



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 31st MEETING

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. MLLOJA (Albania) : The militarization of outer space has already become a subject of great concern to international public opinion and, justifiably, that issue is being broadly discussed. The concern stems from the fact that there is now a greater danger of outer space being turned into an arena for a frenzied sophisticated arms race by the two Super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. All this can have a catastrophic impact on humankind. Sharing this concern, the Albanian delegation takes this opportunity to express its view on this issue.

Outer space is the common heritage of all mankind and, therefore' from the very outset the first achievements of space science were commended world-wide. But, to the disappointment of the peace-loving peoples, it was very soon proved once again that every scientific discovery in the hands of imperialist circles, which aspire to military supremacy and hegemony in the world, is exploited as a means of war and blackmail. The same thing has happened from the very beginning to cosmic science . Nowadays, outer space is saturated with spy satellites, missiles of different types, various weapons equipped with systems of laser beams, and so forth. Real chaos has been created there and greater dangers have been added because of the extensive increase in military space arsenals.

When we speak of the military presence in outer space, everyone is struck by the steep increase in space weapons there: it is not a matter of some dozens of spy satellites,, but of hundreds upon hundreds of sophisticated military objects, bases and space weapons that have already been deployed there. This unbridled race between the United States and the Soviet Union has gone through various stages, and today the "star war" preparations have come out of the laboratories, out of the

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realm of science fiction, and are being applied concretely. The military-industrial establishments of those countries have been put to work full steam to manufacture the technological equipment and train the military staff for the future "star wars".

The present arms race in outer space has become the core of the permanent imperialist confrontation and rivalry for hegemony and expansion. If on our planet Earth the distribution of the spheres of influence has taken specific shape, the struggle for their distribution in outer space has just started and will go on fiercely for a long time. Each of the super-Powers aims at capturing the infinite horizons of space, at "getting" this or that star of our solar system. Hence, the means to carry out this new expansionism is the strengthening, the sophistication of space weaponry.

The United States so-called Strategic Defence Initiative programme, which claims that it can make obsolete a nuclear attack by the adversary in every circumstance and at whatever level, has as its basic substance the discovery and development of such weapons as would help to acquire supremacy over the Soviet Union, which, for its part, is exerting efforts and working with precisely the same aims: to create and preserve its supremacy. We can say that the space arms race has already become the core of their rivalry, and the related programmes are envisaged in such a way as to help each of them acquire a position of strength in this field.

There is no need to recall here the dangers this new arms spiral poses to mankind, to our planet Earth. For many years now - starting long before this arms race had taken on these dimensions - in this very Committee concern about the danger it poses has been voiced. Nevertheless, the two super-Powers have continued to intensify that race. But it must be stressed that even today, when everyone can easily see the dangerous proportions of the militarization of outer

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space and when the aims for the future **are well known**, the **United States and the Soviet Union do** their **best** to create the **psychosis that everything is being done for the purpose of "defence"**. As a matter of fact, there **is nothing** new in **this** kind of demagogy. For a long time now it has been the **method they prefer** in order to hide every **qualitative new step** in the **arms race**.

This speculation, with the demagogy of "defence" - nowadays called "strategic defence" - cannot conceal the reality, because the history of the development of the weapons of mass destruction has testified to the fact - and this continues to be true to this very day - that all arsenals created by imperialist forces are started under the guise of defence. The endless arms race has always been a competition between offensive and defensive weapons, and the dangers of war have never been reduced; on the contrary, they have increased ever more.

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The recent further extension of the militarization of outer space has brought into focus the tendency of the super-Powers to engage their allies in their star war schemes. This is no doubt connected with many factors, the most important being their aim of preserving their military monopoly and maintaining their political control over those allies. It remains to be seen at what level and pace other countries follow this road in the future. This will surely depend on the evaluation they make of the dangers arising from this new adventure.

As on many issues of armament, expansionism or bilateral relations, the super-Powers are also keeping open the bargaining channels on space weapons too. Their aim is to maintain the balance, wherever possible, and to preserve their monopoly in this new field of the most sophisticated arms race of our time. The history of their negotiations on outer space dates back to the outset of its militarization. And it still goes on, as it recently did at the Reykjavik summit talks, where that issue was the main and most delicate bargaining chip. But we are witnesses to the uncontestable fact that nothing has been done to halt or limit its militarization. On the contrary, new steps are taken every year towards further qualitative and quantitative militarization.

The Albanian delegation would like to reiterate its concern at this new escalation of the arms race by the two super-Powers in extending it to outer space, which gravely threatens peace and the very existence of mankind. By denouncing this new round of the frenzied arms race we emphasize that outer space, just like the earth, the sea and the air, must be kept free of weapons. This noble aim will not be achieved through imperialist bargaining, treaties and agreements, but through the resolute struggle and endeavours of the peace-loving peoples and countries.

Mr. URIBE de LOZANO (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): At this same time last year when we adopted General Assembly resolution 40/18, entitled "bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations", our attitude was that of hopeful spectators. We hoped, as we stated in that same resolution, that the meeting being held at that time between the two leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America would give a decisive impetus to their current bilateral negotiations so that these negotiations would produce early and effective agreements on the halting of the nuclear-arms race with its negative effects on international security as well as on social and economic development, reduction of their nuclear arsenals, prevention of an arms race in outer space and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

A year later we continued to hope, although that hope has turned increasingly into anguish, the anguish of impotence of those who have no choice but to trust in the sincerity of the words and good will of the leaders of the two great Powers. But time is short, and it is becoming increasingly urgent for the good sense that has been absent in recent years to prevail. We heard that urgency in the words of Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze, when he said during the general debate in the General Assembly:

"The time is at hand when considerations of groups, blocs or ideologies are beginning to give way to the understanding that peace is the supreme value
(A/41/PV/6, p. 43)

Similarly, we understood that the firm purpose of President Reagan was to diminish the danger of war and radically to reduce nuclear weapons with the definitive aim of freeing the world of the future from those weapons of mass destruction. If that were not so, and the present irreconcilable trends, which

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made it impossible to reach agreement in Iceland, were to continue, there would be no more disheartening example of the incapacity to abandon methods that have been shown to be incompatible with humanitarian preachings of peace, methods rejected by the world that they claim to want to save.

The march towards the limited nuclear war inherent in the doctrine of deterrence since the 1950s, after decades of avoiding another world war has, since the 1970s, reached a point at which the precision of offensive weapons has been so far refined that continuing with deterrence, in that form, has brought the world to the edge of a general nuclear war. The study on deterrence prepared by the Secretary-General pointed this out to us. The experts who prepared that study have convinced us that the development of military technology, under the deterrence concept, the theories of massive reprisals, initial attack, reprisal counter-attack forces and mutually assured destruction have converted deterrence from the defensive concept it was into a threat of mutual suicide. Thus the study on deterrence corroborates the feeling of my delegation that the present arms race makes no sense. Even for those of us who believe that truth should be perceived with the heart and not with the head, and that the intellect is an instrument for achieving good, and not a good in itself, the arms race is a challenge to intelligence. It is tempting to express this in the words of Gabriel Garcia Marquez who said;

"The arms race runs counter not only to human intelligence but to the intelligence of nature itself, whose ultimate aim cannot be glimpsed, even through the clairvoyance of poetry. Ever since the appearance of visible life on earth, 380 million years had to pass before a butterfly could learn how to fly. Another 180 million years to produce a rose, whose only purpose is to be beautiful, and four geological ages had to pass before human beings in contrast with their great-grandfather Pithecanthropus succeeded in singing

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better than the birds, and in dying of love. It dishonours human talent that, in the golden age of science, it has been able to conceive a way of enabling that vast and endlessly fruitful process lasting a billion of years to turn back to the nothingness from whence it came through the simple skill of pressing a button."

But Garcia Marquez, our distinguished winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, is not the owner of that button, nor are we. Those who have seized the right to press it are the most prosperous countries, the countries that call themselves civilized, those countries which paradoxically have managed to accumulate sufficient destructive power to annihilate 100 times over not only the human beings who have existed on earth to date, but the totality of living beings who have passed across the surface of this planet. The strategy that could prevent that, which could lead us to abolish war and obtain lasting peace, can only be that leading to general and complete disarmament.

