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LETTER DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1961 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I am transmitting herewith a Statement by the USSR Government on the bilateral USSR-United States disarmament negotiations. Documents submitted by the USSR Government in the course of the said negotiations are attached to the Statement.

I should be glad if you would arrange for the said Statement of the USSR Government and the attachments thereto to be issued as a General Assembly document.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) A. GROMYKO

STATEMENT BY THE USSR GOVERNMENT ON THE BILATERAL USSR-UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

In fulfilment of General Assembly resolution of 21 April 1961, the USSR Government deems it its duty to inform the Members of the United Nations of the course and results of the exchange of views between the USSR and the United States on disarmament questions held at Washington, Moscow and New York in June, July and September 1961. The great interest in this exchange of views shown by the Members of the United Nations is quite understandable.

In our times there is no problem that is more acute or pressing than the strengthening and maintenance of peace. Towards this noble goal the thoughts and strivings of all the nations are directed. Their fondest hopes and aspirations concerning a happy life, undisturbed labour and the well-being of their children are predicated on peace. They rightly regard general and complete disarmament which will eliminate the material means of waging war and will thus make war impossible, as the sure and direct road to that goal.

It is therefore not surprising that the question of general and complete disarmament, brought up, for the first time, at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the USSR Government's initiative, immediately received wide support from all States Members of the United Nations, which unanimously acknowledged that it was the most important problem of our day and demanded that Governments should make the utmost efforts with a view to its early solution. Perturbed by the failure of the Ten-Nation Committee at Geneva which, through the fault of the Western Powers, proved unable to perform the task entrusted to it - that of elaborating an agreement on general and complete disarmament - many States Members of the United Nations deemed it essential that steps should be taken to prevent further delays in finding a solution to this most important international problem. They expressed themselves in favour of the General Assembly laying down specific directives for the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In an endeavour to contribute to the solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet Union submitted proposals concerning such directives for subsequent negotiations. A large group of neutralist States, including India, Indonesia and Ghana, also submitted a draft resolution concerning the basic principles of general and complete disarmament. The USSR Government at once indicated its positive attitude to this draft.

As is known, the General Assembly, at its fifteenth session, nevertheless proved unable to agree on directives because of the position of the former United States Administration, which openly opposed the adoption of any decisions concerning general and complete disarmament. The new United States Administration, for its part, stated that it was not yet ready to consider the substance of disarmament questions and asked for time in which to study the problem of disarmament.

Acceding to the wishes of the new United States Administration, the General Assembly agreed not to examine the substance of the question of disarmament at the resumed fifteenth session. In that connexion, account was also taken of the important circumstance that agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to hold a bilateral exchange of views on disarmament questions. It will be remembered that the General Assembly, in a special resolution, approved the holding of such an exchange of views in the expectation that the talks would contribute to the solution of the problem of disarmament and to the attainment of the necessary agreement.

The USSR Government herewith submits to the General Assembly a Statement on the bilateral USSR-United States disarmament negotiations.

I. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IS SUREST ROAD TOWARDS DELIVERING MANKIND FROM THE THREAT OF WAR

The Soviet Government attached great importance to direct negotiations between the USSR and the United States, in the expectation that during the negotiations both parties would make a sincere effort to bring their positions as close together as possible. It is common knowledge that the solution of the disarmament problem depends to a large extent on agreement between these two Powers. It is impossible to disregard the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States of America now possess the largest armed forces and the most powerful modern armaments, including missiles and nuclear weapons. Agreement

between the USSR and the United States on basic questions of disarmament would, beyond doubt, give a powerful impetus to the solution of the whole problem of disarmament and would pave the way for agreement on the dismantling of the entire military set-up of States.

The Soviet Government made careful preparations for the bilateral exchange of views. It was of the opinion that the new form of negotiations gave the parties an opportunity not only of understanding each other better and determining where their positions coincided and where they were at variance, but also of mapping out jointly a practical approach to the solution of the disarmament problem. It was the Soviet Government's sincere desire that, from the very outset, the talks should be business-like, and that positive results should be obtained. That was why the Soviet Government proposed to the United States Government that they should begin by exchanging views on the substance of the problem of general and complete disarmament and by considering practical proposals to that effect, especially as the need to solve the problem of disarmament on the basis of the general and complete disarmament of States had already been recognized by the United Nations General Assembly.

With a view to enabling the United States Government to make a thorough study of the Soviet Union's position, the USSR delegation, on 27 June 1961, transmitted to the United States a Statement by the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament. Later in the course of the talks, the USSR delegation transmitted to the United States delegation a memorandum dated 19 July 1961 on the need for general and complete disarmament and a memorandum dated 21 July 1961 dealing specifically with control over general and complete disarmament. These documents set out in detail the programme of general and complete disarmament under strict international control put forward by Mr. Khrushchev, the Head of the USSR Government, on 23 September 1960 for consideration by the General Assembly.

What are the motives which impel the USSR Government to insist on the immediate carrying out of general and complete disarmament?

In the history of man, the need for taking the most resolute steps to deliver mankind from the threat of a war of extermination has never been as acute and pressing as it is now. The swift progress of science and of military technology has led to the development of monstrous nuclear bombs, each one of which is capable of obliterating a large industrial and cultural centre. Intercontinental ballistic missiles have been produced which can deliver such bombs to any point on the globe in a matter of minutes and which cannot be recalled. The formation by the Western Powers of a number of military blocs - NATO, SEATO and CENTO - which are directed against peace-loving States, the creation of a dense network of United States military bases on foreign territory, the fanning of the "cold war" which has envenomed the relations among States and the continuous speeding up of the arms race have already prepared the fuel for a war of inestimable danger.

Particularly dangerous are the latest events, when, in reply to the Soviet Union's proposal concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the consequent normalization of the situation in West Berlin, the Western Powers have been rattling their sabres and threatening to precipitate a military conflict.

The surest way to deliver mankind for all times from the danger hanging over it is general and complete disarmament. We must eliminate all the means of waging war, dismantle the war machinery of States and prevent its re-establishment in any form whatever.

As long as States possess armies and weapons, the danger of war cannot be regarded as past. As long as armaments and armed forces, even reduced, restricted or cut down, remain in existence, the possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict and of the use of armed force by one State or group of States against another will still be there.

The Soviet Government regards general and complete disarmament as a feasible task. What are the grounds for this conclusion? First of all, the fact that the carrying out of such disarmament would preclude all possibility of any State or States enjoying a military advantage and guarantee equal conditions for all countries. When all States disarm, no State will possess the machinery of war, and no threat to the security of any State can then arise.

General and complete disarmament would make it possible to do away with many of the obstacles which arose whenever there was talk of partial disarmament measures and when some States feared that the implementation of such measures might upset the balance of power at a particular stage and prove detrimental to their security. Whereas in the past many States regarded various disarmament plans with suspicion, perceiving in them the other side's intention to acquire some special advantage, such fears are removed by general and complete disarmament, since everyone will gain and no one will lose by it.

It goes without saying that the willingness of States to embark on such disarmament would in itself have an immediate favourable effect on the entire world situation. Such willingness would show that these States have no intention of attacking anybody and are determined to strengthen international confidence and to base mutual relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence, that is, to live in peace and friendship.

It should also be borne in mind that the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament would make it much easier to carry out international control over disarmament measures. When the threat to their security has been removed because of general and complete disarmament, States will have no reasons to conceal anything, and will open wide the door to international inspection of their compliance with accepted obligations. In these circumstances the control will not impede, but rather will cement, mutual confidence between States, enabling each State to make certain that the other parties to the agreement are also discharging their obligations conscientiously.

It is hardly necessary to state that the destruction of the means of waging war would fundamentally alter the entire world situation: instead of the arms race and the cold war, which keep the nations in constant fear of what the next day may bring, there would be stable peaceful coexistence and a joining of efforts to master the still unexplored forces of nature, nuclear energy, all the natural riches of our planet, and outer space, into which man has already made a bold entry. Men's thoughts would then turn not to preparations for a destructive war but to the creation of material and cultural values and to a united campaign against disease and natural disaster, which still wreak havoc among them.

In elaborating a plan for general and complete disarmament in three consecutive stages, the Soviet Government was guided by a desire to have the very first steps in this direction yield a maximum positive result and permit if not the total elimination then at least the greatest possible reduction of the threat of nuclear war - the worst danger facing mankind. The Soviet Union therefore proposes that the disarmament process should begin not merely with a substantial curtailment of the armed forces and conventional armaments of States but also with the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the dismantling of military bases in the territories of other States and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from such territories.

It will readily be seen that the complete destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons would virtually remove all threat of attack by one country on another with atomic and hydrogen weapons. This in turn would prepare favourable conditions for the speedy solution, at the next stage, of the problem of complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, including the cessation of their manufacture, their elimination from the arsenals of States, and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons.

