



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Chairman: **Mr. ZACHMANN** (German Democratic Republic)

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Mr. Yamada (Japan)
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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46 TO 65 AND 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. YAMADA (Japan) : Allow me to begin, Sir, by congratulating you on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I am certain that under your able guidance the Committee will deal successfully with the many and difficult questions on our agenda. My delegation will spare no effort to assist you in the fulfilment of your very important duties. My congratulations go also to the other Officers of the Committee, Ambassador Roche of Canada, Ambassador Ki of Burkina Faso and Mr. Aoki of my own delegation. I wish them all well in carrying out their considerable responsibilities.

In his statement at the opening of the current session of the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Kuranari, addressed the questions of Peace and disarmament. Speaking as a citizen of Nagasaki, a city that was reduced to rubble by the atomic bomb, Mr. Kuranari placed particular emphasis on the search for a way to abolish nuclear weapons and called upon the international community to continue to work towards that goal. He stressed that today questions of peace and disarmament are of even greater importance than ever before and require urgent solutions. Unfortunately, however, in spite of the fervent desire of the peoples of the world for peace and disarmament, the present international situation remains as tense as ever. Existing stockpiles of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, have more than enough potential to wipe all of mankind off the face of this earth. Given this situation, it is imperative that we pause to ask ourselves seriously what we should - or rather, what we can - do at this time to deal with these questions.

The special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the questions of world peace and disarmament cannot be overemphasized.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

The world thus follows developments in their bilateral relations with great interest and hope and watches the course of their arms-control talks with high expectations. Their nuclear and space talks in Geneva concern some 20-odd thousand nuclear warheads with tremendous destructive potential. As noted in their joint statement of November 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to reduce their nuclear arms by 50 per cent. If they succeed in translating that agreement into a concrete arms-control convention, it would be the first time that they would have agreed, not merely on a ceiling to their arms build-up, but on a substantial reduction in their armaments. Such an arms convention would increase their bilateral strategic stability and, at the same time, enhance world peace and security. It would be of immense historic significance. For those reasons, great hope was placed on the meeting between the two leaders earlier this month at Reykjavik, Iceland. The international community regarded the meeting as a valuable opportunity to strengthen the East-West political dialogue, enhance mutual trust and make progress in the bilateral negotiations on the various issues of arms control and disarmament. It is regrettable that, in spite of the constructive efforts made by the two sides, they were unable to attain a final agreement at that meeting.

There did, however, emerge considerable mutual understanding over a wide range of issues concerning, in particular, intermediate-range nuclear forces, strategic weapons, nuclear testing, human rights and various regional and bilateral issues. Japan earnestly hopes that the two nations will make use of every opportunity to continue their dialogue and consultations so as to make further progress in resolving these issues.

In stressing the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to questions of world peace and disarmament, it is not my intention to imply that other nations may just stand by idly. As Foreign

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Minister Kuranari stated in his address to the General Assembly, Japan, for its part, intends to redouble its efforts in the Conference on Disarmament, in the United Nations and elsewhere to make further contributions in this field.

In dealing with the questions of arms control and disarmament in today's world, we need to understand clearly the international situation, in which security interests of States are extremely complex. At the same time, however, we must also recognize that weapons technology has become highly sophisticated, and it is being applied in an increasingly wide variety of fields. Given these developments, and from past experience, it should be clear that idealistic slogans alone will not suffice; if our problems are to be resolved, greater trust among States and steady efforts to achieve concrete practical tasks will be required.

The first thing to bear in mind in advancing the cause of disarmament is the need to foster relations of trust in the international arena. It is my belief that measures to enhance confidence among States, formulated by taking fully into consideration the various political, military and other conditions of a particular region, will not only serve to prevent conflicts but also contribute to the promotion of disarmament. Most of the measures contained in the agreed document of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which successfully concluded its work this past September, are aimed at building confidence and require specific action on the part of the States concerned. It is believed that those measures will enhance political security and, at the same time, have substantive military significance. Furthermore, we welcome the agreement - reached for the first time in the annals of disarmament negotiation - regarding on-site inspection as a verification measure; that represents a step towards a definitive disarmament agreement. I hope that that development will lead to similar breakthroughs in the other disarmament negotiations which have been stalled on the question of adequate verification measures.

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In this connection, I should like to note that the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, with its unresolved territorial problem and other outstanding issues, is both politically and militarily different from that which exists in Europe. I believe that efforts to solve those problems should be made as a first step in building mutual confidence.

The next thing we need to bear in mind in advancing the cause of disarmament is the importance of verification as a concrete means of enhancing confidence between States. This is one of the most crucial issues in arms control and disarmament.

Any solution of the verification problem must satisfy national security requirements and foster mutual confidence. I feel it is necessary to point out that differences in social systems have important implications, particularly with regard to access to information and discrepancies in the accuracy of verification measures. Because the strong concern about the issue of violations of existing agreements has not been fully answered, it is all the more important to adopt a firm position with regard to verification. The development of verification measures that are acceptable to the States concerned is an important aspect of disarmament efforts.

Allow me to turn now to the issue of nuclear disarmament, specifically to the issue of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, to which my country has long attached central importance. Japan has consistently maintained that a nuclear-test ban is the most important issue in the field of nuclear disarmament and has worked assiduously for its realization. Recognizing that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would directly affect the national security of States, we have stressed the importance of resolving the verification issue, including on-site inspection, so as to ensure compliance. We believe that that is the soundest approach and, in the

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

final analysis, a shortcut to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. It was from that perspective that Japan made a step-by-step proposal at the Conference on Disarmament in 1984, namely, that those nuclear tests whose yields are at levels which are now verifiable would be banned immediately, and that as improvements are made in verification technology the threshold would be gradually lowered so as finally to arrive at a comprehensive ban. Following up on that proposal in April of this year Japan proposed developing a system, as part of an international seismic-data exchange system, through which more accurate data on seismic wave forms would be shared in order to improve verification capabilities. It was gratifying that that proposal was welcomed by many countries.

