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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The report contains the proposed resource requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen for 2016, amounting to \$6,932,900 (net of staff assessment).



Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

(\$6,932,900)

Background, mandate and objective

1. Since the beginning of the uprising in Yemen early in 2011, the Secretary-General has used his good offices to promote peace and stability through dialogue and negotiations. In its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015) and 2216 (2015), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue and to intensify his good offices role. The Council receives regular briefings on Yemen in accordance with the current 60-day reporting cycle reaffirmed by the Council in its resolution 2201 (2015).
2. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions 2014 (2011) and 2051 (2012), together with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism signed in Riyadh on 23 November 2011 and facilitated by his Special Adviser, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012 ([S/2012/469](#) and [S/2012/470](#)). As requested by the Yemeni sides, the Office supported the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative through continuing political mediation and facilitation efforts and by promoting the inclusive participation of all constituencies, including previously excluded and marginalized groups, such as youth movements, women's groups, the Hiraak Southern movement and the Houthis movement.
3. With the support and facilitation of the United Nations, and after six months of preparation and ten months of deliberation, on 25 January 2014 the 565 delegates representing all constituencies of the National Dialogue Conference adopted by consensus a final report that provided a blueprint for the creation of a new federal State underpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, national reconciliation and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people of Yemen. After the Conference, the transition moved to the next stage through the establishment of a constitution drafting committee. That body, tasked with drafting a new constitution on the basis of the final report of the Conference, finalized a first draft with support from United Nations constitutional experts.
4. The overall progress made in the political transition notwithstanding, the situation in Yemen has since seen dramatic changes. Continuing conflict between the Houthis, other armed groups and government forces intensified and, in September 2014, the Houthis seized control of the capital, Sana'a. While the Special Adviser brokered an agreement that brought immediate violent confrontations to an end, the Houthis nonetheless persisted in consolidating their control over Sana'a and elsewhere and, in fact, further escalated the situation by continuing to expand into new territory.
5. In January 2015, the President and the Prime Minister tendered their resignations and were placed under house arrest, sparking a political crisis. The Special Adviser facilitated rounds of inclusive negotiations in an attempt to resolve the political impasse and to find a consensus solution in accordance with the Gulf

Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and relevant Security Council resolutions. The situation became more complicated in February 2015, when the President escaped house arrest to Aden, rescinded his resignation and subsequently fled to Saudi Arabia where he reconstituted the Government in exile.

6. At the request of the President, a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes on Houthi and Houthi-allied positions on 26 March 2015. Concurrently, ground fighting in Yemen intensified and spread, triggering a humanitarian emergency.

7. Meanwhile, the Security Council, in its resolution 2216 (2015), requested the Secretary-General to intensify his good offices role in order to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition process.

8. To that end, a new special envoy was appointed at the Under-Secretary-General level. He visited the region, including Yemen, several times to engage closely with all sides. He arranged for the initial Yemeni consultations in Geneva from 15 to 19 June 2015 and has subsequently continued his efforts aimed at returning Yemen to a peaceful path.

Cooperation with other entities

9. The Department of Political Affairs is responsible for providing administrative and substantive support to the Office of the Special Envoy. Within the Department, the Middle East and West Asia Division is the principal entity that provides backstopping support.

10. The Policy and Mediation Division, the Electoral Assistance Division and other divisions also provide assistance to the Office as appropriate. The Department of Field Support provides administrative support relating to the Office in Yemen. Advice on safety and security for the Office, as well as for other United Nations entities in Yemen, is regularly obtained from the Department of Safety and Security. The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and other United Nations offices in the region provide support through the provision of close protection security officers to supplement the existing close protection team, on an ad hoc, cost-reimbursable basis, if a surge in these requirements occurs. The Kuwait Joint Support Office deals with human resource transactions.

11. In fulfilling its tasks, the Office of the Special Envoy works closely with United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes, as well as the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Yemen. System-wide information-sharing and coordination at the working and senior levels is organized through meetings of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen.

12. In implementing the Secretary-General's good offices role, the Special Envoy and his Office engage closely with Member States and the Security Council, as well as international and regional organizations, including the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other international partners.

