



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 3RD MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

ELECTION OF A VICE CHAIRMAN

Mr. ORTEZ COLINDRES (Honduras) (interpretation from Spanish):

On behalf of the Government of Honduras, it gives me great satisfaction to nominate as Vice-Chairman of this Committee a most distinguished Argentinian, who has been involved in the fundamental work carried out by the Security Council as the supreme body of the United Nations and who was a permanent representative of Argentina to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva. His work bestows prestige on the Office and demonstrates the competence of the proposed candidate. I am referring to Ambassador Julio Cesar Carasales, an Argentinian, a citizen of a country which without doubt has contributed greatly, as has its brother country, Mexico, to the task of disarmament, especially since the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty by both countries. Ambassador Carasales in particular has made an outstanding contribution to one of the most delicate issues facing mankind, that of denuclearization.

The candidate whom I wish to nominate has had considerable experience in the Argentine Foreign Service, beginning his career in 1949. He worked his way through all levels of the foreign service until he became an Ambassador in 1963, when he served in various posts in the Foreign Ministry of his country. Part of his distinguished career includes outstanding service at the Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations in Geneva and at the Argentine Embassy in Austria.

To give the Committee a more complete description of his career, may I say that he represented Argentina in the Security Council and in his capacity as a representative he has taken part in 14 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. At present he is the special representative of Argentina on disarmament questions, and in that capacity he has led the delegation of the Argentine in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to the delicate issue of disarmament.

(Mr. Ortez Colindres, Honduras)

I have no doubt that the candidate nominated by the Honduras delegation at the present time meets all the required qualifications so that once elected on the basis of a consensus, he may give us the opportunity of benefiting from his experience and skills.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Honduras for his nomination of Ambassador Carasales of Argentina for a vice-chairmanship. I am sure that I am expressing the sentiments of the Committee when I thank him for his valuable contribution to the work of this Committee as Vice-Chairman of last year's session.

As there is no other nomination, I take it that, in accordance with rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and with established practice, the Committee wishes to dispense with the secret ballot and to declare Ambassador Carasales of Argentina elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

Mr. Julio C. Carasales (Argentina) was elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

The CHAIRMAN: May I express to Ambassador Carasales my warmest congratulations on the distinction that has been conferred upon his delegation and upon him personally and to assure him of my confidence that we shall successfully discharge the responsibilities incumbent upon us.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to express to you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to all members of this Committee, my wholehearted thanks for the honour that has been bestowed on me in electing me Vice-Chairman of this Committee. In particular, I should like to thank the representative of Honduras for his extremely kind words addressed to me in nominating me to the post of Vice-Chairman of this Committee.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

It is commonplace in bodies such as this to take the honour conferred to mean recognition toward the country one represents rather than the person who has been elected, and I believe that to be the case in this instance.

I accept this honour bestowed upon me as an expression of recognition of the interest which the Republic of Argentina has shown in the progress of disarmament negotiations, our deep spirit of co-operation and concern in seeing that concrete and significant results are obtained in the field of disarmament.

I need not say that it is my wish to co-operate to the fullest with the Chairman, in particular, as well as with the other officers of the Committee, the other Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur, so that the deliberations of this Committee may be successful. The Chairman may count on my most loyal co-operation in his important task.

Finally, since I have been called upon to speak, I could not fail to express my wholehearted congratulations to the Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, for the high honour and distinction which has been bestowed upon him by the award of the Nobel Prize, which is just recognition for the very noble work he has done and continues to do in the field of disarmament. This is a distinction which not only honours Mr. Robles and his country, Mexico, but also all Latin American countries.

I should also like to congratulate the delegation of Sweden for the Nobel Prize which has been bestowed upon Mrs. Myrdal, which was also well deserved, for her work in the field of disarmament.

#### STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Argentina, our elected Vice-Chairman for his statement and I fully reciprocate his kind remarks addressed to the Committee.

We shall now begin our general debate on all disarmament items. Before I call upon the first speaker inscribed on the list, allow me to say a few words as presiding officer of this body.



(The Chairman)

The primary task with which the First Committee has been entrusted for the past few years has been to further the progress of the disarmament process, insofar as that process depends on the entire world community, as represented by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The atmosphere in which the First Committee is beginning its work this year is not particularly encouraging for such progress.

It is generally recognized that international relations among States, in particular between the major nuclear-weapon States, have significant impact on the process of disarmament negotiations. Since the conclusion of deliberations on disarmament issues at the Assembly's thirty-sixth session by the adoption of a great number of resolutions on various disarmament items, the overall international situation has not improved, particularly the relation between the two major Powers. Although the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on intermediate nuclear forces have continued since November 1981 and talks on strategic nuclear weapons have begun since June 1982, no tangible progress has been registered in the dialogue between the two Powers. Differences have persisted in some areas of disarmament questions and international security has become even more precarious than ever. Meanwhile, world military expenditure is at present well over \$500 billion per year and is still increasing. Indeed for the first time in many years, the production of conventional arms has also risen dramatically.

Overshadowed by unfavourable international conditions, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, inspired with high expectations by the overwhelming majority of member States, was paralysed, thus closing without any substantial achievement on priority disarmament questions, particularly nuclear disarmament. Problems posed by the continued production and refinement of nuclear weapons are particularly urgent issues. More and more of the peoples of the world are aware of and concerned about the seriousness of the danger posed by the possible outbreak of a nuclear war, as demonstrated by the series of peace movements devoted to nuclear disarmament

(The Chairman)

in many parts of the world, The Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly stated that:

"Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth", (resolution S-10/2, paragraph 11)

Truly, all peoples of the world are facing a serious choice today, that is disarmament or annihilation. As has been pointed out by many member States, the political will of all nations in particular the major Powers, is required to reverse an ever-escalating arms race, particularly between the two super-Powers, and to adopt effective measures for disarmament, so that the joint efforts for international security and human survival will have a chance to succeed. In my judgement the achievement of this objective demands a stronger commitment on the part of all of us to work diligently and sincerely towards halting the arms race and channelling the vast resources thus released, inter alia, to the much needed economic and social development of developing countries, and above all, to strengthening international peace and security and saving mankind from what now seems to be certain disaster.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations spoke in his annual report this year of the crisis in the multilateral approach to international affairs, which is eroding the authority and status of the United Nations, and bringing the world ever closer to a new international anarchy. The continuing arms race, with its squandering of enormous resources, and its increasingly unfortunate consequences for the developing countries, is both a cause and a symptom of this drift toward international anarchy. However, as pointed out by the Secretary-General:

"Despite present difficulties, it is imperative for the United Nations to dispel that sense of insecurity through joint and agreed action in the field of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament." (A/37/1, page 4.)

(The Chairman)

At this session, the First Committee will have before it some 23 items related to disarmament; they are: items 39 to 57 inclusive and items 133, 136, 138 and 139. This is an increase in its workload as compared with the thirty-sixth session, owing, in particular, to pending issues arising out of the second special session devoted to disarmament.

Most of the items are included in the agenda on the basis of General Assembly resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session. Item 39 relates to the economic and social consequences of the arms race, and the Committee will have before it an updated report prepared by a Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General.

The report of the Committee on Disarmament on its work during the 1982 session covers a number of items on the agenda of the thirty-seventh session, including items 42 and 43 on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, item 47 on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and item 50 (d) on nuclear weapons in all aspects. It also covers many other important items on the agenda.

