

**REPORT**  
**OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION**  
**WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION**  
**OF THE DECLARATION**  
**ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE**  
**TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES**

---

**VOLUME III**

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWENTY-NINTH SESSION

✓ SUPPLEMENT No. 23 (A/9623/Rev.1)



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**UNITED NATIONS**

New York, 1976

## NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The report of the Special Committee is divided into six volumes. The present volume contains chapters VII to XIV;\* volume I, chapters I to III; volume II, chapters IV to VI, volume IV, chapters XV to XX; volume V, chapters XXI and XXII; and volume VI, chapters XXIII to XXIX; each volume contains a full table of contents.

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\* The present version of chapters VII to XIV is a consolidation of the following documents as they appeared in provisional form: A/9623/Add.1 (Parts I and II) of 3 and 14 September 1974; A/9623/Add.2 of 5 September 1974; A/9623/Add.3 of 21 September 1974; and A/9623/Add.4 (Parts I and II) of 10 October and 13 November 1974.

CONTENTS

VOLUME I

(Chapters I to III)

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL . . . . .	
<u>Chapter</u>	
I. ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE (A/9623 (Parts I-III)) . . . . .	1 - 187
A. Establishment of the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 12
B. Opening of the Special Committee's meetings in 1974 . . . . .	13 - 37
C. Organization of work . . . . .	38 - 49
D. Meetings of the Special Committee and its subsidiary bodies . . . . .	50 - 67
E. Consideration of Territories . . . . .	68 - 69
F. Question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable . . . . .	70 - 80
G. Question of the participation of national liberation movements in the work of the United Nations . . . . .	81 - 88
H. Matters relating to the small Territories . . . . .	89 - 92
I. Week of Solidarity with the Colonial Peoples of Southern Africa and Cape Verde Fighting for Freedom, Independence and Equal Rights . . . . .	93 - 95
J. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination . . . . .	96 - 101
K. Relations with other United Nations bodies and international institutions associated with the United Nations . . . . .	102 - 113
L. Co-operation with the Organization of African Unity . . . . .	114 - 116
M. Co-operation with non-governmental organizations . . . . .	117 - 127
N. Consideration of other matters . . . . .	128 - 156
O. Review of work . . . . .	157 - 172
P. Future work . . . . .	173 - 184
Q. Adoption of the report . . . . .	185 - 187



# CONTENTS (continued)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
II. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON DECOLONIZATION (A/9623 (Part IV)) . . . . .	1 - 9
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 6
B. Decisions of the Special Committee . . . . .	7 - 9

## ANNEXES

I. REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, MR. SALIM AHMED SALIM (UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA), RELATING TO THE WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES, MOSCOW, OCTOBER 1973	
II. REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, MR. SALIM AHMED SALIM (UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA), ON HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS	
III. REPORT OF THE RAPPORTEUR, MR. HORACIO ARTEAGA ACOSTA (VENEZUELA), ON HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS	
IV. EXCERPTS FROM THE FOURTH REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS AND INFORMATION ON THE QUESTION OF DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON DECOLONIZATION	
III. QUESTION OF SENDING VISITING MISSIONS TO TERRITORIES (A/9623 (Part IV)) . . . . .	1 - 13
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 12
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	13

## ANNEXES

I. REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN	
II. LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	
III. LETTER DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	

# CONTENTS (continued)

## VOLUME II

(Chapters IV to VI)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
IV. ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH ARE IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION AND IN ALL OTHER TERRITORIES UNDER COLONIAL DOMINATION AND EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE COLONIALISM, APARTHEID AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (A/9623 (Part V)) . . . . .	1 - 7
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 5
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	6 - 7
ANNEX: REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I	
V. MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS BY COLONIAL POWERS IN TERRITORIES UNDER THEIR ADMINISTRATION WHICH MIGHT BE IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (A/9623 (Part VI)) . . . . .	1 - 7
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 5
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	6 - 7
ANNEX: REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I	
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (A/9623 (Part VII)) . . . . .	1 - 13
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 12
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	13
ANNEXES	
I. REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN	
II. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE IMPLEMENTATION BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES AND OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS	

# CONTENTS (continued)

## VOLUME III

### (Chapters VII to XIV)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
VII. TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION (A/9623/Add.1 (Parts I and II)) . . . . .	1 - 31	2
A. Consideration by the Special Committee before 25 April 1974 . . . . .	1 - 17	2
B. Related developments since 25 April 1974 . . . . .	18 - 27	5
C. Further consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	28 - 31	15
ANNEXES		
I. WORKING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		18
II. A. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 960th MEETING ON 15 MARCH 1974 . . . . .		47
B. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 971st MEETING ON 5 APRIL 1974 . . . . .		51
III. NOTE BY THE CHAIRMAN . . . . .		53
IV. LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF GUINEA-BISSAU TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .		54
V. TELEGRAM DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (FRELIMO), ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .		56
VIII. SOUTHERN RHODESIA (A/9623/Add.2) . . . . .	1 - 15	58
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 13	58
B. Decisions of the Special Committee . . . . .	14 - 15	61
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		68
IX. NAMIBIA (A/9623/Add.3) . . . . .	1 - 11	127
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 10	127
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	11	128
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		131

# CONTENTS (continued)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
X. SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA (A/9623/Add.4 (Part I)) . . .	1 - 14	157
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 12	157
B. Decisions of the Special Committee . . . . .	13 - 14	159
ANNEXES		
I. WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		162
II. STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CHAIRMAN ON 22 APRIL 1974 . . . . .		179
III. LETTER DATED 10 MAY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .		180
IV. TELEGRAM DATED 14 MAY 1974 FROM THE SECRETARY- GENERAL OF THE SEYCHELLES PEOPLE'S UNITED PARTY (SPUP), ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .		182
V. REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I . . . . .		183
XI. COMORO ARCHIPELAGO (A/9623/Add.4 (Part II)) . . . . .	1 - 11	185
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 10	185
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	11	186
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		189
XII. SPANISH SAHARA (A/9623/Add.4 (Part II)) . . . . .	1 - 6	201
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 5	201
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	6	201
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		203
XIII. GIBRALTAR (A/9623/Add.4 (Part II)) . . . . .	1 - 4	214
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 3	214
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	4	214
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		215

# CONTENTS (continued)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
XIV. FRENCH SOMALILAND* (A/9623/Add.4 (Part II)) . . . . .	1 - 4	224
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 3	224
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	4	224
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		225

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\* Note by the Rapporteur: See foot-note 1 of chap. XIV for the new designation of the Territory.

# CONTENTS (continued)

## VOLUME IV

### (Chapters XV to XX)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
XV. NEW HEBRIDES (A/9623/Add.5 (Part I)) . . . . .	1 - 12
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 11
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	12
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XVI. TOKELAU ISLANDS (A/9623/Add.5 (Part I)) . . . . .	1 - 9
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 8
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	9
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XVII. AMERICAN SAMOA AND GUAM (A/9623/Add.5 (Part I)) . . . . .	1 - 9
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 8
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	9
ANNEX: WORKING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XVIII. TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (A/9623/Add.5 (Part I)) . . . . .	1 - 8
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 7
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	8
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XIX. BRUNEI (A/9623/Add.5 (Part I)) . . . . .	1 - 5
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 4
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	5
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XX. COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA (A/9623/Add.5 (Part II)) . . . . .	1 - 11
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 9
B. Decisions of the Special Committee . . . . .	10 - 11
ANNEX: REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO THE COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS, 1974	

CONTENTS (continued)

VOLUME V

(Chapters XXI and XXII)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
XXI. GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS, PITCAIRN AND THE SOLOMON ISLANDS (A/9623/Add.5 (Parts III and IV) . . . . .	1 - 22
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 20
B. Decisions of the Special Committee . . . . .	21 - 22

ANNEXES

I. REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO THE GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS, 1974	
II. WORKING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
III. COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	
XXII. NIUE (A/9623/Add.5 (Part V)) . . . . .	1 - 12
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 10
B. Decisions of the Special Committee . . . . .	11 - 12

ANNEXES

I. REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL MISSION TO OBSERVE THE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN NIUE	
II. TELEGRAM DATED 17 OCTOBER 1974 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, ADDRESSED TO THE HONOURABLE ROBERT R. REX, LEADER OF GOVERNMENT, NIUE	

# CONTENTS (continued)

## VOLUME VI

(Chapters XXIII to XXIX)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
XXIII. BERMUDA (A/9623/Add.6 (Part I)) . . . . .	1 - 11
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 10
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	11
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XXIV. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS (A/9623/Add.6 (Part I)) . . .	1 - 9
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 8
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	9
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XXV. BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, CAYMAN ISLANDS, MONTserrat AND TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS (A/9623/Add.6 (Part I)) . . . . .	1 - 9
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 8
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	9
ANNEX: WORKING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XXVI. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) (A/9623/Add.6 (Part II)) . . .	1 - 5
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 4
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	5
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XXVII. BELIZE (A/9623/Add.6 (Part II)) . . . . .	1 - 4
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 3
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	4
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
XXVIII. ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA AND ST. VINCENT (A/9623/Add.6 (Part II)) . . . . .	1 - 4
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 3
B. Decision of the Special Committee . . . . .	4
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	



# CONTENTS (continued)

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
XXIX. INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 <u>e</u> OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (A/9623/Add.7) . . . . .	1 - 7
A. Consideration by the Special Committee . . . . .	1 - 6
B. Decision of the Special Committee ... . . . .	7

## ANNEXES

- I. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
- II. LETTER DATED 14 AUGUST 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

## CHAPTER VII

(A/9623/Add.1 (Parts I and II))

### TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

#### CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE BEFORE 25 APRIL 1974 . . . . .	1 - 17	2
B. RELATED DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 25 APRIL 1974. . . . .	18 - 27	5
C. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. . . . .	28 - 31	15

#### Annexes

I. WORKING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT. . . . .	18
II. A. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 960th MEETING ON 15 MARCH 1974. . . . .	47
B. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 971st MEETING ON 5 APRIL 1974 . . . . .	51
III. NOTE BY THE CHAIRMAN. . . . .	53
IV. LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF GUINEA-BISSAU TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	54
V. TELEGRAM DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (FRELIMO), ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. . . . .	56

## CHAPTER VII

### TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE BEFORE 25 APRIL 1974

1. The Special Committee's consideration of the question prior to the fall of the colonialist régime in Portugal took place at its 952nd to 960th meetings, between 26 February and 15 March, at its 963rd meeting, on 26 March, at its 966th meeting, on 29 March, at its 969th meeting, on 3 April, and at its 971st meeting, on 5 April 1974.

2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, by paragraph 11 of which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". Further, the Special Committee took into account General Assembly resolution 3113 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973 concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Special Committee also paid due regard to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council relating to the question.

3. During its consideration of the question, the Special Committee had before it working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see annex I to the present chapter) containing information on developments in the Territories prior to April 1974. The Committee also had before it a letter addressed to the Chairman, dated 19 March 1974, from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations (A/AC.109/440).

4. At its 952nd meeting, on 26 February, the Special Committee decided without objection to invite Mr. Peter Pringle, of The Sunday Times of London, to make a statement concerning the item. At the 953rd meeting, on 5 March, Mr. Pringle made a statement and replied to a question put to him by the representative of the Ivory Coast (A/AC.109/PV.953). Statements in that connexion were made by the Chairman and by the representatives of India and the Congo (A/AC.109/PV.953).

#### Participation of the national liberation movements

5. In accordance with a decision taken at its previous session, which was subsequently approved by the General Assembly, the Special Committee, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), invited the representatives of the national liberation movements of the African Territories

under Portuguese domination to participate in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item.

6. Accordingly, the following national liberation movements were represented at meetings of the Special Committee during its consideration of the item:

Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA):

Mr. Mangali Tula

Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA):

Mr. Manuel Jorge

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO):

Mr. Sharfudine Khan

Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC):

Mr. José Eduardo Araújo

Mr. Abilio Monteiro Duarte

Mr. John da Silva

7. At the 953rd meeting, on 5 March, Messrs. Jorge, Tula and Khan made statements (A/AC.109/PV.953). At the 954th meeting, on 7 March, Messrs. Khan, Jorge and Tula made statements in reply to a question by the representative of the Ivory Coast (A/AC.109/PV.954). At the 966th meeting, on 29 March, Mr. Monteiro Duarte made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.966 and Corr.1). At the 971st meeting, on 5 April, Mr. Monteiro Duarte made a further statement (A/AC.109/PV.971).

#### General debate

8. The Special Committee held the general debate on the item at its 954th to 958th meetings, between 7 and 13 March. Statements in the general debate were made by the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania, Indonesia, Australia and China at the 954th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.954); the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Sierra Leone at the 955th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.955); Afghanistan, Chile, Bulgaria, Denmark, Iran and Mali at the 956th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.956); Tunisia, the Congo, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia and Trinidad and Tobago at the 957th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.957); and Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ivory Coast at the 958th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.958).

#### Draft resolution on the item

9. At the 959th meeting, on 14 March, the representatives of Ethiopia and Trinidad and Tobago introduced a draft resolution on the item (A/AC.109/L.926/Rev.1), sponsored by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Congo,

Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia. Subsequently, India and Indonesia became sponsors of the draft resolution.

10. At the same meeting, statements were made by the Executive Secretary of OAU to the United Nations, by the representative of Trinidad and Tobago and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.959).

11. At the 960th meeting, on 15 March, following a statement by the representative of India (A/AC.109/PV.960), the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution without objection (see annex II.A to the present chapter). Statements were made by the representatives of Denmark and Venezuela and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.960).

12. By a letter of 29 March, the text of the resolution (A/AC.109/439) was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/11247). Copies of the resolution were also transmitted to all States, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

#### Reported negotiations between Portugal and the United States of America

13. At the 960th meeting, on 15 March, following statements by the representative of India and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.960), the Special Committee authorized its Chairman to seek clarification from the Government of the United States of America concerning reported negotiations between that Government and the Government of Portugal relating to certain United States military bases. At the 963rd meeting, on 26 March, the Chairman read out to the Committee the text of a letter dated 21 March 1974 received from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations (see annex III to the present chapter).

#### Draft resolution relating to Cape Verde

14. The Special Committee examined specific aspects of the question relating to Cape Verde at its 966th, 969th and 971st meetings, on 29 March and 3 and 5 April. At the 966th meeting, the representative of PAIGC made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.966 and Corr.1). Following statements by the representatives of India and the Congo and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.966 and Corr.1), the Committee decided without objection that the information furnished to it by PAIGC should be given the widest possible publicity, as appropriate.

15. At the 969th meeting, the representative of India introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.937), which was finally sponsored by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

16. At its 971st meeting, on 5 April, following a statement by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania (A/AC.109/PV.971), the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution without objection (see annex II.B to the present chapter).

Statements were made by the representatives of Venezuela, Denmark and the Ivory Coast (A/AC.109/PV.971). Statements were also made by the representative of PAIGC and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.971).

17. On 11 April, the text of the resolution (A/AC.109/445) was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/11261). Copies of the resolution were also transmitted to all States, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

#### B. RELATED DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 25 APRIL 1974

18. Given below is an account of a series of related developments which took place since 25 April 1974. During the period, having regard to the particular responsibility of the Special Committee with respect to the Territories concerned and in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Special Committee and the General Assembly, the Chairman maintained close contact on a continuing basis with leaders of the national liberation movements and the Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, as well as with the Secretary-General, in the efforts to assist in the speedy implementation of the decisions of the United Nations in this regard.

19. The Special Committee received a communication from the Executive Committee of FRELIMO containing the text of a statement issued by the Executive Committee on 27 April concerning events in Portugal (A/AC.109/L.942). The text of the statement is reproduced below:

##### "Statement by the FRELIMO Executive Committee on the events in Portugal"

"On 25 April 1974, we learned from radio broadcasts about the coup d'état in Portugal by the armed forces which resulted in the ousting of the Government of Marcelo Caetano and its replacement by a 'Junta of National Salvation'. This movement, according to its promoters, is intended to provide a solution to the present crisis which the Portuguese régime and society are going through after 13 years of colonial war.

"The coup d'état which has just taken place cannot be seen in isolation. It is a result of the new awareness of growing sectors of the Portuguese people that the purpose of the colonial war launched by the fascist régime is to suppress the colonized peoples' aspiration to independence and freedom and is against the desire for well-being and political and social democracy of the Portuguese people themselves.

"At this time we hail, in the first place, the Portuguese democratic forces, which for many years have been actively and courageously opposing the colonial war. This growing awareness is closely bound up with the affirmation of the unshakable will of the Mozambican people, and of the peoples of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde islands, to achieve independence and freedom. This will has taken on material form in the armed struggle for national

liberation, which has been steadily growing and has already reached vital regions of our country. The coincidence between the crisis of the régime in Portugal and the great advances of the national liberation struggle in Mozambique over the past two years is no accident, but additional proof of the impact of our struggle on the situation in Portugal. The determinant factor of the situation in Portugal and the colonies has been and still is the struggle of our peoples. And the fundamental issue upon which the solution of all other problems depends is the independence of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde islands, as well as that of the remaining Portuguese colonies.

"As far as the Portuguese people are concerned, to the extent that the principles contained in the proclamations that the leaders of the coup d'état have made up to now are put into force, this will doubtless be a step forward towards the establishment of democracy in Portugal. The young people who engaged in action aimed at putting an end to 48 years of uninterrupted dictatorship in Portugal, acting in line with the aspirations of the Portuguese people to realise their legitimate right to democracy, liberty and real independence, are the same young people who, when they were made to fight against our people, understood the unjust nature of the war in which they were engaged and the character of the régime which forced them to give up their lives for the defence of interests contrary to the interests of their people. The establishment of democracy in Portugal would be a victory for the Portuguese people, a victory at which we would rejoice.

"For the Mozambican people, under the leadership of FRELIMO, the correct definition of who is the enemy has always been an essential point of principle. The enemy of the Mozambican people is not the Portuguese people, themselves victims of fascism, but the Portuguese colonial system. And an important section of the Portuguese army itself was made to understand that it was not defending the interests of its people in the colonial war when it felt the growing disaffection of Portuguese opinion with regard to the war it is waging in the colonies. If our struggle thus contributed to the Portuguese people's struggle against fascism and to win their right to democracy, FRELIMO cannot but congratulate itself for having contributed to this. But just as the Portuguese people have the right to independence and democracy, this same right cannot be denied the Mozambican people. It is for this elementary but essential right that we are fighting. The objectives of FRELIMO are very clear: the total and complete independence of the Mozambican people and the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism. The Mozambican people are an entity quite distinct from the Portuguese people, and they have their own political, cultural and social personality which can only be realised through the independence of Mozambique.

"We are not fighting to become Portuguese with black skins. We are fighting to affirm ourselves as Mozambicans, without this meaning contempt for the Portuguese people or any other people. In this respect, FRELIMO reaffirms its wish to fully co-operate with all peoples in the world on a basis of independence, equality, respect and mutual interest. FRELIMO also reaffirms that the definition of a Mozambican has nothing to do with skin colour or

racial, ethnic, religious or any other origins. Members of FRELIMO are all Mozambicans who adhere to its programme of struggle against Portuguese colonialism, for the independence of Mozambique. FRELIMO is not a racialist organization and it is not waging a racialist war. We reaffirm here what we declared in July 1972 when we opened a new front: 'On starting the struggle in Manica e Sofala where an important section of the Portuguese community in our country is established, we reaffirm that our struggle is not against them, that our victory can only benefit those who live from honest labor, those who suffer from colonial and fascist exploitation. The Mozambican people fraternally call upon the Portuguese soldiers, the Portuguese people to join the common effort of liberation. At the same time as hailing the growing support from white Mozambicans for the struggle for national liberation, we wish to warn certain sectors of the European population of Mozambique against the attempts of the ultra-racist forces, encouraged by the neighboring racist countries, to transform our armed struggle for liberation into a total war between whites and blacks. This manoeuvre has as its purpose to make the white settlers participate actively in suppressing our people. That attitude makes them instruments of other forces and does not serve their own interests or the interests of the Mozambican people.'

"Freedom and independence, the affirmation of our own personality - these then are the objectives of our struggle. FRELIMO fighters are not professional soldiers. They are the Mozambican people in arms. They are, before all else, political militants who have taken up arms to put an end to the daily violence of colonial domination, exploitation and repression. It is up to the Portuguese Government to learn from past experience and understand that only through recognition of the right to independence of the Mozambican people, led by FRELIMO, their authentic and legitimate representative, will the war end. Any attempt to elude the real problem will only lead to new and equally avoidable sacrifices. The way to solve the problem is clear: recognition of the Mozambican people's right to independence. If, however, the objective of the coup d'état is to find new formulas to perpetuate the oppression of our people, then the Portuguese leaders are warned that they will face our firm determination. The Mozambican people, over 10 years of heroic armed struggle, have endured heavy sacrifices and shed the blood of their finest sons and daughters to defend the inalienable principle of their sovereignty as a free and independent nation. Politically and militarily tempered, encouraged by the growing successes of the armed struggle for national liberation, more united than ever under the leadership of FRELIMO, the Mozambican people will not retreat before any sacrifice in ensuring that their rights and fundamental aspirations triumph. We cannot accept that democracy for the Portuguese people should serve as a cover to prevent the independence of our people. Just as Caetano's era clearly demonstrated that liberal fascism does not exist, it must also be understood that there is no such thing as democratic colonialism.

"At this moment it is important that all the forces in solidarity with the people of Mozambique and with the peoples of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde and São Tome e Principe, continue their action for the recognition of our right to complete independence. They must remain vigilant in the face



of any manoeuvres aimed at blocking the process of our total liberation coming not only from the Portuguese Government, but from the régimes in South Africa and racist Rhodesia. It is also essential that the forces which support our struggle step up their assistance of every kind to the liberation movements, so that with the end of Portuguese colonialism, the aspirations of our peoples, which are those of all mankind, may be fulfilled."

20. On 9 May, the Chairman issued a statement relating to developments in Portugal, jointly with the Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid and the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia (A/AC.109/447), the text of which is given below:

"Joint statement by the Chairman of the Special Committee of 24, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, Mr. Edwin Ogebe Ogbu, and the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Rashleigh E. Jackson

"1. As presiding officers of the United Nations organs most intimately concerned with the problems of southern Africa, we have followed the current situation in Portugal since the overthrow of Mr. Marcello Caetano with keen interest and serious attention. Our collective approach should be viewed in the context of the interrelationship of the problems of the area. For it is common knowledge that developments in Angola and Mozambique have significant relevance to the struggle of the oppressed peoples in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

"2. The current developments in Portugal must be viewed in their proper perspective. The first and foremost observation - obvious to all - is that the end of the Caetano era is a clear demonstration of the bankruptcy of Portuguese colonialism. It is a recognition of the futility of the murderous colonial wars waged by the Portuguese military forces in Angola, Mozambique and the illegally occupied parts of Guinea-Bissau. If the world recognizes that the cause of the recent coup in Portugal emanates from the futile colonial wars in Africa - as all reports so far seem to confirm that it does - then it is equally important to realize that the changes brought about by those who have taken power in Portugal were only made possible by the effectiveness, determination, resilience and sacrifice of the peoples in the Portuguese dominated Territories and their national liberation movements.

"3. Although developments in Portugal proper are a matter for the Portuguese people, these developments have serious implications for the general situation in southern Africa. In this respect, we have followed very closely the various statements reported to have been made by the spokesmen of the new Portuguese military junta. We are disappointed to note that these statements have yet to conform with the position of the United Nations in respect to the issues of decolonization.

"4. The United Nations has never wavered in its support of the total liberation of the Territories under Portuguese domination. The General

Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee of 24 have on numerous occasions called on the Government of Portugal to take the necessary measures to bring its colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde to an immediate termination. We believe that the evolving situation in Portugal provides the opportunity for the new régime to abandon wholly and completely the misguided policy of its predecessors. They must not only recognize the legitimate right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde to self-determination and independence, but must forthwith take decisive and concrete measures towards the realization of that right.

"5. We reiterate here the several calls previously made by the United Nations, that the Portuguese authorities should enter immediately into negotiations with the national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the purpose of ending Portuguese colonialism in those Territories. Only by such a course of action can a significant and positive new era be fostered in the relationship between Portugal and the peoples of the Territories currently under her domination. Such steps would also lend credibility to the opinions of those who optimistically look forward to a new Portugal. For, if the current changes are to have any meaning to the oppressed African majorities in Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde, they must be directed towards a complete transformation of the existing situation. As the Executive Committee of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) rightly pointed out in their statement of 27 April 1974 'there is no such thing as democratic colonialism'.

"6. Any equivocation on the part of the Portuguese authorities, any ambiguities could only lead the world to believe that the change which has taken place in Portuguese policy so far as Africa is concerned, is only a change of tactics and strategy and not of substance. Obviously, such a change is neither acceptable to the liberation movements nor can it be entertained by the United Nations.

"7. We are encouraged by the vigorous demands for freedom and independence being voiced by different sectors of public opinion within Portugal. We believe that this is one of the most important by-products of the recent developments. We feel that the international community must not only sustain its current efforts in support of the liberation movements, but must indeed intensify its activities so as to put maximum pressure on those determined to frustrate the rational and positive voices in favour of freedom and independence in Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde, as well as the complete evacuation of Portuguese occupation forces in Guinea-Bissau.

"8. The end of the misery and repression in the Portuguese dominated Territories is long overdue. It is our hope that the authorities in Portugal will recognize the needs of the hour and seize the opportunity which it presents. We also firmly believe that this is the opportune time for the military allies of Portugal, as well as her trading partners, to demonstrate their goodwill towards Africa and their commitments to the United Nations by taking measures calculated to end once and for all Portuguese colonialism in Africa. Such a course of action would, in our opinion, also be in the best interests of the people of Portugal.

"9. For our part, as the presiding officers of the three bodies responsible for following the situation in southern Africa, we shall continue to work for the attainment of this objective: the total and complete independence of Angola, Mozambique and the other Territories in southern Africa."

21. On 17 May, the Secretary-General issued the following statement on the subject:

"Statement by the Secretary-General on 17 May 1974

"I have followed with close attention the recent changes which have occurred in Portugal and which have resulted in the formation of a new Government under the presidency of His Excellency General Antonio de Spínola.

"Prior to the formation of the Government, the present leaders of Portugal had reportedly indicated their intention of seeking ways and means of putting an end to the bitter conflicts in the African Territories which, for nearly fourteen years, have brought so much bloodshed, suffering and hardship to all those involved and especially to the civilian inhabitants of the Territories concerned.

"It is my firm belief that the relevant resolutions of the United Nations provide the only basis for a peaceful solution of those tragic conflicts, a solution which is vital to the interests not only of Africa but of Portugal itself. I sincerely hope that, bearing in mind these resolutions, the new government of Portugal will recognize the right of the peoples in the territories to self-determination and independence and that it will for this purpose begin negotiations with the African liberation movements concerned without delay so that peace may be restored.

"Of course, I am quite prepared to provide any assistance that may be required with respect to the negotiations, and indeed, I have been requested to do so by the General Assembly in its resolution 2918 (XXVII)."

22. On 20 May, the Permanent Observer of Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations communicated to the Special Committee information relating to Cape Verde (see annex IV to the present chapter).

23. On 24 July, the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations called on the Chairman at the latter's office at United Nations Headquarters and informed the Chairman of recent developments relating to the question of Territories under Portuguese domination. The Chairman and the Permanent Representative exchanged views on these and other matters of common concern. On the same day the Chairman received the following communication from the Permanent Representative (A/AC.109/452):

"With reference to our conversation of this morning, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Portugal intends to co-operation with the Special Committee.

"We consider that this co-operation will contribute to the affirmation and strengthening of the principles and rules of the United Nations Charter."

In a letter of 1 August 1974 addressed to the Permanent Representative (A/AC.109/453), the Chairman in reply stated as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 24 July 1974, which I have brought to the attention of the members of the Special Committee.

"I would like to express my satisfaction at the decision of your Government to co-operate with the Special Committee and to assure you that, as Chairman of the Committee, I stand ready to consult with you at all times on matters of mutual concern."

24. At the invitation of the President of Portugal, the Secretary-General visited Lisbon between 2 and 4 August. An account of the visit, as issued in a press communiqué, is given below:

"During his stay in Lisbon the Secretary-General was received and had conversations with the President of the Portuguese Republic, General Antonio de Spínola, on matters of international concern, and in particular relating to African Territories administered by Portugal.

"The Secretary-General also was received and had conversations about the same issues with the Prime Minister, Colonel Vasco Goncalves and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mario Soares. The meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs were also attended by the Ministers of Defence and Interterritorial Co-ordination, Lieutenant-Colonel Mario Firmino Miguel and Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos.

"The Secretary-General explained the position of the United Nations on the question of African Territories under Portuguese administration, as reflected in the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, as well as the views expressed to him on this question by the heads of African States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and leaders of the liberation movements.

"In the course of the conversations on the subject of co-operation with the United Nations, ways and means of possible United Nations assistance in the process of decolonization were also discussed, with a view to promoting the social and economic well-being of the population of these Territories.

"The Government of Portugal elaborated its position on these issues, within the context of the new Constitutional Law No. 7/74 of 17 July 1974 and President Spínola's statement of 27 July on the African Territories administered by Portugal, as reflected in a memorandum dated 3 August 1974 from that Government, which was handed to the Secretary-General at the conclusion of his visit to Lisbon."

The memorandum of 3 August, referred to above, has been circulated in documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/9694-S/11419). 1/ In a note dated 6 August 1974, the Secretary-General also transmitted the text of the memorandum to the Chairman for the attention of members of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/454). The memorandum read as follows:

"Memorandum from the Government of Portugal

"1. In the course of the visit to Portugal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, the Government of Portugal elaborated its position on the question of the African territories under its administration, within the context of the new Constitutional Law No. 7/74 of 17 July 1974 and President Spínola's statement of Saturday 27 July.

"2. The said position is as follows:

"(1) Co-operation with the United Nations

"The Government of Portugal, reaffirming its obligations with regard to Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, and in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, pledges full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter, the Declaration and the relevant resolutions in respect of territories under Portuguese administration.

"(2) Territorial unity and integrity

"The Government of Portugal reaffirms its recognition of the right of self-determination and independence for all overseas territories under its administration. It pledges full support for the territorial unity and integrity of each territory and will oppose any secessionist attempts or attempts of dismemberment from any quarter.

"(3) Guinea-Bissau

"(a) The Government of Portugal is ready to recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau as an independent State and is prepared to enter forthwith into arrangements with the Republic of Guinea-Bissau for the immediate transfer of the administration;

"(b) Accordingly it will give its full support to the application of Guinea-Bissau for United Nations membership.

"(4) Cape Verde Islands

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right of the people of the Cape Verde Islands to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard.

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1/ For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974.

"In accelerating the process of decolonization in the Cape Verde Islands the Government of Portugal is prepared to co-operate closely with the competent organs of the United Nations.

"(5) Mozambique

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right of the people of Mozambique to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard. In furtherance of this declaration of principle the Government of Portugal, which previously had established contacts with the representatives of FRELIMO, will take immediate steps to enter into negotiations with FRELIMO with a view to accelerating the process of independence for the Territory.

"(6) Angola

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right of the people of Angola to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard. It is the intention of the Government of Portugal to make early contacts with the liberation movements so that formal negotiations can commence as soon as possible.

"(7) São Tomé and Príncipe

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right of the people of São Tomé and Príncipe to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard.

"(8) Co-operation with specialized agencies

"The Government of Portugal expresses the hope that since it has taken concrete steps to comply fully with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) the Assembly may reconsider its previous decisions on the matter and enable Portugal to participate fully in the social, economic, financial and technical programmes of the United Nations and the specialized agencies as well as in the activities of those bodies."

25. In a letter dated 6 August 1974, the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations communicated to the Secretary-General the text of a Constitutional Law approved by the Council of State of Portugal on 24 July 1974 (A/9697).

26. In a statement made on behalf of the Special Committee to the Security Council at the latter's 1791st meeting, on 12 August, in connexion with the Council's consideration of the application of Guinea-Bissau for admission to membership of the United Nations, the Chairman noted with particular satisfaction the above-

mentioned memorandum received by the Secretary-General from the Government of Portugal and expressed the hope that the goals outlined therein would be achieved with the minimum possible delay. The Chairman considered that the action by the Security Council, symbolizing the momentous achievement of the people of Guinea-Bissau, demonstrated once and for all that colonial and alien domination of the peoples concerned was doomed to irrevocable failure and that nothing could arrest the irreversible tide of their liberation struggle. The Chairman appealed to the Government of Portugal to take the necessary measures in consultation with PAIGC to create conditions leading to the attainment of freedom and unity between the people of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde; and to proceed forthwith, as it had undertaken so to do, to the speedy conclusion of the talks with the national liberation movements, the authentic representatives of the people, with a view to the expeditious transfer of power to the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. The Chairman warned that nothing should be done to create doubts among the peoples of these Territories about the true intentions of the new Government of Portugal. He noted in that regard that the frequently raised issue of the possibility of holding a referendum was now almost dead; he considered that it could not be otherwise as it was inconceivable to ask these peoples whether or not they wished freedom after more than a decade of suffering, sacrifices and bloodshed, precisely for the purpose of securing that freedom. The Chairman was confident that in the very near future the Security Council would be considering the admission of Mozambique, under FRELIMO's undisputed leadership, and of Angola, under the able leadership of its national liberation movements. The Chairman also called for continued United Nations support for, and solidarity with, the determination of the oppressed peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe to bring about the restoration of their fundamental human rights and the attainment of their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence. Finally, the Chairman stated that the Special Committee looked forward to close collaboration with Guinea-Bissau in the work of the United Nations and elsewhere towards the elimination of the remaining vestiges of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

27. Speaking at the same meeting of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations reiterated the undertakings of his Government in respect of the Territories under its administration. Portugal had begun the decolonization process with the immediate acceptance of the right to political independence of these Territories on terms and dates to be decided by mutual consent. As a demonstration of democratic authenticity, Portugal would welcome the presence of United Nations observers in any electoral process to be carried out in those Territories. Because of the different conditions prevailing in each Territory, it was obvious that the ways for carrying out the process of decolonization would not be the same for them all but would depend on specific circumstances. On behalf of his Government, the Permanent Representative reaffirmed its obligations with regard to the Charter of the United Nations and pledged full and close co-operation with its organs. The Portuguese Government was prepared to develop the process of decolonization, to supply all the information required under Article 73 e of the Charter, and to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and other relevant resolutions concerning the Territories under its administration.



### C. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

28. At its 979th meeting, on 29 August 1974, the Special Committee, having regard to developments relating to the question of Territories under Portuguese domination, requested its Chairman to make a statement on behalf of the Committee setting out its position on the current situation. The Committee also took note of a communication dated 8 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/459).

29. At the 980th meeting, on 3 September, the Chairman drew attention to a telegram dated 2 September from Mr. Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO (see annex V to the present chapter).

30. At the 981st meeting, on 5 September, in accordance with the decision referred to in paragraph 28 above, the Chairman made a statement relating to the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination (A/AC.109/PV.981). The text of the statement reads as follows:

"(1) The substantive consideration of the question of Territories under Portuguese domination during 1974 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples took place between 26 February and 5 April. During that period, the Special Committee once again undertook a thorough examination of the critical situation obtaining in Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and other Territories under the domination of the former fascist régime of Portugal, and adopted resolutions 2/ calling on that régime to cease forthwith all its colonial wars against the peoples of the Territories, with a view to the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with respect to those Territories. The Special Committee also appealed to all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to non-governmental organizations to render to the peoples concerned all the moral, material and economic assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the achievement of their inalienable right to freedom and independence.

"(2) On 25 April, the fascist régime in Lisbon was overthrown. The overthrow of the Caetano régime at once represented a clear demonstration of the inevitable bankruptcy of Portuguese colonialism. Indeed, the entire world was cognizant of the futility of the policy of colonial oppression long pursued by that régime in the African Territories. It was also clear that the changes were made possible only through the determined efforts of the peoples of the Territories led by their national liberation movements in their struggle, under conditions of extreme hardship and with untold suffering, to regain their human dignity and attain their liberation. These changes signaled the beginning of a new era of hope and expectation for the realization of the long fought for freedom and independence of the millions of Africans in the Portuguese-dominated Territories.

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2/ See annex II below.



"(3) Having regard to the developments which took place in Portugal thereafter and within the context of the interrelationship of the problems of southern Africa, the presiding officers of the three United Nations organs most intimately concerned with these problems issued, on 9 May, a joint declaration setting out their views on the matter. <sup>3/</sup> As will be recalled, a particular emphasis was placed in that statement on the necessity that the new Government of Portugal should abandon wholly and completely the misguided policy of its predecessors and that it should not only recognize the legitimate right of the peoples of the Territories concerned to self-determination and independence but also take forthwith decisive and concrete measures towards the achievement of that goal.

"(4) Bearing in mind the particular responsibility of the Special Committee concerning the Territories and in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in this regard, the Special Committee has, through its Chairman, maintained close contact on a continuing basis during the period with leaders of the national liberation movements and the Executive Secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity, as well as with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in order to assist in the expeditious implementation of the related United Nations resolutions. In addition, both the Secretary-General and the Chairman have since had an opportunity to hold consultations with representatives of the new Government of Portugal, and these consultations have thus far proved useful and encouraging.

"(5) The Special Committee wishes to note that, following the further evolution of events in Portugal, the Government of Portugal has since indicated its intention to renounce categorically the colonialist policy of the previous régime and has accepted fully the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the right of the peoples concerned to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration, as well as with the provisions of all relevant resolutions of the United Nations. The Special Committee, reiterating its firm conviction that the close co-operation of the administering Powers is an essential element in the effective discharge of its tasks, welcomes these developments and in particular the official undertaking given by the Portuguese Government to co-operate closely in the work of the competent organs of the United Nations in the implementation of these resolutions.

"(6) The Special Committee notes with appreciation the good offices being extended by the Secretary-General and in particular commends his efforts in this regard during his recent visit to Lisbon.

"(7) While encouraged by these developments, the Special Committee wishes to reiterate its firm belief that only through their total and unequivocal decolonization can the era of peace be restored in Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and other Territories under Portuguese domination. The Special Committee therefore calls upon the Government of Portugal to translate into

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<sup>3/</sup> Ibid., para. 20.

reality, as a matter of priority and without hesitation or ambiguity, its acceptance of the principles and obligations set out in the above-mentioned United Nations decisions. The Special Committee is of the firm view that the first and the foremost action to be taken by that Government is to ensure the satisfactory conclusion, without delay, of the negotiations with the national liberation movements of the Territories concerned, by working out concrete modalities for the speediest possible transfer of all powers to the inhabitants of the Territories led by their national liberation movements and by adopting forthwith all necessary measures to remove all obstacles standing in the way of their complete and full independence. Any arrangements falling short of these measures or any undue delays in arriving at a satisfactory solution will only create obstacles to the process of decolonization and thus will have far-reaching implications for the peace and stability of the Territories concerned. In this context, the Special Committee welcomes the agreement reached in Algiers between Guinea-Bissau and Portugal and expresses its hope that all the necessary measures will be taken without any delay towards the total decolonization of Cape Verde. At the same time, the Special Committee welcomes the resumption of the talks between Portugal and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) which have begun today in Lusaka and expresses its confidence that these talks will result in the final agreement leading to the total independence of Mozambique

"(8) The Special Committee wishes to pay a particular tribute to the national liberation movements whose resilience, dedication and sacrifice made the current situation possible. The Special Committee once again reaffirms its continued and unwavering support of and solidarity with the peoples of these Territories under the leadership of their national liberation movements in their determined efforts to achieve freedom and independence. At the same time, the Special Committee wishes to appeal to all Governments as well as the specialized agencies and the institutions associated with the United Nations to continue to extend all possible moral and material assistance to the peoples of these Territories as they enter a new and critical stage of their legitimate endeavour to attain their freedom and independence. The Special Committee further requests all Governments to exert their efforts with a view to accelerating the process of decolonization in the Portuguese-dominated Territories as expeditiously as possible."

31. On 6 September, the text of the statement (A/AC.109/L.980) was transmitted to the Chargé d'affaires of the Portuguese Mission to the United Nations; copies were also sent to the national liberation movements of the Territories concerned.

## Annex I

### WORKING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT\*

#### CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
A. ANGOLA . . . . .	19
B. MOZAMBIQUE . . . . .	26
C. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE . . . . .	33
D. TIMOR . . . . .	36

#### Appendices

I. MAP OF ANGOLA . . . . .	39
II. POPULATION MAP OF ANGOLA . . . . .	41
III. MAP OF MOZAMBIQUE . . . . .	43
IV. POPULATION MAP OF MOZAMBIQUE . . . . .	45

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\* These working papers were prepared and circulated before 25 April 1974.  
See also documents A/AC.109/L.921 and Add.1.

A. ANGOLA\*

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. GENERAL . . . . .	1 - 8
2. THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION . . . . .	9 - 32

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.918.

## 1. GENERAL

1. The Territory of Angola, comprising an area of 1,246,700 square kilometres, lies south of the Equator between latitude 4°22' S and 18°03' S and longitude 24°05' E and 11°41' E. Except for the Cabinda enclave which is administered as part of it, the entire Territory lies south of the Congo River. It is bound on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, on the north by the People's Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Zaire, on the north-east by the Republic of Zaire, on the east by Zambia and on the south by Namibia (see appendix I below).
2. Some three fifths of the total area of Angola is an extension of the central African plateau which drops off to the coast in two steps. Three basic geographic zones may be distinguished in Angola. The coastal plain, with elevations to 400 metres, varies in width from less than 10 kilometres south of Benguela to a maximum of 200 kilometres in the lower valley of the Cuanza River south-east of Luanda. The plain, comprising the entire coastline, 1,650 kilometres in length, is a desert in the south but gradually changes to a steppe in the north. The northward-flowing Benguela Current off shore moderates temperatures along the coast and reduces precipitation markedly. Rainfall increases from south to north and from west to east.
3. Between the coastal plain and the plateau lies a transitional zone with varied geographic features. This zone, which ranges from 400 to 1,000 metres in elevation, rises gradually in the north to the main plateau; in the central and southern sections, it rises abruptly. North of this zone, orographic precipitation contributes to the existence of an abundant vegetation which gradually changes towards the south into savanna and steppe patterns. This zone varies greatly in width, being at its widest at parallel 14° S in the northern part of Moçâmedes.
4. The plateau itself rises to about 1,000 metres. In the north and south it ranges from 1,000 to 1,500 metres but rises higher in the centre to 2,500 metres and over, especially along its western edge. The rainfall pattern is determined mainly by the latitudinal position. The climate changes from tropical rainy in the north and in Cabinda to tropical highland savanna in the centre and highland steppe in the south. The Benguela-Bié plateau, which corresponds to the highland savanna of west central Angola, enjoys the best climate conditions of the Territory. Because of the altitude, there is ample rainfall for agriculture and tropical diseases are at a minimum.
5. According to provisional 1970 census figures, the total resident population of Angola was 5,673,046. At the 1960 census, the total resident population was 4,830,499, of whom 4,604,362 were listed as "pretos", 172,529 as "brancos", 53,392 as "mestiços" and 166 as "others". Official Portuguese statistics published after 1960 do not give any information by race. For the period 1972/73, the European population has been variously estimated from 350,000 to 600,000. The largest population concentration is in and around Luanda, the capital. In 1970, Luanda and its environs had a population of approximately 500,000.

6. Basically, the population pattern of the Territory consists of urban islands of European settlement surrounded by an almost completely African population. More than a third of the African population lives in the Benguela-Bié plateau region. Owing to its climate and favourable conditions for producing most of the food crops needed by the Portuguese settlers, there has been intensive European settlement in this area (see appendix II below).

7. In 1960, the economically active population comprised 2,679,498 persons between the ages of 15 and 64 years, corresponding to 55.5 per cent of the total population, a large majority of whom were engaged in the subsistence sector. According to one report, at the end of 1968, out of a total of 560,000 wage earners, some 247,000 were classified as skilled or semi-skilled and 313,000 as non-skilled and subject to the Rural Labour Code of 1962. a/ Of the non-skilled, 88 per cent were employed in agriculture.

8. Since 1961, when the African population took up arms in their struggle for national liberation from colonial domination, large areas of Angola have been declared free of Portuguese control. According to various reports, more than 1 million inhabitants live in liberated areas of Angola. In addition, by 1973 more than 600,000 Angolans were reported to be living in Zaire. There were also over 17,000 Angolan refugees living in Zambia and some 4,000 in Botswana.

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a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/7200/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex II, paras. 168-174.

## 2. THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

9. Angola is divided into 16 districts for administrative purposes. Considered from a geopolitical point of view, however, there are six distinct regions in the Territory which, in fact, largely correspond to the military regions designated by one of the liberation movements: (a) the northern region, comprising the districts of Zaire, Uíge, Luanda, Cuanza-North, Cuanza-South and Malanje; (b) the enclave of Cabinda; (c) the eastern region, comprising the districts of Moxico and Cuando-Cubango; (d) the north-eastern region, corresponding to the district of Luanda; (e) the west-central region, comprising the districts of Benguela, Huambo and Bié; and (f) the south-western region, comprising the districts of Moçâmedes, Huíla and Cunene.

10. The national liberation struggle in Angola, which began in the northern region in 1961, has been since extended to Cabinda and to the eastern, north-eastern and the southern parts of the Territory. As shown in section 5 below, in each region the liberation struggle has been affected by and has in turn affected the socio-economic structure. In particular, the centres of economic activity, which are controlled by Portuguese interests, have increasingly become the focal points from which Portuguese occupation and control of the surrounding areas are being extended. The Angola Diamond Company (DIAMANG) in Lunda District, the mining concessions of the Companhia de Petróleos de Angola, SARL (PETRANGOL) and the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, the European coffee, sisal and sugar plantations and white farming areas on the Bié-Benguela plateau are typical examples of such control points. By 1973, however, it had become apparent that the national liberation struggle had begun to threaten the socio-economic bases of the Portuguese rule.

11. The two original movements which began the armed struggle in 1961 for the liberation of Angola were the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the União das Populações de Angola (UPA). The UPA subsequently merged with two smaller movements and became the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA). Since 1966, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) has also been engaged in armed struggle for the liberation of the Territory. An article in the Dutch press estimated that in 1972 MPLA was responsible for 59 per cent of the military activities against the colonial Government, FNLA was responsible for 37 per cent, and UNITA for 4 per cent.

### A. Northern region

12. This region is characterized by its economic and political importance. It produces almost all of the Territory's coffee and cotton, as well as the crude petroleum which supplies the PETRANGOL refinery. The territorial capital and a large proportion of the Territory's transforming industries are also situated in this region.

13. Throughout 1973, the Portuguese monthly military communiqués acknowledged intense activity by FNLA and MPLA forces in this region. FNLA reported activities by its army, known as the Armée de Libération Nationale de l'Angola (ALNA),

in Zaire, Uíge, Luanda, Cuanza-North and Malanje districts. MPLA forces were active in Luanda and Cuanza-North districts, and UNITA reported that its forces were active in Malanje District.

14. Although the Angolan press is carefully censored, in August 1973 one local paper acknowledged that activities by the liberation movements in the northern region had grown in intensity compared with previous years, particularly during the coffee harvest period. The article attributed most of the disruption of economic activities on coffee plantations to FNLA. In the Songo-Lucunga-Quivungu area near Carmona, for example, in a period of three weeks there were three successive attacks with heavy casualties on the Portuguese side.

15. According to an article in the international press, much of the war news is suppressed. An explosion about 80 kilometres from the city of Luanda which blew up a crew engaged in road maintenance - a task usually assigned to Portuguese troops in the war zones - was not reported by the local press or radio. In fact, it is said to be little known that every week new mine explosion cases arrive by helicopter at the military hospital in Luanda.

16. In September 1973, a series of strikes broke out in Luanda. Press reports at the time suggested that MPLA political activities had been behind these strikes. The most important work stoppage was organized by African stevedores, over 1,000 of whom demonstrated outside the offices of the Governor-General before being dispersed by Portuguese troops and police. Subsequently, the stevedores' wages were almost doubled.

#### B. Cabinda region

17. The economy of this region is dominated by the mining operations of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company. However, timber is being increasingly exploited for export by the colonial authorities.

18. Despite the extensive military occupation of this district by Portuguese troops to protect the Cabinda Gulf oil operations, during 1973, MPLA forces in this area were engaged in continuous activities which intensified towards the latter part of the year. Early in the year, a Portuguese military convoy delivering supplies to military centres along the Kingombungu-Bulo road was attacked at Miconje and suffered a number of casualties.

19. In October, MPLA forces carried out a large-scale operation in the region and occupied access roads to Miconje where they destroyed some Portuguese barracks. In this operation, MPLA forces destroyed the Singuisa bridge on an access road, and Portuguese troops coming from the Sanga Plains were ambushed, suffering 50 casualties and losing one military vehicle.

#### C. Eastern region

20. Since 1968, MPLA forces have liberated a considerable part of the eastern region, which, under Portuguese domination, remained one of the least developed



parts of the Territory. In recent years, the Portuguese authorities have tried to strengthen their control in the area by regrouping the local population into aldeamentos (protected strategic hamlets) and by increasing their military occupation.

