


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FIRST COMMITTEE
38th meeting
held on
Friday, 19 November 1982
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 38TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 57, 133, 136, 138 AND 139 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will continue its consideration of and action upon draft resolutions related to disarmament items.

Mr. STRULAK (Poland): This year's general debate in our Committee has once again reflected wide international concern about the dangers of the chemical-weapons race and about unsatisfactory progress in negotiations towards their complete and effective prohibition and destruction. But that well-founded concern also prompted most representatives to demand as a matter of utmost urgency a redoubling of international negotiating efforts aimed at the elimination of chemical weapons, based upon positive contributions and achievements to date and calling for a constructive approach on the part of all concerned.

It is with this constructive approach in mind that I wish to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Poland, draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.44, under agenda item 54 - chemical and bacteriological weapons.

This draft resolution follows the traditional pattern of earlier consensus resolutions. Its preambular paragraphs recall the General Assembly's numerous previous resolutions on the subject and reaffirm the two international instruments now in force pertaining to the ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the elimination of the latter. There is also a new reference - to relevant proposals and initiatives, including those put forward at the second special session in disarmament. Indeed, we witnessed at that session a major initiative aimed at facilitating negotiations on a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and providing for their destruction. The constructive impact of that initiative has since received wide approval.

(Mr. Strulak, Poland)

Certainly of great relevance and substance is the paragraph of the preamble in our draft which points to the necessity of a resumption and fruitful conclusion of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the elimination of all chemical weapons.

The work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1982 with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the progress achieved by its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in particular, has been duly recorded and appraised both in a preambular and an operative paragraph. Actually, this echoes a similar favourable assessment in our general debate here. As a representative of Poland, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to thank all those representatives who in this connection had words of appreciation for the Chairman of the Working Group, my compatriot, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka.

In the remaining operative paragraphs, the common concern to which I have earlier pointed is reflected by an expression of regret that agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated and - what is most important - the Committee on Disarmament is consequently urged, as a matter of high priority, to continue elaboration of such a convention, giving due consideration to all present and future initiatives with a view to reaching agreement at the earliest possible date. Naturally enough, the Committee is therefore requested to report on the results of its work next year at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

We are confident that this constructive thrust of our draft resolution will gain wide support in this Committee and that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

Naturally, the sponsors are also willing to consider the views of other States willing to help to achieve this consensus. We are also ready to accept additional sponsors for this draft resolution.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.59 on behalf of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Yugoslavia. As you can see, the sponsorship of this draft resolution cuts across ideological lines and this

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

reflects the fact that it has received support from every ideological corner of the world.

The dynamics of the arms race, together with their implications for the constant evolution in weapons technology, suggest that there is an urgent need for the development and codification of the rule of law which should govern the conduct of States in the use of weapons in combat. Since it is generally accepted that conventional weapons have been used in all major conflicts since the Second World War, it has been considered legitimate that the first concern in the development of such law should bear on certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

In this regard, the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which urged States to refrain from using weapons which aggravated the suffering of the disabled, the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 which prohibited the use of poison, or poisoned weapons, and projectiles and explosives from balloons, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned the use of poison gases and bacteriological methods of warfare, must be seen not only as the very first efforts but as useful contributions to the process of the development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts.

Building upon these initiatives, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which took place between 1974 and 1977, considered, among other things, the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. As recommended by that Conference, the General Assembly, in its resolution 32/152 of 19 December 1977, decided to convene a United Nations Conference on prohibitions or restrictions of the use of specific conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. That Conference completed its assignment successfully in 1980 with the adoption by consensus of a Convention, together with three protocols on non-detectable fragments, on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices, and on incendiary weapons. It was opened for signature on 10 April 1981.

In submitting for consideration and subsequent adoption the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.59, the sponsors would like to

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

reiterate their conviction that this first international arms regulation agreement to be negotiated at a specific United Nations Conference demonstrates the capacity of the United Nations to provide an adequate forum for disarmament negotiations, given the necessary political will on the part of States. Although the Convention itself does not strictly constitute a disarmament measure, its adoption represents a strengthening of international humanitarian law applicable in combat situations as well as an indication that it is possible to negotiate a disarmament agreement under the auspices of the United Nations.

(Mr. Ijeweri, Nigeria)

The Convention and three Protocols on certain inhumane conventional weapons were adopted in the firm conviction that the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction would not be contemplated. The negotiations precedent to the adoption of the Convention represented a delicate balance of interests and sensitivities bearing on the subject. Therefore it is our view that nothing should be done to disturb that balance until the Convention and the three Protocols have come into force. We invite attention, however, to the fact that under article 8 of the Convention there is a provision which envisages the possibility of holding conferences to consider amendments to the Convention, additional Protocols and review mechanisms.

The sponsors are pleased to note that an increasing number of States have either signed or ratified the Convention and the three Protocols since 10 April 1981. It is their hope that more Member States will endeavour to do so shortly so as to obtain the entry into force of the Convention and the additional Protocols.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I am going to introduce three draft resolutions and make a few comments as regards the draft resolution which has just been introduced by the representative of Nigeria.

On behalf of the sponsors - namely, Bahamas, Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uruguay and Sweden - I first wish to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.60, on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

In the history of disarmament negotiations a number of proposals have been made for the creation of an international institution for disarmament. During the preparations for the first special session on disarmament several delegations commented on this matter.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The Swedish Foreign Minister, in a statement in the First Committee on 29 October 1979, suggested that the possibilities of establishing a United Nations disarmament organization be studied in a comprehensive manner. The General Assembly decided in the same year to carry out a study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

Sweden, in that context, called for the establishment of a United Nations disarmament agency which would be organized to meet the priorities and more ambitious goals that the United Nations should set for the 1980s and beyond. Such an agency should, in our view, have an independent position within the United Nations system, but would report directly to the General Assembly.

The matter was the subject of a United Nations expert study, which contained a number of useful comments but which did not recommend specific action towards the establishment of such a United Nations disarmament agency. Sweden, therefore, in its submission dated 16 April 1982 to the Preparatory Committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, recommended that the second special session should decide, in principle, to establish such a disarmament agency. In addition, Sweden stated that as a first step towards an independent disarmament agency the Centre for Disarmament should be transformed into a department for disarmament affairs within the United Nations Secretariat.

During the second special session proposals concerning the strengthening of the United Nations disarmament machinery were also submitted by other member States, indicating widespread support for the ideas advanced by Sweden, but no decision was taken on this matter. The Centre for Disarmament was, however, entrusted with the co-ordination of the World Disarmament Campaign, which underlined the tendency prevailing during the past several years to place increased duties on the United Nations in the management of disarmament activities and in carrying out disarmament studies.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

It is against this background that it is proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.60 that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to transform the Centre for Disarmament, appropriately strengthened within the existing overall resources of the United Nations, into a department for disarmament affairs headed by an Under-Secretary-General. It is further stated that the department should be so organized as to reflect fully the principle of equitable geographical distribution. The Secretary-General is also requested to report to the thirty-eighth session on the practical implementation of this resolution.

We have to recognize that the growing importance attached to disarmament questions since the first special session has been evidenced by an increasing workload as regards the Committee on Disarmament also. I am not going to deal here with questions of how the efficiency of that Committee can be enhanced. This is an internal task for the Committee.

A suggestion has been made, however, that the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum should have the designation of a conference, which may be more in conformity with the terminology commonly used as regards bodies of this important character in the international context. It is naturally within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Disarmament to decide itself upon such a change of designation and the General Assembly can only recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that it consider this question.

It must be clearly stated that such a change of designation is in no way intended to have, nor in our opinion can it have, any implication as regards the structure of the Committee on Disarmament. It could therefore not prejudice paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session. The draft resolution for this purpose, inter alia, contains a paragraph according to which the validity of the provisions of that paragraph is reaffirmed.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

I now have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.61, which concerns the strengthening of the compliance procedure in connection with the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, on behalf of the following sponsors - Austria, Colombia, Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

The said Convention constitutes an important example of an international disarmament agreement concluded without the inclusion of a satisfactory complaints and verification mechanism.

At the 1980 Review Conference of the Convention efforts were made to improve the complaints procedure of the Convention in order to ensure that a permanent consultative machinery should be available to all States parties to consider allegations of possible violations of the Convention and for fact-finding purposes. A partial improvement was achieved in that the Conference agreed to give an interpretation of the Convention. The effect of that interpretation is that the provisions concerning consultation and co-operation on any problem which might arise in relation to the objective or in the application of the other provisions of the Convention are considered to include, inter alia, the right of any State party to request that a consultative meeting open to all States parties be convened at expert level. The Conference also stated that the question of the adequacy of article V should be further considered at an appropriate time.

In the view of the sponsors it is desirable to consider further the whole question of the adequacy of the complaints procedure of the Convention. As reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, an effective verification mechanism should be based on a combination of national and international measures which would complement and supplement each other to provide a system that would ensure the effective implementation of the Convention.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

In this context the role of the Security Council in carrying out investigations into complaints, in accordance with article VI of the Convention, should be noted. In reviewing the complaints procedure it would also, in the view of my Government, be essential to obtain reassurances that permanent members of the Security Council would not prevent an investigation, or, alternatively, that the initiation of an investigation would be decided upon by the Security Council in a manner prescribed for procedural matters.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

In its submission which I have just mentioned to the Preparatory Committee for the second special session devoted to disarmament, Sweden recommended that the special session should, inter alia, consider inviting the depositary States of the bacteriological-weapons Convention to convene a special conference, as soon as possible, to establish a flexible, objective and non-discriminatory complaints procedure applicable to the Convention.

No decision was reached on this matter during the second special session on disarmament and it is therefore proposed in the present draft resolution that the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, by adopting the enclosed draft resolution, should recommend the States Parties to the Convention to hold a special conference to establish a flexible, objective and non-discriminating procedure to deal with issues concerning compliance with the Convention. The Secretary-General is requested to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including background papers, as may be required for the special conference.

The third draft resolution that I wish to introduce is that in document A/C.1/37/L.62, which deals with the role of the military utilization of research and development. I am doing this on behalf of the following sponsors: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Colombia, France, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Military research and development programmes have become an increasingly important factor in the overall arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race. These programmes account for enormous financial and intellectual resources. In 1981, at least \$40,000 million in government spending alone were used for this purpose. It has been estimated that some 20 per cent of all scientists and technicians in the world are at present involved in military programmes. The major military Powers spend 10 to 15 per cent of their military budgets on research and development. Even so, it is evident that the role of military research and development in fuelling the arms race by far exceeds their share of total military expenditure.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

It has, for example, long been obvious that in the arms competition there is an increasing emphasis on the qualitative aspects. Military research and development play a decisive role in this process: today's projects become tomorrow's expensive and constantly more sophisticated weapons. New scientific and technological developments are rapidly incorporated into new weapons and defence systems. Innovation is driven at a fast pace for fear of falling behind in the military-technological competition. An increased openness concerning military research and development could reduce this fear, since it could have a moderating effect on the arms race and facilitate agreements on arms limitation and disarmament.