In renouncing the weapons which constitute its main defence against aggression, the Soviet Union is entitled to demand that its security interests should also be given due regard and that concurrently with the destruction of means of delivery the military bases established in the territories of other States should be dismantled. One need merely glance at a map of the net of military bases which the United States of America and other members of Western military blocs have drawn around the borders of socialist States to realize that if missiles are destroyed and foreign military bases left untouched, the United States and its allies in military blocs will be placed at an advantage.

The simultaneous elimination of the means of delivery and of military bases is a pre-condition for ensuring in practice the equal position of States during disarmament. The Soviet Union does not demand advantages for itself, but neither can it jeopardize its security and agree to have unjust advantages given to others. For this very reason, both in the context of the entire programme of general and complete disarmament and at each stage of its implementation, the disarmament measures are so co-ordinated that their execution would give no advantage to any country or group of countries.

During the bilateral exchange of views, the USSR delegation stressed the great importance of reaching an understanding on the elaboration and conclusion of a single treaty covering all stages of the programme of general and complete disarmament and prescribing specific time-limits for the implementation both of the separate stages and of the programme as a whole. Only if there is an agreement setting out a definite time-table for the execution of disarmament measures under effective control can it be said that States will assume specific obligations. Only then will it be certain that the opponents of disarmament will be unable to delay, or even discontinue, the execution of disarmament measures on the pretext that the obligations under the treaty are ill-defined.

Bearing in mind the urgent need to solve the disarmament problem, the Soviet Government, during the bilateral negotiations with the United States, expressed its conviction that States should make a maximum effort to implement the disarmament programme within a relatively short time. The Soviet Union proposes that general and complete disarmament should be effected in four or five years. This is a realistic figure which makes due allowance for the ability of States to dismantle their war machinery and convert their economy and their entire national life to a peace-time basis. The Soviet Union is prepared to consider any other proposals on time-limits for implementing the programme of general and complete disarmament. In its view, however, the agreed time should in any case be clearly defined and as short as possible.

II. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT MUST BE CARRIED OUT UNDER STRICT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

During the negotiations, the USSR gave a detailed exposition of its position on the question of international control of disarmament.

The Soviet Government holds that an agreement on general and complete disarmament must provide firm assurances that none of the parties will violate its obligations. The Soviet Union therefore advocates the establishment of strict international control of disarmament and it will never agree to any disarmament measures that are not accompanied by effective control.

As the Soviet Government emphasized before, the Soviet State has good reason to hold this position, if only because past experience has taught it that it cannot rely on the integrity of certain Western partners in the agreement.

As is known, the Government of the USSR, and the Head of the Government, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, have time and again stated that if the Western Powers were to accept the proposal on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union would unconditionally accept any proposals of these Powers on disarmament control.

These unambiguous statements make it obvious to all that the solution of the control problem is being impeded not by the USSR position but by the attempts of the Governments of the Western Powers to make use of this problem to set up artificial barriers to disarmament, by the intrinsic falseness of their position on questions of disarmament and control, and by their unwillingness to agree either to disarmament or to control over disarmament.

While it advocates effective control over disarmament, the Soviet Union is emphatically opposed to control over armaments. Such control would not only fail utterly to contain the arms race, but would instead set the stage for its unimpeded continuation and consequently for further stockpiling of all types of weapons, including nuclear weapons and missiles. Any control unrelated to disarmament measures would evolve into an international system of legalized spying, providing a means for gathering the information sought by the war departments of certain States. Instead of serving the cause of disarmament, such control would promote preparations for another war.

The control system provided for in the USSR programme of general and complete disarmament is efficacious and reliable. The Soviet Union holds that both the disarmament process in general and each disarmament measure in particular should from beginning to end be subject to effective control. It follows that the tasks, functions and powers of the control system must expand continuously as the disarmament process evolves, encompassing additional fields. Only bad faith and unwillingness to seek agreement can explain the wide-spread Western contention that the Soviet Union proposes that disarmament should be started first and control established later.

What does the Soviet Union propose in the matter of control? An international control organization, which would embark on its duties simultaneously with the entry into force of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This control organization would comprise all States parties to the treaty, whose representatives would meet periodically at a conference to consider matters arising

out of the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The conference would elect a control council which would have its own organs in all countries participating in the treaty, these organs being composed of staff recruited on an international basis.

The Soviet Government considers that the Control Council, which will be responsible for the practical administration of the entire control system, should consist of representatives of socialist countries, representatives of States belonging to Western military and political alliances, and representatives of neutral States. The Soviet Union makes this proposal in consideration of the realities of the present world situation and with a view to ensuring that the control organization, instead of becoming a weapon in the hands of any group of States, should be a reliable and truly impartial control body.

It was precisely these considerations that guided the Soviet Government in drafting the control provisions contained in its programme for general and complete disarmament, and in seeking to ensure that the international control body should possess suitable ways and means of carrying out the duties assigned to it.

Accordingly, provision is made in the programme for the establishment, during the first stage, of on-site international control over the destruction of rocket weapons, military aircraft, surface warships, submarines and other means which can be used as vehicles for atomic and hydrogen weapons. Control is to be established over the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of military personnel and troops to their own national territories, and over the disbanding of troops and the destruction of armaments. The control measures for the second and third stages of the Soviet disarmament programme were similarly worked out on the basis of close co-ordination with measures of disarmament.

The Soviet Government considers that even after general and complete disarmament has been achieved, the control organization should continue to operate, and should exercise constant supervision to ensure that no State secretly resumes military production and begins once again to create armed forces.

States will provide the control organization with information about the points at which contingents of police (militia) are stationed, about their strength at every such point and about any significant movements of such

contingents near State frontiers. International inspection teams will have to carry out comprehensive control to ensure that the strength and armament of the police (militia) are in conformity with the quota agreed upon for each country.

The Soviet proposals meet every requirement of an international system of strict control over disarmament. If, however, the United States and other Western Powers do not for some reason find them acceptable and submit their own proposals for strengthening control, the Soviet Government will be prepared to consider such proposals.

The Soviet Union is ready, as in the past, to sign at once an agreement on general and complete disarmament providing for the strictest international control in any form, up to and including control of the broadest and most all-inclusive kind, under conditions of general and complete disarmament.

III. THE UNITED STATES POSITION IN THE WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

During the first two phases of the bilateral negotiations, in Washington and Moscow, the United States delegation flatly refused to consider a programme for general and complete disarmament, insisting that agreement should be reached only on general principles. Indeed, the actual "Statement of principles" which the United States delegation submitted on 19 June 1961 did not even refer to the need to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament, although a resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, for which the United States, too, cast its vote, declared that problem to be the most important one facing the world today and called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of it. Instead of general and complete disarmament, the United States put forward the idea of "total, universal disarmament", no provision being made in this for the abolition of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, or the elimination of military bases in the territory of foreign countries.

At the same time, the United States delegation sought during the first two phases of the negotiations to substitute for general and complete disarmament such measures as cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, control over the launching of devices into outer space, and so forth, although these measures actually have nothing to do with disarmament.

In point of fact, unless nuclear weapons were banned and the stockpiles of such weapons destroyed, halting the production of fissionable materials for military purposes would have no real significance; it would amount to establishing control over atomic industry - and indeed over other types of industry as well - which would enable the Western Powers to obtain desired information about Soviet nuclear weapons. The proposal to establish control over the launching of devices into outer space in isolation from disarmament can be regarded only as an attempt to gain access to information about Soviet rockets.

The United States delegation placed primary emphasis on the need to create international armed forces, advancing proposals in this connexion which were aimed at bringing about the establishment of such forces in evasion of the Security Council. It was also proposed that the strength of these forces should be increased as national armed forces were curtailed, and that provision should be made for the possibility of equipping the international armed forces with nuclear weapons. At the same time, the United States Government demanded that the unanimity rule provided for in the United Nations Charter should be abolished so far as concerned decisions regarding the employment of the international forces, thus seeking to shatter the main principle underlying the United Nations Charter, a principle which the States chiefly responsible for the creation of the United Nations had regarded as the cornerstone of that organization's activities. It is obvious that the creation of international armed forces on this basis could provide no guarantee that such forces would be used in the interests of peace and would not prove a weapon in the expansionist policy of some State or group of States. The use made of the United Nations armed forces which were sent to the Congo serves as an eloquent warning in that regard.

While proposing the creation of international armed forces, the United States delegation completely disregarded the question of how such forces were to be administered and of the need to prevent their unlawful use. Furthermore, the demand for the abolition of the unanimity rule provided for in the United Nations Charter, so far as concerned decisions on putting the international armed forces into action, provided broad scope for the arbitrary use of those forces in the interests of the Western military bloc, against the vital interests of the peace-loving States, for the purpose of suppressing the national-liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries and of maintaining or setting up hated reactionary regimes.

Needless to say, this position of the United States Government made any agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament impossible during the first two phases of the negotiations.

