



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 25th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46 TO 65 AND 144 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorusian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): For many years, the Byelorussian SSR has been devoting special attention to the question of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Military developments - not to mention existing arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons - indicate that this question is not growing less relevant, but on the contrary becoming increasingly serious.

We are living in a true golden age of science. The frontiers of knowledge are receding rapidly. In every direction, from the microscopic world to outer space, the human mind is penetrating the depths and secrets of nature, until recently inaccessible. Full use of the fruits of our knowledge would enable us qualitatively to enrich the material and intellectual lives of peoples, yet it is a monstrous paradox of the twentieth century that scientific achievements are being used for the development of weapons of mass destruction, and threatening the very existence of the human race.

In recent years the ruling circles of certain Western countries have established the very dangerous trend of always relying on the most sophisticated modern military technology and its accelerated development as the principal means of gaining military supremacy, and consequently as a sort of material guarantee to back up their policy of solving political problems by using or threatening to use military means. The history of recent decades, and logic itself, clearly indicate the unproductive nature, the fallacy and the danger of that approach. Every challenge thrown down in the field of new weaponry meets with a response; this constant tit for tat, of which the long chain of the arms race is composed, has not

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

resulted in national security for mankind and far less in global security, but rather in persistent and increasing confrontation at an ever higher level of military danger. But none of this negative experience has made the politicians of certain Western countries understand the need for a new type of political thinking and for a new approach to the question of guaranteeing security.

A proper understanding of the interests of States and peoples rules out the possibility of achieving security through military and technological decisions, including the development of new kinds of weapons of mass destruction. In this nuclear space age, that fact should become axiomatic in the science of political thought.

In that connection, it is interesting to recall that at the end of the nineteenth century the well-known arms manufacturer and inventor of explosives, Alfred Nobel, wrote the following:

"I wanted to invent weapons or ammunition with so monstrous a destructive power as to make war unthinkable. Perhaps my factories will do away with war more quickly than your congresses. On the day when two army corps are able to destroy one another in a matter of seconds, all civilized nations, horrified, will curse war and disband their armies".

The twentieth century has seen the creation of means of mass destruction even more terrifying in their destructive power. It has become possible to destroy in a matter of minutes not merely armies, but entire States - even human civilization itself. But instead of the dream of that arms manufacturer, we are faced with the opposite: the threat has not vanished, but has rather assumed apocalyptic dimensions. This means that the security of mankind must be sought not by turning the forces of science into the forces of destruction, but by political means.

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In making every possible effort to prohibit the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the Byelorussian SSR proceeds from the premise that efforts to ban and eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons are not being made so as to leave a loophole for the production of the next generation of various types of weapons of mass destruction. Efforts to ban existing weapons of mass destruction and to prevent the development of new types should be made in parallel.

The fact that such efforts are necessary and that the danger about which we are talking is not a fantasy has been borne out by events. As we have read in the press, a strategist of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) quite recently stated that the renunciation of nuclear weapons would be possible only if they were replaced by new types of weapons of equal power.

According to the assessment of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) contained in its 1986 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, expenditures on military R and D is growing faster than military expenditures as a whole.

New types of weapons of mass destruction, quite apart from their direct destructive effects, also create new and very serious dangers. It is as yet impossible to have a clear idea of such dangers, but even at this stage it is perfectly clear that weapons systems of such sophistication may emerge that it will be very difficult and perhaps even quite impossible to monitor any ban on them. As a result, it will be extremely difficult to reach agreement on their control and elimination. In addition, by creating an illusion of military supremacy, new types of weapons of mass destruction will tempt the military to use them, and that in turn might lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

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Thus, the development of such weapons would lead to a lowering of the nuclear war threshold. Events in previous decades have shown us that the constant spiral of weapons development in the main source of tension and instability in the world.

At the present advanced level of scientific knowledge, the abuse of scientific and technological progress for military purposes, particularly in respect of weapons of mass destruction, will seriously upset the strategic balance. Thus, what we have is a powerful destabilizing effect due to the possibility of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction. Even today, the world is confronted with a situation in which the development of science and technology and the arms industry is proceeding more rapidly than the drafting of treaties in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The development of new types of weapons of mass destruction could further widen that gap to an extremely dangerous, if not irreversible, extent.

Today it is impossible to draw up an accurate catalogue of the specific types of weapons of mass destruction that are now being developed by military technology. The leaps such technology may take are unforeseeable, but even at the present level of knowledge, we must ensure the rapid prohibition of radiological weapons. This is the subject of the disarmament talks in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. Such weapons might include laser weapons, radiowaves, infrasonic, geophysical and genetic weapons.