It has long been recognized that there is an urgent need to come to grips with this process. Over the years a number of ideas and proposals on possible solutions have been discussed. One possible approach is to focus on well-defined measures in specific areas of technologically advanced weaponry and means of warfare, as has been the case inter alia with the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Convention on the Prohibition of Military and Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, and some of the limits agreed upon in the SALT II Treaty. Another, complementary, line of action is to preclude certain types of military exploitation of specific geographic areas, as has been done with respect to the Antarctic, the sea bed, and outer space. In this context should be noted the possibility to establish procedures whereby new weapons and military programmes are made the subject of analyses as to their impact on arms limitation and disarmament.

A potentially more effective approach would be the comprehensive curtailment of such military research and development as well as technology which have a strong impact on the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race. Efforts in this direction will, however, encounter many difficulties and obstacles. Among them is the problem of obtaining sufficiently reliable and complete data and information

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

on current plans and programmes from all countries of interest in this context and to verify any agreement to limit them. Only in very few cases is the nature of a specific research and development activity such that a restriction could be easily verified. Examples of this is the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and the threshold-test-ban Treaty.

The Swedish Government considers that it is of great importance to intensify efforts to achieve a common understanding of the role of military research and development both for fuelling the arms race and for its possible potential to improve national and international means of verification. At the second special session on disarmament Sweden suggested that a United Nations study should be carried out on research and development and its impact on the arms race. Many delegations showed interest in the matter and supported the idea of giving it further consideration.

In the view of the sponsors of this draft resolution it is now essential to initiate substantive consideration of this matter within the United Nations system. For this purpose it seems appropriate to call for an expert study on the question of military research and development. Such a study should in a comprehensive way deal with the scope, role and direction of the military use of research and development, the mechanisms involved, its role in the overall arms race and its impact on arms limitation and disarmament, particularly in relation to major weapons systems such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The purpose of this would be to prevent a qualitative arms race and to ensure that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes.

The General Assembly would further invite all Governments to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1983, their views on the subject of the study and to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objectives of the study may be achieved. Finally, the Secretary-General is requested to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session in 1984.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

I shall now make a few remarks in support of the statement by the Ambassador of Nigeria who just introduced draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.59.

When the Convention and the annexed three Protocols on particularly inhumane weapons were adopted in Geneva in October 1980, it was frequently admitted that the results of the United Nations Conference were modest. At the same time, however, it was generally felt that this new regulation in the field of international humanitarian law was a significant development: for the first time since 1925 it had proved possible to restrict the use of specific categories of weapons. It was also felt that the humanitarian effects of the new protocols in an armed conflict should not be underestimated even if these effects were expected to be only a matter of marginal importance.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The cautious optimism that lies behind this kind of reasoning presupposes that the Convention and its Annexed Protocols will be signed and ratified by a large number of States and that the new rules will be applied and respected in cases of armed conflict - in short, that these rules will become a live and effective part of modern international law. So far, two and a half years after the texts were opened for signature, they have been ratified by some 15 States, among them certain developing nations, the Nordic States and most of the Eastern European States. It is a matter of concern, however, that similar action has not yet been taken by all Western States. It is most desirable that they join, thereby contributing to the entry into force of the Convention, which will be six months after the twentieth ratification.

The Swedish delegation would like to appeal to Governments speedily to sign and ratify the Convention and accept the Protocols, so that these new rules will become part of the established international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. The General Assembly should encourage Governments to achieve this aim as soon as possible. That is why the draft resolution before us is so important.

The draft resolution is important also in the sense that it focuses attention on the not too remote possibility of a review conference. According to the Convention, a review conference may be convened when a majority of the Parties, although not less than 10, so agree.

I have already indicated that the results of the United Nations Conference could have been more substantial. With regard to the Protocol on incendiary weapons, no protection of combatants was achieved. This will remain a central issue for later agreement. In this context I should like to make it clear that Sweden has in no way given up its claim that incendiary weapons are liable to have grave and unnecessarily injurious effects. We think that most medical and technical data support that view. In the long run all use of incendiary weapons, also against combatants, should be outlawed.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

With regard to some other categories of weapons there was no final agreement in Geneva, partly because the Conference lacked the time to consider those weapons, partly because these issues were not ripe for agreement. That was the case with regard to small-calibre projectiles. It is our opinion that work on this issue should continue in an international framework, as far as both international legislative efforts and basic research are concerned. On the scientific level a lot of work has already been done. In this context I would like to inform the Committee that the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, plans to host a fifth international symposium on wound ballistics in 1983 or 1984.

The Convention of 1980 does not establish any machinery for implementation and verification, nor does it establish any machinery for clearing remnants of war, including mines, after the cessation of hostilities. With regard to the verification problem, the Federal Republic of Germany and others presented an interesting proposal at the United Nations Conference. Unfortunately there was no time to consider that proposal seriously. This matter will require our further attention.

With regard to the material remnants of war, Sweden has suggested, in response to a letter from the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, the preparation of a factual United Nations study on the subject. Such a study could describe the problems of remnants of war in different parts of the world, indicate the means required for international mine-sweeping operations, analyse the legal setting of the problem in the light of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict and contain suggestions for integrating international ad hoc machinery for mine-clearance operations in the United Nations system. The study might eventually enable appropriate United Nations procedures to be instituted with regard to co-operation regarding the problems of remnants of war. Such co-operation might lead to an agreement on ad hoc machinery involving United Nations task forces for clearing remnants of war, including mines.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

Against this background, it goes without saying that my delegation attaches the utmost importance to continued discussion of the legal situation in the field of particularly inhumane conventional weapons. We therefore find it useful and appropriate for the draft resolution to call attention to the need for future review conferences.

We also feel that the question of such weapons should be a recurrent item on the agenda of the General Assembly. That would enable the Assembly to follow the technical, medical and military developments in this field. It would also enable it to follow the signing and ratification of the new Convention and its annexed Protocols and to commend them to all States, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments of international humanitarian law.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I have the privilege of introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/37/L.39, under the General Assembly's agenda item 133, entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly". The sponsors of the draft resolution are Argentina, Bangladesh, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, India, Malta, Palistan and Sri Lanka. The subject of the draft resolution is this First Committee's overall subject, disarmament and international security.

The draft resolution recalls previous resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, 35/156 J of 12 December 1980 and 36/97 K of 9 December 1981. Those resolutions have one central purpose: the implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter as a necessary element for any progress towards disarmament. That system stems from the very purposes and principles of the Organization, which are: (a) the primary purpose is effective collective security; Article 1 relates to "effective collective measures for prevention or suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; (b) the main principle is the prohibition of the threat or use of force, coupled with enforcement action under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 2. Those are the purposes on which the Charter system of international security is based and developed in the text of the Charter, culminating in Chapter VII, including the effective implementation of the decisions of the Security Council. They have been the main purport of the

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

General Assembly resolutions that I have referred to. Two of them were adopted by consensus and they referred clearly to the need for applying the Charter system of international security in order to make the disarmament effort productive. They pointed out that the first requirement for such a system was the effective implementation of Security Council decisions.

There is great significance in the discussions and the decisions adopted in this First Committee of the General Assembly. What gives them particular significance this year is the serious, even tragic, developments which have taken place in the world. They have made manifest the incapacity of the Security Council to give effect to its decisions - even those unanimously adopted. Another aspect of the problem related to international security is the intensification of the arms race, particularly its qualitative aspect, which is bringing us very close to a nuclear conflagration. It is therefore vitally important to go to the root of the problem. We cannot this year discuss other aspects that take time. We must meet the dangers of this situation, dangers which would have been met if the resolutions which I have recalled had been duly implemented, as they should have been.

In the present draft resolution we state that the General Assembly views with concern the aggravation of the deteriorating world situation, which has reached the lowest possible ebb of understanding and co-operation for peace and security, thus making the survival of mankind extremely precarious. We say that we are alarmed at the present critical situation, and the stagnation in disarmament efforts for nearly 35 years, while the arms race has been rapidly escalating, with threatening consequences, and we consider that a new approach is required to the whole problem of disarmament.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

We know that there is a feeling now prevalent in the world in favour of getting rid of armaments, but one cannot get rid of armaments unless the conditions of international security that would make disarmament effective are created. It is impossible to say "get rid of the nuclear weapons" now that they have been invented and are becoming increasingly sophisticated. There is no way to rule them out other than through international security. It is not enough to say that we should make agreements not to use nuclear weapons. It is not enough - although it is a good thing - to say that we shall not be the first to strike. I say that any use, first, second or any other, is a crime against humanity and that therefore we must stop it. We cannot, however, stop it unless we have international security and order through compliance with the Charter requirements for compellingly effective decisions of the Security Council.

I am impelled by necessity to say a few more words. An old Latin adage of Roman times states: Si vis pacem, para bellum - if you want peace, prepare for war. In other words, by preparing for war you will achieve peace. This principle, regrettably, still prevails today, in a momentum from our obsolete past, although we are living in a time when preparation for war does not mean anything other than preparation for the complete elimination of humanity from the globe. Preparation for war today cannot be a mere preparation for a war that will one day come to an end; it is, rather, preparation for a holocaust that will be the end of our civilization and perhaps of all life on our planet. This is the reality with which we now live, and we must therefore regard the arms race as a preparation for such a war. The nuclear arms race can have no other meaning. Both participants are preparing for war, no matter how much they think they are working for peace. No one can be working for peace if he is preparing for a nuclear war. That is the essence of the draft resolution we are submitting. We want the resolutions, particularly resolution 36/97 K, to be actually implemented.

Recent tragic events have shown how difficult and serious the situation is when the unanimous decisions of the Security Council remain wholly unimplemented and are even treated with contempt. It was thus necessary for the Secretary-General to proceed to his forthright report. He was in duty bound to issue that report because of tragic world developments. He had to bring the current situation to our notice particularly to the attention of the Security Council. It is up to us

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

to act; it is we who must apply the principles of the Charter that are so necessary for international security and peace.

