



FIRST COMMITTEE
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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 37TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 57, 133, 136, 138 and 139 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will continue its consideration of and action upon draft resolutions related to disarmament items.

Mr. MBAI (Kenya): On behalf of the African Group in the First Committee, I have the honour to introduce today two draft resolutions under agenda item 44 relating to a subject of special concern and interest to Africa, namely the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

The first draft resolution appears in document A/C.1/37/L.37, and deals specifically with the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

The second draft deals with the particular aspect of the nuclear capability of South Africa, and appears in document A/C.1/37/L.38.

This year the African Group as a whole wishes to present to this Committee and to the General Assembly these two texts which the Group feels should command general consensus acceptance. The international community is today confronted with severe crises to its socio-economic, political and security order. To counterbalance and eliminate those crises, it is imperative for all Member States to act collectively to resolve disputes and prevent potential conflicts in various regions of the world.

It is in this light that the African Group sees the question of preventing the nuclearization of the African continent as imperative at this stage.

The two draft resolutions to which I have referred are very simple and non-controversial. They recall previous resolutions and decisions of various United Nations bodies, including the General Assembly, on matters relevant to item 44. They also note the importance of the item to the overall question of the maintenance of international peace and security

(Mr. Mbai, Kenya)

and the dangers of South Africa's nuclear activities not only to Africa but to the international community as a whole, and call for concrete action to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

We should like to emphasize that these resolutions are not directed at scoring political points against any State or group of States but at promoting a cause which we believe is in the interest of all of us gathered here. After all, we have consistently denounced apartheid, supported the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and stressed the importance of the need to maintain international peace and security. It is therefore time, the African Group believes, to match our words with deeds by accepting by consensus draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.37 and A/C.1/37/L.38.

We wish in particular to emphasize the relevance of operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.38, which requests the Secretary-General "to follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session". This is not just a routine request. We believe that it is vital for the Assembly to be kept fully informed of any developments that might be relevant to the question of South Africa's nuclear capability so as to enable the Assembly and the international community as a whole to take effective action, as appropriate, to deal with the implications of such developments, if any. Reports have appeared from time to time on South Africa's nuclear activities. Such reports might be closely followed to determine their validity and trustworthiness and, in this connection, we appeal to all Member States to co-operate with the Secretary-General's efforts in documenting whatever developments might arise relating to South Africa's nuclear capability.

Particular attention should also be given to operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.38, in which the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendation of the Security Council Committee, established by resolution 421 (1977), should prohibit effectively all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime in the nuclear field.

(Mr. Mbai, Kenya)

The draft resolution also demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The African Group wishes to draw attention to an ominous trend; it is increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception for a number of countries to have ready recourse to the use of veto any time issues of southern Africa are discussed within the United Nations system. It is our ardent hope that such countries will rethink the development of their policy and attitude, in the realization that a destabilized Africa is a danger to international peace and security.

I should like in conclusion to express the hope that the two draft resolutions I have just introduced will meet the approval of this Committee.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa which was adopted at the first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity held in Cairo between 17 and 21 July 1964, is, in the view of my delegation, an important contribution to the concept of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a collateral measure of disarmament. Aside from its acceptance as a confidence-building measure, the objective of such a concept is to promote the purposes of the non-proliferation régime through the prevention of any overt or covert attempt by any State or group of States within a particular geographical region or outside it to introduce nuclear weapons into the region in any manner whatsoever.

Efforts undertaken in this regard have resulted in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Antarctica and Latin America. Although Antarctica may be uninhabited, its declaration as a nuclear-weapon-free zone represents a benefit to the environment and ecology. On the other hand, the successful conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, of which the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Ambassador Garcia Robles, was a major architect, assures the Latin American people of the possibility of living in peace within secure borders through an absence of nuclear weapons in their territory. We applaud those modest steps as a useful contribution to the peace process.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

In line with their obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to contribute to efforts which seek to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war as well as to promote international peace and security, African countries have largely regarded the nuclear-weapons option as inconsistent, at least for the present, with their development aspirations, and particularly so since they desire to live in peace within secure borders.

It was against such a background that the first summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) solemnly adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, in which it called upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In supporting the draft resolution on this subject, my delegation would like to reaffirm that the objective of a denuclearized Africa remains fundamental to the efforts of the continent towards collective self-defence. In this connection, it is our view that the United Nations has an abiding interest in and responsibility for helping the OAU evolve the enabling modalities for its realization. We consider it therefore not only an unfriendly act but an act of interference in the domestic affairs of the continent for certain countries outside it to seek, either directly or through proxies, to dictate to it the pattern of its domestic policies. We agree with the Secretary-General when he says in his report on the Work of the Organization that "the most urgent goal is to reconstruct the Charter concept of collective action for peace and security" (A/37/1, p. 5). We should like to submit that the peace and security of the African continent remain subsumed in that collective action.

We invite the Committee to take note of the continuing validity of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa as a modality for achieving internal peace and security in the continent and our consideration that the sole impediment to the achievement of the above-stated objective in present circumstances resides in the overt attempt by the racist régime of South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent. In the interest of that peace and security, we call upon all countries to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to refrain from any action or inaction which might frustrate the objective of keeping Africa free from nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

The implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa has since taken an ominous turn with the development of a nuclear-weapon capability by South Africa. The reported detonation of a nuclear device on 22 September 1979 confirmed earlier indications - which were already evident in 1977, when South Africa was caught red-handed making preparations in the Kalahari Desert for a nuclear test explosion - that the racist régime intended to pursue a nuclear-weapons option in order to perpetuate its abhorrent policies of apartheid and to use that capability as an instrument of nuclear blackmail, aggression and terrorism. It is for this reason and against the background of international concern over the matter that the draft resolution on the nuclear capability of South Africa contained in document A/C.1/37/L.38 has been submitted for the Committee's consideration.

South Africa's capacity to produce nuclear weapons has now been established beyond all reasonable doubt. Indications are that, in collaboration with Israel, South Africa is developing a cruise missile with a range of 1,500 miles, a neutron bomb and various nuclear delivery systems. Above everything else, this massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, which it has ruthlessly employed for aggressive and repressive purposes, underlines the apparent contempt with which the racist régime views international concern, public morality and the pertinent resolutions and decisions of the United Nations on the subject. Besides, its military attacks against independent States of southern Africa, in particular its invasion of the sovereign State of Angola, part of whose territory South African forces are still occupying, demonstrate South Africa's ready disposition to flagrant violation of international law and the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which we adopted by consensus, states inter alia:

"... the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm."

(resolution S-10/2, para. 12)

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

And yet, certain Western countries and Israel have had no qualms about extending military and nuclear collaboration to racist South Africa in pursuance of their economic interests, as well as their geopolitical and geostrategic designs. We must remind these countries that they are acting out of tune with their deeply-held and often-vaunted convictions of democratic principles and rationality and are in gross violation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977. The same countries have also failed to prevent corporations, institutions and individuals within their territories from extending such co-operation.

In the face of the manifest incapacity of the Security Council to take enforcement measures against South Africa, because of the posture of some of the régime's collaborators in the Council, the draft resolution renews the call upon the Security Council once again to intensify its efforts with a view to instituting enforcement measures against the racist régime so as to render the arms embargo mandatory and more effective.

Last year we drew attention to a disturbing trend in which it is increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception for a number of countries, whether or not they are actually endowed under the provisions of the Charter with the right to exercise the veto, to have ready recourse to its possibilities any time the South African question is discussed within the United Nations system. It must be pointed out to those countries that exception has been taken to this development of policy and attitude. They must realize that such a posture does not help the cause of international peace and security, which we are all sworn to contribute to achieving as Members of the United Nations.

In the view of my delegation, the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/37/L.37 and A/C.1/37/L.38 take into account the existing reality in southern Africa, the mood of the African people and the sensitivities of the various interests groups in connection with the subjects. We therefore hope that they will be supported by all.