There is also a danger that the distinction between weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons will become blurred and that a grey area will be created. As a result of their greater accuracy and increased possibilities of processing military data inputs, such new types of conventional weapons might become analogous to weapons of mass destruction by virtue of their strike capability and, consequently, possibilities of using them.

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Generally speaking, it is important to ~~emphasize~~ the fact that military technology being developed so rapidly that peoples, States and politicians are left with much less time in which to become aware of the true danger presented by ~~developments~~ and mankind finds it increasingly difficult to prevent ~~the erosion~~ of the barrier that now ~~stands~~ between it and the nuclear abyss.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, recently stated:

"We have ~~reached~~ a stage in the ~~scientific~~ and ~~technological~~ revolution when new discoveries might further ~~speed~~ up the ~~arms~~ race and create a situation that might make it very difficult even to initiate talks."

Referring to the same problems, the United Nations Secretary-General, in his annual report on the work of the ~~Organization~~, referred to the task of providing

"~~the~~ multilateral ~~structure~~ for the management of possible adverse ~~consequences~~ of the new technologies, which may affect the international community as a whole." (A/41/1, p. 8)

The ~~efforts~~ made by the Byelorussian SSR for a number of years have been directed precisely at the solution of the problems involved in the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such ~~weapons~~. At the current session of the General Assembly our delegation will submit a draft resolution in this connection, and consultations on it ~~are~~ now being held with a large number of delegations.

Experience has taught us that problems of curbing the arms race qualitatively are even more difficult to resolve than is the question of quantitative limitations and reductions. In this connection, the preventive approach is of particular significance and has ~~special advantages~~. It is essential to prohibit the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new ~~physical~~ principles which, owing to

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their destructive power, would be analogous to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. As authoritative Soviet officials have pointed out, the Soviet Union has not engaged in the testing or deployment of such weapons and does not intend to do so. We will also strive to ensure that this is not done by other countries.

The possibility of implementing in practice a preventive approach to the prohibition of various types of weapons and the effectiveness of such an approach have been corroborated by the successful operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. In the context of the efforts being made to curb the arms race, the value of the preventive approach has been recognized by many States. The ultimate stage of such approach would be for States to refrain completely from the use of new scientific and technological discoveries in order to produce new means of destruction.

We believe that the only adequate way to remove the threat inherent in the inclusion of new types of weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of States is to create machinery to initiate immediate talks to prohibit such types of weapons as soon as they appear. To this end, the Conference on Disarmament should, with the assistance of a group of experts meeting periodically, constantly monitor such matters and, if need be, make recommendations on holding concrete negotiations with regard to such weapons as they emerge.

It is also essential that, immediately after the detection of any new type of such weapons, States should declare a moratorium on their practical development and at once begin talks with a view to their prohibition.

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Those are the practical measures that States should take now and in the future so that the nightmares of today do not become the nightmares of tomorrow. The world is so shot through with means of destruction that world society should not, simply by remaining passive, allow the way to be paved towards new weapons of mass annihilation.

The Byelorussian SSR calls upon all States to refrain from any steps that might lead to the creation of such weapons and to act so as to promote the creation of a firm barrier against them. It is convinced that mankind's intellectual potential should serve to multiply its material and intellectual wealth, and not to create new types of lethal weaponry that would produce global destruction.

There are national socio-economic problems that await solution, and global problems affecting all mankind are becoming increasingly serious: the destruction and pollution of the environment, the atmosphere and the oceans; the depletion of natural resources; hunger and illness. This is a worthy sphere in which to concentrate the material and productive resources of mankind.

The foundations for the further development of human civilisation can be established only through construction, and not through destruction.

Mr. WNA (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): A few weeks ago the world witnessed the Reykjavik summit meeting, naturally hoping that an early start would be made on the efficient and irreversible dismantling of nuclear arsenals until they had been completely eliminated, and on the halting and reversal of the arms race, which with each passing year reaches increasingly alarming levels. Although it is disappointing that those just hopes were not met, that does not mean that disarmament is nothing more than a Utopian aspiration, but it certainly confirms the perception that perseverance is the only way to achieve it.

Even though disarmament is a collective aspiration, the super-Powers bear primary responsibility in this regard. It is incumbent upon them to take the



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initiative again in an effort that transcends their national perspective in order to recover control of science and technology, which in ironic contrast now serve military uses rather than the eradication of hunger and poverty.

