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REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(covering its work during 1966)

Rapporteur: Mr. Ala'uddin H. ALJUBOURI (Iraq)

CHAPTER III (Part I)

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

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* This document contains part I of the chapter on Southern Rhodesia. The general introductory chapter of the report of the Special Committee will be issued subsequently under the symbol A/6300. Other chapters of the report will be issued as addenda.

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I. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING 1965

1. On 22 April 1965, the Special Committee adopted a resolution in which, in addition to addressing various recommendations to the administering Power, it drew the immediate attention of the Security Council to the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia.^{1/}
2. At its 1194th, 1195th, 1197th, 1199th, 1201st and 1202nd meetings, between 30 April and 6 May 1965, the Security Council considered a letter dated 22 April 1965 (S/6294 and Add.1) from the representatives of thirty-five African States requesting the Council to examine the very serious situation existing in Southern Rhodesia.
3. At its 1202nd meeting, on 6 May 1965, the Security Council adopted resolution 202 (1965) by 7 votes to none with 4 abstentions (France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), by which it:
 1. Noted the United Kingdom Government's statement of 27 October 1964 specifying the conditions under which Southern Rhodesia might attain independence;
 2. Noted further and approves the opinion of the majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia that the United Kingdom should convene a constitutional conference;
 3. Requested the United Kingdom Government and all States Members of the United Nations not to accept a unilateral declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia by the minority Government;
 4. Requested the United Kingdom to take all necessary action to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence;
 5. Requested the United Kingdom Government not to transfer under any circumstances to its colony of Southern Rhodesia, as at present governed, any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty, but to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population;

^{1/} See A/6000/Add.1, paragraph 292.

6. Further requested the United Kingdom Government to enter into consultations with all concerned with a view to convening a conference of all political parties in order to adopt new constitutional provisions acceptable to the majority of the people of Rhodesia, so that the earliest possible date may be set for independence;

7. Decided to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda.

4. During its meetings in Africa the Special Committee adopted two further resolutions relating to Southern Rhodesia,^{2/} as well as a general resolution on the question of the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories of Southern Africa.^{3/}

5. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, adopted three resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

6. By its resolution 2012 (XX) of 12 October 1965, the General Assembly:

1. Condemned any attempt on the part of the Rhodesian authorities to seize independence by illegal means in order to perpetuate minority rule in Southern Rhodesia;

2. Declared that the perpetuation of such minority rule would be incompatible with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

3. Requested the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all Member States not to accept a declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia by the present authorities, which would be in the sole interest of the minority, and not to recognize any authorities purporting to emerge therefrom;

4. Called upon the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence and, in the event of such a declaration, to take all steps necessary to put an immediate end to the rebellion, with a view to transferring power to a representative government in keeping with the aspirations of the majority of the people;

^{2/} See A/6000/Add.1, paragraphs 471 and 513.

^{3/} See A/6000, paragraph 463.

5. Decided to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia under urgent and continued review during the twentieth session and to consider what further steps might be necessary.
7. By its resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, the General Assembly:
 1. Approved the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Southern Rhodesia and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;
 2. Reaffirmed the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 3. Solemnly warned the existing authorities in Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in its capacity as administering Power, that the United Nations would oppose any declaration of independence which was not based on universal adult suffrage;
 4. Condemned the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;
 5. Condemned any support or assistance rendered by any State to the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
 6. Called upon all States to refrain from rendering any assistance whatsoever to the minority régime of Southern Rhodesia;
 7. Requested that the administering Power effect immediately:
 - (a) The release of all political prisoners, political detainees and restrictees;
 - (b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation and, in particular, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act;
 - (c) The removal of all restrictions on African political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights;

8. Requested once more the Government of the United Kingdom to suspend the Constitution of 1961 and to call immediately a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political parties would take part, with a view to making new constitutional arrangements on the basis of universal adult suffrage and fixing the earliest possible date for independence;

9. Appealed to all States to use all their powers against a unilateral declaration of independence and, in any case, not to recognize any government in Southern Rhodesia which was not representative of the majority of the people;

10. Requested all States to render moral and material help to the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for freedom and independence;

11. Called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to employ all necessary measures, including military force, to implement paragraphs 7 and 8 above;

12. Drew the attention of the Security Council to the threats made by the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia, including the threat of economic sabotage against the independent African States adjoining Southern Rhodesia;

13. Further drew the attention of the Security Council to the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia which threatened international peace and security, and decided to transmit to the Council the records and resolutions of the twentieth session of the General Assembly on this question;

14. Decided to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia under urgent and continuing review.

8. In a note dated 12 November 1965, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 2022 (XX) to States and drew their attention, in particular, to operative paragraphs 6, 9 and 10 of the resolution.

9. By its resolution 2024 (XX) of 11 November 1965, adopted immediately after the illegal declaration of independence, the General Assembly:

1. Condemned the unilateral declaration of independence made by the racialist minority in Southern Rhodesia;

2. Invited the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to implement immediately the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in order to put an end to the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Southern Rhodesia;

3. Recommended the Security Council to consider the situation as a matter or urgency.
10. The Security Council at its 1257th to 1265th meetings, between 12 and 20 November 1965, resumed consideration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia.
11. At its 1258th meeting, on 12 November 1965, the Security Council adopted resolution 216 (1965) by 10 votes to none with 1 abstention (France), by which it:
 1. Decided to condemn the unilateral declaration of independence made by a racist minority in Southern Rhodesia;
 2. Decided to call upon all States not to recognize this illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal régime.
12. At its 1265th meeting on 20 November 1965, the Security Council adopted a further resolution 217 (1965) by 10 votes to none with 1 abstention (France), by which it:
 1. Determined that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia is extremely grave, that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should put an end to it and that its continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
 2. Reaffirmed its resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;
 3. Condemned the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority in Southern Rhodesia and regards the declaration of independence by it as having no legal validity;
 4. Called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quell this rebellion of the racist minority;
 5. Further called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end;
 6. Called upon all States not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with this illegal authority;

7. Called upon the Government of the United Kingdom, as the working of the Constitution of 1961 has broken down, to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

8. Called upon all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products;

9. Called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the measures it has announced, as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 above;

10. Called upon the Organization of African Unity to do all in its power to assist in the implementation of the present resolution, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations;

11. Decided to keep the question under review in order to examine what other measures it may deem necessary to take.

13. In a note dated 29 November 1965, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 217 (1965) to States, drawing their attention, in particular, to operative paragraphs 6 and 8.

14. As at 30 April 1966, replies to the notes of the Secretary-General transmitting the above resolutions had been received from the following sixty-six States:

Albania	A/6116 - S/6972
Argentina	A/6239 and Add.1 - S/7094 and Add.1
Australia	A/6244 - S/7104
Austria	A/6251 - S/7115
Belgium	A/6231 - S/7052 A/6271 - S/7161
Brazil	A/6256 - S/7122
Bulgaria	A/6255 - S/7121
Burundi	A/6249 - S/7113
Byelorussian SSR	A/6299 - S/7053
Cameroon	A/6286 - S/7214
Canada	A/6234 - S/7082 A/6272 - S/7164

Ceylon	A/6269 - S/7157
Chile	A/6297 - S/7234
China	A/6258 - S/7130
Colombia	A/6247 - S/7112
Congo, Democratic Republic of	A/6275 - S/7177
Cuba	A/6112 - S/6961
Cyprus	A/6241 - S/7099
Czechoslovakia	A/6110 - S/7167 A/6273
Denmark	A/6153 - S/7005
Dominican Republic	A/6264 - S/6979 S/7141
Ecuador	A/6291 - S/7226
Finland	A/6243 - S/7101
Germany, Federal Republic of	- S/7181
Greece	A/6324 - S/6986 and Add.1 and 2
Guinea	A/6263 - S/6923 - S/7140
Haiti	A/6253 - S/6951 - S/7119
Hungary	A/6268 - S/7156
India	A/6237 - S/6959 - S/7092
Iran	- S/6971
Iraq	- S/7056
Ireland	A/6259 - S/7132
Israel	- S/6930 - S/7083
Italy	- S/7016 - S/7048 and Corr.1
Jamaica	- S/6969
Japan	A/6133 - S/6990 A/6248 - S/7114
Jordan	A/6254 - S/7120
Liberia	A/6257 - S/7124
Libya	A/6266 - S/7144
Luxembourg	- S/7055 - S/7160

Malaysia	A/6290 - S/7225
Madagascar	A/6285 - S/7213
Mongolia	A/6270 - S/6943 - S/7159
Netherlands	- S/7046 - S/7162
New Zealand	A/6238 - S/7093
Nicaragua	- S/7139
Nigeria	- S/6966 - S/7153
Norway	A/6155 - S/7008
Pakistan	- S/7127 - S/7258
Philippines	A/6293 - S/7228
Poland	A/6235 - S/7087 and Add.1 and Add.1
Romania	A/6170 - S/7015
Rwanda	A/6260 - S/7135
Singapore	A/6282 - S/7188
Sweden	A/6156 - S/7010 - S/7012
Trinidad and Tobago	- S/6946
Uganda	- S/6924
Ukrainian SSR	A/6245 - S/7110
Upper Volta	A/6288 - S/7218
USSR	A/6105 - S/6940 A/6232 - S/7068 and Add.1 and Add.1
United Arab Republic	A/6281 - S/7187
United Kingdom	- S/7021 - S/7108
United States of America	A/6236 - S/7088 and Add.1 and S/7170 and Add.1
Venezuela	A/6321 - S/7253
Yemen	A/6252 - S/7118
Yugoslavia	A/6265 - S/6942 - S/7143

15. The replies received show a considerable degree of compliance with the resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia. All replies specifically stated that the States concerned did not recognize the illegal régime and would have no dealings with it. The replies also show that those States have explicitly or implicitly barred the export of arms, equipment and military material to Southern Rhodesia. The embargo on oil and petroleum products has also been specifically endorsed in replies from producing and exporting countries and has, directly or indirectly, been given general support in the replies from other States.

16. While a substantial number of the replies showed a complete break in all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, a number of replies have shown a gradual phasing out of economic relations based on the barring of trade in specified products.

II. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

A. GENERAL

17. Information concerning Southern Rhodesia, as well as an account of action taken in respect of the Territory, is already contained in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly.^{4/} Supplementary information on developments since then is set out below.

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Statement of the United Kingdom Government on talks with the Government of Southern Rhodesia

18. On 25 May 1965, the Commonwealth Relations Office issued a statement saying that now that the election in Southern Rhodesia was over, the United Kingdom Government intended to explore all possibilities of reaching a negotiated settlement on the constitutional questions at issue between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom. The statement also said that the views of the United Kingdom Government on the negotiations were being communicated to Prime Minister Ian Smith through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Salisbury.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and Southern Rhodesia

19. A Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was held in London from 17 to 25 June 1965. In the final communiqué of the Conference, the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth countries reaffirmed that they were irrevocably opposed to any unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia and further reaffirmed their insistence on the principle of majority rule in relation to that country. According to the communiqué, the Prime Ministers also urged the United Kingdom Prime Minister to convene a constitutional conference at an early

^{4/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 97 (A/5124); *ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 25 (A/5238), chapter II; *ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1), chapter III, appendix; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter III); and A/6000/Add.1.

date, possibly within three months, which all political leaders in Southern Rhodesia should be free to attend, to seek agreement on the question of independence on the basis of majority rule. It was further urged that, should the Southern Rhodesian Government refuse to attend such a conference, and to release detainees, the United Kingdom Government should introduce legislation to suspend the 1961 Constitution and appoint an interim government, which should repeal oppressive and discriminatory laws and prepare the way for free elections.

20. The United Kingdom Government, according to the communiqué, informed the Conference that it was actively engaged in discussions with the Government of Southern Rhodesia and that in the process of seeking to reach agreement on Southern Rhodesia's advance to independence, a constitutional conference would at the appropriate time, be a natural step.

21. On 28 June 1965, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia sent a message to the United Kingdom Prime Minister in which he stated that the constitutional conference recommended in the communiqué was unnecessary and out of the question, and that if such a conference were to be called the Southern Rhodesia Government would not attend, nor would anyone from the country. He also stated in his message that if the United Kingdom Government attempted to promote such a conference, his Government would interpret this as interference in the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia.

Visit of the United Kingdom Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations to Southern Rhodesia

22. On 18 July 1965, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations replied to an invitation from Prime Minister Smith to visit Southern Rhodesia for further talks. In his message, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary stated that he was anxious that these negotiations should be pursued without delay at the ministerial level. However, since he could not proceed to Salisbury as quickly as he would wish to, he proposed to send the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, to Southern Rhodesia as his representative to explore further the possibilities of a settlement with Mr. Smith.

23. Mr. Cledwyn Hughes visited Southern Rhodesia for discussions with the Southern Rhodesian Government from 21 to 27 July 1965. On 25 July 1965, Mr. Ian Smith issued a public statement reassuring his followers that he was not departing from

any principles in his negotiations with Mr. Hughes. The statement, which was issued through the Rhodesia Front Chairman, also said that whether independence came through negotiations or not, it would be without strings. On 30 July 1965, Mr. Smith described the talks as confidential although he was also quoted as saying that Southern Rhodesia had made specific proposals on the independence issue, and was awaiting the reaction of the United Kingdom Government to the talks. On 2 August 1965, Mr. Smith made a further comment on the visit of Mr. Hughes to Southern Rhodesia. In this report, he was quoted as saying that his Government was trying desperately to negotiate, but if it could not negotiate, there was only one other way to obtain independence and that was to take matters into its own hands.

24. On his return to the United Kingdom, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes gave the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, an invitation from Mr. Ian Smith for him to pay another visit to Southern Rhodesia for further talks. In September 1965, Mr. Bottomley and Mr. Smith exchanged messages for continuing the talks on the question of independence.

Visit of Mr. Ian Smith to London

25. On 30 September 1965, Mr. Smith announced that he would visit the United Kingdom for negotiations with the United Kingdom Government on the independence issue. The announcement said that it had been made clear to the United Kingdom Government that in view of the fact that the independence negotiations had dragged on for more than two years, these talks had to be final and conclusive. On 1 October 1965, Mr. Smith stated that he had decided to go to the United Kingdom because even though Mr. Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, had agreed to come to Southern Rhodesia for talks, he could not come until the middle of October and that was too long to wait. Since any agreement between him and Mr. Bottomley would require the approval of the United Kingdom Prime Minister, he had decided to go to the United Kingdom instead so that if the negotiations failed he could make a personal appeal to the United Kingdom Prime Minister. Mr. Smith was also reported to have said that if he returned from the United Kingdom empty-handed he and his Government would have to face the question of declaring independence unilaterally. He further stated that no matter what

the United Kingdom Government did, Southern Rhodesia would be independent by Christmas of 1965.

26. Mr. Ian Smith visited London from 4 to 11 October 1965 and held meetings with the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, and the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, on the independence issue. On 8 October 1965 Mr. Smith told newsmen after his third meeting with the United Kingdom Prime Minister that he had made no concessions.

Statement by the Commonwealth Relations Office on 9 October 1965

27. The Commonwealth Relations Office issued a statement on 9 October 1965 on the discussions with Mr. Ian Smith. The statement reiterated the United Kingdom Government's position on Southern Rhodesian independence, as put forward to Mr. Smith, as follows:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
 2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
 3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
 4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
 5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.
- The statement also summarized the views of Mr. Smith on these five principles as follows:

- (i) The 1961 Constitution provided, in the qualifications governing the franchise, for an increasing number of Africans to be entitled to the vote and the question of guarantees against retrogression was essentially a matter of providing a suitable mechanism.
- (ii) The Government of Southern Rhodesia proposed the addition of a Senate (to be composed of twelve Chiefs elected by the Chiefs' Council) which would vote with the Assembly at third readings on any question affecting the revision of the entrenched clauses. This would replace the referendum procedure under the 1961 Constitution.

- (iii) The Government of Southern Rhodesia stated that their proposal for a Senate of twelve African Chiefs represented a major advance for Africans. The Southern Rhodesian Government could not contemplate any increased representation for Africans in the Assembly, while so many Africans refused the opportunities offered under the present Constitution but they were prepared to consider the extension of the B roll franchise, for example, by admitting all taxpayers.
- (iv) The Government of Southern Rhodesia stated that they wished to see an end to racial discrimination by an evolutionary process, but they could not agree to the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.
- (v) The Government of Southern Rhodesia claimed that they had already demonstrated that the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia desired independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. This had been shown by their consultation of tribal opinion and the referendum of the electorate.

28. According to the statement of the Commonwealth Relations Office, the United Kingdom Government did not consider that these proposals provided any positive advancement for Africans and had therefore come to the conclusion that no basis existed on which the United Kingdom Government would feel justified in granting independence to Southern Rhodesia. The statement also reiterated the United Kingdom Government warning of the grave consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

29. On 11 October 1965, Prime Minister Wilson held another meeting with Mr. Ian Smith in an attempt to break the deadlock on the issue of independence. Mr. Smith stated after their meeting that there had been no change in their respective positions on the independence issue.

Exchange of correspondence on resumption of talks

30. On 12 October 1965, Prime Minister Wilson sent a message to Mr. Smith in Southern Rhodesia in which he suggested sending to Southern Rhodesia a mission of senior Commonwealth Prime Ministers, headed by Mr. Robert Menzies, the former Prime Minister of Australia, to find ways and means of breaking the deadlock on the question of independence. On 18 October 1965, Mr. Smith rejected the suggestion

for such a mission on the ground that the Commonwealth had no jurisdiction as far as Southern Rhodesia was concerned. On the same day, Mr. Wilson replied to Mr. Smith's message saying, among other things, that the United Kingdom Government was still open to any new ideas for seeking agreement between the two Governments.

31. On 20 October 1965, Mr. Smith responded to Mr. Wilson's request by suggesting that the United Kingdom Government could grant Southern Rhodesia independence and put the Government on trust to observe and abide by the principles of the 1961 Constitution. To this end he offered to abide by a treaty to guarantee those principles. He also stated that should such a treaty be broken, the United Kingdom Government could then take whatever steps it thought fit.

32. On the strength of the treaty proposal by Mr. Smith, Prime Minister Wilson offered on 21 October 1965 to fly to Southern Rhodesia for further talks on the independence issue.

Visit of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Southern Rhodesia

33. Prime Minister Wilson, accompanied by the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, visited Southern Rhodesia from 25 to 30 October 1965 for a fresh round of talks on the independence issue. They were later joined by the United Kingdom Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones.

34. While in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Wilson held meetings with Mr. Smith and his advisers, also with Mr. Josiah Gondo, Leader of the Opposition, other members of the United Peoples Party, a delegation of the Provincial Council of Chiefs, independent members of Parliament, Mr. Garfield Todd (a former Prime Minister who is under restriction), and members of the Asian Community. He also held talks with Mr. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the banned Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Rev. N. Sithole, leader of the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), who were flown from their restriction areas for the talks. In all, it was estimated that Prime Minister Wilson talked with 126 leading and representative Southern Rhodesians.

Proposal for appointment of royal commission

35. In his discussions with members of the Southern Rhodesian Government, Prime Minister Wilson impressed upon them the dire consequences of an illegal seizure of

power and also put to them two propositions. The first was that Mr. Smith's assertion that the Rhodesian people, including a majority of Africans, wanted independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution should be tested by a referendum of the whole people, or of the present electorate plus all African taxpayers. The second was that a royal commission should be set up under the chairmanship of the Southern Rhodesian Chief Justice, to recommend amendments to the 1961 Constitution which would provide the basis on which Southern Rhodesia might become independent as quickly as possible, give effect to the five principles set out by the United Kingdom Government and which would be acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

36. The Southern Rhodesian Government accepted neither of these alternatives, and instead proposed that a royal commission, under the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia, with one other member nominated by the Southern Rhodesian Government and another by the United Kingdom Government, working on the basis of a unanimous report, should receive from the two Governments an agreed draft independence arrangement, based on the 1961 Constitution, with such amendments as might be considered necessary, and should then ascertain whether such a document was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole.

37. Mr. Wilson agreed to this proposal, whilst reserving the right to return to the original concept of the commission's powers and duties, if the commission failed to agree. He also felt that the commission should produce an interim report on the methods it recommended for consulting Rhodesian opinion as a whole. On the question of which amendments should be made to the 1961 Constitution, important differences between the two Governments remained, however.

Statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom concerning his visit to Southern Rhodesia

38. In his report to Parliament on 1 November, after his return to London, Mr. Wilson said that the chiefs could not by the widest stretch of imagination be said to be capable of representing the African population as a whole, nor could the United Kingdom Government leave without safeguards a situation which

would permit an independent Southern Rhodesia Parliament without check or constitutional hindrance to reduce the "B" roll seats or increase the "A" roll seats and thus postpone majority rule.

39. Regarding his talks in Salisbury with African leaders, Mr. Harold Wilson stated:

"... I should tell the House that in my talks with the African Nationalist leaders, and with African and other M.P.'s elected on the "B" Roll, I made clear, with absolute frankness, three things. First, I regarded it as my duty to remove from their minds any idea of hope they might have that Rhodesia's constitutional problems were going to be solved by an assertion of military power on our part, whether for the purposes of suspending or amending the 1961 Constitution, of imposing majority rule tomorrow or any other time - or for that matter dealing with the situation that would follow, an illegal assertion of independence.

"... Secondly, I said that although successive British Governments are deeply and irrevocably committed to guaranteed and unimpeded progress to majority rule, the British Government, who alone, though the British Parliament have the legal power to grant independence, do not believe that in the present and tragic and divided condition of Rhodesia, that majority [rule] can or should come today, or tomorrow.

"... Thirdly, I urged them to unite the at present bitterly divided forces of African opinion, to work the Constitution of Rhodesia in a constitutional manner, to persuade their followers to register and to vote."

Offer to test acceptability of Southern Rhodesian proposals

40. On 3 November, Prime Minister Wilson informed Parliament that, despite further discussions between the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General (who had delayed their departure from Salisbury) and the Southern Rhodesian Government, there was no prospect of agreement on the amendments to be made to the 1961 Constitution as a basis for use by a royal commission. In view of this, the present United Kingdom Government, whilst not moving from the

/...

position of its predecessors - in being ready to take account of any views which might be freely expressed by the population on the issues involved, but nevertheless reserving their position - agreed, subject to certain conditions, that the Rhodesian Government's proposals should be put to the test of acceptability to the Rhodesian people as a whole.

41. The conditions were that it must be known that the United Kingdom Government disagreed with those proposals, that before canvassing the views of the Southern Rhodesian people the royal commission should submit for approval by both Governments a unanimous report on how they would propose to determine acceptability, and that having ascertained the views of the Southern Rhodesian people the commission should submit a unanimous report. The United Kingdom Government could not commit themselves in advance to accept that report since the eventual decision must rest with the British Parliament.

42. As an alternative, the United Kingdom Government was still willing that the Rhodesian Government's proposals should be submitted to the test of a referendum of the whole Rhodesian people conducted without restriction on free political activity.

Reaction of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom Government proposals for a royal commission

43. On 6 November 1965 Mr. Smith sent a message to Mr. Wilson in which he stated that Southern Rhodesia could not accept the United Kingdom Government's proposals for a royal commission as outlined in the statement of Mr. Wilson in Parliament on 3 November 1965.

Internal developments in Southern Rhodesia

44. On 18 October 1965, the Southern Rhodesian Government issued a twelve months' restriction order against Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Southern Rhodesian Prime

Minister, who is reported to be a supporter of African rights. Mr. Todd was restricted to his farm as he prepared to leave for the United Kingdom on 19 October 1965.

45. The restriction order stated that there was reason to believe that Mr. Todd was actively associated with the leaders of an unlawful organization - the banned Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and that he had actively associated himself with activities prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order.

46. On 5 November 1965, the Southern Rhodesian Government declared a three-month state of emergency throughout the country. A statement by the Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, said that the state of emergency was necessary because there was a threat to security in Southern Rhodesia. By way of explanation, he referred to what he called the threats posed by numerous trained saboteurs sponsored by prescribed African nationalist organizations who, he claimed, had already returned to the country. He also claimed that many more were undergoing training in sabotage in countries hostile to Southern Rhodesia and that some of these saboteurs were already in countries north of Southern Rhodesia, awaiting directions and the opportunity to return to the country. He also claimed that statements by certain African countries indicated a threat to security and the maintenance of law and order.

47. On 3 November 1965, the Southern Rhodesian Minister of Finance, Mr. John Wrathall, announced the imposition of a control of all imports into Southern Rhodesia. An official statement said that the purpose of the import control was to stabilize the country's external reserves and to maintain a level of imports comparable to that of 1964.

48. These three acts of the Southern Rhodesian Government gave rise to general speculation that a unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia was imminent. Prime Minister Smith had stated on his return from the United Kingdom on 12 October 1965, that it was an even bet that Southern Rhodesia would be independent by Christmas of 1965.

Further attempts at talks

49. On 7 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson sent Mr. Smith a message asking to meet him in Malta for a further discussion of the Southern Rhodesia issue. He

suggested in his letter that Sir Hugh Beadle (Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia and Chairman designate of the proposed royal commission) visit London first to discuss the workings of the commission in the light of the newly declared state of emergency.

50. On 8 November 1965, Mr. Smith rejected the United Kingdom proposals for a royal commission. He informed Mr. Wilson that the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian views on independence were irreconcilable. He objected to a statement in Mr. Wilson's last letter that the United Kingdom Parliament alone could grant independence to Southern Rhodesia, although the commission's report would carry great weight. He also said that the United Kingdom had made it clear it would not permit the commission to submit a majority report and that it would not advocate its acceptance in Parliament.

51. Mr. Smith later announced that Sir Hugh Beadle, the Southern Rhodesian Chief Justice and Chairman designate of the proposed three-man royal commission, would go to London as suggested by Mr. Wilson. He made it clear, however, that Sir Hugh was going entirely at his own initiative. Sir Hugh arrived in London on 9 November 1965 to begin talks with Prime Minister Wilson and the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Bottomley.

Final exchanges

52. Prime Minister Wilson, in a further message to Mr. Smith on 10 November 1965, asked the following: If the United Kingdom Government undertook to commend to Parliament a unanimous report by the royal commission to the effect that the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for independence, would the Southern Rhodesian Government give a corresponding undertaking that if the 1961 Constitution was not so acceptable they would abandon their claim in this respect and agree that a royal commission should then devise an acceptable new constitution giving effect to the five principles?

53. In a statement to the House of Commons on 11 November, Mr. Wilson said that he had had a final telephone conversation with Mr. Smith several hours before the illegal declaration in which he had told him that there were no outstanding points remaining and that he was sending a senior minister to Salisbury to sign an agreed minute recording the basis on which the royal commission could be set up that week

and start its work. Mr. Smith, however, had persisted in maintaining that the positions of the two Governments were irreconcilable.

Mr. Ian Smith declares independence unilaterally

54. On 11 November 1965, Mr. Ian Smith declared independence unilaterally. The announcement was contained in a proclamation (see appendix I) read by Mr. Smith in a broadcast to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

55. In a subsequent statement after reading the proclamation, Mr. Smith said that Southern Rhodesia would abide by the 1961 Constitution which now included the necessary amendments to adapt it to that of an independent country. Southern Rhodesia would continue in its loyalty to the Queen, the Union Jack would continue to fly in Southern Rhodesia, and the national anthem would continue to be sung. He also said that it was the intention of his new régime, in consultation with the Chiefs, to bring the Africans into the "Government" and "Administration", on a basis acceptable to them.

56. He ended his statement by saying that Southern Rhodesia had assumed its sovereign independence.

Statement by the United Kingdom Government on the illegal declaration of independence

57. On 11 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson made a statement in the United Kingdom Parliament on the illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia.

58. He stated, inter alia, that the United Kingdom Government condemned the purported declaration of independence by the former Government of Southern Rhodesia as an illegal act and one which was ineffective in law. It was an act of rebellion against the Crown and against the Constitution as by law established, and any action taken to give effect to it would be treasonable. He also informed Parliament that the Governor, in pursuance of the authority vested in him by the Crown, had, on 11 November 1965, informed the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Southern Rhodesian Government that they ceased to hold office. They were now private citizens in Southern Rhodesia and could exercise no legal authority. He further stated that the United Kingdom Government would have no dealing with

the rebel régime. The United Kingdom High Commissioner was being withdrawn and the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London had been asked to leave.^{5/}

59. He went on to state that it was the duty of all British subjects in Southern Rhodesia including all citizens of Southern Rhodesia to remain loyal to the Crown and to recognize the continuing authority and responsibility for Southern Rhodesia of the Government of the United Kingdom.

60. Prime Minister Wilson also informed Parliament that the purpose of the United Kingdom Government's action against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia was not punitive but rather to restore constitutional Government in Southern Rhodesia. He further informed Parliament on 12 November 1965 that the only way this could be done was by bringing the rebel régime to an end by making that regime unworkable and creating a situation where, at the earliest possible moment, the people of Southern Rhodesia themselves would wish to see a lawful government in its place.

Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965

61. On 16 November 1965, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (see appendix II) which emphasizes United Kingdom jurisdiction over Southern Rhodesia and gives the Government powers for suspending, amending, revoking, or adding to any of the provisions of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, 1961. The Act also gives the United Kingdom Government powers to impose sanctions and take any other necessary action against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. It also empowers the Government to declare invalid any laws made by the illegal régime since the unilateral declaration of independence. The Act further empowers the United Kingdom Government to make any Orders in Council which appear to be necessary or expedient in consequence of the illegal declaration of independence. The Act provides that these Orders take effect as soon as they are made, subject to their approval by Parliament which must be given within twenty-eight days of their date of issue.

62. Immediately after the passage of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, the United Kingdom Government issued seven Orders in Council on Southern Rhodesia, among which were the following:

5/ The Prime Minister also announced financial and economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia which are dealt with in section C, paragraphs 176-178 below.

(a) Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order, 1965

63. Sections 2 and 3 of this Order in effect make illegal any orders issued by Mr. Ian Smith and the former Southern Rhodesian Government since the illegal declaration of independence and gives the United Kingdom Government general power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia. Sections 4 to 6 of this Order also empower a Secretary of State to exercise executive authority in Southern Rhodesia currently with the Governor, in so far as the Governor is in a position to exercise it, or it is to be exercised directly through Orders emanating from the United Kingdom (see appendix III).

64. The executive authority of a Secretary of State under this Order in Council is vested in the Commonwealth Relations Secretary.

65. The United Kingdom Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones, stated in Parliament on 24 November 1965 that the Order invalidated in advance any laws which the Legislative Assembly in Southern Rhodesia might attempt to pass and any other business which it might transact. It also freed the Governor from his constitutional obligation to act in accordance with the advice of ministers and authorized the United Kingdom Government to exercise or control the exercise of various functions of officers and authorities of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The Attorney General also stated that the Order declared invalid the constitution which Mr. Ian Smith and his colleagues purported to have granted to Southern Rhodesia. According to the Attorney General, the Order enabled the United Kingdom Government to keep under its own hand the necessary constitutional powers in Southern Rhodesia and thus enabled it to resist any attempt to set up an alternative government.

(b) Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881) Order, 1965

66. This Order prevents alleged fugitive offenders from being returned to Southern Rhodesia unless the Home Secretary considers their return expedient.

(c) Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act, 1948) Order, 1965

67. This Order makes it easier for loyal Southern Rhodesian citizens to be granted citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies.

(d) Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Immigration Act, 1962) Order, 1965

68. This Order ensures that Southern Rhodesians to whom emergency United Kingdom passports are issued do not thereby become exempt from the provisions of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act.

(e) Southern Rhodesia (Property in Passports) Order, 1965

69. This Order enables immigration authorities to confiscate passports issued by the illegal authorities.

United Kingdom Government policy on the use of force

70. Prime Minister Wilson, following his statement on 11 November 1965 concerning the attitude to be taken towards the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and on the economic sanctions to be introduced, also informed Parliament that the solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem was not one to be dealt with by military intervention unless troops were asked for to avert a tragic action such as subversion, murder, etc. The United Kingdom Government did not contemplate any national action or international action to coerce even the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia into a constitutional posture.

71. On 12 November 1965, the Prime Minister elaborated further on the policy of the United Kingdom Government concerning the use of force. He informed Parliament that if the legally constituted Government of Southern Rhodesia, that is the Governor, were to seek help in dealing with law and order, the United Kingdom Government would have to give it the fullest consideration.

Censorship imposed in Southern Rhodesia

72. On 10 November 1965, censorship was imposed on Southern Rhodesia by the Smith régime. The censorship powers, which came into force on 11 November 1965, include regulation, control, restriction and prohibition of printing, publishing, the posts and telegraphs and radio transmission and the entry into and exit from Southern Rhodesia of personnel. In addition, the regulations empower the régime to take over and operate newspapers and can compel newspaper staff to maintain and carry on the production of newspapers.

73. Under these censorship powers, the Rhodesia Herald was prevented from publishing a proposed special edition on 11 November 1965, on the Governor's proclamation dismissing Mr. Smith and his ministers from office.
74. On 8 February 1966, the Southern Rhodesian authorities introduced new emergency regulations by which it becomes an offence for newspapers to state expressly or to indicate by leaving blank spaces that they are subjected to censorship. The new regulations give censors powers to order that any material - including headlines - be altered or moved to another page. The issue of any publication which breaks the new regulations can be prohibited and any one who breaks them or obstructs a censor can be fined up to £500 or jailed for two years.
75. Both Southern Rhodesia's newspapers, the Rhodesia Herald and the Chronicle of Bulawayo had frequently appeared in the past with many blank spaces, indicating that their stories had been censored.
76. On 7 December 1965, Mr. Ian Smith's régime promulgated regulations to prevent people from listening to "subversive and seditious broadcasts" from countries bordering on Southern Rhodesia. Under these regulations any one who causes or permits to be heard in public one of these broadcasts is liable to a fine of £500 or two years' imprisonment, or both. It was reported that the immediate object of this move was to prevent people in Southern Rhodesia from listening to nationalist broadcasts from Zambia. It was further reported that the wording of the announcement of this regulation could well embrace broadcasts from the new British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) station in Bechuanaland.

United Kingdom radio station in Bechuanaland starts BBC broadcast to Southern Rhodesia

77. A new United Kingdom radio station in Bechuanaland was reported to have started beaming broadcasts to Southern Rhodesia on 22 December 1965.
78. The Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, was reported to have announced on 29 December 1965, that the United Kingdom Government had built the transmitter in the Francistown area near the Southern Rhodesian border to contribute to its efforts to bring about the downfall of the Smith régime. The United Kingdom Government had decided to take this action after news censorship was instituted in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Bottomley was further reported to have said that the transmitter had been relaying programmes intermittently for a fortnight and that it would relay appropriate programmes from the BBC.

Illegal régime assumes more powers

79. Under the Emergency Powers Act of Southern Rhodesia, the illegal régime, on 11 November 1965, assumed new powers to suspend chiefs, appoint new chiefs and to appoint additional district commissioners. It also assumed powers to requisition vehicles, equipment, buildings or premises and to take over radio stations.

80. The régime also took powers on 11 November 1965, to retain officers in the armed services or the Civil Service, to compel them to undertake any duties and suspend them from duty "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the conditions of service". Under the terms of these new powers, any employees who withdraw from their employment or refuse to carry out their duties are liable to two years' imprisonment, a fine of £500, or both.

81. On 10 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson stated in Parliament that the illegal régime had introduced into Southern Rhodesia police state methods repugnant not only to the 1961 Constitution but also repugnant to all civilized standards.

Ian Smith "Constitution"

82. The so-called Constitution which was annexed to Mr. Smith's illegal declaration follows the general lines and terminology of the 1961 Constitution, with some important changes. The whole section on the Governor is replaced by arrangements for an "officer administering the Government" who is also the Commander-in-Chief. The powers of the "Officer Administering the Government" are the same as the Governor's, without, however, any powers to reserve bills for the assent of the Crown. He is to be either a Governor-General who may be appointed by the Crown on the advice only of the "Ministers" of the "Government of Rhodesia" or in the absence of such an appointment by the Crown within fourteen days, a Regent appointed by Members of the Executive Council presided over by the Prime Minister.

83. The Legislature, the franchise and the electoral provisions are generally the same as in the 1961 Constitution. The declaration of rights is unchanged except that the whole of the section providing for appeals to the Privy Council is abolished.

Position of the Governor in relation to the illegal régime

84. Immediately following the illegal declaration of independence, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, issued a proclamation stating that Mr. Ian Smith and the other persons holding office as ministers of the Government of Southern Rhodesia or as deputy ministers ceased to hold office. He also called on all citizens of Southern Rhodesia to refrain from all acts which would further the objectives of the illegal régime. Subject to that, he stated that it was the duty of all citizens to maintain law and order in the country and to carry on with their normal tasks. This applied equally to the judiciary, the armed services, the police and the civil servants.

85. The Governor's statement was not given any publicity because of the censorship which had been imposed on Southern Rhodesia.

86. Mr. Ian Smith was quoted as saying on 12 November 1965, that any powers which the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom attributed to Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, were fictitious. He was further quoted as saying that the Governor had been advised that in view of the new Constitution which had been given to the people of Southern Rhodesia by the de facto Government in control, he no longer had any executive control in Southern Rhodesia.

87. On 14 November 1965 Sir Humphrey Gibbs, issued a statement saying that he could not accept Mr. Smith's order that he no longer had any executive authority. He stated that he had been asked to continue in office by the United Kingdom Government and therefore remained the lawful Governor and the lawfully constituted authority. He also stated that he would not recognize the illegal régime or the new Constitution under which Mr. Smith was running the country.

88. On 17 November 1965, Mr. Smith announced the appointment of Mr. Clifford Dupont, former Deputy Prime Minister, as "Acting Officer Administering the Government" to assume the powers of a Governor under the so-called new Constitution. On 4 December 1965, it was reported that the Crown had refused a request from Mr. Smith to appoint Mr. Dupont as Governor-General of Southern Rhodesia.

89. Mr. Dupont was "sworn in" on 20 December 1965 as "Officer Administering the Government". By this action the illegal régime purported to have replaced the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs.

90. Mr. Dupont was to have been made "Regent" under the Smith constitution but Mr. Smith announced on 16 December 1965 that he had decided to amend the original plan and appoint an "Officer Administering the Government" in deference to the British Royal family.
91. On 16 November 1965, an aide to Sir Humphrey Gibbs was reported to have said that the telephone to Government House, the official residence of the Governor, had been cut off. It was later reported that the Governor had been deprived of his official cars and most of his servants by the illegal régime. The Governor was also reported to have been deprived of all but two of the typewriters in his office.
92. On 18 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson informed Parliament that the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, had been appointed by Queen Elizabeth II and could be removed only at her request. He also branded as an act of treason the move by Mr. Smith's régime to appoint Mr. Dupont as a replacement for the Governor.
93. On 26 November 1965, Sir Humphrey Gibbs stated that he intended to remain as the lawful Governor of Southern Rhodesia until such time that constitutional government was restored, which he hoped would be very soon. On 23 December 1965, the Governor also issued a Christmas message to the people of Southern Rhodesia in which he expressed the hope that the country would return to constitutional government.
94. However, none of these statements was communicated to the people of Southern Rhodesia because of the censorship which was imposed by the illegal régime.
95. On 10 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson, speaking in Parliament, clarified the United Kingdom Government's attitude towards the Smith régime. He stated that the Government could not negotiate with the illegal régime which had perverted, distorted and misused the 1961 Constitution in a way not intended by its authors or by the United Kingdom Parliament.
96. He emphasized that it was for the Southern Rhodesian people, through the Governor, to make clear their desire for a return to their original allegiance and the rule of law. He also stated that Mr. Smith, like any other private individual in Southern Rhodesia, was free to make representations to the Governor and that if the Governor in his discretion forwarded any submissions to the United Kingdom Government, it would be considered. However, he further stated that

the United Kingdom Government was not prepared to enter into negotiations with Mr. Smith on any basis which involved dealing with an illegal régime, or under any conditions other than procedural conditions, for a return to constitutional government.

97. On 21 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson stated in Parliament that the Governor had standing authority to talk to anyone in Southern Rhodesia who could provide a means of returning to constitutional rule. The United Kingdom Government had authorized him to discuss even with the illegal régime the mechanism by which Southern Rhodesia could be returned to constitutional rule. He also stated that there were a number of detailed matters including the transfer of the armed forces and the police to the Governor's authority, and also several administrative matters which could be handled more smoothly if there were discussions.

Prerogative of the Crown challenged

98. On 20 and 21 January 1966, it was reported that the Crown had used its prerogative of mercy in favour of two Southern Rhodesian Africans who had been condemned to death under the mandatory death sentence of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, for attempted arson. It was also reported that since the Southern Rhodesian régime was illegal and the Governor unable to operate, the prerogative was exercised direct from the United Kingdom and that the Governor, the Southern Rhodesian Attorney General and the governor of the prison were informed direct of the Crown's wishes.

99. The Smith régime issued a statement on 21 January 1966, that it regarded the exercise of the royal prerogative in this case as an illegal act. The Commonwealth Relations Office said on 20 January 1966, that it would be an illegal act if the death sentence were carried out in defiance of the wishes of the Crown.

United Peoples Party and the illegal régime

100. It was reported on 18 November 1965 that Southern Rhodesia's all-African parliamentary opposition party had declared a boycott on any further discussions with Mr. Smith over his seizure of independence. Mr. Josiah Gondo, leader of the United Peoples Party, which has ten members in the Legislative Assembly, said in the statement that there could be no question of his party sitting down with Mr. Smith and his colleagues to discuss ways of furthering independence.

101. Mr. Smith had been previously reported to have stated on 17 November 1965, that he hoped to have discussions with African politicians on Southern Rhodesia's future under independence.

Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly

102. When the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly met on 25 November 1965, an African Opposition Member, Mr. Chad Chipunza asked the Speaker for a ruling on whether Parliament was in fact constituted and whether he would read to the House the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council, 1965. Dr. Ahrn Palley, an independent member of Highfield electoral district, asked the Speaker to suspend the sitting because certain members of the House had issued a document purporting to be a new constitution for the country which had no legal validity and was in law an act of rebellion; those who accepted the document as a new constitution were acting illegally. The Speaker replied that the Chair itself was of that number and suggested that any member who found the United Kingdom enactment binding had only one proper course to pursue - to withdraw himself from the transactions of business by the House.

103. After making further attempts to interrogate the Speaker, Dr. Palley was suspended and was removed from the Chamber by the Sergeant-at-Arms. He was followed, it was reported, by nine of the fourteen other members representing the 'B' roll electoral districts.

Mr. Smith's message to the armed forces, police and public servants on their loyalty to the illegal régime

104. On 15 November 1965, Mr. Smith sent a message to all government servants, including all officers and other ranks of the British South African police, the Army and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force and prison services, warning them to beware of the efforts of the United Kingdom Government to undermine their loyalty to his régime. Mr. Smith stated in his message that his Government was the Government of Southern Rhodesia and that they should disregard any claims that might be advanced by the Governor or persons purporting to speak in his name, or officials or members of the United Kingdom Government.

United Kingdom Government's view on the position of public servants in Southern Rhodesia

105. In his statement to Parliament on 11 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson stated that it was the duty of all British subjects in Southern Rhodesia to remain loyal to the Crown and to continue to recognize the authority and responsibility for Southern Rhodesia of the Government of the United Kingdom.

106. In an interview on the BBC on 17 November 1965, Mr. Wilson was asked what answer he would give to Southern Rhodesian loyalists who wished to know what they should do in answering Mr. Smith's claims on their personal allegiance. The Prime Minister stated that the administering of an oath by the Smith régime was illegal and anyone who sought to administer it would be committing a further act of illegality. He added that it had to be a matter for the conscience of every public servant, that they should do nothing, and in view of their oath to the Crown, they could do nothing to further the purpose of the rebellion. Subject to that, it was the view of the Government that the public servants should continue the ordinary services and help to maintain law and order - particularly the judiciary - but if they were asked to take an illegal oath, this was a matter that they would have to decide against all the circumstances. It could well be that the loyal servants of the Crown, by staying at their posts, provided they were not asked to further the purposes of the rebellion, might be in a position to frustrate the purposes of the rebellion and speed the return of Southern Rhodesians to the rule of law and to their original allegiance. He also stated that those who might lose their positions because of their loyalty to the law were not going to lose their pensions and their accumulated rights.

107. The Prime Minister's statement was reported to have been beamed on the BBC to Southern Rhodesia. The statement was made a day after the African Worker's Postal Union, which has a membership of 4,000, had made an open appeal to the United Kingdom Government for guidance as to whether they should sign a pledge of loyalty to the Smith régime.

Southern Rhodesia High Court and the legality of the Ian Smith régime

108. On 13 January 1966, the legality of the Smith régime was challenged in the Southern Rhodesia High Court by the editor of the Central African Examiner. She

contended that the censorship regulations order made on 10 November 1965 by the Southern Rhodesia Government had been revoked by an Order in Council made by the United Kingdom Government on 19 November 1965 and had ceased to have any force or effect from that date. The Judge was urgently asked to make a ruling on the validity of the censorship order in view of the severe limitation on the freedom of expression and the fact that the magazine wished to print in its February issue items which should have been in the Christmas issue but had been censored.

109. The editor of the Examiner further contended that the present Southern Rhodesia Government even if in fact in control of the country was not the lawful Government thereof. Alternatively, if it was the lawful Government, it was so by virtue of the 1961 Constitution.

110. The Southern Rhodesian régime contended that the "1965 Constitution" prevailed in Southern Rhodesia and a United Kingdom Act of Parliament and orders made under it were of no force or effect in Southern Rhodesia. It claimed further that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a challenge to the authority of the "1965 Constitution", and the present Government which was constituted and appointed under it.

111. The Smith régime also contended that the present Southern Rhodesian Government constituted and appointed in terms of the "1965 Constitution" was fully established as the lawful and effective Government of Southern Rhodesia and the continuance in office of the cabinet ministers was also lawful.

112. It was reported on 14 January 1966, that during the proceedings of the High Court the Attorney General of the illegal régime indicated, as being possible, the total closure of the Courts if they were drawn into a political and constitutional battle on the side of the United Kingdom.

113. On 27 January 1966, the Judge dismissed the case, reportedly saying that the direct question involved - the validity of the Smith régime's censorship regulations - was one that should be decided by a criminal court. At the same time, he was also reported to have stated that no question arose of the Court taking sides in a political struggle between the United Kingdom Government and the Southern Rhodesian Government.

Armed forces of Southern Rhodesia

114. It was reported on 12 November 1965, that the Southern Rhodesia Army had 3,400 men on active duty and 8,400 white reservists. The Army was said to comprise

two regular army battalions, the all-white Rhodesian Light Infantry and the white-officered Rhodesian African Rifles. It was also reported that there were eight National Guard battalions, four of which were known to be active and the others believed to be in various stages of readiness.

115. The report further said that the Royal Rhodesian Air Force had 75 aircraft and 900 men which included one squadron of B-57 bombers, one of Hunter fighters, a reconnaissance squadron of armed Provosts, an Alouette Helicopter Squadron and a transport squadron of DC-38 and Canadian North Star aircraft.

116. The report also stated that Southern Rhodesia had a 6,000 strong regular police force - still named the British South Africa Police - of whom 2,000 were white. It further stated that the Reserve Police numbered 28,000 of whom 21,000 were white.

Political demonstrations against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia

117. It was reported on 12 November 1965, that 300,000 copies of a statement by the Smith regime were distributed on 11 November 1965 to the African population, warning them that the police and the army were ready to deal with any persons who caused trouble.

118. It was reported that on 15 November 1965, Southern Rhodesian policemen armed with shotguns had broken up a strike by African workers in Bulawayo who were protesting against the illegal declaration of independence. On 22 November 1965, thousands of Africans in the cities of Bulawayo and Gwelo staged a strike in protest against the unilateral declaration of independence.

119. On 23 November 1965, one African was reported killed in Bulawayo when police opened fire to disperse an African demonstration. One African was shot in the leg when police opened fire to disperse demonstrators in the African township of Que Que. The police used tear gas on 24 November 1965 to disband political demonstrators in Bulawayo. On 22 November 1965, the police opened fire to disband a crowd of political demonstrators in Salisbury.

Detainees and restrictees in Southern Rhodesia

120. It was reported on 18 January 1966 that there had been a sharp increase in the number of people under restriction in Southern Rhodesia in the past two months, but that the number in detention had dropped. A spokesman for the

Southern Rhodesian régime was reported to have announced on 18 January that there were about 350 restrictees and 20 to 30 detainees in Southern Rhodesia. 121. On 25 November 1965, the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", Mr. Lardner-Burke told the Legislative Assembly that there were 276 people in restriction and 47 under detention.

122. The latest details of the restriction orders, which were reported to have been listed in the Government Gazette, showed that twenty-two people were restricted between 14 and 24 December 1965. Of those, four - including a woman - were restricted for five years, seven for three years, five for two years and six for one year. The spokesman for the Southern Rhodesian authorities was reported to have said that the figure of 350 restrictees included a small number of people being held for two or three weeks only under the emergency regulations.

Population figures

123. It was reported on 21 January 1966 that according to the Government Monthly Statistical Report on Southern Rhodesia for January 1966, the population of Southern Rhodesia had reached an all-time high of 4,330,000. There were 4,080,000 Africans, an Asian community of 8,100 and another 13,000 coloured (mixed race) people. According to the official figures, Southern Rhodesia's white population was 224,000 in December 1965. It was reported that this was the second time the number of whites reached 224,000. The number of whites was reported to have declined from this figure to 221,000 during 1963, at the break-up of the Central African Federation.

Relations between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia

124. On 11 November 1965, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. H. Verwoerd, issued a statement on the unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia. In his statement, the Prime Minister of South Africa said that the problems which had arisen between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia were, and should remain, a dispute limited to those Governments alone. Such limitation was in the interest of world peace. The Government of South Africa had condemned and continuously condemned the fact that other States or organizations had found it necessary, and still found it necessary, to intervene

in this domestic matter. The Government of South Africa would continue its policy of non-intervention. In accordance with this attitude, which it had adopted in the course of the dispute both prior and subsequent to Southern Rhodesia's declaration of independence, it would express no views on the arguments put forward by either the United Kingdom or Southern Rhodesia in this matter. The Government of South Africa would, however, continue to maintain the normal friendly relations with both countries.

125. He also stated that, unlike countries separated by great distances, it was of exceptional importance for the Republic of South Africa that normal intercourse with its Southern Rhodesian neighbours should continue as in the past. The measure and character of this course was such that its continuation was unavoidable, irrespective of who exercised effective authority in Southern Rhodesia. It therefore followed that South Africa could not participate in measures such as a boycott.

126. South Africa has continued to maintain relations with the illegal régime. Mr. John Gaunt, the former representative of Southern Rhodesia in South Africa, was reported to have stated on 23 November 1965, that there had been no change in his status since the "declaration of independence". He was also reported to have said that he was still Southern Rhodesia's "plenipotentiary diplomatic representative in the Republic".

Relations between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia

127. On 27 July 1965 the Government of Southern Rhodesia announced the appointment of "a diplomatic representative" in Portugal with effect from 1 August 1965.

Mr. Harry Reedman, the representative designate arrived in Lisbon on 15 September 1965 and made a formal call on the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 20 September 1965. A spokesman for the Portuguese Foreign Ministry said that Mr. Reedman had presented "a letter of introduction" and that his status there would be that of "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission". The Foreign Ministry spokesman also stated that Mr. Reedman would deal directly with the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning all matters of interest to Portugal and Southern Rhodesia.

128. The status of Mr. Reedman was disputed by the United Kingdom Government which has responsibility for the overseas affairs of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government wished to have Mr. Reedman accredited to the United Kingdom Embassy.

129. On 1 October 1965, the Government of Portugal issued a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia's representation in Lisbon. According to the statement the United Kingdom Government had issued a truncated text of a Portuguese note in reply to a United Kingdom Government note of 23 September 1965, asking Portugal to clarify its views on the status of Southern Rhodesia's representative in Lisbon. The Government of Portugal had not the slightest doubt that Southern Rhodesia was not a sovereign country and it was incumbent on the United Kingdom Government to conduct the external relations of Southern Rhodesia that might involve the ultimate responsibility of the United Kingdom Government. On the other hand, the neighbourhood between Portuguese territory and Southern Rhodesia, the long-standing tradition of relations between the two countries and their respective governments and the existence of numerous problems in common provided the justification for Southern Rhodesian representation in Lisbon on a basis corresponding with the status of the territory.

130. There has been no report of any change in the status of Mr. Reedman since the illegal declaration of independence.

131. At a press conference on 25 November 1965, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira dealt mainly with the position of his Government on the question of sanctions (see paragraph 268 below). He stated, however, that Portugal would continue to maintain normal relations with what he reportedly described as the "local government" of Southern Rhodesia.

Action taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

132. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Accra, Ghana, from 21 to 25 October 1965, adopted two resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

133. In the first resolution, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU called upon the United Nations to regard a unilateral declaration of independence by the European minority Government of Southern Rhodesia as constituting a threat to international peace, and to take any steps that such a situation required in accordance with the Charter and to help to establish a majority Government in Southern Rhodesia. The resolution also called upon all Governments and international bodies, in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence to withhold recognition of a European minority government and to apply sanctions.

134. The resolution further called upon the United Kingdom Government to take all necessary measures including the use of armed forces to take over the administration of Southern Rhodesia; to release the leaders of the nationalist movements, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Rev. N. Sithole and all other political prisoners; to hold a constitutional conference with the participation of the representatives of the entire population of Southern Rhodesia with a view to adopting a new constitution guaranteeing universal adult suffrage, free elections and independence.

135. In the event of failure on the part of the United Kingdom Government to take the measures set forth above, all OAU member States were, inter alia, to use all possible means, including the use of force, with a view to opposing a unilateral declaration of independence; and give immediate and every necessary assistance to the people of Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) with the view to establishing a majority government in that country.

136. The resolution also empowered the African Group at the United Nations to ensure that the request sent to the United Nations and the Security Council received due consideration.

137. In the second resolution, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU decided to set up a Committee of Five composed of the United Arab Republic, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria to see to the effective implementation of the above resolution.

138. An extraordinary session of the OAU's Council of Ministers was held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1965, to discuss OAU policy in response to the illegal declaration. The Council of Ministers adopted three resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia. In the first resolution they agreed, inter alia to implement a total blockade of Rhodesia; suspend all economic relations; "freeze" Rhodesian accounts in African banks; deny all means of transport to and from Rhodesia, including the overflying of aircraft, ban all cable, telephone, telex and radio-telephone communications with Rhodesia; and to appeal to all countries to enforce an embargo on oil and fuel supplies to Rhodesia.

139. The Council of Ministers agreed to ask all African States to submit to the OAU copies of all legislation implementing the Council's decisions.

140. In a second resolution, the Council of Ministers, requested the Committee of Five to co-opt military experts of the States Members in order to study and make plans for the use of force with a view to assisting the people of Zimbabwe;

requested all States Members to grant through the Committee of Five every kind of assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in their national fight against foreign domination; requested the Committee of Five to appeal to States Members to make a military contribution in order to face up to any emergency situation which might be created in the States Members adjacent to Southern Rhodesia without prejudice to the right of those States to appeal directly to any brother African State with a view to such assistance; requested the Committee of Five to see what contribution of military or other nature could be made by the States Members to face up to any emergency situation which might exist if one of the States Members of the OAU adjacent to Southern Rhodesia was in danger of being attacked; and addressed an urgent appeal to all States Members to facilitate in every way the task entrusted to the Committee of Five.

141. In a third resolution, the Council of Ministers instructed the African group at the United Nations to request the execution of the Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965.

Action taken by other international organizations

142. The Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stated on 19 November 1965, that it had severed all contacts with the Ian Smith régime and that it would have no further communications with it, although Southern Rhodesia as such remained a full member of GATT.

143. On 19 November 1965, the Governing Council of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia (S/6957). In this resolution, the Governing Council requested the Director-General to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the ILO would do everything in its power to contribute in its own sphere to such action as might be decided upon by the Security Council; refrain from having any official or unofficial contact, direct or indirect, with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; and keep abreast of developments in the situation and to report to the Governing Body at its next session.

144. On 17 November 1965, the United Kingdom Government informed the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) that in present circumstances it did not wish to proceed with its application for associate membership for Southern Rhodesia. FAO took no action on the application for associate membership for Southern Rhodesia.

145. On 29 November 1965, the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) informed all Members and associate Members that all official communications between WHO and the Territory had been suspended with effect from 11 November 1965.

146. In the course of the last session of the Technical Assistance Committee the question of the application of the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965 to assistance to Southern Rhodesia within the framework of the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme (EPTA) was raised. The report of the Committee to the Economic and Social Council recorded satisfaction over the Executive Chairman's statement that no further action was to be taken on contingency authorizations for Southern Rhodesia, and that, since the passage of the Security Council resolution, the participating organizations of EPTA and the executing agencies of the Special Fund had been requested to withdraw to Zambia all experts serving in Southern Rhodesia, pending clarification of the political situation in that country.

147. At the request of the United Kingdom Government, the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also made appropriate arrangements to suspend official communications with Southern Rhodesia.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in Lagos

148. A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 11-12 January 1966, to discuss the question of Southern Rhodesia.

149. In the final communiqué of the Conference, the Prime Ministers agreed that the goal of future progress in Southern Rhodesia should be the establishment of a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due them without discrimination or unjust impediment.