The Group of Scientific Experts at the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament was able to reach agreement on its future programme of work, including the exchange of wave forms or level II data. My country, together with other interested countries, intends to begin this coming December an exchange of level II data on an experimental basis.

In spite of the many constructive proposals on the substance of a nuclear-test ban, we regret that for the past three years the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to establish an ad hoc committee on the item owing to disagreement over its mandate. Japan proposed at the beginning of this year's summer session that work on the item be conducted in the plenary Conference. In view of the urgency of the issue my country hopes that the States concerned will be able to overcome their differences regarding the mandate, so that we can reach early agreement on a framework for conducting substantive work at the coming spring session.

Japan is greatly concerned also about chemical weapons - another means of mass destruction - and has contributed actively over the past 15 or so years to the work on this topic by the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor bodies. We

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appreciate the detailed and concentrated discussions on the major problems regarding a chemical weapons convention which took place this year in the Conference on Disarmament. Although progress was made in some important areas, recently the negotiations have become extremely complicated, expanded in scope and deeply absorbed in detail. We hope that the negotiations will concentrate to a greater extent on resolving those major issues which have been identified in the work conducted so far, with a view to concluding a convention at an early date. In particular, we hope to see the still outstanding basic differences concerning verification resolved, so that a blueprint can be drawn up for an effective and feasible verification system, including an international on-site inspection régime.

On a related matter, I wish to express Japan's appreciation that the Second Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention, concluded successfully in Geneva last September, helped to strengthen the authority of the Convention and enhance confidence in it. My country intends to take an active part in the meeting of experts in March 1987, which will consider various confidence-building measures. We trust that the results of the Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention will spur progress in the negotiations on the closely related issue of a chemical weapons convention.

In view of the recent developments in space-related technology, Japan considers that the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space should be fully examined by the General Assembly, and especially by the Conference on Disarmament.

This year, as in 1985, the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee and held discussions on the subject. Since the problem of regulating military activities in outer space is of a complex and highly technical nature, we feel it is necessary to continue the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee, and request the States concerned to provide the necessary information and clarification so that the various issues may be identified and better understood.

(Yamada, J a p a n)

I wish to take this opportunity to comment on the method of work and the need to improve the Committee's efficiency. In response to a proposal submitted last year by Japan, an 18-member Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts was established to deal with the very serious administrative and financial situation facing the United Nations.

(Mr. Yamada, Japmn)

The report that the Group recently submitted to the General Assembly contains comprehensive recommendations for making the United Nations a more efficient organization. In particular it includes recommendations concerning the efficiency of the Main Committees, including the Committee, by rationalizing the agenda, streamlining the procedures and methods of work and reducing the number of resolutions and requests for reports of the Secretary-General. Japan hopes that the First Committee will work to achieve greater efficiency and is prepared to co-operate to attain that end. In particular the number of resolutions discussed and adopted by the First Committee has increased steadily, tripling in the past 10 years. Japmn is disturbed by this trend, and from the perspective of efficiency believes it is imperative to strive to streamline and consolidate various resolutions under the same agenda item. Japmn welcomes the efforts of the former Chairman of the First Committee in presenting specific ideas for rationalising the agenda. Moreover we strongly hope that at this session consultations among the States concerned can be held under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, so as to determine what progress can be achieved on this matter.

I wish to come back again to the main issue of arms control and disarmament. Disarmament negotiation is a process in which participating States, while paying careful heed to the security interests of all, seek to find as wide a common base as possible on which to build mutual confidence and through positive verification to reduce armaments. Because this process requires compromise among participating States, no product will be complete or ideal. But in considering disarmament and arms control we should always bear in mind that disarmament negotiation is only one among several processes aimed at solving the question of war and peace.

We have learned from experience that the road to peace and disarmament is long and difficult. But no matter how difficult the situation may be, or how elusive

(Hr. Yamadm, Japan)

the goal, we must continue our efforts in the knowledge that with perseverance we can and will make progress towards the creation of a world that is free from the scourge of war.

I wish to conclude on a personal note.

I was a boy of 14 years old, attending a junior high school in Hiroshima in August 1945. I still vividly remember what I saw with my own eyes. I feel it is a great honour for me that my Government recently assigned me to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and that I will be able to work with distinguished colleagues so that the tragedy of mankind that I experienced will never be suffered again by a future generation.

Mr. OTT (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic has followed with great interest the debate held so far in the First Committee. We appreciate the constructive and businesslike attitude displayed by the delegations and commend the ideas, proposals and suggestions that have been submitted in many statements.

We believe that, after the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik, this is the right way to continue the dialogue on the vital questions of our time and to seek possibilities for their settlement. Of course it is to be regretted that the expectations of the meeting were not fulfilled. The main obstacle to an agreement on the cardinal question of our time, which was within reach and would undoubtedly have been of historic significance, again turned out to be the striving of well-known circles for military superiority and the imposition of their political will on other States. The obstinate insistence on the strategic defence initiative, on "star wars" plans, is a dangerous and comprehensive expression of that policy.

Therefore the great chance immediately to bring about a fundamental turn for the better in the world by taking courageous and responsible steps could not be

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taken advantage of. However, this fact must not and will not keep us from pursuing this aim with even more perseverance, consistency and initiative and above all by diminishing the danger of a nuclear inferno through the comprehensive reduction of all types of nuclear weapons and a nuclear-test ban. There is no doubt that the new situation in the struggle for the reduction and liquidation of nuclear armaments is also characterized by the aspect that Reykjavik furnished proof that agreements on this vital question for mankind are possible. Indeed, in itself this experience is of great benefit and constitutes an encouragement not only for the two negotiating sides but also for all peoples and peace-loving forces.

It is the unswerving position of the German Democratic Republic that it is all the more important at this time, which is full of danger, to reach together with all forces of common sense and realism a basic turn from confrontation to détente and co-operation. In this effort the voices of all peoples count. The will of the peoples must be expressed even more vigorously to make common sense prevail at last.