Therefore, the main resolution for which we seek implementation is resolution 35/156 J. It clearly states that we must proceed to implementation of the system of international security provided for in the Charter by rendering the decisions of the Security Council on the implementation of Chapter VI effective.

In our draft resolution, we recall the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session, and we refer to it because it effectively echoes the provision of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, namely:

"the need for strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations in accordance with the Final Document."

This is the important part of the Concluding Document of the second special session devoted to disarmament. Both the Final Document of the first special session and the Concluding Document of the second special session have therefore reasserted this essential principle, and basic concept: that the security system provided for in the Charter must be implemented. This is what we also seek in our draft resolution. Although the second special session was in some respects thought to be a failure as regards the comprehensive programme of disarmament, on the whole it was not because it emphatically reasserted the main directive of the Final Document of the first special session without implementation of which the comprehensive programme could not proceed.

The draft resolution, in reaffirming resolution 36/97 K of 9 December 1981, called for carrying out the provisions of the consensus resolution of the General Assembly, 35/156 J of 12 December 1980, which requested the permanent members of the Security Council to "facilitate the work of the Council towards carrying out this essential responsibility under the Charter" for a system of international security. Resolution 35/156 J was not only adopted by consensus but also with the express agreement and consent of the two major Powers after the sponsors had accepted certain changes in the text before its adoption.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

Today we are asking for the implementation of that resolution, as confirmed by resolution 36/97 K, which:

"Calls upon all States to take prompt action for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/156 J,"

and which:

"Deems it necessary, as a first step in this direction, that the Security Council take the required measures towards the implementation of Chapter VII" Article 43, "of the Charter, which would reinforce the foundations of peace, security and order through the United Nations and avert the growing threat of nuclear conflagration."

The need for giving effect to the decisions of the Security Council is twofold. First, to bring order and security to a world of growing insecurity and anarchy. Secondly, to render productive the efforts to halt the arms race and pave the way to fruitful negotiations on disarmament.

On behalf of the sponsors, therefore, I would request that this draft resolution, based as it is on consensus resolutions of the General Assembly, be adopted by this Committee by consensus.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2, which I have the honour of introducing, is sponsored by the delegations of Ecuador, Sweden and Mexico. It can truly be said to be self-explanatory, which greatly facilitates my task.

The first two preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution, which is on the subject of a nuclear arms freeze, recall the deep concern expressed by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race and also that the Assembly pointed out that mankind was confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation.

The third preambular paragraph suggests that the Assembly note that the conditions prevailing today are a source of even more serious concern than those existing in 1978 because of several factors, such as the deterioration of the international situation, the increase in accuracy, speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons, the promotion of illusory doctrines of "limited" or "winnable" nuclear war and the many false alarms which have occurred owing to malfunctioning of computers, which could easily have tragic and incalculable consequences for mankind in the near future.

The urgency of drawing a line as regards the arms race and activating disarmament negotiations provides the contents of the following two preambular paragraphs. The sixth preambular paragraph is one of the most important in the draft, since it states that, while a freeze is not an end in itself, it would constitute the most effective first step towards the achievement of the aforementioned two objectives, since it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of the reduction negotiations while, at the same time, preventing the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations would take place.

As regards the seventh and final preambular paragraph, it is as important as the preceding one, since here the Assembly would express its firm conviction that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the United States and the Soviet Union are now equivalent in nuclear military power.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

That is axiomatic for any objective observer, and it is easily borne out by dozens of reliable opinions. I will mention only a few.

The thirty-first Pugwash Conference, held in Banff, Canada, in October last year, categorically stated, "General parity exists between the two super-Powers as regards nuclear military capacity" - a judgement which was reaffirmed at the thirty-second conference, which was held in Warsaw in August of this year.

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Problems, presided over by the present Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olaf Palme, by whose name the Commission is generally known, included a similar judgement in the report it approved unanimously in Stockholm on 25 April 1982.

Leslie H. Gelb, who from January 1977 to July 1979 was in charge of the Office of Political and Military Affairs of the Department of State, after presenting a careful comparative examination of the land-based, under-water and aerial nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers and also of their respective systems of command, control, communications and intelligence, emphasized in June 1982 that "the experts who analyse all these factors conclude that there is parity" between the two.

Finally, Professor Hans H. Bethe, whose impressive curriculum vitae includes the fact that he held the post of chief of the division of theoretical studies at the scientific laboratory of Los Alamos from 1943 to 1945, when the first atomic bomb was developed, was a member of the strategic military group advising the President of the United States from 1957 to 1969, and in 1967 received the Nobel Prize for studies on nuclear reactions in the stars, in the testimony he gave on 13 May of this year to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, said, inter alia:

"Various members of the Government have repeatedly stated that, in regard to strategic weapons, we are now in a situation of inferiority as compared with the Soviet Union and that we need to increase our armaments. In my opinion, there is no such inferiority. We have more nuclear warheads than the Soviet Union, and I consider that this is the most important measure of relative power.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"We are told that there is a vulnerability gap because the Soviet Union could use its long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles to destroy our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. ... Leaving aside the question of technological feasibility, I believe that a first strike would not give the Soviet Union any important military advantage.

"The reason for this is that intercontinental ballistic missiles represent only a quarter of our strategic nuclear force, calculated in terms of warheads. A quarter of our power is invested in invulnerable nuclear-powered submarines and another quarter in bombers, many of which can take off from their airfields, which are widely dispersed, in the event of an alert. Consequently we would have an adequate attack force, even if all our intercontinental ballistic missiles were destroyed."

As a conclusion from the foregoing assessments by Professor Bethe and from various other assessments on which I will not dwell, that distinguished scientist made the following unequivocal statement:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"In summary:

"Our strategic forces are, if anything, superior to those of the Soviet Union;

"The greatest threat to our national security and to that of our allies is the grotesque size and the continuing growth of the nuclear arsenals on both sides.

"Those are the basic facts. Once they are recognized, the essential features of a rational policy of national security become obvious."

Returning to the draft resolution which I am introducing, I might add that the operative part contains only three paragraphs, of which the first is paramount. In it an appeal is made to the two super-Powers to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear arms freeze which would be a first step towards the comprehensive programme of disarmament and whose structure and scope would be the following.

As indicated, the freeze would embrace four elements: a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; the complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; and the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

The last two paragraphs of the operative part of the draft resolution are those traditionally inserted in similar cases. In the first, both parties concerned are requested to submit a report to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its thirty-eighth session, on the implementation of the present resolution, and in the second the General Assembly decides to include in the provisional agenda of that session an item providing for the consideration of how this resolution could be implemented.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In conclusion, I should like to put forward the following two observations. First, the immediate freeze sought in the draft resolution is requested of the United States and the Soviet Union, which faithfully reflects the spirit and letter of the Final Document, which states:

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility". (A/S-10/4, para.48)

The example that would thus be set by the two super-Powers, however, should be followed within a reasonable period of time by other States possessing nuclear weapons. Thus the original duration of the freeze as set out in the draft would be five years, although with a proviso that it could be prolonged in so far as other nuclear weapon States join in such a freeze, as the General Assembly expects them to do", as the draft resolution expressly states.

Secondly, in order to dispel in advance any concern about strict compliance with the commitments involved in the freeze which is requested, the draft expressly provides that it would be subject not only to all the relevant verification procedures and measures already agreed upon by the parties under the SALT I and SALT II treaties -- and they pose much more complicated verification problems than those that would arise in connection with the planned freeze -- but also to those agreed upon in principle by the parties themselves in the course of the bilateral preparatory negotiations on a complete nuclear-test ban which took place in Geneva from 1977 to 1980.

In one statement made here yesterday morning, doubts were expressed about the possibility of verifying compliance with the prohibitions involved in a freeze. In reply, I should like simply to reiterate the view of one of the research institutes on disarmament, whose Director, Rear-Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, was one of the speakers at both the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I am referring specifically to the Center for Defense Information, with Headquarters in Washington, in whose official publication The Defense Monitor, there is a description of the relevant "facts" pertaining to verification:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Both the United States and the Soviet Union use a vast range of powerful and sophisticated systems to collect information to monitor each other regularly, in detail and with great accuracy. Those systems include photographic reconnaissance satellites, radar and other devices in outer space, on land, in the sea and in the air, which monitor all aspects of tests and the deployment of weapons. It is said that United States satellites can photograph objects with a diameter of less than 6 inches. The Soviet Union is surrounded by monitoring stations of the United States."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"Without doubt the verification of nuclear-weapons tests and of new systems of weapons is practical. The United States has detonated 733 nuclear devices; and the Soviet Union has detonated 472. The verification of the deployment of new nuclear weapons is practical. The United States possesses precise information about the number of inter-continental ballistic missiles, bombers, strategic submarines and submarine-based missiles, in the possession of the Soviet Union. The verification of the cessation of the production of new nuclear weapons is more difficult, but not impossible. In negotiations on a complete nuclear-test ban, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have already agreed in principle to significant in situ inspection measures.

"American military and civilian officials have repeatedly stated in Congress that the United States has the necessary capacity adequately to verify existing treaties on weapons control. The Soviet Union has signed 14 such agreements with the United States. Neither of the two countries has ventured the opinion that problems of compliance with any of them would justify their denunciation.

"We do not know what can be achieved in the area of verification of a nuclear freeze until our negotiators sit down with the Soviets and start working out specific problems. In the absence of negotiations on a freeze, speculation about what can be verified is just that: speculation. If both sides give serious thought to a freeze, it should be possible to find a means of ensuring verification.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"There will be many dangerous and unverifiable uncertainties resulting from future nuclear escalation in the United States and the Soviet Union if there is no freeze. It is not possible completely to verify a freeze, nor is it necessary. What we should do is compare that with the danger to the United States of an unlimited nuclear arms race, with that which would be involved in halting today the expansion of nuclear arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union. The choice of a nuclear freeze becomes simple in that context.

"As Dr. Herbert Scoville, ex-Assistance Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said:

"The freeze means a halt to all activities in any arms programme, for the detection of a single new missile or aeroplane would be evidence of a violation. That simplifies verification as compared to what is implied in a maximum limit. ...

Verification can no longer be legitimately invoked as an excuse not to proceed to an agreement on a freeze and on reductions."

(The Defense Monitor, Vol. XI, No. 7, 1982)

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 that I have just introduced share Dr. Scoville's opinion, which I shall quote again:

"Verification can no longer be legitimately invoked as an excuse not to proceed to an agreement on a freeze and on reductions."

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Bulgaria to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.29 and A/C.1/37/L.34.