Desiring, nevertheless, to move the negotiations out of this standstill, the Soviet Government declared, at the end of the Moscow phase of the negotiations, that it was willing to come to an agreement even on nothing more than the basic principles of general and complete disarmament. With that end in view, the Soviet delegation on 27 July 1961 submitted a draft "Joint Soviet-United States statement on the basic principles of a treaty on general and complete disarmament". This document contained recommendations for directives to be transmitted to a future body with a view to negotiations on the basis of which it would have been possible to begin the work of drafting a disarmament treaty. However, the United States representatives did not accept the draft joint document submitted by the Soviet Union.

This being the United States Government's position, it proved impossible to reach agreement even on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament during the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations in Washington and Moscow.

IV. THE CONCLUDING PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE AGREEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES

In the last phase of the bilateral negotiations, in New York, the United States Government modified its position on general and complete disarmament in certain respects, and on 6 September 1961 presented a new document, a "Statement of principles", which was then further revised by the United States delegation and presented in final form on 14 September 1961. In this "Statement of principles", the United States Government recognized the need to reach agreement on a programme ensuring general and complete disarmament and providing for: the disbanding of armed forces; the dismantling of military bases; the cessation of the production of armaments; the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and of all means of delivery of such weapons, and cessation of the production of weapons of those types; the abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of States; the cessation of military training and the closing of

all military training institutions, and the discontinuance of military expenditures. The United States document also stated that general and complete disarmament should be carried out by stages, within specified time-limits, and that no State or group of States should gain military advantage at any of the various stages.

The United States acceptance of these principles, which the Soviet Union had urged throughout the course of the negotiations, represented an advance over the United States Government's previous position. In consideration of that fact, and because it was desirous of facilitating a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament in every way possible, the Soviet Government decided that the "Statement of principles" could be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in the form of a joint proposal by the USSR and the United States of America as a set of draft directives for the working group which would be called upon to prepare the agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government agreed to this even though the United States draft "Statement of principles" contained not a few formulations which lacked adequate clarity, formulations which, as the United States representative's verbal explanations during the bilateral negotiations showed, could be given various interpretations, some of which had nothing in common with the tasks of disarmament. The Soviet delegation declared that one major proposition in the United States draft was entirely unacceptable and might set up an insurmountable obstacle to the achievement of agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament. This proposition provided that control should be established not only over the execution of disarmament measures but also over the armed forces and armaments retained by States at the various stages of disarmament. In practice, this would mean the establishment of control not over disarmament but over armaments - which could benefit only a potential aggressor and could not, of course, be accepted by States having no aggressive intentions.

At the insistence of the Soviet side, the United States Government agreed on 19 September 1961 to delete this proposal for the establishment of control over armaments from the "Statement of principles". As a result, it became possible to place a joint USSR-United States statement on basic principles before the General Assembly for its consideration.

The USSR-United States "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations" was submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration by the Soviet Union and United States delegations on 20 September 1961.

It must be said, however, that serious difficulties may arise in the forthcoming negotiations for the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament if the United States of America and its allies do not renounce their position aimed at the establishment of control over armaments. Although the United States of America has deleted the proposal on that point from the statement of principles, it has still not relinquished its policy of substituting control over armaments for disarmament. That may be seen, for example, from the letter of 20 September 1961 addressed by the United States representative in the bilateral negotiations to the USSR representative, in which it is flatly stated that control of retained armed forces and armaments at each stage of disarmament is "a key element in the United States position".

The Soviet Government wishes to stress that the question whether disarmament under control should be effected or whether control will be established over armaments is a fundamental matter of principle.

V. QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

In their bilateral negotiations the USSR and the United States of America also sought to reach agreement on the composition of the working organ in which negotiations for the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament will be continued.

In the course of the talks the Soviet Government reaffirmed its opinion that the continuance of negotiations on general and complete disarmament in the Ten-Nation Committee which sat at Geneva in the spring and summer of 1960 was useless. In that body, it will be remembered, five socialist countries and five Western Powers were represented. That composition proved unsatisfactory, and the Committee's futility was due in no small degree to the fact that one of the three main groups of States existing in the world today, the neutralist countries, took no part in its work.

Yet the direct participation in the disarmament negotiations of representatives of countries practising a policy of neutralism is not only desirable but essential, even though the neutralist States themselves do not possess large armed forces. The peace-loving policy of these States, which represent approximately 1,000 million people, is an important support in the maintenance of peace, and one which must be put to use in dealing with the problem of eliminating the danger of war. For that reason the Soviet Union had already proposed at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly that representatives of the group of neutralist countries should be admitted to take part with equal rights in the Disarmament Committee side by side with the Committee's existing ten members. How many neutralist States should be represented in the Committee and which States they should be are questions which should be agreed on. During the bilateral negotiations with the United States of America, the Soviet Government stressed that the working disarmament organ would be effective and capable of carrying out its tasks only if all three groups of States - the socialist countries, the States members of the Western military blocs, and the neutralist countries - were represented in it with equal rights.

The proposals on the composition of the working organ put forward by the United States Government during the Soviet-United States exchange of views, do not satisfy these basic principles. The Government of the United States of America proposed that the Ten-Nation Committee should resume its work. The Soviet Union could not accept this proposal, since it meant that the neutralist States would as in the past be excluded from participation in disarmament negotiations.

The United States Government proposed in addition that three citizens of neutralist countries should be added to the Ten-Nation Committee as chairmen and vice-chairmen without equal rights to take part in the discussion and decision of disarmament questions. Obviously, this proposal too was unacceptable, since it would in fact have barred the neutralist countries from participation in the work of the Disarmament Committee.

Finally, the United States Government proposed that the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee should be expanded to include ten additional States the majority of which were avowed advocates of the policy of the Western Powers, or even their military allies. Only if the USSR consented to the proposal for the inclusion of those countries would the United States Government agree to the inclusion of the few neutralist States named in its proposal. It goes without saying that this proposal too could provide no basis for agreement.

Thus, it proved impossible, during the Soviet-United States negotiations, to reach agreement on the composition of the working organ for the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government considers it essential that the General Assembly should take a decision on this matter such as will ensure the participation in disarmament negotiations, with equal rights, of all States which have a lawful right to take part and without whose participation productive negotiations on disarmament will not be possible.

In informing States Members of the United Nations of the course and results of the bilateral negotiations, the Soviet Government would like to stress that the situation with regard to the solution of the problem of disarmament calls for the most serious attention. The General Assembly must make every possible effort to achieve success in solving this problem - the most important mankind has ever faced. The Soviet Government, for its part, will do everything in its power to further an early and practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, in the interests of peace throughout the world.

The following documents submitted by the Soviet Government during the USSR-United States bilateral negotiations are annexed to this report:

1. Statement by the Soviet Government on the question of general and complete disarmament, dated 27 June 1961.
2. Aide-mémoire concerning the need for general and complete disarmament, dated 19 July 1961.
3. Aide-mémoire concerning control over general and complete disarmament, dated 21 July 1961.
4. Draft joint Soviet-United States statement on the basic principles of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, dated 27 July 1961.
5. Aide-mémoire concerning the composition of the Disarmament Committee, dated 28 July 1961.
6. Letter dated 20 September 1961 addressed by the representative of the USSR in the USSR-United States bilateral negotiations on disarmament to the representative of the United States in the negotiations.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

27 June 1961

On the initiation of the exchange of views between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to make the following statement.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction that the two greatest Powers in the world - the USSR and the United States of America - are meeting in negotiations in order to exchange views on questions relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations in the appropriate organ.

As is known, the negotiations on general and complete disarmament which were conducted in the spring and summer of 1960 in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament came to a deadlock, and the General Assembly, on the proposal of the Soviet Union, considered the resulting situation at its fifteenth session. It is hardly appropriate at this time to turn back the pages of the past, pages that record the persistent attempts of certain countries to place one obstacle after another in the path of general and complete disarmament. But if an agreement on disarmament is to be achieved, the obstacles to it must be removed.

In view of the urgency of solving the problem of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union considered it necessary that agreement should be reached even at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly on directives for subsequent disarmament negotiations and on the composition of the working body in which those negotiations should be conducted. At the same time, the Soviet Government took cognizance of statements by United States leaders and by President Kennedy himself concerning their intention of studying the problem of disarmament and working out a constructive policy in the matter, and felt able to meet the United States Government's desire for a temporary postponement of the substantive discussion of the disarmament problem. The Soviet Government hopes that now, after this review, the United States and the Soviet Union can begin an exchange of views on the basic provisions of the treaty on general and complete disarmament which all mankind awaits.

The crucial importance of an exchange of views between the Soviet Union and the United States is obvious. For there can be no doubt that a solution of the

disarmament problem depends to a considerable extent on the reaching of agreement between the USSR and the United States. The Soviet Union and the United States are now the strongest Powers, possessing the greatest armed forces and armaments, Powers which, given goodwill and willingness on both sides, can exert a positive effect on the solution of the whole question of general disarmament. A joint initiative by them would undoubtedly give tremendous impetus to the solution of the disarmament problem.