My country's Head of State, Erich Honecker, in referring to this universal concern, put it as follows: "The world conscience must in fact determine the world's development". What is needed now more than ever before is businesslike, result-oriented dialogue. Now it is imperative to do everything so that what emerged in Reykjavik as concrete steps and real possibilities will finally become reality.

This idea was also expressed at the recent meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member States held in Bucharest last week. In the joint communiqué of that meeting it is said that implementation of the far-reaching proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik

"would make it possible to bring about, within a short time, a fundamental change for the better in international affairs, to reach a breakthrough in all

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

● pherem □⁷ the struggle fa disarmament, to mvmt the danger of a nuclear war and to star t a real movement for a world without nuclwr weapons".

The mee ting launched an appeal to the United Sta tes *md* the other NATO countries to become a ware of the seriousness of the present international situation *md* to approach, fra a position of realism . responsibility *md* constructiveness, the Soviet proposals, which will wntinue to be the main subject in the Soviet-American dialogue.

The German Democratic Republic, like the other ● ouialimt States, is resolutely determined - and I quote again fra the joint communiqué Of Bucharest:

"to wntinue and deepen the political dialogue with other States in order to

● trengthm confidence and understanding *md* bring about concrete agreements on questions of disarmament and of securing peace".

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It is along these lines that the German Democratic Republic intends to submit a number of concrete initiatives to this Committee.

It would be an important step towards the prevention of nuclear war if all States were to pledge themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament should give due attention to that question in its debates on the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection, the proposals made by the socialist and non-aligned States, as well as by the six Heads of State or Government, to reach international agreements on the non-use and non-first use of nuclear weapons could be discussed as a group. Now and before, however, three nuclear-weapon States are not willing to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and to renounce the option of the first use of nuclear weapons.

Such a position has grave consequences for the international situation. Based on the concept of the first use of nuclear weapons, certain quarters stubbornly seek to create nuclear-weapon capacity, as well as large-scale missile defence systems, to reach that aim. Such systems are intended to serve as a shield against a nuclear counter-attack which could follow a first strike.

To renounce the first use of nuclear weapons would hence not only be an important confidence- and security-building measure but would also promote the cessation of the arms race on Earth and its spread to outer space. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic will therefore not lessen its efforts to bring about a universal pledge to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons.

In order to spare mankind the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war once and for all, nuclear arsenals must be reduced and, finally, completely liquidated. A feasible way towards that end is seen in the Soviet programme to rid the world of

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nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. That programme is supported by the German Democratic Republic and the overwhelming majority of States, because it is - as is emphasized in the declaration of the eighth summit of non-aligned countries at Harare - comprehensive and timely. First, this programme proposes concrete stages and periods of time and thus makes it possible to fix exact interim objectives.

Secondly, the programme takes into account the proportions between existing arsenals of nuclear-weapon States, envisages first and far-reaching steps to be made by the Soviet Union and the United States and takes up the interests and proposals of the other nuclear-weapon States, the non-aligned States and other States.

Thirdly, it is open to further specification, especially with regard to procedures for liquidating nuclear weapons and for verification measures.

Fourthly, the universal agreement foreseen for the end of the third stage meets the urgent need to banish nuclear weapons once and for all from the life of mankind.

Finally, the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and the other States members of the Warsaw Treaty on the prohibition of space strike weapons and of other weapons based on the latest scientific findings, as well as on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, take into account the complex character of the disarmament problem.

This far-reaching programme must not remain a mere vision. It must be turned into reality, especially with regard to the proposals made and the experience gained at Reykjavik. The First Committee should therefore call on the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to enter into multilateral negotiations on measures aimed

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at ending the nuclear arms race and reaching nuclear disarmament, including the elaboration of a programme of nuclear disarmament.

We expect that the Conference on Disarmament will be in a position next year at last to take up negotiation8 on these questions within the framework of an appropriate conference committee.

The German Democratic Republic is also firmly convinced that multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States would complement Soviet-American negotiation8 in a very useful way.

Measures for regional arms limitation would also make a significant contribution to preventing the danger of nuclear war. Thus, non-nuclear-weapon States are able to promote the process of nuclear disarmament by establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

We welcome the fact that, especially in recent years, the movement to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace - be they in the Balkans, North or Central Europe, the South Atlantic, the South Pacific, Africa, the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East or other regions of the world - has gained momentum.

The German Democratic Republic is also continuing its efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. In this connection, I should like to take this opportunity to inform the Committee of the fact that this morning - a few hours ago - a new initiative was presented to the world public - that is, the principles for a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe, which have been elaborated and accepted by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany on the part of the German Democratic Republic and the Social Democratic Party of Germany in the Federal Republic of Germany.

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

What is involved is mainly that the new initiative is in line with the process of European and global endeavours aimed at arms limitation and disarmament. It is intended to create greater trust and greater security in Central Europe without calling into question the alliance membership of the sides involved.

The main objective of the initiative is the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor along the dividing line between the two alliances in Central Europe. It is to encompass parts of the territories of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia and to extend initially to 150 kilometres on each side - that is, 300 kilometres in all.

The principles refer to weapons systems in Central Europe which are currently not the subject of negotiations either in Geneva or Vienna. It is precisely those weapons systems that would keep the nuclear threshold very low in case of a military incident. Their inclusion in a treaty and its implementation would harm no one and benefit everyone.

Coming as it does after the meeting in Reykjavik, this initiative is based on the precept that the Soviet Union and the United States must have a shared interest in reducing the extremely high concentration of weapons in Central Europe.

The reduction and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons would lessen the threat of a war of aggression quite considerably. It is profoundly in line with the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act to move the most dangerous weapons systems in Central Europe further apart. Greater security and greater confidence would make it easier for peoples and States to work together and live together.