13. Work on the draft constitution, electoral reform and other transition tasks are conducted in close coordination with the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team, including the United Nations Development Programme, which is providing technical and logistical support for the electoral process.

Performance information

14. The establishment of the mission in Yemen in mid-2012 has enabled the launch of the transition process through political facilitation, monitoring and the provision of technical expertise.

15. An important achievement was the successful conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference in January 2014 with the adoption of a final report signed by all constituencies. It established the framework and principles for the creation of a new federal and democratic State and allowed the constitution-making process to begin. The Constitution Drafting Committee began its work with a retreat in March 2014, with support from United Nations constitutional experts. With the facilitation and mediation efforts of the Special Envoy, the Committee reached consensus on a first draft of the new constitution in late December 2014.

16. The finalization of a first draft notwithstanding, many hurdles await before the constitution can be put forward for adoption, including review and approval by the national body for oversight of the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes. In addition, public consultations to ensure broad popular participation and transparency need to be undertaken. Extensive political debate can be expected on several constitutional issues, such as federalism, before a final draft can be agreed upon and the constitution adopted. This will require intensive mediation efforts.

17. The tasks outlined above will need to be carried out as soon as the military confrontations come to an end and the situation stabilizes in order to allow for the continuation of the political transition.

18. With a view to promoting a peaceful resolution of the conflict, the Special Envoy is continuing his mediation efforts in order to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the people.

Planning assumptions for 2016

19. It is expected that the engagement of the Security Council will remain active and high, including regular reporting requirements to the Council (every 60 days). The reports are presented to the Council by the Special Envoy, and, given the expected challenges to the political transition, frequent ad hoc briefings by the Special Envoy can be anticipated.

20. In the light of the continuing crisis in Yemen, the transition timetable has encountered inevitable delays. Many of the remaining transition tasks, including broad and fully inclusive public consultations on the draft constitution, the adoption of the constitution, reform of State structures to prepare for the transition from a unitary to a federal State, electoral reform and general elections, are now expected to be accomplished after the hostilities are over.

21. The membership of the national body for oversight of the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes is expected to be reconstituted in order to ensure fair representation of the constituencies that participated in the Conference. It would review and approve the draft constitution that could then be expected to be put to a referendum in the second half of 2016. On the basis of that constitution, new electoral laws are foreseen, leading to general elections to complete the transition period.

22. Yemen is in the middle of a complex civil war and political crisis. Humanitarian partners are concerned about a possible continuation of the conflict and its impact on the civilian population. The increased political instability and risk of conflict may also complicate humanitarian efforts to develop durable solutions and sustainable livelihoods and to facilitate the country's progress towards recovery.

23. The Office will retain its presence in Yemen to maintain regular engagement with all political stakeholders and the United Nations country team, to lead the coordination of international assistance to the transition, in particular the constitution-making and electoral reform processes, and to lead United Nations assistance to create mechanisms on ceasefires and the disengagement and withdrawal of armed groups from various provinces, as well as on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform.

24. In the light of the dynamic political environment and the regular reporting cycle to the Security Council in accordance with its resolutions, the Special Envoy will continue to be based in New York, supported by a small number of staff, to maintain regular and close contact with Member States and, in particular, with the members of the Council.

25. The Special Envoy will travel regularly to Yemen and to the region to maintain close contact with all stakeholders, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Government, all political parties, the Houthis, the Southern Hiraak movement and other key stakeholders, including women's groups, young people and civil society.

26. The need for the Special Envoy to engage frequently with regional actors will remain and is likely to grow. Regular visits to the region are expected, including to Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi, and to other capitals, including Washington, D.C., Moscow, Brussels and London, in support of international engagement and coordination.

27. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures of the Office are set out below.