For countries like Colombia, there is no more disturbing message than the anguish aroused by the crisis through which the present disarmament process is moving and our impotence to solve this problem. As the Secretary-General said in his report on the work of the Organization:

"It is evident that only the nuclear-weapon States themselves, especially the two most powerful, can take the basic decision required for the limitation and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons." (A/41/1, p. 9)

Unfortunately, we are involved in the problem but not in its solution. The same study on deterrence teaches us that a military strategy which permits us to move towards peace:

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"... must accept the danger that East-West nuclear conflict could become world wide. That is why all nuclear scenarios include deployment in other parts of the world to defend one's interests, lines of communications and vital areas and materials. If an East-West nuclear conflict occurred in Europe, for example, the rest of the world would suffer. A valid strategy must take into account the fact that the balance of power between the nuclear Powers cannot be assessed on the basis of their capabilities in the European context. The strategy must allow for a world-wide balance of power. It must seek to avoid both regional and global escalation." (A/41/432, p. 24)

That is what the study has to say.

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Nuclear **escalation** thus **also** affect5 us from a third-world viewpoint and it is in the sense that the study refers to it:

"A large number of the third-world countries live today with third type of deterrence, **nuclear** deterrence wielded by **ambiguous** nuclear **nations**, and the result **is** very different from mutual deterrence. A nation **is said to have** ambiguous nuclear capabilities if it is **impossible** to predict under what circumstances it might **be tempted to strike or** take advantage of the fact that its opponent **has no retaliatory force**. ... When this ability does not **exist**, **nuclear** forces can play a critical role in political or military **blackmail**. Considering the huge, complex and diversified types of problem5 facing third-world countries, unilateral **capability** or nuclear blackmail will have serious **and prolonged repercussions**. Unilateral **capability** will lead to proliferation."

The study in **its wisdom** concludes:

"States have a right to **survive**, but **any** form of nuclear proliferation **is an** invalid **strategy** or form of deterrence for the third world." (A/41/432, para. 22 (i))

It is useful and indeed **necessary** to take **into** account that, for **non-nuclear and neutral** countries of the **third** world like Colombia, their **position with regard to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons** would seem in principle to affect us **more closely** since, for obvious reasons, we lack power in terms of vertical proliferation except when we act in concert with other cc. **tries** in **multilateral** bodies such as this.

Colombia, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supports the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. We believe that this **is one of the viable and functional ways of avoiding horizontal proliferation**, of achieving nuclear disarmament and consequently of attaining greater **security**. The creation of such

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zone not only brings total nuclear disarmament to the member countries but leads, as a consequence, to the reduction of geographical areas where a nuclear confrontation is conceivably possible.

Clearly, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in reducing the chances of a nuclear confrontation and in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our Hemisphere, has made one of the greatest contributions to international law. In the efforts designed to prevent the possibility of a nuclear arms race in Latin America, the inclusion in the Treaty of Tlatelolco of all the countries of its zone of application would bring greater security and trust to the Hemisphere and would likewise contribute to the economic and social development of the peoples of Latin America by the diverting of enormous economic resources that might otherwise have been used for nuclear military material. Here I should like to stress the words of the President Virgilio Barco Vargas of Colombia, who, in his statement at the 18th meeting of the General Assembly, said:

"The enormity of the sums of money States devote to developing new technologies of annihilation and to manufacturing instruments of death and destruction makes even the strongest spirits fearful. The resources used up in this endeavour could well be devoted to alleviating the sufferings of mankind and speeding its development and progress.

"Latin America, which seemed to be far removed from the risks of nuclear contamination, must now carefully examine what is happening elsewhere in the world, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and must exercise care in its own utilization of such energy." (A/41/PV.18, pp. 10-11)

Man today knows quite well, since he has lived through it, that any event in any part of the world affects him directly. Wars and conflicts are our wars and our experience. The amazing means of communication now available will not permit us to ignore this fact: they are consequently confronting us with reality. Never

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more than **today** has **man** lived in a world in which he is so well informed about **everything** that happens, minute by minute, upon the surface of the Earth. And **this**, together with the two **great wars**, has brought **man** in the twentieth **century** into constant contact **with death**. That is why he is more than ever **before** **obsessed** with the **apectre** of collective death. The danger of another **war** and the **simple** **existence** of the **nuclear** bomb threatens that **collective being** which is mankind.

Today, mankind **has** grown aware of its interdependence. **Deepite** wars and **conflicts**, man **knows** that there is a unity of the **species** that we formerly **disregarded**. That knowledge can lead us to **disarmament** and peace. That **knowledge** can also **be** our **salvation**.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (interpretation from Chinese) : **Today** on behalf of the Chinese delegation I **wish** to make **sane** observations on the **uuectior**. of conventional disarmament and, at the same time, to take **this** opportunity to introduce **the draft resolution** which we have **submitted on conventional disarmament** (A/C.1/41/L.29).

I think everyone would agree that, in the face of the unprecedented threat to the **survival** of mankind **posed by the nuclear** arms race, nuclear **dinarmament** and the **Prevention of nuclear war** should assume the greatest **urgency** and highest priority **in disarmament efforts**. I have **already** spoken on **thia** aspect yesterday, **RIO** I **shall** not repeat my comments today. Now I **wish** to focus on conventional **dinarmament**.

What I **wish** to **point** out at the outset is that the **undermining** of world peace and the security of States by the conventional arms race and the need for **conventional disarmament** should **also** not be overlooked. The two **world wars** and the **hundred-odd** **auhseauent** wars and armed **conflicts** were **fought** with conventional weapons. **Certain countries**, in carrying out armed **aggressaion** aimed at the occupation of other **countr** **les**, also used **conventional** weapons. New **ty,ees** of conventional weapons are **becoming** increasingly lethal and **destructive**. At **present**

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conventional weapons account for the bulk of the nearly \$1 trillion of total annual world military expenditure. Conventional armed forces consume vast amounts of the precious manpower and material resources that could have been used to developing economies and science and technology and to increasing the welfare of the people.

Moreover, in certain regions conventional weapons and military forces are highly concentrated, thereby not only directly aggravating the tension in those regions but also constituting serious obstacles to the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

We can say that, in today's world, the conventional arms race and the nuclear arms race have the effect of mutual exacerbation and deterioration.

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It is very natural therefore that the relationship between conventional disarmament and nuclear disarmament is also one of complementarity and mutual enhancement. There Core it is required that ainultaneoua efforts be made on both aspects. Not long ago the Political Declaration issued in Harare by the Heads of State or Government of the countries of Non-Aligned countries.

"noted with deep concern that the qualitative development of conventional weapons adds a new dimension to the arms race, especially among States possessing the largest conventional arsenals. They urged these States to restrain such development."

They pointed out that

"The adoption of such disarmament measures should take place in an equitable and balanced manner in order to ensure the right of each State to security . . ."

They emphasized that

"the adoption of [conventional] disarmament measures should be based on full respect for the principles of non-intervention, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the peaceful solution of disputes in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations". (A/41/697, para. 53)

We completely endorse these correct views.

At the same time, I also wish to recall that the Final Document of the first

● special session on disarmament pointed out that

"States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions."

(resolution S-10/2, para. 81)

This statement is in full accord with the present actual situation. The conventional arsenals of the two super-Powers and the two major military alliances and the amounts of manpower and money that they invest in conventional armed forces

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together account for the largest share of total world figuree. The tension and confrontation between them directly threaten world peace and security of States.

As far as many small and medium-sized countries of the world are concerned, particulariy the non-aligned developing countries, domestically they face the paramount tasks of developing their economies and building up their countries, while externally they require the development of relations of friendship and good-neighbourliness. So for them it is wise to exercise self-restraint in building up armaments. Of course, the situations of countries differ. It is also understandable that those which face external threat and aggression require the necessary defence capabilities to safeguard their national security interests.

In recent years the question of conventional disarmament has received increasing attention from States. A number of countries have already made very sound proposals on this issue. From 1982 to 1984 a Group of Experts appointed by the United Nations carried out a study on this question and produced a report. Last year, the fortieth session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution on conventional disarmament on a regional scale. All of this has provided a good basis for further efforts by the international community towards conventional disarmament.