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The process of a constant reduction in armaments levels, particularly in the light of Reykjavik, • hould become a tangible reality for the people of the two German States and for Europe as a whole.

Thorns principle8 highlight what can be achieved through intergovernmental negotiations. They constitute an appeal to all Governments, East and West, that maintain armed forces in the corridor under consideration to start negotiations on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor at the earliest possible date. Such a corridor would complement the Geneva negotiations, notably on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles, and would • nh ce the security of both sides. The creation of such a corridor may be regarded as a first step. Three years after the corridor is established the Governments concerned would negotiate on extending the corridor, which could become a central European nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The German Democratic Republic stands for taking effective steps to eliminate chemical weapons, both within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and through regional initiatives. My delegation commends the considerable progress recently reached in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. In that connection we are by no means overlooking the open questions remaining to be resolved. To bring about a convention as soon as possible it is important to refrain from any action which could further impede the negotiations. For instance, starting production of binary weapons would step up the chemical arms race, promote the proliferation of chemical weapons and considerably harm ongoing negotiations.

What is required is a constructive and flexible approach by all sides to the negotiations. We are firmly convinced, that, given political will, unresolved fundamental questions, such as those related to verification on request and guarantees of non-production of chemical weapons, can be solved quickly so that the draft convention could be submitted next year.

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

Zones free of chemical weapons could strengthen security and confidence in areas of increased military confrontation. Regional agreements could be reached sooner than global ones, due to a number of more favourable conditions relating, for instance, to the participants and to the lesser complexity of the questions to be solved. There could form an essential transitional phase towards the liquidation of chemical weapons. Regions such as Central Europe, the Balkans or others could be freed from these dangerous weapons of mass destruction even prior to the complete liquidation of chemical weapons, which would take at least 10 years from the adoption of a convention. As can be seen, there is indeed no competition between regional steps and a global prohibition. Both endeavours would effectively complement one another.

In continuing their initiative, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic submitted a proposal as early as May this year to the Federal Republic of Germany and to other European States. The proposal contains the principles and main guidelines for future negotiations. This initiative has attracted world-wide attention and is supported by many States.

Last but not least, we are also in favour of starting concrete preparations for a third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This could give fresh impetus to disarmament efforts through a realistic assessment of the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and drawing appropriate conclusions on how, in today's conditions, to achieve security through disarmament.

Achieving a breakthrough in the struggle against the arms race and towards arms limitation and disarmament is, today more than ever before, the imperative of the hour. New political thinking and action must provide the possibilities

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

necessary for such a breakthrough. The joint proposal of the socialist countries aimed at the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, on which my delegation will elaborate later in the debate, serves that objective.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia) : The principles under which we live, the principles of the Charter, are as important to day as they were when they were written. They mean that we, the United Nations, are determined to try to ensure that every person shall be able to enjoy a decent standard of living, and to live in freedom and in peace. Regrettably, the Charter gives inadequate attention to the role of disarmament in the fulfilment of those principles, but since the Charter was written much has been done to fill the gaps that were left.

The biggest, the most yawning of such gaps arose from the arrival of the nuclear age. When the Charter was written the awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb was about to be revealed. Even had they known this, none of the authors of the Charter could have been expected then, in 1945, to be able to chart the full measure of the nuclear age.

So, our world community has striven to meet this challenge and, in practical terms, to supplement the Charter. A series of treaties dealing with and regulating the nuclear age have been concluded and, largely, observed. But one treaty perhaps stands out amongst all others, and this is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. No one should forget that 20 years ago many of us reckoned that the possession of nuclear weapons might represent a badge of membership in a special club: those of us who were technologically sophisticated enough or in some other way important enough to possess nuclear weapons.

But sense prevailed. We paused and examined the proposition that nuclear weapons were simply a bigger kind of gun. The conclusion that was reached was clear and resounding: We rejected that facile proposition and the idea that

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

nuclear weapons were nothing more than the continuation of some kind of inevitable technological development in the world. Instead, we agreed that the principles by which we had all decided to live demanded a new piece of legislation in the nuclear age.

That legislation, that piece of international law, was provided in the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. What is fundamentally asserted in that Treaty is that nuclear weapons are not the means by which we will maintain the peace or seek to guarantee a decent standard of living and wider freedom. It was agreed in that Treaty that no one else should acquire those weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and that those who had acquired them should get rid of them.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The Charter has also been supplemented by the decisions made at the historic first session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Final Document, adopted unanimously at that session, remains of irreducible importance. While what it provides, intrinsically, remains to be fulfilled, what is beyond question is the fundamental commitment it continues to represent. This is that we must continue to live by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that our ability to realize its purposes demands the relentless pursuit of arms control and disarmament.

Any analysis of the kind I have just presented, an analysis of the conditions under which we live and work together in this world community, would be incomplete without reference to the needs of the developing countries. One of the clearest purposes of the Charter of the United Nations was that the prior period of colonialism, and of colonial domination, should come to an end. For the most part this has been achieved even though there are notable and dreadful exceptions such as the situations in South Africa and Namibia. Australia is determined that such situations be removed.

But it is already true that when the history of the period from the end of the Second World War to the present time has been written, a centrepiece of that history will be already realized, great period of decolonization and self-determination. This has brought into the United Nations over 100 independent States. The history and culture of those States is diverse but most of them have one thing in common - the urgent need for economic and social development. That need is clear and stark. And it is connected with the problems of the nuclear age and the role which arms production and trade has come to play in international relations.

Let me try to simplify this. One of the great needs of the developing countries is energy. Energy generated by nuclear means is one potential source.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

But the commitment in the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is that the availability of nuclear-generated electricity should not bring with it the availability of nuclear weapons. It is also tragically true that too many resources, material and human, which are required for development have been diverted to the purchase of conventional arms.

Thus, two great challenges of our age intersect - disarmament and development. We must strive to allay the pressure that armaments put on resources needed for development and remove situations where, in the place of the pursuit of a decent standard of living, we see conflict and death. It is for this reason that Australia wants to see the issue of the scandalous and indiscriminate level of international arms trade brought squarely into our deliberations.

