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**Chairman: Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)**

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

**AGENDA ITEMS 46 TO 65 AND 144 (continued)**

**STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE**

**Mr. LOWITZ** (United States of America): Today the United States delegation is introducing a draft resolution under agenda item 59, "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". Ambassador Okun, in the United States statement before this body on 22 October, indicated our intention to do so, in order to follow up on our initiative at the fortieth session of the General Assembly. I am pleased to announce that the draft resolution is being submitted under the co-sponsorship, as of now, of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Uruguay.

In both 1984 and 1985 the General Assembly voted by a large majority to condemn any and all use of chemical weapons and any other actions in contravention of existing relevant international accords. Despite this condemnation, there have been instances again this year of the use of chemical weapons. Such violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 make it even more incumbent upon this body again to place on record its conviction that the use of chemical weapons must cease and that all nations must strictly observe existing international instruments and obligations in respect to this abhorrent form of warfare.

Another disquieting dimension of the erosion of restraint with regard to chemical weapons stems from the spread of these weapons. In 1963 some five States possessed a chemical weapons capability. Today 15 or more States are in this category. The draft resolution I am introducing on chemical weapons will lend the support of the General Assembly to efforts to prevent the spread of chemical weapons.

(Hr. Lowitz, United States)

My delegation hopes that this draft resolution will serve as a reproach to those States that have used chemical weapons and dissuade them from doing so again. We hope that it will encourage nations to take appropriate action to restrict the export of chemicals with potential for use in chemical weapons.

My delegation also fully expects this draft resolution to give an impetus to the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament that are aiming at completion of a convention to ban these weapons from the face of the earth. Those negotiations have intensified and this is a welcome development. They should now build on the strong foundation that has been set in place. The United States again places on record its strong support for the chemical weapons negotiations. A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons - an effective and verifiable ban - is the best way to eliminate the threat of their future use and spread.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The United States delegation invites the full support of all **members** of **this** Committee for **this** draft resolution.

In its **statement** of 22 October the **United** States also addressed the importance of States parties complying with and **implementing** arms limitation and disarmament agreements and indicated that the United States **and others** would once again introduce a draft resolution on this indispensable element of the disarmament endeavour. Today the United States introduced a draft resolution on **compliance and** non-compliance, under the agenda item dealing with general and **complete** disarmament. The United States **is** pleased to **submit** **this** draft resolution with the **co-sponsorship, as** of this time, of Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and Spain.

In introducing a similar draft resolution last year, my delegation pointed out that signing an arms **control** or arms limitation agreement **is** not **the** end of effective **arms** control. After the agreement enters into force faithful adherence to the terms of the agreement is required if its purposes are to be realized. The widespread **acceptance** of this reality, as reflected in the strong support resolution **40/94** L received in the General Assembly last year, was an encouraging expression of the international community's **commitment** to serious disarmament **efforts**.

We believe that compliance with **agreements** lays the groundwork **for** effective negotiation for further arms limitation. This is so because negotiating parties are more likely to reach agreement if they **work** in an **atmosphere** of **greater** mutual trust predicated on a history of **compliance** with existing agreements. Negotiation **are** also facilitated when the negotiators have confidence that the **international** **community** as a whole, and **not** just the negotiating parties alone, is **committed** to **ensuring compliance** with agreements.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

We hope that this new draft resolution will gain even wider approval than did resolution 40/94 L. Such an outcome would improve the prospects for full compliance with existing agreements and send a message of strong support to disarmament negotiators in all forums - multilateral, regional and bilateral - so that their efforts to develop new agreements will be fully successful.

Mr. McDOWELL (New Zealand) : I speak on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, the members of the South Pacific Forum that are also Members of the United Nations. We wish to address the question of nuclear-free zones, which is before this Committee under items 46, 49 and 50.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco will always hold pride of place for having created the first nuclear-free zone covering an inhabited part of the world. A second such zone, contiguous with the first, has now been created in the South Pacific. The South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty, commonly known as the Rarotonga Treaty, has now been signed by 10 of the South Pacific countries, of which five have already ratified. Samoa is the latest addition to the ratification list.

Although some of our members would have preferred a more comprehensive measure, we believe that the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty is a significant addition to the existing arms control and disarmament régime. We also believe that it will make an important contribution to the region's favourable security environment.

Several South Pacific delegations have already spoken here about the form and the objectives of the nuclear-free zone, so I will not cover this ground again today. What we do wish to do is acknowledge and comment briefly on what other delegations have said about the South Pacific zone in the course of our debates here.

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

We have been encouraged by the number and the warmth of those references. It is heartening to learn that the initiative is so widely supported. By our reckoning, countries from every regional and political grouping in this Organisation have welcomed the proposed establishment of the zone. We are grateful for these expressions of support. We have been gratified too by the indications from some of the States eligible to sign the Protocols that signature will receive favourable consideration. That is doubly encouraging.

We are also grateful for the support that the wider international community has given outside this room to the initiative. It has, for example, been welcomed by States participating in the Third Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons last year. Just last month the 132-member joint assembly of Asian, Caribbean, Pacific and European Economic Community parties to the Lomé Convention passed a resolution endorsing the treaty.

We have to say, nevertheless, that we were greatly disappointed over the statement made by one delegation in this Committee. The representative of France noted that his country had had discussions in Paris earlier this year with a delegation made up of the sponsors of the Rarotonga Treaty. He emphasized that France took a great interest in these discussions. South Pacific Forum countries in turn were pleased that the beginnings of a dialogue with France took place, because of the importance they attach to the regional initiative.

In his statement in this Committee, however, the representative of France went on to say:

"On the pretext" - I underline the word "pretext" - 'of establishing a denuclearization régime - without any reason, given the absence of any threat of proliferation in the region - the Treaty would attempt to impose a régime discriminatory with regard to France.' (A/C.1/41/PV.10, p. 79)

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

Setting aside the **implied** suggestion that the only reason for setting up a nuclear-free zone is to halt nuclear proliferation - which **is quite** misleading - we wish to examine briefly the implication of what has been said.

It is being suggested that the South Pacific countries, in setting up a nuclear-free zone, are **simply** using this as an excuse to take an **anti-France stand**. It is true that in the area of **nuclear** testing the Treaty would restrict **France** in its current activities. But that is not to say it is anti-French. To do so would be similar to **characterizing** Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which France has signed, as being **directed against** those countries **which** had responsibility for territories within that region. If it really is the belief **of** the delegation of France that this Treaty is anti-French, that **illustrates** vividly the need for further discussions.

**The** people of the South Pacific have no interest in taking an anti-French **stand**. The setting up of the zone is not an **expression** of any **cultural** or political bias. It is an expression of the deeply felt and sincerely held **view** of the **peoples** of the region that they want their part of the world to **be** nuclear free. They are saying, inter alia, that after **40** years of being used **as** a testing ground by remote nuclear Powers they want an end to it.