The Chinese Government has consistently held that simultaneously with the stepping up of nuclear disarmament efforts we should also move forward the process of conventional disarmament. In accordance with this position, this year we have submitted to this Committee not only a proposal on nuclear disarmament, but also a draft resolution entitled "General and complete disarmament: conventional disarmament" (A/C.1/41/L.29). Its purpose is the clarification of certain basic principles on conventional disarmament, while pointing out the direction of our efforts. Of course, the issue of conventional disarmament also involves many complicated aspects and issues, for instance, the regional question, arms transfer,

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the question of the reduction of military budgets, *and so on*. It has not been possible to include all of these in our proposal. Some of those issues have already been the subject of proposals by other delegations and certain matters must await further exploration and study in the future.

The Chinese people are engaged in the peaceful construction of our country. Our first task is to develop our national economy and improve our welfare and standard of living.

In recent years we have unilaterally taken a series of actions in the area of conventional disarmament. For instance, we are implementing the plan to reduce our troops by 1 million. The proportion of our national budget devoted to military expenditure is gradually falling. We have already switched a considerable portion of our military production capacity and military installations to civilian uses, and so on. These measures not only have the effect of promoting our economic development, but are beneficial to the cause of world peace. The safeguarding of peace and opposition to war are China's basic national policy. The Chinese Government and people, both nationally and on the international level, will continue to strive for the early achievement of nuclear and conventional disarmament.

In submitting the present draft resolution on conventional disarmament the Chinese delegation has received the encouragement and support of many delegations, and several of them have made a number of positive suggestions. I wish here to express my whole-hearted thanks. This draft, as far as possible, has incorporated the views of all sides. We hope that it will have the serious study and positive support of all countries.

Mt. ROCHE (Canada) : I have the honour to introduce under item 62 (n) (iii) a draft resolution entitled 'Verification in all its aspects'. I do so on behalf of the delegation⁶ of Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belgium, Botswana, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

For the last several years, more and more nations have been giving serious thought to the political and technical role of verification in achieving international peace and security. As members will recall, our deliberations on this crucial matter were motivated by a commitment made at the first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978.

The Final Document confirmed what Canada had concluded from our own review of arms control and disarmament negotiations over the past two decades: namely, that verification was a central problem which was often misunderstood.

At the second special session on disarmament, in 1982, Canada expressed the view that the international community should address itself to the problem of verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s. We felt that the work on verification should prepare the way for arms control agreements that still lie ahead.

The following year Canada affirmed its own practical commitment to the principles expressed at the first and second special sessions on disarmament through the establishment of a verification research programme with an annual budget of \$1 million.

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Last year, it will be recalled, Canada took the lead in sponsoring, with 10 other Member States, the resolution entitled "Verification in all its Aspects". It was adopted by consensus, thus reflecting the growing awareness within the world community of the significance of verification in the process of developing effective arms limitation and disarmament agreements. That resolution also served to reinforce the belief that all countries - not just the major Powers - have a responsibility in this regard and can make both practical and thoughtful contributions on verification questions. The proof of this statement can be found in General Assembly document A/41/422 of 11 July 1986 and the addenda thereto, which contain the replies to the Secretary-General of the more than 25 Governments which have responded to the invitation contained in the verification resolution.

Over the last year, Canada had been encouraged by the references to the significance of effective verification in the arms control process. We note the intervention by the delegation of the Soviet Union on 22 October, which stated:

"We are for effective and adequate verification. We are in favour of considering and resolving all disarmament and verification problems in a businesslike and concrete manner, taking a dynamic approach to find mutually acceptable solutions." (A/C.1/41/PV.16, p. 42)

We also note the intervention of the delegation of the United States on the same date, which said:

"Our work, whether it deals with nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons, must result in equitable and verifiable agreements which move us away from, not towards, the brink of conflict." (Ibid, p. 52)

But however important statements have may be - and however useful the replies of Member States in response to last year's resolution - it is the practical activities related to verification principles and techniques which will prove crucial in promoting agreement on, and implementation of, arms control and

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disarmament mesures **There are a number of these activities and events which could be selected as examples. I shall cite only three: first, the World Disarmament Campaign Regional Conference in Tbilisi last May; secondly, the Mexico Declaration of 7 August issued by the Five Continent initiative; and thirdly, the document of the Stockholm Conference of 19 September 1986 which was developed by the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.**

While those three events were diverse in nature, in our view they serve as examples of the potential which exists in the multilateral process to contribute to an understanding of verification in relation to international security and stability at lower levels of armaments. The Tbilisi Conference permitted wide-ranging discussions which included both governmental and non-governmental organizations and represented every spectrum of opinion. The proceedings of the Conference will constitute a useful addition to United Nations literature.

The Five Continent Declaration focused on a single issue and proposed a manner in which the signatories might be able, through strengthening their mutual co-operation in the seismic aspects of nuclear test detection, to facilitate test ban verification. Conceptually, the Declaration has strong similarities to some of the proposals made by the Group of Seismic Experts in Geneva following the International Seismic Data Exchange Test of 1984.

Finally, the document of the Stockholm Conference, in itself the product of more than two years of multilateral negotiations, defines a number of agreed confidence and security building measures and enunciates several specific compliance and verification procedures. We recognize that the procedure agreed in the context of the Stockholm Conference would have to be modified and strengthened for purposes of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Nevertheless, agreement in Stockholm on certain methods of verification - such as mandatory air

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and ground on-site inspection • is encouraging. We look forward to the implementation and practical application of these measures which should prove an effective basis for future arms control negotiations.

As reflected in the accord at Stockholm, any confidence-building agreement and any arms control agreement must essentially be a compromise in which each side bases some of its national security on the promises of the other contracting parties rather than on the strength of its own weaponry. Consequently, reciprocal confidence is essential. Promises of restraint have to be accompanied by means to ensure that promises are kept. By confirming that activities prohibited by agreements are not taking place and that parties are fulfilling their obligations, verification can help to generate a climate of international confidence that is indispensable for progress in arms control.

This year, Canada is again sponsoring a draft resolution on verification in all its aspects. While this draft resolution is effectively similar to its predecessor, it advocates an additional step, that is, it requests the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider verification at its 1987 session.

As it did last year, this year's draft resolution recognizes that verification techniques and provisions must be such as to apply effectively to specific agreements. It also notes, however, that this should not preclude advance efforts in verification which would produce a source of verification principles, procedures and techniques from which disarmament negotiators might draw. Verification provisions will always have to be tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of any specific agreement to which they apply. But work should and can be done, in advance, on principles, procedures and techniques.

Canada will continue to devote great efforts and considerable resources to working out practical, workable, technical solutions to the very real problems still presented by the concept of adequate verification.

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Canada's participation in the Tbilisi Conference, the Stockholm Conference and our intense interest in the deliberations of the Group of Scientific Experts in the Conference on Disarmament, are all symbolic of our commitment. We do not pretend to provide answers applicable to any specific nation or negotiation, but we are prepared to share the experience and knowledge gained through the approach which seems to fit our circumstances. This experience may be considered useful to others.

It is in this spirit that the Canadian Government continues to commit some \$1,000,000 annually to an active Arms Control Verification programme. A broad spectrum of projects and studies has been carried out under this verification programme. It has employed not only Government resources but has co-ordinated and complemented these with others from the academic and commercial sectors. Working papers and compendia in a number of areas have been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by Canada.

Thus, last December, Canada presented to the United Nations Secretary-General, a "Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons." This document was also submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. The Handbook was the result of a study by Canadian scientists and officials and represents a practical contribution to the investigation of allegations of non-compliance with existing agreements relating to chemical and biological weapons.

Last February the Canadian Government announced its decision to spend \$3.2 million over three years to upgrade the Yellowknife Seismic Array in our Northern Territories as a major Canadian contribution to research into monitoring an eventual Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Yellowknife is recognized as a unique and sensitive location for monitoring global seismic events, including underground nuclear tests. The programme to update and modernize Yellowknife will

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enable Canada, using the best technology available, to contribute to an essential monitoring element of a negotiated test-ban treaty,

In October 1985, a two-year research grant was awarded to the University of Toronto to examine the effectiveness of using regional seismic data - in particular high-frequency seismic waves - to discriminate between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions, including those conducted in decoupled situations.

