

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

ANNEXES

19 SEPTEMBER—19 DECEMBER 1967,
24 APRIL—12 JUNE 1968
and
23 SEPTEMBER 1968

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1970

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Official Records of the General Assembly include the records of the meetings, the annexes to those records and the supplements. The annexes are printed in fascicles, by agenda item. The present volumes (I, II and III) contain the annex fascicles of the twenty-second session.

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Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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^{*} No fascicles were issued for the following agenda items: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

Official Records

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 3:* Credentials of representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly:

- (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
- (b) Report of the Credentials Committee

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DOCUMENT A/6990

Report of the Credentials Committee

[Original text: English] [14 December 1967]

- 1. At its 1560th plenary meeting, on 19 September 1967, the General Assembly, in accordance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, appointed a Credentials Committee for its twenty-second session consisting of the following Member States: Ceylon, Ireland, Japan, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Paraguay, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America.
- 2. The Credentials Committee met on 13 December 1967.
- 3. Mr. Cornelius C. Cremin (Ireland) was unanimously elected Chairman.
- 4. The Chairman drew the attention of the Committee to two memoranda by the Secretary-General, one presented at the request of the Credentials Committee of the fifth special session and relating to the credentials of some of the representatives to that session, the other indicating the status of credentials to the current session of the General Assembly. It appeared from these memoranda that the credentials of some representatives to both sessions had not yet been submitted to the Secretary-General in the proper form, as required by rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.
- 5. With regard to the first memorandum, the Chairman suggested that the Committee take note of it and request the Secretary-General to approach the Governments concerned once again. Regarding the memorandum relating to the status of credentials to the current session, the Chairman suggested that, in view of the imminent adjournment of the session, the Committee decide to accept provisionally, in place of the credentials in due form, the communications mentioned in that memorandum, on the understanding that credentials issued in conformity with rule 27 would be promptly submitted to the Secretary-General.
- 6. The Committee adopted unanimously the suggestions formulated by the Chairman.

- 7. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that his delegation did not recognize the validity of the credentials of the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek régime, which were not in conformity with rule 27 of the rules of procedure. His delegation's position, as expressed on many previous occasions, was that only the Government of the People's Republic of China had the right to represent China in the United Nations.
- 8. For the above-mentioned reasons, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed that the Committee consider the said credentials invalid and introduced to this end the following draft resolution:

"The Credentials Committee,

"Having considered the proposal of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the non-recognition of the credentials of the persons calling themselves 'the representatives of the Republic of China';

"Decides to consider invalid the credentials of the persons calling themselves 'the representatives of the Republic of China' at the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly owing to the incompatibility of these credentials with the requirements of rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the United Nations General Assembly."

9. The representatives of Ceylon and Mali supported the draft resolution. They both stressed that the responsibilities of the Committee required that in examining the credentials it should make certain that the persons holding the credentials were the true representatives of the State concerned. Their delegations held that the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek régime had no legitimate right to speak on behalf of China, which was properly represented by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1560th and 1635th meetings.

- 10. The representative of Japan stated that the USSR draft resolution involved two distinct questions, namely, the representation of China in the United Nations and the validity of the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of China. The first question, in his view, was not within the competence of the Committee; it had already been considered at the current session by the General Assembly which, at its 1610th plenary meeting, on 28 November 1967, had decisively rejected a proposal¹ to change the representation of China. Accordingly, the USSR draft resolution was out of order, but his delegation would not object to its being put to a vote in order to avoid a procedural debate. As regards the second question, he saw no grounds to challenge the validity of the credentials, which had been issued by the competent authorities of the Republic of China in accordance with rule 27 of the rules of procedure.
- 11. The representatives of Mexico, Paraguay and the United States of America endorsed the views expressed by the representative of Japan and said that they would vote against the USSR draft resolution.
- 12. The Chairman put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the USSR. The draft resolution was rejected by 5 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.
- 13. The representative of Mali expressed formal reservations concerning the credentials of the representative of South Africa, since they emanated from a racist and fascist régime which defied the United Nations Charter, and not from the people of South Africa. He believed that those credentials should be rejected.
- 14. The representatives of Madagascar and the USSR associated themselves with the view expressed by the representative of Mali. The representative of the USSR further stated that his delegation had repeatedly expressed its opposition to the minority Government of South Africa, which deprived the rightful masters of the country—the indigenous population—of their rights and freedoms and which had persistently flouted the General Assembly resolutions calling upon it to end its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination.
- 15. The representatives of Paraguay and the United States of America stated that their Governments also categorically rejected the policies of racial discrimina-

tion and apartheid practised by the Government of South Africa. They were of the view, however, that their Governments' detestation of those policies did not affect the validity of the credentials of the South African delegation, which fulfilled the requirements of rule 27 of the rules of procedure.

16. The Chairman stated that all reservations expressed in the Committee concerning the representation of China and South Africa would be recorded in the Committee's report to the General Assembly and proposed the following draft resolution for adoption by the Committee:

"The Credenfials Committee,

"Having examined the credentials of the representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly,

"Recalling the different views expressed during the debate,

- "Accepts the credentials of all representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly and recommends to the General Assembly that it approve the report of the Credentials Committee."
- 17. The representative of the USSR stated that he would be obliged to abstain on the draft resolution because it failed to take account of the reservations expressed by several delegations regarding the credentials of the representatives of China and South Africa. The representative of Ceylon stated that he would vote for the draft resolution on the understanding that reservations made during the debate would be recorded in the report. The representative of Mali also requested that his objections regarding the credentials of the representatives of China and South Africa be mentioned in the report.
- 18. The draft resolution proposed by the Chairman was adopted by 7 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

Recommendation of the Credentials Committee

19. The Credentials Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Credentials of representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly

"The General Assembly

"Approves the report of the Credentials Committee."

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1635th plenary meeting, on 16 December 1967, the General Assembly, by a vote of 67 to none, with 20 abstentions, adopted the draft resolution submitted by the Credentials Committee (A/6990, para. 19). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, resolution 2322 (XXII).

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Second Session, Annexes, agenda item 93, document A/L.531 and Add.1.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967-1968

Official Records

Agenda item 3:* Credentials of representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly:

- (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
- (b) Report of the Credentials Committee

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^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1672nd and 1673rd meetings.

DOCUMENT A/6990/ADD.1

Second report of the Credentials Committee

[Original text: English]
[11 June 1968]

- 1. The Credentials Committee held its second meeting on 11 June 1968. The representatives of all Member States appointed to the Committee by the General Assembly participated in the meeting.
- 2. The Chairman drew the attention of the Committee to the memorandum by the Secretary-General of 11 June 1968 relating to the changes in the status of the credentials of representatives which had occurred since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2322 (XXII) of 16 December 1967 approving the first report of the Credentials Committee (A/6990).
- 3. The Committee found that the credentials had been submitted to the Secretary-General in the proper form as required by rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly for the representatives of the Member States referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the above-mentioned memorandum.
- 4. The Committee further noted that the Governments of certain Member States had informed the Secretary-General of the changes in their representa-

tion to the resumed session, but the credentials of some of their new representatives had not yet been submitted to the Secretary-General in the proper form. On the proposal of the Chairman, the Committee decided to meet at a later stage with a view to examining credentials of those representatives when they had been submitted to the Secretary-General and to recommend to the General Assembly that in the meantime the representatives concerned should be seated provisionally with the same rights as the other representatives.

Recommendation of the Credentials Committee

- 5. The Credentials Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:
 - "CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
 - "The General Assembly
 - "Approves the second report of the Credentials Committee (A/6990/Add.1)."

DOCUMENT A/6990/ADD.2

Third report of the Credentials Committee

[Original text: English] [23 September 1968]

- 1. The Credentials Committee held its third meeting on 23 September 1968. The representatives of the following Member States appointed to the Committee by the General Assembly participated in the meeting: Ceylon, Ireland, Japan, Madagascar, Mexico, Paraguay, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America.
- 2. The Chairman recalled that the Committee, at its 2nd meeting, held on 11 June 1968, had decided to meet again at a later stage with a view to examining the outstanding credentials of some of the representatives to the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly and drew its attention to the memorandum of the Secretary-General of 23 September

1968 from which it appeared that credentials of all those representatives were now in order. He then proposed that the Committee should find the credentials of the representatives concerned in order and recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of a draft resolution approving the Committee's report.

3. The Chairman's proposal was unanimously adopted.

Recommendation of the Credentials Committee

4. The Credentials Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"Credentials of representatives to the twentysecond session of the General Assembly

"The General Assembly

"Approves the third report of the Credentials Committee (A/6990/Add.2)."

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1672nd plenary meeting, on 12 June 1968, the General Assembly adopted, without objection, the draft resolution submitted by the Credentials Committee (A/6990/Add.1, para. 5). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16A, resolution 2374 (XXII).

At its 1673rd plenary meeting, on 23 September 1968, the General Assembly adopted, without objection, the draft resolution submitted by the Credentials Committee (A/6990/Add.2, para. 4). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16A, resolution 2375 (XXII).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

Official Records

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 7: Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations*

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DOCUMENT A/6819

Letter dated 18 September 1967 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly

[Original text: English and French] [18 September 1967]

In accordance with the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, and with the consent of the Security Council, I have the honour to send you herewith a notification to the General Assembly, listing matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council.

(Signed) U THANT Secretary-General of the United Nations

NOTIFICATION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER ARTICLE 12, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

In accordance with the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter and with the consent of the Security Council, I have the honour to notify the General Assembly of matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and also of matters with which the Security Council has ceased to deal.

The matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which have been discussed during the period since my notification to the last session¹ are as follows:

- Letter dated 21 September 1966 from the acting Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 2. The Palestine question.
- 3. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of thirty-two Member States.
- 4. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- ¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 7, document A/6423.

- Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 6. Complaint of the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security".
- Letter dated 27 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 8. Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as a result of an aggression".
- Letter dated 6 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 11. Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council.

During this period, the Security Council has not discussed the following matters of which it remains seized:

- 1. The Iranian question.
- Special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter and the organization of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council.
- 3. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and information on the armed forces of the United Nations.
- Appointment of a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste.
- 5. The Egyptian question.

^{*}For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1564th meeting.

- 6. The Indonesian question.
- 7. The India-Pakistan question.
- 8. The Czechoslovak question.
- 9. The question of the Free Territory of Trieste.
- 10. The Hyderabad question.
- Identic notifications dated 29 September 1948 from the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General.
- 12. International control of atomic energy.
- 13. Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Complaint of bombing by air forces of the territory of China.
- 15. Complaint of failure by the Iranian Government to comply with provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case.
- Question of an appeal to States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons.
- Question of a request for investigation of alleged bacterial warfare.
- Letter dated 29 May 1954 from the acting Permanent Representative of Thailand addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 19. Telegram dated 19 June 1954 from the Minister of External Relations of Guatemala addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 8 September 1954 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 21. Letter dated 28 January 1955 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China; letter dated 30 January 1955 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the question of acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan (Formosa) and other islands of China.
- 22. Situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.
- 23. Actions against Egypt by some Powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which constitute a danger to international peace and security and are serious violations of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 24. The situation in Hungary.
- 25. Military assistance rendered by the Egyptian Government to the rebels in Algeria.
- Letter dated 30 October 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 27. Letter dated 13 February 1958 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council concerning: "Complaint by Tunisia in respect of an act of aggression committed against it by France on 8 February 1958 at Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef".
- 28. Letter dated 14 February 1958 from the Permanent Representative of France to the President of the Security Council concerning: "Situation resulting from the aid furnished by Tunisia to rebels enabling them to conduct operations from Tunisian territory directed against the integrity of French territory and the safety of persons and property of French nationals".

- Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General.
- 30. Complaint of the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 18 April 1958 entitled: "Urgent measures to put an end to flights by United States military aircraft with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union".
- 31. Letter dated 29 May 1958 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council concerning: "Complaint by Tunisia in respect to acts of armed aggression committed against it since 19 May 1958 by the French military forces stationed in its territory and in Algeria".
- 32. Letter dated 29 May 1958 from the Permanent Representative of France to the President of the Security Council concerning: (a) "The complaint brought by France against Tunisia on 14 February 1958" (see item 28 above); and (b) "The situation arising out of the disruption by Tunisia of the modus vivendi which had been established since February 1958 with regard to the stationing of French troops at certain points in Tunisian territory".
- 33. Report by the Secretary-General on the letter received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos, transmitted by a note from the Permanent Mission of Laos to the United Nations, 4 September 1959.
- 34. Letter dated 25 March 1960 from the Permanent Representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic and Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Telegram dated 18 May 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 23 May 1960 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador and Tunisia addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 20 February 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 41. Letter dated 26 May 1961 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen and Yugoslavia.
- 42. Complaint by Kuwait in respect of the situation arising from the threat by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait, which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; complaint by the Government of the Republic of Iraq in respect of the situation arising out of the armed threat by the United

- Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the independence and security of Iraq, which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
- 43. Telegram dated 20 July 1961 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tunisia; letter dated 20 July 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 44. Letter dated 21 November 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 45. Letter dated 18 December 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 46. Letter dated 22 October 1962 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council; letter dated 22 October 1962 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council; letter dated 23 October 1962 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 47. Complaints by Senegal of violations of its air space and territory.
- Telegram dated 5 May 1963 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Haiti to the President of the Security Council.
- 49. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council concerning developments relating to Yemen.
- 50. Question relating to Territories under Portuguese administration: letter dated 11 July 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of thirty-two Member States.
- 51. Question relating to the policies of apartheid of the Republic of South Africa: letter dated 11 July 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of thirty-two Member States
- 52. Letter dated 10 January 1964 from the Permanent Rep-

- resentative of Panama addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 53. Letter dated 1 April 1964 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Yemen, Chargé d'affaires a.i., addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 54. Complaint concerning acts of aggression against the territory and civilian population of Cambodia.
- 55. Letter dated 3 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the United States addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 56. Letter dated 3 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 57. Letter dated 5 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council; letter dated 8 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 6 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 59. Letter dated 1 December 1964, addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia.
- 60. Letter dated 9 December 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 1 May 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Letter dated 31 January 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- 63. Letter dated 2 August 1966 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1564th plenary meeting, on 23 September 1967, the General Assembly took note of the communication from the Secretary-General (A/6819).

Official Records

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

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Provisional agenda of the twenty-second session

[Original text: English, French and Spanish] [21 July 1967]

- 1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Aghanistan.
- 2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
- Credentials of representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
- 4. Election of the President.
- 5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers
- 6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
- 7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 8. Adoption of the agenda.
- 9. General debate.
- 10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
- 11. Report of the Security Council.
- 12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
- 13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
- 14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
- 15. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.

- 16. Election of nine members of the Economic and Social Council.
- 17. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board.
- 18. Election of the members of the Executive Board of the United Nations Capital Development Fund.
- 19. Election of the members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
- Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission.
- 21. United Nations Emergency Force:
 - (a) Report on the Force;
 - (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force.
- 22. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2193 (XXI) of 15 December 1966].
- 23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolutions 2134 (XXI) of 29 September 1966, 2138 (XXI) of 22 October 1966, 2145 (XXI) and 2146 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, 2151 (XXI) of 17 November 1966,

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, General Committee, 165th to 173rd meetings; ibid., Plenary Meetings, 1564th, 1572nd, 1583rd, 1592nd and 1629th meetings.

- 2183 (XXI), 2184 (XXI) and 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, and 2226 (XXI), 2227 (XXI), 2228 (XXI), 2229 (XXI), 2230 (XXI), 2231 (XXI), 2232 (XXI) and 2238 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
- 24. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination [resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966].
- 25. Installation of mechanical means of voting: report of the Secretary-General [decision of 7 December 1966].
- 26. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter [resolution 2114 (XX) of 21 December 1965].
- Question of holding further conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic energy [resolution 2056 (XX) of 16 December 1965].
- 28. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:
 - (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [resolution 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966];
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966].
- 29. Question of general and complete disarmament:
 - (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [resolution 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966];
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966].
- Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [resolution 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966].
- 31. Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [resolution 2165 (XXI) of 5 December 1966].
- 32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [resolutions 2222 (XXI) and 2223 (XXI) of 19 December 1966].
- 33. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [resolution 2224 (XXI) of 19 December 1966].
- 34. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [resolution 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966].
- 35. The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa [resolution 2202 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966]:

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [resolution 2213 (XXI) of 17 December 1966].
- 37. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations [resolution 2249 (S-V) of 23 May 1967].
- 38. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: report of the Trade and Development Board [resolutions 2206 (XXI), 2207 (XXI), 2208 (XXI), 2209 (XXI) and 2210 (XXI) of 17 December 1966].
- 39. United Nations Industrial Development Organization: report of the Industrial Development Board [resolutions 2152 (XXI) of 17 November 1966 and 2178 (XXI) of 9 December 1966].
- 40. United Nations Capital Development Fund: confirmation of the appointment of the Managing Director [resolution 2186 (XXI) of 13 December 1966].
- 41. United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2218 (XXI) of 19 December 1966].
- 42. External financing of economic development of the developing countries [resolutions 2169 (XXI) and 2170 (XXI) of 6 December 1966]:
 - (a) Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Outflow of capital from the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General.
- 43. Development of natural resources [Economic and Social Council resolution 1218 (XLII) of 1 June 1967].
- 44. The role of the United Nations in training national technical personnel for the accelerated industrialization of the developing countries [resolution 2090 (XX) of 20 December 1965].
- 45. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director [resolution 2187 (XXI) of 13 December 1966].
- 46. Operational activities for development [resolutions 2179 (XXI) and 2180 (XXI) of 9 December 1966]:
 - (a) Activities of the United Nations Development Programme: reports of the Governing Council;
 - (b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary-General.
- 47. Regional development [decision of 24 September 1966¹].
- 48. Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2155 (XXI) of 22 November 1966].
- 49. General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized

¹ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1415th meeting, para. 10.

Agenda item 8

- agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system: report of the Enlarged Committee for Programme and Co-ordination [resolution 2188 (XXI) of 13 December 1966].
- 50. World social situation: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2215 (XXI) of 19 December 1966].
- 51. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
 - (a) Report of the High Commissioner [resolution 2197 (XXI) of 16 December 1966];
 - (b) Question of the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner [resolution 1783 (XVII) of 7 December 1962].
- 52. Housing, building and planning: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2036 (XX) of 7 December 1965].
- 53. Town twinning as a means of international cooperation: report of the Economic and Social Council [resolution 2058 (XX) of 16 December 1965].
- 54. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [resolution 2199 (XXI) of 16 December 1966].
- 55. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance:
 - (a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance [decision of 19 December 1966];
 - (b) Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance [idem].
- 56. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination [resolutions 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965 and 2142 (XXI) of 26 October 1966]:
 - (a) Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) Measures to be taken against nazism and racial intolerance [Economic and Social Council resolution 1211 (XLII) of 29 May 1967];
 - (d) Measures for the speedy implementation of international instruments against racial discrimination [Economic and Social Council resolution 1244 [XLII] of 6 June 1967].
- 57. Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2144 (XXI) of 26 October 1966].
- 58. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966].

- 59. International Year for Human Rights:
 - (a) Programme of measures and activities to be undertaken in connexion with the International Year for Human Rights: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2217 A (XXI) of 19 December 1966];
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights [resolution 2217 C (XXI) of 19 December 1966].
- 60. Freedom of information [resolution 2216 (XXI) of 19 December 1966]:
 - (a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information;
 - (b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
- 61. Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity [Economic and Social Council resolution 1220 (XLII) of 6 June 1967].
- 62. Question concerning the implementation of human rights through a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights or some other appropriate international machinery [General Assembly decision of 19 December 1966 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1237 (XLII) of 6 June 19671.
- 63. Capital punishment: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1918 (XVIII) of 5 December 1963].
- 64. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations [resolution 2233 (XXI) of 20 December 1966]:
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
- 65. Question of South West Africa [resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2146 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, and decision of 13 June 1967]:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa;
 - (c) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa.
- 66. Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2236 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
- 67. Question of Territories under Portuguese administration [resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966]:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 68. Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2237 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].