150. To this end, several principles were affirmed. The first was the determination of all present that the rebellion must be brought to an end. All those detained for purely political reasons should be released. Political activities should be constitutional and free from intimidation from any quarter. Repressive and discriminatory laws should be repealed. The Prime Ministers noted the statement of the United Kingdom Government that a period of direct rule would be needed, leading to the holding of a constitutional conference. This conference, representing all sections of the Southern Rhodesian people, would be for the purpose of recommending a constitution leading to majority rule on a basis acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

151. The Prime Ministers reviewed and noted the measures taken by Commonwealth and other countries against the illegal regime. Some expressed concern that the steps taken so far had not resulted in its removal. They called on all countries which had not already done so to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965, making at the same time necessary arrangements to provide for the repercussions of such further measures on the economy of Zambia.

152. The Prime Ministers discussed the question of the use of military force in Southern Rhodesia, and it was accepted that its use could not be precluded if this proved necessary to restore law and order.

153. In this connexion, the Prime Ministers noted the statement by the United Kingdom Prime Minister that, based on the expert advice available to him, the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months. While some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard, all expressed the hope that these measures would result in the overthrow of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia within the period mentioned by the United Kingdom Prime Minister.

154. The Prime Ministers decided on the following measures of Commonwealth action, with immediate effect:

(1) To appoint two continuing committees composed of representatives of all Commonwealth countries to meet with the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. The first would review regularly the effect of sanctions and also the special needs which might from time to time arise in honouring the Commonwealth's undertaking to come to the support of Zambia as required. The second would co-ordinate a special Commonwealth programme of assistance in training Rhodesian Africans as set out below.

(2) The Sanctions Committee would recommend the reconvening of the Prime Ministers' meeting when they judge that this is necessary. In any case, the Prime Ministers agreed to meet again in July 1966 if the rebellion has not been ended before then.

(3) The Sanctions Committee would advise the Prime Ministers if it considered action by the United Nations was called for.

(4) Some Prime Ministers indicated that they reserved the right if need arose to propose mandatory United Nations action under Articles 41 or 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter. This statement was noted by the other Heads of Government.

155. The Prime Ministers were agreed that planned assistance to a lawfully constituted government of Southern Rhodesia should begin at once. They therefore approved the establishment of a special Commonwealth programme to help accelerate the training of Rhodesian Africans and directed the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat to arrange as soon as possible a meeting of educational and technical assistance experts to consider detailed projects of aid by Commonwealth countries, including the early establishment of an administrative training centre in Southern Rhodesia.

Mr. Ian Smith's statement on resumption of talks with the United Kingdom

156. Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have stated on 17 January 1966 that he was willing to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom Government. He was quoted as saying that he thought they should try to start negotiations for the sake of Anglo-Rhodesian relations and that if negotiations could resolve existing problems then the time was ripe to start them. It was also reported that Mr. Smith had refused to state his conditions for negotiations lest disclosure weaken his position, but that he would insist that Southern Rhodesia remained independent.

Visit of the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom

157. Sir Hugh Beadle, the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia, visited the United Kingdom from 18-24 January 1966, for talks with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth Relations Secretary. The visit of the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom was reported to be a substitute for the proposed visit of the Commonwealth Relations Secretary to Southern Rhodesia to see the Governor on 14 January 1966. The proposed visit was cancelled when Mr. Smith imposed conditions for the visit which amounted to a United Kingdom recognition of the illegal régime. Sir Hugh Beadle is still recognized as the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom Government. However, his position has not been challenged by the illegal régime.

158. Although Sir Hugh was reported to be on a private visit, the purpose of his trip was said to be to report to the United Kingdom Government on developments in Southern Rhodesia and to be briefed by the United Kingdom Prime Minister on further government plans on the Southern Rhodesian question.

159. It was reported that the main points which the United Kingdom Government wished to discuss with the Chief Justice included developments following the Lagos Commonwealth Conference on Southern Rhodesia and United Kingdom plans for development in Southern Rhodesia when constitutional rule was restored. It was also reported that the United Kingdom Government was eager to have Sir Hugh's assessment of the impact of economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. The Commonwealth Relations Office was reported to have stated on 18 January 1966, that Sir Hugh's visit had been arranged between the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and the United Kingdom Government.

160. A United Kingdom Government spokesman was reported on 23 January 1966, to have emphasized that Sir Hugh would not carry a message to Mr. Ian Smith. No official statement was issued on the discussions between Sir Hugh and the United Kingdom Government. The Chief Justice returned to Southern Rhodesia on 25 January 1966, and was reported to have had talks lasting ninety minutes with Mr. Smith on 27 January 1966. Spokesmen for the illegal régime refused to confirm or to deny that the talks had taken place. Sir Hugh was believed to have reported separately to Mr. Ian Smith and to Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor, on the United Kingdom Government's attitude towards the Southern Rhodesia crisis.

Statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in Parliament
on 25 January 1966

161. On 25 January 1966 Prime Minister Wilson made a statement in Parliament on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

162. In his statement, the Prime Minister said that the first aim of the United Kingdom Government was to bring the Southern Rhodesian rebellion to an end as quickly as possible, without lasting damage to the country. To this end, it would maintain and, as necessary, intensify economic measures with a view to a speedy settlement. It was equally the purpose of the United Kingdom Government to help the people of Southern Rhodesia in making a fresh start towards establishing a just society without discrimination. This fresh start must begin with an unqualified return to constitutional rule.

163. Southern Rhodesia's future course could not be negotiated with the régime which illegally claimed to govern the country, although the Governor was authorized to receive from the régime any proposals about the means by which the rebellion was to be brought to an end. But discussion of Southern Rhodesia's constitutional future must be with responsible persons representing all the people. The people of Southern Rhodesia obviously could not proceed at one step from rebellion to independence. The process towards majority rule must be renewed without delay or impediment but it could come only with time measured by African advancement and achievement.

164. Assuming that there was a speedy and peaceful return to constitutional rule, the best provision for the first stage after this return would appear to be for the Governor to form an Interim Government of Southern Rhodesians, responsible to him, comprising the widest possible spectrum of public opinion of all races in the country and constituting a representative government for reconstruction. During this time, the police and military forces would come under the direct responsibility of the Governor. The first responsibility of this Interim Government would be the maintenance of law and order. This would require not only the normal precautions against domestic disturbances and illegality but also guarantees to prevent a repetition of the rebellion and to protect human rights. The United Kingdom Government would need to be assured about the adequacy and effectiveness of these guarantees.

165. The United Kingdom Government would be ready to contribute to the economic needs of the country to restore the Southern Rhodesian economy and, in particular, to assist, in co-operation with other Commonwealth Governments, with schemes for the advancement, education and training of Africans so that they might as soon as possible play their full part in the development of the country's economic and political institutions.

166. Persons restricted or detained for purely political reasons would have to be released, provided they gave guarantees that their political activities would be conducted constitutionally.

167. How long this period of Interim Government might last could not immediately be foreseen; neither could the date on which parliamentary institutions could be restored. The Interim Government would last until conditions could be stabilized

and the social and political wounds inflicted on the country could be healed. The views of the people of Southern Rhodesia would have to be sought on the amendments and changes necessary in the 1961 Constitution to secure a resumption of full constitutional government on the basis of the five principles of the United Kingdom Government. To these must now be added a sixth principle, namely, the need to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

168. The Prime Minister ended his statement by saying that it now rested with all responsible Southern Rhodesians who had the true welfare of the country at heart to bring the rebellion to an end before it was too late and to support the representative of the Crown in upholding constitutional law in Southern Rhodesia.

Changes in the illegal régime

169. On 31 December 1965, the Ian Smith régime announced a number of cabinet changes. Lord Graham, "Minister of Agriculture", was moved to the "Ministries of External Affairs and Defence". The two portfolios had been vacant since the appointment of Mr. Clifford Dupont as "Acting Officer Administering the Government". Mr. George Rudland, "Minister of Transport, Roads and Road Traffic" became "Minister of Agriculture" as well, shedding responsibility for roads and road traffic. Mr. Basil Musset, "Minister of Local Government and Housing", added Roads and Road Traffic to his portfolios.

State of emergency extended for a further three months

170. The "Legislative Assembly" of Southern Rhodesia met on 2 February 1966 and considered the extension of the three months' old state of emergency for a further three months. In introducing the motion to give effect to this, Mr. Lardner Burke, the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", informed the "Legislative Assembly" that the original declaration of the emergency on 5 November 1965 had been taken solely to maintain law and order and had nothing to do with the unilateral declaration of independence. The "Southern Rhodesian Government" considered it necessary to extend the present state of emergency for at least a further three months. He also informed the "Legislative Assembly" that it had come to his notice that certain misguided individuals in the country, some in high places who had held

political rank or had represented the Government in various capacities, had formed what had been colloquially referred to as a "shadow cabinet". These individuals had met and discussed various matters and were trying to form themselves into a Government so that they could take over if requested by Sir Humphrey Gibbs or Prime Minister Harold Wilson. He stated that these people had been warned that if they continued with their endeavours to overthrow the "Government", it would have no hesitation in dealing with them in exactly the same way as it had dealt with anybody else who had endeavoured to cause bloodshed in the country.

171. On 3 February 1966, the "Legislative Assembly" voted 34 to 13, to extend the state of emergency for a further three months. An opposition amendment to limit the extension to one month was defeated by the same margin. The amendment was offered by an African member, Mr. C. Hlabangana of the United Peoples Party. He was reported to have told the "Legislative Assembly" that the emergency was a smoke screen behind which the white minority government of Mr. Smith hid ugly things. He was also quoted as saying that without the emergency regulations there would be a civil war, adding that the emergency was a naked form of intimidation of the opposition.

Southern Rhodesia petitions to Privy Council

172. It was reported on 26 January 1966 that petitions had been lodged with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council by the Southern Rhodesian authorities seeking leave to withdraw appeals from two rulings of the High Court of Southern Rhodesia which had declared invalid restriction and detention orders made in 1964 against Mr. Joshua Nkomo, the African nationalist leader and sixteen other Africans (see A/6000/Add.1, paragraph 57). Mr. Desmond William Lardner-Burke, as "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", had appealed to the Privy Council against that decision and also a finding that orders restricting Mr. Nkomo and 107 others to the Gonakudzinga or Wha Wha restriction areas could not stand.

Twenty-four Africans on trial

173. On 7 February 1966, twenty-three Africans were brought to trial in the High Court in Salisbury, accused of having undergone secret training as saboteurs and intelligence agents in the USSR and the People's Republic of China. A twenty-fourth man was charged with being one of the primary organizers of the training scheme.

The prosecution alleged that they were trained on behalf of the banned Peoples' Caretaker Council and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU).

174. The prosecution alleged that the twenty-three had been among fifty-two Southern Rhodesian Africans trained between March 1964 and October 1965, in guerrilla warfare, the use of explosives and arms, political science, map reading and radio communications. All twenty-four men pleaded not guilty.

C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

General

175. It will be recalled that on 20 November 1965, the Security Council adopted resolution 217 (1965) which, inter alia, called upon the United Kingdom Government, among other things, to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end. The resolution also called upon all States, inter alia, to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The replies of Member States to this resolution have been already circulated as official documents of the United Nations (see paragraphs 12-16 above). Supplementary information on the major developments concerning the economic and financial sanctions, including the embargo on oil and petroleum products, is given below.

Economic and financial sanctions by the United Kingdom Government

176. In his statement to Parliament on 11 November 1965 on the purported declaration of independence by the former Government of Southern Rhodesia (see paragraphs 57-60 above), the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom also announced economic and financial sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

177. The economic sanctions announced by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom covered a total ban on further purchases of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia. Plans to suspend the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in its relation to Southern Rhodesia and to ban further purchases of Southern Rhodesian sugar were also announced. In addition to these measures, Southern Rhodesia was suspended with immediate effect from the Commonwealth Preference Area and its goods denied preferential treatment in the United Kingdom. The Ottawa Commonwealth Preference Agreements of 1932 governing the United Kingdom's trading relations with Southern Rhodesia were suspended. The export of arms, including spares, was also stopped.

178. Financial sanctions announced involved the cessation of all United Kingdom aid, the removal of Southern Rhodesia from the sterling area and a ban on the

export of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was denied access to the London capital market and special exchange control regulations were introduced against Southern Rhodesia. The Export Guarantee Department also ceased to give cover to exports to Southern Rhodesia.

179. Following the passage of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, by the United Kingdom Parliament on 16 November 1965 (see paragraph 61), Orders in Council were published by the United Kingdom Government suspending the operation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in relation to Southern Rhodesia and also removing Southern Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference Area. The other economic and financial measures against Southern Rhodesia did not require new Orders in Council as the Government had power to introduce them under previous legislation.

180. On 1 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson informed Parliament of further economic measures which the Government had decided to introduce.

181. He stated that in addition to the embargoes on tobacco and sugar which represented 70 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports to the United Kingdom, the new embargoes covered the following Southern Rhodesian exports: asbestos, copper and copper products, iron and steel ores and concentrates of antimony, chromium, lithium and tantalum, maize, meat and edible meat products and a range of other food-stuffs. The new embargo items, in addition to those of sugar and tobacco which were announced on 11 November 1965, covered 95 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports to the United Kingdom.^{6/} He further stated that the United Kingdom was reviewing certain items in its export trade to Southern Rhodesia where these were relevant to the objectives of securing a speedy return to constitutional rule in Southern Rhodesia and was also in touch with other countries about them.

182. Prime Minister Wilson also stated that pursuant to the United Kingdom's economic sanctions, the Government was in close touch with other countries that buy significant quantities of imported commodities from Southern Rhodesia. The object of these consultations was to deny Southern Rhodesia as far as possible the export outlets on which the finances of the illegal régime depended.

183. He also announced further financial measures against Southern Rhodesia. In general terms, by these financial measures, a stop was placed on practically

^{6/} Total domestic exports of Southern Rhodesia in 1964 amounted to £119,465,000, of which £30,509,022 went to the United Kingdom.

all current payments by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, except for those arising out of the very limited trade in goods still permitted and on remittances. He went on to say that contractual obligations would not be repudiated, but that they could not be fulfilled in present circumstances. Money due to residents of Southern Rhodesia would be held back for the time being and would be released as soon as constitutional government was restored in Southern Rhodesia.

184. Orders made on 11 November under the Exchange Control Act, 1947, and directions given under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act, 1964, had the effect of excluding Southern Rhodesia from the Scheduled Territories (Sterling Area) and of excluding residents of Southern Rhodesia and their accounts and securities from certain general exemptions and permissions which apply to residents of all other countries outside the Scheduled Territories. Central Banks were advised by the Bank of England of the details of the measures.

185. It was stated that certain current transactions between United Kingdom residents and residents of Southern Rhodesia (e.g. wages, salaries, pensions, interest, dividends) would continue to be allowed for the time being but that Southern Rhodesian accounts in London would be subject to control. Exports of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia would not be allowed, either in the form of direct investments or by the purchase of Southern Rhodesian securities with investment currency.

186. It was also stated that the proceeds of sale by Southern Rhodesian residents of sterling securities held by them in London could be credited only to a Southern Rhodesian security sterling account and used only for appropriate re-investment subject to control or sold to other residents of Southern Rhodesia for such investment. Southern Rhodesian security sterling could not be sold for foreign currency on an overseas security market.

187. Further exchange control measures, intensifying the restrictions already applied, were announced on 1 December 1965, by which practically all current payments by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, except where these arose out of permitted trade in goods, were stopped.

188. Payments in sterling to and from Southern Rhodesia sterling accounts would continue to be allowed in respect of trade in goods, and freight and insurance connected therewith, directly between Southern Rhodesia and countries of the sterling area, to the extent that such trade was allowed by the Governments

of the territories concerned. United Kingdom residents would not be allowed to merchant goods between Southern Rhodesia and any other territory.

189. In general, for current transactions no permission would be given for payments in regard to travel, wages and salaries, and contractual payments such as pensions, interest and dividends, by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, until constitutional government were restored in Southern Rhodesia. Money due to residents of Southern Rhodesia for pensions or interest on United Kingdom Government stocks would be held back for the time being and would be released as soon as normal relations could be resumed. British firms and others were advised to adopt a similar procedure. There was no question, the announcement said, of such obligations being repudiated, but they could not be fulfilled in present circumstances.

190. In general, no permission would be given for remittances by United Kingdom firms to subsidiaries or branches in Southern Rhodesia. No United Kingdom bank facilities would be allowed to, or in favour of, firms or individuals in Southern Rhodesia. No facilities for travel to Southern Rhodesia would be allowed except for approved official or business purposes. Gifts of cash from United Kingdom residents to individuals in Southern Rhodesia up to an aggregate of £50 would continue to be allowed until further notice.

191. On 14 December 1965, the United Kingdom Government revised a previous decision of 1 December 1965, and authorized the resumption of payments of United Kingdom pensions to services and civil service pensioners in Southern Rhodesia.

192. On 17 December 1965; the United Kingdom Government imposed further financial sanctions on Southern Rhodesia by insisting that all its purchases of United Kingdom goods and services should be paid for in hard currencies other than sterling and the South African rand. This replaced a previous regulation of 1 December 1965 which had allowed the use of Southern Rhodesian sterling accounts for a narrow range of payments for United Kingdom and other sterling exports to Southern Rhodesia. The sterling balances can be used only for pensions and other payments. It was reported that the United Kingdom Government had asked other sterling countries also to insist on such payments.

193. By the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Order in Council, 1965, made on 3 December, the governor and other directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia were suspended from office and deprived of all authority in relation to the Reserve Bank. In their place the Order appointed a new board of directors.

194. A Commonwealth Relations Office statement, issued on 3 December, said that Governments and central banks of other countries were being informed of the making of the Order and of its effects. The new governor of the Reserve Bank, Sir Sidney Caine, was giving appropriate instructions to those banks which hold accounts for the Reserve Bank as to the authority under which they should operate those accounts. The main purposes of the Order, the statement said, were to ensure that the assets of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia held abroad were safeguarded in the interest of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and to help to achieve the United Kingdom Government's aim of bringing about a return to constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia.

195. It was stated on 9 December that the new board had established its authority over the assets of the Reserve Bank of Southern Rhodesia throughout the world by communicating with central banks. The new governor of the bank was reported to have said on 9 December that the authority of the new board had not been challenged by any central bank or government.

196. Under The Southern Rhodesia (Bank Assets) Order, 1965, which came into operation on 7 December, the Treasury was authorized to require any bank to supply information about any assets which it has held at any of its United Kingdom Offices, at any time since 11 November, on behalf of any Southern Rhodesian Office of any bank.

197. The assets of the Southern Rhodesia Reserve Bank were estimated at £23.5 million at the time of the illegal declaration of independence. Of this amount, it was reported that about £10 million was held in sterling balance in London. This amount is understood to have been effectively blocked in the United Kingdom. It was further reported that at least £3.5 million of the reserve assets were held in Southern Rhodesia at the time the United Kingdom froze the assets of the Southern Rhodesia Reserve Bank. The then governor of the Reserve Bank of Southern Rhodesia was reported to have stated on 17 November that not less than £12 million of the reserves were held outside the United Kingdom in a number of countries.

198. Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have stated on 11 December 1965 that although the United Kingdom had seized £9 million of Southern Rhodesia currency reserves held in London, there was little chance of the United Kingdom Government finding the remaining £13 million.

Oil embargo by the United Kingdom Government

199. The United Kingdom Government imposed a total oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia on 17 December 1965. By the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, which came into operation on 17 December, the United Kingdom, in exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, prohibited the import of oil and oil products into the Territory. It also prohibited United Kingdom nationals from supplying or carrying oil products for Southern Rhodesian use.

200. Prime Minister Wilson made a statement in Parliament on 20 December 1965 on the oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. He stated, inter alia, that the oil embargo was aimed at getting Southern Rhodesia to return to constitutional rule. He said it would mean great inconvenience and hardship, but that it was essential to get a quick solution to the Southern Rhodesian crisis and to avoid the dangers of outside intervention.

Further economic and financial sanctions by the United Kingdom Government

201. On 20 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government assumed powers under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, 1966, to embargo Southern Rhodesia's trade in any specified product. The Order prohibits the export from Southern Rhodesia or the import into Southern Rhodesia of products specified by the Order. The Commonwealth Relations Office confirmed that it was effective under the laws of both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia and would apply to British exporters. The penalty clause states that any person guilty of an offence under the Order shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to six months, or to a fine of up to £500, or both, and the higher penalties stated above are for conviction on indictment. Where a body corporate is guilty, and the offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of a director, manager, secretary or any other similar officer, then that person or persons would be liable to the punishment.

202. Except where authorized by the government regulations, no person is allowed to make or carry out any contract for the export from Southern Rhodesia or the import into Southern Rhodesia of any specified product;

or make or carry out any contract for the sale of any specified product which he intends or has reason to believe that another person intends to export from or import into Southern Rhodesia. The Order would also make void any contract for export from or import into Southern Rhodesia of specified goods whether made before or after the commencement of the Order (20 January 1966), and any transfer of property or interest in products in pursuance of any such contract.

203. It was reported that the United Kingdom Government hoped that foreign Governments would recognize its legal authority (under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, 1966), to impose this embargo - as they have done in the case of the oil embargo.

204. By an Order in Council made on 20 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government made the selling of Southern Rhodesian chrome illegal. A purchaser henceforth would be a party to an illegal act. It was reported that the reason for the immediate ban on chrome was that some difficulty had been found in preventing purchases by United States importers who buy most of Southern Rhodesia's £2 million worth of exports of chrome ore.

205. On 28 January 1966, the United States Department of State asked United States importers to stop buying Southern Rhodesia chromite. In announcing the request the Department said it was based on a recognition of the legal authority of the United Kingdom Government to prohibit the export of chromite from Southern Rhodesia.

206. On 30 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government imposed a total ban on exports to Southern Rhodesia with the exception of essential humanitarian needs, for the essential requirements of the Joint Central African Organizations and for goods on the quayside already paid for. The ban on imports of goods from Southern Rhodesia into the United Kingdom was also extended (from the 95 per cent announced in 1 December 1965) to cover all imports from Southern Rhodesia.

207. In 1964, Southern Rhodesia's imports from the United Kingdom amounted to £33,379,446 (or 30.43 per cent of the total imports of Southern Rhodesia) and exports from Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom amounted to £31,164,268 (or 21.56 per cent of its total imports) of which tobacco and sugar exports alone amounted to £22 million.

208. On 30 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government issued a warning to people within Southern Rhodesia and to other Governments that it would not

be responsible for any money lent to the Smith régime since it declared independence illegally on 11 November 1965. A statement by the United Kingdom Government Treasury said that any person who lent money or otherwise gave credit to the Smith régime did so entirely at his own risk. When constitutional government was restored in Southern Rhodesia, the lawful Government would not be bound to accept responsibility which the illegal régime might have purported to incur and it could not be assumed that it would meet them.

209. The warning appeared to be particularly directed at anyone who might be tempted to invest in the Southern Rhodesian "independence bonds" which the Smith régime issued on 1 February 1966. It was also reported that the warning was aimed at South Africa and some other nations and also any attempts by the illegal régime to raise money outside Southern Rhodesia.

210. On 7 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government made an Order which banned the export of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia and the sale of tobacco in Southern Rhodesia with a view to its being exported. Under the Order, it is now an offence under United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law for traders or speculators to buy Southern Rhodesian tobacco and stockpile it until the return of lawful government.

211. In an official statement issued on 7 February 1966, the Commonwealth Relations Office announced that the Order made it illegal for speculators or others to buy tobacco and hold it in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere in the hope of selling it at a profit when legal government was restored. Purchasers of tobacco in contravention of the Order would have no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back. The statement added that from now on all transactions in Southern Rhodesia that were aimed at the export of tobacco were invalid, whether the export was to take place immediately or in the future.

212. Under the Order, once lawful government was restored, stocks of tobacco that had been illegally transacted would have to be re-auctioned before they could be exported. Only lawfully sold tobacco would be exported, under an export licence system; equally, only lawfully sold tobacco would be allowed into the United Kingdom.

213. It was reported that this Order was clearly intended to be a warning to any traders from third countries who might be planning to buy this year's crop.

Counter-measures taken by Southern Rhodesia

214. On 16 November 1965, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia (recognized by the illegal régime) announced that the Bank would buy all the gold production of the country which before the announcement was sold in the United Kingdom. Gold exports in 1964 amounted to over £7 million. It was reported that the Reserve Bank has so far not sold any of its gold which is being used as a backing for the Southern Rhodesian pound.

215. On 30 November 1965, Southern Rhodesia announced the abolition of Commonwealth preferences on United Kingdom imports into Southern Rhodesia. The announcement stated that this would enable Southern Rhodesia to seek friendly trading arrangements with countries which until then had been excluded from participating in special arrangements because of Commonwealth preferences.

216. On 2 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia announced counter-financial sanctions against the United Kingdom. By these financial sanctions, Southern Rhodesia also blocked United Kingdom accounts in Southern Rhodesia. Under the financial restrictions, the payment of interest, rents, dividends, profits and other income as well as repayment of capital to United Kingdom residents would be made into blocked accounts until such time as normal financial relations were restored; payments for the maintenance of relatives in the United Kingdom would be reduced, the reduction depending on the hardship involved; exchange control authority would be required for debits and credits to United Kingdom residents' bank accounts; United Kingdom residents working in Southern Rhodesia on contract up to three years could no longer automatically remit their earnings abroad; and monetary gifts to United Kingdom residents would be limited to £50.

217. On 4 December 1965, Mr. Ian Smith declared that since the United Kingdom had seized Southern Rhodesia's London reserves, it would not be possible for Southern Rhodesia to meet its public debt obligations in London and to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). On 8 December 1965, he contended that since the United Kingdom Government had seized Southern Rhodesia's London reserves it should also pay for Southern Rhodesia's external debts.

218. On 8 December 1965, the United Kingdom Treasury stated that the United Kingdom Government was not liable for Southern Rhodesian Government debts.

219. In a broadcast on 8 December 1966, Mr. Smith stated that imports from the United Kingdom, at present running at the rate of £35 million, would be reduced to a relatively insignificant amount and that this realignment would inevitably be of a long-standing nature. He further stated that Southern Rhodesia was developing payment arrangements to by-pass the United Kingdom. He restated in his broadcast that payments of interest, rents, dividends, profits and capital from Southern Rhodesia to United Kingdom nationals had been blocked, causing a loss of "invisibles" of £26 million.

220. A Southern Rhodesian Treasury announcement on 8 December 1965, on exchange control measures, said that all payments to Southern Rhodesia for any purpose from residents of the sterling area excluding South Africa and the United Kingdom could no longer be settled in sterling but had to be made in United States or Canadian dollars or in a West European currency. Payments for Southern Rhodesian exports to Malawi and Zambia must be received in full in an approved currency before goods were dispatched. Exports to countries other than Malawi and Zambia would not be permitted to leave the country until the Southern Rhodesian customs were satisfied on an authorized dealer's certificate that payments had been made or would be made within six months, in an appropriate currency. A Treasury official of Southern Rhodesia was reported to have explained the new regulations by saying that payments made in sterling would only go to swell the accounts of Southern Rhodesia which have been effectively blocked by the United Kingdom Government.

221. On 28 January 1966, the "Ministry of Information" of Southern Rhodesia announced that the Southern Rhodesian pound would now be valued in terms of gold and not sterling as had been the case in the past. The statement said that the new par value of the Southern Rhodesian pound in relation to gold would remain the same as before and that there was no change in the value of the Southern Rhodesian pound to other currencies. The "Ministry" was further quoted as saying that the severance of the ties to sterling meant that the Southern Rhodesian pound was not obliged to follow any adjustments in the exchange parity of sterling.

Internal economic and financial measures introduced in Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence

222. The economy of Southern Rhodesia has undergone some internal reorganization since the illegal declaration of independence. Statements made by officials of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia have confirmed that these changes have become necessary as a result of the international sanctions which have been imposed on Southern Rhodesia.

223. Intensified import and export controls were announced by the illegal régime on 11 November. It was stated that the immediate issues facing Southern Rhodesia were the securing of adequate supplies of essential commodities (such as wheat, medical and veterinary supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants), the ability to earn foreign currency to pay for the supplies and the ability to sustain economic activity. The purpose of export control was stated to be to safeguard essential supplies which were already in the country. Powers had been taken to introduce rationing if the necessity arose, holiday travel allowances were to be cut from £300 to £100 per annum, the sale of Post Office money orders for payment outside Southern Rhodesia was to be discontinued, and the purchase of foreign securities from non-residents by Southern Rhodesian residents was prohibited. Pension payments to pensioners abroad and other normal remittances abroad (including profits, rents, and the repatriation of capital) were allowed to continue.

224. Increases in excise and customs duty on cigarettes, tobacco, beer, wines and spirits were announced in Salisbury on 16 November. Further increases in taxation were reported to have been forecast on 6 December by Mr. Wrathall, the "Minister of Finance" of the illegal régime, who said that expenditure programmes were being reviewed with the object of creating employment to help cushion the effect of British sanctions.

225. On 18 November it was announced that Mr. Smith had established an organization, in which officials and representatives of business, farming and mining would take part, to contend with the sanctions being imposed on Southern Rhodesia and to assist in controlling the economy. The organization was to have three committees: commerce and industry, agriculture, and mining.

226. On 24 November 1965, the Governor of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank (recognized by the illegal régime) announced sweeping measures to restrict credit and at the same time to provide additional funds for the banking system. The statement of the Reserve Bank said that this should result in an immediate release of cash resources amounting to £2.76 million. The announcement said that this had been done because traditional resources available to the banks in Southern Rhodesia were no longer at their disposal.

227. According to the announcement, the banks were requested to follow a six-point advice aimed at reducing credit to the maximum extent to private persons. In no circumstances were they to make facilities available for the purchase of consumer goods. Credit should also be reduced to the distributive trades, but small traders should be given sympathetic consideration, to prevent closure. On the agricultural question, the Reserve Bank asked that the present credit level be maintained and, in the case of tobacco farmers, that continuing assistance be given to those who had already spent substantial amounts towards raising the 1966 crop. But they were to be asked to reduce their expenses to the lowest possible level and to be encouraged to switch to other crops where this was at all feasible. The statement added that credit facilities should be extended for the production of essential goods which would eliminate or reduce the demand for imported articles.

228. To counteract any adverse effects of sanctions, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. G.W. Rudland, on 1 December 1965, announced moves to bolster the sugar industry. He announced a 20 per cent increase in the domestic price of sugar and stated that this measure was to enable Southern Rhodesia to continue with its planned production of 350,000 short tons. He stated that this measure would ensure that full employment was maintained in the sugar industry which employs 30,000 people directly and supports about 150,000.

229. On 16 November 1965, the "Minister of Agriculture", Lord Graham, advised the tobacco farmers that work on tobacco already started or on land irrevocably committed to tobacco, should be continued in the normal way but that where growers still had room to manoeuvre they should consult with their local extension officers on the question of putting uncommitted acreage under alternative cultivation.

230. On 24 November 1965, Lord Graham in a further statement said that tobacco producers would be very unwise to disregard his advice to put their uncommitted land into alternative crops. He was commenting on reports that the Southern Rhodesian tobacco-buying companies were launching an intensive marketing drive to overcome tobacco sanctions. He strongly advised growers to hold back enough to reduce the tobacco crop from the original goal of 280 million pounds to 200 million pounds.

231. Emergency regulations published in Salisbury on 7 December 1965, declared the finance, commerce and industry of Southern Rhodesia to be essential services and provided for the control of corporations, including banking and insurance concerns, through a custodian who would be free to discharge or appoint directors or employees.

232. A statement by the illegal régime said that these powers would be permissive and that they were being taken to ensure that where any company operating in Southern Rhodesia, including a subsidiary or branch of an external company, came under undue pressure from external sources, it might be required to act only in the interest of Southern Rhodesia. It was reported on 29 January 1966, that the list of companies controlled under these emergency regulations numbered eight.

233. To meet the incidence of unemployment in Southern Rhodesia as a result of the international financial and economic sanctions, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. John Wrathall, announced on 6 December 1965, new measures to provide additional employment. He stated that the Roads Ministry was planning to substitute labour for machines as far as possible to create 1,500 new jobs. He also stated that building projects were being accelerated with high priority to projects with high employment factors and large local material content.

234. Mr. Ian Smith stated in his broadcast of 8 December 1965, that the various United Kingdom restrictions would inevitably cause unemployment problems among certain sections of the community. He stated that apart from measures being taken for the direction of the economy, provision would be made for national service schemes to meet the possible unemployment situation. He further stated that workers who could not be absorbed in the national service schemes and who became redundant as a result of the economic pressure from the United Kingdom would be

diverted towards employment at present enjoyed by alien workers and the latter would be replaced and repatriated to their countries of origin.

235. On 17 December 1965, the "Southern Rhodesian Government" ordered the Rhodesia Reserve Bank (recognized by the illegal régime) to stop publishing weekly statements of assets and liabilities, showing the value of foreign assets. A statement from the Bank said they had been ordered to stop publishing them under the emergency regulations. On 22 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia clamped down on publication of details of how it was containing international sanctions. In a statement headed "Secrecy saves lives", the "Ministry of Information" said publication of such reports was detrimental to the national interest. Publicity would aid and encourage Southern Rhodesian opponents to take counter-measures and embarrass the country's friends. He stressed that silence might save the nation.

236. On 19 January 1966, the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board announced new regulations for Southern Rhodesia's tobacco auction sales due to start in March 1966. A statement by the Tobacco Marketing Board said that all tobacco would be pre-classified and a reserve price fixed for each grade. Classification would be carried out by two independent classifiers who would be checked by a senior classifier. During classification the classifiers would be completely isolated. There would be no appeal by buyers or growers against the classification. There would be elaborate precautions to ensure that classifiers had no idea whose tobacco they were grading. Once graded, the tobacco would be vested in a tobacco corporation.

237. The leaf would then be offered on one or two tobacco auction floors at the reserve price or a price above it, and bales not bought would be taken by the corporation at the reserve price. The corporation would hold this in the pool and be responsible for its disposal. It would then be responsible for distributing the proceeds equitably among growers.

238. Even if a grower's leaf was sold above the reserve price, he would only be paid the reserve price in the first instance. The surplus would be credited to a pool and shared among growers. There would be a separate pool for flue-cured and burley tobacco.

239. On 29 January 1966, the "Ministry of Commerce and Industry" of the illegal regime announced that foreign currency available for the importation of goods during the second quota period from 31 April to 31 July 1966 would be increased by 20 per cent. The statement added that the Ministry had made strict preparations for the distribution of currency during this period. The first priority for imports would be given to the procurement of essential supplies. The second priority would be given to materials and supplies for industry, especially those which make the greatest earnings of foreign exchange with the manufacture of capital goods for export. The quota for industry generally, for the re-export trade, and for imports by merchants would be increased.

240. Following the extension of the state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia (see paragraphs 170-171 above), the Smith regime, on 5 February 1966, gazetted a new set of emergency regulations to strengthen its hold over most aspects of economic activity in Southern Rhodesia. The regulations cover the control of corporations, the investment of blocked funds, the publication of financial statements, control of manpower, control of goods and services, price maintenance, petroleum products distribution, local authority borrowing powers and transport and equipment requisitioning.

241. These regulations include the following:

(a) The Emergency Powers (Control of Corporations) 1966, which in addition to the "Minister's" powers to "designate" a corporation, also enables him to direct a corporation "to submit to him in such manner as he may specify any information relating to the conduct of the business of the corporation that he may consider necessary for determining whether or not the corporation should be designated". The Minister would appoint a "custodian", a senior Treasury official, to administer the power conferred on him by the regulations over a designated company. The regulations empower the custodian to adjust the capital structure of a designated corporation, control its labour and "make such order as he deems necessary or expedient relating to the conduct of the business of the corporation...".

(b) The Emergency Powers (Control of Manpower) No. 2 Regulations give the "Minister" - in this case the "Minister of Labour" - extensive powers over the labour policy of a controlled industry.

(c) The Emergency Powers (Publication of Financial Statements) Regulations, 1966, give the "Minister of Finance" power to suspend the publication of the regular statements which are required from the Reserve Bank in terms of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Act, 1964.

242. On 11 February 1966, the illegal régime published orders extending the closed labour areas to all parts of Southern Rhodesia with the exception of five districts on the eastern border of Southern Rhodesia. These orders make it illegal for employers outside these five districts to engage alien Africans who enter Southern Rhodesia from 11 February 1966. According to an official statement, the purpose of these orders was to make job opportunities available to Southern Rhodesian Africans. The order did not affect foreign Africans who were already working in Southern Rhodesia. It is estimated that there are close to 200,000 foreign Africans, mainly from Malawi and Zambia, employed in Southern Rhodesia.

243. On 11 February 1966, the "Minister of Labour, Social Welfare and Health" made a statement on the employment situation in Southern Rhodesia since 11 November 1965, in which he stated that the over-all position was better than many people believed it would be.

244. He said that the purpose of the new manpower regulations was firstly to ensure that the industries concerned were able to continue to operate in the national interest, and that there was adequate manpower to maintain production at a proper level; and secondly to maintain as many people in employment for as long as possible.

245. Touching on the employment situation, the "Minister" said that it was of course true that there had been many changes in the employment pattern in various sectors of the economy since 11 November 1965. While it was obvious that commerce had suffered to some extent, there were on the other hand developments in industry which were creating new job opportunities. The status quo was being maintained whenever possible, and where it was not possible, the redeployment of the resources of manpower in these fields was being undertaken.

246. On 23 February 1966, the Southern Rhodesian régime took further action aimed at combating the effect of sanctions when the Emergency Powers (Industrial Relations) Act was gazetted. These give the "Minister of Labour" the right to suspend specific provisions of industrial agreements made under the Industrial Conciliation Act, at the request of the employers. It covers most aspects of commerce and industry, but excludes agriculture and railways. Employers may now request alterations in conditions concerning hours of work, short time, leave and remuneration laid down in present agreements. The object is to enable employers, for a temporary period, to alter these conditions of service as an alternative to dismissing workers.

Southern Rhodesia and the oil embargo

247. It will be recalled that Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, called on all States, inter alia, to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia including an embargo on oil and petroleum products (see paragraph 12 above). It will also be recalled that the United Kingdom imposed a total oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia on 17 December 1965 (see paragraph 19 above) by which it prohibited the import of oil and oil products into Southern Rhodesia.

248. The normal oil consumption of Southern Rhodesia is estimated at 400,000 tons a year, or approximately 300,000 gallons per day, which accounts for only 27 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's energy requirements. Southern Rhodesian industry and agriculture are worked by coal (63 per cent) and electric power from the Kariba dam (10 per cent).

249. Through 1964, Southern Rhodesian oil requirements were met by product imports, largely from the Persian Gulf. Since then, Southern Rhodesian oil requirements (as also Zambian) have been met by the output of the Central African Petroleum Refineries Ltd. (CAPREF) refinery in Southern Rhodesia at Feruka, near Umtali. Crude oil for the refinery had been delivered for the account of CAPREF at the port of Beira, Mozambique by the several companies that are shareholders in CAPREF, and transported by pipeline from Beira to the refinery. CAPREF is entirely owned by external capital, as follows: 20.75 per cent, Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (United Kingdom and Netherlands); 20.75 per cent, British Petroleum Co. Ltd. (United Kingdom); 17.75 per cent, Mobil Petroleum Co. Ltd. (United States); 15.75 per cent, Caltex Ltd. (United States); 15 per cent, American Independent Oil Co. (United States); 5 per cent, Kuwait National Petroleum Co. (Kuwait); 5 per cent, Total Oil Products Rhodesia Pet. Ltd. (France).

250. The refinery's operations are keyed to the circumstances of its shareholders, who are both marketers of petroleum products within Southern Rhodesia and crude producers in various other areas from which crude supplies for the Southern Rhodesian refinery would be drawn.^{7/}

^{7/} With the exception of American Independent, which has crude production but does not market in Southern Rhodesia, and Kuwait National Petroleum Co., which has neither markets in Southern Rhodesia nor crude production.

251. Following upon the Security Council resolution, all the Governments of the shareholders of Central African Petroleum Refineries Company placed an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia. Thus, all of the companies participating in normal oil supply operations for Southern Rhodesia are under constraint not to do so in contravention of the embargo - either directly by action or advice of their home governments, or indirectly in appreciation of the attitude of their home governments and governments of oil-exporting countries as expressed through acts of embargo. Among other oil producing countries, Iran, the normal supplier of crude oil to CAPREF has also imposed an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia.

252. To counteract any immediate adverse effects of the embargo on the refinery, the Smith régime on 21 December 1965, introduced emergency regulations which provided that no employee of the Central African Refining Company or distributive companies might be discharged or resign without the prior consent of the Minister of Labour.

253. It was reported that the last cargo of crude oil consigned to CAPREF arrived at Beira around mid-December 1965, prior to the United Kingdom embargo. Subsequent refinery operations were limited by the crude in storage at Beira (no crude has been pumped through the pipeline since 31 December), and the crude and unfinished oil in storage at the refinery. Accordingly, the refinery shut down its facilities around mid-January. (The exact date is uncertain since various facilities would be subject to separate operation depending on the internal flow of oil in process.) The start-up of operations would obviously depend on whether arrangements could be made for crude oil receipts from alternative sources of supply.

254. Control over oil distribution was initiated by the Southern Rhodesian régime on 19 December 1965, two days after the British Order embargoed further oil supplies. On that date, oil companies were requested to limit weekly supplies of gasoline and automotive diesel oil to garages and other retail outlets to the average weekly amount delivered over the previous three months.

255. Rationing began formally on 28 December. Private motorists were allowed 3 to 5 imperial gallons weekly per car, according to size of car. Commercial users were limited to between 5 and 20 gallons per week, according to the size of commercial vehicle; no limitation was imposed on automotive diesel oil consumption. Other users were not rationed, and other petroleum products were not then subject to controls.

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256. On 4, 11, 18 and 25 January, successively more stringent rationing was imposed on oil consumers. Gasoline rations were sharply reduced; rationing was extended to automotive diesel oil and aviation fuels; and farmers were brought under rationing controls.

257. As of mid-January, it appeared that oil consumption had been slowed to around two-thirds the normal rate, or perhaps slightly less. Restrictions on private motorists were most severe; restrictions were minimal or nil in essential end-uses. By late January, however, the impact of rationing was to become much more pronounced as new measures were imposed. Government railway, airways, broadcasting, and power systems are among the remaining exempt users.

258. On 17 January 1966, Mr. Ian Smith said in an interview that oil was still coming into Southern Rhodesia despite the embargo. He would not say how much oil was coming in or how his régime was beating the embargo. He also said that while his régime had been embarrassed for a while about the oil embargo, new plans had been made and he was satisfied that this problem would be resolved as would a number of others.

259. On 31 January 1966, a South African truck delivered 6,000 gallons of motor fuel to Southern Rhodesia. The delivery was described as a private business venture which might develop into a daily shuttle service. On 11 February 1966, it was again reported that gasoline from South Africa had been delivered to the Southern Rhodesian army and police. On 15 February 1966, a consignment of gift gasoline from South Africa was handed over to the "Minister of Defence and External Affairs", Lord Graham, in the City Centre in Salisbury. The gasoline which was estimated at 1,400 gallons was described as a gift from the townspeople and the Candour League of the South African town of Stellenbosch.

260. In a nation-wide broadcast on 10 February 1966, Mr. Smith stated that the flow of oil to Southern Rhodesia was increasing in spite of the United Kingdom embargo and that the target was to bring in more oil than was actually consumed in Southern Rhodesia. The significant thing was that the flow of oil was increasing not decreasing. He also stated that if all the various schemes which his régime was planning materialized, Southern Rhodesia would beat the United Kingdom embargo.

261. On 16 February 1966, it was reported from South Africa that Southern Rhodesia might be getting 70,000 gallons of fuel daily from South Africa and Mozambique

and that more than 35,000 gallons of gasoline, oil and kerosene were passing daily from the Beit-Bridge road border point from South Africa into Southern Rhodesia. The report said that this information was the result of a three-day survey made at Beit-Bridge. The fuel was being taken to Beit-Bridge by South African road tankers, furniture trucks and heavy duty trucks, then transferred to Southern Rhodesian tankers. The report also said that Southern Rhodesia appeared to be getting an equal quantity of oil from Mozambique.

262. On 17 February 1966, a spokesman for the United Kingdom Government acknowledged that petrol was getting through to Southern Rhodesia from South Africa and that this was viewed with concern. But it was emphasized that press reports which had mentioned up to 70,000 gallons a day were greatly exaggerated.

263. Subsequent press reports estimated the inflow of oil from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia at between 35,000 to 40,000 gallons a day for the period from mid-February to the first week of March 1966.

264. An observer in Southern Rhodesia stated on 1 March 1966 that she had counted forty-four rail tankers in five days bringing some 308,000 gallons of gasoline up the railway line from Mozambique to Bulawayo. The observer, who said her watch only covered the daylight hours, estimated the capacity of the gasoline cars she saw at about 7,000 gallons each.

265. On 3 March 1965, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry" announced a relaxation of the petrol rationing to enable Southern Rhodesians to go on holiday. According to this announcement, persons who produced evidence of firm bookings for holidays outside the country of three weeks or more, would be given enough petrol to enable them to reach the border.

Portugal and the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

266. Portugal has only very limited trade with Southern Rhodesia. However, Southern Rhodesia, which is a landlocked territory, depends wholly on Portugal for its rail connexion to the Mozambique seaports which handle most of its foreign trade. Moreover, the Beira-Umtali pipeline which supplies Southern Rhodesia with all its crude oil also passes wholly through the Portuguese territory of Mozambique.

267. The Mozambique railway connects with the Rhodesia railway at Umtali and extends through the Portuguese territory to the Mozambique seaport of Beira which handles

the main bulk of the overseas trade of Zambia and Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesia railway is also connected with the Mozambique seaport at Lourenço Marques in the south which handles a limited amount of Southern Rhodesia's foreign trade. The Mozambique line thus provides the main outlet to the sea of the Rhodesia Railways which owns the supply line through Southern Rhodesia and Zambia. The Mozambique line is entirely controlled by the Portuguese who do not therefore have to share the revenue or responsibility for the line. With Mozambique under Portuguese administration, both the railway and the seaport of Beira fall completely under the jurisdiction of the Government of Portugal.

268. The Foreign Minister of Portugal, Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira, held a press conference on 25 November 1965, on the attitude of the Portuguese Government to the question of Southern Rhodesia. He was quoted as saying that to cut Southern Rhodesia's rail communications via Mozambique would be to harm Zambia more than Southern Rhodesia. To carry all Zambia's copper through Angola to Lobito would be to sacrifice Katanga's mineral exports, with serious consequences to the economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the Benguela Railway had not the capacity for both. Portugal, he added, wished to continue her good neighbour policy towards Malawi, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo besides Southern Rhodesia. He was also quoted as saying that it was easy for some to advocate drastic, violent and theoretical measures. But Portugal must always act with a great sense of responsibility and in a spirit of collaboration with numerous countries without harming the just balance of the collective necessities.

269. Conversely, Portugal was reported on 5 December 1965, to have approved an emergency plan for shipping out the bulk of Zambia's copper through Angola if Southern Rhodesia cuts Zambia's rail link to the Indian Ocean. On the return journey the trains would have ample capacity to carry Zambia's imports. Portugal's approval of the plan was given in October 1965, privately to officials of the Benguela Railways which is controlled by Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., a British firm with many investments in Africa.

Portugal and the oil embargo

270. Southern Rhodesia receives its crude oil at Umtali, which is on the Southern Rhodesian border with Mozambique. The crude oil is pumped through the 184-mile pipeline from the seaport of Beira in Mozambique to Umtali. The Beira-Umtali oil pipeline was opened in late December 1964. The pipeline is owned and operated by Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia. Ownership of the pipeline is held by Lonrho Ltd., a British company (62.5 per cent) and by Portuguese interests (37.5 per cent). A nine-man board, however, includes five Portuguese directors (of whom one is a Portuguese Government nominee) and four British directors.

271. The Board of Directors of the Mozambique-Rhodesia Pipeline (Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia) met in Lisbon on 5 December 1965, to discuss the question of the oil embargo imposed by the United Kingdom Government against Southern Rhodesia. At the Board meeting, the Portuguese directors (by the Chairman's casting vote), blocked a proposal of the Lonrho directors that the pipeline should stop operating until the United Kingdom Government lifted its oil embargo. But at the same time the directors of the Company unanimously rejected a request, received from the Smith régime, via the Central African Petroleum Refineries Company, that an estimated 14,000 tons of oil in the pipeline be pumped through to Feruka despite the lack of supplies to replace it. Pumping had been discontinued on 31 December 1965 when supplies at Beira were exhausted as a result of the embargo.

272. In the absence of a guarantee of indemnification for possible damage, the Southern Rhodesian request was rejected by the pipeline company because it was feared that if water or compressed air was used, the pipes would be damaged.

273. Since mid-January 1966, there have been persistent press reports that refined oil products were coming by road and rail from Mozambique into Southern Rhodesia. These press reports stated that the refined oil products were coming from Lourenço Marques in Mozambique where there is an oil refinery and a direct rail link with both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. On 11 February 1966, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, commenting on press reports that oil was going from Lourenço Marques to Southern Rhodesia, stated that he knew nothing about oil going into Southern Rhodesia from Mozambique. On 13 February 1966, it was reported that seventeen tank cars, carrying about 140,000 gallons of petrol

had arrived in Southern Rhodesia the previous week by way of the Mozambique port of Lourenço Marques. The petrol was said to have been shipped by rail from South Africa. A press report from South Africa dated 16 February 1966, estimated that Southern Rhodesia was receiving 35,000 gallons of oil daily from Mozambique.

274. It was reported on 4 March 1966, that the Smith régime was constructing on a high priority basis six prefabricated oil tanks at Beira, each capable of holding 3,000 tons of crude oil. The tanks are in the vicinity of the pipeline and are planned to link direct to the pipeline, by-passing the storage depots owned by the British and United States oil companies which, before the embargo, took delivery of the crude oil for CAPREF. It was reported that the tanks were being built in anticipation of private oil tankers arriving in the near future with crude oil for Southern Rhodesia.

275. On 2 March 1966, the United Kingdom Government expressed serious concern to the Government of Portugal about reports of the supply of oil products from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, made the representations personally to the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal in London. Mr. Stewart also expressed concern over further reports about the construction of the storage tanks in Beira for Southern Rhodesia.

276. It was reported from Johannesburg on 9 March 1966, that thousands of gallons of gasoline have been secretly sent to Southern Rhodesia by South African railways, through Lourenço Marques, the capital of Mozambique. According to this report, in a secret operation, with Portuguese trains back tracking and using diversionary tactics, an estimated total of 155,000 gallons of petrol had been sent to Southern Rhodesia to counter the embargo imposed on oil shipments. The report stated that the Smith régime had been getting the bulk of its oil in this way.

277. On 7 March 1966, the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal in London informed the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, that reports that oil products were going by rail from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia were incorrect. A United Kingdom Government spokesman was subsequently reported to have stated that Portugal had also informed the United Kingdom Government that the new oil storage tanks being built at Beira were for use within Mozambique and not for oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia.

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South Africa and the economic and financial sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

278. South Africa is the third most important trade market for Southern Rhodesia after the United Kingdom and Zambia. In 1964, imports from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia amounted to £26,589,447 or 24.35 per cent of the total value of imports. Exports from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa amounted to £12,249,326 or 8.47 per cent of the total value of exports, including re-exports. The balance of trade for Southern Rhodesia was adverse by £14,340,121.

279. In his statement of 11 November 1965 on the illegal declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia (see paragraphs 124-125 above), the Prime Minister of South Africa stated that his Government would continue to maintain normal friendly relations with both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia. He further stated that the Government of South Africa could not participate in measures such as a boycott movement. Its declared policy had always been, whenever boycotts had been directed against it, that boycotts were in principle wrong and that retaliation by the institution of a counter-boycott would not even be considered. His Government could therefore not take part in any form of boycott. By acting thus, South Africa was not only pursuing its own policy, but also acting in accordance with the stand of principle against boycotts which had frequently and unambiguously been the subject of declarations by the world's most important States.

280. On 12 November 1965, the Republic of South Africa announced the suspension of all dealings in Southern Rhodesian currency until the position between the South African rand and the Southern Rhodesian pound was clarified. On 18 November 1965, the Reserve Bank of South Africa announced that financial transactions with Southern Rhodesia would return to normal immediately. A joint statement issued by the Reserve Bank of South Africa and the Central Bank of Southern Rhodesia on 18 November 1965, stated that negotiations had been concluded so that "permissible financial and trade transactions" between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia could be resumed immediately on the same basis as before 11 November 1965.

281. Following this announcement, the Reserve Bank of South Africa stated on 18 November 1965 that financial and trade transaction with Southern Rhodesia were resumed forthwith. The rate quoted against the Southern Rhodesia pound was the same as that prior to the illegal declaration of independence. On 22 December 1965, it was reported that South Africa Reserve Bank had frozen Southern Rhodesia's foreign assets as a result of pressures from the United Kingdom Government. Both the Government and Reserve Bank of South Africa were quoted as having declined to comment on this report.

282. The Minister of Finance of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Donges, was quoted as saying on 5 December 1965, that a statement on South Africa's financial relations with Southern Rhodesia would be made at the appropriate time if necessary. Since then there has been no further indication of when the statement can be expected.

283. It was reported that trade sources in Southern Rhodesia expected South Africa to be the first country to benefit from the cancellation of Commonwealth preferential tariffs on imports from the United Kingdom. The announcement of the illegal régime on 30 November 1965, abolishing Commonwealth preferences on United Kingdom imports, stated that this action would enable Southern Rhodesia to seek friendly trading arrangements with countries which had been hitherto excluded from participating in special arrangements (see paragraph 215 above). South African goods were in the past unable to compete on the Southern Rhodesian market with United Kingdom manufactured goods because of the preferential import rates enjoyed by the United Kingdom.

284. It was reported from Johannesburg on 4 December 1965 that South African exporters expected a very considerable increase in South Africa's exports to Southern Rhodesia as a result of these developments. The report further stated that increases in trade between the two countries was expected to be between 20 and 30 per cent, depending on a relaxation of import control restrictions imposed by Southern Rhodesia. The major increases were expected to be in goods essential to the Southern Rhodesian economy, such as machinery, particularly mining machinery, railway rolling stock and telephone equipment. The Southern Rhodesian "Trade Commissioner" in South Africa was reported on 22 November 1965

to have stated that trade between the two countries was already back to the pattern that existed before the illegal declaration of independence.

285. It was reported from Salisbury on 25 December 1965, that a Southern Rhodesian marketing centre was to be opened in Johannesburg on 1 February 1966 for an experimental period of three months. The centre was reported to be designed to push the sales of Southern Rhodesian light industries and to enable them to take full advantage of the quota granted under the 1965 Southern Rhodesian-South African trade agreement.

286. It was reported on 8 January 1966 that South Africa had decided to stop making a distinction between exports and re-exports in its trade figures. As a result of this it was stated that it had become a good deal harder for outsiders to discover whether or not South Africa was acting as a channel for embargoed Southern Rhodesian exports or supplying it with embargoed oil. It was also reported on 30 January 1966 that as a result of this, South African businessmen were left freer to channel what they could to Southern Rhodesia.

287. On 21 January 1966, the President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Charles Swart, stated in his speech at the opening of Parliament that South Africa would continue its policy of trying to maintain friendly relations with both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia but would not participate in boycotts or sanctions against any country.

288. On 17 February 1966, the "Minister of Transport and Power" for Southern Rhodesia, Brigadier Andrew Dunlop, stated in the "Legislative Assembly" that plans for railroad links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had been in existence for many months and could be implemented immediately to deal with any emergency which would arise should Southern Rhodesia be denied the use of the railway through Bechuanaland.

289. At present the only rail link with South Africa is through Bechuanaland and two possibilities exist for joining up the Southern Rhodesian and South African railway systems. One would be a hundred mile link from Rutenga, on the line to Lourenço Marques down to Beit-Bridge. The other, of similar length and costing approximately the same, would be from the existing Rhodesia Railway Terminal at West Nicholson to Beit-Bridge.

South Africa and the oil embargo

290. Soon after the oil embargo by the United Kingdom, a number of ostensibly private South African "petrol for Rhodesia" movements started, sending quantities of gift gasoline to Southern Rhodesia. An unknown number of private business groups and individuals were also reported to have started a shuttle service of refined oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia.

291. On 17 January 1966, Mr. Smith publicly stated that oil and petroleum products were still coming into Southern Rhodesia despite the embargo (see paragraph 257 above). He followed this statement up on 27 January 1966, by broadcasting a message of thanks to the people of South Africa, in which he stated that the donations of fuel to Southern Rhodesia were a gesture typical of the traditional friendliness for which South Africans were noted throughout the world. Mr. Smith said in his broadcast that the gifts of oil would fortify his regime for the struggle ahead.

292. On 25 January 1966, the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Hendrik Verwoerd, stated in Parliament that his Government would not prevent South Africans from sending gifts of oil or gasoline to Southern Rhodesia. He stated that to ban gifts of any kind would be a form of participation in boycott measures against Southern Rhodesia. His Government, while declining to interfere in the Southern Rhodesian dispute, maintained its position that it would not join in any form of boycott, including an oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. He was also quoted as saying that if gasoline companies or traders wanted to supply fuel to Southern Rhodesia, the Government would not stop them.

293. On 25 January 1966, the Department of Commerce and Industry in South Africa announced that it had established an inter-departmental committee to study the shipping of gasoline and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia. The Committee was set up after a group of supporters for Southern Rhodesia in Johannesburg formed an organization to collect money from private individuals to buy gasoline for Southern Rhodesia. In reply to a question as to whether there was anything to stop South African citizens from privately sending a gift of gasoline to friends in Southern Rhodesia, an official of the Department of Commerce and Industry was reported as saying that gasoline and petroleum products were not at present under export control. He was further reported as saying that if people sent petrol to

Southern Rhodesia without first approaching the Ministry they would not know about it but that since the matter was now under consideration the advice of the Ministry to people was to do nothing pending a statement by the Committee.