It was clear when the Charter was written that there were great disparities of power, both economic and military. The Charter tried to deal with those realities. The subsequent experience has been mixed.

We saw the realities of great power a week ago at Reykjavik. The two States possessing the greatest extant military power sought to negotiate a better management of their relations. Some have said that they failed. We do not share that view.

It is only a year and a half ago that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to return to the bargaining table to negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements in three fields: long-range nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and the use of outer space. What was critical was that they agreed that those three areas, each of immense concern, should be considered in their interrelationship.

Only 10 months after they agreed to conduct those interrelated negotiations their two leaders met in Geneva and reiterated their commitment. And they made

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

additional commitments. Those included a commitment to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent.

And at Reykjavik they went further.


The 50 per cent target for initial reductions was reaffirmed, but new measures of agreement leading to the ultimate elimination of strategic nuclear weapons were explored. Deep reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces were outlined. Progress towards an end to all nuclear testing was made a part of their negotiations. And a further exploration of what might be required to prevent an arms race in outer space was entered into. Those two States were not able to agree in full then, on the spot, in Reykjavik. While it is clear that we all would have preferred that they could have reached agreement at Reykjavik it would be blindness to fail to recognize progress when it is, in fact, staring us in the face.

What do we truly expect of two Great Powers which, for better or worse, have spent 10 years facing each other militarily and have been deeply concerned about the management of their own relations and about the weapons systems, in the framework of which, key aspects of their relations have been conducted. Do we seriously expect that they could simply wipe the slate clean of their past experiences with each other, without any apprehension, or pause for reflection? To ask them to do this would be to ask them to sail on truly uncharted waters or to look into a void, the end of which could not be seen. That would be too much to ask of anyone.

But it is not too much to ask them to continue, to ask them to build on what they have started to chart, and to develop and bring to fruition what they have now been able to say to each other, that this world would be better off if there were no nuclear weapons. Last year they committed themselves to the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. This year at Reykjavik they truly started

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

to chart the course to that destination. They should be kept on that course and given every encouragement towards its completion.

I say again, no one should minimise the significance of the negotiations at Reykjavik.  gave expression, in the real way that has yet been given, to the conviction that nuclear weapons should be eliminated. Essential though that is, no one should minimise the difficulty of the task and the utterly fundamental reality that it can only be completed in negotiations, the result of which is acceptable to both sides and able to be stuck to and verified. What is required, as the Prime Minister of Canada has said so aptly, is "an honourable compromise". Any other solution, a solution sought through mere declaration, would leave us the most deluded of people.

An important question from all of this, from those realities of great power, is where does it leave us, we in the United Nation. My Government's firm conviction is that we are intimately involved in what the great military Powers do and do not do. We will never accept that the possession of great military power reduces to naught what we in the United Nations stand for. It is important to recognize that those who possess great military power apparently agree. For example, two weeks ago in this General Assembly the President of the United States said:

"The United States remains committed to the United Nations. For over 40 years, this Organization has provided an international forum for harmonizing conflicting national interests and has made a significant contribution in such fields as peacekeeping (A/41/PV.4, p. 16)

He went on:

"My country, which has always given the United Nations generous support, will continue to play a leading role in the effort to achieve its noble purposes."

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

In the same forum, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union said:

"No single nuclear Power has the right to take decisions on behalf of all, and the USSR refuses to do so." (A/41/PV.6, p. 47)

He went on:

"The Soviet Union will accept recommendations formulated under the auspices of the United Nations.

"We agree that those States which believe that the question of whether mankind will live in a nuclear or a nuclear-free world must be decided by the whole world community and not by a small group of nuclear Powers." (p. 51)

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

As we proceed through consideration of specific disarmament items, my delegation will make its position clear on them. Sufficient to say at this stage that the following are the main points of concern to us.

Because we live in a world community and because the solutions to the problems posed by armaments are necessarily global solutions, disarmament cannot and will not make its correct contribution to the maintenance of peace unless certain main issues in disarmament are resolved globally and multilaterally. I have in mind such issues as a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the entry into force of a universal convention against chemical weapons and the generation of full support for the three nuclear-weapon-free zones now established.

Great Power solutions are required, but, alone, they are not enough. They must be matched by universal solutions, and the search for these solutions is within the hands of the United Nations - within our hands. The United Nations has an established machinery for global disarmament, for the pursuit of the solutions we require. That machinery has, broadly, the correct components. We have a declaratory body, a deliberative body and a negotiating body. I think no one disagrees that, while those are the required parts, none of them has been worked adequately since they were established at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is thus a matter of urgency that we consult together, now, to find ways in which that machinery can be made to work better. In the declaratory body, we want to see a real effort made further to streamline the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly. In that context we support the proposal that has been made by Ambassador Alatas of Indonesia.

In the wider field, we support the effort made by the delegation of Cameroon to open up consideration of all aspects of the United Nations disarmament machinery.

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Since Australia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we can say with experience and clarity that its agenda needs revision and that we will support any proposal which seeks to remove from that vital Conference dispute about procedure and to put in its place a new method of work that will focus on practical progress and the production of viable and durable arms control and disarmament agreements.

I hope that what I have said has been helpful. If it has had any central point, it is this: we recognize the realities of great power in this world, but we do not accept that the possession of great power reduces the responsibilities of those who possess it to fulfil the principles and the purposes of our Charter. We believe that the two most militarily important Powers have entered into a new phase of negotiation, the central point of which is that they have expressed their recognition that they must ultimately get rid of their nuclear weapons.

But there is another vital point, and that is that the drive to ensure that disarmament plays its correct role in the maintenance of peace and in the pursuit of our common goals is a shared responsibility. It is a responsibility in which all of us have to, must and will play our part.