21. Throughout 1973, Portuguese military communiqués continued to report MPLA activities, as did MPLA sources.

22. Early in 1973, MPLA reported the shooting down of a Portuguese army helicopter and the destruction of a bridge on a road linking aldeamentos in Caianda and Jimbe in the eastern enclave of Moxico District. Other reported activities in the first half of the year included the shelling of the Portuguese barracks at Ninda in the south-eastern corner of Moxico District, an attack on a Portuguese police station in the Matia aldeamento and a clash with Portuguese troops who had been ferried in by helicopter from the Menongue post to the area of the Munhona River.

23. In June, MPLA learned of Portuguese plans to launch a major operation against the liberated areas from Lumbala in the eastern enclave. The operation was to have been preceded by land and river missions starting 22 June. On 2 June, MPLA forces initiated a series of attacks on trucks transporting Portuguese troops and matériel to Lumbala. Four trucks were destroyed and large quantities of matériel were seized.

24. During the second half of 1973, MPLA reported, among other actions, the destruction of a bridge on the Lute River on the Cazombo-Lumbala route in the eastern enclave; the destruction of a Portuguese military vehicle by a land mine on the Ninda-Chiumbe road; the destruction of four Portuguese military trucks on the Lucuse-Lumbala road on the right bank of the Zambeze River; and an attack on a truck carrying Portuguese troops on the Luso-Gago Coutinho road between the Lumai and Luio rivers which resulted in the death of all its occupants. On the Cazombo-Lumbala road, three military vehicles were destroyed when a convoy entered an MPLA mine field.

25. In August 1973, UNITA reported that it had held its Third Congress in the liberated areas of Moxico District. The Congress was attended by 221 delegates representing the various organs of UNITA and nine foreign observers, five of whom were journalists. Mr. Jonas M. Savimbi was re-elected president of UNITA and Commander-in-Chief of UNITA's armed forces, the Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (FALA), for another four-year term. Mr. Savimbi has been president of UNITA since its creation in 1966.

#### D. North-eastern region

26. DIAMANG is the major Portuguese stronghold in this region. It appears from recent developments that the liberation forces in this region are gradually advancing in a semi-circle towards the north-eastern part of Lunda where DIAMANG is located. In particular, FNLA forces were active in a large area extending between the Cuango and Cuilo rivers, from the Zaire border to Moxico District and in the southern part of Lunda, including the Henrique de Carvalho area.

#### E. West-central region

27. This west-central region, comprising the Bié-Benguela plateau, has the second largest concentration of European settlers after Luanda and is, in effect, the heartland of Portuguese colonial interests. Apart from the regrouping of the population to prevent contacts with the liberation movements, the Portuguese authorities have drawn up new regional economic plans to reinforce European domination (see A/AC.109/L.918, paras. 33-36).

28. Although there are no Portuguese reports of military activities in the region, MPLA is said to have several units operating here.

29. According to MPLA reports released in 1973, its forces have consolidated their positions in Bié District through a policy of self-reliance and support from the local population. MPLA has also concentrated its efforts on the political mobilization of the African population; an article published in Luanda in August 1973 acknowledged increased MPLA political activities in this region, making it difficult for the recruitment offices to sign up contract labourers for work on the coffee plantations in the north (see A/AC.109/L.918, paras. 76 and 132).

30. In 1973, UNITA forces were reported to have extended their activities from Bié to Huambo District.

#### F. South-western region

31. The Cunene River Basin scheme and the Cassinga mines are the dominant economic features in the south-western region, and expanding colonial exploitation in the area is being faced with a growing political awareness among the African population.

32. In 1973, it was reported that MPLA had intensified its political work in what it calls its sixth politico-military region. MPLA is said to have set up action committees in the region, aimed at strengthening resistance to colonial oppression.

B. MOZAMBIQUE\*

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. GENERAL . . . . .	1 - 6
2. THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION IN 1973 . . . . .	7 - 34

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.919 and Add.1.

## I. GENERAL

1. The Territory of Mozambique, comprising an area of 778,009 square kilometres, lies south of the Equator between latitude 10°30' and 27°. It is bound on the north by the United Republic of Tanzania, on the west by Lake Nyasa, Malawi, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, on the south by Swaziland and South Africa and on the east by the Indian Ocean (see appendix III below). Most of the country is covered by open forests and savanna, with some steppes in the south and in the Zambezi valley.
2. Three basic geographical divisions may be distinguished in Mozambique: a coastal belt, one of the largest in Africa, covers about 44 per cent of the Territory. It includes most of the area south of the Save River, the lower Zambezi area and a coastal area of about 100 kilometres deep, from the Licungo to the Rovuma rivers. The middle plateau, a transitional zone of hills and low plateaux, ranging from 500 to 2,000 feet in elevation, covers about 29 per cent of the Territory. The plateau and highland regions, with average elevations of 3,000 feet, include most of the Territory north of the lower Zambezi valley, Lake Nyasa and the northern coast.
3. There is considerable variety in the climate. The northern region is within the tropical monsoon climate, and has relatively high temperatures. Although the southern region is in a subcyclonic area, about one third of the Territory is considered suitable for agriculture, but less than 10 per cent is cultivated.
4. According to the provisional 1970 census figures, the total population of Mozambique was 8,233,834. Statistics by ethnic origin have not been published since 1960. The non-African population was reported to be 220,000 in 1972. The population of the Territory is unevenly distributed. The density is greater in the coastal areas and in the southern part of the Territory. In the district of Lourenço Marques, where an estimated half of the European resident population lives, the population density reaches 48.8 per square kilometre. The districts of Niassa and Tete have the lowest population density, with 2.5 and 4.9 inhabitants per square kilometre respectively (see appendix IV below).
5. The majority of the population lives in the rural areas and is engaged in subsistence agriculture. An estimated 600,000 people live in the urban and suburban areas. Of this number, over 350,000 live in Lourenço Marques, the most important urban centre.
6. Since the inception in 1964 of the armed struggle for the national liberation of the Territory from colonial domination, one fourth of Mozambique, with over 1 million inhabitants, has been declared free of Portuguese control by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). In addition, in 1973, 58,000 Mozambican refugees were reported to be living in the United Republic of Tanzania, and 6,400 in Zambia. These refugees were receiving assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

## 2. THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION IN 1973

7. The armed struggle for independence in Mozambique has entered its tenth year, and despite intensification of the colonial war the liberation movement has continued to make progress.

8. As in Angola, in each region the liberation struggle has been affected by and is in turn affecting the socio-economic structure. In general, because of the relatively sparse Portuguese occupation of the northern districts, the beginning of the armed struggle led to the rapid mobilization of the rural population in that area. FRELIMO's initial success led the Portuguese authorities progressively to strengthen east-west lines of defence to prevent southward penetration of the liberation movement. Thus, east-west routes of communication, such as the roads extending from Palma to Nangade, and from Porto Amélia in Cabo Delgado through Montepuez to Vila Cabral in Niassa, have gained in importance. As a consequence, several settlement schemes are being established along the routes to reinforce the security measures of the Portuguese army. In November 1973, one of the members in the Legislative Assembly stated that the opening up of the road network was giving impetus to the development of Cabo Delgado District and that the Porto Amélia-Montepuez and Palma-Nangade roads would be barriers against "terrorism". This strategy is being further reinforced by the completing of the final link in the railway from Nacala to the Malawi frontier and Vila Cabral. The development of the Zambezi valley is also related to the general strategy of strengthening the east-west lines of defence. The construction of the Cabora Bassa dam in this area is only an initial step towards the goal of securing the Portuguese presence and attracting further European settlement.

9. At the same time, in an effort to tighten administrative control of the Territory and to facilitate the movement of troops and matériel to the north, a 4,000 kilometre road is being completed under the Third National Development Plan which will link Lourenço Marques to the Rovuma River in the north-east and to Cabora Bassa in the north-west.

### A. Northern region

10. Under Portuguese administration this region was known for its sparse population and absence of easily exploitable natural resources. FRELIMO has been able to liberate large areas of this region and in 1973 it began to consolidate its influence there. With the intensification of the liberation struggle, the Portuguese authorities have concentrated their efforts on regaining control of the region. These include construction of a new network of roads and increased settlement of European farmers in strategically located areas as barriers to the southward advance of the liberation forces. More recently, regional development plans, similar to those in effect in Angola, have been drafted with the aim of extending Portuguese control of the region. In 1973, the main Portuguese strongholds in Cabo Delgado District were Porto Amélia, Mocímboa da Praia and Palma on the coast, Nangade and Mocímboa do Rovuma along the frontier with the United Republic of Tanzania and Mueda, Montepuez and Vila Cabral in Niassa District.

11. Portuguese military communiqués throughout the year have reported intense and continued activity by the liberation forces in 5 of the 10 administrative units in Cabo Delgado District, including one south of the Messalo River, as well as in 4 of the 9 administrative units in Niassa District, one of which (Maúá) is the southernmost point in that district ever mentioned in military communiqués.

12. According to FRELIMO sources, between January and June 1973 its forces in Niassa District blew up two trains and destroyed one Portuguese aircraft flying a reconnaissance mission, as well as five vehicles and two bridges. FRELIMO also carried out various operations in Vila Cabral, Maniamba, Metângula, Messângulá, Mandimba, Lunho, Oliveira and Marrupa against Portuguese controlled villages and military camps.

13. Early in the year, Portuguese sources reported that FRELIMO had established new bases in Augusto Cardoso and Nova Coimbra in the north-west, and near Messângulá in the south, and that Portuguese troops, including groups of caçadores, special forces, naval fusiliers, militia and personnel of the Direcção-Geral de Segurança (DGS) had been deployed in an effort to block their advance. In November, a Portuguese military communiqué reported an attack on a FRELIMO base located on the Chipamulo plateau in Niassa District.

14. Intense FRELIMO action was reported in Cabo Delgado District during 1973. In February, FRELIMO forces attacked a military garrison at Diaca, a few kilometres from Mueda, with the support of recoilless cannons, mortars and heavy machine-gun fire. They also attacked Portuguese facilities at Namaneco, near the extreme northern border with the United Republic of Tanzania and carried out operations at Muisse, 120 kilometres from Porto Amélia, the capital of the district. In April, FRELIMO forces attacked Portuguese military installations near Chai, south of the Messalo river. In May, the nationalists again attacked the Portuguese control points at Mueda, Chai and Mocímboa da Praia. According to reports, FRELIMO fighters damaged a bridge during the attack on Chai, and shelled a Portuguese garrison at Mueda with 122 mm rockets. Additional Portuguese aircraft and ground forces had to be sent to the area in order to strengthen the colonial occupation.

15. In June, a group of 400 FRELIMO fighters attacked the military garrison at Noazombe, on the frontier with the United Republic of Tanzania, and in July and August they engaged Portuguese forces around Nangude and Mocímboa da Praia. According to Portuguese sources, the liberation forces were equipped with 122 mm rockets, recoilless rifles, 82 mm mortars and other automatic weapons.

16. Both Portuguese and FRELIMO communiqués reported operations during January-June 1973 in the areas of Nangololo, Mocímboa do Rovuma, Nambude, Nantdola, Comangano, Namele, Nazombo, Ancuabe, Quionga, Montepuez and Porto Amélia. Official Portuguese sources also mentioned action at Miteda, Nairoto, Angra, Mossomué, Bique, and Aupi.

## B. North-western region

17. This region, which is potentially the richest in the Territory, has become the focal point in the struggle for national liberation and it is here that FRELIMO's challenge to Portuguese domination has become more intense. Among the region's natural resources are large deposits of coal, iron ore and other minerals.

18. Since the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam, this area has grown in strategic and economic importance because the electric power generated is expected to attract foreign investments and large-scale European settlement. a/

19. In the period August 1972-June 1973, FRELIMO reported the destruction of 26 aircraft; attacks on 50 Portuguese administration posts, aldeamentos (strategic hamlets) and camps; and the destruction of 127 military vehicles.

20. FRELIMO operations in this region were marked by a new intensity in 1973, including action in at least 8 of the 11 administrative units, namely the Angónia, Macanga, Moatize, Mutarara, Mâgoé, Zumbo and Tete concelhos and the Marávia circunscrição.

21. In February, FRELIMO forces reported attacks on the Portuguese military garrisons at Fíngoè and Furancungo. According to Portuguese military communiqués, FRELIMO forces used 122 mm rockets during these attacks. Fighting was also reported in the areas of Guro, Mungári and Changara. In March, it was reported that a group of some 200 freedom fighters, equipped with recoilless cannons, mortars and 122 mm rockets, had attacked the garrison of Gago Coutinho in the extreme north, near the frontier with Zambia. The Portuguese had to call on helicopter-borne troops for support. A further FRELIMO attack was made against the Portuguese military post at Vila Gamito, also at the Zambian frontier. In April, Bene, Massambe and Zambuè were the objects of attacks by FRELIMO forces using anti-personnel mines, automatic weapons and mortars. They also inflicted damage on a Portuguese army patrol in Marara.

22. In May, FRELIMO reported an attack on a northbound train near the Mecito station about 430 kilometres north of Beira. One of FRELIMO's major operations took place in June against the Portuguese military headquarters of Chitima (Estima) some 14 kilometres from the defence base of the Cabora Bassa dam project in Tete District. It was reported that the Portuguese officers' mess, the artillery positions, the power station and the airfield were either destroyed or badly damaged. Estima is the command centre from which the Portuguese army is said to control all entry and exit to and from Cabora Bassa, including supply convoys. According to FRELIMO, the attack had a very serious psychological impact on the Portuguese troops and on the technicians working at Cabora Bassa. FRELIMO also reported engagements in the Tembuè area in June, in which 150 Portuguese soldiers were killed.

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a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1). chap. IV, annex, appendix II, para.9.

23. In August, a FRELIMO landmine blew up the engine and nine freight cars of a train near the town of Doa, six miles from the Malawi border, reportedly the seventh FRELIMO strike against the Beira-Tete rail link in 1973. From August to November, there were reports of clashes between FRELIMO forces and Portuguese troops and local militia. Although not all the locations can be identified, places mentioned include Nhacamba, Soronhate, Chale, Domuè, Chifisse, Muchena, Chioco, Faqueiro, Chinchanda, Banga, Cagulula, Caduco, Chiringa and Bene.

24. Other FRELIMO operations in Tete District during 1973 included frequent strikes against the supply lines for the Cabora Bassa project, particularly the Tete-Beira line. Some of the attacks which were also reported by the Portuguese military authorities, included the derailment in February of a Beira-bound train travelling south from Caldas Xavier near kilometre 168 at the frontier with Malawi. The derailment, caused by a FRELIMO landmine, damaged the engine and six rail cars.

### C. Central region

25. The central region, formerly known as Manica e Sofala, is delimited in the north by the Zambezi River and bisected in the middle by the Beira railway and the parallel road running from the coast to Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. The economy of the region is characterized by large sugar, cotton and sisal plantations owned by Portuguese and other foreign enterprises.

26. In 1973, FRELIMO forces succeeded in opening a new front in the central region. The offensive was launched on 21 May, with an attack against a brigade of DGS personnel between Chemba and Sena, in Vila Pery District. This was followed by another attack on 27 May in the same area. Since then the liberation forces have been active in various areas including the Gorongosa National Park. Portuguese military communiqués reported that security forces had been sent to pursue the FRELIMO group as part of a large-scale operation aimed at containing any further infiltration by the liberation forces. Although official sources claimed that the FRELIMO attacks had no military significance, it was admitted that the new developments had caused alarm in circles which support Portuguese interests.

27. By mid-July FRELIMO forces had penetrated even further into the interior of the region, with an attack on a camp at Chitengo in Gorongosa Park, located about 25 miles north of the main road linking Beira to Salisbury. During the same month, FRELIMO forces opened fire on an aircraft landing at an air strip near the village of Maringue, north of the Púnguè River, also in the vicinity of Gorongosa Park.

28. In August, FRELIMO reported that its landmines had destroyed four military vehicles, two of which had been intercepted in the Cachemba area. In September, FRELIMO forces shot down a Portuguese reconnaissance plane over Chitengo in the Nage area and destroyed several vehicles.

29. FRELIMO operations are reported to have been extended to Inhaminga, Chiringoma, Dondo, Mungári, Vila Gouveia, Maringue, and Púnguè. During the period June to September, FRELIMO forces shot down 5 aircraft, attacked 6 posts and encampments and destroyed 20 vehicles.



30. On the last day of 1973, FRELIMO forces mined two trains on the Beira-Southern Rhodesia railway. Although a spokesman for Southern Rhodesia Railways refused to give the location of the derailment because they did not want to "embarrass the Mozambique military authorities", reports indicate that the incidents occurred near the town of Garuso, in Mozambique, about 60 kilometres from Umtali, at the border with Southern Rhodesia. One source stated that the tracks had been mined on both sides. Rail traffic between Beira and Umtali was temporarily halted by the attack. The attack was the first by FRELIMO on this vital railway link; it also marked a new stage in FRELIMO's southward advance.

31. FRELIMO has since stepped up its activities in the central region. In January 1974, liberation forces attacked a European-owned farm between Vila Pery and Vila de Manica, on the Southern Rhodesia frontier, and made a raid considered by one source as "the most daring attack yet" on a Portuguese garrison at Inhaminga, 150 kilometres north of Beira. A Portuguese military communiqué reporting on the raid described Inhaminga as one of the most important operational centres of the railway system linking Beira to Malawi and Tete and to the Moatize coal mines. During the attack at Inhaminga, FRELIMO's forces were reported to have used rockets and automatic weapons.

32. Both the attack on the farm and the raid at Inhaminga appeared to have caused great anxiety to the European settlers in the region, and several thousand people demonstrated in Beira and Lourenço Marques asking for tighter army control of the area.

33. According to international sources, Portuguese authorities are increasingly worried by FRELIMO's advance because it implies that FRELIMO has consolidated its control even further south. An article in the Financial Times (London) stated that guerrilla attacks normally meant that lines of supply had been consolidated in an area and contacts had been established 50 to 100 miles ahead. It could therefore be assumed that the guerrillas were getting dangerously close to achieving their stated goal of reaching the Save River by 1973/74, "as part of their southward push into the white heartland".

34. As a consequence Portuguese colonial authorities sent reinforcements to the region, and General Francisco da Costa Gomes, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces in Lisbon, travelled to Mozambique to take charge of the situation. General Costa Gomes, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Angola, has been referred to in the press as an outstanding Portuguese military officer.

C. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE\*

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. GENERAL. . . . .	1 - 2
2. POLITICAL CONDITIONS . . . . .	3 - 9

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.971.

## 1. GENERAL

1. The two islands of São Tomé and Príncipe are situated in the Gulf of Guinea, west of the Republic of Gabon. Their total area is 964 square kilometres, and they lie between 1° 44' N and 0° 1' S latitude and 6° 28' EG and 7° 28' EG longitude. The area of São Tomé is 854 square kilometres; the area of Príncipe, which lies about 120 kilometres north of São Tomé, is 110 square kilometres.

2. According to the 1970 census, the total resident population of the Territory was 73,811, of whom 69,149 were on São Tomé and 4,662 were on Príncipe. There is no recent information on the distribution of the population by ethnic groups.

## 2. POLITICAL CONDITIONS

3. The change of government in Portugal on 25 April 1974 created new political conditions for the activities of the liberation movement of São Tomé and Príncipe.

4. The Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP) founded in 1960, was replaced by the Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP), established in July 1972. The MLSTP was recognized by the OAU /Organization of African Unity/ Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa at its meetings held at Accra in January 1973.

5. On 9 May 1974, African nationalist leaders from São Tomé and Príncipe stated in Gabon that they were watching the new Portuguese Government closely for signs that it intended to encourage self-determination in the African Territories. The leaders of MLSTP said that they were ready for a dialogue with the new régime in Portugal with a view to the independence of São Tomé and Príncipe.

6. On the other hand, the newly created political association, Centro Democrático de São Tomé e Príncipe (CDSTP), issued a press communiqué on 26 May stating that it was transmitting a message to the provisional President of the Republic. The document emphasized the need to elucidate responsibilities for the crimes committed by the overthrown régime against the people of São Tomé and Príncipe and the urgency of a purge of the persons involved with the former régime. To this effect, CDSTP requested the prompt designation of a new governor for São Tomé and Príncipe.

7. Two other recently established political associations, the Frente Popular Livre and the Partido Liberal, issued a communiqué on 3 June in which they drew the attention of the new régime in Portugal to the fact that all the posts in the civil administration continued to be held by members of the former régime whose policy was in contradiction with the principles defined by the new Portuguese Government. The Communiqué stated, moreover, that there was still an absence of liberty and justice.

8. On 6 June, in another communiqué, the Frente Popular Livre regretted that the purge of the authorities involved with the overthrown régime had not yet been carried out and expressed the hope that the policies outlined by the new Portuguese

Government would be implemented in São Tomé and Príncipe. It thanked some of the Portuguese political parties and newspapers for their support in trying to solve the problems of São Tomé and Príncipe.

9. There is reportedly an atmosphere of uncertainty in São Tomé and Príncipe concerning the future, and the population is behaving cautiously for fear of possible reprisals. The authorities of the islands have not allowed the local information media to report on events which they believe might create unrest in the Territory.

D. TIMOR\*

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. GENERAL. . . . .	1 - 2
2. POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS. . . . .	3 - 8

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.972.

## 1. GENERAL

1. The island of Timor is located at the tip of the chain of islands forming the Republic of Indonesia. It lies between latitudes  $8^{\circ} 17' S$  and  $10^{\circ} 22' S$  and longitudes  $123^{\circ} 25' E$  and  $127^{\circ} 19' E$ . The western part of the island is part of the Republic of Indonesia. The area under Portuguese domination totals 18,899 square kilometres comprising the eastern part of the island (17,900 square kilometres); the enclave of Oé-Cussi Ambeno (850 square kilometres); the island of Ataúro off the northern coast (144 square kilometres); and the uninhabited island of Jacó off the extreme eastern tip (5 square kilometres).

2. According to the 1970 census, the total population of the Territory was 610,541 (517,079 in 1960). There is no recent information on the distribution of the population by ethnic groups. In 1950, there were 568 persons of European origin, 2,022 mestiços and 3,128 Chinese.

## 2. POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

3. The Junta de Salvação Nacional (Junta of National Salvation) which was established after the change of régime in Portugal on 25 April 1974, was reported to have dismissed the governors in all the Portuguese overseas Territories. At the end of May 1974, however, Colonel Fernando Alves Aldeia, who has been Governor of Timor and Military Commander of the Territory since January 1972, was still at his post.

4. During May, Colonel Aldeia met with consular representatives in Dili, including those of Indonesia and France, to explain Portugal's new policy both at a national and regional level. At about the same time Major Carlos Medelo, the Chief of Staff of the Comando Territorial Independente de Timor (CTIT) (Timor Independent Territorial Command), was reported to have travelled to the Indonesian side of Timor to explain Portuguese policy.

5. According to a Portuguese press report which quoted the Indonesian newspaper, Sinar Harapan, Colonel Aldeia had declared that the Portuguese population of Timor would decide by referendum, whether the Territory should become independent, continue to be Portuguese or become part of Indonesia.

6. No information is available on the activities of the Timor Liberation Front, the only liberation movement known to have been formed in the Territory. According to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Front was formed in September 1971, and the Portuguese authorities have kept silent about its formation, denying reports that a liberation movement had declared the independence of Timor.

7. Since April, three political parties have been formed in Timor: the Partido de União Democrática, which favours the continuation of Portuguese presence in Timor; the Partido Social-Democrata, which demands complete independence for the Territory; and the Associação para a Integração de Timor na Indonésia, which

advocates the integration of Timor with Indonesia. A fourth party, the União dos Povos Timorenses, reportedly in the process of being formed, advocates the integration of Timor with Indonesia, and has already held talks with representatives of the Movement of the Armed Forces.

8. According to the Sydney Morning Herald (18 and 24 August 1973), there were 2,000 Portuguese regular troops, 2,000 Timorese "front line" troops, and up to 5,000 "second line" irregulars in Timor. Another Australian newspaper, the Financial Times, reported in May 1973 that Trans-Australian Airlines (TAA) had carried Portuguese troops and equipment between Darwin and Timor. TAA operates three Fokker Friendship flights from Darwin to Baucau each week for Timor Air Transport.

Appendix I


MAP OF ANGOLA






Appendix II

POPULATION MAP OF ANGOLA




Appendix III

MAP OF MOZAMBIQUE



Appendix IV

POPULATION MAP OF MOZAMBIQUE



Annex II

A. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 960th  
MEETING ON 15 MARCH 1974

The Special Committee

Having considered the question of Territories under Portuguese domination,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), who participated in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item, a/

Having heard the statement by Mr. Peter Pringle, correspondent of The Sunday Times of London, concerning the massacres of villagers by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and bearing in mind the statement made by the Chairman in that regard, b/

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, as well as all other resolutions relating to the question of Territories under Portuguese domination adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee,

Recalling in particular the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2918 (XXVII) of 14 November 1972, and of Security Council resolution 322 (1972) of 22 November 1972 in which the Government of Portugal was called upon, inter alia, to enter into negotiations with the parties concerned, with a view to achieving a solution to the armed confrontation that exists in the African Territories under its domination and permitting the peoples of those Territories to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence, and strongly condemning the refusal of that Government to comply with those provisions,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on Territories under Portuguese Domination,

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a/ A/AC.109/PV.953, 954.

b/ A/AC.109/PV.953.



adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its tenth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa in May 1973,

Condemning the continued collaboration of Portugal, South Africa and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, designed to perpetuate colonialist and racialist domination in the region, and the persistent intervention against the peoples of the Territories concerned by police and armed forces, as well as by mercenaries from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia,

Condemning the repeated acts of aggression committed by the armed forces of Portugal against independent African States, which constitute a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those States and seriously disturb international peace and security in the African continent, as reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972,

Condemning any attempt by Portugal to place any of the facilities in the Territories under its domination at the disposal of its military allies on a bilateral or multilateral basis for military purposes,

Strongly deploring the policies of those States, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal, which, in defiance of repeated requests addressed to them by the United Nations, continue to provide Portugal with military and other assistance both within the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and bilaterally, without which Portugal could not pursue its policies of colonial domination and oppression of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique,

Deeply disturbed by the intensified activities of those foreign economic, financial and other interests which, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, are assisting Portugal in its colonial wars and obstructing the realization by the peoples of Territories under Portuguese domination of their legitimate aspirations for freedom and independence,

Aware of the urgent need for all States, particularly those having close economic or other relations with Portugal, to take all possible steps to induce Portugal to comply with the relevant provisions of the United Nations resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination,

Taking into account the important decision taken by the Arab States to impose an embargo on oil exports to Portugal, in view of the colonial policy pursued by its Government,

Noting with appreciation the concrete programmes of assistance being extended to the national liberation movements of those Territories by a number of Governments, as well as those initiated by organizations within the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations,

Noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom being made by the national liberation movements in those Territories, both

through their struggle and through reconstruction programmes, particularly in the liberated areas of Angola and Mozambique,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and other Territories under Portuguese domination to self-determination and independence, as recognized by the General Assembly in its resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve that right;

2. Condemns the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to comply with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and, in particular, the intensified armed repression by Portugal of the peoples of the Territories under its domination, including the brutal massacre of villagers, the mass destruction of villages and property and the ruthless use of napalm and chemical substances, in order to stifle the legitimate aspirations of those peoples for freedom and independence;

3. Demands that the Government of Portugal should cease forthwith its colonial wars and all acts of repression against the peoples of Angola and Mozambique, withdraw its military and other forces and discontinue all practices which violate the inalienable rights of those populations, including the eviction from their homes and regrouping of the African populations, the creation of aldeamentos and the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories;

4. Reaffirms that the national liberation movements of Angola and Mozambique are the authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the peoples of those Territories and, pending the accession of those Territories to independence, requests all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and the United Nations bodies concerned, when dealing with matters pertaining to the Territories, to ensure the representation of those Territories by the liberation movements concerned in an appropriate capacity and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity;

5. Demands that the Government of Portugal treat the freedom fighters of Angola and Mozambique captured during the struggle for freedom as prisoners of war in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949, c/ and invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to continue to maintain close contact with the liberation movements as parties to the conflict, to provide reports on conditions in prisoner-of-war camps and on the treatment of prisoners of war detained by Portugal and to make the necessary arrangements to secure the exchange of prisoners of war;

6. Appeals to all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations

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c/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 972, p. 135.

to render to the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and other Territories under Portuguese domination, in particular the populations in the liberated areas of those Territories, all the moral, material and economic assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the achievement of their inalienable right to freedom and independence;

7. Urges all Governments, particularly those members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which continue to render assistance to Portugal, to withdraw any assistance that enables Portugal to prosecute the colonial war in Angola and Mozambique, to prevent the sale or supply of all arms and military matériel to Portugal, including civil aircraft, ships and other means of transport capable of being used for transporting military matériel and personnel, as well as supplies, equipment and material for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition that it uses to perpetuate its colonial domination in Africa, and to refrain from any collaboration with Portugal involving the use of any of the Territories under its domination for military purposes;

8. Calls upon all States to take forthwith all possible measures:

(a) To put an end to any activities that help to exploit the Territories under Portuguese domination and the peoples therein;

(b) To discourage their nationals and the bodies corporate under their jurisdiction from entering into any transactions or arrangements that contribute to Portugal's domination over those Territories;

(c) To exclude Portugal from taking part on behalf of Angola and Mozambique in any bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements relating particularly to external trade in the products of those Territories;

9. Calls upon those States which have close economic or other relations with Portugal to make concerted efforts to obtain Portugal's compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions;

10. Draws the attention of the Security Council, having regard to the explosive situation resulting from the policies of Portugal in the colonial Territories under its domination and from its constant provocations against the independent African States bordering those Territories, and in the light of the outright disregard by Portugal of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, particularly Security Council resolutions 312 (1972) and 322 (1972), to the urgent need for taking, as a matter of priority, all effective steps with a view to securing the full and speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and of the related decisions of the United Nations;

11. Requests its Chairman, in the light of the relevant decisions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, to continue his consultations with the Organization of African Unity and with the liberation movements to work out the necessary modalities for the dispatch of special missions to the Territories concerned, as appropriate;

12. Invites the Secretary-General, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 3164 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, to continue to take effective and concrete measures through all the media at his disposal to give widespread and continuous publicity to information relating to the situation obtaining in these Territories;

13. Decides to keep the situation in these Territories under continuous review.

B. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS  
971st MEETING ON 5 APRIL 1974

The Special Committee,

Having considered the situation regarding Cape Verde,

Having heard the statement of the representative of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), who participated in an observer capacity in its consideration of the Territory, d/

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, as well as all other resolutions relating to the question of Territories under Portuguese domination adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee,

Recalling the provisions of its resolution of 15 March 1974 concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese domination, e/

Gravely concerned at the critical situation obtaining in the Territory, where, as a consequence of the policies of colonial domination and oppression pursued by Portugal and the latter's persistent neglect and disregard of the well-being of the inhabitants, the people of the Territory are suffering seriously from starvation, malnutrition and associated diseases brought on by several years of drought during which no effective measures were taken by Portuguese authorities,

Noting with serious concern the plight of thousands of Cape Verdians outside the Territory, the majority of whom were compelled to leave their country due primarily to the conditions of poverty and the hardships prevailing in the Territory as a direct consequence of the exploitative colonialist practices of Portugal,

Condemning all acts of repression by Portuguese military and police forces against the people of Cape Verde, including in particular the imprisonment of nationalists in Cape Verde and the deportation of these patriots to concentration camps, such as those in the Moçamedes desert in Angola,

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d/ A/AC.109/PV.966 and Corr.1.

e/ See sect. A above.

Deeply disturbed by the further strengthening of Portuguese armed forces in the Territory and other measures taken by the Government of Portugal designed to entrench its military and colonial domination over Cape Verde,

Condemning the attempt by the Government of Portugal to offer the use of Cape Verde for military purposes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as being a manoeuvre aimed at securing accomplices in and support for its colonial war against the national liberation movements of Cape Verde and other countries in Africa,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Cape Verde to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle, under the leadership of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), to achieve that right;

2. Reaffirms its recognition of PAIGC as the only and authentic representative of the people of the Territory and requests all Governments and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations to take this into consideration when dealing with matters pertaining to the Territory;

3. Condemns the Government of Portugal for its continued colonial domination over Cape Verde, its complete indifference to the sufferings of the drought-stricken people of the Territory and its deliberate neglect of their welfare;

4. Requests all States and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to render all moral and material assistance, through their national liberation movement, to the people of Cape Verde in their struggle for freedom and independence, and, in particular, to assist the efforts of PAIGC to protect the interests and safeguard the rights of Cape Verdians forced to emigrate by the conditions prevailing in the Territory;

5. Holds responsible the Government of Portugal for whatever consequences may result from the violent police repression practised against the people of the Territory and from the intensified military and other measures designed to suppress their national liberation movement;

6. Urges the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to impress upon Portugal the futility of its colonial wars in Africa and in particular to reject categorically that Government's repeated offers of the use of Cape Verde for military purposes to that organization;

7. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation obtaining in Cape Verde as a result of the continued Portuguese colonial domination over the Territory;

8. Decides to keep the situation in the Territory under continuous review.

### Annex III

#### NOTE BY THE CHAIRMAN

1. In accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 960th meeting, on 15 March 1974, the Chairman of the Committee addressed a letter, on the same date, to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the text of which is reproduced below:

"I have the honour to inform you that, at its 960th meeting, on 15 March 1974, the Special Committee decided to request its Chairman to seek clarification from the Government of the United States of America concerning the reported negotiations between the Governments of the United States and Portugal regarding the establishment by the United States of a military base in Mozambique, as well as the renewal of the agreement relating to the United States military base in the Azores.

"As will be recalled, the General Assembly and the Special Committee have in the past, in various resolutions adopted on the question of Territories under Portuguese domination, addressed repeated appeals to all Governments to refrain from any collaboration with the Government of Portugal for military purposes which would involve any of these Territories. In the light of this and other related recommendations of the United Nations and bearing in mind the tasks entrusted to the Special Committee, I would be grateful to receive from you any information which you might wish to put forward to the Special Committee regarding this matter."

2. The substantive portion of a letter dated 21 March 1974, addressed to the Chairman by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States in response to the above-mentioned letter, reads as follows:

"In Ambassador Scali's absence, I am replying to your letter to him of 15 March, concerning reported negotiations between Portugal and the United States. As you are aware the United States for some time has utilized military facilities at Lajes in the Azores Islands as part of the NATO /North Atlantic Treaty Organization/ defence system for North America and Europe. The current negotiations between the United States and Portugal pertain solely to the extension of the United States' use of the Azores facility.

"The United States has no intention of establishing a military or naval base in Mozambique or any of Portugal's other Territories in Africa. United States naval vessels with the approval of the Governments involved will continue to make occasional calls at East African ports, including those in Mozambique, as they traditionally have.

Annex IV

LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1974 FROM GUINEA-BISSAU

I have the honour to communicate to you the following dispatch sent to us by the information service of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) concerning the events in the Cape Verde Islands and to request you to have it circulated as an official document of the Decolonization Committee, under the item relating to Territories under Portuguese domination:

"According to information received, the population of the town of Praia has demonstrated in favour of independence and to reaffirm its support for PAIGC.

"Because of the scepticism still prevailing in Cape Verde after the Lisbon coup d'état, groups of young people have expressed through these demonstrations on 27, 28 and 29 April 1974 their desire for the establishment of true liberty for everyone.

"It should be noted that on 30 April, at the very time when the army was occupying the headquarters of the Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE)/Direcção-Geral de Segurança (DGS), a great popular demonstration was taking place in front of the building. A motor-car and several other vehicles belonging to PIDE agents and their collaborators were set on fire.

"Placards carried by the demonstrators read: 'Long live PAIGC!', 'Down with colonialism!' and 'Honour and glory to Amílcar Cabral!'.

On 1 May 1974 a large procession marched in the morning from the town of Praia, from Santa Caterina and from several other parts of the island towards the Tarrafal concentration camp; shouting slogans and rhythmic rallying cries, the marchers demanded the release of the political prisoners of Cape Verde and the other colonies and the resignation and public trial of Eduardo Fontes, the sadistic chief of the camp.

"In the afternoon, when the prisoners arrived at the town of Praia, a crowd of about 15,000 persons held up dozens of placards, PAIGC flags and portraits of Amílcar Cabral.

"A meeting in support of PAIGC was held that night at Santa Catarina. At Praia, the same night, the police fired on the demonstrators, killing a worker. The next day several thousand persons participated in the funeral, which took place without incident.

"During the following days the people continued to demonstrate in support of PAIGC. On 4 May a large political meeting was held at the Praia Cinema, in an atmosphere of great nationalistic and revolutionary fervour. At the meeting a demand was made for the total and immediate independence of Cape Verde under the flag of PAIGC.

"A second popular meeting at Santa Catarina, at which the people again demanded total and immediate independence, took place on 8 May.

"On 11 May another political meeting took place at Praia. The same day a small group of about 30 persons, protected by the police and supported by the reactionary elements, vainly attempted to express opposition to the rallying cries of those calling for the immediate and unconditional independence of Cape Verde. This attempt at sabotage failed miserably in the face of the spontaneous reaction of the people."

(Signed) Julio SEMEDO  
Ambassador, Permanent Observer  
to the United Nations



Annex V\*

TELEGRAM DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1974 FROM THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (FRELIMO),  
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

We salute the decolonization Committee of the United Nations and express once again our appreciation for the action it has been taking to support the people who are struggling against colonialism and racialism and for the respect of the rights of all people to liberty and independence, in particular the Mozambican people.

The Mozambican people, led by FRELIMO, are, now as before, firm in their determination to win total and complete independence for Mozambique.

FRELIMO is the only and legitimate representative of all the Mozambican people, composed of men and women of all colours, religions and ethnic origins.

FRELIMO has the total adherence of the Mozambican people and all our combatants have a very high morale.

In Mozambique, the Portuguese Army itself supports the position of FRELIMO.

For this reason it is imperative that Portugal understands and accepts the necessity to transfer power to FRELIMO, the legitimate representative of Mozambican sovereignty.

By its nature and based on the principles which have always oriented our organization over 12 years of its existence and 10 years of armed struggle, FRELIMO reaffirms its decision and determination to make Mozambique an independent country and thus create peace and progress in Mozambique for the economic, social and cultural well-being of the people.

FRELIMO reaffirms also its respect for human rights, including the rights of the Portuguese people living in Mozambique.

FRELIMO hopes that the United Nations, and in particular the Committee of 24, will reaffirm that peace and justice can only be realized by the total independence of Mozambique, and for this reason will urge Portugal to accept the transfer of powers that they are still holding in Mozambique to FRELIMO, without ambiguity, without evasion, without manoeuvres.

Samora Moises MACHEL  
President of FRELIMO

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/461.

CHAPTER VIII  
(A/9623/Add.2)  
SOUTHERN RHODESIA

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	1 - 13	58
B. DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	14 - 15	61
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT. . . . .		68

## CHAPTER VIII

### SOUTHERN RHODESIA

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 961st to 968th meetings, between 22 March and 2 April 1974.
2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, by paragraph 11 of which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". Further, the Special Committee took into account General Assembly resolutions 3115 (XXVIII) and 3116 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973 relating to the Territory. The Special Committee also paid due attention to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning Southern Rhodesia.
3. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on the latest developments in the Territory. The Committee also took into account a note by its Chairman dated 28 March 1974 containing the text of an exchange of letters between the Chairman and the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations concerning the participation of the United Kingdom in the Committee's work relating to the item (A/AC.109/441).
4. In addition, the Special Committee had before it a written petition dated 12 February 1974 from Mr. Jean Brück, General Secretary, World Confederation of Labour, and Mr. Otto Kersten, General Secretary, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (A/AC.109/PET.1253).
5. At the 963rd meeting, on 26 March, at the invitation of the Special Committee, Miss Barbara Rogers, Friends of Namibia Committee, made a statement on the item (A/AC.109/PV.963). At the same meeting, on the proposal of the representative of Australia, the Committee decided without objection to transmit the text of Miss Rogers' statement, for appropriate action, to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia. In a letter dated 28 March 1974 addressed to the latter, the Chairman transmitted the text of the statement accordingly.

### Participation of the national liberation movements

6. In accordance with a decision taken at its previous session and subsequently approved by the General Assembly, the Special Committee, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), invited the representatives of the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe, namely, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), to participate in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item.

7. Accordingly, during the consideration of the item, the two movements were represented as follows:

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU):

Mr. Noël Mukono, Secretary for External Affairs  
Mr. Tapson Mawere

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU):

Mr. T. George Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information

Mr. Mukono and Mr. Silundika made statements at the 961st meeting, on 22 March (A/AC.109/PV.961 and Corr.1). At the same meeting, Mr. Mukono and Mr. Silundika made further statements in response to a question by the representative of the Ivory Coast (A/AC.109/PV.961 and Corr.1). At the 963rd meeting, on 26 March, Mr. Mukono and Mr. Silundika made statements in connexion with the reported abduction of Zimbabweans in Francistown, Botswana (see paragraph 9 below) (A/AC.109/PV.963). At the 968th meeting, on 2 April, Mr. Silundika made a statement on behalf of both ZANU and his own organization (A/AC.109/PV.968 and Corr.1).

### General debate

8. The Special Committee held the general debate on the item at its 962nd to 965th meetings, between 25 and 28 March. Statements in the general debate were made by the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, the Syrian Arab Republic and China at the 962nd meeting (A/AC.109/PV.962); Chile, Tunisia and Indonesia at the 963rd meeting (A/AC.109/PV.963); Iraq, Bulgaria, Trinidad and Tobago and Sierra Leone at the 964th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.964); and Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iran, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Denmark and the Congo at the 965th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.965).

## Abduction of Zimbabweans

9. At the 963rd meeting, on 26 March, the representative of ZANU made a statement concerning the reported abduction of four Zimbabweans in Francistown, Botswana, on 10 March 1974 (A/AC.109/PV.963). Following statements by the representative of ZAPU and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.963), the Special Committee decided without objection to request its Chairman to hold consultations on the matter, as appropriate, with the parties concerned. At the 966th meeting, on 29 March, the Chairman made a statement informing the Committee of the result of his preliminary consultations with the Permanent Representative of Botswana to the United Nations (A/AC.109/PV.966 and Corr.1). At the 968th meeting, on 2 April, the Chairman made a further statement concerning his consultations on the matter with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations (A/AC.109/PV.968 and Corr.1).

## Draft resolutions

10. At the 967th meeting, on 1 April, the representatives of Mali and Iraq introduced two draft resolutions, namely: (a) draft resolution A/AC.109/L.934 relating to the question in general, which was finally sponsored by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia; (b) draft resolution A/AC.109/L.935 relating to specific aspects of the question, which was finally sponsored by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

11. At the 968th meeting, on 2 April, the representative of the Ivory Coast made a statement in connexion with draft resolution A/AC.109/L.934 (A/AC.109/PV.968 and Corr.1).

12. At the same meeting, the Special Committee voted on the two draft resolutions as follows:

(a) Draft resolution A/AC.109/L.934 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 23 to none, with 1 abstention (see para. 14 below). The result of the voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Denmark.

(b) Draft resolution A/AC.109/L.935 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 23 to none, with 1 abstention (see para. 15 below). The result of the voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Denmark.

Statements in explanation of vote were made by the representative of China on (a) above, and by the representatives of Denmark and Australia on (a) and (b) above (A/AC.109/PV.968 and Corr.1). Following a statement by the Chairman, the representative of ZAPU made a statement on behalf of both ZANU and his own organization (A/AC.109/PV.968 and Corr.1).

13. On 11 April, the text of the resolution referred to in paragraph 12 (b) above was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/11262). Copies of the two resolutions referred to in paragraph 12 above were transmitted to all States, including the administering Power, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, and to OAU.

#### B. DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

14. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/443) adopted by the Special Committee at its 968th meeting, on 2 April, to which reference is made in paragraph 12 (a) above, is reproduced below:

The Special Committee,

Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe),

Having heard the statements of the representatives of the national liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), 1/ who participated in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item,

Having heard the statement of Miss Barbara Rogers, Friends of Namibia Committee, concerning the item, 2/

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the programme of action for the full implementation

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1/ A/AC.109/PV.961 and Corr.1, PV.963 and PV.968 and Corr.1.

2/ A/AC.109/PV.963.

of the Declaration, contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, as well as all other resolutions relating to the question of Southern Rhodesia adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee,

Bearing in mind that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, has the primary responsibility for putting an end to the critical situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) which, as repeatedly affirmed by the Security Council, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming that any attempt to negotiate the future of Zimbabwe with the illegal régime on the basis of independence before majority rule would be in contravention of the inalienable rights of the people of the Territory and contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV),

Condemning the continued oppression of the people of Zimbabwe by the illegal racist minority régime, the arbitrary imprisonment and detention of political leaders and others, the illegal execution of freedom fighters, and the continued denial of fundamental human rights, including in particular the criminal measures of collective punishment, as well as the measures which are designed to create an apartheid State in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe),

Condemning the continued illegal presence and intensified military intervention of South African forces in the Territory, which assist the racist minority régime and seriously threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring African States,

Strongly deploring the failure of the Government of the United Kingdom to comply with provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee, and in particular its persistent refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the Assembly,

Deeply disturbed at the negative attitude of the United Kingdom authorities in respect of the activities of the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe, including the refusal of those authorities to issue passports and travel documents to members of the movements,

Noting with satisfaction the recent achievements made by the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe through their determined struggle towards freedom and independence, despite the intensified military and police action and other acts of violence and harassment carried out against them by the illegal régime,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and independence and the legitimacy of the

struggle of the people and their national liberation movements, who are the sole and authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, to secure by all available means at their disposal the enjoyment of that right as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

2. Reaffirms the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and that any settlement relating to the future of the Territory must be worked out with the full participation of the genuine political leaders and the leaders of the national liberation movements, including in particular the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, the President of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and Mr. Joshua Nkomo, the President of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and must be endorsed freely and fully by the people;

3. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in the discharge of its primary responsibility as the administering Power, to take all effective measures to terminate the illegal racist minority régime and not, under any circumstances, to accord to the illegal régime any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty, and requests that Government to ensure the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population;

4. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to bring about the conditions necessary to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise freely and fully their right to self-determination and independence, including:

(a) The expulsion of all South African forces from the Territory forthwith;

(b) The unconditional release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees, including in particular the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU and Mr. Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU;

(c) The discontinuance forthwith of all repressive and discriminatory measures, including the arbitrary closure of African areas, the eviction, transfer and resettlement of Africans and the creation of the so-called "protected villages" and new administrative "districts";

(d) The cessation of the influx of foreign immigrants and mercenaries into the Territory and the discontinuance of the immigration campaign entitled "Settlers 74";

(e) The removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights;



(f) The convening, as a matter of urgency, of a national constitutional conference where the genuine political representatives of the people of Zimbabwe, including the national liberation movements, would be able to work out a settlement relating to the future of the Territory for subsequent endorsement by the people through free and democratic processes;

5. Further calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure that, in any exercise to ascertain the wishes and aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe as to their political future, the procedure to be followed should be in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of one-man one-vote, without regard to race, colour or educational, property or income considerations.

6. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom, bearing in mind its responsibility as the administering Power under Chapter XI of the Charter, to secure the full enjoyment by the African people of Zimbabwe, both within and outside the Territory, of their fundamental human rights, their just treatment and their protection against abuses, including in particular their right to travel freely, and to ensure the full utilization of all available assistance in co-operation, as appropriate, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

7. Requests all States, directly and through their action in the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system of which they are members, as well as the non-governmental organizations concerned and the various programmes within the United Nations, to extend to the people of Zimbabwe through their national liberation movements all the moral and material assistance necessary in their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable rights;

8. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom to remove any obstacles to the effective utilization by the African people of Zimbabwe, both within and outside the Territory, of offers by the States, organizations and programmes referred to in paragraph 7 above of educational and training grants and facilities and, at the same time, to ensure that adequate resources are made available for the education and training of the people of Zimbabwe;

9. Calls once again upon the Government of the United Kingdom, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions, to co-operate with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the Assembly and to participate in the work of the Special Committee in connexion with the latter's consideration of the question, as well as to report to the Special Committee and to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

10. Invites all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, the United Nations bodies concerned and non-governmental organizations having a special interest in the field of decolonization, as well as the Secretary-General, to take steps, as appropriate, to give widespread and continuous publicity through all the media at their disposal to information on the situation in Zimbabwe and the relevant decisions and actions of the United Nations, with particular reference to the application of sanctions against the illegal régime;

11. Decides to keep the situation in the Territory under review.

15. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/444) adopted by the Special Committee at its 968th meeting, on 2 April, to which reference is made in paragraph 12 (b) above, is reproduced below:

The Special Committee,

Having examined the critical and deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), which the Security Council, in its resolution 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970, reaffirmed as constituting a threat to international peace and security,

Strongly deploring the fact that measures taken so far have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to an end, owing primarily to the continued and increasing collaboration which certain States, in particular Portugal and South Africa, in violation of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations and of the relevant decisions of the United Nations, maintain with the illegal régime, thereby seriously impeding the effective application of sanctions against the illegal régime,

Gravely concerned that the Government of the United States of America continues to permit the importation of chrome and nickel into the United States from Southern Rhodesia, in violation of the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970, 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970, 314 (1972) of 28 February 1972, 318 (1972) of 28 July 1972 and 320 (1972) of 29 September 1972, and in disregard of General Assembly resolutions 2765 (XXVI) of 16 November 1971, 2946 (XXVII) of 7 December 1972 and 3116 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,

Deeply disturbed at recent reports of widespread violations of United Nations sanctions, including the regular operation of Southern Rhodesian aircraft for international passenger and cargo traffic and the participation of Southern Rhodesian teams at various sporting events, as well as the continued functioning of information and airline offices of the illegal régime outside Southern Rhodesia and the resultant influx of foreign tourists into the Territory,

Bearing in mind the views expressed by the representative of the national liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), 3/

Reaffirming its conviction that the sanctions will not put an end to the illegal racist minority régime unless they are comprehensive, mandatory, effectively supervised, enforced and complied with, particularly by Portugal and South Africa,

Taking into account the important decision taken by the Arab States to ensure the complete stoppage of oil exports to the Territory, thus reinforcing the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia,

1. Condemns the failure of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures in accordance with the relevant decisions of the United Nations to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and calls upon that Government to take forthwith all effective measures to bring down the rebellious minority régime;

2. Strongly condemns the policies of the Governments, particularly those of Portugal and South Africa, which, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and contrary to their specific obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, continue to collaborate with the illegal racist minority régime in its racist and repressive domination of the people of Zimbabwe, and calls upon those Governments to cease forthwith all such collaboration;

3. Condemns all violations of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council, as well as the failure of certain Member States to enforce those sanctions strictly, as being contrary to the obligations assumed by them under Article 25 of the Charter;

4. Strongly condemns the continued importation by the Government of the United States of America of chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in contravention of the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions and contrary to the specific obligations assumed by that Government under Article 25 of the Charter, and calls upon the Government of the United States to terminate forthwith all such importation and to observe faithfully and without exception the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

5. Requests all Governments which so far have not done so:

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3/ A/AC.109/PV.961 and Corr.1, PV.963 and PV.968 and Corr.1.