294. Following the statement of Prime Minister Verwoerd on 25 January 1966, the traffic in oil and petroleum products from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia was reported to have increased considerably, reaching their peak in mid-February.

295. On 27 January 1966, representatives of South African oil companies met in Cape Town to discuss the Prime Minister's statement that the Government would not interfere if private oil companies or individuals sent supplies to Southern Rhodesia. The companies decided to contact the Government on the implications of the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament in order to clarify the position. All the executives attending the meeting declined to comment on its outcome.

296. Later, the United States, the United Kingdom and French oil companies operating in South Africa announced that their head offices had issued instructions that fuel must not be sold to persons and organizations buying it for later transportation to Southern Rhodesia. It was reported on 12 February 1966 that the South African Government had warned the oil companies in the Republic that the conditional sale of oil would not be tolerated. The warning was reportedly made after the foreign oil companies told their depots near the Southern Rhodesian border not to sell oil to Southern Rhodesian buyers. The South African Financial Gazette was quoted as saying that the Government saw instructions from head offices to overseas oil companies in the Republic as a direct interference in South African affairs.

297. On 13 February 1966, the South African Oil Company which is locally owned announced that it was selling fuel without restriction but denied that it was under pressure to do so from the Government of the Republic.

298. According to estimates published in Pretoria on 16 February, 1965, shipments of oil crossing the South African border to Beit-Bridge in Southern Rhodesia amounted to nearly half of Southern Rhodesia's daily requirements of gasoline and oil products under the rationing plan imposed as a result of the United Kingdom embargo. It was estimated that at least 35,000 gallons of petroleum products were crossing the border daily in a regular shuttle arrangement.

299. According to press reports, these shipments were clearly beyond the means of voluntary organizations in South Africa which had originally initiated the

"petrol for Rhodesia" campaign. They were described as large scale commercial shipments of petroleum, organized through a Southern Rhodesian based organization, GENTA, which was sending road tankers to collect petrol in the Transvaal, ostensibly as voluntary gifts.

300. On 16 February 1966, the United Kingdom Ambassador called on the Foreign Minister of South Africa to express concern over the mounting shipment of oil to Southern Rhodesia. The Foreign Minister was reported to have replied that his Government was holding to its announced policy of not supporting boycotts but that it would look into the United Kingdom complaint.

301. On 19 February 1966, Prime Minister Wilson of the United Kingdom had talks with the South African Ambassador in London, Dr. Carel de Wet, on the breach in the oil embargo against the Smith régime. Mr. Wilson was reported to have made a strong protest to the South African Ambassador.

302. On 22 February 1966, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, told Parliament that refined petroleum was reaching Southern Rhodesia from South Africa in quantities which were causing the United Kingdom Government concern. He also stated that representations on this matter were being made to the South African Government.

303. Subsequent press reports estimated the inflow of oil from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia at between 35,000 to 40,000 gallons a day for the period from mid-February to the first week of March 1966.

304. On 28 February 1966, Prime Minister Verwoerd reaffirmed in an electioneering campaign speech that his Government did not believe in sanctions. If any commodity available in South Africa including oil or petrol was traded with Southern Rhodesia, his Government would be participating in a boycott if it were to stop such trade. In what was considered a direct reference to the current increased volume in sales of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia, he stated that South Africa's policy of continuing "normal trade" with Southern Rhodesia did not imply continuing to sell the same commodities or quantities as before. "Normal trade" he said, meant that everybody involved in competition tried to sell what and as much as he could. It meant trade without inhibition and without breaks. It often happened that in the course of normal trade some individual gained an advantage over another and that in the course of it, he sold more than he used to. This did not make the trade abnormal.

Zambia, Malawi, and the economic and financial sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

305. Zambia and Malawi together in 1964 accounted for 25 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports, including re-exports, while their total exports to Southern Rhodesia amounted to only 5.5 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports. Zambia alone absorbed 28.28 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports, including re-exports, while accounting for only 4.92 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports. Malawi, on the other hand, absorbed 6.31 per cent of the total value of exports of Southern Rhodesia, including re-exports, while it accounted for only 1.45 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports. Southern Rhodesian sales to Zambia and Malawi were mainly of manufactured goods.

306. In 1964 the total value of exported goods including re-exports from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia amounted to £40,732,687, while imports amounted to £5,396,453; 39.41 per cent of the entire imports of Zambia in 1964 came from neighbouring Southern Rhodesia; the entire imports of Zambia amounted in 1964 to £78,219,201, of which £30,868,610 of domestic merchandise came from Southern Rhodesia. In particular, electric power and coal are the most vital items for Zambia's economy, since neighbouring Southern Rhodesia is the main supplier of electric power and the only economical supplier of coal to Zambia.

307. The figures of trade with Malawi show that Southern Rhodesia in 1964 had a favourable trade balance of £5,598,637. In 1964, exports amounted to £7,229,550 of the total value of exports, including re-exports, while the imports amounted only to £1,630,913 of the total value of imports; 39.1 per cent of the entire imports of Malawi in 1964 came from Southern Rhodesia.

308. Both Zambia and Malawi imposed trade restrictions on Southern Rhodesia when it declared independence illegally. Zambia removed Southern Rhodesia from the Commonwealth preference list on 14 November 1965 and Malawi also announced on 17 November 1965, that it had abrogated its preferential trade agreement with Southern Rhodesia with effect from 18 November 1965. Owing to difficulties in finding alternative suppliers and the geopolitics of Central and Southern Africa, both countries have in the meantime continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia in essential goods but have appealed to local importers to find alternative sources of supply.

309. On 8 December 1965, the Smith régime imposed trade restrictions on Zambia and Malawi. The new restrictions forbid Southern Rhodesian exporters to accept sterling in payment for goods sold to Zambia and Malawi. Under the new restrictions, goods shipped to Malawi and Zambia now have to be paid for in advance in United States or Canadian dollars or in a West European currency.

310. In a White Paper published on 26 April 1965, the former Government of Southern Rhodesia stated that if the Southern Rhodesian economy was to suffer as a result of sanctions by the United Kingdom Government, Southern Rhodesia would consider the repatriation of foreign workers and their families to Zambia and Malawi, to protect its indigenous labour force. It estimated that there were 500,000 such persons in Southern Rhodesia (see A/6000/Add.1, appendix I).

311. In an obvious reference to Zambia and Malawi, Mr. Smith stated in his broadcast on 8 December 1965, that workers who became redundant as a result of economic pressures from the United Kingdom would be directed towards employment at present held by alien workers and the latter would be replaced and repatriated to their countries of origin.

Other developments between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia

312. Prior to the United Kingdom oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia, the Central African Petroleum Refineries Company in Southern Rhodesia was the normal supplier of oil and petroleum products to Zambia. On 18 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia banned all shipment of oil and petroleum products to Zambia. The Southern Rhodesian "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. George W. Rudland, described the retaliatory embargo on Zambia as temporary. He stated that it would be lifted when Southern Rhodesia had overcome the effects, of the United Kingdom embargo.

Following the Southern Rhodesia embargo, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States Governments together, started a regular airlift of oil and petroleum products to Zambia to beat the embargo.

313. On 19 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia imposed additional royalties of £5 a ton on coal and an export tax of £8 a ton on coke exported to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

314. On 1 January 1966, Mr. Smith announced proposals to resume gasoline supplies to Zambia and cut the royalties charge on coal and the export tax on coke. On

2 January 1966 his offer was rejected by President Kaunda of Zambia who described it as an empty gesture.

315. On 3 January 1966, the Southern Rhodesian "Ministry of Lands and Mines" announced that the additional royalties on coal and the export tax on coke exported to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo had been suspended as of midnight on 1 January 1966.

316. The copper industry of Zambia which accounts for over 90 per cent of its exports is heavily dependent on coal from Wankie in Southern Rhodesia which is shipped through the Rhodesia Railways. In 1964, Zambia imported 1,073,923 tons of coal from Southern Rhodesia for £1,204,449, which accounted for about 95 per cent of the total consumption of coal. The remaining 5 per cent, which amounted to 3,961 tons, was imported from South Africa for £11,013. In addition to this, 72,476 tons of coke and semi-coke of coal and their briquettes were also imported from Southern Rhodesia for £290,019.^{8/}

Zambia, Malawi, and the common services with Southern Rhodesia

317. Zambia shares three common services - the Central African Power Corporation (the Kariba dam), Rhodesia Railways and Central Africa Airways - with Southern Rhodesia. Malawi is a third partner in the Central Africa Airways. These common services which were retained after the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963, are administered by higher authorities of the government members. The Kariba dam and the Rhodesia Railway are each under a Zambia-Southern Rhodesia Higher Authority, with two members from each country, which can only make decisions unanimously. The Higher Authority of the Central Africa Airways differs from the others in having one member representing Malawi.

318. When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved on 31 December 1963, the Governments of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia agreed to assume jointly the ownership, control and responsibility for further development of the Kariba hydro-electric scheme. A Higher Authority for Power, composed of two Ministers from each of the two countries (whose decisions must be unanimous) was established to determine policy, and a statutory corporation, the Central African Power Corporation, in which the assets and liabilities of the Federal Power Board were vested, was set up to operate and develop electric power supplies.

319. The Kariba power station now produces the bulk of the electricity generated in Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, the output from thermal power stations having been substantially reduced. By 1963, the Copperbelt was drawing over half its requirements from Kariba, the balance coming from local thermal generators operated by the mining companies and from the Le Marinel hydro-electric power station in Katanga under an agreement which expires in the second half of 1966. The existing single transmission line of the grid - from Kariba to Kitwe on the Copperbelt - is already operating at full capacity and it is estimated that requirements in that area will exceed the capacity of the single line in the latter part of 1966.

320. Although the Kariba dam site is on the frontier between the two countries the power station for generating the electricity is on the Southern Rhodesian side of the border of the two countries.

321. The Rhodesia Railway extends 3,000 miles from the region of Ndola in the Copperbelt of Zambia to Umtali on the Southern Rhodesian border with Mozambique, and through Bulawayo down into Bechuanaland. It has rail connexions through Southern Rhodesia to the Mozambique seaports of Beira and Lourenço Marques and through Bechuanaland to the South African seaports. The main bulk of the rail traffic goes to the Mozambique seaport of Beira for shipment overseas.

322. The rail connexions of the Rhodesia Railway in Southern Rhodesia to the seaports of Mozambique and South Africa, make landlocked Zambia dependent on transit rail facilities through Southern Rhodesia to the seaports. Zambia's annual copper exports of 750,000 tons are shipped through the Rhodesia Railways to Beira. Zambia also depends on the Rhodesian rail link for essential imports of food, machinery, coal, petroleum products, cars and trucks and medical supplies.

323. The two common services jointly owned with Zambia, Kariba and Rhodesia Railways, are vital to the economy of Zambia. The Kariba provides over 66 per cent of the electrical energy needed to work the copper mines which account for over 90 per cent of Zambia's exports. The Rhodesia Railway also handles 99 per cent of all imports into Zambia, including oil. It also carries all the coal needed by the copper mines from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia. The denial of Kariba power and transit railway facilities by Southern Rhodesia would have a major effect on the copper industry of Zambia and also close the rail route to imports to Zambia, including coal from Wankie, Southern Rhodesia, for the copper mines.

324. President Kaunda of Zambia told a press conference on 17 November 1965, that he had asked the United Kingdom to send troops to help Zambian soldiers to defend the Kariba dam. If the United Kingdom failed to send in troops after Southern Rhodesia cut off the power from the Kariba to Zambia, he would reserve the right to invite any Power to come and help to protect Kariba. He indicated that he would prefer troops to be sent to Kariba before anything happened. President Kaunda repeated his request for troops to the United Kingdom on 27 November 1965, after power from Kariba to Kitwe had been briefly interrupted by saboteurs in Zambia.

325. On 1 December Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in Parliament that the United Kingdom was willing to send a military contingent to Zambia. He stated that the United Kingdom was willing to fly a squadron of Javelin jet fighters to Zambia with support from the members of an air force regiment. The jets were ready to go to the Zambian town of Ndola and the ground troops would go to Ndola, Lusaka and probably Livingstone. He also stated in Parliament on 1 December 1965, that he had given President Kaunda of Zambia an assurance that the United Kingdom Government would not stand idly by if Mr. Smith used his illegitimate control over the Kariba dam to cut off power supplies to the Copperbelt in Zambia.

326. On 2 December 1965, Mr. Harold Wilson disclosed that he had received word from the President of Zambia, accepting the dispatch to Zambia of Royal Air Force planes. He said that talks about stationing United Kingdom ground forces in Zambia were continuing. The squadron of Javelin jet fighters and members of the air force regiment were reported to have arrived in Zambia on 3 December 1965.

327. The Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, was reported on 5 December 1965 to have stated that the United Kingdom had reason to believe that explosives had been planted at the Kariba dam. Mr. Smith was, however, reported to have said that his régime had no serious plans to blow up the dam. He said the concept existed only in remote contingency planning. The contention of Mr. Arthur Bottomley that the Kariba dam had been mined was denied by both the Zambian Government and the Central African Power Corporation on 6 December 1965.

328. On 9 December 1965, President Kaunda was quoted as saying in the Zambian Parliament that if Southern Rhodesia interfered with any of the common services, it would be a declaration of war and that he would not hesitate to order his country into action. He was also reported to have said that the United Kingdom

Government was using Zambia's dependence on Southern Rhodesia for electricity, coal and oil as an excuse for not tightening United Kingdom sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. He was also quoted as saying that Zambia should not be used as an excuse for United Kingdom inaction. It was also reported on 9 December 1965, that President Kaunda had issued a new and urgent appeal to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for British troops to protect the Kariba dam.

329. A United Kingdom military mission led by Major-General Willoughby, the General Officer Commanding United Kingdom Middle East Land Forces at Aden, visited Zambia from 19 to 24 January to consider with the Government of Zambia future arrangements for United Kingdom forces in Zambia. During the visit the mission inspected the Zambian side of the Kariba dam.

330. The "Deputy Minister of Information" of the illegal régime, Mr. Van der Byl, said in Salisbury on 26 January 1966, that Southern Rhodesia would not hesitate to carry out a "scorched" earth policy if the United Kingdom sent troops into Southern Rhodesia. He stated that once the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom knew of this, he would never send United Kingdom or other troops into Southern Rhodesia.

Drought in Southern Rhodesia

331. It was reported on 5 January 1966, that Southern Rhodesia was facing a severe farm crisis as a result of drought in nearly the whole of the south west province of Matabeleland and part of the Midlands. It was reported that cattle were dying at the rate of 250 a day, much of the maize crop had been lost, dams and rivers were dry and even trees were dying. In an emergency removal scheme announced by the Southern Rhodesia régime cattle were being removed in northern areas where conditions were better.

332. On 8 January 1966, it was reported that a famine relief operation to get grain supplies to the drought struck countries of Central Africa, including Southern Rhodesia, had been initiated on 7 January 1966 by the United Kingdom Government in collaboration with the Governments of Australia and Canada.

333. It was reported that in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government would work through Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the legal Governor of Southern Rhodesia, who would deal with the Smith régime in organizing the emergency supplies

of grain to the stricken areas. The United Kingdom Government emphasized that the move on grain did not portend any relaxation of the embargo on oil or the trade and financial sanctions. The United Kingdom Government also stated that this was a humanitarian exercise and that it was not going to use starvation as a sanction. It could hardly help other countries all around and let thousands die in Southern Rhodesia.

334. On 13 January 1966, it was reported that slow progress was being made with the relief operation scheme launched by the United Kingdom because no estimates had been received regarding the amount and type of grain required. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, it was reported that the previous plan whereby the Governor of Southern Rhodesia was to deal with the Smith régime in obtaining information on what was needed and in organizing emergency supplies to the stricken areas, had not been carried out. It was reported that the United Kingdom Government had now apparently asked the Governor to make his own estimate of what was required on the basis of such information that reached him. The report emphasized that so far there had been no dealing with the illegal régime.

335. On 20 January 1966, it was reported that the Governor had submitted a report on the drought situation to the United Kingdom Prime Minister. The report was said to have indicated that although the drought had been severe, the position was far short of famine. Additional help along the lines suggested by the United Kingdom Prime Minister would be welcomed, but it would not be needed on the scale that his original announcement suggested. The report was also said to have suggested that the urgent problem was water and some feed for animals with only some local need of emergency food for the people.

III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

336. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 401st to 407th meetings between 6 and 21 April 1966.^{9/}

337. The Permanent Representatives of Ghana and Algeria, by letters dated 12 April 1966 (A/AC.109/155), and 13 April 1966 (A/AC.109/156), respectively, asked to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia. At its 403rd meeting on 14 April 1966, the Committee decided, without objection, to grant these requests.

338. By letter dated 19 April 1966 (A/AC.109/157), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia also asked to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia. At its 405th meeting on 19 April 1966, the Committee decided, without objection, to grant this request.

A. WRITTEN PETITIONS

339. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Southern Rhodesia:

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document</u>
Mr. Emilio Sereni, Chairman, Alleanza Nazionale dei Contadini Italiani	A/AC.109/PET.435
Mr. Reinhard Fiedler and twenty-one other High School Students at Burgstädt, German Democratic Republic	A/AC.109/PET.436
Mr. Nnamdi B. Emetarom, President of the African Students' Association in Israel	A/AC.109/PET.437
Dr. Milnor Alexander, Legislative Secretary of the United States Section, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom	A/AC.109/PET.438
Mr. George W. Brind	A/AC.109/PET.439 and Add.1
Mr. Khalid Aljoundi, Chairman, Confederation of Syrian Workers Trade Unions	A/AC.109/PET.440
FIFITAMA (Council of Youth of Madagascar)	A/AC.109/PET.441
Mrs. A.M. Hughes, State Secretary of the Union of Australian Women	A/AC.109/PET.453

^{9/} See Section VI and VII for an account of the Special Committee's further consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia during its meetings in Africa.

B. GENERAL STATEMENTS

340. The Chairman said that in view of the recent alarming developments concerning Southern Rhodesia, the main item on the agenda for that meeting, several delegations had urged him to make a statement from the Chair.

341. Many members of the Special Committee had expressed deepening concern at the fast deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. That concern had in no way been alleviated by events of the past few days. Members were all no doubt fully aware of the incident of the Greek tanker Joanna V carrying oil, presumably destined for Southern Rhodesia, which had anchored off the harbour of Beira, Portuguese Mozambique. That, according to the news from London, had been in defiance of a United Kingdom frigate's instructions not to proceed to Beira and, according to the British, in issuing those instructions they had been anxious to enforce an oil embargo declared by the United Kingdom against Southern Rhodesia in keeping with United Nations Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965.

342. That incident, it was generally believed, was far from being an isolated occurrence in the breach or attempted breach of the United Kingdom embargo on Southern Rhodesia. Many and convincing had been the reports of Portuguese and South African activities in getting oil to Rhodesia. What was of the gravest concern to the majority of members of the Committee was that those incidents had demonstrated convincingly the lamentable failure of the United Kingdom Government to bring down the illegal régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia by the imposition of sanctions.

343. The Committee had been entitled to expect the United Kingdom to restore constitutional legality in Southern Rhodesia, in view of the many statements it had made on the matter in the United Nations and elsewhere, as early in December 1965 and in January 1966, that the measures which it had been imposing by means of sanctions would bring down that illegal régime "in a matter of weeks rather than months". In the circumstances it was quite proper and fitting to hold the United Kingdom Government squarely responsible for the continuing and fast deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. That Government had often made pious statements about its responsibilities in its territories to all sections of the community. And yet, in that crucial test where 200,000 Whites arrogantly

and defiantly in the worst traditions of racism had imposed their rule on the 4 million black indigenous inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia in flagrant contempt of democracy and the much vaunted British ideas of justice and self-determination, the British had failed lamentably to honour their commitments and their responsibilities to the black Southern Rhodesians and had also failed to put into effect the United Nations resolutions.

344. It was therefore the duty of the Committee, with that vexed question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda and in face of the continued existence of the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia, to recognize that explosive situation as constituting a threat to international peace and security. The Committee urged all States not to recognize the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with that illegal authority and to desist in every way from aiding and abetting it by whatever means. It condemned the actions of all States which had not complied with the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, in particular Portugal and the racist régime of South Africa. In recognizing the inadequacy and the failure of the measures so far undertaken by the United Kingdom Government to bring to an end the Smith régime, the Committee drew the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the appalling state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia and asked the Secretary-General to alert the President of the Security Council, since the matter was already on the agenda of the Security Council, to take steps to bring it before the Council for the necessary action.

345. In the present circumstances, the Committee believed that the time had come for firm mandatory sanctions to be taken under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter, since the measures already adopted had proved inadequate. The Committee solemnly called upon the United Kingdom Government once again to comply with Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, to honour its responsibilities to the 4 million black indigenous Southern Rhodesians and to bring to an immediate end the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, indeed in keeping with its own undertaking.

346. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the Chairman's statement accurately reflected the views and grave concern of the members of the Special Committee. The so-called sanctions had simply not worked and at the present rate they would continue to fail miserably.

347. The representatives of the United Kingdom had constantly reminded the Committee that the Southern Rhodesian question was the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government. That was quite true: the Southern Rhodesian question was only a continuation of colonialism and responsibility for it lay fully with the United Kingdom Government. The deteriorating situation demanded the application of mandatory sanctions and total economic blockade of southern Africa, including the use of military force to dislodge the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith.

348. From the day of the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom Government had been warned that mild economic sanctions would not work and that the only way to end the illegal régime was to use force and crush it. Considering that five months had passed since the declaration, it was time to resort to more forceful measures. The economic measures adopted so far had achieved nothing; everyone knew that the Smith régime was obtaining oil from Portugal and South Africa, to mention only two places. An oil tanker had just entered Beira harbour, and his delegation was not so naive as to believe that the ship would not deliver its cargo, despite British assurances. Another oil tanker was now approaching Beira; those ships, of course, were the only two that had been given such wide publicity.

349. South Africa and the Portuguese colonialists were doing all they could to keep the Smith régime supplied with everything it needed. It was no longer possible to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia, economically or otherwise, in isolation from the rest of southern Africa. The area was covered by a system of foreign financial oligarchies which provided an umbrella for the illegal Smith régime. Southern Rhodesia had been quietly but definitely selling its tobacco crop. It had been able to secure a large foreign investment in a milling and maize processing company. It had also been reported to have sold large amounts of iron ore and sugar to certain Japanese firms. An article in The New York Times of 5 April referred to the stationing of middlemen in neighbouring countries who purchased and sold for Rhodesian business men without being detected. The

only way to stop that traffic was to police the borders of Southern Rhodesia by armed guards who would confiscate goods leaving and entering Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, agents of the Smith régime were allowed to carry out open publicity activities in the United States and other countries.

350. What his delegation held to be of paramount importance was the fate of the 4 million Africans and their right to rule their own land. The continued existence of the Smith régime meant a continued threat to international peace and security in the heart of Africa. An armed police State existed in Southern Rhodesia today; the African nationalists were detained, imprisoned, tortured, murdered. In those circumstances, his delegation felt that all the talk about economic sanctions was nothing but a ruse to divert attention from the suffering of the African people of Zimbabwe. It was generally accepted that the Smith régime was a threat to international peace and security, and it was high time that drastic and effective action was taken to bring that régime down and to return the land to its rightful owners. The only way that justice could be done in Southern Rhodesia was by the use of force. He hoped that the United Kingdom Government would shoulder its responsibilities. It had used force to impose its rule in other colonies and there was no reason why it should not use force to restore justice. That would be an exceptional action which would be well applauded. Even the Episcopal Church of Southern Rhodesia and the Primate of the Church of England had called for the use of force. Chapter VII and Article 42 of the United Nations Charter showed clearly what was to be done. Military force was the only means that could crush the Smith régime. It was the Committee's duty to recommend in clear terms to the Security Council that it should take the necessary action under Article 42 of the Charter. His country had always supported the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe against enslavement and colonialism and it considered that struggle part of its own fight for the total liberation of Africa and for development and peace. His delegation would therefore readily co-operate with all delegations which were ready to take action on those lines.

351. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thanked the Chairman for his clear statement on the present situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Soviet Union, consistent with its position of principle, supported the right of

the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and genuine independence. The Soviet Union Government had condemned the Smith régime and had branded the unilateral declaration of independence as a further crime of the colonialists against the suffering people of Zimbabwe. The governing circles of the United Kingdom pretended to oppose the Smith régime and to be working towards its downfall, but the facts showed the very opposite to be true. Through the 1961 Constitution, the United Kingdom had laid the foundation for the present racist régime; it had subsequently armed the Southern Rhodesian racists and encouraged a colonial union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. As a result, Southern Rhodesia had become a police State. The United Kingdom could never rid itself of responsibility for the national tragedy of the people of Zimbabwe.

352. It might be alleged that the present United Kingdom Government did not bear responsibility for past events. He would point out, however, that the Labour Government had taken no steps to abrogate the 1961 Constitution, nor had it declared itself willing to carry out United Nations decisions on the granting of genuine independence to the people of Zimbabwe; judging from various statements by Labour Party leaders, it did not intend to do so.

353. On 11 November 1965 the General Assembly in resolution 2024 (XX) had condemned the unilateral declaration of independence and invited the United Kingdom to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions in order to put an end to the rebellion. On the following day the Security Council in resolution 216 (1965) had called upon all States not to recognize the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering it any assistance. On 20 November 1965, the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965) calling on the United Kingdom Government to quell the rebellion of the racist minority, to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end and to take immediate measures to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

354. A significant number of States Members of the United Nations had already adopted the necessary effective measures for the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council. In December 1965 the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had decided to implement a total economic blockade of Southern Rhodesia and to sever all communications with that country. Under that decision, aircraft travelling to Southern Rhodesia were denied the right to fly over the African countries concerned. The decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council had been supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States. By 18 March, communications announcing the adoption of concrete measures against the Smith régime had been received from fifty-eight countries, and communications on that subject were continuing to arrive. The Soviet Union, which systematically supported the peoples struggling against colonial domination, had informed the Secretary-General (S/7068 and Add.1) of its willingness to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. The Soviet Union did not recognize the Smith régime; it had not provided that régime with arms, equipment or military materiel and maintained no economic relations with it. The Soviet Union had severed postal communications and telecommunications with the Salisbury régime. It was ready to co-operate with the African countries in extending all possible support to the Zimbabwe people in their struggle.

355. The United Kingdom - which, as the administering Power, was basically responsible for the tragic situation in Southern Rhodesia - had not implemented the decisions of the United Nations. Although it had claimed that the economic and financial sanctions would crush the rebellion within weeks, the ineffectiveness of those sanctions had been recognized by Mr. Smith himself, by the Press in the United Kingdom and the United States, by officials in the United Kingdom and by representatives of African countries. The sanctions had been adopted too late and the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia had been able to prepare for them. The United Kingdom had announced the oil embargo only on 17 December 1965 - in other words, five weeks after the unilateral declaration of independence. The total ban on trade with Southern Rhodesia had been imposed by the United Kingdom only on 30 January 1966 - two and a half months after the racist mutiny

and the Security Council resolution. It was only on 18 March 1966 that the United States had officially imposed a ban on all exports to Southern Rhodesia. The sanctions allowed exceptions, which the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western Powers used in order to continue trade with Southern Rhodesia. Figures published by the United Kingdom Board of Trade showed that in February - after the United Kingdom had imposed a total embargo - the value of United Kingdom imports from Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £523,000 and its exports to Southern Rhodesia to £672,000. Tobacco exports from Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom had been to a value of £484,000, although officially imports of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia had been prohibited as from 11 November 1965. Those figures showed the "effectiveness" of the so-called economic sanctions.

356. The Smith régime was being assisted by its partners in the unholy alliance; Portugal and South Africa were undermining the economic sanctions. Mr. Swart, the President of the Republic of South Africa, had stated on 21 January 1966 that the South African Government would maintain normal relations with the régime in Southern Rhodesia and would not take part in any sanctions or boycotts. The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had announced on 25 November 1965 that Portugal would maintain normal relations with the Government of Southern Rhodesia. As could be seen from Press reports and from the Secretariat working paper (paragraphs 1 to 335 above), Verwoerd and Salazar were helping their friend Ian Smith to overcome the oil embargo; supplies of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia each month from South Africa and Mozambique were equal to the monthly consumption of such products in Southern Rhodesia under the current rationing system. The economic life of Southern Rhodesia was not hampered by any lack of petroleum; the railways were operating normally and, despite Portuguese denials, witnesses claimed that oil was going to Southern Rhodesia by rail from Lourenço Marques.

357. With the help of friends in Western countries, the Smith régime was also evading the financial sanctions. After the racist mutiny, the United Kingdom had blocked Southern Rhodesian currency reserves in London. The racist régime had, however, made its preparations; all reserves, with the exception of £9 million, had been removed from London and placed in banks in South Africa and Europe.

As could be seen from paragraph 198 of the working paper, the reserves available to the Salisbury authorities were estimated at £14 million. Moreover, the Smith regime had solid gold reserves. The value of the annual gold production of Southern Rhodesia was £7 million.

358. The embargo on the sale of tobacco was equally ineffectual. On the eve of its declaration of independence, the Smith régime had succeeded in selling its 1965 tobacco harvest. The embargo was being violated not only by South Africa and Portugal but also by the United Kingdom, the United States and certain other Western Powers.

359. The sanctions were also being sabotaged by powerful international monopolies, which were openly helping the Southern Rhodesian racists to overcome the oil embargo. The petroleum products being supplied by South Africa to Southern Rhodesia were produced at installations under the control of the international petroleum monopolies, including Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil Oil and Caltex. They were then taken to Southern Rhodesia in tanks owned by British Petroleum, in which United Kingdom nationals owned 56 per cent of the shares. As stated in The New York Times of 26 February 1966, the branches of Mobil Oil and Caltex in Southern Rhodesia had complained to their parent offices that business was slipping away to the big United Kingdom companies, which were bringing oil clandestinely into the country. The oil monopolies in the United Kingdom and the United States were making no attempt to conceal their failure to co-operate in the oil embargo.

360. The subversive role of the monopolies was demonstrated by recent attempts to resume the pumping of oil through the Beira-Umtali pipeline. The pipeline was owned by Companhia do Pipeline Mocambique-Rodésia, whose capital was controlled by Lonrho Ltd., a British company (62.5 per cent) and by Portuguese interests (37.5 per cent). It had been explained that the decision to resume pumping had been carried through by the Portuguese, who were in the majority on the Board of Directors of the Companhia do Pipeline Mocambique-Rodésia. It was difficult to believe, however, that a company which owned two thirds of the shares in that concern had no say in the matter.

361. So far as sales of Southern Rhodesian tobacco were concerned, it was "business as usual" for the monopolies.

362. Although it was aware of those violation , the United Kingdom Government had taken no effective action to ensure the implementation of the sanctions. Despite its diplomatic exchanges with Greece and negotiations with Lisbon and despite constant supervision by United Kingdom armed forces, a tanker carrying oil for the Smith régime had succeeded in reaching the shores of Mozambique and anchoring two miles of Beira.

363. It was thus clear that responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia lay primarily with the United Kingdom and those countries which, by direct or indirect means, were violating the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. The Soviet Union delegation agreed fully with the Afro-Asian delegations that the Special Committee should request the Security Council urgently to reconsider the question of Southern Rhodesia with a view to the adoption of measures under the Charter to ensure the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations, including the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965.

364. The representative of Ethiopia supported the Chairman's statement. His delegation hoped that the statement would be adopted as a consensus of the Committee; otherwise, it would be compelled to introduce a draft resolution.

365. The United Kingdom Government had failed to crush the rebellion, primarily because it did not wish to do so. If it had so wished, it would have dispatched troops as it had done in many parts of Africa and Asia. Only force would crush the rebellion; the failure of the economic sanctions was obvious.

366. The representative of India congratulated the Chairman on his clear and concise statement, which reflected the sentiments of a large majority of the States Members of the United Nations. The statement constituted an effective interim pronouncement, which would focus the attention of the world community and of the Security Council on the explosive situation which the United Kingdom Government had allowed to develop in Southern Rhodesia.

367. The representative of Mali thanked the Chairman for his statement, which reflected the concern of the majority of the members of the Special Committee.

368. Mali considered Southern Rhodesia a colony and did not recognize the illegal and racist minority régime established at Salisbury. His delegation was convinced of the full responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In Aden and British Guiana, the United Kingdom had not hesitated to suspend constitutions, revoke assemblies and governments elected by universal suffrage and arrest officials against the will of the people. In Southern Rhodesia, however, that same Government was showing complaisance and acting in complicity with a white settler minority which practised discrimination and cynically exploited the large majority of the African population, in violation of human rights and of the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter.

369. He would be glad to learn what the United Kingdom Government intended to do in order to ensure the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia.

370. The representative of Bulgaria said that the Chairman's statement should, as an expression of the opinion of the Special Committee as a whole, be transmitted to all those who should take effective action to overthrow the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

371. The steps taken by the United Kingdom and other countries, which continued to be the mainstay of the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, were deliberately ineffective. Racist regimes, such as that in South Africa, knew that they could count on the support of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments. Although six months had elapsed since the adoption of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, the unlawful Rhodesian regime continued to exist and to violate the most elementary rights of the overwhelming majority of the population. It was encouraging to note that a large number of Member States had responded promptly and positively to the appeals of the Security Council but the measures adopted by certain Governments - and particularly by the United Kingdom Government - had been ineffective.

372. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Chairman's statement had shown the causes, implications and consequences of the current situation in Southern Rhodesia and the extent to which the United Kingdom Government bore responsibility for that situation. By asking for the application of Article 42 of the Charter, the

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Chairman had indicated a way out of the problem. For that reason, the Yugoslav delegation fully supported the statement. It was imperative for the Committee to take more vigorous action, if it was to fulfil its duties and continue to be an important and authoritative organ of the United Nations.

373. The representative of Iraq said that, when his delegation had referred at a recent meeting to the deteriorating situation in Aden, it had done so not only because the people who were being maltreated there were its kith and kin but also because the cause of freedom and independence was indivisible. If people were allowed to suffer in Aden, those responsible for that suffering would be encouraged to do the same thing in other parts of the world. His delegation therefore strongly condemned the events in Southern Rhodesia, the inactivity on the part of the United Kingdom and the support given to the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia by South Africa and Portugal. The United Kingdom should be pressed to carry out its duty fully and the Security Council should be called upon to consider the situation again.

374. Another reason why his delegation was so interested in the matter was that any discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia reminded it of a similar case, that of Palestine. There, too, there had been a Mandatory Power, settlers and an embargo. He had warned the General Assembly, at its eighteenth session, that what had happened in Palestine would happen in Southern Rhodesia and his prediction was proving true: in Southern Rhodesia an administering Power was helping a minority to take over the country illegally and was doing its utmost to encourage the settlers and invaders, while 4 million people were suffering under the shackles of colonialism.

375. His delegation therefore supported the clear and strong statement made by the Chairman and would be prepared to support any draft resolution which would request the General Assembly or the Security Council to take stronger action to compel the administering Power to carry out its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and to ensure that those who were ignoring the decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council were brought to reason.

376. The representative of Syria associated his delegation with those which had expressed support of the Chairman's statement, which reflected the grave concern felt by all members with respect to the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

377. The statements of the representative of the administering Power on the question of Aden and the question of Southern Rhodesia had given the impression that the problems would soon be solved, that independence would come and that the rebel regimes would collapse. Yet the truth of the matter was that colonialism continued to exist. After decisive arguments presented by the representatives of Tanzania and the Soviet Union concerning the United Kingdom Government and the steps that were being taken by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, there was little left to say. The Committee was faced with a serious situation which showed a complete disregard for human rights and United Nations resolutions. No attempt should be made to minimize the Committee's responsibility as a body representing the consensus of the United Nations and there should be no question about the direction which the Committee's work should take.

378. His delegation supported the Chairman's suggestion that the matter should be referred to the Security Council so that Article 42 of the Charter could be invoked with respect to the question.

379. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had been surprised to hear the actual terms of the Chairman's statement in that they appeared to suggest that they reflected a general view, although at that stage no views had been expressed by delegations or by the Committee as a whole. Nor could his delegation be expected to accept the comments which the Chairman and other representatives had made about his Government's actions and policies.

380. His delegation and his Government had of course never underestimated the seriousness of the situation created by the illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia or by recent events. That had been made quite clear in every statement which the United Kingdom delegation had made in the Security Council or in any other United Nations body.

381. At that very moment in London the United Kingdom Ministers were taking stock of the whole Rhodesian problem in the light of the latest developments. The Commonwealth Sanctions Committee, which had been set up at the Lagos Conference in January 1966, was also meeting in London. Furthermore, the United Kingdom

Government was in touch at a high ministerial level with the Portuguese Government about recent developments.

382. He reserved his delegation's position with regard to the statements which had been made during the meeting.

383. The representative of the United States of America said that there were certain passages of the Chairman's statement with which his delegation could not associate itself. He consequently reserved his Government's position on the matter.

384. The representative of Denmark said that, while his delegation was in full agreement with much of the Chairman's statement, it reserved its position with regard to certain points in the statement until it had had time to study the text more closely.

385. The representative of Italy said that his delegation, like other delegations, found itself in agreement with much of the Chairman's statement. There were, however, certain points on which he was obliged to reserve his Government's position at the present time.

386. The representative of Australia said that he, too, would like to reserve his position regarding the Chairman's statement. His delegation was not prepared at the present stage to go into details about many of the things that had been said.

387. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation had agreed with the idea that the Chairman should make a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia because it had thought it necessary to stress the seriousness and urgency of the matter. His delegation generally supported the Chairman's statement, which was, however, one of considerable detail and, to some extent, a substitute for a resolution that would have been adopted after appropriate debate. He therefore reserved his delegation's right to comment on certain aspects of the statement at a later stage, when it had had time to examine the statement carefully and to receive appropriate instructions.

388. The representative of Chile said that his delegation's position with regard to the Chairman's statement coincided with that of the representative of Uruguay. While it was in general agreement with the statement, it was unable to commit its Government regarding certain points of detail without receiving instructions. His delegation therefore reserved the right to comment on the subject at a later meeting.

389. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation agreed that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was serious and that effective action should be taken by the Special Committee and other appropriate United Nations organs to put an end to that illegal situation. His delegation had supported the idea that the Chairman should make a statement in order to emphasize the gravity and urgency of the matter. The statement had, however, been much broader than had been expected and there were a number of points which his delegation felt it must consider with great care. It could not take a position on the statement without consulting its Government and accordingly reserved its right to comment at a later stage.

390. The representative of Afghanistan said that his delegation was happy to note that there was a wide area of agreement among the members in the Committee regarding the gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the need for effective measures to remedy that situation. He had been glad to hear the United Kingdom representative say that his Government had never underestimated the gravity of the matter. That representative had also recognized the illegal nature of the actions of the authorities in Southern Rhodesia. The majority of the members, however, had given the clear impression that they did not consider the action being taken by the United Kingdom sufficiently effective.

391. His delegation expressed its appreciation of the Chairman's statement and saw no contradiction between the spirit of that statement and the unanimous concern felt by the members of the Committee. His delegation regarded certain points in the statement as mere recommendations, based on the consensus of members of the Committee that the attention of the Security Council should be drawn to the urgency and gravity of the question of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation therefore whole-heartedly supported the spirit of the Chairman's statement in the light of the discussion in the Committee.

392. The representative of Poland said that his delegation whole-heartedly supported the Chairman's statement, which fully reflected the concern felt by his delegation about the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia.

393. The representative of Tunisia associated his delegation with all those which had given the Chairman's statement full support. Like other delegations, his delegation had intended to present an interim draft resolution at the present meeting because it considered that the seriousness of the events in Southern Rhodesia and the fact that the administering Power had not taken any effective steps to put an end to the situation and to the illegal Southern Rhodesian regime required immediate action. It was, however, prepared to accept the Chairman's statement, which reflected its position and which it regarded as the consensus of the views of members.

394. His delegation felt that the problem was so serious as to demand urgent action on the part of the Security Council, which should be requested to adopt effective measures to put an end to the deplorable state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation also felt that it would be well to express, on behalf of the United Nations and the Special Committee, the concern that was felt about the situation.

395. The United Kingdom representative's reservations had caused his delegation no surprise. The problem had, however, been debated on so many occasions in the United Nations that the astonishment shown by the United Kingdom representative seemed exaggerated. It was obvious that the situation could not last indefinitely and that the time had come to take further action.

396. The representative of Iran associated his delegation with those which had spoken in support of the Chairman's statement. The situation was grave and called for more effective action to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. As members were aware, Iran had been one of the first countries to impose a ban on the sale of oil to Southern Rhodesia and that ban had been scrupulously observed.

397. The representative of Madagascar expressed his delegation's support of the Chairman's statement, which fully reflected the gravity of the situation and the general concern felt by members of the Committee.

398. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the various reservations that had been made were not likely to detract from the Chairman's statement, which reflected the views of the delegation of the Ivory Coast.

399. It was impossible to think of the Southern Rhodesian question without recalling that a few months previously Ian Smith had requested the United Kingdom to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia and had threatened to declare independence unilaterally should the administering Power not accede to that request. Ian Smith had indeed made good that threat. It seemed that reason no longer prevailed and that the Smith government felt that it had the right to keep 4 million black patriots in bondage, in spite of the appeals made to it and of its condemnation by world opinion.

400. The United Kingdom, which had come to the United Nations to explain the difficulties and to obtain assistance in order to put down the Rhodesian rebellion, had exhausted all means, while Ian Smith's regime stood fast and became stronger with every passing day. All that was in contradiction with the principles enshrined in the Charter. His delegation was surprised at the weakness of the measures which the United Kingdom delegation had allegedly taken to bring down the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. It was convinced that, faithful to the idea which had prompted it to bring the question before the Security Council a few months previously, the United Kingdom Government must immediately take further steps to crush the Rhodesian rebellion.

401. His delegation supported the Chairman's statement and hoped that the Security Council would soon have an opportunity to consider the Southern Rhodesian question in the light of recent events.

402. The representative of Ethiopia pointed out that the Special Committee had drawn the attention of the Security Council to the gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia as early as April 1965 and had called upon the United Kingdom Government to take urgent measures in that Territory. The Security Council had subsequently adopted resolution 202 (1965) concerning Southern Rhodesia and the provisions of that resolution had been endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 October 1965. After the unilateral declaration of independence, the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965), which called upon States to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and to impose an embargo on oil and petroleum products. Notwithstanding all those efforts, there was a greater need than ever for action

to restore the rights of the African population and it was a major part of the Committee's duty to use the United Nations forum to keep world opinion informed on the matter and to renew its appeal to the conscience of the United Kingdom Government.

403. Recent developments in Southern Rhodesia might be referred to as a farce, were it not for the human tragedy involved. The only possible conclusion from the sequence of events was that the administering Power had known from the beginning that there would be an illegal seizure of power by the Ian Smith Government. That Government had rejected the United Kingdom offer to set up a Royal Commission to amend the 1961 Constitution and its negotiations with the United Kingdom in October 1965 had been followed almost immediately by Mr. Smith's announcement that Southern Rhodesia would become independent by Christmas 1965. The preparations made by the Government in the ensuing weeks had obviously been a prelude to the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965 and to the assumption of full control by the illegal minority.

404. The United Kingdom Government, on the other hand, had been strikingly reluctant to display its wonted firmness in dealing with disorder and illegality. It had imposed some vague and ineffective sanctions, having already made it quite clear that force would not be used in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. Mr. Wilson's announcement on 11 November 1965 that his Government did not contemplate any national or international action against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia had only helped that regime to entrench itself. It was therefore not surprising that the declaration of independence placed so much stress on "kith and kin". While Mr. Wilson had been telling the world that, if the legal Governor of Southern Rhodesia asked for help, the United Kingdom would fully consider the request, the Governor's proclamation dismissing Ian Smith and his Ministers had been barred from publication in Southern Rhodesia. Even when the Governor had been deprived of all signs of office, Mr. Wilson still had not thought there was enough provocation to justify action. Nor had the mass intimidation of the African population convinced the United Kingdom Government of the urgent need for action.

405. At the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1966, Mr. Wilson had finally agreed that the use of force could not be precluded if it proved necessary to restore law and order. The need to use force to dislodge the illegal regime had been abundantly proved; any further delay would amount to deliberate support of Ian Smith and his fellow rebels. The use of force had been requested by the Organization of African Unity as early as 25 October 1965, by the Episcopal Church of Rhodesia and by the Archbishop of Canterbury.

406. The half-hearted manner in which economic sanctions were being implemented had fully justified Ethiopia's scepticism. Like the United Kingdom assurance that no force would be used, the progressive nature of the sanctions was designed to reduce the effect of each stage and further assist the rebels. The purchase of tobacco was declared illegal only if the tobacco was for sale abroad. Thanks to the embargo, Southern Rhodesia copper could be sold on the open market at higher prices, giving an extra profit of about £3 million a year. Large foreign concerns continued to supply Southern Rhodesia with spare parts and equipment free of charge.

407. The calculated leniency of the United Kingdom Government contrasted with the firm stand adopted by the retrograde Governments of South Africa and Portugal. Both before and after the unilateral declaration of independence, the Verwoerd Government had stated that it would maintain economic and other relations with Southern Rhodesia. Even before the unilateral declaration, Portugal had given the sovereignty of Southern Rhodesia de facto recognition by accepting a Mr. Reedman as "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission" to Lisbon.

408. The failure of the oil embargo was catastrophic. The flow of oil into Southern Rhodesia was increasing and not decreasing; 70,000 gallons of fuel were arriving daily from South Africa and Mozambique. Greek tankers had recently defied the United Kingdom and headed for Beira. The depraved Portuguese colonialists had made it clear that oil entering Territories under their subjugation would reach Southern Rhodesia. The reluctance of the United Kingdom to use force in that matter had been explained by a desire to avoid loss of life. The fact, however, that lives were being lost in the racist prisons of Southern

Rhodesia and that lives had been lost in Kenya, British Guiana, India and Aden did not appear to cause the United Kingdom any concern. Since Southern Rhodesia depended on oil for only 27 per cent of its energy needs and had all the assistance it required in that regard, the only solution was to use direct, firm and unequivocal force. If economic sanctions were to be effective, the United Kingdom Government would have to use force against South Africa and Portugal, but since the United Kingdom Government had already declined to use force even against the settlers, it would obviously not do so against those two States.

409. The Special Committee should urgently recommend that the Security Council should decide upon enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to end the highly explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Ethiopian delegation had recommended the adoption of such measures during the consideration of the question in the Security Council in November 1965. Together with many other delegations, it had not been satisfied with the manner in which the Security Council had recently handled the question of Southern Rhodesia. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and adopted by the Council on 9 April 1966 was limited and inadequate in many respects. The amendments submitted by the three African members of the Council with the aim of strengthening and broadening the text had unfortunately been rejected. The Special Committee should therefore request an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia in the light of Chapter VII of the Charter.

410. The representative of Australia stated that there was a serious misunderstanding in some quarters about the Australian Government's policies and actions with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Yet his Government's position had been clearly explained in many statements and particularly in the note dated 28 January 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Australia addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7104). The Australian Government's economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were not merely declarations of principle in the absence of economic ties but actual discontinuance of trade, with consequent economic sacrifices. Although it had been necessary to go through

certain parliamentary processes, the action of the Australian Government had been prompt and had been completed by 16 November 1965 - in other words, before the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. The economic measures detailed in document S/7104 meant that Australia had placed an embargo upon 93 per cent of its imports from Southern Rhodesia.

411. On 29 December 1965, the Australian Prime Minister had stated that his Government regarded the unilateral declaration of independence as illegal and would not grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime. He had affirmed that a settlement of the problem should be achieved on the basis of steady progress towards majority rule and the elimination of racial discrimination. The need for an education programme to prepare for majority rule had been mentioned. The Prime Minister had said that Australia supported the United Kingdom sanctions and had imposed sanctions of its own. Australia believed that economic sanctions would induce a return to the conference table; it opposed proposals for the use of armed force in Southern Rhodesia. It supported the Security Council resolution of 9 April 1966.

412. The representative of Denmark said that since the Committee had last discussed the question of Southern Rhodesia the situation had taken a turn for the worse. The Smith regime had declared Southern Rhodesia independent, with the object of establishing yet another State based on racial discrimination in the southern part of Africa. It was continuing in its illegal course, in defiance of the lawful authorities in London and of various United Nations resolutions. In resolution 217 (1965) the Security Council had called upon the United Kingdom to quell the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and upon all States not to recognize the illegal regime of Ian Smith and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. His delegation deplored the fact that some Governments did not appear to be willing to comply with that resolution, as had recently been demonstrated when the Security Council had had to call upon the United Kingdom to use force if necessary in order to prevent certain unconcealed breaches in the oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia.

413. In the circumstances, it was clear that the proper United Nations organ to deal with the matter was the Security Council. His delegation considered that,

in adopting the resolutions of 20 November 1965 and 9 April 1966, the Council had proved its intention of bringing down the Smith régime with a view to establishing genuine independence with equal rights for all groups of the population in Southern Rhodesia. There seemed to be virtually unanimous agreement about that goal and it would be tragic if differences of opinion regarding the way in which it should be achieved could not be overcome.

414. His delegation would have considered it more suitable for the question to be followed up in the Security Council. The Security Council was the only United Nations organ which had the power to make recommendations or take decisions concerning the measures called for, and his delegation did not think that any other United Nations organ with a limited membership should spell out explicitly what decisions the Council ought to take. The Council's composition and position in the structure of the United Nations were such as to offer the best possible guarantees for a realistic and efficient approach to the problem and the effective implementation of its resolutions.

415. It was encouraging to note that the entire international community - with a few exceptions - had joined forces on the side of the United Kingdom Government in the trial of strength between that Government and the Salisbury régime. The outcome of the action initiated against the Smith régime would have far-reaching repercussions, affecting, inter alia, the situation throughout the southern part of Africa. For those reasons, and in accordance with its traditional positive policy vis-à-vis the United Nations, his country had strictly observed the provisions of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) and had informed the Secretary-General accordingly (S/7005). His Government considered any action contrary to that resolution to be reprehensible, immoral and irresponsible. It could not avert the fall of the Smith régime and the consequences of such behaviour would be grave perhaps not least for those who now played with the fire. It had taken note of the repeated declarations of the United Kingdom Government to the effect that that Government would discharge its responsibility for resolving the Rhodesian constitutional problem. It had noted the steps already taken by the United Kingdom to achieve that end and was fully confident that the United Kingdom would take all the necessary action to fulfil its declared intention of bringing down the Smith régime. The fact that that régime had so far been able to remain in power showed that vigorous action was still needed and would only be effective if there was close co-operation between the United Kingdom and the other Members of the United Nations in carrying it out.

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416. He suggested that upon the conclusion of its consideration of the question the Special Committee should transmit the official records of the debate to the Security Council.

417. The representative of India said that recent events had shown that urgent and effective action was essential if the rebellious Smith regime was to be brought down. It had become increasingly clear that to attempt to impose sanctions against Southern Rhodesia alone would not help to achieve the common objective of freeing the oppressed African majority in that Territory. As his delegation had pointed out in the Security Council on 12 November 1965, the question of Southern Rhodesia should not be viewed in isolation from other colonial and racial problems in Africa, since it was intimately and directly connected with the racist and colonial oppression in South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. That fact had been demonstrated once again by the collusion between the three racist colonial Governments in southern Africa in perpetuating white supremacy there.

418. The representatives of the United Kingdom Government had frequently told members that Southern Rhodesia was their Government's responsibility. His delegation was prepared to accept that statement in so far as it meant that the distressing state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia was the outcome of the policies of the United Kingdom Government. If, however, the implication was that the United Nations had no jurisdiction to discuss the issue and to recommend action, his delegation categorically rejected that contention. In fact, the United Kingdom Government itself had approached the Security Council in November 1965 for endorsement and support of the economic measures it was enacting to deal with the situation. It had been repeatedly affirmed in resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was applicable to it. It was therefore the right and indeed the sacred duty of the United Nations to do all in its power to help the suffering African people of Zimbabwe to achieve their goal of political independence on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

419. The United Kingdom Government had from the outset failed to discharge its responsibilities towards the majority population of Southern Rhodesia. For more than forty years it had allowed itself to be threatened and subjected to pressure by a few hundred Whites in the Territory. While it was possible to explain away the mistakes made by the United Kingdom Government from 1923 to 1965 as inexperience or ignorance of the dishonest motives of the Whites in southern Africa, the same view could not be applied to the United Kingdom actions in 1965. The United Kingdom had been told time and time again by the racists in Rhodesia that their sole objective was complete independence from the United Kingdom on their own terms. The United Kingdom Government had always adopted a meek attitude in its negotiations with the illegal Salisbury regime and had encouraged the white settlers in their fraudulent aims by assuring them that force would not be used in any circumstances. After that assurance, nothing could prevent Ian Smith from pursuing his disastrous policy.

420. On 11 November 1965, a few hours after the illegal Government in Southern Rhodesia had seized power, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had informed Parliament that the United Kingdom Government did not contemplate any national or international use of force to coerce the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia into a constitutional posture. Although the United Kingdom Government had declared the usurpation of power by the Smith regime a rebellion, it had taken no effective steps to quell that rebellion. The failure to restore constitutional rule in Southern Rhodesia would go down in history as the great betrayal by the United Kingdom Government of the trust placed in it by the African people.

421. The oil embargo which had been announced after a crucial delay of five weeks was doomed to failure. The Whites in Southern Rhodesia had not been greatly affected by the embargo and other economic sanctions, since they could rely on oil and other supplies from their racist and colonial neighbours of Portugal and South Africa. The South African Government had lost no time in stating that it would not participate in any economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. It was clear from the Secretariat working paper (paragraphs 1-335 above) that the South African Government had gone out of its way to help its fellow racists in Southern Rhodesia. By 22 November 1965, the Southern Rhodesian "Trade Commissioner" in South Africa had been able to report that trade between the two countries had

returned to the level that had existed before the illegal declaration of independence. It was not possible to determine the exact amount of oil and other petroleum products being sent to Southern Rhodesia from South Africa, since the South African Government had stopped making a distinction between exports and re-exports in its trade figures. The estimates, however, ranged from 35,000 to 70,000 gallons of oil a day. In addition, there was a daily inflow of oil, estimated at about 35,000 to 40,000 gallons, from Mozambique. It had been hoped that the ban on tobacco exports would deal a disastrous blow to the Southern Rhodesian economy. The fact was, however, that the Smith Government had been able to guarantee the white farmers the sale of their tobacco at the minimum prices fixed by them.

422. It was in that context that the affair of the two oil tankers must be viewed. While the additional supplies of oil from the two tankers would undoubtedly help the settler regime, the Southern Rhodesian economy depended on oil for only 27 per cent of its energy requirements. Moreover, Southern Rhodesia had already accumulated sufficient stocks of oil and Mozambique was not the only, or the most important, source of supply. To attach undue importance to the tankers was to magnify their role out of proportion and thus to divert attention from the most important supply source, namely, South Africa. If the United Kingdom and others sincerely wished to apply pressure on the white extremists in Southern Rhodesia, effective steps must be taken to close all sources from which the country obtained what it needed.

423. His Government's policy in the matter had been clear and consistent. India did not recognize the illegal Smith regime. It had repeatedly called upon the United Kingdom Government to abrogate the 1961 Constitution and to convene a constitutional conference attended by all sections of the population to draft a democratic constitution based on the principle of one man, one vote. It had severed all diplomatic and economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. It had

co-operated fully with the United Nations, the Special Committee and the Organization of African Unity in their efforts to help the people of Zimbabwe to attain genuine independence. It was convinced that concrete and effective measures, including the use of force, must be adopted against the rebellious Smith regime.

424. The representative of Mali said that the problem of Southern Rhodesia was becoming increasingly disturbing and the need for action was obvious to all. His delegation deplored the persistent refusal of the United Kingdom to implement all the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on that subject. The United Kingdom had recently come before the Security Council in order to give the world the impression that it was concerned and wanted intervention by the Council. It had sought approval of vague measures of dubious effectiveness. In reality, it had come to plead in favour of the security of Mr. Smith and to protect him from any armed intervention by the United Nations. The administering Power had tried to gain time so that Smith and his clique could strengthen their position. A great deal of fuss had been made about one ship, while tons of petroleum were reaching Southern Rhodesia via South Africa.

425. The United Kingdom Government had declared that it would not use troops in Southern Rhodesia; Smith had thus been assured that the United Kingdom would use its influence in the Security Council to prevent any recourse to force. Indeed, it was the United Kingdom Government which, on its own initiative, had under the 1961 Constitution handed over arms and military power to the racists, despite the warnings of the African States. It could not therefore claim that it was unable to disarm the illegal racist clique. If the United Kingdom had governmental authority in Southern Rhodesia, it should restore law and order there immediately, using force if necessary. A rebellion could not be handled with patience, in the hope that the rebels would capitulate. Smith and his clique had said that they would die rather than hand over power to the majority.

426. Months had elapsed since the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. The only result was that Smith had been given time to reorganize his economic structure and regain stability after the initial shock. The United Kingdom Government refused to use force, although it had not hesitated to imprison men like Gandhi, Nehru, Jagan, Nkrumah and Archbishop Makarios. It had not hesitated to use force in Nyasaland, Kenya and Aden to massacre defenceless citizens.

Admittedly, in those cases the people had been coloured, while in Southern Rhodesia they were white settlers. The only explanation for the inaction of the United Kingdom Government was that it was guilty of racial prejudice and discrimination.