And just last month, Canada was host to a useful technical workshop on seismic wave data exchange at which many of the member countries of the Conference on Disarmament were represented.

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In the Conference on Disarmament Canada has submitted working papers on the legal régime and terminology relating to arms control and outer space. We have investigated some aspects of the technical requirements that might exist for verifying a Multilateral agreement to control space weapons. Under the "PAXSAT A" study, as it is called, we have looked at the feasibility of the practical application of space-based civilian remote-sensing techniques to verify an outer-space treaty. Results of the PAXSAT research will be made available by Canada in the Conference on Disarmament.

We have also compiled and cross-indexed several useful reference volumes of speeches and working papers in the Conference on Disarmament which have been prepared and distributed. These volumes cover a wide range of issues, including verification, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and outer space. We believe that they are valuable tools.

The proposed verification draft resolution in document A/C.1/41/L.73, now before us, draws on language and concepts which have already won general agreement from all Members of the United Nations. It repeats the conviction that for arms limitations and disarmament measures to be effective, compliance with them must be evident. It reiterates the need for arms-limitation agreements to provide for adequate measures of verification. It recognizes that form and modalities should be determined by the characteristics of the relevant agreement; it recalls our consensus that the problems of verification should be further examined. And, in pursuit of this goal, it requests the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider, at its 1987 session, verification in all its aspects.

Events over the past few months have given considerable reason for hope that concrete progress towards arms limitation and disarmament may be closer to reality than has been the case for many years. The prospect of effective arms-control

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agreements brings with it a corresponding need for effective verification methods and procedures. The importance of verification for successful arms-limitation agreements is not lessening. To the contrary, it is becoming more immediate.

As the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Clark, pointed out recently:

"Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust. The priority attention Canada has given to verification issues . . . attacks this question directly. Arms-control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security.

Verification justifies that confidence'.

Finally, our draft resolution is intended to reflect this fact, and in doing so to provide a practical means of engaging the United Nations and all its Members - especially those with experience and technology relevant to verification - in defining and making available the sound and practical means by which successful and lasting arms-control measures can be achieved.

Mr. AGSTNER (Austria) : Today my delegation would like to comment briefly on agenda item 61 (a), "Confidence-building measures". The term "confidence-building measures" is only a recent addition to our political vocabulary. Twenty years ago, only a few experts would have known the term.

Although one might consider the "Memorandum of understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the establishment of a direct communications link" - the so-called Hot-Line Agreement of 20 June 1963 - as the first confidence-building measure, it is not so much in the context of United States/Soviet relations that this new instrument came to prominence.

The first confidence-building measures were introduced by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and covered a relatively

(Mr. Agetner, Austria)

narrow set of measure*. The adoption of confidence-building **measures** may be seen as a token response to **the desire of** the group of neutral and non-aligned countries for comprehensive **arms-control** agreements within the CSCE. As the bulk **of the** military aspects of European **security** had been **transferred** to the **talks** on the mutual reduction of forces, **armaments** and **associated** measures in Central **Europe**, which had begun in Vienna **simultaneously** with the **CSCE** but without the participation **of the** neutral and non-aligned countries, negotiating confidence-building measures and including them in the Final Act appeared at the time to be some sort of compensation for excluding the neutral and non-aligned States from effective arms-control negotiations. One **could** even go so far **as** to see them only as of concern to the neutral and non-aligned States rather **than** a serious undertaking in the **area** of military security.

Such a view of confidence-building **measures** today would indeed be **inadmissible**. Today confidence-building **measures** are no longer restricted to the area of military security. In fact, there have been proposals to expand the **scope** of confidence-building **measures** into other areas, such **as** the economy.

Significant changes have taken place **over** the last decade. The General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to **disarmament**, stressed in its Final Document the necessity **to**

"take **measures** and **pursue** policies **to** strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States" (resolution S-10/2, para. 93), in order to facilitate the process of disarmament. Resolution 34/87 B requested the **Secretary-General** to carry out a comprehensive study on confidence-building **measures**.

Austria, which had already manifested its great support for confidence-building measures in the process leading to the **CSCE** Final Act, has been

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a co-sponsor of all draft resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on confidence-building measures. Two Austrian experts participated in the Group of Governmental Experts which prepared the comprehensive study just referred to. This study was a first attempt to clarify and develop the concept of confidence-building measures in the global context. Confidence, like security, was seen in the study as a result of many factors, both military and non-military.

The Austrian Government is greatly encouraged by the positive results achieved by the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. My delegation is confident that the measures contained in the Stockholm Document will contribute to the stabilization of the military situation in Europe. Although the neutral and non-aligned States did not achieve all their goals, we are very satisfied because of the considerable potential of the agreement for the further development of confidence, co-operation and security in Europe. The result of Stockholm has to be assessed against the background of the more than 10 years which had elapsed since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. During that period no further development of confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act was possible. The potential of the new measures now will have to be tested as of 1 January 1987. Austria welcomes the Stockholm Document not only for its contribution to a code of military conduct among States - which makes their military activities more predictable, thus reducing the risks of war by misunderstanding or miscalculation - but also because of its potential for the whole CSCE process.

We hope too that this first multilateral agreement, which not only expanded confidence-building measures but also included security-building measures, will provide a strong impetus to the work in other arms-control forums.

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

During its 1986 session the United Nations Disarmament Commission, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Wegener, concluded its elaboration of "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level."

My delegation is particularly pleased to note that the Commission was able to meet the deadline indicated in resolution 39/63 E and thus could submit the draft guidelines at the present session. My delegation shares the view that a confidence-building process has become increasingly important.

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

We are highly appreciative of the fact that, although confidence-building measures have already been referred to in the context of the United Nations in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and been dealt with by the United Nations comprehensive study on confidence-building measures, the experience gained in 10 years of operation of the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Final Act have now found their way into the United Nations. My delegation is, of course, aware that what has been developed in the context of the present political and military context in Europe in many cases will not lend itself to being adopted without change by other regions.

Allow me to turn briefly to the only two points where no consensus was reached and where we are offered a choice between the formulations of the 1984 Chairman's composite draft and a proposal by the socialist States, that is to say, points 2.3.3, 4 and 6. My delegation has its views on declarations of intent and has elaborated on this issue on previous occasions. As far as point 2.3.6, which deals with the question of reliable information on military activities is concerned, my delegation would like to recall its initiative on "objective information on military capabilities", which it began at the thirty-seventh session. The initiative had to be discontinued at the thirty-ninth session, when it became obvious that no ground for consensus existed between the different views of the two major military alliances on the issue.

While my delegation would obviously have preferred a consensus also on these questions, we believe, however, that it was better not to arrive at some rather empty consensus formulation, but leave the two alternative formulas in place.

As has been stated, confidence-building measures are not disarmament measures. They are, however, of great importance for overcoming the fears and

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doubts of ~~States~~ via-b-vie other States and are instrumental in creating the right Climate for disarmament. Confidence-building ~~measures~~ are a valuable tool to promote disarmament and are helping to implement those famous words from united States President F. D. Roosevelt's inaugural speech that "the only thing we have to fear ~~is~~ fear itself."

Mr. PEREZ RIVERO (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): In its statement in the general debate, the Cuban delegation referred to the top priority items on our agenda - those dealing with the prevention of nuclear war, a nuclear-test ban and the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, among others. Today, we would like to put forward some ideas on ~~certain~~ other ~~items~~ of unquestionable importance for the work of the First Committee, the Conference on ~~Disarmament~~ and the Disarmament Commission.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is one item on which major progress has been made in recent years. ~~The possiblility~~ has even been raised of the Conference on Disarmament being able to complete its work on the preparation of a convention in this regard as early as 1987.

A cursory reading of the report of the Conference on Disarmament shows, in fact, that progress ~~has~~ been made towards ~~common understanding~~ and that some of the technical complexities are beginning to be resolved. It is clear that delegations are taking up problems with greater flexibility and that there ~~is~~ a tendency to seek the common approach necessary if results acceptable to all are to be achieved.

However, there are still certain important ~~aspects~~ which have to be borne in mind and which should be pointed out, so that there will be a proper awareness of the need to confront them with sufficient determination. ~~The~~ question of binary chemical weapons is an example of the obstacles being encountered by the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Perez Rivero, Cuba)

The production of binary **chemical weapons** has introduced **new complexities** in the **work of the Conference** on Disarmament and it **has delayed the attainment of an understanding** in important **areas**. **This reality has been acknowledged more than once, and at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries**, held in **Harare from 1 to 16 September last**, the **leaders of the non-aligned countries** expressed their profound concern over the development of these weapons.

