

GENERAL
ASSEMBLYDistr.
GENERALA/2738
27 September 1954

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Ninth session
Agenda item 67INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN DEVELOPING THE PEACEFUL
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGYLetter dated 25 September 1954 from the Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General

New York, 25 September 1954

I have the honour to refer to my note to you, dated 23 September 1954,
which has been circulated to the Members of the United Nations as document A/2734.

There are transmitted herewith copies of the communications exchanged
between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is
requested that copies of these communications be circulated to the Members of
the United Nations

(Signed) Henry Cabot LODGE, Jr.

NOTE HANDED TO AMBASSADOR ZAROUBIN
BY SECRETARY DULLES, WASHINGTON, 11 JANUARY 1954

1. The United States suggests that the conversation with reference to atomic energy should initially be conducted through diplomatic channels, reserving the right of any participant to propose shifting the deliberations to the United Nations pursuant to its resolution^{1/} suggesting private discussions under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission.
2. It is suggested that the diplomatic discussions take place at Washington and wherever else it is convenient for the participants to meet. Presumably Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles would have a private discussion at Berlin.
3. It is suggested that procedural talks should in their initial stage be limited to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, with the participation of the other nations principally involved as determined in the light of the subject matter to be discussed.
4. The United States is prepared to consider any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.
5. However, the United States believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope. That is why the United States urges an early discussion of the proposal made by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953.^{2/} The United States is prepared to have concrete private discussions about this plan and its possible implementation.
6. The United States suggests that privacy will best serve practical results at this time and that these talks should not be used for propaganda purposes by either side.

^{1/} General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953.

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, 470th plenary meeting.

NOTE HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES
BY AMBASSADOR ZARUBIN, WASHINGTON, 19 JANUARY 1954

In connexion with the aide-memoire handed by J.F. Dulles, Secretary of State, to Ambassador G.N. Zaroubin on 11 January, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to communicate the following.

1. Paragraph 1 of the United States aide-memoire states:

"The United States suggests that the conversation with reference to atomic energy should initially be conducted through diplomatic channels, reserving the right of any participant to propose shifting the deliberations to the United Nations pursuant to its resolution suggesting private discussions under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission."

On this point there are no remarks.

2. Paragraph 2 of the United States aide-memoire states:

"It is suggested that the diplomatic discussions take place at Washington and wherever else it is convenient for the participants to meet. Presumably Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles would have a private discussion at Berlin."

On paragraph 2 there are no remarks.

3. In paragraph 3 of the United States aide-memoire it is said:

"It is suggested that procedural talks should in their initial stage be limited to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, with the participation of the other nations principally involved as determined in the light of the subject matter to be discussed."

Agreement is expressed regarding the considerations stated in paragraph 3 of the aide-memoire, keeping in mind that at the specified stage of the negotiations there will be considered the necessity for drawing into the negotiations all Powers that bear the chief responsibility for maintaining peace and international security.

4. Paragraph 4 of the United States aide-memoire states:

"The United States is prepared to consider any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction."

In this connexion, it is necessary to recall the statement made by the Soviet Government on 21 December 1953, which pointed out that the Soviet Government proceeds on the basis of the assumption that during the course of the negotiations there will be considered at the same time the proposal of the Soviet Union with regard to an agreement under which the States participating in the agreement would assume the unconditional obligation not to use the atomic, hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction.

5. In paragraph 5 of the United States aide-memoire it is said:

"However, the United States believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope. That is why the United States urges an early discussion of the proposal made by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953. The United States is prepared to have concrete private discussions about this plan and its possible implementation."

The Soviet Government agrees to consider President Eisenhower's proposal of 8 December 1953, and likewise agrees to enter into the said negotiations relating to this proposal. At the same time the Soviet Government considers it necessary to negotiate to the effect that in the discussion of this proposal made by the United States and the proposal made by the USSR as mentioned in paragraph 4, the principle of rotation be observed, with one conference being devoted to the consideration of the United States proposal and the next being devoted to the consideration of the USSR proposal.

6. Paragraph 6 of the United States aide-memoire states:

"The United States suggests that privacy will best serve practical results at this time and that these talks should not be used for propaganda purposes by either side."

On this paragraph there are no remarks.

DRAFT DECLARATION HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES
BY MR. MOLOTOV, BERLIN, 30 JANUARY 1954

Draft Declaration of the Governments of the United States of America, England and France, the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union concerning Unconditional Renunciation of the Use of Atomic, Hydrogen and other Forms of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Governments of the United States of America, England, France, the Chinese People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics determined to deliver humanity from the threat of destructive war with the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction, desirous of assisting in every way in the utilization of the great scientific discoveries in the field of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes for the well-being of peoples and the amelioration of their living conditions,

Considering that the unconditional renunciation by States of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction correspond to the basic purposes of the organization of the United Nations and would constitute an important step on the road to the complete withdrawal from national armaments of the atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction with the establishment of strict international control guaranteeing the execution of agreement concerning the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, animated by the aspirations of the peoples for a reduction in international tension,

Solemnly declare that they take upon themselves the unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction;

Call on other countries to adhere to the present declaration.

AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES
BY MR. MOLOTOV, BERLIN, 13 FEBRUARY 1954

1. In the aide-memoire presented by the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington to the Secretary of State of the United States of America on 19 January 1954, the Soviet Government expressed the view that at a subsequent stage of the negotiations on the atomic problem all the Powers bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security should be invited to take part.

In a private talk with Mr. Dulles on 30 January last, V.M. Molotov explained that the Powers referred to are the five Powers, namely the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the Chinese People's Republic.

2. In that talk Mr. Dulles expressed the view that Britain, France and also Canada and Belgium should be invited to join in the negotiations on the atomic problem, and he explained that Canada and Belgium should take part as countries possessing resources of atomic materials.

3. In connexion therewith the Soviet Government states that it would have no objection to the participation in the negotiations on the atomic problem at an appropriate stage, besides the five Powers, of Canada and Belgium, and also believes it necessary to have Czechoslovakia invited to take part in the said negotiations as a country possessing atomic materials.