(a) To take stringent enforcement measures to ensure strict compliance by all individuals, associations and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to ensure the complete discontinuance by them of any form of collaboration with the illegal régime;

(b) To take effective steps to prevent or discourage the emigration to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of any individuals or groups of individuals under their jurisdiction;

6. Further requests all Governments to refrain from taking any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal racist minority régime and, in particular, calls upon the Government of the United States to take the necessary steps to put an end to the operation and activities within the United States of Air Rhodesia, the Rhodesia National Tourist Board and the Rhodesian Information Office, or any other activities which contravene the aims and purposes of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council;

7. Considers that, in view of the further deterioration of the situation resulting from the intensified repressive measures taken by the illegal racist minority régime against the people of Zimbabwe and with a view to putting an end to the illegal régime, the scope of sanctions against the régime must be widened to include all the measures envisaged under Article 41 of the Charter, and accordingly invites the Security Council to consider taking the necessary measures in that regard and, in particular, calling upon all States to take effective steps aimed, inter alia, at:

(a) The unconditional confiscation of all shipments to and from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe);

(b) The nullification of all insurance policies covering such shipments;

(c) The invalidation of passports and other documents for travel to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe);

8. Further draws the attention of the Security Council, having regard to their persistent refusal to carry out the mandatory decisions of the Council, to the need, as a matter of priority, to consider imposing sanctions against Portugal and South Africa;

9. Appeals to those permanent members of the Security Council whose negative votes on various proposals relating to the question have continued to obstruct the effective and faithful discharge by the Council of its responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter in this regard to reconsider their negative attitude with a view to the elimination forthwith of the threat to international peace and security resulting from the critical situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

ANNEX\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. Land and people . . . . .	1 - 4
2. Background to the conflict . . . . .	5 - 8
3. Struggle for national liberation . . . . .	9 - 23
4. Illegal régime's strategy of repression . . . . .	24 - 69
5. Other internal policies and practices of the illegal régime . . .	70 - 106
6. Question of a settlement . . . . .	107 - 144
7. Relations with Portugal, South Africa and neighbouring States . .	145 - 165
8. Economic conditions and the question of sanctions . . . . .	166 - 222

Appendices

- I. Map of Southern Rhodesia
- II. United States imports of strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia,  
1 October-31 December 1973

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.923 and Add.1.

## 1. LAND AND PEOPLE

1. The Territory of Southern Rhodesia, comprising an area of 150,820 square miles, lies south of the Equator between latitude 15° 36' S and 22° 30' S and longitude 25° 13' E and 33° 4' E. It is bound on the west and north-west by Zambia, on the south-west by Botswana, on the south by the Republic of South Africa, and on the east and north-east by Mozambique. Part of the boundary with Zambia runs through Lake Kariba which was formed by the dam in the Kariba Gorge, completed in 1959 (see appendix I below).
2. According to provisional 1973 census figures, the population of the Territory was 5,890,000, an increase of 200,000 compared with 1972. The African population was estimated at 5.6 million, an increase of 180,000, and the European population at 270,000, an increase of 8,000. There were about 9,700 Asians and 17,900 Coloureds.
3. From January to September 1973 the net increase of Europeans through migration was 1,950, a decrease of 5,300 compared with the figure for the corresponding period of the previous year. European emigration increased by 1,810 over the previous year. The net decrease in white immigration is ascribed by various independent sources to the effect on the Territory of the struggle for national liberation, in particular the calling up of young men, including recent immigrants, for national service (see paragraph 30 below).
4. Most of the European population is concentrated in urban areas, particularly Salisbury, the capital (121,000 Europeans) and Bulawayo (57,900 Europeans). In contrast, most of the African population lives in the Tribal Trust Lands (4 million, or 65 per cent) and white rural areas; only 15.1 per cent is resident in urban areas.

## 2. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

5. It will be recalled that, on 11 November 1965, the white minority Government of Southern Rhodesia, headed by Prime Minister Ian Smith, illegally declared its "independence" from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having refused to agree upon an independence constitution which would incorporate the five principles insisted upon by the administering Power as the basis for independence. a/ Since then, the illegal régime has steadily intensified its oppression of the African majority of the Territory, in 1970 purporting to proclaim a republic on the basis of a "constitution" enshrining racial segregation and permanently precluding the possibility of majority rule. b/ Subsequently, the

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a/ Unimpeded progress to majority rule; guarantees against retroactive amendment of the Constitution; immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; progress towards ending racial discrimination; any basis proposed for independence must be acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

b/ For details of the "Constitution", hereafter referred to as the "1969 Constitution", see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. V, annex, paras. 14-29.

illegal régime began to take still further measures to increase racial discrimination in the Territory, with the ultimate goal of creating semi-autonomous African areas, analogous to the bantustans of South Africa.

6. Efforts to bring down the illegal régime and to restore the Territory to legality have been made by both the United Nations and the administering Power. In 1966, the Security Council determined that the situation in the Territory constituted a threat to international peace and security and decided to impose limited economic sanctions against the illegal régime. By subsequent resolutions, the Security Council progressively strengthened sanctions against the illegal régime, finally making them comprehensive and mandatory to include all exports and imports. Apart from South Africa and Portugal, all States Members of the United Nations have undertaken to comply with the Security Council resolutions regarding sanctions and have broken off all relations with the illegal régime.

7. As the administering Power, the United Kingdom has made several attempts to reach a settlement with the illegal régime. On 24 November 1971, following extensive negotiations, the United Kingdom Government and the illegal régime agreed upon a set of provisional "proposals for a settlement", based on the so-called "1969 Constitution", modified to allow for gradual progress to African majority rule and to prevent retrogressive amendment of the Constitution. These proposals were to be confirmed and implemented only after the United Kingdom Government had satisfied itself that they were acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. The test of acceptability, which was conducted between January and March 1972 by the Pearce Commission, proved that the proposals were not acceptable to the African majority of the Territory. c/ Since then there has been no meaningful progress towards a political settlement.

8. In December 1972, following the rejection of the settlement proposals by the population of the Territory as a whole and the decision of the illegal régime to discontinue further negotiations with the United Kingdom, African nationalist forces renewed attacks in the north-eastern part of the Territory. The armed struggle and other major political and economic developments affecting the situation in the Territory during the period under review, are summarized below.

### 3. STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

#### A. Armed struggle

9. The three liberation movements waging an armed struggle in Southern Rhodesia are the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People's

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c/ For further details concerning the Pearce Commission, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 14 ff. For details of the proposals for a settlement, see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971 (S/10405), p. 60.

Union (ZAPU), and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). Of these, ZANU and ZAPU were formed in 1963, under the leadership of the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Mr. Joshua Nkomo, respectively, to wage an intensive political campaign to liberate the Territory. In 1964, both ZANU and ZAPU were simultaneously banned by the Government but were reorganized both inside and outside the Territory, and began to wage an armed struggle against the illegal régime in 1966. FROLIZI was formed in October 1971 in Lusaka and since 1972 has also been involved in the liberation struggle. Initially, FROLIZI was conceived as an umbrella organization for both ZANU and ZAPU, but later it evolved as a separate group. In December 1972 all three movements intensified the armed struggle.

10. In its new phase, ZANU has concentrated its activities in the north-east of the Territory, specifically in a broad arc running from Mt. Darwin in the north-east to Karoi in the north-centre, an area of approximately 40,000 square miles. The operations of ZAPU have been centred in the area along the Zambian border. Scattered attacks have also been reported to the south of Salisbury, particularly at Wedza and Enkeldoorn, within some 50 miles of the capital.

11. According to press reports, the freedom fighters are carrying out their attacks and evading the security forces with unprecedented success, owing to their high level of preparedness, both in terms of tactics and armaments, and to the large-scale support of the local African population, numbers of whom have joined the nationalist struggle.

12. This situation of armed confrontation between the African nationalist forces and the illegal régime was reflected in communiqués issued by ZANU, which stated that its operations had resulted in the deaths of 140 members of the Southern Rhodesian security forces between 21 December 1972 and February 1973 and a further 153 deaths from May through July 1973. d/ Military vehicles and other property belonging to the illegal régime were also destroyed. In a later communiqué, ZANU reported that in August and September it had engaged the Southern Rhodesian security forces, attacked settler farms used as bases, mined roads and destroyed bridges and police stations; in addition it had shot down four spotter planes and a helicopter in this period, killed 77 Southern Rhodesian troops and wounded hundreds more.

13. The 10 July issue of Zimbabwe Line, the official publication of FROLIZI, listed 22 "pitched battles", ambushes and other attacks and incidents between February and June 1973 which had resulted in the death of 13 members of the security forces. These included an attack on a police station in February in the Karoi area, north-west of Salisbury, in the course of which one member of the security forces was killed and five others injured; the death of a South African soldier in March 1973 when his vehicle was blown up by a landmine planted by FROLIZI; and two "pitched battles" with members of the security forces in the Umvukwes and Mt. Darwin areas

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d/ The casualty rate among its security forces acknowledged by the illegal régime is substantially lower. As at December 1973, the illegal régime reported 26 deaths among the security forces, about half of whom were whites (The Observer, 16 December 1973).



in April, during the course of which two members of the security forces were killed and four injured. The pamphlet said that "combat and logistic operations were in progress" as part of a carefully conceived plan to liberate the country.

14. On 23 September, ZAPU reported that it had destroyed a South African military camp at Urungwe in the north-central part of the Territory, killing 13 members of the South African police, wounding 40 others and demolishing two army trucks. ZAPU later reported that in three separate operations in October it had killed at least 10 Southern Rhodesian and South African soldiers.

15. In a Christmas message to security forces, issued on 17 December 1973, Lieutenant-General G. P. Walls of the "Rhodesian Army" said that nationalists had launched a new offensive to coincide with the start of the main rainy season and that the security forces still had a hard struggle ahead of them.

16. The gravity of the situation facing the illegal régime has been confirmed by an independent study published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies in December 1973. <sup>e/</sup> The study observes that with its limited gross national product, the illegal régime can afford only a small defence force and that the problems of obsolescence and the acquisition of spare parts have been accentuated by sanctions. Although the security forces, backed by paramilitary support from South Africa, have until now managed to function in the face of shortages of manpower, equipment and facilities, this situation cannot continue indefinitely. Describing the prospect facing Southern Rhodesia as a war of national liberation fought by guerrillas recruited from various parts of the Territory, increasingly well-trained, armed with modern weapons and enjoying the moral and material support of most countries, the study concludes that if the guerrillas are able to expand their numbers significantly, it is doubtful whether white minority rule could be sustained.

#### B. Political developments within the liberation movements

17. In March 1973, the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU, under the auspices of OAU /Organization of African Unity/ Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, signed a unity agreement providing for the creation of a joint political council and military command.

18. Under the agreement, the political council would comprise a chairman from ZAPU, a vice-chairman from ZANU and six members of each party. It would: (a) be responsible for propaganda, mobilization, diplomatic activities, the welfare of the civil population and consolidation of areas of operation; and (b) work out a common policy for integrating all Zimbabweans willing to join the struggle. The military command would be responsible for planning and conducting military operations. To date, there is no information on the establishment of these commands.

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<sup>e/</sup> Anthony R. Wilkinson, Insurgency in Rhodesia 1957-1973: An account and Assessment, Adelphi Paper, 100 (London), The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn, 1973.

19. In the course of the meetings leading up to the unity agreement, leaders of both parties declared their intention to maintain their offensive against "white settlers". Mr. Herbert Chitepo, Acting President of ZANU in the absence of the Rev. Sithole, who is in prison in Southern Rhodesia, said that the first priority of ZANU was to continue the armed struggle which had created panic in the Territory and had led to the breaking off of relations between the illegal régime and Zambia (see paras. 162-165 below). He emphasized that the freedom fighters had found the people ready, united in action and able to join in the struggle.

20. Mr. Jason Moyo, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of ZAPU, said that his organization within the Territory intended to continue intensifying the armed struggle it had been carrying out for the past several months.

21. ZANU held its biannual conference at Lusaka from 14 to 16 September. For the first time, the conference was attended by representatives from the organization's operational zones within the Territory, including chiefs, provincial, district and branch delegates. The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa were also represented.

22. The conference adopted a number of resolutions, inter alia, pledging support and loyalty to the Rev. Sithole and other members of the Central Committee in detention and restriction in the Territory; reaffirming their belief that armed struggle offered the only way of liberating the Territory; condemning the execution of members of ZANU by the illegal régime (see paragraph 27 below); and calling on all Zimbabweans to commit themselves unequivocally to the war of liberation and to contribute money, clothes, food and other material support for the armed struggle.

23. Following the meeting, Mr. Ignatius Chigwendere, ZANU representative in the United Kingdom, said that the organization was watching with interest the attempts of the African National Council of Zimbabwe to negotiate a settlement with the illegal régime (see paras. 120-125 below), but would dissociate itself from any agreement which fell short of black majority rule. Mr. Chigwendere also said that there had been a 300 to 400 per cent increase in the size of the ZANU army over the past year, including the formation of a women's detachment in December 1972.

#### 4. ILLEGAL REGIME'S STRATEGY OF REPRESSION

24. The illegal régime has responded to the resurgence of African nationalist armed struggle by throwing its entire military and police apparatus and the reserves into action against the freedom fighters and by imposing progressively more punitive measures against the African population. At the same time it has repeatedly asserted that local African support of the nationalists has been the result of coercion and intimidation rather than spontaneous co-operation reflecting the legitimate aspirations of the African people. In this connexion, the illegal régime has also labelled the freedom fighters "outside agitators" and has even declared its intention of bringing the nationalist movement to an end by wiping out bases outside the Territory.

25. In a major statement on the security situation in April 1973, Mr. Ian Smith said that the security problem would take a longer time to resolve than had been anticipated because its roots were located outside the Territory and because the "terrorists", with the aid of "witch doctors", had succeeded in subverting the African population. He said that the ultimate objective in restoring security was to clean out "terrorist" bases across the borders.

26. Since December 1972, the illegal régime has issued progressively fewer communiqués on its military operations within the Territory. Such communiqués as have been issued have dealt primarily with the number of casualties it claims to have inflicted on nationalist forces and have consequently made it difficult to appraise the actual situation. That the illegal régime is facing growing difficulties is reflected in the increasingly repressive measures against the local African population and by recent reports of "unrest" and a "breakdown of discipline" among Africans in the regular army and police. According to a report in The Observer (16 December 1973), six non-commissioned officers in the 1,000-member Rhodesian African Rifles, the Territory's only African regiment, whose loyalty had always been taken for granted, have been court-martialled for mutiny, which is punishable by death. The development was considered to be specially significant because of the preponderance of Africans in the security forces as a whole. (Africans comprise about one third of the regular army and two thirds of the British South Africa Police (BSAP) f/). Indicative of the importance the illegal régime attaches to the "mutiny" is the fact that all details of the case have been suppressed and are forbidden to be mentioned in the Southern Rhodesian press.

27. As at December 1973, the security forces of the illegal régime claimed responsibility for the death of 200 freedom fighters and the capture of approximately twice that number. The illegal régime has also executed at least 14 Africans, convicted on charges of possessing arms of war and "murdering" settlers and members of the security forces, and has imprisoned hundreds of others (see para. 45 below).

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f/ The British South Africa Police is the para-military branch of the Southern Rhodesian forces and is charged with maintaining internal order. It was first formed in 1890 as the private police force of the British South Africa company from which it derives its name.

A. Measures to increase the military capability  
of the illegal régime

28. As previously reported, g/ with the outbreak of fighting, the illegal régime immediately took steps to increase the size of its security forces. As a result of initial measures, including the extension of compulsory service in the regular army from nine months to one year, the calling up of reserves and the granting of bonuses to enlisted soldiers and police, by April 1973, the illegal régime was reported to have concentrated between 1,000 and 1,500 troops in the Mt. Darwin Centenary area, the region hardest hit by guerrilla attacks. The scale of mobilization, however, was reported to have left business and industry undermanned and to be causing adverse economic repercussions, without satisfying the manpower requirements of the military establishment.

29. Despite these efforts, the 1972 annual reports of the "Secretary of Defence" and of the heads of the army, air force and BSAP openly stated that the efficiency of the respective components of the defence establishment continued to be inhibited by the shortage of European manpower.

30. Since mid-1973, the illegal régime has taken further measures to satisfy the manpower needs of the security forces. On 29 June, the illegal régime promulgated a regulation requiring employers to submit the names of European, Coloured and Asian employees between the ages of 17 and 30 years who were eligible for military service. Promulgation of the regulation followed a statement by Mr. Jack Howman, "Minister of Defence", that the "Government" planned to "crack down heavily" on young men who were dodging their territorial call-up and that, in the future, every male school-leaver would be required to register for military service. Mr. Howman also said that young men who left the country before completing military service would be required to fulfil their obligation upon their return, regardless of age.

31. In July 1973, it was reported that for the first time in the Territory's history reserve units composed of men aged 38 and over were being called up to serve as replacements for younger soldiers in relatively sedentary posts who were being transferred into more active units in the field. At the same time, it was reported that women in the north-eastern district were attending Red Cross first aid courses to learn how to deal with wounds from gunshot and landmine blasts.

32. It is generally acknowledged in the international press that, although the illegal régime claims that it is containing the military situation and expects to surmount it, the white community is seriously disturbed by the continuing struggle. Lack of confidence in the ability of the illegal régime to maintain security is reflected, for example, in increased emigration (see para. 3 above).

33. In this connexion, it was reported in December 1973 that the exodus of whites from the Territory was even more serious than that indicated by official figures,

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g/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. V, annex, appendix II, paras, 5-8.

because most emigrants declare themselves to be "leaving on holiday" in order to prevent the freezing of their bank accounts. Those who have left would be reported as having officially emigrated only 12 months after their departure. Although there has been a continuing influx of new immigrants, a high proportion were reported to be "unskilled" labourers, many of whom were illiterate in their own language.

34. The illegal régime's acute concern with the problem of decreasing immigration was reflected in Mr. Smith's New Year's address, in the course of which he announced the immediate launching of a "Settlers 74" campaign, the aim of which was to compile the names of a million possible immigrants. Emphasizing that the campaign would be directed at people with "special skills and qualifications, people with initiative and a spirit of adventure", Mr. Smith said that immigration to Southern Rhodesia must present a "warm and inviting picture" in comparison to the current difficulties in many countries of the western world and would, in addition, provide the most effective answer to the unemployment problem "amongst our African people". The appearance on the same day of a full-page advertisement in the Rhodesia Herald asking readers for the names and addresses of people in the United Kingdom or "anywhere else" who might like to live in "Rhodesia" underscored the seriousness and urgency of the illegal régime's need to increase white immigration. The advertisement stated that the "Ministry of Information" would mail brochures to potential immigrants revealing "a new and alluring vista of Rhodesia".

35. The immigration campaign has been condemned by both the national liberation movements and the African National Council of Zimbabwe. In January 1974, Mr. Mudzi, Executive Secretary of ZANU, charged in Dar es Salaam that the bulk of incoming immigrants would be mercenaries who would fight for the illegal régime against the people of Zimbabwe. He emphasized, however, that no matter how many immigrants were brought into the Territory, the liberation struggle would not be stopped.

36. In a statement, issued on 2 January, the African National Council of Zimbabwe said that Africans would not be deceived by the argument that more immigrants would mean more jobs for Africans, as the "Government's" policy was not based on securing skills, but on "swelling the white population". The statement added that the programme was certain to fail because the political and security situation in the Territory would not encourage immigration.

37. Apparently, the main goal of the illegal régime's new campaign is to change the population balance in favour of the whites. During 1973, the illegal régime gave increasing emphasis to curbing the African birth-rate, calculated at 3.6 per cent per year. At the annual congress of the Rhodesian Front, in September 1973, Mr. Des Frost, the party Chairman, called for the establishment of a separate ministry to deal with the "population explosion". He said that what was needed was "a ministry with teeth that can dish out benefits to those who conform and penalties to those who refuse to see the problems ...".

38. It was reported in December 1973 that continuous mobilization of reserves was imposing a serious strain on the white population. Nearly all white men of military age, according to the report, had been required to do at least one month of service in either the army or police reserves over the year and many had been called up twice.

#### B. Military expenditure

39. Out of the total estimated expenditure of \$R 318 million, h/ the 1973/74 budget provides for an expenditure of \$R 53 million by the army, air force and BSAP, an increase of 22 per cent over 1972/73. Of this sum, \$R 31 million is allocated to the defence forces and \$R 22 million to BSAP. In addition, \$R 4.8 million has been provided for improving wages, salaries and allowances for the defence forces and police and \$R 2.3 million for military motor transport and mechanical equipment, bringing the total defence allocation to \$R 60.1 million. Other defence-related allocations include \$R 1 million to the "Ministry of Internal Affairs" for "border control", i.e., for the development of a cordon sanitaire along the north-eastern border with Mozambique, and \$R 4 million for the establishment of four new administrative districts in the north-eastern area (see para. 52 below).

#### C. Repressive measures against the civilian population

40. Recognizing that the military success of the liberation movements is in large part a result of their popular support, early in 1973 the illegal régime began imposing progressively more severe punishments on the African population for any actions that could be broadly interpreted as aiding the enemy, including harbouring "terrorists", failing to report their presence and providing them with food or material support. In addition to imprisoning an unknown number of Africans, the illegal régime has razed African villages, fired on civilians, incarcerated numbers of Africans for questioning and imposed collective fines on villages wherein any inhabitant was suspected of "collaborating" with the freedom fighters. i/ In September 1973, in its most drastic action, the illegal régime imposed execution as the maximum penalty for collaboration (see below).

41. The extent of the illegal régime's concern with African co-operation with the nationalists was highlighted in July 1973 by the distribution to European farmers in the north-east of a confidential pamphlet outlining precautionary measures they should take to protect themselves from possible attacks by their African servants or labourers. The pamphlet warned farmers to maintain vigilance over their labour force, to note changes in attitude, any unusual degree of turn-out, or abnormal

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h/ The exchange rate of the Southern Rhodesian dollar fluctuates between approximately \$US 1.20 and \$US 1.65.

i/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap VII, annex, paras. 151-165.

compound activity, and to report any dramatic changes to the police. Any African with "grudges" was to be regarded as particularly susceptible to "subversion" and farmers were advised that it was essential to maintain good labour relations with their employees. The pamphlet further warned farmers to keep poisons in a secure store, to do everything possible to prevent "unauthorized persons" from studying the layout of buildings and surroundings, to avoid keeping to any routine, and to change their sleeping places from time to time. The pamphlet stated that the measures outlined were not intended to "create a state of alarm".

42. Repressive measures taken by the illegal régime against the civilian population, in the period under review, are outlined below.

#### Imprisonment and death penalties

43. As previously reported, j/ on 16 February 1973, under the terms of the state of emergency regulations, penalties for aiding freedom fighters or failing to report their presence were increased from 5 to 20 years' imprisonment with hard labour.

44. On 18 September, the "House of Assembly" increased the maximum penalty for harbouring or failing to report the presence of "terrorists", as well as for undergoing "guerrilla" training, recruiting "guerrillas" or committing any act of "terrorism" with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in Southern Rhodesia or in a neighbouring country, from 20 years' imprisonment to death or life imprisonment (Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill No. 2 of 18 September 1973). The bill also provided for the forfeiture of property as an additional penalty for "law and order offences" and empowered the "Minister of Law and Order" to charge persons with offences committed extra-territorially against the "Law and Order (Maintenance) Act", including sabotage, acts of terrorism, assisting terrorists, and possessing arms of war. In connexion with this provision, the "Minister of Law and Order" said that inasmuch as the Territory's border with Mozambique was ill-defined, it was necessary to give extra-territorial operation to the offences "in order that no terrorist or person who helps a terrorist should escape conviction on the grounds that in the area of the border it has not been proved to the satisfaction of the court that the offence took place in Rhodesia".

45. No information regarding the total number of Africans imprisoned for allegedly aiding the nationalists has been published by the illegal régime. As reported previously, k/ informed sources estimated that over 200 Africans had been arrested in February 1973 alone. The Guardian later reported that hundreds of Africans were being held for months at a time in makeshift barbed wire camps used as interrogation centres. The Africans, numbering around 500 at any one time, were said to have been rounded up from areas surrounding "guerrilla" activities, and held without trial or charge for as long as the police saw fit.

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j/ Ibid., para. 159.

k/ Ibid.



46. On 21 June, Mr. Wickus de Kock, "Deputy Minister of Justice, Law and Order", confirmed that although some "sympathizers" had been prosecuted in the courts for rendering assistance to the "terrorists", Africans had been detained without charges in cases where there was insufficient evidence for a prosecution.

#### Closure of African areas

47. Under the emergency regulations of 16 February 1973 (later incorporated into the "Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill" of 10 May 1973), the illegal régime authorized "protecting authorities" to order the closure of places in the interest of security. Under these regulations, the illegal régime is reported to have sealed off at least five African areas for indefinite periods of time and to have ordered the closing of a number of African schools.

48. In addition to closing down all churches, schools, African businesses and stores in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, about 50 miles north of Salisbury, the illegal régime also closed down similar facilities at the Masembura, Msana and Chevamora Tribal Trust Lands, about 30 miles north of Salisbury, to enable members of the security forces to conduct searches in those areas and to order strangers to leave.

49. In March 1973, the illegal régime ordered the closing of the Ichesa African Purchase Area, 120 kilometres north-east of Salisbury, where two white land inspectors had been killed the previous December. Stores, schools and beer halls in the area were closed and thousands of leaflets were airdropped offering rewards for information about freedom fighters.

50. The illegal régime also ordered the closing of two African schools near Saint Albert's German Jesuit mission at Mt. Darwin, about 100 miles north of Salisbury. According to reports, farmers in the adjacent Centenary area had signed a petition in January calling for the closure of the mission and alleging that it had shown sympathy to "terrorists". In mid-March, the school was permitted to reopen, but was closed again after four days "until further notice". The closing affected about 80 African school children, who were instructed to return to their homes.

51. On 14 April, the "Ministry of Education" announced that all African schools in the northern area closed for security reasons were to reopen.

#### Resettlement of civilian African population in the north-eastern region

52. As one of its major efforts to tighten control over the African population in the north-eastern region, the illegal régime has created four new administrative



districts and has ordered the evacuation and resettlement of about 8,000 Africans from a five-mile-wide cordon sanitaire along the north-eastern border with Mozambique. The illegal régime has allocated \$R 4.2 million for development of the new districts, of which \$R 2 million has been designated for a high priority road-building operation, \$R 1.2 million for dams and irrigation, and \$R 1 million for the construction of four new administrative centres. Each of the newly created districts, Centenary, Rushinga, Mudzi and Mutasa will have their own district commissioners and staff.

53. Shortly before the creation of the new administrative districts, Mr. Smith said in a radio broadcast that the success of the nationalists in the north-east was at least partially attributable to the shortage of administrative officers and to the consequent lack of "grass roots" communication between the Africans and the "Government". It was hoped that the creation of smaller districts would rectify this situation.

54. Emergency regulations of 18 May authorized the evacuation of the African population from the cordon sanitaire ("no-go area") and their resettlement elsewhere, after they had been "screened" for security purposes. The same regulations also empowered the Commissioner of Police to authorize the confiscation, seizure or destruction of all property in the area which he considered might be used by "terrorists". According to a statement by Mr. Howman, "Minister of Defence", evacuation of the population was designed to ease the task of the security forces by enabling them to concentrate on "terrorists", who could take cover in every nook and cranny in "very rugged country", and to protect the Africans from the "terrorists". He also indicated that Africans evacuated from the area would be resettled in the four newly created administrative districts referred to above. As these areas had not been provided with roads, irrigation facilities, or schools, the evacuees would be kept in "holding camps" for an unspecified period of time.

55. The African National Council of Zimbabwe has strongly condemned the mass removal of Africans. In a statement issued on 18 May, the Council said that it did not believe, as the "Government" had alleged, that the Africans involved had asked to be evacuated. Furthermore, it had no reason to doubt that if the Africans did resent and resist removal, the security forces might use "unorthodox means" to deal with the situation. The Council also expressed doubt that facilities such as schools, clinics and businesses would be available to the Africans resettled in the new districts.

56. In December 1973, it was reported that the illegal régime had begun to resettle the evacuated Africans in "protected villages". Four such "villages" were being planned, each with a population of between 1,500 and 2,000 persons; two had already been established with areas of 50 acres, surrounded by high fences. Africans compelled to live in the villages were required to obtain permission from the authorities to leave the site. Each village would also have "government" administration buildings and accommodations for a police detachment.

57. In a statement in "Parliament" on 7 December, Mr. Wickus de Kock, "Deputy Minister of Law and Order", said that the removal of Africans to the villages had been carried out in an orderly fashion with no force needed. African members of "Parliament" pointed out, however, that prior to their resettlement, the Africans had been confined in a relocation camp, described as a "cage" and a "concentration camp", and that there had been reports of grossly inadequate water and housing conditions. Mr. Ronald Sadomba, one of the members, said he had been told that at one time 6,000 people had been placed in an open, fenced-off two-acre area of the camp, provided with only three water taps. Although the Africans involved had finally been removed to a "protected village" where conditions were more favourable, Mr. Sadomba noted that each family was entitled to only one "hut", irrespective of the number of children or their ages; that freedom of movement was greatly restricted; and that people had not been allocated fields for food, so that they would have to depend on "Government" rations.

#### Military action against rural Africans

58. As evidence of "unorthodox means" of dealing with the African civilian population, The Zambia Daily Mail carried a report on 9 August, documented by photographs of injured women and children and by statements from doctors at three hospitals in Lusaka and eastern Zambia, of attacks by the security forces of the illegal régime against at least five African villages in the north-eastern sector of Southern Rhodesia in January. The newspaper reported that security forces had sprayed the villages with bullets, burned dwellings, destroyed grain stores and commandeered cattle in retaliation against the local inhabitants for alleged co-operation with the freedom fighters.

59. In an interview with the press in Nairobi in August, the Rev. Canaan Banana, Vice-President of the African National Council of Zimbabwe confirmed the Zambian report. He said that in the backlash against Africans following talks between "Prime Minister" Smith and Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa of the African National Council (see para. 122 below), many Africans were being killed in cold blood and that over 2,000 refugees had already crossed into Zambia.

#### Renewal of state of emergency

60. On 21 June the Southern Rhodesia "House of Assembly" voted to renew for another year the state of emergency, which has been in force uninterruptedly since 1965. The state of emergency empowers the illegal régime to legislate by regulation, to commit persons to detention for unlimited periods of time and to suspend the Declaration of Rights.

61. In the debate in the "House", Mr. Wickus de Kock said that although the "Government" has been doing all it could as regards the security situation,

"guerrillas" were showing a greater sense of purpose and determination than their predecessors, that they were using more sophisticated tactics, and that it would take time and effort before the situation was completely remedied. The state of emergency was necessary, therefore, to enable the "Government" to take appropriate measures to deal with the situation.

#### Measures to suppress freedom of speech

62. The illegal régime has also attempted to deal with the security situation in the Territory by limiting the free flow of any information it considers to be detrimental to its interests. To this end, it has imposed repressive controls on the press, held numerous trials in camera, and imposed penalties for the "spreading of rumours".

63. In early February 1973, the illegal régime issued an official statement, headed "Warning to rumour-mongers", reminding the public that, under the existing state of emergency regulations, "rumours likely to cause alarm and despondency or false alarms regarding bomb hoaxes could lead to prosecution and the imposition of severe prison sentences of up to seven years of hard labour". The statement also advised persons who heard "rumours retailed by others ... to report immediately to the police so that steps may be taken to apprehend rumour-mongers". The statement said that the warning had been prompted by "the number of rumours currently circulating throughout the country".

64. As previously reported, l/ on 20 February, the illegal régime detained Mr. Peter Niesewand, a free-lance journalist who had been reporting on the security situation in the north-east. Mr. Niesewand was subsequently charged with an alleged breach of the "Official Secrets Act" of 1970, and on 6 April 1973, after an in camera trial, he was sentenced to one year's hard labour.

65. On 27 April, the Appellate Division began an appeal hearing of Mr. Niesewand's case, which opened in public, but later went into camera as the result of an order issued by Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Law and Order", stating that it would "not be in the public interest for any matter to be publicly disclosed", apart from an edited version of the original charges and judgement. It was learned from the edited transcript of the original trial that the accusation against Mr. Niesewand was that he had on 15 November "wrongfully and unlawfully published or communicated, transmitted or transferred" information for a purpose that was "prejudicial to Rhodesia's safety or interests".

66. As later revealed by Mr. Niesewand in his book In Camera, m/ published in London in September 1973, the reports in question stated that security forces of the illegal régime were already taking an unofficial part in the "Mozambique guerrilla war - including supplying aircraft of the Rhodesian Air Force for specific tasks in the neighbouring territory, and sending patrols of soldiers across on request".

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l/ Ibid., paras. 101-103.

m/ Weidenfeld and Nicolson (London, 1973).

67. On 1 May, the Appellate Court acquitted Mr. Niesewand on the grounds that his reports had not been proved to be prejudicial to the interests or safety of Southern Rhodesia. The Chief Justice stated, however, that the extent to which the evidence would be made public would be arranged with the "Minister of Law and Order".

68. Despite the reversal of the conviction, Mr. Niesewand remained in gaol under his original detention order until 3 May 1973, when he was allowed to leave for London, although still technically in detention. According to Mr. Lardner-Burke, Mr. Niesewand's presence outside Southern Rhodesia would not be detrimental to the interests of public safety or public order within the Territory, especially since one condition of his release was that he make no comment on the court hearings in connexion with his case or refer in any way to the military situation in Southern Rhodesia. n/

69. Since Mr. Niesewand's trial, the illegal régime has enacted legislation to make the publication of trial transcripts containing "subversive" statements a criminal offence, punishable by a two-year prison sentence (Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill of 10 May 1973). The legislation also makes it an offence to distribute any publication in which such a statement might appear, to broadcast it on radio, or otherwise to communicate it to another person, in or outside Southern Rhodesia. Bona fide legal publications, law reports which do not form part of any other publication, and any publication found by a court not to be subversive, are exempted from the specified penalties.

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n/ According to a report in the Rand Daily Mail, at least 58 journalists had been declared prohibited immigrants by the illegal régime since 1963, had had their work permits withdrawn or had not been permitted to enter the country.

## 5. OTHER INTERNAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE ILLEGAL REGIME

70. Since coming into power in 1965, the illegal régime has continued a repressive policy against the African population in order to maintain the privileges of the white minority. In implementation of this policy it has enacted the "Land Tenure Act, 1969", which reserves half of the Territory for the 270,000 Europeans and the other half for the almost 6 million Africans. o/ The illegal régime has further increased racial segregation in urban areas, evicted thousands of Africans from their traditional homes, and embarked on a plan of provincialization, which is expected to result in the creation of numerous segregated African self-governing areas. It has also detained large numbers of Africans who have expressed opposition to its policies.

71. In July 1973, Mr. Ian Smith, in a statement at Victoria Falls, said that Rhodesian racial policy was based on the standards set by the country's early white pioneers and that it would harm both blacks and whites if these were lowered "a long way down" to present African standards. As regards the "Land Tenure Act" and other racially discriminatory measures, Mr. Smith contended that such measures had been brought about "expressly for the protection of the African" at the "insistence" of the United Kingdom Government at the time for "obvious" reasons. "Had land not been set aside for the exclusive use of the African", he said, "the European with his superior know-how and capital resources would very soon have owned all the land, or at least the lion's share of it and the very best of it". Mr. Smith also asserted that the successful African businessmen in the tribal areas would not have existed had they not been protected from European competition.

72. In a subsequent statement in "Parliament", Mr. Smith, replying to a suggestion that the land of the Territory should be shared by the races in proportion to their relative numbers, said that the "Government" would not deviate under any circumstances from its fundamental policy of dividing the land equally between the two races.

### A. Intensification of racial segregation

73. In 1972, the illegal régime, in response to the demands of the Rhodesian Front, enacted a series of laws to step up racial discrimination in the Territory. These laws, which were fully described in the previous report of the Special Committee, p/ inter alia: (a) imposed racial segregation at bars and post offices; (b) empowered local authorities to segregate swimming pools and other public

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o/ Under the "Land Tenure Act, 1969" (which replaced the Land Apportionment Act of 1930), European land comprises 45 million acres; African land, 44 million acres; and national land, 7 million acres. Africans and Europeans are prohibited from occupying land in areas designated as belonging to a race other than their own.

p/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 119-139.

amenities on a racial basis; (c) empowered landowners to create residential subdivisions from which Asian and Coloured occupants could be excluded; (d) required all Africans over 16 years of age to carry identity cards at all times; and (e) instituted a policy of "influx control" to restrict the freedom of rural Africans to enter urban areas.

74. Since the renewal of the armed struggle by the liberation movements in December 1972, which has imposed great strains on the political as well as military resources of the illegal régime, the latter has taken steps to limit the number of Africans moving to urban areas in search of higher wages and has continued the eviction of thousands of Africans from areas which were reclassified as "European" under the "Land Tenure Act".

#### "Influx control"

75. It will be recalled that, in November 1972, the illegal régime amended the "Vagrancy Act" as part of its policy to control the influx of rural Africans into urban areas. In March 1973, this control was further tightened with the publication of the "Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration (Employment Bureaux) Regulations". Under these regulations, Africans seeking work must register at an employment bureau upon their arrival in an urban area and have their identity documents endorsed. Africans have 15 days to find work before their registration expires; failing to find work they are required to return to their rural areas. Failure to register is an offence carrying a fine of \$R 50 or three months' imprisonment.

76. In an address at the annual conference of the Local Government Association in May 1973, Mr. Mark Partridge, "Minister of Local Government and Housing", said that the measures already introduced represented only a start towards complete influx control, but that he was as yet reluctant to embark upon an extensive policy of documentation and rigid policing in view of the possible security implications and international repercussions. Mr. Partridge ascribed the flow of Africans into urban areas, which he said was threatening the planned evolutionary growth of towns and regions, to the tremendous African population growth, the lack of matching development in the Tribal Trust Lands, and the inability of the rural areas to pay wages competitive with those paid in towns. The ultimate solution to this problem, he said, which was rapidly getting out of control, lay in better farm prices, thus attracting people to the rural areas because of the resulting higher wages, and in the rapid development of the Tribal Trust Lands.

#### "African (Registration and Identification) Amendment Act"

77. On 24 February 1973, the illegal régime published a government notice slightly modifying the "African (Registration and Identification) Amendment Act, 1972", which requires Africans to carry identity or registration certificates at all times. Specifically, Africans: (a) living in Tribal Trust Lands; (b) employed on white-owned farms or mines; or (c) owners or lessees of farms in African Purchase Areas are exempt from carrying registration or identity documents while within their own kraals (villages), on their employers' property, or on their own

farms respectively. African members of the police, prisons, army and air force and district assistants employed by the "Ministry of Internal Affairs" are also exempt while in uniform. The exemption does not apply to Africans living within the four newly created districts in the north-east of the Territory, nor does it apply to Africans living in urban areas or in rural areas other than those specified in the notice.

78. On 9 November, it was reported that new regulations had been published in the "Government Gazette" requiring Africans in eight districts in the northern areas to apply for new registration books. The districts are Bindura, Centenary, Mt. Darwin, Mrewa, Mtoko, Shamva, Sipolilo and Mazoe. Under the new regulations, all Africans desiring to enter these areas are also required to obtain new books.

### Segregation of public facilities

79. In March 1973, the Salisbury City Council stated that, in view of the absence of local demand, it was unlikely to mandate separate public facilities, swimming pools, parks or sports grounds for Africans and Europeans. Amendments to the "Municipal Act", promulgated on 19 January, had authorized local authorities to establish separate facilities on such basis as was considered equitable by the "Minister of Local Government and Housing".

80. Shortly before the opening of the 1973 annual congress of the Rhodesian Front, in September 1973, Mr. Des Frost, the party Chairman, said that the Rhodesian Front was willing to see if the present permissive legislation was workable, but that if it were not, the party wanted stronger measures introduced.

### Evictions

81. As previously reported, the "Land Tenure Act" entitles the illegal régime to evict Africans from areas reclassified as "European" land. Particular targets for eviction have been the Tangwena tribe, whose traditional home is on the Gaersi Ranch in the eastern highlands near the Mozambique border, and the Mutasa tribesmen who have traditionally lived in the Stapleford Forest Reserve, also near the frontier with Mozambique. Recent steps taken by the illegal régime to evict these groups are summarized below.

#### (a) Tangwenas

82. Since 1969, when the illegal régime first undertook to remove the Tangwenas from the Gaersi Ranch by destroying their dwellings and confiscating their cattle, the tribesmen have repeatedly rebuilt their village. In August 1973, a year after their previous effort to remove the Tangwenas from the Gaersi Ranch, q/ the Southern Rhodesian police again set fire to the newly rebuilt Tangwena village

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q/ Ibid., paras. 105-106.



and crops, forcing the tribesmen into hiding in the surrounding hills. According to a report in The Guardian (18 September 1973), the eviction of the Tangwenas has assumed deep symbolic importance both to other Africans and to the illegal régime, which is said to be more committed than ever to expelling the tribe in order to prevent it from serving as an example of successful defiance of racial policies. In the same article, it was reported that the illegal régime had installed a police detachment in the area which it is determined to maintain there indefinitely, despite the demands placed on the security forces by the struggle for national liberation.

(b) Mutasas

83. It will be recalled r/ that, in the spring of 1972, the illegal régime announced its decision to proceed with the removal of the approximately 2,000 Mutasa families, comprising about 7,500 individuals living in the Stapleford Forest Reserve, to a tract of 4,250 hectares about 18 miles to the north-west. Subsequently, some 5,000 members of the Mutasa tribe "voluntarily" left and settled in the nearby Inyanga area, in preference to the government-designated tract, which they described as "over-populated". In May 1973, the illegal régime decided that the remaining 2,500 Mutasas should be resettled as soon as possible and allocated \$R 92,000 for the development of the new tract.

B. Provincialization and the policy of "separate development"

84. As previously reported, s/ in November 1972, the illegal régime, in pursuance of its policy of "provincialization", enacted a "Regional Authorities Act" providing for the establishment of semi-autonomous African regional authorities and enumerating their functions.

85. Although it was announced on 26 March 1973 that regional authorities would be established in the two largest provinces, Mashonaland South and Matabeleland North, no further action was taken. At the annual congress of the Rhodesian Front in September, Mr. Lance Smith, "Minister of Internal Affairs", in an attempt to forestall criticism about the delay, announced that the "Government" was planning instead to introduce authorities in all eight provinces at once and that elections were being arranged. Mr. Smith gave no indication, however, of when the authorities would actually be established.

86. A commentary by Salisbury Radio on 26 March said that the illegal régime was also considering extension of regional authorities to urban areas but that owing to the greater complexity of urban problems, there was controversy as to how such a measure should be carried out.

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r/ Ibid., para. 107.

s/ Ibid., paras. 110-116.



87. The proposals for the establishment of "regional authorities" have met with widespread criticism from Africans in the Territory. In a statement on 27 March, the African National Council of Zimbabwe said that it had always opposed "provincialization" because it led to "bantustanism" and that the "Government's" announcement on the composition of the regional authorities had confirmed its fears. Since the "authorities" would be largely composed of tribal chiefs, they would be no different from the present chief's councils and would continue to be guided, not by the people, but by the provincial and district commissioners. The statement said that the authorities should be formed through free elections and that most of the members should not be chiefs; it also warned that, with their envisaged membership, the "regional authorities" would be a failure from the start.

88. Commentaries in the Southern Rhodesian press have also criticized the regional authorities. In March, an article in the Rhodesia Herald, for instance, quoted local observers as saying that the method of choosing the members of the authorities made it impossible for political parties to play a useful role.

89. Replying to these criticisms, Mr. R. J. Powell, "Secretary for Internal Affairs", said that the regional authorities were not a duplication of chiefs' assemblies and would cover a completely different sphere of responsibilities. The decision whether or not to open membership of the regional authorities to African "commoners", however, would have to be taken in the light of experience. Mr. Powell asserted that the provincialization programme had the complete support of tribal chiefs.

### C. Detentions

90. As noted above, the State of Emergency Regulations (Emergency Powers Act No. 48 of 1960), which have been in effect uninterruptedly since the illegal declaration of independence and which were invoked for brief periods in the earlier 1960s to quell African nationalism, endow the illegal régime with virtually unlimited powers of detention without trial.

91. In May 1973, according to estimates by the International Defence and Aid Fund in London, an organization that provides financial aid to families of detainees, approximately 120 detainees were being held in six detention camps in Southern Rhodesia. t/ Most of this number had been held for more than nine years and had never been brought to trial or given any reason for their imprisonment.

92. In mid-1973, reports indicated that the illegal régime was in the process of carrying out a further series of mass detentions. Two letters smuggled out of two detention camps in Southern Rhodesia in July 1973 said that the number of political prisoners had increased by about 60, bringing the total number of detainees to about 200. Many of the new detainees were said to be from rural areas. Subsequently, in August 1973, Bishop Muzorewa, Chairman of the African

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t/ According to the 1972 annual report of the "Minister for Law and Order", there were 90 detainees at the end of 1972, compared with 77 at the beginning of the year. During the year, some 14 detainees had been released, but further detentions had been made.

National Council of Zimbabwe, said that 33 members of his organization had been detained over the preceding month, including nine leaders in Mtoko in the north-east. (Mr. Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", admitted to the detention of only six council officials (see also para. 128 below). Confirming Bishop Muzorewa's assertion, an article in The Guardian reported in August that the illegal régime had opened a new detention centre in the Midlands town of Que Que and that members of the African National Council were being brought there.

93. Additional information regarding the political prisoners in the Territory has been provided by the Campaign for the Relief of Rhodesian Political Prisoners (CRRPP), a newly formed organization based in London with the aim of providing welfare to political prisoners and their dependants. The interim chairman of CRRPP is Mr. Jason Moyo, Chairman of ZAPU's Revolutionary Council. According to this information, it is not possible to establish how many political prisoners there are in Southern Rhodesia at any one time, although it is known that the total is now in the thousands, divided into four principal categories: (a) those who have been charged, tried and sentenced for political offences and who continue to be held in prison under detention conditions upon completion of their sentence; (b) those who have not been charged or tried but who have nevertheless been placed in indefinite detention in a maximum security prison or in a specially constructed detention camp; (c) those who have been detained on a 30-day order, which can be served without judicial authority by a policeman, and which can be renewed in perpetuity without the name of the detainee ever having to be disclosed; and (d) those who have been restricted either to a specially prepared remote area or to a limited environment such as a private house. u/

94. Under the regulations, detainees are entitled to have the charges against them reviewed each year by a review tribunal. The charges do not require proof, and the illegal régime is neither bound to act on recommendations of the tribunal, nor to publish the names of the detainees or their place of detention. Detainees are further prohibited from communicating freely with anyone, including legal counsel. Since 1969, the tribunal has recommended the release of only five persons from detention.

95. As regards the actual plight of detainees, it was reported in The Guardian (5 May 1973) that the conditions of imprisonment for detainees are normally substantially worse than those prevailing for ordinary criminals: letters and visits are heavily curtailed as a matter of course; solitary confinement is standard punishment for minor infractions; and the detainees' families are not eligible for the welfare available to the wives of ordinary criminals. Furthermore, as reported by CRRPP, political detainees, in contrast to those serving criminal sentences, are never allowed into the open air; they are required to provide their own clothing; and they have to find work for themselves or keep themselves occupied with studies and arrange their own recreation.

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u/ There is no information on the number of restrictees. Those currently restricted include Mr. Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and Josiah and Ruth Chinamano, who were first detained by the illegal régime in January 1972 during the test of acceptability.