Mr. TURKMEN (Turkey): I wish at the outset to extend to you, sir, the congratulations of my delegation on your election to chairmanship of the First Committee.

This meeting of the First Committee feels, inevitably and directly, the impact of the aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. In this regard it is comforting to see that the sense of disappointment that prevailed in the beginning as a result of the failure to reach a comprehensive agreement is gradually giving way to a more sober evaluation. We welcome, in particular, the statements by both sides indicating a willingness to preserve the substance of the understandings reached in the meeting with regard to

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strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear missiles and the cessation of nuclear tests. It is clear that on all of those issues the position of the two sides has never been so close and that such an outcome cannot be allowed to fade away, even if an important stumbling-block emerged in Reykjavik.

The resumption of the arms control talks in Geneva now gives to the two sides an opportunity to strive for concrete agreements. One important consideration should be that the issues in question do not affect exclusively the individual or reciprocal interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. The peace and security of all the countries of the world and the future of humankind are at stake. The responsibilities assumed by the leaders of the two sides are not only national; they are also global.

In the endeavour for a more secure world, nuclear disarmament can have none but the highest priority, since the whole world will be at the mercy of bad judgement or accident as long as nuclear weapons are not totally eliminated. Recent events have amply demonstrated what can happen, even in the case of a limited nuclear accident. We therefore fully subscribe to the goal proclaimed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last year at Geneva of terminating the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. That twin objective should guide all decisions and approaches related to disarmament.

We are fully aware that nuclear arms reductions between the two most powerful States will not be sufficient. All the nuclear countries have the duty to contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear countries should act in a manner which will prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There should be no attempt in any region of the world to achieve supremacy through the possession of such weapons.

The importance of a comprehensive test ban on the nuclear disarmament agenda is universally accepted. It is a prerequisite for the prevention of further

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proliferation of nuclear weapons and of a race among nuclear Powers for qualitative supremacy. We therefore welcome the steps taken to facilitate a comprehensive test ban treaty and the beginning of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on this issue. Needless to say, this question too has a multilateral dimension, and we hope that it will finally be possible in the Conference on Disarmament to arrive at an agreed mandate for an ad hoc committee in this field.

With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, we continue to support the establishment of such zones in regions where they can make a significant contribution to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But in regions saturated with nuclear weapons of all kinds the establishment of such zones will not enhance security unless region-wide and effective nuclear disarmament measures are carried out simultaneously.

We share the view that the process of arms control and disarmament must apply not only to nuclear weapons but also to conventional weapons. Turkey is in Europe, where the greatest concentration of military forces and armaments exists. It is also adjacent to the Middle East, the most explosive area. Two of our neighbours have been engaged in a cruel war for more than six years. Our region is beset by conflicts and misunderstandings. We are within the range not only of the intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe or Asia, but also of the shortest-range tactical missiles. We are therefore better placed than any other country to grasp the vital need for nuclear as well as conventional disarmament. We yearn for greater security through disarmament and confidence-building, and we are fully ready to contribute to the efforts to achieve balance at the lowest possible level of conventional forces.

Confidence is a key factor in promoting arms control and disarmament. The agreement reached at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm is certainly significant in this respect.

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Its importance lies not only in the result it produced but also in the example it has set. It has shown that multilateral diplomacy can yield productive results when there is convergence of purpose and the will to agree.

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The agreement reached in Stockholm will contribute to better East-West relations and promote greater security in Europe by lessening misapprehensions and the risk of accidental war. We hope that it will have a positive influence on the Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) which will begin shortly in Vienna.

A more realistic and flexible approach is also required at the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions for the inclusion of elements enabling a stable balance at the lowest possible level of conventional forces and a reduction of the danger of a military confrontation in Central Europe.

In the multilateral context, the Conference on Disarmament has a unique role to play. We welcome the fact that negotiations within that body have tended to be more productive in particular in the field of chemical weapons. Recourse to such weapons has confirmed the need for the early inclusion of an agreement and a global chemical weapons ban under an effective and reliable verification system, including on-site and on-challenge inspections. The momentum achieved in the negotiations on the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction should be maintained. We hope that progress will be made on the question of requests for on-site inspection on challenge and regarding procedures for verifying the non-production of chemical weapons.

We firmly believe that outer space should be reserved for peaceful purposes and the common interests of humankind. Extension of the arms race to outer space must be prevented. It is encouraging that, although belatedly, the Conference on Disarmament has succeeded in establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. The present bilateral and multilateral treaties on outer space constitute a legal

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framework which should be scrupulously respected. Complementary agreement⁸ to reinforce the present commitments obviously require both bilateral and multilateral discussions.

The relationship between development and disarmament is an issue which has a national and a global dimension. We agree that the two processes are separate and that progress in both will promote greater peace and security in the world. But it is also clear that substantial disarmament will release resources for development on a much larger scale and at the same time create a better environment for greater international co-operation. We are confident that the General Assembly will decide, as recommended by the Preparatory Committee, to convene a conference next year.

Finally, we welcome the adoption by consensus of the Final Declaration of the second Review Conference of the States parties to the Convention on biological and toxic weapons. The determination of the parties to strengthen the authority of the Convention and their commitment to implement a number of measures to improve international co-operation for the peaceful uses of biological agents dissipated doubt⁸ and suspicions arising from scientific and technical developments, particularly on genetic engineering and in other fields of biotechnology. We share the view that the question of verification of compliance with the terms of the convention continues to be a crucial element in promoting confidence among the states parties.

Several disarmament issues are discussed in bilateral or restricted multilateral forums. The First Committee is a venue where the views of all the Members of the United Nations can be heard, and since any disarmament discussion will ultimately affect, directly or indirectly, all countries, the debate which takes place here is relevant and important. This Committee, by reflecting the

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expectations, anxieties and evaluations of member countries, provide a forum where convergence of views can emerge and influence negotiations. This Committee's work will certainly benefit from a streamlining of procedure and a reduction in the number of resolutions adopted. We believe that, especially this year when the attention of world public opinion is focused on disarmament negotiations, the First Committee would be well advised to project an image of effectiveness, consistency and unity of purpose.