Mr. CHANANA (India): I have asked to speak to introduce in the Committee the proposal for a freeze on nuclear weapons which is contained in document A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1, which has been circulated this morning on behalf of the delegations of India, Liberia and Mali.

It will be recalled that at the second special session on disarmament India put forward a proposal for a freeze on nuclear weapons which would, inter alia, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. It is this same proposal which is contained in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1, except that an additional operative paragraph has been added which would enable the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly to review the implementation of this proposal.

(Mr. Chanana, India)

In putting forward this proposal we were guided by the recognition that nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction, must be limited, reduced and eliminated wherever they exist. It is for this reason that our draft resolution calls upon all nuclear-weapon States without exception to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons and a simultaneous cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The freeze on nuclear weapons must be followed immediately by negotiations on the reduction and subsequent elimination of all nuclear-weapon stockpiles. In these negotiations, due account must of course be taken of the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States.

Our proposal for a freeze on nuclear weapons focuses attention on two crucial elements that must be addressed in any process of nuclear disarmament. These elements are the production of nuclear weapons and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This does not mean that aspects relating to development and deployment are not important. However, those additional elements have been excluded from our freeze proposal precisely because we felt that in order to be practical and facilitate quick agreement, it was necessary to concentrate on the key elements in the process of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons along with a simultaneous cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would enable the same system of universal and non-discriminatory safeguards to be applied to all nuclear facilities in all countries of the world. The problems of verification and control which have been cited as arising in the event of there being a freeze on development and deployment as well as on delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons would also not apply in the case of our proposal being accepted.

It should also be clearly understood that we have not included the element of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons pending conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban, precisely because there are other draft resolutions before this Committee which address this particular problem.

(Mr. Chanana, India)

From what I have said, it should be obvious that the sponsors will have no difficulty with the proposal for a nuclear arms freeze which has been put forward by the delegations of Ecuador, Mexico and Sweden in document A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2. We regard that proposal as being entirely in harmony with our own and we give it our full support. However, we are of the view that a freeze on nuclear weapons should be agreed upon by all nuclear-weapon States and that, in the interests of simplicity and ease of implementation, it should in the first instance cover the production of nuclear weapons and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

It is our hope that the proposal contained in document A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 will be supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations.

Before I conclude, I should like to announce that India proposes to withdraw the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.5, entitled "Urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament". The measures contained in that draft resolution have already been covered in separate draft resolutions which are before the Committee, and it is felt that any unnecessary duplication should be avoided.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Today, I wish to address some draft resolutions pertaining to nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. We have been confronted with quite a few if not a barrage of, draft resolutions dealing, albeit in different ways, with all sorts of topical items, such as freeze, non-use, no-first-use, cut-off, comprehensive test ban and prevention of nuclear war.

The fact that there are so many draft resolutions on the same items reflects the importance and urgency that we all attach to these matters. The fact that, as in previous years, we have before us different draft resolutions

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

on the same items and that we do not succeed in amalgamating them reflects our fundamentally different approaches to those matters. Realism tells us not to close our eyes to these facts. Realism also tells us that the impact of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly suffers when the Assembly adopts two or more recommendations on the same agenda item - when the Assembly, as it were, speaks with two voices.

Before I deal with some of the draft resolutions in greater detail I should like to set out some of the main considerations underlying Netherlands' policies on nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament.

We cannot expect nuclear weapons to disappear overnight; they will continue to be an essential element in the inventory of the armed forces of a number of major Powers for the foreseeable future and will remain linked to the strategies of military alliances. None the less, we should do our utmost to reduce to a minimum, the risks inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons, which have led to a qualitative change in security conditions. War can no longer be a political instrument and must be prevented by all means available. In view of the destructive potential of modern weapons, it is our primary concern to prevent, in conformity with the Charter, any type of military conflict, be it conventional or nuclear.

We advocate concrete, militarily significant control and the verifiable limitation of armaments. Such balanced reductions should aim at creating a stable equilibrium of forces at the lowest possible level. It is therefore our consistent policy to try gradually to take the emphasis off the role of nuclear weapons. Priority should be given to curbing the most destabilizing weapon systems. Agreements on such specific measures would serve to build confidence and enhance security throughout the world.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

I cannot over-emphasize the relevance, in the efforts to ensure the preservation of peace, of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which are of crucial importance to the successful implementation of the Netherlands policy I mentioned earlier. The START process is the single most important instrument for stabilizing the strategic balance and bringing it down to lower levels. We feel encouraged by the fact the both the United States and the USSR are on record as being willing to live up to earlier agreements. It would be of vital interest not only to the two nations directly involved but also to the world at large if the United States and the USSR were to succeed in their efforts to reach agreement on substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear-weapon arsenals, leading to considerably lower but equal levels.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Closely related to the START process are the important negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) between the United States of America and the USSR. The Netherlands Government attaches special interest to these negotiations, and is of the opinion that achieving a mutual zero-level result regarding intermediate-range land-based missiles would represent a major step on the road to nuclear disarmament.

These endeavours of ours for achieving substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides have their special relevance, too, for maintaining and strengthening as an instrument of a peace policy a credible non-proliferation system, aimed at universal acceptance. I may recall in this context the importance of an integral implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We are convinced that it is high time for the nuclear-weapon States, parties to the Treaty, to live up to their commitments, especially the one under article VI of the NPT, that is to say:

"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race" (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

and to nuclear disarmament. With the same insistence, we call on all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to accept safeguards on all their nuclear installations.

The European situation illustrates the problems one has to face while trying to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons, once they are part of an existing regional balance. Part of this balance in Europe is the single largest concentration of conventional weapons in the world. In our case, the problems relating to this precarious balance are compounded by the fact that the USSR has achieved a conventional superiority. It is obvious that an early agreement on equal collective ceilings for the forces of Eastern and Western participants in the Vienna negotiations, on mutual and balanced force reductions and associated measures, would considerably increase the prospects for substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals.

In my statement of 27 October last, I stressed that we are not in need of further declaratory proposals or solemnly-worded drafts without substance, and that we view such declaratory proposals and draft resolutions primarily

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

from the angle of public relations. What we need is not words, words, words, but rather a readiness for greater openness and transparency as well as for confidence-building in our common search, through negotiation, for effective and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements.

An example of such a draft resolution we could do without, is the Soviet proposal contained in document A/C.1/37/L.7, entitled "Intensification of efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy". A/C.1/37/L.7 is mainly a reintroduction in another form of the 1981 Soviet proposal "Prevention of nuclear catastrophe; declaration of the General Assembly". In a cool and fundamental analysis, presented to the First Committee on 6 November 1981, the leader of the Netherlands delegation, Ambassador Richard H. Fein - like others - demonstrated that this proposal was imprecise, inconsistent in character and nothing but declaratory in nature.

Since then we have heard, of course, the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei A. Gromyko, on 15 June 1982 before the plenary meeting of the second special session devoted to disarmament in which he declared that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assumes, with immediate effect, an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

On the same day the then Netherlands Prime Minister, Andreas van Agt, declared that:

"... even the slightest possibility of any use of any nuclear weapon horrifies us". (A/S-12/PV.13, p. 42) .

The Prime Minister granted that a serious no-first-use declaration could be an important confidence-building measure in a certain stage of the disarmament process. But he also gave the reasons why, in view of the present situation, in particular in Europe, a no-first-use declaration cannot be the first step. Our Prime Minister continued:

"First we have to make progress in controlling and limiting the nuclear weapons themselves and create a stable balance between East and West in the conventional field also. This would in itself reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the over-all military posture." (ibid., p. 43-45)

(Mr. Vagenmakers, Netherlands)

The United Charter lays down that there should be no first use of force, regardless of the military means employed. This commitment binds us all. Why should we renegotiate the Charter? By seeking to set an order of precedence among the various manifestations of the use of force, one risks undercutting the Charter in one of its central affirmations. What we need is a credible and verifiable assurance against any resort to the use of force - any force. This criterion was unambiguously met by the declaration of the Heads of State or Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn, on 10 June 1982, in which they said: "None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack."