Parallel to the political will needed for any fruitful result in the bilateral negotiation between the super-Powers in Geneva, one cannot overlook the impact on the mutual trust that should exist between the parties of an actual or imaginary offensive intent on the part of one of the parties against the other. Such an assumption, which explains the pre-eminence of offensive nuclear weapons notwithstanding the SALT I agreements, is now acquiring renewed importance, when, in the light of what is known as the strategic defence initiative, the super-Powers are expressing their different security perceptions. Thus the thesis of the impenetrable defensive system is now being countered with the argument of the special offensive system, and accordingly an agreement on the substantive reduction of strategic and intermediate nuclear arsenals will be blocked as long as each party refuses to recognize that the other has purely defensive intentions or as long as there is resistance to the idea of assuming similar intentions in word and deed on either side.

From the point of view of the two super-Powers we are therefore faced with a particularly heightened perception of insecurity rendered more acute by a qualitative change in the strategic race. In the interval, the so-called peaceful existence - that is, the armed peace in the Northern Hemisphere - may well serve as a fulcrum for the relaunching of the arms race, shifting the bipolar competition to outer space, which would become a new technically and qualitatively higher level. That would be directly contrary to the feelings of the international community, which views space as the common heritage of mankind and feels that it should be used solely for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all countries, as we have just been reminded by the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries at the recent Harare summit meeting.

(Mr. Luna, Peru)

Notwithstanding the concern aroused by the results of the Reykjavik summit, there is an encouraging sign. It derives from the completion of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 September of this year. Promoted by that tireless fighter for peace the much-lamented Olof Palme, its auspicious results are the best tribute to Mr. Palme's memory and the best example of the great things that can be achieved when mutual interests and political will are joined by peace and regional security. The consolidation and development of the Helsinki agreements, as well as the finalization of the arrangements for on-site inspections, represent significant progress in the strengthening of military détente based on mutual trust and the necessary confidence.

We are encouraged by the results of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, which was completed in Geneva a few weeks ago. In spite of difficulties caused by mutual accusations between the super-Powers, it proved possible to adopt by consensus a Final Declaration introducing the important concept of endogenous reform of the 1972 Convention in order to upgrade the verification machinery provided for in article V. This will be done through the holding of consultative meetings between the contracting parties at the request of any of them on any problem which may arise, and it will be done through the application of a series of confidence-building measures with particular reference to facilities for investigation, research and development in highly sophisticated biosciences. In this way concrete steps have been taken towards the intensification of international co-operation pursuant to article X of the Convention with a view to having the contracting parties make better use of scientific and technical progress in genetic engineering, biotechnology, microbiology and related fields.

(Mr. Luna, Peru)

It **is** true that the report of **the Conference on Disarmament** does not provide us with an optimistic response on the various subjects that are before it annually. But there **is** still every reason to hope that a total and non-discriminatory ban on chemical weapons will soon be enshrined in a convention. My delegation **emphasizes** the importance of the **verification** system, **particularly** the modalities **for** inspection by challenge, and we feel that the process of destruction of **existing** arsenals should provide for on-site inspection in addition to Firm and non-negotiable deadlines. Clearly, if the efforts in the Ad Hoc Committee fail there will no alternative other **than** the promotion, in regions where conditions are right for it, of **chemical-weapon-free zones**.

As far as the complete cessation of nuclear tests is concerned, **we are** encouraged by the **resumption** in Geneva of talks between the **super-Powers**. None the less we find the **reluctance** of most of the nuclear Powers to commit themselves to a unilateral moratorium very **disappointing**.

The continuation of nuclear-weapon tests, which inter alla are designed to upgrade warheads qualitatively, constitutes **a** flagrant challenge to the international community, which demands of the nuclear Powers, especially the super-Powers, **a** gesture of goodwill, the definitive halting of all nuclear tests, preceded by a generalized moratorium.

(Mr. Luna, Peru)

Towards that end, we warmly commend the statesmen who took part in the Ixtapa summit meeting last August for their timely and valuable move. The Government of Peru has already placed on record its solidarity with this new and praiseworthy effort designed to provide a concrete type of negotiations which will allow multinational verification. We therefore attach the greatest importance to the annex to the Mexico Declaration, which is now being studied by the competent national authorities.

However, it is a source of disappointment to note that the Conference on Disarmament has failed to fulfil its mandate under General Assembly resolution 40/80 A by instituting the appropriate ad hoc committee to carry out multilateral negotiations on a total nuclear-test ban. It is essential in this connection that the General Assembly should renew its mandate for that body in comprehensive and unambiguous terms.

Peru wishes to place on record its rejection of and opposition to the continued holding of nuclear tests in the South Pacific. We wish to reiterate Our appeal for respect for the ecological integrity of the marine environment and the restoration of the peaceful tradition of the South Pacific basin.

My country is disturbed at the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament on the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament and related issues. Is it not paradoxical that top priority in disarmament negotiations, as acknowledged by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, turns out to have been supplanted by an indiscriminate qualitative and quantitative multiplication of nuclear arsenals to the point where only a tiny portion of them is needed to turn our civilization into a nuclear wasteland?