- 69. Question of the consolidation and integration of the special educational and training programmes for South West Africa, the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration and the educational and training programme for South Africans: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2235 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
- 70. Question of Fiji: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966].
- 71. Question of Oman [resolution 2238 (XXI) of 20 December 1966]:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 72. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2234 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
- 73. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1966 and reports of the Board of Auditors:
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Development Programme;
 - (c) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (e) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- 74. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1967.
- 75. Budget estimates for the financial year 1968.
- 76. Pattern of conferences [resolution 2239 (XXI) of 20 December 1966]:
 - (a) Report of the Committee on Conferences;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 77. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
 - (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
 - (f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
- 78. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
- 79. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:

- (a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations from the Technical Assistance Account of the United Nations Development Programme;
- (b) Allocations from the Special Fund Account of the United Nations Development Programme.
- 80. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
- 81. Implementation of the recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies: reports of the Secretary-General [resolution 2150 (XXI) of 4 November 1966].
- 82. Publications and documentation of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2247 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
- 83. Personnel questions:
 - (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Other personnel questions.
- 84. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
- 85. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2176 (XXI) of 9 December 1966].
- 86. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its nineteenth session.
- 87. Law of treaties [resolution 2166 (XXI) of 5 December 1966].
- 88. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States [resolution 2181 (XXI) of 12 December 1966].
- 89. Question of methods of fact-finding [resolution 2182 (XXI) of 12 December 1966].
- 90. Draft Declaration on Territorial Asylum [resolution 2203 (XXI) of 16 December 1966].
- 91. United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 2204 (XXI) of 16 December 1966].
- 92. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [item proposed by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (A/6676 and Add.1 and 2)²].

² Argentina and Honduras subsequently joined the list of countries requesting the inclusion of this item in the agenda (A/6676/Add.3 and A/6676/Add.4, dated 3 August and 15 September 1967 respectively).

Agenda item 8

DOCUMENT A/6697

Supplementary list of items proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-second session

[Original text: English, French and Spanish] [25 August 1967]

- 1. Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind [item proposed by Malta (A/6695)].
- 2. Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations [item proposed by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/6696)⁸].

DOCUMENT A/BUR/167

Organization of the twenty-second session: memorandum by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English, French and Spanish] [12 September 1967]

1. The Secretary-General has the honour to place before the General Committee the following observations and suggestions regarding the arrangements for the meetings of the General Assembly and its Main Committees during the twenty-second session.

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

- 2. It is suggested that both plenary and committee meetings should begin promptly at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.
- 3. It is proposed that a five-day working week be established, it being understood that meetings on Saturdays, and also night meetings, may be scheduled should this prove necessary.

CLOSING DATE FOR THE SESSION

4. In accordance with the provisions of rule 2 of the rules of procedure, the Secretary-General wishes to suggest that the General Committee propose to the General Assembly that the closing date of the twenty-second session should be Tuesday, 19 December 1967.

VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES

5. The Secretary-General wishes to draw to the General Committee's attention that in previous years, in accordance with a recommendation made by the Fifth Committee at the second session, verbatim records have been authorized "for one Main Committee at a time, the Committee which, in the opinion of the General Committee, has the most important items on its

agenda".⁴ The Secretary-General suggests that the First Committee be provided with verbatim services and that the verbatim records be the official records of that Committee. The summary records would remain the official records of all other Main Committees. The Secretary-General further suggests that the debates of the Special Political Committee be transcribed from sound recordings upon request, with priority in the distribution given to the records of the First Committee.

SEATING ARRANGEMENTS

6. In accordance with established practice, the Secretary-General caused lots to be drawn for the purpose of choosing the Member to occupy the first desk on the Assembly floor from which the alphabetical seating order will begin. Iraq was the name drawn and, consequently, the delegation of that country will sit at the first desk at the extreme right of the President and the other countries will follow in the English alphabetical order. The same order would be followed by the Main Committees.

Use of the General Assembly Hall by Main Committees

7. Since there are only five conference rooms available, the Secretary-General suggests that all the Main Committees make full use of the General Assembly Hall when the plenary Assembly is not meeting and, in particular, use the voting machine on a rotating basis.

 $^{^3}$ Cambodia subsequently joined the list of countries requesting the inclusion of this item in the agenda (A/6696/Add.3 dated 15 September 1967).

⁴ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. II, annex 6 (b), document A/498, p. 1501.

DOCUMENT A/BUR/168 AND ADD.1-3

Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items: memorandum by the Secretary-General

DOCUMENT A/BUR/1685

[Original text: English, French and Spanish] [12 September 1967]

1. The Secretary-General has the honour to place before the General Committee for its consideration the following observations and proposals in connexion with the report to be made to the plenary meeting by the General Committee on the adoption of the agenda of the twenty-second session and the allocation of agenda items.

I. Adoption of the agenda

- 2. All proposals for the inclusion of items in the agenda of the twenty-second session have been communicated to the members of the General Assembly in the following documents:
- (a) Provisional agenda of the twenty-second session (A/6680/Rev.1);
- (b) Supplementary list of items proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-second session (A/6697);
- (c) Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session: letter dated 8 September 1967 from the representatives of Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, the Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Romania and Syria (A/6831).
- 3. With regard to item 47 (Regional development), the Secretary-General wishes to remind the members of the General Committee that the item was placed on the provisional agenda of the twenty-second session as a result of a decision taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session to postpone consideration of the question. In view of the fact that this matter will be discussed at the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to be held at New Delhi in February and March 1968, the General Committee may wish to recommend to the General Assembly that this item be deleted from the agenda of the twenty-second session.
- 4. In resolution 1255 (XLIII) of 2 August 1967, the Economic and Social Council submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration a draft resolution relating to the review of the World Food Programme. The General Committee may wish to recommend that this question be combined with item 48 of the provisional agenda (Programme of studies on multilateral food aid) under the single heading "Multilateral food aid". Item 48 in its revised form would thus read:
 - "Multilateral food aid:
 - "(a) Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General;
 - "(b) Review of the World Food Programme."
- 5. Subject to the General Committee's recommendations regarding paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the agenda
- ⁵ Incorporating document A/BUR/168/Corr.1 dated 22 September 1967. This corrigendum was issued for the purpose of replacing the original wording of item 62, "Question concerning the implementation of human rights through a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights or some other appropriate international machinery", by the wording: "Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights".

- of the twenty-second session would consist of the following items:⁶
- 1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Afghanistan (P.1).
- 2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation (P.2).
- 3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly (P.3):
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
- 4. Election of the President (P.4).
- 5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers (P.5).
- 6. Election of Vice-Presidents (P.6).
- 7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations (P.7).
- 8. Adoption of the agenda (P.8).
- 9. General debate (P.9).
- 10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (P.10).
- 11. Report of the Security Council (P.11).
- 12. Report of the Economic and Social Council (P.12).
- 13. Report of the Trusteeship Council (P.13).
- 14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (P.14).
- 15. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council (P.15).
- 16. Election of nine members of the Economic and Social Council (P.16).
- 17. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board (P.17).
- 18. Election of the members of the Executive Board of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (P. 18).
- 19. Election of the members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (P.19).
- 20. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission (P.20).
- 21. United Nations Emergency Force (P.21):
 - (a) Report on the Force;
 - (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force.
- 22. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General (P.22).
- 23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (P.23).
- 24. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under

A. = an additional item (A/6831).

⁶ Abbreviations used in the present document:

P. = an item on the provisional agenda (A/6680/Rev.1);

S. = an item on the supplementary list (A/6697);

- Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination (P.24).
- 25. Installation of mechanical means of voting: report of the Secretary-General (P.25).
- 26. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter (P.26).
- 27. Question of holding further conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic energy (P.27).
- 28. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (P.28):
 - (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.
- 29. Question of general and complete disarmament (P.29):
 - (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.
- 30. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (P.30).
- 31. Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (P.31).
- 32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (P.32).
- 33. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (P.33).
- 34. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (P.34).
- 35. The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (P.35):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 36. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (P.36).
- 37. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (P.37).
- 38. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: report of the Trade and Development Board (P.38).
- 39. United Nations Industrial Development Organization: report of the Industrial Development Board (P.39).
- 40. United Nations Capital Development Fund: confirmation of the appointment of the Managing Director (P.40).
- 41. United Nations Development Decade; report of the Secretary-General (P.41).

- 42. External financing of economic development of the developing countries (P.42):
 - (a) Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Outflow of capital from the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General.
- 43. Development of natural resources (P.43).
- 44. The role of the United Nations in training national technical personnel for the accelerated industrialization of the developing countries (P.44).
- 45. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director (P.45).
- 46. Operational activities for development (P.46):
 - (a) Activities of the United Nations Development Programme: reports of the Governing Council:
 - (b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary-General
- 47. Regional development (P.47).7
- 48. Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General (P.48).8
- 49. General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system: report of the Enlarged Committee for Programme and Co-ordination (P.49).
- 50. World social situation: report of the Secretary-General (P.50).
- 51. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (P.51):
 - (a) Report of the High Commissioner;
 - (b) Question of the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner.
- 52. Housing, building and planning: report of the Secretary-General (P.52).
- 53. Town twinning as a means of international cooperation: report of the Economic and Social Council (P.53).
- 54. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (P.54).
- 55. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance (P.55):
 - (a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance;
 - (b) Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance.
- 56. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (P.56):
 - (a) Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) Measures to be taken against nazism and racial intolerance;

⁷ See paragraph 3 above.

⁸ See paragraph 4 above.

- (d) Measures for the speedy implementation of international instruments against racial discrimination.
- 57. Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories: report of the Secretary-General (P.57).
- 58. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the Secretary-General (P.58).
- 59. International Year for Human Rights (P.59):
 - (a) Programme of measures and activities to be undertaken in connexion with the International Year for Human Rights: report of the Secretary-General:
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights,
- 60. Freedom of information (P.60):
 - (a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information;
 - (b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
- 61. Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity (P.61).
- 62. Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (P.62).9
- 63. Capital punishment: report of the Secretary-General (P.63).
- 64. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations (P.64):
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
- 65. Question of South West Africa (P.65):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa;
 - (c) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa.
- 66. Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General (P.66).
- 67. Question of Territories under Portuguese administration (P.67):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 68. Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General (P.68).
- 69. Question of the consolidation and integration of the special educational and training programmes
 - ⁹ See foot-note 5 above.

- for South West Africa, the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration and the educational and training programme for South Africans: report of the Secretary-General (P.69).
- 70. Question of Fiji: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (P.70).
- 71. Question of Oman (P.71):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 72. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General (P.72).
- 73. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1966 and reports of the Board of Auditors (P.73):
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Development Programme;
 - (c) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (e) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees.
- 74. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1967 (P.74).
- 75. Budget estimates for the financial year 1968 (P.75).
- 76. Pattern of conferences (P.76):
 - (a) Report of the Committee on Conferences;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 77. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (P.77):
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
 - (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
 - (f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
- 78. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions (P.78).
- 79. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (P.79):
 - (a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations from the Technical Assistance Account of the United Nations Development Programme;
 - (b) Allocations from the Special Fund Account of the United Nations Development Programme.
- 80. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (P.80).

- 81. Implementation of the recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies: reports of the Secretary-General (P.81).
- 82. Publications and documentation of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General (P.82).
- 83. Personnel questions (P.83):
 - (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Other personnel questions.
- 84. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board (P.84).
- 85. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General (P.85).
- 86. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its nineteenth session (P.86).
- 87. Law of treaties (P.87).
- 88. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (P.88).
- 89. Question of methods of fact-finding (P.89).
- 90. Draft Declaration on Territorial Asylum (P.90).
- 91. United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law: report of the Secretary-General (P.91).
- 92. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (P.92).
- 93. Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind (S.1).
- 94. Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations (S.2).
- 95. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (A.1).

II. Allocation of items

- 6. The allocation of items proposed in the present memorandum follows the pattern adopted by the General Assembly in previous years. No recommendation has been made concerning the allocation of the following item, which was not considered by the Assembly at previous sessions:
- Item 93 (Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind).
- 7. In connexion with item 12 of the provisional agenda (Report of the Economic and Social Council), the Secretary-General proposes that, as in previous years, the various parts of the report should be allocated to the Main Committees in accordance with their respective fields of competence. Bearing that consideration in mind, the Secretary-General wishes to recommend the following allocation:

Chapters I to X	Second Committee
Chapters XI and XII	Third Committee
Chapter XIII	Second Committee
Chapter XIV:	
(a) Section I	Third Committee
(b) Section II	Second Committee
(c) Sections III to V	Third Committee
(d) Section VI	Fifth Committee
(e) Section VII	Third Committee
(f) Sections VIII to X	Second Committee
Chapter XV:	
(a) Substantive aspects	Second and Third Committees
(b) Administrative and budgetary as-	
pects	Fifth Committee
Chapter XVI	Fifth Committee
Chapter XVII:	
(a) Substantive aspects	Second and Third Committees
(b) Administrative and budgetary as-	
pects	Fifth Committee
Chapters XVIII and XIX	Plenary meetings

In addition, the General Committee may wish to bear in mind that:

- (a) Chapter XI, section III (Population), might also be of interest to the Second Committee;
- (b) Chapter XVI (Implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies) might be referred to the Second and Third Committees for comments;
- (c) Chapter XVIII, section IX (Documentation of the Council), section XII (Programme of conferences and meetings for 1968 and 1969), and section XIII (Financial implications of actions of the Council), might also be of interest to the Fifth Committee.
- 8. With regard to item 23 (Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), the General Committee may wish to consider the desirability of referring to the Fourth Committee, as was done at the twenty-first session, all the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to specific territories. This would again enable the General Assembly to deal in the plenary with the question of the implementation of the Declaration in general.
- 9. In connexion with item 35 (The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa), the General Assembly will also have before it the report of the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa (A/6818 and Corr.1), held in accordance with paragraph 6 (a) of General Assembly resolution 2202 A (XXI). Since the Seminar was organized in consultation with the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Secretary-General would suggest that the report of the Seminar be taken into account by the Special Political Committee, the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly in plenary meeting in their consideration of the relevant agenda items.
- 10. Subject to the recommendations of the General Committee regarding the adoption of the agenda and

the considerations set forth in paragraphs 6 to 9 above, the Secretary-General suggests to the Committee the following allocation of draft agenda items:

Plenary meetings

- 1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Afghanistan (P.1).
- 2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation (P.2).
- 3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly (P.3):
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
- 4. Election of the President (P.4).
- 5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers (P.5).
- 6. Election of Vice-Presidents (P.6).
- 7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations (P.7).
- 8. Adoption of the agenda (P.8).
- 9. General debate (P.9).
- 10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (P.10).
- 11. Report of the Security Council (P.11).
- 12. Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters XVIII and XIX] (P.12).
- Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (P.14).
- 14. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council (P.15).
- 15. Election of nine members of the Economic and Social Council (P.16).
- 16. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board (P.17).
- 17. Election of the members of the Executive Board of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (P.18).
- 18. Election of the members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (P.19).
- 19. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission (P.20).
- 20. United Nations Emergency Force (P.21):
 (a) Report on the Force. 10
- 21. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General (P.22).
- 22. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (P.23).¹¹
- 23. Installation of mechanical means of voting: report of the Secretary-General (P.25).
- 24. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter (P.26).
- 25. Question of holding further conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic energy (P.27).
- 26. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (A.1).

First Committee

- 1. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (P.28):
 - (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.
- 2. Question of general and complete disarmament (P.29):
 - (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.
- 3. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (P.30).
- 4. Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (P.31).
- 5. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (P.32).
- The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (P.33).
- 7. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (P.92).
- 8. Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations (S.2).

Special Political Committee

- 1. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (P.34).
- The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (P.35):¹²
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 3. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (P.36).
- 4. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (P.37).

Second Committee

- Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters I to X, XIII, XIV (sections II and VIII to X), XV and XVII] (P.12).¹³
- 2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: report of the Trade and Development Board (P.38).

 $^{^{10}\,\}mathrm{For}$ sub-item (b), see below, "Fifth Committee", item 4. $^{11}\,\mathrm{See}$ paragraph 8 above.

¹² See paragraph 9 above.

13 Chapters XV and XVII would be referred also to the Third and Fifth Committees.

- 3. United Nations Industrial Development Organization: report of the Industrial Development Board (P.39).
- 4. United Nations Capital Development Fund: confirmation of the appointment of the Managing Director (P.40).
- 5. United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General (P.41).
- 6. External financing of economic development of the developing countries (P.42):
 - (a) Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Outflow of capital from the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General.
- 7. Development of natural resources (P.43).
- 8. The role of the United Nations in training national technical personnel for the accelerated industrialization of the developing countries (P.44).
- 9. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director (P.45).
- 10. Operational activities for development (P.46):
 - (a) Activities of the United Nations Development Programme: reports of the Governing Council;
 - (b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary-General.
- 11. Regional development (P.47).
- 12. Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General (P.48).
- 13. General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, The United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system: report of the Enlarged Committee for Programme and Co-ordination (P.49).

Third Committee

- Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters XI, XII, XIV (sections I, III, IV, V and VII), XV and XVII] (P.12).¹⁴
- 2. World social situation: report of the Secretary-General (P.50).
- 3. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (P.51):
 - (a) Report of the High Commissioner;
 - (b) Question of the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner.
- 4. Housing, building and planning: report of the Secretary-General (P.52).
- 5. Town twinning as a means of international cooperation: report of the Economic and Social Council (P.53).
- 6. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (P.54).
- 7. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance (P.55):
 - (a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance;
- 14 Chapters XV and XVII would be referred also to the Second and Fifth Committees.

- (b) Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance.
- 8. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (P.56):
 - (a) Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) Measures to be taken against nazism and racial intolerance;
 - (d) Measures for the speedy implementation of international instruments against racial discrimination.
- 9. Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of *apartheid*, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories: report of the Secretary-General (P.57).
- 10. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the Secretary-General (P.58).
- 11. International Year for Human Rights (P.59):
 - (a) Programme of measures and activities to be undertaken in connexion with the International Year for Human Rights: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights.
- 12. Freedom of information (P.60):
 - (a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information;
 - (b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
- 13. Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity (P.61).
- 14. Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (P.62). 15
- 15. Capital punishment: report of the Secretary-General (P.63).

Fourth Committee

- 1. Report of the Trusteeship Council (P.13).
- 2. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination (P.24).
- 3. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations (P.64):
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

¹⁵ See foot-note 5 above.

- 4. Question of South West Africa (P.65):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa;
 - (c) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa.
- 5. Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General (P.66).
- 6. Question of Territories under Portuguese administration (P.67):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 7. Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General (P.68).
- 8. Question of the consolidation and integration of the special educational and training programmes for South West Africa, the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration and the educational and training programmes for South Africans: report of the Secretary-General (P.69.
- 9. Question of Fiji: report of the Special Comnuitee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (P.70).
- 10. Question of Oman (P.71):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 11. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General (P.72).

Fifth Committee

- 1. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1966 and reports of the Board of Auditors (P.73):
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Development Programme;
 - (c) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (e) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- 2. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1967 (P.74).
- 3. Budget estimates for the financial year 1968 (P.75).
- 4. United Nations Emergency Force (P.21):
 - (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force. 16
- 16 For sub-item (a), see above, "Plenary meetings", item 20.

- 5. Pattern of conferences (P.76):
 - (a) Report of the Committee on Conferences;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 6. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (P.77):
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
 - (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
 - (f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
- 7. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions (P.78).
- 8. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (P.79):
 - (a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations from the Technical Assistance Account of the United Nations Development Programme;
 - (b) Allocations from the Special Fund Account of the United Nations Development Programme.
- 9. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (P.80).
- 10. Implementation of the recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies: reports of the Secretary-General (P.81).
- 11. Publications and documentation of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General (P.82).
- 12. Personnel questions (P.83):
 - (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Other personnel questions.
- 13. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board (P.84).
- 14. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General (P.85).
- 15. Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters XIV (section VI) and XV to XVII] (p.12.)¹⁷

Sixth Committee

- 1. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its nineteenth session (P.86).
- 2. Law of treaties (P.87).
- Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (P.88).
- 4. Question of methods of fact-finding (P.89).
- 5. Draft Declaration on Territorial Asylum (P.90).

¹⁷ Chapters XV and XVII would be referred also to the Second and Third Committees.

 United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law: report of the Secretary-General (P.91).