According to the French representative's statement, the South **Pacific** countries seek to impose a **"régime** discriminatory with **regard to France"** (A/C. 1/41/PV. 10, p. 79). We are being accused of making an adverse distinction **with** regard to France by setting up this nuclear-free **zone**. We are not. We of the South Pacific feel no animosity towards France. We seek no confrontation with that great **country**. **We** seek a peaceful resolution of those disputes in our region in which France is involved. Let us pursue this path rather than attribute false and misleading motives to the **countries** and peoples of **the** South Pacific.

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

I conclude by **saying** that the **Treaty neither discriminates** nor imposes obligationa on any country against **its will**. The Treaty concerns more than the **question** of nuclear testing. It will, far **example**, augment the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of **Nuclear Weapons**. It will do so not only by ensuring that South Pacific countries do not possess **nuclear** weapons themselves but **also** by ensuring that the nuclear weapons of other countries are not **stationed** on their territories. **It** will prohibit the **dumping** by **its parties** of **radioactive** waste **at sea** within the **zone**. It contains **extensive** and effective control and verification provisions. Obligations under **the** Treaty will pertain to **its** parties only. Obligations contained in the three Protocol6 to the Treaty, to which we have referred, will pertain only to those eligible State8 which choose to assume them. so the South Pacific countries attach very great importance to such adherence by the nuclear-weapon **States**. We hope that all five will eventually Sign up.



Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria) : In looking back at the outcome of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to begin by making some general remarks. Having served as Chairman of the Conference for the month of June 1986, I also feel that it is my duty to include some additional comments in my analysis.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament opened in an atmosphere of heightened political expectation8 prompted by the outcome of the Geneva summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. The "spirit of Geneva" did not, however, materialize in the Conference on Disarmament. No concrete agreements could be reached which would have pushed the Conference out of its lethargic impasse. Such an assessment would be basically correct and yet, on the other hand, it would fail to convey the important and most encouraging characteristics of the session this year.

The issues of a nuclear test ban, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space were addressed by the majority of delegations in a manner that reflected a new sense of urgency and responsibility. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons were further intensified, raising hopes that a convention could be concluded in the immediate future. This important work was characterized by a growing awareness that a new political philosophy and new practical approaches are required for strengthening international and national security and for reaching disarmament agreements.

The socialist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular, did provide, in my opinion, an example of such innovative and far-reaching political thinking.

The January 1986 Declaration of General Secretary M. Gorbachev outlined the firm intention and concrete proposals of the Soviet Union to rid the world of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century. This

(Mr. Telialov, Bulgaria)

exceptional document **attracted** the attention of the Conference and was **frequently** referred to by many delegations throughout the eight months of the session. The Soviet approach was further **elaborated** in a **special message** by the Soviet leader addressed to the Conference on Disarmament.

The **communiqué** and the appeal issued by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty at their Budapest meeting in June **1986** calling upon the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and all European countries to **work out a programme** for the **reduction** of armed forces and **conventional armaments** in Europe, **is** undoubtedly yet another demonstration of their readiness to foster maximum co-operation with other countries in **promoting** disarmament. These two documents adopted at the highest level of the socialist countries played a lasting role during the session. Thus, on practically all agenda items the Soviet delegation **and** the delegates of the other socialist countries put forward ideas and concrete proposals of a markedly **constructive** nature.

This was further reaffirmed in the **message addressed** in June to the Conference on Disarmament by my President, Todor **Zhivkov**, who stated on the **issue** of **international** co-operation in **achieving** nuclear disarmament:

"The world is at a crossroads in its evolution. Either the old behaviour **stereotypes** in the efforts of States to guarantee security will have to be abandoned, or we shall all fall victim to the **consequences** of the dangerous arms race. A nuclear catastrophe **is** a common threat. A salutary choice could only be made by all States working together regardless of their **geographic location**, level of economic development or **socio-political** system."

I should like also to **emphasize** that at the Conference **we** witnessed the intensified efforts and a new interest of the non-aligned countries, notably on the issues of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Tellalov, Rulgar la)

The **proposals** of the Group of 21, **including** the ideas of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, offer realistic solution<sup>6</sup> to the **problems** of a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament, thus **reinforcing** the conviction that new **political** thinking and an innovative approach will **eventually** prevail in the Conference on Disarmament.

Proceeding to **assess** the **Conference's** work in 1986 in view of the **aforementioned** criterion, I have to note with regret that not all our partners in the Conference share the political will and readiness of the socialist **countries** and the Group of 21 to take concrete steps. We failed to detect any **sign**, Particularly in the position of the United States delegation, of an inclination to give up the old **approach** which is based on egocentric notion<sup>6</sup> of international security. The unrestrained ambition of the military-industrial complex have exerted a most negative influence in **this respect**.

**In speaking** of a new political philosophy for **tackling** problems in the field of disarmament, I should like to **pay particular** attention to the issue of a nuclear test ban. With one notable **exception**, the **delegations** to the conference were fully convinced of the key importance of an agreement to ban nuclear-weapon **tests**. The unilateral soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions has continued in 1986 and the constructive approach of the Soviet Government to the solution of **this** problem indeed **impressed** the **members** of the Conference. It has become crystal **clear** that in **order** to achieve a breakthrough in international relations, there must be a halt to **nuclear-weapon** testing. This is the single most important measure that could create conditions for a real end to the nuclear arms race and its prevention in outer **space**. **By rejecting** the concrete proposals on this issue and ignoring the explicit will of all Member States, the American delegation indicated that nothing of substance had changed **in its** approach to the fundamental **questions** of disarmament.

(Mr. Tellov, Bulgaria)

Encouraged by the prospects for a positive turn in the work of the Conference, a number of delegations supported the idea of organizing a series of informal meetings on agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"; these meetings were held in June and July 1986. The statements of those delegations, some of them containing interesting and far-sighted ideas, demonstrated a generally shared awareness of the necessity to reduce and ultimately completely destroy nuclear arms, preventing at the same time the militarization of outer space.

The discussion on agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", was also a rather lively one. Judging by the number of statements and proposals, some of them submitted by Argentina, China and Bulgaria, the session this year was marked by the growing interest of delegations in the central issue of averting the nuclear menace. Regrettably, the Western Group once again demonstrated political thinking which is based on the pursuit of military and technological superiority.

(Mr. TELLALOV, Bulgaria)

Roth the • uhntanc4 and the form of the **negotiations** on chemical weapons **have** indicated that **the** task of **reaching** an agreement on the prohibition of **these** **horrible weapons** **is** a feasible one. In this **respect**, my delegation **would** like to **emphasize** the important momentum which the Soviet **Union** **has** imparted to these **negotiations** **through** its proposals of 15 January **1986** which were further **elaborated** **in the Conference** on Disarmament on 22 April **1986**.