427. The reactionary forces of racism and fanaticism in Southern Rhodesia had long been supported and encouraged by powerful financial circles in the Western world. South Africa and Portugal, in particular, had given direct aid and encouragement; they were acting in concert with the Smith regime to perpetuate white supremacy and the economic exploitation of the Africans. The foreign monopolies rejoiced at the success of Smith and the complaisance of the United Kingdom because they had branches in Southern Rhodesia. By failing to take the necessary measures to crush the Smith regime, the United Kingdom bore a heavy responsibility for the consequences which might ensue. The United Kingdom was making Portugal a scapegoat and was refusing to act or allow any action against South Africa. As was stated in an article in The New York Times of 12 April 1966, the United Kingdom and South Africa were, in a sense, "economic hostages of each other" and there was doubt about how far the United Kingdom could support sanctions against South Africa. Such doubt was justified, since the United Kingdom had enormous economic interests in South Africa - its third most important customer.

428. The African countries shared the concern felt in certain United States circles about the need for vigorous action if the Smith regime was to be overthrown in the near future. His delegation would support any resolution requesting the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, particularly Articles 41 and 42, and the use of force to crush the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia.

429. The representative of Tunisia said that unfortunately most of the resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia had remained dead letters, while the situation in that country had become increasingly disturbing. Southern Rhodesia was a colonized country, where a handful of settlers, taking advantage of the passivity of the administering Power, had usurped authority for their own benefit and imposed on the indigenous people an oppressive regime which was arousing world-wide indignation. Instead of co-operating with the United Nations, the administering Power had constantly repeated that the problems of Southern Rhodesia came within its own sole responsibility and competence. The deterioration of the situation, the insistence of the United Nations and the stand of the African countries had not persuaded the United Kingdom to admit that its policy was mistaken. Despite its numerous declarations of intention, the administering Power had not implemented the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. Contrary to the assertions of the United Kingdom Prime Minister, economic sanctions had not undermined the political strength of Ian Smith or hurt the economy of Southern Rhodesia.

430. The United Kingdom should have foreseen that the sanctions would be ineffective so long as the Smith regime could count on the complicity of South Africa and Portugal. All over the world serious doubts were being expressed about the effectiveness of the sanctions advocated by the United Kingdom Government and there was agreement that the time had come to seek more appropriate and more effective measures. From the outset, the African States had foreseen the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and had tried to persuade the United Kingdom to use other means, particularly military intervention. Unfortunately that Government had stood by its policy and refused to use force. Only when two tankers had headed for Beira with petroleum for Southern Rhodesia had the United Kingdom asked the Security Council for authority to prevent the tankers from unloading their cargo. The outcome of the Rhodesian crisis did not, however, depend upon the delivery of oil through the Umtali pipeline. The oil embargo would be only partial, so long as Southern Rhodesia could obtain large amounts of petroleum via South Africa. It had so much oil that it had been able to relax the rationing of gasoline in Southern Rhodesia.

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431. The United Kingdom was faced with the need to use more appropriate means. Whether it decided to send troops to Southern Rhodesia or to request new action through the United Nations, it was essential for it to show sincere determination to crush the Smith regime and enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to recover their rights and realize their national aspirations. The whole world, and particularly the United Kingdom itself, would gain if the administering Power decided to co-operate with the Organization. Tunisia considered that only armed intervention by the United Kingdom or the United Nations would put into effect the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and rid Africa of the Smith racist regime.

432. The representative of Sierra Leone said that, although after years of manoeuvring to ensure the perpetuation of white rule in Southern Rhodesia the United Kingdom had finally heeded world opinion sufficiently to give some token recognition of the rights of the Africans in the Territory, it had made no attempt to map out a path to lead them to independence. In the present crisis it was behaving with lamentable weakness and its only response to Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence had been to call for sanctions. Its action in attempting to shift the blame and to avoid the central issue of independence amounted, in fact, to double dealing.

433. The urgency with which the United Kingdom delegation had called for a meeting of the Security Council was in sharp contrast to the rather tardy approach it had suggested the day previously in the Special Committee and raised serious doubts about the sincerity or the motives of the United Kingdom Government. On 6 April the United Kingdom delegation had reserved its right to comment on the consensus of most of the members of the Special Committee as given by the Chairman, in which it had been suggested that the time had come for the Security Council to consider action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Its reservations had suggested that the United Kingdom considered the issue to be its exclusive concern and not that of the Special Committee. On the next day, however, although the situation of the oil tankers off the Mozambique coast had not changed, the United Kingdom Government had decided that the issue was an urgent one and had requested a Security Council meeting, at which it had presented a draft resolution.

434. The draft resolution had attempted to shift the responsibility from the United Kingdom Government to the Portuguese Government and had been restricted to the subject of an oil embargo. It had requested the Security Council to give the United Kingdom a mandate - which the Council had clearly given it in operative paragraph 9 of resolution 217 (1965). That manoeuvre by the United Kingdom was an attempt to justify its delay of nearly four months in implementing the Security Council resolution. In addition, by putting the focus on oil, it sought to divert attention from the wider issues of majority rule and independence for Southern Rhodesia.

435. If, as the United Kingdom Government maintained, Southern Rhodesia was a colony, it seemed incredible that that Government would want the United Nations to recommend that it should take any action whatsoever against its own colony. In similar cases, such as the so-called riots in British Guiana and the freedom-fighters in Aden, the United Kingdom had used troops, but when it came to the question of Southern Rhodesia the United Kingdom was reluctant to send troops there. It was, however, encouraging to note that the United Kingdom Government had finally come round to the belief that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to peace and had called for mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter. Since the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965, the greatest sanction imposed by the United Kingdom and other countries had been on oil. It was stated in a report prepared at the request of the Secretary-General, entitled The Economics and Logistics of an Embargo on Oil and Petroleum Products of Rhodesia, that the economy could be significantly affected but that, if the question was one of survival, the availability of oil, in itself, would apparently not be the decisive consideration, that apparently little serious thought had been given to the reality of an oil embargo and that continued access to outside oil supplies seemed to have been a basic assumption.

436. That clearly implied that Mr. Smith and his regime had had prior understanding that they would receive oil. Oil accounted for only 27 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's energy requirements and was used primarily for lubrication and for highway transport, its industries and agriculture depending more on coal and on electric power from the Kariba dam. Mr. Smith himself had said that the flow of

oil to Southern Rhodesia was increasing rather than decreasing. It was reliably reported that Southern Rhodesia was receiving most of that oil via South Africa and Mozambique. According to the Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paragraphs 1 to 335 above), South Africa had decided to stop making a distinction between exports and re-exports in its trade figures, so that it had become much more difficult to discover whether or not South Africa was acting as a channel for embargoed Southern Rhodesian exports or supplying it with embargoed oil. That was an attempt by the South African Government to conceal its nefarious dealings with Southern Rhodesia and to avoid the possibility of an embargo against itself.

437. His Government had always stated that sanctions alone would not topple the Ian Smith regime. There were too many loop-holes. For example, Portugal and South Africa had declared that they would not apply sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia could also rely on assistance from some countries which claimed to be planning sanctions but which left loop-holes that made it possible for almost all supplies to be delivered.

438. The Prime Minister of Sierra Leone had stated at various international conferences that, unless the United Kingdom decided to use force in Southern Rhodesia, very little could be achieved. No credence could be placed in the United Kingdom argument that sanctions alone would bring down the Smith regime. Five months had elapsed since Smith had illegally declared independence. He was receiving supplies of oil, the tobacco crop had been sold and he could command foreign exchange through South Africa and other countries. There were business men in Panama, South Africa, London and the United States who were willing and able to circumvent the sanctions, since most of those countries had not made it mandatory upon their citizens to uphold them.

439. When the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2024 (XX) condemning the unilateral declaration of independence, what had mainly shocked Member States had been the fact that over 4 million Africans were under the domination of 220,000 whites. The States in the best position to help to alleviate that intolerable situation had been the very ones which had tried by all possible means to assist the Smith regime. That was no doubt because they did not consider that situation to be a threat to their way of life.

440. During the debate in the Security Council, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda had submitted an amendment to the United Kingdom draft resolution which would call upon the Government of South Africa to take all measures necessary to prevent the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia (S/7243). The United States and United Kingdom delegations had found that they could not vote in favour of that amendment, although it would merely have extended the embargo to the only other known route for the supply of oil.

441. The only possible conclusion was that lip service was being paid to an embargo on oil; that the doors were wide open for the supply of oil; and that those Powers were not prepared to put pressure on South Africa and by their negligence were condoning what was happening in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

442. In resolution 1514 (XV) and succeeding resolutions the General Assembly had given the Special Committee a clear mandate to liberate all mankind still under colonial rule. The criteria to be used in determining when a country was free were laid down in other resolutions and the conditions obtaining in Southern Rhodesia were the very antithesis of those criteria.

443. It was the clear duty of the Committee to liberate the 4 million Southern Rhodesians and it should call on the United Kingdom to do so with the use of force. All States that were sincere would support any embargo and would assist the United Kingdom in solving the problem by supplying arms where appropriate. The United Kingdom had a duty to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole; it should not shirk that responsibility but should proceed with vigour and determination.

444. The 1961 Constitution, which had never been accepted by the majority of the population, should be revoked. The treason of Ian Smith and his regime should be punished and any uprising that might ensue, through the actions of the white Rhodesians, must be put down firmly. A return to the rule of law must be ensured within the next few weeks, if peace and stability were to prevail in the countries of southern Africa. The United Kingdom must immediately implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of the colony of Southern Rhodesia.

445. His delegation would support any draft resolution aimed at strengthening the United Kingdom's determination and at giving the Security Council a clear indication of the action it could take in Southern Rhodesia.

446. The representative of Syria emphasized the gravity of the problem of Southern Rhodesia, which was the consummation of the conquest of the African land of Zimbabwe by a European minority. The reactionary racist character of that situation had grave implications for international peace and security. The argument invoked to justify the subjection of 4 million Africans to oppression and racial discrimination was reminiscent of the darkest days of colonialism. The effectiveness of the United Nations would be completely jeopardized if the situation was allowed to continue. The continent of Africa would not submit to such tyranny; it had so far been patient in order to test the ability of the Organization to honour the principles of its Charter.

447. In the conduct of the administering Power, there were basic contradictions and a wide disparity between words and deeds. The administering Power claimed sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, but the measures it adopted to discharge that responsibility were timid, inadequate and half-hearted. The ban on the sale of Rhodesian tobacco and on deliveries of oil to Southern Rhodesia had been a failure. The United Kingdom had dramatized the case of two oil tankers and had asked the Security Council for a mandate to halt them, yet the regular and abundant supplies of oil from South Africa to the Smith regime evoked only subtle diplomatic remonstrances. The Verwoerd regime considered the whole problem of Southern Rhodesia to be a small domestic affair and cared little about the fate of 4 million innocent Africans. When the policies of apartheid had been discussed at the twentieth session of the General Assembly and sanctions against the Verwoerd regime had been envisaged, the United Kingdom had opposed such sanctions on the grounds that they would not work and had dissented from the overwhelming majority opinion. A boycott was useless so long as South Africa and Portugal continued with impunity to meet the vital needs of the Smith regime, while the administering Power shirked its responsibility on the pretext that it had no jurisdiction over the illegal acts of those two colonial Powers.

448. The measures designed to crush the Smith regime were in fact only hardening its resistance. The administering Power was refusing to use force against that regime, although it had made speedy, efficient and heavy use of force in other circumstances against freedom fighters struggling for liberation from the colonialist yoke. In the logic of the United Kingdom, the use of force was legal against just causes but illegal against unjust causes. When he had referred to the use of troops to avert a tragic action such as subversion or murder, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had presumably been thinking not of subversion by the minority against the majority - which did exist in Southern Rhodesia - but of efforts by the Africans to organize themselves into liberation movements.

449. It had been said that the aim of the sanctions was to induce Smith to negotiate. It was not customary, however, to negotiate with criminals. Negotiations, in the last analysis, meant compromise and there could be no compromise over the rights of 4 million Africans to life, self-determination, independence and dignity. The United Kingdom should be asked whether it intended to fulfil its sacred trust as an administering Power or whether it hoped that, as in other tragic cases, events would sanctify the primacy of force over right.

450. Syria adopted an unequivocal stand; it would support the strongest resolution reminding the administering Power of its duties before it was too late.

451. The representative of Algeria, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that fortunately the United Kingdom had not been able to paralyse the activities of the Special Committee by opening an incomplete debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia in the Security Council, just as the Council resolution of 9 April 1966 had been unable to create a diversion in the search for a solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia. The Security Council had dealt only with certain marginal aspects of the problem and the United Kingdom drew a distinction between different suppliers. In the case of an oil tanker off Mozambique, it was prepared to enforce the embargo but it maintained an embarrassed neutrality towards the road convoys dispatched by South Africa to Southern Rhodesia.

452. The United Kingdom had wanted to forestall any substantial discussion of the problem of Southern Rhodesia, because it was afraid that a lesson would be drawn from the past five months. Despite the embargo, Southern Rhodesia was receiving

large supplies of oil by road and rail and, unless there was a general embargo against South Africa, it was difficult to see how it could have any difficulty in that regard. Southern Rhodesia was able to sell its tobacco through intermediaries who conveyed it to the usual markets. Despite the lack of results, it was still claimed that economic sanctions would bring about the downfall of the de facto regime of Salisbury and that graduated action was required. Such action was, however, impeded by a twofold limitation: the economic and financial pressure exerted by South Africa on the United Kingdom and Portugal's membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

453. If Algeria had been convinced that the recent action by the United Kingdom had been aimed at eradicating the root of the evil, it would have given complete and unreserved support to that action. Instead of dealing with the essential aspects of the problem, however, the United Kingdom had diverted international attention to a secondary element of the situation. By limiting action to the external aspects of the problem, the United Kingdom had sought an endorsement from the Security Council of its determination and goodwill in the question of Southern Rhodesia. By diverting attention to action of necessarily limited scope, that manoeuvre only aggravated the central problem.

454. If it had found that its action inside Southern Rhodesia was inadequate, the United Kingdom could have asked the international community for additional assistance in exerting pressure and imposing sanctions on the Salisbury authorities. The United Kingdom had, however, reversed the roles. Having evaded its responsibilities within Southern Rhodesia, it was seeking to shift the centre of its responsibilities outside that country by its recent request for United Nations authorization to take certain actions. That attitude showed that the United Kingdom itself did not believe in the overthrow of the Smith regime by peripheral action and that ultimately only action directed at the Salisbury authorities could be effective and decisive. The action should also be directed against the Pretoria and Lisbon regimes. Unless such action was taken, there would be a repetition in Southern Rhodesia of the tragedy of Palestine and a serious threat to peace and stability in Africa and the rest of the world.

455. The solution to the problem lay in the complete, faithful and immediate application of all the recommendations made by the General Assembly and the Special

Committee. In addition, no Member State should have any relations with Southern Rhodesia, which should be completely sealed off from all supplies. An economic blockade was inconceivable except as a general blockade. Sanctions - including, if necessary, the use of armed force - should be applied to all who did not respect the measures decreed.

456. The United Nations should remind South Africa that its obligations under the Charter required it to respect and comply with the decisions of the Organization. After ensuring the survival of the Salisbury regime by meeting its every need, the South African authorities had declared their willingness to mediate between the United Kingdom Prime Minister and Ian Smith. The scene was set for South Africa officially to take its apartheid "techniques" to Southern Rhodesia. It was ironical that the Pretoria authorities should be offering their assistance in a situation imported from South Africa, which had caused them a cynical satisfaction. Far from giving assistance in abolishing the Smith regime, certain Powers were actually helping to maintain that regime, so that it could join them in a policy based on self-interest and domination.

457. In the opinion of Algeria, to hesitate to take action against Smith was to accept him as a de facto authority. Algeria therefore appealed to all the Members of the United Nations to denounce the complaisance of certain Powers towards the Salisbury regime. Members should realize the danger of the situation, which had been aggravated by recent manoeuvres and which might seriously undermine the Organization.

458. The representative of Ghana, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that, although the problem which the United Kingdom had faced in Southern Rhodesia was not unprecedented in the history of its colonial administration, the United Kingdom had so mishandled the problem that it defied solution. In international forums such as the Organization of African Unity, the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the United Nations, Ghana had constantly drawn attention to the delicate nature of the question and to the tragic repercussions that might be expected should the United Kingdom fail to handle the situation with firmness.

459. His country had spared no effort to place the question of Southern Rhodesia in its proper perspective. In searching for a solution to the problem, in consultation with other African States, Ghana had foreseen the intransigence of the minority settler regime in its efforts to defy world opinion and the principles of

the United Nations Charter concerning human rights and the self-determination of peoples. It had drawn attention to the vast conspiracy to create in Southern Rhodesia oppressive conditions similar to those in South Africa and the neighbouring Portuguese colonies. The reason why the United Kingdom Government had failed to react swiftly to the acts of defiance of the Smith regime was that it had considerable interests in Southern Rhodesia and the people involved were its kith and kin. It had therefore hedged behind specious arguments and had not acted as it had in other colonial Territories such as British Guiana, Aden and Kenya. Such vacillation on the part of an administering Power could lead to nothing but the series of events which had culminated in the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith in November 1965. The Smith regime had been confident that by taking advantage of the United Kingdom Government's manifestly docile and indecisive attitude towards its illegal actions it would finally induce that Government to accept and respect the independence and sovereignty which it had unilaterally assumed.

460. At the time of the unilateral declaration of independence, when the illegal regime had done everything possible to prevent the representatives of the Crown from carrying out their administrative functions, there had been only inconsequential statements of condemnation and threats of sanctions from the United Kingdom, which had originally been unwilling to agree to an oil embargo against the rebel regime.

461. Various General Assembly resolutions, as also Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), had called upon all States not to recognize the illegal regime, to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and to impose an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The Government of Ghana and several other Member States had agreed to give the decision to impose sanctions a chance to prove itself. In pursuance of the resolutions, Ghana had refused to recognize the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and had broken off all economic relations with that country; it did not recognize travel documents issued or renewed by the illegal regime; all means of transport, including aircraft to and from Southern Rhodesia, were denied facilities, including the right to fly over Ghanaian territory; all communication channels with Southern Rhodesia had been cut off and Ghana did not provide the illegal regime with arms, equipment or military material.

462. His country had enforced the economic sanctions against the Smith regime, although like many countries it had had strong doubts about their effectiveness, especially since Portugal and South Africa had refused to agree to them. It had realized that the racist Southern Rhodesian regime could not be deterred by the adoption of resolutions, since Smith knew that the nations solemnly undertaking to implement those resolutions would not always do so in practice. Experience had shown that, if economic pressure was to be effective, it must be backed by a readiness and determination to enforce it. As the sanctions had been recommended in the face of abstentions by some and the secret or open hostility of others, it was clear that they had been doomed to failure.

463. Recent events had justified his country's fears. It was common knowledge that South Africa had been aiding the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia in order to enable it to survive the limited embargo and that Southern Rhodesia's tobacco crop was being sold to certain major international concerns. The recent incidents involving the Greek tankers Manuela and Joanna V were but a few of the many examples that demonstrated the failure of the oil embargo recommended by the United Nations.

464. There appeared to be collusion among several countries to frustrate United Nations efforts to bring the Smith regime to respect the rights of the African majority. In two communiqués addressed to the Secretary-General on 7 and 8 April 1966, the Portuguese Government had pointed out that the United Kingdom aero-naval forces had had the means to stop the two tankers from proceeding on their course but had deliberately refrained from doing so. It had also reported that the banking operations for the purpose of payment had been effected through Dutch banks and that the companies involved in the affair were Greek, Panamanian and South African. In the light of those facts, the Portuguese Government had rejected any responsibility for a situation to which a number of foreign Governments had contributed and which could not have developed against the wishes of the United Kingdom.

465. It was clear that the responsibility for bringing down Smith's illegal regime rested with the United Kingdom. Yet, as the African members of the Security Council had said a few days earlier, that country was unwilling to examine the fundamentals of the problem in order to seek a fair, just and rapid solution.

466. His country had shared the sense of urgency with which the United Kingdom had requested a meeting of the Security Council on 9 April 1966 to ask for a mandate to strengthen its hand in restraining the tanker Joanna V from unloading its oil cargo at Beira. The Council should, however, have examined the root cause of the entire Southern Rhodesian problem, instead of merely adopting superficial and ad hoc decisions which were not sufficiently far-reaching. That was why the African members had proposed certain amendments to the United Kingdom draft resolution. It was significant that the United Kingdom had refused to have its draft resolution amended so as to call not only on Portugal but also on South Africa to enforce the sanctions, although it was common knowledge that South Africa had been undermining efforts at economic sanctions. Furthermore, the United Kingdom representative in the Security Council had been opposed to any discussion of the wider problems raised by the breaches of the oil embargo, although that had clearly been the most opportune moment to urge the Security Council to decide on mandatory sanctions.

467. His delegation wondered how long the United Nations would be told that the United Kingdom was holding consultations with Commonwealth Governments and that the United Kingdom was making gradual progress, while the situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to deteriorate and the illegal Smith regime was establishing itself. It was reliably reported that the Joanna V, which was in Beira, was secretly trying to unload part of its cargo and that the master of the Manuela planned to unload its oil in Laurenço Marques. It was now reported that two more tankers were steaming from Venezuela, carrying cargo destined for Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations could still take action to put an end to that state of affairs, and such action could come at the instance of the Special Committee, whose responsibility it was to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

468. Ghana called upon the Committee to be guided by the pertinent resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity and by the Final Statement issued

by the recent eleven-nation African Summit Conference at Nairobi. It was clear that whatever methods the United Kingdom Government had relied upon to crush the illegal Smith regime had failed and that Government should be urged to resort to other measures. The Members of the United Nations must prove their ability to collaborate in a collective effort by agreeing to mandatory sanctions; otherwise the United Nations would fail in its efforts to maintain international peace and security.

469. The representative of Poland recalled that at the twentieth session of the General Assembly his delegation had stated that the policy of the United Kingdom Government towards Southern Rhodesia was and always had been inconsistent with the terms of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Since then, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated still further.

470. The United Kingdom delegation had repeatedly given assurances that developments in Southern Rhodesia were well under control and that patient negotiations would bring results. Events had proved, however, that that had simply given Ian Smith time to strengthen his position and prepare for the unilateral declaration of independence. The United Kingdom Government's policy of non-compliance with United Nations resolutions regarding Southern Rhodesia had therefore been instrumental in paving the way for Smith's usurpation of power. The United Kingdom Government had stated more than once that it was responsible for bringing Southern Rhodesia to independence and the Special Committee was entitled to ask the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations towards the oppressed people of Zimbabwe.

471. Five months had elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 2022 (XX) and 2024 (XX) and Security Council resolution 217 (1965), and it was the Special Committee's duty to review the situation. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat (paragraphs 1-335 above) enumerated various statements and several United Kingdom Government Orders-in-Council concerning Southern Rhodesia, but it did not provide any particular information about the results of those actions.

472. On 11 November 1965, Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had declared that the Smith regime's unilateral declaration of independence was an illegal and treasonable act. He had, however, ruled out the possibility of United Kingdom military intervention in Southern Rhodesia, unless required for the maintenance of law and order, and had stated that the only way to bring down the Smith regime was to create a situation in which the people of Southern Rhodesia themselves would wish to see a lawful Government in its place. It seemed to the Polish delegation that there was no doubt at all about the wish of the vast majority of the Southern Rhodesian people to see a lawful Government in place of the Smith usurpers. The Secretariat working paper gave many examples of strikes and demonstrations by the African population against the Smith regime.

473. If the United Kingdom Government had really wanted to topple the rebellious Smith regime, it should not have hesitated to act vigorously in its capacity as the administering Power responsible for Southern Rhodesia. The truth was that it was not prepared to carry out its obligations under the United Nations resolutions. It had failed to intervene even in circumstances in which the Smith regime's attitude had been openly provocative to it, and Ian Smith had taken full advantage of its weakness. He had savagely oppressed the African population, changed the Constitution, challenged the British Crown's prerogative of mercy and deprived the Governor of all his powers, yet the United Kingdom Government still contended that there had been no breach of law and order to warrant military intervention.

474. On 1 December 1965 the United Kingdom Government had announced stringent financial restrictions and sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and on the very next day the Smith regime had announced financial counter-sanctions against the United Kingdom. It might have been expected that Smith's action would cause a stern reaction on the part of the United Kingdom Government; it had indeed caused a reaction but not the reaction expected, for on 14 December 1965 the United Kingdom Government had revised its previous decision and authorized the resumption of payments of United Kingdom pensions to services and civil service pensioners in Southern Rhodesia.

475. On 11 November 1965 the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had announced a total ban on purchases of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia, on 1 December 1965 he

had extended that ban to almost all Southern Rhodesia's other exports to the United Kingdom, and on 30 January 1966 he had imposed a total ban on United Kingdom exports to Southern Rhodesia, except for certain goods required for humanitarian purposes. Yet the January edition of the Barclays Bank Overseas Review showed that the value of United Kingdom imports from Southern Rhodesia in January 1966 had amounted to £3.814 million, as against a monthly average for 1965 of £2.3 million, and the London Times of 31 March 1966 had reported that the value of United Kingdom tobacco imports from Southern Rhodesia in February 1966 had amounted to £484,000, despite the so-called total ban on imports of tobacco from that country which had been in force since November 1965. United Kingdom exports to Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £453,000 in January 1966 and £672,000 in February. Foreign capital was flowing into Southern Rhodesia at an increasing rate, so much so that the Overseas Review had reported in March that conditions generally on the Rhodesian Stock Exchange had been quiet, with no market trends discernible.

476. Those facts made the ineffectiveness of the sanctions and restrictions imposed against Southern Rhodesia abundantly clear and gave the lie to the United Kingdom Prime Minister's assurance at the Lagos Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers that the cumulative effect of the sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks. It was evident that the Smith regime had used the past five months of British inaction to strengthen its position and readjust its economy to the new circumstances. The Deputy Minister of Mines and Lands of the Smith Government had recently stated that new markets had been found for Rhodesian minerals to replace those lost as the result of trade embargoes. The Rhodesian tobacco crop had been sold and the ban on selling oil to Southern Rhodesia was faring no better than any of the other embargoes.

477. The United Kingdom Government must face its responsibilities and take final and decisive steps for the solution of the problem. Indeed, the need for stern, vigorous and broad measures to topple the illegal Smith regime was widely recognized in the United Kingdom Press.

478. Poland firmly supported the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965 and the resolutions adopted at the twentieth session of the General Assembly on the question of Southern Rhodesia. Its position on the question was clearly stated in documents A/6235 and Add.1 and S/7087 and Add.1. It firmly supported the

right of the Zimbabwe people to independence and self-determination in accordance with the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and it felt that the rights of those people could not be made a subject for bargaining. For that reason, it would support any resolution aimed at the speedy elimination of the racist Smith regime and the restoration of the rights of the 4 million Zimbabwe people to independence.

479. The representative of Madagascar said that reports in the world Press bore witness to the failure of the United Kingdom's economic sanctions to destroy the authority of the illegal Smith regime. Instead of bringing about an acceptable solution, time had made the situation of the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia still more tragic. It was therefore essential that the Special Committee should discuss the new developments in Southern Rhodesia and make the necessary suggestions.

480. The many resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly showed the seriousness of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the reluctance of the administering Power to intervene in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of the nations. Ian Smith's illegal unilateral declaration of independence had been the logical result of the non-intervention of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia, and it was only right that the United Kingdom should accept responsibility for the fate of the African inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government's statements of intention must now be translated into action.

481. Security Council resolution 217 (1965) had called upon the United Kingdom Government to take all appropriate measures to bring the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end and had called upon all States to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime there. Various financial and economic

sanctions had been imposed by the United Kingdom and other countries in implementation of that resolution but they had proved inadequate and Southern Rhodesia had succeeded in selling its tobacco crop and obtaining adequate supplies of oil. Southern Rhodesia's economy was now in a better state than ever, thanks to the criminal complicity of the South African Government. Recent developments had emphasized the role played by the Portuguese Government in undermining the oil embargo, but that role should have been foreseen from the outset for no nation could possibly have expected those two Governments to act in good faith in the matter. Nevertheless, their responsibility for undermining the effectiveness of the economic and financial sanctions did not diminish the responsibility of the administering Power, which had undertaken not only to put down the rebellion but to take steps to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to decide their own fate on the basis of universal suffrage. So long as the illegal Smith Government had nothing to fear from the United Kingdom Government except economic sanctions, it would have no difficulty in overcoming them with the complicity of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa. Indeed, it would even be able to make the Africans who had gone to Southern Rhodesia to work suffer the consequences of those sanctions and the people of Zimbabwe would thus lose all hope of winning their rights.

482. The delegation of Madagascar was convinced that partial measures such as those recently adopted by the Security Council were incapable of achieving a real solution of the problem. The administering Power must therefore consider going beyond such provisional measures and taking coercive action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. The delegation of Madagascar would support any draft resolution along those lines.

483. The representative of Venezuela observed that once again the Special Committee was compelled to consider the abnormal situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia. Venezuela, for its part, had supported and implemented the various recommendations regarding Southern Rhodesia made by the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council. It had refused to recognize the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, had prohibited all acts which might assist or encourage the continued existence of that régime and had prohibited all relations, including economic relations, with it.

484. In particular, the Venezuelan Government had prohibited the supply of petroleum or its derivatives to Southern Rhodesia as long as the Smith régime remained in power. In that connexion, he denied categorically the implication made by the representative of Ghana (paragraph 467). Venezuela did not possess any oil tankers and in no circumstances would the Venezuelan Government permit the sale of petroleum or petroleum derivatives destined for Southern Rhodesia. There were, however, a number of foreign companies operating in Venezuela and obviously once those companies had taken petroleum out of Venezuela and beyond Venezuelan territorial waters the Venezuelan Government had no further control over it and could not be held responsible for sales made by those companies to any specific purchaser. As the members of the Committee were aware, the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea laid down that traffic on the high seas was free, and no State was entitled to interfere with the movements of any ship on the high seas, regardless of its stated or suspected destination..

485. In its reply (S/7253) to the Secretary-General's note concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), the Venezuelan Government had restated its support for the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Southern Rhodesia and its recognition

of the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence, and had formally declared that it would not engage in any action which would assist or encourage the illegal minority Government in Southern Rhodesia, would refuse to supply any military equipment to or maintain any economic relations with that Government and would refuse to supply any petroleum or petroleum derivatives destined for Southern Rhodesia so long as that Government remained in power.

486. Most of the States Members of the United Nations had promised to comply with the Security Council resolution. It was nevertheless perfectly clear that the measures envisaged in the resolution had proved inadequate and the United Nations should therefore consider applying, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, more effective and appropriate measures.

487. In the opinion of the Venezuelan delegation, the Special Committee should not allow itself to be diverted from its true objective of ensuring the speedy application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to all colonial territories, including Southern Rhodesia. The Venezuelan delegation had always held that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was responsible for all matters concerning the people of Southern Rhodesia until such time as those people attained independence. Indeed, the United Kingdom delegation had itself categorically proclaimed its Government's exclusive responsibility in the matter. There were no grounds therefore, for trying to shift that responsibility to other States. It was inadmissible to try to reduce the complicated problem of Southern Rhodesia to a few events of marginal importance, when the administering Power could easily prevent those events from having any real effect.

488. It was the duty of the administering Power to bring all the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence without distinction as to race or colour, and to do its utmost to enable the people of Rhodesia to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. It was both the right and the duty of the United Nations to induce the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations towards the Zimbabwe people. The Committee's objective could not be limited to the overthrow of a régime described as illegal by the administering Power, for that would be tantamount to recognizing the legality of the 1961 Constitution, which had been condemned not only by the 4 million Africans of

Southern Rhodesia but also by the General Assembly. Legality lay in the will of the people of Rhodesia, who rightly aspired to regain their sovereignty.

489. The Venezuelan delegation considered that the best way of putting an end to the abnormal situation in Southern Rhodesia was the complete and prompt application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). So long as the principles in that resolution were not put into effect in Southern Rhodesia, the situation of the Zimbabwe people would not change.

490. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that the question of Southern Rhodesia had been on the agenda of the Special Committee for years but events there had taken a particularly dramatic turn during the twentieth session of the General Assembly, when the racist Smith régime had unilaterally declared independence. The General Assembly and Security Council had thereupon adopted several important resolutions imposing certain obligations upon the Governments of the United Kingdom and other States, but as in previous years the United Kingdom Government had ignored the provisions of those resolutions because of its special interests in Southern Rhodesia.

491. The United Kingdom Government had asserted that it was responsible for Southern Rhodesia and that the Smith régime could rapidly be overthrown, without the use of military force, by the application of economic sanctions and particularly of an oil embargo. Events had given the lie to the United Kingdom Government's claims, however, and the Yugoslav delegation saw no reason to believe that the rule of law could ever be restored in Southern Rhodesia by those means.

492. The economic sanctions and the oil embargo had proved a complete failure. The colonial Powers had striven to maintain the unity of the racist and colonial régimes in the south of Africa, for any real blow to the Smith régime would have repercussions on the colonialist and racist régimes in South Africa and the Portuguese Territories. Both the South African and Portuguese Governments had stated that they would continue to maintain normal relations with the Smith régime, and they were in fact co-operating closely with it. His delegation had doubted the readiness of the United Kingdom to bring down the Ian Smith régime by economic sanctions and it had proved to be right. Indeed, not only had the United Kingdom failed to put an end to the Smith régime, but its attitude had in fact strengthened that régime even further.

493. It was certain that the continued existence of the Smith régime did not depend on the cargoes of one or two oil tankers. Security Council resolution 221 (1966), which related to that problem, was far from covering the important aspects of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom had requested and obtained from the Security Council authority to prevent tankers from docking at Beira, but it had not been willing to vote for the amendments proposed by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, (S/7243) which would have given it even broader authority to prevent the flow of oil and other goods into Rhodesia. The very fact that the United Kingdom Government had had to request the use of force, albeit on a limited scale, indicated that it had recognized the untenable nature of its original stand against the use of force. The limited use of force, however, would not produce results: only the large-scale application of force could overthrow Smith's illegal racist régime.

494. Yugoslavia had followed the development of events in Southern Rhodesia with deep concern. Its position on the problem was stated in Security Council documents S/6942 and S/7143. In keeping with that position, the Yugoslav delegation considered that more determined and broader measures, including the use of force, should be undertaken to put an end to the Smith régime, which was a constant threat to world peace and security.

495. The representative of Iraq said that in the past the United Kingdom had always resisted efforts to bring the question of Southern Rhodesia before the United Nations, on the grounds that the Territory was self-governing and that the United Nations had no jurisdiction in the matter. It had opposed the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and had protected the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. The fact that it had now turned to the United Nations was not to be interpreted as a change of policy. In calling for an urgent meeting of the Security Council, the United Kingdom had claimed that it wanted a legal international mandate to stop vessels carrying oil reasonably believed to be destined for Southern Rhodesia. It had already had such a mandate, however, by virtue of the various resolutions adopted, in particular Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which, among other things, had called upon the United Kingdom to enforce an embargo on oil. If the United Kingdom was sincere, it was difficult to understand why it had waited so

long before coming to the Security Council, a delay that Mr. Smith had used to consolidate his régime. Such a lack of urgency had characterized United Kingdom policy from the beginning.

496. On 25 May 1965 the Commonwealth Relations Office had issued a statement referring to the conclusion of the elections in Southern Rhodesia and the intention of the United Kingdom Government to explore all possibilities of reaching a negotiated settlement of the constitutional question. At a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in London in June 1965, the Prime Ministers had asked the United Kingdom to introduce legislation to suspend the 1961 Constitution and to appoint an interim government, which was to repeal oppressive and discriminatory laws. The United Kingdom Government had also been called upon to prepare the way for free elections, in the event of a refusal by Mr. Smith, and to introduce democratic rule. Mr. Smith had refused to co-operate. After various negotiations, he had warned the United Kingdom Government in October 1965, prior to another round of talks, that if the talks were not successful he would declare independence unilaterally. He had in fact done so on 11 November 1965.

497. In the face of such defiance, the actions of the United Kingdom Government had been hesitant and useless. The United Kingdom Prime Minister had given an assurance that force would not be used against the Southern Rhodesia régime. According to The New York Times of 17 April 1966, he had also promised that he would not blockade the ports of Mozambique and would not refer the Rhodesian issue to the United Nations. Thus Mr. Smith had been able to proceed with his plans unchallenged. The only response of the United Kingdom Government had been to adopt some economic and financial measures and to state that it would give the fullest consideration to any request for help from the Governor-General, a request which did not seem to have been forthcoming. The most the United Kingdom could point to was the fact that it had built a transmitter near the Southern Rhodesian border as part of its efforts to bring down the Smith régime.

498. On 20 November 1965 the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965), which had called upon the United Kingdom Government to quell the rebellion and take immediate measures to enable the Southern Rhodesian people to determine their own future. Five months had elapsed and there was no sign that the rebellion had been quelled. When referring to the economic sanctions, the United Kingdom Prime

Minister had said that a few weeks would be needed to bring Mr. Smith to his senses. The economic sanctions, however, had not worked, since they had been rejected by some Member States and ignored or interpreted at will by others. As far as Security Council resolution 221 (1966) concerning the oil tankers was concerned, it was reliably claimed that Southern Rhodesia could manage without oil from that source, owing mainly to the help of South Africa. The Governments of South Africa and Portugal had made it plain that they would not comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Both continued to maintain good relations with the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

499. In the circumstances, it was essential that new and drastic measures should be adopted to solve the problem once and for all. Force must now be used to overthrow Mr. Smith's régime and to bring self-determination and democracy to Southern Rhodesia. Effective steps should be taken to prevent South Africa, Portugal and others from assisting the régime. The Security Council should consider the question of Southern Rhodesia again, and in particular the question whether the time had come to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter on the use of force and mandatory sanctions. In his delegation's view, that Chapter should be invoked. Finally, the United Kingdom Government must be convinced that only strong measures, including the use of force, could deal properly with the situation. It had both the authority and the power to take such action and it no longer had any excuse for failing to do so. The General Assembly and the Security Council must demonstrate to the people of Southern Rhodesia that their confidence in the United Nations was justified.

500. The representative of Chile said that the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia deserved to be given the most serious attention by the United Nations. It had deteriorated steadily over the past three years, during which time the Committee and the General Assembly had adopted a number of resolutions warning the administering Power of the dangers inherent in the situation and calling upon it to abrogate the 1961 Constitution and other discriminatory laws and to implement the principle of "one man, one vote". The United Kingdom had refrained from complying with those resolutions on constitutional grounds. If it had made an effort to implement them, it would not now be faced with the rebellion of the Smith régime and the responsibility for putting an end to it. However that might be, once the rebellion had occurred, respect for the law could no longer be

invoked as a justification for failing to ensure respect for justice and human rights. There was no longer any pretext for maintaining the discriminatory Constitution of 1961. Until it was abrogated, moreover, there would remain a danger that it would be introduced under some legalistic disguise and its application entrusted to an autonomous Southern Rhodesian Government.

501. It therefore seemed to his delegation that the five principles of the United Kingdom declaration of 9 October 1965, together with the sixth principle referred to in the Prime Minister's statement of 25 January 1966, did not adequately meet the desires of the United Nations, but rather restricted the extent of the changes that could be introduced in the Territory by an interim Government. The power to revoke or amend the 1961 Constitution had clearly been acquired by the United Kingdom Government under the Southern Rhodesia Act of 1965 and should now be exercised.

502. With regard to the action taken to put down the rebellion, his delegation wished to make the following points. Firstly, the Chilean Government supported Security Council resolutions 202 (1965), 216 (1965), 217 (1965) and 221 (1966) and General Assembly resolutions 2021 and 2022 (XX) and had taken the necessary administrative action to apply the measures adopted against the Smith régime. Secondly, it noted that the sanctions adopted by the United Kingdom had not so far achieved their aim of bringing down the régime. Thirdly, information from the Press and other sources indicated that some countries had refused to co-operate in the economic blockade, and particularly in the oil embargo. That made them accomplices of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia and if they continued thus to defy the United Nations the results would be serious. Fourthly, the Chilean Government considered that the Security Council would be justified in applying Chapter VII of the Charter, since the situation had become a threat to international peace and security and voluntary measures had not produced results. The Council's resolution 221 (1966) on the oil tankers was useful but limited. The machinery of Chapter VII must be set in motion so that general and compulsory measures could be

decided on which would bring down the rebel régime. Such measures would also show which countries refused to co-operate with the United Nations in accordance with their legal obligations. In many respects, the outcome of the Southern Rhodesia issue would determine whether the United Nations was capable of establishing an international code of conduct or whether it would dwindle into impotence like the League of Nations after the failure of its sanctions against Ethiopia.

503. The representative of Afghanistan expressed his appreciation of the statements made by members of the Committee and of the interest taken by delegations such as those of Algeria and Ghana, which were not members of the Committee. He quoted passages from a recent issue of The Manchester Guardian Weekly to the effect that no one could be neutral on the Southern Rhodesia issue, that the United Kingdom had retained the right to act by itself and that the people of Africa expected it to do so. That was a reflection of public opinion in the United Kingdom. The Committee was also familiar with public opinion throughout the world, which held for the most part that the measures adopted so far by the United Kingdom were inadequate.

504. His delegation considered that more effective action was required and it regretted the fact that no proposals along those lines had been forthcoming from the United Kingdom. Under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the people of Southern Rhodesia had an inalienable right to freedom and independence. The United Kingdom had taken no steps to guarantee that right and the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. His delegation was therefore in favour of a recommendation by the Committee to the Security Council that it should consider the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter and put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia.

505. The representative of Saudi Arabia, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that it was anomalous for the United Nations to be considering the situation in a country which was still a colony and for which the United Kingdom bore primary responsibility. He preferred to ascribe that situation to the

difficulties confronting the United Kingdom in the Territory concerned rather than to the application by that Power of different standards to territories inhabited by white and by coloured races. The fact remained, however, that the United Kingdom was not taking effective action to end the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

506. The reluctance of the United Kingdom Government to use force in Southern Rhodesia was understandable; the British would not want their own kith and kin in that Territory to be subjected to force or the imposition of certain measures. The measures adopted by the United Kingdom so far took the form of a boycott. Yet a boycott could not possibly be effective, in view of the vast area covered by Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa, even if a costly supervision machinery was established. There would always be smugglers to ensure that the banned goods reached their destination.

507. The adoption of resolutions that would not be implemented would serve no purpose; the time had come to enable the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right to self-determination. It was said that the time was not ripe for action because there were no disturbances in Southern Rhodesia; but oppressed people could not create disturbances in a police State. If the United Kingdom did not want to act, it should ask the United Nations to make Southern Rhodesia a Trust Territory and take over responsibility for it. In addition, there were certain effective measures which could be taken.

508. There should be a collective operation whereby aircraft flying at a high altitude would bombard Southern Rhodesia - not with bombs but with educational leaflets addressed to both the white and the coloured population. The leaflets would appeal to the conscience of the Whites, not all of whom were on the side of Mr. Smith, and urge the Africans to stand up for their rights. Various Governments would no doubt be prepared to contribute to such an operation. In addition, there could be regular radio broadcasts addressed to the population of Southern Rhodesia; the United Nations might earmark funds for that purpose. Another effective measure would be for all States Members of the United Nations to refuse to grant entry or transit visas to white citizens of Southern Rhodesia. Those citizens would then feel that they were imprisoned in their own country, which would have a great psychological impact.

509. Those peaceful means should be tried for six months or a year. If they failed, other practical and pragmatic measures would have to be adopted, as they had been in the Congo. The Soviet Union and the United States - as the two world Powers with the greatest authority and the most financial resources - should together, as part of the current rapprochement, play the principal roles. The Asian States, however, were equally concerned about the situation in Southern Rhodesia and had a responsibility towards all the inhabitants of that Territory.

510. The representative of Bulgaria referred to a cable from the German Democratic Republic, which the Chairman had made available to members. He stated that the cable contained an important communication, in which the Government of the German Democratic Republic had expressed its support of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia for liberation. It was clear from the text of the cable that the German Democratic Republic's policy towards Southern Rhodesia was based on the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

511. It was regrettable that the United Kingdom delegation had so far not told the Special Committee what action its Government intended to take to bring down the racist regime of Ian Smith. By that strange attitude, the United Kingdom delegation was perhaps trying to give the impression that any examination of the question of Rhodesia at the present juncture would be inappropriate and superfluous, and that it would be logical to await the results of the recent Security Council resolution. The Bulgarian delegation did not share that point of view. It considered, as did the majority of delegations, that the recent meeting of the Security Council, convened in great haste upon the initiative of the United Kingdom delegation, had contributed neither to an understanding nor to a solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia. During the debates on the question in the Security Council in November 1965 and April 1966, the United Kingdom representatives had stressed that Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of the United Kingdom and that it lay with that Government to take the necessary steps. The Bulgarian delegation was in full agreement with that statement. Indeed, the present situation in Southern Rhodesia had arisen as a result of the policy pursued by the United Kingdom. It was the United Kingdom which was responsible for the fact that the white minority in Southern Rhodesia had been able to set up a racist regime against the will of the people. His delegation also agreed that it lay with the United Kingdom Government to take all the necessary action to put an end to that racist regime as soon as possible.

512. It was clear from the statements made in the Committee that the overwhelming majority of members were convinced that the measures adopted so far by the United Kingdom Government were ineffective and would not suffice to bring about the downfall of the racist Smith regime. There appeared to be general agreement that the United Kingdom Government's object in bringing the question before the Security Council in great haste, immediately after its victory in the general election, had been to give world opinion the impression that it had decided to take concrete action, whereas the fact was that the measures it had recommended in its draft resolution could in no way help to achieve the objective sought by earlier resolutions and by the large majority of Member States: namely, the removal once and for all of the racist minority regime and the establishment of a majority Government in Southern Rhodesia.

513. The representative of Uruguay said that there was general agreement that the unilateral declaration of independence and the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia should not be recognized and that the United Kingdom bore primary responsibility for the entire institutional progress of Southern Rhodesia. Uruguay could not agree, however, that the United Kingdom bore sole responsibility in the question. The administering Power was responsible to the United Nations for leading Southern Rhodesia to independence in accordance with Chapter XI of the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), transferring all powers and attributes of sovereignty to a representative Government freely chosen by the population. Indeed, the competence of the United Nations and the responsibility of the United Kingdom had been clearly defined by the General Assembly when it had affirmed in resolution 1747 (XVI) that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The Uruguayan delegation had expressed its views on that matter at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly (A/C.4/607).

514. The United Kingdom therefore had the power and the obligation to use every means at its disposal to lead the people of Southern Rhodesia to independence through a process of genuine self-determination. As a first step, it should crush the minority regime currently in power. In its resolution of 20 November 1965, the Security Council had called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quell the rebellion and to take all other appropriate measures to that end. The United Kingdom had not, however, been given carte blanche and was not authorized

to take a certain type of measure. Uruguay approved of the United Kingdom decision to request authorization from the Security Council to detain the oil tankers headed for Beira.

515. Because of the lack of success of the measures adopted so far and because of the responsibility of the United Nations in the question, many Member States had been led to assume responsibilities imposed upon them by the Charter and by international solidarity, in a situation for which they were in no way to blame. International action would succeed whenever the great Powers which had the strength and the necessary means were prepared to find an effective solution to the problem.

516. There was a large measure of agreement that the measures of a practical nature which the United Nations should take were within the purview of the Security Council; that fact had been brought out both in the recent resolutions of the General Assembly and in the draft resolution before the Committee. In paragraph 13 of resolution 2022 (XX) the General Assembly had stated that the situation in Southern Rhodesia threatened international peace and security. In resolution 217 of 20 November 1965, the Security Council, using an unusual wording, had stated that the situation was extremely grave and that its continuance in time constituted a threat to international peace and security. In resolution 221 of 9 April 1966 the Security Council had stated, in connexion with the very specific and limited case then under consideration, that the resulting situation constituted a threat to the peace. It was the determination by the Security Council that a situation constituted a threat to international peace and security which made Chapter VII of the Charter applicable and opened the way to enforcement measures. So far, the Security Council had not determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia in general constituted a threat to international peace and security but it had taken two steps in that direction.

517. The Security Council would therefore have to determine the character of the question and decide on the consequences of that determination - the possible compulsory application of the measures envisaged in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. That would be a complex decision, even in so far as it referred to measures not requiring the use of force and particularly when the use of force was involved. Unfortunately, the machinery envisaged in Article 43 for the use of force had not been established, since the necessary forces had not been

constituted. The application of measures of force depended on the provision of armed forces in each case by one or more States, so that the automatic, coercive and irresistible impact envisaged in the Charter was lost.

518. The representative of Iran said that, despite United Nations efforts, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated to a point where it had assumed new dimensions. The Committee had at first treated the question of Southern Rhodesia like other colonial issues by condemning the continued subjugation of the Zimbabwe people under the oppressive yoke of the racist minority regime and by calling for constitutional conferences and other peaceful means to bring about the freedom and independence of those people. The situation had now changed. It was no longer merely a colonial issue but an actual threat to international peace and security, as had been determined by the Security Council. In view of that finding, the Committee had no choice but to set in motion proceedings for action under Chapter VII of the Charter. It could no longer afford to rely on the goodwill of any particular authority; it must take compulsory action, for the future of the United Nations itself was at stake.

519. More than five months had elapsed since Mr. Smith, in defiance of the United Kingdom, the United Nations and world opinion, had unilaterally declared independence with the avowed intention of perpetuating the white usurper regime and its domination over the Zimbabwe people. Three months had elapsed since the United Kingdom Prime Minister had said that economic sanctions would bring down the rebellious regime in a matter of weeks. It was now generally conceded that the sanctions had failed to achieve their objective.

520. Iran had been the first country to respond to the Security Council's call of 20 November 1965 by ordering a ban on the sale of oil to Southern Rhodesia. The importance of that action could be appreciated in the light of the fact that Iran was the largest exporter of oil to the Territory. Iran had not made a similar declaration with regard to a ban on arms shipments because it had never sent or contemplated sending any arms to Southern Rhodesia. Whatever economic relations it had had with the Territory had been curtailed. By that action Iran was not merely responding to the Security Council recommendations but was demonstrating its unflinching support for the independence and freedom of the Zimbabwe people.

521. The experience of the past few months had shown the need for effective action and for the Security Council to consider the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. Although the United Kingdom's action so far had been inadequate, it was to be hoped that it would now take the kind of action which was necessary in order to bring about the downfall of the Smith regime.

522. According to a news report, the Zimbabwe people were carrying out sporadic demonstrations against the Smith regime in various cities in Southern Rhodesia. Although they were at present armed only with stones, there would come a time when they would be organized and armed with bullets. His delegation earnestly hoped that the United Kingdom would respond positively to the Afro-Asian appeal for effective action before the entire Territory was engulfed in a blood bath.

523. The representative of Italy said that the debate in the Special Committee had been useful in that it had given a number of members which were not on the Security Council an opportunity to express their views with respect to the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

524. The Italian delegation had consistently condemned the attempt by Mr. Smith and his colleagues to establish in Southern Rhodesia a regime based on minority rule and racial discrimination. It was concerned about the fate of the millions of Africans in Southern Rhodesia who, despite the many resolutions of the United Nations, were still denied a voice in determining the future of their country.

525. His delegation felt that the United Nations should adopt a firm yet cautious approach to the question of Southern Rhodesia: firm in stating the principles and goals, and cautious in taking action through the application of the policies which had been adopted. By and large, the action taken so far by various United Nations bodies and more recently by the Security Council - on which the ultimate responsibility rested - had been in line with that approach.

526. The Italian Government had fully supported the decisions of the Security Council on Southern Rhodesia and had done its utmost to implement them. In addition to the measures described in documents S/7016 and S/7048, the Italian Government had recently decided to submit to licence all imports from Southern Rhodesia, a measure which supplemented the total ban previously adopted on all imports of sugar and tobacco from that country, and it had suspended and rescinded all forms of insurance provided by Government bodies in connexion with exports to

Southern Rhodesia. As early as December 1965, it had imposed a total embargo on exports of oil and petroleum products to that Territory.

527. The Italian Government regretted that the relevant Security Council resolutions had not been fully implemented by all Members and hoped that the countries which had failed to do so would realize that it was in their best interest to co-operate with the United Nations in re-establishing the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia.

528. The central theme of the debate was whether the measures so far adopted by the Security Council were adequate to bring down the Smith regime. Although that regime was still in power, it had been reported that the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and implemented by the overwhelming majority of Member States had seriously weakened the Territory's economy. The day was perhaps not far off when the illegal authorities of Salisbury would be brought to reason. While his delegation shared the feelings of impatience that had been voiced, it felt that some time must elapse before a well-founded judgement could be made on the effectiveness of the measures so far adopted. Simple wisdom and the spirit of the Charter suggested that the objective universally sought should be achieved, in the first instance, by means which were the least destructive. In an increasingly interdependent world, no action should be taken in one area without the repercussions elsewhere having been considered.

529. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that since 1960 numbers of resolutions on the subject of Southern Rhodesia had been adopted by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and even the Security Council. There had been so many developments in the situation that there was apparently no longer any profound disagreement on the subject. He used the word "apparently" advisedly, for many delegations which banded together when it came to adopting important decisions against the present regime in Southern Rhodesia did not hesitate to recognize the legitimacy of the Zimbabwe people's struggle against the advocates of discrimination and the enemies of democracy.

530. So just were the claims of the unhappy Zimbabwe people that even the United Kingdom, in a praiseworthy effort of understanding, had twice taken the initiative in asking for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia.

531. It was not simply the destiny of a distant African country that was at stake, but the future of the United Nations itself. It was perhaps for that reason, rather than out of compassion, that his delegation had struggled unceasingly to bring about the restoration of justice in Southern Rhodesia and unequivocally condemned all the countries which were trying to nullify the pressure that was being brought to bear on the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.

IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. CONSENSUS ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE CONCERNING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

532. At its 401st meeting, on 6 April 1966, the Special Committee agreed to adopt as its consensus the statement made by the Chairman at that meeting (see paras. 340-345 above), it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would appear in the record of the meeting. In the statement, the Chairman drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the appalling state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia and asked him to alert the President of the Security Council to take steps to bring it before the Council for necessary action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations. Reservations concerning the Chairman's statement were expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Italy, Australia, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela (see paras. 379-389 above).

B. ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

533. At its 405th meeting, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272 and Add.1). Subsequently Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia submitted a revised version of this draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1).

534. Introducing the revised thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1), the representative of Syria said that the draft resolution reflected the three facts that had emerged from the general debate in the Committee.

535. Firstly, the situation remained grave and had far-reaching international consequences; the problem of Southern Rhodesia was a stubborn and dangerous one arousing the conscience of mankind. Secondly, the United Kingdom Government had failed to deal with the situation. Its recent ambiguous and dubious appeal to the Security Council for a partial mandate to enforce an oil embargo was further proof that a situation for which the United Kingdom bore sole responsibility had been wilfully mishandled. Thirdly, there was an urgent need for more efficient measures to deal with that deteriorating situation, with a view to upholding the principles of the Charter and implementing the resolutions of the United Nations.

536. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution reflected a polarity in the problem of Southern Rhodesia: on the one hand, there was a majority of 4 million Africans with an inalienable right to freedom and independence and, on the other hand, a tyrannical minority of white European settlers completely disregarding that right. The paragraph therefore reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of those rights in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Operative paragraph 2 recalled resolution 2022 (XX), in which the General Assembly had condemned the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia as a crime against humanity. Such a crime called for action. Operative paragraph 3 therefore condemned the failure of certain States to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council. Operative paragraph 4 called upon the administering Power to take all effective measures, including the use of force. That Power could not argue against the use of force, since it had used force in other circumstances, for example in Aden. Since, as stated in operative paragraph 5, the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, adequate measures to remedy that situation should be sought and the Security Council should consider measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, as was recommended in operative paragraph 6.

537. Basically, the draft resolution was invoking the authority of the Charter to deal with a human situation. It was thus putting into practice the terms and provisions of the Charter, so that they became binding on Member States. By adopting the draft resolution, the Committee would be sharing with the people of Zimbabwe the burden of their tragedy and the suffering of their humiliation.

538. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the sponsors of the draft resolution felt that the time had come for the United Kingdom Government to take resolute action and for the United Nations to take a firm decision. The United Kingdom had come to realize that sanctions alone could not crush the rebellion and it had therefore asked the Security Council to authorize the use of force to stop the oil tankers. If the United Kingdom could use force to stop tankers unloading at Beira, it could use force to stop the supply of oil from other areas and to crush the actual rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. The economic blockade

was known to be a total failure; the draft resolution condemned certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, which had failed to implement the relevant resolutions and had given support and assistance to the racist minority regime.

539. The aim of the draft resolution was to end the tragedy in Southern Rhodesia quickly. It therefore suggested that both the United Kingdom Government and the United Nations should take immediate action to end the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in that Territory, to establish the rule of law immediately and to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to enjoy their rights. He was sure that all true friends of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia would support the draft resolution, which asked only that the racist minority should be ousted and that the country should be governed by the people who really constituted the majority.

540. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the sanctions against the Salisbury regime had no real meaning for the African people who were being ruthlessly exploited by that regime. The draft resolution therefore emphasized the need for effective and concrete measures to overthrow the Smith regime. It could be seen from published figures that despite the sanctions trade between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia was increasing and not decreasing. The United States was continuing its tobacco trade with Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was receiving large supplies of oil from South Africa. The failure of the sanctions showed that the only way to crush the Smith regime was to use force. That fact was emphasized in the draft resolution, which he commended to the Committee.