Mr. GARVALOV (Bulgaria): I have the honour, on behalf of the delegations of Angola, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, Mongolia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and my own country, Bulgaria, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.29 under agenda item 52, entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The sponsors of the draft resolution consider the problem of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as one of the most important disarmament issues. The escalation of the arms race, destabilizing international relations, has been undermining the security of both the non-nuclear-weapon and the nuclear-weapon States and poses a threat of nuclear war, the devastating consequences of which would not stop at the borders of the belligerent States.

In these conditions the adoption of effective measures for strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is particularly called for. These measures would constitute an important and necessary step towards the consolidation of the political and legal foundations for the observance of the principle of non-use of force in international relations.

We reaffirm our position that nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of all types of nuclear weapons would be the most effective and credible security guarantees to protect non-nuclear-weapon and all other States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Proceeding from this position, we have exerted persistent efforts to set in motion a stable and purposeful process of negotiations which should bring about this radical solution. It is our conviction, however, that pending the attainment of that objective, the non-nuclear-weapon States, and above all those among them which have renounced the nuclear option and have not allowed nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory, are entitled to receive security guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We continue to hold the view that this goal would be best served by the elaboration and conclusion of an international instrument of legally binding character, such as an international convention.

(Mr. Garvalov, Bulgaria)

The draft resolution submitted by the sponsors is generally modelled, in form and in substance on General Assembly resolution 36/94, which was adopted last year under the same item of the agenda. A new element is our profound conviction that renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons would constitute a significant contribution to the strengthening of the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus we welcome the solemn declarations on this question, particularly the commitment of two nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. At the same time, the draft reflects our conviction that if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume the same obligation, that would in practice result in a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against any State, including the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Garvalov, Bulgaria)

Guided by their confidence in the need for stepped-up efforts to resolve the problem under consideration and in the possibility of achieving such action, the sponsors of the draft resolution deemed it expedient to preserve the general thrust of its operative part as set out in resolution 36/94.

Operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that there is not objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. On the basis of this, operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on this subject. In operative paragraph 4, the sponsors call upon all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts to elaborate and conclude an international instrument of a legally binding character. At the same time, we have once again expressed our readiness also to consider other parallel or interim measures which would contribute to the efforts to conclude an international convention on this matter.

In this connection, operative paragraph 5 calls once again upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories, and recommends that such declarations be approved by a resolution of the Security Council.

The second draft resolution which I should like to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Mongolia, Romania and my country, Bulgaria, is contained in document A/C.1/37/L.34. It is submitted under the title "World Disarmament Campaign", under agenda item 133 (d).

I should like first of all to emphasize in particular that the proposed draft resolution reflects the sincere desire of its sponsors to contribute to the successful carrying out of the World Disarmament Campaign and to the effective attainment of its objectives.

(Mr. Garvalov, Bulgaria)

We have endorsed this timely and useful idea since it was first put forward by Mexico. Our position is in keeping with the view of the overwhelming majority of Member States to the effect that the World Disarmament Campaign constitutes an essential and necessary instrument for mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of peace and disarmament. That is why we welcome the general agreement reached at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament for the solemn launching of the Campaign. In our view, the operational guidelines and modalities which have been agreed upon on the basis of consensus for the carrying out of the Campaign are a sound basis for undertaking concrete, practical and purposeful action for the attainment of its objectives.

The report of the Secretary-General on the World Disarmament Campaign contained in document A/37/548 can play a significant and positive role in that respect. The report's conclusions and recommendations, as well as the Programme of Activities for 1983, will undoubtedly contribute in practical terms to our future work on this question. It is worthwhile noting that a number of activities within the framework of the Campaign have already been initiated. Particular attention should be given to the clarification contained in paragraph 27 of the report that:

"...the Campaign as envisaged by Member States is structured in such a way that Member States and non-governmental organizations can undertake, on their own, certain types of activities to complement those undertaken by the United Nations." (A/37/548, para.27)

The sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.34 are of the opinion that the launching of a world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race, and for disarmament, would be particularly instrumental in achieving this end.

(Mr. Garvalov, Bulgaria)

In keeping with this view, in operative paragraph 1 we call upon Member States:

"in the implementation of the activities within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign to take into account various views and opinions expressed at the second special session devoted to disarmament, including the proposal on launching world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament."

It is our view that our proposal on launching such world-wide action is well founded both in terms of its usefulness and one possibility of its being implemented.

It is in the spirit of the relevant recommendations of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the general thrust of the World Disarmament Campaign for mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of peace and disarmament. World-wide action could be an effective instrument in the realization of the three concrete, primary purposes of the Campaign; moreover, it could be a particularly valuable means of expressing public awareness and support for the objectives and tasks of the United Nations with regard to the priorities and measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament as they are set out in the Programme of Action of the Final Document adopted by the first special session on disarmament.

World-wide action for collecting signatures, to be organized under the auspices of the United Nations within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, will be carried out under the same operational guidelines and modalities as those which have been adopted and remain valid for the Campaign.

In our view, real possibilities exist for the implementation of the idea of such an action. This proposal is not a new one. It was discussed at some length by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, when it adopted resolution 36/92 J on this question. This proposal is contained in the Concluding Document of the second special session devoted to disarmament

(Mr. Garvalov, Bulgaria)

contained in document A/S-12/32 and in the report of the Secretary-General on the World Disarmament Campaign in document A/37/548, where it is envisaged as a possible specific activity within the framework of the Campaign.

The idea of the world-wide action has also been endorsed by a number of Member States in their communications to the Secretary-General on this issue in document A/S-12/15 and Add.1, suggesting concrete views and proposals on the forms and methods to be employed in carrying it out. A large number of national and international non-governmental organizations have been very much interested in the action as well.

All this indicates that such a world-wide action enjoys broad support and can be implemented.

In conclusion, I should like to point out to this Committee that the sponsors have drafted the text of A/C.1/37/L.34 in such a way as to, in their view, enable it to receive general acceptance.

Mr. FISCHER (Austria): On behalf of the sponsors: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Colombia, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden and Austria, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.53 entitled "Measures to Provide Objective Information on Military Capabilities".

The present proposal is based on the conviction that inadequate information on the military strength of States and misinterpretation of available data are important factors in the acceleration of the arms race and in the stagnation of disarmament efforts.

National assessments of the military strength and intentions of others are often incorrect because of lack of reliable information. As these assessments are of vital importance to national security, Governments often tend to overestimate an adversary's military capabilities and to undertake arms programmes on the basis of "worst case" estimates. Since the syndrome of inadequate information, insecurity and fear also influences the behaviour of the other side, a vicious circle of mistrust and arms build-up can be set in motion.

Furthermore, inadequate information is a major obstacle to efforts to end the arms race. Militarily significant agreements on the limitation or reduction of weapons and forces require an understanding of the actual state of armaments. In a situation where little or no information is available, Governments are usually reluctant even to enter into disarmament negotiations. If they do, long and protracted negotiations with no tangible results have to be expected.

We do not claim, of course, that inadequate information is the only or even the most important cause of the accelerating arms race. But we believe that it is a significant element in the present insecurity of international relations and that efforts to increase the flow and to enhance the objectivity of information on military capabilities are a promising approach to improve the situation.

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

Moreover, the past decades have brought important innovations in techniques for the gathering, dissemination and evaluation of information, and further development and wider application of statistical methods. We believe that the great potential of these accomplishments for the improvement of the objectivity of information on military capabilities of States should be further explored and utilized. There already exist a number of promising initiatives in this area. Let me just mention the elaboration of the standardized reporting instrument for military expenditures, the project of the international satellite monitoring agency and the proposals contained in the study on confidence-building measures.

It is the primary objective of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.53 to raise the awareness of the international community of the need for more and more objective information on military matters, and to encourage proposals and initiatives to this end. In our view, a process should be set in motion to enhance the quantity and quality of military data for the purpose of facilitating objective assessments of military strength. Such assessments should eventually take the place of the subjective and often contradictory national evaluations. Of course, this presupposes agreement on criteria and definitions of military data and a high degree of co-operation and understanding. We are aware that these conditions can only be fulfilled gradually and with great effort. But the benefits of more objective military information for the disarmament process justify determined endeavours towards the attainment of this goal. We believe that the United Nations could play an important role in this context.

Let me now briefly summarize the main provisions of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.53. The preambular part sets out the motives underlying the present proposal, including references to relevant provisions of the Final Document. Operative paragraph 1 calls upon States to consider measures to facilitate objective information on, as well as objective assessments of, military capabilities. Operative paragraph 2 invites States to communicate relevant views and proposals to the Secretary-General; operative paragraph 3 requests the Secretary-General to present to the General Assembly at its

(Mr. Fischer, Austria)

thirty-eighth session a report containing the replies of Member States as well as, on the basis of these replies, a preliminary analysis of the possible role of the United Nations in the context of measures to facilitate objective information and objective assessments of military capabilities.

On behalf of the sponsors, I recommend draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.53 to the First Committee.

Mr. GUNDERSEN (United States of America): On behalf of the sponsors of A/C.1/37/L.65, Australia, Indonesia, Kenya, Singapore, the United States and Uruguay, my delegation takes great satisfaction today in introducing and sponsoring a draft resolution on peace and disarmament movements.

As my Government has consistently emphasized - and as President Reagan recently underscored before this body at the second special session on disarmament - the United States is committed to achieving meaningful arms control, including a militarily significant reduction of nuclear weapons. To further that process and to tear down the walls of distrust between nations and peoples, we believe that peace and disarmament movements must have a voice in the vital questions of disarmament and security. This draft resolution is aimed at promoting such an unhindered discussion.

We also view draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.65 as a natural ally of the World Disarmament Campaign. Open and universal availability of information on disarmament matters is a key to the successful implementation of the Campaign. We are therefore heartened that the call of the second special session on disarmament for the Campaign to be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner was adopted by consensus. Moreover, the special session called for the Campaign to be guaranteed by the co-operation and participation of all States, by the widest possible dissemination of information, and by the unimpeded access of all sectors of the public to a broad range of views and opinions.

(Mr. Gundersen, United States)

It is now time to translate these lofty goals into a concrete programme of action. We harbour no illusions as to the serious obstacles which have frustrated the objective of a free flow of information in the past. In our statement of 4 November we outlined some of these obstacles. These realities are still present. But now is not the time to bemoan past problems.