Items 41, 44, 45 and 46 deal with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. Increasing concern has been expressed by many African States on the nuclear plan and capability of South Africa, and they urged the early implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones other than those currently under consideration were also intensified. The reports of the Disarmament Commission, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference will be submitted under items 40 (a), 48 and 49, respectively.

Item 54, on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, is a twofold item. On the one hand, the Committee on Disarmament will report on the consideration of the subject by its Working Group during the 1982 session; and, on the other hand, the Assembly will have the report of the Secretary-General on the alleged use of chemical weapons in response to resolution 36/96 C, which



(The Chairman)

is being prepared by a Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General. Their report will not be submitted until some time in November, owing to the meeting of the members of the Group scheduled after their return from a field trip.

Items 55 (b) and 57 relate, respectively, to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems and the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The Committee on Disarmament had intensive discussions on the subject and will report on both items.

A new item - item 136 - was inscribed on the agenda of the thirty-seventh session at the request of Sweden; it deals with the relationship between disarmament and development. The item was included on the agenda of earlier sessions in connection with the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on the subject.

Issues relating to the twelfth special session will be considered under item 133. It will be recalled that the Assembly at its special session, in paragraph 64 of the Concluding Document (A/S-12/32), decided to transmit to the thirty-seventh session the items on the agenda on which the special session had not reached a decision. In this connection the Secretary-General issued a note, in document A/37/493, regarding this paragraph, which will also indicate that, in addition to the Concluding Document, the Assembly will have before it all other documents related to the items transmitted to it by the special session. A point of interest to the First Committee might be a clarification regarding what action could be taken on the proposals not considered by the special session. Countries which had submitted their proposals and which wish to pursue their initiatives could do so by submitting the appropriate draft resolutions or documents for action by the General Assembly. Another note by the Secretary-General, in document A/37/494, transmitted, in accordance with paragraph 47 of the Concluding Document, five draft resolutions presented to, but not voted on, by the special session for consideration by the current session, which are contained in documents A/S-12/L.1, L.2, L.3, L.4 and L.6. Draft resolutions listed in paragraphs 17-21 of the Concluding Document may be reissued, as appropriate, as draft resolutions of the First Committee.

(The Chairman)

Under item 133, the Assembly will have before it two reports on which the special session has taken decisions, namely, the report on the World Disarmament Campaign, which was officially launched at the special session, and the report on the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme. The Assembly will have to adopt resolutions on the basis of these two reports.

Moreover, two new items -- items 138 and 139 -- concerning nuclear issues were inscribed on the agenda at the request of the Soviet Union and have also been allocated to the First Committee for consideration. In connection with item 138, regarding the question of nuclear-weapon tests, a draft resolution has already been presented to the Committee by the sponsor and members will have the opportunity of making comments and suggestions on the subject.

I have just outlined some points on those items which we are going to consider in the forthcoming weeks. Certainly, I shall have more opportunities to bring them to members' attention in much detail when they are under consideration at a later stage.

As members are well aware, in accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly, each chapter of the proposed medium-term plan is to be submitted to the appropriate Main Committee of the General Assembly before the plan as a whole can be adopted by the Assembly in plenary meeting.

In this connection I shall express my view on how we should tackle this issue after I hold consultations with the officers of the Committee.

Before I call on the first speaker, I should like to say that it is a pleasure for me to see Mr. Jaipal, personal representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, among us; I look forward to his co-operation in dealing with the many important issues before the Committee.

(The Chairman)

On behalf of the Committee and its officers, I should like to pay a tribute to Lord Noel-Baker as a courageous and indefatigable fighter for peace, who never ceased to fight for the realization of the dream of a peaceful world order and especially for disarmament.

I am sure that I speak for all ~~representatives~~ in expressing this Committee's deep sense of gratification and pride - justifiable pride - at the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden and our own Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico, who have dedicated their unceasing commitment to the cause of disarmament and the very survival of mankind. It is our hope that the spirit expressed by the Nobel Prize winners will inspire us all to rededicate our efforts for disarmament and world peace.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): It is my good fortune that it should be you, a distinguished representative of Ghana, one of the front-rank members of the third world, who are presiding this year over the First Committee's work. Those countries which the Assembly is accustomed to call "non-aligned" and which in the Committee on Disarmament make up what is called the Group of 21 without any doubt are among those which can best appreciate the overwhelming importance of everything connected with peace and disarmament.

Even though there are cases in which the Nobel Peace Prize to which the Chairman has just referred has been awarded to institutions - for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross - as a general rule this is a distinction awarded on a personal basis. Hence, without undue pride but also without false modesty, I feel particularly honoured at the fact that the members of the Nobel Committee should have thought of Alfonso Garcia Robles as a recipient of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize together with Alva Myrdal - with whom, by the way, I have so often had the privilege of being associated in the struggle for disarmament.

Individuals, however, do not live or act in a vacuum, especially when it is a matter of activities such as those considered relevant to the promotion or strengthening of peace. I am therefore firmly convinced that in this case



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

it should be considered that, apart from myself, the prize in question has been bestowed, albeit indirectly, on a number of recipients.

First, my country of origin, since almost all acts and major achievements which I have had the privilege of accomplishing in international life have been carried out in my capacity as representative and spokesman of Mexico in the various multilateral forums in which I have been participating ever since I entered the Foreign Service of Mexico in 1939 over 40 years ago.

Secondly, the United Nations -- or, if one wants to be more precise, the First Committee and the negotiating body on disarmament which since 1962 has been meeting in Geneva, with the very same objective, although it has borne successively three different names -- its present one of course is the most terse of all: the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the Committee on Disarmament.

Thirdly, Latin America as a whole, because the whole of Latin America has had occasion to be involved in the hard work which made possible in 1967 the unanimous approval and opening for signature of the Tlatelolco Treaty, thanks to which there now exists in the world the only nuclear-weapon-free zone covering densely populated areas.

Finally -- and here I believe the expression "last, but not least" is particularly pertinent -- the non-governmental organizations and the peace movements, which can play such an important part in the task that is part of the world disarmament campaign and which the Nobel Committee itself has described as "the task of opening the eyes of the world to the threat posed by the nuclear arms race to mankind".

In expressing my gratitude, therefore, with deeply felt emotion for the most generous words which have been uttered about me, I believe that in order to proceed in strict justice and objectivity those words should be understood as applying also, in greater or less degree, to the four entities to which I have referred.

With regard to myself, I venture to hope, as I so often said in the various interviews I held in Geneva last week, that the prize awarded to me will help, particularly in the decision-making centres among the nuclear Powers,

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

to confer a greater measure of cogency on the statements which from 1978 onwards I have been making and shall continue to make with even greater zeal in order to ensure that the many commitments entered into by consensus four years ago and embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament shall be honoured.

I would not wish to conclude this statement without saying that I wholeheartedly share the sense of sadness that you, Mr. Chairman, have expressed over the passing away of that eminent champion of disarmament and peace, Philip Noel-Baker.

Mr. THUNBORG (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I am firmly convinced that, with your exceptional skill and dedication, you will succeed in guiding the difficult work of this Committee to a successful conclusion.