96. Conditions in the detention centres are reported to have deteriorated during 1973. According to letters smuggled out of the detention centres, the illegal régime had begun to increase physical and psychological pressures by depriving the detainees of material support from the outside and by withdrawing books. One letter said that there was "an obvious and deliberate effort by government and prison authorities to render us completely useless to our dependants". As reported in The Guardian (31 July 1973), the authors of the letters had instructed a firm of solicitors, Winterton, Holmes and Hill, to institute court proceedings against the illegal régime because of the "unsatisfactory and deteriorating conditions" in which they were being held. The three detention centres involved in the action are Salisbury Remand Prison and Gwelo and Wha Wha prisons in the Southern Rhodesian midlands.

97. The United Kingdom Government has acknowledged the deterioration of the conditions of detainees. On 28 June, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said in the House of Commons that he had noted regulations introduced earlier in the year altering the conditions upon which detainees might receive visitors and had heard a report that the correspondence of some detainees had been delayed.

#### D. Repression of African students

98. In August 1973, the illegal régime began to take severe repressive measures against the African students at the non-racial University of Rhodesia, the net effect of which has been to reduce the African enrolment at the University by about one fourth. v/ The measures were taken following the participation of large numbers of African students in demonstrations protesting the working conditions of the African staff at the University.

99. According to press reports, the first demonstrations at the University took place on 3 August, when about 200 African students organized a strike of African domestic and grounds staff which lasted several hours. Police arrived with riot gear and dogs, but were reported to have taken no action. The demonstration ended without violence, despite the fact that Professor Robert Craig, Principal of the University, refused to grant an interview at which the students could express their grievances.

100. On 7 August, upon learning that the disciplinary committee had recommended the expulsion of six students and the suspension of eight others for their participation in the demonstration, numbers of African students were reported to have stoned buildings, broken windows and set small grass fires in protest against the "disciplinary" action which they alleged was based on racial discrimination. Police with dogs, who had already been called to the campus by the Principal, arrested 155 African students on charges of public violence and allied offences. Police remained on the campus for several days thoroughly searching the student residences.

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v/ In August 1973, enrolment at the university comprised 370 Africans and 540 whites.

101. On 31 August, 115 of the students were sentenced to gaol in the Magistrate's Court at Salisbury. Of those sentenced, 98 were sentenced to six month's gaol with half the sentence suspended for three years, and the others, including three women, to nine months, also partially suspended.

102. On 31 October, when the 98 students were released, the illegal régime issued a ban preventing them from coming within 20 kilometres of Salisbury city centre for three years. The ban, which precludes the students from attending classes and taking examinations, effectively ends the university education of the students involved. In a statement justifying the ban, the illegal régime said that evidence against the students clearly indicated that they intended to force the closing of the university; the "Government" therefore was taking steps to ensure that the disruptive influence of "troublemakers" was completely removed.

103. The action of the illegal régime has been condemned by the African National Council of Zimbabwe as "ruthless and heartless" and designed to "engender feelings of hostility among the races at a time when all were seeking understanding and harmony".

#### E. African protests

104. On three occasions in 1973, there were riots in some African townships around Salisbury. Although the illegal régime has denied that the riots were politically motivated, Mr. Alan Savory, founder of the "moderate" Rhodesia Party (see paras. 141-144 below), expressed the opinion that African frustration over the policies of the illegal régime was the main reason for at least one of the riots. In a statement on 21 May, he said that Africans were becoming embittered over such things as communal punishments and African bar curfews in urban centres. He also expressed doubt that disturbances would stop before the Rhodesian Front "Government" was out of power.

105. The first two riots broke out on 21 May, following sporting events in the Harari and Highfield African townships. In both cases, Africans stoned white-owned cars and buses as they left the stadiums. Twenty-seven whites were treated at hospitals for injuries they had received in Harari and six Africans were arrested on suspicion of being agitators. On 15 June, however, the illegal régime dropped charges against the arrested Africans on the grounds that no evidence existed to indicate conspiracy.

106. On 6 October, one African was killed and two wounded by police firing on a rioting crowd in the Harari African township. This riot, which, like the earlier ones, had erupted after a sporting event, later spread to industrial areas in the township and a section of the road leading to Salisbury.

## 6. QUESTION OF A SETTLEMENT

107. Since May 1972, when the Pearce Commission reported to the United Kingdom Government that the "people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the proposals /agreed upon between the illegal régime and the United Kingdom in November 1972/ as acceptable as a basis for independence", there has been no discernible progress towards a settlement (see also paragraphs 5-8 above).

108. Information on the deadlock as regards a settlement and on connected developments is summarized below.

### A. Position of the United Kingdom Government

109. In June 1973, the United Kingdom Government, which had had no direct contact with the illegal régime since 1972, w/ sent a three-member mission headed by Sir Denis Greenhill, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Salisbury for what was described as "normal contact between officials". In Salisbury, the mission met with "Prime Minister" Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, and other African leaders, as well as with Southern Rhodesians representing various other shades of opinion. According to a spokesman for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the sole purpose of the visit was to make an assessment of the situation for the Foreign Secretary.

110. Following Sir Denis' return to London, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said in the House of Commons that the problems of Rhodesia could not be solved from London at this stage and that what was required was for the Europeans and Africans in Southern Rhodesia to try to seek solutions to their problems between themselves. Although the Government would consider helping towards a settlement in the future, it would not do so until asked and until there was a greater measure of agreement between Europeans and Africans than at present.

111. Sir Alec also expressed the view that both the African National Council of Zimbabwe and the Southern Rhodesian "Government" had begun to realize that a settlement was essential and he appealed to the two sides "to try to come together in a spirit of mutual compromise to seek a just settlement to their problems". In the meantime, he said, the United Kingdom Government would maintain the status quo "as creating the best climate for discussions in Rhodesia between Rhodesians".

112. On 19 July, Sir Alec reaffirmed in the House of Commons his conviction that the Government's policy of maintaining the status quo in order to allow the various

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w/ In June 1972, Mr. Alec Ward, the only United Kingdom official who had remained in Salisbury after the departure of the Pearce Commission "to deal with matters arising from the test of acceptability", was recalled at the request of the illegal régime (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, para. 35).

parties in Southern Rhodesia to work out a settlement for themselves remained the right one. He told the House that there had been meetings between "Prime Minister" Smith and Bishop Muzorewa (see paras. 121-122 below), which he characterized as "certainly a step forward", and he hoped that they would lead to an eventual agreement between the races. Sir Alec reiterated that it was up to all Southern Rhodesians to "work out for themselves a settlement which could resolve the difficulties within their country, bring the dispute with Britain to an end and be a basis for independence for Rhodesia". The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was reported to have indicated that his conclusions were largely based on the Sir Denis Greenhill report on his mission to Salisbury. Although the contents of this report had not been made public, press reports suggested that it had concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that African rejection of the settlement proposals had been reversed.

113. On 8 November 1973, both houses of the British Parliament voted to approve the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 (Continuation) Order 1972, which continues sanctions against Southern Rhodesia for another year. The vote in the House of Commons was 133 to 26; in the House of Lords the vote was 73 to 33.

114. In presenting the Order to the House of Commons, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that lifting of the sanctions would be a signal to Southern Rhodesians that the United Kingdom had given up hope of reaching agreement between the races. Such an action would leave the field to extremists on both sides who would bring about increasing confrontation and violence. The United Kingdom Government, on the contrary, was as determined as ever to see that a satisfactory agreement was achieved and remained ready to help to give Southern Rhodesia independence in a form which would be broadly acceptable to the people there, both black and white.

#### B. Attitude of the illegal régime

115. Despite African opposition, the illegal régime has continued to maintain that the 1971 proposals constitute the only possible grounds for a settlement. Nevertheless, since the spring of 1973, the illegal régime has indicated in various statements that it considers the prospect for a settlement increasingly remote, and has called upon the white minority to "reconcile themselves" to the eventuality of not gaining international recognition or legality and to accept the continuation of sanctions and other penalties of non-recognition as "normal".

116. In a statement at the opening of a new session of "Parliament" on 13 June 1973, "President" Clifford Dupont said that his "Government" held out little hope of a settlement with the United Kingdom, which, owing to political and economic considerations unrelated to Rhodesia, "no longer had the same determination to resolve the issue that was evident when the agreement was signed in November 1971".

117. Reiterating that the only basis for a settlement would be the implementation of the 1971 proposals by the United Kingdom Government, Mr. Dupont called upon "the people of Rhodesia" to accept his assessment of the possibilities and to reconcile themselves to the situation because of the "disadvantages inherent in prolonged uncertainty about a settlement".

118. On 29 June, in reply to a debate in "Parliament" on the question of a settlement, Mr. Smith said that the possibility of a settlement was receding because Africans continued to look to the United Kingdom for improved proposals rather than "coming to terms with reality in Rhodesia". Although the United Kingdom Government had appealed to Rhodesians of both races to find their own solution to the constitutional problem, it continued to "maintain the fiction" that it was capable of influencing events in Rhodesia and thus constituted the "main stumbling block" to an agreement. Mr. Smith called upon the United Kingdom Government "to get off our backs and let us do the job", saying that as long as the ghost of that Government hovered in the background, acting as a decoy to the inexperienced and the gullible, Rhodesians would continue to be plagued by useless and sterile distractions. Mr. Smith also said that the Rhodesian "Government" had leaned over backwards to achieve an honourable settlement and that failure to reach an agreement would not be "because of lack of perseverance or reasonableness on our part, but because of a dictatorial intransigence on the other African side". Mr. Smith denied that the Territory was dependent on a settlement for its survival, saying only that "without a settlement the road will be more difficult and it will take longer to get there".

119. At the annual congress of the Rhodesian Front, in September 1973, Mr. Smith reiterated that his "Government" had no intention of trying to reopen settlement talks with the United Kingdom. Although his "Government" remained convinced that the majority of Rhodesians supported the settlement, it had been unable to convince the United Kingdom Government of that.

#### C. African National Council of Zimbabwe

120. It will be recalled that the African National Council of Zimbabwe, after successfully consolidating African opposition to the 1971 settlement proposals, announced in March 1972 its formation into a permanent political organization dedicated to non-violent efforts to bring about constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia. Despite the continued efforts of the illegal régime to discredit the Council and limit its effectiveness (see paras. 126-140 below), the Council has persisted in its attempts to reach an agreement with the illegal régime. Since the spring of 1973, there have been a number of meetings between officials of the illegal régime and members of the Council, including several talks between "Prime Minister" Smith and Bishop Muzorewa. So far as is known, however, these talks have not been productive and, according to some sources, were undertaken on the part of the illegal régime only in order to lend plausibility to its contention that it had exhausted all possibilities for reaching a mutually satisfactory compromise with the African majority.

121. According to press reports, five meetings were held between officials of the Council and the illegal régime in April 1973. These were followed by a meeting between Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Smith on 17 July. Following the meeting, Bishop Muzorewa issued a statement in which he said that discussions had been "general, cordial but highly confidential", and, in his opinion, represented an important advance for Rhodesia and all her people. The question of further meetings had been left open but he was hopeful that they would take place.



122. On 18 December 1973, it was reported that talks between Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Smith had been continuing. Although the dates and times of their meetings had been kept secret, it was believed that they had met six times in all, and would meet again in January. According to the report, Mr. Smith had said recently that, although he did not wish to be too optimistic, some progress was being made.

123. Although the Council has reportedly drawn up constitutional proposals, these proposals have not been made public and, according to Bishop Muzorewa, will not be communicated to the illegal régime unless it is willing to negotiate on a basis other than the 1971 proposals.

124. None the less, Mr. Smith, in his statement to "Parliament" on 29 June 1973, rationalized the lack of progress towards a settlement on the grounds that he had received "totally and absolutely unacceptable" demands from the Council. These alleged demands included immediate parity in the House of Assembly; a United Kingdom veto on amendments to the Constitution; the repeal of all discriminatory legislation within 12 months of a settlement; an integrated school system; equal job opportunities for Africans on a quota system in the civil service and armed forces; the release of all political detainees; and an amnesty for guerrillas outside the country.

125. In an interview on 6 July, Bishop Muzorewa said that the Council's proposals were open and that he was prepared to make concessions on major issues and meet the "Government" halfway as long as the concessions were reciprocated. As a measure of the Council's reasonableness it had dropped demands for "one man, one vote" and for immediate parity for Africans in the House of Assembly, and it was also ready to negotiate on the "Land Tenure Act" and the issue of a lowered African franchise. Bishop Muzorewa added that he was the only person who knew the details of all the Council's proposals.

#### D. Repressive measures against the Council

126. In an attempt to undermine the effectiveness of the Council in sustaining African opposition to the 1971 settlement proposals, the illegal régime has imposed increasingly repressive measures against the organization and its members on the grounds that the Council supports and promotes the violent overthrow of the "Government".

127. These increasingly repressive measures, taken since March 1973, are described in the previous report of the Special Committee. x/ They include the arrest of over 40 members of the organization and the detention of two others; banning the sale or distribution of Council membership cards as "undesirable publications", by which action the illegal régime simultaneously deprived the organization of African

x/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 59-68.



financial support and disrupted the enlistment of rank and file members; prohibiting the organization from receiving money or goods from outside the country; and revoking the passports of Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Canaan Banana, Vice-President of the Council.

128. Shortly after the meeting between Mr. Smith and Bishop Muzorewa on 17 July 1973, the illegal régime began a new wave of detentions of high-ranking members of the Council (see para. 92 above). On 1 August, Mr. Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", alleged in "Parliament" that the six men which the illegal régime admitted detaining constituted "security risks" and that he had sufficient evidence to justify their imprisonment. Without specifying what particular acts if any were committed by the detainees, Mr. Lardner-Burke said that, in general, detentions were ordered only because of such subversive activities as helping or associating with "terrorists". He also alleged that the Council practised subversion in cells throughout the country and was trying to subvert the University of Rhodesia. Members of the Council voiced the suspicion that the new measures were aimed at isolating Bishop Muzorewa from his followers.

129. Commenting on the detentions, Bishop Muzorewa expressed his "horror, dismay and disgust" and called upon the "Government" to bring the detained men before the courts immediately. He added that the detention of Council officials without trial was a rejection of the Council's efforts to help Rhodesians achieve an honourable solution without blood baths, but that the liberation struggle would, none the less, continue as long as there were Africans alive.

130. In mid-August, in another move to cripple the Council, the illegal régime instructed banks to inform the Special Branch (the security police) of any foreign financial transactions involving either the Council or a number of suspected individuals, including Bishop Muzorewa, the Rev. Banana and Mr. Edison Sithole, Publicity Secretary of the Council. As the Council had already been named under the Prohibition of Foreign Aid to Designated Political Parties Regulations, the new measures enabled the Special Branch to seize immediately any funds received by the Council and the designated members.

131. Other individuals named on the list included Mr. Garfield Todd, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Alfred Knottenbelt, Rhodesian Chairman of World University Services, an organization based in Switzerland which has provided aid to African students; Mr. Anthony Eastwood, defence counsel for Mr. Peter Niesewand; and Mr. Ramandhai K. Naik, an Indian businessman who is considered to be sympathetic to the nationalist cause.

132. The order also provided that banks inform the Special Branch of any funds received by any depositor from the World Council of Churches; the International Defence and Aid Fund in London; the Joseph Rowntree Trust in New York; World University Services; or Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock, a white Southern Rhodesian who had been deported by the illegal régime and deprived of his citizenship. Mr. Clutton-Brock and the above-named organizations have been providing humanitarian assistance to detainees and their families.

133. According to a report in The Guardian (14 August 1973), the order seems to have three purposes: to prevent the African National Council of Zimbabwe from receiving outside financial support; to stop foreign financial assistance from reaching African detainees and their families; and to enable the illegal régime to compile dossiers on individuals for possible future use.

134. On 15 August, it was reported that the illegal régime was blocking \$R 45,000 belonging to the American United Methodist Church of which Bishop Muzorewa is head. According to a statement by Bishop Muzorewa, the money was being held on instructions from Mr. Lardner-Burke, because he believed it might be used by the Council. Bishop Muzorewa said that the church was being asked to account for the proposed expenditure of the money before it would be released.

135. The illegal régime has also taken measures which, though not overtly directed against the Council, clearly appear to have been enacted with that organization in mind. Among these measures is one prohibiting the holding of public meetings. It will be recalled that, in November 1972, the illegal régime adopted further amendments to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, 1960, extending the prohibition on unauthorized public meetings throughout the African areas as so defined in the "Land Tenure Act". Previous legislation had prohibited such meetings only in the Tribal Trust Lands and other tribal areas. By additional amendments to the Act adopted in September 1973, the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order" is now empowered to ban public meetings for up to a year instead of three months, and to ban individuals from attending public meetings, or private meetings of more than 200 people, for up to a year instead of three months.

136. It is not known how many meetings of the Council have been banned under these regulations. On 10 August, it was reported that the Council's first meeting since the detention of some of its officials on 1 August had been banned without explanation by order of the Salisbury "District Commissioner". A statement issued by Mr. Edison Sithole deplored the cancellation of the meeting which, he said, was expected to have been as peaceful as other meetings of the organization. Mr. Sithole said that it was government actions, such as the detention of officials of the Council, which had created the tension that the "Government" alleged could lead to possible trouble.

137. The illegal régime has also taken measures against Bishop Muzorewa personally. It will be recalled that, on 8 September 1972, Bishop Muzorewa was deprived of his passport under the terms of the newly passed "Departure from Rhodesia (Control) Amendment Act", which provides that the travel documents of individuals may be withdrawn if it is considered that their journey would not be in the public interest. y/ In November 1973, Bishop Muzorewa applied for reinstatement of his passport in order to enable him to receive from the United Nations an award he had

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y/ Ibid., paras. 64-66.

been given for outstanding achievements in the field of human rights. The request was rejected by the illegal régime on the ground that Bishop Muzorewa supported sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. In a protest letter dated 16 November, Bishop Muzorewa said that he supported sanctions because they were a non-violent way of overcoming the hardship, misery and illegality caused by the unilateral declaration of independence.

#### E. African pro-settlement groups

138. As indicated above, since the publication of the report of the Pearce Commission, the illegal régime has attempted to persuade the United Kingdom Government that the rejection of the proposals by the African majority has been reversed and that the terms have since become acceptable to the majority of the population. To this end, the illegal régime has given much publicity to the activities of two pro-settlement African political groups formed early in 1973: the African Settlement Convention (ASC) and the Rhodesian Settlement Forum (RSF). Both of these groups are reported to have extensive European financial backing. z/ During 1973, RSF, in particular, claimed to have considerable support among the African population for acceptance of the proposals, based on signed petitions which it said it intended to submit to the United Kingdom Government as conclusive proof of the acceptability of the 1971 proposals. No such petitions however, appear to have actually been submitted, and the claims of the organization as regards its popular support are said to be greatly exaggerated.

139. A report in the Rhodesia Herald (4 June 1973), for instance, which was based on interviews with a number of Africans identified by both the ASC and RSF as supporting a settlement, concluded that the claims of the organizations were generally unfounded and that the alleged supporters were at best equivocal in their commitment to the organizations.

140. Both organizations have continued their efforts to mobilize African support. On 26 October, Mr. Henry Chihota, leader of RSF, claimed that his organization had gathered 575,000 signatures. At the same time, it was reported that ASC was also making strenuous efforts to amass support and that both groups were holding talks on the possibility of a merger.

#### F. Talks between the Rhodesia Party and the African National Council of Zimbabwe

141. In July 1973, the Rhodesia Party, which favours the elimination of racial segregation in public life and the guaranteed advancement of Africans on the basis of merit, began holding talks with the African National Council of Zimbabwe, aimed at working out viable alternative proposals for a settlement with the United Kingdom.

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z/ Ibid., paras. 78-81.

On 15 September, officials of both organizations announced that they had agreed on a set of 12 detailed principles that could lead to a constitution acceptable to the majority of Southern Rhodesians. These principles include the election of parliament members on the basis of a common roll with a highly qualified franchise; the elimination of racial discrimination in public life; and the eventual formation of a non-racial parliament, although some racial features might be necessary in the initial stages.

142. In a statement at the time the agreement was announced, Mr. Edison Sithole, of the Council, described the occasion as an "historic event". Nevertheless, he said that his organization still hoped to have further talks with the Rhodesian Front.

143. There has been no immediate reaction to the agreement between the Rhodesia Party and the Council, either from the illegal régime or from the United Kingdom Government, which is reported to have received a copy of the agreement from Mr. Alan Savory, one of the leaders of the Rhodesia Party, during the course of a trip to London in September 1973. In the past, the United Kingdom Government has, on several occasions, expressed the view that no agreement could provide a viable basis for a settlement unless it was supported by the party which held power in Rhodesia.

144. It is also unclear to what extent the white population favours the general policies of the Rhodesia Party itself. In April 1973, Mr. Savory reportedly said that, despite his hopes for the development of his party as a major political force, he feared that the "Government" would use "political blackmail", such as the withholding of import licences, against outspoken supporters of the opposition party, thus limiting its growth. Mr. Savory also said that the "Government's" use of censorship and of radio and television as "propaganda weapons" would clearly inhibit the growth of popular support for his party.

## 7. RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL, SOUTH AFRICA AND NEIGHBOURING STATES

145. During 1973, the illegal régime continued to co-operate militarily with both South Africa and the Portuguese colonial authorities in Mozambique in efforts to suppress the national liberation movements. During the year, the illegal régime received greatly intensified support from South Africa in the form of both men and matériel and, in turn, increased its involvement in Portuguese military operations in northern Mozambique. According to Zambian authorities, the illegal régime also continued to manifest hostility towards Zambia and to perpetrate aggression along that country's border with Southern Rhodesia.

### A. Military co-operation with Portugal

146. In May 1973, during the course of the appeal hearing of Mr. Peter Niesewand (see paras. 64-65 above), Mr. John Fleming, "Secretary for Law and Order", confirmed that the security forces of the illegal régime had been operating alongside Portuguese troops in Mozambique against FRELIMO. Mr. Fleming also confirmed that Southern Rhodesian military aircraft had been used in Mozambique, that there had been intelligence meetings between the illegal régime, Portugal and South Africa and that the illegal régime felt that its supply routes to Beira and Lourenço Marques in Mozambique were threatened by FRELIMO activities.

147. On 29 April 1973, The Observer published a report linking the security forces of the illegal régime with the mass killings of Mozambique villagers. The report cited evidence from the trial of two Roman Catholic priests who had been tried by a military court in Mozambique earlier in the year for revealing details of a massacre in a village where 16 women and children were killed. aa/

148. According to this source, Portuguese troops and forces of the illegal régime jointly carried out in September 1971 a terror campaign against the Karapora and Buxo tribes in Mozambique. Southern Rhodesian forces used helicopters to enter the Mucumbura region and, on 3 September, killed three boys and a village chief. On 5 September, they set up a machine-gun ambush at Singa village and killed seven members of one family.

149. On 2 September 1973, The Observer published the report of the first British correspondent to enter Tete District in Mozambique under the auspices of FRELIMO. His report charged that Southern Rhodesian security forces had carried out a "systematic campaign of killing men, women and children" in an attempt to block support for FRELIMO. The report which, according to its author, was compiled on the basis of "irrefutable evidence from eyewitnesses - all refugees from Rhodesian atrocities" - said that the forces of the illegal régime had burned huts and food stores in the Zambezi valley area of Tete Province, and that Southern Rhodesian bombers, jet fighters and helicopter gunships had attacked villages. At least

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aa/ For further details, see A/AC.109/L.919, paras. 48 and 52-62.

1,500 refugees had fled to the north-western part of Tete where they were seen by the reporter. On the basis of all available information, it was considered probable that at least 300 Africans had been killed by Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian forces within the period of a month.

150. According to the testimony of one of the refugees, a contingent of Southern Rhodesian forces had crossed the Zambezi River in inflatable boats during the night of 21 July. On 26 July, after a small band of FRELIMO fighters had clashed with Southern Rhodesian troops, villages in the area were attacked by bombers and jet fighters, and troops were landed by helicopters. Three bombers, four jet fighters and three helicopter gunships took part in the attacks on villages in the area of Mpangula, Lilkela, Mapapaya and Malymidwe. As a result of these attacks, the villagers scattered into the bush. When they returned to the river the next morning to get water, over 100 of them were killed by Southern Rhodesian forces. Refugees also said that the forces of the illegal régime had sprayed defoliants on their crops in an effort to drive away civilians on whom FRELIMO depended for support.

151. Refugees claimed that the soldiers were unquestionably Southern Rhodesian rather than Portuguese, not only because of their uniforms and aircraft but also because they asked continuously about members of the ZANU liberation army rather than those of FRELIMO.

152. In December 1973, a further report in The Guardian said that the security forces of the illegal régime were operating deep inside Mozambique with the agreement of Portuguese authorities and striking not only at ZANU bases, but also at FRELIMO encampments. The report said that over the past few months the illegal régime's forces had been locating FRELIMO camps and calling in jets from bases near Salisbury and Gwelo to blast them with rockets and white phosphorous. The purpose of this tactic, the report continued, was to persuade FRELIMO to withdraw co-operation from ZANU.

#### B. Military co-operation with South Africa

153. During the period under review, the illegal régime has received increasing military support from the Government of South Africa. For the first time, the presence of South African military aircraft in the Territory was also confirmed.

154. It will be recalled that a detachment of South African police has been reinforcing the armed forces of the illegal régime in patrolling the Zambian border since 1967. In 1973, it was reported that a further group of 9 or 10 more companies of South African military police, totalling about 1,000 men, had been involved in anti-nationalist operations along the northern border with Mozambique. The presence of armoured vehicles used by South African police units in the centre of Salisbury has also been reported.

155. In October 1973, a communiqué issued by the Southern Rhodesian security forces reported that one South African policeman had been killed and four injured in a land-mine explosion in the north-east, bringing the total number of South African casualties in the Territory during the year to four killed and eight injured.

156. In July 1973, a spokesman for the illegal régime acknowledged that six South African military helicopters (believed to be French-built Super Frelons capable of carrying up to 30 men and their equipment) were present in the Territory. He said that the aircraft were part of the "normal back-up for South African police" operating in the Territory. An article in a July issue of The Economist stated, however, that "the arrival /in Southern Rhodesia/ this week of six ... helicopters ... should increase the mobility of the security forces ...".

157. Subsequently, on 5 December, it was reported that the Southern Rhodesian army had bought a number of French Panhard armoured cars which had been manufactured under licence in South Africa. The vehicles have a 90 mm gun and two machine-guns mounted on the turret. The illegal régime refused to confirm or deny the sale. The French Ministry of Defense and the Panhard Armoured Car Company of Paris denied knowledge of any sale of French military equipment to the Southern Rhodesian army.

158. In November 1973, Air Marshal M. J. McLaren, Commander of the Rhodesian Air Force, in an address to a South African Air Force Association dinner in Salisbury, said that there was "considerable understanding and interchange of ideas at all levels of government" between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This extended to the armed services, including both air forces, and covered the fields of tactics, techniques and other subjects. The Air Marshal said that Rhodesian military personnel now attended staff courses at the South African Air Force and South African Army colleges. Previously, they had followed Royal Air Force and British Army courses.

159. South African Government and military officials have also held periodic meetings with members of the illegal régime. In June 1973, "Prime Minister" Smith met with Prime Minister B. J. Vorster of South Africa at Cape Town, at which time he was believed to have requested additional South African reinforcements in view of the continued shortage in the Territory of white manpower for the security forces.

160. In July, Prime Minister Vorster, in the course of a "vacation", paid an unannounced visit to Kariba, on the Southern Rhodesia/Zambia border, but no details were released.

161. Other members of the South African Government who paid visits to Southern Rhodesia during 1973 include the Minister of Information, the Minister of Tourism, the Minister of Police and the Commissioner of Police. In November, it was reported that in the course of their visit, the Minister of Police and the Commissioner of Police met their counterparts in the illegal régime for "discussions of mutual interest".

### C. Aggression against Zambia

162. It will be recalled that on 9 January 1973, the illegal régime, charging that the Zambian Government had ignored repeated requests to stop guerrillas from using its territory as a base for raids into Southern Rhodesia, closed its 400-mile frontier with Zambia to all freight traffic except Zambian copper exports. On



4 February, claiming that it had received "messages" as a result of which it was satisfied that its objectives in closing the border had been achieved, the illegal régime reopened the border. Zambia, however, has continued to keep its border closed, and to route its exports, including copper, to Dar es Salaam and Lobito. Furthermore, the Zambian Government has denied giving the illegal régime any undertaking regarding freedom fighters. bb/

163. During the period under review, there were continued reports of violent incidents between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia, primarily involving landmines. On 15 March, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia said at a press conference in Lusaka that continuing landmine explosions along the frontier with Southern Rhodesia, the most recent of which had taken place the preceding week, were "the first phase of a military attack" from Southern Rhodesia. These incidents had not developed into something more serious because of the discipline of the Zambian security forces. President Kaunda denied the existence of guerrilla camps in Zambia and accused the illegal régime of insisting on the presence of such camps as a pretext for any future attack on Zambia.

164. On 12 July, the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/10971) containing a list of 31 instances of attacks on Zambia by the security forces of the illegal régime, Portugal and the Republic of South Africa between 9 January and 14 June 1973. The attacks, including landmine explosions, rifle fire and strafing from aircraft or helicopters, resulted in deaths and injuries in eight cases.

165. The Permanent Representative said that "the state of tension in our part of the world is becoming ever more generalized and intensified in character as the result of greater cohesion among the white minority régimes and their wanton use of the most abominable and ruthless tactics".

## 8. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS

166. Owing to the tight restraints over the publication of economic information imposed by the illegal régime, there is no means of precisely quantifying the effect of sanctions on the economy of Southern Rhodesia. cc/ In general, the carefully edited statistics released by the illegal régime are used to substantiate its claims that the economy is not only surviving the impact of sanctions but is also expanding. Information from other sources, however, including the Southern Rhodesian press, gives a different view. According to some of these reports,

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bb/ Ibid., paras. 174-183.

cc/ For the purposes of this paper, the white settler economy will be treated as comprising the economy of the Territory as a whole. It will be recalled that African participation in the market sector is negligible, being concentrated in agriculture, of which it comprises only 10.5 per cent of the total value.



sanctions have caused dislocations in the Territory's traditional economic structure and are impeding the full development of the Territory's economic potential, particularly by sharply reducing the access of the illegal régime to foreign exchange.

167. Some of the significant changes in the Territory's economic pattern that have occurred since the imposition of sanctions have been discussed in detail in previous reports of the Special Committee. dd/ In summary, these include the displacement of agriculture by manufacturing as the principal component of the gross domestic product; the manufacture of reportedly inferior quality consumer goods rather than primarily export commodities; the loss of tobacco as the principal export and source of foreign exchange; the worsening situation of individual farmers, owing to the relatively poor profitability of alternative crops; and the tightening of controls over the development of the manufacturing sector as a whole, as reflected by the limited foreign exchange allocations to non-vital industries.

168. These changes reveal that although the illegal régime, with the co-operation of South Africa and Portugal, has been able to continue trading on the world market and to offset partially the impact of sanctions, the white settler economy is nevertheless losing control of its own direction and is being compelled continually to readapt itself, with attendant "uncertainty, uneasiness and frustration".

#### A. General economic situation

169. According to information published by the illegal régime itself, the Territory's gross domestic product in 1972, at current prices, rose to \$R 1,256.6 million, almost double its 1965 value and 12 per cent higher than in the previous year. Increases were reported in all the major sectors of the economy, including, in particular, manufacturing, which contributed 22 per cent of the gross domestic product; distribution, hotels and restaurants, 14 per cent; agriculture, 17 per cent; and mining, 6 per cent (see table 1 below). The rate of growth, however, was slower in all sectors when compared with the previous year. The rate of growth in agriculture declined from 28.6 to 16.8 per cent, and in manufacturing from 15.6 to 14.4 per cent. Lower growth rates also occurred in electricity and water, transport and communications, public administration, education and health.

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dd/ For the most recent, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty seventh Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. IV, annex, appendix III.

Table 1

Southern Rhodesia: origin of gross domestic product, 1965-1972  
(million Southern Rhodesian dollars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Mining</u>	<u>Manufacturing</u>	<u>Distribution, hotels, restaurants</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total gross domestic product</u>
1965	127.8	48.3	135.0	105.8	275.9	692.8
1966	136.8	45.2	123.2	90.8	286.5	682.5
1967	146.5	46.2	142.4	102.5	301.2	738.8
1968	130.3	48.4	160.9	113.0	337.8	790.4
1969	162.0	62.1	181.2	126.2	383.5	915.0
1970	160.0	67.2	221.0	139.6	404.3	992.0
1971	190.2	68.7	255.5	156.6	449.5	1,120.5
1972	217.9	72.2	292.2	176.0	498.3	1,256.6

Source: Southern Rhodesia, Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1972 (Government Printer, Salisbury), April 1973.

Details of the current status of the principal sectors of the white economy are given below.

#### Agriculture

170. In 1972 the gross value of agricultural output was reported to have risen to a high of \$R 317 million, reflecting increases in the value of all major crops except wheat. The actual volume of production is difficult to determine, owing to the policy of the illegal régime to express increases and/or decreases in percentage terms. By this standard, the illegal régime reported increases of 8 per cent in the volume of tobacco output; 17 per cent in maize; 27 per cent in cotton; 32 per cent in cattle slaughterings; and 15 per cent in dairy produce. In addition, ground-nut production was reported to have doubled in value and sorghum production to have increased in value five times.

171. Despite the over-all increases reported by the illegal régime, there was strong evidence that the farming community as a whole was not profiting from this growth. According to a statement by the President of the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union (RNFU) in February 1973, sustained profitability and diversification were largely impossible in most farming enterprises, resulting in increasing indebtedness. Although gross output has increased by 44 per cent over the past seven or eight years, agricultural indebtedness has risen by about 98 per cent. As a consequence,

in 1972 out of a total of 6,600 white farmers and farming companies, only 1,090 individual farmers, or about one out of six, earned taxable incomes. The majority of these, 925 farmers, earned profits of less than \$R 10,000. Of the 468 farming companies which paid taxes, 204, or close to 50 per cent, earned profits of \$R 10,000 or less.

172. On the basis of available information, the agricultural sector has been the most severely affected by economic sanctions. Traditionally the principal sector of the economy, in terms of its total contribution to the gross domestic product, has slipped to second place in favour of manufacturing since 1968. Agriculture remains, however, the foremost employer of African labour, as well as the largest source of exports and foreign exchange. The primary cause for the decline in the relative importance of the sector has been the impact of sanctions on tobacco, traditionally the major crop in terms of the number of farmers devoted to its production, as well as the single principal export and source of foreign exchange. In order to counteract the loss of its most important tobacco markets, the illegal régime has had, inter alia, to introduce a programme of subsidies to farmers diversifying into less profitable crops, mainly maize, wheat, cotton and cattle, particularly the latter, which has now become the largest single contributor to the sector (21 per cent); to guarantee minimum price supports to the 1,500 remaining tobacco growers; to stockpile tobacco; and to allocate a total of \$R 88 million from 1965 to 1973 to meet the annual trading losses of the Tobacco Corporation, which has bought all tobacco from growers at the support price, for resale to buyers, usually at a considerable loss. The total budgetary appropriations to cover losses suffered by the agricultural community as a whole since 1965 is not known.

173. Since 1972, there have been reports both from within and outside the Territory that the tobacco industry has begun to recover from the impact of sanctions and that the illegal régime has succeeded in reducing or eliminating its tobacco stockpile, which at one point amounted to between 250 million and 300 million pounds. In the 1973/74 budget (see para. 184 below), there was, for the first time since the imposition of sanctions, no provision for further losses on the tobacco stockpile, which had received an appropriation of \$R 20 million the previous year. A total of \$R 5.75 million was provided, however, to subsidize the 1973/74 tobacco crop, which is being guaranteed at the rate of 60 cents (Rhodesian) per kilogramme, or 5 cents more per kilogramme than in 1972/73. There is no information on the crop target for the 1973/74 season. (In 1972/73, the target was 66 million kilogrammes at 55 cents per kilogrammes.) In his budget statement on 19 July 1973, John Wrathall, the "Minister of Finance", said that past losses on the tobacco stockpile, amounting to \$R 88 million up to 30 September 1972, had been fully covered; although losses had been incurred since, these had been on a declining scale.

### Mining

174. Although mining contributed only 5.7 per cent of the gross domestic product in 1972, next to agriculture it is the second most important source of foreign exchange and represents the largest concentration of foreign investment in Southern Rhodesia. Despite the imposition of sanctions, the value of mining output has almost doubled

since 1965, reaching \$R 129.4 million in 1972. Owing to the devaluation of both the South African and the United States dollar in 1972, however, the value of mining output was only 6.3 per cent higher compared with the previous year, in contrast to a rise in volume of 11.2 per cent. The growth of the "at mine" value of mineral output since 1965 is shown in table 2 below:

Table 2

Southern Rhodesia: value of mineral output, 1965-1972  
(million Southern Rhodesian dollars)

1965	64.0
1966	65.2
1967	66.8
1968	67.4
1969	87.7
1970	98.7
1971	101.2
1972	108.0

Source: Southern Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics (January 1973).

175. Despite the devaluations, the effect of which is reflected in the reduced profits of most important mining companies, ee/ the Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1972, predicted that the steady upward movement in world base mineral prices would counterbalance the short-term losses that had resulted from the major currency realignments and that mining exports in 1973 would be at a higher level.

176. There is no way of determining the volume of the various minerals now produced in Southern Rhodesia. As far as is known, since 1964, base minerals, primarily copper and lead, have replaced gold as the mainstay of the mining sector; chrome, asbestos and tungsten are also mined on a large scale. In 1972, there were reported to be 4 nickel mines, 40 copper mines and about 100 gold mines in the Territory, as well as 48 exclusive prospecting concessions covering about 20,215 square kilometres.

177. There are as yet no mining data for 1973. On the basis of press reports, however, it appears that the most significant development in the mining field during the year was the decision by the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company, Ltd. of South Africa (JCI) to proceed with the development of a nickel and copper mine at Shangani at a cost of \$R 17 million, and the related decision of the Rhodesian Nickel Corporation, Ltd. (RHONICK), a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, to expand its nickel smelter at Bindura at a cost of \$R 7 million. The Shangani mine, located in Matabeleland, is scheduled to start

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ee/ Ibid., paras. 45-60.

production in the second half of 1975, and, according to Mr. Ian Dillon, "Minister of Mines", is expected to have "a tremendous impact" on the Territory's economy. When plans for the mine were originally conceived in 1971, it was estimated that the mine would produce 4,500 tons of nickel a year, valued at \$R 8 million at the current prices. With copper, the total output of the mine was expected to amount to over \$R 12 million annually. Revised estimates are for the production of 5,000 to 6,000 tons of nickel annually, depending on the recovery grade. Ore reserves are estimated at 16 million tons at an average grade of 0.19 per cent nickel.

### Manufacturing

178. Since 1968, manufacturing has occupied first place in terms of its contribution to the gross domestic product; over 50 per cent of the total value of production is accounted for by metal and metal products, food-stuffs, and chemical and petroleum products.

179. According to the Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1972, the gross value of manufacturing output rose by 12.3 per cent over the previous year to \$R 785.7 million, reflecting increases of 10 to 15 per cent in all sectors except food-stuffs, wood and furniture and transport equipment. Detailed statistics of output by industrial sectors for 1972 are shown in table 3 below:

Table 3

Southern Rhodesia: gross output by manufacturing groups, 1972

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Value</u> (million Southern Rhodesian dollars)	<u>Index of volume</u> (1964 = 100)
Metals and metal products	183.5	239.1
Food-stuffs	174.0	184.3
Chemical and petroleum products	123.7	188.1
Textiles, including cotton ginning	81.4	254.8
Clothing and foot-wear	60.3	154.7
Beverages and tobacco	55.7	123.6
Transport equipment and workshops	49.3	115.5
Non-metallic mineral products	32.0	248.4
Paper and printing	42.7	171.2
Wood and furniture	30.5	179.9
Others	8.9	153.9
Total	842.0 a/	180.6

Source: Southern Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics (August 1973), pp. 24-25.

a/ There is a discrepancy of \$R 56.3 million in the gross value of manufacturing output as reported in the Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1972, and the Monthly Digest of Statistics.

180. As previously reported, the main impetus behind the expansion and diversification of the manufacturing sector, which has exhibited the fastest growth rate of all sectors of the economy since the illegal declaration of independence, was initially the need to produce locally goods which previously had been imported, and the simultaneous need to conserve foreign exchange. In 1972, the illegal régime reported that Southern Rhodesian manufacturers had been successful in expanding export market opportunities, notwithstanding increased competition arising from currency devaluations.

181. Despite the continuing expansion of the sector, however, manufacturers have been among the most vocal critics of the economic policies of the illegal régime. In June 1973, Mr. G. P. S. Lowe, President of the Rhodesian Chamber of Commerce, said at a meeting in Umtali that, notwithstanding the optimistic economic signs, business was generally performing lethargically and that there was a loss of confidence in the economic future of the country. Mr. Lowe characterized the country as "drifting" economically, a state of affairs which had to be rectified quickly by means of dynamic and imaginative leadership on all levels.

#### B. Public finance

182. The 1973/74 budget provided for current account revenue of \$R 310 million, an increase of \$R 43 million over the preceding year. Most of the increase came from taxes on income, including personal income tax, supertax and undistributed profits tax. There were no increases in the rate of taxation.

183. Estimated expenditure for 1973/74 was \$R 318.1 million, an increase of \$R 35.5 million over the actual expenditure for the previous year. Of the total increase, \$R 9.3 million went to defence (army and air force) and BSAP; \$R 9.4 million to social services (education, health, social security and pensions); and \$R 12.3 million to Rhodesia Railways to cover the deficit incurred by the loss of Zambian freight traffic following the closing of the Southern Rhodesia/Zambia border in January 1973.

184. Budgetary appropriations for 1972/73 and 1973/74 are shown in table 4 below:

Table 4

Southern Rhodesia: public finance 1972/73-1973/74  
(million Southern Rhodesian dollars)

#### A. Revenue

	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1973/74</u>
Taxes on income	122.9	152.8
Taxes on expenditure and consumption	92.1	100.9
Investment revenue	26.9	29.7
Fees	7.5	7.9
Other	17.8	18.5
Total revenue	267.3	309.8

Table 4 (continued)

B. Expenditure

	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1973/74</u>
Defence <u>a/</u>	25.1	30.9
Justice and police <u>a/</u>	23.8	28.6
European, Asian and Coloured education	21.6	23.9
African education	22.2	24.6
Health	20.5	23.7
Drought relief	-	19.8
Agricultural subsidies	3.6	8.8
Tobacco Corporation losses	20.0	-
Transport and power	6.1	20.6
Public debt	31.6	34.4
General administration	22.8	28.1
Pensions (excluding old age)	11.1	12.1
Other	74.2	62.6
Total	282.6	318.1
Excess of revenue over expenditure	-15.2	-8.3
Surplus/deficit brought forward	14.2	-1.0
Surplus/deficit at end of year	-1.0	-9.3

Source: Southern Rhodesia, Budget Statements 1973, presented to the House of Assembly by the Minister of Finance, 19 July 1973 (Salisbury).

a/ For details of military expenditure, see paragraph 39 above.

185. In addition, the budget provided for estimated loan account expenditure (capital expenditure) of \$R 79.6 million (an increase of \$R 4.6 million compared with the actual expenditure of the previous year). Of the total, \$R 78.1 million was designated for development of the Territory's infrastructure, including an allocation of \$32.6 million to the Ministry of Transport, mainly for Rhodesia Railways.

186. In presenting the budget on 19 July 1973, the "Minister of Finance" characterized the economy's performance during 1972 as "wholly satisfactory". However, he also drew attention to several weaknesses in the general economic picture. These included lower prices for exports, especially minerals, as a result

of world-wide currency devaluations and the consequent increasing strain on the balance of payments, which was further aggravated by the continuing heavy pressure for imports for development. Owing to these factors, the external position would remain under strain, he said, either until the volume of exports increased or until there was an increase in the external price of exports.

187. Addressing himself directly to the question of sanctions, the "Minister" said that the sanctions war was by no means over or abating. The need for secrecy and discretion in trading operations was as great or greater than in the past if evasion of sanctions was to continue to be successful.

### C. External trade and evasion of sanctions

188. The policy of the illegal régime of withholding pertinent economic information in order to protect its sanctions-breaking operations is, as might be expected, most pronounced in the area of external trade. Data provided by the illegal régime relate only to the balance of trade; no information is provided regarding either the destination of exports or their nature or the source of imports. Data on the external trade of the Territory are also prepared by the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of information provided by reporting countries. ff/ These data are incomplete, however, and account for only a fraction of the total trade. On the basis of whatever data are provided by the illegal régime and the Security Council Committee, it is evident that the evasion of sanctions is made possible by exporting and importing via South Africa and Mozambique by means of false certificates of origin and destination.

189. In 1972, the illegal régime reported total export earnings of \$R 345.2 million, of which domestic exports accounted for \$R 322.2 million, re-exports for \$R 6.2 million, and gold for \$R 16.8 million. Imports amounted to \$R 274.2 million and adjustments to minus \$R 8.2 million. As a result there was a visible trade balance of \$R 62.8 million, compared with \$R 0.8 million in 1971. This balance, taken together with a deficit of \$R 58.4 million on invisible transactions and a net inflow of capital of \$R 1.1 million, resulted in a combined surplus of current and capital accounts of \$R 5.5 million in contrast to 1971 when there was a deficit of \$R 24.5 million. The illegal régime also reported that there had been a decrease of 2.1 per cent in the average cost of imports, resulting in an over-all improvement of 1.6 per cent in the terms of trade. According to a review of future prospects included in the Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1972, further improvements were expected in the total value of exports in 1973. However, as imports were also expected to increase strongly, it was anticipated that the balance of payments would remain under strain in 1973.

190. Data contained in the Fifth Report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) gg/ deal with Southern Rhodesia's

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ff/ For the most recent reports, see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Special Supplement No. 2 (S/10852/Rev.1); and ibid., Twenty-ninth Year, Special Supplements Nos. 2 and 2A (S/11178/Rev.1).

gg/ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Special Supplement No. 2 (S/10852/Rev.1).



trade during 1971. These data, which were referred to in the previous report of the Special Committee, are summarized below.

191. According to this report, Southern Rhodesia's merchandise exports in 1971 amounted to \$US 388 million, of which exports valued at \$US 52 million were reported to have been received by the following countries: Zambia, \$US 29 million; Malawi, \$US 16 million; Switzerland, \$US 5 million; and other countries, \$US 1 million. In addition to this recorded trade it was estimated that South Africa received Southern Rhodesian exports amounting to about \$US 90 million. The balance, amounting to some \$US 240 million, was believed to have reached world markets via Southern Rhodesia's neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa and Mozambique, and to have been reflected in world trade as imports from these countries.

192. Based on comparisons of exports declared from South Africa and Mozambique, with imports acknowledged by reporting countries, it was estimated that during 1969-1971, South Africa and Mozambique handled merchandise of Southern Rhodesian origin at a level of over \$US 200 million annually. This meant that since the imposition of sanctions in 1965 Southern Rhodesian exports valued at some \$US 700 to \$US 800 million had reached world markets indirectly via these countries. The Security Council Committee estimated that these exports included from 12,000 to 17,000 metric tons of tobacco per annum; varying quantities of major minerals, including asbestos (96,000 metric tons in 1971), and chrome (probably 200,000 to 300,000 tons in 1968 and 1969), and maize (500-700 tons between 1967-1969).

193. According to the report, Southern Rhodesia's imports in 1971 amounted to \$US 395 million, of which \$US 5 million derived from Malawi; \$US 5 million from Australia; \$US 3 million from Switzerland; \$US 2 million from the United Kingdom; \$US 2 million from the Federal Republic of Germany; and \$US 1 million from other countries, making a total of about \$US 18 million. In addition to this recorded trade, it was estimated that South Africa sent to Southern Rhodesia \$US 170 million worth of goods, leaving some \$US 210 million unaccounted for.

194. The Security Council Committee said that, for various reasons, it was not possible at that time to investigate the true situation concerning the unaccounted portion of Southern Rhodesian imports for the years following the imposition of sanctions. It noted, however, that there had been considerable expansion of the import trade of South Africa, Mozambique and Angola during those years although it remained to be determined whether part of this expansion was in the form of goods which ultimately reached Southern Rhodesia. As regards the export of motor vehicles and their spare parts to Southern Rhodesia, which was specifically prohibited by the Security Council in its resolution 232 (1966), the Committee concluded that there was evidence that motor vehicles were reaching the Territory, in breach of sanctions, mainly through South Africa, at a level possibly well beyond the normal level of Southern Rhodesia's imports during the period prior to sanctions.

195. In its sixth report, adopted on 31 December 1973, the Security Council Committee reported that during the period under review it had considered 42 additional cases of possible sanctions violations including 18 cases of importation of chrome, nickel and other minerals.

#### D. Sanctions and Southern Rhodesia

196. The question of the violation of sanctions has continued to engage the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the Special Committee. By paragraph 3 of its resolution 3116 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned "all violations of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council against Southern Rhodesia", as well as the failure of certain Member States to enforce those sanctions strictly, as being contrary to the obligations assumed by them under Article 25 of the Charter". By paragraph 5 (a) of the same resolution, the General Assembly requested all Governments "to take stringent enforcement measures to ensure strict compliance by all individuals, associations and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to ensure the complete discontinuance by them of any form of collaboration with the illegal régime". The General Assembly also requested the Special Committee to follow the implementation of the above resolution.