It is urgently necessary to reaffirm with concrete and tangible progress the primacy of nuclear disarmament, both in the field of strategic weapons and

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intermediate and theatre nuclear weapon. The existence of these weapons of mass destruction is an insult to the genius of man and it is very much in our collective interest to avoid collective suicide by error, accident, or a sinister ambition for power.

It is on the basis of this position of principle that my country reiterates its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones which, while they are considered as collateral measures for nuclear disarmament, function as containment barriers in certain geographical areas against the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction and impede the propagation of a nuclear conflict.

For the same reason, we support the declaration of new zones of peace by the General Assembly, because these - although perhaps with less emphasis than the ones to which I have previously referred - are also designed to exclude certain geographical areas from the geo-strategic rivalries of extra-regional Powers.

The question of the prevention of the arms race in space is closely linked to the foregoing. If one bears in mind the clear evidence that now exists to the effect that the super-Powers are preparing to shift their current arms race into space, one is deeply disturbed at the slowness of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on this matter. It is more necessary than ever to reaffirm the full vitality of the Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, which should be accompanied by a restricted interpretation of its article V. Without prejudice to the negotiations on a complementary agreement to complete the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, a complete study should be made of the problems of outer space, as the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea had done. In any case, the renewal of the

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mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee for next session • should include the specific task of adapting its work to the need to make an immediate start on negotiations, particularly on the conceptual framework which has differing implications.

In conventional disarmament, resolution 40/94 A constitutes the framework of principle designed to make possible in those regions where the conditions are appropriate processes for arms limitation which will release new resources which can be devoted to economic and social development. It is in this spirit that Peru has for some years been advocating policies of understanding in the area designed to strengthen the development of a climate of mutual trust as a necessary condition to bring about regional agreements and to reduce the amount of expenditure on armaments. As our Foreign Minister, Mr. Wagner Tizon, said in the General Assembly on 22 September :

"We want to give a new dimension to defence needs on the basis of new concepts of regional security, based on a system of relations characterised by the dynamics of co-operation and not of conflict, thereby providing what is needed for the well-being of our people." (A/41/PV.5, p. 21)

In the light of this purpose, my delegation values the efforts of the Disarmament Commission to draw up principles to govern the reduction of military budgets. However, we regret that this effort has not been satisfactorily concluded. It is to be hoped that the difficulties that still exist can be overcome promptly so that we can have an important political reference framework which will benefit the regions concerned.

My delegation deplores the postponement of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We fail to understand the attitude taken by one super-Power which, by staying on the sidelines of the dialogue, has chosen to freeze differences in place instead of resolving them with

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the help of all. What is at stake here is the establishment of a constructive and viable relationship between the two options of disarmament and development through agreed formulas which will place these variables in the context of overall security in both the military and non-military aspects. We do not doubt that this is a particularly thorny question, but what the Assembly cannot do is postpone taking it up sine die, nor can it adulterate the implications of resolution 40/155 in regard to this Conference.

Finally, my delegation is very grateful for the unanimous decision of the Foreign Ministers, Ministers and Heads of delegations who took part recently in the XII Latin American Council, SELA, to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take appropriate measures for the establishment in Lima of a United Nations regional centre for peace, disarmament and development in Latin America. At the same time, my country wishes to place on record its gratitude for the generous welcome given by the countries in the region to the Peruvian initiative and the designation of Lima as the site for the headquarters of the future centre. We wish to emphasize that in light of the financial difficulties of the United Nations the centre may be established in the present infrastructure the United Nations has in our capital city. Its activities will seek to promote the cause of peace and disarmament, in addition to promoting academic and technical analyses of the general problem of disarmament on the basis of the Final Document of the 1978 special session.

(Mr. Luna, Peru)

It is worth pointing out, in this context, that Peru's interest in disarmament is crucial to its overall view of the priorities needed for an appropriate reordering of international relations. For that reason, my country feels that the symbolic importance of the recent Summit should not be allowed to frustrate the substantial disarmament movement among the majority by favouring the logic of cynicism over the historic change of thinking which reason and ethics require of responsible statesmen. Rather than a missed opportunity, Reykjavik must be seen merely as an initial setback on the now well-established path of co-operation, the importance of which has been emphasised for several decades by the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, who will speak on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like, on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, to make some comments on agenda items 62 (e) and (f) regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

In addition to important exchanges on several specific studies, we are pleased to note that the Advisory Board also continued, during its two sessions in 1986, to discuss the general subject of United Nations studies in the field of disarmament. Delegations will recall that one member of the twelve introduced a draft resolution which was adopted without a vote as resolution 40/152 K, which invited Member States to submit views on the broad question of disarmament studies. It also asked the Advisory Board to submit a report on this matter to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. Several Governments have already responded, and we hope that more will do so before the Advisory Board presents its report next year.