I listened attentively to the words of homage you addressed to my compatriot, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, on the occasion of the announcement that she had been awarded the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize, together with His Excellency Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico. I am sure that Mrs. Myrdal will greatly appreciate the attention given to her today by this Committee, on which for many years she represented my country and where she still has many friends. I assure you, Sir, that your message will be promptly forwarded to Mrs. Myrdal.

On behalf of the Swedish Government, I take this occasion to pay a tribute to His Excellency Ambassador Garcia Robles, who, as we all know, has made exceptional contributions to the efforts for peace and disarmament. Suffice it to mention his role as chief architect of the realization of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. The Head of the Swedish Government, Prime Minister Olof Palme, has asked me to convey, through you, Sir, his personal congratulations to Ambassador Garcia Robles, whose experience and knowledge were invaluable assets in the work of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.

We learned with sorrow that Mr. Philip Noel-Baker is no longer among us. We pay a tribute to this great man, who was a Nobel laureate in 1959 and who devoted his whole life to the work for disarmament and peaceful relations between peoples and nations.

(Mr. Thunborg, Sweden)

Mrs. Alva Myrdal and Ambassador Garcia Robles should be regarded as examples to follow and sources of inspiration in our work in this Committee and other disarmament forums. They have demonstrated that representatives of non-aligned countries can, by virtue of factual competence and dedication, exert considerable influence on the direction and the outcome of disarmament and arms control efforts. We all have a responsibility to carry that tradition further in our important work in the United Nations for international peace and disarmament. Both of them have been working inside the United Nations system for many years; hence their prizes are also a tribute to the work of this Organization.



## AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 57, 133, 136, 138 and 139

## GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The First Committee today begins its work at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly in circumstances very different from those which obtained four years ago when, on 16 October 1978, it opened its deliberations on an agenda on which, for the first time, only items on questions of disarmament and related questions of international security were included, in accordance with the decision taken by the Assembly itself at its first special session devoted to disarmament.

The Committee's proceedings at that time benefited from the propitious climate created by the consensus adoption, merely three and a half months earlier, of a Final Document, which can undoubtedly be considered the first achievement of the United Nations in the field of disarmament although, unfortunately, most of it has not yet been implemented.

Now, however, we are meeting after the second special session devoted to disarmament, which was also held a little over three months ago, but the results of which bear no similarity whatsoever with those of the first, since on this occasion the Assembly regrettably failed in what from the start had been rightly considered to be its fundamental purpose; the adoption of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that would faithfully reflect the requirements set forth in paragraph 109 of the Final Document.

That failure, of course, was not due to a lack of organization, hard work or dedication. From its second meeting on 14 June, the Ad Hoc Committee of the special session set up an open-ended working group to deal with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Group, which was termed Working Group I and over which I had the honour to preside, immediately set up four drafting groups, also open-ended, that would strive to reach agreement on the text of the various chapters of the programme on the basis of the draft which, as the result of two years of work, had been transmitted to the Assembly by the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

This is not the place to enter into a detailed analysis of all the uninterrupted efforts which, in a little more than three weeks, were undertaken in order to try and achieve the desired objective in the organs I have already mentioned and in various additional informal **consultations**. I should like to recall briefly that the chapters entitled "Objectives" and "Priorities" were practically completed; that in the chapter on "Principles", very considerable progress was made, as was also the case, although to a lesser degree, with the chapter to be entitled "Machinery and procedures" and with an additional one which, using material from the Geneva draft on the previous chapter, was to be devoted to "Verification".

Furthermore, at its fourth meeting, Working Group I was seized of a draft "Introduction", which I thought I should prepare in my capacity as Chairman of the Group, and although there was no time to give it due consideration, no objections were raised to it.

The part of the programme dealing with "Disarmament Measures", most particularly those contained in the section entitled "Nuclear Weapons", on the other hand became an insurmountable obstacle to the achievement of consensus. In this connection, I do not wish to undertake a thorough analysis of the various elements which came into play leading to the sorry results we now face. I shall simply repeat what I said at the closing meeting of the special session of the Assembly on 10 July, when I expressed my firm conviction that the members of the Group known as the Group of 21 - among them Mexico and which, as we all know, includes all countries of the Committee on Disarmament that belong to neither of the two major military alliances - can have a very clear conscience because, as I stated then, when I used a series of concrete and irrefutable examples, it is most doubtful that in the history of multilateral disarmament negotiations there is a single case in which any of the parties has ever made so many and such important far-reaching concessions as the ones that were accepted at that time by the Group of 21.

I also consider it essential to emphasize that the reluctance of two nuclear-weapon States - among which stands one of the so-called super-Powers - to have the Comprehensive Programme give adequate treatment to a nuclear-test ban was the factor responsible for the failure of the Assembly. The negative attitude of those two States is difficult to understand, since it is in obvious

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

contradiction with the commitment which both entered into in the partial test-ban Treaty almost 20 years ago. The preamble of that Treaty proclaimed their resolve to strive "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" (ENDC/100/Rev.1), a commitment that was to be expressly reiterated five years later in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which indeed is also included in article VI of that Treaty.



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that they also endorsed, by the positive and unequivocal act of voting in favour, the action of the United Nations General Assembly, in three separate resolutions adopted in successive years - 32/78, of 12 December 1977; 33/60, of 14 December 1978; and 34/73, of 11 December 1979 - in urging the three States that had been holding negotiations - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - first, to bring those negotiations "to a positive conclusion" and, secondly, to transmit immediately thereafter the results thus obtained to the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, the Assembly requested the Committee to undertake negotiations on the treaty in question "with the utmost urgency", "immediately", or "as a matter of the highest priority", according to whichever of the formulations in the three resolutions concerned is preferred.

Moreover, there are even more recent commitments than those referred to above - which certainly cannot be described as old commitments - since as recently as 10 July 1982 all nuclear Powers took part in a consensus, set forth in paragraph 62 of the so-called Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly which was devoted to disarmament, solemnly declaring:

"the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of /1978/ ... as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action."

(A/S-12/32, para. 62)

We should like to interpret that consensus as an unequivocal statement that the Powers in question will at last be willing to take seriously what is set forth in paragraph 51 of the Final Document, on the basis of which negotiations leading to the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests:

"should be concluded urgently ... with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date."

(S-10/2, para. 51)

With regard to the super-Power to which I have alluded, we should also like to believe that that consensus is also an indication that it has finally decided to honour the obligations it assumed in legal instruments that are fully valid and binding for that country, such as the two treaties to which I specifically referred a moment ago.

In addition to the many arguments for concluding a nuclear test-ban treaty that can be drawn from an analysis of the background to this matter - a background which goes back more than a quarter of a century, and of which resolution 36/84 of last year contains a brief but significant synthesis - a lengthy series of most varied and impressive facts could also be referred to. In this connection I shall limit myself to mentioning, for those who may be interested in consulting them, the statements made by the delegations of India and Sweden at the 175th meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, held on 3 August; the statement by the representative of Pakistan at the 177th meeting, on 10 August; the statement by the representative of Brazil at the 186th meeting, on 16 September; and the four statements made by me, on behalf of the Mexican delegation, on 3, 19, 24 and 31 August, respectively, at the 175th, 180th, 181st and 183rd meetings of that Committee.

