

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/4772/Add.1
2 November 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Sixteenth session

LETTER DATED 1 NOVEMBER 1961 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

We have the honour, on instructions from Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and from the Government of the United States of America, to transmit additional documents from the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. These documents relate to the Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, which has been circulated as document A/4772 of 3 June 1961, and are entitled: "Alternative Texts of Paragraphs 5 and 7 of Draft Article 10; Addendum to Article 6; and Revised sub-paragraph (viii) and (ix), paragraph 3c of Article 9". They also include excerpts from pages 3 through 18 of the final verbatim record of the 337th meeting of the Conference.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 1578 (XV) which, inter alia, "requests the States concerned in the Geneva negotiations: (a) To keep the Disarmament Commission periodically informed of the progress of their negotiations, (b) To report the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly", we should be grateful if this letter and its enclosure could be circulated to all Members of the United Nations as a document of the General Assembly and of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) Patrick DEAN
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

(Signed) Adlai E. STEVENSON
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the
United Nations

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The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The three hundred and thirty-seventh meeting of the Conference is open. Does any representative wish to speak?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Although I have not attended meetings of the Conference for about two months I have followed its activities in detail from Washington, where I have been able to conduct extensive consultations on all of the aspects of these negotiations, and I take pleasure in greeting my old colleagues at this conference table.

Needless to say, every official in the United States Government who is connected with these talks, from President Kennedy down, has been deeply disappointed at the complete lack of acceptance by the Soviet Union of the very constructive proposals put forward by the United Kingdom and the United States in an effort to get a workable nuclear test ban treaty.

The world has noted and continues to note with approval the sincere desire of the Western Powers to conclude a sound nuclear test ban treaty as rapidly as possible - a desire dramatically evidenced by their far-reaching moves on and since 21 March last and by their repeated statements of readiness to enter into serious give-and-take negotiations on still unresolved questions - and, on the other hand, has noted and continues to note with disapproval the totally negative and obstructive policy of the Soviet Union towards a nuclear test ban agreement. Neither the American people nor its Government, nor the peoples of the world, can find any sense or purpose in this Soviet policy which can only have the effect of increasing world tensions still further.

Even the Soviet Government has not denied the benefits that would flow from a sound agreement banning further nuclear weapon tests. For instance, in his letter of 4 April 1958 to President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev wrote:

"Hardly anyone will deny that the discontinuance of experiments with atomic and hydrogen weapons would greatly improve the international political atmosphere as a whole and would create more favourable conditions for the settlement of other unsolved international problems."

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In the same vein Mr. Tsarapkin himself has also stated on a number of occasions at these meetings that a test ban could play a useful role in inhibiting the further spread of independent nuclear weapon production capabilities and that it would also mark a great step forward in relations between East and West. Moreover, as I noted (GEN/DNT/PV.312, page 7) at the three hundred and twelfth meeting, a test ban would constitute a significant measure of "anticipatory" disarmament which could prevent the appearance on the world scene of still more destructive weapons.

Despite the lip service given by the Soviet Government to these very worthwhile aims, it has nevertheless in practice followed a policy which not only has made agreement between East and West extremely difficult but must indeed, I regret to say, have been calculated to make agreement here impossible. For the course of the Soviet Union in recent months at this Conference has not only been to reject or belittle the major accommodations made by the United States and the United Kingdom to Soviet demands in order to get an effective nuclear test ban treaty. The USSR has also moved backwards to a major extent. It has done this by expressly reversing the position of the Soviet Union on a major question, namely, the appointment of a single administrator and his major deputies, on which agreement between the sides had been worked out only on 6 July 1960 after many months of laborious effort.

On top of that, the Soviet Union's statement in its aide-mémoire (GEN/DNT/111) of 4 June 1961 that all controls at the present time involve an espionage risk has led the Soviet Union, in effect, to repudiate a control system of the type recommended by the experts at Geneva in 1958 as being of too broad a scope, in present circumstances, and, therefore, as being incompatible with Soviet security requirements.

In addition, because of its narrow and outmoded view of its own inordinate security needs as a closed and secret society, the Soviet Union has stressed that regardless of the cost to humanity, its position is totally inflexible upon a number of other questions still at issue regarding essential control machinery for a nuclear test ban treaty.