Table 1

Objective: To support the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, contributing to peace, stability and development in Yemen

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(a) Progress in achieving transitional justice and national reconciliation	<p>(a) Increased number of policy initiatives or legislative measures that advance transitional justice and national reconciliation</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>Actual 2014: 0</p> <p>Estimate 2015: 0</p> <p>Target 2016: 3</p>

(b) Progress towards conditions conducive for the holding of inclusive and participatory general elections

(b) (i) Percentage of voters registered under the new voter registry system

Performance measures

Actual 2014: 1 district with a voting-age population of 20,000, through a pilot project

Estimate 2015: no change

Target 2016: 70 per cent

(ii) Electoral commission fully functional

Performance measures

Actual 2014: established and functional

Estimate 2015: established and functional

Target 2016: reconstituted with improved capacity

(iii) Increased percentage of electoral legislation adopted in compliance with international standards and National Dialogue Conference outcomes

Performance measures

Actual 2014: 0 per cent

Estimate 2015: 25 per cent

Target 2016: 60 per cent

(iv) Number of consultations and engagement with civil society and political parties on electoral issues

Performance measures

Actual 2014: 10

Estimate 2015: 5

Target 2016: 20

(c) Progress towards the adoption of a new constitution

(c) Phases of the constitution-making process completed

Performance measures

Actual 2014: 0

Estimate 2015: first draft of the constitution finalized and submitted to the national body for oversight of the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes and to the President

Target 2016: after public consultations, final draft of the constitution submitted to the national body and to the President

Outputs

- Regular engagement and consultations with the Yemeni authorities and other stakeholders on all issues relating to the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism (100)
- Regular engagement and consultation with relevant Member States and regional organizations, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (50)
- Technical support for the general secretariat of the Constitution Drafting Committee, including support for media initiatives to build public awareness of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and constitution-making process (1)
- Briefings by the Special Envoy to the Security Council (6) and other relevant bodies, including the Friends of Yemen (2) and donors (2-3)
- Provision of technical assistance to the Government, civil society and other relevant actors, upon request and in close coordination with other relevant parts of the United Nations system, to support transition needs, including facilitation of intra-constituency meetings (10) and workshops (5)

External factors

28. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that the current hostilities come to an end, security conditions are conducive to the implementation of the mandate, there is political will, support and engagement from the various stakeholders and there is continued support from the international community.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 2

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category</i>	<i>2014-2015</i>			<i>Requirements for 2016</i>		<i>Total requirements for 2015</i>	<i>Variance, 2015-2016</i>
	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Estimated expenditure</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Non-recurrent</i>		
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)=(1)-(2)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>	<i>(6)</i>	<i>(7)=(4)-(6)</i>
Civilian personnel costs	5 786.9	6 050.6	(263.7)	4 007.6	–	3 464.5	543.1
Operational costs	4 757.5	4 376.9	380.6	2 925.3	168.0	1 887.8	1 037.5
Total	10 544.4	10 427.5	116.9	6 932.9	168.0	5 352.3	1 580.6

Table 3
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>			
Approved 2015	–	1	–	1	3	2	3	–	10	12	1	23	1	10	–	34
Proposed 2016	1	–	1	–	4	5	3	–	14	13	1	28	2	9	–	39
Change	1	(1)	1	(1)	1	3	–	–	4	1	–	5	1	(1)	–	5

29. The anticipated unencumbered balance for 2014-2015 is attributable primarily to the escalation of the political and security situation, which resulted in the non-utilization of planned consultancies and reduced communications requirements, partly offset by higher-than-budgeted expenditure for staff costs and increased costs for official travel and air transportation owing to increased diplomatic efforts and the non-availability of commercial flights to Sana'a.

30. The estimated requirements for the Office for 2016 amount to \$6,932,900 (net of staff assessment) and provide for civilian personnel costs (\$4,007,600) for 39 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 4 P-5, 5 P-4, 3 P-3, 13 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 2 National Professional Officer and 9 Local level), applying a vacancy rate of 26 per cent for international staff, 0 per cent for National Professional Officers and 10 per cent for Local level staff, as well as operational costs (\$2,925,300), comprising official travel (\$1,135,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$659,800), ground transportation (\$53,800), air transportation (\$492,800), communications (\$260,700), information technology (\$169,300) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$153,900).