541. The debate had brought to light many facts which revealed still further the ruthless nature of the colonial system. The question of Southern Rhodesia would present no great problem if the great Powers were disposed to act in an effective manner in favour of freedom and independence for that country. Time and again delegations had been told not to be impatient but to give the weaker measures time to work. In his delegation's opinion, time was the commodity much needed by the racist minority regime in Rhodesia to consolidate its illegal and criminal position. The African delegations called upon all their friends to support them in their effort to secure the adoption of effective measures - by which they meant the use of force - to remove the minority regime.

542. It was high time that force was used in order to effect justice and to give the people of Rhodesia their inalienable right to freedom and independence. It had been argued in the Committee that members should be cautious in speaking about the use of force. It was therefore ironical that in the Security Council it had been the United Kingdom which had brought up the question of using some force. He wondered why such half-hearted measures were advocated. It was the United Kingdom that had allowed the Smith regime to accumulate the modern arms which it was using against the African people. There had been reports in the Press of skirmishes with the Smith forces in Salisbury and of brutal acts committed against the African people. Five months had elapsed since Smith had taken power in Rhodesia. As Africans and as members of the human society, the Tanzanian people could not agree to wait while human lives were being sacrificed. He had been glad to see that the draft resolution had received the support of one great Power and he hoped that others would follow.

543. The representative of Bulgaria said that the fact that the action taken so far by the United Kingdom Government had proved ineffective and inadequate was reflected in the moderate and well-balanced draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1) which a number of countries had submitted and which merely asked the Security Council to consider further measures to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia. The very contents of the draft resolution indicated that the discussion of the question in the Special Committee was but one stage on the way to a more substantial discussion in the Security Council with a view to determining what action must be taken to overcome the serious situation in Southern Rhodesia.

544. The Bulgarian delegation considered that the Committee, and in particular the members which by reason of their geographic situation and fraternal ties with Southern Rhodesia felt themselves closer to the question, should pave the way for a careful examination of the problem in the Security Council, so that the Council could adopt measures to remove the racist white-minority regime in that country as soon as possible and to ensure the establishment of a majority Government.

545. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed his delegation's satisfaction that the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1) reflected the views and proposals which had been expressed

during the general discussion more accurately than had the original text. For example, operative paragraph 3 was not simply a general condemnation of States which supported and assisted the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia but it specifically condemned the South African racists and Portuguese colonialists who through their criminal actions were nullifying the efforts of the countries that were trying to implement the relevant United Nations decisions. The new wording of that paragraph was a considerable improvement and the Soviet Union delegation was prepared to support it, although it considered that the time was long overdue for the Committee to condemn openly and resolutely all those who, directly or indirectly, had hampered the implementation of the United Nations decisions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, in particular Security Council resolution 217 (1965).

546. The new operative paragraph 4, too, was a great improvement in that it stressed the fact that responsibility for liquidating the racist regime in Southern Rhodesia lay squarely with the administering Power and it implied that power was to be transferred to the people in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and with the United Nations Charter.

547. Like many delegations, the Soviet Union delegation considered that the action of the United Kingdom in convening the Security Council had been simply an attempt to remove from the United Kingdom Government the responsibility for its failure to implement the United Nations resolutions and for the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation also considered the decision adopted by the Security Council on 9 April 1966 to be a manifestly inadequate measure because it did not provide for a proper solution of the Rhodesian problem.

548. His delegation favoured the adoption of decisions that would provide for the implementation of a broader series of measures designed to put into effect the Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, including the application of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution was therefore perfectly justifiable; it met the requirements of the situation and was in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of delegations. Although it considered some of the preambular paragraphs inadequate, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

549. The Soviet Union Government had supported and continued to support the struggle of peoples for self-determination, freedom and independence. The Soviet Union stood solidly behind the people of Zimbabwe and was ready to co-operate with African countries in assisting those people in their struggle for independence.

550. The representative of Italy said that it was regrettable that the draft resolution before the Committee was worded in such a way as to make it impossible for his delegation to support it. His delegation also regretted that the original text, which might have met with a considerable measure of agreement in the Committee, had been replaced by a new draft which brought up the controversial issue of the use of force. It would be recalled that, during the debate on Southern Rhodesia at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, it had become clear that the Members of the United Nations were deeply divided on that issue. His delegation had reservations regarding the introduction of a paragraph requesting the use of force, although it recognized the great importance of the question of Southern Rhodesia and shared the objective of the African delegations. Its reasons for those reservations were twofold. Firstly, the use of force should be envisaged only as a last resort. Secondly, it found no provision in the Charter empowering the use of force under the terms suggested in the draft resolution. In his delegation's opinion, the introduction of such a dividing issue could only reduce the number of delegations that would support the draft resolution. In addition, the fourth preambular paragraph was misleading, since it did not take into account a number of circumstances and deeds, in particular the fact that the United Kingdom had taken measures and that those measures had been endorsed by the Security Council and implemented by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations. In his delegation's view the following formula would have been more appropriate: "Considering that the measures taken by the Government of the United Kingdom and endorsed by the Security Council have failed so far to bring down the regime of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia".

551. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 should have been worded in such a way as to avoid confusion between the responsibilities of the Security Council and those of the General Assembly. His delegation agreed, however, on the inner meaning of the two paragraphs, namely, that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was fraught with dangerous potentialities and that the Security Council was the appropriate body to

consider the implications of the situation and to take whatever action might be necessary. It was for the Security Council, and not the Committee, to indicate whether such action was under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter. Moreover, it was not necessarily the legal context that ensured the effectiveness of a political action but rather the nature of the measures adopted and the political will to implement them.

552. In view of those considerations, the Italian delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. In conclusion, he stressed that the Italian delegation had always advocated and whole-heartedly supported the restoration of law and order in Southern Rhodesia and the recognition of equal rights to every inhabitant of that country. Any differences that might exist between his delegation and the majority of the members of the Committee concerned, not the objectives, but only the methods to follow in order to achieve those objectives.

553. The representative of Iraq said that the Italian representative had expressed the view that, had the original draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272) come before the Committee, it would have commanded a much larger majority than would the revised text. The Iraqi delegation did not consider that the strength of a resolution lay in the amount of support it obtained; it was a well-known fact that in the matter of colonialism weak resolutions usually gained more or less unanimous acceptance, while strong ones did not. His delegation therefore preferred a strong resolution adopted by the majority to a weak resolution adopted unanimously.

554. Secondly, the Italian representative had spoken of the use of force as a last resort. He would point out that five months had already elapsed and he did not think that those who had voted in favour of the various resolutions on Southern Rhodesia had contemplated waiting for years before recommending the use of force. He agreed with the Italian representative that it was the prerogative of the Security Council to recommend the use of force. The reference in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution to the use of force was the natural outcome of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which spoke of "quelling" Ian Smith's rebellion; those who had voted in favour of that resolution had undoubtedly had more in mind than an embargo on oil to "quell" the rebellion. Moreover, operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution recommended that the Security Council should

consider the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter, and that Chapter dealt with the use of force.

555. With regard to the Italian representative's comment on the wording of operative paragraph 5, he pointed out that the Security Council had already, in resolution 221 (1966), referred to the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a threat to peace.

556. Although the points mentioned by the Italian representative might prevent that representative from voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Iraqi delegation was convinced that the draft resolution represented the very least that the Committee could adopt.

557. The representative of Italy, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he had always been concerned about the use of the words "strong" or "weak" to describe a resolution: the important thing was that the resolution adopted should be consistent with the aims pursued by the Committee and with the context of the situation under discussion. He had certainly not said that he would have preferred the original draft resolution because it was a "weak" resolution; he had only said that it would meet with a considerable amount of agreement in the Committee and there was no denying that, the larger the majority by which a resolution was adopted, the more weight would it carry.

558. In referring to his remark that the use of force should be only a last resort, the representative of Iraq had spoken of the sad five months that had elapsed since the unilateral declaration of independence. He would remind him that Italy had struggled for a hundred years before achieving unity and independence. The situations were not, of course, comparable, but it was well to consider such matters in some kind of historical perspective. In any case, his main objection to the reference to the use of force in the revised draft resolution was that it did not appear in operative paragraph 6, in which action by the Security Council was contemplated, but in operative paragraph 4, in which the administering Power was called upon to use force. Such a request to the administering Power was contrary to the very spirit of the Charter and the Italian delegation could never agree to it.

559. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that his delegation, which was a sponsor of the draft resolution, was confident that it would be adopted

unanimously. The measures recommended in the draft resolution were those which had already been adopted on other occasions; in calling upon the administering Power "to take all effective measures, including the use of force", the draft resolution was only echoing the Security Council, which twice already had taken similar decisions.

560. The representative of Mali said that his delegation hoped that all delegations would support the draft resolution, whose recommendations represented the minimum that the Zimbabwe people were entitled to expect. Operative paragraph 4 merely asked the administering Power to use all the means within its power, including armed force, to put an end to the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. It was the duty of the United Kingdom to take action to safeguard the interests of the Zimbabwe people and to ensure their security. It was to assist the administering Power in exercising its prerogatives that the Malian delegation had co-sponsored the draft resolution.

561. The representative of the United States of America said that, while his delegation disagreed with certain points in some of the statements that had been made during the debate, and with certain provisions of the draft resolution, it was in general agreement with the objectives sought: namely, democratic government and self-determination and independence for all the people of Southern Rhodesia on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole.

562. The practical steps his country had taken in pursuit of those objectives had been described in detail in the Security Council. His delegation would like to see other countries take similar steps to assist the United Kingdom in discharging its responsibilities towards the people of Southern Rhodesia.

563. His delegation supported those parts of the draft resolution which affirmed the applicability of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to the question of Rhodesia, attacked the policy of racial discrimination in that country and recognized the legitimacy of the aspirations of the people for the full enjoyment of their rights - rights which it took to include the right of self-determination.

564. On 9 April the Security Council had taken an important step in implementation of the programme of economic measures against Southern Rhodesia. The full impact of that step had yet to be felt and his delegation therefore considered that it was too early to decide as firmly as did the draft resolution what further steps might be necessary. It was therefore unable to concur in the draft resolution and would abstain in the vote.

565. Southern Rhodesia remained one of the most important problems before the Security Council and it was in that forum that the United States would prefer to express its views on policy and the further steps that might be appropriate. It felt that whatever contribution the United States might make to the solution of the problem could best be made there, at the proper time.

566. The representative of Venezuela said that it would be seen from his delegation's statement in the general debate that it had been in general agreement with the substance and form of draft resolution A/AC.109/L.272. It had therefore co-sponsored that draft. Following a decision by the Afro-Asian group in the Committee, however, substantial changes had been introduced in the text, which made it impossible for Venezuela to remain a sponsor. It had serious reservations about the changes made and the final wording of the draft resolution.

567. His delegation could not support operative paragraph 3 of the revised text, which went beyond the terms of reference of the Special Committee. Venezuela was not convinced that the Committee could use the word "condemns"; in the language of the Charter, that word had a precise meaning and entailed serious consequences, which could be decided only by the Security Council. In any case, it would be for the Council itself and not for the Special Committee to "condemn" a State for the non-implementation of its resolutions, with all the ensuing consequences. Indeed, the Council resolution only called upon Member States and did not require or oblige them to implement it. His delegation had on numerous occasions stated its views about the need strictly to respect the exclusive competence of each of the organs of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

568. With regard to operative paragraph 4, his delegation had already had occasion to explain that it could not accept the use of force. If some of the great Powers insisted on acceptance of the principle of the delimitation of the competence of United Nations organs, actually refusing to contribute to expenses resulting from decisions taken by an organ they did not consider competent, the small States - including Venezuela - had even more reason to do so. The rights of small States could be effectively defended only if the provisions of the Charter were strictly observed. So far force had been used to impose the will of the strong and take away the freedom of the weak. The Special Committee would not help the people of Southern Rhodesia by assuming the functions of the Security Council. The unilateral use of force would jeopardize the cause of the small States by setting

a precedent for a type of action covered by specific provisions in Chapter VII of the Charter. The United Nations was based on the renunciation of the use of force, which was permitted only for individual or collective self-defence, in cases which were strictly specified in the Charter and were to be decided only by the Security Council. Venezuela therefore could not, by its vote, call upon or invite a State to use force unilaterally. It had serious reasons for feeling considerable misgivings about the use of force, even collectively, at the regional or international level. It had even more reason to feel misgivings about any attempt to legitimize the unilateral use of force by any Member State.

569. For those reasons, his delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution and it asked for a separate vote on those paragraphs.

570. With regard to operative paragraph 5, for the reasons it had already given, his delegation considered that the Special Committee was not competent to describe any situation as a threat to peace and security. That was a matter within the exclusive purview of the Security Council, under Article 39 of the Charter. The Committee could bring a situation to the attention of the Security Council but it was for the Council to determine the nature of that situation. Venezuela would abstain in the vote on paragraph 5, as it had done in the General Assembly when a vote had been taken on resolution 2022 (XX), to whose paragraph 13 the paragraph in question related. It asked for a separate vote on paragraph 5.

571. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

572. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that his delegation had raised no objection to the discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia as a matter of priority, because it understood and shared the Committee's deep concern about that question. The United Kingdom Government had never underestimated the seriousness - indeed, the great difficulties and dangers - of the situation.

573. Much that had been said in the Committee had been misleading and some comments, such as the accusations of complacency, lack of determination or collusion, had been wholly misconceived. In rejecting such misguided imputations, the United Kingdom remained convinced that no useful contribution would be made by pursuing any wrangle about facts or motives. As stated recently in the Security Council (S/PV.1277), the United Kingdom was not seeking to provoke or to answer provocation. It was constantly concerned with the action needed to achieve purposes on which there was a wide measure of agreement.

574. The action already taken had been extensive and much more effective than many wished to admit. The United Kingdom was grateful to all those who had answered its call to match its own actions in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 1965.

575. The determination of the United Kingdom Government to end the rebellion and work constantly for a settlement acceptable to the entire people of Southern Rhodesia had been clearly stated and repeatedly confirmed. His Government was persisting and would continue to persist until those declared aims had been achieved.

576. His delegation reserved its position on the substance of the draft resolution, on which it did not wish to comment. In connexion with operative paragraph 4, however, he reminded the Committee that his Government's views on the use of force had been stated on many occasions. With regard to operative paragraphs 5 and 6, its views on the appropriateness of the Committee's making determinations on peace and security were also well known.

577. The United Kingdom would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole and on any separate paragraphs.

578. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, which was in conformity with basic principles supported by Uruguay in the question of Southern Rhodesia. However, his delegation would not participate in any separate vote on operative paragraphs 5 and 6, which dealt with attitudes to be adopted by the Security Council. His delegation would like that position to be recorded in the Committee's report.

579. Uruguay would abstain in the vote on operative paragraph 4, as it had done in the vote on operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX), which embodied the same concept of the use of force.

580. With regard to operative paragraph 3, it would have been preferable not to mention by name certain States which did not bear the principal responsibility in the matter concerned. In all cases of racial discrimination and colonization, Uruguay had no hesitation in condemning States which were directly responsible. In the case under consideration, however, it would have been preferable not to dilute the responsibility by referring to secondary responsibilities.

581. The representative of Denmark regretted that the revised text of the draft resolution went much further than the original version, particularly by referring

to the use of force. His delegation would have been able to vote in favour of the original text with only a few reservations, but it did not think that the Committee should take such a drastic step as to recommend the use of force. In the existing delicate situation, all efforts should be concentrated on the adoption and implementation, by agreement between the United Kingdom and the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations, of the strongest possible measures designed to oust the Smith regime.

582. Consequently, although Denmark could support most of the paragraphs in the revised draft resolution, it would have to abstain when it was put to the vote. It was more important to see that resolutions obtained the desired goal by unified action than to qualify their wording as "weak" or "strong". The original text of the draft resolution had not been weak; it had been better and more realistic. As a result of the changes made, there would unfortunately be less votes cast in favour of it.

583. The representative of Chile said that his delegation could support most of the changes reflected in the revised text of the draft resolution but not the inclusion, in operative paragraph 4, of an appeal for the use of force by the administering Power. According to the Charter, the use of force was prohibited except under the authority of the Security Council or in cases of self-defence against armed attack. Although it would no doubt be decisive in crushing the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, the use of force by the United Kingdom would set a dangerous precedent for other colonial cases. The United Nations should not call for the use of force, except by authorization of the Security Council. His delegation's views on that subject had been expressed in the General Assembly during the discussion of operative paragraph 11 of resolution 2022 (XX). It would abstain in the vote on operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.

584. Chile would vote in favour of the other paragraphs and of the draft resolution as a whole.

585. The representative of Iraq said that the difference between the original and the revised text was that the revised text condemned the failure of certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and called for the use of force by the administering Power. Certain delegations which could not vote for the latter provision might be able to vote for the condemnation of certain States. There should therefore be separate votes on paragraphs 3 and 4.

586. At its 407th meeting, the Special Committee voted by roll-call on the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1) as follows:

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 20 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 votes to none, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Chile, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 5 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 19 to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

587. The text of the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/158), as adopted by the Special Committee at its 407th meeting on 21 April 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee

"Deeply concerned about the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further the Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, including resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, the relevant General Assembly resolutions and in particular resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, and the relevant resolutions of the Special Committee,

"Considering that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to take the necessary and adequate measures to bring down the regime of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia, and to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

"Noting that some States, including States Members of the United Nations, actively encourage the racist minority regime of Southern Rhodesia by their refusal to implement the pertinent Security Council resolutions, including resolution 217 (1965),

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. Reaffirms in particular General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) which condemns the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;

"3. Condemns the failure of certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council by giving support and assistance to the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Calls upon the administering Power to take all effective measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia;

"5. Considers that the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security;

"6. Recommends to the Security Council to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia;

"7. Decides to transmit to the Security Council the records of the discussions of the Special Committee on this question;

"8. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on the agenda of the Special Committee and to review the situation whenever it considers it necessary."

588. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the debate on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 April 1966 (S/7263).

V. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1966

589. At its 1276th and 1277th meetings on 9 April 1966, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a letter dated 7 April 1966 (S/7235) from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, requesting the President of the Council to convene an emergency meeting to consider the situation arising from the arrival in Beira of an oil tanker which might result in substantial supplies of oil reaching Southern Rhodesia in contravention of the oil embargo imposed by his Government in accordance with the Council's resolution 217 of 20 November 1965. At its 1277th meeting, the Security Council adopted a resolution 221 (1966) by 10 votes (Argentina, China, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America) to none with 5 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Uruguay). The text of the resolution is as follows:

"The Security Council

"Recalling its resolutions Nos. 216 of 12 November 1965 and 217 of 20 November 1965 and in particular its call to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

"Gravely concerned at reports that substantial supplies of oil may reach Rhodesia as the result of an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further tanker which may lead to the resumption of pumping through the CPMR pipeline with the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities,

"Considering that such supplies will afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to remain longer in being,

1. Determines that the resulting situation constitutes a threat to the peace;

2. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia;

"3. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil destined for Rhodesia;

"4. Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira;

"5. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia, and empowers the United Kingdom to arrest and detail the tanker known as the Icarina V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged there.

590. The Security Council at its 1278th to 1285th meetings, between 17 and 23 May 1966, resumed its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a letter dated 10 May 1966 (S/7285 and Add.2) by thirty-two African States which requested the President of the Security Council to convene an immediate meeting of the Council on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, in order to examine, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the necessary measures to establish majority rule in Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

591. On 11 May, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda submitted a draft resolution on this problem (S/7285/Add.1). Under its operative part the Council would: (1) determine that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security; (2) call upon all States to apply measures with a view to the complete severance of economic relations and communications with Southern Rhodesia in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter; (3) invite the Portuguese and South African Governments, in particular, to take forthwith the necessary measures under Article 41 of the Charter to sever economic relations and communications with Southern Rhodesia; (4) call upon all States, and particularly the Portuguese and South African Governments, to take all necessary measures to prevent the supply of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia; (5) call upon the United Kingdom to take the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter in order, by the use of air, sea or land forces, to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia; (6) reaffirm the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly

resolution 1514 (XV), and recognize the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations; (7) call upon the United Kingdom to hold consultations with the leaders of African political parties with a view to the establishment of a régime consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe; (8) draw the attention of the United Kingdom to the harmful consequences which the present negotiations might entail for the establishment of a régime based on universal suffrage; and (9) call upon the United Kingdom Government to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

592. At its 1285th meeting, on 23 May 1966, the Security Council proceeded to vote on the draft resolution. In voting the draft resolution was not adopted. It failed to receive the required majority, receiving 6 votes in favour, 1 against, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: New Zealand.

Abstaining: Argentina, China, France, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Population

593. It will be recalled that the Government Monthly Statistical Report on Southern Rhodesia for January 1966 stated that the population of Southern Rhodesia had reached an all-time high of 4,330,000, with a white population of 224,000 (see paragraph 123 above). According to the Central Office of Statistics figures released in Salisbury on 28 February 1966, Southern Rhodesia had a net gain of 4,463 white immigrants in 1965, compared with a net loss of 6,722 in 1964.

"Constitutional" developments

594. On 17 February 1966, the Southern Rhodesia "Legislative Assembly" passed the Constitutional Ratification Bill "to ratify the 1965 Constitution" by 48 votes in favour to 2 against. The thirteen-member official opposition, the all-African United Peoples Party, boycotted the vote. The Bill was signed on 18 February 1966 by Mr. Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government".

595. In a broadcast on 27 March 1966, Mr. Ian Smith stated that he proposed to set up a commission to recommend to his "Government" new constitutional safeguards which would replace in the "1965 Constitution" the provisions governing the alterations to the entrenched clauses.

Emergency Powers Act

596. On 8 March 1966, the Southern Rhodesia "Legislative Assembly" passed the Emergency Powers Amendment Bill by 44 votes to 14. The Bill, which was subsequently signed by the "Officer Administering the Government", purports to widen the circumstances under which the "Officer Administering the Government" may proclaim an emergency, facilitate the issuing of regulations following a declaration of emergency and increase the range of subjects for which emergency regulations can be readily issued.

597. Under the present Act - the Emergency Powers Act of 1960 - the Governor can proclaim a state of emergency if he feels there is a sufficient threat to public

safety, public order or the maintenance of an essential service, inside Southern Rhodesia. The Ian Smith régime claims that with the declaration of independence these powers are now vested in the "Officer Administering the Government" in terms of the "1965 Constitution".

598. To these powers the amendment purports to add that the "Officer Administering the Government" can declare a state of emergency if "action has been taken or is immediately threatened by the Government of another country of such a nature as to be likely to interfere with the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia".

599. Speaking in the debate in the "Legislative Assembly", the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, stated that Southern Rhodesia must leave no loopholes that its enemies could seize upon to attack and upset and interfere with good government during what he called this vital and crucial stage of its emergence as a sovereign independent State. He stated that the Bill did not introduce startling changes in the Emergency Powers Act of 1960. The "Government" merely wished to make it perfectly clear to all and sundry that every law, resolution of the House and subsidiary legislation passed and in force since 11 November 1965 in terms of the Emergency Powers Act, chapter 33, was valid and beyond a shadow of doubt the law of the land.

600. Referring to the proposals which would allow a state of emergency to be declared in Southern Rhodesia as a result of the actions of any government of another country, he stated that this was a new concept and an obvious one when the threats aimed at Southern Rhodesia from outside were considered.

601. Many of the new emergency regulations - about twenty different sets of regulations - adopted by the illegal régime since the unilateral declaration of independence have been incorporated into the statutory emergency powers under the Bill. These new regulations relate mainly to the control of manpower, censorship and the control of corporations.

Extension of National Service

602. On 25 March 1966, the Smith régime announced a compulsory scheme of registration for all Europeans, Asians and Coloured males in the country between the ages of 17 and 60. The announcement, which was made by Lord Graham, the "Minister of Defence and External Affairs" declared a doubling of the period of

peace-time military training which Europeans, Asian and Coloured youth undertake in Southern Rhodesia from four and a half months to nine months. He stated that the compulsory registration was not a call-up but merely a registration of manpower to be used as and when required in the national interest. The extension of the National Service was designed to give Southern Rhodesia a much more efficient territorial force and to produce more young officers to replace a number nearing retirement.

United People's Party

603. On 25 March 1966, the all African Opposition United People's Party which has thirteen members in the Southern Rhodesian "Legislative Assembly" announced that Mr. Chad Chipunza had succeeded Mr. Josiah Gondo as a leader of the Party.

The University College and the illegal régime

604. Over 100 students, mostly Africans, from the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, staged demonstrations on the college campus from 16 to 18 March 1966. The students were protesting against the illegal declaration of independence and the restriction of university students by the illegal régime. On 17 March 1966, the student demonstrators were supported by over thirty lecturers of the university who issued a statement reaffirming their opposition to the illegal régime and deploring the restrictions of the university students by the Southern Rhodesian régime. On 18 March 1966, the police in Salisbury placed a ban on all non-educational public meetings at the university.

605. The lecturers and about 300 African and Asian students also instituted a complete boycott of lectures at the university. It was reported on 25 March 1966 that both the students and lecturers involved in the demonstrations and boycott of lectures had returned to classes.

606. On 13 April 1966, Dr. Walter Adams, Principal of the University College, submitted his resignation to the college authorities after having defied police attempts to recapture an African student who had returned to classes after escaping from a restriction camp at Gonakudzingwa.

Censorship regulations and the Constitutional Council

607. On 12 April 1966, the Constitutional Council of Southern Rhodesia ruled that three Sections of the Emergency Powers (Control of Publications) Regulations, 1966 were inconsistent with the constitutionally entrenched Declaration of Rights. The sections of the Censorship Regulations which the Constitutional Council ruled as inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights and not alternatively covered by the provisions for emergencies in the Constitution deal with the leaving of blank spaces in publications to indicate where material has been censored; the power of the censor to alter headlines or the positioning of material in the publication; and the power of the Director of Information to prohibit an issue of a publication if these regulations have been breached.

608. It is the responsibility of the Constitutional Council under the 1961 Constitution, to test statutory instruments for violation of the Declaration of Rights. The so-called "1965 Constitution" grants the Constitutional Council the same powers as under the 1961 Constitution.

609. On 21 April 1966, the Southern Rhodesian regime announced that it would revoke the sections of the censorship regulations whose legality was questioned by the Constitutional Council. However, other sections of the censorship regulations would remain in force.

Demonstration in Salisbury against the illegal régime

610. On 19 April 1966, demonstrations against the illegal régime broke out in the African townships surrounding Salisbury. According to reports, cars and public buildings were stoned in Harare and in the townships of Highfield, Mufakose and Kambazuma. A gasoline bomb was reported to have been thrown through the window of a clinic in Mufakose.

611. The riot police were reported to have fired warning shots to disperse the demonstrators. On 20 April 1966, the police reported that all was quiet in the African townships. A police spokesman was reported to have stated that they had no reports of any injuries from the warning shots they fired to disperse the demonstrators. Some of the demonstrators were arrested but the police spokesman could not give the exact number.

State of emergency extended

612. On 21 April 1966, the "Legislative Assembly" of Southern Rhodesia, by 43 votes to 13, extended for a further three months the state of emergency which was proclaimed in Southern Rhodesia on 5 November 1965, by the Smith régime. The state of emergency had been extended for three months at the beginning of February 1966.

613. In introducing the motion for extension, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order" stated that by far the most serious threat confronting Southern Rhodesia at present was the further action the United Kingdom might institute to bring down the "Government". United Kingdom action might be instituted, he said, in the light of the fact, unpalatable to the United Kingdom, that economic sanctions and the oil embargo were unlikely to deliver the predicted coup-de-grâce in the foreseeable future.

Relations with the United Kingdom

614. Mr. N.D. Watson, an Assistant Under-Secretary in the United Kingdom Commonwealth Relations Office visited Southern Rhodesia (and briefly Zambia) from 16 to 28 March 1966. According to United Kingdom Government sources the purpose of the visit was to examine the present organizational structure at the residual office of the United Kingdom High Commission. On 22 March 1966, the Commonwealth Relations Office issued a statement that Mr. Watson was engaged in dealing with harrassments concerning the remaining officials of the United Kingdom High Commission in Salisbury. While in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Watson held meetings with the "Department of External Affairs" to discuss the position of the United Kingdom High Commission. Mr. Watson also had a number of meetings with Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor, to discuss the United Kingdom Government's policy in Southern Rhodesia and in particular the scope of possible talks with the Smith régime.

615. On 21 April 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson told the House of Commons that Mr. Duncan Watson, the Senior Commonwealth Relations Office Official, who had visited Salisbury in March, had been authorized to meet Mr. Smith to accept representations on his behalf. In spite of repeated inquiries, Mr. Wilson said there had been no response from the Smith régime. A second Commonwealth Relations Office Official, Mr. John Hennings, had since been sent to Salisbury with authority

to follow up these moves. He was still there and open to approaches. The major condition laid down by the United Kingdom Government had been that any talks should not imply the recognition of the illegal régime. The United Kingdom, he said, was not prepared to legalize an act of rebellion against the Crown.

616. On 23 March 1966, the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia announced that the head of the United Kingdom residual mission in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Stanley Fingland, had been requested to leave the country. A statement issued by the "Minister of Foreign Affairs", Lord Graham, said that following the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Salisbury and the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London were both withdrawn. According to the statement, the Deputy High Commissioners of both countries were to be withdrawn shortly afterwards. The Southern Rhodesian Deputy High Commissioner left the United Kingdom at the end of November 1965 but the United Kingdom Government changed its mind and wished to leave its Deputy High Commissioner, Mr. Fingland, in Salisbury for an indefinite period. The "Southern Rhodesian Government" was not prepared to allow the disparate representation to continue on this basis and had made a request for Mr. Fingland's departure as originally planned. Mr. Fingland left Salisbury on 13 April 1966 and was replaced by Mr. J. Hennings as head of the United Kingdom residual mission.

617. The Smith régime also requested Mr. N.A.I. French, a First Secretary in the United Kingdom High Commission, to leave the country on the grounds that he had taken part in espionage directed at undermining Southern Rhodesia in economic and security matters. These charges were later denied by the Commonwealth Relations Office. Mr. French left Southern Rhodesia on 24 March 1966.

618. On 16 April 1966, Mr. Smith announced in a broadcast that his "Government" had decided to close down Rhodesia House in London and recall the staff. It had also issued instructions for the "British Embassy" in Salisbury to be closed and for their staff to be repatriated. He stated that the action was being taken as a protest against the United Kingdom Government's action in invoking Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to obtain authority to impose a blockade on Beira to prevent oil from reaching Southern Rhodesia. On 19 April 1966, Mr. Hennings stated that he had received written confirmation of the decision of the illegal régime to sever the remaining links with the United Kingdom Government.

619. On 26 April 1966, Mr. Smith informed the Southern Rhodesia "Legislative Assembly" that he was prepared to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom in an effort to resolve their differences. He was ready for unconditional negotiations with the United Kingdom at any level, at any time and at any place.

620. He said that there was an erroneous belief that he had adopted an obstinate stand whereby he was not prepared to talk to the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, or any other representative of the United Kingdom Government. As far as his "Government" was concerned it had never closed the door and was always prepared to take part in constructive discussions with anybody.

621. On 28 April 1966, the "Ministry of External Affairs" of Southern Rhodesia announced that the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia had agreed to suspend the withdrawal of their Missions from each other's country for the time being. The announcement said that this move was being made because of the informal talks due to take place between officials of both countries.

Seven Africans reported killed

622. On 29 April 1966, the Southern Rhodesian police reported that they had killed seven African "terrorists" in a running gun battle in the Sinoia area, about 85 miles from Salisbury. The spokesman of the police said that all seven were members of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), one of the two African Nationalist parties which had been banned in Southern Rhodesia. Air Force helicopters supported the police unit in its engagement. According to the statement, some arrests were made and those detained indicated they had undergone terrorist training in the People's Republic of China. The members of the band were said to have crossed into Southern Rhodesia from Zambia. The incident was reported to be the first known clash between nationalist guerillas and Southern Rhodesian security forces since the illegal declaration of independence.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the question of Southern Rhodesia

623. The Council of Ministers of the OAU met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 28 February to 5 March 1966 to review the situation in Southern Rhodesia and examine the report of its Committee of Five. At the end of its meeting the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution in which it: (1) renewed its appeal to all Member States of the United Nations and all peace-loving nations of the world not to

recognize the racist minority régime in Rhodesia; (2) called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to apply such effective measures, including the use of force, that would bring about the immediate downfall of Ian Smith's régime; (3) decided to establish a "Committee of Solidarity for Zambia" composed of five members whose task would be to seek appropriate measures of technical and economic assistance by Member States to Zambia; (4) recommended to the Organization of African Unity and interested Governments not to recognize any party and instead to give aid only to such groups of Zimbabwe fighters who were actively engaged within Rhodesia in the fight to liberate their country from the colonialist and racist yoke; (5) called upon all Member States of the United Nations, who had so far not taken any action, to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965 and to intensify their efforts for the adoption of other more effective measures, including the release of all Zimbabwe leaders from the Nazi-type concentration camps; (6) decided to recommend to all African delegations to the United Nations to assist the Ministers of Algeria, Senegal and Zambia in their efforts to bear upon the Security Council to examine the situation in Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Portugal and the question of Southern Rhodesia

624. On 13 April 1966, the Prime Minister of Portugal, Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, in a speech in Lisbon, stated that the Southern Rhodesian problem could set off a vast fire with risks even for those who were far afield. All could still be saved but all could also be lost if passions spoke louder than reason. The Southern Rhodesia case had covered the skies of Africa with the blackest clouds but it was not too late to solve it in agreement with the United Kingdom Government. He stated that the United Nations Security Council resolution of 9 April which had empowered the United Kingdom to use force to stop the tankers with oil for Southern Rhodesia from reaching Beira had internationalized an exclusively internal United Kingdom problem. One more false step in solving the Southern Rhodesian problem by the responsible powers could set off a vast fire with risks for all those who considered themselves immune because they were far from the field.

South Africa and the question of Southern Rhodesia

625. On 15 April 1966, the United Kingdom Ambassador to South Africa, Sir Hugh Stephenson, arrived in London for consultations with the United Kingdom Government on matters pertaining to relations between South Africa and the illegal régime.

626. On 16 April 1966, the South African Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Dr. Carel de Wet, called on the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, to deliver a message from the Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Henrick Verwoerd. No statement was issued after the meeting but it was reported that the meeting was on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

627. The United Kingdom Ambassador returned to South Africa with a message from Mr. Wilson to Dr. Verwoerd. On 21 April 1966, Sir Hugh Stephenson called on Dr. Verwoerd for talks. No statement was issued after the talks.

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom announces "informal talks" with Southern Rhodesia

628. On 27 April 1966, Prime Minister Wilson made a statement on Southern Rhodesia in the House of Commons. He informed the House that as the Government had repeatedly made it clear over the past five months, anyone in Southern Rhodesia was free to approach the Governor or the British representative in Salisbury with proposals as to the basis on which a solution of the problem could be reached. As a result of a recent report from the Governor, informal talks between officials had been arranged to examine whether such a basis existed.

629. Mr. Wilson said that he had received a report from the Governor in the previous week, at a time when his private secretary, Mr. Oliver Wright, had just left by air for Pretoria to assist the United Kingdom Ambassador in his talks with the South African Government. He was instructed to leave the aircraft at Salisbury for discussions with the Governor before going on to Pretoria. As a result of Mr. Wright's report on his talks with the Governor, Mr. Wright was instructed to return to Salisbury on 22 April. The Governor then arranged a meeting between Mr. Wright, Mr. Hennings, the representative of the United Kingdom Government in Salisbury, and Mr. Smith.

630. A further talk had been held leading to agreed arrangements for the informal talks which would now proceed. They were informal, directed only to see whether a basis for negotiations genuinely existed; and they were without commitment on either side.

631. In answers to questions after his statement, Mr. Wilson stated that the United Kingdom Government had always been willing to have talks. What had been decisive had been the oil sanctions and the action the United Kingdom had taken recently at Beira with the authority of the United Nations. It was these things which had created the situation in which the talks could now take place. The Governor had played a leading part in promoting the meeting which led to this situation. But he made it plain that these were not negotiations. The United Kingdom Government was not negotiating with the illegal régime. These were informal talks to see whether there was a basis on which proper negotiations could take place. Regarding the principles that would be embodied in a final settlement, Mr. Wilson said that while there was quite a lot the United Kingdom was prepared to forget and forgive, it would not condone, or be prepared to accept, a settlement that condoned an illegal act, or which failed to satisfy the principles which had been laid down by the United Kingdom Government and which had been accepted by Mr. Smith himself in the negotiations last year. He thought the Commonwealth countries, particularly those who were represented in Lagos, would recognize, as he had said in Lagos, that the economic sanctions would work. Many doubts had been expressed then that they would not be effective. He would not want to prejudice the talks by saying how negotiations would be conducted, what kind of machinery might have to be established, either on a bilateral basis between the United Kingdom Government and representatives of Southern Rhodesia, possibly in the widest sense, or whether other machinery - some of the things discussed before the illegal declaration last year - might have to be incorporated. It would all be discussed in informal talks which were to be conducted away from the direct glare of publicity and away from pressures of all kinds.

632. In the course of the independence negotiations last year, the United Kingdom Government laid down "five principles" as a basis for the negotiations to which it added a sixth principle on 25 January 1966. These six principles are as follows:

- (1) Unimpeded progress to majority rule would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
- (2) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the Constitution.

(3) Also immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

(4) Progress would have to be made toward ending racial discrimination.

(5) The British Government would have to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

(6) There was a need to ensure that regardless of race, there would be no oppression of majority by minority or minority by majority.

Statement by Mr. Smith on "informal talks"

633. On 29 April 1966, Mr. Smith, speaking at the opening of the Central African Trade Fair, in Bulawayo, stated that Southern Rhodesia would enter the informal talks "determined never to surrender". Southern Rhodesia could not, in fact, even lose. There was room for manoeuvre on both sides, without the surrender of basic principles. Southern Rhodesia was not giving up its independence, but neither was the United Kingdom recognizing the unilateral declaration of independence. Neither side was giving ground. The less said about the talks, the better, so as not to prejudice them before they started. He went on to declare that Southern Rhodesia had proved it could take sanctions.

Further developments on informal talks between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia

634. On 5 May 1966, the United Kingdom Government announced that the informal talks with Southern Rhodesia would open in London in the second week of May 1966. The United Kingdom Government would be represented at the informal talks by Mr. Oliver Wright, private secretary to Prime Minister Wilson (now Ambassador-designate to Denmark) and Mr. Duncan Watson, Assistant Under-Secretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office, who had both been involved in the initial arrangements for the talks. On 5 May 1966, the Smith régime also announced the names of a three-man "delegation" to the informal talks. The "delegation" was to be headed by Sir Cornelius Greenfield, Principal Economic Adviser to Mr. Smith. The other members were to be Mr. Stanley Morris, Chairman of the "Public Service Board" and Mr. Gerald Clarke, Secretary to "the Rhodesian 'Cabinet'".

C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

General

635. In addition to the general censorship in force in Southern Rhodesia, the illegal regime has also imposed censorship on the publication of details on how it is containing international sanctions. By the last week of February 1966, the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury had ceased publishing most of its statistical bulletins on the various sectors of the economy. Included in the list of other specifically banned government publications were the regular bulletins on the state of the mining industry and statements which were required from the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in terms of the Reserve Bank Act of 1964. Most of the normal and regular sources of information on the state of the Southern Rhodesian economy have not been available since the illegal declaration of independence.

636. It will be recalled that on 5 February 1966, the Ian Smith régime gazetted a new set of emergency regulations to strengthen its hold on most aspects of economic activity in Southern Rhodesia. On 8 March 1966, these new regulations, which relate to censorship, the control of manpower, and corporations were incorporated into the purported amendments to the Emergency Powers Act of 1960. In general terms, these regulations include:

- (1) Regulation and control of persons employed or engaged in any trade, business, occupation, profession, calling or industry in Rhodesia.
- (2) Taking possession or control on behalf of the Government of any property or undertaking.
- (3) Regulation and control of persons or corporations carrying on business in Rhodesia.
- (4) Acquisition on behalf of the Government of any property other than land.
- (5) Entering and search of any premises.
- (6) Payments of compensation and remuneration to persons affected by any regulations or order made under this section.

Provision is made for a maximum penalty of a £500 fine or two years imprisonment or both for breaches of these regulations.

Southern Rhodesia tobacco crop

637. United Kingdom trade figures show that the January 1966 imports of Southern Rhodesian tobacco into the United Kingdom totalled £2,460,000, compared with a monthly average of £1,266,000 for past years.

638. A United Kingdom Foreign Office spokesman was quoted on 3 March 1966 as saying that Southern Rhodesian tobacco imported into the United Kingdom in January was bought and fully paid for by United Kingdom importers before the illegal declaration of independence in November 1965.

639. According to the United Kingdom Overseas Trade Accounts for February 1966, British imports from Southern Rhodesia were worth £523,000, of which £484,000 was accounted for by tobacco imports. The tobacco was said to have been imported during January but the papers were processed only during February. This left £39,000 unaccounted for.

640. To counteract the United Kingdom Government's ban on the sale and purchase of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, the illegal régime, on 4 March 1966, brought the tobacco packing and buying sections of the industry under the Emergency Control of the Manpower Regulations. The Manpower Regulations purport to give the illegal régime powers to prevent companies from dismissing their employees and can stop employees from resigning and leaving the country without permission. The new regulations pertaining to the tobacco industry also prevent members of the industry from disclosing information relating to the tobacco sales which were scheduled to begin on 29 March 1966. Persons who break the regulations are liable to a fine of £500 or imprisonment for two years or both.

641. By the end of March 1966, all the major consumers of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, namely, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Benelux, the Scandinavian countries, and Australia, had announced that they would not buy any more tobacco from Southern Rhodesia while the Smith régime remained in power. In terms of the 1964 trade figures, over 90 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's tobacco had already been placed under an embargo by exporting countries before the auction sales of the crop for 1966. The main outlet still openly left to tobacco exports is South Africa. In 1964, unmanufactured tobacco accounted for £39,221,735 or 32.83 per cent of the total value of domestic exports or 28.53 per cent of domestic exports and re-exports of Southern Rhodesia.

642. The tobacco crop for 1966 was estimated at 200 million to 240 million pounds in weight. The State Tobacco Corporation is handling the sale of tobacco this year. On 24 March 1966, the Ministry of Agriculture announced a list of reserve prices for different grades of tobacco. The crop would be classified into 273 grades for each of which a price ranging from 1d. to 48d. was fixed. The announcements emphasized that these prices were those on which payments to growers would be based and did not represent the figure which would be the purchase price to tobacco merchants (see paragraphs 236-238 above). On the average, the prices would fall around 26d (about 31 cents (US)) per pound. The average price of the Southern Rhodesia leaf last year was 33d. (about 39 cents) per pound. Tobacco not sold in the open market would be bought by the Corporation at the reserve price. Over-all, these prices were reported to be higher than was expected and were estimated to have assured the growing industry of between £20 million to £25 million, depending on the size of the crop. It was further reported that this sum should be sufficient to cover the working cost of producing the current crop over-all, although a number of growers were likely to lose in the season if they were paid no more than the support prices for their tobacco.

643. On 25 March 1966, the United Kingdom Government again warned the world's tobacco buyers against taking part in the tobacco auctions scheduled to begin in Salisbury on 29 March 1966. The warning was delivered by Mr. Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary. Under an Order-in-Council made on 7 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government made the export of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia a criminal offence under both British and Southern Rhodesian Law. The Order prohibits not only the export of tobacco but also its sale inside Southern Rhodesia with a view to its being exported.

644. On 26 March 1966, the Chairman of the Tobacco Export and Promotion Council, Mr. John Graylin, stated that the United Kingdom Government had already lost the tobacco war. In an address before the Fourteenth Annual Congress of the Rhodesian Guild of Journalists, he stated that the United Kingdom's hopes of bringing Southern Rhodesia to its knees during the next few months had been scotched. He stated that in the short-term aspect, Southern Rhodesia had won the tobacco

war by splitting the sales into internal and external aspects. The internal sales would benefit the farmers immediately but the external sales were a long-term prospect which might not be an easy joke. Mr. Graylin said that whether the auctions were a success or not, and the Tobacco Association had to buy the whole crop, farmers would be paid at least the production price of their crop.

645. The Southern Rhodesian tobacco sales opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1966. On 30 March 1966, sources within the tobacco industry were quoted as saying that for security reasons, it had been decided on the night of 29 March to replace the auction system with one of private bargains. The buyer would decide what grade of tobacco he wanted and then make an offer to the Tobacco Corporation. This was reported to be a further move to protect the identity of the foreign buyers. The President of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, Mr. Carol Heurthley, said that the private treaty selling was strictly a matter of convenience and would not be adhered to throughout the season.

646. When the tobacco auction sales began on 29 March 1966, special guards and police threw a strict security screen around a huge building on the outskirts of Salisbury where the auction sales were being held. The buildings were declared protected places under the Emergency Regulations for the duration of the auction. Only buyers and authorized officials were allowed inside, and, consequently, no one except buyers and officials of the Tobacco Corporation knew how much tobacco, if any, was sold.

647. On 17 April 1966, the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board announced that farmers could step up their weekly deliveries of tobacco for sale in the Salisbury auctions by 25 per cent. The quota increase was reported to have created considerable speculation that Southern Rhodesia was selling its 1966 crop despite the international sanctions. Other sources also suggested that this could mean that the tobacco crop had turned out to be greater than expected and that the "Government" was anxious to get to the farmers as quickly as possible the guaranteed support price payments for delivered tobacco, so that they in turn could wipe out some of their obligations to the banks and commerce.

648. On 19 April 1966, the Rhodesian Tobacco Marketing Board also announced reserve prices for burley tobacco. They ranged from 1d. to 47 1/2d. a pound, covering a wide range of graded tobacco. The announcement emphasized that these prices were those on which payments to growers would be based and did not represent the figure which would be the purchase price to tobacco merchants.

649. As stated earlier, because of the security screen thrown around the tobacco sales, it was not possible for outsiders to know how much tobacco, if any, was being sold. However, it was reported that some merchants might try to export Southern Rhodesian tobacco from South Africa in the guise of South African leaf, although the two could be distinguished by experts. South Africa could, even without re-exporting Rhodesian tobacco, decide to import more of it for its own needs and in turn export more of its own crop.

650. South Africa normally imports only about 2 million pounds a year of Rhodesian tobacco. It was reported that the South African crop for this season was expected to yield a rather low figure of 59 million pounds which should in any case improve the prospect for imports from Southern Rhodesia. Stocks were also down to a low point (67 million pounds last August) so that there was also scope for restocking.

Southern Rhodesia's sugar crop for 1966

651. On 17 March 1966, the United Kingdom Government announced a ban on all exports of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. According to the Order which is effective under both United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law, it is now "illegal for speculators or others to buy Rhodesian sugar and hold it in Rhodesia or elsewhere in the hope of selling it at a profit when legal Government is restored". Those who now bought Rhodesian sugar would acquire no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back. Furthermore, all transactions that took place in Southern Rhodesia aimed at the export of sugar were invalid whether the export was to take place immediately or in the future.

652. Southern Rhodesia's sugar industry has expanded almost tenfold during the last six years. The 1965 crop before the illegal declaration of independence was estimated at 250,000 tons. It was expected to reach the 350,000 ton mark in 1966. The world price for sugar was quoted as around £20 per ton.

653. The main buyers of Southern Rhodesian sugar, namely the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have already placed an embargo on sugar imports from Southern Rhodesia. United Kingdom authorities hoped that Zambia and Malawi which have been dependent on Southern Rhodesia for their sugar supplies would co-operate in this latest ban.

654. Eight Japanese trading houses are reported to have contracted to buy 50,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar worth about £1 million. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan was reported to have stated on 21 March 1966 that this was the only exception to the ban on imports of sugar which was announced by Japan in late January 1966. The sugar was contracted for before the illegal declaration of independence and the existence of the contract had been known to the United Kingdom since December 1965. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry was reported to have stated that the shipment of the sugar due to take place in April might be postponed. However, the contract was still standing on 22 April 1966.

Mining industry

655. Chrome. On 25 February 1966, a spokesman for the United Kingdom Board of Trade confirmed that a licence had been granted to a United Kingdom firm for the importation of a "consignment" of chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia since the Order-in-Council of 20 January, which prohibited such exports. The spokesman explained that the consignment had been bought and paid for before the Order came into force and was already in a warehouse in Beira awaiting shipment. According to the Board of Trade, although some 9,000 tons of high grade metallurgical chrome ore had been sent to the United Kingdom since 20 January, the shipment was perfectly legal.

656. According to United Kingdom estimates, between 15,000 to 17,000 tons of chrome have been shipped to the United States since the illegal declaration of independence, but like the United Kingdom shipments, all of it was out of Southern Rhodesia before the ban started.

657. On 28 January the United States State Department issued an announcement that the United States Government had requested all United States importers of Southern Rhodesia chromite to comply with the United Kingdom Government's Order-in-Council prohibiting the export of chrome from Southern Rhodesia.

658. As regards the Federal Republic of Germany, chrome is not as yet included in the list of specified items of Southern Rhodesian exports for which import licences are not being granted (see S/7181).

659. Copper. On 3 March 1966, the "Deputy-Minister of Mines" of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Dillon, stated in an interview that three new copper mines would probably

be opening in the northern area of Southern Rhodesia within the next twelve months. Southern Rhodesia's copper production is about 24,000 tons a year. Mr. Dillon stated that the "Ministry of Mines" was aiming at 30,000 tons within the next two years. If that figure was reached then consideration would have to be given to the installation of a copper refinery. Consideration had already been given to a possible site for the refinery and it was hoped that this would lead to another industry producing copper piping, sheeting and other products.

660. Mr. Dillon also stated that sanctions would not affect Southern Rhodesian sales of copper. The current emphasis on copper mining in Southern Rhodesia was dictated simply by demand and value.

661. The Federal Republic of Germany's list of prohibited imports from Southern Rhodesia does not as yet include copper. The Federal Republic of Germany is reported to have spent £3.3 million on Southern Rhodesian copper in the first nine months of 1965.

662. Iron ore. The Japanese Government announced a ban on imports of Southern Rhodesian pig iron towards the end of January (S/7114). These were worth £2.4 million in 1964 and represent nearly 85 per cent of the output of the Southern Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO). RISCO has been declared a "designated industry" by the Southern Rhodesian régime to prevent it from being closed, and a manpower control order has been issued to prevent dismissals of employees. RISCO has shut down two of its three blast furnaces and one of its two open-hearth steel furnaces and has abandoned a £7 million expansion and modernization scheme. It is reported that this has made about 400 workers, including 100 Europeans, redundant.

663. It was reported in Salisbury on 2 February that the Japanese steel company of Kobe, in which the Japanese Government holds 20 per cent of the shares, had given notice that its Southern Rhodesian iron ore mine was to be closed. The mine is reported to produce 350,000 tons of ore a year.

664. On 13 April 1966, the United Kingdom Government declared illegal the export of iron ore from Southern Rhodesia. A statutory instrument to that effect was made on 7 April and became operational on 13 April 1966. Under this statutory instrument, it is now a criminal offence under both United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law to engage in the export of Southern Rhodesian iron ore.

665. Although Japan imposed a ban on the import of pig iron from Southern Rhodesia in late January 1966, licences were issued thereafter for the import of at least 84,000 tons of iron ore worth roughly £250,000. According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan, these imports were being made under contracts concluded before the unilateral declaration of independence.

666. On 14 April 1966, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry held consultations with the representatives of the steel industry on the situation arising out of the United Kingdom ban on the export of Southern Rhodesian iron ore. It was reported that the steel mills had agreed to postpone the imports for the time being.

667. Asbestos. As of April 1966, manufacturers in the Federal Republic of Germany were reported to be still importing asbestos from Southern Rhodesia on the grounds that switching to other sources of the raw material would involve them in heavy extra costs.

668. Japan was also reported on 21 March 1966 to have outstanding licences for the import of asbestos from Southern Rhodesia. Asbestos is not included in the specified list of Southern Rhodesian exports which have been banned by Japan but fall under the general licencing system introduced for imports from Southern Rhodesia.

669. Gold. According to the Barclays Bank, D.C.O. Overseas Review for April 1966, the Anglo-American Corporation had sunk three new shafts at its mines on the Felixburg gold belt, near Umvuma. Another, at the Tchargwa mine, which was abandoned some years ago because of water difficulties, was being deepened and developed. It is presumed that Southern Rhodesia has no difficulty in disposing of its gold production, which in 1964 amounted to £7.2 million.

Other developments in commerce and industry

670. On 4 March 1966, the Director of the Salisbury Co-ordinating Centre for Commerce and Industry, Mr. W. Livesey, was reported by a South African newspaper to have stated that he had received requests from overseas countries for huge quantities of Southern Rhodesian goods. The list of requests included 3 million tons of soya beans; unlimited quantities of sunflower seed; 100,000 tons of sorghum, 100,000 tons of mealies; 50,000 tons of cotton seed; about 4 million yards of cotton sheeting; "and all we can produce in the way of bismuth, copper, silver, zinc, lead and other minerals". These requests had come from countries in Europe and America and the Middle and Far East. Some of the requests had come from countries supposed to be backing the trade ban.

671. Mr. Livesey was also reported to have said that some of the countries concerned were also prepared to invest in Southern Rhodesian industry. Most of the local firms in Southern Rhodesia ready to diversify and expand were subsidiaries of British companies.

672. On 18 March 1966, Mr. Ian Smith addressed the annual meeting of the Fort Victoria Chamber of Commerce. In his address, he stated that Southern Rhodesia had beaten the United Kingdom sanctions so far and that it was weathering the storm much better than had been anticipated. Southern Rhodesia could look forward to the future with optimism and confidence provided its affairs were handled wisely. He was aware of the heavy burdens being borne by the commercial sector of the economy. The business sector had been successful on the home front and if this was reflected by other sectors they would win the sanctions war and enjoy the fruits of victory. Southern Rhodesia had problems at the moment and no doubt would have more before the present issue was over.

673. It was reported on 15 March 1966 that, according to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury (some of the few remaining statistics still being published), new passenger vehicle registrations in January 1966 were 38 per cent lower than in January 1965. The figure was reported to be the lowest monthly figure for at least four years.

674. In a statement made in Bulawayo on 17 March 1966, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B. Musset, appealed to local retailers to buy Southern Rhodesian goods wherever possible, saying he was disappointed that many concerns were placing orders with local industry on a very short-term basis, giving the impression that they were only too anxious to use imported supplies once again, when sanctions were removed.

675. Mr. Musset also stated that the local motor trade - which was reported to be one of the hardest hit by sanctions - would not overcome its problems until the rationing of petrol was ended. He expected too that many motor companies would have to retrench but said it was important to keep skilled workers in the country.

676. On 31 March 1966, the illegal régime extended the Manpower Regulations to cover four of the major motor vehicle assembly plants in Southern Rhodesia.

677. On 3 April 1966, the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. Hughes, stated in Johannesburg that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were not breaking the country's economy but were helping to create a bigger domestic market for locally manufactured goods. Unemployment in Southern Rhodesia had not reached serious levels although there was a measure of unemployment and a shortage of skilled labour. He also said that Southern Rhodesian industrialists wished to expand their exports to South Africa to replace some of their lost trade with Zambia.

678. On 5 April 1966, Mr. Hughes made a further statement in Johannesburg in which he said that the success Southern Rhodesia had achieved in spite of sanctions was far in excess of the most optimistic hopes held by commerce in the country four months ago. The Southern Rhodesia currency remained strong; exports continued at a high level and new supplies were still coming in. Since "independence", vast new opportunities for investment and development had arisen and new business ventures continued to be established. The Southern Rhodesian economy might require eventual repairs but would not be crippled.

679. The Barclays Bank Overseas D.C.O. Review for April 1966 included a report on Southern Rhodesia's economy. It stated that apart from the Fort Victoria district, retail trading conditions in Southern Rhodesia during February-March reflected buoyant tendencies, with the larger stores experiencing satisfactory turnovers in most departments. Wholesale trade, traditionally quiet at that time of the year, was satisfactory with a slight rise in activity in Bulawayo and turnovers generally comparing favourably with the corresponding period of 1965.

680. A number of small industrial developments to meet local consumer needs were also reported. The Barclays Bank D.C.O. Overseas Review did not, however, refer to oil supplies or tobacco sales.

Employment situation

681. Although no official statistics are available, press reports indicate that the number of Europeans who have lost their jobs as a result of the economic and financial sanctions might run to over a thousand and that these were isolated cases. It was reported however that a large number of Africans had been laid off. In an address to the Fort Victoria Chamber of Commerce on 18 March 1966, Mr. Ian Smith stated that the United Kingdom and foreign sanctions had hit the Southern Rhodesian African hardest.

682. On 6 April 1966, the "Minister of Labour", Mr. McLean, stated that the "Government" was creating employment opportunities. He stated that since last December, 274 Europeans had been taken into government service. He also said that 1,200 school leavers and a further 300 European, Asian and Coloured school leavers had been found jobs in private enterprise. The "Minister" added that so far this year, the government labour exchange had found jobs for more than 8,000 people.