LETTER FROM SECRETARY DULLES TO MR. MOLOTOV,
BERLIN, 16 FEBRUARY 1954

Dear Mr. Minister,

I refer to your aide-memoire, which you handed me on 13 February 1954, regarding the discussions on the atomic proposal.

In your numbered paragraph 2, you state that I "expressed the view that Britain, France and also Canada and Belgium should be invited to join in the negotiations on the atomic problem, and (he) explained that Canada and Belgium should take part as countries possessing resources of atomic materials". This statement does not fully accord with my recollection of what I said on the subject on 30 January. I would like to clear up the apparent misunderstanding. At that discussion I said that the United Kingdom, Canada and France had all made progress in the atomic field. I then referred to Belgium and other countries which were important sources of raw material. In these circumstances I indicated that if we shifted our talks from a bilateral basis to a broader conference at that stage the United States would raise the problem of what countries should participate.

In connexion with the general subject of possible future participation, I should like to call your attention once more to a general statement which I have made repeatedly here in Berlin. This is that the United States is not prepared to participate in any conference with the Chinese Communist regime on the theory that it has, or shares, any special position of responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I shall hope to be in a position to hand to Ambassador Zaroubin in Washington, shortly after my return, a memorandum on the substance of the President's proposal.

(Signed) John Foster DULLES

His Excellency
V. M. Molotov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs for
The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

LETTER FROM MR. MOLOTOV TO SECRETARY DULLES
BERLIN, 18 FEBRUARY 1954

Dear Mr. Secretary of State,

I confirm the receipt of your letter of 16 February 1954.

Inasmuch as you are already preparing to depart today, I will send my reply to your letter through the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Washington, Zaroubin.

(Signed) V. MOLOTOV

Mr. J. F. Dulles,
Secretary of State,
United States of America

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO ACTING SECRETARY SMITH
BY AMBASSADOR ZARUBIN, WASHINGTON, 10 MARCH 1954

In connexion with the letter from the Secretary of State of the United States of America of 16 February of this year addressed to Mr. V.M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am instructed by Mr. V.M. Molotov to state the following.

The views expressed in the letter that it is not considered expedient to define at present which specific countries should be invited to participate in the talks on the atomic question at a later stage of the talks have been noted.

As already stated in the aide-memoire handed to Mr. Dulles by Ambassador Zaroubin on 19 January, as well as in the private discussion held by Mr. V.M. Molotov and Mr. Dulles at Berlin, the Soviet Government agrees to negotiate with the Government of the United States of America on the atomic question on a bilateral basis. At the same time, in case it is decided to shift these negotiations to a broader basis, there is no objection to an additional examination of the question as to the participants in such negotiations.

With regard to the possible participation of the Chinese People's Republic in the negotiations on the atomic question at a subsequent stage, the opinion of the Soviet Government on this question was stated in the aide-memoire of 13 February.

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO AMBASSADOR ZAROUBIN
BY SECRETARY DULLES, WASHINGTON, 19 MARCH 1954

Outline of an International Atomic Energy Agency

The United States Government wishes to submit additional tentative views amplifying the proposals for an International Atomic Energy Agency as presented by the President of the United States to the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1953:

I. The objectives of the United States proposals

The United States proposes that there should be established under the aegis of the United Nations an International Atomic Energy Agency to receive supplies of nuclear materials from those Member Nations having stocks of such materials to be used for the following objectives:

(a) To encourage world-wide research and development of peaceful uses of atomic energy by assuring that engineers and scientists of the world have sufficient materials to conduct such activities and by fostering the interchange of information.

(b) To furnish nuclear materials to meet the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities including the eventual production of power.

II. The International Atomic Energy Agency

(a) The Agency would be created by and derive its authority under the terms of a treaty among the participating nations. To the greatest extent practicable, the treaty should define standards and principles which would govern the Agency in the discharge of its functions.

(b) Membership

All signatory States would be members of the Agency.

(c) Governing Body

(i) The highest executive authority in the Agency should be exercised by a Board of Governors, of limited membership

representing Governments. In determining the composition of the Board of Governors, it might be desirable to take account of geographic distribution and membership by prospective beneficiaries. It is expected that the principal contributors would be on the Board of Governors.

- (ii) It is suggested that decisions of the Board of Governors generally should be taken by some form of majority vote. Arrangements could be worked out to give the principal contributing countries special voting privileges on certain matters, such as allocations of fissionable material.

(d) Staff

The staff of the Agency should be headed by an administrative head or general manager, appointed for a fixed term by the Board of Governors and subject to its control and, of course, include highly qualified scientific and technical personnel. Under the general supervision of the Board, the administrative head should be responsible for the appointment, organization and functioning of the staff.

(e) Financing

- (i) Funds for the central facilities and fixed plant of the Agency and its research projects should be provided through appropriation by the participating States in accordance with a scale of contributions to be agreed upon. It is suggested that it might be possible to utilize the general principles governing the scale of contributions by individual Members to the United Nations.
 - (ii) Funds for specific projects submitted by Member Nations to utilize the materials or services of the Agency should be provided by the recipient country concerned through specific arrangements in each case.
- (f) The administrative headquarters of the Agency could be located at a place mutually agreed upon.

(g) Relationship to the United Nations and other international bodies

The Agency should submit reports to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly when requested by either of these organs. The Agency should also consult and co-operate with other United Nations bodies whose work may be related to that of the Agency.

(h) The facilities of the Agency would include:

- (i) Plant, equipment and facilities for the receipt, storage and issuance of nuclear materials.
- (ii) Physical safeguards.
- (iii) Control laboratories for analysis and verification of receipts and inventory control of nuclear materials.
- (iv) Necessary housing for administrative and other activities of the Agency not included in the preceding categories.
- (v) Those facilities, as might in time be necessary, for such purposes as education and training, research and development, fuel fabrication and chemical processing.