Returning to the text of A/C.1/37/L.7, in the same vein one may question that part of the Soviet draft in which attacks on nuclear facilities even by means of conventional weapons are declared to be essentially equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, that is to say, to actions of a kind which the United Nations has already described as "the gravest crime against humanity."

If this is the true Soviet approach to this matter, one may wonder why in the Committee on Disarmament the Soviet delegation invariably kept itself aloof from proposals relative to this subject matter. The Soviet position in the Committee on Disarmament was that the pertinent Swedish proposal did not legitimately qualify for consideration under the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. In fact, attempts like those by my own delegation to have that Working Group deal with the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, were labelled "artificial" and "non-realistic". Why this difference of approach in Geneva and in New York? Is it because here in the First Committee one may feel safe within the realms of mere declaratory language, whilst in the Committee on Disarmament one is supposed to work to establish treaty language, that is, legal commitments?

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

All these criticisms should not be conceived of as implying that we in the Netherlands delegation do not take seriously the urgency of preventing a nuclear war. On the contrary: we do indeed, as was amply manifested by the constant efforts of the Netherlands delegation toward this goal during the second special session on disarmament.

To a large degree our objectives are compatible with the Argentine approach on the prevention of nuclear war, as embodied in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.45. We would add some topics to which we attach the greatest importance, in particular the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, vertical or horizontal, and the harmonization of the solemn declarations that all nuclear weapon States have already made on important restrictions on the possible use of nuclear weapons with respect to non-nuclear States.

However, instead of a call to the Committee on Disarmament we would have preferred a direct call upon the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to attain the objective of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race by concluding agreements on significant and verifiable reductions and to devise stabilizing mechanisms to reduce the possibility of a nuclear war. Moreover, we see a role for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to promote the objective of the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, by recommending practical measures aimed at more openness and transparency and by expanding the dialogue, in particular on nuclear weapons, with a view to enhancing both confidence and stability.

May I revert again to the thought with which I opened my statement: the fact that we are faced with a barrage of draft resolutions, quite a few of them dealing with the same agenda item.

The Netherlands has always held that it was a good United Nations custom that in case of submission of several competing draft resolutions under one and the same agenda item, efforts should be made by the delegations concerned to try to thrash out the differences and to arrive at one agreed draft. It seems, however, that this good custom is gradually being abandoned and being substituted by a "dialogue de sourds".

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

To prove my point, I could refer to the various draft resolutions on the prevention of nuclear war, but I might also recall that no less than four draft resolutions have been submitted on the question of a "freeze". The Indian draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.1, calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a "freeze" on nuclear weapons, which could, inter alia, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete "cut-off" in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The Mexican-Swedish resolution, A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.1, urges a "freeze" which would comprise a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; the complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; and the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The Soviet draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.7, calls for a "freeze" on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and also on the production of fissionable materials for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons. Finally, the Indian draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.5, calls for a complete "freeze" on the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, along with a "cut-off" of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Each of these four "freeze" variants has a different scope. A further distinction is that the Mexican-Swedish draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.1, refers to either simultaneous unilateral declarations or a joint declaration of the two major nuclear-weapon States, whilst the other drafts are unspecific on this score.

The Netherlands position on the question of a freeze is that at this juncture a freeze of the development, production and/or deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles would legitimize the recent massive growth in missile weaponry of the Soviet Union and leave intact the resulting imbalance. Thus the West would be prevented from remedying the vulnerabilities which now exist. This holds true in particular for land-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons as well as for certain aspects of the strategic relation.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

For these reasons a "freeze" under today's conditions would be equivalent to a consolidation of certain destabilizing aspects of the present East-West relationship.

All our endeavours should now concentrate on promoting a successful outcome of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations, for, contrary to a "freeze", the START and INF talks both aim at achieving substantial reductions as well as a stable balance of forces.

One might note in passing that the detailed elaboration of an agreed "freeze" would be just as complicated as that of a real reduction agreement and would call for the same kind of intrusive verification measures. It would seem that the main proponents of a "freeze" ignore these problems. So as to avoid any misunderstanding, I should add that what I have said just now does not exclude that, once a more stable balance has been achieved, a certain agreed "freeze" might contribute to curbing the nuclear arms race.

A "cut-off" of the production of fissionable material for military purposes would set absolute limits for the total volume of nuclear weapons. In that respect its scope would bypass that of a comprehensive test ban.

The Netherlands has therefore invariably supported "cut-off" proposals, the initiative for which was taken by the late President Eisenhower. An important consideration in this context is that such a "cut-off" is technically feasible. For its implementation, lessons can be drawn from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection system and the experience gained in safeguarding nuclear facilities. Plutonium production reactors and military reprocessing plants do differ to a degree, but not in principle, from facilities presently subjected to IAEA safeguards. The only field where practical experience is lacking, is safeguarding gas-diffusion enrichment plants. The Netherlands delegation is of course not blind to the important differences between civil and military facilities. And recognition has to be made of the vital security interests at stake.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

For all those reasons, the most expedient way to gain momentum in this realm would be the commissioning by the Secretary-General of a comprehensive study, in which the nuclear-weapon States would participate. Such a study should provide a complete inventory of problems to be expected and would constitute a useful gauge for drafting future specific proposals.

In the light of the considerations above, we have serious objections to the draft resolutions I mentioned earlier concerning a "freeze". I hope I made clear that we are not "firmly convinced", as is stated in the seventh preambular paragraph of the Mexican-Swedish draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.1, that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a "freeze". To assume, as is done in operative paragraph 1 of that draft resolution, that far-reaching measures like those envisaged there can be established by a mere proclamation or "declaration" is tantamount to underestimating seriously the complexities involved. I have already dwelt at length on the objections of the Netherlands to the envisaged "freeze". I would be remiss if I did not single out a positive factor, that is, that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.1 is the only "freeze"-type draft resolution which refers to verification, in its paragraph 1 (b). The verification measures and procedures agreed upon under the SALT I and SALT II treaties would, however, not suffice for monitoring compliance with all the limitations and bans mentioned in that same paragraph.

The idea that negotiations are necessary in relation to a "freeze" is conspicuously absent in the Indian draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.1. Negotiations are mentioned only in relation to the reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles.

We are glad that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1, in contrast to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.4, includes the idea of negotiations. However, our fundamental objections to a convention such as that annexed to the draft resolution remain unchanged.

For draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.5 we feel no need at all, because nothing of substance is added to already existing material.

We would be prepared to join in a consensus on the Indian-Mexican draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.2, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war". We would do so for the reasons which I explained earlier. That position notwithstanding, we have our doubts about the viability of a representative group of public persons

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

of great eminence. We deem the purpose mentioned in the draft resolution to be rather diffuse and possibly counter-productive. For all practical purposes, we fear that the eminent persons would rather gratify public opinion than assist in controlling, managing and resolving critical or confrontational situations. If something along the lines suggested in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.2 were to be undertaken, a low-key approach with the participation of the militarily-significant States would be my delegation's preference. Furthermore, one might consider too whether the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) should not be brought into the picture. I recall that part of the job has been executed there already; I refer to UNIDIR's publication entitled "Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War".