Another source of concern is **radiological weapons**. It has been pointed out that many of the functions intended for chemical weapons could be performed by radiological weapons and that the production of radiological weapons may be influenced by a ban on **chemical weapons**.

It is true that **radiological weapons, as such**, do not exist, but there is a **latent danger that they might be manufactured**. Let us not **forget** the enormous quantities of **radioactive residues** which exist in the world and the fact that science and technology geared towards **military ends** has become **highly developed** and effective.

An issue closely related to the prohibition of radiological weapons is the prohibition of **attacks on nuclear facilities**. The **Israeli** attack on the **Iraqi** civilian nuclear facilities shows that here we are not in the realm of science fiction. The protection of nuclear facilities is an imperative need which must be given priority in the Conference on Disarmament. What is at stake here is the right of all peoples, particularly the peoples of the developing countries, to engage in safe conditions in the peaceful uses of **nuclear energy**. As of the end of 1985 there were 374 nuclear power stations in the world supplying 15 per cent of the world's production of electricity. The number of such power stations will

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increase in the future. That is a fact, and these facilities may be attacked under any pretext. Therefore, they have to be protected. The need for such protection is all the greater in the developing countries, which generally lack the military capacity to deter a potential aggressor.

Allow me now to comment briefly on the question of conventional disarmament. In the opinion of my delegation, conventional disarmament cannot be considered outside the context of the priorities set by the international community in the disarmament field which focus primarily on nuclear disarmament.

As has been indicated by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the problem of conventional disarmament must be viewed jointly with negotiations for the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures and the States with the greater military arsenals bear a special responsibility in this regard.

At the regional level, it is essential to take into account the characteristics of each region, together with the need for the cessation of acts of hostility and aggression against developing countries; for an end to be put to the holding of threatening military manoeuvres which intimidate those countries; for the dismantling of foreign military bases; for the elimination of surviving colonial situations; and for putting an end to politically motivated measures of economic coercion and to any type of hostile and aggressive measures in the military, political and economic spheres, which actions compel the developing countries to invest considerable amounts of money in their defence. There can be no question of conventional disarmament for developing countries which have to endure such situations as long as these situations last; just as there can be no question for them of confidence-building measures if such situations are maintained.

(Mr. Perez Rivero, Cuba)

Another alarming **development** which we **have before us now is** the steps which are being taken to extend the **arms race into** outer space. **In Harare, the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries reaffirmed** again that **outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that it must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.** They called on the **Conference on Disarmament to** commence **negotiations** urgently to conclude an agreement **or agreements to prevent** the extension of the **arms race into outer space.**

In particular, the Heads of State or Government stressed the urgency of halting the development of anti-satellite weapons and, in particular, the need for the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons systems into outer space. The **Heads of State or Government called upon all States to adhere strictly to the existing legal restrictions and limitations on space weapons, including those contained in the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, and the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.**

My delegation cannot fail to point out that the plans of the United States Government for star wars are a flagrant violation of those agreements and are designed to carry confrontation into a new setting, and that they considerably increase the dangers of the outbreak of a nuclear holocaust, with all its attendant adverse consequences for the survival of mankind. This Committee cannot fail to acknowledge that reality and whatever resolution it adopts must point it out clearly. At the same time it must press for the commencement of serious and urgent negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament to prevent such an outcome.

Another **item** on our **agenda of priority importance for the developing countries in particular** concerns the **relationship between disarmament and development.** The **policy of pursuing military superiority, promoting the arms race and opposing concrete disarmament negotiations has led the world to a choice between war and**

(Mr. Perez Rivero, Cuba)

peace, which affects us all but has a particular impact on the developing countries, over the heads of whose inhabitants hangs the threat of tons upon tons of weapons of mass destruction, while they also have to suffer the consequences of the unjust international economic order, which has been foisted upon them until which, among other things, has caused their colossal external indebtedness.

For us the struggle for peace and the cessation of the arms race is inseparable from the struggle for development and the establishment of a new international economic order. The preparatory work for the convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development has been sufficient, in our view. We must now support the recommendation of the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee to the effect that the Conference be held in 1987, as we read in the annex to document A/C.1/41/7, which my delegation fully endorses.

I would not wish to conclude my statement without referring to an item of particular importance to us: the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. The implementation of this Declaration has been impeded by the nuclear capability of South Africa, in co-operation with the Zionist régime in Israel and the Government of the United States. This has encouraged South Africa to continue its acts of aggression against the front-line countries and to intensify its brutal internal repression.

The United States policy of constructive engagement has encouraged the Pretoria régime to spurn the decisions of the international community and press ahead with its criminal policy of apartheid. This becomes all the more alarming when we remember that South Africa already has a major nuclear capacity, as does also the Israeli Zionist régime.

(Mr. Perez Rivero, Cuba)

South Africa's **nuclear capability** and the co-operation between that **country** and certain Western States, **Israel and** the United States, **which** makes **possible the increase of South Africa's capacity, is** a serious **threat to international peace and security**. Moreover, it makes a mockery **of the demands reiterated each year by the international community for an end to nuclear co-operation with South Africa.**

We **hope that the General Assembly's resolutions on this item will be implemented, just as we** look forward **to the implementation of the resolutions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and nuclear disarmament,** together **with the General Assembly's decisions on items of vital importance for the future of mankind.** We **trust that survival, and not supremacy, will prevail.**

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French) : I wish to make **certain comments on behalf of my delegation on item 62 (e) and (f).**

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has **carried out much positive work and we hold the view, with others, that it has proved to be a valuable institution.** In the **spirit of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Institute, which experienced some difficulty at its inception, has contributed to both the enhancement of research on certain very topical disarmament issues and to keeping States and the public better informed on the positive implications of disarmament for international peace and security.**

This **explains the immediate support** given from the outset **to the establishment of UNIDIR by a number of countries, including Romania, which agreed to make available to the Institute one of its citizens as its Director.**

Pursuing the activities **carried out in previous years, the Institute's programme for 1987 includes the preparation of two studies dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the possibility of establishing an**

(Mr. Marin Ionescu, Romania)

organization for the promotion of the peaceful uses of outer space. These are questions which have been dealt with in Romanian proposals since 1982. The programme also provides for continuance of the analysis of the relationship between disarmament and development, regional disarmament and the continuation of the publication of new studies on the security of States and the reduction of armaments.

As can be seen, all these questions are of topical interest and my country has put forward specific ideas and proposals in this regard in various disarmament forums.

At the same time, I wish to say that we fully understand the concern of the Advisory Board for Disarmament Studies, which, in its capacity as the governing body of the Institute, underscores in the report submitted to the present session that the prolonged absence of the Director hampers the activity of the Institute, and the support which the Board wishes to give to the Secretary-General "in his efforts aimed at arriving at a solution satisfactory to all the parties concerned".

Since the Director in question is a Romanian citizen, I feel obliged to express my country's deep regret that the difficulties resulting from his situation have harmed the activities of the Institute, and to express our real, abiding and definite interest in seeing the activities of the Institute continuing in an appropriate way.

(Mr. Mar ineacu, Romania)

Of course, the existence and future of the Institute are not linked to the personality of its first Director. The directorship of the Institute is a matter that could be and perhaps can still be resolved in a very simple way by the appointment of another qualified person. There is no lack of candidates for the position. Such a change is inevitable, for that matter, for staff members of the United Nations since they are not appointed to a given post for life.

As regards the problems relating to the status of Mr. Rota as an international civil servant of the United Nations, we have taken the view and we remain of the view that those problems are of an administrative nature and fall within the purview of other bodies, not of the First Committee.

We have always said, and we are seeking to do so again in this forum, that the difficulties around this problem are delicate and should be the subject of discussions between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Romanian authorities.

Like the Secretary-General, we have taken the view that these discussions should lead to a satisfactory solution for the parties concerned. This of course implies that the rights and interests of all of the parties should be taken into consideration with the greatest care and attention.