Finally, after having deliberately created these new obstacles to agreement and after having thus gone far to remove the possibility of finding any mutually acceptable basis for a treaty, the Soviet Union has seized upon the resulting

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deadlock as a pretext for proposing that these negotiations be terminated altogether and that the test ban question be merged into a consideration of general disarmament problems without any agreement as to when it would actually come up for discussion. Indeed, the last Soviet note (GEN/DNT/116) of 9 August to the United States implies that the Soviet Union does not now propose even to discuss the problem of a test ban at the general disarmament conference. It indicates, rather, that once an agreement on general disarmament has been reached, whenever that may be, the question of a test ban will have become moot because of the general elimination of military activities. Therefore, it seems to say that no special agreement on a nuclear test ban will ever be required at all.

As I have already said, the United States Government cannot concur in the view that a treaty to terminate nuclear weapon tests is no longer important to the world at large. Whatever may happen in the next few years in the field of general disarmament negotiations, the problem of banning nuclear tests under effective international control arrangements is an immediate one. Without a properly functioning control system, there is no assurance whatsoever that the current so-called de facto moratorium on tests actually is being carried out in the closed society of the Soviet Union, although the Soviet Union knows full well that the United Kingdom and the United States, with their open societies, are indeed observing it by not testing. There is no guarantee that clandestine nuclear weapon tests, which are perfectly possible from a technical point of view, are not already being carried out in secret on the territory of the Soviet Union, in violation of the current informal moratorium on testing, to its advantage and to the disadvantage of the world.

So, at the request of President Kennedy, and as evidence of his deep sincerity in seeking a nuclear test ban treaty, I have returned to Geneva, to this Conference room, because these issues are so important to us and to the peoples of the world. I have come because President Kennedy is determined to leave no stone unturned in an effort to bring the Soviet Union to understand that its own interests in the long run will be as much served by the conclusion of a reasonable nuclear test ban treaty as will those of the United Kingdom and the United States. Whatever military gains either side could achieve in a resumption of testing, these would be

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a much smaller contribution to the real security of the United States or of the Soviet Union than could come about from the conclusion of a first accord in the field of disarmament.

The Western Powers are convinced that the proposals which they have put forth in their draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (GEN/DNT/110, Corr.1 and Add.1) are entirely equitable and completely sound. Nevertheless they have stated, and I state again today, that these terms have never been presented on a "take it or leave it" basis to the Soviet Union. What we have said and continue to say is that only we of the West have offered a well thought out total plan in treaty language for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Despite our failure, at least up to now, to induce the Soviet delegation to comment constructively upon our proposals, we in the West have nevertheless examined all that the Soviet Union has had to say in recent months about concrete issues that have not yet been resolved with respect to a nuclear test ban. In the remainder of my statement today I should like to concentrate on one of these questions. I shall, of course, deal with some of the other problems at subsequent meetings. But it is the complex of issues involved in the proposed nuclear test ban threshold treaty and the proposed further moratorium concept of three years from the date of the signing of the treaty with respect to nuclear weapon tests producing a seismic signal of below the threshold level of 4.75 that I intend to discuss now in some detail.

The big controversy on the proposed three-year further moratorium now no longer primarily concerns the exact length of this temporary commitment but rather whether, according to the Soviet representative, this commitment should be temporary.

Despite its previous agreement to a threshold treaty and to a moratorium coterminous with the seismic research programme, the Soviet Union now says that it will not be a party to an arrangement under which any possibility is left open that testing below the treaty threshold of 4.75 might legally be resumed at the end of the three-year moratorium.

The Soviet Union goes further to charge the United States with proposing in bad faith a three-year moratorium to run from the date of the signing of the treaty, that is, proposing it with the aim of abandoning after three years the ban on

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underground tests below the threshold of 4.75 seismic scale of magnitude and of then planning to undertake such tests below the treaty threshold while the rest of the treaty and control system with respect to tests registering 4.75 and above continues to be valid and operative.

Both Mr. Stelle and I have pointed out here time and again the absurdity of this Soviet position. The moratorium arose in the first place only at the suggestion of the Soviet Union on 19 March 1960, (GEN/LNT/PV.188, pages 13 and 14) and it was explicitly meant to be a temporary expedient to prevent underground testing registering below 4.75 while a research programme went on to seek improvements in seismic controls in an attempt to lower the treaty threshold.