We cannot support the Soviet draft resolution, A/C.1/37/L.6, entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". We deem that the scope of this draft resolution is too limited, since it aims at a ban of nuclear-weapon tests only. We have invariably advocated a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Although we would have preferred a fuller mandate for the Committee on Disarmament's ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban, we think that the present mandate has not yet been fulfilled and moreover that it allows for extensive interpretation. We therefore do not agree with operative paragraph 1. We also have serious difficulties with the moratorium as proposed in paragraph 3. A moratorium is not adequately verifiable and is, as a unilateral measure, open to doubts, as is proved by the history of nuclear-weapon testing. We appreciate the relevance of proposing in written form the possible basic provisions of a treaty, as is done in the annex to the draft resolution. It seems that extensive use has been made of Committee on Disarmament document CD/L30, the last and most extensive report of the parties to the trilateral negotiations. The points which are lacking, however, are conspicuous as well. For instance, the reference in document CD/L30 to the need for establishing "high-quality national seismic stations of agreed characteristics" (CD/L30, para. 22) has been completely omitted. Instead of proposing this new agenda item and submitting a draft resolution under it, I think that the USSR would have been better advised simply to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.40, sponsored by, inter alia, Australia and New Zealand, on the same subject. And as far as the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament are concerned, the Netherlands delegation would welcome it

if the former trilateral negotiators jointly - or, if necessary, one of them - could provide the ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban with a working document containing a survey of the technical problems which remained to be resolved in their former negotiations.

I would conclude by emphasizing once again the positive attitude of the Netherlands delegation regarding a constructive dialogue on nuclear matters. If we have difficulties with some of the draft resolutions presented to us it is simply because we fail to see how they could help us any further. We shall, however, continue our efforts for the prevention of nuclear war. We remain open to further consultations, now and in the future.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): I have the honour today to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.48 on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, which has been sponsored by Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Denmark, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden and my own country.

Like its predecessors - General Assembly resolutions 32/91 H, 34/87 D, 35/156 H and 36/97 G - this draft resolution is procedural in nature. It requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider at an appropriate time the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress on this matter.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

The draft resolution is based on the view, which has attained wide acceptance in the international community, that such a freeze of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes could make a significant contribution to disarmament, complementing and reinforcing verifiable agreements which limit and prohibit nuclear weapons themselves.

Therefore I commend the draft resolution to the Committee, with confidence that it will attain wide support.

I should like also at this time to draw attention to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.44, a procedural draft resolution on negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. Canada is one of the sponsors of this draft resolution, which will be introduced in due course by Poland. Along with the other sponsors, we hope that many delegations will associate themselves with this draft resolution and that it will be adopted by consensus, particularly in view of the critical stage that has been reached in negotiations on this matter in the Committee on Disarmament.

We have just heard an extremely thoughtful and thought-provoking statement by the representative of the Netherlands. Views may differ on the substance of what was said, but one point struck me particularly because of the similarity of the views expressed to those which I and perhaps many others share. We are all aware that the United Nations is under attack in some quarters and that its effectiveness is being challenged in many other quarters, and that this is occurring at the same time as we are witnessing an encouraging but amazing upsurge in public concern over and interest in the problem of arms control and disarmament. It has just been pointed out that on vital issues, including those relating to nuclear weapons and other serious arms control matters, the General Assembly has begun to speak increasingly with more than one voice, thereby quite obviously lessening its effectiveness and appearing to diminish its importance. I think we all know that it is far more effective to proceed by consensus. I am not at this point referring to any specific resolution. We all know that certain

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

law-making and other conferences and deliberative organs proceed by consensus. We have heard pleas in this Committee that we attempt to streamline our procedures in some fashion. I wonder what would be the effect of adopting rules for this Committee, whatever else is done in other places, whereby we would agree to work by consensus and proceed to vote only when it is clearly established that all efforts at consensus have been exhausted. Would such an approach bring the Committee to a grinding halt or would it maximize pressure for realism on the part of all and focus our attention on the need for concrete action? Would such a proposal make us nervous or would it be met with relief? There is one thing I believe I can say with some confidence: the world public would welcome it.

I am not so naive as to advance such a proposal, but I mention these thoughts precisely because the concern that I feel is, I am sure, widely shared, that is, that we must somehow work in such a way as to maximize our effectiveness. I say this after having previously complimented you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee on the way in which you are conducting our proceedings. Quite clearly, if we are not working by consensus we are all guilty, but, by the same token, if we all make a commitment to attempt to work by consensus we could all take satisfaction in the results.

Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark): Speaking on behalf of the Ten member States of the European Community, I should like to address some of the draft resolutions introduced in the First Committee.

In our statement in the general debate in this Committee, the Ten have already stressed the importance we attach to confidence-building measures. It is our firm view that the introduction of such measures, both in a regional and in a global context, could improve and facilitate progress in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

The regrettable deterioration of the international situation in recent years has made the elaboration of principles for confidence-building measures and the application of such measures all the more urgent. The comprehensive study, initiated by the Federal Republic of Germany and submitted by the Secretary-General at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, was therefore particularly welcome and a valuable contribution to progress in this important field.

In the view of the Ten, the study rightly emphasizes that the principal objective of confidence-building measures would be to contribute to reducing or possibly eliminating distrust and fear among States. Thus by applying such measures in an equal, uniform and balanced manner, States would enhance their security and contribute to more stable and fruitful international relations.

A general feature of confidence-building measures should be the application of concrete, specific and verifiable measures adapted to the freely perceived security requirements of the States concerned. The Ten would like to recall in this connection that they are at present engaged in negotiations with the object of the adoption of new verifiable, binding and militarily significant confidence-building measures in the European context.

Foremost among the causes of distrust between States is the mutual misperception resulting from the lack of reliable information in the area of military potentials and intentions. Improved transparency in military matters, including timely information on military activities, therefore forms an important part of the concept of confidence-building measures. Thus there is much scope for developing and strengthening confidence-building measures relevant to the security of States.

The establishment of confidence-building measures should obviously be considered part of an overall process consisting of mutually reinforcing efforts to achieve progress in the fields of both international security and disarmament. As is stated in the expert study, the concept of confidence-building measures deserves to be further explored in its global and regional perspectives as well as with regard to its military and non-military aspects.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Now that States have had an opportunity to consider in depth the comprehensive study on confidence-building measures prepared by the Secretary-General, the Ten think it necessary to advance a further step towards an elaboration of the concept of confidence-building measures. We feel that the United Nations Disarmament Commission, as a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, is the suitable forum in which to elaborate guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for their implementation at the global or regional level. The Ten support the invitation extended to all States in the draft resolution (A/C.1/37/L.35) to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions in keeping with the conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective regions. The Ten welcome and support this draft resolution, which was introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, and look forward to participating actively in the consideration of this important issue in the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

I should now like to address myself to the question of regional disarmament. Even though the international arms build-up will have to be seen in its overall global perspective, the regionally perceived security considerations of States are also a factor contributing to the continued arms build-up. The possibility of supplementing the global approach to disarmament by constructive efforts at the level of the region are particularly promising, although so far there has not been sufficient progress in this field. Initiatives in this regard must clearly emanate from the expressed will of the States belonging to the region concerned, taking fully into consideration their legitimate security interest, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. On this basis, however, regional disarmament could, in the view of the Ten, provide ample opportunities for assuring at lower levels of armaments both the individual and the collective security of States in a specific region.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions of the world can be a major contribution in the field of regional disarmament in so far as all States concerned will be prepared to participate on the basis of freely concluded arrangements.

A comprehensive analysis of the regional approach to disarmament - initiated by Belgium and carried out by a group of experts - was welcomed by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth regular session.

It gave rise to a series of valuable considerations and suggestions which, together with the conclusions of the study itself, deserve attention as a source of inspiration for regional disarmament endeavours.

Along with many States from all regions, the Ten, therefore, welcome and support the draft resolution introduced by Belgium, according to which the Member States are encouraged to take steps with regard to promoting adequate regional disarmament measures and to report their concrete experiences to the General Assembly through the Secretary-General.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

I should now like to make some remarks on the draft resolution before the Committee on the Convention on certain conventional weapons. A number of member States of the European Community have sponsored that draft resolution. This reflects the importance which we attach to the Convention on certain conventional weapons, which we consider to be a significant step in the development of humanitarian law to reduce the suffering of victims of armed conflict. The Convention constitutes considerable encouragement for our continuing efforts to implement the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. We are therefore pleased that by 31 August this year, as reported by the Secretary-General in document A/37/199, a total of 53 States had signed the Convention, including, I should mention, all member States of the European Community. We hope that all States will become parties to the Convention as soon as possible so that it may enter into force in the near future. We therefore support the draft resolution and hope it will be adopted by consensus.