The Soviet side considers it useful and expedient, at the very outset of the exchange of views between the USSR and the United States, to state its views on ways of solving the disarmament problem and to clarify some points of its proposals for general and complete disarmament.

I. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IS THE ONLY ROAD TO LASTING PEACE

There is no more acute or urgent problem in our time than the task of consolidating peace. Wars have always been a grievous calamity for the peoples. They have left deep scars in the history of mankind, scars that bear witness to the suffering endured. In the present century alone, people have experienced the miseries of two bloody World Wars, which have left in their train more than 40 million people slaughtered, towns and villages in ruins and ashes and indescribable sufferings of many millions of people.

But the horrors of the past pale before those that a new war, if it is allowed to break out, will visit upon the world. The enormous destructive power of modern weapons, the unprecedented expansion of the arms race and the emergence of military blocs that have spread their tentacles all over the world have created a situation in which the smallest spark will be sufficient to cause the outbreak of the war the threat of which hangs like the sword of Damocles over mankind. Hundreds of millions of persons would perish in its flames. The centres of world production and culture would be reduced to smoking ruins. Even after the war ended, its frightful legacy in the form of radioactive contamination knowing no State frontiers would for many years be disastrous to health and bring death to future generations.

Never before in history has the necessity of adopting the most resolute measures to save mankind from the prospect of mass annihilation been so urgent and acute.

In order to rid mankind forever of the danger that hangs over it, there is only one sure path that can be taken - the path of general and complete disarmament. All means of waging war must be eliminated, the military organization and machinery of States must be dismantled and must not be permitted to be re-established in any form.

So long as States continue to possess great armies equipped with all types of modern military equipment, in particular nuclear-rocket weapons, so long as young people throughout the world are taught the art of war and general staffs draw up plans for future war, there are not and there cannot be any guarantees that a flame kindled anywhere, in however remote a place, will not engulf the whole world in the holocaust of a future war, of future extermination. In our century of headlong scientific and technological development, which has produced missiles that in a matter of minutes can deliver a lethal nuclear warhead to any point in the world, the most radical measures are necessary to avert the threat of war. Only general and complete disarmament, eliminating the very possibility of war between States and depriving aggressors of the material means of unleashing war, can ensure a lasting peace. That is why the fate of each and every man, wherever he may live, now hangs upon general and complete disarmament. That is why this has now become the major problem of our day.

The advantage of general and complete disarmament over all other plans for preserving peace is, first and foremost, that it is the easiest to put into practice. Its implementation would exclude the possibility of any State's gaining military advantages and guarantee equality of conditions for all countries. This permits the elimination of many of the obstacles which have arisen when merely partial disarmament measures have been under consideration and when individual States have feared that the application of such measures might destroy the balance of forces and be prejudicial to their security.

Whereas before many States were suspicious of the various plans for disarmament, regarding them as an attempt by the other side to obtain certain unilateral advantages, general and complete disarmament removes these fears and suspicions, since all will gain and none will lose by it. The agreement of States to begin disarmament of this kind would in itself alone be convincing proof that they did not intend to attack anyone and were resolved to found their relations with other

countries on peaceful co-existence and on respect for the sovereign rights of peoples. The implementation of general and complete disarmament would, indeed, completely deprive all States of the physical possibility of carrying out any other policy than a policy of peace.

It must be borne in mind too that the conclusion of such an agreement will also greatly simplify the exercise of international control over disarmament measures, since, if complete disarmament is achieved, States will have no reason for concealing anything from one another and the door will lie wide open for international inspection to verify the performance by States of the obligations they have assumed.

The destruction of the means of war would radically change the whole situation in the world. Over and above the fact that general and complete disarmament would remove from the people the intolerable burden of military expenditures and would give all countries new prospects for economic development, it would create unparalleled opportunities for sharply raising the standard of living of all peoples, by employing for useful purposes the funds now immobilized in the form of unproductive military expenditures. Such phenomena in international relations as the arms race and the "cold war", militarism and war propaganda, which poison the peaceful labour of the peoples, would vanish into the past forever and remain only as a bad memory in the history of mankind. They would be replaced by lasting peaceful co-existence and mutual assistance in the mastering of as yet unknown forces of nature, outer space, nuclear energy and the natural wealth of our planet. The thoughts of men will then be directed not towards the preparation of destructive wars but to the creation of material and cultural values and to a joint struggle against the diseases and natural calamities which inflict great damage on the peoples.

Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Government, as far back as September 1959, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly for consideration at its fourteenth session a Declaration on general and complete disarmament. The idea advanced by the Soviet Union of the necessity for the complete and final elimination of all types of arms and armed forces, and thereby the destruction of the material basis for waging war, won support from the widest public circles. This found expression in the special resolution unanimously adopted on 20 November 1959 by the United Nations General Assembly at its fourteenth session.

The General Assembly proclaimed that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important one facing the world today, called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a solution of that problem, and expressed the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. In so doing, the General Assembly clearly defined the main direction of all future disarmament negotiations.

The comprehensive discussion of disarmament problems that took place at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly provided further confirmation that the majority of States understood the vital necessity of implementing general and complete disarmament, and not partial measures of one kind or another. Representatives of many States spoke during the fifteenth session of the General Assembly in favour of the adoption of specific directives for the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, with the object of preventing further delays in the solution of this problem. An entire group of neutral States together with certain other countries - India, Indonesia, United Arab Republic, Ghana, Morocco, Burma, Nepal, Iraq, Cambodia, Ceylon, Yugoslavia and Venezuela - prepared and submitted on 15 November 1960, to the General Assembly at its fifteenth session, a draft resolution containing directives which reflected the standpoints and desires of most States Members of the United Nations. This draft resolution emphasized the urgency of the speediest conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which should include the time-limits and schedules for the implementation of each successive stage of the disarmament programme.

The Soviet Government continues to hold that this draft resolution contains the essential minimum of provisions on which a treaty on general and complete disarmament should be based, and that it would facilitate the resumption of negotiations on this highly important problem of our time.

All this convincingly shows that the most extensive possibilities are open for fruitful co-operation between States for the purpose of reaching an agreement on complete disarmament. Nowhere in the world are any serious reasons to be found why general and complete disarmament should not come about, provided only that States display the desire to achieve the realization of this hope which is cherished by all the peoples.

The opponents of disarmament have expended considerable efforts in vain attempts to prove the "impracticability" of general and complete disarmament. They say, for instance, that general and complete disarmament is impossible for economic reasons, in that it would result in a disorganization of industry and an increase in unemployment. Admittedly, the conversion of economies from military to peaceful production would take a certain time and might create some temporary difficulties. But any serious shocks to the economy - even of a temporary nature - in the way, for instance, of an increase of unemployment, with which the protagonists of the arms race threaten the workers, are, of course, ruled out. The practicability of such measures, without an increase in unemployment, is confirmed by the single fact that the large-scale and highly complicated problem of reconversion in the United States was solved after the Second World War. The cessation of the arms race and the expansion of industrial production for peaceful purposes will require the employment of many highly-skilled workers, as well as of engineers and technicians; this can lead to greater employment in industry, and in production as a whole.

Disarmament will bring about a reduction of the tax burden; this means an increase in the people's purchasing power, which will permit capital investment to be expanded in every branch of the economy. For instance, the conversion to housing construction of only 5 per cent of the money at present spent in the United States for military purposes would, within fifteen years, enable housing to be provided for that country's entire population. A similar result would become possible in regard to school-building, the social and health services, municipal transport, etc. According to a statement by the National Planning Association of the United States, government expenditure on the satisfaction of immediate needs in the field of peaceful construction should, over the next five years, amount to \$330,000 million - which would substantially exceed military expenditure over the same period.

All this provides convincing evidence that the cessation of military production, far from causing any economic shocks and worsening the position of the workers, would definitely improve the economy and lead to a higher level of living for the population.

The expansion of peaceful production would also permit of ever-increasing assistance to the under-developed countries, and of a considerable development of international trade, which is at present shackled by artificial restrictions adopted in connexion with the existing arms race.

The opponents of disarmament endeavour to show that only the accumulation and perfection of weapons of war, and not their liquidation, can "prevent" the outbreak of war and safeguard peace. But that is not the case at all.

States have now already accumulated, and are continuing to accumulate, colossal quantities of nuclear weapons and of devices for delivering them to their targets. This in itself constitutes a serious danger to peace, inasmuch as the establishing of military alliances and the speeding-up of the arms race have already led to a position where even an insignificant incident can develop into global war.

In the present international circumstances of distrust and suspicion, when States have at their disposal enormous stocks of nuclear weapons, every further step forward in the arms race also increases the danger of a so-called accidental outbreak of war. Any inaccurate working of the radar system may result in an incorrect interpretation of radar readings, and hence in a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. An incorrect understanding of their orders by the airmen who, as the United States Government has affirmed, are carrying out round-the-clock flights of bombers equipped with atomic weapons may result in the bombs being dropped on the territory of some other State, with all the grievous consequences for peace that would ensue. Again, faulty electronic mechanisms in military nuclear-rocket systems may start a chain reaction in military conflict. If the nuclear arms race continues, it will become ever more difficult to prevent such "accidents".