We have said to our Soviet colleague that his own political experience must tell him that it would, as a practical matter, be impossible for any country cavalierly to abandon the moratorium after three years unless the research results clearly showed that treaty control improvements essential for the lowering or eliminating of the threshold were not possible. Since the Soviet Union is confident that nothing but improvements in the treaty control system's detection and identification capabilities will result from the seismic research programme, there would seem to be no cause for its pretended alarm, especially since the United States and the United Kingdom have pledged themselves to full consultation with the Soviet Union on the revision of the treaty threshold, in the full glare of world publicity, well prior to the expiration of the three-year moratorium. It appears to us that if the Soviet Union were honestly trying to overcome obstacles in this negotiation, instead of creating new ones, it would admit that its fears about Western good faith at the end of the three-year moratorium were completely groundless. Unfortunately, however, we are confronted with no such Soviet admission. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case.

Therefore, I have been authorized by President Kennedy to go even further in giving the USSR assurances that only the most objective and carefully considered actions with respect to the treaty threshold will be taken at the end of the three-year moratorium period. In fact, I am about to put forward "A proposal for reducing or eliminating the threshold in the treaty at the end of the three-year moratorium". Indeed, my Government now formally proposes that, assuming a nuclear

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test ban treaty is agreed upon, about six months before the expiration of the three-year moratorium, with respect to tests below the treaty threshold of 4.75, a panel of eminent scientists representing each of the eleven nations which will then be members of the control commission of the treaty organization should be convened. As with the commission itself, so this panel would consist of scientists from four Western States, four Soviet bloc countries and three non-aligned nations.

This scientific panel would be charged with the task of preparing a report to the eleven-nation control commission, by at least a majority vote of the scientists in it, on the following matters:

- (1) recommended improvements in the treaty control system in the light of the findings of the proposed seismic research programme in which we have asked the Soviet Union to participate;
- (2) scientific estimates of the capabilities of the control system in the light of such improvements; and
- (3) recommendations as to whether or not the treaty threshold of seismic scale of magnitude 4.75 should be lowered, and if so, to what point, and indeed whether the threshold can be eliminated entirely by scientific improvements in the treaty control system.

When that has been done, the control commission itself, composed of four Western Powers, four Soviet Powers, and three neutral or uncommitted Powers, will consider the report and agree, by majority vote, on such draft amendments to the treaty to eliminate or to reduce the threshold as may be required by such of the recommendations of the scientists as the commission may approve. All such treaty amendments would be submitted to the next annual conference of the parties, or to a special conference if the annual conference were not scheduled until after the expiration of the moratorium, since under the agreed treaty article on amendments, article 23 in the Western draft treaty (GEN/DNT/110, Corr.1 and Add.1) it is the conference which must adopt proposed amendments.

Mr. Tsarapkin has, on occasion, told us that although his Government proposed the moratorium at the one hundred and eighty-eighth meeting on 19 March 1960, he added (GEN/DNT/FV.189, pages 10 and 11) two days later, at the one hundred and eighty-ninth meeting, that the moratorium should not be permitted to expire "automatically", so that after that date each of the parties would then not be completely free to test registering up to 4.75.

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By any normal definition of the word "automatically", I think that the formal procedure which I have proposed today excludes the possibility of any "automatic" end to the moratorium. On the contrary, our plan guarantees the most careful deliberation and review - by the majority vote of eminent scientists, including at least three scientists of neutral countries, by the control commission, and by world public opinion - of the situation at the expiration of the moratorium.

There is then clearly no loophole for the resumption at the end of the moratorium of testing below the treaty threshold of 4.75. Our proposal is a means to make sure that when the treaty obligation is extended to cover underground tests of lower yields adequate control measures shall be available to monitor the fulfilment of that obligation, which will not be left to chance.

Surely the Soviet Union can now have no basis whatsoever for not being ready to accept the plan which I have just outlined, which is a clear guarantee that the moratorium will not "automatically" expire at the end of the proposed three-year term from the date of signing the treaty. However, we must take note of the statement in the Soviet aide-mémoire of 4 June 1961, that

"There can be no exceptions to the treaty; all kinds of nuclear weapons tests must be prohibited; in the air, under water, under ground and in outer space". (GEN/DNT/111, page 1)

That is precisely our objective too, and it has been from the beginning.