197. The following information on sanctions violations has been derived from various public sources.

198. According to various reports, nationals from at least 32 countries have been involved in possible violations of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. In fact, the interaction of nationals from many countries in violating the sanctions has grown since 1966 in both its sophistication and complexity. A case in point is the acquisition by the illegal régime of three Boeing jets, which involved collaboration by the nationals of at least three countries. Details of this acquisition, as revealed in press accounts, are given below.

#### Air Rhodesia

199. The reports indicate that Mr. Mervyn Eyett, deputy manager of Air Rhodesia, contacted United Air Lines of the United States, which had a number of used Boeing 720s for sale. Towards the end of November 1972, Mr. Clark MacGregor, a vice-president of United Aircraft Products, Inc., hh/ is said to have visited Southern Rhodesia and met with officials of Air Rhodesia. United Aircraft manufactures the Pratt and Whitney engines used in Boeing jets. A month after Mr. MacGregor's visit to Southern Rhodesia, Air Rhodesia decided to train its crews in the handling of Boeing jets. United Air Lines, according to the report, agreed to provide the training in January 1973. Almost at the same time, Mr. Eyett's principal European connexion, Mr. Carl Hirschmann, a Swiss businessman and owner of Jet Aviation, a Swiss company, negotiated with the Boeing company the settlement of a three-year-old lien on some Boeing 720s he owned. Thereupon, Boeing and Mr. Hirschmann applied for and received from the United States Department of Commerce a licence to export \$US 500,000 worth of spare parts to Mr. Eyett. The three 720s were flown from Switzerland to Southern Rhodesia via Portugal. The Southern Rhodesian Government was reported to have awarded the Legion of Merit to Mr. Eyett for his success.

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hh/ United Aircraft Products, Inc. is a manufacturing company; United Air Lines runs flights.

### Zephyr network

200. There are many reports that can be substantiated which involve nationals of a number of countries who are assisting Southern Rhodesia in the evasion of sanctions. As will be discussed below, the Zephyr network, with headquarters in Amsterdam, has successfully operated in possible violations of the sanctions through a network of nationals from many countries. Invariably, however, most of these nationals deny any knowledge that their contact operating in another country is working for Southern Rhodesia.

201. Preliminary evidence indicates that the Zephyr network, with trading connexions in at least 14 countries, has been involved in violating sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and has successfully transacted business on behalf of Southern Rhodesia in many countries (see table 7 below). According to reports, the Government of the Netherlands is planning to prosecute Joba Chemicals, a trading firm engaged in the Zephyr network.

202. The Zephyr network reportedly operates as follows. A Southern Rhodesian client orders certain goods through a Southern Rhodesian company known as Aromex. Aromex sends the order to the Zephyr organization in Amsterdam which then chooses a supplier. When the quality and price of the commodity are agreed upon with the Southern Rhodesian client, Zephyr places the order and instructs the supplier to ship the goods to an intermediary address within the Zephyr network, three of which are at Beira and two at Lourenço Marques (see table 6 below). The supplier forwards the invoice and shipping documents to the Amsterdam office of Zephyr. The supplier also advises the Amsterdam office of Zephyr of the date and the name of the ship on which the goods are shipped. The Amsterdam office of Zephyr makes the invoice for the Southern Rhodesian client. It also sends the originals of the packing lists and shipping documents to its bankers in Amsterdam, who are instructed to collect the money from a Southern Rhodesian bank. Aromex is held responsible for payment. After payment, documents are sent to the Southern Rhodesian client, who takes the documents to Beira and collects the goods from there. In all cases, it is said that the suppliers are never told the ultimate destination of the goods. Goods which have been imported through this network include pharmaceuticals, curry powder and spices, engineering supplies, clothing and foot-wear.

203. Evidence shows that at least 16 Southern Rhodesian firms, as shown in table 5 below, have imported goods through the Zephyr network in this manner.

### Byrd Amendment and its effects

204. The Zephyr network has operated mainly in Europe. But corporate bodies in the United States operating under the Byrd Amendment (section 503 of the United States Military Procurement Act of 1971), which allows American firms to import certain minerals from Southern Rhodesia, are reported to have also been engaged in a massive violation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the importation of chrome, copper, asbestos, manganese and nickel from Southern Rhodesia. Evidence provided to the United States Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, indicates that between 24 January 1972 and

Table 5

Southern Rhodesian companies which have had transactions  
with the Zephyr network

<u>Name</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Activities</u>
Central African Pharmaceuticals (CAPs)	P.O. Box 202 Manchester Road Salisbury	Producers and distributors of pharmaceuticals
Rho-Allied Services (Pvt.), Ltd.	Caltex Building P.O. Box 2917 Salisbury	Provides customs formalities services to CAPs and others
Aromex	P.O. Box 2297 Salisbury	Provides shipping services and makes export-import possible for many small firms
Sanders (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 583 Salisbury	Provides warehouse facilities
Khatri Brothers	P.O. Box 1068 Salisbury	Trades in curry powder and spices
Sawmill Engineering Supplies (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 2517 Dublin House Salisbury	Provides engineering supplies
San Michelle	Enterprise House 125 Victoria Street Salisbury	Trades in maternity clothes
Cole and Chandler (Agencies), Ltd.	59 Fife Street Bulawayo	Stationery
B. Wolfe Daimpre (Pvt.), Ltd.	503 Salisbury Drive Chisipite Salisbury	...
Gordons Clothing Factories (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 1400 Salisbury	Trades in clothing
Footwear Manufactures (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 1245 Salisbury	Trades in foot-wear
Enterprise Products (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 3769 Salisbury	...
Cone Textiles (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box St 226 Salisbury	Trades in textiles
Jackson and Company (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 151 Salisbury	...
Vic Rene Rubber Stamps (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 160 Salisbury	...
Berbat (Pvt.), Ltd.	...	...

Source: Stichting Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland, Zephyr Rapport,  
Amsterdam, 13 November 1973.

Table 6

Southern Rhodesia: Zephyr network: intermediary links in Mozambique

<u>Name</u>	<u>Address</u>
Euromatola (Moc.) Lda.	P.O. Box 1164 Beira
Companhia Industrial de Matola	P.O. Box 2218 Lourenço Marques
Companhia Distrubitia de Matola	Lourenço Marques
Aromex (Pvt.), Ltd.	P.O. Box 1833 Beira
J. M. Barnett and Company, Ltd.	P.O. Boxes 311-312 Beira

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Source: Stichting Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland, Zephyr Rapport,  
Amsterdam, 13 November 1973.

Table 7

Southern Rhodesia: international Zephyr trading connexions

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Number of connexions</u>	<u>Number of suspected violations</u>
Austria	2	1
Belgium	2	1
Czechoslovakia	2	1
France	3	7
Germany (Federal Republic of)	9	8
Hong Kong	5	5
Italy	6	3
Japan	9	8
Netherlands	16	9
Portugal	-	3
Spain	-	1
Sweden	-	1
Switzerland	3	3
United Kingdom	24	5
United States	3	1

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Source: Stichting Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland, Zephyr Rapport,  
Amsterdam, 13 November 1973.

12 January 1973 United States companies imported a total of 246,650,947 pounds of minerals from Southern Rhodesia valued at \$US 13,295,570 (see table 8 below) ii/

Table 8

Southern Rhodesia: importation of minerals from Southern Rhodesia  
by United States companies, 24 January 1972-12 January 1973  
(United States dollars)

<u>Mineral</u>	<u>Pounds</u>	<u>Value</u>
Chrome ore	184,723,992	2,822,930
Ferrochrome	58,042,293	5,964,805
Nickel	3,471,143	4,412,067
Asbestos	360,000	87,900
Beryllium ore	53,519	7,868

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Source: Future Direction of U.S. Policy toward Southern Rhodesia, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, First Session, 21-22 February and 15 March 1973 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1973).

205. United States companies continued importation of Southern Rhodesian minerals throughout 1973. During the past year, efforts were made in the United States Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Although the Senate voted on 18 December 1973 to repeal the Amendment, action is still awaited in the House of Representatives.

206. Both the United States companies and the Zephyr network have been aided in their violations of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by the willingness of shipping companies from Europe, Africa and Latin America to transport commodities to and from Southern Rhodesia.

#### Affretair

207. The Southern Rhodesian régime and its corporate supporters have exploited the fact that they can obtain South African and Portuguese papers to evade sanctions. Some of the most flagrant operations in this regard are said to have been and continue to be carried out by Captain Jack Malloch, a personal friend of Mr. Ian Smith and an organizer of many sanction-evading activities, who established his own private airline called Affretair. The airline operates a DC 8, whose

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ii/ For details of United States importation of strategic minerals from Southern Rhodesia from 1 October to 31 December 1973, see appendix II below.

registration mark is TR LQR. (The DC 8 is nicknamed Tango Romeo after the first two letters of its registration mark.) It is reported that the aircraft flies Southern Rhodesian beef from Salisbury to Athens and collects air freight originating from many European countries from Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam for Southern Rhodesia. Affretair is reported to have informed the Governments of Greece and the Netherlands that the DC 8 aircraft is a Gabonese airline and that it carries freight to and from Libreville, the capital of Gabon. The airline maintains that the beef carried by the DC 8 is from South Africa. According to reports, the Governments of Greece and the Netherlands accepted the story. The DC 8 is at times serviced at Le Bourget Airport on the outskirts of Paris by a French airline, the Union de transports aériens (UTA), and at other times by Olympic Airways, the Greek airline.

208. It must be noted that Affretair and Air Trans Africa, also established by Captain Malloch and Brigadier Andrew Dunlop, a former "Minister of Transport" of the illegal régime, are said to be owned by the Compagnie Gabonaise d'Affrètement and have the same representative in Gabon, a French national, Mr. Jean Louis. Thus, using the Gabonese registration for the DC 8 and Portuguese and South African papers to "prove" the origin or destination of the cargo on board the DC 8, the Southern Rhodesian aircraft has been able to obtain transit facilities in many countries both in Africa and Europe.

209. Reports indicate that in a year Affretair can earn £1.6 million in foreign currency for Southern Rhodesia. The illegal régime, apparently encouraged by the successes of Affretair, is planning to introduce another weekly flight, using a Boeing 707.

#### Southern Rhodesian agencies

210. In violation of sanctions, the illegal régime successfully established various offices in other countries. It has also been able to recruit nationals of other States to serve as its agents in their own States. According to a report of the United States Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, jj/ among the many Southern Rhodesian agencies are the following:

- |          |  |
|----------|--|
| Belgium  | - Unofficial representative of Southern Rhodesia, citizen of Belgium |
| Botswana | - Officials of Rhodesia Railways                                     |
| France   | - The Southern Rhodesian régime claims a Rhodesian office in Paris   |

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jj/ Implications for U.S. International Legal Obligations of the Presence of the Rhodesian Information Office in the United States, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, First Session, Part I, 15 and 17 May 1973 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1973).

- Portugal
  - "Accredited Diplomatic Mission" in Lisbon
  - Rhodesian Trade Mission in Luanda, Angola, operated by Rhodesians
  - Southern Rhodesian "Consulate General" operated by Southern Rhodesians and Rhodesian Tourist Office in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique
  - A Southern Rhodesian "Consulate" is stated to be in Beira
- South Africa
  - Southern Rhodesian "Diplomatic Mission" in Pretoria, operated by Rhodesians
  - A Southern Rhodesian "Consulate" is stated to be in Cape Town
  - Rhodesian Tourist Board offices are advertised in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town
- Switzerland
  - Rhodesian Tourist Board lists an office in Basel
- United Kingdom
  - Southern Rhodesian pensions office in the United Kingdom handles accounts of Southern Rhodesian pensioners in the United Kingdom
- United States
  - Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, DC, operated by Southern Rhodesians
  - Air Rhodesia Office in New York
  - Rhodesian National Tourist Board in New York

211. These agents of the illegal régime are reportedly engaged in the promotion of trade between Southern Rhodesia and other countries, in the promotion of tourism and immigration to Southern Rhodesia and in public relations on behalf of Southern Rhodesia. For example, a pamphlet entitled Employment in Rhodesia, published by the "Department of Immigration", was circulated by a number of these agents. The first paragraph of this pamphlet reads as follows:

"As a prospective immigrant to Rhodesia, you are no doubt aware of the country's beauty and the unlimited opportunities that go hand-in-hand with a healthy, invigorating life. This brochure is an attempt to show what you can expect to earn, the scope in your particular trade and general conditions of employment."

212. This represents a sample of promotion of immigration to Southern Rhodesia (see section below on promotion of tourism).

213. These agents are also reported to have established, in many of the countries where they operate, "free" accounts to which they transfer funds received from corporations and individuals. Many of these accounts are suspected to be in branches of the Standard Bank, Ltd., and Barclays Bank International, Ltd.



## Tourism

214. Available information shows that until the intensification of guerrilla activities in Southern Rhodesia in 1973, tourism had become a major source of foreign earnings for the illegal régime. In the first nine months of 1973, tourism dropped by 35 per cent. However, many airlines around the world have continued to make travel reservations on Air Rhodesia flights from Johannesburg to Salisbury and from Blantyre to Salisbury and have not hesitated to confirm travel reservations from Salisbury on Air Rhodesia flights. The tickets for these flights are paid for in the cities in which reservations are made. In the United States, credit cards can be used for this purpose.

215. As a result, many foreign airlines have had to pay funds to Air Rhodesia. Inasmuch as Air Rhodesia is not a member of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), through which international airlines settle accounts with each other, foreign airlines have had to transfer funds directly to Air Rhodesia. For example, a study published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace indicates that in 1972 Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) transferred to Air Rhodesia about \$US 200,000, an increase of about 200 per cent from the funds it transferred in 1971. kk/ The study concluded that:

"This increase, we were told, cannot be accounted for by higher costs and prices; the increase thus apparently represents an increase in the number of passengers purchasing tickets on Air Rhodesia flights through Pan American."

216. Tourism to Southern Rhodesia is further facilitated by rental car services and travelling facilities offered by branches of foreign companies based in Southern Rhodesia. The Hertz Corporation and Avis Rent-a-Car, of the United States, have offices in Southern Rhodesia which they call "independent sub-licenceses" operating under their names. There are differences in legal interpretations as to whether names can be considered as "commodities". If so, these "sub-licencees" arrangements are in possible violation of sanctions. These "sub-licenceses" pay for the right to use the name of Hertz and Avis. The Carnegie study holds the view that names used in return for payment must be treated as commodities. However, once in Southern Rhodesia, the tourists can join tours run by subsidiary branches of United States companies such as Bennett Tours, Inc., Percival Tours, Inc., Merriman and Finnerty Associates.

217. Travel arrangements for tourists to Southern Rhodesia can also be made through private travel companies. According to the study published by Carnegie, a local travel agency in a country may receive full payment for services to be rendered to a customer, including reservations for hotels and car rentals. The travel agency pays all the expenses to the Southern Rhodesian companies. Payment is made either directly to the companies in Southern Rhodesia or through a local

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kk/ Stephen Park: Business as Usual. Transactions Violating Rhodesian Sanctions (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1973).

agent in Southern Rhodesia. The local agent then pays the hotels, car rental companies and other firms which would have rendered some services. The local agent generally utilized is the United Tourist Company, a Southern Rhodesian firm. At times, the actual foreign funds are not sent directly to Southern Rhodesia. The transfer of the funds might occur between banks outside Southern Rhodesia and the Southern Rhodesian firms themselves may, in such cases, receive Southern Rhodesian currency.

218. Tourists who hold credit cards have their financial transactions in Southern Rhodesia further simplified. Hertz in Southern Rhodesia accepts American Express, Diners Club and Carte Blanche. Avis in Southern Rhodesia accepts American Express, Master Charge, Carte Blanche and Diners Club, all United States credit cards. According to the Carnegie study, the funds are transferred to the Southern Rhodesian enterprises as follows. The tourist presents his/her credit card to the Southern Rhodesian enterprise. The enterprise presents the sales slip to its own bank or to a member bank of an international association which serves as a clearing house for the credit card companies. The bank pays the enterprise. The bank in turn presents the sales slip either directly to the credit card company in the United States or through the international association of which the credit card company is a member. The credit card company bills the tourist and pays the bank of the Southern Rhodesian enterprise. Thus the transactions become complete.

219. Before the intensification of guerrilla fighting in Southern Rhodesia, tourism to Southern Rhodesia had become so lucrative to many companies, both Southern Rhodesian and foreign, that it was decided to build a number of new hotels for tourists. The Holiday Inn, holding the United States corporation's franchise, was recently opened in Bulawayo. Another Holiday Inn is to be built soon in Salisbury. A hotel is also being built at the Chiredzi game reserve. In October 1973 it was announced that the Rhodesian Tobacco Leaf Hotel would be built in Salisbury and that the Cecil Hotel in Umtali would be replaced by a new structure. Owing to the recent decline in tourism, however, hotels all over Southern Rhodesia have been reporting falls of up to 80 per cent. Some hotels have been given government clearance to close mid-week.

220. Pan Am found it necessary, as an attraction to tourists, to insert in its Clipper Magazine of November 1973 an advertisement celebrating the date of the unilateral declaration of independence of Southern Rhodesia. This is the time when a number of foreign supporters of the illegal régime want to visit Southern Rhodesia.

#### Advertisement of business opportunities in Southern Rhodesia and promotion of immigration to Southern Rhodesia

221. A number of newspapers and journals have continued to carry advertisements inviting business to invest in Southern Rhodesia, and promoting and encouraging immigration to Southern Rhodesia. Some cases involve United Kingdom and United States publications. The Economist, published in the United Kingdom, carried an advertisement in December 1973 making a direct appeal for the British people to immigrate to a land where:

"Britain's way of life is still treasured and life has a special tempo of its own. Where endless sunny days and peaceful ways let one forget the problems of life elsewhere. Rhodesia, a land of leisurely pursuits and sophisticated facilities; of outstanding service and good neighbourliness; where money still goes a lot further and taxes are low. There are spacious homes, domestic help, modern health amenities, fast communications and uncrowded cities ..."

It is reported that The Economist is being investigated by the United Kingdom Government for possible violation of sanctions.

222. On 19 June 1972, The Journal of Commerce, a United States journal, published a full supplement of 16 pages carrying advertisements for Southern Rhodesian industries, banks, hotels, touring companies and many other commercial enterprises. One of the items advertised was the following:

"Whatever your product, the most profitable way to enter the Rhodesian market is via The Standard Bank."

The Journal followed these large-scale advertisements with others in 1973, on 5 January, 13 March, 26 April, 30 April, 14 May, 11 June, 9 July and 13 July.

Appendix I

MAP OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA



## Appendix II

UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS FROM SOUTHERN RHODESIA,  
1 OCTOBER-31 DECEMBER 1973

<u>Vessel (country of registry)</u>	<u>Date of arrival</u>	<u>Port of debarkation</u>	<u>Port of embarkation</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Quantity (tons)</u>
African Dawn <sup>a/</sup> (United States)	25/9/73	Baltimore, Maryland	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	88
Mormaccaple (United States)	8/10/73	Baltimore, Maryland	Lourenço Marques	Nickel cathodes	64
Mormachay (United States)	9/10/73	Baltimore, Maryland	Beira Lourenço Marques	Nickel cathodes	486
African Sun (United States)	3/11/73	Baltimore, Maryland Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Charleston, South Carolina	Beira Lourenço Marques	Nickel cathodes Asbestos fibre	232 410
M.V. Platte (United States)	25/10/73	New Orleans, Louisiana	Beira Lourenço Marques	Chrome ore Ferrochrome	18,334 6,673
Mormaclake (United States)	9/11/73	Baltimore, Maryland	Lourenço Marques Beira	Nickel cathodes High carbon ferrochrome	385 688
American Condor (United States)	19/11/73	New Orleans, Louisiana Baton Rouge, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome Low carbon ferrochrome	4,989 2,973
Mormacpride (United States)	20/11/73	Baltimore, Maryland	Lourenço Marques	Nickel cathodes	215
Nedlloyd Kembla (United States)	18/12/73	Seattle/Tacoma, Washington	Durban	Nickel cathodes	20
Morganstar (South Africa)	24/12/73	Baltimore, Maryland	Lourenço Marques	Nickel cathodes	22
Yellow Stone (United States)	31/12/73	Baton Rouge, Louisiana	Beira	Chrome ore	16,805
Hellenic Destiny (Greece)	30/12/73	Charleston, South Carolina Boston, Massachusetts	Lourenço Marques	Asbestos fibre Chrysotile asbestos fibre	645 50
Ocean Pegasus <sup>a/</sup> (Greece)	9/11/72	Baltimore, Maryland	Lourenço Marques	Charge chrome (ferrochrome)	556
Venthisikimi <sup>a/</sup> (Greece)	6/10/72	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	Charge chrome	1,119
Costos Frangos <sup>a/</sup> (Greece)	11/2/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	2,239
Adelfoi <sup>a/</sup> (Liberia)	18/3/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	550
Nortrans Unity <sup>a/</sup> (Greece)	10/4/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	839
Missouri <sup>a/</sup> (United States)	22/5/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	555
Merrimac <sup>a/</sup> (United States)	9/7/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	1,372
Sun River <sup>a/</sup> (Norway)	17/9/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	1,488
Safina E. Najam (Pakistan)	1/12/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	778
Wildenfels (Federal Republic of Germany)	2/10/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	974
Steinfels (Federal Republic of Germany)	13/12/73	Burnside, Louisiana	Lourenço Marques	High carbon ferrochrome	325

Source: Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 (S/11594/Rev.1),  
vol. II, annex III, sect. B.

<sup>a/</sup> Arrival report recently received, not previously reported.

CHAPTER IX  
(A/9623/Add.3)

NAMIBIA

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	1 - 10	127
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	11	128
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		131

## CHAPTER IX

### NAMIBIA

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Namibia at its 968th to 973rd meetings, between 2 and 8 April 1974.

2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolutions 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973 on the question of Namibia and 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By paragraph 11 of the latter the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". The Special Committee also paid due consideration to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning Namibia and to the reports and decisions of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

3. In considering the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on developments concerning the Territory. The Committee also took into account a statement issued by the United Nations Council for Namibia relating to the current situation in Namibia (S/11228). 1/

#### Participation of the national liberation movements

4. In accordance with a decision taken at its previous session and subsequently approved by the General Assembly, the Special Committee, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), invited the representative of the national liberation movement of Namibia, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to participate in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item.

5. Accordingly, during the consideration of the item, SWAPO was represented by Mr. Moses Garoeb, who made statements at the 968th and 973rd meetings, on 2 and 8 April respectively (A/AC.109/PV.968 and Corr.1 and 973).

#### General debate

6. In accordance with established practice, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and representatives of the Council participated in the work of the Special Committee relating to the item. The President of the Council addressed the Committee at its 968th meeting, on 2 April (A/AC.109/PV.968 and Corr.1).

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1/ For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1974.



7. The Special Committee held the general debate on the item at its 969th to 972nd meetings, from 3 to 5 April. Statements in the general debate were made by the representative of Australia at the 969th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.969), by the representative of Iraq at the 970th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.970), by the representatives of Indonesia, the Syrian Arab Republic and China at the 971st meeting (A/AC.109/PV.971) and by the representatives of Mali and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 972nd meeting (A/AC.109/PV.972).

#### Draft consensus

8. At the 972nd meeting, on 5 April, the Chairman, at the request of the Special Committee and on the basis of his consultations with the members in that regard, submitted for the Committee's consideration the text of a draft consensus on the item contained in document A/AC.109/L.939. At its 973rd meeting, on 8 April, following a statement by the representative of the Ivory Coast (A/AC.109/PV.973), the Special Committee adopted the draft consensus as orally revised (A/AC.109/PV.973) without objection (see paragraph 11 below). The representative of Denmark made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.973). Statements were made by the representative of SWAPO and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.973).

9. On 11 April, the text of the consensus was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/11260). Copies of the consensus were also transmitted to all States, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

#### Namibia Day

10. On 26 August, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3111 (XXVIII), members of the United Nations Council for Namibia observed Namibia Day by holding special meetings at Georgetown, Guyana, and at United Nations Headquarters. The Special Committee was represented at the meeting held at Georgetown by its Chairman, and at the meeting held at Headquarters by one of its Vice-Chairmen.

#### B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

11. The text of the consensus (A/AC.109/446) adopted by the Special Committee at its 973rd meeting, on 8 April, to which reference is made in paragraph 8 above, is reproduced below:

(1) Having considered the question of Namibia within the context of the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and having heard the statements by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and by the Administrative Secretary-General of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), participating as an observer, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples expresses its profound concern at the

extremely dangerous situation created by South Africa's continued violation of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations with regard to the Territory, its outright defiance of world public opinion and its increasing resort to violence, torture and intimidation in its efforts to stifle the opposition of the Namibian people to its inhuman policy of "bantustanization" and apartheid and their demand for the exercise of their inalienable right to freedom and national independence in accordance with United Nations decisions.

(2) The Special Committee notes that, during the past year, and especially after the Security Council adopted its resolution 342 (1973) of 11 December 1973, by which it decided to terminate further efforts on the basis of its resolution 309 (1972), there has been an escalation of police terror and intimidation of Namibians both by the illegal régime of South Africa and by the authorities of the so-called "homelands". By mass arrests and detentions, accompanied by brutal public floggings and denial of the basic freedoms of political expression and assembly, the South African authorities are seeking to destroy all organized political opposition to their illegal presence in Namibia and to the continued imposition of their racist policies of apartheid and "bantustanization" which are totally rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Namibian people. The Special Committee condemns those actions which are not only contrary to the assurances given to the Secretary-General by the Government of South Africa concerning its recognition and acceptance of the need for freedom of speech and freedom of political activity, including the holding of public meetings, 2/ but are a flagrant violation of basic human rights which can only serve to render the situation in the Territory more dangerous and explosive. In this connexion, the Special Committee expresses its profound concern for the safety of the Namibians arrested and held in detention by the South African authorities and endorses the action taken by the United Nations Council for Namibia in bringing this matter to the attention of the Security Council.

(3) The Special Committee considers that the recent mass arrests, the detention and trial of political leaders and the efforts to restrict the freedom of the press constitute a grave escalation of repression by the South African authorities which seriously endangers peace and security in the region. In the light of these developments and of South Africa's continued and flagrant defiance of United Nations decisions, and bearing in mind the direct responsibility of the United Nations for the Territory and its people, the Special Committee expresses the hope that the Security Council will consider, as a matter of urgency, taking effective measures, in accordance with the Charter, to secure South Africa's compliance with its resolution 310 (1972) and previous resolutions calling for the latter's immediate withdrawal from the Territory.

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2/ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973, document S/10921, para. 14.

(4) In this connexion, the Special Committee condemns the support which South Africa receives in perpetuating its illegal occupation of Namibia, especially from those members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which continue to collaborate with the racist régime, and, in particular, from its major trading partners and from those financial, economic and other interests which, for selfish motives, have joined with the illegal régime in exploiting and exhausting the Territory's natural resources to the detriment of their rightful owners. The Special Committee calls upon all States to discontinue all such support and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 283 (1970) of 29 July 1970, and 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972, as well as with General Assembly resolution 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973. The Special Committee notes in this regard the important decision taken by the Arab States to impose an embargo on oil exports to South Africa, in view of the repressive racist policy pursued by its Government.

(5) The Special Committee commends the people of Namibia for their courageous stand in the face of the ruthless and brutal repression practised by the South African authorities. It reaffirms its solidarity with the Namibian people in their legitimate struggle to free their country from the racist and colonialist oppressors, and calls once again upon all States and the specialized agencies and institutions within the United Nations system, in close co-operation with the United Nations Council for Namibia and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to provide the Namibian people, through their liberation movement, with the increased moral and material assistance which they require in their struggle against foreign occupation and oppression.

(6) The Special Committee commends the United Nations Council for Namibia for the vigorous measures which it has taken to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly and in particular to protect and safeguard the interests and welfare of Namibia and its people. The Special Committee calls upon all States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to co-operate fully with the Council as the legitimate authority for the administration of Namibia.

ANNEX\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. Land and people . . . . .	1 - 2
2. General political developments . . . . .	3 - 6
3. "Homelands" policy of fragmentation . . . . .	7 - 25
4. Measures of repression . . . . .	26 - 70
5. Struggle for national liberation and independence . . . . .	71 - 100
6. White South African political parties . . . . .	101 - 105
7. Decisions adopted by regional conferences . . . . .	106 - 109
8. Economic conditions of Namibians: labour questions . . . . .	110 - 113
Appendix: Map of Namibia	

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.932.

## 1. LAND AND PEOPLE

1. Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa, lies along the South Atlantic Ocean between the seventeenth and twenty-ninth parallels of south latitude. It is bound on the north by Angola and Zambia, on the east by Botswana, and on the south-east and south by the Republic of South Africa. The area of Namibia is approximately 318,000 square miles. From north to south, the Territory measures about 800 miles, and from west to east an average of 350 miles. The Caprivi Strip is an elongated piece of land in the north-east corner of Namibia which runs east and touches Southern Rhodesia at a point colloquially known as "Crooks' Corner".

2. The total population of Namibia in 1970 was reported to be some 746,300 of whom 620,900 were classified as non-whites and 125,400 as whites. The ethnic distribution in 1970 is shown in table 1 below.

Table 1

Namibia: Ethnic distribution of population, 1970

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Estimated total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Ovambos	326,900	43.8
Whites	125,400	16.8
Damaras	60,500	8.1
Hereros	47,800	6.4
Namas	47,700	6.4
Kavangos	38,100	5.1
East Caprivians	21,700	2.9
Coloureds	19,400	2.6
Rehoboth Basters	16,400	2.2
Bushmen	16,300	2.2
Tswana and others	13,400	1.8
Kaokovelders	12,700	1.7
	<hr/> 746,300	

## 2. GENERAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. In defiance of the advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice on 21 June 1971 a/ and of repeated resolutions of the United Nations calling for its withdrawal from Namibia, South Africa has maintained its illegal occupation of the Territory.

4. Notwithstanding the new initiatives undertaken in accordance with Security Council resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972, the South African Government, while expressing its desire "to enable and assist the population of South West Africa to exercise their right to self-determination and independence" b/ nevertheless insists on proceeding with its policy of creating separate ethnic "homelands" with so-called "autonomous governments". Instead of encouraging progress towards national independence and unity, the South African Government, in March 1973, created an "Advisory Council" in the Territory largely composed of representatives of the "homelands" and traditional chiefs from each ethnic group. Increasingly, the South African Government has encouraged the "homelands" authorities to suppress all political opposition. Furthermore, public flogging was re-introduced in Ovamboland in 1973 with the approval of the South African Government.

5. Finally, the Security Council, in its resolution 342 (1973) of 11 December 1973, decided to discontinue further efforts on the basis of its resolution 309 (1972). Prior to the decision ending the contacts, the South African Government had contended that it was leading the people of Namibia to self-determination. The Government also contended that, subject to the requirements of public safety, the freedoms of speech, political activity and movement were being respected. Nevertheless, there has been growing repression of political activity in Namibia, as indicated by the breaking up of political meetings, the placing of leaders and others on trial for what are described by the South African Government as political offences, the torture, including public flogging, and further restrictions on the press.

6. The major developments in the Territory during the year are summarized below.

## 3. "HOMELANDS" POLICY OF FRAGMENTATION

7. Since the South African Government accepted the recommendations of the 1964 Odendaal Commission, which called for the partition of the Territory along racial lines, the "Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa

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a/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

b/ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973, S/10921, para. 13.

Act" of 1968 and the "South West Africa Affairs Act" of 1969 have served to entrench the pattern of fragmentation of Namibia. c/

8. By the end of 1972, three "homelands" had been created, each with a "homeland authority" consisting of a "legislative council" with members appointed by the South African Government or elected on a tribal system of selection, and an "executive committee" selected from among the members of the "legislative council" and headed by a "chief councillor". In February 1973, the South African Government enacted the "Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Amendment Act", which empowered the State President of South Africa to declare a "homeland" to be a "self-governing area" by proclamation. In such cases, the "executive government" would be vested in a "chief minister" and "cabinet". In terms of the Odendaal plan, a total of 11 "homelands" would eventually be established.

#### A. Ovamboland

9. Ovamboland was proclaimed a "self-governing area within the Territory of South West Africa", with effect from 1 May 1973. Details of the new governmental structure of the "homeland" have already been reported. d/

10. Following this change in status, new elections were held on 1-2 August 1973 to the Ovamboland Legislative Council. Thirty-five seats were filled by nominated members and 25 by elected members, 20 of whom were elected unopposed. Only five seats were contested. As a result of a boycott organized by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), only 2.5 per cent of the electorate took part in the voting.

11. As constituted on 5 October 1973, the Ovamboland "Cabinet" comprises Chief Philemon Elifas as "Chief Minister", Pastor Titus Haita (economic affairs); Senior Headman Jackie Ashipala (interior); Headman Daniel Shooya (public works); Mr. J. S. Taapopi (agriculture and forestry); Chief Jafet Munkudi (justice); and Pastor Cornelius Njoba (education). Chief Elifas also has responsibility for financial matters.

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c/ For a summary of the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs (the Odendaal Commission), see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chap. IV, paras. 18 et seq. For further details of the 1968 Act, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/7200/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 45-49, and for the 1969 Act, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/7623/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 36-44.

d/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex, paras. 19-22.

12. Mr. B. J. Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, officially opened the first session of the second "Legislative Council" on 10 October. In announcing the members of his "Cabinet", Chief Elifas said "we will side with the Republic of South Africa. We will help the fight against terrorism and we will stand firm on the road on which the Republic is leading us. We believe that this is the only way to prosperity and peaceful coexistence."

13. Mr. Brian O'Linn, a Windhoek lawyer and one of the leaders of the white opposition United Party in the Territory, has opposed the new development in Ovamboland. He said on 5 October, that an extremely dangerous situation had developed in Ovamboland and that the rule of law was almost non-existent there. Referring to the new titles, such as "chief minister" and "minister", he stated that such titles had been bestowed "as if you were dealing with a sovereign independent state", although there was not the slightest semblance of the institutions which were essential for self-government. He also charged that power was being given to primitive institutions where justice was dispensed without trial, and which were used to intimidate political opponents.

#### B. Kavangoland

14. Kavangoland was granted "self-governing status" on 9 May 1973, with Chief Linus Shashipapo as "Chief Minister". The five-man "Cabinet" is composed of a "minister" appointed from each of the five tribes which make up the Kavango "nation". Elections were held on 29 and 30 August to fill 15 seats in the Council where each of the five Kavango tribes is entitled to three elected seats. The remaining 15 seats in the Council are filled by members nominated by the tribal authorities in the same ratio of tribal distribution.

15. In an attempt to avoid the experience of the Ovamboland elections (see para. 10 above) the South African authorities provided an extensive transport system in Kavango to take voters to the polling booths. According to official sources, 66.2 per cent of those eligible actually cast their votes.

16. The newly constituted Kavangoland "Cabinet" comprises a "Chief Minister" who has not yet been appointed; Mr. Alfons Majavero, representing the Mbukushi tribe (justice and interior); Mr. Andreas Kandjumu, representing the Sembyu tribe (agriculture); Mr. Levi Hakusembe, representing the Mbunze tribe (education); and Mr. Rudolf Ngonde, representing the Kwangali tribe (public works). There is no information on the responsibilities of Mr. Sebastian Kamuanga Ndunda who represents the Jaikuru tribe.

#### C. Damaraland

17. In 1972, the South African authorities attempted to elevate Damaraland to the status of a full "homeland". The Damara leaders responded to this attempt by issuing a statement in which they said that they were not prepared to discuss the question of "self-government" unless they were first allowed to hold talks with the Prime Minister of South Africa "on profound policy problems" which they said were deeply rooted in South Africa's policy of "multinational development".



18. On 3 October 1973, the Chairman of the Damara Tribal Executive Committee issued a statement rejecting the "federal" policy of the United Party (see paras. 101-103 below) as well as further dialogue between South Africa and the United Nations. He appealed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to end the "useless" contacts and dialogue unconditionally, because they had served no useful purpose.

#### D. Coloureds

19. The Odendaal Commission had recommended that, except for a small number of Coloured farmers for whom a rural irrigation settlement had been proposed on the Orange River, the entire Coloured population was to be persuaded to remove to the areas of their greatest concentration (Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Lüderitz) and that the management of their separate Coloured townships should be entrusted to Coloured local township authorities. It was also suggested that the "Coloured Council of South West Africa", which then consisted of members appointed by the Administrator of the Territory, should be expanded to include elected members.

20. With the transfer of legislative and administrative powers to South Africa in 1969, however, there was first a move to incorporate the "Coloured Council of South West Africa" into the Coloured Council of South Africa and, in fact, elections were held accordingly. In a further change of policy, Mr. van der Merwe, the South Africa Minister for Coloured Relations and Rehoboth Affairs, announced in October 1973 that elections to a representative "Coloured Council of South West Africa" would be held in May 1974. It was reported that six members would be elected and the remaining five appointed. There is no further news on subsequent developments.

#### E. Other "homelands"

21. There is no recent information on the steps taken by the South African Government in respect of the other designated homelands, namely Bushmanland, Eastern Caprivi, Hereroland, the Kaokoveld, Namaland and the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet.

#### F. Establishment of the "Advisory Council"

22. It will be recalled that, in November 1972, the South African Government first indicated its intention to create an advisory council, drawn from representatives of the "various regions, regional governments or authorities in the Territory". e/ In fact, the establishment of this "Advisory Council" appears to be an integral part of the South African policy of fragmentation. During the period under review, the first working meeting of the South African Prime Minister's "Advisory Council

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e/ For a description of the terms of reference and composition of the "Advisory Council", see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973, document S/10921, annex I.

for South West Africa" was held on 16 and 17 August 1973, not in Namibia, but at the Holiday Inn Motel at Jan Smuts International Airport, outside Johannesburg.

23. At the end of that meeting, members of the "Advisory Council" rejected the various published allegations that they were "stooges" of the South African Government, stressing that they had been elected by their own groups, and not appointed by the Prime Minister. Mr. Alex Kudomo, the Ovamboland member, said that the "Advisory Council" rejected United Nations intervention. He also criticized the use of the name "Namibia" by the United Nations Council for Namibia.

24. Commenting on the results of the meeting, Prime Minister Vorster said that delegates had been unanimous in calling on the South African Government to allow all the peoples of "South West Africa" to play an "active part in the fight against terrorism". He said that emphasis at the meeting had concentrated on development of the Territory, the necessity for improving race relations and the question of wages.

25. On the other hand, sentiment opposing the "Advisory Council" was voiced in several quarters in Namibia. In a statement issued in mid-August, the leaders of the Mbanderu group of Hereros said that Headman Elifas Tjingaete, a member of the Council, did not represent the Mbanderus. The statement was later confirmed by Chief Munjuku Nguvauva II of the Mbanderu group. In addition, the Rehoboth Baster Council, in a statement issued in September 1973, rejected the "Advisory Council", saying that it was "nothing but a sop" and that if the "Advisory Council" should claim to give direction to the political struggle in this Territory, it could do no more than make idle promises. As long as the "game" continued, any attempt at dialogue would be smothered and the present Government would press on with its policy of absorbing "South West Africa" into South Africa and forcing the inhabitants of the country to register as South African citizens.

#### 4. MEASURES OF REPRESSION

26. During the period under review, the South African Government pursued its policy of repression on various fronts: (a) repression of political activities; (b) political trials; (c) prison conditions and torture; (d) control of the press; (e) restriction on freedom of movement; and (f) corporal punishment. Selected examples of these types of repressive acts are described below.

##### A. Repression of political activities

27. The South African Government began to intensify its repressive measures in Ovamboland even before the "elections" held in August (see para. 10 above). Although, in theory, political parties were to be permitted to campaign before the "elections", provided that they were registered, only the registration of the ruling Ovambo Independent Party was approved. Nevertheless, despite that approval, two speakers from the party, who were scheduled to address a meeting outside Windhoek, were denied that right because the Municipal Director of Non-White Affairs expressed fear of disturbances.

28. On 19 July, South African police arrested nine officers of the Youth League of SWAPO for holding a meeting in defiance of a prohibition order. The meeting was held in Engela, a small village 15 kilometres south of Oshikango near the border between Namibia and Angola. Those arrested were Mrs. Veronica Shiluwa and Messrs. Keshii Nathaniel, Paulus Kaimbi, Thomas Hivelwa, Namhola Ya Namhola, Justus Amkongo, Hipanga Kanyanda and Rehabem Namehuja. All were speakers at the rally. The name of the ninth person was not available.

29. On the following day, the Ovambo "Cabinet" issued a statement in which it declared that it had knowledge that illegal meetings had been taking place and were continuing. It said that such meetings were "intended to undermine law and order, to slander the authorities and to propagate undesirable foreign influences", and added that the South African police would be "requested to proceed severely against persons who convene these meetings, appear in them or deliver speeches". This announcement was broadcast over Radio Ovambo.

30. On the week-end of 21-22 July, Chief Jafet Munkudi, "Minister of Justice" of Ovamboland, led a group of tribal police in breaking up a SWAPO political meeting in his own area of Ongandjera. The Chief's men smashed a SWAPO loudspeaker mounted on a truck and assaulted SWAPO supporters as they dispersed.

31. During the next few days, several SWAPO officials were arrested. On 23 July, three SWAPO officials, Messrs. Erastus Mbumba, Petrus Moongo and Keshii Kalimba, were arrested under Emergency Proclamation No. R.17 of 1972 under which it is an offence to hold public meetings without permission or to criticize the authorities. A fourth SWAPO official, Mr. Tobias Haukanga, was arrested on 24 July. Two other SWAPO officials, Mr. Fillipus Shilongo and Mr. Willem Nankondo, were arrested around the same time. On 26 July, Mr. Shilongo and Mr. Nankondo were gaoled for 12 months and Mr. Moongo for eight months, after having been found guilty of having held or participated in an illegal meeting in Ovamboland. Mr. Mbumba was remanded on bail for a further hearing on 8 August. The fate of Mr. Kalimba and Mr. Haukanga is unknown.

#### Action against the SWAPO Youth League

32. In January 1974, the South African authorities took further severe measures against supporters of the SWAPO Youth League, which had become increasingly active since termination of the dialogue between the United Nations and the Government of South Africa. On 13 January, police with tracker dogs and automatic weapons arrested 127 Africans, most of them Ovambos, who were on their way from Windhoek to Rehoboth to attend a political meeting called by the League. Those arrested, including six women, were charged with either being without their passbooks or with refusing to show them. Bail was refused the Africans on the grounds that the names of the accused still had to be verified, and they were remanded in custody until various dates between 17 and 22 January.

33. Later in the same week, a force of 360 policemen raided the African township of Katutura, outside Windhoek, and arrested 141 men and 45 women who were to appear

in court on various charges. According to the press, although the police recovered some stolen goods, their main aim was to follow up the arrests of the previous Sunday as part of their over-all strategy of "closing in on" the SWAPO Youth League.

34. In January and February 1974, 10 SWAPO leaders were arrested and detained without charges under article 6 of the Terrorism Act. This process culminated in the arrest, on 8 February 1974, of Mr. David H. Meroro, National Chairman of SWAPO inside Namibia, and, according to reports in the local press, completed the round-up of the SWAPO leadership in the urban areas.

35. As the Terrorism Act stipulates that no one other than the Minister of Justice of South Africa or other officials designated by him may have any information relating to persons detained under the Act, the detainees have been deprived of access to legal counsel and no evidence against them has been made public.

#### B. Political trials

##### Trial of Namibian party leaders

36. In May 1973, four Namibian party leaders were arrested in Ovamboland and later charged, under Emergency Proclamation No. R.17 of 1972, with having held an illegal meeting and with having made statements aimed at undermining the security of the State. They were Mr. Johannes Jefta Nangutuuala, leader of the Democratic Co-operative Development Party, Mr. Andreas Nunkwawo, a member of the party, Mr. John Otto, a SWAPO leader, and Mr. Jimmy Ampala, a SWAPO activist. However, on 21 May 1973, after a hearing before the Ondangwa magistrate, Mr. Nunkwawo and Mr. Ampala were released on bail.

37. On the following day, when the Court met to hear a request by the counsel for the four men for an order cancelling the charges, 5,000 Africans demonstrated in support of the men outside the Ondangwa Magistrate's Court in Ovamboland. The next day, a similar but smaller demonstration of about 1,500 men, women and children was broken up by armed police who clubbed demonstrators with machine pistols. Subsequently, a police spokesman denied that force had been used.

38. On the same day, a large number of school students from the Ongwediwa Training College were caned for participation in the demonstration. The demonstrators had carried posters demanding the end of the "bantustan" policy and the release of their leaders and calling for abrogation of the Emergency Proclamation.

39. On 5 June, after arguments before the Supreme Court, in Windhoek, bail, which had originally been refused by the Ondangwa magistrate, was also granted to Mr. Nangutuuala and Mr. Otto. In the course of these hearings, it emerged that, although all four men were charged with holding an illegal meeting or meetings, only Mr. Nangutuuala was charged with making statements aimed at undermining the authority of the State, the Ovamboland Government or officials.

40. A South African correspondent, who had been granted a special visitor's permit to be present at a part of the proceedings in the Ondangwa Magistrate's Court, reported that he had been prevented from holding any interviews or even talking to Africans in Ondangwa. He also stated that police had followed his every step and that South African security policemen had filled the courtroom while police armed with machine pistols patrolled outside.

41. When the four men actually appeared in court in August for further remand, a crowd, estimated at some 3,000, assembled again. The police reportedly used force to disperse the crowd. People were chased into nearby houses and into the bush outside the town where they were allegedly set upon and beaten. Sixteen people, some with open wounds and broken limbs, were taken to hospital. At least four persons with injuries were missing afterwards.

42. Later in the same month, a judge in Windhoek ordered the territorial magistrate at Ondangwa to cancel two charges of holding illegal meetings brought against Messrs. Nangutuuala, Nunkwawo, Otto and Ampala. Finally, on 18 September, Mr. Nangutuuala was found guilty in the Ondangwa Magistrates' Court on a charge of undermining the authority of the State, the Government of Ovamboland, the Administration of "South West Africa" and of the traditional leaders. On 21 September, he was sentenced to pay a fine of R 400 f/ (or spend two years in prison), half of which was conditionally suspended. Mr. Otto was sentenced to pay a fine of R 200 (or spend one year in prison), half of which was conditionally suspended; Mr. Nunkwawo was sentenced to pay a fine of R 100 (or spend six months in prison), all of which was conditionally suspended. Mr. Ampala was found not guilty on both charges and released.

43. Although Mr. Nangutuuala was released on bail pending an appeal, he was rearrested in mid-October (see also para. 66 below). In addition, Mr. Nunkwawo, who was also out on bail pending appeal, was rearrested shortly before the visit of Prime Minister Vorster to Namibia at the end of August 1973.

#### Trial of SWAPO Youth League leaders

44. On 13 August, following a mass meeting held by the SWAPO Youth League on the previous day in Katutura, Windhoek's segregated black township, Mr. Jeremiah Ekandjo, Deputy Chairman of the League in Windhoek, was arrested. The arrest was announced in a written statement handed to the press on 14 August by Mr. Jacob N. Shindika, the Chairman of the SWAPO Youth League in Windhoek, who had presided over the mass meeting.

45. Following this, a number of black leaders went into hiding. Subsequently, special investigators, both from the South African Security Police and the Criminal Investigation Department, were assigned to trace the whereabouts of some of the men wanted for questioning. Later, police reinforcements from Pretoria joined in the

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f/ One rand (R) equals approximately \$US 1.50.

search and, on 10 September, Mr. Shindika and Mr. Ezriel Taapopi were arrested in an area known as the Rietfontein Block, north of Gobabis; they were reportedly on their way to Botswana. According to a statement issued on 12 September by Mr. Elifas Shikongo, the SWAPO Youth League Deputy Secretary, Messrs. Shindika and Taapopi, when arrested, were on a mission to African countries to seek assistance. Thus, as at 12 September, the total number of leaders arrested by the authorities in connexion with the mass meeting of 12 August stood at eight, five of whom were Messrs. Jeremiah Ekandjo, Jacob N. Shindika, Ezriel Taapopi, Martin Kapawasa and Jack Nghidinua. The names of the other three are not known.

46. When the trial opened in Windhoek's Supreme Court on 12 October, three SWAPO Youth League leaders, namely Messrs. Ekandjo, Kapawasa and Nghidinua, were charged under the Sabotage Act. The State alleged that the three accused had addressed a political meeting on 12 August at Katutura where they "encouraged, incited and advised their listeners to commit unlawful acts", and urged them to take up arms against the whites of "South West Africa". The case against Mr. Taapopi was subsequently withdrawn. It was expected that Mr. Shindika would be tried separately.

47. The cases against Messrs. Immanuel Nepembe, Martin Shilongo and Nehemia Haufiko, all members of SWAPO, who were believed to have been arrested at about the same time, were eventually withdrawn.

#### Other trials

48. In addition to the above, eight other members of the SWAPO Youth League were each fined R 100 in the Ovamboland Territorial Court on a charge of convening, holding, addressing or attending an illegal public meeting in Ovamboland on 29 July 1973. They were Messrs. Paulus Kaimbi, Thomas Hivelwa, Ndaxu Namhola, Shipanga Kanjanda, Walde Namehuja, Temus Uukande, and Mrs. Veronica Shiluwa and Ms. Frieda Wilhelm.