**These** proposals and **the** constructive negotiating position of the socialist countries in the Ad Hoc **Committee** on Chemical Weapons contributed to the **successful**, though not entirely complete, **resolution** of the probleme concerning **one** **of** the most important parts of the Convention, namely, the net of provisions regarding chemical weapons **stocks** and the relevant production base in articles **II**, **III**, **IV** and **V**. **We** are convinced that all efforts **should** be made to **negotiate** **as** **soon** **as** **possible** the remaining sections of these provisions, since that would **open** up new prospects for solving the problems connect **d** with other sections of the draft convention. The **Bulgarian** nelegation **is** prepared to contribute to this **end**, **as** it did in 1985 and 1986, and **we** call upon all other interested delegations to make **the** most effective use of the **forthcoming** multilateral **consultations** in Geneva.

In view **of** the decisive stage which the **negotiations** on chemical weapons have **entered**, the continued resolute display of **political will** on the part **of** all **parties** concerned is now of the **utmost** importance. States should refrain from any action which may **jeopardize** the neqotiationa and, In particular, should **refrain** from the production and deployment of binary and **other** new types of chemical **weapons**.

**My** delegatinn notes with **partic ular** satisfaction that the work of **the** Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an **Arms** Race in Outer Space revealed a determination not to Permit the appearance of space strike weapns which would be **extremely**

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

dangerous and **destabilizing** to international **secu** rity. Thanks to a number of concrete proposala made by **various** countries, the Conference now has adeauate material to undertake the **alahoration of interim** measures as a step **towards** **reaching** a comprehensive agreement. We have in mind, in particular, the proposals for the definition of weapons within the **class** of space **weapons** and for measures to **ban** anti-satellite **systems**.

**As** to the **vital question** of excluding outer space from the arena of militaristic **ambit'ons**, my delegation would like to **see** progress made an soon **as possible** in the bilateral neqotiationa between the Soviet **Union** and the **United States**. The solution to thie problem **lies above** all in the adoption by both parties to the anti-ballistic missile Treaty of measures to strengthen **its régime**.

At their meeting on 15 October 1986 in Bucharest, the **Foreign Ministers** of the States **parties** to the Warsaw **Treaty** further **emphasized** the necessity of halting forthwith **the** star **warn** preparations and the involvement of other States in **this programme**, and of ending the development of similar **projects**, in particular the European **defence** initiative, **as** well as any action to **militarize** outer space which increased the danqer of **nuclear** war.

**As** regards the Conference on Disarmament, it should be entrusted as soon as it opens its **1987** session with the task **of** elahoratlnq, as appropriate, an agreement or aqreementa dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

**Finally**, I should like to turn to the **question** of the Comprehensive **Programme** Of Disarmament. My **delegation** would **like above all** to reiterate **its** desire to see the Comprehensive **Programme** of Disarmament **elaborated as** soon as **possible**. we deem it necessary to **address** the time factor because, in **spite** of **the tireless efforts** of Ambassador Garcia **Robles**, the results **of** the work of the Conference **i this**

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulyar ia)

**issue** hardly live up to the commitment assumed in General Assembly resolution 40/152 D, namely:

"**concluding** that **task** and submitting to the General **Assembly** at its forty-first **session** a complete draft of the **programme**".

The **1986 session** of the Conference on Disarmament once again **demonstrated** the vast potential of that forum to generate valuable **ideas, facilitating** the trend towards new thinking in international relations and to elaborate agreements on **curbing the arms race** and on disarmament. This potential should continue to have the full support of the international community. Today, following the summit meeting in Reykjavik which has created a **qualitatively** new situation with regard to nuclear disarmament and international security, the role of the Conference on Disarmament is bound to grow. The **socialist** countries stand ready to contribute to a **comprehensive** and concerted effort by all members of the Conference to enhance **its** effectiveness.

Mr. HARMON (Liberia): On this occasion when the thoughts of all of us in the General Assembly and particularly in Africa are focused on the deep grief which we have suffered as the result of the **passing** of one of **Africa's heroic** and outstanding leaders in the **person** of President Samora **Machel** of Mozambique, I should like to request our colleague of Mozambique to convey to his Government and the people of **Mozambique** our deepest condolences on **this great loss**, praying for **God's** continued guidance and **blessing** upon them in this hour of deep distress.

Once again, **representatives** of nations and international **organizations** have gathered to **consider** perhaps the **most** urgent issues of our time, **namely**, arms control and disarmament. The making of eloquent **speeches**, the crescendo of **hypocritical** rhetoric, the adoption of scores of **resolutions** which are not

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

implemented or intended for **implementation**; all this has contributed to the **sterility** Of our general debate and the erosion of the credibility of the United Nations in the field **of** disarmament and related **matters**.

In view of the threat **posed** by the continuing **arms** race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, **it** is our earnest hope that we **will** turn a new leaf by bringing **with us** to this forty-first **session of** the General Assembly a new **set** of commitments which will lead to **serious** and concrete results In this **field**, **especially** on the part of those held **responsible** for the **global arms** race.

It has been acknowledged that the **greatest** peril facing the **world** today **is** the threat to the survival of mankind **posed** by the existence and **justification** of nuclear weapons. The threat of human annihilation **is** therefore not just another **issue** but the most important problem facing **mankind**. And nuclear disarmament **is** thus, fundamentally, an issue **of** human survival.



(Mr. Hsrmon, Liberia)

Surely it should not take much convincing for all States, especially the **major** military Powers to see the **ultimate** folly of the continuation of the **nuclear-arms** race.

**Everyone** here will agree that the advent of nuclear weapons drastically **changed** the notions of security. Hitherto States had long **sought** to maintain **security** through the **possession** of arms. But in **the** nuclear age that can no longer be a realistic approach. The accumulation of weapons, **particularly nuclear** weapons, **constitutes** a real danger for the future of **man-kind**. The danger that any armed conflict anywhere in **the** world today **can escalate** into a broader nuclear confrontation is real. Nuclear **accidents** by any nuclear Power, or other States opting for such a status, causing death and inflicting deadly diseases **even** upon generations yet unborn, is real.

The idea, therefore, of a so-called limited nuclear war is unrealistic. Hence, my delegation believes that the time has come to put an end to **this** pervasive **sense** of anxiety and to seek genuine security in global **disarmament**.

The Liberian Government counsels a **United Nations** policy based on principle and not on power. In accordance with this Policy, we welcomed the recent **mini-summit** between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in **Reykjavik**. In view of **past** and present developments we **harboured** no illusions that their meeting would produce spectacular results. **But** we support whatever has been **achieved** and shall continue to **encourage** meaningful and productive dialogue, which we hope will contribute to the **maintenance** of durable peace and **security**.