(Mr. Gundersen, United States)

We must look to the future. This draft resolution on peace and disarmament movements does just that: it seeks to unite us, not separate us: it seeks to foster trust and confidence, not distrust and suspicion, among the peoples of the world; it seeks to tear down the walls of secrecy and open up the gates of understanding. We believe that excessive secrecy can only create mistrust and misunderstanding; it is thus an enemy of peaceful relations among nations.

In the United States vast amounts of diverse information on the momentous issues of war and peace are freely available. One need only step out of these cloistered halls to appreciate the vitality and diversity of discussion that abounds in an open society. We might not always like what we hear or see. Demonstrators sometimes protest against the established authority that our Governments represent. All of us here have at one time or another portrayed our Governments as watch-dogs of public morality on the momentous issues of war and peace. But who watches over us?

I submit that a well-informed public is the best guarantee against misuse of this authority we have. Last June, for example, a few hundred yards from here, hundreds of thousands of my fellow citizens demonstrated openly and peaceably for various disarmament measures. My Government shared their concerns and their goals. As you are aware, we did not agree with every means proposed to achieve the end of disarmament. But we listened. No one was harassed; no one was incarcerated. We cannot afford to do otherwise. Unless any of us, as individuals or as representatives of Governments can honestly say he has a monopoly on the truth or on virtue, we dare not close our minds to the voices of our own people.

But as healthy as a free and open dialogue within societies is, it is not an end in itself. We are convinced that unimpeded access of all sectors of the public to a broad range of information on disarmament issues can exercise a positive influence towards achieving meaningful arms limitation measures. Finally, as this resolution notes in both the preambular and operative sections, the free flow of a broad range of information - among individuals, non-governmental organizations, and Governments - can contribute to the achievement of the final objective we all strive for: general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic): The First Committee has now moved on to an extremely important and responsible stage of its work, the adoption of resolutions on a broad range of issues relating to averting the threat of nuclear war, curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, blocking the appearance of any new forms of weapons of mass destruction, and establishing conditions under which all States and peoples are able to live in conditions of peace and security. It is our duty to conclude this work in a proper manner responding to the demands of the peoples on whose behalf this Organization is called upon to act. Is this possible? Yes, without a question.

The overwhelming majority of the 65 draft resolutions that have been submitted indicate that it is possible. They reflect the concern of the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations over the future of the world and the human race, and a responsible search for ways of preventing the danger of war, achieving true disarmament and creating favourable conditions for peaceful co-existence and co-operation. Unfortunately, there are also departures from this dominant trend.

The record number of draft resolutions, unprecedented in the history of the First Committee, is not in itself proof of the output or actual results of our work, but it is a rebuff to those who hamper the successful outcome of the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. It is also a condemnation of those that disregard the principle of equality and equal security which has been approved in the United Nations, that accelerate the arms race, slow down the process of talks on disarmament, and make more difficult the work of our First Committee.

In this statement the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR intends to state its position on a number of the draft resolutions that have been submitted. Our delegation, on behalf of a large group of delegations, had the honour to introduce yesterday two draft resolutions relating to the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons (A/C.1/37/L.43) and also the renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes (A/C.1/37/L.46).

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

We would also like to say that we are willing to co-operate fully with those delegations that have sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.62, with a view to ensuring full mutual understanding on matters relating to this and the need to ensure that science and technology serve the causes of peace and co-operation and not warfare and the arms race.

Typical of many of the resolutions that have been submitted is the presence in them of appeals to intensify ongoing talks on disarmament and to achieve concrete results at those talks. There is an appeal to resume talks that have been suspended, and also to begin new talks, multilateral and bilateral. We fully support this. What is also important and is contained in these draft resolutions is the confirmation of the fact that all talks should be carried on in a spirit of good will, on the basis of equality, mutuality, and without being detrimental to the security of one or the other parties.

The draft resolutions on averting the danger of nuclear war and achieving nuclear disarmament contain a broad range of constructive measures that are proposed. These include the recognition of the importance of the obligations entered into not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and the desire and hope that the three nuclear members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will follow this example.

There is also the proposal to draft a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, there is a series of proposals on a mutual freeze of existing nuclear potentials. That is, the production and deployment of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, and also the production of fissionable material used for various kinds of nuclear weapons. However, at the same time, we must say that we do not share the approach taken in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.48 which makes the question of halting the production of fissionable materials depend on the general context of efforts on nuclear disarmament.

The draft resolutions proposed reject the doctrines and concepts of a limited or partial use of nuclear weapons. They reject the idea of the admissibility or acceptability of a nuclear conflict, whether it be limited or protracted. These draft resolutions also refer to the urgent need for a

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

comprehensive and full ban on nuclear weapon tests, the need for all countries to accede to the treaty prohibiting such tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and a rejection of all nuclear tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty excluding the continuation of any nuclear-weapon test.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

It is proposed to outlaw neutron and radiological weapons, defend peaceful nuclear facilities, achieve the stage-by-stage limitation, reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weaponry and delivery vehicles; and to that end to draft a programme for nuclear disarmament in the Committee on Disarmament. Also, measures are proposed with a view to ensuring that nuclear weapons are not stationed on the territory of those States where there are none at present or on the territory of other States. It is also proposed that nuclear-weapon-free zones be created in various parts of the world, that there be a strengthening of the nuclear-free status of Latin America, and that there be no appearance of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Israeli aggressors or the South African racists. In addition, there is condemnation of the Western countries for their co-operation with them in the nuclear field.

What is also important are proposals to establish international legal guarantees to ensure that States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory will not be subjected to nuclear attack. That would be possible through the conclusion of appropriate conventions or, as a first step, by statements of the nuclear Powers on this matter, statement confirmed by the United Nations Security Council. We wholeheartedly support this approach to matters relating to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and achieving nuclear disarmament.

Turning now to the draft resolutions on eliminating chemical weapons, we are happy to see provisions in them reflecting the aspiration of virtually all countries to conclude a convention on this matter. Moreover, what is envisaged is a halt in the production and deployment of binary and other new forms of chemical weapons, an agreement not to place such chemical weapons on the territory of other States, and recognition of the importance of creating zones free of chemical weapons. There is also recognition of the importance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

There is only one draft resolution - A/C.1/37/L.5⁴ - which, along with the generally acceptable provisions included within it, apparently simply for the sake of a cover-up, that is designed to undermine the significance and effectiveness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. That draft resolution raises questions which are within the sole competence of the countries parties to the Protocol, and in the view of a majority of those countries there is nothing that needs to be changed in it. The last few decades have confirmed its validity.

I turn now to the goal of prohibiting the stationing in outer space of weapons of any kind - something that we support - and should like to note that we do not share the view about replacing the whole idea of preventing the extension of the arms race into outer space with just one of its aspects, namely, prohibiting anti-satellite systems. This should be just part of the overall effort, not the prevailing goal.

The Byelorussian delegation takes a positive position on the draft resolutions that appeal to countries to accede to treaties and conventions designed to curb the arms race and those relating to the preparation and holding of review conferences. We share the views on freezing and reduction of military expenditures and using the resources thus made available for economic and social development and assistance to the developing countries. However, at the same time we consider unacceptable and reject attempts to depart from the direct reduction of military budgets so as to avoid it. What is proposed is simply the collection of various types of data for very specific and rather suspect purposes, under any pretext whatsoever, and would not lead to a reduction of military budgets or to an increase in the resources available for development and co-operation.

In considering the matters of confidence-building measures and regional disarmament, we should like the resolutions adopted on them to promote the success of the appropriate measures. This could be done, for example, at the Madrid meeting of the States taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

We support the resolutions which envisage an intensification of the Committee on Disarmament's work and the establishing to that end of working groups with effective mandates, as well as the continuation of efforts for disarmament within the Disarmament Commission and the preparation of the world disarmament conference.

We would like to note that preliminary study of the draft resolutions that have been introduced arouses certain concern over the fact that some of them entail unjustified financial implications. We do not yet have the views of the United Nations Secretariat as to how existing resources will be used, what additional resources will be requested and what the Secretariat itself, along with its sub-unit, the Centre for Disarmament can cover. We trust that it will be able to do a lot.

It is difficult to understand, for example, why when there is an increase of five in the number of those receiving stipends for disarmament in the United Nations additional personnel should be required in the United Nations Secretariat. After all, throughout the history of the United Nations we have been dealing with disarmament matters in the First Committee. There were times when there were only two or three such items on the agenda, but now there are more than 20 items. There were three times fewer States Members, but there was always only one Chairman of the Committee, one Rapporteur and one Secretary of the Committee and they - like you, Mr. Chairman - must have successfully discharged their responsibilities and mandates.

In conclusion, I should like to make a few comments about the World Disarmament Campaign. In our Constitution we have prohibited war propaganda and we not only support the goals of this Campaign but also take the appropriate measures needed for that support. We regularly mark Disarmament Week in our Republic. Our delegation has pledged a voluntary contribution on behalf of the Byelorussian SSR for the purpose of mobilizing world public opinion in support of averting nuclear war, curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

We also support the world campaign to collect signatures in support of those measures. Taking that into account, we will determine our position on the draft resolutions that have been submitted under this item. There is no doubt that we support making widely available to the population information on all matters relating to the struggle for peace, halting the arms race and achieving disarmament; and we consider it necessary that people should know not only about what is happening but also about who is responsible for the lack of progress in achieving the objectives of removing the threat of a nuclear conflagration and achieving real disarmament.

Our delegation is also convinced that the campaign in support of disarmament will reveal the will of the peoples, who will undoubtedly express their desire not to permit war, particularly nuclear war, but to achieve disarmament, and every Government must take account of the will of its people.

In determining our position on the draft resolutions that have been submitted, seven of which the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic has sponsored - and I would say that we shall be sponsoring other proposals - we support those that are in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter and other international norms and obligations.

We shall endeavour to ensure that the decisions taken at this thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly on this whole range of most important issues relating to disarmament respond to the requirements of the present complicated international situation and will lead to its normalization, not to any deterioration in it.

Mr. MORENO-SALCEDO (Philippines): The Philippines delegation is pleased to sponsor the draft resolution on confidence-building measures introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, contained in document A/C.1/37/L.35. It believes that the draft resolution is not only important but practical as well and constitutes a significant first step on the long and tortuous path to disarmament and security. Distrust, fear and suspicion have been the lot of man since Cain and Abel and have clouded his brow through numberless generations. How many lives have been lost over the ages just because one nation distrusted the motives or actions of another? Over the centuries,

(Mr. Moreno-Salcedo, Philippines)

how many families have been sundered and dispersed just because one State sowed in another State the seeds of unjustified fear and suspicion towards a third? How much has been lost in terms of liberty, independence, territory and possessions just because a country lost all confidence and trust in its neighbours?