III. Functions of the Agency

(a) Receipt and storage of materials

- (i) All Member Nations possessing stocks of normal and enriched uranium, thorium metal, U-233, U-235, U-238, plutonium and alloys of the foregoing would be expected to make contributions of such material to the Agency.
- (ii) The United States would be prepared to make as a donation, a substantial initial contribution of nuclear material towards the needs of the Agency. The USSR would make an equivalent donation towards these needs.
- (iii) The Agency would specify the place, method of delivery and, when appropriate, the form and composition of materials it will receive. The Agency would also verify stated quantities

of materials received and would report to the members these amounts. The Agency would be responsible for storing and protecting materials in a way to minimize the likelihood of surprise seizure.

(b) Allocation of materials by the Agency

- (i) The Agency would review proposals submitted by participating members desiring to receive allocations of Agency stocks in the light of uniform and equitable criteria, including:
 - (a) The use to which material would be put, including scientific and technical feasibility.
 - (b) The adequacy of plans, funds, technical personnel, etc. to assure effective use of the material.
 - (c) Adequacy of proposed health and safety measures for handling and storing materials and for operating facilities.
 - (d) Equitable distribution of available materials.
- (ii) Title to nuclear materials would initially remain with the Agency, which would determine fair payment to be made for use of materials.
- (iii) In order to ensure that adequate health and safety standards were being followed, and in order to assure that allocated fissionable material is being used for the purposes for which it was allocated, the Agency would have the continuing authority to prescribe certain design and operating conditions, health and safety regulations, require accountability and operating records, specify disposition of by-product fissionable materials and wastes, retain the right of monitoring and require progress reports. The Agency would also have authority to verify status of allocated material inventories and to verify compliance with the terms of issuance.
- (iv) Information about all transactions entered into by the Agency would be available to all members.

(c) Information and service activities of the Agency

- (i) All Member Nations possessing information relevant to the activities of the Agency would be expected to make contributions from that information to the Agency.
- (ii) In addition to data developed as a result of its own activities, the Agency would have available:
 - (a) Data developed by participating countries as a result of the utilization of the materials, information, services and other assistance of the Agency.
 - (b) Data already publicly available in some of the countries.
 - (c) Data developed and previously held by principals or other members and voluntarily contributed to the Agency.
- (iii) The Agency would encourage the exchange of scientific and technical information among nations, and be responsible for making wide dissemination of the data in its possession.
- (iv) The Agency would serve as an intermediary securing the performance of services by one participating country for another. Among the specific activities the Agency might provide would be the following:
 - (a) Training and education.
 - (b) Services concerned with developing codes for public health and safety in connexion with the utilization of fissionable materials.
 - (c) Consultative technical services in connexion with the establishment and carrying on of programmes.
 - (d) Processing of nuclear materials (i.e., chemical separation and purification, fabrication of fuel elements, etc.).
 - (e) Supply of special materials, such as heavy water.
 - (f) Design and supply of specialized equipment.
 - (g) Special laboratory services such as conduct of experiments and tests.
 - (h) Aid in making financial arrangements for the support of appropriate projects.

AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED TO SECRETARY DULLES
BY MR. MOLOTOV, GENEVA, 27 APRIL 1954

In connexion with the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America dated 19 March, containing supplementary explanations concerning the international organ (agency) of atomic energy, discussed in President Eisenhower's statement of 8 December 1953, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following considerations.

In the afore-mentioned statement of the President of the United States which underlined the special danger of the atomic weapon, a proposal was made that the appropriate States allocate a small part of the atomic materials out of their stocks for the disposal of the international agency to use for peaceful needs. In the memorandum of 19 March several details of the organization of the afore-mentioned International Agency were given, but those remarks which were made by the Soviet Government in its statement of 21 December concerning the statement of the President of the United States on 8 December were completely ignored. Nevertheless, these remarks of the Soviet Government aim to achieve an agreement concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons and to secure the acceptance of an obligation by the States in the very near future not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are by their nature weapons of aggression.

In his address of 8 December the President of the United States declared "My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations". In this statement the President of the United States also said: "The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved', to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race which over-shadows not only the peace, but the very life of the world."

These statements of the President of the United States expressed wishes for peace, a yearning to find a solution of the problem of the atomic armament race, together with representatives of other countries, and a desire to achieve

"agreements, not wars, among nations". Inasmuch as it is the constant aspiration of the Government of the USSR to assist in strengthening peace among nations and under present conditions, in particular, to assist in the elimination of the threat of an atomic war, the Soviet Government has expressed readiness to take part in the appropriate negotiations.

However, the Soviet Government has considered and still considers it necessary to call special attention to the following.

First: The proposal of the United States that the appropriate States place a small part of atomic materials out of their stocks at the disposal of the international organ to be used for peaceful needs, cannot assist in the achievement of the aims set forth in the afore-mentioned address of the President of the United States. By such an allocation of a small part of the atomic materials for peaceful needs, the principal mass of the atomic materials will go, as before, for the production of new atomic and hydrogen bombs, which means a further accumulation of atomic weapons and the possibility of creating new types of this weapon of more destructive force. Such a situation means that the States which have the opportunity to produce atomic and hydrogen weapons will not be restrained at all in the further increase of stocks of this weapon.

The allocation of a small portion of atomic materials out of the stocks in existence to be utilized for peaceful needs may only create the appearance that the quantity of atomic materials allocated for the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons is being decreased. But, in reality that is not the case at all. The production of atomic materials in a number of countries has been growing with each year so fast that the allocation of a certain part for peaceful needs will by no means reduce the quantity of the newly produced atomic and hydrogen bombs. Consequently, even in case the United States proposal should be carried out, it would be impossible to say that the atomic armament race is being stopped, as was said in the statement of the President of the United States of 8 December.

The level of science and technique which has been reached at the present time makes it possible for the very application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to be utilized for increasing the production of atomic weapons.

It is well known that it is practically feasible to carry out on an industrial scale a process of obtaining electrical power for peaceful needs by utilizing atomic materials, in which the quantity of the fissionable atomic materials applied in the process not only fails to decrease but, on the contrary, increases. And the harmless atomic materials are converted into explosive and fissionable materials which are the basis for the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In other words, the fact that the peaceful application of atomic energy is connected with the possibility of simultaneous production of atomic materials utilized for the manufacture of the atomic weapon is indisputable and has been proved in practice. Such a situation not only fails to lead to a reduction of the stocks of atomic materials utilized for the manufacture of atomic weapons, but also leads to an increase of these stocks without any limitations being applied either to the constantly increasing production of these materials in individual States or to production by the international agency itself.