While the member States of the European Community willingly lend their support to this draft resolution, we consider that an important aspect of the work in this field has not yet been given adequate consideration by the Members of the United Nations. This is the question of how to ensure that the Convention will be fully implemented and its obligations honoured in times of actual conflict. In this connection, the Ten recall that a proposal has been put forward by a number of States to the effect that a consultative committee of experts should be set up under the Convention to investigate matters arising in connection with its implementation. It is the firm conviction of the member States of the European Community that appropriate methods and procedures assuring the proper functioning of and verifying compliance with the Convention and the three annexed Protocols would deter possible violations and contribute to the strict and effective observance of its provisions. We believe that this conviction is shared by many members of this Committee and we hope that this question will be adequately dealt with in due time. The proposal on this subject therefore remains on the table and we hope it will be further pursued during the next session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

I should like finally to address the question of the social and economic consequences of the arms race, draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.16, and the related issue of disarmament and development.

It is a well-known although regrettable fact that the global arms race absorbs a large and increasing amount of the world's material and economic resources. Recent reports and analyses have contributed to a clearer understanding of this disquieting aspect of the arms race. It is unfortunate, however, that those reports were based on unbalanced compilations of data because some countries were not prepared to make sufficient and adequate information available. The Ten hope this situation will be redressed, so that studies in these and related fields can be based on the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems.

The present high level of military expenditures is one pertinent reason why there is a strong need for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament.

One result of the attention recently drawn to the social and economic aspects of the arms race is that it has become increasingly clear that it is not only military threats that affect the security of States but also social and economic factors, which are part of a wider comprehension of the concept of security.

The present difficult international situation, which affects States regardless of their socio-economic systems, serves to underline the need for reallocation of resources from military purposes following disarmament, which could contribute to the solution of pressing social and economic problems. Although the need for resources is felt in most countries, it is particularly strong in the developing countries and especially in the poorest of those countries. This last aspect was thoroughly dealt with in the report on disarmament and development which was submitted to the General Assembly last year. In the view of the Ten, that report contains a wealth of information on the complicated question of the relationship between disarmament and development and is a valuable contribution to our consideration of the social and economic consequences of the arms race. In this context, the Ten welcome the interest shown by specialist national and international groups and institutions in this matter.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

The Ten member States of the European Community support the view that there is a need for analysis of and information on the social and economic aspects of the arms race, with regard to which there is also increasing and justified public interest. In the view of the Ten, the United Nations should play a proper role with regard to the collection and dissemination of information on this issue, which is also considered part of the Organization's activity within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign.

This concludes my statement on behalf of the Ten member States of the European Community.

I shall now, in the name of the delegation of Denmark, introduce a draft resolution on the subject of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Implacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. This draft resolution has been distributed as document A/C.1/37/L.56. The draft resolution is sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Finland, India, Japan, the German Democratic Republic and Norway, in addition to my own country. Though it is simple and procedural, the draft resolution is urgent for the reasons that I shall try to explain briefly.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

One hundred and one of our Member States have already signed this Treaty, and so far 71 have ratified it. The Treaty entered into force in 1972 and the first Review Conference took place in 1977, as stipulated by article VII of the Treaty. Article VII further stipulated that the first review conference should make a decision on an additional review conference, and it was decided that a further review conference should be held in Geneva in 1982 unless a majority of States parties indicated to the depositaries that they wished such a conference to be postponed, in which case it should be convened not later than 1984. Last year such a postponement was decided upon. The parties to the Treaty held an informal meeting at the United Nations some days ago, on 12 November, and decided that a review conference should be held in 1982.

For these reasons, the sponsors commend to this Committee draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.56. The first preambular paragraph simply recalls General Assembly resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, which commended the sea-bed Treaty. The second preambular paragraph notes the provision of article VII of the Treaty, which provides for review conferences. The third preambular paragraph reminds us that the first Review Conference decided that a further review conference should be held in Geneva not later than 1984. The fourth preambular paragraph recalls the resolution whereby the General Assembly assessed the outcome of the first Review Conference. The fifth preambular paragraph makes reference to all the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

Turning now to the operative paragraphs, paragraph 1 notes that after appropriate consultations a preparatory committee of parties should be established prior to holding a further review conference in 1983. Operative paragraph 2 embodies a request to the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services for the preparatory committee and the review conference. I should perhaps emphasize at this point that in the case of the first Review Conference this servicing was at the expense of the participants in that Conference. Finally, operative paragraph 3, the last paragraph, simply recalls the General Assembly's hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of the delegations of Cuba and the German Democratic Republic, I should like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.47.

The draft is self-explanatory. Immediate measures for the prevention of the catastrophe of a nuclear war were again demanded by the overwhelming majority of States at the second special session devoted to disarmament. The pledge made by the USSR at the special session not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was fully in accordance with this concern. Many States appreciated that as a courageous step in the right direction. The People's Republic of China reaffirmed its declaration on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons at the special session.

The declarations of the two nuclear-weapon States have met with wide response at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. The representatives of many States have welcomed those declarations during the disarmament debate in this Committee and urged the other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit. Many delegations, among them those of Mexico, Argentina, Madagascar, Mozambique, Pakistan, Qatar, Benin, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Egypt, Ireland and Sweden have advocated such an approach.

Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching positive consequences. They would create favourable conditions for the conclusion of an international instrument on the non-use of nuclear weapons, as proposed by India in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1. They would generally strengthen confidence in international relations and improve the atmosphere for the negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament at the various levels.

World peace can be guaranteed, not by the so-called doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which includes the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons, but only by immediate measures for the prevention of a nuclear war. The draft resolution before us proceeds from the priority which was attached to the prevention of nuclear war and to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

The first preambular paragraph refers to the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons to the survival of mankind. It is pointed out in the fourth preambular paragraph that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. The sponsors advocate that the respective bilateral negotiations be continued and that multilateral negotiations be begun in the

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic
Republic)

Committee on Disarmament in the hope of achieving success. They are firmly convinced that the pledge of all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons would have a favourable impact on those negotiations.

The operative part of the draft resolution stresses that the above-mentioned commitments of two nuclear-weapon States offer an important prospect of reducing the danger of nuclear war. Furthermore, the hope is expressed that the other nuclear-weapon States will consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a pledge would be a concrete expression of the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for the prevention of nuclear war and for ensuring nuclear disarmament. It would be highly appreciated by all peoples.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): We customarily refer to the First Committee of the General Assembly as one of the deliberative organs in the multilateral disarmament process. However, regrettably there is almost no deliberation. From the general debate, where we listen to approximately 100 statements, many of them of great interest but generally unrelated to each other, we pass almost directly to a voting phase on a host of draft resolutions which have never been discussed in full and which often enough are voted on merely on the basis of past voting behaviour. There is little opportunity to engage in rational discourse, bring argument and counter-argument to bear, and to arrive at a refined judgement on the basis of their respective merit.

The inordinate number of draft resolutions with which our Committee has to cope this year and, generally, their unharnessed proliferation deprive us of the dialogue on security measures for which this Assembly has been created.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic
of Germany)

Instead, we seem to have a mere bundle of monologues. Apart from the obvious fact that the excessive number of draft resolutions cancels out, or at least diminishes the political impact of each individual draft resolution, one of the negative points in a session so structured is that we seem to sight of the real priorities.

In the very limited time we still have available, my delegation wishes to make at least a modest contribution to a discussion on one important subject. I propose to make a statement on agenda item 54 relating to chemical weapons. In this respect, I should first like to commend the United States delegation for the excellent and precise speech Mr. Fields offered to us a few days ago. My delegation's perspective on this matter is exactly the one he espoused. In my own statement, which I would look upon as being supplementary to his, I should like first to lay out some elements of basic philosophy and then comment on the various draft resolutions on chemical weapons which the Committee has before it, namely, A/C.1/37/L.15, A/C.1/37/L.44 and, very briefly, A/C.1/37/L.54.