But this particular quoted statement implies that the Soviet Union has gone back on its proposal of 19 March of last year for a moratorium to prohibit tests with yields below 4.75 for some period after the date of the signing of the treaty, and now is merely looking for some pretext to avoid the necessary implications of its statement. If that should unfortunately prove to be the case, then my Government is unconditionally prepared to meet even this possible Soviet reversal of position, in the interest of reaching agreement on a reasonable and sound treaty at once. I will call this further proposal "A proposal for reducing or eliminating the threshold in the treaty immediately".

First let me recall a bit of history as to how the threshold ever entered into our negotiations. The Hardtack series of United States nuclear tests in the fall of 1958 produced new data which convinced American scientists that the conclusions

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of the Geneva experts in August 1958 that all underground tests could be controlled by the system which those experts recommended were not borne out by subsequent scientific discoveries.

The Soviet Union contested this new scientific data (GEN/DNT/25) when it was introduced into the Conference on 5 January 1959, and the issue was fought over spasmodically in our meetings from then until November 1959 when it was finally agreed to convene a new meeting of British, Soviet and American scientists to review the situation. These experts, who were known as Technical Working Group 2, met in December 1959. They agreed on the possibility of certain control improvements, but on nothing else. The Soviet scientists rejected the American analysis of the so-called new data and they reaffirmed their support of the 1958 Geneva experts' recommendations, whereas the British and the American scientists concluded that the underground controls recommended in 1958 would not be effective, even with the possible improvements envisaged by the same Technical Working Group 2, and that only larger seismic events could be practicably monitored by the 1958 experts' system.

It was to deal with the resulting Soviet-Western impasse that my Government proposed (GEN/DNT/PV.170, pages 5 to 9), on 11 February 1960, that, instead of an immediately comprehensive treaty, the Conference should agree to a treaty in stages. For the first stage we suggested that treaty obligations in the underground environment should begin only for seismic events of a magnitude of 4.75 or higher.

At the same time the United States proposed a major research programme to develop seismic control improvements which could in due course, we hoped, justify the lowering or abolition of the 4.75 threshold. It was that United States offer which the Soviet Union accepted on 19 March 1960, on the condition that the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the Soviet Union, would pledge themselves not to conduct any nuclear tests producing a seismic signal of less than 4.75 during the period of the research programme.

As I have already noted today, this arrangement of a 4.75 threshold treaty with the Geneva control system, plus a research programme, plus a moratorium, was an ingenious and reasonable political-technical solution to the Soviet-Western

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deadlock. However, I must stress and repeat that my Government has never sought either a moratorium or a threshold treaty for its own sake. As we have always said, we would infinitely prefer an immediately comprehensive treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests from the outset if scientific controls for monitoring such an obligation were made part of the treaty system. In all of this our guiding principle - which I submit is not particularly startling or unreasonable - has only been not to undertake any obligation under a treaty without some reasonable assurance that the scientific control measures accompanying the agreement would be effective in verifying the compliance of all parties with their treaty obligations. Otherwise there would be no confidence in the treaty.

If the Soviet representative would look back to the statement made by my predecessor, Mr. Wadsworth, at the one hundred and seventieth meeting on 11 February 1960 when he first introduced the threshold proposal, he would find the following sentence:

"... the specific threshold magnitude to be adopted under this approach would depend in large part on the level of inspection that the other delegations were prepared to accept." (GEN/DNT/PV.170, page 8)

I should note that there was nothing new or startling in Mr. Wadsworth's statement, because much the same sort of reasoning had been accepted by the 1958 Geneva experts themselves. Indeed, the penultimate sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of Annex VII of the experts' report of 1958 says much the same thing, as follows:

"The dependence between these parameters" - and here the report is referring to three parameters for a network of control posts - "is such that with an increase in the yield of the explosion or the number of control posts the probability of detection and identification increases, and the number of unidentified events suspected of being a nuclear explosion decreases. On the other hand, for the identification of the increased number of unidentified events resulting from a smaller number of control posts it would be necessary to increase the number of on-site inspections or to make greater use of information coming from sources not subordinate

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to the international control organ or, if necessary, both." (EXP/NUC/28, Annex VII, page 2)

Today, while following the same reasoning, I would go a bit further, because still other variables are also involved. Thus, the level of the treaty threshold is dependent not only on the number of inspections but also on the number of control posts, on the types of control posts, whether manned or unmanned, on their coverage of seismic areas, on their being evenly spaced throughout a territory or possibly clustered in seismic areas, on the number of seismometers at a particular post and the depths at which they are placed, on the detection and identification techniques available at any moment, and on numerous other factors.