Mr. LACLETA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): Since this is the first time that I have spoken in the First Committee, allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman. My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee. I wish you every success in your work and am quite confident that, under your expert guidance, we will achieve positive results.

Allow me also to convey to the delegation of Mozambique an expression of sympathy from my delegation and Government on the occasion of the tragic death of President Samora Machel.

On 14 October Mr. Timothy Renton made a statement on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Economic Community (EEC). Spain is one of the 12 and, therefore, there is no need for me to emphasize that my delegation fully endorses the substance of that statement made on our behalf. However, I wish to draw attention to certain specific points and expand slightly on our views on some items on the Committee's agenda.

The year 1986 has been proclaimed by the United Nations as the International Year of Peace and has come very close to yielding results of major importance on one of the paramount issues that contribute to the strengthening of peace - disarmament agreements.

We experienced a feeling of hope when the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

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of the Soviet Union, at their meeting in Reykjavik, showed that drastic reduction⁶ in nuclear weapon⁸ now deployed in Europe and elsewhere are not beyond reach. We felt frustrated because the agreements which seemed so close at hand failed to materialize, but we continue to hope that uninterrupted negotiations between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers will make it possible in the not too distant future to complete the effort that did not reach its fulfilment in Rey'javik.

We noted with the greatest interest the joint statement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev when, at their Geneva meeting, in November of last year, they affirmed that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and that such a war must never be started. We are pleased to note that those two Great Powers have demonstrated their awareness of the special responsibility incumbent upon them for the maintenance of peace. That is a responsibility which is actually theirs, in material terms, because of the immensity of their nuclear and conventional military power, as well as legally, because, by virtue of Article 24 of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council - of which those two Powers, together with China, France and United Kingdom, are permanent members - the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security".

The strengthening of peace and security and the prevention of war thus form part of that primary responsibility. One can rightly wonder whether the danger of war exists because of the existence of weapons or whether the existence of weapons is due to the danger of war. We are inclined to favour the second Of those assertions, although we do not thereby deny that an unbridled arms race in pursuit of relative advantage may by itself start a war when one party considers that it has an important advantage which might be wiped out by its potential adversary's next move.

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Hence **it is necessary** and urgent to put **an end** to the **arms race**. But that is not enough. It is also **necessary** to **eliminate** the causes of tensions and conflicts which produce the confrontation that can touch off a war, and it is also **essential** to **promote** systems for the **peaceful settlement** of disputes.

These **precisely** are the **fundamental objectives** of the United Nations. **Collective security** and the **peaceful settlement** of disputes **are essential** for the maintenance of peace and **security**, and it is vital to **implement** the provisions Of the Charter **in that regard**. Otherwise all disarmament **measures** would fail to produce the **final outcome desired** by all **Member States**.

Nuclear and conventional **disarmament**, or rather the limitation and control of nuclear and conventional weapons, **are not separable issues**. Until we reach the **ultimate objective** of general and **complete disarmament**, which can only be achieved in successive stages, **peace can be preserved** only if the weapons in the possession of States remain in a balance that will prevent any temptation to commit aggression. This balance will have to be maintained through **effective** and **verifiable arrangements** whereby **security** will be preserved at progressively lower levels of armaments.

Therefore it is not **realistic** to talk about the **radical separation** of nuclear disarmament from **conventional disarmament** or about preventing nuclear war independently of the prevention of any war, with the exception of **measures** designed to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war by accident. But **it is necessary** and possible to make an **intensive effort** to **prevent** the continuous quantitative and qualitative escalation of nuclear weapons and to **begin quantitative reduction** in phases. The deterrent capacity of **nuclear weapons** would not be diminished by such a reduction. Peace and security would not be endangered, and large **resources** would

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be released that could be put to use for other purposes of greater benefit to mankind than multiplying and indefinitely upgrading a destructive capacity that is already excessive and totally unnecessary.

These basic considerations explain my Government's position on the specific subject matter being dealt with by this Committee and by other disarmament negotiating forums. I shall now refer briefly to some of them.

My Government warmly welcomed the final result of the Stockholm Disarmament Conference a few weeks ago. We have no illusions as to the limited scope of certain provisions, which in reality do not include disarmament measures but only confidence-building measures. None the less these measures are significant and important and, if accompanied by acceptance of reliable verification methods, would constitute an important step forward along the long road ahead. We very much hope and trust that this step will be bolstered by the continued efforts that are now to be focused in the context of the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

We also hope that negotiations for the reduction of conventional forces being held in that name will be given a strong impetus in the next few months. Among the general considerations I have outlined, I believe I have stressed the fundamental importance my Government attaches to a balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

My Government views with concern the slow progress being made in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. But first a word about the positive factors, including progress in negotiations on the preparation of a convention which, complementing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, would prohibit the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. There is no need for me to

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emphasize the cruelty of these weapons or their nature as weapons of mass destruction. But I would emphasize that we are dealing here with weapons that are well known and have been used in the past and are, unfortunately, also being used now - a fact which my Government firmly condemns.

The draft convention uses the zero option as a qualifying approach. This is a satisfactory solution, but its acceptance is conditional upon the establishment of a rigorous system of verification. Mankind must remove the threat of the use of chemical weapons, but in order to obtain security it must prove that no one is manufacturing them and no one possesses them; thereby the possibility of their use, which has been prohibited since 1925, would disappear.

My delegation hopes that the proposals made in the final phase of the Conference on Disarmament this summer, and the efforts being made in the interim period under the effective guidance of the present Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, will produce positive momentum that will make it possible to complete the preparation of the draft convention on chemical weapons very soon. If the weighty objective reasons for such a result were not enough, one would have to invoke the need for the Conference on Disarmament to offer the international community some new concrete results after too many years of unproductive formal efforts.