31. The proposed number of positions for the Office for 2016 is 39. The Office, based in New York, would comprise five positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)). The Political Support Office, based in Sana'a, would comprise 10 positions (1 D-2, 3 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 National Professional Officer, 1 Field Service and 1 Local level). Mission support services would be provided from Sana'a and comprise 10 positions (1 P-4, 1 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer and 7 Local level). The Safety and Security Section, based in Sana'a, would comprise 13 positions (1 P-3, 11 Field Service and 1 Local level). Backstopping in the Department of Political Affairs would comprise a P-4 position, based in New York.

32. In 2016, a net increase of five positions is proposed for the Office. The proposed changes include the following:

(a) The regularization of the upgrade of the position of Special Envoy to the Under-Secretary-General level, given the increasing complexity of anticipated developments in Yemen, in addition to the changes in both the substance and scope of his role pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2201 (2015) and 2216 (2015);

(b) The reclassification of the position of Principal Political Affairs Officer (D-1) to the position of Director (D-2) in Sana'a, owing to the elevated level of

responsibility stemming from the revised role of the Special Envoy, as requested by the Security Council in its resolutions 2201 (2015) and 2216 (2015). The Special Envoy requires increased high-level support in the country and the region to facilitate negotiations for moving forward and completing the political transition process. The Director will be required to support the Special Envoy in maintaining close engagement with the Government and regional stakeholders at the senior level. In addition, the Director will support the Special Envoy in his efforts to establish a comprehensive ceasefire and create mechanisms for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as security sector reform, in addition to undertaking the day-to-day management of the operations in Sana'a;

(c) The establishment of a position of Senior Security Sector Reform Officer (P-5) in Sana'a to advise the Special Envoy and support his efforts to facilitate an agreement between the parties to the conflict on a comprehensive ceasefire and the implementation of relevant security-related provisions of Security Council resolutions 2201 (2015) and 2216 (2015), as well as any other agreements reached by the parties;

(d) The establishment of a position of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer (P-4) in Sana'a to provide the expertise and capacity necessary to advise the Special Envoy on strategies to reduce violent conflict, including through comprehensive and/or geographically specific ceasefire agreements, interim security arrangements and the creation of mechanisms for ceasefire monitoring, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;

(e) The establishment of a position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) in New York to ensure appropriate Headquarters-level backstopping support to the Office in fulfilment of its strengthened and expanded role under Security Council resolutions 2201 (2015) and 2216 (2015), as well as the effective coordination between the Office and the Middle East and West Asia Division and other relevant divisions of the Department of Political Affairs;

(f) The establishment of a position of Administrative Officer (P-4) in Sana'a to strengthen the operational capacity of the Office by assuming overall responsibility for the provision of comprehensive mission support services and ensure the necessary level of leadership, including coordination with relevant Headquarters and regional and local counterparts;

(g) The redeployment of a position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from Sana'a to New York, given the escalation of the conflict and the need to liaise even more closely with the members of the Security Council and other interested or relevant stakeholders in New York, including United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes;

(h) The establishment of a position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) in Sana'a to support the Political Support Office through the provision of a wide range of office support and administrative functions, including coordination and communication with relevant counterparts within the Organization and regional partners;

(i) The establishment of a position of Finance and Budget Officer (National Professional Officer) and the abolishment of a position of Finance and Budget Assistant (Local level) in Sana'a, in view of the increased complexity of mission support requirements and based on lessons learned;

(j) The establishment of a position of Public Information Assistant (Local level) and the abolishment of a position of Research Assistant (Local level) in Sana'a, to reflect the Office's focus on monitoring, analysing and responding to information requirements with regard to local media outlets.

33. The variance between the proposed resources for 2016 and the approved budget for 2015 is attributable mainly to the proposed increase in the number and level of positions, the new requirement for air transportation services in the light of the unavailability of commercial flights to Sana'a and the increased travel requirements, partly offset by discontinued requirements for consultants.

Extrabudgetary resources

34. In 2015, extrabudgetary resources of approximately \$600,000 have been used to support the Office to execute the complex support functions (administrative, human resource and programme management) necessary to support the political transition, including follow-up to the national dialogue process and the constitution-making and electoral reform processes. For 2016, extrabudgetary resources are being sought from donors, but there have been no commitments to date.