Consequently, the proposal of the United States concerning the allocation of a certain portion of atomic materials to be utilized for peaceful purposes not only fails to stop the atomic armament race but leads to its further intensification.

Second: The United States proposal of 8 December, as well as the United States memorandum of 19 March, completely evades the problem of the inadmissibility of the use of atomic weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction.

The acceptance of President Eisenhower's proposal would by no means restrict the aggressor in utilizing atomic weapons for any purpose and at any time and, consequently, would not diminish at all the danger of a war with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Thus, the acceptance of the afore-mentioned proposal of the United States would not introduce any change into the existing situation, when States which have at their disposal atomic materials and appropriate manufacturing and technical possibilities for the production of atomic weapons produce them on an increasing

scale and accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen bombs of more and more destructive power. Besides, all this takes place under conditions of complete absence of any international agreement whatsoever which binds States in the application of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

However, it cannot be denied that recently there has been widespread uneasiness in many countries in connexion with the increase in the destructive power of the atomic weapon and especially in view of the appearance of the hydrogen weapon. It would be wrong not to consider these well-known facts and the ever-increasingly insistent demands not to permit the use of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon in warfare.

All this justifies the conclusion that neither the United States proposal of 8 December nor the United States memorandum of 19 March meets the basic purpose - elimination of the threat of atomic war.

In its statement of 21 December the Soviet Government pointed out that if the Government of the United States, as well as the Government of the USSR, is striving to reduce international tension and strengthen peace, then the efforts of both Governments should be directed toward concluding an agreement for prohibiting the atomic weapon and toward establishing a suitable and effective international control over this prohibition. With such an international prohibition against the atomic weapon, broad possibilities would be opened for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Since the statement of 8 December of the President of the United States and the United States memorandum of 19 March both evade the question of prohibiting the atomic weapon and actually ignore the possibility of further unlimited increase in the production of this weapon and its use by an aggressor, the United States proposal for the creation of an international agency for the utilization of atomic energy does not reduce the danger of atomic warfare in the slightest.

Moreover, it may even serve ends that are the exact opposite. This proposal to use some portion of the atomic materials for peaceful purposes may create the deceptive appearance of curtailing the production of the atomic weapon and may lead

to the relaxing of vigilance on the part of nations with regard to the growing threat of war with the use of this weapon of aggression and mass destruction of people.

The fact that heretofore it has been impossible to conclude an appropriate agreement for the unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction not only does not diminish the importance of efforts in this direction but, on the contrary, makes such efforts still more necessary, taking into account the ever-increasing danger for nations in connexion with the continuing race in the production of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon. This applies especially to those States which have available the corresponding resources in atomic materials and are producing the atomic and the hydrogen weapon.

If the matter were reduced merely to agreements between States that, for peaceful purposes, there should be allotted only some small portion of the atomic materials, but the production of the atomic weapon in the future also should not be restricted at all, then such an international agreement would in fact grant an inadmissible sanction to the production of the atomic weapon, which would suit the convenience of the aggressive forces only. This sort of international sanction of the production of the atomic weapon not only would not facilitate the conclusion of an agreement for its prohibition but would, on the contrary, be a new obstacle on the road to the conclusion of such an agreement.

It is indispensable that not merely some portion, but the entire mass of atomic materials be directed entirely to peaceful purposes, that the achievements of science in this field serve not purposes of war and mass destruction of people but purposes of improving economic life and culture, which would open up unprecedented opportunities for improving industry, agriculture, and transportation, for use in medicine, for perfecting technical processes and the further progress of science.

The prohibition of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon and the utilization of all atomic materials for peaceful purposes, supplying the proper aid to regions that are economically weak, would at the same time promote the possibility of concluding an agreement on the matter of a decisive reduction in conventional types of armaments.

This would make it possible greatly to alleviate the tax burden which nations are bearing as a result of the existence in many States of inordinately swollen armies, since the armament race goes on.

Desiring to facilitate the possibility of concluding an agreement for the unconditional and complete prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of appropriate international control, the Soviet Government, having expressed its readiness to take part in negotiations with respect to the proposal of the Government of the United States, has, on its part, introduced the following proposal for consideration:

Being guided by the desire to reduce international tension, the States participating in the agreement undertake the solemn and unconditional obligation not to use the atomic, the hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction.

This proposal was set down as the basis for the draft of a declaration of the Governments of the USA, Great Britain, France, the Chinese People's Republic, and the Soviet Union, a draft which the Soviet Government communicated on 30 January to the Government of the United States, as well as to the Governments of Great Britain, France and the Chinese People's Republic. The adoption of the obligation of unconditional repudiation of the use of the atomic and the hydrogen weapon by States, and first of all by the great Powers, would mean a great step toward relieving humanity of the threat of atomic war with its countless sacrifices and hardships.

The Soviet Government observes that the Government of the United States has so far not only failed to recognize the necessity for the urgent prohibition of the atomic and hydrogen weapon and for the establishment of appropriate international control over this prohibition, but it has also failed to express readiness to come to an understanding on the unconditional repudiation by States of the use of the atomic, the hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction. In this connexion the Soviet Government attaches special importance to achieving co-ordination between the positions of the USSR and the United States with regard to the adoption by States of the solemn and unconditional obligation not to use the atomic, the hydrogen, or any other weapon of mass destruction. Consideration of the separate

proposals regarding partial utilization of atomic materials for peaceful purposes, without agreement between States on repudiating the use of the atomic weapon, would not contribute anything at all toward reducing international tension and the danger of war. Besides, it might lead to a blunting of the vigilance of nations with regard to this danger.

In view of the considerations cited and in accordance with General Eisenhower's statement concerning the desire of the United States to reduce international tension, the Soviet Government considers it urgently necessary in the first place to arrive at an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the question of repudiating the use of the atomic weapon, without which the negotiations initiated cannot yield the proper results, in which the peoples of our countries and other States are interested. .