I should also like to mention, for the same purpose, the very important statement made on 10 August by six eminent Americans whose competence in this field is unassailable, since four of them have been no less than Directors of the Disarmament and Arms Control Agency of that country, and the other two have been negotiators for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests, respectively.

In the document containing the statement in question, which was published in Washington by the prestigious organization which bears the name of "The Committee for National Security", those officials identified both the advantages that would accrue from a complete test-ban treaty and the risks entailed in rejecting such a prohibition.

With regard to the advantages, they have quite rightly affirmed that the achievement of the objective of putting an end to all nuclear explosions, which was established by President Eisenhower and has been pursued ever since then by all American administrations until very recent times, would moderate the arms race between the super-Powers, set an example to nations that aspire to join the nuclear club and make it more difficult for them to develop such weapons, while at the same time protecting the fundamental interests of the United States and of the world community.



With reference to the second matter, that is, to the obvious dangers posed by the continuation of the situation which we have thus far had to tolerate, the statement I have been referring to emphatically stressed that this situation:

"Considerably reduces the possibility of putting an end to the arms race and to the **risk of nuclear war** ...;

"Increases the **risk** of nuclear weapons proliferation and is clearly incompatible with the provisions of the partial Test-Ban Treaty and with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

"Gives rise to doubts about the sincerity of the United States in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and in other arms control negotiations; and

"Perpetuates the possibility of **hazards** to health and to the environment stemming from **accidental** discharges from underground nuclear tests."

The signatories of that **statement** also pointed out that the draft treaty on a total nuclear test ban, which for four years was under negotiation by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom:

"already contains agreed provisions on the basic means for **effective verification** of compliance with the treaty, including seismic installations not subject to foreign interference, and on-site inspection procedures."

This led the signatories to the conclusion that "there therefore remains no substantial problem in the way of adequate verification."

If I have considered it proper in this statement to give special attention to the question of the total cessation of nuclear-weapon test explosions, that is not only because the Assembly has always referred to it in its resolutions as deserving of the "greatest" or the "highest" **priority**, and because from the beginning it has occupied first place on the annual agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, but also because, in light of what took place at the second special session devoted to disarmament, it can be said that one of the **indispensable** conditions for the **implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament**, which the Assembly should once again consider at its **thirty-eighty session**, is that the **programme** should include nothing which, either in letter or in spirit, could be interpreted as a step backward from the 1978 Final Document. In order

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

for that requirement to be met, it is also obvious that the total cessation of nuclear weapons testing should have its rightful place in the programme.

Another matter I shall now discuss, although in a much more concise way, is the question of a nuclear-weapon freeze, regarding which the delegations of Mexico and Sweden submitted to the second special session on disarmament on 2 July last a draft resolution, distributed as document A/S-12/AC.1/L.3, which at the request of the sponsors has been transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly for consideration at the current thirty-seventh session.

Since the format and content of that draft resolution are clear and unequivocal, I shall only say that it is based on well-known, unanimous decisions of the General Assembly, made at its first special session devoted to disarmament. It stresses that a nuclear-weapon freeze is not an end in itself, but would be the most effective way of creating a climate favorable for the holding of negotiations on the reduction of such weapons and of preventing their continued increase and qualitative improvement during the period of the negotiations. It also stresses that present conditions are very propitious for bringing about such a freeze, given that the United States and the Soviet Union now possess equivalent nuclear strength.

In fact, the "superiority" allegedly enjoyed by one of the super-Powers, which is the pretext most often used to oppose a freeze, is an argument which in the eyes of any objective observer is seen to be totally without validity. That was stated by the 31st Pugwash Conference, held a year ago at Banff, Canada, when it affirmed that:

"generally speaking, parity exists between the two super-Powers regarding their nuclear military capability".

It was reiterated by the Palme Commission, which included the same conclusion in the report it unanimously adopted at Stockholm on 25 April this year. It was stated by Leslie H. Gelb - who, from January 1977 to July 1979, was in charge of the Political and Military Affairs Office of the United States Department of State - when he affirmed on 27 June this year in The New York Times, after setting out a meticulous comparative analysis of land-based, underwater and airborne nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers and of their respective command, control, communications and intelligence systems, that "the experts who analyze all those factors conclude that there is a tie" between the

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United States and the Soviet Union regarding their nuclear forces. It was explained, with much data and irrefutable proof, by Professor Hans H. Bethe - whose curriculum vitae in the area of nuclear weapons is truly impressive - in his testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 May 1982.



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

There are five other points on which I should like to say a few words. With regard to the ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has an important place in the Committee's agenda, we think it worth noting that only one of the four nuclear-weapon States to whom it was addressed has failed to ratify the Protocol, and that more than three years have passed since that State signed the instrument. Hence, we venture to hope - and I am sure that this expectation is shared by the delegations of all States Parties to the Treaty - that before the end of the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly, the instrument of ratification in question will be deposited.

Another question with which I should like to deal is that of the non-first use of nuclear weapons. Among the few positive elements of the second special session of the Assembly, to which I have referred several times, one must mention the message addressed to it by the President of the Soviet Union, which was read out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that country at the twelfth plenary meeting of the Assembly held on 15 June 1982. That message contained the following paragraph on renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons:

"Guided by the desire to do all in its power to deliver the peoples from the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to exclude its very possibility from the life of mankind, the Soviet State solemnly declares: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This obligation shall become effective immediately, at the moment it is made public from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly." (A/S-12/PV.12, p. 22)

This unilateral commitment takes its place with a similar commitment made public by the People's Republic of China on 16 October 1964, which makes it even more desirable for the other three nuclear-weapon States to follow the example that has been made at an early date. The significance of that is confirmed by the fact that in addition to the Soviet Union no fewer than 40 States among those participating in the general debate made specific reference to this question.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Reference is made in paragraph 13 of the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the 1982 session of the Assembly to a working paper entitled "Establishment of Subsidiary Organs", which the Group of 21 submitted to the Committee for possible consideration at its session next year. That document (CD 330) is contained in appendix II of the Committee's report and appears to deserve the attention of this Committee, since its purpose is none other than to prevent, by means of a brief addition to rule 25 of the Committee's rules, further - abuse which unfortunately has occurred more than once - of the consensus rule with serious and detrimental consequences on the negotiating function of that body.

In the "Commentary" of that paper it is recalled that since 1980 the Group of 21 declared that it was its considered view:

"... that working groups are the best available machinery for conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament." (CD 330, p. 1)

It goes on to mention the two most obvious cases of obstruction of initiatives to set up working groups in 1982. The first has to do with the proposal made originally two years ago to set up a working group on agenda item 2 entitled "Cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" which, in spite of the fact that it has had the support of more than 30 members of the Committee, has not yet been implemented.

The second case has to do with another proposal of the Group of 21 made for the first time this year, which was supported by 38 of the 40 members of the Committee and which has not achieved its objective because of the negative attitude of two members of the Committee, although no one dared to doubt the importance or urgency of the item in question, that of "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Final Document of the first special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament contains a paragraph, paragraph 27, which reads as follows:

"In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all

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measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations."

(S-10/2)

Since at the most recent special sessions the participating States, among them the two super Powers, reiterated their formal commitment to the implementation of the Final Document of 1978, my delegation wishes to suggest to the States that either jointly or separately they notify the General Assembly at this thirty-seventh session as to the progress achieved in the two separate negotiations they are conducting, those on intermediate or medium-range nuclear weapons, which began in Geneva on 30 November 1981, and those which cover strategic nuclear weapons, known as Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) instead of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which began on 29 June 1982, also in Geneva.