Liberia has **consistently** supported initiatives aimed at ensuring peace, security and constructive co-operation among nations, **because** we **see** peace **as** an essential pre-condition **for** stability and development. We therefore follow **very** closely developments between the **super-Powers**: as heavily armed States in the

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

world they have a great possibility to contribute to the achievement of enduring peace.

In that connection, we further encourage - indeed implore - the leaders of the two super-Powers to continue the dialogue they have already started, so that the next encounters will not simply be another in a series of lost opportunities, but an occasion for fruitful and constructive undertakings towards concrete and effective disarmament agreements.

My delegation believes that the whole question of disarmament and international peace and security should be the priority resolve of the United Nations, as indeed it has been since the Organization was founded. However, one thing should be made clear - that is, that while we fully support the endeavours of the super-Powers, their deliberations should in no way be a substitute for the collective effort of this Organization in the very important subject of disarmament.

That brings us to the question: why has Reykjavik become so important in the disarmament issue? The reply is: because of the universal hope that the two super-Powers might achieve such reductions in their arms race as to enable the masters of the world economy to divert their savings to the crying needs of the majority of nations that are in an insufficient state of development. There - beyond their own economic confines - are the majority of nations and the majority of peoples whose accelerated growth, in a constructive partnership, would ensure greater stability in their own economies, in their industrial development.

The world economy today is an issue vital to all the peoples of the world, frightened by the prospects of nuclear war in a race that is bringing mankind nearer to the final fate of Armageddon.

That new summit being promised must be in the best possible climate in which the two Heads of State might meet, in terms of developments before, during and after Reykjavik.

(Mr. Harmon, Liber is)

Given our **analysis** of the situation, my Government **is** bound to conclude that **as far as** the major **problems** of **disarmament** and **economic** development are concerned **what** transpired **in Reykjavik** is largely related to the United **Nations** and **its responsibility** to the Charter, which **is** the Constitution of all mankind, including the two **super-Powers**.

I wish now to refer to a matter of utmost importance to Africa. Independent African States have always paid particular attention to the **objectives** of peace and security, which they believe are essential to the realisation of their cherished **aspirations** to development, unity and **stability**. Indeed, in the **preamble** to the charter of the **Organization** of African Unity, the founding fathers of **that** organization clearly **stated** their conviction that condition@ of **peace** and security **must** be **established** and maintained in order to translate those **aspirations** into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress.

We remain firmly of the view that **the** attainment by the **racist** Pretoria **régime** of a nuclear-weapon capability constitutes the most **serious** obstacle **to** the **implementation** of the **Declaration** on the **Denuclearization** of **Africa**, and a **threat** to international peace and security. If that obstacle **is** not removed, the non-proliferation efforts - which many **complain** have already **been** undermined by discriminatory **practices** - could be **further**, indeed **critically**, hampered, **and** the arms race as a whole in the **area** considerably fuelled.' African States owe it to their populations and future generations to exercise **fully** their right to self-defence. That obligation includes **the sacred** duty to take appropriate and effective **measures** to repel aggression in all **its** forms. We are therefore convinced that the **imposition** of **comprehensive mandatory sanctions** against South Africa by the Security **Council**, under **Chapter** VII of the Charter, **would** be a **step** in the right direction. But we welcome, at this juncture, the **voluntary** and selective sanctions against South Africa already being imposed by **Member** States and international **organizations**.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

As far as general and complete disarmament **is** concerned, my delegation attaches great value to the Declaration on the **Denuclearization** of Africa adopted by the **Assembly** of Heads of State and Government of the **Organization** of African Unity (OAU) at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo in July 1964 - the Declaration which sought to keep nuclear weapons out of our continent. The Declaration was a concrete demonstration of **Africa's** support not only for the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear **war**, but also for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security as a whole.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

As far as the Declaration is concerned, I wish to stress that **its** adoption was a major political development. For the first time an entire region undertook unilaterally to renounce the **acquisition** of nuclear weapons; for more than 20 years African Governments have continued to abide by the Declaration and to remain fully committed to **its** objectives. Unfortunately, Africa's commitment to nuclear disarmament and peace is being undermined by the intensification of the nuclear and military activities of the apartheid régime of South Africa, and with the acquiescence of its well-known collaborators, who for many years have been afraid of upsetting the **sensibilities** of racist Pretoria.

My Government has clearly indicated that it shares the grave concern of the international community as a whole over the arms race, and in particular the nuclear-arms race, which, as I stated earlier, threatens the survival of mankind. It seems to us that peace and security would be better served by being **based** on the least possible diversion of resources to armament, rather than on the continued qualitative and **quantitative** escalation of weapon acquisition.

But **we** believe also that to be genuinely effective and durable, disarmament must guarantee States their security through assurances of equal security for **all States**, as **well** as **through** effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles set out **in** the Charter of the **United Nations**.

The **task** that confronts us in Africa is crucial. Our region faces the grim challenge of trying to maintain peace and security without further weakening our economies through the increasing diversion of limited resources to defence **requirements** necessary to deter threats of armed **oppression**, sabotage, nuclear **blackmail** and aggression by apartheid South Africa. Despite the painful social and **economic sacrifices** that may be required, we are not prepared to capitulate or to weaken our commitment to the total elimination of apartheid, **colonialism** and illegal occupation in Africa.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

I should like at this juncture to address myself to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. We welcome its establishment by the General Assembly at its fortieth session. The creation of that new forum, which responds to a request to that effect by the Assembly of Heads of State or Government of the OAU at its twenty-first ordinary session, is viewed as a possible international contribution to the continuing search for all possible ways and means of promoting peace and progress in Africa.

I believe that the Centre can provide a valuable forum for promoting dialogue, as well as greater information and understanding of African realities and interests in this complex and challenging field. Our African leaders have therefore strongly recommended that the Centre work closely with the Organization of African Unity.

If I have dwelt at length on the regional aspect of disarmament and international peace and security it is because of our interest in that area, and more particularly because my delegation believes that the objectives of the Organization of African Unity must be pursued so that we do not lower our sights in our quest for peace, unity and stability in our region, Africa.

My delegation also reaffirms its strong conviction that there is an urgent need for a thorough review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament with a view to enabling the world body to play a more effective and credible role in that area. We look forward to the early completion of the work of the Disarmament Commission on this item, based on the very constructive and comprehensive proposals submitted to the Commission at its 1986 substantive session by the Chairman of the Commission's working group dealing with this item.

Liberia reaffirms that disarmament, the relaxation of tension among States, respect for the right of self-determination and independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the strengthening of international peace and security

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

are all very **closely** related. In our view, progress in any of those **fields** could **have** a beneficial impact. In turn, **failure** in **any** of them could have a negative **effect**. **Rearing those** considerations in **mind**, **it is** vital that the international community strive **for** agreement on a realistic programme **of** comprehensive security.