It is regrettable to note that our repeated statements have not been taken in all seriousness, certain representatives seeking to play up this question as much as possible, and to exploit it for political reasons.

Facing this situation, my delegation feels that we must reply.

Hastening to respond to the requests of those same representatives, Mr. Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, read out last Friday a statement entitled "On the situation of Mr. Liviu Rota, Director of the

(Mr. Mar inescu, Romania)

Institute". Aside from certain distortions and omissions, possibly due to the haste with which it was drafted, this response contains nothing new compared to what delegations could surmise from the report of the Secretary-General to the Fifth Committee and the report of the Advisory Board for Disarmament Studies.

I could add a few details for those who wish to have additional information.

Mr. Bota was seconded to the Secretariat of the United Nations for a fixed term. He worked first at the United Nations Information Centre in Bucharest and later at the United Nations Disarmament Centre, today the Department of Disarmament Affairs, in New York. Formerly, he was for several years an attaché and then a Third Secretary at the Permanent Mission of my country to the United Nations in New York.

In 1980 Mr. Bota was appointed, first provisionally, and then for a fixed term, to the post of Director of the Institute. At the beginning of this year, the Romanian Government informed him that, after nearly 14 years, a period during which the Government agreed with the repeated renewal of his contract as an international civil servant, it wished once again to secure his services. On 12 March Mr. Bota presented to the Resident Representative of the United Nations in Bucharest his letter of resignation addressed to the Secretary-General. On the same day, I myself informed the Secretary-General of this resignation and of the fact that the Romanian Government had appointed him to an important post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conformity with his professional qualifications.

At the beginning, Mr. Bota worked for a short time at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the post entrusted to him. He then stated that, as a result of the fact that his resignation had not been accepted, he still considered himself the Director of the Institute. Consequently, he installed himself at the Information Centre in Bucharest, from where he is virtually directing the activities of the Institute.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

In connection with Mr. Martenson's statement, I wish to add a few points, in particular the following.

A visit to Bucharest at the beginning of this year by a special envoy of the Secretary-General did not take place for reasons that cannot be attributed in any way to the Romanian authorities. For objective reasons, the Romanian Minister could not receive the envoy on the date indicated, and he therefore proposed another date on which to receive him.

It is to say the least surprising that there should be references to the lack of an official response to the steps taken by the Secretary-General. In addition to the official correspondence exchanged with the Romanian Mission, in repeated discussions I brought to the attention of the Secretary-General the viewpoint of the Romanian authorities with regard to various aspects of this affair. What is communicated by a Permanent Representative, is of course done on the authority and instructions of his Government and is therefore of an official character.

Finally, we are, like the Secretary-General, convinced that it is a matter of correctly applying the regulations governing the conditions of employment of United Nations staff. But those regulations are not subject to unilateral and exclusive interpretation. For example, we cannot support the interpretation that a resignation must necessarily be submitted in person, while the Staff Regulations refer to that as one possibility.

This is a formal problem of procedure, of course, which certainly has its importance, but it is not the most important. Much more important are questions of substance and of principle in this case.

The first is that Mr. Bota became an international civil servant only with the agreement of the Romanian authorities. He served the United Nations for nearly 14 years. Throughout the period in which he worked as a staff member of the

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

United Nations, Mr. Bota was, and remains today, a Romanian citizen. Consequently, the Government of my country has the right, in conformity with the prerogatives of the Romanian State with regard to its citizens, to recall him whenever it deems it necessary to do so. The Romanian authorities believe that the resignation that Mr. Bota addressed to the Secretary-General on 12 March of this year is a text which fully expresses the intent of the signatory. Following his action, the Romanian Government offered the Romanian citizen Liviu Bota all the necessary conditions for him to continue his activities in Romania.

(Mr. Marin ~~escu~~, Romania)

I turn now to the second particularly serious aspect of this case. The fact that the person whom we are discussing here was in the service of the United Nations for many years does not in any way signify that he should not respect the laws of his country. As a citizen of the Socialist Republic of Romania, he is subject to the laws of the Republic and is obliged strictly to respect them. Those laws, as in general the laws of any country, prohibit Romanian citizens from placing themselves in the service of foreign information services. The moderation and the clemency displayed by the Romanian authorities should not be misinterpreted with respect to their unswerving position of principle.

First, the Romanian State cannot tolerate, and never will tolerate, such violations of its laws. Secondly, no privilege or immunity, no reference to United Nations texts can be invoked and much less accepted as a justification or a cover for such activities which are totally incompatible with the status of an international civil servant, in the case of any such civil servant, including the case of Liviu Bota.

The competent bodies of Romania have concrete proof that, during the period of his service in the United Nations system, Bota placed himself in the pay of certain foreign espionage service. It is true that during the talks that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania and the Secretary-General held on 30 September this year, there was also discussion of this case and that it was agreed that the discussion should continue. But the question is this: where and how, through whom and in what context, in what atmosphere and under what conditions, and especially within which parameters, should we seek a correct solution satisfactory to all the parties concerned?

The other day YK. Martenson refused to give me a simple answer to some very clear questions, that is to say, in dealing with administrative and personnel matters, should such a question be discussed in the First Committee? Secondly,

(Mr. Marinăescu, Romania)

can one at the same time and in parallel fashion discuss the same question stated in an identical way in two different committees? Since he himself cannot be a sponsor of the draft resolution on this subject, Mr. Martenson obviously wishes to appear at least as a spiritual sponsor. But this refusal to answer - and he was thanked for this immediately - does need a reply. He confirms in fact what we have said and what many other representatives are saying, even if they have not taken part in this artificial discussion which is out of place, namely, that good sense itself dictates that the First Committee has nothing to discuss in connection with such a question, one which is not a disarmament problem or a problem having anything to do with international security.

From the outset we wished this case to be resolved with all the discretion and sense of responsibility that is necessary these days for maintaining the prestige of the United Nations and of the staff members of the Secretariat. We had hoped that our moderation would be understood and that all those who show interest would display a spirit of co-operation. I wish once again to emphasize that I made this statement following a campaign waged for several months, using false allegations, speculation, rumours and other means unworthy of the status of those using them, several times with gross provocations organized in this House itself.

Perhaps all of this agitation into which some delegations wish to draw the First Committee as well can be explained by the fear that the Rota affair will inevitably come to an end in a way that usually happens in similar cases.

I wish to express the gratitude of my delegation to the representatives who, while expressing their concern over the situation of the Institute, understand the delicate nature of this case and have deemed it proper to deal with it with appropriate prudence.

(Mr. Mar inescu, Romania)

Since the **discussion at this session has been conducted so far without confrontation, perhaps those** who **like confrontation missed** its absence. Thus there **was a need to stage a confrontation.** The subject may **seem tempting to them since** it involves an Eastern European country **and, at the same time, distracts our attention from the substantive issues before this Committee.**

The **true motive which** has nothing to **do with Bota's situation as an individual may be the desire of some to create an issue, to place the Romanian authorities in conflict with the United Nations, to give credence to the idea that we are** undermining the authority **of the Secretary-General. That is entirely false.** The **participation of Romania in the United Nations, the support that it has consistently given to the Secretary-General in substantive political problems, its resolute action to strengthen the role and authority of the United Nations in the solution of problems which the Organization is facing today attest to our good faith, our real and abiding interest to see the United Nations as a more viable, credible and active organization. These are facts and not mere words. They cannot be ignored or forgotten.**

The change in **Bota's decision to resign was essential to the staging of this affair, and Bota entered into the spirit of the game.** The discussion of his **position as an international civil servant by this Committee, a Committee that deals with disarmament and international security matters, is very significant in unveiling the political aim pursued by those who are behind the campaign waged over this case.**

Equally significant are the insistence and the haste with which action has been taken to compromise the chances of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problem in the interests of all the parties truly concerned. I wish to state that fundamentally the Romanian authorities have nothing for which to reproach themselves. The Romanian Government acted in conformity with its sovereign right

(Mr. Mar inescu, Romania)

to defend its interests, rights that cannot be challenged. The hope that by using so-called methods of pressure the hand of the Romanian authorities would be forced it3 quite naive. It is even more unrealistic to believe that such a result could be achieved with a draft resolution.