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Of course, we do not expect or wish the negotiating States to disclose to the Assembly aspects of their negotiations which they at present consider to be restricted or confidential, but we believe that, in light of the express provisions in the Final Document, both the General Assembly and the Member States of the United Nations are entitled to receive authoritative and reliable information from the participants in the negotiations about proposals and counter-proposals which may have been made within that framework and the interpretations given to them by their respective authors. We do not believe that it is proper that either the Assembly or Member States should have as their sole source of information in this area newspaper articles, which, as is well known, are frequently contradictory or unreliable, especially taking into account the fact that, as was stated four years ago, all peoples of the world have a "vital interest" in negotiations of this kind, particularly when they concern nuclear disarmament, since, as was also stated at that time:

"existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth". (resolution S-10/2, para. 11)

The failure of the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament with regard to the central item of its agenda, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, highlighted once again the importance of all the peoples of the world taking their struggle for peace and disarmament very seriously.

That is undoubtedly why in the Final Document of 1978 the Assembly proclaimed the need to adopt concrete measures aimed at increasing the spread of truthful information on the arms race and efforts to halt and reverse its course so as to "mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament". (ibid., para. 99)

It would thus seem encouraging - and that is why I have reserved this as the last point in my statement - that the only substantive question among the several items included in the agenda of the second special session of the Assembly on disarmament on which it was possible to adopt substantive decisions by consensus was the one dealing with the organization and financing of the

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World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations and led and co-ordinated by the Secretary-General of the Organization.

Through the first of those decisions, the President of the General Assembly, with the acquiescence of all participating States, formally proclaimed the launching of the Campaign at the opening of the second special session on disarmament.

The growing support for the Campaign and the enthusiasm which it has generated, especially among non-governmental organizations, which will have to play a prominent role in carrying it out, were clearly seen in the deliberations at the special session. It is therefore to be hoped that in considering the Secretary-General's report under item 22 (d) of our agenda the First Committee will be in a position to recommend to the Assembly the adoption of the decisions necessary to ensure on the one hand that the operation of the Campaign and its Programme of Action is duly organized, and on the other that the extremely important factor of appropriate financing procedures is dealt with and settled satisfactorily. The first few steps to this end have already been taken, and the procedures might include, among other elements, the holding of pledging conferences of Member States.

It is true that the second special session of the Assembly on disarmament, proceeding on the basis of the guidelines and operational modalities defined in two previous reports of the Secretary-General (A/36/458, A/S-12/27) was able among other things, to reach unanimous conclusions stressing the need "to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament and to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information". (A/S-12/32, annex V, para. 8); emphasizing that the Assembly "is aware of the public concern of the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and its negative social and economic consequences" (*ibid.*, para. 1); and recognizing "that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence on the attainment of meaningful measures of arms limitation and disarmament". (*ibid.*)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Let us hope that that "positive influence" to which the Assembly referred will be strong enough to overcome the reluctance to reach agreements and adopt effective disarmament measures which, particularly in recent times, we have had to deplore in New York as well as in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Mexico for his important and thought-provoking statement and once again express the feeling of pride of this Committee and our most sincere congratulations.



Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas): Sir, I wish to congratulate you on your election to the chairmanship of the Committee. Since I have had the opportunity to witness your display of firmness, patience and good judgement in dealing with international matters, I am convinced that we are fortunate to have you guiding our work. I wish to assure you that my delegation stands ready to lend you every support and co-operation in your difficult search for meaningful solutions to the many serious obstacles to disarmament.

I should also like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Golob of Yugoslavia, whose performance at the previous session has branded him as a skilful and respected negotiator.

Today I am indeed proud of the recognition given to two of the most devoted supporters of disarmament, Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico and Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden, to whom this Committee, and indeed the United Nations system, owe a debt of gratitude for their selfless and untiring service to the cause of peace. This Nobel Peace Prize, which augurs well for the image of the United Nations, is proof that dedication has not been in vain. Their well-deserved recognition should encourage us to try harder to make disarmament a reality in their lifetime.

I must confess that my statement today is born out of a deep sense of disappointment and frustration which, in part, stems from the repetition and redundancy of items, the debate of which can serve no other purpose than promoting similar series of tiring and esoteric verbiage which are fast becoming the trademark of this Committee and, indeed, the entire United Nations system.

My delegation finds it painful to have to listen to regurgitations of the same traditional statements updated in part by events emanating from special reports or amendments to time-worn resolutions. Yet, conscious of the need to keep the worthy cause of disarmament alive, rather than keep silent, I have decided to direct my attention to certain suggestions which, I trust, will be given favourable consideration.

The Charter of the United Nations states that the purposes of the United Nations are, inter alia, to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; and to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

The above purposes sum up the task of responsibility of this Committee. Consequently, if these objectives are not being met, then perhaps the blame must be placed on the political stubbornness of Member States.

In this regard the Bahamas delegation cannot help but note that, within the United Nations system, the acute tension brought on by East-West and North-South polarization makes it almost impossible to discuss any issue solely on its merit.

It is even more disconcerting that nations appear to revert to war as the best or only way to settle disputes. This year the world has witnessed an inordinate amount of senseless fighting in many regions. The cost in loss of human lives and the damage to property have been astronomical; but the tragedy is that these confrontations have only helped to weaken the chances for meaningful disarmament.

One of the sentences in the constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) states:

"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace have to be constructed."

In his Problems of Peace, Gerald Bailey offers a viable solution:

"We must, then, if we are to survive in the age of thermonuclear armaments, reject the assumption that wars must always occur because the human animal is inherently aggressive or because modern societies like our own are incapable of presenting the dislocation of the anarchy that would ensue if lasting peace 'broke out'."

Last year a major part of my statement was directed towards this very dilemma - that living in a disarmed world presents a challenge and a threat to many and that, unless we could come to grips with such a concept, we would never be able to understand or accept the real significance of peace and disarmament.

There is an old adage that politics makes strange bedfellows which, I feel, is applicable to this whole question of disarmament. It is no secret that enemies collaborate with enemies in the sale or transfer of arms, for example, or the recruitment of experts to train nationals in how to build or use sophisticated weapons of war. Imagine how much more productive it would be if such transactions were to take place in promoting the principles of the Charter to which I alluded earlier.

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

Sir Richard Ackland in his work Waging Peace gives the following reason:

"A thousand centuries of human warfare that have imposed on racial memory the certainty that the man without a club is utterly at the mercy of the man who has one; the man with a sword absolute master of the man who has none. We are convinced, with a conviction that a tribe lacking the best and latest weapons exists, if at all, only at the good pleasure of the neighbouring tribe that has them."