DOCUMENT A/BUR/168/ADD.1

[Original text: English, French and Spanish] [18 September 1967]

- 1. The Secretary-General has the honour to draw the attention of the General Committee to resolution 2257 (ES-V), entitled "The situation in the Middle East", adopted by the General Assembly at its 1559th plenary meeting, on 18 September 1967. In that resolution the Assembly decided to place on the agenda of its twenty-second regular session, as a matter of high priority, the question on the agenda of its fifth emergency special session.
- 2. The following item should, therefore, be added to the draft agenda of the twenty-second session (A/BUR/168):
 - "96. The situation in the Middle East (A.2)".

DOCUMENT A/BUR/168/ADD.2

[Original text: English, French and Spanish] [19 September 1967]

1. In connexion with item 61 of the draft agenda (Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity), the Secretary-General has the honour to draw the General Committee's attention to the fact that that item, which was referred to the General Assembly by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1220 (XLII), deals with the consideration and adoption by the Assembly of a convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity. A preliminary draft convention on this subject has been prepared by the Secretary-General and it has been discussed by the Commission on Human Rights and by a working group of the Commission.¹⁸

18 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 6, para. 153.

2. This item is closely connected with human rights questions and presents important legal aspects. In view of the past history of the item, it has been listed in the draft allocation of items among the items to be referred to the Third Committee. However, the General Committee may also wish, in view of the nature of the item and the fact that only a few points of difficulty remain regarding the text of the draft convention, to suggest that the Chairman of the Third Committee might consult with the Chairman of the Sixth Committee concerning the best and most expeditious manner of dealing with the item. In this respect, the two Chairmen may wish to consider the possibility of the item being considered in the first instance by a joint working group to be set up by them. In selecting the members to serve on the joint working group, the Chairmen may wish to bear in mind the composition of the Commission on Human Rights and of its working group on the subject. The joint working group would report to the Main Committee to which the item is allocated by the Assembly. Annex II to the rules of procedure of the General Assembly recommends the establishment of such groups for the drafting of legal

DOCUMENT A/BUR/168/ADD.3

[Original text: English] [20 September 1967]

- 1. The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of the General Committee to his note dated 20 September 1967 (A/6832) by which he requested the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session.
- 2. The following item should, therefore, be added to the draft agenda of the twenty-second session (A/BUR/168):
 - "97. The situation which has arisen between Guinea and the Ivory Coast involving section 11 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (A,3)".

DOCUMENT A/BUR/169

Correction to rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly: note by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English and French] [26 October 1967]

- 1. At the 171st meeting of the General Committee, on 5 October 1967, an observation made by the representative of Dahomey drew attention to the fact that the English and French texts of rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly contained a discrepancy, in that the English text began with the words "Additional items of an important and urgent character", while the corresponding French text read: "Des questions nouvelles présentant un caractère d'importance ou d'urgence". The representative of the United States of America requested that the Secretariat investigate this discrepancy. He also pointed out that only the French text referred to items of an "important or urgent" character, all the other texts quali-
- fying such items as being of an "important and urgent" nature.
- 2. In the light of the request of the representative of the United States, the Secretariat has undertaken a study of the legislative history of rule 15, and this clearly demonstrates that the French text is not correct, in that it fails to take account of an express decision that the rule should refer to items which were "important and urgent", not "important or urgent".
- 3. The present reference to items of an "important and urgent" character in what is now rule 15 of the rules of procedure originates from discussions which took place in 1947 in the Committee on Procedures and Organization, which had been set up by General

Assembly resolution 102 (I) of 15 December 1946 to recommend measures to economize the time of the General Assembly. A sub-committee of this Committee recommended a text of the rule here concerned, which referred to items of an "important or urgent character".19 When this text was discussed in the full Committee on 8 October 1947, the United Kingdom proposed that the text be changed to "important and urgent". This amendment was adopted by 9 votes to 3, the French record of the proceedings stating that "Le Comité décide, par 9 voix contre 3, de recommander l'insertion dans l'article des mots 'important et urgent'".20 The necessary change was incorporated in the English text of the Committee's recommended formulation of the rule but, undoubtedly as the result of an oversight, was not made in the French text.

4. The report of the Committee on Procedures and Organization,²¹ containing the text of the rule in question, was considered by the General Assembly at its second session and referred to the Sixth Committee. The proceedings of the Sixth Committee indicate that the formulation "important and urgent" is the correct one. This formulation was used by the rapporteur of a sub-committee of the Sixth Committee which considered the matter, the rapporteur explaining to the

Sixth Committee²² that the sub-committee had "taken over" the proposal of the Committee on Procedures and Organization that the relevant rule should be limited to items which were "important and urgent". The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics objected in the Sixth Committee to this formulation, and proposed that the words "important and urgent" should be deleted. This amendment23 was defeated by 17 votes to 12, with 7 abstentions, and the words "important and urgent" were retained. No changes in this respect were put forward in the Assembly, and it adopted the new rules of procedure by its resolution 173 (II) of 17 November 1947. Unfortunately, however, the error in the French text which dates back to the report of the Committee on Procedures and Organization was carried over, the French text of the new rules still referring to items of "un caractère d'importance ou d'urgence". All the other texts differ from the French text in that they refer to "important and urgent" items.

5. The above account clearly demonstrates that the present French text of rule 15 is not correct and it is the intention of the Secretary-General to make the necessary change when the next edition of the rules of procedure is issued.

DOCUMENT A/6840

First report of the General Committee

1. At its 165th, 166th and 167th meetings, on 20, 21 and 22 September 1967, the General Committee considered two memoranda by the Secretary-General relating respectively to the organization of the twenty-second session (A/BUR/167) and to the adoption of the agenda and allocation of items (A/BUR/168 and Add.1-3).

2. A summary of the discussion in the Committee appears in the records of the above-mentioned meetings.

I. Organization of the session

Schedule of meetings

- 3. On the proposal of the Secretary-General (A/BUR/167), the General Committee recommends to the General Assembly the following arrangements relating to the schedule of meetings:
- (a) Plenary and committee meetings should begin promptly at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.;
- (b) A five-day working week should be established, it being understood that meetings on Saturdays, and also night meetings, may be scheduled if necessary.

Closing date for the session

4. The General Committee proposes to the General Assembly, in accordance with rule 2 of the rules of procedure, that the closing date of the twenty-second session should be Tuesday, 19 December 1967. [Original text: English, French and Spanish] [22 September 1967]

Verbatim records of the Main Committees

5. On the proposal of the Secretary-General, the General Committee recommends to the General Assembly that the First Committee should be provided with verbatim services and that the verbatim records should be the official records of that Committee. The General Committee further recommends that the debates of the Special Political Committee should be transcribed from sound recordings upon request, with priority in the distribution given to the records of the First Committee.

Use of the General Assembly Hall by the Main Committees

6. At the suggestion of the Secretary-General, the General Committee proposes that all the Main Committees make full use of the General Assembly Hall when there is no plenary meeting and, in particular, use the voting machine on a rotating basis.

II. Adoption of the agenda

- 7. The General Committee considered the draft agenda submitted by the Secretary-General in his memorandum (A/BUR/168, para. 5; A/BUR/168/ Add.1, para. 2, and A/BUR/168/Add.3, para. 2). This draft was based on the following documents:
 - (a) Provisional agenda of the twenty-second session (A/6680/Rev.1);
 - (b) Supplementary list of items (A/6697);

¹⁹ See A/AC.12/10.
20 A/AC.12/SR.9, p. 3.
21 Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. II, annex 4, document A/388, p. 1455.

²² Ibid., Sixth Committee, 56th meeting, p. 130. 23 Ibid., Sixth Committee, annex 4 (g), document A/C.6/ 186, p. 273.

- (c) Requests for the inclusion of additional items (A/6831, A/6832 and General Assembly resolution 2257 (ES-V) of 18 September 1967).
- 8. In connexion with item 24 (Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination), the General Committee decided to recommend the inclusion of the item with the addition of the words "and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa", as proposed by the United Republic of Tanzania.
- 9. The General Committee decided by a vote of 16 to 4, with 4 abstentions, to recommend that item 33 of the draft agenda (The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) should be included in the agenda; it also decided to recommend that item 94 (Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations) be included in the agenda. By a vote of 12 to 6, with 5 abstentions, the Committee then decided to recommend that item 33 should be combined with item 94 under a single heading. The item would then read:

"The Korean question:

- "(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
- "(b) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations".
- 10. The General Committee, taking into account the considerations given in paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's memorandum (A/BUR/168), decided to recommend that item 47 of the draft agenda (Regional development) should be deleted from the agenda of the twenty-second session.
- 11. The Committee decided to recommend, as suggested by the Secretary-General in paragraph 4 of his memorandum, that the question of the review of the World Food Programme should be combined with item 48 of the draft agenda under the single heading "Multilateral food aid". The item in its revised form would then read:

"Multilateral food aid:

- "(a) Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General;
- "(b) Review of the World Food Programme".
- 12. The General Committee decided to recommend the inclusion of item 96 (The situation in the Middle East) as a matter of high priority.
- 13. The General Committee decided to defer temporarily consideration of the question of the inclusion of item 97 (The situation which has arisen between Guinea and the Ivory Coast involving section 11 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations).
- 14. Taking into account paragraphs 8 to 13 above, the General Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following agenda:24

A = an additional item.

- [For items 15 to 23, see A/BUR/168, para. 5.]
- 24. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa (P.24).25

[For items 25 to 32, see A/BUR/168, para. 5.]

- 33. The Korean question:26
 - (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (P.33);
 - (b) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations (S.2).

[For items 34 to 46, see A/BUR/168, para. 5.]

- 47. Multilateral food aid:27
 - (a) Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General (P.48);
 - (b) Review of the World Food Programme.
- 48. General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system: report of the Enlarged Committee for Programme and Co-ordination (P.49).
- 49. World social situation: report of the Secretary-General (P.50).
- 50. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (P.51):
 - (a) Report of the High Commissioner;
 - (b) Question of the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner.
- 51. Housing, building and planning: report of the Secretary-General (P.52).
- 52. Town twinning as a means of international cooperation: report of the Economic and Social Council (P.53).
- 53. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (P.54).
- 54. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance (P.55):
 - (a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance:
 - (b) Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance.
- 55. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (P.56):
 - (a) Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;

²⁴ Abbreviations used in the present document: P = A item on the provisional agenda (A/6680/Rev.1);

S. = an item on the supplementary list (A/6697);

²⁵ See paragraph 8 above.

²⁶ See paragraph 9 above. 27 See paragraph 11 above.

- (c) Measures to be taken against nazism and racial intolerance;
- (d) Measures for the speedy implementation of international instruments against racial discrimination.
- 56. Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories: report of the Secretary-General (P.57).
- 57. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the Secretary-General (P.58).
- 58. International Year for Human Rights (P.59):
 - (a) Programme of measures and activities to be undertaken in connexion with the International Year for Human Rights: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights.
- 59. Freedom of information (P.60):
 - (a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information;
 - (b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
- 60. Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity (P.61).
- 61. Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (P.62).
- 62. Capital punishment: report of the Secretary-General (P.63).
- 63. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations (P.64):
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
- 64. Question of South West Africa (P.65):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa;
 - (c) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa.
- 65. Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General (P.66).
- 66. Question of Territories under Portuguese administration (P.67):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.

- 67. Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General (P.68).
- 68. Question of the consolidation and integration of the special educational and training programmes for South West Africa, the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration and the educational and training programme for South Africans: report of the Secretary-General (P.69).
- 69. Question of Fiji: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (P.70).
- 70. Question of Oman (P.71):
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 71. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General (P.72).
- 72. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1966 and reports of the Board of Auditors (P.73):
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Development Programme;
 - (c) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (e) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- 73. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1967 (P.74).
- 74. Budget estimates for the financial year 1968 (P.75).
- 75. Pattern of conferences (P.76):
 - (a) Report of the Committee on Conferences;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 76. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (P.77):
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
 - (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
 - (f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
- 77. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions (P.78).
- 78. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (P.79):
 - (a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations from the Technical Assistance Account of the United Nations Development Programme;

- (b) Allocations from the Special Fund Account of the United Nations Development Programme.
- 79. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (P.80).
- 80. Implementation of the recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies: reports of the Secretary-General (P.81).
- 81. Publications and documentation of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General (P.82).
- 82. Personnel questions (P.83):
 - (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Other personnel questions.
- 83. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board (P.84).
- 84. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General (P.85).
- 85. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its nineteenth session (P.86).
- 86. Law of treaties (P.87).
- 87. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (P.88).
- 88. Question of methods of fact-finding (P.89).
- 89. Draft Declaration on Territorial Asylum (P.90).
- 90. United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law: report of the Secretary-General (P.91).
- 91. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (P.92).
- 92. Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind (S.1).
- 93. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (A.1).
- 94. The situation in the Middle East (A.2).28

III. ALLOCATION OF ITEMS

- 15. The General Committee approved the proposals for allocation contained in paragraph 10 of the Secretary-General's memorandum (A/BUR/168), with the following modifications:
- (a) Plenary meetings
- (i) Item 12 (Report of the Economic and Social Council): the General Committee recommended, on the proposal of the Secretary-General (A/ BUR/168, para. 7), that the General Assembly should suggest that chapter XVIII, section IX (Documentation of the Council), section XII

- (Programme of conferences and meetings for 1968 and 1969) and section XIII (Financial implications of actions of the Council) might also be of interest to the Fifth Committee.
- (ii) Item 23 (Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples): the General Committee decided to recommend, on the proposal of the Secretary-General (A/BUR/168, para. 8), that all the chapters of the Special Committee's report relating to specific territories should be referred to the Fourth Committee; this would enable the General Assembly to deal in plenary meetings with the question of the implementation of the Declaration in general.

(b) Special Political Committee

Item 35 (The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa): at the suggestion of the Secretary-General (A/BUR/168, para. 9), the General Committee decided to recommend that the report of the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa (A/6818 and Corr. 1) should be taken into account by the Special Political Committee, the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly in plenary meeting in their consideration of the relevant agenda items.

(c) Third Committee

- (i) Item 12 (Report of the Economic and Social Council): the General Committee recommended on the proposal of the Secretary-General (A/BUR/168, para. 7), that chapter XI, section III (Population), might also be of interest to the Second Committee.
- (ii) Item 61 (Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity): the General Committee, after having approved the Secretary-General's proposal that the item be allocated to the Third Committee, decided to recommend that the Chairman of the Third Committee should consult the Chairman of the Sixth Committee, that both Chairmen should consider the establishment of a joint working group and that the report of that group should be examined by the Third Committee.

(d) Fourth Committee

Item 65 (Question of South West Africa): the General Committee decided to recommend that the item should be discussed in plenary meetings, on the understanding that the petitioners asking to speak on the item would be heard by the Fourth Committee, which would submit a report on such hearings to the Assembly in plenary meeting before the latter concluded its consideration of the question.

(e) Fifth Committee

Item 12 (Report of the Economic and Social Council): the General Committee decided to recommend, on the proposal of the Secretary-General (A/BUR/168, para. 7), that chapter XVI of the report (Implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies) should be referred to the Second and Third Committees for comment.

²⁸ See paragraph 12 above.

- 16. The General Committee adopted the following decisions regarding the two items listed below, for which no recommendation had been made by the Secretary-General (A/BUR/168, para, 6 and A/BUR/ 168/Add,1):
- (a) Item 93 (Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind): the General Committee decided, by a vote of 14 to 1, with 6 abstentions, to defer its recommendation regarding the allocation of this item.
- (b) Item 96 (The situation in the Middle East): the General Committee decided to recommend that the item be allocated to plenary meetings as a matter of high priority.
- 17. Taking into account paragraphs 15 and 16 above, the General Committee recommends the following allocation of items:

Plenary meetings

[For items 1 to 11, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

12. Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters XVIII and XIX] (P.12).29 [For items 13 to 21, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

22. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (P.23).30

[For items 23 to 26, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

- 27. Question of South West Africa (P.65):31
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa;
 - (c) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa.
- 28. The situation in the Middle East (A.2).

First Committee

[For items 1 to 5, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

- 6. The Korean question:
 - (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (P.33);
 - (b) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations (S.2).
- 7. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (P.92).

Special Political Committee

1. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (P.34).

- 2. The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (P.35):32
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.

[For items 3 and 4, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

Second Committee

[For items 1 to 10, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

- 11. Multilateral food aid:
 - (a) Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General (P.48);
 - (b) Review of the World Food Programme,
- 12. General review of the Programme and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system: report of the Enlarged Committee for Programme and Co-ordination (P.49).

Third Committee

1. Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters XI, XII, XIV (sections I, III, IV, V and VII), XV and XVIII (P.12).33

[For items 2 to 12, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

- 13. Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity (P.61).34
- 14. Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (P.62).
- 15. Capital punishment: report of the Secretary-General (P.63).

Fourth Committee

- 1. Report of the Trusteeship Council (P.13).
- 2. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa (P.24).
- 3. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations (P.64):
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
- 4. Question of South West Africa (hearing of petitioners) (P.65).35

²⁹ See paragraph 15 (a) (i) above.
30 See paragraph 15 (a) (ii) above.
31 See paragraph 15 (d) above.

 $^{^{32}}$ See paragraph 15 (b) above. 33 Chapters XV and XVII would be referred also to the Second and Fifth Committees. See also paragraph 15 (c) (i)

above.

34 See paragraph 15 (c) (ii) above.

[For items 5 to 11, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

12. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (chapters relating to specific territories) (P.23).³⁶

³⁶ See paragraph 15 (a) (ii) above.

Fifth Committee

[For items 1 to 14, see A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

 Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters XIV (section VI) and XV to XVII] (P.12).³⁷

Sixth Committee

[See A/BUR/168, para. 10.]

 37 Chapters XV and XVII would be referred also to the Second and Third Committees. See also paragraph 15 (ε) above.

DOCUMENT A/6840/ADD.1

Second report of the General Committee

Committee:

[Original text: English and French] [26 September 1967]

- 1. At its 168th and 169th meetings, on 25 and 26 September 1967, the General Committee considered requests from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the inclusion of the following additional items in the agenda of the twenty-second session:
- (a) Need to expedite the drafting of a definition of aggression in the light of the present international situation (A/6833);
- (b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (A/6834).
- 2. The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that both items should be included in the agenda.

- 3. The General Committee adopted the following
- decisions regarding the allocation of the items:

 (a) The Committee decided, by a vote of 13 to 5, with 5 abstentions, to recommend that the item listed in

paragraph 1 (a) above should be allocated to the Sixth

- (b) The Committee decided without objection to recommend that the item listed in paragraph 1 (b) above should be allocated to the First Committee,
- 4. In connexion with the item proposed by the Secretary-General, entitled "The situation which has arisen between Guinea and the Ivory Coast involving section 11 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations" (A/BUR/168/Add.3), the General Committee decided to defer a decision.

DOCUMENT A/6840/ADD.2

Third report of the General Committee

[Original text: English and French]
[5 October 1967]

- 1. At its 171st meeting, on 5 October 1967, the General Committee considered the question of the allocation of the item entitled "Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind", which constituted item 93 of the draft agenda (A/6840, paras. 14 and 16), and which the Assembly had already included in the agenda of the twenty-second session as item 92. The Committee decided to recommend that the item should be allocated to the First Committee, it being understood that a revised wording of the item would be submitted to the General Assembly in plenary meeting.
- 2. At the same meeting, the General Committee considered a request submitted by Bulgaria (A/6835) for the inclusion in the agenda of an additional item

- entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations". The Committee decided to recommend that the item should be included in the agenda and allocated to the Fourth Committee.
- 3. The General Committee also had before it a request from Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville) and Yemen (A/6836) for the inclusion in the agenda of an additional item entitled "Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". The Committee decided to recommend that the question should be included in the agenda. It also decided to recommend that the question should become sub-item (c) of agenda item 33 (The Korean question) and that this sub-item should be allocated to the First Committee.

DOCUMENT A/6840/ADD.3

Fourth report of the General Committee

[Original text: English and French] [19 October 1967]

1. At its 170th, 171st and 172nd meetings, on 29 September, 5 October and 18 October 1967, the General Committee considered a request submitted by the Secre-

tary-General for the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-second session of an additional item entitled "Reaffirmation of an important immunity of representatives of Member States to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United Nations" (A/6832/Rev.1).