49. Three men, Messrs. David Shikombe, Imanuel Andriano and Elia Ngwahahua, were placed on trial in Windhoek on 17 June for allegedly calling a meeting in Katutura on 27 May without permission from the Compound Superintendent and inciting approximately 1,000 Ovambo men to destroy their identification papers. All three were sentenced to a fine of R 25 or one month's imprisonment, conditionally suspended for two years.

#### C. Prison conditions and torture

50. In April, 50 prisoners presented a petition to the prison authorities of Robben Island, in South Africa, where many Namibians are held, in which they claimed that a number of basic prisoners' rights had been eroded. As punishment for this action, Colonel W. H. Wilmwilleme, the officer commanding the prison, reportedly stripped the prisoners concerned of their rights to smoke, read, write letters or study; Mr. L. Kader Hassim, the leader of the group, was placed in solitary confinement. According to the information given in the petition, a copy of which was later smuggled out of the prison, the condition of black political prisoners in South

Africa has deteriorated since the mid-1960s. This incident later led to a court action brought by two of the wives of the prisoners seeking restitution of their husbands' rights. Mr. Justice Timont of the Supreme Court in Cape Town, who ruled on the action, declared that the isolation of the prisoners' leader was unlawful, and he criticized both the South African Prison Department and the officer commanding the prison in particular.

51. According to a report prepared by a group of six members appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Commission to study the treatment of political prisoners in southern Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination, the South African police were reported to have used "most cruel and degrading torture" on people arrested in Namibia (E/CN.4/1111). The report stated that the victims were tied to horizontal poles, head-down, and beaten or kicked. Other tortures included the use of electric shock equipment and the dropping of victims from helicopters. After calling for an end to the "inhuman and degrading treatment" of people who had been detained solely because they opposed South African policy in Namibia, the report demanded an inquiry into cases in which people had been killed.

52. In a press interview in June 1973, the Secretary-General of the World Federation of Lutheran Churches, Pastor Albertus J. Maasdorp, a former minister of the Windhoek Evangelical Lutheran Church and a resident of the segregated Coloured township of Khomasdal, also charged that the South African police were carrying out systematic acts of torture. He said that such acts were carried out in special torture chambers, where the detained people received electric shocks and cuts with canes on sensitive parts of their bodies. Pastor Maasdorp also informed the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, a Dutch newspaper, that Bishop Leonard Auala, head of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church, had invited Prime Minister Vorster to visit Ovamboland so that he could personally see the tortured people.

53. Replying to a question as to whether the reports of torture were true, Bishop Auala said at a press conference in Helsinki in September 1973: "Yes, they are true. Ovambo men are tortured. A list containing the names of 37 tortured Ovambos has been given to Mr. Vorster." In another press interview, Bishop Auala again charged that detainees had "been flogged, given electric shocks and hung with their heads down and then kicked", and said "we wish we could preserve peace in Namibia, but the South African Government speaks only of law and order and enforces it with such an iron grip that peace cannot result ...".

#### D. Control of the press

54. On 27 July, Mr. J. de Wet, the South African Commissioner General for the Native Nations of South West Africa, announced in Windhoek that the press, with the exception of the South African Press Association (SAPA), would be barred from the Ovamboland elections to be held on 1 and 2 August (see para. 10 above).

55. Using existing legislation, the South African Government confiscated the July/August edition of the SWAPO publication, Namibia News, when it arrived in



Namibia. Mr. David Meroro, the National Chairman of SWAPO inside Namibia, was informed that all copies of the magazine had been sent to Pretoria. Namibia News was later banned. Subsequently, its name was changed to the Kalahari Post, and this publication was also banned.

56. As a result of the frequent criticisms of the Government's policies in the South African press, Prime Minister Vorster has charged that newspapers were "inciting" racial hatred. On 5 September 1973, Mr. Vorster announced that he would amend the Riotous Assemblies Act to enable the courts to act against anyone who created "bad blood" between the race groups. On that occasion he stated: "If South Africa finds itself in the position of Rhodesia, we will not allow the press to play the same role as it has there. There are people, organizations and newspapers which would stand against the whites in such a confrontation." In further statements, made on 12 and 18 September, Mr. Vorster said that newspapers which failed to exercise restraint would be forbidden to appear on the streets.

57. Early in 1974, new legislation affecting the freedom of the press was proposed in South Africa. At the time it was suggested, newspapers in South Africa and elsewhere raised a storm of protest. Even two Afrikaans newspapers, Die Transvaler and Vaderland, which are normally considered to be supporters of the Nationalist Party, came out against the proposed legislation, as did a third Afrikaans newspaper, Rapport. Speaking against the proposals, Mr. Hans Strydom, the President of the South African Society of Journalists, stated, inter alia: "If reflection of the complex society we live in is to be regarded as incitement, then there will be very little left to report on." Mr. Strydom went on: "The press should not be made the scapegoat if the structure of society is so brittle and potentially so inflammable that it cannot stand the glare of publicity."

#### E. Restrictions on freedom of movement

58. South Africa has never guaranteed the freedom of movement set out in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.

59. Inside the Territory, non-white persons have no freedom of movement outside the designated areas called "homelands", and travel outside the country is subject to strict controls. The South African Government has often refused to issue visas to opponents or would-be opponents of the Government to visit or to leave the country.

60. The South African Government has applied such restrictions not only to Africans but also to white religious groups. On 1 May 1973, for instance, a delegation from the United Evangelical Church of South West Africa met the South African Prime Minister in Cape Town to discuss restrictions on churchmen in the Territory and the refusal of visas to overseas clergymen. The group of eight pastors was led by Bishop Auala who said afterwards that the group had complained that as a result of restrictions placed on them in the name of the policy of separate development, it was difficult for a clergyman of one race to work among people of



another group. The church had also had difficulty in finding lecturers for its theological school, because visas for a number of overseas clergymen to work in Namibia had been refused. Bishop Auala also mentioned 50 instances of overseas theological lecturers who had been refused visas to enter "South West Africa".

61. The delegation was apparently unsuccessful in securing a change in these restrictive practices, because it was announced in mid-June that the temporary residence permit of Pastor Wolfgang Krüger, a white minister of the German Evangelical Lutheran Church, would not be extended beyond the end of that month. According to press reports, this action was probably connected with Pastor Krüger's participation in an exchange of black and white priests in Otjiwarongo, in the course of which he had preached in a "non-white" church, while a black pastor had preached in Pastor Krüger's white church.

62. The request of Pastor Gerhard Dunze for an extension of his visa was rejected at the same time. This was linked by the press to the fact that, upon his arrival in Namibia, he had left his white German Evangelical Lutheran parish and joined a parish of the "non-white" United Evangelical Lutheran Church of South West Africa, where he had urged the unification of the white and non-white Evangelical Lutheran churches.

63. The South African Government maintained its special restrictions on entry into Ovamboland throughout 1973. In consequence, all foreign journalists were barred from covering the 1973 "elections" in Ovamboland (see para. 10 above). In addition, Mr. Alex Lyon, a member of the United Kingdom Parliament, who had been asked by the International Commission of Jurists to go to Namibia as an observer at a political trial, was informed by the South African Government that his visa exemption had been withdrawn.

#### F. Corporal punishment

64. Having granted so-called "self-government" to several of the "homelands" the South African Government has reportedly permitted the "homeland" authorities to suppress opposition political movements and to mete out harsh fines and corporal punishment against dissidents.

65. In August 1973, it was reported in The Star (Johannesburg), that there had been a "unanimous request" from the "Advisory Council for South West Africa" to the South African Cabinet, seeking a "more active role for the different South West African nations in the fight against terrorism". Apparently in a partial response to this "request", the South African Government authorized the tribal authorities in the "homelands" to try to stamp out dissent by physical punishment.

66. Mr. Johannes J. Nangutuuwala, President of the Democratic Co-operative Development Party in Ovamboland (which is not officially recognized) was the first to be flogged by the Ovambo Tribal Police. After he had been released on bail by the South African Police in September (see paras. 36-43 above), he was arrested by the Ovambo Tribal Police, and charged with having spoken against Mr. de Wet, the

"Commissioner General for the Native Nations of South West Africa", with attending the opening of the Ovamboland "Legislative Council", and with having followed Prime Minister Vorster in an attempt to see him outside the hall of the "Legislative Council" on 11 October 1973. In the proceedings before the Ondangwa Tribal Court, he was not allowed to plead and was refused permission to defend himself. He was sentenced to 20 lashes with a cane and ordered to leave the Ondangwa tribal area and to go to the Okuambi region. Mr Nangutuuala was actually given 21 lashes after which he had to be given medical treatment.

67. Other incidents of public floggings also took place. Three women students of the Odibo Anglican Mission in Ovamboland were publicly flogged after being brought before a tribal court on 12 September 1973 and "asked questions which apparently had no relation to any charges". Subsequently, they were told that they were "guilty of being absent from duty". They were not given any opportunity to defend themselves and each was sentenced to six strokes with the central rib of a malakani palm. They were taken away by non-white security police, held over a stool and flogged in front of some 200 onlookers. The Reverend Philip Shilongo, the Archdeacon of St. Mary's Anglican Parish, who took the three girls back to the mission, was the same day ordered by the Tribal Authority to leave the area.

68. Mr. Nicky Alweendo, a businessman, was reportedly arrested on 15 August 1973 and held in police custody, without charge, until 5 September. The day before he was released he had to stand naked for seven hours while the police interrogated him on the identity of SWAPO leaders and on his participation in demonstrations during visits to the Territory by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Representative. Mr. Alweendo was repeatedly assaulted. On 5 September, the police handed him over to the Chairman and Secretary of the Tribal Council at Andangwa where he was again kept in custody. The Chairman of the Tribal Council ordered that the Alweendo family shop be closed and forbade the family to trade again. The Chief Minister of the Tribal Authority sentenced Mr. Alweendo to 15 lashes because he was member of SWAPO and taught children SWAPO songs. He was actually given 17 lashes.

69. Four other men were sentenced to 15 lashes each for possession of flags with the SWAPO colours and for attendance at SWAPO meetings. No formal proceedings took place, nor were they given any opportunity to defend themselves. Their floggings also took place in public.

70. The policy of flogging was castigated in a statement delivered on 25 October 1973 by Mr. Brian O'Linn (see para. 13 above) before a Congress of the white opposition United Party. Mr. O'Linn stated that the South African police were holding the political opponents of the Ovamboland "government" under the emergency regulations and then handing them over to the "government" whereupon they were summarily punished.

## 5. STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION AND INDEPENDENCE

### A. Political struggle

71. Following the Security Council's decision to discontinue further efforts on

the basis of its resolution 309 (1972), it has become increasingly evident to the Namibians that the only road open to them is to intensify their struggle on all fronts.

72. The political groupings principally involved in this campaign are SWAPO and the National Convention. SWAPO operates both inside and outside Namibia and the National Convention operates inside the country. Although the activities of the two groups are described separately below, it should be noted that they are closely interrelated; SWAPO is a member of the National Convention.

#### SWAPO

73. At the beginning of 1973, SWAPO organized a Youth League, composed largely of men in their twenties, which carried out many of SWAPO's activities inside Namibia during the year. Meetings were held across the country, particularly in Windhoek, where meetings were permitted with various restrictions, and in Ovamboland where, in terms of the emergency regulations in force there, meetings are generally considered illegal.

74. In July and early August, SWAPO urged the people of Ovamboland to boycott the elections for the Ovamboland Legislative Council. As a result of this action, only 2.5 per cent of the electorate, both inside and outside the "homeland", went to the polls (see paras. 9-11 above).

75. Some of these meetings, and the action taken against the participants by the South African authorities and their agents, have been described above.

76. In what was described as the biggest political gathering held there for many years, the SWAPO Youth League convened a meeting on 12 August 1973, in Katutura, the segregated African area outside Windhoek (see paras. 44-47 above). Approximately 2,000 to 3,000 Africans packed the Katutura sports field to listen to 12 speakers, standing on a platform decorated with the Namibian flag.

77. The first speaker was Mr. David Shikombe, Secretary of the SWAPO Youth League, who told the audience that their freedom would not come from the Secretary-General or his Special Representative. According to one report, he said "Do not wait until tomorrow. Let blood flow. Only after blood has flowed, will freedom come." He exhorted his listeners not to wait. They should start from all directions in "South West Africa" and they should fight for the "freedom of the country". Conflicting reports circulated as to what Mr. Shikombe and other speakers had actually said, and uncertainty existed on the specific point of whether they had actually called for violence or not.

78. Following that meeting, the South African security police began a search for the speakers, and eventually arrested 11 of them (see para. 27 and ff. above).

## National Convention

79. As previously reported, the second meeting of the National Convention was held in February 1972 and was attended by representatives of SWAPO; the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO); the South West Africa National Union (SWANU); the Volkspartei of the Rehoboth Basters; the South West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO), the Voice of the People; the Damara people; and the Nama people.

80. In the course of a number of sessions, the National Convention expressed as its principal demand the unconditional withdrawal of the South African régime from Namibia.

81. The Voice of the People later followed an independent policy, and appears to have withdrawn from the National Convention. At one stage, the representatives of the party found it necessary to issue a statement, saying that it was not a supporter of the South African Government.

82. In September 1973, a group representing the National Convention met with Mr. Brian O'Linn, one of the leaders of the white opposition United Party, to hear an explanation of that party's proposed "federal policy" for Namibia. After the meeting, Chief Clemens Kapuuo, Vice-Chairman of the National Convention, stated that it was now for the Convention to decide whether the United Party's proposals should be rejected or accepted.

83. Mr. Gerson Veii, a leader of both the National Convention and of SWANU, said in a statement issued at the end of September that the black people of the Territory were not looking for or desiring a white-black confrontation. If there were to be a confrontation it would be created or caused by the selfish attitude of the whites, their racial prejudice and their tendency to dominate and dictate at gunpoint. The blacks were not becoming racists, they were only showing their convictions and political consciousness. The United Party in "South West Africa" was not the real opposition to the Government. "We, the blacks, are the real opposition. This is the prevailing situation in the country and to this reality one should not close one's eyes", he said.

84. In November, Chief Kapuuo travelled to New York, where he addressed the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and the United Nations Council for Namibia. In his statements before these United Nations bodies, g/ Chief Kapuuo condemned the South African Government for its refusal to withdraw from Namibia, for continuing to implement its "homelands" policy in the Territory, for introducing and maintaining the policy of apartheid, and, above all, for having stolen the Namibians' land and given it to white settlers from South Africa.

85. Prior to his travel to the United Nations, Chief Kapuuo had commented on the role of the "Advisory Council" by stating that he "did not accept the Advisory Council because it was not acceptable to his people and the National Convention".

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g/ A/C.4/SR.2053; A/AC.131/SR.188.

86. Questioned at a press conference at United Nations Headquarters as to whether he supported the policy of dialogue between the United Nations and South Africa regarding Namibia, he replied that Namibians had never requested such a policy, and that it was therefore for the United Nations to decide whether to continue it.

87. Questioned further as to whether he himself had not indulged in dialogue with the South African administration in Namibia, Chief Kapuuo replied that inside Namibia, the South Africans controlled the lives and property of all Namibians; it was, therefore, necessary from time to time to talk to them; however, this was quite a different thing from a dialogue between the United Nations and the South African Government.

#### B. Armed struggle

88. The policy of unabated repression (see para. 27 and ff. above) has further stimulated the armed struggle in Namibia. Following is a brief description of the general nature of this confrontation. h/

89. The armed struggle is conducted by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which is linked with the external wing of SWAPO. The internal wing of SWAPO continues to operate inside Namibia, following a policy of strict non-violence. Although the internal wing, together with its Youth League, is the permanent object of various types of repressive action, the party itself has not yet been banned.

90. PLAN fighters in 1973 were reported to be more confident and better armed than previously. Scattered reports have described some of the armed engagements which occurred during the year. In January, for example, PLAN attacked the Kamenga military base in the Caprivi Strip, killing or wounding 160 South Africans. In April, a PLAN ambush cost the lives of 37 South African soldiers, many reported to be Africans, and it appears that the South African Government is in fact implementing its announced policy of putting African troops into the front line. In June, PLAN forces captured a large quantity of arms and destroyed an ammunition depot.

91. South African retaliation to these actions was reported to include bombardment of villages, poisoning of water supplies and setting fire to forests and farms. As a result, thousands of people from the Caprivi area fled to Zambia and Botswana.

92. In a white paper on defence and armaments submitted to the South African Parliament on 10 April 1973, Mr. P. W. Botha, the South African Minister of Defence, made the following statement: "I do not wish to spread alarm but I must state unambiguously that for a long time already we have been engaged in a war of low intensity and this situation probably will continue for some considerable time to come."

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h/ A detailed description of this struggle appears in vol. II of the present report, chap. V, annex, appendix III.

93. A senior officer of the security police, speaking in Windhoek in June, said that South Africa would only remain safe from the threat posed by terrorism on its borders for as long as its people were prepared to help combat the menace. Addressing delegates to the Nederduitsch Hervormde Sustersvereniging congress, Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. X. du Plooy said South Africans should not rely exclusively on the police, the defence force and the State to protect the country from the terrorist threat but should be prepared to help and, if necessary, make sacrifices. Colonel du Plooy said that since the first terrorist attack in 1965, between 1,500 and 1,800 people had left the Republic, either legally or illegally, to obtain military training to be directed against the country. A further 800 members of SWAPO had joined these forces.

### C. Other political action

94. Apart from the activities of SWAPO and the National Convention, there have been a growing number of protests organized by other groups.

95. In August, 250 black students walked out of, or were expelled from, the Augustineum College in Windhoek. They were supported shortly afterwards by 120 students of the Martin Luther High School at Okombahe in Damaraland, who decided to stay away from classes in a "three-day prayer sympathy movement". It was later reported that only 4 of the 250 students who had walked out of Augustineum College were to be readmitted. In a statement made the following month, the South West Africa Black Teachers Organization, known as SWASOV, asked for the readmittance of all the students expelled from the College, reappointment of a dismissed black teacher and resignation of the principal of the College "because he does not care for the black pupils".

96. Unrest was also reported in September 1973 at the Cornelius Goraseb School but no details are available.

97. The South African authorities have refused to discuss these events. When seven delegates of SWASOV met with Mr. A. F. Gous, the Regional Director of Bantu Education in "South West Africa", in October to discuss the incident in the Augustineum College, they were told to leave his office, and were warned that if they refused, he would have them removed.

98. In August 1973, leaflets were distributed in Katutura calling upon African workers to participate in a general labour strike. The leaflets read as follows:

"... All Namibians are called on to strike from today until such time as the Government complies with the following demands:

'... All Namibian political prisoners on Robben Island, as well as those in Namibia, must be released immediately;

'... The pass and contract system must be abolished;

'... South Africa must remove all its troops from Namibia immediately, and Namibia must be freed';

"These demands must be met so that Namibians can continue their work."

99. A government official, the "Administrator of South West Africa", later confirmed that such a leaflet had been distributed. However, no action appears to have been taken either by the workers or by the Government.

100. In November 1973, Mr. Nangutuuala, President of the Democratic Co-operative Development Party, stated in Windhoek that he intended to convene a meeting of the special labour committee i/ which he had established in order to discuss dissatisfaction over the labour agreement introduced at the end of the strike of contract workers in February 1972.

## 6. WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES

### A. United Party

101. Early in September 1973, the United Party placed advertisements in newspapers in Namibia to describe its proposed "federal" system for the Territory.

102. The advertisement began with the following statement:

"Although it cannot be foreseen what concessions the National Party Government may still make to the United Nations in respect of South West Africa, it is clear that the Government is already committed to the following:

'a. The territory of South West Africa has a separate international status.

'b. The principle of self-determination and independence for the territory is accepted and the decision in respect of the measures to achieve this will be taken in co-operation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and in consultation with population of South West Africa.

'c. The putting into practice of the principle will take place with due regard to the territory as a whole and the expectation is that it will not take longer than 10 years for the population of South West Africa to reach the stage at which it will be ready to exercise its right to self-determination.

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i/ For details on this committee, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8723/Rev.1), chap. IX, annex I, para. 101.

'd. In the meantime the territory's various population groups will gain experience in local self-government.

'e. A central advisory board consisting of nominated representatives of all the population groups will be brought into being.'"

103. The proposals of the United Party consisted of a federation based on ethnic groups, with each group having its own legislative assembly. However, the number of assemblies would be smaller than the number planned at present by the South African Government in terms of the Odendaal Plan (see paras. 7-8 above).

#### B. Democratic Party

104. Mr. Theo Gerdener, the leader of this newly formed party, proposed the creation of a new constitutional structure, a "Commonwealth of States", for a large part of southern Africa. "This", he said, "should be based on the acceptance of a common value system, and not necessarily that of colour. It would probably mean the grouping of whites, Indians and Coloureds in one State, and the grouping of blacks in a number of independent States - not only in their homelands, but also in the urban areas." Mr. Gerdener was, until his recent resignation, Minister of the Interior in the South African Government.

#### C. Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)

105. Speaking in Windhoek in September, Mr. Jaap Marais, Deputy Leader of HNP, stated that the recent eruptions of violence in "South West Africa" were the result of aggression which the South African Government had created by giving certain assurances to the United Nations, thereby stirring SWAPO to action. As part of this campaign, HNP mailed out 20,000 postcards warning the whites of "South West Africa" that they might soon lose everything they possessed because "the claws of the United Nations were tightening around South West Africa".

### 7. DECISIONS ADOPTED BY REGIONAL CONFERENCES

#### A. Organization of African Unity (OAU)

106. The Council of Ministers of OAU, meeting at its twenty-first ordinary session in Addis Ababa from 17 to 24 May 1973, adopted a resolution in which it called for the ending of contacts between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of South Africa regarding Namibia (CM/Res.300 (XXI)). This decision was later endorsed by the OAU Conference of Heads of State and Government at its meeting later in May.



## B. Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries

107. The Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers from 5 to 9 September 1973, condemned the increase in repression in Namibia practised by the "illegal racist administration", recognized SWAPO as the "legitimate representative and spokesman of the Namibian people", pledged increased support to SWAPO and urged the termination of the "dialogue" between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the "illegal South African régime" in Namibia (A/9330, pp. 42-43).

## C. Arab Summit Conference

108. At the Arab Summit Conference, held at Algiers in November 1973, it was decided to impose a total oil embargo on shipments to South Africa (as well as Portugal and Southern Rhodesia) because of its policies of apartheid and illegal occupation of Namibia.

## D. Islamic Summit Conference

109. The Islamic Summit Conference, held at Lahore in February 1974, also condemned South Africa's policy of apartheid and its illegal occupation of Namibia. Thirty-eight Governments were represented at the Conference, mainly by Heads of State and Government.

## 8. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF NAMIBIANS: LABOUR QUESTIONS

110. In March 1973, the South African Government established a "Labour Advice and Co-ordinating Committee for South West Africa", which it stated would be consulted for advice on labour questions. No workers were to sit on the Committee.

111. According to a bill placed before the South African Parliament in May 1973, the right to strike in a limited form was to be granted to African workers for the first time, it was reported, in 30 years. To initiate a lawful strike, African workers would have to follow a conciliation procedure, starting with the holding of negotiations by a workers committee, and in the event of failure, the dispute would be referred to a government labour officer. If this also failed, workers would be allowed to go on strike 30 days after the matter had been referred to the labour officer. The bill provided for certain exceptions, namely, that African workers employed by local authorities, utilities, transportation companies and other "essential services" would not be allowed to strike. Furthermore, the Minister of Labour would be allowed to designate other undertakings in which strikes would also be forbidden.

112. A survey carried out inside Namibia provided rare details of wages paid to Africans in Namibia, which, for the industries indicated, averaged as follows:

	<u>Rand per month</u>
Tsumeb Corporation (mines)	17.60 to 19.60
Farms (starting wage)	6.00 to 8.50
(long service wage)	10.00 to 12.00
Hotels	15.00 to 30.00
Domestic service (Windhoek)	22.17
(Walvis Bay)	15.00 to 20.00

113. A new agreement concerning migratory labour from Angola and the movement of Africans on private visits between Namibia and Angola was announced in Windhoek by Mr. P. E. S. Sinde, the Chief Commissioner for Bantu Affairs. The agreement was to come into effect on 1 October 1973. Portuguese authorities in Angola have reportedly declared their willingness to institute border control between Angola on the one hand and Ovamboland and Kavangoland on the other. The agreement would make it easier to recruit workers in Angola; migratory labourers would be able to sign contracts in Angola that would be valid in "South West Africa".

Appendix

MAP OF NAMIBIA



## CHAPTER X

(A/9623/Add.4 (Part I))

### SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA

#### CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	1 - 12	157
B. DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	13 - 14	159

#### ANNEXES

I. WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT. . . . .	162
II. STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CHAIRMAN ON 22 APRIL 1974. . . . .	179
III. LETTER DATED 10 MAY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	180
IV. TELEGRAM DATED 14 MAY 1974 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SEYCHELLES PEOPLE'S UNITED PARTY (S.P.U.P.), ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	182
V. REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I. . . . .	183

## CHAPTER X

### SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. At its 952nd meeting, on 26 February 1974, the Special Committee, by approving the seventy-first report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.920 and Corr.1), decided, inter alia, to refer the question of the Seychelles and St. Helena to Sub-Committee I for consideration and report.
2. The Special Committee considered the Territories at its 974th to 976th and 978th meetings, between 17 May and 28 August.
3. In its consideration of the Territories, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, by paragraph 11 of which the Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". The Committee also took into account the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3158 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 concerning the Seychelles, by which the Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue its examination of the question, including in particular the dispatch of a special mission to the Territory. Further, the Special Committee took into account General Assembly resolution 3156 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 concerning eight Territories, including the Seychelles and St. Helena.
4. During its consideration of the Territories, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex I to the present chapter) containing information on the latest developments concerning the Territories.
5. In connexion with the general elections held on 25 April in the Seychelles, the Chairman issued a statement on 22 April, expressing the hope that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, would extend its full co-operation to the Special Committee in the discharge of its tasks relating to the Territory, particularly as regards sending a visiting group to the Seychelles for the purpose of securing adequate and first-hand information on conditions prevailing in the Territory (see annex II to the present chapter). In a letter dated 10 May 1974, in response to representations made by the Chairman, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations submitted to the Special Committee information on the results of the elections held, on developments concerning the future status of the Territory and on the position of his Government related thereto (see annex III to the present chapter).

6. At the 974th meeting, on 17 May, following a statement by the Chairman and at the invitation of the Special Committee, Mr. James R. Mancham, the Chief Minister of the Seychelles, made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.974). The Chief Minister was accompanied by Mr. David Joubert, Minister for Social Services, Mr. Chamery Chetty, Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Marketing and Messrs. Uzice and d'Ossay, members of the Legislative Assembly of the Government of the Seychelles. The Special Committee noted in that connexion information contained in a telegram, dated 14 May 1974, addressed to the Chairman by the Secretary-General of the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) (see annex IV to the present chapter).

7. At the same meeting, at the invitation of the Special Committee, Mr. Radha Krishna Ramphul, the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.974). The Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.974). Mr. Mancham replied to questions put to him by the representatives of Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.974). Statements were also made by the representatives of the Ivory Coast and India (A/AC.109/PV.974). Further statements were made by Mr. Mancham and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.974).

8. At the 975th meeting, on 1 July, the Chairman of Sub-Committee I, in a statement to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/PV.975 and Corr.1), introduced the report of the Sub-Committee, containing an account of its consideration of the Seychelles and St. Helena and the text of a draft resolution on the Seychelles (see annex V to the present chapter).

9. At the same meeting, following a statement by the Chairman, the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Special Committee that, having regard to the express readiness of his Government to co-operate in the related work of the Committee, as reflected in a letter dated 13 July 1974 addressed to the Chairman by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and to the United Nations (A/AC.109/450), his delegation welcomed the opportunity to study the report and comment thereon in due course, where necessary (A/AC.109/PV.975 and Corr.1).

10. At the 976th meeting, on 20 August, the representative of the United Kingdom made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.976). The Special Committee subsequently took note of a telegram, dated 5 September 1974, received from the Chief Minister of the Seychelles in that regard (A/AC.109/462).

11. At the 978th meeting, on 28 August, following a statement by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.978), the Special Committee approved without objection the report of Sub-Committee I, as revised on the basis of consultations among the members of the Committee (see annex V to the present chapter), adopted the draft resolution on the Seychelles and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations on St. Helena contained in the report (see paras. 13 and 14 below).

12. On 30 August, the text of the foregoing decisions was transmitted to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom for the attention of his Government.

## B. DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

13. The text of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 978th meeting, on 28 August, referred to in paragraph 11 above, is reproduced below:

### 1. Question of the Seychelles

The Special Committee,

Having considered the question of the Seychelles,

Having heard the statement of the Chief Minister of the Government of the Seychelles, 1/

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration, contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, as well as all other resolutions and decisions of the United Nations relating to the Territory,

Taking note of the expressed willingness of the administering Power to grant independence to the people of the Seychelles in accordance with their wishes,

Noting that a constitutional conference, with the full participation of both political parties in the Territory, is to be held in London in 1974 in order to determine the modalities whereby the Seychelles is to proceed to independence,

Noting further the expressed desire of the Government of the Seychelles that the Territory should attain independence during 1975,

Bearing in mind the statement of the Chief Minister to the effect that every effort will be made to work as closely as possible with the opposition towards the task of national unification,

Mindful also of the stated position of the Government of the Seychelles with regard to the restoration of its territorial integrity,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the united wish of the people of the Seychelles to achieve independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

2. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take all the necessary steps to facilitate the Territory's accession to independence without delay, in accordance with the express wish of the people of the Territory;



3. Urges the Government of the United Kingdom, in the fulfilment of its obligations as the administering Power, to keep the United Nations fully apprised of developments relating to the Seychelles and invites the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, under the mandate entrusted to him by the Committee in that regard, to continue consultations with the administering Power with a view to making the necessary arrangements, as appropriate, for the dispatch of a United Nations visiting mission to the Territory in connexion with the processes leading to the Territory's accession to independence;

4. Stresses the responsibility of the United Nations to render all possible assistance to the people of the Seychelles in their efforts to achieve independence and, to that end, invites the specialized agencies and the institutions associated with the United Nations to work out concrete programmes of assistance to the Seychelles;

5. Decides to keep the question of the Seychelles under continuous review.

14. The text of the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee at its 978th meeting, on 28 August, referred to in paragraph 11 above, is reproduced below:

## 2. St. Helena

### Conclusions

(1) The Special Committee notes with deep regret the continued failure of the administering Power to comply with the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3156 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, as well as the specific recommendations of the Special Committee relating to the Territory.

(2) The Special Committee regrets in particular the absence of any constitutional progress towards the full and speedy attainment by the Territory of the goals set forth in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

(3) The Special Committee is conscious of the small size of the Territory, its geographic isolation, the smallness of its population and its limited resources. Nevertheless, these factors do not justify any delay in the implementation of the Declaration with respect to the Territory, and its people should be given the opportunity without further delay to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV).

(4) The Special Committee notes with serious concern that the economic and social situation in the Territory remains unsatisfactory. It notes in particular that, owing to the decline of economic activity, St. Helena has become increasingly dependent upon grants from the administering Power and remittances from emigrants. The Committee considers it imperative that every effort be made by the administering Power, in consultation with the representatives of the people of St. Helena, with a view to making the economy more self-sustaining.

#### Recommendations

(5) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of St. Helena to self-determination and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve that right.

(6) The Special Committee reaffirms its previous recommendations, in particular those contained in resolution 3156 (XXVIII), and calls on the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take all necessary measures to enable the people of St. Helena to exercise their right to self-determination and independence without further delay.

(7) The Special Committee requests the administering Power, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, to receive a special mission of the United Nations, as envisaged under resolution 3156 (XXVIII), for the purpose of securing adequate and first-hand information in regard to political, economic and social conditions in the Territory and the views, wishes and aspirations of the people therein.

(8) The Special Committee urges the administering Power to take all effective measures to prevent the economic intervention of South Africa in the Territory with a view to safeguarding the interests of the people of St. Helena.

(9) The Special Committee once again requests the administering Power, bearing in mind its express readiness to co-operate with the Committee, to participate in the relevant proceedings of the Committee and to provide it with adequate and up-to-date information concerning the social, economic and political situation in the Territory.

(10) The Special Committee reiterates its request that the administering Power should accelerate economic development in order to reduce the economic dependence of the Territory on the administering Power and to improve the living conditions of its inhabitants.

Annex I\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. Seychelles . . . . .	1 - 62
A. General . . . . .	1
B. Constitutional and political developments . . . . .	2 - 26
C. Economic conditions . . . . .	27 - 46
D. Social conditions . . . . .	47 - 58
E. Educational conditions . . . . .	59 - 62
2. St. Helena . . . . .	63 - 84
A. General . . . . .	63
B. Constitutional developments . . . . .	64
C. Economic conditions . . . . .	65 - 72
D. Social and educational conditions . . . . .	73 - 80
E. Dependencies of St. Helena . . . . .	81 - 84

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.925 and Add.1.

## 1. SEYCHELLES a/

### A. General

1. Since 8 November 1965, when three of its islands (i.e. Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches) were included in the "British Indian Ocean Territory", the Territory of the Seychelles has comprised 89 islands, with a combined land area of approximately 100 square miles. The Territory is situated in the western Indian Ocean approximately 1,000 miles east of the Kenya coast. The estimated population in 1972 was 53,735, an increase of 1,298 over 1971.

### B. Constitutional and political developments

#### Constitution

2. The Constitution agreed upon at the Seychelles Constitutional Conference in March 1970, the provisions of which are fully described in a previous report of the Special Committee, b/ remains in effect.

#### Appointment of a new Governor

3. In November 1973, Mr. Colin Allan was appointed as the new Governor of the Seychelles, succeeding Sir Bruce Greatbatch, who had completed his tour of duty.

#### General elections

4. It will be recalled that under the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly, which includes 15 directly elected members, is to be dissolved every five years and new elections are to be held at that time, unless the Assembly is dissolved earlier.

5. Early in 1974, there were reports that general elections might be held in April, approximately one year earlier than required by the Constitution. In this connexion, the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), the opposition party, which has been recognized as a national liberation movement by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (see para. 12 below), addressed a communication to the Chairman of the Special Committee on 21 January 1974, expressing its belief that the present electoral system was unfair and undemocratic. The SPUP asked the Special Committee to exercise its influence to present its case, particularly with regard to election

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a/ The information presented in this section is derived from published sources and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations on 9 August 1973, for the year ending 31 December 1972.

b/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I, paras. 6-14.

procedures and supervision. The SPUP also requested the United Kingdom Government to hold talks with its representatives on these issues early in March, and requested the Governor not to agree to the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly until SPUP had had an opportunity to discuss the matter fully in London.

6. Although SPUP did not specify its objections to the electoral procedures in its communications to the Special Committee or to the United Kingdom Government, one of the main issues involved appears to be the delineation of electoral districts. Under the present system, the Territory is divided into seven double-member constituencies and one single-member constituency which are not proportionately delineated. Because of the unequal number of voters in the eight constituencies, at the 1970 elections, SPUP won only five seats despite receiving 45 per cent of the total vote (15,834 out of 34,806), while the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) won 10 seats with 55 per cent of the total vote (18,972).

7. In March 1973, Mr. F. Albert René, President of SPUP, tabled a motion in the Legislative Assembly to reapportion the Seychelles into 15 equal electoral districts, but the motion was rejected.

#### Political parties and their position on the Territory's future

##### (a) Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP)

8. As noted in previous reports of the Special Committee, SDP, under the leadership of Chief Minister James R. Mancham, has opposed independence for the Seychelles because of the Territory's isolation and lack of economic development. The SDP has advocated instead a form of integration with the United Kingdom analogous to the status of the Channel Islands.

9. In November 1973, Mr. Mancham, in a speech at the swearing-in ceremony for the new Governor, called upon the United Kingdom to lift "the clouds of uncertainty" that hung over the future of the Seychelles and to acknowledge its moral and legal obligation to the islands. Mr. Mancham said that, had the Territory not been conquered by the United Kingdom, it would have become a department of France, like Réunion, and a de facto part of the European Economic Community (EEC), and, as a result, the Seychellois would have had the right to work in the United Kingdom and every other Common Market country. Mr. Mancham also reiterated his arguments against independence for the Territory, saying he had never seen any dignity in poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and a future of over-all insecurity.

10. Since 1972, when a number of bombings, strikes and demonstrations took place in the Territory, none of which resulted in serious damage, c/ SDP has also favoured a revision of the Constitution to give the Government, rather than the Governor, exclusive responsibility for law and order. As previously reported, Mr. Mancham is believed to have complained at the time of the disturbances that

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c/ Ibid., Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8723/Rev.1), chap. XI, annex I, paras. 18-20.

the Governor had allowed "seditious" speeches to be made by SPUP. He also reportedly accused SPUP of posing a real security threat, owing to the support it received from OAU. d/

11. In March 1973, during an address at an SDF rally, Mr. Mancham said that the Government could not stand idly by and watch a militant minority destroy the fabric of Seychelles society through the abuse of civil liberties. To counteract the "threats" that were being made and to secure peace in the Territory, he had decided to call for the introduction of capital punishment for offences directed against the security of the Territory, such as bombings, and to "take control" of law and order. Subsequently, on 29 March 1973, the Legislative Assembly passed a motion favouring the death penalty for any person found guilty of causing an explosion which resulted in fatalities. The Government has not yet implemented this motion. Shortly afterwards, Mr. Mancham said that his Government would formally request the Government of the United Kingdom to grant the Seychelles internal self-government in the interests of maintaining internal order. SDP also advocates the development of the Territory through tourism, for which Mr. Mancham has assumed ministerial responsibility.

(b) Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP)

12. As noted above, SPUP, headed by Mr. René, is the official opposition party in the Territory and advocates the immediate attainment of independence. In May 1973, the party was recognized as a national liberation movement by the Council of Ministers of OAU, meeting at Addis Ababa.

13. In a series of interviews in Mauritius in August 1973, Mr. René characterized SPUP as a labour party supported by the industrial workers in the Territory which advocates the economic development of the Territory through agriculture, fishing, handicrafts and small industries. Attributing the current economic difficulties of the Territory, including, most importantly, inflation, to the Government's policy of promoting tourism, Mr. René described the Government as a "régime of merchants, by merchants and for merchants", which was turning the Territory into a nation of "head waiters and house boys".

14. Mr. René said that his party also advocated the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, the return of the three islands incorporated into the "British Indian Ocean Territory", the promotion of Seychellois culture, including the teaching of French in the public schools, and restraints on the intervention of United States and South African interests in the Territory's economy.

15. Following the reports of forthcoming general elections, Mr. Matthew Servina, Secretary of Publicity and External Relations of SPUP, in a statement issued from Dar es Salaam, announced that if SPUP lost the general elections, it might introduce new measures to intensify the struggle for independence. Mr. Servina

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d/ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. X, annex I, paras. 13-14.

added that tension against the policies of the Government had been building up for some time among the majority of the population and that violence was likely to erupt if independence were delayed further because of British arrogance and intransigence.

#### Progress towards independence

16. On 29 March 1974, Chief Minister Mancham announced that during the course of talks he had held with United Kingdom officials it had been agreed that general elections would be held on 25 April and that the Territory would become independent one year later. Mr. Mancham said that the decision to accept independence had been forced upon him because of the support given to the opposition SPUP by the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. It was reported that another factor behind the decision was the rejection by the United Kingdom Government of the alternative policies favoured by SDP of either integration of the Territory with the United Kingdom or the status of an "associated state".

17. In his statement, Mr. Mancham said that as his party (SDP) had now agreed to independence, he had already pointed out to OAU that its support for SPUP should cease. He also said that his Government was not opposed to the supervision by the United Nations of the forthcoming general elections, provided that the members of the mission were clearly objective persons.

18. Earlier, in June 1973, upon receiving a copy of the resolution of the Council of Ministers of OAU confirming that OAU recognized SPUP as a national liberation movement, Mr. Mancham had addressed a letter to that organization, accusing it of ruthlessly disregarding the wishes of the majority of the Seychellois regarding independence and of contributing to the creation of disorder and conflict in the Territory. Protesting what he called the "interference" by OAU in the internal affairs of another country, Mr. Mancham had accused the organization of exhibiting a "blackmailing attitude" towards his Government and contravening the principle of self-determination.

19. According to Mr. Mancham's statement of March 1974, if his party were returned at the elections, his Government would maintain a neutralist foreign policy and oppose the installation of foreign bases of any kind in the Territory; it would cultivate continued friendship with the United Kingdom but would seek to reintegrate the three islands which had been detached from the Territory and included in the "British Indian Ocean Territory". He also expressed the hope that United Kingdom aid would continue at the present level, although the Seychelles would seek aid from the United States of America, international agencies and other sources.

20. On 5 April, replying to a question in the House of Commons regarding the constitutional future of the Seychelles, Miss Joan Lestor, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, confirmed that general elections would be held in the Seychelles on 25 April. She added:

"Both the major political parties in Seychelles are now publicly committed to independence. No decision about the future constitutional relationship between Britain and Seychelles can be taken until after the

results of the elections are known and have been carefully considered in consultation with the Seychelles Government. Her Majesty's Government's policy remains, in accordance with long-standing practice, that the wishes of the people of the Territory will be Britain's main guide in considering the future status of Seychelles."

#### "British Indian Ocean Territory"

21. Information concerning the "British Indian Ocean Territory" prior to December 1972 is contained in last year's report of the Special Committee. e/ Briefly, it will be recalled that the "British Indian Ocean Territory", comprising three islands detached from the Seychelles (Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches), together with the Chagos Archipelago, formerly part of Mauritius, was established as a separate administrative unit under a United Kingdom Order-in-Council of 8 November 1965. According to the administering Power, the arrangement was made with the consent of the Governments of the Seychelles and Mauritius, which were compensated for the loss of the islands and atolls. (In the case of the Seychelles, the compensation took the form of the construction of the international airport on Mahé which is the basis for the development of the tourist industry in the Territory.)

22. The islands were detached from the Seychelles to make them available for the construction of military staging facilities by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which in 1966 entered into an agreement for the joint use of any facilities that might be constructed. Under the terms of a second agreement, reached in 1972, the United States installed a limited naval communications facility on Diego García, an inhabited island in the Chagos Archipelago. The purpose of the facility was to provide a link in United States defence communications, and to furnish improved communications support for, and facilitate the supply and refueling of, ships and aircraft in the Indian Ocean owned or operated by, or on behalf of, either Government.

23. In February 1974, it was reported that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed in principle to expand the facilities on Diego García. In a statement in the House of Commons on 5 February 1974, Mr. Julian Amery, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, said that the United Kingdom Government welcomed the expansion of the United States facilities, which would also be available for use by the United Kingdom, as it had long felt that it was desirable in the general western interest to balance other activities in the Indian Ocean area. He added that the two Governments would consult periodically on joint objectives, policies and activities in the area.

24. According to press reports, expansion of the United States facilities is ultimately expected to cost \$US 15 million and to include: lengthening of the airport runway from 8,000 to 12,000 feet, so that it can be used by almost any type

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e/ Ibid., paras. 29-37.



of aircraft, fully loaded; deepening of the harbour; installation of additional fuel storage tanks; and provision of maintenance facilities for air strips and aircraft. It is anticipated that the present contingent of 375 military personnel will be expanded to a staff numbering from 500 to 600 within the next two years. According to press reports, the facilities will constitute the first permanent United States base in the Indian Ocean.

25. These plans are opposed by a number of countries in the Indian Ocean area. On 6 February 1974, Swaran Singh, Foreign Minister of India, called the expansion a "matter of great concern" to his country and expressed his Government's "total opposition" to it. Mr. Singh said that his Government had expressed its "deep concern" to the Governments of both the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the bringing of naval units, including aircraft carriers, into the region, and added that such a "show of force" would never be "relished" by any country in the region.

26. It will be recalled that, at its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, solemnly declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. It also called upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultation with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, as well as any manifestation of great Power military presence conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.

### C. Economic conditions

#### General

27. The economy of the Seychelles has traditionally been based on the export of a limited number of agricultural commodities, primarily coconuts, cinnamon, patchouli and vanilla. Owing to the declining prices for these commodities on the world market and the heavy reliance of the Territory on imports for almost all basic requirements, including food-stuffs and manufactured goods, the Territory has, since 1958, suffered from a chronic adverse balance of trade. This deficit has been offset by United Kingdom grants-in-aid, land purchases by foreigners, spending by personnel from the United States Tracking Station on Mahé, and remittances from emigrants. Beginning in 1970, in an attempt to make the Territory economically viable, the Seychelles Government, in conjunction with the United Kingdom Government, which is providing the funds, undertook to develop the as yet untapped tourist potential of the Territory by means of a four-year development plan, the principal components of which were the construction of the international airport at Mahé and the reclamation of 100 acres of land and the construction of a new port at Victoria, the capital and principal port.

28. In its report for 1972, the administering Power said that considerable progress had been made in connexion with the tourist industry during the year. At the same time, renewed emphasis had been given to strengthening the agricultural sector, particularly the production of food-stuffs for local consumption, and to the development of education, housing and social services. Other developments during the year included the completion of the first phase of the Victoria reclamation project and the beginning of the second phase, i.e., the provision of roads and services in the new area; continuation of work on the new deep-water berth; the imminent completion of a new power station which would increase the installed electric supply capacity on Mahé to 8.38 mW; and the construction of an abattoir, which was scheduled to open in October 1973.

29. According to the administering Power, nearly SeyRs 200 million f/ was invested in various development programmes in the Seychelles over the period 1967-1972, about one third of it in 1972. Although there has been considerable foreign investment, the Government's policy is to encourage as much local participation as possible. The United Kingdom Government is continuing to supply grants-in-aid to the Territory for development projects in the public sector. In accordance with the recommendations of the Economic Aid Mission of the Overseas Development Administration, which visited the Territory in October 1972, g/ such grants-in-aid will henceforth be increased from £3.0 million to £3.5 million annually.

#### Agriculture

30. As noted above, the main commercial crops of coconuts, cinnamon, patchouli and vanilla are produced mainly for export and occupy most of the arable land. The main crops grown for local consumption are sugar cane, tobacco, various fruits, root crops and green vegetables, none in sufficient quantity to meet local demands.

31. In 1972, coconuts and cinnamon occupied approximately 23,000 acres and 14,000 acres respectively. Production of coconuts declined slightly from 1971 to 3,477 tons, valued at SeyRs 2.4 million. Cinnamon production, however, increased from 1,297 to 2,038 tons and, owing to an increase in the world market price, rose in value from SeyRs 3.3 million to SeyRs 6.0 million.

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f/ The Seychelles rupee (SeyRs) was valued at approximately \$US 0.19 in 1973.

g/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. X, annex I, para. 56.

32. In December 1973, Mr. Chamery Chetty, the Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Marketing, announced that a programme of grants would be introduced to increase agricultural productivity. In making his announcement, Mr. Chetty noted that the Government was determined to try to inject a new spirit of progress and development into agriculture, which needed to break away from the old idea of plantation cultivation based only on coconuts and cinnamon. Although there would continue to be an important place for these crops, and everything possible should be done to improve their productivity, especially in view of the high copra prices now prevailing, the crops should be viewed as part of a diversified and more intensive system of farming, including livestock production and cultivation of fruits and vegetables. Mr. Chetty also noted that the ultimate success of agricultural development plans hinged largely on obtaining labour for agricultural work by paying wages competitive with those in industry. To this end, he suggested that farm workers should be trained and supervised in the same way as those in any other industry.

33. Under the new programme, grants would be provided for: (a) improving land for approved crops (50 per cent of the total cost); (b) building farm roads, ditches, bridges, culverts, fences, sea walls and sluices, developing water supplies and purchasing horticultural materials; (c) clearing old coconut palms and planting approved crops other than coconuts (SeyRs 10 per palm); (d) clearing scrub to allow for replanting of approved crops (up to SeyRs 200 per acre); (e) erecting buildings solely connected with agriculture (10 per cent of the total cost up to SeyRs 2,500); and (f) purchasing agricultural machinery and equipment other than motor vehicles (50 per cent of the total cost up to SeyRs 2,600).

34. Even prior to the establishment of these grants, the administering Power reported that the Seychelles Government had already taken measures during 1972 to increase agricultural production. These measures included raising the subsidy on fertilizers from 16 2/3 per cent to 50 per cent, making low-interest loans available to farmers not previously eligible because of insufficient or unacceptable security; supplying certain vital farm inputs such as stock feed, seeds and pesticides at cost price; and continuing its cattle and pig importation programme in order to increase the national herd.

35. The administering Power reported that, as a result of these efforts, the Territory had become self-sufficient in eggs and was expected to be totally self-sufficient in pork in the near future.

### Tourism

36. The tourist development plan set up by the Seychelles Government in 1969 calls for the construction of approximately eight hotels, with a total of 1,500 beds, capable of catering to approximately 30,000 tourists annually by 1975. (Hotel facilities in 1970/1971 could accommodate only 600 persons.)

37. By the end of 1972, two major hotels, the 300-bed Reef Hotel and the 200-bed Coral Strand Hotel, plus two smaller hotels, had been constructed on Mahé; and it had also been announced that Houlders World Holidays, a United Kingdom tour

operator, would construct a 350-bed hotel, scheduled to be opened in November 1973. No additional hotels are known to have been completed in 1973, although there were reports of two major seaside land purchases by interests from the Federal Republic of Germany with the intention of constructing luxury resorts.