We must ask ourselves honestly, therefore, if this is the kind of paranoia that nuclear-weapon and militarily significant States cause the non-militarily significant and defenceless States. We must ask ourselves if this is one of the reasons why, according to statistics, certain third-world countries spend almost two-thirds of their annual budget on the acquisition of arms. We must ask ourselves if this is why a number of States are trying to develop nuclear weapons and why the super-Powers are unwilling to agree to meaningful reductions in their military and defence budgets, or to negotiate on realistic measures to stop the arms race, or to effect unilateral measures towards disarmament. We must ask ourselves if these are the reasons for the proliferation of resolutions on the same item. Are they being submitted in order to appease all sides, even though to do so could only retard progress towards the achievement of that illusive goal of general and complete disarmament? We must ask ourselves if this could be the reason for all of the intellectual rhetoric contained in statements that are nothing more than niceties of protocol instead of the required concerted call to stop the armaments race.

Over the years I have read innumerable documents, books, studies and reports on disarmament, the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and I regret to say that nowhere have I found any reference that significant progress is being made in negotiations on international disarmament. Every effort seems to end in a stalemate.



(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

Perhaps Sir Richard Barnet's following comment in Who Wants Disarmament comes closest to the reason for the impasse:

"Attempts at disarmament proposals which try to hedge against all conceivable risks will not only fail to build confidence, but will actually further inflame the atmosphere. Any agreement for meaningful disarmament requires an awareness of the risk as it is given to humans to make, and, ultimately, an act of faith."

Permit me now to look more closely at the agenda.

Before this Committee can begin to study seriously the whole question of disarmament, as contained in the obvious titles and subheadings, we must answer certain basic time-worn questions which hold the key to the eradication of the nihilism we must all feel in this "no exit" arena. First, what is the role of the First Committee and how do the decisions taken affect the work of this Organization? Secondly, why have so many resolutions been adopted and so few implemented? Thirdly, while some progress has been made towards disarmament, why is the pace of the movement so painfully slow? Fourthly, why has the United Nations succeeded only partly in "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war"? And, fifthly, what measures must be taken to strengthen the United Nations so that it may have greater authority to prevent fighting and to ensure that disputes are settled peacefully?

In my quixotic madness I can see a number of simple answers to the above questions, but I am sane enough to realize that we prefer to tackle complex issues which have little or no chance of success other than the excuse that we tried and failed. A good example of this attitude is evident in the results achieved at the second special session on disarmament. Nevertheless, I shall present some simple suggestions.

First of all, my delegation held the view that our deliberations and negotiations were geared to the production of positive results and that once a solution was found to a specific problem that item should be deleted from the agenda. We fail to understand the reason for presenting more than one resolution on the same item. It seems to me that interested delegations should, as in the past, continue to spare no efforts in their attempts to merge drafts on the same subject. Failing that, the entire issue should be deferred

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

until passions have cooled and the global significance of the matter realized.

Let me hasten to say that my delegation is conscious of the political ramifications and nuances that could make consensus impossible at all times. We are also cognizant that the national - not selfish - interests of all countries must be protected; but at the same time we are convinced that if every Member State or Government accepts fully the consequences of acceleration of the arms race and believes in the real purpose of those pleasant-sounding phrases, such as "general and complete disarmament", "good-neighbourliness", "cessation of all tests", "prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling and use of all radiological weapons", "economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" and so on, we would be prepared to modify some, if not all, of our rigid positions and to register genuine concern that we not taint the image of the United Nations through selfish and negative action.

Secondly, given the state of progress towards the achievement of our goal, it would seem to my delegation that we could render more effective service by either shortening or eliminating the general debate and entering into serious negotiations on priority issues such as the use of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones and economic consequences of the armaments race and the strengthening of international security - to name a few. In fact, my delegation feels that the major part of our agenda could be adequately discussed under the heading of general and complete disarmament. A more specific example for streamlining is seen in items 52 and 133. My delegation fails to understand why those two similar ideas should call for separate debate or consideration.

Thirdly, we need to review the purposes or roles of the Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the Centre for Disarmament. In the case of the Committee and the Commission, my delegation is tired of complaints that they are not making any progress in their deliberations. Whose fault is it? The Bahamas delegation is less concerned with how many members are on the Committee than with its effectiveness. While a strong case

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

could be made for any position one wishes to take, the most realistic answer is to have a committee that comprises interested, dedicated States whose main objective would be to turn negotiations and deliberations into positive action. The Commission ought to be given no more than three specific functions to perform at each session. There is a certain degree of overlapping or interdependence that cannot be ignored, but they need not be allowed to stifle the debate on the main issue agreed upon at the organizational session of the Committee. A good example of this is that at this session the Commission will be able only to take note of the work that was done.

The Centre for Disarmament needs reorganization. Its main task is to disseminate or to "sell" the idea of disarmament. To do that effectively the Centre should not be encumbered by too many bureaucratic restrictions. These inconsistencies to which I referred must be reckoned with if we are going to get out of the morass or the slough of despond that is stifling progress and causing grave concern outside the international community as well.



Demonstrations and activities by non-governmental organizations from all over the world should send us a message that the United Nations must act urgently if greater tragedies are to be averted. These comments may sound melodramatic, but they highlight the frustration that my delegation senses in its interaction with colleagues here and with people outside the international community.

One of the other things that this Committee can do in order to create a worthwhile atmosphere in our deliberations is to study the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, contained in document A/37/1. I would not attempt to summarize his forthright and clear views, since I feel that the report must be taken in its entirety to be effective. However, there are certain ideas on peace-keeping, the contrast between expenditure on armaments and economics, the call for a revival of the Charter concept of collective action for peace and security, around which we could construct resolutions that would transcend platitudes. To praise the Secretary-General's efforts in preparing this report is hardly enough. The problems he highlighted need to be discussed in depth with a view to finding the proper avenue for implementation. Failure to act at this session would mean missing a tailor-made opportunity to counter public opinion that the international community is not serious about the maintenance of universal peace and security.

We could also direct our attention to the study on the relationship between disarmament and development prepared under the auspices of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden. The study attempts to leave no stone unturned in its search for measures that would support the interdependence of disarmament and development. There are many paragraphs that call attention to the need for urgent action, but the one that holds my attention as extremely pertinent to the work of this Committee is found in paragraph 31 of Chapter II:

"Mankind is at present facing the greatest challenge of the century. The level and speed of the arms race are bound to increase the danger of war. The outbreak of a nuclear war would jeopardize the very existence of all mankind. During this decade peoples will be confronted with new technological, economic and social challenges that will be made far more complex if the arms race continues unabated." (A/36/356, Annex, para. 31)

Paragraph 146 contains a number of valuable recommendations which my delegation feels merit further study in order to determine how they could best be used in this or in the Second Committee to produce more immediate results.

Incorporated in this and in the report of the Secretary-General are short-term and long-term recommendations. If at this session we did nothing more than earmark some of them for early action we would have set the stage for the change that must take place if the threats to the continued effectiveness of this institution are to be assuaged.

Over the years we have been obsessed with the danger of war, particularly nuclear war. For better or for worse the talk of a nuclear holocaust has taken centre stage. The 11 October issue of Newsweek carried an article accompanied by photographs showing children demonstrating with signs that read "You can't hug your kids with nuclear arms". The article seems to convey a feeling of uselessness in young people. A Yale psychiatrist pointed out that children as young as five have begun to fear that the world could be annihilated by a chain of events that adults cannot control. There is a sense of what he called radical futurelessness and cynicism is on the rise, planning seems pointless and, according to Roberta Snow, a Boston educator, students interviewed feared that the prospect of nuclear war might influence their decisions on whether or not to have families. Fifth-grade girls say "we won't have babies" or "our babies would be deformed".