- 2. At its 172nd meeting, the General Committee also considered a request submitted by the United States of America for the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-second session of an additional item entitled "Measures tending to implement the privileges and immunities of representatives of Member States to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United Nations, as well as the obligations of States concerning the protection of diplomatic personnel and property" (A/6837).
- 3. At the same meeting, the representative of the United States proposed:
- (a) That the two items should be combined as subitems (a) and (b) under the single heading "Question of diplomatic privileges and immunities";
- (b) That the item should be allocated to the Sixth Committee.
- 4. The representative of Jordan proposed that the item submitted by the United States be amended by the insertion of the phrase "and the privileges and immunities of the staff and of the Organization itself" after the words "convened by the United Nations". The amendment was accepted by the representative of the United States.
- 5. The representative of Dahomey submitted an amendment by which the order of sub-items (a) and (b) proposed by the representative of the United States would be reversed.

- 6. The General Committee took the following decisions regarding the proposals before it:
- (a) The amendment submitted by Dahomey (see paragraph 5 above) was adopted by 10 votes to 9, with 5 abstentions:
- (b) The proposal submitted by the United States on the combining of the items (see paragraph 3 (a) above) was adopted by 16 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions;
- (c) The proposal submitted by the United States on the allocation of the item (see paragraph 3 (b) above) was adopted without objection.
- 7. The General Committee therefore decided to recommend to the General Assembly that the following item should be included in the agenda of the twenty-second session:

"Question of diplomatic privileges and immunities:

- "(a) Measures tending to implement the privileges and immunities of representatives of Member States to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United Nations and the privileges and immunities of the staff and of the Organization itself, as well as the obligations of States concerning the protection of diplomatic personnel and property;
- "(b) Reaffirmation of an important immunity of representatives of Member States to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United Nations."

It also decided to recommend that the item should be allocated to the Sixth Committee.

DOCUMENT A/6840/ADD.4

Fifth report of the General Committee

[Original text: English and French] [13 December 1967]

- 1. At its 173rd meeting, on 13 December 1967, the General Committee considered a request submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-second session of an additional item entitled "Admission of new Members to the United Nations" (A/6838).
- 2. At the same meeting, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that

that item should be included in the agenda and allocated to plenary meetings.

3. The General Committee also considered, at the same meeting, a note by the Secretary-General concerning a correction to rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly (A/BUR/169). It decided to take note of paragraph 5 of that document.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1564th, 1572nd, 1583rd, 1592nd and 1629th plenary meetings, on 23 and 28 September, 6 and 25 October and 13 December 1967 respectively, the General Assembly adopted the agenda of its twenty-second session and approved the allocation of agenda items.

At its 1583rd plenary meeting, the Assembly decided, pursuant to rule 22 of its rules of procedure, to amend the wording of item 92, which had been included in the agenda at the 1564th plenary meeting (see A/6840/Add.2, para. 1).

For the final text of the agenda, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, prefatory fascicle; for the allocation of agenda items, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/6716), p. v.

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of item 8 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Document No. A/6676 and Add.1-4	Title or description Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela: request for the inclusion of an item in the	Observations and references Official Records of the Gen- eral Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Annexes, agenda item 91
A/6680 A/6695	provisional agenda of the twenty-second session. Provisional agenda of the twenty-second session Malta: request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Replaced by A/6680/Rev.1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Annexes,
A/6696	Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	agenda item 92 Replaced by A/6696/Rev.1
A/6696/Rev.1 and A/6696/ Add.3	Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 33
A/6696/Add.1	Letter dated 17 August 1967 from the representative of Romania to the Secretary-General	Minieographed
A/6696/Add.2	Letter dated 11 September 1967 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General transmitting a letter dated 28 August 1967 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 21 August 1967	Ditto
A/6818 and Corr.1	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the International Seminar on <i>Apartheid</i> , Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa	Ditto
A/6831	Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Romania and Syria: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 93
A/6832	Secretary-General: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid., agenda item 98
A/6832/Rev.1	Secretary-General: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid.
A/6833	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid., agenda item 95
A/6834	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid., agenda item 96
A/6835	Bulgaria: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid., agenda item 97
A/6836	Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville) and Yemen: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid., agenda item 33
A/6837	United States of America: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid., agenda item 98
A/6838	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session	Ibid., agenda item 99
A/6850 and Add. 1-2	Agenda of the twenty-second session	Replaced by A/6850/Rev.1
A/6850/Rev.1 A/6850/Rev.2	Agenda of the twenty-second session Agenda of the twenty-second session	Replaced by A/6850/Rev.2 Mimeographed. For the printed text of the agenda, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Plenary Meetings, prefatory fascicle
A/6851 and Add.1-2	Allocation of agenda items for the twenty-second session	Replaced by A/6851/Rev.1
A/6851/Rev.1 A/6851/Rev.2	Allocation of agenda items for the twenty-second session Allocation of agenda items for the twenty-second session	Replaced by A/6851/Rev.2 Mimeographed. For the printed text of the alloca- tion of agenda items, see Official Records of the Gen- eral Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Supplement No. 16, (A/6716), p. v.

Official Records

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 9: General debate*

CONTENTS

Document No.	Title	Pag
A/6845	Letter dated 28 September 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General	1
A/6867	Letter dated 18 October 1967 from the representative of Jamaica to the President of the General Assembly	2

DOCUMENT A/6845

Letter dated 28 September 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [29 September 1967]

I have the honour to refer to the statement by the distinguished Minister for External Relations of Guatemala at the 1566th meeting of the General Assembly, on 25 September 1967, in which reference was made to British Honduras.

As the distinguished Minister for External Relations of Guatemala himself mentioned, mediation on this question, undertaken at the joint invitation of the Guatemalan and United Kingdom Governments, is now in progress. However, in view of the words of the distinguished Minister for External Relations of Guatemala, it is appropriate that I should in the traditional manner reserve the United Kingdom Government's rights concerning this territory in so far as it relates to the proceedings of the General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) CARADON
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

^{*}For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1562nd to 1563rd and 1565th to 1591st meetings.

DOCUMENT A/6867

Letter dated 18 October 1967 from the representative of Jamaica to the President of the General Assembly

[Original text: English] [19 October 1967]

I have the honour to refer to the statement made by the Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Cuba at the 1591st plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 13 October 1967. In that statement Mr. Raúl Roa said that there were United States naval bases in Jamaica "at Portland Village, Old Harbour, May Pen and Santa Cruz".

This allegation is completely false. The fact is that for several years there have been no foreign military or naval installations or bases whatever in Jamaica, nor are there any agreements in force that would allow the establishment of such installations or bases.

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Keith Johnson
Permanent Representative of Jamaica
to the United Nations

Official Records

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 10:* Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1642nd plenary meeting, on 19 December 1967, the General Assembly took note of the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (A/6701 and Corr.1 and Add.1).

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 10 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Document No.	Title or description	Observations and references
A/6701 and Corr,1	Annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (16 June 1966-15 June 1967)	Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1 and corrigendum
A/6701/Add.1	Introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (16 June 1966-15 June 1967)	Ibid., Supplement No. 1A

^{*}For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1642nd meeting.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Official Records



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 11:* Report of the Security Council

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1619th plenary meeting, on 5 December 1967, the General Assembly adopted without objection the draft resolution submitted by Argentina and Nigeria (A/L.535). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, resolution 2283 (XXII).

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 11 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Title or description

Observations and references

A/6702 and Corr. 1

Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly (16 July 1966-15 July 1967)

Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentysecond Session, Supplement No. 2 and corrigendum

A/L.535

Argentina and Nigeria: draft resolution

Adopted without change. See
Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentysecond Session, Supplement
No. 16, resolution 2283
(XXII)

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1619th meeting.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Official Records



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 12:* Report of the Economic and Social Council

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Note

REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

- Chapters I to X: allocated to the Second Committee;
- Chapter XI: allocated to the Third Committee;
 - Section III: drawn to the attention of the Second Committee;
- Chapter XII: allocated to the Third Committee;
- Chapter XIII: allocated to the Second Committee;
- Chapter XIV, sections I, III to V and VII: allocated to the Third Committee;
 - Sections II and VIII to X: allocated to the Second Committee;
 - Section VI: allocated to the Fifth Committee;
- Chapter XV: allocated to the Second, Third and Fifth Committees;
- Chapter XVI: allocated to the Fifth Committee and referred to the Second and Third Committees for comment;
- Chapter XVII: allocated to the Second, Third and Fifth Committees;
- Chapter XVIII: for consideration in plenary meeting;
 - Sections IX, XII and XIII: drawn to the attention of the Fifth Committee;
- Chapter XIX: for consideration in plenary meeting.
- The Third Committee agreed, at its 1467th meeting, to take up the sections of the report which related to

- items on its agenda in connexion with its consideration of those items, as follows:
- Chapter XI, section I: item 49 (World social situation);
 - Section II: item 51 (Housing, building and planning);
- Chapter XII, section 1: item 55 (Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination);
 - Sections II and III: item 56 (Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories);
 - Section V: item 54 (Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance);
 - Section VIII: item 60 (Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity);
 - Section X: item 61 (Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights);
 - Section XI: item 62 (Capital punishment);
 - Section XII: item 53 (Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women);
- Chapter XIV, section 1: item 50 (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees);
 - Section V: item 52 (Town twinning as a means of international co-operation).

^{*}For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Second Committee, 1173rd to 1177th meetings; ibid., Third Committee, 1552nd and 1553rd meetings; ibid., Fifth Committee, 1219th, 1222nd and 1225th meetings; and ibid., Plenary Meetings, 1633rd and 1638th meetings.

DOCUMENT A/C.2/L.998

Financial implications of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.2/L.994

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [11 December 1967]

- 1. In operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.2/L.994, the General Assembly requests the Secretary-General "to submit a report to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, dealing with the advantages accruing to developed countries, and the disadvantages accruing to the developing countries as a result of the tendency of trained personnel from the latter to remain in the industrialized countries after they have received their training".
- 2. The Secretary-General wishes to inform the Second Committee that the preparation of such a report cannot be undertaken with the facilities presently available in the Secretariat and would necessitate the services of highly qualified experts who would assist in consultations with various Governments and in the preparation of the report. The requirements are estimated at 24 man-months of consultants (\$58,000) and 12 man-months of secretarial assistance (\$7,000), for a total of \$65,000.
- 3. The compilation of the material required for the preparation of the report and its assessment would necessitate various trips by the consultants and departmental staff to developed and developing countries. It is intended to arrange extended visits to at least three countries each in Africa, Asia and the Far East, and Latin America. Travel for that purpose within the United States to institutions working in this field is also envisaged. Finally, there would be an extended trip to several industrialized countries in Europe where

trained personnel from developing countries tend to remain (United Kingdom, France, Federal Republic of Germany, and a Scandinavian country), as well as to certain of the specialized agencies in Geneva, Rome and Vienna. The costs of this travel programme are estimated at \$7,000, plus \$5,000 for subsistence (eight man-months).

4. It is expected that the report will have a maximum of 110 mimeographed pages and will be published in the five official languages. Its translation, typing and reproduction would involve the following expenditure:

<u> </u>	United States dollars
(a) Translation into four languages and typing five languages	
(b) Reproduction in five languages	5,000
Tot	11 000

As regards the reproduction, the Secretariat will endeavour to print the report at no cost if facilities are available at Headquarters when it is completed.

5. Thus, the financial implications of draft resolution A/C.2/L.994 may be summarized as follows:

	ι	nited Stat
		dollars
(a)	Consultants and clerical assistance	65,000
(b)	Travel and subsistence	12,000
(c)	Translation, typing and reproduction of report	11,000
	Total	88.000

DOCUMENT A/C.5/1156

Financial implications of draft resolution IV submitted by the Second Committee in document A/6977

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [13 December 1967]

- 1. At its 1177th meeting, on 12 December 1967, the Second Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it adopt the draft resolution IV contained in its report on agenda item 12 (see A/6977, para. 23).
- 2. Prior to this decision, the Second Committee had been advised by the representative of the Secretary-General that the adoption of the draft resolution as it had been finally amended would entail additional expenditures in the amount of some \$9,500 in 1968. This estimate would cover the costs of: (a) a consultant for a period of two months including fee, travel and subsistence (\$6,500); and (b) translation, typing and reproduction of the enlarged report requested of the Secretary-General (\$3,000).
- 3. The Fifth Committee might wish to inform the General Assembly that, should it adopt the draft resolution submitted by the Second Committee, additional expenditures in a total amount of \$9,500 would arise in 1968; however, the Secretary-General believes that these additional costs could be met within the regular budgetary appropriations for 1968.

DOCUMENT A/6963

Report of the Fifth Committee

[Original text: English]
[11 December 1967]

1. The Fifth Committee considered chapters XIV (section VI) and XV to XVII of the report of the Economic and Social Council (A/6703 and Corr.1) at its 1219th meeting, on 6 December 1967. The Committee heard statements by the representative of the Secretary-General and by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. It then decided to include a summary of the statement by the representative of the Secretary-General in its report to the General Assembly.

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

- 2. In his statement before the Committee, the representative of the Secretary-General limited his observations to points raised under chapter XIV, section VI, and chapters XV to XVII of the report of the Economic and Social Council.
- 3. Chapter XIV, section VI, of the Council's report deals with the question of information activities of the United Nations in regard to its work in the economic, social and human rights fields. At its fortythird session the Council considered a report of the Secretary-General (E/4341)¹ on the information activities of the United Nations in these fields, and a second report (E/4394)¹ in which the Secretary-General suggested ways in which national information programmes, official and non-official, could give support to the United Nations. The Council, in resolution 1265 (XLIII) of 3 August 1967, endorsed the Secretary-General's proposals and, inter alia, invited the Secretary-General to take, within existing staff and financial resources, action leading to the possible establishment on an experimental basis of information centres with regional responsibilities. It further requested the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of Member States his recommendations concerning ways in which national information services could increase their own dissemination of information concerning United Nations activities.
- 4. The Secretary-General is continuing his studies of the ways and means by which it might be possible, within existing resources, to establish regional information bureaux. To this end, discussions have been held in the Economic and Social Information Advisory Board. He has also addressed a *note verbale* to the Governments of Member States, as requested by the Economic and Social Council, drawing their attention to recommendations concerning measures which they might take to improve national information efforts on behalf of the United Nations. A full report of the implementation of resolution 1265 (XLIII) will be submitted in due course to the Council.
- 5. Chapter XV of the Council's report deals with matters related to the work programmes of the United Nations in the economic, social and human rights fields and its budgetary requirements.
- 6. Several measures have already been taken with a view to keeping Member States and the appropriate

¹ See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-third Session, Annexes, agenda item 20.

legislative bodies informed, in more clear and precise terms, of the relationship between the work programmes to be undertaken by the various organizational units in the economic, social and human rights fields and the budgetary resources required for the implementation of these work programmes. In pursuance of the request made by the Council at its forty-first session, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination again prepared a report (E/4351)² setting forth the expenditures of each organization in the United Nations system, in accordance with a common classification. Steps are being considered with a view to improving the presentation of the report, particularly in regard to the form of classification used. In the presentation of the budget estimates for the financial year 1968 (A/6705 and Corr.1)3 certain improvements have been introduced, particularly in regard to section 3, and also in the comprehensive analysis given in annex I. These improvements are designed specifically to bring into closer focus the work programmes in the economic, social and human rights fields and their budgetary implications. Further possible steps in this direction were outlined by the Secretary-General in his foreword to the budget estimates for the financial year 1968 and in a separate report (A/C.5/1121)⁴ on the form of presentation of the United Nations budget. A more comprehensive report was provided to the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination and to the Council in regard to the work programmes in the economic and social field (E/4331/Rev.1⁵ and Add.1-9⁶). This report contains an analysis of the various sectors and sub-sectors of the work programmes together with an indication of the man-months and other resources required for each of the projects. The Committee could be assured that the Secretary-General will continue his efforts in 1968 with a view to achieving an even closer relationship between the work programmes and the budget, to implement more fully the recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in its second report (A/6343).⁷

7. Much remains to be done in the field of long-term planning and the establishment of priorities. The need for longer-term planning was stressed in many statements in the Fifth Committee during the current session. Similarly, the process of evaluation required more attention and the Secretary-General hoped that it would be possible to provide more information in this regard in the annual performance report which is called for under the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts. In this respect, the Secretary-General stated that, in his opinion, equal attention should be given to the achievements of the past, as is

² Ibid., agenda item 17.

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, supplement No. 5 and corrigendum.

⁴ Ibid., Twenty-Second Session, Annexes, agenda item 80.

⁵ See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-third Session, Annexes, agenda item 29.

⁶ Mimeographed.

⁷ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 80.

given to the requirements of the future, for in planning for the future the experience of the past is invaluable.

- 8. Finally, a more precise means of determining more accurately the resources required to carry out the work programmes is needed. Some members of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination felt that the report on the work programmes submitted to it did provide useful indicators of the order of magnitude of the work required for the various projects. Other members of that Committee, however, felt that perhaps the effort involved in producing detailed information in an area where there could be no precision was out of proportion to the results obtained. Similarly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in his report to the Board at its fifth session on the integrated work programme of UNCTAD and its budgetary requirements,8 provided for each main substantive division an indication of the projects to be undertaken and the man-months required for their implementation. The Secretary-General of the United Nations hopes that the basis on which these resources are computed could be perfected so that the estimates given could not only be used for information purposes in the reports submitted to the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, the Economic and Social Council and the Trade and Development Board, but could also serve as the basis for compiling the budget estimates for 1969 for these programmes of work.
- 9. On the question of the desirability of the United Nations adopting a biennial budget, to which the Council had referred (A/6703 and Corr.1, para. 723), the

8 TD/B/122.

- Secretary-General's views are presented in a separate report (A/C.5/1122)⁹ before the Fifth Committee.
- 10. Chapter XVI of the Council's report deals with the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts. The Fifth Committee has already discussed this matter under a separate item on its agenda at the current session (agenda item 80).
- 11. Chapter XVII deals with the activities of the organizations within the United Nations system. The Secretary-General has nothing to add at this stage to the points raised in the report of the Council on this question.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY QUESTIONS

12. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions associated himself with the observations of the representative of the Secretary-General. He pointed out that in chapter XIV, section VI, of its report, the Council had concentrated its attention more specifically on information activities in the economic and social fields, whereas in paragraphs 110 to 118 of its report (A/6707 and Corr.1-3)10 on the budget estimates the Advisory Committee had taken a broader view, dealing with the operations and expenditure of the Office of Public Information and the studies and reappraisal the latter had carried out.

DOCUMENT A/6977

Report of the Second Committee

[Original text: English] [14 December 1967]

- 1. At its 1564th plenary meeting, on 23 September 1967, the General Assembly allocated to the Second Committee certain parts of agenda item 12 entitled "Report of the Economic and Social Council" (A/6703 and Corr.1). The parts of the report allocated to the Second Committee were as follows: chapters I to X, XIII, XIV (sections II and VIII to X), XV and XVII. The Assembly also decided that chapter XI, section III, might be of interest to the Second Committee and that chapter XVI should be referred to the Second Committee for comment.
- 2. The Committee considered these parts of the report of the Council throughout the course of its meetings in conjunction with agenda items 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47 dealing with the subject-matter contained therein. The Committee also had before it during its consideration of agenda items 38, 42 and 48, chapters I, III and IV of the addendum to the Council's report (A/6703/Add.1), relating to the first and second parts of its resumed forty-third session.
- 3. The Committee considered this item at its 1173rd to 1177th meetings, held on 8, 11 and 12 December 1967. Four draft resolutions were submitted for the consideration of the Committee, the texts of which are reproduced in sections I to IV below.

- THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
- 4. At the 1173rd meeting, on 8 December 1967, the representative of Austria, on behalf of the delegations of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia, introduced a draft resolution (A/C.2/ L.985), which read as follows:

"The General Assembly.

"Referring to the Declaration adopted by the commemorative meeting of the Economic Commission for Europe to celebrate the Commission's twentieth anniversary, in which representatives of the Governments participating in the work of the Commission expressed the belief that the situation now presenting itself in the region of that Commission called for active work and joint efforts in developing further the co-operation within the Commission's framework which was in the interests of all nations,

"Noting with great interest the Secretary-General's statement in the introduction to his annual report

⁹ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 80.