As far as the other questions dealt with in the United States memorandum of 19 March are concerned, the inadequacy and one-sidedness of which are obvious, they can be considered as a supplement, after arriving at agreement on the fundamental questions.

INFORMAL PAPER LEFT WITH MR. MOLOTOV BY SECRETARY DULLES
GENEVA, 1 MAY 1954

1. I have now read the aide-memoire of the Soviet Union of 27 April re the proposal for "an international atomic energy agency" submitted to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on 19 March. This aide-memoire criticizes the proposal on the grounds that it would not substantially reduce atomic material stockpiles, or control the making or use of atomic weapons or remove the threat of atomic war.
2. These criticisms misconstrue the purpose of the United States proposal of 19 March. By its terms this proposal was not intended as a measure for the control of atomic weapons or for solving itself the various other problems mentioned in the Soviet note. Its purpose was the more limited one of initiating international co-operation in the field of atomic energy on a basis which would avoid many of the obstacles which have heretofore blocked any agreement. In this way the proposal could contribute to improving relations among the co-operating nations and thereby to facilitating solution of the more difficult problem of effective control of atomic energy for military purposes.
3. Accordingly, the United States cannot concur in the view of the Soviet Union that creation of an international agency to foster the use of atomic materials for peaceful purposes would not be useful in itself. On the contrary, it believes that such an agency could have valuable results both in encouraging closer co-operation among the participating nations and in expediting more extensive use of atomic energy for purposes beneficial to mankind. The United States therefore regrets that the Soviet Union is not willing to explore this matter further at this time.
4. In view of the lack of interest now of the Soviet Union in pursuing this proposal, the United States will feel free to examine the creation of such an agency with other nations which might be interested. If the Soviet Union should later decide that it wishes to take part in any such discussions, the United States will, of course, welcome its participation.
5. The United States proposal of 19 March was, of course, not intended as a substitute for an effective system of control of atomic energy for military purposes. The United States will continue, as heretofore, to seek means of achieving such control under reliable and adequate safeguards. It is prepared to

continue exchanges of views with the Soviet Union for that purpose, and will shortly submit to the Soviet Union comments on its proposal referred to in its aide-memoire of 27 April.

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO AMBASSADOR ZAROUBIN
BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MERCHANT, WASHINGTON,
JULY 9, 1954.

The United States has further considered the draft declaration of 30 January and aide-memoire of 27 April delivered by the Soviet Union to the United States. The United States wishes to make the following comments:

I.

1. The President's speech of 8 December 1953 to the United Nations General Assembly pointed out the dangers of the atomic armaments race and stressed the desire of the United States to remove these dangers by any effective method which includes adequate safeguards against violations and evasions. The United States would welcome any system of disarmament which would serve to protect the peoples of the world from the threat of war and relieve them of the heavy burden of military defence in a manner consistent with their security.

2. The United States is also aware of the difficulties which have been experienced since 1946 in trying to negotiate a disarmament plan. From that date until the present, the United States has persistently sought, alone and in concert with other nations, to find ways of easing the burden of armaments and of lessening the threat of war. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 through 1948, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments from 1947 through 1950, in the special meetings of the six permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1949 and 1950, and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission since 1951, the overwhelming majority of nations was able to reach agreement - the Soviet Union alone prevented progress.

3. Despite this discouraging record, the President, in his address on 8 December, stated that the United States, heeding the resolution of 28 November 1953 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, was "prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved' to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the very life of the world".

II.

4. In his address, the President also stated that the United States would carry into these talks a new proposal for an international atomic energy agency to expedite the use of atomic energy to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. In its memorandum of 19 March, the United States explained in more detail its views on the method for converting this conception into a practical reality. The aide-memoire of 27 April of the Soviet Union appears to misconstrue completely the purpose of this specific proposal.

5. This proposal was intended to make a beginning toward bringing to the peoples of the world the peaceful benefits of atomic energy. This offer by the United States to join with other nations having atomic facilities to furnish fissionable material and atomic energy technology for the common benefit, would provide a new opportunity for international co-operation. Successful co-operation in the implementation of the President's proposal would surely result in an improved atmosphere, which in turn, could significantly improve the prospects for genuine, safeguarded international disarmament. The proposal itself was not put forward as a disarmament plan.

6. The Soviet aide-memoire of 27 April states in effect that the USSR will not co-operate in steps to achieve peaceful benefits of atomic power for the world until the United States agrees to a ban on the use of atomic weapons. The primary reason given for this position is that under the President's United Nations proposal, stockpiles of weapon-grade material could continue to increase after the international agency had been established. Yet the Soviet proposal for a ban on weapons' use would not in any way prevent such increases in stockpiles. Accordingly, the United States cannot agree that the Soviet position provides a valid objection to proceeding at this time with steps for promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

7. The Soviet Union also appears to assume that any form of peaceful utilization of atomic energy must necessarily increase stocks of materials available for military purposes. In reality, however, ways can be devised to safeguard against diversion of materials from power-producing reactors. And there are forms of peaceful utilization in which no question of weapon-grade material arises.

8. The United States believes that the nations most advanced in knowledge regarding the constructive uses of atomic energy have an obligation to make it available, under appropriate conditions, for promoting the welfare of peoples generally. At the present stage of nuclear technology, the United States believes that it is now possible to make a beginning in this direction. Accordingly, the United States will feel free to go ahead with its proposal with other interested nations, even though the Soviet Union does not wish to pursue it at this time. If at a later time the Soviet Union should decide to take part in any such discussions, the United States will continue to welcome such participation.

III.

9. The Soviet Union refers to its proposal of 30 January for an international agreement calling for unconditional renunciation of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. The United States has thoroughly and earnestly considered this proposal in accordance with its oft-declared policy to examine with an open mind all suggested approaches to the problem of disarmament.

10. In the opinion of the United States, any effective plan for disarmament must provide satisfactory answers to two fundamental questions:

a. First, will the plan result in an actual reduction or elimination of national armaments in a manner consistent with the security of each nation? A paper promise not to use weapons will not enable the nations safely to reduce their armaments. The very existence of any weapon poses the possibility of its use, despite promises not to do so, which can be broken without notice.

b. Second, will the plan materially reduce or eliminate the danger of aggression and warfare? If any plan would, in fact, tend to increase the danger of resort to war by a potential aggressor, it would not accomplish the basic purpose of disarmament.

