatories of the Treaty, which is contrary to the principles and spirit of several Articles of the Treaty; fourthly, the existence of United Nations resolutions calling for a complete halt to nuclear co-operation with South Africa; fifthly, objections to the credentials of South African representatives at sessions of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Review Conferences of the parties to the Treaty; and, sixthly, the discriminatory nature

(Mt. Bagbeni **Adei to Nzengeya,**  
Zaire)

of the Treaty in so far as it distinguishes between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon Statee.

Those are the conditions chat the South African delegation hae raised with representatives of the three depository Governments of the Treaty - the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom - during talks in Vienna on 11 and 12 August last on South Africa's possible adherence to the Treaty.

According to a letter dated 16 September 1988 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the Director-General of the IAEA:

"The South African Government is convinced, however, that the inter national community will understand that South Africa cannot allow itself to exercise its sovereign right to adhere to such an important Treaty before carrying out a very careful consideration of all the questions that such adherence raises."

In view of those matters, the Group of African States proposes in part A of the draft resolution that the General Assembly call upon all Statee to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; reaffirms that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote inter national peace and security; expresses once again its grave alarm at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability; condemns South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime that enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclear ization of Africa, which seeks to keep Africa free from

(Mr. Bagheni Adeito Nzengeya,  
Zaire)

nuclear weapons; demands that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and that it submit forthwith all its nuclear installations to inspection by the IAEA; and requests the Secretary-General to assist the African States in the preparation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa - of course, under the control of the consultative services for disarmament studies.

In the same context, part B of the draft resolution suggests that the Assembly condemn the massive build up of South Africa's military machine, in particular, its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail; demands that South Africa and all other foreign interests put an immediate end to the exploration for and exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia; requests the Disarmament Commission to consider once again as a matter of priority during its substantive session in 1989 South Africa's nuclear capability; and requests the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session.

On behalf of the African Group, Mr. Chairman, I request you to have both parts of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.31 adopted without a vote in order to stress the support of the whole international community for the denuclearization of Africa and its being made a real nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The last draft resolution that I have the honour to present on behalf of the African States (A/C.1/43/L.41) deals with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, established in Lomé, Togo, on 24 October 1986.

(Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya,  
Zaire)

Members will recall the colloquium, organised jointly by the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, which was held in Lomé from 11 to 15 August 1985 and whose theme was: peace, security and disarmament in Africa. This colloquium, which was in fact organized within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign and in which I personally participated, adopted the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa and the Programme of Action for Peace, Security and Co-operation in Africa. Endorsed by the Eighth Summit Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare in September 1986, and by the twenty-third Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1987, this Lomé Declaration, containing a programme of action, is being implemented by the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, at Lomé.

If these activities are to continue, there must be sufficient resources coming from voluntary contributions by Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations.

In that context, the General Assembly, under the draft resolution now before the Committee, would, first, commend the Secretary-General for his efforts to ensure the functioning of the Centre; and, then, appeal to Member States and to international, governmental and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the effective functioning of the Centre.

I do not think there can be any objection whatsoever to this draft resolution, for it fits within the very objectives of our Committee.

I should like to revert to draft resolution A/C. 1/43/L.72 - the first text that I submitted today - and to announce that Romania has become a sponsor.



Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish) : I have the honour of introducing a draft resolution, co-sponsored by the delegation of Mexico, relating to the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions".

The preamble to this draft resolution - contained in document A/C. 1/43/L. 13 and sponsored by the delegations of nine countries: Ecuador, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico - summarizes the major facts that are necessary to gain a clear understanding of it. Among those facts are the following:

The complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been examined for more than 30 years, and the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions on the subject. It is a basic objective of the United Nations in this sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which the Organization has repeatedly assigned the highest priority. On eight different occasions the Assembly has condemned such tests in the strongest terms, and since 1974 it has stated its conviction that the continuance of such tests will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war.

It should be recalled that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament.

In the preamble to the draft resolution the General Assembly would also recall that the three nuclear-weapon States that act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - undertook in article I of the Treaty to conclude another treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

nuolear-test exploeione, **including all** thoe exploeione **underground**, and that **such** an undertaking **was** reiterated in 1968 in the preamble **to** the Treaty on the **Non-Prolifera tion of Nuclear Weapons**, srtiole VI of **which** further **embodies their** **solemn** and legally binding oommitment to **take** effective **measures relating** to oeeeeation of the nuolear-arms race at an early date and **to** nuclear **disarmament**.