10 Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 7 and cor-

on the work of the Organization, submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, in which special attention is drawn to the increasingly vital contribution made by the regional economic commissions to the United Nations efforts directed towards economic and social development throughout the world (A/6701/Add.1, para. 65),

"Recalling its resolution 2129 (XX) of 21 December 1965, which welcomed the growing interest in the development of good-neighbourly relations and co-operation among European States having different economic, social and political systems in the political economic, technical, scientific, cultural and other fields,

"Recognizing that the development of co-operation among countries of the region of the Commission—regardless of their economic and social system—in the economic, scientific and technological fields will facilitate and accelerate the economic progress of developed and developing countries,

"1. Notes with appreciation the important achievements that the Economic Commission for Europe has realized during the twenty years of its existence, thus contributing to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to better mutual understanding, peace and international security in that region;

"2. Invites States Members of the Economic Commission for Europe to continue to intensify their common efforts towards:

- "(a) Promoting their economic, scientific and technical co-operation in traditional as well as new fields on a mutually beneficial basis and also for the benefit of the entire international community, in particular of the developing countries;
- "(b) Expanding trade by seeking to remove economic, administrative and trade policy obstacles to the development of trade, thereby facilitating world trade in general;
- "3. Endorses the appeal by the Economic Commission for Europe at its twenty-second session to the States Members of the Commission to realize the desirability of strengthening economic relations with countries in other regions and to this end to maintain the closest co-operation with other United Nations bodies and specialized agencies and in particular with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization."
- 5. At its 1174th meeting, on 11 December 1967, the Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/C.2/L.985) unanimously (see para. 23 below, draft resolution I).
- 6. Some delegations stated that they understood the words "Expanding trade" in operative paragraph 2 (b) to mean "Expanding East-West trade" and that they would interpret the text of operative paragraph 2 (b) accordingly.
- 7. Several delegations drew the Committee's attention to the fact that this year also marked the twentieth anniversary of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and referred to resolution 1246 (XLIII) of the Economic and Social Council, in which the Council commended the progress of work and the achievements of the Commission during the twenty years of its existence. They thought it would be proper for the General Assembly to commend the two commissions for their achievements. The adoption of the draft resolution on the role of the Economic Commis-

sion for Europe in the development of international economic co-operation should not create the impression that the Assembly attached greater importance to the interests of the developed countries than to that of other countries.

II. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

8. At the 1174th meeting, the representative of Romania, on behalf of the delegations of Algeria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, France, Iran, Mali, Pakistan, Romania and the United Arab Republic, introduced a draft resolution (A/C.2/L.986), which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Convinced that science and technology can make an outstanding contribution to economic and social progress,

"Recalling its resolution 2082 (XX) of 20 December 1965 relating to the second report of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development and endorsing the views of the Advisory Committee concerning the establishment of a programme for intensifying international co-operation in the application of the resources of science and technology to the economic and social development of the developing countries,

"Welcoming the progress made by the Advisory Committee,

"Endorsing Economic and Social Council resolution 1155 (XLI) of 5 August 1966, in which the Council welcomed the Advisory Committee's proposal designed to establish a world plan of action for the application of science and technology to development and endorsed the objectives for the proposed plan set forth by the Advisory Committee,

"Concerned at the fact that, despite improved dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge, little progress has been made to enable the developing countries to benefit from it,

"Believing that the application of science and technology in the interests of the economic and social progress of the less developed countries cannot produce concrete results unless it forms part of a coherent programme of development in the economic, industrial, social and cultural fields,

"Emphasizing the importance of considering these problems within a regional framework and the role which the regional economic commissions and the Economic and Social Office in Beirut can play in achieving the objectives contained in Economic and Social Council resolution 1155 (XLI),

- "1. Endorses the objectives set forth by the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development in its third report (E/4178 and Corr.1) with a view to:
- "(a) Assisting in the building of an adequate structure of institutions in the developing countries;
- "(b) Improving the arrangements for the transfer and adaptation of knowledge and technology already available in the more developed countries;
- "(c) Encouraging closer co-operation between scientists and research organizations in developed and developing countries;
- "2. Appeals to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency to

- endeavour to take full account, particularly in their bilateral aid programmes, of the aid requirements of the developing countries in the field of science and technology;
- "3. Invites the United Nations Development Programme, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and related institutions, in the light of the objectives of the world plan of action for the application of science and technology to development, to consider making available additional resources to meet requests from the developing countries for projects directed towards the application of science and technology to development;
- "4. Requests the United Nations and related international organizations to assist the Advisory Committee, within the limits of their competence, in preparing guidelines for the application of science and technology to development;
- "5. Requests the Advisory Committee and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination to examine the detailed statements to be submitted on 1 January 1968, in conformity with Economic and Social Council resolution 1155 (XLI), by the United Nations and related international organizations with regard to their current or future contribution to the achievement of the objectives set forth by the Advisory Committee and to prepare detailed proposals in that regard for the Council;
- "6. Requests the Advisory Committee, in continuing its work of establishing a world plan of action:
- "(a) To consider carefully the regional aspects of such a plan and to seek, for that purpose, the cooperation of the regional economic commissions and the Economic and Social Office in Beirut;
- "(b) To remain aware of the need to ensure close co-ordination between its work in that field and the plans which are to be prepared for the next United Nations development decade;
- "(c) To review periodically the list of urgent problems for the solution of which it has recommended the launching of a concerted offensive, so that efforts and available resources will be concentrated to the greatest possible extent on problems having high priority;
- "(d) To report to the General Assembly not later than at its twenty-fourth session, through the Economic and Social Council, on the progress achieved in this field;
- "7. Expresses the hope that the Advisory Committee will receive the broadest possible co-operation, whenever it expresses the desire therefor, from scientific and technical institutions interested in its work."
- 9. Syria became a sponsor of the draft resolution.
- 10. At the same meeting, the sponsors orally revised the draft resolution, as follows:
- (a) In the fifth preambular paragraph, the words "little progress has been made" were replaced by the words "there is much more progress to be made";
- (b) In the sixth preambular paragraph, the words "cannot produce concrete results" were changed to read "cannot produce the best results";
- (c) In operative paragraph 2, the words "Appeals to" were replaced by the word "Recommends".

11. The Committee then unanimously adopted the draft resolution (A/C.2/L.986), as orally revised (see para. 23 below, draft resolution II).

III. INCREASING THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF EDIBLE PROTEIN

12. At the 1175th meeting, on 11 December 1967, the representative of Pakistan, on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Ceylon, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, introduced a draft resolution (A/C.2/L.993), which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Noting Economic and Social Council resolution 1257 (XLIII) of 2 August 1967 on increasing the production and use of edible protein,

"Convinced that the majority of mankind, especially in the developing countries, is faced with an impending protein crisis, imperilling the physical and mental development of children and adversely affecting the health and productivity of adults,

"Believing that it is essential that the organizations in the United Nations system urgently take coordinated action aimed at closing the present gap between world protein needs and protein supplies and at preventing an even more widespread protein deficiency in future generations,

"Calling for closer co-operation between Governments, industry, agriculture, universities, scientific and technological institutes and other interested organizations, in both industrialized and developing countries, in order to provide a significant impetus to the efforts to improve the protein nutrition of mankind,

"Believing that national development planning in the Member countries should include, where necessary, the most effective formulation, co-ordination and implementation of programmes to assure an adequate supply and human consumption of protein foods.

"Expressing its deep appreciation to the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development for its excellent report entitled Feeding the Expanding World Population: international action to avert the impending protein crisis" (E/4343/Rev.1),

"Welcoming the intention of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Children's Fund to enlarge the scope and functions of the Protein Advisory Group (*ibid.*, paras. 51-56) and their participation in it,

- "1. Endorses Economic and Social Council resolution 1257 (XLIII);
- "2. Endorses further the policy objectives and the technical aspects of the recommendations for international action to avert the impending protein crisis contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development;
- "3. Requests Governments to communicate to the Secretary-General by 1 July 1968 their comments and suggestions on the report;

- "4. Further requests Governments to inform the Secretary-General by 1 July 1968 of present and proposed activities at the national level on the part of Government, industry, agriculture, universities, scientific and technological institutes and other interested organizations relating to improving and increasing the production and human consumption of protein;
- "5. Calls for improved co-ordination of the organizations in the United Nations system of activities to combat protein malnutrition and for closer links between institutions concerned in the developed and developing countries in order to ensure concerted action and to avoid duplication of effort;
- "6. Invites the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund and other organizations concerned to pay particular attention to the Advisory Committee's report and to assist Governments to develop United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Children's Fund projects for increasing the supply and human consumption of protein;
- "7. Expresses the hope that the services and advice of the Protein Advisory Group will be utilized to the fullest possible extent by members of the United Nations family of organizations to assist in and co-ordinate the work on projects involving the supply and human consumption of protein;
- "8. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the organizations in the United Nations system, including the regional economic commissions and the Economic and Social Office in Beirut, to consider what action may be appropriate at the regional level in dealing with the impending protein crisis;
- "9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report, through the Economic and Social Council, to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution, including the activities reported by Governments and the work undertaken within the United Nations system, together with the comments of the Protein Advisory Group and the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development."
- 13. At the same meeting, the sponsors of the draft resolution orally revised operative paragraph 5 to read:
 - "Calls for concerted and well co-ordinated action by the organizations in the United Nations system to combat protein malnutrition and for closer links between institutions concerned in the developed and developing countries in order to avoid a duplication of effort and to achieve the maximum exchange of technology;"
- Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Thailand and Tunisia became co-sponsors of the draft resolution.
- 14. The Committee heard statements by representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Children's Fund.

- 15. At the 1176th meeting, on 12 December 1967, the sponsors made the following oral revisions in the draft resolution:
 - (a) Operative paragraph 2 was changed to read:
 - "Welcomes the policy objectives and the technical aspects of the proposals contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development;"
- (b) In operative paragraph 6, the words "to assist Governments to develop" were changed to read "to assist Governments to formulate";
- (c) In operative paragraph 7, the words "members of the United Nations family of organizations" were replaced by the words "the organizations in the United Nations system".
- 16. The Committee then unanimously adopted the draft resolution (A/C.2/L.993), as orally revised (see para. 23 below, draft resolution III).

IV. OUTFLOW OF TRAINED PERSONNEL FROM DEVEL-OPING COUNTRIES

- 17. The delegations of Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Dahomey, Guatemala, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay and Venezuela had presented a draft resolution (A/C.2/L.994), which read as follows:
 - "The General Assembly,
 - "Recalling its resolutions 1824 (XVII) of 18 December 1962 and 2090 (XX) of 20 December 1965 on the role of the United Nations in training national technical personnel for the accelerated industrialization of the developing countries,
 - "Recalling also Economic and Social Council resolution 1274 (XLIII) of 4 August 1967 on the development and utilization of human resources,
 - "Noting with satisfaction that the Secretary-General intends to compile, co-ordinate and finalize studies, undertaken within the United Nations system, of various aspects of the disparity in scientific and technological development with a view to determining the effects of the drainage of highly trained personnel from developing countries and thereby to promote concerted action by the United Nations family to remedy this situation,
 - "1. Requests the competent organs and bodies of the United Nations to assist the interested developing countries in adopting the necessary measures to identify and assess the local obstacles in the way of the optimum employment and utilization of their technical and professional personnel;
 - "2. Recommends further that the United Nations, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the United Nations Development Programme, intensify their support for the efforts of the Governments of the developing countries to create or expand existing national or regional institutions where research would be carried out or professional personnel trained, in order that the acquired skills and experience may be placed at the service of their respective countries and regions;
 - "3. Requests the Secretary-General, in the light of the comments he has received from Governments, specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and organs in the United Nations system,

pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1029 (XXXVII) and General Assembly resolution 2090 (XX), to submit a report to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, dealing with the advantages accruing to developed countries, and the disadvantages according to developing countries as a result of the tendency of trained personnel from the latter to remain in the industrialized countries after they have received their training;

- "4. Decides to keep the subject under constant review and to include in the agenda of its twenty-third session a separate item on the drainage of trained professional and technical personnel at all levels from the developing to the developed countries, its consequences and practical remedies for it."
- 18. A note by the Secretary-General on the financial implications of the draft resolution was circulated to the Committee in document A/C.2/L.998.
- 19. At the 1177th meeting, on 12 December 1967, the representative of Upper Volta, on behalf of the nine sponsors, introduced a revised version of the draft resolution (A/C.2/L.994/Rev.1) which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolutions 1824 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, 2090 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and 2259 (XXII) of 3 November 1967 on the role of the United Nations in training national technical personnel for the accelerated industrialization of the developing countries,

"Recalling also Economic and Social Council resolution 1274 (XLIII) of 4 August 1967 on the development and utilization of human resources,

"Noting with satisfaction that the Secretary-General intends to compile and co-ordinate studies, undertaken within the United Nations system, of various aspects of the disparity in scientific and technological development with a view to determining the effects of the drainage of highly trained personnel from developing countries and thereby to promote concerted action by the United Nations family to remedy this situation,

- "1. Requests the appropriate organs and bodies of the United Nations system to assist the interested developing countries in adopting the necessary measures to identify and assess the local obstacles in the way of the optimum employment and utilization of their technical and professional personnel;
- "2. Recommends further that the United Nations, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the United Nations Development Programme, intensify their support for the efforts of the Governments of the developing countries to create or expand existing national or regional institutions where research would be carried out or professional personnel trained, in order that the acquired skills and experience may be placed at the service of their respective countries and regions;
- "3. Requests the Secretary-General to assemble and analyse the comments and information that have been received from Governments, specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development and organs in the United Nations system pursuant to Economic and Social

Council resolutions 1029 (XXXVII) of 13 August 1964 and 1274 (XLIII) of 4 August 1967 and General Assembly resolution 2090 (XX), and submit a progress report to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, dealing, inter alia, with the advantages accruing to developed countries, and the disadvantages accruing to developing countries as a result of the tendency of trained personnel from the latter to remain in the industrialized countries or to leave their country after they have received their training;

- "4. Decides to keep the subject under constant review and to include in the agenda of its twenty-third session a separate item on the migration of trained professional and technical personnel at all levels from the developing to the developed countries, its consequences and practical remedies for it."
- 20. The Committee was then informed of consequent revisions to the Secretary-General's note on the financial implications of the draft resolution.
- 21. At the same meeting, the sponsors orally made the following changes in the draft resolution:
- (a) The third preambular paragraph was revised to read:

"Noting with satisfaction that the Secretary-General intends to report on the studies undertaken within the United Nations system on the various aspects of the problem of the outflow of highly trained personnel from developing countries,"

(b) Operative paragraph 1 was revised to read:

"Invites the appropriate organs and bodies of the United Nations system to assist the developing countries, at their request, in adopting the necessary measures to identify and assess the obstacles in the way of the optimum employment and utilization of their technical and professional personnel;"

- (c) Operative paragraph 2 was revised to read:
- "Recommends that the United Nations, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Development Programme and the Specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency intensify their support for the efforts of the Governments of the developing countries, at their request, to create national or regional institutions or to expand existing ones, including those where research would be carried out or professional personnel trained, in order that the acquired skills and experience may be placed at the service of their respective countries and regions;"
- (d) In operative paragraph 3, the words "and submit a progress report to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, dealing, inter alia, with the advantages accruing to developed countries, and the disadavantages accruing to developing countries" were changed to read: "and, when submitting the report, to highlight the advantages and disadvantages accruing to both the developed and the developing countries";
 - (e) Operative paragraph 4 was revised to read:

"Decides to keep the subject under constant review and to include in the provisional agenda of its twentythird session a separate item on the outflow of trained professional and technical personnel at all levels from the developing to the developed countries, its causes, its consequences and practical remedies for the problems resulting from it." 22. The Committee then unanimously adopted the revised draft resolution (A/C.2/L.994/Rev.1), as amended (see para. 23 below, draft resolution IV).

Recommendations of the Second Committee

23. The Second Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolutions I to IV below:

Ι

THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

II

Science and technology

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

III

INCREASING THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF EDIBLE PROTEIN

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

IV

OUTFLOW OF TRAINED PERSONNEL FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

DOCUMENT A/6986

Financial implications of draft resolution IV submitted by the Second Committee in document A/6977

Report of the Fifth Committee

[Original text: English] [14 December 1967]

- 1. At its 1225th meeting, on 14 December 1967, the Fifth Committee considered a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1156) on the financial implications of draft resolution IV submitted by the Second Committee in its report (A/6977, para. 23) and an oral report by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
- 2. The Fifth Committee decided, without objection, to inform the General Assembly that, should it adopt the draft resolution recommended by the Second Committee, additional expenditures in a total amount of \$9,500 would arise in 1968. However, as the Secretary-General had advised that he would endeavour to meet these additional costs within the regular budget for 1968, the adoption of the draft resolution would require no additional appropriation for 1968.

DOCUMENT A/7003

Report of the Third Committee

[Original text: English] [16 December 1967]

I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. At its 1564th plenary meeting, on 23 September 1967, the General Assembly allocated to the Third Committee certain parts of agenda item 12, "Report of the Economic and Social Council". These parts of the report (A/6703 and Corr.1) were chapters XI, XII, XIV (sections I, III, IV, V and VII), XV and XVII.
- 2. At the same meeting the General Assembly also decided that: (a) chapter XI, section III, of the Council's report, dealing with population, might also be of interest to the Second Committee; (b) chapters XV and XVII should also be referred to the Second and Fifth Committees; and (c) chapter XVI, dealing with the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances
- of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, which had been allocated to the Fifth Committee, should also be referred to the Second and Third Committees for comment.
- 3. At its 1467th meeting, on 29 September 1967, the Third Committee agreed that the following subjects, which were dealt with in the report of the Economic and Social Council, would be taken up by the Committee under other items on its agenda covering the same subjects:
- (a) World social situation [item 49] (chap. XI, sect. I);
- (b) Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [item 50] (chap. XIV, sect. I);
- (c) Housing, building and planning [item 51] (chap. XI, sect. II);

- (d) Town twinning as a means of international cooperation [item 52] (chap. XIV, sect. V);
- (e) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [item 53] (chap. XII, sect. XII);
- (f) Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance [item 54] (chap. XII, sect. V);
- (g) Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination [item 55] (chap. XII, sect. I);
- (h) Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories [item 56] (chap. XII, sects. II and III);
- (i) Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity [item 60] (chap. XII, sect. VIII);
- (j) Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [item 61] (chap. XII, sect. X);
- (k) Capital punishment [item 62] (chap. XII, sect. XI).

The discussion of these different parts of the Council's report is therefore covered in the Committee's reports on those items.

4. The Third Committee had before it the remaining parts of the report of the Council which had been referred to it at its 1552nd and 1553rd meetings, held on 15 December 1967. These were:

Chapter XI, sections III (Population) and IV (United Nations Children's Fund);

Chapter XII, sections IV (Slavery), VI (Prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities), VII (Periodic reports on human rights), IX (Allegations regarding infringements of trade union rights), XIII (Status of women in private law), XIV (Access of women to education), XV (United Nations assistance for the advancement of women), XVII (Political rights of women), XVII (Economic rights and opportunities for women), XVIII (Promotion of women's rights in the International Year for Human Rights), XIX (Comments of the Commission on the Status of Women on periodic reports on human rights) and XX (Advisory services in the field of human rights);

Chapter XIV, sections III (Transfer to the United Nations of the responsibilities and assets of the International Relief Union), IV (Natural disasters), and VII (International control of narcotics);

Chapter XV (Work programme of the United Nations in the economic, social and human rights fields and its budgetary requirements);

Chapter XVII (Development and co-ordination of the activities of the organizations within the United Nations system).

As mentioned in paragraph 2 above, the Assembly also referred chapter XVI of the report to the Third Committee for comments.

5. Owing to the lack of time, the Committee was able to discuss in substance only chapter XI, section IV, on UNICEF. The Director of the Division of Human Rights, in a statement made at the 1553rd meeting, briefly referred to certain matters dealt with in other

chapters of the report of the Council before the Committee.