Of paramount importance to what I have been speaking about **is** the **subject of** the relationship **between** disarmament and development. A decade ago in this very Committee **the** Liberian **delegation sought** to underline the **subtle** relationship between the **arms** race and the attainment of a just and **equitable** world economic order. We felt **strongly** enough about that matter to introduce a draft resolution accompanied by a draft declaration, **entitled "New philosophy of disarmament"**, contained in document **A/C.1/31/L.28** of 29 November 1976. It is in that light that we **once** again reaffirm our support for the initiative of the Government of France and for the **call** by the General **Assembly** for the convening of the International Conference On the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We also agree with the emerging **consensus** that disarmament and development are two of the **most pressing** needs of contemporary **international** relations, and we strongly urge that the Conference no longer be delayed, but should be **convened** as scheduled in **1987**.

**As** we attach so much importance to the economic recovery of Africa, my delegation **wishes** in closing to express **its** profound appreciation to the Government of Canada, which has taken the initiative in **association** with the **Secretary-General** to put together a plan, supported by Governments, **the** World Bank and its affiliates and perhaps other **banking** institutions, to join in a strategy that will **place** Africa on the road to an era of recovery.

Mr. CHUNGONG AYAWR (Cameroon) : My delegation wishes at this time to outline the views of the Government of the Republic of Cameroon on the following specific items of our agenda: agenda item 61 (g), "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Development in Africa: report of the Secretary-General"; agenda item 61 (a), "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures: report of the Disarmament Commission"; and agenda item 62 (n) (iii), "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session: Verification in all its aspects: report of the Secretary-General".

We commend the Secretary-General for the measures he has taken to implement General Assembly resolution 40/151 G, adopted by consensus last year at the Assembly's fortieth session, which established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.



(Mc. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

The **initiat ive** for the creation of **the** Centre came from the African Heads Of **State** and Government, as reflected in resolution **AHG/Res.138** (XXI), adopted at the twenty-first summit conference of the **Organization** of African Unity (**OAU**), held at **Addis** Ababa in July 1985. In that resolution the African **leaders** expresaed, inter alia, their firm conviction that an interrelationship exists between **security, development** and **disarmament**. They **recognized** the need for the United Nations to establiah an institutional arrangement in Africa to conduct in-depth **studies** and promote the objectives **of** peace, disarmament and development. At the twenty-econd OAU summit conference, held at **Addis** Ababa from 28 to 30 July this **year**, the African **leaders** reaffirmed reeolution **AHG/Res.138** (XXI) and expresaed their appreciation of the establishment by the United Nations of the Regional Centre. They also **reco mmended** that the Centre should work closely with **the OAU**.

Clearly, the major military Powers, in particular the super-Powers, have the primary responsibility regarding **disarmame nt**, especially nuclear disarmament. At the same time, it **is also a** fact that diarmament **is** of interest to all **countries** and peoples, especially since the whole world faces the **common** threat of nuclear annihilation. Furthermore, for small and **medi n**-sized developing countries like **ours**, which are not **responsible** for the **arms** race but are nevertheless negatively affected by it, we duppoit efforts towards genuine disarmament, which would help enhance our security and facilitate our development endeavours. Weapons produced by arms-producing **countries** cause death and destruction in our countries and divert our limited resources from **development** to military **uses**. In **addition**, the unregulated transfer of conventional **weapons** into our regions by producers, as well **as** by private dealers, encourages such forces of aggreeaion, as the racist apartheid **régime** in South Africa to continue their **repressive policies**, and, in **its** **case**, its occupation of and aggression **against** neighbouring African States.

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

It is, therefore, important to **recognize** that any serious efforts towards **disarmament must** take fully into account the political realities of the world and the specific conditions existing in each **particular** region. **Condi** tions vary from region to region and the **nature** of the peace and **security** issues to be addressed differs in each **case**. It would be undesirable to attempt the administration of an undesirable **remedy** for particular cases. That **is** why we support the **regional** approach to disarmament, **not** as the final goal in the field but as a **complementary** feature in the effort to achieve the ultimate **objective of** world-wide general and complete disarmament. The regional approach would enable the international community to be apprised **of** the realities and the needs of each particular region, thus increasing the ease with **which** the scope of support needed by the region concerned in achieving progress could be determined. Thus, in our region, for example, the international community would be aware of the fact that genuine peace and security will be difficult to achieve while apartheid remains in force in southern Africa.

We therefore **attach** much importance to the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament **in Africa** as a forum **for** two-way communication and dialogue in this field, **first** among African countries and, secondly, **between** the region and the **international** community as a whole.

Through the Centre's activities in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign, for instance, **efforts** would be made to inform, to educate and to **de**velop public understanding and support in our region for United Nations objectives in the field of disarmament. At the same time, the African public would have the opportunity to express its concerns and views regarding the **prospects** and the possibilities for peace in the region. **Such** dialogue, we believe, is vital in developing the necessary understanding and awareness, which could in **turn** facilitate the **realization** of concrete measures in this field. We wish to stress

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

the **growing** interest in this subject in our region and to point out that during 1986 alone several major conferences and **seminars** on peace, **disarmament** and development have taken place throughout the continent, from **Addis** Ababa to **Brazzaville** and from **Maputo** to **Yaoundé**.

We therefore welcomed with much satisfaction the Declaration (A/41/341) adopted by the Co-ordinating Bureau **of** the Non-Aligned Movement at its Ministerial Meeting in New Delhi last April, in paragraph 51 of which the Bureau reaffirmed the need to strengthen the role of regional bodies such **as** the Centre in **mobilizing** support for the achievement of the objectives of the World **Disarmament** Campaign. For many developing countries without adequate **expertise** in this field, except that which is made available by institutions or **programmes** such as the United Nations programme of fellowships in disarmament, the Regional Centre's activities could contribute significantly not only to **promoting** greater knowledge of and expertise in the subject but also to creating and encouraging a better climate for constructive action in this field. My delegation would strongly support initiatives such as those that have been endorsed for Latin America by the Non-Aligned Movement and we **commend** the Government of Peru for its willingness to host the Regional **Centre** for Peace, Disarmament and Development in that continent.

"here is no more urgent or pressing problem confronting mankind today than that of removing the **risk** of war, containing and **eliminating** conflicts **within** and between States and moving towards genuine and lasting peace. No opportunity that offers even a slim chance for peace should be left unexplored.

My delegation wishes to **comment** on the "Draft guidelines for appropriate **types** of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level' (A/41/42, annex II). We believe that the importance of confidence-building is growing in a world **characterized** by political **tension**,

(Mr. Chunqong Ayafoe, Cameroon)

**mistrust** and increasing recourse to the threat or use of force on the one hand and the escalation of the world-wide arms race on **the** other.