(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The twelve are also pleased to note that, acting in its capacity as Trustees of UNIDIR, the Board reached agreement on a number of proposals regarding the Institute's programme of work and budget which take account of the serious financial situation of the United Nations as a whole.

It is with considerable concern, however, that we note that the Director of UNIDIR was unable to prepare and submit his annual report on the work of the Institute. These tasks had to be undertaken by his Deputy.

It is clear, both from the Advisory Board's report (A/41/666) as well as that submitted by the Deputy Director of UNIDIR (A/41/676) that Mr. Bota is being prevented from returning to his post - for almost 10 months now - and that this situation has seriously impaired the work of the Institute. The effect is particularly critical at this point in the Institute's development, when the presence of an active Director is vital.

Several countries, including members of the European Community, contribute voluntarily to the funding of UNIDIR. And all Member States contribute through the subvention which the Institute receives from the regular budget of the United Nations. It is in the interests of all of us that UNIDIR should function properly and effectively. Clearly it cannot do so without its Director at the helm.

Like a number of other Governments, the twelve have taken a direct interest in Mr. Bota's case in support of the Secretary-General's persistent efforts to secure his return to his post. We believe that it would be valuable if the Secretary-General could inform this Committee of the efforts that have been made on Mr. Bota's behalf and of the present situation.

In conclusion, the twelve wish to repeat our appeal to those who hold the key to a solution to bring this matter to a speedy conclusion to the satisfaction of everyone concerned.

The CHAIRMAN, I now call on the representative of Sri Lanka, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, will introduce the report of that Committee.

Mr. WIJewardane (Sri Lanka) : The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean is in document A/41/29. It has been prepared pursuant to resolution 40/153 of 16 December 1985.

In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee was scheduled to meet for a period of six weeks during the year 1986. However, due to financial constraints and exigencies confronting the United Nations, the Ad Hoc Committee reduced its meetings to four weeks in two sessions in 1986. The first session was held from 26 March to 8 April 1986 at United Nations Headquarters in New York, followed by the second session, also at Headquarters from 14 to 25 July 1986. Altogether the Ad Hoc Committee held 13 formal meetings, as well as a number of informal meetings, during these two sessions. Additionally, the working Group established by the Ad Hoc Committee on 11 July 1985 held nine meetings in the course of the two sessions in 1986.

A happy feature about the proceedings was the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee was able, within the time allocated and the resources made available to it, to reach a consensus resolution, a feat which I am told has no parallel in recent years. I believe, and this is my personal opinion, that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was facilitated considerably by the fact that some issues of substance were discussed in the Working Group. This device of having a working Group enabled delegations to have a free and frank exchange of views. I must thank all member States that showed such keen and abiding interest in the progress of work both in the Working Group and in the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. Wijewardane, Sri Lanka)

Having said that, I will briefly indicate to the Committee the structure of the report, which is divided into three parts. The first is an introduction, the second, a review of the work of the Ad Hoc committee, and the third, the recommendation of a draft resolution to the General Assembly.

At this point, permit me also to give the First Committee the background to the work of the Working Group, which, as I said earlier, served a useful purpose in enabling the Ad Hoc Committee to complete the mandate that was entrusted to it. The Working Group was established as the Ad Hoc Committee reported last year in paragraph 15 of its report (A/40/29). The working Group held nine meetings during the year under review. An informal working paper was presented by the Group's Chairman to structure and organize the Group's consideration of substantive issues. The working paper was available in all United Nations languages following a request by the Working Group. There were intensive negotiations and discussions within the Working Group.

While substance was being dealt with within the Working Group, the Ad Hoc Committee discussed various issues, including procedural matters, which included draft rules of procedure, participation, level of representation, stages of the Conference and a final document of the Conference. During the year, I am happy to say, the Ad Hoc Committee strove to give adequate time to the discussion of both procedural and substantive issues.

The draft resolution, as usual, was presented by Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned group. It was introduced on 25 July 1986 and was discussed by the regional groups both informally and formally in the course of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee during its July session. The draft resolution has 15 operative paragraphs, of which only operative paragraph 2 and aspects of operative paragraph 5 are new features.

(Mr. Wijewardane, Sri Lanka)

I have already dealt with the input of the Working Group into the discussions that preceded the drafting of this report. Hence, at this point I do not think it necessary to expand on what I have already said regarding the Working Group and the manner in which it discharged its work - except to thank its Chairman, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, and the delegations that joined him.