II. United Nations Children's Fund

- 6. The Executive Director of UNICEF, in a statement made at the 1552nd meeting on the main trends in UNICEF's work, referred to the view of the UNICEF Executive Board that the most effective use of UNICEF's resources was to assist key programmes of benefit to children and youth which had a recognized priority within the context of the development efforts of individual countries. UNICEF was also prepared to help in emergencies affecting children. A large proportion of UNICEF aid was in the form of supplies and equipment. Another unique feature was that UNICEF funds were used to help meet local currency costs, particularly for training schemes for national personnel which now accounted for about one third of all UNICEF aid. The wastage of human life and talent among the young in developing countries was appalling and a drain on economic and social development; the need to direct more funds to the care and well-being of children was imperative and urgent. The level of \$50 million allocations reached in 1967, as a result of drawing down all the reserves of UNICEF consistent with prudent administration, could only be maintained if contributions from Governments and private sources were increased.
- 7. Many delegations voiced their appreciation of the excellent work of UNICEF, its flexibility in adapting its programme to the changing requirements of developing countries, and its emphasis on investment in children and youth as a key element in national development efforts. In the course of its twenty-one years—the anniversary of which was an occasion for warm congratulations by delegations—its emphasis had always been on practical programmes of maximum impact. It had developed a close partnership and effective working relationships with the relevant United Nations and specialized agencies. It had maintained its reputation for efficient administration. Its concept of service had transcended political and ideological lines. It had set a valuable example of international goodwill in which many thousands of individuals through UNICEF National Committees and other non-governmental agencies were able to participate in a direct way.
- 8. A number of delegations cited the importance of UNICEF aid in helping their own countries initiate or strengthen programmes benefiting children. Several delegations welcomed the fact that UNICEF aid for education was now second only to health. Others welcomed the widening of the scope of UNICEF aid to include family planning as part of maternal and child health. It was suggested that in addition to material aid, some countries could benefit from UNICEF cooperation in bringing to them advanced technology affecting children. A view was expressed that UNICEF should avail itself more of the experience of certain countries. Objection was voiced by one delegation to UNICEF aid to South Viet-Nam; another delegation pointed out that this aid was provided under normal UNICEF procedures and that the UNICEF Board was willing to extend aid to both parts of Viet-Nam on the basis of governmental requests. Several delegations commended UNICEF for its prompt response to the emergency needs of children in the Middle East. The view was expressed by two delegations that this aid

should be channelled through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and Red Cross organizations; the Executive Director explained that UNICEF was working through existing organizations to the extent possible, and that the Governments in the area, in the final analysis, decided on the distribution channels. In response to misgivings expressed by one delegation that UNICEF in its emphasis on long-range aid was not responding sufficiently to emergency needs of children, particularly refugee children in Africa, the Executive Director cited the desire of UNICEF to respond to these needs if the Governments of the countries in which the children were located considered this a priority matter for UNICEF aid.

- 9. Many delegations expressed concern at the insufficient funds at the disposal of UNICEF. While the increased contributions for 1967 and 1968 announced by some Governments were welcome, it was necessary for more Governments to be increasingly generous and for support from private sources to continue to grow if the Fund was to reach its financial goal of \$50 million by the end of 1969.
- 10. A draft resolution was submitted by Canada, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Turkey (A/C.3/L.1515/Rev.1). Subsequently Botswana, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Guinea, India, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Thailand, Tunisia and Uganda also became sponsors. An oral amendment by the representative of France to add the words "the specialized agencies" in the fourth preambular paragraph after the words "United Nations Secretariat" was accepted by the sponsors. The text of the revised draft resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered chapter XI, section IV, of the report of the Economic and Social Council (A/6703 and Corr.1), dealing with the United Nations Children's Fund,

"Welcoming the fact that the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund had reviewed the assistance policies of the Fund, which are focused not only on the immediate needs of children but also on preparing children to contribute to the social and economic development of their countries,

"Noting with approval that the United Nations Children's Fund continues to provide emergency aid to children and mothers in situations of urgent need, while placing increasing emphasis on long-term programmes,

"Noting that co-operation between the United Nations Children's Fund and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the Division of Human Rights of the United Nations Secretariat, the specialized agencies and the relevant technical and other agencies in the United Nations family continues to be close,

- "1. Endorses the policies and programmes of the United Nations Children's Fund;
- "2. Congratulates the United Nations Children's Fund on the occasion of its twenty-first anniversary;
- "3. Commends the United Nations Children's Fund for its very substantial and significant achievements during its twenty-one years of operation, particularly on behalf of the children of the developing countries;
- "4. Expresses the hope that the United Nations Children's Fund's goal of \$50 million income from voluntary contributions by Governments and private sources will be attained by the end of 1969, thus enabling the Fund to continue the constructive work which merited for it the award of the Noble Peace Prize for 1965."
- 11. The Committee, at its 1553rd meeting, unanimously adopted the revised draft resolution, orally amended (see para. 12 below).

Recommendation of the Third Committee

12. The Third Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

United Nations Children's Fund

[Text adopted by the General Assembly without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1633rd plenary meeting, on 15 December 1967, the General Assembly adopted unanimously draft resolutions I, II, III and IV submitted by the Second Committee (A/6977, para. 23). For the final texts, see General Assembly resolutions 2317 (XXII), 2318 (XXII), 2319 (XXII) and 2320 (XXII).¹¹

At the same meeting, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Fifth Committee (A/6963).

At its 1638th plenary meeting, on 18 December 1967, the General Assembly adopted unanimously the draft resolution submitted by the Third Committee (A/7003, para. 12). For the final text, see General Assembly resolution 2335 (XXII).¹¹

At the same meeting, the General Assembly took note of chapters XVIII and XIX of the report of the Economic and Social Council.

¹¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16.

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 12 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Document N_{θ} .	Title or description	Observations and references
A/6701/Add.1	Introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (16 June 1966-15 June 1967)	Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Supplement No. 1A
A/6703 and Corr.1	Report of the Economic and Social Council (6 August 1966-4 August 1967)	Ibid., Supplement No. 3 and corrigendum
A/6703/Add.1	Addendum to the report of the Economic and Social Council	Ibid., Supplement No. 3A
A/6839	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the text of the Economic and Social Council resolution 1281 (XLIII), section I, entitled "National co-ordination"	Mimcographed
A/C.2/L.958	Barbados, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia: draft resolution	See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Annexes, agenda item 44, document A/6881, para. 10
A/C.2/L.985	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia: draft resolution	See A/6977, para. 4
A/C.2/L.986	Algeria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, France, Iran, Mali, Pakistan, Romania and United Arab Republic: draft resolution	Ibid., para. 8
A/C.2/L.993	Afghanistan, Ceylon, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution	Ibid., para. 12
A/C.2/L.994	Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Dahomey, Guatemala, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay and Venezuela: draft resolution	Ibid., para. 17
A/C.2/L.994/Rev.1	Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Dahomey, Guatemala, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay and Venezuela: revised draft resolution	Ibid., para. 19
A/C.3/L.1515	Canada, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Philippines, Poland, Sweden and Turkey: draft resolution	Replaced by A/C.3/L.1515/ Rev.1
A/C.3/L.1515/Rev.1	Botswana, Canada, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uganda: revised draft resolution	See A/7003, para. 10
A/C.5/L.930	Draft report of the Fifth Committee	For the text of this document, as amended by the Fifth Committee at its 1222nd meeting, see A/6963
E/4178 and Corr.1	Third report of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development	Official Records of the Eco- nomic and Social Council, Forty-first Session, Supple- ment No. 12 and corrigen- dum
E/4329	Annual report of the Economic Commission for Europe	Ibid., Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 3
E/4343/Rev.1	Feeding the Expanding World Population: international action to avert the impending protein crisis	United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIII.2

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Official Records



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 13:* Report of the Trusteeship Council**

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A/6926	Special report of the Trusteeship Council	2
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Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the representative of Australia to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [13 November 1967]

ANNEX

Letter dated 24 October 1967 from the representative of Australia to the Secretary-General

For your information I enclose with this letter the text of a statement which is being made today, 24 October, in the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Australia by the Minister for Territories, the Honourable C. E. Barnes, M.P., concerning the future of the Trust Territory of Nauru.

Mr. Barnes reviewed the course of the discussions which were held in Canberra in June this year and resumed in October between representatives of the British, New Zealand and Australian Governments, which are at present responsible under the Trusteeship System for the administration of Nauru, and the representatives of the Nauruan people, headed by Head Chief Hammer De Roburt. Mr. Barnes read the text of a statement made jointly by the representatives of the three administering Powers and the representatives of the Nauruan people, in which it was stated that the three Governments had agreed to meet the request of the representatives of the Nauruan people for full and unqualified independence. The date on which Nauru will become independent requires consideration in the light of the constitutional and administrative steps that are necessary to enable the change to independence to be made, and the three Governments and the Nauruan representatives will make every effort to adhere to the date of 31 January 1968, if this is found to be practicable, as the date on which Nauru shall receive its independence.

(Signed) Patrick SHAW Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations

Statement by the Minister for Territories, the Honourable C. E. Barnes, M.P., in the House of Representatives on 24 October 1967

Discussions on the constitutional future of the island of Nauru have been proceeding between representatives of the

On 24 October I sent you a letter (see annex) with which I enclosed the text of a statement which was made on that day by the Minister for Territories, the Honourable C. E. Barnes, M.P., in the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Australia, concerning the future of the Trust Territory of Nauru. In that statement Mr. Barnes read the text of a joint statement made by representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, New Zealand and Australia, and by the representatives of the Nauruan people, in which it was recorded that the three Governments had agreed to meet the request of the representatives of the Nauruan people for full and unqualified independence. It was also stated that the actual date on which Nauru would become independent was still under consideration, but that every effort would be made to adhere to the date which the representatives of the Nauruan people wanted, that is 31 January 1968.

I wish now to advise you that the Australian Government announced today, 7 November, that this matter has been determined and that the date on which Nauru becomes independent will be 31 January 1968.

May I request that the texts of this letter, of my letter of 24 October and of the statement by the Minister for Territories, be circulated as documents of the Trusteeship Council and of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Patrick SHAW Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Fourth Committee. 1739th-1741st, 1745th, 1750th and 1754th meetings; and ibid., Plenary Meetings, 1641st meeting.

^{**} Since 1961, this question has been discussed by the General Assembly as agenda item 13 at the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, twentieth and twenty-first sessions.

DOCUMENT A/6903***

^{***} Also issued under the symbol T/1669.

Nauruan people and of the three Governments—Britain, New Zealand and Australia—which are at present responsible, under United Nations trusteeship, for the administration of the island

My colleague, the Attorney-General, and I have represented the Australian Government in these talks.

The British and New Zealand Governments have been represented by their High Commissions.

The Nauruan people have been represented by delegates of the Nauru Local Government Council headed by Head Chief Hammer De Roburt, o.B.E.

The conclusions reached in those discussions are recorded in a Joint Statement subscribed to by representatives who took part in the talks.

The text of the statement is:

"Discussions between representatives of the Nauruan people and representatives of the Governments of Australia, Britain and New Zealand on the constitutional future of Nauru were recently resumed.

"At the earlier discussions held in June this year proposals by the Nauruan delegation seeking the agreement of the Partner Governments to Nauru becoming an independent State on 31 January 1968 were considered.

"At that time the Governments agreed that it was appropriate that basic changes should be made in the Government of Nauru but they put forward for consideration alternative arrangements under which Australia would exercise responsibilities for external affairs and defence but which would otherwise give the Nauruans full autonomy.

"At the resumed talks the Nauruan delegation said that they remained grateful to the Partner Governments for the careful thought that had been given to the problems of the political future for Nauru but that the particular proposals suggested by the Partner Governments presented substantial difficulties from the Nauruan point of view.

"The Nauruan delegation envisaged that Nauru should in the future maintain close links with all three Partner Governments.

"They proposed that the relationship with Australia would remain a closer one than that with any other country.

"The Nauruans would wish to maintain a Nauruan office in Australia as a main channel of communication with the outside world and would be happy to see an Australian office established in Nauru if this were desired.

"They hoped that Australia would agree that the High Court of Australia should hear appeals from the Supreme Court of Nauru and that Nauruan students could continue to come to Australia.

"The position of the Nauruan delegation was, however, that the nature of the future links between Nauru and the three countries which were now the Administering Authority should be determined by agreement after independence had been attained.

"The primary objective of the Nauruan delegation was the attainment for Nauru of full and unfettered sovereignty.

"The Partner Governments responded that they would respect the views put forward by the Nauruan delegation.

"The Partner Governments were therefore agreeable to meet the request of the Nauruan delegation for full and unqualified independence.

"The date on which Nauru will become independent requires consideration in the light of the steps that are necessary to enable the change to be made.

"The Partner Governments have agreed to take the necessary steps to seek from the present United Nations General Assembly a resolution for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement upon independence being achieved.

"The Australian Government has agreed that the passage of legislation by the Parliament should be sought during the current parliamentary session so that Australian law will cease to apply in Nauru upon a date to be proclaimed, this being the date agreed upon for independence.

"The Nauruan delegation is now engaged in examining in detail with a working party of officials the arrangements required to enable a constitution to be drafted for discussion by the Nauruan people and the many other administrative steps that need to be taken to prepare the way for a smooth transition from trusteeship to independence.

"In the light of progress made, a date for independence will be agreed upon.

"The Nauruan delegation and the Partner Governments will make every effort to adhere to the date of 31 January 1968, if this is found to be practicable.

"At the same time both the Nauruan delegation and the Partner Governments place importance on proper consideration being given to the drawing up of the constitution as well as ensuring that the essential administrative requirements to enable the Nauruan people to take over their own government are met.

"The Partner Governments have undertaken to co-operate with the Nauruan representatives to the fullest possible extent and to provide all possible assistance that may be needed and sought by the Nauruan representatives towards the achievement of their objectives."

The agreement that has been reached is an historic one and is of far-reaching importance to the Nauruan people.

The choice of full independence is theirs.

We wish them well.

If after independence the Nauruan Government wishes to continue close links with Australia, as forecast by the Nauruan delegation at these talks, the Australian Government will be ready to respond and to consider sympathetically any requests that may be made for assistance.

I expect to introduce in the House in the near future the bill referred to in the Joint Statement.

DOCUMENT A/6926

Special report of the Trusteeship Council

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Introduction

- 1. By a letter dated 10 November 1967 (T/1670) addressed to the Secretary-General the Permanent Representative of Australia requested, under rule 3 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, that a special session of the Council be convened. His request had the support of the delegations of New Zealand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Australian Government wished formally to report to the Council that, following the resumed talks between representatives of the Nauruan people and of the partner Governments of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, it had been agreed that Nauru should accede to independence on 31 January 1968. As a consequence of this decision, the Administering Authority wished to request the Trusteeship Council to recommend to the General Assembly that it resolve that the Trusteeship Agreement between the United Nations and the Administering Authority, approved by the General Assembly on 1 November 1947, cease to be in force upon the accession of Nauru to independence on 31 January 1968.
- 2. The letter from the Permanent Representative of Australia also stated that as a consequence of the impending independence of Nauru, it would also appear necessary to amend Trusteeship Council resolution 2148 (XXXIV) of 29 June 1967 so as to delete the references to a visiting mission to Nauru in 1968.
- 3. The thirteenth special session of the Council was therefore convened on 22 November 1967, according to rule 3 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council.

THE FUTURE OF NAURU

- 4. The representative of Australia informed the Council at its 1323rd meeting on 22 November 1967 that, following the resumed talks between representatives of Nauru and representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, it had been agreed that Nauru should accede to independence on 31 January 1968. It was the earnest hope of the joint Administering Authority that the Trusteeship Council would recommend to the General Assembly that the latter decide, in agreement with the Administering Authority and in consultation with the Nauruan delegation, to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru. In order to give effect to the agreement which had been reached between the Nauruan authorities and the Administering Authority, it was necessary that the General Assembly should agree to do so during its current session (see also A/6903). The representatives of New Zealand and the United Kingdom endorsed the statement made by the representative of Australia on behalf of the Administering Authority.
- 5. In the general discussion on this item which followed at the same meeting, all members of the

Council participated. Head Chief Hammer De Roburt, speaking as Special Adviser to the Australian delegation, made a statement.¹

6. At the 1323rd meeting, the representative of Liberia submitted a draft resolution on the future of Nauru (T/L.1134). The draft resolution was unanimously adopted at the same meeting (see annex I below).

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA, 1968

- 7. At the 1323rd meeting, on 22 November 1967, China and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution (T/L.1135) to amend Trusteeship Council resolution 2148 (XXXIV) of 29 June 1967 concerning the terms of reference of the United Nations Visiting Mission, 1968. The representative of the United Kingdom, introducing the draft resolution, said that, as a result of the decision that Nauru should accede to independence on 31 January 1968, it would no longer be appropriate for the 1968 Visiting Mission to include Nauru in its itinerary. The draft resolution sought to amend the Mission's terms of reference accordingly.
- 8. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that his delegation at the thirty-fourth session of the Council had proposed that a joint mission of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Trusteeship Council should be sent to the Territories of Nauru and New Guinea.² This proposal had been overruled and he had abstained on resolution 2148 (XXXIV). For the same reason he could not support paragraph 3 of draft resolution T/L.1135. If the paragraphs were voted on separately, he would be able to support paragraphs 1 and 2 but would abstain on paragraph 3.
- 9. The Council adopted the draft resolution while at the same time taking note of the statement made by the representative of the USSR. The text of the resolution appears in annex II below.

Composition of the Trusteeship Council

10. At the 1323rd meeting, on 22 November 1967, the President recalled her statement to the Council at its 1322nd meeting, on 30 June 1967, regarding the future composition of the Council in the light of Article 86 of the United Nations Charter when Nauru achieved independence. Now that the Council had adopted a resolution recommending termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru, she thought it was appropriate to request the Secretary-General to submit,

¹ See Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirteenth Special Session, 1323rd meeting.

² Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, 1321st meeting, para. 3.

at his earliest convenience, a legal study on the future composition of the Council. On the proposal of the representative of Australia, the Council requested that the document be made available to members before the next meeting.

- 11. Accordingly, at the 1324th meeting, on 23 November 1967, the Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories drew attention to a note by the Secretary-General containing the study on the composition of the Trusteeship Council (T/1674). The text of this note appears in annex III to the present report.
- 12. At the same meeting, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that he had more than once in the past, both in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly, set forth his delegation's views concerning the Council's activities. His appraisal of those activities had been based on the role played in the over-all decolonization efforts of the United Nations by the Trusteeship Council—a body which, under the United Nations Charter, was called upon to promote the political, economic and social advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories and their development towards self-government or independence. The facts showed that, owing to the domination of the Trusteeship Council by the colonial Powers and those who supported their position, the Council had on a number of occasions proved incapable of taking swift, decisive action to eliminate colonial rule in the Trust Territories, as required by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Council had consistently disregarded the numerous decisions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples designed to secure the immediate implementation of the Declaration.
- 13. He vigorously condemned that policy. It was in the light of those circumstances that he approached the question of the composition of the Trusteeship Council, which had arisen by virtue of the fact that New Zealand would cease to be a member of the Council on 31 January 1968, when Nauru became independent. In his opinion the reference, in paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's note (T/1674), to the possibility of amending the Charter had not been made in response to any need and was not based on the provisions of the Charter. It was quite obvious that the provision in Article 86 of the Charter, calling for parity in the Council between those Powers which administered Territories and those which did not, was intended to prevent the first group of Powers from outnumbering the second. At the present time, as the Council was aware, a situation had arisen in which the number of Powers that did not administer Territories was greater than the number of those that did. Consequently, it was not possible now to apply in an artificial manner the provisions of Article 86, paragraph 1 c, of the Charter. That was because a number of colonial countries had won independence. Accordingly, it would not be contrary to the requirements of the Charter if the Trusteeship Council was curtailed in its composition, i.e., if New Zealand was not a member. At the same time, Liberia, which had been elected to the Council in accordance with Article 86 of the Charter, must of course remain a member of the Council until its term expired.

- 14. His delegation also felt that the question of the future composition of the Trusteeship Council was not in any sense a matter of immediate interest and, in any event, was not one that could require amendments to the Charter. The problems involved in eliminating the remnants of colonialism and fulfilling the requirements of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples could and must be solved by the Special Committee and the General Assembly.
- 15. The Council then decided, without objection, to take note of the Secretary-General's note together with the observations made by the representative of the USSR.