11. The Soviet Union's proposal of 30 January fails to meet either of these basic tests, or to offer any hope for beneficial results in the disarmament field:

a. It would leave unimpaired existing armaments and continued armament production. This is clear from the terms of the Soviet proposal itself. There would be only an exchange of promises not to make use of weapons which are still retained. There could be no certainty that these assurances would be observed. The maintenance of stocks of weapons and the continued manufacture of weapons would bear ominous witness to the danger that the assurances might be disregarded.

b. The danger of aggression and war would not be lessened if the Soviet proposal were put in effect. Indeed, it could be increased, since the deterrent effect upon a potential aggressor of the existence of nuclear weapons would doubtless be lessened if his possible victims had undertaken an obligation not to use them. Such an aggressor might be tempted to initiate an attack in the hope that the ban would prevent or delay the use of such weapons in the defence of his victims. Yet, the aggressor with nuclear weapons would be in a position to repudiate his past assurances and employ nuclear weapons whenever it suited his interests. Thus, such a plan might merely serve to induce aggression and weaken its victims.

12. Not only does the Soviet proposal fail to meet the necessary tests of any effective plan to prevent atomic warfare, but it would in fact harm the chances of adoption of any such effective plan. For surely the Soviet proposal, if it were accepted, would tend to create the deceptive impression that the danger of atomic warfare had somehow been limited and weaken the vigilance of the people regarding a threat which had, if anything, increased. This false sense of security could discourage further efforts to achieve genuine disarmament under effective safeguards, which would actually enhance the security of all, reduce the danger of war and lighten the heavy burden of armaments.

IV.

13. The United States reaffirms, as it did in the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 November 1950, that, whatever the method used, aggression itself is the gravest of all dangers. Only if there is aggression will the world be exposed to the horrors of modern war.

14. The signatories of the United Nations Charter have undertaken solemn assurances not to commit aggression. In conformity with its historic traditions, the United States will never violate that pledge. But, as indicated, the United States is convinced that the only truly effective way to ensure that aggression will not take place and that nuclear weapons will not be used in war is to adopt a safeguarded, balanced system of disarmament. Such a system could materially reduce the chance of successful aggression, and thereby minimize the risk of any aggression at all.

15. The United States continues to believe that a solution of the armaments problem is essential. Despite its inability to accept the Soviet proposal, the United States is ready at all times to discuss acceptable measures for effective disarmament under proper safeguards. It is prepared to do so either in the continuation of private exchanges or in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In view of the urgency of disarmament, the United States will welcome such a continuation if the Soviet Union considers it a useful means for seeking a common approach to this problem.

16. The United States also hopes that, in the light of the foregoing, the Soviet Union will wish to comment further on the concrete proposal submitted by the United States on 19 March 1954. In any event the United States is prepared to renew with the Soviet Union at any time the talks on the President's proposal.

AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED TO AMBASSADOR BOHLEN BY MR. GROMYKO, MOSCOW,
22 SEPTEMBER 1954

The Soviet Government has examined the United States Government's memorandum of 9 July 1954, which is in answer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government's aide-memoire of 27 April and considers it necessary to state the following:

In the above-mentioned aide-memoire of 27 April the Soviet Government set forth certain observations in connexion with the United States Government's proposal concerning the establishment of an international organ for atomic energy, which was discussed in President Eisenhower's statement of 8 December 1953. The Soviet Government drew attention to the fact that the implementation of the United States of America's proposal, which provides that appropriate States allot from their stockpiles a certain part of atomic materials to the disposition of the international organ to be used for peaceful purposes, cannot contribute to stopping the atomic armaments race. In this connexion the fact was pointed out that States which have the ability to produce atomic and hydrogen weapons will in no way be hampered in further increase of stockpiles of them by allotting only a small part of atomic materials to peaceful purposes while the main body of these materials will as before go for production of atomic weapons.

In the above-mentioned aide-memoire of 27 April the Soviet Government also drew attention to the fact that the United States of America's proposal avoids the question of the impermissibility of using atomic weapons which are weapons of mass destruction, and that acceptance of this proposal of the United States of America would bring about no change in the existing situation, whereby States disposing of atomic materials and corresponding possibilities for production of atomic weapons are producing them on an ever-increasing scale and are building up stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs of ever greater destructive force.

Such a situation would mean that, in fact, inadmissible international approval would be given to the production of atomic weapons, a fact which not only would not facilitate the attainment of agreement regarding prohibition of atomic weapons and their removal from State armaments but, on the contrary,

would create new obstacles on the path of reaching such agreement. It is not hard to understand that this would serve the purpose only of a potential aggressor; thus the United States of America's proposal does not satisfy the basic aim - to remove the threat of atomic war.

In its memorandum of 9 July the Government of the United States of America speaks of its desire to seek, together with other countries, ways of lessening the threat of war and lightening the armaments burden. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that, if the Government of the United States of America as well as the Government of the Soviet Union desires to lessen the threat of war and lighten the armaments burden, the efforts of both Governments should be directed toward the attainment of an agreement regarding prohibition of atomic weapons, with the establishment of strict international supervision over this prohibition, and regarding substantial limitation on conventional armaments of States.

With just this end in mind the Soviet Government has more than once advanced proposals in the United Nations which provide for the conclusion of an international convention regarding unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction and regarding substantial limitation of conventional armaments. In advancing these proposals the Soviet Government based itself on the fact that they answer the ever-increasing popular demands to put an end to the armaments race, including in the field of atomic weapons, and to take urgent measures to deliver humanity from the horrors of destructive atomic war. Despite the assertion contained in the American memorandum of 9 July, it is not the Soviet Union but the Government of the United States of America which has up to the present time prevented the conclusion of an agreement under conditions acceptable to all sovereign and equal States both regarding prohibition of atomic weapons and also regarding substantial limitation of conventional armaments with establishment of effective supervision over fulfilment of such decisions.