It will be observed that operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution continues to maintain that the Conference in Colombo should open

"not later than 1988, to be decided by the Committee in consultation with the host country, with a clear understanding that if preparatory work is not completed in 1987, serious consideration will be given to ways and means of more effectively organizing work in the Ad Hoc Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate". (A/41/29, para. 17)

Further consultations would undoubtedly be needed within the Ad Hoc Committee to determine how best its work should be reorganized to meet the nature of the understanding I have just referred to. I propose, once the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee is renewed, to address myself to this task, enlisting the assistance of the officers of the Committee. I hope that they will extend to me their full co-operation, customary goodwill, and understanding and accommodation when I meet with them.

Apart from those two changes, the other notable feature about the draft resolution is the request in operative paragraph 11 to the Ad Hoc Committee to hold two preparatory sessions in 1987, each of two weeks' duration, for completion of preparatory work. That recommendation should find acceptance in view of the fact that it has taken into consideration the need for exercising utmost restraint in using the resources and time of the United Nations. The States members of the

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Ad Hoc Committee were keenly alive to the need to exercise this restraint and, with the experience of the 1986 meetings, it would not be beyond the competence of the Ad Hoc Committee, when assisted by its Working Group, to exercise economies and rationalize procedures and processes to enable it to comply with the undertaking set out in operative paragraph 5.

It will be observed that the draft resolution calls for the full and active participation and co-operation of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the major maritime users and the littoral and hinterland States. It has been my good fortune as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to have the full support and co-operation of those three entities. They have extended to me their co-operation, goodwill, accommodation and understanding in the carrying out of my responsibilities as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. During the course of 1987 the Ad Hoc Committee is required "to complete preparatory work relating to the Convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean" (A/41/27, para. 17), and for this purpose it will have to address itself to the still unfinished business, both organizational matters and substantive issues.

I am confident that, given the necessary will and other things being equal, the spirit that pervades the Ad Hoc Committee will enable it to discharge its mandate fully. If that is done, the opening of the Conference in Colombo at an early date - but not later than 1988 - would be a triumph for international goodwill, co-operation and understanding.

I would be remiss in my duty if in conclusion I did not refer to the valuable support and assistance the Ad Hoc Committee and its officers have always received from its Secretary, Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, and his assistants. To them I extend our thanks and appreciation.

Mr. STRULAK (Poland) : Following the rough evaluation of the question of the elimination of chemical weapons that my delegation made in its statement on 21 October, in the general debate, we should like today to elaborate in some detail on this high-priority issue which, while attracting ever-growing attention in various disarmament forums and remaining the subject of sustained negotiating efforts at the Conference on Disarmament, continues to cause serious concern to public opinion at large. Chemical weapons - arms of mass destruction - are vividly remembered as being extremely dangerous and particularly repulsive. Each and every delegation in this room is well aware that one of the two categories of weapons of mass destruction the use of which was outlawed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 became subject to a total prohibition as long as 14 years ago under the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Yet the similar total elimination of chemical weapons has so far eluded us.

The record of multilateral disarmament deliberations and negotiations shows clearly that Poland has always attached special importance to the successful outcome of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Our constructive involvement in this regard goes as far back as the preparation of the Geneva Protocol itself. We are therefore sincerely pleased to be able to share the prevailing Opinion that the work of the Conference on Disarmament in this field is indeed entering a very intensive and - we hope - a final stage. The degree of progress, as described in paragraph 87 of the Conference's report to the General Assembly (A/41.27), is very encouraging indeed, and a draft multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction seems to be really within our reach. It is pertinent to quote here the following passage from the Secretary-General's current report on the work of the Organization:

(Mr. Strulak, Poland)

"Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons merit and are, I believe, receiving high priority'. (A/41/p.9)

Prospects for the speedy conclusion of the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons have certainly been strengthened by the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States at the Geneva summit last November to accelerate their efforts in that direction, and by their bilateral consultations that have been held since then. While not a substitute for the work in the Conference on Disarmament, they certainly do contribute substantially to the progress of the multilateral endeavour.

I believe that the best summary of the common feeling with respect to what has been accomplished, as well as what remains to be done, is contained in article IX of the concurring Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction - adopted in Geneva on 26 September this year. The positive results of the Review Conference should, in the view of my delegation, well serve a decisive advance in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Noting with satisfaction the substantial progress already achieved by the Conference on Disarmament, the Review Conference took note of

"the bilateral talks between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on all aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons".

(Mr. Strulak, Poland)

At the same time it deeply regretted that "an agreement on a convention on chemical weapons has not yet been reached" and urged the Conference on Disarmament "to exert all possible efforts to conclude an agreement on a total ban of chemical weapons with effective verification provisions by the earliest possible date". It is this appeal which requires the concentration of our attention here and of our practical support.