The safeguarding of peace and security is to be found, not in a continuation of the arms race and in the accumulation of destructive devices for waging war, but in a uniting of the efforts of all States to maintain peace, in the prohibition of atomic weapons, and in general and complete disarmament.

Certain statesmen of the West are now asserting that salvation from a nuclear war of extermination is to be sought not in disarmament, but in the establishment of a system of international security, which is conceived as a sort of preliminary condition. But it is easy to see that no plans for establishing international security, however far-reaching, can lead to the desired result so long as armaments and armed forces equipped with nuclear missiles continue in existence. Moreover, the very idea of security while such weapons continue to exist is meaningless. The present type of armament, because of the lightning speed with which it can be brought to bear, is in itself a factor making for lack of security, since no controllers can prevent a sudden attack so long as the armaments of States include formidable weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them to their targets almost instantaneously. Under such circumstances, the establishment of control without disarmament would amount merely to military espionage, the open assembling of information on military potential and the location of military objectives, such as a potential aggressor must possess in order to carry out a sudden attack. Such "control" would not merely not strengthen peace but would, on the contrary, increase distrust and suspicion between States. It would be quite otherwise if general and complete disarmament were brought about. Only in this event would genuine conditions be created for ensuring the security of all States, large and small alike. If, under general and complete disarmament, it becomes necessary to take steps for the maintenance of peace and of international law and order, then, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, States should, where necessary, make available to the Security Council of the United Nations the necessary units from the militia or police contingents which they would retain after general and complete disarmament had been brought into effect. Such units, of course, may be used solely for the maintenance of peace between nations, and not for the suppression of peoples struggling for their independence and social progress, or for purposes of intervention in the domestic affairs of States. Such international armed forces should be administered by a body consisting of representatives of the socialist countries, representatives of the States at present comprised in the Western military and political alliances, and representatives of the neutralist States. In such a body, decisions should be taken unanimously.

Such a solution of the problem of ensuring international security would be in line with the interests of all countries, since collective measures, involving the use of the national police or militia contingents remaining at the disposal of States after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, would permit of the swift and effective prevention of any military conflict or aggression. At the same time, it would fully meet the security interests of States, as it would give to no individual State any sort of advantage which it might use to the detriment of other countries.

II PROPOSAL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR CONCERNING A PROGRAMME OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

On 23 September 1960, the Soviet Union, desirous of facilitating a solution of the disarmament problem, put forward for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly a new proposal entitled: "Basic clauses of a treaty on general and complete disarmament", which constituted a further development of the Soviet proposals of 18 September 1959 and 2 June 1960. The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that the proposal offers a good basis for the preparation and conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The substance of the Soviet proposals is as follows:

The Soviet Government proposes that, in three successive stages over a period of four years, or some other mutually agreed period, all States should carry out complete disarmament; in other words, that they should completely and definitively eliminate all their armed forces, armaments, military production and military installations and establishments.

In the first stage, lasting for approximately one to one and a half years, the manufacture of means of delivering nuclear weapons will be discontinued and all such means of delivery will be destroyed. During this same stage all foreign military bases in the territories of other countries will be eliminated and all foreign troops will be withdrawn from such territories. The strength of national armed forces will be substantially reduced, the force level for the USSR and the United States of America being fixed at 1.7 million men. Conventional weapons and military expenditures will be reduced correspondingly.

States having nuclear weapons at their disposal will undertake not to transfer such weapons, or to transmit information necessary for their manufacture, to States which do not possess them. States not possessing nuclear weapons will refrain from manufacturing them.

What would be the situation resulting from the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for in the first stage of the Soviet programme?

In the first place, it must be pointed out that when all means of delivering nuclear weapons - war rockets of all ranges, military aircraft, submarines and surface warships, artillery capable of firing nuclear missiles, etc. - have been eliminated and States no longer maintain armed forces and military installations outside their own borders, the threat of attack by one country against another with atomic and hydrogen weapons will be virtually eliminated. For the sake of achieving this great goal the Soviet Union has even expressed its readiness to begin disarmament with the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, in spite of the fact that it enjoys a universally recognized superiority in the most modern and efficient means of this kind, namely, in intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union cannot overlook the following circumstance: the elimination of any particular type of nuclear-weapon carrier - for example, of only intercontinental rockets - would put States in an unequal position. Intercontinental rockets are only one of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. A target may be destroyed with nuclear weapons with the help of aircraft operating either from land bases or from aircraft-carriers. Nuclear weapons may also be used by long-range artillery and submarines. To isolate the one question of ballistic missiles would be to place in a privileged position those States which have covered the whole world with their military bases. That is why it is necessary to bring about the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons without exception and of military bases in foreign territories.

It must also be pointed out that, not only at each separate stage of the Soviet proposals but within the framework of the whole programme, the disarmament measures are linked together in such a way that their implementation would not create a military advantage for any country or group of countries.

The implementation of all the measures in the first stage of the Soviet disarmament programme will mean a significant reduction in the armed forces and armaments of States as well as the prevention of a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. All this will not only stop the dangerous arms race but will also substantially reduce the possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict.

As can be seen, the Soviet Union is in favour of proceeding, immediately, at the very beginning of the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, to carry out effective disarmament measures, which at the same time are bound to have a beneficial effect upon the international situation as a whole. Of course, the goal - the complete elimination of the threat of war - will not have been reached with the completion of the first stage. States will continue to have at their disposal the weapons of mass destruction themselves as well as rather considerable armed forces and conventional armaments. The proposals of the Government of the USSR accordingly provide that after the international control body and the Security Council are satisfied that all States have fulfilled their obligations with respect to this stage, the States will proceed to take subsequent disarmament measures constituting the second and third stages.

In the second stage, the Soviet Government proposes the implementation of the complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, including the cessation of the manufacture and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons, and the carrying out of a further reduction of national armed forces with a corresponding reduction in armaments, military technical equipment and military expenditures.

However, the Soviet Government takes the position that matters must not stop even here. In order to reach general and complete disarmament it is necessary to go still further and, in the third stage, complete the elimination of the armed forces and armaments of all States, cease military production, abolish war ministries, general staffs and military and para-military establishments and organizations of every kind, as well as discontinue the appropriation of funds for military purposes.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw attention to the fact that its proposals contain control provisions which have been worked out thoroughly and in detail. The proposals provide that from the very beginning disarmament measures - both the process of disarmament as a whole and each measure separately - will proceed under strict and effective control. With this in view, immediately after the entry into force of the treaty on general and complete disarmament an international control organization is to be set up which will have at its disposal in all countries parties to the treaty its own staff, recruited on an international basis. This organization is to station its inspectors and control officers in the territories of States in such a way as to enable them to proceed to perform their duties at the very moment when States begin to implement disarmament measures. It follows that the Soviet Union does not by any means propose to begin with disarmament and only later to establish control, as certain people in the West are trying tendentiously to make out.

The Soviet proposals contain detailed provisions concerning the structure and functions of the control organization. They provide, in particular, that the control organization is to comprise all States parties to the treaty, whose representatives are to consider all matters arising out of the implementation of effective control over disarmament. A conference is to elect a control council, which will be responsible for the practical administration of the entire control system, will draw up instructions and will in good time analyse and process the reports rendered to it.

What ought the composition of this council to be? In the view of the Soviet Government, the control council will consist of representatives of socialist countries, of representatives of States now members of Western military and political alliances, and of representatives of neutral States. In proposing this composition of the control council, the Soviet Union bases itself on the real situation which has come about in the world, on the need to secure the interests of all three main groups of States.

The Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament is based on the necessity of ensuring equal conditions with respect to control for all parties to the agreement. This constitutes a guarantee that the control organization will not become a weapon in the hands of any isolated group of States but will be a body that expresses and safeguards the interests of all.

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Control measures should be indissolubly linked with specific disarmament measures and should be adapted to these measures. What is important is disarmament, not control. Control is a means of verifying the fulfilment by States of this or that disarmament measure. Control in isolation, not linked to disarmament measures, would become an international system of legalized espionage.

How does the Soviet Union apply this principle in its proposals? In the Soviet programme the task of control, its functions and powers, would constantly expand as the disarmament process was carried out, embracing more and more new fields.

As has already been stated, the first stage of the programme proposed by the Soviet Government envisages the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons to their targets, together with the dismantling of foreign military bases, a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons and several other measures. The Soviet plan also includes appropriate provisions for control over these measures.

In the first stage, on-site international control would be established for the elimination of all means which could be used as vehicles for the delivery of atomic and nuclear weapons. The control organization would have the right to inspect all undertakings, plants, factories and shipyards formerly used entirely or in part for the production of rockets, aircraft, surface warships, submarines and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons. In addition, the international control teams dispatched by the control organization would have the right to carry out a thorough inspection of rocket devices launched for peaceful scientific uses and to be present at their launching.