International agreement regarding prohibition of atomic weapons with establishment of appropriate supervision over this prohibition would open wide possibilities for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

As is known, up to this time it has not been possible to reach appropriate international agreement regarding unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, in view of the fact that the United States, from the very beginning of the arising of the atomic problem, has refused to take part together with other States in an international agreement prohibiting atomic weapons.

However, the circumstance that it has not been possible to reach such agreement up to the present time should not diminish the significance of efforts to reach the required agreement between interested States.

Such a new effort on the Soviet Government's part to find a way out of the existing situation was the Soviet Union's proposal that States take upon themselves the unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen or other types of weapons of mass destruction. This proposal in the form of a draft of an appropriate declaration by States was transmitted to the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, on 30 January.

Renunciation by the States of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction would be an important step on the path toward removal from State armaments of these types of weapons and establishment of strict international supervision guaranteeing fulfilment of an agreement regarding prohibition of use of atomic energy for military purposes. Acceptance of the above-mentioned declaration would have tremendous significance in the matter of removing the threat of war in which atomic weapons would be used, would contribute to strengthening international trust and lessening international tension, and also to improving atmosphere, to the importance of which the United States Government refers in its aide-memoire.

As is apparent from the United States Government's memorandum of 9 July, the Government of the United States of America has taken a negative position with regard to the above-mentioned proposal of the Soviet Union. As an objection to the Soviet proposal the United States Government refers to the alleged fact that it cannot be sure that an agreement regarding unconditional renunciation by States of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons will be carried out. However, if one takes this point of view, one must in such a case recognize that almost any international treaty or any agreement, and also

consequently obligations undertaken in accordance with it, must be placed in doubt. It stands to reason that it is impossible to agree with this, since it contradicts established principles and standards of relations between States.

In reality, the international obligations of States which could arise out of a declaration regarding the renunciation of the use of weapons of mass destruction could have not less but rather far more significance than certain important international agreements concluded in the past whose positive significance is generally recognized.

It is known that during the First World War, when there was as yet no corresponding international agreement, there were widely used such weapons of mass destruction as suffocating and poisonous gases, and also other types of chemical weapons, which met with the decisive condemnation of peoples. Specifically in this connexion the necessity was recognized of concluding an international agreement forbidding the use of such types of weapons of mass destruction of people. As a result, the Geneva Protocol concerning prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons was signed in 1925. It is known that this Protocol played an important role in preventing the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons during the Second World War, as a result of which peoples were spared the grave consequences of use of these weapons by belligerents.

This fact shows that international agreements containing obligations not to use specific types of weapons in war are not only possible but necessary and are important means of struggling for the strengthening of peace. This should be all the more applicable to an agreement concerning the most destructive weapons known to mankind, atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Also groundless is the allegation contained in the United States Government's aide-memoire that international agreement on the renunciation by States of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons could increase the danger of war, as is also the assertion that the existing situation, which is characterized by an unlimited race in the field of production of atomic weapons, creates greater security than the conclusion of an agreement on renunciation by States of the use of the types of weapons mentioned. Such an assertion is in clear contradiction to the actual situation and to the facts. It was specifically

with the appearance of atomic and then/hydrogen weapons, and also of rocket and other new types of weapons of mass destruction of ever-growing destructive force, that the armaments race, including the race in production of atomic and hydrogen weapons, especially gained intensity and at the same time the threat increased of atomic war, with all the grave consequences ensuing therefrom for all peoples.

On the other hand, the renunciation by States of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons would change the international situation, would assist in further reduction of tension in international relations and would lighten the burden of the armaments race and excessive expenditures on the maintenance in many States of swollen armed forces. This, in its turn, would create conditions for the transition to the next step, to complete the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their removal from the armaments of States.

In the Soviet Government's aide-memoire of 27 April of this year attention was drawn to the fact that it is possible to carry out the process, on an industrial scale, of generating electrical energy through utilization of atomic materials whereby the quantity of fissionable materials used does not decrease but rather, on the contrary, increases. At the same time non-dangerous materials are turned into dangerous and explosive materials capable of serving as the basis for production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. This means that the peaceful use of atomic energy is tied to the possibility of simultaneously producing explosive atomic materials for manufacture of atomic weapons, which immutably leads to an increase in the scale of production of atomic weapons and an increase in the stocks of these.

In the United States Government's memorandum it is stated that forms of peaceful utilization of atomic energy are possible in which ways can be found to guarantee against seepage of materials from factories producing energy and that, according to the opinion of the United States Government, there are forms of peaceful utilization in which the question of materials going into production of atomic weapons does not arise. The Soviet Government is ready to examine in course of further negotiations the United States Government's views on this question.

The proposal of the United States Government and the proposal of the Soviet Government as well as the views expressed by both Governments in the course of negotiations show that it has not yet been possible to harmonize the positions of the parties on a number of substantive questions. In the course of negotiations the Soviet Government insisted, and continues to insist, on the necessity for international agreements which would insure that atomic energy would not be permitted to be used for military purposes and would make its use possible only for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind. The United States Government also states that it desires to co-operate in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

Inasmuch as reconciling positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union on this question has an important significance for the achievement of international agreement regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the Soviet Government deems it desirable for both Governments to continue efforts to bring the positions of the parties closer together. One must not consider that the possibilities of making the positions of the parties agree have been exhausted, especially if one takes into account the fact that a number of concrete questions which arise, both in connexion with the proposal of the Soviet Union and in connexion with the proposal of the United States, have not yet been subjected to proper examination. Moreover, thorough examination of these questions could assist in further clarification of the possibilities of reaching an appropriate agreement.

In this connexion, the Soviet Government would consider it expedient to draw the attention of the United States Government to certain important principles which one must not overlook in considering the question of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Soviet Government proceeds from the principle that an important pre-requisite to international agreement in this field is recognition that any such agreement should not place any one State or group of States in a privileged position whereby this State or group of States could enforce its will on other States. This is particularly worthy of emphasis in connexion with the United States Government's proposal having to do with structure and governing bodies of the international agency.