This **was** already **recognized** at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to **disarmament**, which, in its Final Document, stated that

"Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together **with** other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute **to** the creation of favourable conditions **for** the adoption of additional disarmament **measures** and to further the relaxation of international tension. (resolution S-10/2, pars. 24)

and that

"In order to facilitate the process of **disarmament**, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence **among** States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing **for** further progress in disarmament..." (para. 93).

It should be noted, further, that the General Assembly has expressed in a series of consensus resolutions its belief that confidence-building measures, where **appropriate** conditions exist, will significantly contribute to facilitating the **process** of **disarmament**, as well as its conviction that **commitment** to such measures could contribute to strengthening the security of States, and that, based upon these insights, the General **Assembly** has **recommended** **that** States consider the introduction of such measures with a view to enhancing security between them and facilitating progress in arms limitation and **disarmament**.

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

As to the response of **individual** Member States to the proposals of the General Assembly, it is noteworthy that **a large** degree of **agreement** emerged both in the replies from **Governments** to the relevant resolutions, informing the Secretary-General of their views and suggestions regarding confidence-building measures (**A/34/416** and addendums and **A/35/397**) and in the "Comprehensive study of the Group of Governmental Experts on **Confidence-building Measures**" (A/36/474). An equally impressive convergence of views concerning the subject matter was **seen** in the proposals made to the General Assembly by individual countries at the second special session devoted to disarmament (**A/S-12/AC.1/59**).

**As both the** imperative need for the **United Nations** to play a part in confidence-building between States and its historic role in **that work are** **unanimously** accepted **by** all Member **States**, further strengthening of the role of the United Nations in confidence-building could **greatly enhance the** United Nations ability to maintain international peace and security and to develop friendly relations between nations based on respect for the **principle** of equal rights and self-determination. **In this connection, we believe that the objectives and principles** of confidence-building **between States** should **be on** indispensable prerequisite for **enhancing confidence between States**. The principles enshrined in the Charter **must be** strictly observed.

The ultimate goal of confidence-building measures is to **strengthen** international peace and security, **thus** creating and improving the conditions **for** fruitful international co-operation. The **immediate objective is to reduce or even** eliminate the **causes** of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and miscalculation with regard to the military activities of other States, for these **are** factors **which** impair security and encourage the continuation of the international arms build-up. **Thus** confidence-building should, **in particular**, facilitate the process of arms

(Mr. Chunqonq Ayafor, Cameroon)

limitation and disarmament as well as the prevention or settlement of international disputes and conflicts. Measures adopted in pursuance of confidence-building must be neither a substitute nor a pre-condition for disarmament measures, nor should they divert any attention from them.

Confidence-building measures would in our view serve the additional objective of facilitating verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Conversely, adequate verification measures and co-operation in their implementation have a considerable confidence-building effect of their own. Action in pursuit of these objectives will enhance rationality and stability in international relations and contribute, in accordance with the Charter, to inhibiting the use of force or the threat of its use. In so doing, it has to create a political and psychological climate in which the momentum towards a competitive arms build-up can be reduced and eliminated.

The absence of such confidence can introduce unnecessary harmful bickering and charges and counter-charges of alleged violations. Durable processes of peaceful and co-operative inter-State relations would be difficult to realize in such a climate of suspicion and uncertainty.

In this connection, my delegation is of the view that the Disarmament Commission has made a major step in the right direction in recommending draft guidelines for adoption by the General Assembly. We believe that all Member States should seriously commit themselves to a thorough review of this very important element, which is a noble step towards disarmament and arms limitation. The recent conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe must be lauded. Indeed, the Stockholm Conference demonstrated that a regional confidence-building process can be sustained and widened in its approach, even in a region where there is an unprecedented concentration of both nuclear and conventional forces and armaments.

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

The **Cameroon** delegation would not wish to see any retrograde or sideways movement, on this important achievement by the Disarmament Commission. We do not wish to risk, by undoing the draft guidelines, the loss of such meaningful work, contributed to by all Member States, in arriving at the present stage. Instead, we shall join in the endeavours to resolve the last two outstanding areas of disagreement and recommend to all Member States in the General Assembly that the effective implementation of all the recommendations in Annex II of the Disarmament Commission's report (A/41/42) would be constructive action.

Any attempt to mitigate the successful results of the Commission's hard work on the subject matter would belittle the productive effort. Neutral and non-aligned countries have made far-reaching compromises subscribing to the adoption of a set of principles that had its origin in the most armed region of the world - Europe - and whose application worldwide covers the subregional, regional and, later, global levels.

A primary objective of the **Cameroon Government** in disarmament, whether conventional or nuclear, has been strongly to support the role of the United Nations in strengthening and maintaining international peace and security. My delegation fully supports the Secretary-General's view, expressed in his annual report, that

"the ability of the **Organization** to assist in verification and compliance arrangements should be explored". (A/41/1, p. 10)

Conversely, we firmly believe that there exists a fundamental interrelationship between confidence- and security-building measures and verification in all its aspects. Further, while confidence-building must neither be a substitute nor a pre-condition for disarmament measures, nor divert attention from them, my delegation considers that commitment to pursuing appropriate confidence-building

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

measure6 in a specific context, including strict compliance with agreements **already** entered into, could foster the process of **disarmament** and **security**.

The Cameroon delegation is delighted to have been one of the co-sponsors of General **Assembly** resolution **40/152 O** of 16 **December 1985**, an initiative of the delegation of Canada on verification in all its aspects. The Cameroon delegation takes note of the replies submitted to the **Secretary-General** on this issue (**A/41/422**). We note **with** satisfaction that a review of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament reveals several principles relating to verification. We believe **that** it is the task of Governments to formulate verification provisions in conformity with those principles, for it would be a fruitless exercise should disarmament and arms control accords lack dependable verification measures. Conversely, we are of the view that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, and existing ways and means should be **utilized** effectively and efficiently in the area of verification and compliance. We are of the view that the Disarmament Commission is the appropriate body to deliberate on **this** subject matter.

In this connection, it is important to recall **paragraphs** 91 and 92 of the Final **Document** of the first special session devoted to disarmament which state:

"In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for **verification** in such agreements.