What I am saying to Mr. Tsarapkin today is that the United States is still very flexible in this matter of controls and is quite prepared to study and discuss them with the Soviet Union on a co-operative basis and to accept any revised control arrangements in its own territory as well.

And, so I say, first, we are willing to contemplate an initial treaty threshold that would be lower than the proposed one of seismic magnitude 4.75; and further, we are even willing to consider arrangements, if this, with your co-operation, should prove scientifically possible, which would amount to virtually no treaty threshold at all.

I am suggesting to the Soviet representative that the United States is ready and prepared to negotiate here and now for the immediate lowering or even removing of the treaty threshold of 4.75, provided that the Soviet Union is ready to explore with us and open-mindedly consider those improvements or adjustments in the control system which could so increase its scientific capabilities from the outset as to warrant the lowering or removing of the threshold.

These adjustments to be explored, which are necessary to deal with the increased number of unidentified events which would result from lowering the threshold, might include: the relocation of some of the control posts in both of our countries and other countries from relatively aseismic to highly seismic areas, if that can be done without injury to the whole control system; the introduction into United States, United Kingdom and USSR territories of a number of unmanned seismic recording stations, perhaps in conjunction with some of the

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foregoing changes regarding the relocation or regrouping of control posts; a modification of the total number of control posts in the United States, the Soviet Union and, possibly, elsewhere; an adjustment of the fixed annual number of inspections in the quota; and the immediate adoption from the outset of certain scientific improvements in the treaty control system.

Let me emphasize the entire willingness of the United States to re-examine the scientific aspects of the entire control system. We are prepared to do everything possible to advance and to make workable a nuclear test ban treaty which would eventually and as soon as possible ban all further nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere, in outer space and in the oceans, and all tests underground, just as soon as it is scientifically possible to do so.

My Soviet colleague will notice that I am not today referring to any specific new treaty threshold level or to any specific changes in control arrangements. However, my delegation is fully prepared to confer and to negotiate on these points. It goes without saying that agreement on some changes in the control network, along with a lower or even no initial threshold, would still necessitate our going forward with plans to conduct a large-scale seismic improvement research programme underground. The basis for this, as before, would be our hope that in the future we could either abolish the threshold altogether or, if technically feasible, improve the control system with a view to simplifying it and to reducing the annual number of on-site inspections as the identification capabilities of the treaty control system increases.

Concerning that portion of the underground environment which might still not be able to be covered by the treaty from a scientific standpoint, a moratorium would still be instituted for the duration of the three-year research programme, and all of the procedures which I outlined earlier today in my proposal for reducing or eliminating the threshold in the treaty at the end of the three-year moratorium naturally would still be applicable.

My two major and far-reaching proposals of today are further evidence of the open-mindedness and serious purpose of the United States Government in devising sound political initiatives and approaches which, however, remain fully consistent with scientific control requirements. I trust that my Soviet colleague,

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in reporting this statement to his Government, will not only note this new and great evidence of Western sincerity and entire flexibility in these talks on the subject of scientific controls, but will also point out the wide scope which we have opened for negotiation. At the same time, I must make it clear that I reiterate the complete unacceptability of the Soviet three-man administrative council proposal below the top eleven-man control commission, on which the West and the East have equal voices, and the Soviet theory of self-inspection.

On the one hand, we have the Western proposal for reducing or eliminating the threshold in the treaty at the end of the three-year moratorium. This means that we are ready to give the Soviet Union extremely far-reaching guarantees for scrupulously fair dealings with the issue of lowering the threshold or even of extending the proposed three-year moratorium at the expiration of the fixed moratorium period. Under such arrangements, there would be no possibility that the way would be left free to abandon research efforts and to resume testing at yields below 4.75 unless it were clearly the opinion of a majority both of the panel of scientific experts of the eleven countries, including neutral representatives, and of the control commission, that there was no substantial scientific hope of working out satisfactory controls for the underground environment below the threshold of 4.75.

On the other hand, we have put forward an alternative proposal for reducing or eliminating the threshold in the treaty immediately. This path only calls for some imaginative negotiation on all sides, plus Soviet exploration of and agreement to reasonable adjustments in the control system which are essential, at this stage of scientific knowledge, for providing effective control capabilities for underground events yielding below 4.75 on the seismic scale of magnitude.