The urgency of finally doing away with chemical weapons has been emphasized by their inclusion, next to nuclear arsenals, in the programme of eliminating weapons of mass extermination from Earth before the end of this century, put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in January this year.

The necessity of finalizing the elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles and production facilities has of late been reaffirmed in the communiqué of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Bucharest on 14 and 15 October.

At the Conference on Disarmament proper, intense efforts undertaken in its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the three Working Groups, as well as in other informal forums, have been greatly enhanced by a number of developments, notably the Soviet far-reaching proposals of April 1966 on the destruction or dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities including their effective verification, through, inter alla, systematic international on-site inspections. Our delegation was among those which, by submitting specific suggestions, contributed to a search for solutions to the intricate verification problems, notably provisions on on-challenge inspection.

We note efforts of others too and we are satisfied that businesslike discussions covered all the most important aspects of the future convention. Our



(Hr. Strulak, Poland)

considered judgement is that the exchange of views continues to be comprehensive, open and constructive. The guidance provided by that Committee's Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie, should also be appreciated.

Yet, while it seems certain that, as I mentioned earlier, the work on the convention is entering its final technical stage, a lot remains to be done. Mutually acceptable solutions still have to be worked out in three crucial areas, namely, the elimination of chemical weapons and of their production facilities, the non-production of those weapons and the reliable verification of compliance with the convention's provisions.

During the 1986 session of the Conference progress was achieved in all of these areas. However, considerable substantive work is still needed there. Redoubled efforts and no small amount of political will would be required for dealing successfully with such specific issues as, for example, the scope of data on production, distribution and use of relevant chemicals to be submitted to the future Consultative Committee, the listing of key precursor chemicals and on-challenge inspections. The Polish delegation to the Conference will certainly not be found wanting in its attempts to find solutions to these and other issues.

Without wishing to detract in any way from the fundamental importance of a global elimination of chemical weapons, Poland sees the relevance of interim steps that may be taken pending the conclusion of a final comprehensive agreement. This is precisely why we take a favourable view of partial measures, such as the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in Europe and other regions of the world and support proposals made in this regard.

We strongly believe that, pending the conclusion of the convention, no action should be undertaken which might, directly or indirectly, negatively influence the work being done by the Conference on Disarmament, in particular taking into account the fact that it has entered such a decisive and delicate stage. We have to say in

(Mr. Strulsk, Poland)

all frankness that we fail to understand how decisiona to go ahead with the production and eventual deployment of new types of chemical weapons, taken and supported by some Conference on Disarmament member States, can be reconciled with their professed intentions of a speedy introduction of a chemical weapons ban.

My delegation belongs to the growing number of those that believe that a real possibility exists to finalise the chemical weapons convention during the course of next year. In this context, we welcome the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to hold an additional session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons from 12 to 30 January 1987, preceded by intersessional consultations between 24 November and 17 December 1986. It is our most sincere hope that this much needed extra time will be well spent. We, for our part, are going to spare no effort to ensure that indeed it will be.

In conclusion, let me say that there seems to be an almost universal conviction, which we share, that the solution of the formidable political and practical problems of a complete chemical weapons ban would be of enormous significance. Not only would it mark a major disarmament measure of high priority, eliminating both the already amassed stockpiles of chemical weapons and the all too present threat of development of qualitatively new, ever more dangerous types of these weapons of mass destruction, but it would also demonstrate, after so many years of general impasse in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the effectiveness of this multilateral negotiating body. Solutions of various aspects of the chemical weapons ban, including that of verification, would also set a telling example for seeking accord on other issues under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament. In order for this to become a long-awaited reality, the Conference has - to paraphrase the Secretary-General - to continue to receive the high-level attention and the expert participation of Member States. For its part, Poland pledges the continuation of both.

Hf. MOREL (France) (interpretation from French) : A number of countries have emphasized in this Committee their interest in the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. This is of course quite natural for those countries that directly participated in it. But we were also very interested to note the positive response of a number of other delegations to these results. This quite general approval is easily explained. The agreement reached at Stockholm is, in the field of security and East-West relations, the first positive development in the form of an agreement since the signing of the 1979 SALT II agreement. We therefore felt it desirable to emphasize in the United Nations the importance of the conclusions reached by the Stockholm Conference and highlight the advantages it represents for both European participants and all other States.