PETITION CONCERNING THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU

16. At the 1324th meeting, on 23 November 1967, the President informed the Council that she had just received a petition from Nauru. In view of the fact that the Council had already adopted resolution 2149 (S-XIII) concerning the future of Nauru, it decided, without objection, to circulate the petition (T/PET.9/L.2 and Add.1) and the observations of the Administering Authority thereon (T/1675) and subsequently to forward them to the General Assembly. The texts of the petition and of the comments of the Administering Authority appear in annex IV to the present report.

Annexes

ANNEX I

Trusteeship Council resolution 2149 (S-XIII)

THE FUTURE OF NAURU

[For the text of resolution 2149 (S-XIII), see Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1.]

ANNEX II

Trusteeship Council resolution 2150 (S-XIII)

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA, 1968

[For the text of resolution 2150 (S-XIII), see Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1.]

ANNEX III

Note by the Secretary-General on the composition of the Trusteeship Council*

- (Submitted in accordance with the decision taken by the Trusteeship Council at its 1323rd meeting on 22 November 1967)
- 1. In the light of a letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations (A/6903) advising the Secretary-General of the Administering Authorities' intention to seek the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru on 31 January 1968, the Secretary-General wishes to draw attention to the future composition of the Trusteeship Council.
- 2. The Trust Territory of Nauru is at present administered by Australia on behalf of itself, New Zealand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Under the

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol T/1674.

provisions of Article 86 of the United Nations Charter, with Nauru's gaining of independence, New Zealand will no longer be a member of the Trusteeship Council since it will not have any other Trust Territories under its administration. The United Kingdom will change its status from that of an administering member (under sub-paragraph 1 a of Article 86) to that of a non-administering member (under sub-paragraph 1 b of Article 86). Australia will remain on the Council (under sub-paragraph 1 a of Article 86) as a member administering the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and Liberia, elected for a three-year term (under sub-paragraph 1 c of Article 86), will in accordance with past practice continue as a member until 31 December 1968.

3. The composition of the Council on 1 February 1968 will be as follows:

Administering members
Australia
United States of America

Non-administering members

Republic of China
France
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Liberia

Automatically under subparagraph 1 a of Article 86

Automatically under subparagraph 1 b of Article 86

Elected under sub-paragraph 1 c of Article 86

- 4. It will be noted that the number of Administering Authorities will be reduced from four to two, while the number of non-administering Member States which will remain permanently as members of the Trusteeship Council will be increased from three to four.
- 5. Members of the Council may wish to take into account the following considerations:
- (a) Article 7 of the Charter establishes the Trusteeship Council as a principal organ of the United Nations. By virtue of Article 85, paragraph 2, it functions under the authority of the General Assembly in assisting the latter in the discharge of its responsibilities for Trust Territories. Pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter, the Trusteeship Council, under the authority of the General Assembly, is vested with certain specific functions, including consideration of reports submitted by the Administering Authority, acceptance and examination of petitions, and provision for periodic visits to Trust Territories. In terms of the Trusteeship Agreements, the Administering Authority undertakes to co-operate with the Trusteeship Council in the discharge of these functions, this undertaking not expressly extending to any other organ to which the General Assembly might entrust similar functions.
- (b) Continuance of a permanent majority of non-administering members on the Council will render inoperative sub-paragraph 1 c of Article 86 as the condition it was designed to meet, namely an excess of administering over non-administering members in the Council, is unlikely to recur. The practical result will be that supervision of the administration of Trust Territories based on an equal balance on the Council between administering and non-administering members will disappear and will be replaced by supervision effected under a permanent majority of non-administering members.
- (c) It is to be noted that the Charter provided for parity between administering and non-administering members only at the Trusteeship Council stage and did not seek to apply the concept either in the Fourth Committee or in the General Assembly, under whose authority the Council operates. The purpose of sub-paragraph 1 c of Article 86, was to provide a composition of the Council which would permit adequate outside supervision by non-administering members of the conduct of the administering members in order to ensure the paramountcy of the interests and well-being of the inhabitants of Trust Territories. These vital objectives may be equally well achieved with administering members forming a permanent minority in the Council, as it would not seem that a lack of parity in the form of a permanent majority of non-administering members of the Council could prejudice the interests of the Territories as reflected in the provisions of the Charter,

Should the administering members consider that their loss of parity would be prejudicial to their interests, it would be open to them to raise the matter for consideration through appropriate procedures.

- (d) In any event, it will be recalled that the Trusteeship Council has functioned with a majority of non-administering members over administering members on several occasions. For example, during the twenty-sixth session of the Trusteeship Council from 14 April to 30 June 1960, the Council functioned with a majority of eight non-administering members to six administering members. During the eleventh special session of the Trusteeship Council, which met on 10 April 1961, and the twenty-seventh regular session, which met from 1 June to 19 July 1961, the Council functioned with a majority of eight non-administering members to five administering members. During the second part of the twenty-ninth session of the Trusteeship Council, which met from 2 July to 20 July 1962, the Council functioned with a majority of five non-administering members to four administering members
- (e) No amendment of the Charter could restore parity between administering and non-administering members while retaining all the permanent members of the Security Council on the Trusteeship Council.
- 6. In view of the foregoing, it may be concluded that, on Nauru's obtaining independence on 31 January 1968, the membership of the Trusteeship Council (see paragraph 3 above) may continue until the normal expiration of the three-year term of the member previously elected under sub-paragraph 1 c of Article 86 on 31 December 1968, and that thereafter the Council be composed of members automatically appointed under sub-paragraphs 1 a and b of Article 86 until all Trusteeship Agreements have been terminated or, in the case of an amendment to the Charter, until the amendment comes into force.

ANNEX IV

Petition concerning the Trust Territory of Nauru and observations of the Administering Authority

A. Petition from Mr. I. V. Eoaeo, Member of the Legislative Council of Nauru, concerning the Trust Territory of Nauru*

The President,
Trusteeship Council,
United Nations Organization,
New York
(through the Administering Authority)^a
Dear Madam President,

On behalf of certain citizens of the Trust Territory of Nauru, I humbly beg that the Trusteeship Council withhold its resolution of granting full independence for Nauru by 31 January 1968.

I have taken this action with great reluctance because of the tremendous amount of work and difficulty this matter has incurred but I feel compelled to express the majority view of the Island's population with regard to independence.

It is a great pleasure to extend to you and the Council our sincere gratitude for the work and assistance you have exerted in the deliberation of Nauru's problems.

It is our earnest desire to make it clear that this request is not against the principle or idea of independence. We have agreed to a discussion of the matter by our Nauruan mission but not to the decision of the independence date envisaged by both the Nauru delegation and the Trusteeship Council.

In view of the time-table (see attached copy) proposed by the Administering Authority and the Nauru delegation, it is always contended that by attainment of independence by 31 January 1968, it would be possible to follow generally the objective aim of the United Nations Charter with ultimate success.

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol T/PET.9/L.2 and Add.1.

^a The text of this petition was transmitted under covering letters dated 23 and 28 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Australia.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support this belief and there are important reasons why it is unlikely. The political and economic unsettlement under independence of Western Samoa and some African States furnish glaring examples.

With all due respect, I humbly submit that the basic objection of the people toward independence by 31 January 1968 is three-fold. Firstly, it is felt that birth of Nauru independence without relationship with the Australian Government is too hazardous and undesirable. Secondly, it is noted with distress that the period between the first meeting of the Constitutional Convention and proposed independence date is most inadequate for the people to make a through and careful study of the Constitution. Lastly, it is to be regretted that Nauru was denied the opportunity of plebiscite as wisely decided by the Trusteeship Council before independence for Western Samoa had been attained.

In view of the foregoing facts, I trust that your Council will give serious consideration to the postponement of full and unqualified independence for Nauru.

Your assistance in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Humbly submitted,

Yours faithfully, (Signed) Victor Eoaeo, M.L.C.

Time-table

17 November 1967

Legislative Council meets and the constitutional bill is introduced

19 November 1967

Nauruan delegation departs from New York

By 24 November 1967

Administrator in Council to make regulations and appoint returning officer. Bulletin to be issued giving details of the elections and stating method of nominating

By 1 December 1967

Settling of draft parts of Constitution already prepared by the draftsman. Settling instruction for remaining parts of the Constitution

8 December 1967

Nominations close

By early December 1967

Nauruan delegation returns to Australia and Nauru. Working party settles remaining parts of the Constitution as drafted, so that the proposed Constitution is ready for presentation to the Convention. Settlement of outstanding matters relating to monetary arrangements, postal and telephonic services, phosphate, etc.

11 December 1967

Bulletin distributed listing candidates and their nominators, places for polling, etc. Arrangements for elections to be completed

14 December 1967

Charter aircraft to Nauru

16 December 1967

Elections held. Results of elections declared

4 January 1968

First meeting of the Constitutional Convention

By 12 January 1968

Convention approves of parts of Constitution relating to the Legislative Assembly and to the election of members of first Legislative Assembly, so that elections can proceed

12 January 1968

Nominations for election to the Legislative Assembly open

19 January 1968

Nominations close, final election arrangements made

27 January 1968

Elections held. Results of elections declared

31 January 1968

First meeting of the Legislative Assembly held. Legislative Assembly appoints Speaker, and then members of the Council of State are appointed. Council of State appoints Chairman

B. Letter dated 23 November 1967 from the representative of Australia to the President of the Trusteeship Council*

With reference to my letter of 23 November 1967, transmitting to you the text of a petition addressed to yourself from I. V. Eoaeo, Member of the Legislative Council of Nauru, the following are the comments of the Administering Authority:

- (a) The petitioner is the only member of the Nauru Legislative Council who has publicly questioned the proposals put to the Administering Authority by the Nauruan delegation that Nauru should become fully independent on 31 January 1968;
- (b) The last aspect of the proposals of the Nauruan delegation that was discussed was the fixing of a date for independence. Because of doubts whether administrative and other requirements could be met by that date the question was, at the request of the Administering Authority, referred to the Nauru Local Government Council which is a fully elected body consisting of nine Nauruans. The members of the Nauru Local Government Council are in fact the same persons as the elected members of the Legislative Council. The local Government Council endorsed the proposal of the Nauruan delegation for independence on 31 January 1968, with only one dissentient;
- (c) The bill to set up the Constitutional Convention was passed by the Nauru Legislative Council on 20 November. The petitioner, Mr. Eoaeo, spoke against the bill but without support from other elected members and the bill was passed without a division.

(Signed) Patrick Shaw Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations

ANNEX V

Records of the Trusteeship Council during its thirteenth special session

[See Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirteenth Special Session, 1323rd and 1324th meetings.]

DOCUMENT A/7009

Report of the Fourth Committee

[Original text: English] [17 December 1967]

Introduction

1. At its 1564th plenary meeting, on 23 September 1967, the General Assembly, by adopting the recom-

mendations of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda and to allocate to the Fourth Committee an item entitled "Report of the Trusteeship Council",

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol T/1675.

- 2. The Fourth Committee considered the item at its 1739th to 1741st, 1745th and 1750th meetings, between 6 and 14 December.
- 3. In its consideration of this item, the Committee noted that the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples concerning the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. XX) was related to this item.
- 4. At the 1739th meeting, on 6 December, the President of the Trusteeship Council introduced the report of the Council covering the period from 27 July 1966 to 30 June 1967 (A/6704) and the special report of the Council on its thirteenth special session, held on 22 and 23 November 1967 (A/6926).
- 5. The Committee had before it a letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/6903) and the reports of the Commonwealth of Australia on the administration of the Trust Territory of Nauru (A/6924) and of New Guinea (A/6925) for the period from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966.

I. TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU

- 6. The Committee considered the question of the Trust Territory of Nauru at its 1739th to 1741st meetings, on 6 and 7 December.
- 7. At the 1739th meeting, on 6 December, the representative of Australia introduced a draft resolution (A/C.4/L.879),³ the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

["The General Assembly]

- "1. Notes the formal announcement by the Administering Authority that, following the resumed talks between representatives of the Nauruan people and of the Administering Authority, it has been agreed that Nauru should accede to independence on 31 January 1968;
- "2. Welcomes the statement made in the Fourth Committee by the representatives of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the Administering Authority that the Administering Authority has agreed to meet the request of the representatives of the Nauruan people for full and unqualified independence;
- "3. Resolves accordingly, in agreement with the Administering Authority, that the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru approved by the General Assembly on 1 November 1947 shall cease to be in force upon the accession of Nauru to independence from 31 January 1968."
- 8. At the 1740th meeting, on the same day, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, on behalf of the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ghana, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, introduced amendments (A/C.4/
- ³ For the preamble, see paragraph 15, draft resolution I, below,

- L.881), by which the following paragraphs would be added as operative paragraphs 4 and 5:
 - "4. Calls upon all States to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the independent State of Nauru;
 - "5. Urges the organs of the United Nations concerned and the specialized agencies to render all possible assistance to the people of Nauru in their endeavour to build a new nation."
- Subsequently, Indonesia became a sponsor of the amendments (A/C.4/L.881/Add.1).
- 9. At the 1741st meeting, on 7 December, the representative of Syria introduced an oral amendment to the draft resolution by which, in operative paragraph 2, the words "has agreed to meet" were replaced by the words "has complied with". This oral amendment was accepted by Australia.
- 10. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the twenty-Power amendments (A/C.4/L.881 and Add.1) by a vote of 98 to none. The draft resolution (A/C.4/L.879), as amended (A/C.4/L.881 and Add.1), and as further orally revised, was adopted unanimously (see paragraph 15 below, draft resolution I).

II. PAPUA AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA

- 11. The Committee considered the question of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea at its 1745th and 1750th meetings, on 11 and 14 December.
- 12. At the 1745th meeting, on 11 December, the representative of Liberia introduced a draft resolution concerning Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (A/C.4/L.886).
- 13. At its 1750th meeting, on 14 December, the Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.886) by a roll-call vote of 64 to 8, with 19 abstentions (see paragraph 15 below, draft resolution II). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Botswana, Ceylon,⁴ China, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand.

⁴ The delegation of Ceylon subsequently stated in the General Assembly that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution (see 1641st plenary meeting, para. 43),

III. COMPOSITION OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

14. At its 1750th meeting, on 14 December, the Fourth Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it should take note of paragraphs 10 to 15 of the special report of the Trusteeship Council on its thirteenth special session (A/6926), concerning the composition of the Council.

Recommendation of the Fourth Committee

15. The Fourth Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolutions:

"Draft resolution I

"QUESTION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru approved by the General Assembly on 1 Nóvember 1947,

"Recalling its resolutions 2111 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and 2226 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,

"Mindful of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the special report of the Trusteeship Council on its thirteenth special session (A/6926),

- "1. Notes the formal announcement by the Administering Authority that, following the resumed talks between representatives of the Nauruan people and of the Administering Authority, it was agreed that Nauru should accede to independence on 31 January 1968 (A/6903);
- "2. Welcomes the statement made in the Fourth Committee by the representatives of the Governments

- of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the Administering Authority that the Administering Authority has complied with the request of the representatives of the Nauruan people for full and unqualified independence;
- "3. Resolves accordingly, in agreement with the the Administering Authority, that the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru approved by the General Assembly on 1 November 1947 shall cease to be in force upon the accession of Nauru to independence on 31 January 1968;
- "4. Calls upon all States to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the independent State of Nauru;
- "5. Urges the organs of the United Nations concerned and the specialized agencies to render all possible assistance to the people of Nauru in their endeavour to build a new nation.

"Draft resolution II

"Question of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further its resolutions 2112 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and 2227 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,

- "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Papua and New Guinea to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "2. Reaffirms its previous position as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2112 (XX) and 2227 (XXI);
- "3. Calls upon the administering Power to take the necessary measures to implement without delay the provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions."

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1641st plenary meeting, on 19 December 1967, the General Assembly adopted unanimously draft resolution I submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/7009, para. 15). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, resolution 2347 (XXII).

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 85 to 16, with 18 abstentions, adopted draft resolution II submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/7009, para. 15). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, resolution 2348 (XXII).

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee (A/7009, para. 14), took note of paragraphs 10 to 15 of the special report of the Trusteeship Council on its thirteenth special session (A/6926), regarding the composition of the Council.

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 13 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Document No.	Title or description	Observations and references
A/6700/Rev.1	Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples	Official Records of the Gon- eral Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23
A/6704	Report of the Trusteeship Council (27 July 1966-30 June 1967)	Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4
A/6924	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Commonwealth of Australia on the administration of the Trust Territory of Nauru for the period from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966	Mimeographed
A/6925	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Commonwealth of Australia on the administration of the Trust Territory of New Guinea for the period from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966	Ditto
A/C.4/L.879	Australia: draft resolution	See A/7009, para. 7
A/C.4/L.881 and Add.1	Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia: amendments to document A/C.4/L.879	Idem, paras. 8 and 10
A/C.4/L.886	Liberia: draft resolution	Adopted without change. See A/7009, para. 15, draft resolution II
A/C.4/L.892	Draft report of the Fourth Committee	Same text as A/7009
T/1669	Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the representative of Australia to the Secretary-General	Same text as A/6903
T/1670	Letter dated 10 November 1967 from the representative of Australia to the Secretary-General, requesting the convening of a special session of the Trusteeship Council	See Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thir- teenth Special Session
T/1674	Note by the Secretary-General on the composition of the Trusteeship Council	Same text as A/6926, an- nex III
T/1675	Letter dated 23 November 1967 from the representative of Australia to the President of the Trusteeship Council	Idem, annex IV, section B
T/L.1134	Liberia: draft resolution	Mimeographed. Adopted as amended at the Council's 1323rd meeting. See Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1, resolution 2149 (S-XIII)
T/L.1135	China and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution	Mimeographed. Adopted with- out change. See Official Records of the Trustceship Council, Thirteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1, resolution 2150 (S-XIII)
T/PET.9/L.2 and Add.1	Petition from Mr. I. V. Eoaeo, Member of the Legislative Council of Nauru, concerning the Trust Territory of Nauru	Same text as A/6926, annex IV, section A

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Official Records

Agenda item 14:* Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1620th plenary meeting, on 5 December 1967, the General Assembly adopted without objection the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Bulgaria and Indonesia (A/L.534). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, resolution 2284 (XXII).

*For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1619th and 1620th meetings.

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 14 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Document No.	Title or description	Obscrvations and references
A/6679**	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the General Assembly the annual report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference (1 July 1966-30 June 1967)	Mitteographed
A/6679/Add.1**	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the General Assembly the supplement to the annual report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference (1 July 1966-30 June 1967)	Ditto
A/L.534	Argentina, Bulgaria and Indonesia: draft resolution	Adopted without change. See Official Records of the Gen- eral Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Supplement No. 16, resolution 2284 (XXII)

^{**} The annual report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference (1 July 1966-30 June 1967) and the supplement to this report form the eleventh report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly.

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ANNEXES

Official Records

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 19: Election of the members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law*

CONTENTS Document No. Title Page A/6689 Note by the Secretary-General 1 Action taken by the General Assembly 1

DOCUMENT A/6689

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [10 August 1967]

- 1. Under General Assembly resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, the Assembly is required to elect the twenty-nine members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Section II of the resolution provides that in electing the members of the Commission, the Assembly shall observe the following distribution of seats:
 - (a) Seven from African States;
 - (b) Five from Asian States;
 - (c) Four from Eastern European States;
 - (d) Five from Latin American States;
 - (e) Eight from Western European and other States.

The Assembly shall also have due regard to the adequate representation of the principal economic and legal systems of the world, and of developed and developing countries. It is also provided in the resolution that the representatives of members on the Commission shall be appointed by Member States in so far as possible from among persons of eminence in the field of the law of international trade.

2. In the first election, to be held at the twenty-second session, the General Assembly is to choose all twenty-nine members for terms beginning on 1 Janu-

- ary 1968. The terms of fourteen members shall expire at the end of 1970; the other fifteen members shall be elected for a full six-year term or until the end of 1973. The President of the General Assembly shall select these members within each of the five groups of States referred to in paragraph 1 above, by drawing lots.
- 3. As indicated in paragraph 29 of the Sixth Committee's report on this item at the twenty-first session of the Assembly, the sponsors of the draft resolution agreed that the fourteen members with three-year terms would be selected from the different groups as follows:
 - (a) Four from African States;
 - (b) Two from Asian States;
 - (c) Two from Eastern European States;
 - (d) Two from Latin American States; and
 - (e) Four from Western European and other States.
- 4. In accordance with rule 94 of the rules of procedure, the election shall be held by secret ballot and there shall be no nominations.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1593rd meeting on 30 October 1967, in accordance with its resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, the General Assembly elected the twenty-nine members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.