The Soviet proposals also include effective control measures for on-the-spot verification of the disbanding of troops and the destruction of conventional weapons. They enumerate specifically and in detail the tasks and functions of the controllers.

Similarly, control measures are formulated for the second and third stages of the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament.

Should the control organization be maintained after the programme of general and complete disarmament has been carried out? The Soviet Government's plan provides that even after the entire programme of general and complete disarmament

has been put into effect, the control organization will continue to function and to maintain constant supervision to ensure that no State secretly resumes war production and begins again to build up armed forces. Given conditions of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control must be exercised. The control organs must be assured of free access to all places without any so-called veto, any prohibition, any limitation from any quarter whatsoever, including the State in whose territory control is being exercised. The inspectors should have free entry at all times and in all places.

The Soviet Union is a consistent advocate of really effective and strict disarmament control. The Soviet Union is not a whit less desirous than the Western Powers that the agreement on general and complete disarmament should be carried out by all States, and is doing everything within its own power to prevent the problem of control from becoming a stumbling-block on the road to disarmament. The control system envisaged in the Soviet proposals is a reliable and adequate one. If the United States and other Western Powers do not agree to it, then the Soviet Government, as Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has repeatedly stated, is ready to accept any control proposals put forward by the Western Powers, on condition that they for their part agree to accept the Soviet Union's proposals on general and complete disarmament.

It is of great importance that agreement should be reached on the principle that in the course of the negotiations a single treaty on general and complete disarmament should be worked out and concluded, covering all stages of such a disarmament programme and setting precise dates for the completion both of the various stages and of the disarmament programme as a whole. Any failure to reach agreement on the entire programme might enable the opponents of disarmament, resorting to ruses of various kinds, to delay or even prevent the implementation of disarmament measures. Only if there is a definite agreement, together with precisely specified time-limits for its implementation, will the obligations assumed by States under the terms of the treaty on general and complete disarmament have any reality.

In view of the urgent need for a solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet Government considers that States should exert themselves to the utmost to carry out a disarmament programme within the shortest possible time. Accordingly,

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the Soviet Union proposes that the programme of general and complete disarmament should be carried out within a period of four to five years. In proposing this time-limit the Soviet Union has had due regard to the actual ability of States to dismantle their war machines and convert their economies to peaceful aims.

The Soviet Union is ready to study other proposals regarding time-limits for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. In any case, however, the agreed time-limit should be entirely specific and as short as possible.

Such are the main provisions of the Soviet Union's most recent proposals on general and complete disarmament.

In working out these proposals the Soviet Government has met the Western Powers half way on a number of important points. The Soviet Union has reconsidered the order of implementation of the measures envisaged in the programme of complete and general disarmament. In including among the measures to be carried out during the first stage the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the USSR has taken into account the view expressed by France, notably through the mouth of President de Gaulle of France during his talks with Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in April 1960. The Soviet Government still hopes that this approach may facilitate the achievement of agreement with the Western Powers on the entire programme of general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Union has taken into account the statements of representatives of the Western Powers that from the first stage, measures relating to nuclear weapons should be combined with measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. To that end, the Soviet proposals envisage a substantial reduction in the armed forces and conventional weapons of States at the very first stage.

As the United States and other Western Powers have repeatedly stated in the course of the disarmament negotiations that the placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of devices capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited from the very beginning, a provision to that effect is included in the Soviet proposals along with other disarmament measures. In accordance with the wishes expressed, in particular, by the United States, the Soviet Government

has included in its proposals a provision that rockets should be launched for peaceful scientific purposes only and that such launchings should be subject to agreed control measures, including on-the-spot inspection of the rocket-launching sites. Considering that these measures are included among the measures to be applied during the first stage, there is every justification for the view that the United States should be satisfied with the fulfilment of its wishes concerning the prohibition of the use of cosmic space for military purposes.

The Soviet Union has also taken into consideration in its programme the proposal on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. As is known, a resolution on this question was supported by a majority of States at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly.

The Soviet Government cannot fail to take into account the fact that the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament will require of all participants in the negotiations patience, mutual respect for the interests of the parties, and flexibility. The Soviet Government is ready, as in the past, to enter into such negotiations. In that connexion it would like to stress once again that the settlement of the disarmament problem depends to a large extent on agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Such agreement, if it were reached, would be a major step towards the strengthening of peace and a great blessing to all mankind.

The Soviet Government hopes that such negotiations, like the bilateral exchange of views on disarmament questions between the Soviet Union and the United States, will facilitate the efforts to find a solution of the disarmament problem acceptable to all parties, in the interests of all the peoples of the world.

THE NEED FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Aide-mémoire

19 July 1961

The Soviet Government regards general and complete disarmament as an international problem whose solution brooks no further delay.

Disarmament negotiations have been dragging on now for more than fifteen years. During that time a variety of commissions, committees and sub-committees have discussed innumerable disarmament proposals. The results of these long-drawn-out negotiations have been far from encouraging: hundreds of meetings, mountains of records filling up the archives of the organs concerned, and no agreement.

In the meantime, beyond the walls of the disarmament conference chambers, events have been occurring which with every passing year have increased the danger of a new war. The establishment by the Western Powers of a complex of military blocs - NATO, SEATO, CENTO - aimed against peace-loving States, the creation of a dense network of United States bases on foreign soil, the "cold war" provocations which have poisoned relations among States and the constant efforts made to accelerate the armaments race have been providing the most dangerous kind of fuel for another war.

The headlong development of science and military technology for its part has led not only to the creation of monstrous nuclear bombs the explosion of which over great industrial and cultural centres would bring mutilation and death to many tens of millions of people, but also to the addition to the armaments of States of intercontinental ballistic missiles, missiles capable of delivering nuclear war-heads irrevocably to any point on earth in a matter of minutes. Wars have always been a terrible calamity for the peoples; but in the conditions prevailing today they could for certain States be a catastrophe whose consequences would spell their ruin.

If this dangerous concatenation of events is to be broken, drastic measures and a new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem are necessary, not a game of diplomatic leap-frog intended to deceive the peoples and prevent agreement on disarmament. The Soviet Government considers that this purpose will

be served by general and complete disarmament, with the elimination of all armed forces and armaments of States, including nuclear weapons and rockets, and the destruction of the military organization and machinery of countries. The implementation of these measures could lead mankind to a world in which there would never again be the possibility of war.

The idea of general and complete disarmament has already found its way to the hearts of the people. The overwhelming majority of the world's States have spoken out in favour of a solution of this pressing problem of our times. Recognizing general and complete disarmament as the most important question confronting mankind, the United Nations General Assembly at its fourteenth session called upon all States to bend their efforts towards its speedy accomplishment. The peoples see it as the only sure road towards lasting peace.

While States still possess weapons, the danger of an outbreak of war cannot fully be removed. While armaments and armed forces remain, even if they be reduced, restricted or cut down, the possibility persists that an armed conflict may break out and that one State may use armed force against another.

Unfortunately the position adopted by the United States of America at the bilateral USSR-United States talks at Washington shows that that country is opposed to the carrying out of general and complete disarmament. In its proposals the Government of the United States says not a single word about the need to resolve this pressing problem. It proposes that efforts should be confined to the discussion of some very vague measures which presumably should lead to the goal of "controlled universal disarmament". It may be recalled in this connexion that the Soviet Union has frequently had to deal with similar vague proposals on the part of the Western Powers which - as is clear from the history of years of negotiations, including those which took place in the days of the League of Nations - have been followed by continuous efforts on the part of the opponents of disarmament to prevent agreement on each and every disarmament question.

The latest proposals of the United States on the basic principles for disarmament submitted in Moscow on 17 July show that the negative position of the United States in relation to general and complete disarmament remains substantially unchanged.

This approach to the solution of the disarmament problem affords no break in the chain of obstacles created by the policy of the Western Powers, obstacles

which have hindered the achievement of disarmament in the past, for it offers not the slightest solution to the principal problem now confronting the peoples of the world, that of ensuring a peaceful life for themselves.

It should also be borne in mind that the United States Government in essence makes the implementation of even limited measures of disarmament dependent on a number of preliminary conditions such as the solution of outstanding international political problems, the formation of international armed forces, etc. It brings all this under the head of international security, but in fact its position has nothing whatever to do with the provision of such security. No plans for creating international security can achieve the desired results while there remain armaments and armed forces equipped with missiles and nuclear devices, while States still hold these terrible weapons in their hands

In recent times particular stress has been laid on the need for the establishment of international armed forces.

But assuming that these armed forces are established, what, in fact, would be their practical use at the present time? Surely no one is going to maintain that such armed forces, which would be limited in number, could be used against a great Power, or indeed against any reasonably strong State. Hence, in present conditions, when the Western Powers are in effect proposing that the command of the international armed forces should be placed under their own control, these forces would be confined to the shameful role of an international gendarmerie which would be used to frustrate the national liberation movements of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, as recent events in the Congo have tellingly demonstrated.