At the other end of the scale, the same article shows that while some college students wanted to study all there is about nuclear war, others did not want to think about a nuclear holocaust. Their main objective was to get on with their careers.

Our task is to allay the fears of many who are preoccupied with the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Our task is to pay genuine attention to the relevant issues on the agenda and to turn words into action. We can no longer continue to play games. In this regard I appeal to the super-Powers to demonstrate a greater degree of trust and confidence in each other, to be less accusatory and to abide by agreements already reached and initiate others that would make negotiations less inconclusive. Similarly, States lacking military might must also act constructively. They must be able to discern fact from fiction and as far as possible must refrain from taking sides on issues that can only help to exacerbate tension.



(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

In reading Common Security - a Blueprint for Survival, directed by Mr. Olof Palme, now Head of the Swedish Government, I found an objective comment which corroborates my earlier remarks:

"The Non-Aligned Movement, itself a manifestation of the desire of many developing countries to distance themselves from the effects of great-power rivalry, has contributed a measure of confidence in the developing world but has not diminished the need for an effective global framework for collective security. In its absence, the third world's disillusionment with the ability of the United Nations to contribute meaningfully to international peace and security will persist and they will continue to arm for survival."

The Bahamas delegation urges the non-aligned States to continue to serve as gadflies, yet at the same time to take into account the delicate balance that is necessary to effect tangible progress in negotiations. Of course, such a task is easier said than done, but then as I pointed out earlier, we seem to prefer challenges. It is said that success realized from hard-won conquests is often sweeter. So let it be for the cause of peace.

I have talked far too long, but I wish to end with a appropriate summation of the foregoing. It is taken from Mr. Bailey's work to which I referred earlier:

"Certainly, those who want to take peace-making seriously today, have to become 'involved in mankind'. They have to see that what is in the best interests of others is on their own best interests too. They have to see other individuals, the world over, if not as children of the same God, at least as members of the same human family, inhabiting a world which is, in a phrase of U Thant's, 'an indivisible entity'. The alternatives, after all, are stark and simple enough. We have this vision of one world and to make it a reality progressively, or we perish."



Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should first of all like to congratulate you, a distinguished representative of Ghana, and also the Vice-Chairmen of the Committee and the Rapporteur on your respective elections to your important posts. I should like to assure you that you can count fully on the co-operation of the Soviet delegation in your performance of your important and very difficult tasks facing our Committee.

I should also like to congratulate most warmly Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles on the award to him of the Nobel Peace Prize. There are differing views about the objectivity of various decision by the Nobel Committee. Nevertheless, in this particular case, I doubt whether anyone would challenge the fact that Ambassador Garcia Robles has certainly been an outstanding fighter for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament and this is demonstrated by his statement today. All of us, colleagues and friends of Ambassador Garcia Robles, wish him every success in his future efforts to achieve these objectives.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

The Soviet delegation would also like to congratulate the delegation of Sweden on the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mrs. Myrdal, who is well known to everyone as a person who has devoted her life to the strengthening of peace among peoples.

Only three months have elapsed since the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and once again we are all gathered here to discuss the most urgent problems of the day. The main problem, as the special session clearly demonstrated, is how to reduce the threat of nuclear war and what should be done to steer the course of events back on to the path of peace and detente.

Indeed, if one compares and sets in logical sequence the facts and trends characteristic of the current international situation, one cannot but feel a profound concern for the future of all mankind. The arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, knows no bounds. Existing nuclear arsenals are more than enough to destroy all life on our planet many times over. Yet we are witnessing efforts to continue the build-up of those arsenals and to expand the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Of equal concern is the increasingly evident trend to put more emphasis on the qualitative aspect of the arms race. Ever newer and more sophisticated means of mass destruction are being developed and tested, and are going in production. To use a figure of speech, scientific, technological and industrial progress is being dressed in a military uniform and is being made to march to the drumbeat of strategic directives.

One after another, as if in some parlour game foolhardy theories are put forward endorsing a blitzkrieg or for protracted, limited or all-out nuclear war, and cynical estimates are made of "acceptable" losses in such a war, or calculations of what are in fact the non-existent chances of winning it.

Under these circumstances, how can we prevent mankind from sliding towards the abyss of nuclear war? Obviously, it would be of paramount importance to set up barriers to the further evolution of both of these trends - the development of political, military and strategic plans and doctrines for unleashing a nuclear

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

war and the perfecting and building up of ever-newer types of nuclear weapons systems designed to effect those goals.

An instrument of the greatest of invaluable importance is the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, adopted last year by the General Assembly in resolution 36/100, solemnly proclaiming the first use of nuclear weapons to be the gravest crime against humanity. In keeping with the spirit and letter of that document, the Soviet Union, as this Assembly will recall, unilaterally assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It should be stressed that this decision is of a quite specific character. As Dmitri F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR, explained, it means that: from now on, in the training of armed forces, even more attention will be paid to the tasks of preventing a military conflict from developing into a nuclear conflict. These tasks in all their diversity have become an integral part of our military activity.

Thus a more rigid framework is being imposed on the training of troops and the staff of military headquarters and on determining a weapons "mix", establishing a more stringent control to ensure against any unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons, whether tactical or strategic.

Therefore the USSR decision not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is a truly tangible and specific act, and should the other nuclear Powers follow suit it would then be tantamount to prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in general. A major step would thus have been taken towards the elimination of the threat of war - above all, nuclear war.

At the same time, the Soviet Union proposes to erect additional barriers to the unleashing of any kind of war and to make the prohibition proclaimed in the United Nations Charter against the use of any kind of force - nuclear or conventional - into an absolute law of international life by concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

In addition to such political and international legal barriers to the growing military danger, the material and physical obstacles should be erected as a matter of urgent priority. To this end we believe it necessary to act



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simultaneously at several levels, and in particular at the level of nuclear disarmament, where action should include the cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of developing various types of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles, a gradual reduction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That is the purport also, of the USSR proposal for the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, a proposal submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration at the current session by the head of the Soviet delegation and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, at the plenary meeting on 1 October and contained in document A/37/243.

The point of the proposal is that a major practical step should be taken without delay towards reducing the nuclear threat in an area where, to a large extent, all the necessary preconditions already exist. All that is needed is political will on the part of the States concerned. It would be no exaggeration to state that the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapons testing would serve as a real test of goodwill - in terms not of words but of deeds - on the part of the governments of States, primarily, of course, the nuclear Powers.

A cessation of tests would put up a major barrier to a qualitative nuclear arms race, and especially to the emergence of new and even more destabilizing types of weapons designed for a first-strike potential. It can be stated, therefore, that an immediate cessation of tests would actually be an indicator of the military and political intentions of States, a kind of a material expression of their readiness to renounce preparations for a nuclear attack. Finally, the renunciation of such testing would be tantamount to affirming the commitment of States to the non-proliferation régime, inasmuch as nuclear tests are a necessary stage in the development of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

The question of a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is not a new one, of course. But in the present circumstances of a growing threat of war and of stepped-up military preparations it acquires particular urgency.

In accord with our serious and responsible approach to this task - tackling which is long overdue - we now propose a joint search for a solution to this problem in all possible areas, whether radically or by means of a series of consecutive steps. In other words, the new Soviet proposal presents a comprehensive set of programmes, including measures both radical and partial, permanent and temporary - but all quite concrete and practical.