That is the purpose of the draft resolution I am introducing in the Committee with the joint sponsorship of 11 countries: first, the Federal Republic of Germany - since this document is the fruit of joint work - but also Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

To describe the draft resolution briefly, I should like to say that, first, it recalls the specific context of Europe since the last war and the actions which led to the Stockholm Conference. That is the subject of the preamble. The operative part of the text is intended to expatiate on the matter by highlighting the following six points: first, it recalls the objective sought, that is, stability and security through increased openness and the search for a balance of forces at a lower level; secondly, it recalls the compatibility between the regional approach to conventional disarmament and the principle of universality established by the United Nations; thirdly, it confirms the usefulness of the specific measures

(Mr. Morel, France)

adopted at the Stockholm Conference; fourthly, it recalls the role to be played by those measures in the European context; fifthly, it refers to the general advantage of confidence-building measures and states that the General Assembly

“Relieves that increased confidence can improve the basis for effective, adequate and effectively verifiable measures of conventional disarmament aimed at enhancing the security of all States”;

and, finally, it calls upon all States to make use of confidence and security-building measures whenever they deem it advisable.

That brief summary is intended to indicate the importance we attach to this matter, and we think it will be possible to rally broad support for this text.

In attempting to anticipate questions which certain delegations may have in mind, I should like to spell out our intentions. Our draft is not intended to supplant various texts which have already been, or will be, submitted on conventional disarmament, be they on continuing work in the Disarmament Commission or on a comprehensive approach to the question of conventional disarmament.

Nor is this text intended to give any rigid definition of any exclusive fundamental link between confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament. Our purpose is a pragmatic one: it is based on past experience, on our conclusions and on a practice that will be implemented at the end of this year, 1986, among 35 States.

Nor does this draft intend to dictate to those countries that did not take part in the Stockholm Conference what their choice should be for the future, or to impose any particular formula. It is understood that every regional context has its own peculiarities, and there can be no question of almost mechanically transposing the Stockholm conclusions to other regions.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Nor is it the purpose of this text in any way to prejudge ensuing negotiations after the initial result reached by the Stockholm Conference. The countries members of the Atlantic Alliance made an appeal at Halifax and they are preparing suggestions in this connection. The 35 countries are to meet in Vienna next week to consider the implementation of the Final Act in all its component parts; it will be for them to decide on this themselves in the competent bodies.

Those clarifications are meant to bring out the aims we are pursuing in the draft resolution. On the basis of a negotiation which was successful after seven years' efforts among 35 countries of greatly varying size, social systems and security options, the text we are submitting to the General Assembly - initially here in the First Committee - emphasizes the inherent advantage of this step forward for security in Europe and proposes quite openly to all other States concerned to draw on it in any way that can be useful to them, both from the point of view of confidence-building measures in the strict sense of the term and, more generally speaking, from the point of view of prospects for conventional disarmament.

That is why my delegation and the other sponsors of the draft resolution hope that this text will win very broad support.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on representatives wishing to exercise the right of reply, I remind members that the Committee will follow the procedure set forth in my previous remarks on this point.

Mr. TINKA (Romania): At this meeting the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of some other countries, expressed considerable concern over the present functioning of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). I must confess that we take very seriously the concerns of that group of delegations; we believe that they are sincere; and we would like to add

(Mr. Tinka, Romania)

that my delegation also is preoccupied with the **present** functioning of UNIDIR. As a matter of fact, Romania's interest in UNIDIR's functioning did not start this year but **goes** back many **years**. We have made contributiona from the very beginning of the Institute and its activities enjoy Romania's support.

At the same time, in a previous ~~fight~~ of reply my delegation has stated that at present there is a delicate dialogue ~~between~~ the Secretary-General and Romanian authorities concerning the situation of UNIDIR and ~~its~~ ~~director~~. At this juncture, I would not like to elaborate any further in explaining the situation in addition to what the **representative** of the United Kingdom said. It ~~might~~ happen that this delegation has ~~some~~ new details or views on the **subject**. I shall refrain from making any hasty reply to the representative of the United Kingdom because, as I have said, the matter is of such a nature that it **requires** patient, ~~quiet~~ diplomacy.

Having said that, I reserve my ~~delegation's~~ right to **return** to the subject at a later stage should that **prove** necessary.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom) : I have listened with interest to what was said by the representative of Romania. I think that **clearly** we do not wish to cut **across** the efforts that are being made by the Secretary-General to secure Mr. Bota's release.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

It is the view of my delegation and of those for whom I spoke that the continued absence of Mr. Rota from his post is having an effect on the work of the Institute, and this is of direct interest to this Committee. The documents which I quoted make it clear how serious are the consequences of Mr. Rota's absence from his post at the Institute. He has now been absent for 10 months and we hope that we shall hear very soon the results of the Secretary-General's negotiations with the Romanian authorities.

The CHAIRMAN: I am now in a position to inform Committee members that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for tomorrow morning's meeting: the United States of America, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Liberia, Cameroon, Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which will speak on behalf of the 12 States members of the European Community.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.