38. It was reported in the Seychelles press that the tourist industry had suffered substantial setbacks since March 1973, owing to the policy of the major airline serving the Seychelles not to sell passages to tourists unless they could be accommodated in hotels in which the airline had shares. As a result, small privately owned establishments were being under-utilized. It was also reported that fares to the Seychelles established by the principal airline were discriminatorily high and were driving away potential vacationers. The principal airline serving the Seychelles is British Airways which provides four flights weekly from the United Kingdom and a weekly transit flight from Johannesburg to Tokyo. Other airlines serving the Territory are British Caledonian Airways (one flight weekly), and the LUXAIR charter company.

39. During 1972, a total of 17,993 passengers disembarked at Mahé, of whom 10,600 were in transit and the remainder presumably tourists.

#### Public sector development

40. In its report for 1972, the administering Power stressed that the successful development of a tourist industry in the Territory was largely dependent on improved communications and adequate, reliable water supplies. During 1972 and 1973, the United Kingdom Government made several grants to the Seychelles Government for this type of development.

41. On 26 March 1972, the administering Power announced a grant of £2.3 million to the Seychelles Government for the design, construction and equipment of a dam with a capacity of 170 million gallons to provide increased water supplies for the most heavily populated area of Mahé. Howard Humphreys and Sons, of the United Kingdom, was engaged as consultant for the project, which was to be managed by Crown Agents on behalf of the Government. The grant marked the second phase of a project to improve the all-year water supplies in the northern half of Mahé. The first phase, involving expansion of the water treatment plant at Cascade, on the east coast, at a cost of £1.2 million, was started in 1971.

42. In August 1973, it was announced that a firm of London consultants had been commissioned to study the possibilities of expanding the Seychelles airport. The study was being financed by the Overseas Development Administration under technical assistance arrangements at the request of the Seychelles Government.

43. It was also reported that, following a road traffic survey published in 1972, which indicated the need for major road development along the east coast of Mahé between Victoria and the airport, a study had been scheduled for 1973.

## Public finance

44. The Territory's recurrent revenue is derived mainly from import and export duties, income tax, licence fees, other direct taxes, miscellaneous receipts and a grant from the administering Power to cover the annual deficit. All capital expenditure is met from funds provided by the administering Power.

45. In 1971, territorial revenue was estimated at SeyRs 60.6 million compared with actual revenue of SeyRs 37.8 million in 1970, of which SeyRs 28.4 million comprised local revenue; SeyRs 5.6 million was a recurrent grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom (an increase of SeyRs 4.0 million) and SeyRs 26.5 million was from capital grants from the United Kingdom (an increase of SeyRs 13.0 million). Import duties, amounting to SeyRs 12.0 million, were the largest single source of local revenue, followed by income taxes, which amounted to SeyRs 3.8 million.

46. Total estimated expenditure for the year amounted to SeyRs 58.2 million, of which recurrent expenditure accounted for SeyRs 32.0 million and capital expenditure for SeyRs 26.2 million.

## D. Social conditions

### Labour

47. There were an estimated total of 17,560 persons employed in the Seychelles in 1971, the great majority of whom were engaged in agriculture (4,881); community, social and domestic service (4,601); and construction (4,130). Most of the remainder worked in trade, restaurants and hotels (1,106); transport, storage and communications (967); and manufacturing (939). The number of persons receiving welfare during the year was 1,770, falling to 1,712 in 1972.

48. The administering Power has provided no information regarding wages, other than to state that, although the average monthly wage in the private sector rose by roughly 30 per cent in 1972, this increase was cancelled by a parallel increase in the cost of living. According to various reports in The People, the weekly news organ of SPUP, most of the workers in the Seychelles are poorly-paid and are suffering from the effects of steadily increasing inflation, which amounted to 30 per cent in 1972, owing primarily to the rising cost of food imports and the decline in the value of the pound sterling.

49. It will be recalled h/ that during 1972 the 1,800 members of the Government Unestablished Workers Union went on strike for 14 days after failing to reach an agreement with the Government regarding wage increases. On the recommendation of the Arbitration Tribunal, increases were finally awarded, amounting to 35 per cent in the case of the lower paid workers and 25 per cent for higher paid workers.

50. In 1973, the union demanded further wage increases, to be effective from 1 June 1973. In May 1973, the Government responded to this demand by proposing increases of 25 per cent for lower paid workers and 21 per cent for the higher paid. In its statement, the Government said that it had taken into account not

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h/ Ibid., paras. 63-65.

only the cost of living, but also the effect of wage increases on the economy as a whole, government finances, and wages in similar jobs outside government service. The Government asked the union to agree to accept the proposed increases at least provisionally and to have any dispute settled by arbitration.

51. In July, the membership of the union voted to instruct its Executive Council to press the Government to increase its offer by a further 15 per cent for lowest paid workers, and 5 to 7 per cent for the higher paid categories. The union announced its intention to take any action which would obtain for its members what it considered to be a fair wage.

#### Public health

52. Medical service facilities include a 140-bed general hospital; 4 infirmaries with a total of 62 beds; 7 out-patient infirmaries; and 4 infirmaries for less severe cases awaiting transfer to the general hospital. In addition, there are 6 maternity and child welfare centres and 1 tuberculosis treatment centre.

53. The medical facilities are staffed by 13 registered physicians, 14 senior nurses (i.e., with qualifications equivalent to those required in the United Kingdom), 62 certified nurses (i.e., with locally recognized certificates), 43 partially trained nurses and 70 midwives. There are also 3 laboratory and X-ray technicians and 1 pharmacist.

54. According to the administering Power, most tropical diseases are absent from the Seychelles; intestinal and parasitic infections are very common, although somewhat reduced since the extension of filtered and chlorinated water to the out-districts. During 1972, the principal causes of adult deaths were cardiovascular diseases, cerebrovascular diseases and cancer. The infant mortality rate was 32.6 per cent.

55. Recurrent government expenditure on medical services in 1972 was SeyRs 4.1 million, an increase of SeyRs 1.0 million compared with the previous year.

#### Housing and town and rural planning

56. As reported by the administering Power, although the population of the Territory has grown by 29 per cent since 1960, the number of houses has increased by only 15 per cent. In 1972, the Seychelles Government decided to initiate a 15-year housing programme to replace the backlog of inadequate and insufficient housing and to meet housing needs resulting from the population increase. The programme calls for the initial construction of 2,120 new houses and the substantial improvement of 870 others during the period 1972 to 1977. Owing to the fact that housing will have to compete with the development of infrastructure, tourism and ancillary activities in a limited labour market, only 200 units will be completed in 1972 and 370 in 1973. Thereafter, it is envisaged that 600 new or substantially improved houses will become available annually.

57. To achieve this goal, the Government will continue to construct low-rent housing for families with incomes of less than SeyRs 4,800 annually (by 1972 there were 700 low-rent houses in the Territory); provide loans for individuals building their own housing (SeyRs 180,000 annually); make repairs to the homes of recipients of relief allowances; and provide improvement grants to very poor families (SeyRs 87,000 annually). It will also introduce several new forms of aid, including assistance to owner-occupiers and landlords for effecting major improvements; grants and loans to encourage construction in low-density residential areas; incentives, coupled with pressure if necessary, to encourage employers to provide housing for employees; and urban renewal to replace slum housing and increase housing densities, particularly in Victoria.

58. In order to ameliorate congestion in Victoria and to achieve a more rational population distribution, the linear extension of Victoria and the establishment of six principal settlements along the east and north coast, were also being considered.

#### E. Educational conditions

59. The Territory has 35 primary schools, 11 junior secondary schools, 2 secondary schools and 5 vocational schools with enrolments respectively of 10,074, 1,859 and 655 and 399 students. The junior secondary schools offer a two-year programme to students who have failed to be admitted, by competition, to the academic secondary schools; at the end of the course, pupils may apply for a limited number of places in vocational and pre-vocational training centres. Both of the secondary schools provide a five-year course leading to the Cambridge Overseas Joint School Certificate and the General Certificate of Education examination. Only boys, however, are eligible for the additional two-year course leading to the Advanced Level General Certificate of Education examination.

60. In 1972, the first 55 students had completed vocational training courses in carpentry, engineering, vehicle mechanics and electronics at the Seychelles Technical School. A further 114 students were enrolled at the Teacher-Training College.

61. There are no facilities for higher education in the Territory. Bursaries and scholarships are awarded for overseas education and training. The latest data available in this connexion are set out in the last report of the Special Committee.

62. Recurrent expenditure on education for 1972 rose to SeyRs 5.9 million, from SeyRs 4.3 million in 1971.



## 2. ST. HELENA i/

### A. General

63. The Territory of St. Helena, covering an area of 159 square miles, is situated in the South Atlantic Ocean and consists of the island of St. Helena and two dependencies, Ascension Island and a group of six islands (five uninhabited) forming the dependency of Tristan da Cunha. Of these islands, St. Helena is the largest, with an area of 47 square miles and a population, mainly of African, Asian and British descent, estimated at 5,056 at the end of 1972. Ascension, with an area of 34 square miles, is inhabited largely by people from outside the island, their numbers varying from year to year according to the availability of local employment (1,266 at the end of 1969). Tristan da Cunha, with an area of 38 square miles, had 276 inhabitants, also of mixed origin, at the end of 1970.

### B. Constitutional developments

64. Since the last general elections, held on 14 February 1968, there have been no constitutional developments in the Territory.

### C. Economic conditions

65. Owing to the limited extent of arable land (600 acres) and the meagreness of natural resources, the island of St. Helena imports most of its food supply and all of its consumer and capital goods. The only significant export industry, consisting of flax and flax products, died out in 1966, when the world market for these products was taken over by synthetics. At present, the only industry consists of a 49-member Handicraft Association, which produces lace and embroidery, wood-work and fibre work.

66. The export of fish and a limited number of hides and fleece provides a further limited source of income. In 1972/73, approximately 40 tons of frozen fish, primarily tuna and bonito (valued at about £4,000), together with approximately £400 worth of hides and fleece, were exported. Commercial fishing is carried out by Frank Robb and Sons, a company believed to be registered in the United Kingdom.

67. According to the administering Power, agricultural production suffered in 1972 as the result of protracted drought conditions. The Agriculture and Forestry Department accounted for the major proportion of potatoes, beef, mutton, vegetables, milk and fuel produced. During the year, the Government, in collaboration with the owner of 3,100 acres of land previously under flax and now neglected (a United Kingdom registered company in which the Government is a 32 per cent shareholder),

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i/ The information presented in this section is derived from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Government of the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 15 October 1973, for the year ending 31 March 1973.



began converting the acreage into pasture and forest. Efforts were also being made to increase cattle and pig production to meet local food requirements.

68. Owing to the decline of economic activity, St. Helena has become progressively more dependent on grants from the administering Power and remittances from emigrants to Ascension and the United Kingdom. In 1972/73, government revenue amounted to £826,956 (£702,288 in 1971/72), of which £460,100 comprised a United Kingdom grant-in-aid; £94,470 was from British Development Aid (used to meet nearly all capital expenditure); and £21,068 was provided under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme. The latter funds are used to attract overseas officers who would not otherwise be available to serve in St. Helena. Government expenditure amounted to £804,868 (£726,034 in 1971/72).

69. The Government reportedly spent £125,000 during the year for improvements to St. Helena's amenities and infrastructure, including the following: forestry development (£13,000); flax clearance (£11,250); improvement of pastures (£7,615); expansion of Jamestown Junior School (£16,000); apartment construction (£18,750); and improvements to domestic water supplies (£8,750). A number of privately financed projects were also completed, including a new supermarket; a reservoir and agricultural irrigation project; the planting of new orchards; and renovations and improvements to an existing hotel.

70. In addition, under technical assistance arrangements provided by the United Kingdom Government, the services of a resident water engineer and technical trades instructor were provided and visits were made by experts in harbour engineering, animal health and livestock development, tourism, hospital buildings and equipment, pest control and surveying and land registration.

71. The administering Power has begun to draw up a comprehensive five-year development plan for the Territory and has appointed a development adviser who began work in February 1973.

72. The role of foreign economic interests in the exploitation of the Territory was discussed in the last report of the Special Committee. j/ It will be recalled that since 1968, the South Atlantic Trading and Investment Company (SATIC) has been the second largest shareholder of Solomon and Company, the most important trading company in the Territory (the St. Helena Government is the principal shareholder). SATIC, although registered in the United Kingdom, is financed by South African capital and has South African directors. In 1971, allegations were made by an anonymous St. Helenan that apartheid-like conditions had existed in the Territory since the entry of SATIC into its economy. These allegations were refuted by the United Kingdom Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, however, and during 1972 no further reports were received.

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j/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. X, annex I, paras. 84-88;

## D. Social and educational conditions

### Labour

73. During 1972, the principal categories of wage earners in St. Helena were agricultural labourers (224); skilled and general labourers (245); building tradesmen and apprentices (119); fishermen and boatmen (20); and mechanics, engine and motor drivers (66). A total of 464 St. Helenans were employed on Ascension Island, primarily in connexion with the radio communications and other facilities operated by the United Kingdom and the United States. Average weekly rates of pay remained unchanged from the previous year, ranging from £6.7 to £7.7 for agriculture and general labour; £7.7 to £8.8 for skilled labour; and £3.9 to £7.5 for apprentices.

74. According to the administering Power, the Government's labour policy is to create more job opportunities and to provide as much training as facilities permit. In this connexion, a Technical Trades Centre was established during 1972 to provide brief courses for practising technical personnel and an 18-month building course for 12 trainees. In addition, under a government apprenticeship programme, 18 apprentices were being trained in carpentry, masonry, plumbing and mechanics by the Public Works Department, and 43 apprentices were receiving training in general agricultural, farming and forestry work by the Agriculture and Forestry Department.

75. There were no labour disputes during the period under review.

### Public health

76. The Public Health Department maintains a 54-bed general hospital in Jamestown, a mental hospital and five rural health centres. There are three medical officers in the Territory and one dental officer, as well as auxiliary personnel, including nurses.

77. During 1972/73, recurrent expenditure on medical and health services amounted to £81,508 and capital expenditure to £4,574, accounting for 12.5 per cent of total budgetary expenditure.

### Housing

78. During the period under review, the Government completed the renovation and improvement of three low-rental one-family houses and an apartment building in Jamestown, and another three cottages in Half Tree Hollow. It also continued to provide grants and loans to individuals building or improving their own homes and in some cases supplied imported materials at cost.

### Education

79. Education is free and compulsory for all children between the ages of

5 and 14 years, although 14-year-olds may be exempted under certain circumstances. During 1972/73, approximately 1,200 children (24 per cent of the total population) attended the 12 schools on the island, of whom 750 were in the 8 infant and junior schools, and 450 in the 3 senior and 1 secondary selective school. In addition, 12 apprentices attended the Technical Trades Centre (see para. 74 above) and 5 trainees attended the Teacher Education Centre. There were 68 full-time and 2 part-time teachers; 6 teachers were receiving additional training abroad. Teacher-training offered locally consists of one year of instruction followed by two years of practice teaching. Since 1963, 32 teachers have been sent to the United Kingdom: 15 for three or four-year courses leading to a Certificate in Education or a degree and 17 for one-year courses.

80. Government expenditure on education during 1972/73 was £75,123, or 9.4 per cent of total budgetary expenditure. Capital improvements included the building of additions to a junior school and to the public library.

#### E. Dependencies of St. Helena

81. Ascension Island and the Tristan da Cunha dependency are governed from St. Helena, but because of their remoteness and isolation, their administrators exercise a certain degree of autonomy.

82. Since 1969, there has been a limited amount of self-government on Tristan da Cunha in the form of an Island Council consisting of the Administrator, three appointed members and eight members elected by adult suffrage. Councillors serve on three committees charged with executive powers and general supervision of government departments. In addition, one of the elected councillors, known as the Chief Islander, assists the Administrator in day-to-day affairs. The last elections were held in November 1969.

83. Since the construction of a harbour by the United Kingdom at a reported cost of £80,000, fishing has become the most important economic activity on Tristan da Cunha. The industry is dominated by the South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation, a British company registered in Bermuda, which employs almost all the working population of the dependency. In 1970, the last year for which this information is available, the St. Helena Government received £43,473 in revenue from this concession.

84. In 1970, 48 pupils attended the one school on the island.

## Annex II

### STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CHAIRMAN ON 22 APRIL 1974

It will be recalled that, in the light of the express readiness of the Chief Minister of the Seychelles to receive a United Nations mission to the Territory and to hold a referendum on its future status, the General Assembly, in resolution 2866 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971, requested the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to receive a special United Nations mission, which would recommend practical steps to be taken for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, and to make the necessary arrangements, in consultation with that mission, for the holding of the referendum envisaged. In the same resolution, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to appoint the special mission for the above purposes, in consultation with the administering Power and with the assistance of the Secretary-General.

The provisions of this resolution, as well as those of the resolutions adopted subsequently by the General Assembly on the subject, namely, resolutions 2985 (XXVII) of 14 December 1972 and 3158 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, have so far remained unimplemented owing to the negative attitude of the administering Power and despite the efforts of the Special Committee to secure its co-operation in this regard.

According to a recent report, it was agreed at the end of March 1974 that general elections would be held in the Seychelles on 25 April. Although the Special Committee has not been apprised of the details of the arrangements being made for the proposed general elections, the Chairman wishes to note that the Chief Minister's Government is reportedly not opposed to the supervision by the United Nations of the elections.

As is well known, the United Nations attaches vital importance to the sending of visiting groups as a means of collecting adequate and first-hand information on conditions in the colonial Territories and on the wishes and aspirations of the people concerning their future status. It is for that reason that the General Assembly has repeatedly urged those administering Powers which have not yet done so to change their attitude and to receive United Nations visiting groups in the Territories under their administration.

In the light of the recent related developments and taking into account the active interest and positive spirit of co-operation shown recently by the Government of the United Kingdom with respect to the work of the Special Committee, the Chairman wishes to express the hope that the United Kingdom will extend its full co-operation as administering Power to the Committee in the discharge of its tasks relating to the Seychelles, particularly as regards the sending of a United Nations visiting group to the Territory, in order to facilitate the exercise by the people fully and freely of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

Annex III\*

LETTER DATED 10 MAY 1974 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN  
IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. In response to your inquiry, I am forwarding to you for your information a note setting out the results of the recent elections in the Seychelles and the main developments that have taken place subsequently.

2. The elections were held on 25 April 1974. Preliminary results, with 1970 figures in brackets, are:

<u>Seats</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percentage of votes</u>
Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) 13 (10)	21,892 (18,972)	52.4 (52.8)
Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) 2 (5)	19,920 (15,834)	47.6 (44.1)
	41,823 (84 per cent of voters)	

These figures exclude the Parti Seychellois.

3. There were press reports of demonstrations after the results were announced. Mr. James R. Mancham, who was reappointed as Chief Minister, is reported to have said, however, that SDP hoped to work "with a responsible Opposition within a democratic society", and to have added that he intended to consult his colleagues and the British Government on a date for independence.

4. On 30 April, Radio Seychelles broadcast the text of a joint statement issued by Mr. Mancham and Mr. F. Albert René, the opposition leader. This said: "The Chief Minister, Mr. James R. Mancham, and the Leader of SPUP, Mr. France A. René, today had an hour-long exchange of views at the Chief Minister's office in the secretariat. This was the first meeting of the two party leaders for more than two years. Afterwards they both declared that they had talked frankly and in a cordial way. The leaders have agreed to meet again shortly."

5. I understand that Mr. René is reported to have said he would like to work more closely with Mr. Mancham and help unify the country.

6. Between 6 and 9 May Mr. Mancham had discussions in London with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Miss Joan Lestor, and with officials. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued the following press release after the discussions had ended:

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/448 and Corr.1.

"Mr. J. R. Mancham, the Chief Minister of the Seychelles, and a party of his ministers and members of the Legislative Assembly, have been in London this week for discussions with Miss Joan Lestor, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This followed the victory of Mr. Mancham's party, SDP, at the general elections held in the Seychelles on 25 April. Both parties at these elections campaigned for independence for the Seychelles, and the purpose of Mr. Mancham's visit was to discuss the next steps towards this.

"At preliminary talks with Miss Lestor on 6 May, and then on 9 May, it was agreed that a constitutional conference would be held in London in the autumn of this year. Both the governing party of the Seychelles and the opposition would be invited to attend in accordance with the usual practice.

"In the light of the conclusions of this conference, Her Majesty's Government would propose to reach decisions on constitutional advance and, subject to the approval of Parliament, on final progress to independence."

7. May I add that my Government's own position remains unchanged. We have always said that if a majority of the people of the Seychelles desired independence, we would not stand in their way. As you are aware, both the major political parties in the Seychelles fought the election on an independence programme.

(Signed) Ivor RICHARD

Annex IV\*

TELEGRAM DATED 14 MAY 1974 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE  
SEYCHELLES PEOPLE'S UNITED PARTY (SPUP), ADDRESSED TO THE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

UNDERSTAND JAMES MANCHAM IN NEW YORK TO DISCUSS SEYCHELLES IN COMMITTEE OF 24.  
IN VIEW OF HIS PAST ACTION WISH TO STATE THAT HIS PARTY SPEAKS ONLY FOR 52 PER CENT  
OF PEOPLE OF THE SEYCHELLES AND WHATEVER IS AGREED WILL NOT COMMIT THE PEOPLE OF  
SEYCHELLES AS A WHOLE.

SECRETARY-GENERAL SPUP

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.946.

Annex V\*

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I

Chairman: Mrs. F. J. JOKA-BANGURA (Sierra Leone)

SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA

1. Consideration by the Sub-Committee

1. The Sub-Committee considered the Territories of the Seychelles and St. Helena at its 130th to 134th meetings, held between 27 March and 24 May 1974 (see A/AC.109/SC.2/SR.130-134).
2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex I above). The Sub-Committee also took into account information contained in a letter dated 10 May 1974 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee (see annex III above) as well as the statement made by Mr. James Mancham, the Chief Minister of the Government of the Seychelles, at the 974th meeting of the Special Committee, on 17 May (A/AC.109/PV.974).
3. At the 133rd meeting of the Sub-Committee, on 21 May, Mr. Chamery Chetty, Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Marketing, and Mr. David Joubert, Minister for Social Services of the Government of the Seychelles, made statements and replied to questions put to them by the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Congo, as well as by the Chairman.

2. Adoption of the report

4. Having considered the situation in the Seychelles and St. Helena, the Sub-Committee, at its 134th meeting on 24 May 1974 adopted a draft resolution on the question of the Seychelles and conclusions and recommendations relating to St. Helena. a/ The Sub-Committee adopted the present report at the same meeting.

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.954/Rev.1.

a/ The draft resolution and conclusions and recommendations under reference were approved by the Special Committee without any modification. They are reproduced in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the present chapter.



CHAPTER XI  
(A/9623/Add.4 (Part II))

COMORO ARCHIPELAGO

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	1 - 10	185
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	11	186
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		189

## CHAPTER XI

### COMORO ARCHIPELAGO

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of the Comoro Archipelago at its 978th, 979th, 981st and 982nd meetings, between 28 August and 6 September 1974.
2. In its consideration of the item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions including, in particular, resolution 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By paragraph 11 of this resolution, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet obtained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". The Committee also took into account the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3161 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 concerning the Comoro Archipelago, by paragraph 9 of which the Assembly requested the Committee to keep the situation in the Territory under continuous review.
3. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on the latest developments concerning the Territory.

#### Participation of the national liberation movements

4. In accordance with a decision taken at its previous session and subsequently approved by the General Assembly, the Special Committee, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), invited the representative of the national liberation movement of the Comoro Archipelago, the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores (MOLINACO), to participate in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item.
5. Accordingly, during the consideration of the item, MOLINACO was represented by its Secretary-General, Mr. Abdou Bakari Boina, who made statements at the 979th and 982nd meetings on 29 August and 6 September, respectively (A/AC.109/PV.979 and 982).
6. At the 978th meeting, on 28 August, the Chairman made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.978).

#### Draft resolution

7. At the 981st meeting, on 5 September, the representative of Iraq made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.981).

8. At the same meeting, the representative of the Ivory Coast, in a statement to the Committee, introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.979), sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Mali, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania (A/AC.109/PV.981).

9. At the 982nd meeting, on 6 September, following a statement by the Chairman, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution without objection (see para. 11 below). A further statement was made by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.982).

10. On 9 September, the text of the resolution was transmitted to the Permanent Representative of France for the attention of his Government. Copies of the resolution were also transmitted to all States, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

#### B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

11. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/463) adopted by the Special Committee, at its 982nd meeting, on 6 September, to which reference is made in paragraph 9 above, is reproduced below.

The Special Committee,

Having considered the question of the Comoro Archipelago,

Having heard the statement of the Secretary-General of the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores, 1/

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, containing the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration,

Recalling also General Assembly resolution 3161 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the question of the Comoro Archipelago,

Convinced of the vital importance of sending a visiting mission to the Territory as a means of securing adequate and first-hand information in regard to the political, economic and social conditions therein,

Noting with regret the continued refusal of the administering Power to participate in the related work of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

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1/ A/AC.109/PV.978.

Mindful of the responsibility of the United Nations to render all help to the people of the Comoro Archipelago in their efforts freely to decide their own future,

Taking into account the statement by the representative of France that the French Government has affirmed "the readiness of the Comoro Archipelago for independence" and "its intention to respond faithfully to the aspirations" of the Comorian people, and has stated that the Comorian Government can request independence for the Territory at any time, 2/

Taking into account also the statement made on 26 August 1974 by the Government of France, according to which an "archipelago-wide" consultation concerning the independence of the Comoro Archipelago shall be organized in the Territory either in December 1974 or in March 1975, 3/

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Comoro Archipelago to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

2. Affirms the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro Archipelago;

3. Notes the express desire and readiness of the Comorian people to accede to independence in friendship and co-operation with France; 4/

4. Takes note with interest of the important statement made by the Government of France on 26 August 1974, to the effect that the consultation on the independence of the Comoro Archipelago shall be organized on an "archipelago-wide" basis; that the Territory will retain "the frontiers that it had as a colony"; and that, for the French Government, "a multiplicity of different statuses for the various islands of the Archipelago is inconceivable";

5. Requests the Government of France, as the administering Power, to ensure that the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro Archipelago are preserved;

6. Calls upon the administering Power to take all necessary measures to ensure the full and speedy attainment of freedom and independence by the people of the Territory in accordance with the objectives of the Declaration and in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations;

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2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Fourth Committee, 2064th meeting, paras. 22 and 27.

3/ See the annex to the present chapter, para. 32.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Fourth Committee, 2065th meeting; *ibid.*, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XI, annex, appendix II.

7. Further requests the Government of France to take the necessary measures to promote and facilitate the return of Comorian political leaders and other Comorians to their country and to create a favourable political climate for the free and effective participation of the entire population in the process of self-determination and independence of the Comoro Archipelago;

8. Urges the administering Power to extend its co-operation to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the discharge of the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly with respect to the Territory, in conformity with the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular by enabling the Special Committee to send a visiting mission to the Comoro Archipelago for the purpose of securing adequate and first-hand information on the situation obtaining in the Territory, as well as on the wishes and aspirations of its peoples as regards their future status;

9. Requests all States to render the necessary assistance to the people of the Territory in their efforts to achieve the objectives of the Declaration;

10. Decides to keep the situation in the Comoro Archipelago under continuous review.

Annex\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. General . . . . .	1 - 4
2. Constitutional and political developments . . . . .	5 - 32
3. Economic and social conditions . . . . .	33 - 49
4. Education . . . . .	50 - 51

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.941 and Add.1.

# COMORO ARCHIPELAGO<sup>a/</sup>

## 1. GENERAL

1. Basic information on the Comoro Archipelago is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. b/ Supplementary information is set out below.

2. The Comoro Archipelago lies in the Mozambique Channel, north-west of Madagascar, between 11° and 13° south latitude and 40°30' and 43°10' east longitude. The Territory has a total land area of 2,235 square kilometres and is made up of four main islands, Mayotte, Anjouan, Moheli and Grande Comore, and a number of smaller islands. All the islands are of volcanic origin. Mayotte, or Mahore, the southernmost island of the archipelago, has a total area of 374 square kilometres. Anjouan covers an area of 424 square kilometres. Moheli, the smallest of the four islands, has an area of 290 square kilometres. Grande Comore, or Angazidja, is both the largest island of the group (1,147 square kilometres) and the most northerly.

3. The Territory has a tropical climate. A dry, cooler season extends from May to October, and a hot, rainy season from November to April.

4. The total population of the Territory in 1970 was 281,000, distributed as follows:

<b>Grande Comore</b>	136,000
Anjouan	100,000
Mayotte	34,000
Moheli	11,000

## 2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

### A. Status of the Territory

5. The constitutional provisions of the Territory were dealt with in an earlier report of the Special Committee. c/ In brief, the Act of 22 December 1961 relating to the political organization of the Comoro Archipelago was amended and supplemented by the Act of 3 January 1968. d/ By virtue of the latter Act, the Territory has a

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a/ The information contained in this section has been derived exclusively from published sources.

b/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XI, annex.

c/ Ibid., chap. XI, paras. 16-32.

d/ See Journal officiel de la République française, 4 January 1968.

personnalité juridique (juridical entity) and exercises internal self-government. The Government is composed of a Government Council, a Chamber of Deputies, and four conseils de circonscription (district councils), one for each island. The members of the district councils are elected by universal suffrage. The 1968 Act also defines the powers of the High Commissioner of the French Republic, who exercises the functions of the State in certain specific areas such as foreign affairs, defence and currency. For purposes of administration, each island constitutes an administrative district under the direction of a prefect. These districts are divided into cantons.

6. As regards the judiciary, there are three kinds of jurisdiction: State, Moslem and territorial.

#### B. Political developments

7. As previously noted, e/ an important step forward for the Territory was the adoption by the Chamber of Deputies of the Territory on 22 December 1972 of a resolution instructing the Comorian Government to consider and negotiate with the Government of France on the accession of the Comoro Archipelago to independence in co-operation and friendship with France.

8. The conversations between representatives of the two Governments, which took place in Paris on 18 May 1973, led to the signing on 15 June 1973 of a "Joint Declaration on the accession to independence of the Comoro Archipelago". f/ In the Joint Declaration, the French Government affirmed the fitness of the Comoro Archipelago for independence, which was to be achieved following consultation with the population of the archipelago, on a date to be jointly agreed upon but not more than five years from the date of signature of the Declaration.

9. According to the terms of the Joint Declaration, the consultation of the people for the purpose of deciding on the Territory's independence would, assuming a positive response by the electorate, have the effect of vesting in the Chamber of Deputies of the Territory in office on that date, the powers of a constituent assembly, and of vesting in the President of the Government the powers of head of State. The Chamber of Deputies would then draw up the new State constitution, which would uphold the rights and interests of the regional bodies and be subject to popular ratification.

10. It was further specified that relations between the French Republic and the Comoro Archipelago would then be governed by co-operation agreements. During the period of transition, annual consultations would be held alternately in Paris and Moroni (capital of the Comoro Archipelago) between representatives of the French Government and the Government of the Comoro Archipelago.

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e/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XI, annex, para. 45.

f/ Ibid., appendix II.



11. During the period of transition, certain powers of the State would be exercised by the President of the Government and the Comorian authorities. These powers would cover, in particular, matters relating to public finance, foreign trade and currency, the apportionment and expenditure of the annual financial assistance from the French Government, education falling within the jurisdiction of the Department of National Education, technical assistance, the maintenance of law and order and the judicial system. At the same time, the French Government would associate the Comorian authorities in its exercise of State powers relating to foreign affairs, defence and civil aviation. The Joint Declaration also emphasized the introduction of a policy of regionalization with a view to upholding the rights and interests of the regional entities which comprise the Territory.

12. The French High Commissioner, who would have the title of Delegate-General of the Republic, would be appointed by the French Government after consultation with the President of the Comorian Government.

### C. Reactions to the Declaration

13. Reaction in the Territory to the Joint Declaration gave rise to comments dealing principally with the date of independence, the nature of the new links between France and the Comoro Archipelago, the territorial unity of the archipelago, ethnic integration and political reconciliation.

14. Representatives of the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores (MOLINACO) denounced the contents of the Joint Declaration at the 934th meeting of the Special Committee on 9 August 1973, saying that it violated all the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The chief representative of MOLINACO, after pointing out the contradictions between the two documents, asked the Special Committee to condemn the Joint Declaration as being contrary to the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). He warned against any attempt at the partial or total destruction of national unity and especially against any consultation which would not be global in scope (see para. 11 above). He asked that independence be immediate and without any conditions or reservations, adding that any referendum on the independence of the Comoro Archipelago should be carried out under the supervision of the United Nations. In the same statement, MOLINACO requested that the United Nations should, as a first step, send a mission of inquiry to the Comoro Archipelago in order to obtain first-hand information on political, economic and social conditions. Finally, in an "explanatory statement" dated 7 November 1973, and in a further statement made by its representative before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 23 November 1973, g/ MOLINACO reiterated its objections to the Joint Declaration and announced its decision to oppose it by every possible means.

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g/ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Fourth Committee, 2065th meeting.

15. Subsequently, in a statement to Agence France Presse, Mr. Ahmed Abdallah, President of the Government of the Comoro Archipelago, declared that MOLINACO had no right to speak on behalf of the archipelago or to represent it in any international body.

D. Statements of local and French authorities

16. On his return from Paris, where he had headed the Comorian delegation at the independence consultations, Mr. Abdallah stated before the Chamber of Deputies that if the Comorian people had wanted immediate independence, France would not have denied it to them. He also stated that all powers of internal sovereignty had now been entrusted to him and that he was being associated with and being informed of all matters which concerned the external sovereignty of the Territory. Mr. Abdallah concluded by asking his countrymen to forget party differences so that a party unity could be brought into being.

17. After making his statement, Mr. Abdallah called for a vote of confidence on the mission which he had just completed. In response, the Assembly expressed its confidence in the Government by a vote of 34 to 2.

18. Mr. Bernard Stasi, the French Minister for Overseas Departments and Territories, visited the archipelago from 24 to 29 September 1973. During his visit, Mr. Stasi, in referring to the Paris agreement, said that what was important was to draw the consequences of the democratic aspirations expressed by the Comorian voters through their lawful representatives and to give concrete expression to them in defining the new relationship between the French Government and the elected representatives of the Territory. The Overseas Minister then reaffirmed that the expressed desire of the Comoros for independence had been officially recognized. Mr. Stasi added, however, that the concept of independence was indissolubly linked to friendship, co-operation and collaboration with France.

19. On the eve of Mr. Stasi's arrival, the Parti pour l'évolution des Comores (PEC) launched an appeal to the population to boycott the visit by demonstrating against the Joint Declaration and in favour of "immediate and genuine independence".

20. The arrival of Mr. Stasi in the Territory was marked by a number of incidents. According to press reports, several young members of the Parti socialiste des Comores (PASOCO), who had demonstrated, waving banners demanding immediate independence and shouting hostile slogans, were apprehended.

21. In a communiqué dated 6 October 1973, PEC, which is allied to MOLINACO, indicated that the local government had issued decrees prohibiting any demonstrations during Mr. Stasi's visit. According to PEC, the demonstrations organized in the principal towns of the Comoros had been dispersed by the police who, it was claimed, employed "bludgeoning, arrests, intimidation and other arbitrary measures".

22. On 22 December 1973, by 29 votes in favour and 3 abstentions, 7 of the 39 members being absent, the Chamber of Deputies of the Territory adopted a resolution requesting the Government to associate its members with the negotiations with the French Government in order to fix a date for the accession of the Comoros to independence, not later than 1976.

23. During the 2064th meeting of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, held on 20 November 1973, h/ the representative of France indicated that a period of transition had been arranged to allow for the assembling of the instruments needed for the powers of a State, except for foreign affairs and external defence and currency. The period of transition would also allow for the creation of conditions for a national life, which implied the solution of various problems arising from the fact that the Comoros were not a homogeneous territory but an archipelago whose peoples were of diverse origins. For that reason, the French Government had provided that, when the time came, the people would have to decide the question through a consultation, the modalities of which would be determined by legislative means. According to the representative of France, it was for that reason that the Joint Declaration had provided, in section 4, that "during the period of transition and in order to promote the unity of the archipelago ... a regionalization policy would be put into effect".

24. According to a press report dated 16 April 1974, Mr. Abdallah is said to have issued a statement at Tananarive in which he said that the Comoros would accede to independence in 1974, in friendship and co-operation with France and that an accelerated process towards the full sovereignty of the Comorian people had been worked out with the French Government.

#### E. The case of Mayotte

25. It was reported in the press that the political leaders of the island of Mayotte disagreed with the other leaders of the archipelago regarding the legitimacy of independence. They maintained that the 30,000 inhabitants of the island wished to remain under French administration with Mayotte having the status of an overseas Territory.

26. The leaders of Mayotte argued that their Sultan had been placed under the protection of France in 1841 and that, until 1900, Mayotte had been the only French possession in the archipelago. Moreover, the inhabitants of Mayotte, the Mahorais, considered the share of the Comorian budget allocated to the island to be ridiculously small.

27. At the elections to the new Chamber of Deputies in December 1972, the Mouvement mahorais, the separatist party, obtained 9,534 votes out of a total of

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h/ Ibid., 2064th meeting.

104,929 and five seats out of a total of 39. On 19 December, the five deputies for Mayotte voted against the resolution advocating negotiations with a view to the accession of the Territory to independence.

28. The policy advocated by the Mouvement mahorais of Mayotte led to several developments.

29. In a resolution dated 18 October 1972, some Mayotte intellectuals expressed their "anti-separatist" position. During the above-mentioned elections, the list of candidates favouring union which ran against the Mouvement mahorais obtained 25 per cent of the votes. Finally, Mr. Bamana, the leader of the Mouvement mahorais, was sentenced to 40 days' imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 CFA francs i/ for having instigated the disorders which occurred in July 1973.

30. In connexion with section 4 of the Joint Declaration, relating to regionalization (see para. 11 above), Mr. Abdallah declared, on 5 October 1973, that no regionalization policy was contemplated and that there would be no separation of the islands because unity was stronger than ever.

31. MOLINACO considers, however, that the regionalization provided for in section 4 of the Joint Declaration represents a deliberate attempt to divide the Comoro Archipelago, by distinguishing peoples and regional entities having divergent rights and interests.

32. On 26 August 1974, the following communiqué was issued by Agence France-Presse concerning a bill to be introduced in the French Parliament by the Government regarding the Territory:

"A new stage will shortly be reached in the process begun by France in June 1973 to bring its Overseas Territory of the Comoro Islands to independence. A bill for the organization of a referendum in the archipelago regarding its independence will be introduced by the Government when the Parliament reconvenes in October. Mr. Olivier Stirn, the Secretary of State, announced this officially in Paris on Monday evening and said that the date for the referendum might be either December next or March 1975.

"The problem of Mayotte has always pervaded the atmosphere of the Franco-Comorian talks on the future of the archipelago, and the Mahorais have consistently stated their preference, in the event of a referendum on independence, for an island-by-island consultation. That is out of the question now, and Mr. Stirn explained why: the French Government, he said, 'has opted for an archipelago-wide consultation for three reasons: first, for the legal reason that under the rules of international law a territory retains the frontiers that it had as a colony; secondly, a multiplicity of different statuses for the various islands of the archipelago is inconceivable; thirdly, it is not for France to set the Comorians against each other; on the contrary, its role is to help to bring them closer together and to find an appropriate legal status'."

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i/ The local currency is the CFA franc. In early 1972, 261 CFA francs were equivalent to approximately \$US 1.00.

### 3. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

33. The economy of the Comoro Archipelago, which is exclusively agricultural, depends on export crops, particularly the production of essential oils used in the perfume industry, vanilla, copra, cloves and cinnamon. The export crops are for the most part processed by companies with foreign capital.

34. According to MOLINACO, more than three fourths of the land in the Comoros belongs to French companies and settlers, and the remaining quarter belongs to "the local feudal middle class". The Comorian peasants, who represent more than 95 per cent of the population, are nothing but agricultural labourers or tenant farmers.

35. The largest firms in the archipelago include the Société Comores-Bambao, which controls 50 per cent of the production of essential oils, the Société de la Nioumakélé, the Société des plantes à parfum and the Société des plantations Mirongoni et de Chiconi.

36. The local farmers who are engaged in subsistence farming grow coconut palms, food crops and rice. However, the Société de développement des Comores (SODEC) and the Bureau pour le développement agricole (BDPA) are encouraging the modernization of farming.

#### A. Public finance

37. In 1972, French assistance to the Comoros included 7.2 million French francs in financial assistance, 3.6 million French francs in technical assistance and 13.0 million French francs in assistance through the Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social (FIDES).

38. The 1974 budget estimates for the Territory total 2,310.9 million CFA francs, compared with 1,779.3 million CFA francs in 1973 and 1,617.0 million CFA francs in 1972. The breakdown of local and external revenue is as follows:

<u>Local revenue</u>	(Million CFA francs)
Direct taxes	235.0
Registration and stamp duties	34.1
Revenue from State-owned property	18.9
Miscellaneous services	127.9
Customs	1,015.8
Loans	260.1
Advances to other budgets and public organs	<u>150.0</u>
Total	1,841.9
<u>External financing</u>	(Million CFA francs)
Fonds de concours de la République française	469.0

39. In 1974, 79 per cent of the revenue will be provided by internal funds, in particular, customs receipts; and 21 per cent by funds received from the Fonds de concours and loans to be contracted with certain public organs.

40. Under section 2 of the Joint Declaration, the Comorians reaffirmed their desire to remain within the franc area. The Banque des Comores was established and is responsible for issuing currency in the Territory.

#### B. Balance of trade

41. The following table, based on a press report, indicates trade balances for 1971 and 1972:

##### Comoro Archipelago: balance of trade, 1971-1972

	1971		1972	
	<u>Net weight</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Net weight</u>	<u>Value</u>
	(tons)	(thousand CFA francs)	(tons)	(thousand CFA francs)
Imports	54,299	2,834.7	50,346	2,849.5
Exports	12,756	1,572.0	11,787	1,511.2
Total	67,055	4,406.8	62,133	4,360.8
Deficit		1,262.6		1,338.3
Reserve ratio		55.4 per cent		53.0 per cent

42. The decrease in the volume of imports is explained by the substantial decrease in essential commodities, particularly cattle from Madagascar, imports of which fell from 2,860 head in 1971 to 1,227 head in 1972.

43. With regard to the export trade, the decrease resulted from the slump in the sales of copra (1,525 tons and 16,026,000 CFA francs), and a fall-off in sales of cloves (170 tons and 103.3 million CFA francs).

44. The following table indicates the fluctuations in the external trade of the Comoros since 1960:

Comoro Archipelago: external trade, 1960-1972  
(million CFA francs)

	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Deficit</u>	<u>Reserve ratio</u> (per cent)
1960	940	799	141	85.0
1961	909	686	233	75.5
1962	1,088	626	462	57.5
1963	1,334	1,163	171	87.2
1964	1,508	986	522	65.4
1965	1,622	915	707	56.4
1966	1,783	953	830	53.5
1967	1,850	958	912	50.7
1968	1,763	1,008	755	57.2
1969	2,092	1,289	803	61.6
1970	2,373	1,278	1,095	53.9
1971	2,835	1,572	1,263	55.4
1972	2,849	1,511	1,338	53.0

C. Transport

45. In 1972 the Territory had approximately 1,000 kilometres of roads, of which 295 kilometres were asphalted. FIDES and the Fonds européen de développement (FED) are helping to finance the construction of paved roads.

46. With regard to sea transport, heavy tonnage vessels anchor at Moroni, Mutsamudu, Dzaoudzi and Fomboni. The development of the port of Mutsamudu has made it possible for medium-tonnage vessels to put in.

47. There is a general aviation airport at Moroni and three local airports at Bandar-Salam, Quani and Pamanzi.

48. Following the meeting of a small interministerial council, convened on 20 November 1973 under the chairmanship of Mr. Georges Pompidou, the late President of the French Republic, it was announced that the French Government would provide substantial aid to the Comoros for equipment, particularly for roads and ports. It was also announced that the French Government would favour the establishment of a new company with majority participation by Air France.

#### D. Health

49. In the field of health, MOLINACO reported that there were only 13 physicians and 650 hospital beds for a population of 500,000 inhabitants. The sole pharmacy in the Territory, owned by a Frenchman, enjoyed a monopoly in the sale of medications. MOLINACO also reported that malnutrition and undernourishment caused a number of deaths.

#### 4. EDUCATION

50. In 1972, the school enrolment rate was 20 per cent in the Comoros. Primary education was provided in 80 public schools and one private school, with a total enrolment of 12,000. Secondary education was provided in four public schools - the Moroni lycée and its annexes on the three other islands - and one private school, with a total enrolment of 900 students.

51. According to information provided by MOLINACO, in 1973, the Territory had a total of 100 primary schools for a school population of 80,000 children, with the result that only 15,000 actually attended school. MOLINACO also pointed out that bottle-necks had been created to reduce to an absolute minimum the number of Comorians graduating with useful training.



CHAPTER XII

(A/9623/Add.4 (Part II))

SPANISH SAHARA

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	1 - 5	201
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	6	201
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		203

## CHAPTER XII

### SPANISH SAHARA

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Spanish Sahara at its 981st meeting on 5 September 1974.

2. In its consideration of the item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, by paragraph 11 of which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". The Committee also took into account the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3162 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 concerning the question of Spanish Sahara, by paragraph 9 of which the Assembly requested the Committee to continue its consideration of the situation in the Territory.

3. During its consideration of the Territory, the Special Committee had before it a working paper (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on the latest developments concerning the Territory. The Special Committee also had before it an undated written petition from the Executive Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet El-Hamra and Río de Oro concerning Spanish Sahara (A/AC.109/PET.1254).

4. The Special Committee also took into account the following communications addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the item: (a) letter dated 8 July from the Permanent Representative of Morocco (A/9654); (b) letter dated 10 July from the Permanent Representative of Spain (A/9655); (c) letter dated 20 August from the Permanent Representative of Spain (A/9714); and (d) letter dated 20 August from the Acting Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Mauritania (A/9715).

5. At the 981st meeting, on 5 September, the Chairman informed the Special Committee of the receipt of a communication, dated 3 September, from the Permanent Representative of Spain indicating the continued readiness of his Government to participate in the work of the Committee during its consideration of the item.

#### B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

6. At the 981st meeting, on 5 September, following a statement by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.981), the Special Committee decided to postpone consideration of the

question of Spanish Sahara pending conclusion of the consultation among the member States directly concerned. The Special Committee also decided to transmit to the General Assembly the working paper referred to in paragraph 3 above in order to facilitate consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee.

Annex\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. General . . . . .	1 - 3
2. Constitutional and political developments . . . . .	4 - 20
3. Economic conditions . . . . .	21 - 41
4. Social and educational conditions . . . . .	42 - 54

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.956.

## SPANISH SAHARA a/

### 1. GENERAL

1. Basic information on Spanish Sahara is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. b/ Supplementary information is set out below.
2. Situated on the Atlantic coast of Africa and bordering on Morocco and Algeria in the north and Mauritania in the south and east, Spanish Sahara covers an area of about 280,000 square kilometres, most of which is desert or semi-desert.
3. According to the Boletín Oficial de la Provincia del Sahara of 15 September 1971, the total population of the Territory at 31 December 1970 was 76,425, of whom 24,048 lived in El Aaiún, the capital, and 6,692 in Villa Cisneros. According to the national liberation movement, nearly 600,000 refugees from Spanish Sahara are living in the neighbouring countries of Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco. In a letter dated 12 July 1973 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations refuted this figure. c/

### 2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. Constitutional arrangements

4. As noted previously, the Spanish administration of the Territory is based on an act of 21 April 1961, amended by a decree of 29 November 1962. The Territory is administered by a Governor-General, who is appointed by the Council of Ministers of Spain and through whom the central organs of the Spanish Government exercise the same authority as in the metropolitan provinces of Spain. The Secretary-General, who is also appointed by the Council of Ministers, is the head of the administrative services, except for the judiciary and military, and is the second highest authority in the Territory.

5. Organs of local administration are the Cabildo Provincial d/ (Territorial Council), the municipal councils of El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros and smaller local

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a/ The information contained in this section has been derived from published sources and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Government of Spain under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations on 30 June 1973 for the year ending 31 December 1972 and on 24 June 1974 for the year ending 31 December 1973.

b/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XII, annex I.

c/ Ibid., annex II.

d/ For more details see ibid., annex I, paras. 7 et seq.

units at Semara and La Güera. There are also special "nomadic sections", which include those Saharan herdsmen who cannot participate in the municipal organs.

6. According to information provided by the administering Power, the Yema'a (General Assembly) was reorganized in 1973 with a view to increasing its participation in the administration of the Territory. The number of the representatives of the various tribes in the Yema'a was also increased from 29 to 190.

7. The elections to the Yema'a, held on 10 June 1973, resulted in the election of 188 tribal chiefs, of whom 115 were re-elected and 73 were new representatives.

#### B. New statute for the Territory

8. As reported previously, in February 1973 the Yema'a sent a declaration to the Head of the Spanish State. In the declaration, the Yema'a, among other things, stated that the Saharan people are entitled to decide their future alone without coercion or interference from abroad and that the security and integrity of the Territory and its population should be guaranteed at all times, as these were the conditions essential for the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of the Sahara and for their greater participation in the administration of the Territory. The Yema'a further requested that the Head of the Spanish State ensure that "the process effectively permitting the Saharan people to decide its future would be continually furthered", and that at the same time existing legal institutions are "gradually extended so that the people of the Sahara will have a greater share in the functions and powers" relating to the internal administration of the Territory. e/

9. This communication was acknowledged by the Spanish Government on 6 March (see A/9176, annex II). Following the elections on 10 June 1973 (see para. 7 above), the newly elected Yema'a ratified the Declaration on 28 July and decided formally to ratify the communication addressed to the Head of the Spanish State on 28 February and the requests contained in it.