A total ban on chemical weapons aiming at preserving humanity from the threat of these terrible weapons of mass destruction has always had a high priority on my Government's agenda. We have strongly supported every effort aimed at the complete and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, their destruction and the dismantling of the respective production and filling units. During the second special session, my delegation submitted a working paper, A/S-12/A/C.1/37, summarizing its work of several years on the principles and techniques of a viable and credible international verification system which, in our view, must be an integral part of a total chemical weapons ban.

At the recent session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, my delegation submitted the latest of a series of working papers in the area of verification and offered tentative treaty language for some of the central problems of the future verification régime in the chemical weapons domain.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic
of Germany)

In his first policy statement of 13 October 1982, the new Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Kohl, singled out the rapid conclusion of a total chemical weapons ban as one of the most important subjects on the international agenda and underlined the determination of his Government to contribute to the achievement of this vital objective.

Accordingly, it is with satisfaction and expectation that we note the results of this year's discussion on chemical weapons within the Committee on Disarmament. Satisfaction, because the talks have reached a point where an approximation of views on some important questions seems to be forthcoming. This raises our expectation that during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament substantial progress can be achieved. We therefore suggest three points. The first is that the Committee on Disarmament concentrate its efforts in 1983 on negotiating a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons; the second is that these efforts focus on the crucial outstanding questions such as the scope of the prohibition and the elaboration of legally binding mutually acceptable and effective international verification measures, including on-site inspections, bearing in mind that the non-possession or non-production of chemical weapons cannot be reliably monitored by national technical means; and the third point is that recent proposals for resolving these problems be duly taken into account.

Since the Federal Republic of Germany is the only country in the world which has practical experience of international verification measures in this field, measures which were accepted by my country in connection with its unilateral renunciation of chemical weapons production in 1954, my delegation is ready to assist every delegation in considering and promoting effective verification rules. We are convinced that it is necessary and possible to eliminate chemical weapons completely. They differ from other weapons because their use has already been prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Renouncing their possession and production, therefore, should not pose serious problems, provided that every State can be sure that no other State has chemical weapons at its disposal.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic
of Germany)

Let me now turn to the individual draft resolutions on hand and the particular advantages and deficiencies they may possess. Since we were a co-sponsor of resolution 36/96 A and its predecessors, it appears logical that we should sponsor this year's draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.44, which purports to be a general consensus draft resolution on the subject. In view of the breadth of opinions represented, in the Committee on Disarmament, a consensus resolution necessarily has to maintain a certain level of generality. It is therefore natural that this draft does not reflect all the problems on which our attention is focused. Nevertheless, we believe that this draft, contained in document A/C.1/37/L.44, will adequately fulfil its primary purpose, namely, to instil an additional political momentum into the work of the Committee on Disarmament. In that respect, that draft resolution is welcome and we hope that a traditional consensus will come about without any complication.

I realize that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54 on chemical and bacteriological weapons is now before us in printed form, but that it has not yet been formally introduced by its principal sponsor. Since I will not have another opportunity to address the subject, I would nevertheless like, with the indulgence of the sponsors, to indicate briefly the full support of my delegation for this draft resolution, which is designed to establish an effective and businesslike fact-finding mechanism for both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the biological weapons Convention of 1972.

These simple and well-conceived proposals will go a long way towards securing compliance with these two important international treaties. All countries that believe in the vital necessity of these two instruments and their full implementation must be grateful to the authors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54 for their initiative.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15, by contrast, poses substantial problems. I see no way for my delegation to support it, although it contains a limited number of general considerations which we can indeed endorse. Our objections in the first place relate to the very existence of this draft. We fail to understand why a second draft resolution on the subject of the Geneva chemical weapons negotiations had to be introduced, raising doubts about the support expressed by so many delegations for draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.44.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic
of Germany)

This is a needless introduction of controversial subject-matter which distracts us from the common purpose which I assume lies behind our work directed towards a total chemical weapons ban.

Three elements of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 appear particularly objectionable. The arbitrary singling out of a particular kind of chemical weapon for condemnation, the introduction of a new concept of chemical-weapon-free zones and the strange absence, in a draft resolution of this degree of detail, of references to some of the most important parts of the negotiations in Geneva.

My delegation, together with many others, advocates a world-wide comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, to be concluded at the earliest possible date. The singling out of an allegedly special type of chemical weapon, such as binary weapons, appears to us as one-sided as the singling out of particular activities, for instance, the mere deployment of chemical weapons. The truth is that we do not want any type of chemical weapons to exist or to be stationed anywhere. All of them should be condemned and fall under the scope of the prohibition of a chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal
Republic of Germany)

Those who do not want new technical developments to occur, such as the one leading to the production of binary weapons, should redouble their efforts to have all chemical weapons banned. To single out special types of chemical weapons at this time, with the conclusion of the Geneva Convention not far off, is to arouse suspicions that other chemical weapons, which continue to be produced in great quantities in certain countries and which continue to be applied, according to every evidence we possess, in others, should not be the subject of prohibitions for some time to come.

A similar objection would seem to hold as regards the new concept of chemical-weapon-free-zones. This concept, which is new to our discussion, does not figure in the Final Document of the first special session. We do not know what its criteria are supposed to be. I do not want to speculate here on possible criteria, nor do I want to go into the doubtful and perhaps non-existent military relevance of such zones. But it is quite clear that any agreement on a verifiable ban on chemical weapons - and verifiable it would have to be - in a particular zone would require the solution of the very same problems that we are attempting to solve for the purposes of a world-wide ban. In fact, additional problems would be created, since it would be indispensable in addition to control access to the limited areas which the zone would comprise.

In the chemical-weapon field, we are in the advantageous position that full-fledged negotiations for a world-wide ban are in progress which offer substantial promise of success. Why, then, spend time in the elaboration of a limited zone which would only exist to be superseded by the larger, world-wide prohibition? Again, those who purport to promote the concept of geographically-limited chemical zones of a smaller or larger dimension would seem to be fueling the suspicion that they are less concerned about the rapid conclusion and effective implementation of a world-wide ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal
Republic of Germany)

It is disappointing, moreover, that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 does not contain any reference to the central problem of verification. It does not contain as much as a single word on the need to establish an international consultative committee of experts, a point on which broad agreement has been reached. I wonder why that important question escaped the attention of the authors of the draft resolution.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 raises a number of additional problems, adding to the controversy which the aforementioned problems bring to the subject matter. My delegation will withhold its consent on the draft resolution, and we feel that this negative judgement is amply justified by the objections which I have described in some detail.

Before continuing, I would be remiss, however, if I did not acknowledge some positive elements in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15. In operative paragraph 2, we read that the General Assembly appeals to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of a chemical-weapon convention. That, indeed, is a statement which my delegation, with many others, can whole-heartedly endorse. In the view of my delegation, the words "in every possible way" point directly to the key problems of international verification. States are indeed asked in the interest of an effective total ban on chemical weapons to open their territory to credible and effective verification measures through on-site inspection of relevant chemical facilities and stocks.

It is now acknowledged by an overwhelming number of delegations participating in the negotiations that on-site inspections, both on a regular basis and in the case of challenges, must be part of an international verification system supplementing the limited contribution national verification measures can make. It is equally acknowledged that the obligation to submit to verification in cases that the convention would describe as necessary must be part of the contractual commitment and that it would be grossly insufficient to leave it to the discretion of States to submit merely in particularly suitable cases to voluntary on-site inspection.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal
Republic of Germany)

There should be no misunderstanding of this principle. My delegation, jointly with a great number of others, is looking for a verification régime which considers the introduction of reciprocal contractual commitments to admit on-site inspection in precisely regulated cases into the convention, and there is no doubt that this will be the essential point by which we measure the sincerity and preparedness of other delegations in the realization of the noble task of prohibiting chemical weapons for all time.