If only nations would repose confidence in one another, and especially in their neighbours, perhaps the lash of war would strike less frequently, and only for real and substantive causes. In this situation confidence-building measures are an indispensable element in the quest for international peace and security, for only those measures can dispel the clouds of suspicion, mistrust and fear that lie at the root of so many international conflicts. Indeed, if the present draft resolution fails to be adopted it will probably be because of the mistrust and suspicion which Members of this Organization harbour concerning other Members. There is, then, no question that the building of trust and confidence will be a long and arduous process.

One significant feature of this proposal is the encouragement given to States to promote and agree on confidence-building measures on a regional basis. Thus, while the super-Powers might decline to join in the process, yet States in a particular region might find it useful and beneficial to participate in regional arrangements. In fact, countries in a region, given their proximity to one another, possessing common desires and purposes and enjoying a community of economic, social, political and cultural interests, would probably find it far easier to co-operate in confidence-building than if the big Powers were involved in the process. And if many regions established confidence-building arrangements perhaps enough moral and political pressure and influence might be generated to persuade the big Powers to join in the efforts. But in any event the creation of regional confidence-building blocs in every continent or area of the world would in itself represent no mean political achievement and would indeed contribute substantially to international peace and security per se.

(Mr. Moreno-Salcedo, Philippines)

The signs and portents for the success of these ventures are really very encouraging. The Treaty of Tlatelolco among the Latin American States is known to us all; the mediation, conciliation and arbitration Commission within the Organization of African Unity is another case in point, and the experience of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which my country is a member, provides an excellent example of confidence-building in action. In ASEAN, where Heads of State or Government and foreign ministers are personal friends and can talk to each other on the telephone to consult and even reach agreement without much formality, where high officials meet frequently and regularly in each others' countries, establishing personal ties of friendship, and where each State knows what the other is doing, we might perhaps find the basic ingredients for making the system operate regionally.

We would warn, however, that confidence-building measures can never take the place of disarmament arrangements, though they will certainly make it easier to conclude and implement such arrangements. We therefore hope that this draft resolution will be seriously and favourably considered by all. It is true that it is not the ultimate remedy for the malady of war and we realize that differences between States can be so deeply embedded in history and so complex in their ideological, psychological, ethnic, cultural and territorial elements that removing the existing distrust and suspicion among some nations in a region will prove no easy task. But we firmly believe that the present draft resolution constitutes a practicable first step towards attaining international peace and security - and, after all, the longest journey must commence with a first step.

Miss DEVER (Belgium) (interpretation from French): I should like to introduce the draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.58 relating to regional disarmament, on behalf of the following 30 countries: Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Viet Nam and my own country, Belgium.

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

Document A/C.1/37/L.58 will be reissued for technical reasons. Operative paragraph 4 of the French text has to be corrected, and the English version of the text of the draft resolution that has been distributed is not the version my delegation submitted to the Secretariat on behalf of the co-sponsors but a translation of the uncorrected French text. The present English text of paragraph 4 will be replaced by the correct English version, as drawn up in the course of the informal consultations, as follows:

"Requests the United Nations Secretariat, in particular the Centre for Disarmament, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to lend assistance to States and regional institutions which may request it in the context of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative, and with the participation, of all the States concerned."

Having made those technical points, I would remind representatives that at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament Belgium submitted a memorandum in which it suggested that the Assembly determine what follow-up action there should be on the study of all aspects of regional disarmament, taking into account the views expressed on the subject by States. The draft resolution that will be submitted for consideration in our Committee is based on the proposals and statements made by Belgium at the second special session. The text has been negotiated with the participation of a broadly representative group of members of the international community. The agreement reached in that group reflects the tradition of consensus that the General Assembly has established and followed for several years in respect of the regional approach. This approach is most welcome.

Belgium would like to thank all those delegations that participated in the preparation of the draft resolution and to pay a tribute to their spirit of compromise and their readiness to engage in dialogue. The special concerns of representatives of the various regional groups were taken into account in such a way that the international community can agree on the overall framework in which any future action relating to the regional approach should take place.

Because of the parameters of the fundamental aspects of the study on regional disarmament, the regional approach to disarmament offers prospects of agreement between the various countries in a region. I would emphasize the importance of the parameters defining the regional approach and would like to mention the

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

principal ones. To begin with, regional disarmament measures can be taken only on the initiative of and with the participation of all States in the region. This does not, of course, mean that individual proposals cannot be made by any given State in a region, but a regional measure properly speaking can result only from a consensus approval by the States of the region acting in their individual sovereignty. It is not for us in this universal body to define these regions: that is the duty of our States within their respective regions. It goes without saying that such regions are not entities separate from the rest of the world. To varying degrees there exists an interrelationship between the security of the region and the security of the rest of the world. That interrelationship creates mutual rights and duties. Lastly, regional disarmament can only contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It is in fact part of the process leading towards that objective.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.58, which will be submitted in an amended and corrected form, takes explicit account of the parameters that determine the regional approach. It expresses the hope that, when the situation in the region so permits, Governments will consult together with a view to agreeing on effective measures for regional disarmament, in particular through regional institutional arrangements. It also envisages that the United Nations, taking into account the limits inherent in its possible action in this area, should play its part in relations between the region and the rest of the world. On the one hand, regions must inform the international community of measures they have taken. This provision relates to paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. Belgium trusts that those provisions of the Final Document will be more widely applied in other areas also.

The Secretariat of the United Nations, in particular the Centre for Disarmament, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) are asked to provide assistance to regions that request such assistance within the framework of regional disarmament initiatives. Lastly, the Secretary-General is requested to report to the General Assembly to keep it fully informed of initiatives taken in this area.

(Miss Dever, Belgium)

These proposals, are modest, but they are also ambitious. They are modest because they are part of a general framework, the only one possible in this area because of the great diversity of the regions represented in this universal body. They are ambitious because this draft resolution establishes for the first time the necessary link between global efforts and regional efforts. With the other countries from various parts of the world that sponsor this text, my delegation expresses the hope that this draft resolution will enjoy the support of all the members of our Committee.

Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt): I wish to introduce the two draft resolutions submitted by my delegation - A/C.1/37/L.49 and A/C.1/37/L.63.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.49, concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, I should like to say the following.

The question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones enjoys an international consensus as one of the concrete and important measures aimed at the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In fact, the right to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from a given region has been confirmed in several international conventions, in particular in article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament devoted three paragraphs to nuclear-weapon-free zones, affirming that the establishment of such zones constitutes an important measure towards total disarmament.

For eight years now Egypt has been taking initiatives concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. At several sessions of the General Assembly we have assumed the responsibility for keeping the idea afloat. We have done this up to the present and shall continue until circumstances permit its actual establishment.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

Our conviction has always been and still is that an initiative of this nature requires not only careful preparation but, most important, wide international support both within and outside the region of the Middle East. The importance of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East stems not only from the fact that it would be a positive step towards reducing tension and threats to security in that region, but also from its close relation to security within the region, in the Mediterranean and, indeed, in Europe. Its impact and contribution to reducing world tension in general is clear.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

We had entertained high hopes, especially after the achievement of the consensus during the thirty-fifth session on this issue, that an appropriate mechanism would be created for the establishment of such a zone. However, being fully aware of the political realities in the region and taking into account the developments that the region has witnessed, we recognize the fact that the time might not yet be ripe to get all the parties concerned to accept a more practical approach, namely, the dispatching of a special representative of the Secretary-General, who would contact all the parties concerned in the region with a view to ascertaining their attitudes concerning the procedures necessary for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, including the scope and modalities thereof.

Cognizant of that fact, we believe that there is yet an indispensable minimum that should be maintained, bearing in mind and without infringing upon the basic positions of the parties concerned. It is against this background that we are introducing the draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.49 for the consideration of the First Committee.

In fact the matter we are raising here is closely related to a fundamental issue, that is, that all parties should live up to their responsibilities in an area of constant tension and instability where the situation at the present time is extremely delicate and fragile.

In introducing draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.49, as well as similar ones, Egypt has always had the aim of promoting the prospects of a just and lasting peace in the region, in which all States and all peoples would enjoy their full rights.

I wish to state that draft resolution A/C.2/37/L.49 has been the subject of intensive consultations among the parties concerned, and we hope it will commend itself to the First Committee and secure a consensus.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

Now, with your permission, I wish to introduce the next draft resolution we have submitted, which is contained in document A/C.1/37/L.63 and concerns general and complete disarmament. Here I should like to recall Egypt's statement in the First Committee on 29 October, in which we underlined the seriousness of the international situation and its negative effects on the international drive in the field of disarmament.

We also stated that the past few months have witnessed serious developments, the most significant and regrettable among which was the failure of the second special session devoted to disarmament - a failure which indeed reflects the alarming situation we are facing and the dangers we are encountering.

Furthermore .. and I think all of us share this concern - we notice with grave concern the growing tension in the relations between the two super-Powers. Statements have been made to the effect that there are determined plans for a massive build-up of armaments on both sides of the nuclear equation. This can in no way help the pursuance of collective disarmament efforts.

Therefore we believe that our work here in this building should be linked to the realities outside it. We should not be working in a vacuum: in other words, we should reflect the realities of the situation beyond our conference rooms and render effective our collective efforts to face the threat of the escalating arms race.

As may be recalled, we have previously proposed that the General Assembly, which has proclaimed disarmament as one of its major objectives, should, upon the initiative of the First Committee express its grave and profound concern over such developments. We have also said that, in the framework of the collective responsibilities provided for in the Charter, the two super-Powers bear a special responsibility commensurate with their strength, power and influence. After all, the main objective that should guide our actions in this field is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

With all this in mind, we are introducing draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.63 for the consideration of the First Committee.

In the draft before us, in the preambular part, we recall the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We express grave concern over the alarming deterioration and the growing tension characterizing the international situation. We emphasize the link between genuine and lasting peace and real progress in disarmament. We express deep concern over the escalating pace of the arms race in both its qualitative and its quantitative aspects. We underline the special responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon States, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race, and express our regret over the failure of the second special session devoted to disarmament.