10. On 21 September 1973, General Francisco Franco, the Spanish Chief of State, replied to the communication of the Yema'a. In the eight-point statement, the Spanish State, inter alia, solemnly guaranteed that the population of the Sahara would freely determine its future, and that the process of self-determination would take place when the population freely requested it.

11. The Spanish State guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Sahara, pledged the economic and social development of the Territory and acknowledged ownership by the Saharan people of their natural resources, including the benefits of the

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e/ Ibid., para. 15. For the full text of the declaration, see A/9176, annex I.

exploitation of these resources. The Spanish State also undertook to establish a system of progressive participation of the Saharan people in the conduct of their own affairs. f/

12. Speaking before the Fourth Committee at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on 26 November, g/ the representative of Spain said that at its session from 13 to 15 November, the Yema'a had unanimously expressed agreement with the contents of that document.

13. At the 2138th meeting of the General Assembly on 3 October 1973, the Foreign Minister of Morocco said the following:

"... periodically the Spanish Government promulgates laws which modify the structures of the Territory and its status, while proclaiming that such measures are merely stages which push the Territory towards the desired self-determination. On 22 September last the Spanish Government again promulgated another series of measures in the same spirit. Yet, if the Government of Spain were to adopt the same decisions with the co-operation of the United Nations, as that co-operation is called for in numerous resolutions, the endorsement of our Organization would doubtless have guaranteed the fulfilment of these measures and the genuineness of the freedom of expression of the will of the peoples. In admitting that these measures, in their formulation, might constitute progress, the suspicion of Spain with regard to co-operation with the United Nations is legitimately upsetting the confidence that it was calling for from us and that we were prepared to grant it in good faith in a framework which excludes initiative on the part of the administering Power alone."

14. During 1973, consultations were held between Spain and the neighbouring countries of Spanish Sahara. The Foreign Ministers of Spain and Morocco met in Rabat in March and in Madrid in April and the Foreign Ministers of Mauritania and Spain met in Nouakchott in April.

15. The Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco met in Nouakchott on 10 May h/ and again, in Agadir, on 24 July. They reaffirmed their adherence to the principle of self-determination for Spanish Sahara and issued a joint communiqué stating that self-determination should be implemented without foreign interference and in conformity with relevant United Nations resolutions.

### C. Struggle for national liberation

16. At present, there are several national liberation movements in Spanish Sahara. Following is a summary of the recent information available on their activities.

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f/ For the full text of the statement, see A/9176, annex IV.

g/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Fourth Committee, 2066th meeting.

h/ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XII, annex I, para. 20.

17. The Mouvement de résistance des Hommes bleus (MOREHOB), which was originally based in Morocco, is now based in Algeria. i/

18. In 1973, a new movement for the liberation of Spanish Sahara was created, under the name of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el-Hamra and Rio de Oro. In its first statement, the Front said that its forces had attacked Spanish military posts in May and June, identifying them as Khanga Tifariti and Bin Dhlou. The statement added that Spanish troops had retaliated by arresting 32 unarmed people and by dismissing the recently elected 'sheikhs'. The Front also issued an open letter to the heads of State of the countries neighbouring Spanish Sahara, asking them to take a "firm constructive stand". It also denounced "the obstinacy of the colonial authorities and their manoeuvres aimed at separating this territory from its authentic allies".

19. In response to the Front's statement, MOREHOB denounced what it said were plans to annex Spanish Sahara. MOREHOB reaffirmed its goal of liberation for the Territory, not only from Spanish domination, but also from the "imperialist designs" of other countries.

20. There are also two other movements: the "Movement of August 21", based at Tarfaya in southern Morocco, and one based in Mauritania, on which no information is available.

### 3. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

#### A. Agriculture and livestock

21. According to the administering Power, agricultural studies that have been made with a view to extending the areas that can be used, and for the sowing and selection of seeds were being continued. Discovery of water at Villa Cisneros, Aargub, Tauarto and other points made it possible to carry out agronomical tests to find ways of making better use of the graras by selecting seeds. Agricultural investments amounted to 2.7 million pesetas. j/ Studies were also made on pasture land and fodder.

22. According to the administering Power expenditures on the construction of irrigation channels, wells and reservoirs and the acquisition of vehicles and agricultural machinery totalled 45.4 million pesetas in 1972 and 40.5 million pesetas in 1973.

23. In 1969, the animal wealth of Spanish Sahara was reported as follows: 56,200 camels; 145,000 goats; 18,000 wool-bearing animals; 2,000 donkeys; 400 zebras; 200 pigs; and 3,200 others. As a result of the recent severe drought in Africa,

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i/ Ibid., para. 22.

j/ In 1972, 68.9 Spanish pesetas equalled \$US 1.00.



it was reported that the supply of livestock had declined by approximately 60 per cent. The administering Power reports that special attention is being paid to this aspect in providing assistance to drought victims. It was also reported that 3.5 million pesetas had been spent on setting up a reserve to protect the fauna of the Territory.

## B. Mining

24. Interest in Spanish Sahara has grown with the discovery in recent years that it possesses vast deposits of phosphate. Discovered in 1947, the phosphate deposits are located at Bu Craa, about 100 kilometres inland from El Aaiún. The reserves are estimated to be around 1.6 thousand million tons with an average quality of 31 per cent pure phosphate, one of the highest levels of yield in the world. k/

25. According to information transmitted by the administering Power for 1972, work on the exploitation of the phosphate deposits at Bu Craa continued during the year. A conveyor belt to carry the ore from Bu Craa to the shore installations at El Aaiún was completed. The belt, which is one of five projects related to the exploitation of the deposits, has a transport capacity of 2,000 tons, at a rate of four metres per second. It was reported that crushing and concentration of the ore had started at the deposit site and the loading areas.

26. Plans were also announced to prospect for aluminium, copper, zinc, titanium, vanadium, lead, manganese, kaolin, bentonite and halogen salts. In that connexion, it was believed that the results of preliminary exploration for sedimentary and precambrian iron had been encouraging and justified continuance of the exploration.

## C. Water supplies

27. Locations for the tapping of ground water is determined in the light of the Territory's needs and on the basis of suggestions and requests made by the Yema'a. The work for the tapping of ground water covers deep bored wells, medium-depth bored wells and traditional wells.

28. There are deep bored wells at El Aaiún and Semara, and well-boring operations for deep ground-water tapping have been completed at Villa Cisneros, Tiniguir, Tahauarte and La Güera. Water does not have to be pumped at any of these sites. The medium-depth bored wells are located as follows: two each in Umdereiga and Bir Enzaren; and one each in Tius, Tabacca, Imudeguen, El Fuch and La Grara del Caballo. The output of these wells is 2,900 cubic metres daily which, added to the output of previously dug wells, amounts to a daily output of 58,230 cubic metres.

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k/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XII, annex I, paras. 27-31.

29. Towards the end of 1973, work was begun at El Aaiún, on the study of the extraction possibilities of the aquifer now being used to supply water to this area; at the same time an investigation was started on the possible existence of another aquifer in the northern part of the town. This work was undertaken owing to increased consumption of water over the past few years in El Aaiún, which is now in the region of 6,000 cubic metres per day.

30. In the search for and tapping of ground water in 1973, over 4,800 metres were bored, providing a total output of 8,020 cubic metres per day. Based on the present output, water supply possibilities for the Territory amount to 66,250 cubic metres per day. In addition to the work mentioned above, work has been completed on the construction of traditional wells, the installation of electrical pumps and motor-powered pump beams, and the construction of well shelters, cattle troughs, pipelines, etc.

31. Total investments on prospecting for and tapping of ground water during the period under consideration amounted to 104.0 million pesetas.

#### D. Communications

32. According to information transmitted by the administering Power, the Saharan Telecommunication Service consists of a primary network of interlocking circuits forming a triangle joining El Aaiún, Villa Cisneros and Las Palmas which provide telephone and telegraph services via radio teletype machines. There is also a radio network, dependent upon the primary network.

33. There is a 50-kW radio broadcasting transmitter located at El Aaiún and a 10-kW transmitter at Villa Cisneros. These installations, with the two 10-kW short-wave transmitters located at El Aaiún, are valued at approximately 50 million pesetas. At El Aaiún and Semara, there are 50-watt-television repeaters. A total of 34.7 million pesetas is reported to have been invested in telecommunications during 1972.

34. In 1973, the Telecommunications Service installed a teletype radio link between El Aaiún and Semara which is now in operation. The cost of this investment is estimated at 3 million pesetas. In addition, there is the new telecommunications building at Semara, constructed at a cost of some 3.5 million pesetas.

35. The tropospheric link between Las Palmas and El Aaiún, equipped with 10 telephone and 30 telegraph channels, went into operation in September 1973. The cost of this installation was 36 million pesetas.

36. In June 1973, contracts were awarded for works involving the installation of an urban telephone network and of an automatic telephone exchange with 1,000 lines at El Aaiún. The urban network has been practically completed and the telephone exchange will be set up and operating by late 1974. The cost of this installation is estimated at 57 million pesetas. A project to expand the network to 2,000 telephones has already been drawn up and approved. Service for these subscribers is scheduled to begin in early 1975. The cost of the expansion is estimated at 21 million pesetas.

37. A project has been drawn up and is being processed with a view to expanding the tropospheric link, now in service, to 24 telephone channels which should begin operating in early 1975. This expansion should cost 8 million pesetas.

38. In addition, the following projects have been drawn up and are awaiting allocation of the necessary funds:

(a) Installation of an automatic telephone exchange serving 1,000 subscribers and the urban network at Villa Cisneros, involving a sum of 66 million pesetas;

(b) Radio link between the telecommunications building at El Aaiún and Plava El Aaiún, involving a sum of 18 million pesetas;

(c) Renovation of radio and electrical equipment, involving a total amount of 19 million pesetas.

#### E. Housing construction

39. The following housing facilities have been approved by the National Housing Institute of the Ministry of Housing, and are to be constructed during 1973/74:

El Aaiún . . . . . 652 housing units

Villa Cisneros . . . . . 248 housing units

The total cost of the construction of these housing units amounts to 1,003 million pesetas.

#### F. Tourism

40. Work on the expansion of the Parador Nacional de Turismo at El Aaiún is continuing with a view to equipping it with new facilities and providing more accommodation. Further work is also being carried out, by private Saharwi initiative, on the construction of a three-star hotel, also at El Aaiún, under the "hotel credit" funds.

41. A definite site has already been selected for the initial construction of the Parador de Turismo in Rio de Oro Bay, near Villa Cisneros, with a capacity to accommodate 125 persons and involving a sum of 125 million pesetas. The Parador will also have adjoining sports facilities with chalets and recreation areas, which will cost 10 million pesetas.

#### 4. SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

##### A. Labour

42. During 1973, 8.9 million pesetas were invested in programmes to improve the status of Saharwi women.

43. The delegation of the Instituto Nacional de Previsión (National Social Welfare Institute) extended to the inhabitants of the Territory all the benefits provided under labour mutual insurance schemes as part of its work to improve the system of social security. All the labour provisions designed to give workers greater advantages as regards pay, social security, or as regards negotiation and administration of their rights, have been extended to the Territory.

44. Special mention should be made of the Decree of 29 March 1974 establishing the minimum interoccupational wage, and the base for and rates of social security contributions.

45. In view of the persistence of the adverse climatic conditions which caused the drought in the Sahelian region, the Spanish Government has continued to provide assistance to the stricken people by supplying food and initiating public works involving a total sum of approximately 100 million pesetas.

##### B. Public health

46. There are two general hospitals at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros, and 15 dispensaries throughout the Territory. In 1972, there were 29 doctors, 2 pharmacists, 25 assistant health technicians, 3 midwives, 57 assistant health workers and 19 nurses. Approximately, there was one doctor for every 2,150 inhabitants and one hospital bed for every 238.

47. There were two training schools for registered health personnel at the hospitals of El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros. Some 100 registered health personnel were employed by the public health service and private companies.

48. Investments during 1973 in health campaigns, health equipment, the acquisition of instruments and medications, amounted to 22.6 million pesetas. Government expenditure on public health amounted to 63.3 million pesetas.

##### C. Education

49. Education in the Territory consists of pre-school education, general basic education, the bachillerato and technical studies.

50. In 1973/74 there were two secondary schools (at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros) and 137 school units (school groups consisting of various sections, mixed schools, rural and nomadic schools). In addition to the teaching staff at the two secondary

schools, there were three directors of school groups, one inspector of primary education, 160 Spanish teachers (144 in 1972/73) and 60 Saharan teachers (unchanged).

51. For the academic year 1973/74, 6,428 students were attending courses in basic education (4,995 in 1972/73) and 780 were enrolled in intermediate education studies (911 in 1972/73). It should be noted that the apparent decline in the latter field of study, as compared with the previous year, is due to the fact that some bachillerato courses have been included in the new general basic education curricula, in keeping with the new educational structure. The number of scholarship and fellowship holders following university studies and intermediate-level studies in Spain was 61 (36 in 1972/73).

52. In 1972/73, 260 students were enrolled in the two vocational training schools at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros and 169 students were enrolled in the two domestic science schools, one at El Aaiún for boarders, and one at Villa Cisneros.

53. In addition to the school libraries that are to be found in all schools, a provincial library has also been functioning regularly at El Aaiún, as have a municipal library at Villa Cisneros and the libraries of the two intermediate education institutes.

54. Work on the execution of the project to construct a Sahara Museum to house a collection and exhibition of geological and mineral specimens, fossils, rock carvings, etc., to be found in the Territory, is at an advanced stage.

CHAPTER XIII  
(A/9623/Add.4 (Part II))

GIBRALTAR

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	1 - 3	214
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	4	214
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		215

## CHAPTER XIII

### GIBRALTAR

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Gibraltar at its 981st meeting, on 5 September 1974.

2. In its consideration of the Territory, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, by paragraph 11 of which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and in particular to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". The Committee also took into account the consensus adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1973 concerning Gibraltar. 1/

3. During its consideration of the Territory, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on the latest developments concerning the Territory.

#### B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

4. At its 981st meeting on 5 September, following a statement by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.981), the Special Committee decided, without objection, to transmit to the General Assembly the working paper referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to facilitate consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee and, subject to any directives that the General Assembly might give in that connexion at its twenty-ninth session, to give consideration to the item at its next session.

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1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/9030), p. 111.

Annex\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. General . . . . .	1 - 5
2. Political developments . . . . .	6 - 14
3. Economic conditions . . . . .	15 - 27
4. Social and educational conditions . . . . .	28 - 34

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.965.



## GIBRALTAR a/

### 1. GENERAL

#### A. Constitution

1. Details of the constitutional arrangements in the Territory are described in an earlier report of the Special Committee. b/
2. The preamble to the Gibraltar Constitution Order of 1969 states that "Gibraltar is part of Her Majesty's dominions and Her Majesty's Government have given assurances to the people of Gibraltar that Gibraltar will remain part of Her Majesty's dominions unless and until an Act of Parliament otherwise provides. Furthermore, the preamble states that Her Majesty's Government "will never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another State against their freely and democratically expressed wishes".
3. During 1973/74, no constitutional changes relating to the Territory were reported.

#### B. Local government

4. During the period under review, namely 1973/74, no legislative changes affecting the Government of the Territory were reported. It will be recalled that the last elections in the Territory were held in 1972 when the Labour Party came to power. Sir Joshua Hassan (Gibraltar Labour Party) is the Chief Minister of the Territory. Mr. Maurice Xiberras (Integration with Britain Party) is the leader of the Opposition.

#### C. Population

5. According to official estimates, the population of Gibraltar at the end of 1972 was as follows:

Gibraltarians	19,007
Other British	6,511
Aliens	<u>3,736</u>
	29,254

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a/ The information contained in this section is based on published reports and on information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations on 9 August 1973 for the year ending 31 December 1972.

b/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/7623/Rev.1), chap. XI, annex, paras. 7-23.

## 2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

### A. Conversations between the United Kingdom and Spain

6. As reported previously, conversations concerning the question of Gibraltar took place in London, in May 1973, between Mr. Edward Heath, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Mr. Gregorio López Bravo, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was accompanied by a senior military adviser, Lieutenant-General Díez Alegría, Chief of the Spanish General Staff. Although no joint communiqué was issued after the talks, press reports indicated that this round of talks brought the differences more to the foreground than any of the previous meetings.

7. On his return from London, Mr. López Bravo stated that the negotiations to solve the Gibraltar problem had not been broken off. The Minister went on to say that the dialogue had been postponed but it was Britain's turn "to do some thinking" and that "Spain's position in connexion with the Gibraltar problem has not changed".

8. Subsequently, in a letter dated 18 July 1973 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain set out the position of his Government on the negotiations which had taken place between the two Governments since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2429 (XXIII) of 18 December 1968. He said that, although Spain had prepared a draft of a special régime to protect the interests of the population of Gibraltar after decolonization, the United Kingdom had made no effort to find a solution. Instead, it had taken refuge in the provisions of a constitution which it had prepared and imposed for the purpose of making decolonization more difficult. It had also taken refuge in rhetorical references to the interests of a small indigenous population whose interests Spain had always borne in mind. In addition, by its continued illegal use of the "neutral zone of the isthmus" and the violation of Spanish waters and air space, the United Kingdom was posing a serious threat to the security of Spain. Since the United Kingdom had shown no willingness to negotiate and was continuing the colonial situation in Gibraltar in violation of the United Nations Charter, Spain had decided to suspend the talks with the United Kingdom. After referring to paragraph 5 of resolution 2429 (XXIII), the Chargé d'affaires said that, until Gibraltar had been decolonized, his Government would be obliged to give serious consideration to such additional steps as might be appropriate.

9. Two days later, in a speech delivered in the Spanish Cortes, Admiral Carrero-Blanco, the President of the Spanish Government, reaffirmed the wish of his Government to initiate, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, negotiations to end a protracted colonial situation and return Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty. He felt that it was up to the British to consider the suggestions which had been put to them and to bring forward some new elements so that negotiations might be possible.

10. In September 1973, during the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, further talks were held in New York on the question of Gibraltar between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Laureano López Rodó, the Spanish Foreign Minister. Following the talks, a spokesman of the United Kingdom Government said in London

that Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. López Rodó met for an hour at the United Nations, during which their discussion covered the general area of relations between Spain and the United Kingdom. The two Foreign Ministers agreed that they would keep in touch through diplomatic channels and that further meetings between the two could be arranged as necessary in the light of progress made in discussions through such diplomatic channels. Further talks between officials of the two Governments took place in Madrid on 30 and 31 May 1974.

B. Statements made by Spain and the United Kingdom at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly

11. At the 2133rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 28 September 1973, the Spanish Foreign Minister made a statement in which he said that Gibraltar was the last vestige of the colonial past in Europe. He said that Gibraltar illustrated that security, both in the global and regional sense, was improbable if one nation decided to base its own security on the insecurity of others. Mr. López Rodó said that Gibraltar more than once had exposed Spain to involvement, under direct pressures, in the great wars of the century, and that as a military base, the British colony was a strategic point which placed Spain's security in jeopardy in relation to other Powers and it prevented Spain from co-operating more effectively in Mediterranean security. The Foreign Minister recalled what he described as the General Assembly's doctrine on Gibraltar which he summarized as follows: (a) the question of Gibraltar is colonial in nature; (b) an end should be put to the colonial status through negotiation between Spain and the United Kingdom; (c) General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on decolonization, specifically paragraph 6 which considers the principles of national unity and territorial integrity as essential, applies in this case; and (d) the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar must be protected upon termination of the colonial status.

12. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister said that in order to justify its attitude on Gibraltar, the United Kingdom had attempted to use the people of Gibraltar as a screen, disregarding the fact that the 1967 referendum was rejected by the United Nations in General Assembly resolution 2353 (XXII) of 19 December 1967. When the British occupied the fortress of Gibraltar, the original Spanish population was forced to leave. This vacuum was filled over the course of years by people of different origins. Subsequently, the United Kingdom Government, through an Order in Council, had inserted clauses in the preamble of the 1969 Constitution of Gibraltar, according to which the United Kingdom could not return sovereignty over the Territory to Spain without the consent of the inhabitants, thus ignoring both the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and the United Nations resolutions. Finally, the Foreign Minister declared that Spain was willing to guarantee that once the era of colonization ends in Gibraltar, the people of Gibraltar would "enjoy a special status of legislative, judicial, administrative and financial autonomy which will respect their right to opt in matters of nationality, to their present civic rights and freedoms, their local government and their status as a free port". Spain also undertook, inter alia, "to ensure, as a minimum, the per capita income which the inhabitants may have achieved, and their annual growth expectations". In the course

of his statement, the Spanish Foreign Minister alluded to what he considered to be the position of "eminent Gibraltarians" who, on many occasions, had called for "a negotiated solution with Spain".

13. In reply to the Spanish Foreign Minister's statement, the United Kingdom representative said that his Government welcomed the improvement over the whole range of Anglo-Spanish relations in recent years and hoped that this would continue. This improvement reflected the steady expansion of the common interests of Spain and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom regretted that more rapid progress had not been made towards settling the differences over Gibraltar. He went on to say that the disagreement arose from differences of legal interpretation and that the United Kingdom had no doubt about its sovereignty over Gibraltar and its responsibility towards it.

14. The United Kingdom representative said that in so far as it had not been possible to settle the differences over Gibraltar which arose from differences in legal interpretation, his Government had made a firm offer to refer the legal differences to the International Court of Justice but the Spanish Government had not accepted it. The Gibraltar question was not a matter of a transfer of real estate; it was about people. In accordance with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Kingdom Government regarded the interests of the people of Gibraltar as paramount. If the Spanish Government could persuade the people of Gibraltar that a change in their status would be to their advantage, then the United Kingdom Government would not stand in the way. He did not believe that it was the intention of the Spanish Government that the people of Gibraltar should come under Spanish sovereignty against their will. Finally, he expressed the hope that further contacts would be continued through diplomatic channels and which would generate the necessary confidence and goodwill both of the Governments and of the peoples so that real progress could be made to settle the problem.

### 3. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

15. During the period under review, the economy of Gibraltar continued to depend largely on the entrepôt trade and re-exports, as well as on the provision of supplies to visiting ships and tourists and to the military personnel attached to the base. Apart from the dockyards and installations serving the United Kingdom naval forces, the port facilities also included a small but important commercial ship-repair yard. There were a number of relatively small industrial concerns engaged in tobacco and coffee processing and the bottling of beer, mineral waters, etc., mainly for local consumption. Other concerns were engaged in the manufacture of cotton textile goods produced mainly for export.

16. Efforts to broaden the Territory's economic base have been directed primarily towards development of tourism.

17. Information concerning imports, exports and public finance for the years 1971 and 1972 is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. c/

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c/ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XIII, annex, paras. 20-23.

#### A. United Kingdom aid to Gibraltar

18. Earlier in March 1973, the United Kingdom Government reached an agreement with the Gibraltar Government to continue its aid to the Territory. In that statement, the British Government reaffirmed its undertaking to support and sustain the people of Gibraltar, and pledged the extension of aid to Gibraltar beyond 1975, provided the need continues.

19. Speaking before the House of Assembly on 19 March 1973, Sir Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, said that during his visit to London he had proposed a third development programme, although the second development programme was intended to run until March 1976. His objective, the Chief Minister said, was to secure a commitment to aid from 1975 onwards, in order to maintain the momentum and the continuity of development, and to obtain this commitment well in advance in order to be in a position to start the necessary planning and preparation. The specific request for aid related to the sports centre. This project was included in the second development programme but could not be proceeded with because of the increased expenditure on housing.

20. As to the supplementary funds made available for additions to existing schemes, the items involved were: furniture, equipment and minor works for the comprehensive school, £64,750; furniture and equipment for St. Bernard's Hospital and the Health Centre, £38,775; Victoria Stadium, £15,000; Laguna primary school, £38,750; and housing at Catalan Bay, £7,000.

21. Finally, the Chief Minister reported to the House that it has been accepted that a review of the principles governing the disposal of surplus Ministry of Defence Lands to the Gibraltar Government would be carried forward as a matter of urgency.

#### B. Gibraltar and the European Economic Community (EEC)

22. As noted previously, d/ the inclusion of Gibraltar in EEC under article 227 (4) of the Treaty of Rome, would differ from that of the United Kingdom in that: (a) Gibraltar would be excluded from the common tariff arrangements; (b) the common agricultural policy would not apply to Gibraltar; and (c) the value-added tax would not apply to Gibraltar.

23. The Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce, which held its annual general meeting in May 1973, issued a report in which it welcomed the EEC membership, including the exemption from import tariffs and tax agreements. The report stated that settlement of EEC nationals in Gibraltar, for whatever purpose, would be limited by Trade Licencing Ordinance and/or the conditions governing residence. The report also listed the forthcoming advantages, such as free movement in Europe, harmonization of the social systems relating to employment, labour conditions, vocational trades and recourse to development funds.

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d/ Ibid., paras. 24-26.

### C. Transport and communication

24. In 1972, there were 26 miles of road in Gibraltar (19 miles in 1970) and 6,431 licensed vehicles (6,498 in 1971).

25. The Gibraltar airport is situated at North Front, approximately 1,900 yards from the town, and has a runway 2,000 yards long. Air traffic control, meteorological facilities and the maintenance and operation of the airfield are the responsibility of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Gibraltar Airways has an agreement with the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence for the handling of all civil aircraft.

26. According to press reports, the Spanish Government has decided to give priority to the building of a new airport in the Gibraltar area. It is believed that if this new airport is built, it would mean the end of the Gibraltar runway as an operational civil air base, and would result in a new threat to the economy of Gibraltar.

### D. Tourism

27. Tourism is one of the most important growing industries in the Territory. According to press reports, since the imposition of restrictions by Spain, there has been an increase in the proportion of tourists who prolong their stay in Gibraltar for periods of more than one day. According to the Minister for Tourism, Trade and Economic Development, there were 140,000 tourists who visited Gibraltar during 1972 and a quarter of this number stayed an average of 10 or 11 nights, compared with 700,000 visitors in 1964, most of whom stayed one or two nights.

## 4. SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

### A. Labour

28. On 16 May 1973 the Minister of Labour proposed to the House of Assembly a 100-per cent increase in old-age pensions, unemployment benefits and transitional retirement pensions. The proposals would increase the old-age pension to £7.10 weekly for a married couple and to £4.45 for a single person; unemployment benefits to £4 and £2.40 respectively; and transitional retirement pensions to £3.20 and £2. Pension contributions would also be increased by 88 per cent.

### B. Social security

29. According to press reports, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Gibraltar have concluded an interim agreement on social security arising out of the United Kingdom's accession to EEC.

30. It was reported that since 1 April 1973 the EEC Social Security Regulations have applied to Gibraltar as they do to the United Kingdom. However, as the Regulations apply only between member States and, for the purposes of EEC, Gibraltar

is part of the United Kingdom, it has been considered necessary to enter into a bilateral reciprocal agreement in order to avoid the anomalous situation that the rights available under the Regulations to other EEC nationals would not apply to persons moving between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar and vice versa.

31. The purpose of the agreement, it was reported, was to apply the EEC Regulations, other than for family allowances, to employed persons and to certain social security beneficiaries who move between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. This would enable them to treat their residence in one country as residence in the other for the purpose of receiving old-age and survivor's benefit. It also means that where contributions paid under the legislation of one country are insufficient to establish title or pay maximum benefits under that legislation, contributions which may have been paid under the legislation of the other country may be taken into account. Furthermore, it is said that although the agreement excluded the operation of the provisions of the EEC Regulations on family allowances, it provided for presence in one country to be treated as presence in the other for this purpose. Prior to the agreement, Gibraltarians staying in the United Kingdom for more than six months had had to wait a further six months after their return to Gibraltar to re-qualify for family allowances. With the agreement, they would be able to draw the allowances immediately on return. There was also provision for a person from one country, who claims family allowance in the other, to benefit from any more favourable qualifying conditions which might apply to persons born in the country where the claim is made.

#### C. Health care agreement

32. During a visit to the United Kingdom in October 1973 by the Minister for Medical Services, an agreement was reached for Gibraltar to have reciprocal arrangements for health care with the United Kingdom. Citizens of the United Kingdom temporarily resident in Gibraltar would be entitled to health care in Gibraltar on the same conditions as citizens of Gibraltar. Likewise citizens of Gibraltar temporarily resident in the United Kingdom would be entitled to health care in the United Kingdom on the same conditions as the people of the United Kingdom.

33. The agreement shall not apply to persons who go from one country to the other for the express purpose of benefiting from the agreement except that, where a citizen of Gibraltar is in need of hospital care for which adequate facilities do not exist in Gibraltar, he shall receive that hospital care in the United Kingdom on the same conditions as people of the United Kingdom. The provisions for citizens of Gibraltar to receive hospital treatment in the United Kingdom shall apply to no more than 40 patients in any period of a year. Any expenses incurred under the agreement shall be borne by the Government of the country in which they arise.

34. In 1973, it was reported that the Government of Gibraltar had awarded 17 of the 19 scholarships which were available for teacher-training courses at colleges in the United Kingdom. Fourteen scholarships were awarded in 1972, compared with 10 in 1971 and 9 in 1970. It was estimated that the cost of the 19 scholarships would amount to £20,000.

CHAPTER XIV  
(A/9623/Add.4 (Part II))

FRENCH SOMALILAND

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	1 - 3	224
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	4	224
ANNEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT . . . . .		225



## CHAPTER XIV

### FRENCH SOMALILAND 1/

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of French Somaliland at its 981st meeting on 5 September 1974.
2. In its consideration of the Territory, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, by paragraph 11 of which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session". The Committee also took into account the decision taken by the General Assembly on 14 December 1973 concerning the question of French Somaliland. 2/
3. During its consideration of the Territory, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on the latest developments concerning the Territory.

#### B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

4. At its 981st meeting, on 5 September, following a statement by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.981), the Special Committee decided, without objection, to transmit to the General Assembly the working paper referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to facilitate consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee and, subject to any directives that the General Assembly might give in that connexion at its twenty-ninth session, to give consideration to the item at its next session.

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1/ Note by the Rapporteur: Terminology Bulletin No. 240 issued by the Secretariat on 15 April 1968 (ST/SC/SER.F/240) reads as follows:

"The new name of the Territory formerly known as French Somaliland is: French Territory of the Afars and the Issas ...

"This designation, which is being introduced at the request of the administering Power, should be used in all documents with the exception of those records of texts in which the speaker or author has used a different terminology."

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/9030), p. 111.

Annex\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
1. General . . . . .	1 - 3
2. Constitutional and political developments . . . . .	4 - 33
3. Economic conditions . . . . .	34 - 41
4. Social conditions . . . . .	42 - 45
5. Educational conditions . . . . .	46 - 47

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.963.

## FRENCH SOMALILAND a/

### 1. GENERAL

1. Situated on the east coast of Africa between 39°30' and 41° east longitude and between 11° and 12°30' north latitude, French Somaliland covers an area of 23,000 square kilometres (8,900 square miles), most of which is desert or semi-desert. The Territory has common frontiers with Ethiopia to the north, west and south-west, and with Somalia to the south. Its coastline is about 800 kilometres in length and runs from Ras Doumeira in the north to Loyada in the south. The terrain consists mostly of volcanic plateaus, bordered in places by sunken plains and lakes, some of which, Lakes Assal and Alol, for example, are below sea level. The Territory has no permanent surface watercourse. The climate is very hot during the major part of the year, averaging 85° Fahrenheit at Djibouti, the capital. Humidity is high near the coast but decreases in the interior. Precipitation is scarce and irregular, averaging less than 127 millimetres (5 inches) annually.

2. The population is divided into the following four major groups: Afars or Danakil, comprising the Adohyammara and the Asahyammara; Issas, a Somali group comprising the Abgals, the Dalols and the Wardiqs; Arabs, chiefly of Yemeni and Saudi Arabian origin; and Europeans.

3. According to Le Réveil de Djibouti of 11 March 1967, b/ the total population in March of that year was estimated to number 125,050 persons, classified as follows:

Issas	58,240
Afars	48,270
Europeans and <u>assimilés</u>	10,255
Arabs	<u>8,285</u>
Total	125,050

Of these, 28,430 Issas, 1,700 Afars, 2,600 Europeans and 5,120 Arabs were said to be classified as foreigners.

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a/ The new designation of the Territory is "French Territory of the Afars and the Issas". See Terminology Bulletin No. 240 (ST/CS/SER.F/240) issued by the Secretariat on 15 April 1968. For detailed information concerning this change, see also Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/7200/Rev.1), chap. XV, annex, paras. 6 and 7. The information contained in this section has been derived from published sources.

b/ As quoted by V. Thompson and R. Adloff in Djibouti and the Horn of Africa (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press), p. 36.

## 2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

### A. Constitutional status of the Territory

4. The constitutional arrangements of the Territory are described in detail in an earlier report of the Special Committee. c/ It will be recalled that, following the referendum of 19 March 1967, the Act of 3 July 1967 altered the status of the Territory, which became an overseas Territory within the French Republic possessing a legal personality and financial autonomy. The Act defines the functions of the Government Council and the Chamber of Deputies, and sets out the powers of the High Commissioner (who represents the French Republic), which are limited to external relations, defence, law and order, control of immigration, currency, justice and radio and television.

5. The Chamber of Deputies has 40 members elected by universal direct suffrage for a term of five years. The staff of the Permanent Commission of the Chamber of Deputies has nine members; the ministers forming the Government Council are also nine in number. d/

6. The Chamber of Deputies holds two regular sessions each year and is convened by the President of the Government Council. It can also be convened in special session.

7. The members of the Government Council are elected by the Chamber of Deputies from among their own members.

8. France is represented by a High Commissioner, who is assisted by a deputy. The High Commissioner promulgates the laws and decrees after informing the Government Council, which ensures their execution. Decisions of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Government Council must be communicated to the High Commissioner before being published or implemented. The High Commissioner may request the Minister for Overseas Territories to annul acts of the territorial authorities. Matters not specifically listed as within the competence of the Chamber of Deputies or the Government Council are within the competence of the French Republic (see para. 4 above). The Territory is represented in the French National Assembly and the French Economic and Social Council.

9. For administrative purposes, French Somaliland is divided into the district of Djibouti and the cercles of Dikhil, Ali Sabieh, Tadjourah and Obock. The Territory's judicial organs are a High Court of Appeals, a Court of First Instance at Djibouti and a number of customary courts.

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c/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), vol. III, chap. XI, annex, paras. 8 et seq.

d/ The membership of these bodies was enlarged in 1972. See ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XIV, annex, paras. 9 et seq.

## B. Elections

10. On 18 November 1973, elections were held to choose the 40 members of the new Chamber of Deputies. Of the Territory's 47,376 registered voters, 72.4 per cent of the electorate was officially reported to have voted. The lists sponsored by Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan, the President of the Government Council, namely Union et Progrès dans l'ensemble français and the Regroupement Issas dans l'ensemble français, received 26,855 votes, representing nearly 75 per cent of those cast, against 8,536 for the other lists. The government party won all 40 seats in the Chamber. In the outgoing Chamber, which had only 32 seats, the opposition Ligue Populaire Africaine (LPA), had had 2 votes.

11. On election day, an incident was reported at the polling station in the second ward of Djibouti. According to the government paper Le Réveil de Djibouti, two members of LPA struck the person in charge of the polling station as the voting got under way, causing him injuries.

## C. "Irregularities" in the electoral campaign and the electoral process denounced by the opposition

12. During the electoral campaign, the opposition alleged that there were a number of irregularities. For example, obstacles had reportedly been placed on certain roads thereby preventing opposition candidates from gaining access to some constituencies. When the election results were announced, LPA, which had failed to obtain a single seat, denounced the electoral irregularities perpetrated in various ways such as "control", "padding the ballot box", "refusal to inscribe candidates on the opposition list", and the use of an electoral system involving election by an absolute majority in a single round of voting.

13. "Control" is described as a system whereby each ethnic group has a separate polling station. Thus, a large number of French military personnel and their families were reportedly able to vote in a single constituency to defeat a candidate for the opposition. By padding the vote, the presidents of the polling stations, all of whom were Europeans, allegedly use the ballot papers which had not been distributed to vote for governmental candidates. Another alleged irregularity was the refusal to inscribe candidates on the opposition list. As a result, over one fourth of the deputies were elected on a single ballot. Lastly, it was maintained that the electoral procedure, involving an "absolute majority in a single round of voting", had enabled a minority government candidate in a constituency to defeat the opposition which had a majority but was divided.

14. These "irregularities" were confirmed by Mr. Florian, the representative of the Governing Committee of the French Socialist Party, who was in the Territory from 15 to 19 November 1973. He reported on several matters which, in his view, justified an appeal for annulment before the French Council of State.

15. In the same constituency where, according to Mr. Florian, Mr. Hassan Gouled-Aptidon, leader of the opposition, was defeated by only

200 votes by the government candidate, military personnel recently arrived from France with their families (350 persons) took part in the vote, although the majority of them did not live within the boundaries of the constituency.

16. Mr. Florian also reported the following events, which allegedly took place in the districts of Dikhil and Tadjourah and Obock: in a polling station at Galafi, an assessor withdrew with a ballot box because a member of the opposition had apparently surprised someone in the process of padding the ballot box the night before the elections. Many of those inscribed on the electoral roll were not able to obtain their voting cards. In Tadjourah and Obock, the opposition list was refused its deposit receipt. Of the 9,500 persons inscribed on the electoral roll for that district, Mr. Florian noted that 5,000 were prevented from voting because they did not have their cards. Lastly, Mr. Florian confirmed that all of the presidents of the polling stations were Europeans.

17. Mr. Gaston Defferre, French Socialist Deputy, drew the following to the attention of the Minister for Overseas Departments and Territories. According to Mr. Defferre, several reports confirmed that local, territorial and French authorities had set up blockades throughout the Territory. The Djibouti-Tadjourah road via Assal lake was apparently completely cut off, sea traffic was interrupted and interurban telephone communications were cut. Mr. Defferre claimed that these steps made it impossible for the opposition to express its ideas and to publicize its programme and thus to participate in the electoral campaign. In conclusion, he asked the French Government to inform him of the reasons for "these administrative practices which are so divorced from constitutionality and democracy".

18. As a result of the elections of 18 November, Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan was reelected as President of the new, nine-member Government Council.

#### D. Situation in the Territory according to the liberation movements

19. In an interview published in Révolution Africaine of Algiers (22-28 June 1973), Mr. Aden Roble Awalé, Secretary-General of the Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS), said that France told the world that the people of French Somaliland wished to remain French with broad internal autonomy within the French system. In fact, according to Mr. Awalé, France remained in French Somaliland by the use of violence; some examples of that violence mentioned in the interview are given below.

20. Mr. Awalé said that the French expeditionary force at Djibouti consisted of 20,000 men, most of whom were members of the Foreign Legion. The French parachutists who had left Algeria in 1962 had been transferred immediately to Djibouti where France had established a large military air base (Base N.1-88) and an important naval base. A "security" system had been installed at Djibouti, which was surrounded by electrified barbed wire, with sentries every 100 metres and anti-personnel mine fields. Inhabitants of other areas could enter Djibouti

only after being thoroughly checked. According to Mr. Awalé, the barrier was inhuman because it separated people belonging to the same family living in the same Territory under the same administration. The FLCS leader went on to say:

"The refusal to conduct a census is another form of repression. People have no identity papers and then they are told they are breaking the rules. Repression also takes the form of inhuman deportation measures. France deports anyone who professes radical nationalist beliefs. People are expelled across the borders in the middle of the night. It is estimated that more than 30,000 people have been expelled in this way. In Djibouti there are more prisons than schools. At present, 11,000 people are being held in detention."

21. It will be recalled that the aim of FLCS, which was established in 1963, is to lead the Somali people to complete independence and national sovereignty. The FLCS holds a congress every two years. It elects a Central Committee of 19 members, who in turn elect an Executive Committee of 9 members. In June 1973, the Algerian authorities agreed in principle that FLCS should be represented at Algiers.

22. According to its Secretary-General, FLCS is preparing for an armed struggle, which is expected to begin in the fairly near future. He said that armed struggle was the only course open to FLCS since the President of the French Republic had declared at Djibouti that France was determined to remain in the Territory "by force".

23. Mr. Ahmed Bourhan Amar, Secretary-General of the Mouvement de Libération de Djibouti (MLD), stated on 18 November 1973 that his organization would seek by every possible means to liberate the Territory from the French colonial administration. He said that MLD was in the process of training freedom fighters, who would lead the armed struggle for the independence of the Territory if peaceful means did not suffice. The MLD, whose headquarters are situated at Dirédawa (Ethiopia), has nominated candidates for the election of the 40 members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Territory. According to Mr. Amar, a victory for MLD would help to persuade France to grant independence to the Territory.

#### E. Strategic importance of the Territory

24. Although the Territory has few mineral and agricultural resources, its geographical position is important. Of a total population of roughly 125,000, approximately 85,000 live in Djibouti, from which the Territory derives its strategic and economic importance. Djibouti is one of the best equipped ports in the region, has an airport of international standing and has been the terminus since 1917 of a railway linking Addis Ababa to the Red Sea. When asked whether Djibouti was to become a communications link from 1974 onwards, Mr. Xavier Deniau, the former State Secretary for Overseas Departments and Territories, replied that France would be setting up a very large airport at which Air France Boeing 747s would land en route to South Africa, Australia and the Indian Ocean.

25. The strategic importance of the Djibouti naval base was emphasized by Mr. Bourhan when he stated that from the Djibouti base the French Navy could control the cross-road between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. He also stated that a French presence in the Bab al Mandab Strait was essential. Mr. Bourhan accordingly went to Paris in July 1973 to request that the French troops withdrawn from Madagascar should be sent to Djibouti.

26. According to an article published in the Revue française d'Etudes politiques africaines of February 1973, political equilibrium, both in the Middle East and in East Africa, required the maintenance of the status quo in the Red Sea. Moreover, according to the same article, the status of the Territory was a matter of concern not only to the neighbouring States but also to all the great Powers, in so far as it ensured the maintenance of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

27. Mr. Awalé, the Secretary-General of FLCS, stated in an interview published in Révolution Africaine (see also para. 19 above) that, strategically, Djibouti enabled France to control the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. He added that "cultural" interests were making Djibouti a bridge-head for spreading the "French presence" throughout East Africa.

#### F. Action by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

28. It will be recalled that, during his visit to Djibouti in January 1973, Mr. Georges Pompidou, the late President of the French Republic, stated that the purpose of his journey was to assure the people of the Territory that the presence of the French Republic would not be questioned. e/ Mr. Pompidou's official visit to OAU headquarters, which he had been scheduled to make while he was in Addis Ababa, was cancelled at the last moment.

29. Several weeks later, on 17-18 May 1973, the Council of Ministers of OAU met in regular session at Addis Ababa. In his report to the Council, Mr. Nzo Ekan Ngaki, Secretary-General of OAU, denounced the French presence in Djibouti. A dozen years earlier, according to the Secretary-General, France had been in the forefront of the processes of historical change, recognizing the independence of the African countries which it had formerly administered. Why, he asked, did it now feel the need to make a forceful affirmation of its intention to remain in Djibouti, which had no political or economic importance whatever for France?

30. In its resolution CM/Res.303 (XXI), the Council of Ministers of OAU condemned the violent repressive measures perpetrated by the French colonial authorities against the people of the Territory. The Council appealed to all

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e/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9023/Rev.1), chap. XIV, annex, para. 20.



States to intensify their moral, diplomatic, political and material assistance to the liberation movements of the Territories under French domination to enable them to pursue their struggle for complete freedom and independence. In that connexion, a minister of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania subsequently announced, on 22 October 1973, that the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa had just granted the sum of 540,000 Tanzanian shillings to FLCS and MLD.

#### G. Reaction in Djibouti and Paris

31. The pronouncements by OAU and its Administrative Secretary-General were received with expressions of disapproval by the local authorities in Djibouti and by the French authorities.

32. On 22 May 1973, Mr. Bourhan, the President of the Government Council, made a request to President Pompidou that the French protest on behalf of the Territory the statements of the Secretary-General of OAU, which Mr. Bourhan regarded as contrary to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries proclaimed by OAU and the United Nations.

33. On 23 May 1973, a French government spokesman stated that, in the view of Mr. Pierre Messmer, the Prime Minister of France, the peoples of the Territory had indicated on a number of occasions their desire to remain French. It was therefore not the business of a foreigner to decide what position they should take.

### 3. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

#### A. Trade

34. At the opening of the budgetary session on 30 November 1973, the President of the Government Council stated that 1973 had been marked by natural disasters, including the serious earthquake in late March and early April and the repercussions of the widespread drought affecting the entire Sahelian zone of Africa. The damage caused by the earthquake was estimated at several hundred million Djibouti francs.<sup>f/</sup> An initial grant from the metropolitan country of DF 106 million had made it possible to finance emergency measures. The Territory's financial situation, consistently precarious since the closing of the Suez Canal, had thus proved particularly disquieting in 1973.

35. With regard to activities in the commercial port, receipts from transit traffic in goods totalled DF 73.2 million as against a projected figure of DF 75.6 million. Traffic for the Territory was slightly higher than had been estimated, totalling DF 73.6 million as against a projection of DF 72.0 million.

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<sup>f/</sup> One Djibouti franc (DF) equals approximately 0.026 French francs.

36. By 30 September 1973, 716 vessels had called at the port, representing 3.4 million net tons (772 vessels and 4.0 million tons in September 1972). Receipts totalled only DF 35.4 million, compared with a projected figure of DF 42.0 million. However, the increased traffic in hydrocarbons had offset the decline in bunkering activities. Actual receipts from this traffic amounted to DF 48.0 million, compared with the estimated figure of DF 43.5 million.

37. With regard to port facilities, the major developments in 1973 were the completion of the new access road linking the port directly with the commercial sector of the customs-free zone and the beginning of construction of additional berthing facilities in the south harbor, undertaken with a grant of DF 88.0 thousand million from the European Development Fund.

#### B. Transport and communications

38. As concerns the road infrastructure, the asphaltting of the Djibouti-Dikhil highway was completed, work was begun on the Tadjourah-Randa-Le-Day road and various improvements were made on the Loyada road. Expenditure on the Dikhil road and on the survey concerning its extension to the Addis Ababa-Assab road in Ethiopia amounted to DF 53 million.

39. It was announced from Paris that a small ministerial council had met on 20 November 1973 to consider the situation in the Territory. The Council had decided to give priority to the repair and improvement of the Djibouti port installations, which had been partially destroyed by an earthquake. Following the meeting of the Council, Mr. Bernard Stasi, Minister for Overseas Departments and Territories, announced: "The reopening of the Suez Canal is approaching, and the Djibouti port must be in a position to play its part as effectively as possible, as soon as possible". The Minister also indicated that a contract for the entire length of Djibouti-Addis Ababa road was about to be concluded and that the first kilometres would be built in the coming months. The cost of the road was estimated at 60 million French francs.

40. With regard to telecommunications, a telephone line concentrator was put into operation at Ambouli, a VHF radio-telephone link was established between Djibouti and Obock and a carrier current link was established with Ali-Sabieh. The Posts and Telecommunications Office plans the construction in 1974 of a building to house Djibouti's future automatic telephone exchange, which will have a capacity of 4,000 lines, or 2,500 more than the present exchange.

#### C. Agriculture

41. The Department of Agriculture continued, as for several years past, to encourage nomads to settle in the areas suitable for farming. As regards the agricultural infrastructure, two agricultural stations were built in 1973, at Obock and As-Eyla. At the same time, assistance for the development and upkeep of gardens in Djibouti was continued.

#### 4. SOCIAL CONDITIONS

##### A. Public health

42. In the area of public health, efforts were focused on the sectors concerned with tuberculosis control, rural medicine, hygiene and medical care. With regard to tuberculosis control, an 8 per cent increase in the number of cases detected and treated and a 30 per cent increase in the number of persons who received BCG vaccine were reported. Work continued on the equipping of medical centres at Dikhil (46 beds) and Tadjourah (56 beds).

##### B. Labour

43. During the first 10 months of 1973, 391 individual labour disputes were referred to the Inspectorate of Labour. Of this number, 300 were reportedly settled amicably. These settlements resulted in the payment of DF 14 million to the workers involved.

44. Salaried workers are paid a guaranteed minimum wage, which was increased by 37.5 per cent during the year under review. A system of paid leave is also in effect in the Territory. In May 1973, the number of calendar days of paid leave was increased from 21 to 28 days.

45. Vocational training has also been introduced and provision has been made for the training of personnel in the following trades: hotel trade, 16 trainees; automobile repair, 14 trainees; and refrigeration, installation and maintenance, 14 trainees.

#### 5. EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

46. The number of pupils attending schools increased from 9,500 in 1972/73 to 10,500 in 1973/74, a 13 per cent increase over last year. The increase was confined mainly to the public schools. Primary school enrolment increased from 6,200 to 7,000. Enrolment in the first class in secondary schools rose from 190 in 1972 to 360 in 1973.

47. It was reported that in 1973, DF 249 million had been allocated for the operating costs for elementary education in the Territory, and DF 35.8 million for investment.

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