683. Unemployment to a considerable extent has been arrested temporarily at least by the extension of the Manpower Regulations to certain sectors of the economy. The Manpower Regulations empower the illegal régime to prevent companies from dismissing employees and can stop employees resigning and leaving the country without permission. By April 1966, the Manpower Regulations had been extended to cover all the oil companies at CAPREF, tin and iron and steel industries, the tobacco industry and most of the motor vehicle assembly plants in Southern Rhodesia. Also, the Emergency Powers (Industrial Relations) Act of 23 February 1966 gives the "Minister of Labour" the right to suspend specific provisions of industrial agreements made under the Industrial Conciliation Act, at the request of the employers. It covers most aspects of commerce and industry, but excludes agriculture and railways. Employers may now request alterations in conditions concerning hours of work, short time, leave and remuneration laid down in present agreements. The object is to enable employers, for a temporary period, to alter these conditions of service as an alternative to dismissing workers. It was reported that a number of industries have since cut down on their hours of work to save workers from retrenchment, but no estimates were available.

Related developments in finance and trade

684. The Southern Rhodesian Treasury and Reserve Bank are providing the estimated £20 million - £25 million to finance the purchasing of the tobacco crop by the Tobacco Corporation. The appropriation of this amount, in spite of the credit squeeze by the United Kingdom, has been partly made possible by the availability to Southern Rhodesia of an estimated £10 million - £13 million, in a full year, as the net result of the two-way blockade of interest, dividend and profit payments between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia.

685. According to a statement issued by the "Ministry of Finance" on 15 March 1966, nearly £600,000 of the régime's "independence bonds" which were first issued on 2 February 1966, had been sold in the first six weeks of issue, breaking all previous savings certificate records. Also according to the statement, a medium-term loan of £5 million, which was floated by the "Government" on 28 February, had been fully subscribed by 15 March 1966.

686. It was reported that as a result of these developments, the credit squeeze which the United Kingdom's financial sanctions was expected to impose on the financing of the tobacco crop had not worked as quickly as expected although the commercial banks were still tightly stretched.

687. On 18 April 1966, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B. Musset, stated in Bulawayo that commerce should try to help agriculture in Southern Rhodesia by supplying farmers hit by sanctions or drought with credit over a difficult period. He also urged commerce not to give up franchise for United Kingdom supplied machinery and equipment or this might mean that agriculture would be deprived of vital spare parts. On 19 April 1966, Mr. John Hughes, the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, replied that commerce itself was in no position to carry the agricultural community because it was also affected by the credit squeeze and by the national effort to retain employees in spite of reduced profits and turnover.

688. In his speech on 29 April 1966, at the opening of the Central African Trade Fair in Bulawayo, Mr. Smith stated that Southern Rhodesia had maintained a favourable trade balance since "independence" and the Rhodesian pound had not been devalued as predicted by the pessimists. Since "independence", the "Government" had provided industrialists with foreign currency for more than fifty projects.

689. He also gave economic information not published before. Mineral output last year, he said, was worth a record £32 million and trends in the first quarter of 1966 suggested that this would be bettered. Manufacturing exports amounted to £65 million in 1965 - also a record. But he admitted that the index of manufacturing output had fallen 5 per cent in February 1966, because of sanctions. The building plans passed by the local authorities in January and February 1966, were £50,000 higher than in the same month last year. Sixty-five per cent of this was for residential homes.

Economic relations with South Africa

690. On 1 March 1966, the Johannesburg Star quoted the latest issue of the Journal of the South African Foreign Trade Organization which carried a report on South African exports to Southern Rhodesia. According to this report, South Africa could provide Southern Rhodesia with virtually everything it had been importing from the United Kingdom which in 1964 supplied 30 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's total imports. Payments by Southern Rhodesian importers for goods from South Africa presented a potential problem, however, particularly since almost 45 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's gross national product was accounted for by exports.

691. According to the report, there have been no reports of South African exporters experiencing trouble in obtaining payments for their products. Exports insurance for goods sold on credit to Southern Rhodesia was also no more expensive than it was before the unilateral declaration of independence. The article added that the extension of credit by South African exporters would, on the other hand, probably continue only for so long as it seemed likely that payments would be made within a reasonable period. This could be a crucial point in trading relations between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia during the next few months.

692. On 2 March 1966, the Cape Times reported that South African exporters had moved into the trade vacuum caused by the United Kingdom Government's ban on exports to Southern Rhodesia. South African exports of manufactured goods to Southern Rhodesia had risen sharply during the first two months of 1966 and the trend was expected to continue. A strict ban, however, had been placed by the Southern Rhodesia and South Africa Governments on the disclosure of information on the volume of trade and value of trade. According to the report, officials of the South African Department of Commerce and Industry and of the "Rhodesia Trade Commissioners" office in Johannesburg refused to comment on the growing trade. The authorities in Southern Rhodesia were reported to have stated that South African manufacturers were adequately filling the gap left by British manufacturers because of the boycott.

693. It was reported on 8 March 1966 that Southern Rhodesian manufacturers had formed an association to spearhead an export drive into South Africa. Manufacturers with a knowledge of South African conditions and requirements had agreed to pool information for the benefit of the Southern Rhodesian manufacturing industry as a whole.

694. Secretaries to the association, known as the Rhodesia Export Association, had been appointed in Salisbury, Bulawayo and Johannesburg and warehouse facilities had been established in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London and Pietersburg. The association would provide Southern Rhodesian manufacturers with information on market potential, transport depots, customs and tariff problems and would help to arrange marketing campaigns.

695. On 3 April 1966, a five-man delegation of Southern Rhodesian businessmen, led by the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. Hughes, arrived in Johannesburg to attend the Republic Festival Show in Johannesburg. Mr. Hughes stated on arrival that Southern Rhodesian industrialists wished to expand their exports to South Africa to replace some of their lost trade with Zambia. On 5 April 1966, Mr. Hughes also stated in Johannesburg that South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were more economically inter-dependent now than ever before. He was speaking as leader of the Southern Rhodesian commercial mission which was visiting the Rand Easter Show. The purpose of the visit was to give South African businessmen and others factual information on the present economic situation in Southern Rhodesia and to correct any misconceptions there might be regarding opportunities for two-way trade.

Economic relations with Portugal

696. On 22 February 1966, it was reported from Salisbury that a Southern Rhodesian trade delegation had left secretly for Angola for talks with the Portuguese Government. The talks were said to be a follow-up to meetings held last year, following the signing of a trade agreement between Southern Rhodesia and Portugal. Under the trade agreement, which is to last for an initial period of five years, the signatories agreed to treat each other's products on a "most favoured nation" basis.

697. On 17 March 1966, it was reported from Lisbon that Portugal had taken delivery of a total shipment of 133 tons of Southern Rhodesian beef on trial basis and would decide if it wished to purchase more after gauging the success and the commercial utility of the Southern Rhodesian product.

698. On 6 and 8 April 1966, the Government of Portugal issued two press communiques in which it reiterated its position of keeping transit facilities from Mozambique open to Zambia, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia. It stated in these communiques that it would not interfere with goods destined to any of those countries. (See paras. 715-716 below.)

Southern Rhodesia and the international economic sanctions

699. According to United Kingdom Government estimates, by March/April 1966, Southern Rhodesian exports (on the basis of 1964 figures) had been reduced by 60 per cent by international sanctions. Most of Southern Rhodesia's normal major trading partners had banned all, or most of their imports from Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia's domestic exports for 1964 amounted to £119,465,000. The 60 per cent of Southern Rhodesian exports affected by sanctions included tobacco, sugar, asbestos, chrome, lithium, ferro-alloys, meat, hides and skins, pig iron, steel and copper.

700. South Africa, which is not participating in sanctions, imported £9 million of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. Portugal which is also not participating in the sanctions imported £700,000 of domestic merchandise into Mozambique from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. It has been estimated that Angola and Portugal took domestic imports from Southern Rhodesia worth £225,000 and £380,000 respectively in 1964.

701. Zambia's imports of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia were valued at £31 million in 1964, most of which were essential items to the national economy. As of April 1966, these imports had declined at an estimated rate of about 30 per cent (or £10 million per annum), following an appeal by the Government to local importers to find alternative supply sources. Malawi, which is in the same predicament as Zambia, since its imports of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia are essential items, also imported £5.6 million worth of goods from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. The Malawi Government has also made an appeal to local importers to find alternative sources of supply (see paragraphs 305-330 above). There are no current estimates of the impact of this appeal on the trade between the two countries. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which also imports essential items from Southern Rhodesia, was reported to be in a position similar to that of Zambia and Malawi, although on 1 February 1966 it announced its intention of suspending economic dealings with Southern Rhodesia. In 1964, Southern Rhodesian domestic exports to the Democratic Republic of the Congo were worth £1.5 million.

702. Bechuanaland, which is experiencing serious economic difficulty owing to a prolonged drought, imported £700,000 worth of domestic products from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. No estimates are available as to how far its trade has been affected by the sanctions.

703. Japan has imposed sanctions on about 75 per cent of its imports (by 1964 figures) from Southern Rhodesia. In 1964, Japan imported £5.5 million worth of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia. On 3 December 1965, Japan informed the Secretary-General (S/6990) that it was its policy not to import any more tobacco and sugar from Southern Rhodesia except for sugar committed prior to the unilateral declaration of independence. On 1 February 1966, Japan also informed the Secretary-General (S/7114) that there would be no further imports of pig iron from Southern Rhodesia and that hereafter, all imports from Southern Rhodesia would be subject to import licencing by the Japanese Government and that the necessary legal measures had been taken to this effect.

704. It is reported that, according to Japanese officials, the sanctions which were announced in late January 1966, do not cover sugar and iron ore contracts which were negotiated before the unilateral declaration of independence. Accordingly, since the ban was issued, Japan has awarded licences for the import of at least 84,000 tons of iron ore worth £250,000. Most of Southern Rhodesia's iron ore exports go to Japan. It is reported that these exports have continued at a high level since the unilateral declaration of independence. Similarly, Japan has an outstanding contract for 50,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar worth about £1 million.^{10/}

705. Among other Japanese imports from Southern Rhodesia which fall under the licencing system but which have not been banned are copper, asbestos and chrome ore.

706. By December 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany had banned about 70 per cent of its imports from Southern Rhodesia. In 1964, the Federal Republic imported £7.9 million worth of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia. In a note to the Secretary-General (S/7181) dated 4 March 1966, it stated that import licences for tobacco and sugar were not being granted. On 24 February, it was reported that the Federal Republic of Germany had decided to extend its ban to include ferrochrome and pig iron. The report said that no import licences would be granted in respect of import contracts freshly concluded.

^{10/} Japan announced further economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in June and July of 1966 (see S/7362 and S/7420).

707. Included in the list of imports from Southern Rhodesia, which have not been banned by the Federal Republic of Germany are copper, chrome and asbestos.

708. It is reported that the January 1966 import figures, the latest available, show that the Federal Republic of Germany bought Southern Rhodesian goods (including goods of Southern Rhodesian origin purchased from suppliers elsewhere) worth about £1.2 million. That was twice as much as the bill for January 1965. The breakdown for commodities is not available, but it is reported that there may have been a fair amount of stocking up against the possibility of further import bans.

709. It was reported on 22 April 1966, that the United Kingdom had made representations to the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan to tighten their sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

D. OIL EMBARGO

Incident of the oil tankers

710. Towards the end of March 1966, a 13,000-ton tanker, the Joanna V, owned by the Varnma Corporation of Panama and flying the Greek flag, was sighted heading for Beira with a cargo of 18,000 tons of crude oil for Southern Rhodesia. The tanker was under charter to the South African Company of A.G. Morrisson of Cape Town. Following representations made by the United Kingdom Government, the Government of Greece, between 26 March and 2 April, sent four separate warning messages to the Greek Captain and owners of the tanker ordering them not to unload oil at Beira for Southern Rhodesia.

711. On the night of 4 April 1966, the United Kingdom frigate Plymouth intercepted the Joanna V off the coast of Mozambique and a United Kingdom officer boarded the ship. The frigate was reported to have been under instructions not to use force. The United Kingdom Foreign Office was quoted as saying that the Master of the tanker had refused a request from the United Kingdom officer that he change his plans to sail for Beira.

712. The Joanna V arrived at the Port of Beira on 5 April 1966. On 6 April the Greek Government cancelled the Greek registration of the tanker and deprived the Master of his licence as a Merchant Navy Master for life.

713. On 5 April 1966, as part of the attempt to prevent the tanker from landing its oil, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, met with the Chargé d'affaires of Portugal in London, and the United Kingdom Ambassador in Lisbon also called on the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Alberto Franco Nogueira. It was reported that at both interviews, the United Kingdom Government underlined the heavy responsibility that would fall on the Portuguese Government if the Greek registered tanker unloaded its cargo at the Mozambique seaport of Beira.

714. On 5 April 1966, Lord Walston, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the United Kingdom Foreign Office, arrived in Lisbon for talks with Mr. Nogueira, on the question of the oil embargo. Lord Walston had three meetings with the Portuguese Foreign Minister before leaving Lisbon for London on 8 April 1966. He was reported to have stated that he was not altogether satisfied with the talks to get Portugal's backing for an oil ban on Southern Rhodesia.

715. On 6 April 1966, the Government of Portugal issued a press communique concerning the arrival at Beira of the Joanna V. In this communique the Government of Portugal reiterated its position that it had not taken any initiative tending to ensure the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia; neither purchasing it in the name of that country, nor transporting it in Portuguese ships. In the second place, the Portuguese Government had given and continued to give the most formal guarantees that it would not permit any consignment of oil to be diverted to a country different from the one for which it was destined. Consignments of oil for Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi were arriving continually at the Port of Beira and the Portuguese Government felt that it ought to reaffirm its position of principle which consisted in guaranteeing that all merchandise coming from or destined for countries in the interior would not be stopped in transit or diverted. It could not take upon itself the responsibility of establishing the precedent of interfering with the free access to the sea of the countries in the interior, at the request of third parties and for the protection of the interests of the latter. This was a duty which was imposed upon it by the unassailable principles of international law, otherwise recognized expressly in conventions.

716. On 8 April 1966, the Government of Portugal issued a second press communique in which it reiterated its position on the freedom of private companies in Portuguese Territories and rejected responsibility for the docking of the Joanna V in Beira.

717. On 11 April 1966, the Joanna V pulled anchor into the Mozambique harbour of Beira and moved to the quayside. An official of the Foreign Ministry of Portugal was reported to have said that the Joanna V was authorized to dock in the harbour to facilitate the normal movement of the port.
718. On 12 April 1966, the Government of Panama revoked the provisional registry acquired by the Joanna V.
719. On 14 April 1966, a Portuguese Government official was reported to have announced that the Captain of Beira Port had boarded the Joanna V and taken control of the vessel on behalf of the Portuguese authorities.
720. On 5 April 1966, it was reported that another tanker, the Manuela, belonging to the same owners as the Joanna V, was heading for Beira with a consignment of 16,000 tons of crude oil for Southern Rhodesia. On 5 and 6 April 1966, the Government of Greece sent two warning cables to the Master of the 11,000-ton tanker Manuela warning him not to proceed to Beira.
721. It will be recalled that Security Council resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, inter alia, called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia.
722. Following the adoption of this resolution, the United Kingdom anti-submarine frigate, Berwick, on 10 April 1966, intercepted the Greek registered tanker, Manuela, 150 miles east of Beira and put an armed party aboard. A United Kingdom Ministry of Defence spokesman stated that as a result of the action taken by the Berwick, the Manuela had now turned away from Beira and was on a southerly cruise.
723. On 12 April 1966, the Manuela arrived at the South African seaport of Durban and docked in the harbour. On 16 April 1966, the Manuela left Durban for an unknown destination.

Portugal and the oil embargo

724. According to a press report, oil and petroleum products have continued to reach Southern Rhodesia from South Africa by rail through Mozambique. The oil reaching Southern Rhodesia through Mozambique was estimated at about 100,000 gallons daily.

725. The board of directors of the Rhodesia-Mozambique Pipeline Company (CPMR) met in Lisbon on 10 March 1966 to consider a request from the local management of CAPREF in Southern Rhodesia to build a "slip" pipeline to connect the new dockside storage tanks, which were under construction in Beira, to the pipeline for a resumption of crude oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia.

726. At the meeting, the directors of Lonrho Ltd., (the United Kingdom Company that owns 62.5 per cent of the shares of CPMR) presented certain legal documents relating to resolutions passed by the board of directors of CAPREF in London. These resolutions stated that the local management of CAPREF was not in a position to issue instructions in respect of activities outside Southern Rhodesia.

727. According to press reports, the most significant result of the meeting of the board of directors of CPMR was the agreement that another board meeting would have to be held before any connexion could be made between the pipeline and the new storage tanks under construction at the dockside in Beira. The meeting was adjourned sine die on the understanding that it could be convened again at twenty-four hours notice.

728. On 31 March 1966, it was reported that work had been completed on two of the six 3,000-ton prefabricated storage tanks which were being built near the pumping station at Beira and that about twenty-four hours would be needed to connect the tanks to the pipeline.

729. On 6 April 1966, the board of CPMR resumed its meeting to decide whether the two 3,000-ton storage tanks just completed in Beira harbour should be connected to the pipeline so that oil from the tankers could be pumped through to Southern Rhodesia, as well as the 14,000 tons of crude oil that has been lying idle in the pipeline since the beginning of the year. The meeting ended on 7 April 1966, but no official statement was issued. The chairman of Lonrho Ltd., Mr. Alan Ball, was quoted as having said after the meeting that he was personally opposed to pumping oil through the pipeline to Southern Rhodesia, but that he could not forecast how the Portuguese, who are in the majority on the board, would decide.

730. On 14 April 1966, it was reported that the Smith regime had indicated to the representatives of CPMR and CAPREF that they expected facilities to be made ready soon for pumping and refining.

731. On 15 April 1966, it was reported that Portuguese parachute troops had been specially flown from Lourenço Marques to Beira to guard the Mozambique-Rhodesia pipeline. Both the pipeline and all its adjacent buildings are said to be under guard.

South Africa and the oil embargo

732. The Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation made a series of announcements in the second half of March-April 1966 which show that oil and petroleum products have continued to arrive in Southern Rhodesia from South Africa.

733. The quantity of oil and petroleum products mentioned in these broadcasts as coming from South Africa varied from a few hundred gallons to 4,000 gallons per shipment by road. According to these broadcasts, some of the drivers who brought in shipments ranging between 2,000 to 4,000 gallons were officially received by the Mayors of Bulawayo and Salisbury at their respective City Halls.

734. On 18 April 1966, the Rand Daily Mail estimated the extent of the oil flow from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia as being between 140,000 and 160,000 gallons daily. This would be about double Southern Rhodesia's consumption under rationing. According to the Rand Daily Mail, the figure was based on a careful survey in the previous week at Beit Bridge and in Mozambique. The daily total was made up of about 45,000 gallons by road tankers via the Beit Bridge and about 100,000 gallons by rail.

735. The paper stated that while the road flow by Beit Bridge had decreased from a weekly peak of 450,000 gallons to some 300,000 gallons (see paragraphs 261-264 above) the loss had been offset by increased rail traffic. Fueling from road tankers, mostly hauling from the Rand, cost the Smith regime an estimated 6/- per gallon. Rail traffic, mostly from the Rand via Komatipoort to Lourenço Marques and thence via Malvernia to Salisbury and Bulawayo was far cheaper. All the major oil suppliers were said to be participating in the traffic. According to the Rand Daily Mail, it was significant that road tanker drivers were reported as saying that storage space in Southern Rhodesia was becoming scarce - frequently they now had to drive from tank to tank looking for space.

Internal developments related to the oil embargo

736. On 14 April 1966, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B.H. Musset, announced that the present method of fuel rationing would end on 9 May 1966 and be replaced by a coupon system. Petrol ration identification cards which expired on 2 May 1966 would continue to be valid for one more week and the public would be able to draw petrol for the week of 3 May to 9 May as at present. He stated that under the new scheme a more equitable scale of rationing would be introduced. The new scale would be based on a greater number of vehicle weight classifications; consideration would also be given to distance from home to work.

737. In his broadcast of 16 April 1966, Mr. Smith announced that Southern Rhodesia had decided not to use the oil from the tanker Joanna V because it was not its intention to involve unnecessarily other countries and people. It had, however, been proved by the incident of the Joanna V that Southern Rhodesia could break the blockade and, if it wished, pump the oil to the refinery at Feruka. The fact that Southern Rhodesia would not obtain oil from the Joanna V did not concern his regime very much. He said that after all, as the people of Southern Rhodesia knew, the use of the pipeline to transport oil from the coast was a comparatively new development. Prior to that Southern Rhodesia had got on very well using other means, in the same way as many other countries in the world did. Southern Rhodesia would continue by using those other traditional lines of supply.

738. Mr. Smith also stated in his broadcast that his regime was not complacent over the present position. It was now experimenting with a charcoal gas plant for adaptation on Diesel engines. He hoped that plans for this would be ready shortly and thereafter available throughout Southern Rhodesia for commercial production and sale to the public. Southern Rhodesia was also working on the development of oil from coal. This exercise continued and in addition a new prospect for oil, both more encouraging and more exciting, was under investigation. For security reasons, however, he was unable to give any further information about this.

VI. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE^{11/}

INTRODUCTION

739. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 411th meeting on 10 May 1966 and subsequently at its 418th, 423rd to 427th, 432nd and 447th meetings held in Africa between 24 May and 15 June 1966.

A. WRITTEN PETITIONS AND HEARINGS

740. The Special Committee also circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territory:

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document No.</u>
Mr. G. Pongault, Secretary-General, Union Panafricaine et Malgache des Travailleurs croyants	A/AC.109/PET.456
Mr. Faisal El Haji, President of the National Union of Kuwaiti Students	A/AC.109/PET.466
Mr. E. Backwell	A/AC.109/PET.475
Mr. Irving Brown, representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) to the United Nations	A/AC.109/PET.476
Messrs. Laurel Thompson, Christopher Adams and Ronald Brady	A/AC.109/PET.477
Mr. Joseph A. Fallon, President of the United States Youth Council	A/AC.109/PET.517 ^{12/}

741. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia:

- Mr. T.G. Silundika, representative, Zimbabwe African (423rd and 424th meetings) Peoples Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.458)
- Messrs. E.M. Pasipanodya, Chief representative in (424th meeting) Tanzania and L.P. Chihota, Assistant representative in Zambia, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.463)

^{11/} See also chapter II, Meetings in Africa, for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 (A/AC.109/188) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, and other Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

^{12/} This written petition (A/AC.109/PET.517) was circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/167) at its 427th meeting on 31 May 1966.

Mr. David Mpongo, Cairo Office of the Zimbabwe African (447th meeting)
People's Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.458/Add.1) 13/

742. Mr. Silundika (ZAPU) said that since the Committee had held its session in Zambia in 1965, the political situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated. The settler regime had intensified its repression of the African population. It had been pointed out at that time that the aim of the United Kingdom Government was independence for the settler minority regime. The now familiar unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith was just a stage in that Government's scheme eventually to create a sovereign settler minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. That view was supported by the fact that the United Kingdom had retained its legal presence in Southern Rhodesia through a Governor, through whom in fact talks had been resumed between London and Salisbury. There was no doubt, therefore, that the so-called unilateral declaration of independence was a probing action by the United Kingdom to test international reaction to the idea of an independent settler minority regime in Africa.

743. The unilateral declaration had two immediate purposes: to allow the settlers to consolidate their economy and their military and police forces, and to become so hardened to international condemnation as to be able to defy it to the same extent as the South African Boers. It must be crystal clear to anyone concerned with the Southern Rhodesian situation, as it was to ZAPU, that the United Kingdom had deliberately adopted a stand which prevented others from taking action to eliminate the oppressive colonialist regime while doing nothing itself to bring about order and justice.

744. The regime had continued its repressive activities against the Africans, more than 34,000 of whom were in prison and death cells, or under other restrictions. Scores of people were being arrested daily in nazi-style witch-hunts. Detention camps continued to be established in increasing numbers in the rural areas near the

13/ This petitioner was heard after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/167) at its 427th meeting on 31 May 1966.

territory of some chiefs who had completely lost the confidence of their people. It was in those circumstances that the leader of the African masses of Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo, and other leaders continued to be detained. Conflict between Africans and the whites continued to be widespread. Although the settlers were well armed and commanded a force of nearly 40,000 men, the Africans were determined not to accept anything less than the total surrender of their country and the total dissolution of the settler instruments of oppression. It followed, therefore, that the deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was ushering in a dangerous phase of armed resistance, with consequences that were bound to involve areas beyond the country's borders and that could mean nothing less than a threat to international peace. He feared that widespread resistance might develop unless prompt measures were taken to liquidate the Smith regime in the shortest possible time.

745. The United Kingdom had pretended to take steps to bring to an end the illegal regime of Ian Smith as if the question of legality or illegality were the central problem of the situation. It was well known that the United Kingdom had deliberately encouraged the minority regime to anchor itself by promising not to use force if it seized independence. Since the unilateral declaration of independence the United Kingdom had talked of economic sanctions as its measure of bringing the situation to order. Those had not only proved ineffective but, with the resumption of talks between Salisbury and London, had proved to be a sheer bluff. South Africa was supplying more than 100,000 gallons of petrol a day to Southern Rhodesia, whose daily consumption was 83,000 gallons. Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom continued a flourishing trade with Southern Rhodesia as did United States companies like the Union Carbide Corporation at Selukwe, and the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany still had diplomatic missions in Salisbury.

746. German exports to Southern Rhodesia in January and February 1966 had been to the value of £330,000 and £225,000 respectively, while its imports from Southern Rhodesia for December 1965 and January 1966 had been respectively £1,116,000 and £1,170,000.

747. A financial broker from Hamburg, director of a German-Southern Rhodesia trading group, Herr Joachim Seelmaecker, had told a Daily Express reporter in Johannesburg at the end of April that the Rhodesian situation called for business enterprise and he did not see why only the Japanese and French should take advantage of all the opportunities which British action had left open to others.

748. That illustrated that the economic sanctions to which Britain would like to limit the world in opposing the regime were too easily evaded, and therefore completely inadequate to meet the challenge of the situation. Herr Strauss, the former German Minister of Defence, had made an effort to pour in more money.

749. While Governments had made pronouncement against trade with Southern Rhodesia, they had not been able to prevent trading by companies based in their countries. Moreover, it had been learnt that a Japanese company had recently sold tear-gas to the Smith regime for use against Africans and that Turkey had not only sold arms, but a Turkish guerrilla expert was training the settler forces in anti-guerrilla warfare. It could well be that companies and nationals involved in assisting the United Kingdom to entrench the settler regime, were acting outside their Governments' policies, but the effect was that their countries were abetting an unwanted regime. He believed that the Special Committee had the capacity to investigate that information and, when its truth was established, the countries concerned must be asked why they were taking action in Africa that was against African interests.

750. The action of South Africa and Portugal, in openly assisting the settler dictatorship, was indicative not only of their economic alliance but also of their military alliance for oppressing international African populations and using the Zambezi as the protective line against free and independent Africa.

751. The United Kingdom had resumed talks with its agents in Southern Rhodesia, and was shamelessly telling the world that they were aimed at settling the Southern Rhodesian problem as if that problem was between it and its agents in Southern Rhodesia. Talks that were discriminatory in composition, scope and purpose could not be expected to produce non-discriminatory conditions or results. His organization rejected those talks without reservation. They were a blatant

conspiracy to work out a formula for bulldozing the Africans. A peaceful solution of the Southern Rhodesia problem could only be gained by convening a genuine constitutional conference, attended by the representatives of the people, to frame a constitution that would transfer power directly to the African majority.

752. It was common knowledge that the United Kingdom was toying with the idea of a Royal Commission to test the views of the people in the country, with guarantees not to impede majority rule, as a basis for conferring sovereignty on the settler regime. The United Kingdom's so-called six principles for settling the Rhodesian problem had been made vague enough to permit the complete betrayal of the African people. Prime Minister Wilson had sold out South Africa before the unilateral declaration by promising never to use force, and on 27 April he had once again been recorded in Hansard as having made the assertion that it would take a very long time before majority rule in Southern Rhodesia could be justifiable. He clearly wanted to transfer to the settler regime the task of guaranteeing unimpeded progress towards majority rule for "that very long time", and that meant virtually destroying any chance of majority rule. The Special Committee should place on record the fact that ZAFU, on behalf of the struggling masses of Zimbabwe, would accept neither a constitutional device nor a regime other than one based on African majority rule.

753. It was evident that the United Kingdom was not only incapable of but totally opposed to the removal of its settler-dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia. It could not now be allowed to pretend to go along with those who were making efforts to find a just settlement. He therefore proposed to the Special Committee the following conditions for settling the Southern Rhodesian problem:

(a) the United Kingdom, as a colonialist country, should be expelled from the Special Committee as an impediment to the sincere decolonization efforts of the United Nations;

(b) the United Kingdom should be declared the real enemy of the African people in Zimbabwe and of the world's desire for peace in Africa;

(c) all Members of the United Nations should be bound not to recognize or assist in any way any regime in Zimbabwe established by the United Kingdom short of African majority rule;

(d) the United Kingdom should be condemned for conniving with the settler regime in its brutal murders of the African people, whose only endeavour was justice, freedom and the restoration of their country, Zimbabwe;

(e) in considering measures consistent with its role against the Southern Rhodesian regime, the United Nations should openly regard force as the only solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem;

(f) United Nations Members should, individually or severally, assist the African people of Zimbabwe, in every way possible, in their efforts to overthrow minority dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia; and

(g) the continuation of activities of certain Members of the United Nations in trade and other relations with the settler minority regime should be prevented.

754. A peaceful settlement could only come about when all leaders and other political prisoners and detainees had been released unconditionally and when the African leaders had unrestricted political freedom to consult with their followers in moving towards a genuinely convened constitutional conference with the specific purpose of transferring power directly to the African majority.

755. In reply to questions, Mr. Silundika (ZAPU) said that the oil embargo had had no significant effect. There had been much talk about the import of oil through Beira but other routes remained open and over 100,000 gallons of fuel entered Southern Rhodesia from South Africa every day, quite apart from supplies received through Mozambique. The increase in the price of petrol was not due to the oil embargo but was merely a provisional arrangement made by the rebel regime. Furthermore, the two oil tankers "Manuela" and "Joanna V", despite the considerable publicity given to their diversion, were still cruising off the shore of southern Africa and might well discharge their cargo at a South African port or elsewhere.

756. The oil refinery in Salisbury was being expanded, at a cost of £200,00 to receive crude oil arriving through South Africa and Mozambique. Measures had also been initiated for co-operation between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa with a view to ensuring safe and uninterrupted oil supply lines. Oil rationing had been introduced, but only in order to conserve stocks. As Smith himself had made abundantly clear, Southern Rhodesia had two years' supply of oil. Moreover, South Africa was endeavouring to make use of certain oil deposits within its territory and attempts were also being made with the assistance of the powerful Anglo-American Company to derive other forms of fuel from coal.

757. Mr. Chihota (ZANU) said that he was speaking on behalf of the liberation movement which represented the people of Zimbabwe - or Southern Rhodesia, as it was called by the imperialists. That movement was leading the armed struggle to oust British colonialism from Zimbabwe.

758. He was grateful for the opportunity, on behalf of the 4 million exploited Africans of Zimbabwe, to expose the half-truths and lies uttered by British colonialists at the United Nations in an effort to perpetuate their subjugation of the Zimbabwe people. He expressed appreciation to the President, Government and people of Tanzania both for providing the facilities which had made it possible for the representatives of ZANU to appear before the Committee and for assuming a major role in the liberation struggle of the Zimbabwe people.

759. It was with great satisfaction that he noted the absence from the Special Committee of the representatives of the arch-colonial imperialist Power, the United Kingdom - an absence which it was to be hoped, would be permanent. As stated in ZANU's address to the Special Committee at its meeting in Lusaka in 1965, the United Kingdom was the culprit and Smith the agent in the Rhodesian situation. As a colonial Power it should be expelled from the Committee and, like Portugal and South Africa, it should not be allowed to participate in the Committee's work until it had renounced colonialism.

760. Since the representatives of ZANU had appeared before the Committee in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1965, the position had worsened: ZANU's President, Mr. Ndabaningi Sithole, and three quarters of the leading members were either under detention or restriction. The three most well-known concentration camps were Sikombela, Wha Wha and Gonakudzingwa where, together with over 20,000 of ZANU's supporters and freedom fighters, its leaders were confined, without trial, under deplorable conditions. The Smith regime had converted disused mines into special gaols to accommodate some of ZANU's leaders, all of whom were under detention for a minimum of five years. Their families and friends did not know where they were. The prison camps were deliberately designed to reduce their African inmates to the level of animals. Those opposed to British colonial rule in Zimbabwe were removed from their homes by night to prisons, where many had died. Only two weeks earlier many prominent Africans including two doctors, Dr. Silas Mundawarara and Dr. Mutasa, had been imprisoned, together with 500 Africans, following the bloody gun-battle at Sinoia

between the forces of ZANU and the puppet regime. Thousands more were being arrested daily in various parts of the country. It would take too much of the Special Committee's time to recount the full extent of the atrocities suffered by the Zimbabwe people and he would therefore confine himself to two examples. In the first place, the Land Apportionment Act, dividing land between the British settlers and the indigenous Zimbabwe population, was being more rigorously enforced so that Africans were deprived of their livestock, farming areas and homes. Colour discrimination was as rigorously applied as in South Africa. Secondly, in the urban areas thousands of Africans were being evicted from their jobs and houses and were thus reduced to the level of beggars. That was being done so that the settlers would have even more and better jobs and a still higher standard of living when they already enjoyed the best in the world. To a great extent such evictions resulted from deliberate British colonial policy rather than from sanctions.

761. On 11 November 1965, the settler Government had declared independence unilaterally. The United Kingdom, which had created the political and economic conditions making that declaration possible, had thus sought to absolve itself of any responsibility for the further denials of the human rights of the Zimbabwe people by the British settler Government, and had been able to pretend to fight that Government through ineffective sanctions. As a result, the settlers had raised the forces of oppression to an unprecedented level. ZANU, which was fighting to regain the land of the Zimbabwe people, was also struggling for their human rights, for democracy and for justice. The unilateral declaration was merely another means used by the British, both in Southern Rhodesia and in Britain, to continue colonial exploitation.

762. From the outset, ZANU had opposed British sanctions which, as they had repeatedly warned would be the case, had failed dismally. They had only inconvenienced, but would never defeat, the British settlers. Since the United Kingdom - a colonial Power with enormous interests in southern Africa - had established itself as solely responsible for their implementation, it had been an error for the Security Council, which danced to the tune of British imperialism, to allow the United Kingdom to police its own evil deeds.

763. ZANU and the people of Zimbabwe had decided to launch an armed struggle which, they were convinced, was the only realistic and effective way of recovering their rights. Any other course would only result in continued colonial exploitation.

ZANU had been forced to meet counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary resistance and, as the Special Committee had been informed by its representatives in 1965, there would be a bloody racial war in Zimbabwe. For the first time since the early wars of liberation in 1890-1896, known in Zimbabwe as Chimurenga and Chindunduma, the masses, led by ZANU revolutionary forces, had fought with the settler security forces near Sinoia on 28 and 29 April 1966. On 16 and 17 May 1966, under the direction of ZANU forces, they had again fought with the settlers near Hartley. At Sinoia, at least seven gallant heroes had lost their lives, and many Zimbabwean civilians had been killed by the British settlers. Those battles had breached what had hitherto appeared to be the impregnable security of the settlers.

764. The Rhodesian problem remained a threat to world peace. The battles being fought within the country, the involvement in British sanctions of such countries as Zambia, the threat of military invasion of Zambia and neighbouring territories by the settlers, the support provided by South Africa and Portugal to the settlers in Southern Rhodesia, were all factors contributing to the gravity of the situation and to the threat to peace in Africa and the world. The United Nations could help Zimbabweans to liberate themselves and could lessen the bloodshed which was bound to result as ZANU's armed struggle developed and intensified. It could help to defeat British colonialism more rapidly by taking the following measures: first, sanctions, to include South Africa, Mozambique and Angola, should be mandatory and should be placed under United Nations supervision. Secondly, all the borders of Zimbabwe should be sealed by a United Nations force. Thirdly, a force which should be composed of nationals from countries selected by the people of Zimbabwe and should operate under the auspices of the United Nations and OAU, would have to be used in Southern Rhodesia.

765. In conclusion, he strongly condemned the current negotiations on independence between the British in Southern Rhodesia and the British in the United Kingdom. The talks were a fraud and were aimed at creating another South Africa to work in close co-operation with Dr. Salazar and Dr. Verwoerd. The United Nations should make it clear, in a resolution, that it would never recognize the decisions reached at any consultations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia in which Zimbabwe's African representatives, presently under detention or restriction, had not participated.

766. The United Nations, like ZANU, should make it clear that there could be no half measure with regard to majority rule, which it demanded immediately. ZANU rejected outright the United Kingdom's five-point plan, under which the colonialists would determine the pace of African advance. If majority rule in Zimbabwe was not granted forthwith, the racial war would continue and ZANU would not lay down arms until that end had been achieved.

767. Mr. Pasipanodya (ZANU) said that it was to be hoped that the Special Committee's condemnation of British colonialism, so often repeated, could be given practical effect. It was his organization's view that the United Kingdom would have to be expelled from all United Nations organs if colonialism was to be wiped from the face of Africa.

768. Mr. Mpongo (ZAPU), in the name of the oppressed people of Zimbabwe and all its leaders detained or imprisoned by the Rhodesian rebel regime, expressed his thanks to the Special Committee for having accorded him an opportunity, for the second time during its current tour of Africa, to present its case, which was one that occupied the minds of every freedom-loving nation.

769. In Zimbabwe, Africans were being denied all the rights of free citizens in the country of their birth and the settlers were ruling at gun-point. ZAPU felt that the Committee should keep a watchful eye on the Rhodesian situation, which represented a major threat not only to the security of southern Africa and to Southern Rhodesia's neighbours in the north - the African independent States - but to the security of the African continent as a whole and, indeed, to that of international peace and stability.

770. The colonial history of Southern Rhodesia was a sad one, characterized by illegality, unilateral action and racism. It was a history of illegality because colonialism itself was abhorrent and illegal. There was no contract in existence proving that the African people of Zimbabwe had given away their rights and country in exchange for British rule and settler domination. The absence of such a document was clear proof that British occupation and colonization were both illegal and unilateral. That was why ZAPU was fighting against colonial rule and its offspring, settlerism and fascism.

771. Southern Rhodesia's oppressive laws had resulted in a situation in which individual freedom was trampled underfoot by the settlers. It had become illegal for an African in Southern Rhodesia to demand his inalienable rights.

772. The laws that governed Southern Rhodesia were, inter alia, as follows: any statement imputing any improper motive to the legislature, Government, ministers, officers or any department of the Government was prima facie subversive; so was any statement likely (even if not intended) to incite dissatisfaction against the Government or induce any person or persons actively or passively to resist any such laws. Any organization or publication could be banned at the Government's pleasure; any person could be restricted to any area found suitable by the Government for periods up to five years. The police could without warrant enter any home in which they suspected that a subversive statement might be made. The courts of law were obliged to impose minimum sentences for a wide range of convictions: five to twenty years for throwing or threatening to throw an article at a car; two to seven years for boycotts; the death penalty for arson.

773. Under most laws the accused had to prove his innocence. Not satisfied with those laws, Ian Smith's illegal regime had repeatedly imposed emergency legislation which dispensed with the need for trial.

774. Looking back into the history of Zimbabwe, it could be seen that the United Kingdom had committed serious crimes against the African people. The United Kingdom had permitted systematic land robbery and discrimination against the African citizens, while sharing with its kith and kin, the white minority settlers, the proceeds of exploitation. The United Kingdom had haver used its so-called reserve powers to stop discriminatory legislation in the periods 1923 to 1953 and 1953 to 1961.

775. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had rejected an eighty-one-nation appeal at the United Nations in 1962 for a "one man, one vote" franchise in Southern Rhodesia, and in 1965, together with the United States, had rejected a demand by the United Nations for the use of force against the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime. However, it should be noted that there had been no hesitation in the use of force in British Guiana and Aden by the United Kingdom.

776. That country's half-heartedly implemented economic sanctions had proved ineffective and futile. The oppressed people of Zimbabwe and all the freedom-loving nations of the world were witnessing the birth of yet another South Africa. Incidentally, that nation had been set on its path by the United Kingdom in 1910.

777. The land and the wealth of Zimbabwe were unequally divided. The settler population of Southern Rhodesia had over 36 million acres of the best land, or 38 per cent of the total land, of which it was estimated they only used 3 per cent.

778. The 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia had only 40 million acres, and the average African farmer owned not more than six acres of generally inferior land. White farmers usually obtained better prices for their products, while the African got about 20 per cent of those prices. The average yearly income for a white citizen in Southern Rhodesia was not less than £1,400 while that of an African was £114.

779. The notorious Land Apportionment Act forbade an African to own land and conduct business in the commercial centres of towns. Africans were only permitted to live in those areas as servants. Skilled jobs were barred from African workers.

780. Educational opportunities for Africans were strictly limited, as in the South African Bantu education system. In the present educational system there was "European" education, "Asian" education, "Coloured" education and "African" education. The different types of educational systems were not only administered separately but were also separately budgeted for by the Government. In addition, a kind of apartheid was in practice whereby the different races were split up, preference being given to the European to the detriment of the majority of the inhabitants of the country. These and many other injustices proved beyond any doubt that the political future of Southern Rhodesia was grave.

781. The United Kingdom, supported by those nations which hated the idea of majority rule in Zimbabwe, intended to push ahead with its racist policy of supporting illegal minority rule at all costs. The African people of Zimbabwe still held the view that the United Kingdom could have prevented that tragic event if it had believed in the interest of the majority - the 4 million Africans. With clear knowledge of British imperialist conduct - characterized south of the Zambezi by the continued economic and military aid extended both to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the African people of Zimbabwe held no illusion whatsoever as to the tacit complicity of the United Kingdom in the crime committed by the racist minority regime against the indigenous people of Zimbabwe.

782. The past seventy-six years had seen ruthless exploitation of the African people by the settlers, murder, torture and complete denial of their rights. The United Kingdom was responsible for all those injustices and atrocities. The settlers were in fact mere custodians of British economic interests. It was also clear that all the perfidious constitutions which the United Kingdom had imposed upon Zimbabwe since 1923 had been undemocratic and based on the principle of racism and indefinite minority rule.

783. A few examples would show that the United Kingdom's behaviour in Southern Rhodesia was characterized by unilateral action and racialism. The British occupation in 1890 was made without the Africans' consultation or consent; the granting of self-governing status to British settlers in 1923 was done without African participation or consent; the introduction of apartheid under the cover of Land Apportionment Act in the early 1940's was carried out by the British settlers with the support and agreement of the United Kingdom and not of the Africans; the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 was imposed without the consent of the Africans; the racial and undemocratic 1961 Constitution was imposed against the unanimous opposition of the Africans; the shameful white man to white man negotiations between 1961 and November 1965 had neither African participation nor consent. The unilateral declaration of independence had been imposed by the settlers in defiance of African demands and opposition, and the current Anglo-Rhodesian talks were also being carried out without African participation or consent. In fact the African leaders who should have represented the oppressed Africans were behind Smith's bars. There was no reason why the rightful representatives of the African people should not participate in those talks which concerned the future of their country and heritage, if they were intended to find a genuine and lasting solution to the Rhodesian crisis.

784. The United Kingdom's initiative at the United Nations to keep the Rhodesian question out of international control had resulted in the frustration of any endeavours towards a forceful approach by the United Nations. The recent rejection of a Security Council resolution on mandatory sanctions and the use of force under the circumstances had removed any international platform for the urging of the use of force on Rhodesia.

785. For the United Kingdom, therefore, the danger of international reaction through the United Nations to the independent minority regime in Rhodesia had been

completely removed. It felt it could now proceed to give open legal recognition to the regime and enable its allies also to do so.

786. Calculating on that basis, the United Kingdom had resumed talks with the Southern Rhodesian regime to complete the final trick of giving legal status to the Smith regime's independence. A certain pattern of camouflage was being worked out, which must ensure that the territories around Rhodesia acknowledge and recognize the solution the United Kingdom would work out with its kith and kin in their present talks; and that by their acknowledgement and recognition of such a solution the neighbouring territories would automatically insulate and secure Rhodesia territorially from any possible base of infiltration against the regime. While the real issue in Southern Rhodesia was majority rule for the population of Southern Rhodesia, that was no longer the issue as far as the United Kingdom was concerned. Its concern was now support of its arrangement for Southern Rhodesia by the majority of the States around Southern Rhodesia, which would mean securing at once international recognition and independence for the regime.

787. The arrangement must be tolerable to South Africa and Mozambique which practically meant majority territorial security for Southern Rhodesia's regime. Should the United Kingdom by that scheme secure a breakthrough to the impasse of recognizing the regime in Southern Rhodesia, it then hoped to handle Southern Rhodesia's neighbouring African States (who would like to see a rapid change to majority rule in Southern Rhodesia) by economic pressures, and in that way try to neutralize any possibility of those countries becoming sources of support of action against the Southern Rhodesian regime.

788. The constitutional camouflage might mean introducing a few Africans in the administration, increasing the seats in parliament for the Africans to a third, and widening the franchise to give privilege to a handful of a certain class of Africans. That would leave Ian Smith securely in power.

789. When Mr. Wilson had first become the opposition leader in the House of Commons, he had condemned the Tories for their failure to solve the Southern Rhodesian problem. In March 1963, he had told the Commons:

"We have said that the Constitution is indefensible which fails to allow the people of those territories the right to control their own destinies. We have bitterly attacked the Southern Rhodesian Constitution for that, and a Labour Government would therefore alter it. We have made that very, very plain."

790. After the United Nations General Assembly had called upon the United Kingdom to suspend the 1961 Constitution during one of its sessions in 1963, Mr. Harold Wilson had challenged the Conservative leader, Sir Alec Douglas Home, in the Commons as follows:

"Now we must ask the Prime Minister to be utterly unequivocal about this demand he has received. Although our good name has been besmirched by our handling of the Central African question, too much is at stake for Britain's stand in Africa, in the United Nations and in the world for him to evade this issue. Will he give a clear specific assurance that Her Majesty's Government will not concede independence to Southern Rhodesia until a new constitution is in force which accepts what the present Constitution rejects, the principles of a democratic Government? In view of the inability of the Government to solve this problem ... will he tell us that he will convene a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference for the purpose of an agreed Commonwealth solution to this problem?"

791. But at the June 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Mr. Wilson had adamantly refused to heed the demand by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers that a constitutional conference be held within three months. Reporting in the House of Commons, on 29 June 1965, on his discussions with Mr. Smith, Mr. Wilson had declared:

"... if these discussions did not develop satisfactorily within a reasonably speedy time, the British Government would be ready to consider promoting a constitutional conference in order to ensure progress to independence on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole." (That statement was contained in Hansard of 29 June 1965.)

792. Obviously the discussions had not been satisfactory, but Mr. Wilson had done nothing to see that a constitutional conference was convened. On the contrary, he had committed the United Kingdom Government to the acceptance of the 1961 Constitution as the basis for independence.

In a letter to Ian Smith dated 29 March 1965, Mr. Wilson had said:

"What the British Government wish to see is a peaceful transition to majority rule, the principle of which is enshrined in the 1961 Constitution."

793. The claim by Mr. Wilson that the 1961 Constitution "enshrined" the principle of independence under majority rule was untrue because the majority of the Africans were not eligible to become electors, being able to get only fifteen seats against fifty seats of the white settlers.

794. Mr. Ian Smith, who had on several occasions expressed his opposition to majority rule before independence had once stated in a letter to Mr. Wilson that "Since it is our determination not to accept independence under majority rule, the conclusion should be obvious." That statement alone should have been a pointer to Mr. Wilson that Smith was on the brink of declaring Rhodesia independent unilaterally.

795. Instead of using British powers on Southern Rhodesia Mr. Wilson had flown to Salisbury for further talks with Mr. Smith during the course of which, according to the British Blue Book, he had reminded the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet that that was the first occasion in modern history on which the United Kingdom Government had been prepared to contemplate granting them independence on the basis of less than majority rule. That was a clear retreat on the part of Mr. Wilson. It was no longer majority rule before independence but "guaranteed and unimpeded progress to majority rule", as stated in his broadcast speech on 12 October 1965.

796. The foregoing facts should prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the United Kingdom Government had not the slightest intention of taking any effective steps to ensure African majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The so-called economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had proved to be totally ineffective and the United Nations resolutions on Southern Rhodesia had also been ignored by the United Kingdom Government. In all his declarations, and also in his speeches issued during his talks with Mr. Smith, Mr. Wilson had over-emphasized the fact that "he fully shared Mr. Smith's desire to counter communist influence in Africa". All those and many other moves taken by the United Kingdom Government, which his organization had exposed, clearly showed how the British colonialist Government had given in to its kith and kin, the white settler minority dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Wilson had not only refused to press for the release of all political prisoners, but in defence of the Smith regime he had also categorically made the position clear that Smith would only be prepared to release

the African nationalists provided they gave him an assurance that "... they would now resort to purely constitutional means of political activity". He would like to deal with the question of political detainees in detail. The conditions that Mr. Wilson had put forward for the release of the country's leaders were hollow and ineffective, because in the first place, in view of the illegality and unconstitutionality of the present Government administering the country, it automatically followed that the restriction of its leaders under that treasonable regime was immoral and unconstitutional.

797. The African people of Zimbabwe, having sufficient evidence and fears to believe that the continued detention of their leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, was illegal and invalid, and posed a danger to his life in the hands of the Rhodesian regime, requested the Committee to take all necessary and legal steps that could result in his being released from detention. Convinced that his continued detention and restriction, aimed at frustrating both his political activity and his personal life, deprived the African people of Zimbabwe of their rightful leader, they had strong reasons to entertain the fear that he might be murdered in the interests of those who considered him their political enemy. Further, international law decreed that nobody should be detained without trial. For that reason the matter should be taken up, and he should be released or brought to trial, thereby possibly establishing a test case for the fate of thousands of political detainees held illegally. It was also questionable whether the virtue of any order deriving from the 1961 Constitution still held, as that Constitution had been repealed and replaced by the 1965 Constitution of the illegal regime of Ian Smith.

798. ZAPU accused the undemocratic and illegal Smith regime, which should be indicted in the place of Mr. Joshua Nkomo and his colleagues. Its indictment of that regime was supported by millions of the African people in Zimbabwe, who were at present going through untold sufferings at its hands. Because of the illegality of the present regime in Rhodesia, his organization felt strongly that the matter should be raised with the proper authorities in Britain, whose Government bore full responsibility for the present situation in the country. The British Labour Government had stepped up its connivance with its kith and kin by the current historic talks, with a view to finding a basis for negotiation with the rebels

That crowned all the conspiracy, connivance and double dealing in the British venture in the Rhodesian crisis and left no doubt in anybody's mind that the United Kingdom was responsible not only for the unilateral declaration but for the continuity of illegal rule and the perpetration of torture of the African majority by its minority kith and kin.

B. GENERAL STATEMENTS

799. At the 411th meeting, before the Special Committee resumed consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia in Africa, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania made a statement on the question. He said that his delegation had noted with considerable anxiety the disposition of the United Kingdom Government to engage in so-called exploratory talks with the rebellious Southern Rhodesia regime of Ian Smith. Before the unilateral declaration of independence, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had stated that such a declaration would be an open act of rebellion; when that declaration had nevertheless been made, the United Kingdom had argued that economic sanctions would be effective in bringing down the rebellion. Those sanctions had proved a failure and the recent manoeuvres for talks between the United Kingdom Government and the illegal Rhodesian regime raised a number of fundamental points concerning which world public opinion was entitled to an explanation from the United Kingdom.

800. Firstly, was the United Kingdom's contention that the unilateral declaration of independence was a rebellion against the Crown still to be believed? Secondly, in the eyes of the United Kingdom Government, was Smith's action still illegal or had it acquired respectability and legality with the passage of time? Thirdly, was the United Kingdom's stated intention to defeat the rebellion still to be believed? Fourthly, what would be the status of the proposed talks? It might have been supposed that they would be concerned with the rebels' surrender, but Ian Smith had told the world that the talks constituted a victory for him. Fifthly, could United Kingdom officials engage in talks with a rebellious regime without giving the world the impression that they were compounding a felony? Sixthly, was it possible for the Smith regime to negotiate itself out of power now that the sanctions had proved to be a total failure?

801. The United Kingdom Government had ignored not only the indigenous people of Southern Rhodesia but also world public opinion. It was particularly regrettable that it should embark on the dangerous course of arranging for talks with the rebels after it had been instrumental in defeating every move on the part of the African countries that would have ensured the early crushing of the rebellion, specifically their move for the full application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In 1910, in similar circumstances, the United Kingdom Government had granted independence to a minority group in South Africa, with a so-called safeguard for the South African majority; the sad results of that decision were to be seen today.

802. The major issue in Southern Rhodesia was that of independence under majority rule; by its current moves the United Kingdom Government was turning its back on that issue. Before assuming his present office, Lord Caradon, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, had written in an article that European leaders in Africa had failed, when they had had the chance, to win the confidence of the Africans and that the chance of co-operation between Whites and Blacks in Southern Rhodesia had been thrown away by blindness and obstinacy at Salisbury and a lack of political courage in London. He had added that the drift had gone so far that it was difficult to see how it could be stopped short of violence.

803. If the United Kingdom Government had still not abandoned the principle of majority rule and the aim of bringing down the rebellion and returning the country to constitutionality, then his delegation felt obliged to state that the United Kingdom Government was failing to achieve its purpose. Blindness and obstinacy, as well as a lack of political courage, prevailed in London with regard to meeting the demands of Rhodesian Africans and of world opinion, and the drift towards violence was thereby being accelerated. The world was entitled to hear from the United Kingdom Government the nature and the legal status of the so-called talks now being held secretly in London.

804. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he wished to correct some of the statements made about the talks being held in London. As the United Kingdom Prime Minister had stated recently in Parliament, informal talks were being held to discover whether a basis for negotiation existed. He also commended to the attention

of the members of the Committee the other points made by the United Kingdom Prime Minister in his recent statement (see paragraphs 628-632 above).

805. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania agreed with the United Kingdom representative about the need for honest and straightforward discussions. It was not honest, however, for the United Kingdom Government to hold talks with a regime which it had declared to be rebellious and treasonous. It was because the statements being made by the United Kingdom delegation did not correspond to the facts that he had raised certain questions, which should be answered in the Committee or elsewhere.

806. The United Kingdom Government, which had preached the gospel of racial co-operation for so long, was sacrificing justice to colour in Southern Rhodesia, where the oppressed majority was African. It was little consolation for the population of the United Kingdom dependent Territories to be told that millions of people in other Territories had been given independence.

807. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mali and Ethiopia expressed their support for the views expressed by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

808. At its 418th meeting which was held in Dar es Salaam, the Chairman directed the Special Committee's attention to a cable from the United Nations Office of Public Information in New York on the latest developments in the Security Council's examination of the question of Southern Rhodesia, copies of which were before the representatives. According to that cable, the Security Council, by a vote of 6 in favour, 1 against and 8 abstentions, had failed to adopt the draft resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda.

809. The Chairman said that while the result was disappointing, it should nevertheless be regarded as a moral victory and should provide the Special Committee with the impetus to redouble its efforts in that connexion. The fact that as many as six members had voted for the draft resolution was a source of encouragement, as were the statements of those members who had stressed the need for measures to ensure the African population's right to self-determination and independence.

810. The futility of the measures adopted by the United Kingdom, which were merely an expedient to avoid dealing with the crux of the problem, had long been

self-evident. Indeed, instead of undertaking negotiations with a view to implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it had engaged in "exploratory" talks with the rebel regime. That could only lead to the legalization of the existing situation and the maintenance of a status quo which was totally unacceptable to the majority of the Rhodesian population.

811. It was therefore the responsibility of the Special Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in pursuance of its own decision in that regard, to re-examine the Rhodesian question in the light of recent developments. Thus, it would contribute, in keeping with the expectations of both United Nations and of world opinion, to a solution of the problem.

812. The representative of India reviewed the events which had led up to the culminating injury: the United Kingdom Government, after a series of manoeuvres designed to mislead world opinion, had now initiated talks with the Smith regime - having resolutely avowed not to do so only a few months earlier. However, it was underestimating the intelligence of the whole world, and even of its own people.

813. Three salient facts had emerged: first, the sanctions had failed; secondly, the United Kingdom and its supporters did not intend, at least for the time being, to adopt stronger measures against Rhodesia; and, thirdly, the Smith regime was defying world opinion and consolidating its position. While he did not mean to suggest that the United Kingdom Government was deliberately prolonging a regime which had arrogantly ridiculed its authority, it was nevertheless influenced by concern for kith and kin - an attitude which, though understandable, was morally indefensible. The United Kingdom also argued that economic sanctions were preferable to the use of force; but sanctions were surely pointless if trade continued.

814. White Rhodesia's other two partners in the process of consolidation collaborated openly and aggressively. The South African and Portuguese Governments were in the forefront of every movement to reverse the course of history. They should be ostracized by the world for their unspeakable conduct; yet there were Governments which continued to associate with them. One major

Power in Asia had even increased its trade with South Africa in recent years, despite its avowed concern for the exploited races of the world. Words of comfort from the United Kingdom would no longer suffice, and its pretence of sanctions could not be accepted. If Africa and the rest of the world were to be spared a bloody racial conflict, it would have to take effective action.

815. India's stand against racism was well-known. Many years previously, it had taken the lead by forcing the Portuguese colonialists to leave Indian territory when persuasion had failed. As the first country to break off all relations with the Smith regime, it had given tangible proof of its support for the African people in Southern Rhodesia.

816. The Special Committee should call upon the United Kingdom, which was responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, to take effective action. The Committee should also make it clear that its aversion to the use of force could not be used to shield a criminal regime which had to be suppressed, and that all Members of the United Nations should decide whether they wished to support Portugal and South Africa or to join with the vast group of nations which had respect for man and the rule of law.