Spain, which is a party to the 1925 Protocol, has unilaterally renounced the manufacture of chemical weapons and will continue to co-operate with efforts in the Ad Hoc Committee. Moreover, it is a member of the European Economic Community, which has introduced restrictive measures to prevent the export of substances that can be used to make chemical weapons.

My delegation has also been closely following the work of the Conference on Disarmament relating to radiological weapons. Although the concept itself is

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shrouded in ~~vaqueness~~, we have no doubt that that type of ~~weapon~~ should be included among weapons of ~~mass~~ destruction, and we wholeheartedly condemn any attempt to manufacture or to use such weapons. We are satisfied with the ~~progress~~ made in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, but we still have some doubts as to the possibility that the drafting of a single document is the correct objective in an exercise involving two very different issues. The prohibition of the development, manufacture and use of certain potential weapons designed to use radioactive contamination for military purposes will require provisions very different from those intended to prevent attack using any type of weapons designed to destroy nuclear installations because of the danger that such destruction would release radioactivity into the environment. The recent accident at a nuclear power station has demonstrated, if any demonstration were necessary, that the consequences of such release can be very great.

The second question will, of course, require the establishment of specific rules concerning the conditions to be satisfied by and the type of installations that can enjoy such legal protection. On this problem I shall merely point out that in our opinion the reason for such protection is simply that of preventing the dissemination of radioactivity into the environment, and it must therefore be considered in as broad a context as possible.

I have deliberately left until the end of my statement reference to certain concrete issues having to do with nuclear weapons, for I wish to place on record yet again our concern at the linkage between conventional and nuclear weapons and our view that the entire debate must not be concentrated on nuclear weapons, although, obviously, they must also be taken up.

(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

The suspension of nuclear tests has received a great deal of attention this year, and the successive unilateral moratoriums of the Soviet union have undoubtedly helped heighten that interest. The subject has been included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation, like many others, would be gratified if the Conference could again set up an ad hoc committee to study all aspects of the question. My Government is firmly determined to promote all efforts aimed at making possible the attainment of the final objective of a total nuclear test ban, although this does not prevent us from being aware of the difficulties inherent in such a venture.

We have noted with satisfaction the progress made in respect of verification, by seismological means, of compliance with an agreement limiting or prohibiting such nuclear weapon tests. We consider that it should be possible in the near future, by the use of a network of suitable instruments, to achieve an adequate degree of reliability. The fourth report presented to the Conference on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, contained in document CD/720, confirms our belief. Appropriate efforts in negotiations, together with adequate political will, could therefore make it possible to achieve a solution to the problem of verification.

We are aware of the link that exists between nuclear tests and nuclear deterrence, but this does not prevent us from believing that the Conference on Disarmament could study in a positive way the subject of a nuclear test ban, in order to make gradual progress - but starting now - towards the objective of a total ban.

My delegation shares the concern of many others about the danger that the arms race might spread to outer space. We are therefore gratified to note the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the Conference on Disarmament; we hope that it

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will be continued And that the Committee will be provided with an appropriate mandate at the next session.

The use of outer space for military purposes, which began some time ago, is fraught with the obvious danger of destabilization, although on the other hand it is true that communication and observation satellites have a positive stabilizing effect. Those satellites perform various important functions in the essential task of objectively collecting the data needed to check on compliance with accepted norms in the field of disarmament and in many of those aimed at building confidence, as well as in the prevention of acts of aggression, which could make them a prime target for destruction by a potential aggressor. We therefore believe that it is of great importance to establish appropriate norms to protect such satellites.

In regard to theme and other issues, and always with the objective of preventing the extension of the arms race - nuclear and non-nuclear - into outer space, we have confidence not only in the multilateral efforts being made in the Conference on Disarmament, but also in bilateral negotiations, which we believe should be continued by the two super-Powers in their quest for formulas to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space.

I do not want to conclude without reaffirming the interest of my Government in another issue, which I mentioned briefly at the beginning of my statement. I refer to the problem of the relationship between disarmament and development. I should like to place on record that we are prepared to participate in an effort by the international community to ensure to the fullest extent possible the release of resources invested in military efforts which could be avoided so that they may be used for the social and economic development of all mankind.

I must emphasize that my delegation is convinced that it is possible to achieve peace and security at lower levels of armaments without endangering

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any State represented here. We also are convinced that an improvement in the living standards and development possibilities of a large proportion of mankind which now lacks them would constitute a positive factor in the elimination of tension, that also threatens the peace and security of all.

A few days ago, the second review conference of a major disarmament convention, which prohibits the manufacture and possession of a broad range of weapons of mass destruction - the so-called biological, bacteriological and toxin weapons - concluded with a final declaration accepted by consensus. This is another positive step, which confirms our belief that mankind and the States Members of the United Nations are prepared to continue, without losing heart when confronted by the obstacles that exist, the tremendous but vital effort needed to save the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

I wish to mention, just one other question which is of great concern to my delegation, and that is the way in which this First Committee and other subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly deal with disarmament issues. This year, we have noted with satisfaction the renewed vitality that has been manifest in the Disarmament Commission - which, it is worth recalling, is the sole specialized organ in the disarmament field in the United Nations - and we hope that this new impetus will be sustained in forthcoming sessions. However, we are alarmed at the steadily increasing number of draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee, especially because in many cases the spirit motivating the authors of those draft resolutions is not that of achieving decisions that would reflect the common will of the United Nations - that is, of the Organization and its Members - but merely that of what I would call the need to place on record the position of a country or a larger or smaller group of countries.

(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

An effort should be made to have fewer resolutions which could achieve **consensus** and thus **express** our common will. I hope, Sir, that under your expert guidance and with the collaboration of all Member **States** represented here **we** will achieve that objective at the forty-first **session** of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to inform the **Committee** that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting: Oman, Ethiopia, Roland, Burma, the Byelorussian SSR, **Malaysia** and the United Republic of Tanxania.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.