Turning to the operative part, in operative paragraph 1 we reiterate the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament in accordance with the Charter as well as the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. We reaffirm the disarmament priorities agreed upon unanimously, as contained in the Final Document. In operative paragraph 3 we express our profound concern over the escalating pace of the arms race. Finally, we call upon the major nuclear Powers to undertake concrete and effective measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in order to help create the atmosphere conducive to the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

To conclude, we are introducing draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.63 in the hope that it will enjoy the support of this Committee and thus be regarded as a reflection of the universal concern over the serious situation we are facing, a situation that could lead to uncontrolled deterioration in the efforts aimed at achieving total disarmament and consequently in international peace and security.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): I have the privilege of introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.64, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I introduce this draft resolution on behalf of Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Sudan, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and my own country.

It is just 25 years since man's adventure in space began. During these two and a half decades we have been witnesses of startling developments that go beyond our imagination and at the same time give rise to genuine concern and fear about the future. We are all unquestionably interested in the exploration and use of outer space, but we are equally desirous of preserving outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. The potential dangers that lie ahead need no elaborate formulations in this forum. We are all well aware of what could take place.

The international community has already taken some steps to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes. The third and fifth preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution before us recapture the essence of our commitment to achieve that objective, whilst the sixth preambular paragraph reaffirms paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, which states that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

Last year, in the General Assembly, two resolutions were adopted relating to the subject. This year, in Vienna, at the second United Nations Conference on the Exploitation and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, great concern was expressed and the Conference called on the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament to take appropriate action to prevent an arms race in outer space. It was against this background, and with a firm conviction that further measures must, and could, be taken to prevent this unnecessary and dangerous development, that the subject was taken up for discussion in the Committee on Disarmament this year. The thirteenth to sixteenth preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution reflect the proceedings in the Committee on Disarmament.

Operative paragraphs 1 to 4 of the draft resolution contain a reaffirmation that the exploration and use of outer space will be for peaceful purposes and that outer space shall not become an arena for the arms race. The need for effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space is emphasized, and all States are called upon to contribute towards the attainment of this goal. A special responsibility in this regard is borne by the major space Powers, which, no doubt, are equally convinced that outer space should not become an arena of an arms race. Operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution is a request from the General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament that it consider this issue on a priority basis. In operative paragraph 6, the General Assembly requests the Committee on Disarmament to create at its 1983 session the machinery that is necessary for appropriate action.

What operative paragraph 6 seeks to do is to convey to the Committee on Disarmament the wish of the General Assembly that it start work in 1983, on a priority basis, on establishing an ad hoc working group on the subject with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The paragraph conveys to the Committee on Disarmament the solemn wish of the General Assembly that the Committee on Disarmament take the first essential, meaningful

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

step to handle this issue. It is neither an intrusion nor an imposition on the Committee on Disarmament.

The proposal contained in operative paragraph 6 is a broad one. It provides for the Committee on Disarmament to take its own decision and to develop its own approach, taking into consideration all existing proposals and future initiatives that may be taken on the issue. It invites the Committee on Disarmament to handle the issue on a comprehensive basis without limiting itself to any single aspect or to some aspects of the issue.

The sponsors of this draft resolution have done their utmost to secure the broadest possible support for it in this Committee. Inasmuch as outer space is indivisible, we feel that the handling of the issue on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should not be a divided one. We hope that the draft resolution will gain the widest possible support in this Committee.

The draft resolution has been submitted with an abundance of good will and with a deep awareness of the difficulties of negotiating disarmament agreements relating to weapons and weapons systems once these have become the cornerstone of theories of deterrence and national security. It would be easier, we believe, to prevent the emergence of an arms race in outer space than to halt and reverse it after it has gained great momentum. We hope that this Committee can find its way, through this draft resolution, to a single decision on action directed towards preventing an arms race in outer space.

Mr. de La GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): On behalf of the delegations of Belgium, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Sweden, Uruguay and France, I have the honour to present to the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54. The co-sponsors of this draft have only one aim: to maintain the authority of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to that end to give the international community an appropriate mechanism for examining facts which, if verified, would constitute violations of the provisions of that Protocol. The French Government is the depositary of that Protocol and it is for that reason that it was suggested by the other co-sponsors of this draft resolution that the French delegation should submit this joint initiative to the Committee.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

The present initiative is not linked in any way to well-known allegations or to the polemics they have provoked regarding the possible use of chemical weapons. Nor is it linked in any way to the decisions taken by the General Assembly on this subject during its last two sessions. We wish to place our proposal outside the realm of all controversy and outside any political context. We firmly hope that it will be examined calmly and in the spirit of constructive co-operation appropriate to the topic we are discussing, that is, the observance and strengthening of one of the most serious and fundamental provisions of international law, that which prohibits the use of those weapons of mass destruction, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The 1925 Protocol does not provide for a procedure whereby possible violations might be noted. This has caused concern among several Governments and among highly qualified groups which are devoting their efforts to studying the problems of disarmament and security. I mention in this connection the Palme Commission and the Pugwash movement.

The Palme Commission - or more officially the Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament Issues - was composed of 17 eminent persons drawn from the highest levels all over the world. Among them I shall limit myself to mentioning Ambassador Garcia Robles and his Soviet and American counterparts Mr. Arbatov and Mr. Cyrus Vance.

In its report, entitled Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament the Palme Commission noted that

"... since the First World War chemical weapons have been used only in conflicts in the developing world. Thus a new arms race in chemical weapons creates world-wide dangers, in particular for the developing countries".

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

Hence, still according to the Commission, the vital need to speed up negotiations on a general treaty on chemical disarmament. However, as Mr. Palme and his colleagues note:

"These negotiations involve complex technical matters and sensitive political issues and their successful conclusion will require time. Therefore we call in addition for agreement on consultative procedures so that the problems arising under the implementation of the Geneva Protocol and the Convention on Biological Weapons can be resolved through international co-operation. Such procedures could include, for example, the option of consultative meetings at the expert level under the auspices of the United Nations that would be open to all States."

The Pugwash movement, consisting of prominent scientists from various regions, is giving particular attention to the question of chemical warfare. This issue was studied in particular during two meetings of experts or "workshops" in Geneva last year and again this year. At the first of these meetings, which took place from 2 to 4 March, 1981, with 27 participants from 17 countries, including all the principal military Powers, the experts examined questions relating to possible complaints about the use of chemical weapons. Their report was expressed in the following terms:

"As regards complaints, the Workshop considered that at least three stages would be required in the handling of future allegations. The first would be private consultations between contending parties ... If that failed, recourse would be had to a group of appropriate experts which would be constituted on a permanent basis. This group would then render an opinion on whether an on-site inspection might reasonably be expected to clarify the situation. Obviously, if on-site investigations are to be carried out, they should be conducted at the earliest possible time."

The meeting - or the workshop - held from 12 to 14 March, 1982 with the participation of 31 experts from 19 countries, including once again all of the principal military Powers, examined the same problem. Here is the conclusion of their report on this matter:

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

"The workshop explored possibilities for creating a permanent machinery for investigating possible future allegations which could be activated promptly, so that reliable information could be gathered and assessed. Such machinery could involve the use of army units trained for such purposes from neutral or non-aligned nations whose findings could then be assessed by international experts. That approach, and others, will be studied and explored further by Pugwash."

I thought it important to quote the opinions expressed by the Palme Commission and in meetings organized by the Pugwash Movement because they seem to us to express the current thinking clearly prevailing in competent international circles where all political tendencies are represented.

The draft resolution that we are introducing is inspired by the same concerns. It is aimed at satisfying three conditions which emerge from the opinions that I have just cited and which are clearly necessary: the procedure to be established must guarantee the competence and impartiality of the investigations; it should be flexible and practical; and it should be susceptible of rapid implementation.

The solution we propose seems to us to meet these conditions properly. With a list of experts to be drawn up beforehand, the Secretary-General could call on some of them, depending on the circumstances of each case, to carry out the appropriate investigations. With experts available at short notice and laboratories for making the required analyses chosen in advance, the information brought to the attention of the Secretary-General could be examined without loss of time. Finally, the implementation of the proposed procedure under the authority of the Secretary-General carries with it the most positive assurance of objectivity and competence. The Secretary-General is, by his very functions, the guarantor of objective action and under the terms of the draft submitted to the Committee, he would have at his disposal all of the necessary technical and scientific assistance.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

The procedure we propose is not offered as a permanent solution. In this regard representatives will have noted the fifth paragraph of the preamble:

"Believing it conducive to the continued authority of the Protocol that, pending eventual formal arrangements, procedures be established to make possible the prompt and impartial investigation of information concerning possible violations of the provisions of the Protocol," (A/C.1/37/L.54)

It could be considered that the establishment of a mechanism of investigation to ensure observance of an international agreement - that is, the Geneva Protocol - should have the same legal character as the Protocol itself. It is not for me to express an opinion here on the framework of future agreements. I have just referred to the Palme Commission which, in pointing out the time needed for concluding the Geneva convention on chemical disarmament, also implicitly seemed to favour the inclusion in the same convention of provisions for examining possible violations of the Geneva Protocol. The draft put forward to the Committee thus in no way tends to prejudice the future nor to substitute itself for future commitments in the form of a convention. It aims only at quickly establishing a means of investigation that will safeguard the authority and ensure respect for the Geneva Protocol, pending future agreements, and no one can say with certainty when these agreements will be concluded.

If we cannot ourselves decide on the future role of the Disarmament Committee on this matter, nevertheless we felt that we ought to insert a reference, both in the preamble and in the operative part of the draft resolution, to the negotiations taking place in the Committee on a chemical disarmament convention. The link between the elimination of weapons and the prohibition of their use should also be considered, since the elimination of weapons is the best guarantee against their use, and their use is the most obvious proof that undertakings on the destruction of weapons have not been respected.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

Representatives will also have noted that our proposal is addressed to States Members and not specifically to States parties to the Geneva Protocol. We considered the first formula to be preferable. The Geneva Protocol is in effect virtually universal in its application: 118 States have ratified it to date. Moreover, according to the most widely expressed opinion, its provisions are part of customary international law. Lastly, we thought it desirable for all States Members to be able to invoke the provisions of the resolution, should such a need arise.

Obviously, we would be very happy for the procedure thus set out to remain available to States without their having to seek recourse to it.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

We believe that the very existence of this procedure may help to forestall any possible temptations that might arise, but also to obviate groundless accusations as well as the propaganda use of doubtful information. Lastly, we believe that the provisions provided for would constitute a particularly useful confidence-building factor in an area that is extremely sensitive for the whole international community.