This is also the yardstick by which we measure the draft treaty elements that the delegation of the Soviet Union put before the General Assembly in June of this year. My delegation was among the first to welcome, and even praise, the Soviet Union's basic provisions. We have referred to the usefulness and necessity of on-site inspections acknowledged in their text as a breakthrough that could effectively propel us towards a rapid conclusion of a chemical-weapons treaty. Our bona fide assessment of the Soviet overture has, however, been predicated upon further evolution of the Soviet standpoint, which has so far, I am afraid, not occurred.

As I noted before, the recent negotiating session in the Committee on Disarmament has created a new momentum and has undoubtedly brought us forward. In the field of monitoring and compliance and in the establishment of an effective international verification régime in the chemical-weapon domain, however, the session has been disappointing. Despite serious inquiry, we have been prevented from knowing exactly what the Soviet delegation is prepared to offer in that field. My delegation, jointly with another delegation and in order better to understand the Soviet position in that field, formulated a number of questions regarding points which, in the view of all delegations, needed further clarification. We hoped that such queries would facilitate ongoing negotiations. We still look forward to answers to a number of major questions. They have not been forthcoming.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal
Republic of Germany)

Instead, we are now being told that our serious endeavour to obtain a clearer view of where we are heading has been a useless "questions-and-answers game". However, our questions still stand and demand replies. Those to whom our queries have been addressed should realize that our earnest inquiries are not designed to satisfy personal curiosity or to use up negotiating time, but that the very credibility of the basic provisions of the Soviet chemical-weapons draft is now at stake.

Nobody can expect the international community to fall in line with a manifestly insufficient verification approach only because one country, which has displayed considerable reluctance on the verification issue for many years, has now offered a slight modification in principle of their earlier position.

The coming months will show whether all parties to the negotiations in Geneva are heading towards a bona fide conclusion of a total chemical-weapon ban or whether some countries are only paying lip service to established principles while trying to escape the consequences of what they have announced.

This is one domain in international transactions where lip service is not enough. What does a country have to lose if it displays generosity and openness in the chemical-weapon field? Would such openness not exactly correspond to the fervent appeals launched in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 that all States facilitate "in every possible way" the conclusion of a chemical-weapon treaty?

While my delegation cannot, for the reasons stated, support draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15, I submit that these questions will remain highly topical subjects of discussion, far beyond the voting results and the fate which may befall that draft resolution.

Mr. NUSEIBEH (Jordan): I am speaking in connection with the draft resolution presented yesterday by my colleague, the representative of Iraq, and sponsored by Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. It is contained in document A/C.1/37/L.31, under agenda item 56, "Israeli nuclear armament".

The Secretary-General has presented his brief report on Israeli nuclear armament, contained in document A/37/434 of 20 September 1982. That report was in response to operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 36/98, adopted on 9 December 1981, and in which the Secretary-General was also requested:

"... to follow closely Israeli military nuclear activity and to report thereon as appropriate".

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.31 also requests the Secretary-General, "in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States, to follow closely the nuclear and military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and its dangers to peace and security and to efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East."

In pursuance of the General Assembly resolution, the Secretary-General has informed us that he has made the widest possible dissemination of the report concerning Israeli nuclear armament. Furthermore, the Secretary-General has followed Israeli nuclear activities, taking into account the information made available by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is regrettable, though understandable, that the report of the Secretary-General did not contain any further information about Israeli nuclear armament and that, therefore, there was nothing to add to his previous report submitted to the General Assembly.

It is an open secret that Israel has been keeping a very tight lid on its nuclear activities since its initiation - and deliberately so in the early 1950's - of its programme pursuing the nuclear option as an instrument of policy. This nuclear option has continued unabated up to this date, with the result that it has placed the bulk of humanity, particularly in the continents of Asia and Africa, in a totally unacceptable, untenable and unparalleled predicament and danger. The Israeli doctrine in the field of

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nuclear capability -- and which no doubt is shared in theory as well as in practice by racist South Africa -- is loud and clear, and it is a very ominous doctrine indeed. The message to their potential victims is: "Stop your progress in the sciences, in the humanities, in economic development, even in chemistry, biology and all other fields of knowledge, or else ...". I say so, because knowledge and learning are one and indivisible. This explains Israel's oppression and stifling of the academic institutions in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, without distinction between human and natural sciences.

The First Committee is certainly entitled to take full cognizance of what that Israeli "or else ..." means. It is an unadulterated form of political blackmail against hundreds of millions of people, particularly, as I said, in Asia and Africa.

The questions which the General Assembly should address itself to and resolve are the following:

First, should lawless and obsessed countries like Israel and South Africa hold the large bulk of humanity in a state of blackmail, as hostages, and associate their deranged concept of unbridled aggrandizement and ambition and their misguided concept of security with the cessation of mankind's inexorable progress in the sciences and other fields of knowledge?

We have only recently witnessed on television screens and in the media Israel's huge arsenals of the most highly sophisticated weapons in the world being savagely used to attack the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, causing between 80,000 and 90,000 casualties in dead, wounded and maimed, and inflicting devastation on the largely civilian people of Lebanon, on their cities and towns, and their Palestinian guests in their encampments. It has been estimated that the quantity of destructive fire which was showered profusely and indiscriminately on the cities, villages and refugee camps in Lebanon was the equivalent of the primitive nuclear bomb dropped in the mid 1940s on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

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What guarantee is there that that same Israel, possessing nuclear capability, would not at its whim and choosing resort to nuclear weaponry in its wars of aggression, particularly, in the absence of any deterrence against States of the region and beyond, augmented also by the absence of the will and resolve of the super-Powers to provide a credible deterrent? This question is an old one and has been consistently raised by the non-nuclear Powers both before and during their accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The question today is still as acute and as timely as when it was first raised.

Secondly, what should be done to restore the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty when its very foundations have been wilfully annulled and torpedoed by recalcitrant Israel in its wanton attack on Iraq, a State party to that Treaty?

Thirdly, the numerous non-nuclear States have been making incessant pleas and urgings for practical and effective guarantees from the major nuclear Powers against nuclear threats and blackmail, and yet the vast majority of States which have signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty find themselves in a predicament of dangerous vulnerability.

In the aftermath of its aggression against OSIRAK - the small Iraqi nuclear reactor for peaceful research which is under the scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency - Israel has practically destroyed the sanctity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I need hardly reiterate that that Treaty specifically recognizes the incontrovertible and undisputed right of every State to pursue and develop programmes for the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, concomitant with its relinquishing of the option of converting its capabilities into destructive weaponry.

I mentioned on a previous occasion that the late General Dayan told a closed political forum in the summer of 1980 that Israel might consider the nuclear option, even though it claimed before international forums that it would not be the first to use the nuclear weaponry at its disposal. He explained that this was because of the arms race which, he said, was too costly. Indeed, he had considered it in the 1973 war when Israel was suffering reverses on the battlefields of the occupied Arab lands.

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A distinguished American statesman declared in 1968:

"The spread of nuclear weapons would aggravate our difficulties in maintaining friendly relations with parties to a continuing conflict. If one party 'went nuclear' we might have to decide whether to help the other party, directly or through security assurances, whether to sever economic aid to the country acquiring atomic weapons, or whether to stand aside, even though the result might be hard to contain."

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This is a very wise assessment by a statesman who recognizes the inherent dangers of nuclear adventurism by a State which has, since the 1950s, formed the Atomic Energy Commission and worked consciously and assiduously, by fair means and foul, including the theft of substantial enriched nuclear ingredients and technological know-how presumed to be highly classified, to acquire the most advanced delivery systems, such as Pershing rocket launchers, and other rocketry for use as an instrument of a policy of expansion and aggression. It would not therefore be at all surprising if nuclear weapons were to be used by Israel by means of heavy artillery and rockets such as were used during the invasion of Lebanon to deliver the dastardly cluster bombs, which contain hundreds of bomblets each of which kills, wounds or maims large segments of the population in an area as big as a football field. Yet, did the international community take any decisive action to halt this savagery, rather than simply express sympathy for the dead and the maimed victims, some of whom we all saw on television screens?