In essence, Bota never ceased to be a Romanian citizen. His obligation not to act contrary to the interests and laws of his country never ceased, the more so since these interests and laws are in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations which reject interference in the internal affairs of States and any infringement of their sovereign rights. We believed, and we continue to believe, that despite the difficulties, a solution can be found by taking into account the rights and interests of the parties involved. We continue to believe that discreet diplomacy and respect for the interests of all, and not noisy campaigns, will lead us to a solution. We also believe that it is only in that spirit that we should interpret the existing regulations in this matter.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

Probably some representatives will find it appropriate to continue referring to the Rota case in this Committee. Of course, nothing can prevent them from doing so - except their own integrity.

For its part, my delegation believes that this explanation should suffice. I regret that I have had to make it in this forum. We have proceeded in this way despite the fact that our statements are supported by the evidence. But we do not wish to prolong a discussion that has already become painful. We believe that all of us have the obligation to maintain the Committee's discussions, at least - if not the results - at a level of responsibility that corresponds to the seriousness and importance of the problems before the Committee.

As my last point, I would say this: Since Mr. Martenson responded so quickly to the requests - I was tempted to say "instructions" - coming from this room, by assuring the Committee that his statement would be distributed as soon as possible (and indeed that was done in the following minutes), I wonder whether this very good but, to our regret, rather rare example of efficiency could not be repeated more frequently and in a less preferential way. 't be it from me to claim such special treatment, but I do entertain the hope that the statement I have just made in this meeting will be distributed in the official records of the Committee during this session at least, and that it will be correctly reflected in the press release of the Department of Public Information.

The Chairman: There are still three names on the list of speakers for this morning's meeting: the German Democratic Republic, Denmark and Angola. The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs has requested to be allowed to speak. I shall call on him after the representatives, of the three countries whose names I have just read out have spoken.

Mr. KAHN (German Democratic Republic) : My delegation wishes to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Obligations of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations". It is contained in document A/C.1/41/L.13.

The draft resolution draws on the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and particularly on paragraph 28, which states, inter alia, that al.1 the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations.

The necessity of giving a positive impetus to the work in bilateral and multilateral negotiating bodies derives from the present state of the negotiations, on which many speakers outlined their views in the general debate. My delegation wishes to introduce also at this General Assembly session a draft resolution which calls upon States to start, conduct and intensify disarmament negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving concrete agreements. This call is fully in conformity with the resolve reaffirmed by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty at the Bucharest meeting of its Committee of Foreign Ministers on 14 and 15 October last

"to further and deepen their political dialogue with the other States with a view to building up confidence and strengthening understanding, reaching palpable disarmament accords, and ensuring peace".

Dialogue and negotiations producing concrete results are more imperative than ever before, and, as recent developments and events have shown, it is indeed possible to conduct them successfully. For that reason, the preamble to the draft resolution welcomes as a new element the moratorium on all nuclear explosions which has been carried out by one nuclear-weapon State as an expression of the political will to cease the nuclear-arms race and promote negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. As to bilateral negotiations, the draft resolution welcomes the Joint Statement by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

Republics, in which they expressed their intention, inter alia, to accelerate negotiations on space and nuclear weapons. Moreover, emphasis is laid on the significance of a number of priority measures which should be implemented by the two States as a major contribution to halting the arms race and proceeding to disarmament - that is, the prohibition of space-strike weapons, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the radical reduction of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution also welcomes proposals aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000.

The operative part of the present draft resolution is largely identical to that of the draft presented last year. But a new paragraph is included which appeals to all nuclear-weapon States to enter into a dialogue on ways and means to strengthen peace and achieve disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. That idea was repeatedly expressed in the general debate.

As in previous years, my delegation is looking forward to successful co-operation, on a basis of trust, with the delegation of Yugoslavia in order to combine the present draft resolution with that contained in document A/C.1/41/L.53. Such a move would respond to the appeal to reduce the number of draft resolutions on one and the same subject.

Mr. KORSGAARD-PETERSEN (Denmark) : I have asked to speak today in order to introduce the draft resolution entitled "General and complete disarmament: conventional disarmament" and contained in document A/C.1/41/L.17. It relates to agenda item 60 (c) .

As will be recalled, the Secretary-General presented to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces. Having considered the study, the General Assembly adopted a resolution by consensus in which Member States were requested to make available their views on it.

(Mr. Kor ~~sgaard-Peder sen~~, Denmark)

Last year the General Assembly adopted also by consensus a resolution concerning the study on conventional disarmament In which it invited Member States that had not yet done so to present their views on the study and decided to include in the agenda of the forty-first session of the General Assembly a provisional agenda item entitled: 'Conventional disarmament'.

In the view of my delegation, the many positive replies conveyed to the Secretary-General constitute important contributions to further deliberations and can be seen as a token of the widespread interest in and support for further consideration within the United Nations system of conventional disarmament.

The increased concern over conventional armament and the necessity of conventional disarmament characterized a number of statements at the thirty-ninth and fortieth General Assembly session.

(Hr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

In the context of general statements at the eighth session of the Disarmament Commission, numerous references were made to conventional armaments under agenda item 4. It should be remembered that those statements were made by a widely representative group of States.

As stated in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly,

"Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects) and reduction of armed forces.. (resolution S-10/2)

At the same time, paragraph 46 stated that

"Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently." (resolution S-10/2)

Taking that into account, it is encouraging that an increased number of countries have pointed out that, in spite of the threats of nuclear weapons, nobody can ignore the enormous cost in resources in lives caused by conflicts waged by conventional arms.

However, the problems involved are not solved by the adoption of resolutions, but through negotiations. My country considers that the United Nations has an important role to play in this process. We also think that the study on conventional disarmament could assist us all in further discussions. As mentioned in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, it is proposed by my country that the Disarmament Commission should consider at its forthcoming session in 1987 the question of conventional disarmament on the basis of the recommendations and conclusions contained in the study on conventional disarmament, as well as all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

identification of possible measures in the field of conventional-arms reduction and disarmament.

With a view to assisting the consideration of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution proposes that the Disarmament Department should prepare an analysis of the views received from Member States regarding the study on conventional disarmament. We are convinced that the Department for Disarmament Affairs will prepare this analysis in a balanced and objective way.

I hope that the Committee will be in a position to support the draft resolution and that it will be adopted by the Committee without a vote.

Mr. DE FIGUEIREDO (Angola): Since this is the first time my delegation has spoken in the First Committee at the forty-first session of the General Assembly, please accept, Sir, our best wishes to you and to the other officers of the Committee on your election to your posts of this very important Committee, whose work and its outcome may well affect the survival of life as we know it.

The Committee is at present engaged in a discussion on 20 agenda items, from agenda item 46 to 65. Each of those agenda items deals with one or more aspects of the mandate of the Committee, and all of those aspects are important and vital for the continuation of life on Earth and for the atmosphere.

My Government's position on general and complete disarmament - and, indeed on the entire issue of war and armaments - is well known. As a committed member of the Non-Aligned Movement and one that participates most actively in non-aligned activities and in the spelling out of its policies and programmes, the position of the Government of Angola on disarmament is expressed in its complete support of the Non-aligned position.

(Mr. De Figueiredo, Angola)

All of us, collectively, bear too great a responsibility for this globe and its environment to abdicate that responsibility and vest it only on the nuclear "club". Even those of us who have no heavy stake in armaments, either as producers or consumers, have a vested interest in disarmament. Even those of us who have no nuclear capability have a vested interest in nuclear-free zones, for, unfortunately, it is our countries and peoples that form the primary battlefield whenever imperialism rears its ugly head - in fact, in what is called the cold war.

Not only does imperialism take good care to develop, maintain and increase its own nuclear and non-nuclear capability; it does the same for that of its allies in strategic spots around the world. Hence, we have seen the proliferation of United States military bases all over the world and the establishment of facilities for military forces, including nuclear-weapon carriers.

To take our own region of southern Africa as an example, Western imperialism has assisted the apartheid régime over the past two decades to develop its armaments, including its nuclear-arm capability, so that now South Africa can hold much of sub-Saharan Africa hostage to its nuclear attacks. That hostile reach can easily extend all over the South Atlantic as well.