Mr. BOLD (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): The Mongolian delegation would like to submit, on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam and Mongolia, draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.8, under item 57 of the agenda, on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The prevention of the arms race in outer space, which is a comparatively new sphere for human activity, occupies an important place in the range of problems that pertain to halting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

At the last session of the General Assembly, as well as at this session, general concern was expressed regarding the real threat that could develop if no barrier is set up to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. That concern has prompted the sponsors to present this draft resolution. The draft resolution seeks a way of establishing practical talks with a view to preventing outer space from being turned into an arena for the arms race and a source for further deterioration in the relations between States.

At the last session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/99 which contained, inter alia, a request that the Committee on Disarmament should embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of

(Mr. Bold, Mongolia)

a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. However, those negotiations, for reasons which we all know, have not even begun. That is why the sponsors firmly believe that the General Assembly should again approach the Committee on Disarmament and request it to turn again to the task of opening negotiations on this subject. We believe that consideration of the question of prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space has resulted in a general agreement that negotiations on this subject should start immediately and that a special working group should be established for that purpose.

As well as the negotiations on the question of prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the sponsors attach considerable importance to bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States on anti-satellite systems.

At this session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union has declared its readiness to resume such talks immediately. The sponsors therefore believe that the General Assembly should appeal to the participants to resume those bilateral talks.

The need to activate the work of the Committee on Disarmament so as to bring about the beginning of talks, the renewal of Soviet-American bilateral negotiations and the inclusion of item 57 on the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly, are all reflected in the operative part of the draft resolution which the sponsors are now submitting for consideration by this Committee.

The adoption of the draft resolution would, the sponsors believe, help to provide a practical solution to the problem of preventing the arms race in outer space. The sponsors hope that their draft resolution will receive broad support and will eventually be adopted by the Committee.

Ms. BOYD (Australia): I have the honour formally to introduce in the Committee a draft resolution on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/85 on the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I do so on behalf of the delegations of Austria, the Bahamas, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, and of my own delegation, Australia.

The delegations of Sierra Leone, Fiji and the Solomon Islands have also informed us that they wish to be added to the list of sponsors.

The draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/37/L.40. With the permission of the Committee, my delegation will speak at greater length on the subject of this draft resolution later in the Committee's work.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): In order to abide by the timetable suggested for the Committee, I shall present the draft resolution in A/C.1/37/L.32/Rev.1 although it has not as yet been circulated in its revised form. The revision consists in the addition of one paragraph to the operative section as I shall explain in due course.

I have the honour to submit this draft resolution on behalf of its sponsors: Ecuador, Ireland, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and my own delegation, Mexico.

In its preambular section, this draft resolution contains a recapitulation of some highly relevant facts which I am sure the nuclear Powers most closely concerned would prefer us to erase from our memory. That is precisely why delegations like my own feel a duty to recall those facts year after year. Thus, as the Committee can see, the following facts are listed in order in the preamble.

First, the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than 25 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 40 resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, whose attainment it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The second statement of fact is in the second preambular paragraph, which states that: on seven different occasions, the General Assembly, has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war.

Thirdly, it is appropriate to bear in mind the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason whatever for delay in the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. It is also necessary to recall that since 1972 - 10 years ago - the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement; that when the existing means of verification are taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests.

It is appropriate to recall also that the Secretary-General, in the foreword to his report entitled "Comprehensive nuclear-test ban", reiterated with special emphasis the opinion he expressed 10 years ago and, after specifically referring to it, added "I still hold that belief. The problem can and should be solved now".

It should also be noted that in the same report, which was prepared in compliance with General Assembly decision 34/422 of 11 December 1979, the experts emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States in general had come to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, adding that verification of compliance no longer seemed to be an obstacle to reaching agreement.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Finally, it is imperative that we should not forget that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in that Treaty, almost 20 years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Unfortunately, as we all know - and this is a fact that we must deplore - neither the Committee on Disarmament nor the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have been able to elaborate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Thus, the sponsors of this draft resolution propose that the General Assembly: should reiterate once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States and that the General Assembly should also reaffirm also its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament. The sponsors consequently suggest that the General Assembly: urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty.

Here I shall speak to the additional paragraph that we have included in the revision, and that will appear as a new paragraph 4, with the present paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 being renumbered accordingly. If the amendment to the draft resolution is accepted the Assembly, in the new paragraph 4, would urge the three Original Parties to the partial test ban Treaty, which act as depositaries of the Treaty, to abide strictly by the undertakings contained therein to seek, in the words of that Treaty, "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and "to continue negotiations to this end".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The sponsors also wish the General Assembly - and I think that this is the cornerstone of this draft resolution - to urge all States members of the Committee on Disarmament, first, to bear in mind that if the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee, neither should it be used to prevent the approval of appropriate mandates for such subsidiary bodies; secondly, to assign to the ad hoc working group on item 1 of the Committee's agenda, a mandate which should provide for the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, to be initiated immediately after the 1983 session of the Committee has begun; and lastly, to exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth regular session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty.

The draft resolution then also contains a call addressed not to the members of the Committee on Disarmament but to the States depositaries of the Moscow Treaty; those States are called on, by virtue of their special responsibilities under the Moscow Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria.

The last paragraph is the usual final paragraph in this type of resolution, in which the General Assembly decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled, "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons".

The sponsors of the draft resolution trust that this Committee will give overwhelming and enthusiastic support to this draft resolution.

Miss DEVER (Belgium) (interpretation from French): Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54, just submitted, concerns observance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in particular and the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in general.

Belgium is happy to be one of the sponsors jointly with the States depositaries of the Geneva Protocol, and we hope that this draft resolution will be supported by this Assembly. We have pleaded for many years for a procedure for impartial investigation of information in cases where doubts are raised about the observance of these prohibitions. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, Mr. Léo Tindemans, introduced a memorandum suggesting the drawing up of new institutional arrangements for that purpose. These proposals arose out of the need for swift investigation procedures covering all questions relating to the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. They were also the result of a desire to contribute to the search for a solution to the difficulties concerning the scope of the chemical-weapon convention now being negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament.

Our contribution was the result of numerous consultations which overrode the dividing lines between States. It was also based on, inter alia, on the views of the Pugwash Group. The Palme Commission's proposals on short-term measures within a programme for the reduction of armaments and for disarmament confirm the usefulness of exploring this path further. This possibility, among others, is provided by draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54. Moreover that texts as a whole respond to the need recognized by all the members of the international community for many decades now. It detaches itself from the political passions of the moment and proposes a system that should eliminate controversy and mistrust in a field whose importance needs no emphasizing.

It is in this spirit that Belgium hopes that this initiative will receive the support of this Committee.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference: It is my privilege to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to the First Committee. The report, as contained in document A/37/28, has been prepared in fulfilment of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee contained in resolution 36/91 of 9 December 1981.

In implementing this mandate the Ad Hoc Committee held two sessions in 1982. Pursuant to a decision taken at the outset of its second session to entrust its open-ended working group with the task of drafting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, the working group, which held a series of meetings and informal consultations under the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee's rapporteur, Mr. Laclaustra of Spain, successfully concluded its work and made it possible for the Ad Hoc Committee to adopt the present report by consensus at its final meeting on 27 August.

On this occasion I should like to acknowledge the important contribution made by Mr. Laclaustra and his colleagues in the working group, and the spirit of co-operation and true dedication which characterized all stages of their work.

With regard to the content of the Ad Hoc Committee's report, which is composed, as was the previous report, of three chapters: I. Introduction. II. Work of the Committee, and III. Conclusions and recommendations, a significant part of the second chapter of the report reflects the fact that, in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 36/91, the Committee continued to maintain close contact, through its Chairman, with the representatives of States possessing nuclear weapons, in order to remain

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currently informed of their respective attitudes. The positions of the nuclear-weapon States are set out in paragraph 15 of the report.

As paragraph 1 of the draft resolution states, the Ad Hoc Committee in its report holds the view that, having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 64 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the twelfth special session, should take up the question at its thirty-seventh session for its further consideration, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of resolution 36/91, adopted by consensus, in particular paragraph 1 of the said resolution.

I should like to introduce the draft resolution on a World Disarmament Conference, document A/C.1/37/L.28, sponsored by Burundi, Peru, Poland, Spain and Sri Lanka, who are the officers of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The draft resolution is similar to that adopted last year, with differences in the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1 which reflect the results of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, the gist of which I have already indicated, refers, inter alia, to operative paragraph 1 of resolution 36/91 of last year, containing a statement of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, relating to the subject of the possible convening of a world disarmament conference.

Successive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference have presented to the General Assembly both a report and a draft resolution empowering the Committee to continue its work. As with many other measures of disarmament, the Committee needs to proceed with steady and patient work in order to achieve its objectives, especially at a time like the present. It is no small undertaking, but the magnitude of the task itself should not discourage us.

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Disarmament Conference)

I take this opportunity to thank Mr. Krystosik of Poland, who presided over the work of the Committee during my absence, for the excellent guidance he gave the Committee. I should also like to thank the members of the Ad Hoc Committee for the spirit of co-operation and accommodation they have always shown at our meetings, and to place on record my appreciation of the work of the Secretary of the Committee and his colleagues in the Secretariat for the assistance they have given to the Committee at all times.

I commend the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.28, which is now before the Committee, for adoption by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: That exhausts our list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting and would have exhausted the introduction of draft resolutions, except for one delegation which had indicated its desire to speak at the meeting to be held this evening or tomorrow morning. Since there would be no point in convening a meeting to hear only one speaker this evening, I crave the Committee's indulgence and permission to call on Mr. Garcia Robles on Monday morning to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1, A/C.1/37/L.50 and A/C.1/37/L.51, instead of tonight.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee is in agreement with this slight variation of our decision.

It was so decided.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce the order in which the Committee will take a decision on draft resolutions next week. On Monday, 22 November, the Committee will vote upon draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.9, L.12, L.16, L.20, L.23, L.24, L.25, L.30, L.32/Rev.1, L.33, L.35, L.42, L.52, L.57 and L.58.

On Tuesday, 23 November, the Committee will vote upon draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1, L.3/Rev.2, L.4/Rev.1, L.6, L.10, L.13, L.14, L.17, L.21, L.29, L.43, L.55 and L.59.

On Wednesday, 24 November, the Committee will vote upon draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.2, L.15, L.18, L.19, L.22, L.27, L.31, L.39, L.40, L.45, L.53, L.54, L.56 and L.62.

On Friday, 26 November, the voting will be upon the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/37/L.7, L.8, L.26, L.37, L.38, L.41, L.48, L.61 and L.65.

As far as the remaining draft resolutions are concerned, I shall inform the Committee as we go along of decisions reached on when to take them up in the Committee.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.