It **was** perhape for that **reason** that the Third Review Conference **of** the Particle to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation **of Nuclear Weapons**, in **its** Final Declaration, adopted on 21 September 1985, **called** on the nuclear-weapon **States parties** to the **Treaty to resume** trilateral neqotiatione in **1985** and on all the nuolear-weapon **Staves** to participate in the urqent neqotiation and **conclusion of a** oompreheneive nuclear-test-ban treaty, **as a** matter of the **highest** priority, **in** the **Conference on Disarmament**.

Similarly, it **is** recalled that the **leaders** of the **six States associated** with the five-continent **peace** and dioarmament initiative affirmed in the Stockholm Declaration, adopted **on** 21 January 1988, that "any **agreement** that **leaves** room for aontinued testing **would not be acceptable**".

The **operative** part of the draft **resolution** on which I am commenting **proposes** that the General Aaaembly reiterate once **again**

**"its grave** concern that nuclear-weapon **testing** continues **unabated**, **against** the **wishes of** the **overwhelming** majority of Member **States**"; and reaffirm **its** conviction that

**"a** treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-teat **explosions** by all States **for** all time **is** a matter of the **highest** priority", and that

**"such** a treaty would constitute a contribution of the **utmost** importance to the **cessation** of the nuclear-arms race". (A/C.1/43/L.13, paras. 1, 2 and 3)

(Mr. Garoia Robles, Mexico)

The draft resolution **concludes** with the **customary request for** the inclusion in the agenda of the **Assembly's** next session - that **is**, the forty-fourth session - **of** an item on **this subject**. It **is** preceded by three other paragraphs which **can** be regarded **as** the principal **provisions of** the draft resolution and under **which** the Assembly would; urge once more all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the **three depositary Powers** of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon **Tests** in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear **Weapons, to** seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all **test** explosion of nuclear weapons and to expedite **negotiations** to that end; **appeal to all States** members **of** the Conference on Disarmament to promote the **establishment** by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session of an ad hoc committee with **the** objective of **carrying** out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete **cessation** of nuclear-test **explosions**; and recommend to the Conference On Disarmament that **such** an ad hoc committee should comprise two **working** groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: content **and** **scope of** the treaty, and **compliance** and verification.

The CHAIRMAN Does any other delegation wish to speak on the draft resolution? It appears not.

The Committee will recall that I informed it last week of my intention to distribute as early as possible this week an informal paper containing a list of all the draft resolutions on the disarmament agenda items rearranged in appropriate clusters. Following intensive consultations among the officers of the Committee, I am now in a position to present a paper dated 7 November setting out the Chairman's suggested programme, listing those draft resolutions under 15 different clusters. It is now in the process of being distributed to the Committee.

In this connection, I should like to indicate that I have tried to distribute the paper listing the clusters as early as possible in order to enable delegations to undertake the necessary consultations and to seek instructions, as appropriate, from their respective capitals, with a view to facilitating the smooth conduct of the work of the Committee during the voting procedure. These clusters were devised by the officers of the Committee on the basis of the pattern that has evolved during the past several years. In the process of grouping the various draft resolutions, the Bureau took into account the most logical and practical criteria available and made every effort at the same time to group them according to related subject matter, to the extent feasible.

I should like to stress that no other significance should be attached to the endeavours of the officers of the Committee than their desire to facilitate and expedite the work of the Committee with a view to utilizing our time and the conference services allotted for this phase of the Committee's work in the most effective and efficient manner possible,

With respect to the timetable for action on the draft resolutions, it will be my intention to move, as far as possible, from one cluster to another in sequence

(The Chairman)

the conclusion of action on each **cluster**. At the same time, in **applying this procedure** an attempt will be made to maintain the required **degree of flexibility**.

I hope members will understand when I say that I **cannot give** any **precise indication** now of the **days** on which any **particular clusters** will be taken up, but **at the meeting** on Thursday morning we will start with cluster 1, and then **proceed**. To the degree possible, I shall try to provide advance information **as to how we** shall proceed at successive meetings of the Committee. It depends on the speed at which **we are able to** handle the various **clusters**.