There can be no doubt that the formation of an international police force as is now suggested by the United States would exacerbate the international situation still further and make it more difficult to achieve genuine disarmament by States.

The position would be quite different in a world disarmed, in which the necessary conditions existed for truly guaranteeing the security of all States, both large and small, would be present. If, given general and complete disarmament, there should arise a need for collective action to maintain peace or guarantee international law and order, then States would be required, in the

necessary conditions, to place at the disposal of the Security Council units from the contingents of police (or militia) which they would retain after general disarmament had been completed.

The direction of these international armed forces should, of course, be effected by an organ consisting of representatives of the Socialist countries, representatives of the States now participating in the Western political and military alliances and representatives of the neutralist States. The decisions of this body should be taken unanimously. This would be the only way of guaranteeing that these units would be used solely for the purpose of maintaining peace and not for that of obstructing the efforts of peoples to secure their national independence or of interference in the domestic affairs of States.

The United States suggests, as one of the first measures to be taken, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. But the mere cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, without a prohibition of nuclear weapons or the solution of the entire disarmament problem, can in no way diminish the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war.

It is an open secret that by now enormous reserves of nuclear bombs have been accumulated, together with fissionable materials for their production, and that these are more than enough for the conduct of a devastating war, a war which would have the most grievous consequences for mankind. The mere cessation of the production of fissionable materials would have no effect whatever on the possibility of the use of existing reserves for the conduct of an atomic war, if such a war should break out. Its only consequence would be the establishment of control over undertakings producing fissionable materials from atomic raw materials, and over large high-energy research reactors.

But what would be the advantage of this control? It has been shown by scientists that it would not stop the production of nuclear bombs from existing reserves of fissionable materials or the reconstruction and improvement of bombs made earlier. The United States Government itself admits that the processes of production of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes and for military purposes are essentially the same. It must therefore recognize that control would not serve the purpose of preventing the clandestine production of nuclear

weapons. This could be done only by means of comprehensive control, which is possible only in connexion with general and complete disarmament.

In present conditions control without practical disarmament measures would merely permit interested agencies in certain States, which are working on war plans, to gather information about the atomic resources of those whom they regard as their eventual enemies, and to search out and identify bombing objectives.

Furthermore, the mere cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, when the question of reducing the threat of an atomic war has been left unresolved, would play into the hands of those who want to lull the vigilance of the peoples and delude them into believing that some steps have been taken towards the removal of the nuclear danger, whereas in fact that danger would still threaten the world and would indeed grow greater with the continued production and accumulation of nuclear weapons.

It is also suggested that control should be established over intercontinental and cosmic ballistic missiles, quite separately from other disarmament measures. This is not a sound proposal, and the Soviet Union cannot accept it. It is not difficult to see that the object of those who advance it is to damage the security interests of the Soviet Union.

The question of the abolition of intercontinental and cosmic ballistic missiles and the establishment of control over them cannot be considered or resolved independently from the question of dismantling military bases in the territory of other countries. The United States, deliberately separating these two questions, wants to preserve the military bases it has strung around the whole globe.

Such a demand could be accepted only in the event of capitulation. But the Soviet Union is not in a situation in which such demands can be put to it. Can the Soviet Union accept conditions which would undermine its own security while the other side would secure unilateral military advantages? Obviously not.

In the course that has been proposed to us there is no basis for agreement, and it seems that those who have made these proposals have no desire to seek common ground.

The course proposed by the United States Government, if it were adopted, would preclude any possibility of agreement and would lead, not to a reduction of the threat of war but rather to its increase, for a country which has secured unilateral military advantages might resort to force in an attempt to achieve its aggressive aims.

This is but added proof that, while States still possess armed forces equipped with the entire range of modern devices from rifles to nuclear bombs and rockets, while the war machinery of States is continuously drawing ever increasing human and material resources into the sphere of military preparations, and while military staffs are engaged in devising plans for nuclear and rocket attacks, there is no possibility of removing the threat of war.

It is a well known fact that in the past the Western Powers have used the matter of control as a means of avoiding any constructive steps towards disarmament. At the same time, flying in the face of the facts, they misrepresented the position of the Soviet Government and claimed that the Soviet Union was opposed to control in any form. The Soviet Government has often demonstrated the absurdity of such charges. The Soviet Union is opposed to control over armaments, on which the United States Government has stubbornly insisted and on which, apparently it is still insisting. But the Soviet Union has urged and still urges the need for control over disarmament. It was and still is in favour of effective control to the very widest extent, in connexion with general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government and its Head, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, personally have repeatedly declared that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to any control if the Western Powers will accept its proposals for general and complete disarmament.

Many States, including the Soviet Union, have quite rightly reacted with extreme suspicion to proposals in the sphere of disarmament, when these proposals have had the effect of giving one side military advantages to the detriment of the security interests of the other side. General and complete disarmament would remove all fears and suspicions regarding control. Its implementation would exclude the possibility of giving military advantages to anyone whatever, and would guarantee equal conditions for all countries. All States and all peoples would benefit from it. They would gain peace, and only those would lose who are endeavouring to kindle the flames of another war.

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These are the main reasons why the Soviet Government urges the immediate solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament which is the most pressing problem of our day.

The Soviet Government hopes that the considerations set forth in this aide-mémoire on the basic principles for disarmament may make it possible, in the course of bilateral USSR-United States negotiations, to work out agreed decisions on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which may then serve as the basis for the subsequent detailed discussions of this matter in which a greater number of States may participate.

CONTROL OVER GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Aide-mémoire dated 21 July 1961

The Soviet Government is in favour of establishing strict international control over disarmament. The USSR's position on this matter is based on the belief that it is essential to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament which would provide a firm guarantee that none of the parties would violate its obligations. It is unnecessary to stress that it is a matter of concern no less to the Soviet Union than to other States that any disarmament agreement should be carried out conscientiously by all parties. It is, rather, a matter of more concern to it. Knowing how little value its presumed partners in a disarmament agreement attach to their signatures on documents by which they assume obligations of one kind or another, the Soviet Union will never agree to any disarmament measures without effective control over their execution.

General and complete disarmament will require the most careful international control, and the control organs must have guaranteed access to any place at any time, without any so-called veto, without any prohibitions, without any restrictions.

In order to make it easier to reach an agreement with the Western Powers and to prevent the control question becoming an obstacle which would make it impossible to conclude a disarmament agreement, the Soviet Government has stated that if the Western Powers will accept the proposal on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union will unconditionally accept those Powers' proposals on control. This statement, made by the Head of the Soviet Government, N.S. Khrushchev, in the United Nations General Assembly, makes it clear to everyone that it is not the Soviet Union's attitude which prevents a solution of the problem of disarmament control, but the attempts of certain circles in the Western countries to use this problem in order to create an artificial barrier to disarmament and to the liberation of mankind from the threat of war.

The Soviet Union, being in favour of disarmament control and wishing to facilitate as much as possible an agreement on such control, is resolutely opposed to control of armaments, on which the United States Government has so far insisted. Control of that kind would not only not limit the arms race in

any way, but, on the contrary, would create conditions in which it would continue unchecked and in which there would be further accumulation of all types of armaments, including nuclear and rocket weapons. Control not linked with disarmament measures would become an international system of legalized espionage, providing an opportunity for the War Ministries of certain States to obtain information in which they are interested. It would thus help to promote, not disarmament, but the preparation of a new war.

It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Government cannot accept control before disarmament, as it was invited to do by the United States delegation during the Soviet-United States disarmament talks at Washington. Control before disarmament is nothing other than a form of arms control - in other words, control over a continuing arms race - which the Soviet Government categorically rejects.

The Soviet Government would like to draw attention to the fact that the USSR's proposals on general and complete disarmament contain quite detailed provisions regarding control.

These proposals provide that all agreed disarmament measures should from start to finish be subject to strict and effective international control. As soon as a treaty on general and complete disarmament comes into force, an international control organization should be set up, which would station its staff, appointed on an international basis, in all countries parties to the treaty.

The control organization would consist of all States parties to the treaty, whose representatives would meet periodically in conference to consider questions connected with the maintenance of effective control over disarmament. The conference would elect a control council, consisting of both permanent and non-permanent members, which would have subsidiary organs in the field. The control council would comprise representatives of the socialist countries, representatives of the States which at present belong to Western military and political alliances, and representatives of neutral States. Except in certain specified cases, decisions of the control council on substantive matters would be taken by a two-thirds majority, and on procedural matters by a simple majority.

The control council would be responsible for the practical administration of the control system; it would prepare instructions and make a prompt study and

analysis of the reports it received. States would provide the control council with information on their armed forces and armaments.

In all countries parties to the agreement, the control organization would have its own staff, recruited on an international basis with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution and in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. The control organization would station its inspectors in the various States so that they could proceed to discharge their functions as soon as the States began to carry out measures in the field of disarmament. Every party to the treaty would undertake to guarantee prompt and unhindered access for controllers and inspection teams to any point within its territory where disarmament measures subject to check were to be put into effect, or to any area where there was to be on-site inspection of such measures. To that end the parties to the treaty would place at the disposal of the control organization any means of transport necessary for travel by its staff within their territory.