"In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of **other** States or jeopardize their economic and social development'. (**resolution S-10/2, paras. 91-92**)



(Hr. Chunqong Ayafor, Cameroon)

Resolution **40/152** O, adopted by consensus at the historic fortieth session of the **General** Assembly, and thus agreed to by all of us, stated inter alia that each Member State of the United Nations believed that

"**ver ification** techniques should be developed as an objective means of determining compliance with agreements and appropriately taken into account in the course of disarmament negotiations". (resolution 40/152 O, sixth preambular pars. )

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

We were pleased to observe that an ever-increasing number of Member States from varying regions of our globe submitted responses to the Secretary-General in answer to the call for

"views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques for promoting the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification". (General Assembly, Resolution 40/152 O)

As a sponsor of resolution 40/152 O we were also encouraged by the many statements made here in the general debate. That is as it should be; each one of us must be able to take part in the consideration of this important subject. It is too vital to be taken out of our hands. We must ensure that the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs are able to conduct the most comprehensive examination of the subject. Because the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements concerns us all, we must all be permitted as a matter of right to develop principles, guidelines and standards which can then be taken into account during actual negotiations.

Not only should we all, individually and collectively, make our contribution to the growing body of literature on verification but there is also profit to be gained from an examination of the role of the United Nations. Our world Organization has performed verification tasks well. One can think immediately of peace-keeping, and of the confidence-building which has been possible because of the excellent work of United Nations peace-keeping missions. There are many other examples of verification, compliance and confidence-building performances by the United Nations which can be recalled by each of us. In addition, as was stated most eloquently by the representative of Uruguay in his statement in this Committee on 22 October :

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor - Cameroon)

"... **United Nations** should expand its role in the field of **verification** since it can offer **impartiality** and the **guarantee** of its machinery [and] **procedures**...". (A/C.1/41/PV.17, p. 11)

It has been said many **times** - and my delegation certainly agrees - that the principle of **verification** must never be allowed to interfere with arms control **negotiations**; but it must also be **recognized** by all that verification is an essential ingredient in all arms control agreements. **Simply because it is so essential** it must be examined in detail. There is need for a body of principles, guidelines, standards and practical suggestions available for **use** by negotiators. That **is** why we welcome and support the Canadian **suggestion** that the United Nations **Disarmament** Commission be **asked** to consider the subject of verification. The Commission is a forum in which we **can** deliberate at length and in depth; where we can devote to **this subject** the time **that** it deserves.

The concept of verification, the principle of **verification**, must be **considered** in a universal sense so **that** we **may** develop material which will be of **use** in the **future**. If there are Member States which have legitimate concerns **about** arms control negotiations and **about** particular aspects of ongoing negotiations those **concerns** should be the subject matter of resolutions which deal appropriately with those issues.

My delegation **also** believes that the place for a full consideration of verification is here at the United Nations, where **all 159 Member States** can participate. To attempt to relegate verification to any organization which has a **less** than universal **United Nations** membership would be to do a grave **injustice** to our **Organization** and to those outside it. The subject is too important to deserve anything but the most serious consideration by all Member **States**.

(Mr. Chungong Ayafor, Cameroon)

The wisest **course** for **us** to take would be to adopt a simple, uncomplicated **procedural** resolution which would build on our determination, as **expressed** in General **Assembly** resolution **40/152** O. Since we all agreed in that resolution **that** Verification techniques should be developed and that it was important to have Member States put forward their views, **so** should we all agree that the Disarmament Commission should devote a portion of **its** deliberations to **this** vital subject. It is within that framework **that** the Cameroon delegation considers that verification **is** an **essential** and integral element of the **disarmament** process.

In the context **of** universal disarmament deliberations and negotiations, involving **the** review of adequate **measures** of verification acceptable to **all States**, the **United** Nation. is basically the most powerful multilateral forum where all countries have an obligation to **maintain and** strengthen **mutual** peace and security throughout the wor **ld**. This is certainly not a task for only a limited few.

As we know, the concept of verification features prominently in all discussions on **arms** control agreements. Proper **verification** is an extremely effective confidence-building measure. The **development** of a body of knowledge on **verification** **is** too important a task to be left to a select few. It is and should continue to be the **responsibility** of us all.

**Mr. ZIPPORI (Israel):** On this my first intervention in this **Committee** I should like to extend to our Chairman my delegation's congratulations on his election to **his** high office **and** also to congratulate the other officers of the **Committee**.

We are meeting at a very **auspicious** moment in recent history. To **outside** observer, **this** past **year** has **seen** **considerable** positive movement with **regard** to arms control. Most **important**, there was the **meeting** between the leaders of the **United** States and the Soviet Union in Iceland which, if it did not **end** in a final

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

conclusion of ~~the~~ long and ~~delicate negotiations~~ between their two ~~countries~~, did indicate that considerable movement had been made and ~~opened~~ up the distinct ~~possibility~~ of arriving at ~~some agreement~~ in Geneva.

In ~~Stockholm~~, despite much misgiving, the negotiations at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe ended ~~successfully~~ and another small step towards the alleviation of tension in Europe ~~was~~ made.

The conclusion in a remarkably short ~~time~~ of two ~~important~~ Conventions in Vienna, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (~~IAEA~~), providing for early warning and assistance in the event of nuclear accidents, proved that the world community could co-operate, Under pressure, to further ~~world~~ peace ~~and~~ security. Israel was very pleased to be able to sign the two Conventions immediately after their ~~adoption~~ by the General Conference of the ~~IAEA~~.

Unfortunately, the same kind of ~~success~~ has not accompanied the disarmament negotiations carried on in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Although some progress has been made towards the drafting of a draft convention on chemical ~~weapons~~, a great deal remains to be done.

If there has been progress elsewhere, one region where not only has there been no progress but in which there have even been setbacks is, unfortunately, the Middle East.

Mr. Shamir, the Prime Minister of Israel, speaking in the General Assembly, ~~stated~~ that nothing had been done to ~~lessen~~ the three major threats facing all the countries in the Middle East: namely, the escalating race in ~~conventional~~ arms, the continued danger of nuclear weapons ~~and~~, most urgently, the acute problem of chemical warfare.

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

We have in the course of recent years witnessed a Member country of the United Nations, Iraq - a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons -- engaged in an unprovoked war which has caused almost a million casualties and persisting in its use of chemical weapons in fighting that war. Not only has the Government of Iraq used mustard gas but it was also the first country ever to use a nerve gas, "Tabun" in combat. There have been thousands of victims, and not only among combatants. This use of lethal gases by Iraq was confirmed by a commission of specialists appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in March 1984, and again in 1986. On 21 March 1986, the President of the Security Council, on behalf of its members in a statement based on the specialists' findings, condemned Iraq in the following terms.

"Profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces, most recently in the course of the present Iranian offensive into Iraqi territory, the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons, in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons." (S/PV.2667, pp. 3-4)

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

This whole continuing tragic episode was summed up succinctly by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1985 Yearbook in the following way:

"On the accumulated evidence, and despite its protestations to the contrary, Iraq stands exposed as a violator of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, an international criminal" (p. 182).

A dangerous by-product of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and the failure of the world community to take any serious action, has been the considerable evidence that other States in the Middle East, most notably Syria, are busily developing a very menacing chemical warfare capability.