At the same time we are trying to be very realistic in our approach to the question of a nuclear weapon test ban. The Soviet proposals are not an academic scheme divorced from real life: quite the contrary. They are based on many years of experience in dealing with this problem in various international forums, and they take into account various factors which are relevant to the present situation.

On the one hand, there is no need to start from scratch on the question of a test ban, for we have an impressive record of accomplishments in that area.

The Moscow Treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, concluded in 1963, was a very useful measure in this area. However, it failed to cover the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, and, furthermore, not all the nuclear Powers are party to it.

It is understandable, therefore, why for so many years now the peoples of the world and the majority of States have been seeking a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests without exception, and the conclusion of agreements on that subject. The United Nations has adopted many important decisions in that regard, and the Committee on Disarmament has also spent a great deal of time on the matter.

We also have some useful experience of co-operation and interaction among the three nuclear Powers which are parties to the 1963 Treaty.

In 1974 and 1976, the USSR and the United States signed the Treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests to tests of weapons with a yield of not more than 150 kilotons, and on underground nuclear explosions for

peaceful purposes. Since 1977 the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have been holding negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. In the course of these negotiations considerable progress was achieved; there was virtual agreement on the entire draft text of a possible treaty and it remained only to agree on some of the draft provisions, mainly provisions of a technical nature. The results of the negotiations were presented by the delegations of the three countries to the Committee on Disarmament in August 1980, and they were given a positive reception from many other States, which at that time saw them as truly encouraging.

At the same time, in order to get the true picture of the current situation regarding this question, we must also be aware of certain ominous and alarming elements of that situation. Those elements, moreover, have been making more frequent appearances of late, and we cannot rid ourselves of the impression that they are being deliberately and consistently injected into the picture.

The trilateral talks were suspended due to a unilateral decision of the United States. The current United States Administration has refused to reopen them, and had been alleging for the past year and a half that it was studying the problem. What, one might ask, has been the result of that "study"? As a result of the study, the President of the United States announced the decision never to resume the talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. Another decision was taken at the same time: not to ratify the Soviet-United States treaties signed in 1974 and 1976. What is more, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that in view of the need for the development of new weapons systems and modernization of such systems, the United States would have to continue carrying out tests for a long time to come, perhaps even tests of weapons with a yield in excess of the agreed limit of 150 kilotons.

In this connection, it is appropriate to recall that, under the Moscow Treaty of 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons all parties to those treaties, including the United States, assumed an obligation to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests once and for all.



There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the States Members of our Organization believe that this problem, far from having lost its relevance, has become particularly urgent in the present international situation. The Soviet Union concurs with that view entirely, and proposes that we intensify our efforts finally to break the deadlock on the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, to speed up preparation and signing of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and to put on a practical footing the talks on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament. To that end, the Soviet Union has submitted for consideration at this session the basic provisions for a treaty on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. That document takes into account the measure of agreement achieved during the discussion of this problem in recent years, as well as the points of view and wishes expressed by other States.

The document provides that each party to a future treaty would assume the obligation to prohibit, prevent and refrain from carrying out any experimental tests of nuclear weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any environment: in the atmosphere and beyond it, including outer space, under water and underground.

The provisions relating to the enforcement of the treaty embrace a wide range of verification questions, reflecting the idea of combining national and international measures, the questions of consultation and co-operation, the international exchange of seismic data, the establishment of a committee of experts, the carrying out of on-site inspections on a voluntary basis making use of international procedures within the United Nations framework in accordance with the Charter, and other matters. All these questions have been worked out comprehensively and in detail.

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The provisions on consultation and co-operation stipulate that for the purpose of resolving any problems that might arise over compliance with the treaty and in order to ensure that the obligations under the treaty would be carried out States would exchange information on a bilateral basis or through the committee of experts and would make the necessary inquiries.

Each State party to the treaty would have the right to take part in the international exchange of seismic data, which would be channelled through the global telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization or through any other agreed channels. Provision is made for the establishment of international seismic data centres which would receive all the information coming in through the international exchange from its participants.

An important role in the consideration of questions relating to the international exchange of seismic data could be played by the committee of experts. It could work out detailed measures for the establishment and operation of this international exchange, promote fuller international consultation and co-operation and the exchange of information, and facilitate verification in the interest of compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

The final provisions of the treaty provide that it would be of indefinite duration and it would enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, including the permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time the draft envisages that the treaty could enter into force for an agreed period of limited duration and with the participation of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom only.

In our view, the document submitted by the Soviet Union offers considerable possibilities for agreement in the very near future, on the condition, of course, that other States, and the nuclear States in particular, show at least a minimum of political will in resolving one of the most urgent problems in the limitation of armaments.

In order to create more favourable conditions for the preparation of the treaty and so that the constructive negotiations are not marred by the ominous accompaniment of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union proposes

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that all nuclear-weapon States declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, beginning from a mutually agreed date. Such a moratorium would remain in force until the actual conclusion of the treaty.

In the view of the Soviet Union, the cessation of nuclear tests everywhere and by everybody would be facilitated by the implementation of certain interim measures with the same objective. As far as my country is concerned, as stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in the general debate, we are ready at any time to ratify on a reciprocal basis the treaties concluded with the United States in 1974 and 1976 and to resume the trilateral talks with the United States and the United Kingdom.

We certainly claim no monopoly in the search for ways and means of resolving this important problem in its entirety. On the contrary, we are ready to examine most attentively and seriously the views and considerations on this subject of other countries, large or small.

The fundamental elements of the approach of the Soviet Union to the problem of the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests are reflected in draft resolution (A/C.1/37/L.1) which is now being formally submitted in this statement to the First Committee for its consideration. It is important that the results of our present discussion, which we hope will be constructive, are followed up. We should like these results to be taken up by the Committee on Disarmament and to contribute to the conduct of practical negotiations in that body with a view to the conclusion of an international treaty on the subject.

In its statement today the Soviet delegation has touched upon only a few aspects - although extremely important ones - of the problem of averting the danger of a nuclear war. The effective solution of this problem requires hard work in a number of different areas simultaneously in connection with curbing the arms race and strengthening the political and legal guarantees of international peace and security. It includes the cessation of the



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manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stockpiles, up to and including their total elimination, the prohibition and destruction of other types of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, and so on. None of these problems has lost any of its relevance; in fact, they have become even more urgent. In due course, the Soviet delegation will set forth its approach to the solution of those problems.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like to intervene to express the United Kingdom delegation's appreciation of the kind words spoken by you, Mr. Chairman, and by the representatives of Mexico and Sweden on the death of Lord Noel-Baker, who will be very much missed.

Lord Noel-Baker had a very long and distinguished career, both in the service of his own country and in that of the international community, particularly in the field of disarmament. His work in that field began as long ago as 1919, at the time of the foundation of the League of Nations.

In 1959, after 40 years of work, he was awarded in recognition the Nobel Peace Prize. That was more than 20 years ago, but he was still campaigning in the same cause up to the time of his death.

As many members of the Committee will remember, only three months ago he took an active and, as always, an eloquent part in the special session of this General Assembly devoted to disarmament. He was a tireless campaigner and his contribution to this cause will not be forgotten.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.