Similarly, the United States base in Diego Garcia can launch a nuclear attack in that zone, while the United States military presence in the Pacific has so far been an issue on which not much international attention has been focused. We read in the media yesterday that the United States 82nd Airborne Division is carrying out manoeuvres for a simulated attack in Central America. That is, 40,000 troops are being trained in attack on what is called hostile territory - and that hostile territory is not a desert, a jungle or a moonscape peopled by aliens. It is the

(Mr. De Figueiredo, Angola)

homeland of other nations, but, by abstracting and dehumanizing the issue, a super-Power can sell its war to a gullible public.

And what of a developing country like the People's Republic of Angola, which is not a nuclear Power, which has no nuclear capability or programme and whose main activity since independence in 1975 has been national reconstruction and the defence of our sovereignty and territorial integrity from the constant attacks by the racist régime of South Africa? For the majority of Angolans, the agenda items being debated at United Nations Headquarters have an air of abstraction and distance. What is much more immediate for them is the war in their daily lives being inflicted on them by the racist armed forces of South Africa and the hired mercenaries, bandits and terrorists it employs to propagate its policies in southern Africa.

For such people, disarmament should mean not just the avoidance of war in the stratosphere, not just reduction in nuclear weapons, not just a decrease in the number of warheads a delivery system can carry. For them, disarmament in all its aspects should also mean a cessation of the war in their lives, a cessation of the racist attacks against them, a cessation in the illegal occupation of their country, a cessation in the destruction to their property and livelihood. It means their inalienable right to peace.

Hence, the work of the Committee should be seen in concrete, immediate terms, not in abstractions for some distant future. For us, the future is now. It is already here, and there may be none for our children unless we immediately stop the insanity of those who produce, sell, buy or could use arms and armaments, whose production and use costs are so staggering that the price of one tank could save countless children's lives in developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America from sickness and death.

(Mr. D e Figueiredo, Angola)

Nuclear testing is an aggression against **a fragile** environment **which** has kept **its** balance for **millenia** but **is now slowly** giving way to **the determined** onslaught of human hostility.

Often, **we all tend** to speak in **abstractions:** the **globe, the planet,** the environment. **Do we realize we** are talking about our **lives,** the **lives of our children and** the **horror we** and they would be wndemned to by the **nuclear** winter?

(Mr. de Figueiredo, Angola)

Both development and peace are inalienable human rights. There can be no development without peace, and no peace without development. There can be no peace without general and complete disarmament. There can be no disarmament without concrete action. There can be no concrete action without political commitment. There can be no political commitment without political will. And there can be no expression of political will without a leadership committed to peace.

So we come full circle back to people whose unflinching commitment to peace gives their leadership no other course of action but towards disarmament and peace. The key is that disarmament precedes peace and is a condition for it, not vice versa.

The struggle continues. Victory is certain.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

Mr. MARTENSON (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs): I shall be brief, because I do not think it would be appropriate for me as a member of the Secretariat to engage in a debate with a representative of a Member country. However, if the interpretation from French into English was correct, a while ago I was accused of two things: of being a spiritual co-sponsor of a certain draft resolution and of having made a reply on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General in haste on instructions from the floor. It goes without saying that I strongly reject that completely unacceptable statement.

I have been serving the United Nations for more than seven years and I assure the Committee that the only person in this world to give me any instructions is the Secretary-General of this Organization.

With regard to my reply to the First Committee the other day, it was fully in conformity with rule 112 of rules of procedure and in response to 12 Member countries which had asked a question of the Secretary-General, who requested me to give the reply that I then read out..

(Mr. Marienson)

With regard to further elaboration of the question raised by the representative of Romania, I should like to suggest - since I am not an expert in the formalistic approach - that my colleague from the Legal Office be asked to explain the situation.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the Office of Legal Affairs.

The representative of Romania has asked to be allowed to speak. I shall call on him if it is on a point of order.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): It is normally an opinion given by the Legal Counsel after a request; opinions are not given on the initiative of anyone in the Secretariat. I do not mind at all listening to the representative of the Legal Counsel; however, I wish yet again to point out the extent to which certain Secretariat officials seem to be doing their utmost to keep the attention of the First Committee focused on this unfortunate case - which is quite out of place in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is no objection, I shall call on the representative of the Office of Legal Affairs to clarify this Point.

Hr. BORG OLIVIER (Office of Legal Affairs): The representative of Romania in his statement commented on the propriety of the statement of the Under-Secretary-General on the matter that has been discussed in the Committee. In this connection, the representative of Romania asked specifically whether the matter which was the subject of the Under-Secretary-General's statement should be discussed in the First Committee. He also asked whether it was proper for the same matter to be discussed simultaneously in the First and Fifth Committees.

On the first point, I wish to draw attention to rule 112 of the rules of procedure which applies to committees and which gives the Secretary-General or his designated representative the right to make statements to the Committee at any time

(Mr. Borg Olivier)

and on any matter which is under consideration by the Committee. I do not believe there is any question for the basis of the statement. I wish to add that the question under discussion -

The CHAIRMAN: I apologize for interrupting the speaker, but again a point of order is being raised by the representative of Romania on whom I call.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): I am compelled to comment again that that is beside the point. I never challenged the Secretary-General's right to present any information or to make a statement on whatever item. All I did - and I was not given an answer and I am not being given one now; people are avoiding the subject of my question - was ask whether the item is a proper one for discussion in the First Committee, not whether the Secretary-General is entitled to make statements. The fact that is a new distortion. I have lost count of the distortions that have occurred, and I doubt whether this will be the last one.

I addressed Mr. Martenson as Under-Secretary-General. I wanted to know whether or not this item can properly be discussed in the First Committee. I simply wanted his view on the propriety of its being discussed in the First Committee. It did not involve the Secretary-General.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs to respond to the question.

Mr. MARTENSON (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs): I should like to respond in the sense that I should like to ask my friend from the Office of Legal Affairs to answer for me because I am not that well versed in all the intricacies of this matter that has been raised. That is merely my humble suggestion for your consideration, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the Office of Legal Affairs.

Mr. BORG OLIVIER (Office of Legal Affairs): The reason I referred to rule 112 was to indicate that it says the Secretary-General may make a statement on a matter under discussion. The issue is whether or not the matter is under discussion in the Committee. I apologize if I misled some members in another direction; that was not my intention.

The reports before the First Committee on this item are contained in documents A/41/676 and A/41/666, both of which contain references to the subject-matter discussed in the Under-Secretary-General's statement.

(Mr. Borg Olivier)

So, on that basis alone, from a legal point of view, they are a proper matter for discussion in the First Committee. I am aware that the general subject of respect for the privileges and immunities of officials of the United Nations is an item before the Fifth Committee and that there is another comprehensive report on that subject in the Fifth Committee, but it is certainly not unusual for different Committees of the General Assembly to determine that it is within their competence to discuss different aspects of the same item.

With regard to the item before the First Committee, it concerns the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDXR), which is an institute on disarmament created on the proposal of the First Committee, so from a legal standpoint, I consider that the matter is properly a matter for discussion in the First Committee.

If, of course, there is a question about this, the Committee itself can determine whether it is competent to continue discussion on the subject, under rule 121 of the rules of procedure.

The CHAIRMAN: Having heard the statements made in this Committee, I should like once again to request and appeal to all delegations kindly to concentrate on substantive questions which concern all mankind and which are to be dealt with as agenda items in our Committee. In that connection, I should like to point out that the content of this question is also being considered under agenda item 117 (b), "Personnel questions: Respect for the privileges and immunities of officials of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and related organizations". Members are aware of the fact that this item is not before the First Committee.

I call on the representative of Australia on a point of order.

Ms. LETTS (Australia) : I should merely like to recall that, as items 62 (e) and (f) are substantive items on our agenda dealing with the question of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the question that has been the subject of discussion for the past half hour or so is in fact a substantive item.

The CHAIRMAN: In my capacity as Chairman of this Committee, I requested and appealed to delegations to concentrate on the main issues before this Committee. This is the very last day of our second phase; we are approaching the most decisive phase of our work, the consideration of and action upon draft resolutions. I hope we shall make progress on this very important subject.

I wish now to inform members that the following delegations are scheduled to speak at this afternoon's meeting: Poland, Bangladesh, Togo, the Ukrainian SSR, Somalia, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Samoa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland speaking on behalf of the 12 member states of the European Community, and India.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.