817. In conclusion, he directed the Special Committee's attention to the six-point programme which the Indian delegation had presented to the Security Council on 17 May 1966.

818. The representative of Ethiopia deplored the recent Security Council vote on the Rhodesian question. His delegation had from the outset been greatly concerned at the attitude of the Western Powers, and particularly of the United Kingdom, with regard to Southern Rhodesia; Africans were tired of platitudes, and patience had been exhausted.

819. Time and again, the Ethiopian delegation had stated that a ruthless rebel regime, such as that installed in Salisbury, could only be overthrown by force. However, as Emperor Haile Selassie I had stated in his message on Africa Day, it appeared that no such action could now be expected from the United Kingdom. Under those circumstances, the African people of Zimbabwe had no alternative but

to resort to arms in order to gain their freedom. In so doing they would have the support of the Africans and of all freedom-loving people throughout the world.

820. The Rhodesian crisis contained all the elements of a race conflict. Unless it was brought under control, not only Africa but the whole world might be endangered. The United Kingdom and its supporters should be warned that, by sacrificing principles to appease a minority in Southern Rhodesia, they ran the risk of losing the goodwill of the people in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Time was running short, however, and a choice had to be made between Smith's racist minority and the rest of Africa.

821. His delegation was convinced that the African people of Zimbabwe would soon win their freedom, no matter how brutal the oppression or how hard the struggle which lay ahead. All progressive peoples would support Zimbabwe in the attainment of its objectives, and Ethiopia, like other independent countries in Africa, would not rest until Ian Smith's rebel regime had been overthrown and the people of Zimbabwe liberated.

822. Lastly, it was to be hoped that, in presenting its recommendations to the General Assembly, the Committee would reach unanimous agreement on effective measures for dealing with the Rhodesian situation.

823. The representative of Iraq said that the plight of the Zimbabwe people had a special significance for the Arab world, since it served as a firm reminder of the forceful occupation of Palestine by foreign settlers abetted by international Zionism and colonialism. The tragedy which had befallen the Palestinian Arabs had occurred despite the existence of the United Nations and the conscience of the so-called civilized world. The people of Southern Rhodesia should not be exposed to a similar fate.

824. The petitioners in their statements had revealed the alarming fact that more than 34,000 Zimbabwe people were detained in prisons or camps and that the settlers commanded an army of more than 40,000 men - which constituted a real threat to international peace and security.

825. Economic sanctions had failed dismally owing to the co-operation of such Powers as Portugal and South Africa with the Rhodesian racist regime. The oil

embargo imposed by the administering Power had been circumvented by imports of oil from South Africa. The numerous consultations held between the settler regime and the administering Power, both before and after the unilateral declaration of independence, had yielded no positive results. Nevertheless, it had recently been learnt that further secret talks were being held in London which, according to press reports would be resumed in Salisbury during the week. 826. As a result of the manoeuvres of the administering Power and its supporters, a recent resolution submitted to the Security Council by the Afro-Asian members had not received the requisite number of votes. That resolution, which called upon the United Kingdom to act in accordance with the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter, would have assisted the Zimbabwe people in their struggle for freedom and independence.

827. As his delegation had pointed out on a number of occasions, and specifically at the twentieth session of the General Assembly shortly before the unilateral declaration of independence, the administering Power was solely responsible for Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, it had itself made repeated claims to that effect, as in October 1965 when it had been stated that the unilateral declaration was an act of rebellion.

828. The continuation of the abnormal situation in Southern Rhodesia was complicating Africa's political and economic relations with the rest of the world. For example, according to press reports, new regulations had been imposed by the Smith regime on Zambia's copper exports passing through Southern Rhodesia. Zambia had, however, rejected those regulations and an alternative route would have to be found. The racist regime had so far survived the effect of sanctions owing to a lack of firmness on the part of the administering Power. The situation would not, however, be allowed to continue indefinitely: the people of Africa would be forced to prepare for all eventualities, including a war of liberation.

829. The Vice-President of Tanzania had referred to two basic desiderata for solving the Rhodesian problem: the defeat of the illegal regime and a commitment that Southern Rhodesia would only become independent on the basis of majority rule. His delegation believed that the Special Committee, and the United Nations, should make every effort to achieve those objectives.

830. The representative of Mali said that the absence of any reply from the United Kingdom Government to the cable addressed to it by the Special Committee the previous Friday was further evidence of that Government's negative attitude to the Rhodesian question.

831. The situation in Southern Rhodesia had always been of concern to the African countries. Since the racist minority led by Mr. Smith had unilaterally proclaimed independence, the problem had assumed alarming proportions and was a serious threat to peace and security in Africa. It was true that the United Kingdom Government had made statements of intention. It had always claimed that it wished to limit the danger and to try to end a situation which did it no credit, but the fact was that that Government had itself created the Rhodesian crisis out of nothing and had deliberately complicated it in the hope of safeguarding British interests and the British presence in that part of Africa. The behaviour of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia could be explained only by its refusal to evaluate the situation objectively. The administering Power would not be able to maintain its presence by aiding and abetting Mr. Smith in his present conduct towards the Zimbabwe people. The Wilson Government was doing nothing to restore law and order in the country, and was going so far as to finance the handful of white settlers that had usurped power in defiance of all human laws and of human rights. Nor could the administering Power safeguard its interests in Africa by appropriating the productive land of the Zimbabwe people or by introducing, through the settlers it had transplanted into the Territory, the hateful system of apartheid and ruthless exploitation of man by man.

832. There was no doubt that the Ian Smith clique could not have stayed in power against the will of 4.5 million Blacks if the United Kingdom had not used its veto in the Security Council to facilitate the transfer of the armed forces and police force to the white settler minority, thus giving the latter the means of attaining independence at the Zimbabwe people's expense. The Special Committee should examine that aspect of the question and ask itself why the United Kingdom was acting in that way, whereas in other territories formerly under its jurisdiction it had brought its military might to bear against leaders beloved by their people who had demanded independence for their countries. The only answer to that question was that the United Kingdom Government allowed itself to be guided by economic and military

considerations. All the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee had stressed that aspect of the question. Southern Rhodesia possessed wealth, and the United Kingdom, doubtless feeling that it had not exploited the country enough, had found no other way to perpetuate the de facto situation than by granting its colony so-called self-government in 1923. That had been the cause of all the trouble. Who had benefited from that self-government? A mere 200,000 white settlers out of a population of nearly 5 million; it made one wonder what had become of law and justice. That policy was deplorable, and the United Kingdom should promptly restore the rule of law in the country. It was responsible, under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, for maintaining the security and integrity of the Territory.

833. In a strange way, the case of Rhodesia was paving the way for another South Africa. Having set itself that goal, the United Kingdom was methodically working to attain it. It was a pity that ~~the~~ United Kingdom delegation was not taking part in the Special Committee's work, because it would have been interesting to hear it deny the allegation. Although the United Kingdom knew perfectly well that all States condemned that policy, it had allowed Mr. Smith to contract for Southern Rhodesia an unholy alliance with Portugal and South Africa. The support thus secured for Southern Rhodesia had enabled Mr. Smith to proclaim independence unilaterally on 11 November 1965.

834. The United Kingdom had contented itself with an appeal to the Security Council for an economic blockade of its colony. Since then, Mr. Smith, assured of support from South Africa and in British financial circles, had been able to consolidate his position. The Security Council had, it was true, adopted resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, calling upon all States to place an embargo on oil, but Rhodesia nevertheless continued to receive a daily supply of petrol from South Africa. According to the London Times of 28 February 1966, the Financial Times of 21 February 1966 and the Zambia Times of 3 March 1966, the GENTA Company was bringing between 30,000 and 40,000 gallons of petrol a day into Southern Rhodesia by road or rail from the northern Transvaal. What specific measures had the administering Power taken to put an end to such violation of the Rhodesian frontier? Furthermore, according to the Financial Times of 3 March 1966, the arrangements permitting the importation of Rhodesian tobacco into the United Kingdom under

contracts signed on 31 January 1966 had enabled Southern Rhodesian exports to the United Kingdom to attain the record figure of £3.8 million in January 1966 as compared with £3.1 million in January 1965.

835. When Mr. Wilson had sent his emissaries to ask Mr. Smith to resume talks with him, and when Mr. Smith, in complying with the request, had stated that the question of Southern Rhodesia's independence, based on the 1961 Constitution, could not be reopened, the United Kingdom Government had betrayed the 4.5 million Zimbabweans once again. The Special Committee should join President Kaunda of Zambia in condemning the travesty of negotiations which was being enacted in London and which, according to press reports, was to be continued in Southern Rhodesia. The London Government's attitude remained essentially subjective; it was still dictated by anxiety to safeguard British financial interests in Southern Rhodesia and, above all, to perpetuate white supremacy in that part of Africa. There was no doubt that the United Kingdom Government had failed in its duty as administering Power to the Zimbabwe people, who were awaiting their liberation. Those oppressed people now had no choice but to resort to violence in order to free their country. Blood had flowed in Rhodesia, and would flow again unless the United Nations forced the administering Power to intervene and restore the rule of law there. Statements of intention were no longer enough; the struggling people now expected action.

836. It was unfortunate that the Security Council had rejected the resolution submitted by the African States, calling upon the United Kingdom to use force to abolish the iniquitous regime that had been set up in Salisbury. By its action the Security Council had incurred a very grave responsibility, for it was encouraging the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of a regime similar to that in South Africa.

837. Moreover, the United Kingdom Government's attitude was enabling Mr. Smith to harm the interests of a sovereign State - Zambia. According to press reports, Southern Rhodesian trusts were preventing Zambian copper from reaching the port of Beira via Southern Rhodesia. Keeping the Zambian people economically dependent on the monopolies operating in Southern Rhodesia was a further betrayal on the part of the United Kingdom Government. It was intolerable that Zambia should have to suffer the consequences of a retrograde policy which took no account of developments in the world of today. The United Kingdom Government, whose duty it was to maintain security in that part of Africa, should therefore lose no time in taking the necessary measures to restore the rule of law in the Territory.

838. The Special Committee, for its part, should first of all reaffirm the inalienable right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination and independence, as proclaimed in the declaration made in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It should then ask all States to render the Zimbabwe people material assistance in their sacred struggle for independence. It should further recommend the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a special session of the General Assembly in order to consider the serious situation which prevailed in the British and Portuguese colonies and which resulted from the regime of apartheid in force in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

839. In the meantime it was essential that the Security Council should find a means of compelling the United Kingdom to safeguard the interests of the Zimbabwe people and of the Zambian people. The Malian delegation would support any resolution to that effect.

840. The representative of Afghanistan said that the Security Council's rejection of the draft resolution submitted by three African countries had contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. That draft resolution had been perfectly justified, as it had become clear that the recommendations of the General Assembly stood very little chance of being put into effect. Likewise, the oil embargo advocated by the Security Council had proved inadequate. The unilateral declaration of independence - which could have been prevented - put the Smith regime in an even stronger position to oppress the Zimbabwe people, and was incompatible with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

841. The United Kingdom knew that the increasing collusion between South Africa, Portugal and the Smith regime prejudiced the future of the Zimbabwe people and the cause of majority rule. If the administering Power failed to come to grips with the crisis, the situation might suddenly be out of hand. His delegation was not opposed in principle to the current negotiations between the rebel regime and the United Kingdom, which had the legal responsibility and the necessary means to deal with the abnormal situation; the lack of progress had led to scepticism.

842. It was undeniable that the only solution was the removal of the rebel regime and the granting of independence by the United Kingdom under a democratic

constitution guaranteeing majority rule. Anything short of that would be unworkable and incompatible with the right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination.

843. His delegation hoped that common sense and understanding would prevail, and urged the Special Committee to draw the attention of the Security Council once again to the true state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia.

844. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that so long as the Smith regime held out, the Special Committee and the United Nations had to continue their efforts to reach a solution; otherwise the faith which the people of Zimbabwe and Africa placed in the United Nations was bound to waver. Indeed, it had already begun to diminish, and every further blow to it would increase reliance on bloodshed to liberate Africa. The Special Committee therefore bore a great responsibility towards the people of Zimbabwe to restore their faith in the United Nations and to ensure that the principles embodied in the Charter became reality for them.

845. The struggle in Southern Rhodesia was bound to be a bitter one, if only because of two main grievances of the African peoples: the extension of racial discrimination under the minority rule; and the perpetuation of colonialism by the refusal of the United Kingdom to crush the rebellion. The unilateral declaration of independence had in itself been a violation of the 1961 Constitution. The United Kingdom Government therefore had a vacuum to fill, but was shunning its responsibilities. Yet the irony of the matter was that the same Government had been proclaiming its sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia.

846. The United Nations must act without delay. Such legislation as the Land Apportionment Act and the pass laws was a transplantation of the South African pattern of discrimination.

847. The connivance and acquiescence of the United Kingdom Government, which had gone out of its way to proclaim its sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, could not pass unchallenged.

848. Africans charged the United Kingdom with striking a compromise with the minority racialists in Southern Rhodesia and calling the declaration of independence "unilateral" in order to deceive the world and draw international

attention away from the real issue, which was colonialism. If in British eyes Mr. Smith was a rebel, he should have been apprehended and put on trial for rebellion. But he had been to London and returned untouched despite the threatened declaration of independence. The United Kingdom claimed responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, yet allowed African nationalists to languish in prison for "terrorism" while Mr. Smith and his cohorts were merely unpunishable rebels. There were only two sides to the issue: the African people of Southern Rhodesia and the colonial Power and the racist settler minority serving foreign interests.

849. The United Kingdom had ignored African demands to crush rebellion, but had not failed to use the Security Council for its own ends. When the Federation had been breaking up in 1963, the African Members of the United Nations had submitted a resolution aimed at blocking the transfer of the air force to the Southern Rhodesian white minority; but the United Kingdom had used its veto. If Mr. Smith was consolidating his regime, it was because he had the backing of senior army, air force and police officers. Yet those officers had received, or were receiving, government pensions.

850. Even after the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom and its allies shamelessly blocked the application of mandatory sanctions and the use of force provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Therefore the Smith regime was being allowed time to consolidate itself, and in so doing it had initiated a rule of terror and massacre.

851. Many well-meaning people had asked why the African people of Southern Rhodesia had not risen against the illegal regime. In fact there was brave opposition, but because of strict censorship scarcely any information reached the outside world. However, the Tanzanian delegation was able to quote a number of incidents confirming active resistance. It had to be remembered that five years and the efforts of hundreds of millions of people had been needed to crush the Hitler regime.

852. The evils of the situation extended beyond the confines of Southern Rhodesia. It was six months since the unilateral declaration of independence and evidence

showed that South Africa and Portugal were doing all they could to maintain the regime. That alliance would continue to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations to impose optional or mandatory economic sanctions.

853. The illegal regime also had evil effects on other independent African States. It had tried to hold Zambia hostage, but had been bitterly disappointed by the courageous stand of Dr. Kaunda and his people. The rebel government had threatened to expel all Zambians from Southern Rhodesia; after the failure of that move, it had raised the price of coal and insisted on payment in hard currency; when that too had failed, it had turned to the railways and demanded that all freight charges be paid cash in advance. That too had been frustrated by the gallant stand of Dr. Kaunda. The representative of Tanzania appealed to the rest of Africa to aid Zambia; for he was sure that it was making its current sacrifices for the sake of the people of Zimbabwe and the dignity of Africa. The greatest help that Africans could render Zambia was to overthrow the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. As any other course would be but a half measure, his delegation would continue to insist on the use of force as the only means of ending the rebellion. Meanwhile, independent African States could help Zambia to find other outlets for its goods.

854. Africans had foreseen the failure of sanctions. The United Kingdom Government had made a considerable stir over the two tankers at Beira; yet it knew that large quantities of oil were supplied daily through Bechuanaland. If the United Kingdom and the Security Council had been sincere over the sanctions, they would have complied with the African suggestion to seal off the borders of Southern Rhodesia. Sanctions were failing because the British did not want them to succeed, and indeed subverted them by, for instance, importing Rhodesian tobacco via South Africa as a South African commodity.

855. The Zimbabwe people needed practical and sincere friends immediately. Africans had therefore been shocked at New Zealand's vote against the resolution they had submitted to the Security Council. He hoped New Zealand would never need African support.

856. It was the duty of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to ensure the defeat of the Smith regime and to ensure that the regime did not obtain de facto recognition from the United Kingdom.

857. His delegation intended to submit a resolution to the Special Committee during its current session. It would urge:

- (1) the release of all political prisoners;
- (2) recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the Zimbabwe people;
- (3) suspension of the 1961 Constitution and the cessation of all discriminatory practices;
- (4) condemnation of the support given to Southern Rhodesia by Portugal and South Africa;
- (5) the formation of a policing force to seal off the borders of Southern Rhodesia;
- (6) the organization by the United Kingdom of a general election on a majority basis, under United Nations supervision;
- (7) an appeal to all countries to aid Zambia; and
- (8) adoption by the United Kingdom of all necessary measures, including the use of force, to crush the racist regime.

858. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that there was no point in going over every item in the record of Southern Rhodesia; it was enough to note that Mr. Ian Smith's illegal regime was still in existence and indeed growing in strength. Rhodesia's rebellion had come as no surprise to Africans, who had foreseen it since the adoption of the racist Constitution in 1961 and the break up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963. At that time, of course, the African countries had drawn the United Kingdom's attention to the danger involved in handing over the armed forces, including the air force, to the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia. But the United Kingdom had disregarded

those warnings, and for the first time in history a colonial Power had given a colony the means of providing its own defence, thus placing 4 million Rhodesians at the mercy of a handful of racist white settlers.

859. However, the African countries had continued to place their trust in the United Nations. Unfortunately all the efforts made by the United Nations and by friendly countries had remained without effect, and the course of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Mr. Smith's regime was alarming. Never within the memory of the colonized had a metropolitan government been observed begging its subjects not to proclaim independence and bowing to their demands in such a way. That behaviour could only encourage Mr. Smith to carry on his hateful work. Once again the United Kingdom had deserted the Africans, leaving them defenceless in the hands of a group of fanatics who planned to keep them eternally enslaved in the name of Western civilization. For that reason the Africans who still remembered what had happened at Stanleyville in November 1964 were in duty bound to come to the aid of their brothers. The only reason why they had not yet done so was that they had wished to avoid hampering the action of the United Kingdom, which had undertaken to put down the rebellion promptly. The fact now had to be faced that it had failed, and that the only course left was to resort to the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 42, of the Charter - in other words, to force, which was apparently the only means of transferring the powers of colonial authorities in an orderly manner to the peoples of the territories concerned. The Archbishop of Canterbury himself had stated that the failure of economic sanctions justified the use of force to restore law and keep order, when that could clearly be achieved by such means.

860. The United Kingdom Government must act quickly if it wanted to avert a race war in Africa, for Mr. Smith's action was not an isolated case. It was part of a general plan for the oppression of Africa, to which the racist regimes of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia were parties. The fact that the Security Council had rejected the proposal for the use of force showed that the process of recognizing the fascist regime in Southern Rhodesia had already begun, inasmuch as the United Kingdom had undertaken to negotiate with a private individual who in reality had no legal authority. It was hard to believe that the problem would ever be solved by negotiation. Neither the Zimbabwe people nor the independent African countries could agree to a compromise solution that would amount to de facto recognition of the racist regime in Southern Rhodesia.

861. The African countries therefore believed that all available means, including the use of force, should be used to bring down the rebel regime, and they appealed to all democratic and peace-loving peoples to call upon the United Kingdom to take the necessary steps to regain control of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and to prepare for the grant of independence to the Zimbabwe people. The time for statements of intention was past. Action was now necessary, for international peace and security were at stake.

862. The representative of Tunisia said that the question of Southern Rhodesia was a matter of concern to the United Nations and would continue to be so until the Organization found an effective means of helping the Zimbabwe people to regain their lawful right to freedom and independence. He drew attention to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which had been adopted unanimously. The many resolutions which the General Assembly and the Security Council had subsequently adopted on the subject had never been implemented, even in part. The United Kingdom had repeatedly claimed all responsibility with regard to Southern Rhodesia; but it was now clear that that attitude had been merely a clever subterfuge for maintaining the status quo and encouraging the white settlers to persist in their criminal designs. The United Kingdom - which, it would be recalled, had taken a courageous attitude when power was to be transferred to the majority in other territories - advocated the use of such unsound means as negotiation and economic sanctions in the case of Southern Rhodesia.

863. Thus, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, in defiance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the democratic principle of the majority, in defiance even of international public opinion, a minority was oppressing 4 million people whose only desire was to live in dignity and peace.

864. The United Nations and the Special Committee were in duty bound to ensure, as soon as possible, that that criminal regime was rendered incapable of further mischief, and to expose the devious machinations of those countries which, while professing friendship for peoples struggling for their freedom, were underhandedly delivering arms and ammunition to the retrograde Powers that sought to impose their rule on Africa.

865. But obviously no government, however strong, could stay in power without popular support. Tunisia therefore believed that, despite injustice and military and police oppression, the Zimbabwe people, strong in international backing, should rise up and take back what was rightfully theirs. Tunisia would support them in their struggle, for it knew that no colonialist regime would cease to behave like an absolute master until it felt its security threatened.

866. The States Members of the United Nations should bring pressure to bear on the United Kingdom in order to force it to act; the Special Committee should make specific proposals to the General Assembly, designed to draw public attention to that tragic problem and to help the United Nations out of the impasse. Tunisia would unreservedly support any constructive proposal designed to free the African majority from oppression by the minority and to safeguard peace and justice on the African continent.

867. The representative of Denmark expressed his regret that the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had not been crushed. He well understood the growing impatience of Africans, but it was essential to act in harmony. There was general agreement over the need to halt apartheid in South Africa and remove the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. The matter of Southern Rhodesia should be dealt with first as that problem could more readily be resolved.

868. Denmark recognized the United Kingdom's responsibility for a solution to the problem, but the United Nations also bore responsibility since the affair had been internationalized when referred to that body. The immediate aim of the common effort must be to remove the reprehensible regime, but the ultimate purpose was an independent Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule - probably best brought about by direct United Kingdom rule through a transitional period. Denmark deeply regretted the split in the Security Council over Southern Rhodesia. However, as force could not be a purpose in itself, and would undermine the United Nations, it should be used only as a last resort.

869. Sanctions had been ineffective to date, but it would be unwise to conclude that the instrument was insufficient. It was essential that all States Members of the United Nations apply the sanctions. South Africa would not co-operate unless it were made to realize that by undermining the sanctions it would be the eventual sufferer. As it was, South Africa had a direct interest in that form of sabotage.

870. He reminded the Special Committee that Denmark had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, which noted that the increasing co-operation between the authorities of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal was designed to perpetuate racist minority rule in southern Africa and constituted a threat to freedom, peace and security in Africa.

871. It was important to maintain confidence in economic sanctions, and the Special Committee should press the United Nations to persuade all Member States to discontinue their economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. If any were unwilling to co-operate, the United Nations might have to intervene to enforce that policy.

872. Finally, he felt it was the duty and wish of the Special Committee to stress that the aim must be rapid independence for the Zimbabwe people.

873. The representative of Syria said that the new dimensions reached by the Southern Rhodesian crisis constituted a grave threat to international peace. The principles for which the United Nations stood were being violated by a minority regime based on conquest, motivated by oppression and exploitation, and thriving on discrimination.

874. The administering Power had built up a private company to the status of a conquering leviathan. It had annexed most of the territory to the Crown, distributed the most fertile land to the foreign minority, isolated the African inhabitants from the rest of the world by confining them to the most arid areas, used them for cheap forced labour, denied them access to property by such shameful legislation as the Land Apportionment Act, and prevented them from acquiring skill by such measures as the so-called Labour Conciliation Act. It had continued the process by encouraging white immigration, arming the settlers, extending foreign monopolies over the country's resources, and, finally, proclaiming the colony to be autonomous. There had been one over-all purpose: to usurp permanently the rights of the people of Zimbabwe to their land, their freedom and their independence.

875. However, when the settlers had seen their benefactor compelled to recognize the evolution of human relations that had liberated most of Africa, they had rebelled and declared their independence. They claimed to be free from any restraint that would prevent them from keeping African people in Zimbabwe under constant subjection and denying them their most elementary rights.

876. The administering Power had taken a double stand: on the one hand it had claimed sole responsibility over its colony of Southern Rhodesia, and on the other it had abstained from taking any effective action to quell the rebellion. That flagrant contradiction between words and acts was the object of much comment and regret, particularly among members of the Special Committee. The contradiction was, however, more apparent than real. The claim to sole responsibility had been in order to prevent action by others, and had given an added measure of protection and assurance to the regime it had chosen to call "rebel" in order to appease world opinion. The measures it had taken were those

that it had known in advance would be harmless. No embargo could succeed as long as South Africa was able to offer its help. The opposition to sanctions against South Africa by the United Kingdom representative at the last session of the General Assembly had placed the policy of the administering Power in its true perspective.

877. Referring to the statement made by the representative of Denmark at the previous meeting, he said that Verwoerd's regime was well aware that the slightest suggestion to apply Chapter VII of the Charter against South Africa would be met by vehement opposition on the part of the United Kingdom. Given that advance guarantee of non-action, it would be futile to rely on persuasion. He could only wish that the well-intentioned ideas of the Danish representative could be put into practice.

878. He could speak from bitter experience. The Power that was the trustee of the land of Zimbabwe was the same Power that had been trustee of the Palestine Mandate and had promised alien elements a so-called national home in Palestine at the expense of the majority. Behind the tragedy of more than 1 million Arab refugees expelled from their land and homes were the same manoeuvres, intrigues and claims of sole responsibility, and the same juridical subtleties. An amazing similarity could be drawn. The conquerors might be using time to entrench themselves and another fait accompli might be in the making; they would not hesitate to embark on genocide to panic the African masses into fleeing their homeland. The colonial pattern had been thoroughly tested and found to be worth applying again. The conclusions that the petitioners had reached concerning the hopelessness of any measure taken by the administering Power were fully justified, and their appeal for international action stemmed from their sense of realism. That Power that had professed its indignation at Smith's illegal act was now meeting his representatives for negotiations, as though the rights of the Zimbabwe people could be an object of bargaining between essentially alien parties.

879. The record went on endlessly: angry statements, diplomatic contacts, dramatic rehearsals in the Security Council about the oil cargo of two ships while oil was being supplied abundantly by South Africa - negotiations, their suspension for reflection, and optimism succeeding pessimism and vice versa. Meanwhile innocent people were suffering, and another bastion of colonialism was being consolidated.

880. His delegation supported the stand made by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the struggle of the freedom fighters, and the proposals made by the representatives of Tanzania and Mali.

881. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the rejection of the African draft resolution at the recent Security Council meeting was a case for very serious concern. The United Kingdom's responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a well-established fact; indeed it had been confirmed by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom himself.

882. Since the unilateral declaration the United Kingdom Government had been urged to discharge that responsibility and take the necessary measures, including force, to liquidate the racist regime and grant independence to the people of Zimbabwe under majority rule. Instead of taking adequate action it had given assurances that it would end the regime by economic sanctions within a matter of weeks.

883. His delegation had stated on 19 April 1966 that those who had given credence to such promises had realized that they had been taken in, that the rule of law had not been re-established and that there was no reason to believe the present measures capable of doing so. Despite its promises not to recognize the Smith regime, the United Kingdom Government had now begun talks with it.

884. He emphasized that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was closely connected with that in the other colonies and that there was close interconnection of interests of colonial Powers and racist regimes in the southern part of Africa. In the opinion of his delegation, each genuine blow to the Smith regime would have had a more negative effect on the economic and other interests of colonial and some other Powers. That was the reason for lack of adequate action against the Smith regime.

885. The Security Council's failure to act was a matter of grave concern. The way in which the United Kingdom Government was dealing with the Smith regime was not leading to majority rule but to further worsening a situation that already constituted a serious threat to peace.

886. He quoted from the report of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Federal Assembly on 20 January 1966, that the attempt to set up a racist and

colonialist stronghold in Central Africa might easily develop into a crisis whose effects might be felt outside the African continent, which reaffirmed the need to put an end to colonialism without delay.

887. He stressed that the situation in Southern Rhodesia since that time had worsened and had indeed become a threat to peace. The Special Committee should recommend appropriate measures to the Security Council. Broader and more determined action, including the use of force, was necessary.

888. He emphasized that Yugoslavia had no relations with Southern Rhodesia. The Yugoslav Government had most severely condemned the unilateral declaration of independence. The Yugoslav Government fully supported the past struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and in co-operation with African and other Members of the United Nations would continue to lend its support to all actions and measures aimed at enabling the people of Zimbabwe to decide freely and independently on their future.

889. The Yugoslav delegation would associate itself with any resolution that would lead to the downfall of the Smith regime and the establishment of majority rule.

890. The representative of Venezuela said that Southern Rhodesia, as well as South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies, were chronic cases which tested the international community's capacity for effective action. They were a challenge both to the United Nations and to the validity of the principles of the Charter. The unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia was the logical outcome of a crisis which had been allowed to develop through indifference with, it seemed, the connivance and support of the administering Power.

891. Every time that the problem had made itself felt, that Power had adopted a contradictory position, claiming, on the one hand, that it had complete responsibility for everything to do with Southern Rhodesia, while on the other hand, saying that it could not act because of its agreement with the Rhodesian Government. However, the declaration of independence, which was contrary to the provisions both of that agreement and of the 1961 Constitution, by reason of its illegality placed the Government of Ian Smith in a state of rebellion against the British Crown and unilaterally terminated that agreement. Therefore, the United Kingdom Government no longer had any excuse not to intervene and take the necessary steps to restore the rights of the Zimbabwe people.

892. In his view, it was no longer a question of applying sanctions to Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations must urge the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations since, by its own admission, it bore sole responsibility in the matter, and to act in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, instead of holding undercover negotiations with the present illegal Government with a view to restoring the 1961 Constitution; the United Kingdom must crush the rebellion, convene a constitutional conference in which all concerned, and above all the Zimbabwe people, should take part, draft a new constitution and hand over sovereign power to those who were entitled to it, namely, to 4 million Africans, the entire people of Southern Rhodesia and not one sector of it. In this connexion his delegation completely endorsed the statements made by the petitioners.

893. Venezuela had not recognized and would not recognize the Smith Government. As its representative had made clear in the note addressed to the Secretariat, the Venezuelan Government had prohibited all trade with Southern Rhodesia, particularly exports of oil and petroleum products to that country, until such time as the Zimbabwe people had been restored to its rights in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

894. The Venezuelans, a freedom-loving people and peace-loving people, respected the rights of other peoples and were anti-colonialist by nature and tradition, and they would never consider that the problem was settled as long as the rights of an entire people were ignored and trampled underfoot and as long as the Zimbabwe people had not regained freedom and independence under a democratic system of universal adult suffrage.

895. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remarked that the Special Committee was considering an issue which was of deep concern to all progressive men, to all States Members of the United Nations and above all, of course, to the peoples of Africa which were waging a heroic struggle to rid themselves of the colonialist and racist regimes still present on African soil. It was no accident that the future of the Zimbabwe people was being considered. There were only two possibilities: either the Zimbabwe people would obtain their freedom and independence or there would be a triumph of the racist clique which had taken over power at Salisbury with the help of the colonialist and imperialist Powers. Those Powers shrank from nothing to maintain their domination over

Southern Rhodesia, or which they wished to make a base of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Supported by the racist regime of Verwoerd, allied to the fascist regime of Salazar and backed by the military and colonialist NATO bloc, Southern Rhodesia had become a bastion of racism and apartheid. All those regimes had a clear objective: they had developed a new colonialist strategy in Africa, the purpose of which was not only to serve imperialist interests in Central and Eastern Africa, but also to assemble a military potential in that region. The imperialist monopolies, the capitals of which were London, Washington and Brussels, to name but a few, were endeavouring to strangle the national liberation movements in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as they were endeavouring to crush the freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. They wished to force the peoples of those countries to give up their right to independence so that none of the dependent peoples of Africa could achieve advances and free themselves from economic bondage. The imperialist and colonialist Powers were determined not to give up Africa; they still hoped to place it once again under their political, and in some cases economic, influence so as to recolonize certain African peoples. That the imperialist forces had a hand in the situation in Southern Rhodesia was obvious. The ruling classes in the United Kingdom were pretending to condemn the activities of the present Rhodesian regime, calling it rebellious and proclaiming that they wished to put an end to it. But the facts were clear: the United Kingdom Government, and also the United States Government, which fully supported it, were doing all they could to maintain the Ian Smith regime.

896. The members of the Special Committee were aware of the developments in the Rhodesian question, which they had considered on many occasions, as the General Assembly and the Security Council had also done. All three bodies had adopted many useful resolutions, but the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, South Africa and other colonialist countries had refused to take account of the wishes of the peoples as set forth in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those Powers had refused to take account of the many United Nations resolutions condemning the activities of the racists in Southern Rhodesia and calling for the

granting of genuine independence to the Zimbabwe people. Initially, the United Kingdom had affirmed the primacy of racist ideology by imposing on the Zimbabwe people - more than 4 million inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia - the racist 1961 Constitution, which had deprived that people of all its political rights. Subsequently, after the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and despite the urging of the independent African States, it had allowed the Rhodesian racists to seize the instruments of power, namely, the armed forces and military equipment. The response of the United Kingdom Government to the manifold resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council demanding the abolition of the 1961 Constitution had always been negative. London and Washington alleged that the economic sanctions imposed on the Ian Smith regime were yielding the anticipated results. At the same time, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan were trading with South Africa. The figures published by the Board of Trade in March 1966 for trade between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia showed that even after the embargo set up by the United Kingdom, that country's imports from Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £523,000 for the month of February 1966, and its exports to Southern Rhodesia to £672,000. 897. The role of some NATO States and primarily that of the United States, in the matter of economic sanctions against the Ian Smith regime was also questionable. According to the 28 March 1966 issue of International Trade, the Secretary of Commerce of the United States had placed an almost total embargo on the major share of exports to South Africa. However, that decision dated only from 18 March, 1966; moreover, the embargo had not been applied to a sufficient number of goods. It provided, for example, for the granting of export licences for agricultural equipment, many primary commodities, scientific equipment, textiles, etc. The authorization to export agricultural equipment and produce merely strengthened the position of the large stock-breeders and planters who were ruthlessly exploiting the Africans and were supporting the Ian Smith regime. Since agriculture played an extremely important part in the Rhodesian economy, such exports helped to neutralize the boycott of that basic economic sector. 898. Statistics for the months of January and February 1966 showed that United States trade with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had not faltered. In addition, exports to Southern Rhodesia also included goods listed as strategic equipment, spare parts for electro-dynamic machinery and construction materials.

899. United States tobacco purchases from Rhodesia since 11 November, the date of the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith, totalled £175,000, an amount equal to the annual average for United States tobacco purchases from Southern Rhodesia.

900. In January and February 1966, exports from the Federal Republic of Germany to Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £555,000, while its imports from Southern Rhodesia for the month of January alone had amounted to £1,170,000. In April 1966, Mr. Strauss, former Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic, had gone to Southern Rhodesia and to South Africa to begin trade negotiations with Ian Smith and with representatives of his regime and of certain Rhodesian trade circles. According to the German newspaper Die Welt, a desire had been expressed during that visit, to expand trade between the Ian Smith regime and the Federal Republic of Germany.

901. According to the Daily Express of 20 April 1966, a company was being formed for that purpose in the Federal Republic of Germany which already included five large industrial and export firms. Also according to the Daily Express, the management of that company had stated that the company, which had the powerful support of some Swiss banks, would assist German industrial enterprises to the greatest possible extent, despite the prevailing situation.

902. The embargo on petroleum and its derivatives had been a failure. It was an instrument designed to maintain the racist regime of Ian Smith in power. The United Kingdom and the United States kept stressing economic sanctions, which, according to them, should suffice to bring down the Ian Smith regime. Mr. Swart, President of the Republic of South Africa, had told Parliament on 21 January 1966 that his Government would maintain normal relations with the Ian Smith Government and would not apply the sanctions initiated against Southern Rhodesia. In that regard, the Lisbon colonialists echoed the Pretoria racists. Five days after the Security Council resolution calling upon States Members of the United Nations to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal had stated that his Government would maintain normal relations with the Ian Smith Government.

903. The Security Council had called on all Member States to cease exporting oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia. However, oil continued to flow and

was being delivered to Southern Rhodesia by the Republic of South Africa via Mozambique. At present, oil deliveries amounted to 100,000 gallons daily, while the weekly consumption of Southern Rhodesia was roughly 83,000 gallons. World public opinion agreed that the sanctions, as they were being applied, did not ensure a real embargo.

904. The same was true of the financial sanctions against the Ian Smith Government. On 3 March 1966, the Times of London had stated that for the moment, there was no reason to fear a collapse of the financial system of Southern Rhodesia. There too, the South African racists, together with the capitalist monopolies of the West, were coming to the aid of their bosom friends in Rhodesia. According to the Economist, monthly trade credits available to Southern Rhodesia in mid-April 1966 had amounted to \$2.1 million.

905. It would take too long to list every case in which the resolutions aimed at doing away with the shameful Ian Smith regime had not been implemented. The responsibility lay with the Republic of South Africa and Portugal. The Lisbon and Pretoria racists had powerful protectors in the West, primarily among the members of the colonialist and militarist NATO bloc, namely, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and certain other Western Powers. Discussing the reasons for the policies of the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as regards Mozambique and Angola, a New York Times journalist had stated that the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western States were increasing their investment in those four countries and that official sources considered that Western public opinion would not be able to react forcefully enough against the fallacious arguments of the financial groups. Thus, the failure of economic sanctions against the Ian Smith regime was to a large extent attributable to the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States had invested capital in Rhodesia and that their main objective was to defend those investments under the cloak of a few limited economic sanctions.

906. The United Kingdom and the United States had made considerable financial commitments in the Republic of South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia, thus demonstrating their readiness to ignore the fact that the Salazar regime was supporting the racist regime of Southern Rhodesia. The ineffectiveness of the steps taken against the Ian Smith regime

and its partners, Portugal, South Africa and other NATO Powers, had left the Rhodesian racists free to commit further crimes against the Zimbabwe people.

907. In Southern Rhodesia, anyone who dared to speak up against the criminal machinations of Salisbury was subject to reprisals and to constant persecution. Southern Rhodesia had become a police State, a land of prisons and concentration camps, and its African population lived in terror. There was but one conclusion to be drawn from his remarks: the responsibility for the failure of the sanctions and for the present situation lay primarily with the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, and with its accomplices, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Pretoria and Lisbon regimes, as well as with the countries which in one way or another hindered the application of the sanctions adopted by the Security Council. London and Washington had shown their true attitude towards the police State of Ian Smith when they had voted on the draft resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda to the Security Council on 23 May 1966; by refusing to support the proposal of the African States, members of the Security Council, to apply really effective sanctions, to combat the sabotage of the Republic of South Africa and to take practical steps to abolish the racist regime in South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom had demonstrated that they were the accomplices of the racist Salisbury regime.

908. By defending imperialist interests in Africa, London and Washington had adopted an untenable position on the question of Southern Rhodesia. In their statements the United Kingdom and the United States pretended to sympathize with the Zimbabwe people, spoke of the right of peoples to self-determination and of their freedom to appoint the government of their choice, but in actual fact they were extending a helping hand to the Salisbury racists. The negotiations initiated by the United Kingdom Government with the representative of the Ian Smith regime had been watched with as much attention as indignation. It was quite clear that the negotiations between London and Salisbury were nothing but a smokescreen to conceal the plot being hatched against the Zimbabwe people. As recently as 10 December 1965, Mr. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had stated in the British Parliament that his Government would never negotiate with the illegal Salisbury regime. But negotiations were now under way. On 25 January 1966, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had repeated that the

political future of Southern Rhodesia could not be discussed with a regime which illegally claimed to govern the country, and today, that same Prime Minister was sitting down at the same table with the representative of that regime. After having said that the future constitution of Southern Rhodesia would have to be discussed with the accredited representatives of the entire Zimbabwe people, he was now negotiating with the representatives of the regime which he had called illegitimate, illegal and rebellious, while the real representatives of the Zimbabwe people had been prevented from taking part in those negotiations.

909. The United Kingdom Government was negotiating with the Ian Smith regime because it wished to deal with the racists behind the backs of the African people. The colonialist Powers were thus trying to maintain imperialist domination in Africa. The Soviet Union had stated its position clearly and repeatedly in the various United Nations organs. That position was the expression of a firm and coherent policy of defending peoples struggling to free themselves from the colonialist yoke. As always, the Soviet Union defended the sacred right of peoples to govern themselves and freely to choose the methods of their own development.

910. The Government of the Soviet Union had steadfastly supported the struggle of the Zimbabwe people for genuine freedom and independence. It was ready to support any action undertaken by the African nations to guarantee that people's rights.

911. The Special Committee could not remain indifferent to the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, since it constituted a threat to peace and security, not only in Africa, but in the rest of the world as well. Maintaining the white racists in power in Southern Rhodesia was merely helping the imperialist and racist forces which had conceived the criminal idea of setting up a kind of "sanitary cordon" to isolate the peoples of southern Africa, which were still dominated by white colonialists and racists, in the hope of preserving them from the influence of the free African peoples and thus preventing them from freeing themselves.

912. The Soviet Union, the only permanent member of the Security Council to have voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, supported the just claims of the African countries. It believed that emergency measures must be taken to solve the problem of Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible, in the interests both of the Zimbabwe people and of all African peoples. The claims of the African peoples were entirely clear. Power must be taken out of

the hands of the racists, the racist 1961 Constitution must be abrogated, a final date for granting independence to the Zimbabwe people must be fixed, elections must be organized based on the principle of universal suffrage - "one man, one vote" - and power in Southern Rhodesia must be transferred immediately to a government reflecting the desire of the African majority to see implemented the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

913. The Special Committee had a duty to condemn the Portuguese colonialists and the South African racists as it had a duty to condemn all those who were assisting the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia and who, whether openly or covertly, refused to implement United Nations resolutions. It had a duty to issue a new appeal to all Member States to implement immediately and unreservedly the general resolutions relating to the problems of Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

914. The USSR Government advocated, as it had always done, that the most effective and comprehensive measures possible should be taken against the Rhodesian racists. More particularly, it demanded the application of the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, as they alone could protect the interests of the Zimbabwe people and of all other African peoples.

915. The USSR delegation would support any draft resolution taking account of the considerations he had mentioned. It hoped that those conditions as well as the proposals submitted today by the representatives of Mali, Tanzania, India and other countries would be given careful attention and would be embodied in the decisions which the Special Committee would be called upon to take.

916. The representative of Sierra Leone said that since the Committee had discussed the question of Southern Rhodesia a year before, Smith had made his unilateral declaration of independence, and the United Kingdom Government had taken no serious action to bring down that rebellion.

917. The petitioners had told of increased oppression and of the imprisonment of over 34,000 people of Zimbabwe because they had dared to speak up for their inalienable political rights. The United Kingdom had said that it could not free them because it was an internal matter. His delegation had never agreed with that point of view. Since the United Kingdom had repeatedly stated that the Smith Government was illegal and that its Governor in Salisbury was the only legal representative, the fiction by which it had shielded itself had disappeared.

918. The United Kingdom had stated in the Lagos declaration that the Smith regime would be toppled by sanctions in a matter of weeks. Yet, after almost seven months that regime continued to exist. It was receiving all the oil it needed and it could fall back on electricity and coal if forced to do so. It was well known that oil supplies went in daily through South Africa and Mozambique. Trade had increased with Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and France - a clear indication of the ineffectiveness of sanctions.

919. In April 1966, after the United Kingdom had tried to block action in the Special Committee, and had called the Security Council, which had passed its draft, four things had been clearly established: first, the so-called sanctions were not working. Secondly, there was a tacit agreement that sanctions alone could not work. Force was necessary. Thirdly, the resulting situation constituted a threat to peace and fourthly, the Security Council resolution had called upon the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and had empowered the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the Joanne V upon her departure from Beira in the event of her oil cargo being discharged there.

920. By that resolution, the Security Council had authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter in respect of a single ship of uncertain nationality. By rejecting the African amendment, and the draft resolution of Mali, Nigeria and Uganda which had sought to extend the use of force to the more important issue of the swift removal of the Smith regime, the Council had shown its unwillingness to act in accordance with the wish of the majority of States.

921. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, force could and should be used without delay. Any hesitation or doubt strengthened the Smith regime, which had already begun efforts to strangle Zambia. Coal deliveries and communications had been disrupted; perhaps the next move would be to cut off power to Zambia from the Kariba Dam.

922. The Special Committee must not sit back and refuse to use force while a whole nation was being blackmailed. It must let the United Kingdom know that its non-intervention in Southern Rhodesia was a betrayal of the trust of the African people of Zimbabwe. It was a disgrace for the United Kingdom to have used the Africans in Southern Rhodesia and their brothers in West and East Africa to fight

for it in two world wars, and to be now unwilling in turn to fight to liberate Africa. Thousands of Africans had been killed in Burma and hundreds had flown planes over Europe to help the United Kingdom and its allies to maintain their way of life. Yet they were the very people who were now doing everything in their power to prevent any serious action. The United Kingdom could not deny that it had used force in other areas to maintain constitutionality: it was doing so in Aden at that very moment.

923. Two conclusions could be drawn from that indifference to African opinion: first, that the United Kingdom and its allies were content with the status quo, their economic interests being best served by keeping the Africans as hewers of wood and drawers of water.

924. The second conclusion was that had there been 200,000 blacks among 4 million whites, strong action would long since have been taken if they had dared to usurp power. Yet when the small minority of whites had tyrannized the Africans in their own land, no effective action had been taken.

925. When the United States and United Kingdom Governments had felt that the lives of a comparatively small number of their citizens had been at stake in the Congo, they had promptly organized an air lift for what they had described as a humanitarian mission. At present, they had no regard for the feelings of the African people who were oppressed in Southern Rhodesia.

926. The goal of the African people was to establish majority rule in Zimbabwe, to which end Britain would have to use force to bring down Smith, and the Security Council must approve that course. The unjust 1961 Constitution must be revoked and the leaders immediately set free. A constitutional conference must then be called to determine the people's wishes. Force had been used in the small matter of one ship; it should now be used immediately to ensure majority rule in the territory and enable the people of Zimbabwe to move swiftly to freedom and independence. Any resolution that expressed those ideas, condemned the United Kingdom for its inaction, and Portugal and South Africa for their help, would find support from his delegation.

927. The representative of Poland endorsed the statement made at a previous meeting (A/AC.109/SR.418) by the Chairman concerning the Security Council's failure to adopt the resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, and supported by Bulgaria, Jordan and the USSR.

928. The blame for that failure must be placed squarely upon the United Kingdom, the United States and their allies. By withholding support for the resolution they had demonstrated that they were prepared to help the racist white settlers when it came to a choice between that regime and the legitimate aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe.

929. The attitude of those Powers was a further encouragement for the Smith regime. The United Kingdom as administering Power of Southern Rhodesia, had consistently abetted the racial minority in that territory, before and after the usurpation of power by Mr. Ian Smith; indeed the fact that it had stated in advance that it would not use force had encouraged the white settlers in their action, and the continuation of such a policy after the unilateral declaration of independence was a mere smokescreen to allow the illegal regime time to consolidate its position. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had predicted that the cumulative effect of economic and financial sanctions would bring down the Smith regime in weeks rather than months; but it was now plain that those sanctions had failed, for the regime had been in power for almost seven months in spite of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and of world opinion. The rebellion was continuing because it derived its strength from outside support.

930. It was becoming increasingly clear that the question of Southern Rhodesia could not be reviewed in isolation, and that it was directly connected with the racist oppression in the Republic of South Africa. That had been amply demonstrated by the evidence of the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee; their testimony had shed light on the true intentions of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other members of NATO. Far from giving effective help in abolishing the racist minority regime, they were in fact contributing to its maintenance because of their many financial and economic

links with Southern Rhodesia and its neighbours - South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique.

931. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat clearly showed that South Africa and Portugal were openly defying the Security Council's resolution by continuing to provide financial and other assistance to Southern Rhodesia, and that companies in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States were still carrying on a flourishing trade with Southern Rhodesia. The oil embargo had also failed, for South Africa and Portugal had been able to send in supplies. Portugal was maintaining normal relations with Southern Rhodesia, and had even questioned the legality of a recent decision of the Security Council, even though the scope of that decision had been deliberately limited.

932. The true intentions of the United Kingdom, the United States and their allies had also been clearly shown by their abstention from voting on the proposals of the African members of the Security Council, in April and May 1966, which were designed to make the economic sanctions all-embracing and mandatory.

933. His Government sympathized with the concern and the bitterness of African nations in the face of the deliberate attempt to create yet another racist State in Africa, and was convinced that the United Kingdom did possess the means to do away with the Smith regime. Effective measures, including the use of force, must be taken to dislodge that regime. His delegation felt in duty bound to appeal to the Security Council to adopt mandatory sanctions within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, so as to enforce its own resolution 217 (1965), and by inviting the administering Power to use all means including force, the Security Council would pave the way for the granting of genuine independence.

934. Poland had always advocated the implementation by peaceful means of the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). While in favour of the principle of negotiation, it was deeply apprehensive of the secret talks going on between the United Kingdom and the rebel regime in Salisbury, for they implied de facto recognition of the regime and encouraged it even further. Instead of negotiating with the Zimbabwe people, the United Kingdom was trying to come to an arrangement

behind their backs. A number of proposals had been made with which his delegation was in agreement, in particular those of the delegations of Mali and Tanzania. The statement by the representative of Denmark although well-intentioned and sincere had been worded so as not to mention Portuguese violation of the sanctions. He hoped that omission had been unintentional, and was unconnected with the fact that Portugal was a member of NATO. Adoption by the Special Committee of the method of action proposed by the representative of Denmark would mean a step backwards, for whereas the Security Council's resolution 217 of 20 November 1965 called upon all States to apply sanctions, the representative of Denmark had suggested that all United Nations Member States should do so, thus ruling out the Federal Republic of Germany, which was not a Member of the United Nations but continues her support of the racist regimes of Smith and Verwoerd.

935. The representative of Denmark had stressed the need for reason and patience in dealing with the Southern Rhodesia problem, and had tried to persuade the Special Committee not to recommend the use of force. The Polish delegation would be the first to agree with such a policy if a genuine desire existed to grant equal rights, freedom and independence to the people of Zimbabwe; but the United Kingdom was ignoring those rights and supporting a racist regime. The Special Committee could not condone such a policy. Although the Special Committee had been dealing with the matter for six years, the United Kingdom had consistently ignored its views as well as those of the great majority of Member States, including Denmark itself.

936. His own Government had implemented in full all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, had consistently supported the right of the Zimbabwe people to independence, and had repeatedly advised the United Kingdom to abrogate the 1961 Constitution. The Committee should set a target date for the transfer of powers, and the United Kingdom should be requested to conduct general elections in the territory and to set up a democratically elected government, which would abolish discriminatory laws, and the state of emergency and release political prisoners.

937. The Special Committee's immediate objective, however, should be to put down the rebellion. It should appeal to the Security Council to take appropriate steps to implement its own decision of 20 November 1965. His delegation would support any proposal on those lines.

938. The representative of Chile thanked the Tanzanian Government for once again extending its generous hospitality to the Special Committee, thus enabling the Committee to renew its contacts with the various liberation movements with headquarters at Dar es Salaam which were fighting for the independence of their respective countries.

939. Turning to the question of Southern Rhodesia, he deplored the fact that the administering Power had not endeavoured to prevent, by every means at its command, the unilateral declaration of independence. Now that Mr. Smith had defied the free world by proclaiming a fictitious independence, the United Nations must take the necessary steps to put an end to that minority regime, which refused to grant the just claims of the Zimbabwe people. The economic sanctions had failed because some countries had failed to co-operate and because South Africa and Portugal had ignored the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Chilean Government, for its part, had applied to the latter General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX), as well as Security Council resolutions 216/Rev.1 and 217. If all other countries had done the same, the minority regime of Mr. Smith would certainly have been overthrown.

940. His delegation would firmly support any steps that might be taken, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, to overthrow the Ian Smith regime and enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to attain their independence and form their own government.

941. The representative of Bulgaria said that the position of the Bulgarian delegation with regard to the problem of Southern Rhodesia was well known and had been recently reaffirmed at the last meeting of the Security Council. The Government and people of Bulgaria fully supported the relentless struggle of the

Zimbabwe people to rid themselves of a double colonial domination - by the United Kingdom and by the white racist minority.

942. The most recent debates in the Security Council and the rejection of the draft resolution submitted by the African members of the Council had once again turned the spotlight on the policies of the United Kingdom, which was tolerating the criminal acts of the white racist minority bent on depriving the Zimbabwe people of their fundamental political rights and maintaining them in slavery. Succeeding United Kingdom Governments had systematically paved the way for Ian Smith, who had thus no difficulty in proclaiming independence unilaterally.

943. The secret negotiations which were now being held in London between Ian Smith and the United Kingdom Government and which, it appeared, were to continue at Salisbury, had rightly aroused the indignation of the African countries, since they were tantamount to de facto recognition of the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was more than ever reluctant to use force against that racist regime, while emphatically affirming that it alone was responsible for Southern Rhodesia. That ingenious policy enabled it both to maintain the racist minority regime in power and to hinder the implementation of all the measures adopted by the Security Council to overthrow that regime. The United States and the Western Powers, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, had increased their co-operation with the Ian Smith regime, either directly or through South Africa. The regime was taking its inspiration from nazi ideas and Hitlerist practices in order to maintain its subjugation of the Zimbabwe people. There were camps in Southern Rhodesia in which prisoners were tortured and in which the anti-communist hysteria of fascism ran riot. Fortunately for the African peoples and for all peoples of the world, there was another German State, and it took the liberation of colonial peoples to heart. As would be recalled, on 20 April 1966, the Chairman of the Special Committee had received a telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic in which the Minister stated unequivocally that his Government had refused to recognize the racist Ian Smith regime and that it had no relations with it.

944. He himself shared the view of the African representatives who had pointed out that the United States, the United Kingdom and the other Western Powers were always

ready to use force against African freedom-fighters, but never against fascist criminals or white racists. The representative of the Ivory Coast had quite rightly recalled the armed intervention of Belgium at Stanleyville, with the co-operation of the United Kingdom and the United States, against the Congolese troops on the pretext that it was protecting a handful of white nationals. It was regrettable that Western humanitarianism did not extend far enough to protect the lives of human beings whose skin was not white.

945. In its resolution of 21 April 1966 (A/AC.109/158), the Special Committee had recommended that the administering Power should use force against the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia and that the Security Council should urgently apply the measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations so that its resolutions would be put into effect as soon as possible. It was time for the United Kingdom and its allies to stop sabotaging the work of the Security Council. The Special Committee, for its part, now that it was on African soil, should adopt a resolution providing for effective measures to remove the fascist Ian Smith regime and restore the sacred rights of the Zimbabwe people to freedom and self-determination.

946. The representative of the United States of America recalled that her country's views on the question of self-determination for the African peoples had been most recently set forth by President Johnson in an address on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). President Johnson had described the right of self-government through democratic institutions as a basic aspiration shared by the people of Africa and the people of the United States. He had promised that his Government would not support policies abroad based on minority rule or on the idea that men were unequal before the law.

947. The United States Government was therefore in complete agreement with the ideals of the people of Southern Rhodesia. It did, however, consider that the countries of the world must exhaust all the possibilities of achieving the desired objectives by peaceful means before risking bloodshed in Africa. For that reason it was supporting the current efforts of the United Kingdom and the United Nations. The latter was indeed required by its Charter to explore all avenues to a peaceful solution before resorting to others. It was true that the United Nations had not yet achieved its goal, but before the Special Committee concluded that its action had been ineffective an examination of the facts was necessary.

948. In November 1965 the Security Council had voted unanimously in resolution 217 for a stringent programme of measures designed to isolate Smith, politically and economically, and to end his regime. Since then, sixty-six States had volunteered information concerning steps taken to implement that programme.

949. The United Nations action had included a call on Member States not to recognize the Smith regime; and not one State had done so. It was regrettable that certain countries had publicly expressed their intention not to comply with the economic measures called for in resolution 217, though the majority had supported them. However, a considerable variety of response could be distinguished. Some States, in particular 'socialist countries with centrally directed foreign trade, had had no significant economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. For those countries, implementation of the resolution was largely a matter of form. But neighbouring countries, such as Zambia and Malawi had suffered acutely; others, including her own, had found the impact less direct but nevertheless substantial. The United States had previously had a wide variety of economic ties with Southern Rhodesia, and had had to take a correspondingly wide variety of steps. Applications for government loans and guarantees for Rhodesian trade had been suspended; effective measures had been taken to discourage the major imports; the 1965 and 1966 sugar quotas had been suspended and indeed the import of a sugar shipment already on its way had been blocked. Exports of military equipment and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia had of course been embargoed. Almost the only items still being exported were of humanitarian importance, and of no significance to the economy of Southern Rhodesia.

950. Her country had also been able to help in the airlift of petroleum products to Zambia, and in maintaining the Great North Road.

951. The measures taken by various Member States in furtherance of the United Nations resolution were impressive when viewed as a whole, and the process was not yet over. Supplementary replies were still coming in. It was hardly suitable for countries that had had virtually no trade with Southern Rhodesia to belittle the considerable sacrifices of those which had, while emphasizing their own supposedly total embargoes. It was thus obvious that the accusations made against the United States at that meeting were untrue.

952. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paragraphs 593 to 738 above) stated that by March/April 1966, Southern Rhodesia's exports had been reduced by 60 per cent as a result of international sanctions, and that all or most of Southern Rhodesia's normal trading partners had banned imports from that country.

953. Her Government had actively tried to make participation in the sanctions programme more complete. Those countries responsible for the important gaps in the programme should remember that in failing to co-operate they were aligning themselves against the majority.

954. The degree of unanimity attained on the present question was largely due to the fact that basic moral issues were at stake, to which no one could remain indifferent. As a Member of the United Nations her Government felt strongly that it had accepted an obligation to uphold important human rights, some of which were at stake in Southern Rhodesia. Remarkable progress had been made in Africa, and her Government pledged that that progress would not be denied to the people of Southern Rhodesia. It would continue to work within the United Nations to bring about majority rule and self-determination for all the Rhodesian people.

955. The representative of Australia recalled that in 1965, before the unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, the Australian Prime Minister had declared in Parliament that his Government had been in direct touch with the Government of Southern Rhodesia to try to make it see the inevitable end of its course. The Prime Minister had expressed his belief that:

"... an accelerated movement toward adult suffrage must be completed, or the alternative accepted, of mounting internal disorder, of hostility among neighbours, and of a result finally achieved in an atmosphere of hostility, not friendship, with racial hostilities unfavourable to the continuance of European settlement and out of harmony with those inter-racial relationships for which the new Commonwealth has come to stand."

Australia was one of the first Governments to take action immediately after the unilateral declaration well before the Security Council's decisions, in refusing to recognize the Smith regime - withdrawing representation, applying immediate embargoes on its limited trade with Southern Rhodesia, and taking the necessary measures concerning international finance.

956. The representative of Denmark had gone to the heart of the matter at the previous meeting in saying that there was no clear proof that sanctions had failed. Insufficient facts were available to support such an allegation. While it was clear that the measures had not been effective as quickly as it had been hoped there was still evidence that acute discomfort had been caused; and the talks in progress were perhaps evidence of that fact.

957. It was also, he thought, wrong not to recognize the far-reaching nature of the United Kingdom action. That country's naval action had certainly prevented a great deal of oil from being imported into Rhodesia, but even more important, was the fact that that action, unprecedented as it was in United Nations history, must have shaken the confidence of the illegal regime.

958. The use of force alarmed and distressed the Australian Government; such a course would not only be hard to organize but would involve limitless suffering for the people of Africa; it advocated patience, though not passivity, to allow world isolation to take its effect. Time was a small price to pay for avoiding further suffering and perhaps widespread bloodshed in Africa.

959. The representative of Italy said that his Government recognized the right of the peoples of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination, independence and majority rule under universal adult suffrage and deeply sympathized with their struggles. It considered the 1961 Constitution to be unsatisfactory in that, inter alia, it did not imply the possibility of evolution towards majority rule. Italy had condemned the unilateral declaration of independence, and had complied with the provisions of the various General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. It had also criticized the lack of action by the United Kingdom Government. By recognizing that Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of the United Kingdom even when that view was not shared by all the Members of the United Nations, Italy had tried to encourage that country to take bolder and timelier measures, and regretted its failure to do so.

960. However, the Special Committee had been told by the petitioners that the Smith regime had 40,000 armed men at its disposal. That force was a reality, and it had to be taken into full account before further measures to deal with the problem could be adopted. The Italian Government had accepted the method of sanctions

even though they involved considerable industrial, commercial and individual sacrifice. He mentioned that not to emphasize the part Italy had played in the sanctions programme but to show how concerned his country was at the accusations that the programme had been a failure and a fraud. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat listed the States which had complied with the measures decided upon by the Security Council; was it to be concluded that all those countries had been victims or accomplices in a fraud, or did the programme not rather represent an interesting example of international co-operation in an effort to reach a peaceful solution of a serious problem?

961. The Security Council's resolution had not been fully implemented by United Nations Members and as a result of that failure and of the limited scope of the sanctions themselves, the results expected had not been attained. However, was the Special Committee to decide that the system itself had failed and that different measures must be adopted? As his delegation had pointed out at a previous debate, the problem of Southern Rhodesia would be a test case for the United Nations; and the representative of Denmark had experienced concern for the future of the United Nations if a generally acceptable method of dealing with the problem could not be found. He had also made some interesting suggestions as to the best way to secure the effective implementation of sanctions, which should be given careful consideration by the Special Committee.

962. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania thought that further measures were needed, since the sanctions would only harm Zambia's economy, without bringing down the Smith regime. The very countries that said they were applying sanctions were in fact finding ingenious ways of avoiding them. A country such as the United States had a more important part to play than that of a mere supporter of the United Kingdom. The whole of Africa, including Zambia, was completely dissatisfied with the measures taken by the United Kingdom. It was therefore ironical that the United States should only support the United Kingdom, while professing to help Africans. His delegation hoped that the United States would associate itself more closely with the efforts to bring down the Smith regime.

963. The representative of Czechoslovakia, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, and with the permission of the Chairman, thanked the Special Committee for the welcome he had received and for permission to take part in its session as an observer. He also expressed his gratitude to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the hospitality extended to him as a participant.

964. The fact that Czechoslovakia attached great importance to the work of the Special Committee was borne out by the letter from the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, with which the Special Committee was already acquainted.

965. It was most shameful that at a time of unprecedented scientific progress, which held out the prospect of fair living standards for all, colonialism and racist regimes still controlled considerable parts of Africa and other continents and enslaved large sectors of their populations.

966. Colonial Powers and the racist regimes they supported had refused to comply with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Furthermore, they had engaged in feverish preparations to prolong their domination over the colonized peoples, and even intended to start a gradual process of recolonization. It was therefore no surprise that they were moving openly towards a vast colonialist entente, as the findings of the Special Committee and the declarations made by representatives and petitioners had confirmed.

967. It was indeed regrettable to perceive beyond that colonialist entente a more powerful alliance of the imperialist Powers shielding and sustaining world colonialism. Because of the negative attitude of those Powers, the Security Council had been unable to accept the just demand of African States that the Council should call upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. However, his Government was convinced that the Special Committee would adopt a resolution calling for effective measures to restore full constitutional and democratic rights to the people of Zimbabwe. Its competence to act and to set deadlines for an early end to colonialism was indicated in paragraph 5 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

968. The representative of Iran recalled that at its 407th meeting on 20 April 1966, the Special Committee had recommended to the Security Council to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia; but the Security Council had failed to act.

969. In its resolution 217 of 20 November 1965, the Security Council had called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take appropriate measures to bring the minority regime to an immediate end. Yet six months later no progress had been made.

970. In its resolution 221 of 9 April 1966, the Security Council had determined that, as supplies of oil would afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal regime, the resulting situation constituted a threat to the peace. Having once decided that, the Security Council was obliged to take follow-up action. Since oil reached Southern Rhodesia from South Africa as well as through the Port of Beira, the Security Council had no alternative but to act in order to prevent a breach of the peace.

971. Negotiation would only be effective if it resulted in the ending of the regime; but Mr. Smith could hardly be expected to negotiate his own downfall. Force was therefore the only solution.

VII. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. APPEAL TO THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CONCERNING
MR. JOSHUA NKOMO AND REV. N. SITHOLE

972. At its 423rd meeting, the representative of Mali stated that the Special Committee should go thoroughly into the question of Southern Rhodesia and formulate precise recommendations for submission to the General Assembly and the Security Council. He proposed that the Special Committee should request the United Kingdom Government to allow the acknowledged leaders of the Zimbabwe people to appear before the Special Committee.

973. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that he strongly supported the proposal of the representative of Mali, particularly in view of the United Kingdom's insistence that it alone was responsible for Southern Rhodesia.

974. The representative of Iran also supported the proposal made by the representative of Mali.

975. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics supported the Malian representative's proposal; the Special Committee should take a decision on the matter without delay.

976. The representative of Bulgaria said that he unreservedly supported the Malian representative's proposal that the United Kingdom Government be requested to release the imprisoned leaders of the liberation movements, in order that they might be able to appear before the Special Committee.

977. The representative of Iraq supported the proposal made by the representative of Mali. The presence of the nationalist leaders would greatly benefit the Special Committee's deliberations and would expedite its work for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia.

978. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, following consultations which had taken place, the Afro-Asian members had decided to propose that the Special Committee should request the Chairman to call upon the United Kingdom Government to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole so that they could testify before the Committee. While he was aware that certain members might consider such a move to be impractical, they should remember that the United Kingdom claimed sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, it had given repeated assurances of its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations. It was in the light of those facts that the Special Committee should now make its request.

979. On a request by the representative of Yugoslavia, the Chairman said that Yugoslavia would be added to the list of countries making that request. /...

980. The representative of India, supporting the proposal of the representative of Mali and the action suggested by the representative of Tanzania, said that it would be extremely valuable for the Special Committee to hear such outstanding leaders of African public opinion as Mr. Nkoko and Mr. Sithole. It was to be regretted that the United Kingdom Government had not so far seen fit to hold consultations with them.

981. The representative of Venezuela said that, in his view, the Malian representative's proposal was fully justified and he would give it his unconditional support. It was important that the decision should be taken by the Special Committee as a whole rather than by a restricted group whose request would carry less weight with the United Kingdom than that of a United Nations committee.

982. The representative of Madagascar recalled that the previous year the Special Committee had sent a telegram along similar lines to the United Kingdom which, in rejecting the Committee's request, had invoked the constitutional convention with Southern Rhodesia and had claimed that it could not interfere in that country's domestic affairs. The situation, however, had completely changed now that Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally proclaimed its independence.

983. The representative of Australia said that, while his delegation would be most interested to hear Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, it nevertheless considered that at that time it was not within the power of the United Kingdom Government to secure their release; they were not prisoners of the United Kingdom but of an illegal regime in rebellion to it. The Australian delegation would therefore reserve its position on the practicability of the proposal.

984. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation would have appreciated the opportunity to hear Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, had it not been for the fact that they were detained by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. The question of the United Kingdom's right to interfere in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs did not arise in that regard: the existing regime was in rebellion and presumably the United Kingdom would only have the power to bring Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole before the Special Committee when that rebellion had ended. The United States delegation would therefore reserve its position on the matter, for the practical reason that the United Kingdom did not have control in Southern Rhodesia.

985. The representative of Poland whole-heartedly supported the proposal of the representative of Mali. As far as the views expressed by the representatives of

Australia and the United States were concerned, he did not agree that the United Kingdom Government could not act in that connexion. In his opinion, the contrary was the case since there was now an illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and, before the United Nations, only the United Kingdom was responsible for that country.

986. The representative of Mali pointed out that the United Kingdom had long since warned Southern Rhodesia that any unilateral declaration of independence would be considered as an act of rebellion against the Crown and that there was no question now of whether it was in a position to release Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. He regretted that the delegations which had raised that objection were the very ones which always rejected African proposals for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia and of the Zimbabwe people. The Special Committee must therefore address to the United Kingdom, as the administering Power for the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, a request for the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole in order that the Committee might grant them a hearing.

987. The Special Committee agreed to the Chairman's suggestion to address an appeal on behalf of the Special Committee to the United Kingdom Government, by cable, requesting the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole so that they could appear before the Special Committee during its meetings in Africa, it being understood that the reservations expressed by the representatives of Australia and the United States would appear in the records.

988. At its 432nd meeting on 4 June 1966, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that the United Kingdom Government, in reply to the appeal of the Special Committee to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole in order that they might appear before the Committee as petitioners, had telegraphed that, as the Committee knew, they were held by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.

B. ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

989. At its 425th meeting Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294) for the consideration of the Special Committee.

990. Introducing this draft resolution, the representative of Ethiopia said that the co-sponsors had taken into account the usual practice of allowing twenty-four hours

for members to consult their Governments, but in view of the very short time available at Dar es Salaam he hoped that the submission of a draft resolution at that stage would meet with the Special Committee's approval. The draft resolution sought to incorporate the views of all the members of the Special Committee in support of the aspirations of the Zimbabwe people. They would welcome any amendments calculated to improve the text, but none that might weaken its substance, for they considered the draft resolution to be the minimum action the Committee could take and would judge the sincerity of its members accordingly.

991. The representative of Mali said that the draft resolution reflected the opinions of all the members who had made their views known so far. The measures it proposed were the absolute minimum that the Special Committee could request of the administering Power and he hoped that all delegations would support it.

992. The representative of Madagascar said that his delegation had refrained from taking part in the general debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia, but that that attitude should not be interpreted as evidence of a lack of interest in the distressing problem of Southern Rhodesia. On the contrary, that question was of the greatest concern to his delegation, but it considered that, apart from a few recent events, the problem remained unchanged. Hence, the statements previously made by his delegation in setting forth its position in the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee continued to be applicable. At that stage, therefore, he would confine himself to a few brief remarks concerning some of the paragraphs of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294) before the Committee.

993. In the third preambular paragraph, the co-sponsors had considered it necessary to recall the terms of the Security Council resolutions recommending the breaking off of economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, and, in particular, an embargo on oil and petroleum products. As there were, in fact, States which had not complied with the recommendations made by the United Nations, the appeal being made to those States to reconsider their attitude appeared to be fully justified. The Malagasy Republic had, for its part, taken the necessary measures and had informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations about them in a note verbale (S/7213). Furthermore, by virtue of its geographical position in the Indian Ocean, his country had considered itself bound to grant certain facilities on Malagasy soil to the United Kingdom in order to enable it to carry out the aims of the Security Council concerning Southern Rhodesia.

994. In the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, the co-sponsors sought to emphasize their growing concern over the contacts which had been established between the United Kingdom Government and the Ian Smith regime. Although his delegation would like to state once again that it was in favour of discussions and negotiations to settle problems of any kind, it could not understand how negotiations could take place without the participation of the Zimbabwe people, whose interests the United Kingdom claimed to be safeguarding. By entering into negotiations with Mr. Ian Smith and refusing on the other hand to hold any discussions with the representative of the Zimbabwe people, the United Kingdom was displaying an equivocal attitude which led the Malagasy delegation to wonder about the real aim of the United Kingdom's policy concerning the fate of the Rhodesians.

995. As far as the operative paragraphs were concerned, he would merely point out that his delegation was in agreement in deploring the failure of the United Kingdom Government to bring down the Ian Smith regime. The Committee would recall the statement of the United Kingdom Government to the effect that it would undertake further measures against Southern Rhodesia if economic sanctions proved to be ineffective within a reasonable space of time. Six months had elapsed since Mr. Smith had unilaterally declared independence, but the United Kingdom did not even show any disposition to undertake the further measures of which it had spoken. It would seem that nothing more than a question of delaying tactics was involved.

996. With regard to operative paragraph 9, which called upon the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, his delegation had doubts about the advisability of that recommendation; the result of the recent vote in the Security Council had confirmed its scepticism. His delegation knew that the United Kingdom would never be prepared to use force to bring down the rebels, who were none other than its own kinsmen.

997. His delegation would have liked the possibilities of reaching a peaceful settlement of the problem of Southern Rhodesia to be further explored, but in view of the short time at the Special Committee's disposal at the present session, it would support the opinion of the majority.

998. The representative of Ethiopia proposed that, in the preamble, the second and seventh paragraphs should be deleted, and in the fourth paragraph the word "racist" should be substituted for "white".

999. Operative paragraph 5 should be supplemented to read: "Considers that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security as has already been established by the Security Council in its resolution 221 of 9 April 1965;" .

1000. Operative paragraph 6 should be modified to read: "Draws once again the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia with a view to recommending mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter".

1001. The representative of Denmark said that operative paragraphs 7 and 9 were unacceptable to his delegation. There was agreement within the Special Committee that the common aim should be to bring down the Smith regime and ensure an independent Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. However, operative paragraphs 7 and 9 contained the controversial points concerning the use of force which a number of countries had opposed in the Security Council. The attitude of those countries would not have changed. He therefore considered that although the draft might satisfy emotions, it would not bring a solution any nearer. Furthermore, it constituted a negation of the instrument of sanctions. The Special Committee knew that the draft, as it stood, had no chance of bringing about the desired result; indeed, its only result would be to weaken that instrument and sap confidence in the United Nations. Denmark believed that economic sanctions could remove the Smith regime and eventually combat apartheid in South Africa. However, it was essential to ensure that sanctions were applied by all Member States and to leave the door open for United Nations intervention in cases of non-co-operation.

1002. Referring to the comment of the representative of Poland on his statement of the previous day, he said that he had not mentioned Portugal because it had been

his understanding that the main problem was the arrival of oil from South Africa. It should be noted, however, that his delegation had supported mandatory sanctions, which were an innovation. His delegation had wanted to ask all countries to apply those sanctions in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the alternative being enforced compliance.

1003. As immediate action was needed, his Government proposed the deletion of operative paragraphs 7 and 9 and the insertaion of the following two new paragraphs:

"7. Recommends to the Security Council to request all member countries to confirm without delay that they will apply the sanctions mentioned in paragraph 6 in accordance with their obligation under the Charter of the United Nations;

"8. Further recommends to the Security Council, in the event that any State does not comply with the decisions of the Council mentioned in paragraph 6, to consider appropriate measures by the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in order to secure the effective application of the sanctions with a view to the rapid abolishment of the racist regime in Southern Rhodesia;"

Operative paragraph 8 should then be renumbered as paragraph 9.

1004. He regretted the remark of the representative of Ethiopia that the Special Committee would be judged on its vote on the draft resolution. If he had wished to speak in the same vein he would have said that the African and Western countries would be judged on their action in connexion with the Danish amendment (A/AC.109/L.295).

1005. The representative of Chile proposed the following amendments (A/AC.109/L.296) to the draft resolution under consideration. After the final preambular paragraph, the following new preambular paragraph would be inserted:

"Taking into account the decisions of the Organization of African Unity in respect of the difficult situation facing Zambia as a consequence of the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia,"

After operative paragraph 3, the following new paragraph would be inserted:

"Calls upon all Member States to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Zambia to enable them to face the difficult situation arising as a consequence of the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia;"

1006. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation was fully in agreement with the substance of the draft resolution, which contained a number of principles which it upheld. Since, however, the sponsors had clearly said that they would not agree to the draft resolution being amended, he would merely like to make a few comments.

1007. First of all, he supported the two amendments which the representative of Chile had just submitted (A/AC.109/L.296) and which did not call for any explanation. He asked that they should be put to a separate vote by roll-call.

1008. The Venezuelan delegation would like to make it clear that the fact that it honestly supported principles which it considered fundamental did not mean that its position with regard to colonialism had changed. Truth did not belong to a single man or to a single group of men. To say that "anyone who does not accept unconditionally what we decide is against us" was an over-simplification. Although his delegation approved of the substance of the draft resolution, it felt obliged to express certain reservations concerning the methods used to achieve the common goal and concerning the wording of certain paragraphs of the draft resolution.

1009. With regard to the fifth preambular paragraph, it was not for the Special Committee to recommend the use of force. That was a prerogative reserved to the Security Council in cases of extreme gravity. Although the situation in Southern Rhodesia was obviously serious, to resort to the unilateral use of force would create a dangerous precedent. Force should only be used collectively and under the supervision of the United Nations.

1010. That paragraph also appeared to give much more stress to the restoration of the 1961 Constitution than to the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), which was in fact the item on the agenda. He referred in that connexion to the statement which he had made during the last general debate on the question in New York (A/AC.109/PV.405, pages 7-12).

1011. His delegation would only be able to vote for that paragraph if the phrase "including the use of military force" was deleted. It could, however, agree to the insertion of the words "and more energetic" between the word "prompt" and the word "measures".

1012. With regard to operative paragraph 3, his delegation did not think that the Special Committee was competent to condemn the Governments of Member States. Only the Security Council was empowered by the Charter to make such a condemnation, the logical consequence of which was the expulsion of the Member State concerned. Venezuela would only be able to vote in favour of that paragraph if the words "the policies of" were inserted between the word "Condemns" and the words "the Governments".

1013. Again, only the Security Council had the power to make a decision such as that mentioned in operative paragraph 7. The Venezuelan delegation could in no circumstances agree that a Member State should be authorized to use force unilaterally. That would create a precedent which would endanger the very existence of the international community. The experience of the Latin American countries of what the use of force by a State could be had been too long and too bitter for them to agree without protest to the Special Committee authorizing by a vote the use of force by a Member State on the basis, moreover, of arguments of doubtful worth. A great Power could always find some justification for its actions, and there was no need for the Committee to provide it with a precedent on which it could reply. That was why Venezuela supported the amendment (A/AC.109/L.295) submitted by the delegation of Denmark. It must also be borne in mind that in approving operative paragraph 7, the States which were members of the Special Committee would be renouncing any right to criticize the United Kingdom's desire to retain its military bases, since those bases would then be essential to it if it was to give effect to United Nations resolutions. Since the idea expressed in operative paragraph 7 was already contained in operative paragraph 6, his delegation asked that paragraph 7 should be deleted.

1014. He expressed the same reservations concerning the phrase "including the use of force" in operative paragraph 9 as he had concerning the fifth preambular paragraph. The expression "all necessary measures" seemed to him sufficient.

If the administering Power considered it necessary to resort to force, it should do so on its own responsibility alone and not with the support of the United Nations. His delegation asked that the phrase in question should be deleted, and by the same token it supported the amendment proposed by Denmark.

1015. His delegation requested separate votes, by roll-call, on the fifth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraphs 3, 7 and 9, it being understood that a vote would not be necessary on operative paragraphs 7 and 9 if the Danish amendment was adopted.

1016. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of Sierra Leone, thanked the representative of Denmark for his contribution to the debate. Sierra Leone, like other African States, had always appreciated the efforts of the Scandinavian countries, and particularly of Denmark, to introduce a fresh approach to the problems of Africa.

1017. The representative of Denmark had stated that the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294) before the Special Committee contained the same controversial points as those in the resolution recently submitted to the Security Council in document S/7825/Add.1. That was so: they had been included again since they reflected the view not only of African countries but also of a number of others, that the time had come to use force. The representatives of Venezuela, the United States and Australia had all argued against such action, together with the representative of Denmark, who had warned Africans that it would undermine the United Nations instrument of sanctions. In fact, however, that instrument was already being undermined by the countries which, only a month before had supported a United Kingdom resolution before the Security Council invoking Chapter VII of the Charter and advocating the use of force to divert two oil tankers from Beira. Those same countries now refused to support the invocation of the same Chapter in the face of a situation which constituted a grave threat to the peace of the world. Furthermore, the very countries which had taken action in the Congo, without even consulting the Security Council, because they considered a small number of Europeans to be in danger, were now concerned about the use of force in Southern Rhodesia, where 4 million Africans lived in the most wretched conditions.

1018. The existing situation in Southern Rhodesia might well endanger the peace of the whole world. Zambia, for instance, was already affected by it and African States were not prepared to tolerate such a state of affairs any longer. The representative of Venezuela had spoken with considerable feeling of his experience in Latin America with regard to the use of force. While African States respected his views, no other course remained open to them if the illegal Smith regime was to be overthrown.

1019. The representative of Denmark had also considered that the use of force might weaken international confidence in the United Nations. Confidence in the United Nations had already been shaken in relation to several situations in Africa where it remained impotent and unwilling to take action. The representative of Denmark had further stated that the draft resolution before the Committee had no chance of being accepted if it were presented in the Security Council. African States were fully aware of, and realized that, certain countries were prepared to give practical effect to the statements made by their representatives on certain questions of principle. International confidence in the United Nations could not be maintained through debating manoeuvres, particularly on such a question as the Southern Rhodesia situation which, to many people, was a matter of life and death. The fact that many of the battles against colonialism had been won outside the United Nations did little to enhance its dignity and reputation.

1020. Lastly, he expressed the opinion that the question of Southern Rhodesia, which had been debated at length in many places throughout the world, would provide the supreme test of the United Nations and its principles. He appealed to all those who were genuinely interested in its future to examine the question in that light.

1021. The representative of Ethiopia said that the representative of Denmark had taken exception to his statement, at the Special Committee's previous meeting, that the sincerity of members and their support for the African people of Zimbabwe would be judged by their reaction to the draft resolution. He did not, however, intend to apologize for that remark. His delegation respected the manner in which the Danish representative expressed himself and expected the same respect in return.

1022. Moreover, the Danish representative had himself used a similar phrase, stating that he would judge the Special Committee by its reaction to the amendments proposed by his delegation (A/AC.109/L.295). But it was important to keep essentials in mind and, as the Chairman had said, Denmark's support on a number of issues affecting Africa, both in the Committee and in other organs of the United Nations, was highly valued. It was gratifying to note that the Danish delegation was prepared to support the draft resolution with the exception of two paragraphs. The Committee had so far conducted its deliberations in a dignified manner. He trusted that in future that high standard would not be lowered by interventions such as that made by the representative of Denmark.

1023. The representative of Denmark, referring to the remarks made by the representative of Sierra Leone, said that he did not contest the right of certain members to resubmit to the Security Council the same controversial points as those contained in the draft resolution recently rejected by that body. His only concern was to find a solution which would help the people of Zimbabwe. Since there was little likelihood of a change in the majority view within the Security Council, he had therefore sought another avenue of approach which would be acceptable to all and would result in the removal of the Smith regime.

1024. The representative of Sierra Leone had also referred to his statement that the use of force would undermine the United Nations instrument of sanctions. The Danish delegation agreed that the African States were not responsible for that. If, however, sanctions were replaced by the use of force, that might be taken as a sign that they had failed - an outcome which would only benefit South Africa. In his view, the most effective results would be achieved if the Special Committee recommended mandatory sanctions as proposed in the draft resolution. The Security Council should then be requested to consider intervention if any country failed to comply with such a decision.

1025. In further point, the representative of Sierra Leone had rightly stated that the Security Council had already approved the use of force in authorizing the diversion by United Kingdom warships of two oil tankers bound for Beira. However, the countries which had voted in favour of that action at the Security

Council had in all likelihood considered that it would involve no loss of life, whereas armed intervention, as proposed in the draft resolution, might start a war.

1026. He deeply regretted the remark of the representative of Sierra Leone that confidence in the United Nations in Africa had been shaken and it was considered to be an impotent Organization. The Danish Cabinet, which had met during the previous night to consider the matter, had agreed that mandatory sanctions would have to be applied and that the Security Council should authorize intervention as appropriate, if a decision to that effect were contravened. There could then be no excuse for any country which did not support a Security Council decision to intervene in such instances. That compromise solution, in his firm opinion, offered the best chance of securing agreement within the United Nations and, therefore, of helping the Zimbabwe population.

1027. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of Sierra Leone, explained that, in speaking of the impotence of the United Nations in Africa, he had been referring to its activities with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

1028. His delegation welcomed Denmark's initiative in supporting mandatory sanctions and hoped that it would be able to extend that support to those parts of the draft resolution which related to the use of force.

1029. The representative of Mali, speaking as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution submitted by the African-Asian group and Yugoslavia, said that he was very grateful to the representative of Denmark for having proposed an amendment to the draft resolution. He was only sorry that he did not have the French text of the amendment, as that would have enabled him to comment on it with a better knowledge of what was involved.

1030. As far as he could judge, the representative of Denmark appeared to consider that the United Kingdom Government was in no way responsible for the aggravation of the situation in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The Danish amendment concerned two essential paragraphs of the draft resolution. Denmark, however, could not approve of the actions of the Ian Smith government, which no country in the world had agreed to recognize, and could only attribute to the United Kingdom Government the full responsibility for the situation which had thus been created.

1031. The African-Asian group and the Yugoslav delegation had agreed that the administering Power should be asked to take all necessary measures to impose an embargo on petroleum and its products so as to prevent them from reaching Southern Rhodesia. They also called for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

1032. On the basis, however, of the Danish representative's logic, especially with regard to his amendment to operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1), it would appear that it was the other States which had not wanted to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 217 of 20 November 1965. If the amendment in question had been submitted at the session of the United Nations General Assembly, it would very likely have been applauded and accepted. The fact was, unfortunately, that the United Kingdom had appeared for the last six months to be siding with Southern Rhodesia. Hence, it was the capitalist monopolies and the Western countries which should change their position, since there appeared to be no reason for the other delegations to change theirs.

1033. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that although his delegation supported the substance of the draft resolution submitted by the African-Asian group and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1), it did have some reservations. In its opinion, the fifth preambular paragraph of the original draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294), which was the fourth preambular paragraph of the revised version, was unnecessary; it was worded in such a way as to distort the situation, since the measures taken by the United Kingdom with regard to its other colonies were quite clearly unlawful. The fact none the less remained that that country had been led to use force against the peoples of its colonies. Consequently, if such a paragraph was to be included in the draft resolution, it should say that the United Kingdom had used force "unlawfully" in some of its colonies. The fourth preambular paragraph of the revised text should therefore speak of the "unlawful" use of military force.

1034. Secondly, a provision should be added to the draft resolution specifying a date for Southern Rhodesia's accession to independence. It was well known that the policy of the United Kingdom politicians towards Southern Rhodesia was based entirely on the racist Constitution of 1961, which barred the Zimbabwe people, or a total of 4.5 million persons, from participating in free elections. It was clear that in the prevailing situation the people of Zimbabwe would be unable under that Constitution to take part in free elections for forty-one years. His delegation therefore supported the Indian representative's proposal for setting a date by which the people of Zimbabwe could attain independence. The resolution would be more forceful if it specified what particular measures must be taken to organize free elections on a basis of universal suffrage, on the understanding that those elections would be held on a date fixed in advance and would be supervised by the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity.

1035. His delegation called for the immediate repeal of the legislation establishing racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, for the granting to the people of Zimbabwe of the right to freedom of speech and opinion, to freedom of the Press and to political activity. Such a demand was all the more justified as the United Kingdom, having admitted that the Ian Smith régime was illegal, could not plead the principle of non-interference in the country's internal affairs.

1036. The United Kingdom was entirely responsible for the situation as it existed. Under the Security Council resolutions, it was bound to put an end to the Ian Smith régime and to transfer power to a duly elected majority within a clearly defined period of time.

1037. As the draft resolution before the Special Committee would be greatly strengthened if it contained provisions to that effect, his delegation appealed to the sponsors of the draft resolution to consider the possibility of including them.

1038. As for sanctions, the members of the Special Committee were asked to wait until they had proved their effectiveness against the Ian Smith régime. It was obvious, however, that the principle of sanctions had not produced the results expected. That was why his delegation hoped that more effective action would be taken and why it fully supported operative paragraph 3 of the revised draft

resolution condemning the assistance which the Governments of Portugal and South Africa had continued to give to the racist minority régime of Ian Smith. His delegation reaffirmed its support for the other paragraphs of the draft resolution, although it considered that the adoption of the provisions which it had just proposed would strengthen the draft.

1039. His delegation also wished to give its views on the statement made the previous day by the representative of the United States. It could not but oppose that statement, for the United States representative had attempted to justify the failure of the sanctions applied by the United States Government by arguing that the United States held a very strong position in the economy of the Territories under consideration and that it had to take the views of businessmen into account. According to the United States representative, it was easy for the socialist countries to comply with the provisions concerning sanctions, since their economies were planned; the United States, however, was linked to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa by close economic ties.

1040. The fact was that the socialist countries had taken the side of the peoples fighting for their independence, whereas the aim of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany was to crush the national liberation movements, to maintain their own positions and to continue to exploit the people of the Territories which they occupied. The United States representative had stated that his Government was not playing a double game, although that had not prevented him from adding that the United States took the side of the United Kingdom in its refusal to alter the 1961 Constitution. It might be asked whether that was not a perfect example of a double game.

1041. The representative of Denmark had stated that he was in favour of making the sanctions mandatory. As operative paragraph 6 of the new draft resolution already provided for that point, the amendment submitted by the representative of Denmark tended to postpone the application of the provisions of that paragraph. That amendment could only be to the advantage of those countries which considered that once sanctions had been applied, the problem would be solved.

1042. The representative of Tunisia said that the Chairman of the Special Committee, speaking as the representative of Sierra Leone, had already expressed with eloquence,

clarity and precision the sentiments of millions of Africans who, because of the conditions of servitude in which they were kept, were unable to speak for themselves. He himself, therefore, would merely remind the Special Committee that all the petitioners had repeatedly affirmed their unshakable faith in the United Nations. Nevertheless, if the United Nations remained passive, it would forfeit its authority, not through the fault of the African peoples, but through that of certain Member States which, for reasons which would be sought in vain in the Charter, would be only too happy to undermine that authority.

1043. The Tunisian delegation would vote in favour of the African-Asian group's draft resolution and was convinced that the majority of the Special Committee would do likewise.

1044. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that he appreciated the spirit in which the representative of Denmark had urged the Committee to exercise restraint in the formulation of the draft resolution. However, his delegation had strong reservations about the motives behind the Danish amendments since it considered that they sought to excuse the actions of the United Kingdom Government. He appealed to the representative of Denmark to withdraw his amendments.

1045. The representative of Bulgaria said that during the present series of meetings of the Special Committee, the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia had entered on a decisive phase. The majority of delegations represented on the Committee had been extremely disappointed by the vote on the resolution submitted to the Security Council.

1046. The Committee should therefore, at the least, draw up an effective draft resolution summarizing the main points of the resolution submitted to the Security Council, since the latter resolution had obtained a majority of the votes of all countries which sincerely desired freedom for the people of Zimbabwe.

1047. He supported the substance of the draft resolution A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1), which reflected that majority opinion, and he expressed his admiration for the Chairman's moving statement. The struggling African peoples had reason perhaps to lose confidence in the United Nations. Other members of the Committee had expressed the view of their Governments that everything possible should be done to

preserve that confidence. At the previous session of the General Assembly, Denmark had had the courage to vote in favour of the resolution against apartheid. While that stand was certainly heartening, he could not for that reason approve of the Danish amendment.

1048. The representative of Venezuela had expressed the point of view of the Latin American countries. It was clear that those countries were opposed to the use of force against popular movements, and they were doubtless thinking of the United States. The intervention of the United States in Latin America could not, however, be compared to the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

1049. The Bulgarian delegation supported the draft resolution. Furthermore, it hoped that consideration would be given to the Indian representative's suggestion that a time limit should be set for the independence of Southern Rhodesia and the downfall of the Ian Smith régime.

1050. The Soviet proposal concerning the fourth preambular paragraph of the new draft resolution submitted by the African-Asian group and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1) seemed very much to the point. The text of that paragraph did not in its present form seem to be sufficiently clear. His delegation could therefore only suggest to its African and Asian friends who were sponsoring the draft resolution that they should seek a formula which would eliminate the present ambiguity.

1051. He recalled that when the Special Committee had been hearing the statements of petitioners, and in particular those dealing with Southern Rhodesia, his delegation had asked that a report should be made to the Committee concerning the implementation of the resolutions, especially those relating to assistance to refugees and the victims of colonialism, adopted by the competent United Nations bodies. It would appear that the decisions thus adopted particularly concerned Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Special Committee was therefore within its rights in asking the bodies in question to assist the refugees and all the victims of colonialism. His delegation accordingly suggested to the sponsors of the draft resolution that they should insert, between operative paragraph 10 and operative paragraph 11, which would then become operative paragraph 12, a new paragraph 11, which might read somewhat as follows:

"Requests the international specialized agencies and other international assistance organizations to grant aid and assistance to the refugees from Southern Rhodesia and to those who are suffering from oppression by the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia."

1052. As it had been pressed for time, his delegation had only been able to submit its suggestion (A/AC.109/L.297) to some of the sponsors of the draft resolution, who had been kind enough to promise their support. He apologized to those whom he had not had time to consult and asked all the sponsors to take his proposal into consideration.

1053. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that he supported the comment concerning the draft resolution made at the previous meeting by the representative of Sierra Leone; he would merely add, as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, that all members of the Special Committee were agreed in considering the situation in Southern Rhodesia to be extremely serious. That was confirmed by the fact that the United Kingdom had twice appealed to the United Nations to ratify the sanctions that had been applied and to authorize it to use force in applying them. The United Kingdom would not have been in that position if it had, in Lyautey's words, "demonstrated its strength in order not to have to use it" immediately after the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia. Proposals were no longer being made for anything other than economic sanctions, and it was a matter of some surprise that the countries recommending them were the very ones that had declared them unworkable in the case of South Africa. In any event, economic sanctions could not produce any effect in less than two years and could not be applied in the absence of logistic and military support.

1054. The representative of Poland said that the draft resolution in its general terms accorded with his delegation's views. He hoped, however, that the co-sponsors would agree to include in the preamble a reference to the statements that had been made by petitioners. Paragraph 4 of the preamble should also be reworded to make it clear that the use of force by the United Kingdom Government in the instances referred to had been unjustified.

1055. With regard to operative paragraph 8, it was important not only to rid the country of the Smith regime but to see that the people were able to express their wishes at an early date by means of free elections, and the paragraph should take that into account. In that connexion, he quoted a passage from

The Economist of 30 April, which recalled a statement by Prime Minister Wilson in November 1965 to the effect that it would take a very long time, based on achievement by African as well as European politicians, to secure the kind of free-working democracy needed in Southern Rhodesia. The Economist suggested that such a "realistic" time-table should be made an entrenched part of any constitutional settlement so that Africans themselves could act in defence of their rights through a "blocking third" of black African parliamentary representatives. His Government was against allowing the racist minority in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies to gain time to build up their strength and the draft resolution should insist on elections being held immediately after the collapse of the Smith regime.

1056. He was glad that the representative of Denmark had conceded that Portugal played an important role in rendering sanctions unsuccessful, and that the amendment he had submitted addressed itself to all States which would, of course, also include another NATO Power - the Federal Republic of Germany, which was supporting the colonial regimes in the area.

1057. He appreciated the sincere desire of the representative of Denmark to make sanctions mandatory, but considered that a country that did not wish to apply sanctions would not do so even in those conditions. The Security Council should therefore call upon the United Kingdom to use all the means in its power, including the use of force, if necessary, to bring down the Smith regime and enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to independence and freedom.

1058. The representative of Denmark, referring to the contention by the representative of the USSR that the Danish position was inconsistent, pointed out that the question of mandatory sanctions was dealt with in operative paragraph 6, on which he had made no comments. The Danish amendment (A/AC.109/L.295) referred to paragraphs 7 and 9, dealing with the use of force.

1059. In reply to the representative of Tanzania, who had said that Denmark was trying to avoid a strong resolution, he said that what his Government wished to avoid was a resolution that might not lead to practical results. Denmark had, in fact, applied sanctions, but wished them to be made mandatory because some other countries had not so far applied them. Replying to the representative of Poland,

who had said that those countries would probably not apply them whether they were made mandatory or not, he said that in the case of mandatory sanctions there was a legal basis for United Nations intervention to see that they were observed.

1060. Speaking in French, he expressed surprise at the observations of the representative of the Ivory Coast about countries which had refused to apply mandatory sanctions to South Africa. That representative must know that Denmark had approved such sanctions. Since, however, no real decision had been made, no one was obliged to apply them. It was in order to compel Member States to withhold their support from the regime in Southern Rhodesia that Denmark had submitted its amendment.

1061. He had noted the questions raised by the representative of Mali; he considered them to be a tribute to the constructive efforts of the Danish delegation and would bring them to the notice of the Danish Government.

1062. The representative of Ethiopia, on behalf of the co-sponsors, said that after consideration of the various amendments submitted, they had decided, in a spirit of compromise and understanding, to accept the following:

1063. The words "and to taking appropriate measures to secure the effective application of sanctions in the case of default by Member States" would be added at the end of operative paragraph 6, in accordance with the proposal made by the representative of Denmark.

1064. A new operative paragraph 11, in accordance with the Bulgarian proposed amendment (A/AC.109/L.297), would be inserted to read as follows:

"Requests the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Southern Rhodesia and those who are suffering from oppression by the racist minority regime of Southern Rhodesia."

The existing paragraph 11 would then become paragraph 12.

1065. The word "unjust" would be inserted between the words "the" and "use" in the third line of the fourth preambular paragraph to take account of the suggestion made by the representatives of the USSR and Poland.

1066. In accordance with the Polish representative's further proposal, the words "a regime" in the third line of the eighth operative paragraph would be amended to read "an elected government", and the words "and to fix an early date for this purpose" would be added at the end of that paragraph.

1067. He asked the representatives of Venezuela and Chile whether they would agree to withdraw their amendment (A/AC.109/L.296), since the specific issue to be dealt with in the draft resolution was the defeat of the Smith regime, from which alleviation of Zambia's problems would naturally follow.

1068. The representative of Chile said that the Venezuelan and Chilean delegations, in submitting their amendment concerning Zambia, had considered it essential, in any reference to refugees, to mention also the people of Zambia, who were being oppressed by the Smith regime. He understood the attitude of the Tanzanian representative (A/AC.109/SR.424) and, in a spirit of compromise, proposed that, in the Bulgarian amendment (A/AC.109/L.297) the words, "the people of Zambia" should be added after the words "from Southern Rhodesia". That addition would not change the meaning of the amendment.

1069. The representative of Venezuela announced that, at the request of their African friends, the delegations of Chile and Venezuela were withdrawing their amendment (A/AC.109/L.296).

1070. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the words "Member States" in the amendment to operative paragraph 6 should read "any State".

1071. The representative of Poland said that account had not been taken of his proposal to include in the preamble a reference to the statements made by the petitioners, which had been the practice ever since the establishment of the Committee of Seventeen.

1072. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania accepted the proposal on behalf of the co-sponsors.

1073. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation was very gratified to note that the representatives of the African-Asian countries had taken at least some of his country's recommendations into account. He would vote for the draft resolution.

1074. The representative of Bulgaria asked the Chilean representative not to press for modification of the amendment which had been submitted by the Bulgarian delegation and dealt specifically with the question of Southern Rhodesia. Since, as a result of the observations of the Tanzanian representative (A/AC.109/SR.424), the Chilean and Venezuelan delegations had agreed to withdraw their amendment, they could for the same reason withdraw their proposed modification of the Bulgarian amendment.

1075. He said that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution as just amended by the sponsors.

1076. The representative of Denmark thanked the authors of the draft resolution for heaving taken part of his proposed amendment into consideration. He had said earlier, however, that his delegation could not accept operative paragraphs 7 and 9. Since the co-sponsors were unable to accept his alternative proposals, he would withdraw his amendment but would be unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

1077. The Chairman read out the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1) incorporating the amendments that had been accepted by the co-sponsors.

1078. The representative of Iran proposed the deletion of the word "assistance" between the words "international" and "organizations" in the new operative paragraph 11; and of the words in the same paragraph "those who are suffering from oppression by the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia", for similar reasons to those that had led to the withdrawal of the amendment proposed by the representatives of Chile and Venezuela.

1079. The representative of Ethiopia stated that the representative of Iran had agreed not to insist on the points he had raised concerning operative paragraph 11.

1080. The representative of Australia recalled his Government's positive and prompt action to implement the kind of measures recommended by the Security Council. His Government was far from sure that such measures had been ineffective; results had been achieved and more could be expected.

1081. His Government was opposed to the use of force and would continue to place its trust in negotiation; that attitude followed from its adherence to the line of action laid down in the Security Council resolution. It did not share the views expressed in the draft resolution concerning the likely outcome of the talks in progress between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith regime; those talks should not be prejudged and should be supported, at least until their outcome was clear.

1082. His Government shared the view of the representative of Venezuela that the Special Committee should not usurp the functions of the Security Council; to adopt the draft resolution would be to do so, and he would therefore have to oppose it.

1083. The representative of Poland thought that "Reaffirming" in the second preambular paragraph of the revised draft resolution should read "Recalling".

1084. The representative of Ethiopia signified the co-sponsors' agreement to that change.

1085. The representative of the United States of America, explaining her vote after it had been taken, said that since the resolution did not differ greatly from the one rejected by the Security Council the previous week, her delegation, which had abstained from voting on that occasion, had similarly abstained on the present resolution.

1086. Without minimizing the critical nature of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, her Government did not feel that all the peaceful means of solving the problem had been exhausted. Her own delegation respected the viewpoints of others, and she regretted that some speakers in the debate had at times shown a tendency to view other delegations' positions in a dogmatic way, and that honest differences of opinion had been qualified as collusion.

1087. Her delegation had not requested votes on separate paragraphs; because of its reservations regarding the wording of much of the resolution it had preferred not to take part in them.

1088. The representative of Chile, speaking after the vote had been taken, said that the fact that his delegation had abstained on some specific points certainly did not mean that Chile was opposed to the recommended measures as a whole. On the contrary, it had supported all the measures intended to re-establish order in Southern Rhodesia. It was, of course, necessary to respect the principles of the United Nations Charter and at the same time to take care not to hamper the activities of other United Nations organs. It was for that reason that the Chilean delegation had abstained in the voting on the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3, 7 and 9.

1089. He believed that in the fifth preambular paragraph the reference to the use of force should have been deleted. Operative paragraph 3 would have been acceptable if the policies of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa had been condemned, and not the Governments themselves. Operative paragraph 7 was already covered by the previous paragraph and therefore seemed unnecessary. In operative paragraph 9, the phrase referring to the use of force should have been deleted.

1090. Despite those reservations, his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole because it was convinced that the rights of the valiant people of Zimbabwe should be restored.

1091. He added that when his delegation, together with that of Venezuela, had submitted a draft amendment, the intention had been to extend the scope of the draft resolution by mentioning Zambia, which had also been adversely affected by the existence of the Smith regime. Zambia would have to be helped if the Smith regime was really to be weakened. As over 60 per cent of Zambia's imports came from Southern Rhodesia, it was obvious that assistance to that young nation would gradually reduce and possibly eliminate its trade with Southern Rhodesia.

1092. The representative of Venezuela, also speaking after the vote, said that as he had explained his vote at the previous meeting, he merely wished to state that his delegation took operative paragraph 10 to mean that the States Members of the United Nations should assist the people of Zimbabwe in conformity with the Charter. Venezuela had, moreover, voted in favour of the draft resolution because action by the Special Committee to find a solution to the serious problem of Southern Rhodesia was imperative.

1093. The Venezuelan delegation nevertheless had some reservations concerning the wording of the draft resolution.

1094. The representative of Australia, explaining his vote after it had been taken, said that his Government still believed that there was hope in the measures taken by the United Kingdom Government, the significance of which had not been sufficiently appreciated. Actions such as the blocking of the oil supply to Beira indicated the determination of the United Kingdom Government to achieve its aim.

1095. He had voted against the resolution because of his sincere belief that better results would have been achieved by a more moderately worded text.

1096. At its 427th meeting, the Special Committee voted by roll-call on the joint draft resolution, as orally revised (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.2), as follows:

The fifth preambular paragraph was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 1, with 4 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia.

Abstaining: Chile, Denmark, Italy, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Australia, Chile, Italy, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 7 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Denmark.

Abstaining: Chile, Italy, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 9 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Denmark.

Abstaining: Chile, Italy, Venezuela.

The draft resolution as a whole, as orally revised (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.2) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to 1 with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia.

Abstaining: Denmark, Italy, United States of America.

1097. The text of the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/167) adopted by the Special Committee at its 427th meeting on 31 May 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"Having heard the petitioners during its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling the various resolutions of the Security Council and, in particular, resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 which, inter alia, called upon all States to do their utmost to break off all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

"Recalling further that since the illegal declaration of independence by the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has, on a matter of occasions, declared the racist minority regime to be unlawful,

"Considering that the Government of the United Kingdom has in a number of instances taken prompt measures, including the unjust use of military force in other colonies, to restore or preserve so-called constitutionality as defined by the administering Power,

"Gravely concerned at the consequences which the negotiations between the representatives of the racist minority regime and the United Kingdom Government might entail for the rights of the African people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence,

"Noting with regret that the administering Power has made no effort to open negotiations with the leaders of African political parties with a view to establishing in Southern Rhodesia a government consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe,

"1. Deplores the failure of the United Kingdom Government to bring down the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to establish democratic rule in this colony in accordance with the various resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

"2. Expresses its total disapproval of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and draws the attention of the United Kingdom Government to the harmful consequences those negotiations might entail for the legitimate rights of the African people of Zimbabwe;

"3. Condemns the Governments of Portugal and South Africa for their continued support of the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve those rights;

"5. Considers that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, as has already been established by the Security Council in its resolution 221 of 9 April 1966;

"6. Draws once again the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia with a view to recommending mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter and to taking appropriate measures to secure the effective application of sanctions in case of default by any State;

"7. Recommends to the Security Council that it request the Government of the United Kingdom to take measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter in order, by the use of air, sea or land forces, to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia;

"8. Calls upon the United Kingdom Government to hold consultations with the leaders of the African political parties with a view to the establishment of an elected government consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe and to fix an early date for this purpose;

"9. Calls upon the United Kingdom Government to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"10. Calls upon all States to render moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in furtherance of their struggle to achieve freedom and independence;

"11. Requests the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Southern Rhodesia and those who are suffering from oppression by the racist minority regime of Southern Rhodesia;

"12. Decides to maintain the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda and to keep it under urgent and constant review."

APPENDIX I

Proclamation broadcast by Mr. Ian Smith on 11 November 1965

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS, in the course of human affairs, history has shown that it may become necessary for a people to dissolve the political affiliations which have connected them with another people and to assume among other nations the separate and equal status to which they are entitled, and

WHEREAS, in such event, a respect for the opinions of mankind requires them to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to assume full responsibility for their own affairs,

NOW THEREFORE, we the Government of Rhodesia, do hereby declare:

THAT it is an indisputable and accepted historic fact that since 1923 the Government of Rhodesia have exercised the powers of self-government and have been responsible for the progress, development and welfare of their people.

THAT the people of Rhodesia, having demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown and to their kith and kin in the United Kingdom and elsewhere throughout two world wars and having been prepared to shed their blood and give of their substance in what they believed to be a mutual interest of freedom-loving people, now see all that they have cherished about to be shattered on the rocks of expediency.

THAT the people of Rhodesia have witnessed a process which is destructive of those very precepts upon which civilization in a primitive country has been built; they have seen the principles of Western democracy and responsible government and moral standards crumble elsewhere; nevertheless they have remained steadfast.

THAT the people of Rhodesia fully support the request of their Government for sovereign independence and have witnessed the consistent refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to accede to their entreaties.

THAT the Government of the United Kingdom have thus demonstrated that they are not prepared to grant sovereign independence to Rhodesia on terms acceptable

to the people of Rhodesia, thereby persisting in maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction over Rhodesia, obstructing laws and treaties with other States in the conduct of affairs with other nations and refusal of assent to necessary laws for the public good, all this to the detriment of the future peace, prosperity and good government of Rhodesia.

THAT the Government of Rhodesia have for a long period patiently and in good faith negotiated with the Government of the United Kingdom for the removal of the remaining limitations placed upon them and for the grant of sovereign independence.

THAT in the belief that procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation, the Government of Rhodesia consider it essential that Rhodesia should obtain without delay sovereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question.

NOW THEREFORE we, the Government of Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God, who controls the destiny of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly praying that we the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion in seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured, do by this proclamation adopt, enact and give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed hereto.

God save the Queen!

APPENDIX II

Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 Ch. 76

An Act to make further provision with respect to Southern Rhodesia
(16 November 1965)

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. It is hereby declared that Southern Rhodesia continues to be part of Her Majesty's dominions, and that the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom have responsibility and jurisdiction as heretofore for and in respect of it.

2. (1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia, as appears to Her to be necessary or expedient in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken therein.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section an Order in Council thereunder may make such provision -

(a) for suspending, amending, revoking or adding to any of the provisions of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961;

(b) for modifying, extending or suspending the operation of any enactment or instrument in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia;

(c) for imposing prohibitions, restrictions or obligations in respect of transactions relating to Southern Rhodesia or any such persons or things, as appears to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient as aforesaid; and any provision made by or under such an Order may apply to things done or omitted outside as well as within the United Kingdom or other country or territory to which the Order extends.

(3) An Order in Council under this section may make or authorize the making of such incidental, supplemental and consequential provisions as appear to Her Majesty to be expedient for the purposes of the Order, and any provision made by

or under such an Order may be made to have effect from any date not earlier than 11 November 1965.

(4) An Order in Council under this section may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Order in Council thereunder.

(5) An Order in Council under this section shall be laid before Parliament after being made and shall expire at the end of the period of twenty-eight days beginning with the day on which it was made unless during that period it is approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

The expiration of an Order in pursuance of this subsection shall not affect the operation of the Order as respects things previously done or omitted to be done or the power to make a new Order; and in calculating the period aforesaid no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.

3. (1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, section 2 of this Act shall continue in force for the period of one year beginning with the date of the passing of this Act and shall then expire unless it is continued in force in accordance with subsection (2) of this section.

(2) Her Majesty may from time to time by Order in Council provide that section 2 of this Act shall continue in force for a period of one year beyond the date on which it would otherwise expire; but no recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order under this subsection unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

(3) The expiration of section 2 of this Act shall not affect -

(a) the operation of that section as respects things previously done or omitted to be done; or

(b) the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 as in force immediately before the expiration of that section.

4. (1) This Act may be cited as the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965.

(2) This Act extends to Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, any colony or protectorate within the meaning of the British Nationality Act 1948, and (to the extent of Her Majesty's jurisdiction therein) to any foreign country or territory in which for the time being Her Majesty has jurisdiction:

Provided that no Order in Council under section 2 of this Act shall extend to any place other than the United Kingdom or Southern Rhodesia as part of the law of that place, except as far as it makes provision with respect to ships or aircraft to which this section applies, or affects the operation of any Act of Parliament which has effect in that place, with or without modifications, as part of its law, or of any instrument in force under any such Act.

(3) This section applies to British ships registered in the United Kingdom or any other country or place to which this Act extends, and to aircraft so registered.

APPENDIX III

The Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order, 1965

Made	16 November 1965
Laid before Parliament	17 November 1965
Coming into Operation sections 2 and 3	16 November 1965
Remainder	18 November 1965

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 16 day November 1965
Present,

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council

Her Majesty, in exercise of the powers conferred on Her by section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (a) and of all other powers enabling Her in that behalf, is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

1. (1) This Order may be cited as the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965 and, save as provided by sections 2 (2) and 3 (5) of this Order, shall come into operation on 18 November 1965.

(2) Save where the context otherwise requires, expressions used in this Order have the same meaning as in the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 (b) (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and the provisions of sections 116 and 117 of the Constitution (other than section 117 (8)) shall apply for the purpose of interpreting this Order as they apply for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution.

(3) Any reference in this Order to a law made before the commencement of this Order shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as a reference to that law as it had effect immediately before the commencement of this Order.

(4) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, the Interpretation Act 1889 (c) shall apply, with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting this Order and any instrument made thereunder and otherwise in relation to this Order and any such instrument as it applies for the purpose of interpreting and in relation to Acts of Parliament.

2. (1) It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that any instrument made or other act done in purported promulgation of any Constitution for Southern Rhodesia except as authorized by Act of Parliament is void and of no effect.

(2) This section shall come into operation forthwith and shall then be deemed to have had effect from 11 November 1965.

3. (1) So long as this section is in operation -

(a) no laws may be made by the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia, no business may be transacted by the Legislative Assembly and no steps may be taken by any person or authority for the purposes of or otherwise in relation to the constitution or reconstitution of the Legislative Assembly or the election of any person to be a member thereof; and chapters II and III of the Constitution shall have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this paragraph;

(b) a Secretary of State may, by order in writing under his hand, at any time prorogue the Legislative Assembly; and

(c) Her Majesty in Council may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia, including laws having extra-territorial operation.

(2) Orders in Council made under sub-section (1) (c) of this section may confer powers (including the power to make laws) and impose duties upon persons and authorities as well outside as within Southern Rhodesia.

(3) References in the Constitution or in any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia to a law of the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia or to an Act of that Legislature shall be construed as including references to an Order in Council made under sub-section (1) (c) of this section.

(4) Orders in Council made under sub-section (1) (c) of this section shall, for the purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (a), be statutory instruments within the meaning of that Act and shall be laid before Parliament after being made.

(5) This section shall come into operation forthwith and shall then be deemed to have had effect from 11 November 1965.

4. (1) So long as this section is in operation -

(a) the executive authority of Southern Rhodesia may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by a Secretary of State;

(b) sections 43, 44, 45 and 46 of the Constitution shall not have effect;

(c) subject to the provisions of any Order in Council made under section 3 (1) (c) of this Order and to any instructions that may be given to the Governor by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State, the Governor shall act in his discretion in the exercise of any function which, if this Order had not been made, he would be required by the Constitution to exercise in accordance with the advice of the Governor's Council or any Minister;

(d) a Secretary of State may exercise any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia in a Minister or a Deputy Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary; and

(e) without prejudice to any other provision of this Order, a Secretary of State may exercise any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia in any officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia (not being a court of law) or (whether or not he exercises that function himself) prohibit or restrict the exercise of that function by that officer or authority.

(2) Where, in pursuance of sub-section (1) (d) or sub-section (1) (e) of this section, a Secretary of State exercises any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia in a Minister, a Deputy Minister, a Parliamentary Secretary or any other officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, he shall be exempt from any requirement imposed on that Minister, Deputy Minister, Parliamentary Secretary or other officer or authority to consult with, or to seek or act in accordance with the advice of, any other person or authority.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any function that is vested by this section in a Secretary of State may be exercised by him by order in writing under his hand or in such other manner as he considers appropriate.

(4) References in this section to an officer of the Government of Southern Rhodesia shall be construed as including references to the Governor.

5. So long as this section is in operation, monies may be issued from the Consolidated Revenue Fund on the authority of a warrant issued by a Secretary of State, or by the Governor in pursuance of instructions from Her Majesty through a Secretary of State, directed to an officer of the Treasury of the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

6. It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that any law made, business transacted, step taken or function exercised in contravention of any prohibition or restriction imposed by or under this Order is void and of no effect.