Any international organ created on the basis of an appropriate agreement between States can only successfully carry out its functions if its competence, sufficiently wide to permit it effectively to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it, is not at the same time utilized to the detriment of the security of some of the other States. It can answer its purpose only if its competence and tasks, as well as its practical activity, are in conformity with generally recognized principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet Government shares the opinion of the United States Government regarding the thesis that the appropriate international organ would report concerning its activity to the Security Council and the General Assembly. It goes without saying that when, in this connexion, questions arise having to do with the security of some of the other States, necessary decisions must be taken specifically by the Security Council in accordance with its powers as the organ on which is placed principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security. This was recognized as early as January 1946 when the first decision of the United Nations concerning atomic problems was taken.

The Soviet Government, taking into consideration the declaration of the Government of the United States of America concerning its willingness at any time to renew the negotiations connected with the peaceful uses of atomic energy, for its part declares its willingness to continue these negotiations for the examination of the proposals of the Soviet Government as well as the proposals of the Government of the United States of America.

In conclusion, the Soviet Government would like to know the opinion of the United States Government as to whether it is not desirable that all documents which have been mutually exchanged between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America during the course of the conversations which have taken place on the atomic problem should be published in the press of the Soviet Union as well as the press of the United States of America respectively in order that public opinion might be informed concerning the contents of these negotiations. In this connexion the Soviet Government takes into consideration the fact that, in the course of the conversations which have taken place between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, communications have appeared in the press which imprecisely elucidate certain questions concerning the position of the parties.

LETTER DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1954 FROM MR. CHARLES E. BOHLEN TO MR. ANDREI GROMYKO

Dear Mr. Gromyko

I have the honor to refer to the aide-memoire which you handed to me on 22 September and to inform you that the United States Government is willing to publish all documents exchanged between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding the proposal advanced by the President of the United States of America on 8 December 1953, with respect to the international use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

(Signed) Charles E. BOHLEN

Mr. Andrei Gromyko,
Deputy Foreign Minister,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Following is an excerpt from the release of the Secretary of State's address of 23 September 1954, before the United Nations General Assembly, on this subject:

Atomic energy

The past year has been marked by intensive efforts in the field of atomic energy. The United States has sought to share its commanding position in this field in ways which would permit many to join in a great new adventure in human welfare. We hoped to turn atomic energy from an instrument of death into a source of the enrichment of life.

I vividly recall that day - 8 December 1953 - when we here heard President Eisenhower propose that the nations possessing atomic material should co-operate under the auspices of the United Nations to create a world atomic bank into which they would each contribute fissionable material that would then be used for the purposes of productivity rather than of destruction. I shared the drama of that moment and sensed the universal applause which then greeted that proposal - applause which echoed round the world.

Because it often times seems that negotiations publicly conducted with the Soviet Union tend to become mere propaganda contests, President Eisenhower proposed that these new negotiations should be privately conducted. So, the United States, after consultation with others, prepared and submitted a concrete, detailed proposal to carry out President Eisenhower's great conception. I myself met several times with the Soviet Foreign Minister at Berlin and at Geneva to discuss this matter. We are quite willing that all documents exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union during these negotiations should be published.

We hoped and believed that if the Soviet Union would join with the United States; the United Kingdom and other nations possessing fissionable material and atomic "know-how", this act of co-operation might set a pattern which would extend itself elsewhere.

The plan we submitted could not have hurt anyone. It is motivated by the hope of lifting the darkest cloud that hangs over mankind. Its initial dimensions were not sufficient to impair the military capacity of the Soviet Union, and there was no apparent reason for its rejection. Above all, it was a practicable, easily workable plan, not dependent upon elaborate surveillance.

Nevertheless, the proposal was in effect rejected by the Soviet Union last April. Its rejection was not because of any alleged defects in the plan itself. Any such defects would certainly have been subject to negotiation. The Soviet position was, in effect, to say - We will not co-operate to develop peacetime uses of atomic energy unless it is first of all agreed to renounce all those uses which provide the free nations with their strongest defence against aggression.

To date, the Soviet Government has shown no willingness to participate in the implementation of President Eisenhower's plan except on **this** completely unacceptable condition. Yesterday, when it was known that I would speak on this topic today, the Soviet Union broke a five months' silence by delivering a note in Moscow affirming its readiness to talk further. But the note still gave no indication that the Soviet Union had receded from its negative position.

The United States, of course, remains ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union, but we are not ready to suspend any longer our efforts to establish an international atomic agency.

The United States is determined that President Eisenhower's proposal shall not languish until it dies. We are determined that it shall be nurtured and developed, and we shall press on in close partnership with those nations which, inspired by the ideals of the United Nations Charter, can make this great new force a tool of humanitarianism and of statesmanship, and not merely a fearsome addition to the arsenal of war.

The United States is here proposing an agenda item which will enable us to report further on our efforts to explore and to develop the vast possibilities for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. These efforts have been and will be directed primarily towards the following ends:

(1) The creation of an international agency, whose initial membership will include nations from all regions of the world - and it is hoped that such an agency will start its work as early as next year.

(2) The calling of an international scientific conference to consider this whole vast subject, to meet in the spring of 1955 under the auspices of the United Nations.

(3) The opening early next year, in the United States, of a reactor training school where students from abroad may learn the working principles of atomic energy with specific regard to its peacetime uses.

(4) The invitation to a substantial number of medical and surgical experts from abroad to participate in the work of our cancer hospitals - in which atomic energy techniques are among the most hopeful approaches to controlling this menace to mankind.

I want to make it perfectly clear that our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As our proposals take shape, all nations interested in participating and willing to take on the responsibilities of membership will be welcome to join with us in the planning and the execution of this programme.

Even though much is denied us by Soviet negation, nevertheless much remains that can be done. There is denied the immense relaxation of tension which might have occurred had the Soviet Union been willing to begin to co-operate with other nations in relation to what offers so much to fear, so much to hope. Nevertheless, there is much to be accomplished in the way of economic and humanitarian gains. There is no miracle to be wrought overnight. But a programme can be made and vitalized to assure that atomic energy can bring to millions a better way of life. To achieve that result is our firm resolve.