**As for** action on **each** individual cluster, members of ~~the~~ Committee will **first** **have** the opportunity to make any statement, other than explanations of vote, which they regard as necessary with respect to the draft resolutions **in** that cluster. Subsequently, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes on **any or all draft resolutions in a particular cluster before a** decision is taken, will be able to do **so**. Then, after the Committee has taken a **decision** on the draft resolution@ in a given cluster, **delegations wishing** to explain their positions or votes **after** the decision **is** taken will be able to do so. I would **urge** delegations **to the** extent feasible to make a **consolidated statement on the draft resolutions** contained in **any** individual cluster with respect to **the statements** and explanations of vote or positions concerned. I hope that the suggested programme of work and the procedure that I have just outlined will be **acceptable**.

I should now like **to draw to the Committee's** attention document A/C.1/43/8, dated 2 November 1988, which contains A letter **addressed to me by the President of** the General Assembly, **transmitting a letter from the Chairman of the Second Committee concerning** agenda item 12, **entitled "Report of the Economic and Social Council"**.

(The Chairman)

The Chairman of the Second Committee requests that any views which members of the Main Committees, including the First Committee, might wish to express on aspects of the guidelines for international decades which may fall under the mandate of their respective Committees, be communicated to the Second Committee no later than the second week of November 1988. After discussing the matter, this Committee's Bureau concluded that members of the First Committee could express their views on the subject in writing to the Chairman. Accordingly, I invite those members of the Committee who may wish to communicate their views on the subject to do so in writing to me by 10 November, so that I may transmit them to the Chairman of the Second Committee within the required time period.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a statement in connection with the discussion in the First Committee on Friday, 4 November, about your reply to the letter of 12 October from the Chairman of the Fifth Committee.

My delegation fully shares the concern of all in this Committee for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the advancement of arms limitation and disarmament efforts. It believes that it is proper for this Committee to draw these concerns to the attention of the Fifth Committee, and therefore supports the points made to this effect in your proposed reply. My delegation believes, however, that it is not for the First Committee to proffer advice to the Fifth Committee as regards the selection of Secretariat staff.

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

My delegation believes that the **Secretary-General** should be **guided** in his **selection** of **staff** by Article 101, paragraph 3, **of** the United Nations Charter, which states that the paramount consideration **shall** be the **necessity** of **securing** the highest standards of **efficiency**, **competence** and integrity **and that** due **regard** shall be paid to recruitment on **as wide a geographical basis as possible**. My delegation much regrets that **the** amendment to your draft reply which we proposed to take account of the **first** of these criteria, and which to the **best of our knowledge** met with no objection from any delegation, **was not included** in your proposed reply.

**Mr. Chairman**, in the final moments on **Friday**, when you declared the draft adopted, **my** delegation attempted to catch **your eye** to register its objection on this point, without **success**. For the record, therefore, I must state that my delegation did not join **consensus** on paragraph 6, that **is** the penultimate paragraph, of your proposed reply to the Fifth **Committee** Chairman.

Mr. AKALOVSKY (United States of America) : **Mr. Chairman**, the United States delegation finds itself in a position very similar to that **of** the delegation **of** the United Kingdom. Like that delegation, **in the** closing **moments** of the Committee's **meeting** last Friday, 4 **November**, my delegation attempted to ask to speak when you **were** about **to** pronounce as adopted the penultimate paragraph of your proposed letter to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee. **Unfortunately, we also failed** to catch your eye before you made that **announcement**.

**Had my delegation** had an opportunity to speak at that moment it **would have reiterated its position** that it **is not for this** Committee to **advise** the Fifth Committee on matters **relating** to personnel **policies** in the United Nations **Secretariat** and **certainly not to** deviate from or interpret the provision of the Charter, **namely, Article 101, paragraph 3**, which **is to guide** those **policies**. **Regrettably**, the pertinent **language** in your proposed letter **is** in conflict with

(Mr. Akalovsky, United States)

this position. In the circumstances my delegation is obliged to make it clear for the record that the penultimate paragraph of that letter does not command consensus in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I have noted those comments.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.