This development threatens the peace and security of all the States in the Middle East and also underline8 the vital importance of arriving at an effective international Convention on the prohibition of the manufacture, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in addition to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 forbidding the use of such weapons.

As it does not seem likely that the chemical warfare Convention will be completed and adopted in the very near future, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, in his statement to the General Assembly on 30 September, suggested :

"The free world should pool information on this subject and adopt concerted measures to prevent the development or acquisition of chemical and biological weapons. We cannot afford to cower before dictatorships that stockpile these inhuman inventions, especially since these régimes have shown no hesitation in using them.\* (A/41/PV. 16)

A great deal has been said here in this Committee and elsewhere about the close connection between disarmament and economic development. Nowhere is this more self-evident than in the Middle East. The arms bill in 1985 in this area reached the figure of about \$20 billion. How different would all our economies

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look if only 50 per cent of this vast sum were spent on economic and social development. In addition, in the situation of the Middle East, the continued build-up of ever more sophisticated conventional arms in the hands of States that do not conceal their aggressive intentions against Israel, constitutes a very real threat to the security of the region.

I should therefore like to suggest here and now that our region should take a leaf out of the book of our neighbouring continent, namely, Europe. Mutual balanced force reduction in our region is an idea for which the time has come. I am convinced that even without solving all the outstanding problems of our area, a basis for the building of confidence could be found were the States of our region to enter into serious, direct and unlettered negotiations on mutually-balanced force reduction. There is hardly any sense in continuing the ever-increasing spiral of armaments which plague the people and States of the Middle East. It is the accumulation of conventional armaments which creates danger.

I would therefore urge our neighbouring States to think about our proposal to enter into free and direct negotiations in order to examine the possibilities which exist in the concept of a Middle Eastern mutual balanced force reduction; even a serious discussion between the States concerned, of such a possibility, could contribute some of the confidence so badly needed.

Such negotiations would certainly open up another area of vital significance in the disarmament field - the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. An argument that has been put forward by some representatives is that if only Israel would agree to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty the Middle East could be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, just like that. However, we all know that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not prevent conventional wars which are the bane of the Middle East and our principle source of worry. A



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nuclear-weapon-free zone, including mutual reassurances, definitely precludes recourse to war, and that is why Israel so strongly advocates this **concept**. A nuclear-weapon-free zone can only come about through a long **process** of free negotiations among the potential partners as has been done in **South** America and the South Pacific. Thus, in the Final Document of the **Co-ordinating** Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries which met in New Delhi in April of this **year**, it was stated:

"Recalling the final document of SSOD-I, the **Ministers affirmed** that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region, constituted **an** important disarmament measure. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The establishment of such **zones** in different parts of the world should be encouraged, the ultimate objective being to achieve a world **entirely** free of nuclear weapons.\* (A/41/341, pp. 23-24, **para.** 43)

**Israel's** policy has remained constant over the **years**; we fully support the **principle** of non-proliferation, have frequently appealed to the States in the area to negotiate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** and have solemnly declared many times that Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

If, as some of the representatives of the Arab States have declared, they fear Israel's so-called nuclear potential, what better way would there be for them to allay those fears than to accept the open invitation of my **Government** and to enter into negotiations as soon as **possible**. The issue of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East upon which, according to the declared policies of all our **Governments** we all agree - and have demonstrated our consensus in our vote here - could perhaps be the harbinger of getting the peace **process** moving once more.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom) : I have the honour to speak on behalf of

the European Community and its 12 Member States on item 59 of our agenda, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The Twelve welcomed the successful conclusion of the Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention in September and made a joint contribution to this outcome. We look forward to the meeting of experts to be held in March and April when we hope that measures can be agreed to strengthen confidence in and the control régime of the Convention. The Twelve, all of whom have ratified the Convention hope that the First Committee will recommend that the General Assembly should call on those countries which have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention. We very much hope that these countries will do so at the earliest possible opportunity. We support the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Austria, which provided the President of the Review Conference.

I must regretfully reiterate in this Committee the unequivocal condemnation by the Twelve of all use of chemical weapons. We strongly urge all parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol scrupulously to honour their obligations under the Protocol and to observe the generally-recognized principle rules of international law applicable to armed conflict. Members of the Committee will be aware that the Twelve have taken measures together with other countries to control the export of certain compounds which could be misused for the production of chemical weapons. These controls are kept continuously under review and their scope was extended during the course of this year. We shall continue to give them close attention and to apply whatever export control measures are necessary to prevent the abuse of the relevant compounds.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

In his statement on behalf of the Twelve in the general debate on 14 October, my Minister, Mr. Timothy Kenton, Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, emphasized the high priority attached by the Twelve to the early conclusion of an effective and global ban on chemical weapons. As the current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, I am glad to be able to say on behalf of the Twelve that the negotiations are progressing at an accelerating pace. As a result of the hard work done in the Ad Hoc Committee, especially in the last three years since it received its present mandate, a lot of common ground has been identified, to an increasing extent in the form of provisionally agreed treaty language, within the basic structure of the Convention agreed in 1984.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Building on this foundation, the Committee has in its reports of 1985 and 1996 developed further what is called the rolling text of the draft Convention, which records the current state of the negotiations and reports the progress made to the Conference and to the General Assembly.

As members will see from this year's report, we have been able to register remarkable progress in some areas of the draft Convention, notably its articles IV, V and VI. The Government of one member of the Twelve organized a valuable workshop in The Hague and Rotterdam in June which made a major contribution to a new article VI, on "Activities not prohibited by the Convention". We are progressing towards agreement on effective verification of the elimination of chemical weapons and the facilities for producing them. We are also progressing towards agreement to verify effectively by routine methods that stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities for producing them are eliminated during the 10-year transitional period and that the civil chemical industry is not misused to make chemical weapons. It is generally accepted that routine methods of verification need to be supplemented by a system of challenge inspection under article IX of the draft Convention as a safety net to provide the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. Another member of the Twelve has made a proposal in this field which has been supported by a number of speakers in the general debate in this Committee. We look forward to reactions to it from other delegations.

All these subjects are on the agenda for the next session of the Committee, due to take place in January before the opening of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, and this will be preceded by a period of open-ended consultations of the Committee in Geneva starting on 24 November, after this Committee has concluded the consideration of the disarmament items on its agenda. The aim of this inter-sessional work is to make use of the momentum that has been generated in the negotiations at the 1986 session and to build on some of the progress that has been made.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The Twelve hope that the General Assembly will welcome the substantial progress that has been made in the negotiations so far and will encourage the Conference on Disarmament to reinforce its efforts with a view to the earliest possible conclusion of a convention to rid the world completely of this whole class of particularly repugnant weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to inform members that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting: the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 12 members of the European Community, Finland, Czechoslovak. Hungary, Colombia, Bangladesh and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.