On the territory of each party to the treaty, the control organization staff would enjoy such privileges and immunities as were necessary for their exercising of independent and unhindered control over the implementation of the disarmament treaty. The teams of international controllers would include specialists of a suitable kind, depending on the nature of the units to be disbanded and the types of arms to be destroyed. The controllers and the control council would communicate through existing channels, with such privileges as were necessary to ensure quick delivery of reports and instructions.

All expenditure by the international control organization would be financed from funds made available by States parties to the treaty. The scale of contributions would be fixed in the text of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In order for international control to be really effective, control measures must be indissolubly linked with, and must correspond to, concrete disarmament measures. If specific procedures for supervising disarmament measures were not laid down, control would not fulfil its purpose, but would merely constitute an opportunity for espionage. From this it follows that the duties, functions and powers of the control organization must be continually extended as the disarmament process evolves, and must cover more and more new spheres.

As is known, the first stage of the Soviet programme provides for the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target, the liquidation of foreign military bases, a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional arms, and certain other measures. Control provisions have been drawn up with reference to these measures, so that the international control organ would have the means and facilities wherewith to carry out the tasks entrusted to it.

Accordingly, in the first stage, on-site international control would be established to supervise the destruction of rocket weapons, military aircraft, surface warships, submarines and other items which can be used to carry atomic and hydrogen weapons.

International inspection teams would be dispatched to military bases and places where troops are stationed on foreign territory, to supervise the liquidation of these bases and the withdrawal of military personnel and troops to their own territory. Control would also be established at aerodromes and ports, in order to ensure that they were not used for military purposes. At the same time, rocket launching sites would be demolished under the supervision of the international control organization, with the exception of those preserved for the launching of rockets for peaceful scientific purposes.

The control organization would have the right to inspect without hindrance all undertakings, works, factories and dockyards which had previously been engaged wholly or partly in the production of rockets, aircraft, surface warships, submarines and any other means of delivering nuclear weapons, in order to prevent the secret production of equipment which might be used to carry atomic and hydrogen weapons. Permanent control teams might be established, by agreement, at certain factories and plants.

There would be on-site international control over the disbanding of military forces and the destruction of armaments.

The controllers' tasks would include: supervising prompt and faithful compliance with the decisions on the disbanding of large and small military units and on the withdrawal and destruction of the material components of conventional weapons, military equipment and military stocks; and reporting to the control council and to the Government of the country in which they were located.

The control organization would be given unrestricted access to material relating to the budgetary appropriations made by States for military purposes, including all decisions taken in the matter by the States' legislative and executive bodies.

The international inspection teams dispatched by the control organization would have the right to carry out a comprehensive inspection of rocket devices launched for peaceful scientific purposes, and to be present at the time of their launching.

Measures for control over the second and third stages of the programme for general and complete disarmament would be worked out in a similar way. Thus, during the second stage, representatives of the control organization would carry out on-the-spot inspection of the destruction of all existing stocks of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The control organization would have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract atomic raw materials or produce or use atomic materials or atomic energy. Permanent control teams might, by agreement, be established at certain undertakings and plants.

International on-the-spot control over the disbanding of military forces and the destruction of armaments would continue to be carried out.

During the third stage, the conclusion of the process of eliminating all military forces and destroying all types of armament, as well as the elimination of the States' war machinery - War Ministries and all their organs in the field - would be controlled. The international control organization would send controllers to verify, on the spot, the abolition of War Ministries, General Staffs and all military and militarized establishments and organizations, and the cessation of military training and all other types of military activity. Control would be established over the cessation of the allocation of funds for military purposes.

Where necessary, the control organization might establish a system of aerial observation and aerial photography over the States' territories.

The Soviet Government believes that, even after the entire programme of general and complete disarmament has been carried out, the control organization should continue to operate and carry out inspection, on a permanent basis, in order to ensure that none of the States shall secretly re-engage in military

production or again begin to establish armed forces. Once general and complete disarmament has been effected, the control organization should have the right to inspect any place and any object on the States' territories.

The States should transmit to the control organization data on the location of police (militia) contingents, their total strength in numbers in each place (area), and any movements of significant numbers of police (militia) close to their borders. The international inspection teams must exercise thorough control to ensure that the numerical composition of the police (militia) and their armament correspond to the agreed levels for each country.

The Soviet proposal for international control shows plainly that the control system which the Soviet Union proposes in regard to the implementation of measures of general and complete disarmament is a truly effective and reliable one.

If, however, the United States and the other Western Powers are for any reason not in agreement with this proposal and submit their own proposals for the strengthening of control, the Soviet Government is not only prepared to consider the proposals of the United States and the other countries with regard to control but, as N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has repeatedly stated, is also ready to accept any proposal of the Western Powers - that is, any proposal concerning control - provided that they, for their part, agree to accept the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament.

SOVIET-UNITED STATES DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

27 July 1961

From ... June to ... July, an exchange of views took place between representatives of the Governments of the USSR and of the United States of America on the question of disarmament.

During this exchange of views, both sides noted with concern that the continuing arms race was placing a heavy burden on mankind and was fraught with great danger for the cause of the maintenance of world peace.

In view of the fact that all States Members of the United Nations, as stated in resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 adopted at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, consider that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today, both parties recognized the need to devote all efforts to achieving as soon as possible a constructive solution for the problem of general and complete disarmament and concluding a treaty on such disarmament on the basis of the following principles:

I. The ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament is the creation of a world in which war will no longer be an instrument for settling international problems and all weapons and means of waging war will be abolished.

II. General and complete disarmament should include:

(a) the disbanding of all armed forces, the cessation of the production of armaments and their liquidation;

(b) a complete ban on the use, storage and production of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and any other weapons of mass destruction;

(c) the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction and of all foreign bases on alien territories;

(d) the abolition of all organs and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States; the cessation of military training of the people, and the closing of all military training institutions;

(e) the discontinuance of military expenditures.

III. After the achievement of general and complete disarmament, States should only have the strictly limited contingents of police (militia) agreed upon for each country, armed with light rifles and used to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

IV. General and complete disarmament should be effected in an agreed sequence, by stages and within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage.

V. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

VI. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be implemented from beginning to end under strict and effective international control, the extent of which should correspond to the extent and nature of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international control organization including all States should be created within the framework of the United Nations. Under conditions of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control must be implemented. The control organs must be allowed access everywhere without any so-called veto, without any ban and without restriction from any quarter, including the State over whose territory the control is being effected. The inspectors must be allowed free access at all times and to all places.

VII. Under conditions of general and complete disarmament, the necessary measures should be taken, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security, including the obligation of States to provide the Security Council, where necessary, with manpower from the contingents of police (militia) retained by States for the maintenance of internal order. The administration of these international armed forces should be entrusted to a body composed of representatives of the socialist countries, representatives of the States which are now members of Western military and political alliances, and representatives from the neutral States. Decisions in this body should be taken unanimously.

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Both sides consider that the above principles should form the basis for the work of the Disarmament Committee, and urge the member States of the Committee, and all other States in the world, to co-operate in order that a treaty on general and complete disarmament may be drawn up and signed as soon as possible.

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1961 ADDRESSED
BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN THE
USSR-UNITED STATES BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON DISARMAMENT TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

Dear Mr. McCloy,

I have received your letter of 20 September 1961, in which you express a reservation with regard to the position which the United States of America intends to adopt in subsequent negotiations on disarmament.

According to the agreement which we reached in the course of a bilateral exchange of views, the United States agreed not to include, in the joint statement by the Governments of the USSR and the United States on the principles for disarmament negotiations, the proposal with which you are conversant and the adoption of which would imply acceptance of the concept of the establishment of control over armaments instead of control over disarmament. In your letter you say that this proposal "expresses a key element in the United States position".

In this connexion I must state that, as you know, the position of the USSR on the question of control over general and complete disarmament has been thoroughly and clearly explained in the statements of the Soviet Government and its leader N.S. Khrushchev. The Soviet Union favours the most thorough and strict international control over the measures of general and complete disarmament. While strongly advocating effective control over disarmament and wishing to facilitate as much as possible the achievement of agreement on this control, the Soviet Union is at the same time resolutely opposed to the establishment of control over armaments.

It appears from your letter that the United States is trying to establish control over the armed forces and armaments retained by States at any given stage of disarmament. However, such control, which in fact means control over armaments, would turn into an international system of legalized espionage, which would naturally be unacceptable to any State concerned for its security and the interests of preserving peace throughout the world. The position of the United States on this question, if it insists on the proposal described above, will inevitably complicate agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament, on the general principles of which we have agreed.

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The Soviet Union will continue to make every effort towards the earliest preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

I have the honour to be, etc.

V. ZORIN

Permanent Representative of the USSR
to the United Nations