We are all agreed that the use of nuclear weaponry is suicidal madness which could not be contained within the boundaries of any particular region. And yet we in our region of the Middle East have been living in the shadow of this awesome insanity, without any deterrents to thwart its development.

Indeed, the Defense Minister of Israel, Mr. Sharon, publicly proclaimed that he regarded not only the Middle East but countries beyond it, such as Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and remote regions of Africa, as legitimate Israeli spheres of security concern. It would not be surprising if within a few years Israel extended its zone of security to other regions of the world, thereby triggering global devastation.

I need go no further in spelling out the most dangerous implications of Israel's nuclear armament, for this subject has been exhaustively presented and debated at previous sessions of the General Assembly and in the Security Council. I only wish to assert that condemnation can hardly assuage the legitimate apprehensions as to security and progress of the non-nuclear majority of mankind. It is the responsibility of all nations, and particularly the nuclear super-Powers, to make a reappraisal of the totally new and menacing situation arising from Israel's sustained policy of aggression and its monopoly of the acquisition of nuclear weaponry in the region of the Middle East. Unless remedial action is taken

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to guarantee the security of the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, these States will eventually find themselves impelled to resort to some other option or options. Since my Government believes in non-proliferation and in the inherent danger of nuclear war, as do other non-nuclear Member States, it is incumbent upon the permanent members of the Security Council to address themselves to this extremely dangerous issue before things get out of hand.

A central theme in the draft resolution, which represents the least that should be done, and done immediately, is contained in operative paragraph 1, which reaffirms the General Assembly's demand that Israel renounce without delay any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.52, on the review and supplement of the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, on behalf of the delegations of Egypt, France, Greece, Mexico, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Finland.

The General Assembly decided at its twenty-ninth session, in 1974, to undertake a comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The study, carried out by an Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, was completed in 1975 and was considered by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

The study dealt with six substantive aspects of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. They were the following: historical background of military denuclearization by areas; concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones; responsibilities of States within the zone and of other States; verification and control; nuclear-weapon-free zones and international law; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The study was the first of its kind. The expert group was able to reach consensus on several basic aspects and principles relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. On a number of questions it did not prove possible to reach consensus at that time. On those questions the study reflects the various positions held by each expert. While, for example, the experts agreed that a nuclear-weapon-free zone might improve the chance of the zonal States to remain outside a nuclear conflict and decrease the risk of nuclear

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proliferation, a major divergence of views was manifest on the question of security assurances from extra-zonal States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to the zonal States. Nor was agreement reached on questions pertaining to the freedom of the seas, transit of nuclear weapons or peaceful nuclear explosions.

A wide spectrum of views was presented on the study both at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly. Fifteen members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament commented on the study, and in the General Assembly 33 Member States, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) expressed their views on the study during the thirty-first session.

Since the completion of the comprehensive study and consideration of the matter by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly in 1975 and 1976, a number of important developments have taken place. Progress has been achieved in both the practical implementation of existing arrangements and consideration of modalities and issues closely related to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. I shall now touch briefly on some of the most important of these developments.

First, the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was extensively dealt with by the General Assembly in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, in 1978. During its thirty-fifth session, in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly identified the "Strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document" (resolution 35/46, annex, para. 14 (e)) as a priority task which should be pursued as rapidly as possible.

Secondly, the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has progressed since the special session. Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty have been signed or ratified by several nuclear-weapon States. Significant steps have thus been taken towards the full implementation of the Treaty.

Thirdly, the question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, an issue closely related to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, has been

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under substantive consideration in the Committee on Disarmament since 1979. All nuclear-weapon States have made unilateral statements defining situations in which they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Fourthly, proposals concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world have been reiterated, developed further and discussed in different forums. These areas include Central Europe, the Balkans, the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, the region of Asia and the Pacific, Africa, Northern Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. Four items on the agenda of this Committee relate to zones: agenda item 41 - the Treaty of Tlatelolco; agenda item 44 - the denuclearization of Africa; agenda item 45 - establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; agenda item 46 - establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Furthermore, several ideas have been put forward concerning the demilitarization of certain areas through the establishment of zones of peace, proposals which are very close to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. These ideas arise essentially from the same concern about keeping the respective regions beyond the reach of any thought of military involvement on the part of outside Powers.

Fifthly, there is wide agreement that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is a most effective regional measure against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Sixthly, the regional approach, with which the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is closely linked, has been extensively discussed and analysed in subsequent United Nations studies. A study on all aspects of regional disarmament was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, and at its thirty-sixth session the Assembly took note of a study on confidence-building measures.

In addition, new developments have come about with regard to nuclear weapons technology, nuclear strategic doctrines and negotiations in various forums on nuclear arms limitation. The direct and indirect links of those developments with the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the practical implementation of present and future proposals for the establishment of such zones obviously merit further thorough analysis. There is reason to believe that a broader consensus on several aspects of the question could be reached now than in the context of the comprehensive study in 1975.

These reasons among others have led the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.52 to the conclusion that the 1975 comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects should be updated and supplemented. It is suggested in the operative part of the draft resolution that the Secretary-General carry out the study with the assistance of an ad hoc group of governmental experts, and report at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. The sponsors are sure that their conclusions are shared by most delegations in this Committee, and that the draft resolution will therefore be widely supported and can be adopted by consensus.

I should like briefly to note that my delegation has always tried to avoid advocating activities involving unnecessary spending for the United Nations. Thus, we do not believe that the financial implications of the draft resolution I have just introduced would be excessive. My delegation also sees the proposed study as part of an ongoing research activity in which new studies are taken up as older ones are completed.

I also have the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.57 on the review conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, on behalf of the following delegations: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, Japan, Malawi, Norway, Sao Tome and Principe, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States and Finland.

In its report on its work to the General Assembly at the thirty-first session in 1976, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitted the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. When adopting the text of the Convention, the General Assembly noted, in its resolution 31/72, that the Convention was intended to prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use. It also expressed its hope for the widest possible accession to the Convention and noted the provision made for a review conference five years after the Convention's entry into force.

The Convention entered into force on 5 October 1978, when 20 Governments had deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. So far, 37 States have ratified the Convention, and a further 24 States have merely signed it. On 5 October 1983 the environmental modification Convention will have been in force for five years. According to paragraph 1 of its article VIII, the review conference is to be convened by the Depositary five years after the entry into force of the Convention.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.57 is purely procedural in nature. In its paragraph 1, the General Assembly notes that the Secretary will hold consultations with Parties to the Convention with regard to questions relating to the review conference and its preparation, including the establishment of a preparatory committee. Paragraph 2 gives the Secretary-General the legislative authority

to provide the necessary assistance and services for the review conference and its preparation.

Paragraph 3 is designed to avoid any ambiguity regarding the responsibility for meeting the costs of the conference. Meeting the costs of the review conference is to be arranged by the Parties to the Convention. This paragraph is one way of saying that this draft resolution has no financial implications as far as the United Nations is concerned.

The environmental modification Convention review conference will review the operation of the Convention with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized, as was agreed in paragraph 1 of article VIII of the Convention. The sponsors hope that delegations in this Committee will support the draft resolution and that it can be adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to announce that the following countries have become sponsors of the following draft resolutions: for draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.8, Cuba and Viet Nam; for L.10, Algeria; for L.21, Cuba; for L.26, Benin and Qatar; for L.27, Benin; for L.29, Viet Nam; for L.30, Ecuador; for L.34, Viet Nam; for L.35, Indonesia; for L.38, Qatar; for L.39, Bangladesh, India and Malta; for L.44, Australia, Ecuador, Ireland and the United Kingdom; for L.45, Ecuador and Qatar; for L.47, Viet Nam; for L.52, Ecuador; for L.55 and L. 58, Malta; for L.59, Viet Nam; for L.61, Ecuador; for L.62, Malta; and for L.64, Congo, Ecuador and Singapore.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.