What I have said today I hope will convince the Soviet delegation and the Soviet Government that the Western Governments are extremely anxious to negotiate a sound and effective test ban treaty and will leave no stone unturned in an all-out effort to do everything reasonable to bring this about. We shall continue to work for sound arrangements which will not give the illusion of control without any substance. Aside from that, however, there are no limits to our willingness to negotiate on the scientific control system.

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And so I earnestly appeal to the Soviet Union to examine its conscience and, thereafter, to rejoin the United Kingdom and the United States in this urgent task of concluding a sound and effective nuclear test ban treaty which will give new hope for the complete cessation of nuclear testing to a sorely distressed world and which will constitute a major step in complete and general disarmament.

Mr. ORMSBY GORE (United Kingdom): At the beginning of his statement today Mr. Dean referred to the wide-spread disappointment and concern which is felt in the United States about the Soviet attitude in this Conference. The same disappointment, the same concern, are also felt, and felt most strongly, in the United Kingdom, and I believe in most of the world.

It is now nearly two months since I informed the Conference of the United Kingdom Government's reactions to the Soviet Government's memorandum (GEN/DNT/III) of 4 June this year - I am referring to my statement at the three hundred and twentieth meeting on 16 June. I said then (GEN/DNT/PV.320, page 3) that my Government was most unwilling to accept the main and most obvious implication of the Soviet memorandum, which was, on the face of it, that the Soviet Government had now lost all interest in any further effort at constructive negotiation round this table for a properly controlled treaty, a treaty that would place the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests on a firm and reliable basis.

In the ten or eleven weeks that have elapsed we have, unfortunately, had no evidence of any more positive attitude on the part of the Soviet Government. Indeed, the evidence has all gone to confirm the fears which I expressed. The Soviet delegation has still not made any effort to enter into constructive negotiation with us; there has in fact been no attempt at negotiation from the Soviet side during the whole of this year. The Soviet delegation has made no new proposals since 4 June and no constructive proposals since last year, and it has remained unable or unwilling to explain large parts of the Soviet position or to submit clear and full proposals in written form. In short, the Soviet Government has continued to face us with the same ultimatum as in its memorandum of 4 June: either we accept the Soviet proposals lock, stock and barrel, even those parts of them which are as yet unknown or unexplained, or else we and the world must wait for a properly guaranteed cessation of nuclear testing until a programme of

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complete and general disarmament has been agreed and, for all we know, until it has been carried out. In either case the Soviet Government is firmly rejecting the idea that the rest of the world should have any effective means, within the foreseeable future, of assuring itself that the Soviet Government is not secretly improving its nuclear arsenal by means of clandestine testing. Under neither of the Soviet alternatives are we offered effective control and verification of a ban on testing: one alternative offers us no more than self-inspection by the Soviet Union, subject to a universal administrative veto; the other alternative offers us no control at all until some unspecified future date.

It is a very serious situation, and it is entirely the responsibility of the Soviet Government. At a time when international tensions are dangerously increasing - and they are increasing primarily as a result of the deliberate actions of the Soviet Government - at this dangerous juncture in world affairs, the Soviet Government is refusing to take a step that could easily be taken, a step that would markedly contribute towards improving the international atmosphere and increasing security, including the security of the Soviet Union itself, as Mr. Dean has so frequently pointed out. It is perfectly clear that the conclusion of an effective nuclear test ban treaty would have this result and that the only obstacles to that treaty are obstacles which the Soviet Government has deliberately erected during the last few months.

However little encouragement the Soviet Government may have given us, the United Kingdom, like the United States, remains unwilling to accept the worst or to abandon hope in a matter of such importance as this, a matter in which success could make so much difference to the whole international scene. That was our position when I spoke on 16 June of this year, and it is still our position. We want this treaty both for itself and for the good it would do in other ways, and we are determined not to abandon our effort to secure it whilst any hope remains. We have declared ourselves ready to negotiate upon our own proposals or upon any Soviet proposals, provided that negotiation is directed towards the objective that brought us here in the first place -- the objective of a treaty with controls adequate to assure both sides that the treaty is being observed. In this spirit my delegation warmly welcomes and supports the statement which has just been made by the United States representative.

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I also, of course, have been following the proceedings of the Conference in my absence and I have noted the repeated emphasis which the Soviet representative has been laying upon the question of what should happen at the end of the moratorium. Mr. Tsarapkin has repeatedly declared that the Soviet Union now sees three main obstacles in the way of an effective treaty. As my colleague Sir Michael Wright recently pointed out (GEN/DNT/PV.335, page 9), these obstacles are substantially different from the obstacles which the Soviet representative was talking about up to the end of last year and they are very largely obstacles of the Soviet Union's own making. Nevertheless, our object is to negotiate, and if we can reasonably do anything to reassure the Soviet Union on these matters we are prepared to try to do so.

Mr. Dean has described the specific procedures for consultation before the end of the moratorium to which the United States Government is prepared now to commit itself. My Government is certainly prepared also to commit itself to those procedures. I need not repeat what Mr. Dean has said about them, nor need I go into detail about the general United Kingdom position on the moratorium, because Sir Michael Wright has only recently restated it at the three hundred and thirty-fifth meeting. As he pointed out then, the Soviet representative has never explained in any clear or intelligible manner what he means when he says that the parties should not be automatically free to resume testing below the threshold upon the expiry of the period fixed for the moratorium. We have never suggested that it would be our intention to resume testing, automatically or otherwise. Our whole object in accepting the Soviet proposal for the moratorium has been to create the conditions, and to provide the time, in which to work out controls to justify us in agreeing that no form of testing shall ever be resumed -- and to assure ourselves that that agreement will in fact be carried out. To confirm what Sir Michael Wright said at the three hundred and thirty-fifth meeting:

"The only foreseeable circumstance in which we should feel obliged not to renew our undertaking under the moratorium would be if we and our partners in the treaty had completely failed to find any reasonable means of assuring ourselves that this undertaking was being respected and would be respected by others as well as ourselves." (GEN/DNT/PV.335, page 11)

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The procedures which my United States colleague has now proposed show clearly that we have no thought of any hasty or unilateral action at the end of the moratorium. We have always agreed that there should be consultation and negotiation before the period expires, and these procedures show exactly how this would be done. They show that there would certainly be no question of just doing nothing and letting the moratorium automatically lapse. On the contrary, we should expect to discuss the possibilities of merging the moratorium into the treaty, in whole or in part, or of continuing it in some form, in a group of scientists representing all eleven members of the control commission, and we should be willing to see this group make its recommendations to the commission on the basis of a simple majority, though we should naturally hope that the scientists could reach unanimous agreement. Having received the scientists' recommendations, the commission, again by simple majority, could make its own recommendations to the Conference. I can scarcely conceive of a situation in which my country or any other country would wilfully or unreasonably disregard the recommendations of the majority made in this way.

My delegation believes that these proposed procedures should give the Soviet Union the necessary reassurance about what is to be done at the end of the moratorium. In our view they amount to a clear indication that the moratorium would not be left automatically to lapse at the whim of any one party. As I say, the Soviet representative has never clearly explained what he wants to be done at the end of the moratorium period or what he means when he says the moratorium should not "automatically" lapse. We hope he will agree that the proposed procedures put a reasonable interpretation upon those words. If he has any doubts about that, then I would invite him to give us his own interpretation, and to give it specifically in writing. In that way we may at least be able to find a basis for serious negotiation upon this aspect of our work. This is a problem raised by the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative has never clearly explained his position. We have now clearly explained ours, and the next step is for Mr. Tsarapkin.

Secondly, I concur with Mr. Dean about the possibility of an alternative approach to this problem if the Soviet Union would prefer it that way. For us, as for the United States, the threshold and the moratorium have never been an end in themselves. We should much prefer to have a fully and immediately comprehensive

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treaty if the necessary controls could be agreed upon to assure us of its observance by all parties. That has always been our position. We have always been, and still are, ready to accept in the United Kingdom and its territories any controls that may be necessary to justify a comprehensive test ban. That goes also for the United States. If the Soviet Union would only adopt the same position, then none would be more delighted than we to forget about the threshold and the moratorium and go straight to a comprehensive treaty. The threshold treaty has never been more than a second-best course imposed by the shortcomings of available control. It is true that the threshold and moratorium have the virtue of being already agreed between us three in principle, and we believe that a satisfactory treaty can be concluded on this basis and could lead straight into a comprehensive treaty, as a result of further research, in a very few years' time. But, if the Soviet Union is willing to try to find the basis of a fully controllable comprehensive treaty with us now, we are certainly willing also.

Here, then, is an opportunity for the Soviet delegation to show us whether its Government does still retain a constructive desire for an effectively controlled nuclear test ban, and I would remind the Soviet representative of the views expressed by the Government of the Soviet Union regarding this Conference in its statement of 23 January 1959, as follows:

"The Soviet Government, consistently pursuing as it does a policy of bending every effort towards delivering mankind from the threat of a nuclear war of annihilation, has, for a number of years, been persistently pressing for the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests as a first and highly important step towards a radical solution of the disarmament problem. In doing so, the Soviet Government has proceeded and still proceeds from the premise that the question of ending nuclear tests can be solved straightaway, independently of the solution of the other problems of disarmament, given the desire of all the nuclear Powers." (GEN/DNT/26, page 1)

I hope that the Soviet Government will revert to the attitude revealed in its statement of 23 January 1959. It is our earnest desire that the Soviet representative's response to Mr. Dean's statement this afternoon will be such as to enable us to open up an avenue of genuine negotiation upon this issue, which he himself regards as one of the three most important now confronting us.

PRIVATE

GEN/DNT/110/Add.3
30 August 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Revised sub-paragraph (viii) and (ix), paragraph 3 C of Article 9 of the
Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (GEN/DNT/110)

Submitted jointly by the Delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States
at the 338th meeting of the Conference

.....

(viii) The scientific and technical staff of an on-site inspection group shall be composed of technically qualified personnel who are not nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred. If the country exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory is an original party or is associated with an original party, the scientific and technical staff of the inspection group shall be composed of nationals of countries other than such an original party or states associated with it. The party exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory may designate one or more observers to accompany the inspection group.

(ix) At least one-half of the scientific and technical staff of an on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR or countries associated with it, including the leader of the group, shall be nationals of the United States of America or the United Kingdom or countries associated with either or both of them. At least one-half of the scientific and technical staff of an on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States of America or the United Kingdom or countries associated with either or both of them, including the leader of the group, shall be nationals of the USSR or countries associated with it.

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PRIVATE

GEN/DNT/110/Add.1
31 May 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Alternative Texts of Paragraphs 5 and 7 of Draft Article 10 (GEN/DNT/110)
Submitted by the Delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States
at the 313th meeting of the Conference

.....

5. A. The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out annually in territory under the jurisdiction or control of each of the original Parties, pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be between twelve and twenty, in each annual period as set forth in paragraph 8 of this Article, depending upon the number of underground events of seismic magnitude of 4.75 or above occurring in the territory of the original Party, located by the System in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 8 of Annex I. If the number of such events occurring within one year is one hundred or more, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out during that year shall be twenty. If the number of such events occurring within the year is sixty or less, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out during that year shall be twelve. If the number of such events occurring within the year is less than one hundred but greater than sixty, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out during that year shall be twenty per cent of the number of such seismic events. If the number of on-site inspections calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph includes a fraction, that fraction shall be disregarded.

B. If any portion of the certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of an original Party, the event, for the purpose of determining in accordance with sub-paragraph 5 A the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under the jurisdiction or control of that original Party, shall be deemed to have occurred in territory under its jurisdiction or control.

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GEN/DNT/110/Add.1

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7. The number of on-site inspections for each Party shall be reviewed by the Commission within three years after the Treaty enters into force and annually thereafter. Each such review shall take full account of:

A. Practical experience in the operation of the System and of measures taken to maintain or improve its effectiveness;

B. Any criteria for the identification of seismic events eligible for on-site inspection which may be established; and

C. Any amendments to paragraph 2 of Article 1 of this Treaty. In the light of such review, the Commission, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, may fix revised numbers.
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PRIVATE

GEN/DNT/110/Add.2
30 August 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Addendum to Article 6 of the Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests (GEN/DNT/110)

Submitted jointly by the Delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States
at the 338th meeting of the Conference

Add the following as sub-paragraph E of paragraph 2

E. The Administrator or the First Deputy Administrator shall be subject to removal from office by the Commission if, as a result of a failure on his part to comply with the requirements of paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 9 of this Treaty or for any other reason, the Commission decides that it no longer has confidence in him. Any such decision, and the exercise of the power of removal, shall require the concurring votes of seven members of the Commission.