The following States were elected:

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Czechoslovakia, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Spain, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1593rd meeting.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 88, document A/6594.

The General Assembly then selected by the drawing of lots the following fourteen countries to serve for three years: Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, Ghana, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United Republic of Tanzania.

The remaining countries will serve for six years.

United Nations

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Official Records



Agenda item 20

ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 20: Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission*

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1635th plenary meeting, on 16 December 1967, the General Assembly decided to reappoint, for the years 1968-1969, the following members: China, Czechoslovakia, France, Honduras, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay.

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 20 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Document No.

Title or description

Observations and references

A/6811

Note by the Secretary-General

Mimeographed

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1635th meeting.

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Official Records

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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Agenda item 21

ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 21:* United Nations Emergency Force:**

(a) Report on the Force;

(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force

CONTENTS

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(a) Report on the	Force	
A/6672 and Add.1	Report of the Secretary-General	1
(b) Cost estimates	for the maintenance of the Force	
A/6933	Revised cost estimates for 1967: report of the Secretary-General	22
A/6949	Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	25
A/6967	Report of the Fifth Committee	26
Action taken by the	General Assembly	26
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Abbreviations

ADL	Armistice demarcation line
DANOR	Danish-Norwegian
IF	International frontier
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
	in the Near East

(a) Report on the Force

DOCUMENTS A/6672 AND ADD.1

Report of the Secretary-General

DOCUMENT A/6672

[Original text: English] [12 July 1967]

Paragraphs

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	Financial aspects	

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Fifth Committee, 1222nd meeting; and ibid., Plenary Meetings, 1629th meeting.

^{**} Since 1961, this question has been discussed by the General Assembly at the following sessions: sixteenth session (agenda item 26), seventeenth session (agenda item 32), eighteenth session (agenda item 19), nineteenth session (Annex No. 6), twentieth session (agenda item 21), twenty-first session (agenda item 21).

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I. Introduction and observations

- 1. This report is the final one in the series of annual reports on UNEF which have been submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly since the Force came into being in November 1956. It thus marks the end of a pioneering effort, of the first peace force of the United Nations and, for this reason, it may claim a special significance. This final report is an opportune time to broaden and lengthen the comments and observations usually presented by the Secretary-General in the introductions and conclusions of the annual reports on UNEF, to express some general views on United Nations peace-keeping activities and to record some of the more important lessons to be learnt from the experience with UNEF.
- 2. Separate reports on the decision to withdraw the Force, and covering the details of its evacuation have been submitted previously. The experience acquired with the withdrawal of UNEF most certainly points up the desirability of having all conditions relating to the presence and the withdrawal of a peace-keeping operation clearly defined in advance of its entry onto the territory of a host country. In most instances, however, this is unlikely to prove to be practicable for the reason that the critical situation which demands the presence of the operation is likely to require that presence so urgently that time cannot be taken to negotiate agreements on detailed conditions in advance of the entry. Moreover, it remains an open question as to whether in the present stage of the development of international order, any host country would be inclined to accept formal limitations on its sovereignty with regard to the exercise of its consent for the presence of an international force. Its attitude in this regard is bound to be influenced by the knowledge that there can never be certainty about the action on a given matter such as the presence of a United Nations force, which the Security Council or the General Assembly might take at some future date, since the decisions of these political bodies are always subject to political considerations.
- 3. The Force came into existence in response to General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 which established the United Nations Command. It took actual shape as a force on 10 November of that year when its first advance party, consisting of forty-five Danish military personnel landed at Capodichino airport, Naples, the temporary United Nations staging area. Its initial deployment on Egyptian territory was on 15 November 1956, when Danish and Norwegian advance parties landed at Abu Suweir. Following the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic, on 18 May 1967, for the withdrawal of the Force, which was, in fact, preceded by movements of

United Arab Republic troops up to the line in Sinai for the first time in over a decade, UNEF ceased to be operational in Sinai including Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza Strip on 19 May 1967. The evacuation of the Force from the United Arab Republic and United Arab Republic-controlled territory, however, was completed only on 17 June 1967.

- 4. The Force was a highly successful peace-keeping operation, but it was costly enough by United Nations standards. In the period of its existence it suffered eighty-nine fatalities and many wounded and injured, a number of these occurring in the early period of the Force as a result of encounters with mines, often in poorly mapped mine fields. Its total cost to the United Nations over its ten and a half years of deployment was approximately \$213 million, which was, by normal military standards, quite inexpensive for a force of UNEF's size. Its peak strength was 6,073 in March 1957; it had been reduced to 3,378 at the time of its withdrawal. This was a small cost by comparison with the human and financial consequences of a resumption of war in the area. The finanical cost of the Force to the United Nations was, of course, considerably reduced by the absorption by the countries providing contingents of varying amounts of the expenses involved.
- 5. The sudden outbreak of war in the Near East, the severe crisis in the United Nations and the disastrous shattering of peace in the area which soon followed the withdrawal of UNEF need be mentioned only in passing in this report on UNEF's final period of service. What would probably happen whenever UNEF might be withdrawn had been pointed out by the Secretary-General in his reports on UNEF in preceding years. This likelihood was why, despite the increasing difficulties of financing the Force and his belief that no United Nations peace-keeping operation should become relatively permanent, the Secretary-General had never recommended the termination of UNEF or even its conversion into a large-scale observation operation. The risk implicit in any such action had always seemed to the Secretary-General to be much too great.
- 6. The recent tragic events in the Near East that followed UNEF's withdrawal, however-a withdrawal which in itself was a product of deep-seated and longcontinuing Arab-Israel hostility—do not obscure, but rather underscore, the achievements of UNEF as a unique peace-keeping venture. When, in March 1957, UNEF reached the IF in Sinai and the ADL in the Gaza Strip as the military forces of Israel withdrew across the line, it was deployed along what had been only four months before one of the most troubled borders anywhere in the world. With UNEF's deployment there, that line became and remained almost completely quiet. The terrorizing raids of the "fedayeen" across that line into Israel became a thing of the past. Infiltration across the line from either side was almost ended. Fields near the line on both sides, which for long had been left uncultivated because it was near suicidal to come into view in the open fields, were now

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, documents S/7896 and S/7906.

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 5, documents A/6730 and Add.1-3.

being worked right up to the line itself and on both sides of it. Costly irrigation systems were extensively installed. Heavy investments in new citrus orchards and in other cash crops were made. A new prosperity came to the area in UNEF's decade. Above all, because of UNEF's effective buffer role, there was security as there was no longer a military confrontation between the armed forces of Israel and the United Arab Republic, and clashes between those forces practically ceased.

- 7. In consequence, there was throughout Gaza and Sinai an unaccustomed quiet for more than ten years. This was due, very largely, if not entirely, to the presence of UNEF.
- 8. It is very much to the credit of UNEF, to the wisdom and tact of its successive commanders and officers, to the understanding, the fine demeanour and the discipline of its men that throughout the years of its deployment in Sinai and the Gaza Strip its relations with the local population and with the local authorities continued excellent until the last few days of its presence. This was of crucial importance because otherwise it would have been impossible for a United Nations peace-keeping operation to maintain itself and to function for very long. It is inconceivable that the personnel of such a United Nations operation could be maintained if hostile relations should develop between it and the local authorities and, particularly, between it and the local population.
- 9. The Force, in the sense of maintaining quiet and preventing incidents, was a most effective United Nations peace-keeping operation, although others have also enjoyed great success. Like the other peace forces -the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and the United Nations Operation in the Congo-UNEF was, however, an international force in only a limited sense. Its troops were provided as national contingents which retained their identity as such and were seldom broken up. The officers and men wore their national uniforms except for the distinctive United Nations headgear: the helmet, fieldcap or beret of United Nations blue, and the United Nations insignia. The personal arms they carried for self-defence only were those employed and provided by their national armed forces. Each contingent marched according to its own national custom and cadence. Each contingent had its national commanding officer who gave his orders in his national language. Each contingent had its own national dishes and dietary practices. The Force as a whole, however, was under a Commander who was an international staff member, being appointed by the Secretary-General and responsible only to him. But the Governments providing the contingents retained the right to withdraw their units at their pleasure. It is surprising, in retrospect, how seldom this authority has been exercised.
- 10. It is relevant to note some of the features which are peculiar to United Nations peace-keeping forces in general and to UNEF in particular, as compared with normal military operations. The essentially ad hoc nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations affects their nature and functioning from the very outset. In these operations none of the planning and preparation which are expected of normal military procedures can be counted upon. UNEF, for example, was called for in mid-emergency by a resolution of the General Assembly and had to be quickly established out of nothing, without the benefit even of its anticipation. The process of organizing, dispatching, concentrating and deploying

the Force, not to mention its logical support, had to be telescoped into a few days. Such a procedure inevitably gives rise to all sorts of problems—organizational, administrative, and military. It particularly causes some shock at first to well-trained military men and requires a considerable adjustment on their part to very unfamiliar ways.

- 11. The United Nations, unlike national Governments with military establishments, has no permanent logistical services or military establishment. The logistical basis of a peace-keeping operation is therefore an ad hoc emergency arrangement organized by the Field Operations Service with the assistance of Governments and various private concerns throughout the world. Furthermore, the budgetary scale of United Nations peace-keeping operations is always at the minimum level and does not allow for logistical establishments, communications, depots, etc., of the kind which normally support national armies at home or serving abroad. Under rigid budgetary limitations, therefore, and subject to constant pressure for new economies, the Field Operations Service has to provide logistical support for such operations as best it can.
- 12. The circumstances of the setting up of such an ad hoc emergency operation make it inevitable that the Commander, his staff, his contingent commanders and the national contingents meet each other for the first time in the area of operations and when already fully committed to their tasks.
- 13. The ad hoc nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations has other consequences. There can be no initial standardization of stores and equipment, which leads to serious problems of administration and maintenance later on. There are no standard operating procedures to begin with, but these are soon formulated. The standard of training and method of operation of contingents vary widely. The rotation of some contingents every six months also militates against continuity and whatever common standards may be hoped for. Although there is no difficulty in obtaining infantry units, adequately trained technical support elements are far less easily available.
- 14. While the Force Commander exercises operational command and control of the Force as a whole, the national contingents exercise responsibility over their men for such matters as discipline, punishment, awards and promotions. Although this never caused any serious problem in UNEF, the relationship of the Force Commander with the contingents under his command was in fact quite different from, and potentially far weaker than, the relationship of the commander of a national army with the units under his command. On the other hand, the pride of national contingents and their officers and men in being part of a United Nations Force offsets, to a very large extent, the weakness in the link of command between national and international responsibilities and produced a remarkable solidarity, esprit de corps and high standard of the United Nations working languages.
- 15. Despite the excellent morale of UNEF, difficulties of communication among personnel and contingents did give rise to some serious problems and misunderstandings, especially when senior military officers and staff could not communicate in one or other of the United Nations working language.
- 16. The UNEF military man was faced with a concept of soldiering which is entirely foreign to anything taught him in national service. The soldier is trained

basically to fight. In UNEF, however, he was ordered to avoid fighting in all circumstances, and, indeed, to seek to prevent it. Though armed, he could use force only in the last resort in self-defence. He had no enemy. Under provocation he had to show discipline and restraint; his tasks had to be carried through by persuasion, tact, example, calm and soldierly bearing, but, if humanly possible, never by force. It is an immensely encouraging fact that the soldiers of UNEF, almost without exception, were able for over ten years to live up to these unaccustomed and exacting standards and to carry out their duties with extraordinary success and with a minimum of friction.

- 17. There are a number of circumstances peculiar to United Nations peace-keeping forces which can, and sometimes do, create considerable problems for the Commander of a force and also for the Secretary-General. In particular, they constitute potential weaknesses in the authority of the Force Commander. For example, most contingents of the United Nations force maintain direct communications with their home countries. These are supposed to be used only for domestic and national administrative matters. When, however, as does happen, they are used for direct communication with the home Government on matters which are strictly within the authority of the Force Commander or at times even on political matters, misunderstandings and confusion are very likely to arise.
- 18. It may be inevitable that, for reasons usually quite unconnected with the peace-keeping force, some contingents of a force will come to be viewed with more favour than others by the host Government. This can also give rise to embarrassment and difficulty both in the relations among the contingents of the force and in the task of the Commander in maintaining its unity and morale and even in its proper use and deployment.
- 19. On the administrative side, too, there are certain potential or actual problems. The relationship of civilian and military authorities is sometimes strained even in national establishments. In UNEF and other peacekeeping operations the entire financial and logistical set-up has to be under the supervision of a civilian, normally the ranking Secretariat member who usually is the chief administrative officer, and of United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Secretary-General has the responsibility to ensure co-ordination, sound administration, economy and accounting to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. The disbursement of United Nations funds has to be kept under United Nations control. Inevitably this distribution of functions, administrative authority and responsibilities may lead to friction between the international Secretariat element and the Military Command and staff. In particular, the stringent economies which have to be practised in United Nations operations may be, and sometimes have been interpreted by the military as arbitrary and unjustified attitudes on the part of civilians which handicap the operation, while the civilians, in their turn, may feel that the military are showing little understanding for the particular administrative and other difficulties of the United Nations Operations. In only one United Nations operation, however, and in that only during one brief stage, has the misunderstanding between the military and civilian branches assumed an acute form. In that single instance, the relief of the Com-

mander sooner than had been planned proved to be the necessary and adequate remedy.

- 20. Another potential source of unpleasantness on the administrative side is the difference in the reimbursable allowances stipulated by Governments for their contingents. This difference in the money actually paid to individual soldiers by the United Nations, which is determined by the varying pay and allowance scales among the Governments contributing the contingents, is in some cases very striking and does not fail to have an adverse effect on the relations among the contingents of the force and on its morale. All efforts to gain an equitable scale of allowances common to all contingents have, however, so far been unsuccessful.
- 21. An operation such as UNEF is not an end in itself. It is, in fact, a practical adjunct to peace-making. It becomes necessary in a conflict situation, when fighting is stopped, because cease-fires, truces and armistices are seldom self-enforcing or self-policing. Some third presence is required at least to verify and report the breaches. The true function of a peace-keeping effort is to create a climate of quiet which is more congenial to efforts to solve the underlying problems that lead to conflict. It may achieve this better climate in a number of ways, such as averting military confrontations by acting as a buffer through patrolling and policing activities, and through providing an added assurance by its very presence. It is not an enforcement agent and can expect to exercise at best only a very limited degree of authority; an authority, moreover, which, unless explicitly defined in its mandate and the consequent agreements with the host country, automatically and instantly vanishes once it is challenged by the host Government.
- 22. It is only realistic to accept the fact that when a United Nations peace-keeping operation, whether it may be an observation mission or a peace force, is no longer welcome in a country and co-operation with it is withheld, it cannot hope to continue to perform any useful function, may well soon find itself defenceless and in grave danger, and thus had best be withdrawn as amicably as the prevailing circumstances will permit. If there should be serious doubt about the wisdom of this latter course, it would be advisable to abandon altogether the notion of a voluntary peace-keeping operation and turn to consideration of enforcementtype actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The two cannot be mixed. It should be added, however, that it is extremely doubtful that any of the peace-keeping operations thus far mounted by the United Nations would have been acceptable to the Governments of the countries in which they have been stationed if they had been originally envisaged in the context of Chapter VII of the Charter. There is no room at all for doubt about this as regards UNEF.
- 23. Some fundamental principles clearly applicable to any United Nations peace force have been forged in the long experience of UNEF. Such an operation is entirely voluntary: the full consent of the host country and any other parties directly concerned is the indispensible pre-condition for the stationing of the force. The contingents comprising the force are voluntarily provided by the Governments of Member States, subject to conditions of service and finance mutually agreed upon by the Governments and the United Nations. There must be a will on the part of the parties themselves for quiet in the area together with a recognition of the need for international assistance to this end, which is expressed in the extension of a reasonable

degree of co-operation to the operation in the performance of its functions. The force must be always exclusively under United Nations command and neither the force as a whole nor any of its components shall take instructions from the host Government, from any other party directly concerned, or from a Government providing a contingent. The force must have assurance, by means of a formal agreement, of the rights, privileges and immunities essential to its effective functioning, such as freedom of movement on land and in the air and exemption from customs duties for its equipment and supplies.

- 24. United Nations experience with such operations, and this was notably so in the case of UNEF, indicates that the success of a peace-keeping operation may, in itself, induce a false sense of security. The ability of the operation to re-establish and maintain quiet for an extended period may come to be mistaken for a solution of the basic problem. This can only increase the sense of shock when, ultimately and inexorably, it is demonstrated that problems of conflict may lie dormant even for long periods but they do not necessarily solve themselves by the passage of time, and the day may come when they will explode anew. Peace-keeping operations can serve their purpose properly only if they are accompanied by serious and persistent efforts to find solutions to the problems which demanded the peace-keeping in the first place.
- 25. It merits emphasis that United Nations peace-keeping operations function within the wider framework of the United Nations as a whole. Many of the frustrations, the cross-currents, the pressures and particularly the political stresses of the Organization inevitably have a major impact on the original setting-up of a peace-keeping operation and on its day-to-day functioning as well. The present limitations of the United Nations in a world still dominated by rigid concepts of national sovereignty, by power politics and by acute nationalistic sentiments are also the inherent limitations of United Nations peace-keeping operations.
- 26. The recognition of the existence of these limitations should not lead to a passive acceptance of a situation which needs to be remedied. The Secretary-General interprets the shock and dismay produced by the withdrawal of UNEF and the renewed fighting in the Middle East as an expression of how much reliance, especially on the part of those directly concerned, had come to be placed upon the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace in some

areas of the world. Clearly, an important lesson to be gained from this sobering experience is that the peace-keeping function of the United Nations should be strengthened so as better to serve the cause of world peace.

- 27. Before concluding these observations, the Secretary-General wishes once again to pay tribute to the Governments which have provided contingents for UNEF—those of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia, which provided contingents throughout the existence of the Force-and also those of Colombia, Finland and Indonesia which responded promptly to the initial requirement for troops for UNEF and whose contingents served in the early months of the Force. In taking part in such a novel operation, these Governments willingly accepted the risks and uncertainties as well as the varying financial burdens involved and showed in a most practical manner their support of a pioneering effort of the United Nations towards keeping the peace. The Secretary-General would also wish to express his admiration and gratitude to the many thousands of officers and men from these ten countries, without whose discipline, understanding and exemplary bearing UNEF's success would have been impossible. In addition, he wishes to express appreciation to those Governments which, throughout the years, gave the financial and other support to UNEF which allowed it to continue its most valuable function for a far longer period of time than was originally foreseen.
- 28. In order to complete the record of UNEF, details concerning the organization and functioning of the Force during the period from 1 August 1966 to 19 May 1967, as well as arrangements and developments relating to its withdrawal, are set forth in the following sections. That information follows the outline and form established for UNEF reports in previous years.

II. Composition of the Force in 1967, rotation policy and air support

29. Since 31 July 1966, the end of the period covered by the last annual report,³ the Force was further reduced by 581 men. The numerical strength on 19 May 1957 was 3,378. The composition of the Force as of that date was as follows:

³ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 21, document A/6406.

Country	Contingent	All ranks	Total
Brazil	Infantry battalion	423	
	Military police and Headquarters staff	10	433
Canada	Service units and Headquarters staff	702	
	Air transport unit	93	7 95
Denmark	Headquarters staff	3	3
India	Infantry battalion	923	
	Service troops, headquarters Indian contingent, and Headquarters staff	55	978
Norway	Hospital	60	60
Sweden	Infantry battalion	521	
	Military police and Headquarters staff	9	530
Yugoslavia	Reconnaissance battalion	562	
	Military police and Headquarters staff	17	57 9
	GRAND TOTAL		3,378

- 30. Late in 1965 a request was made to contingents whose tours of duty were less than a year to establish a rotation policy on a yearly basis. This resulted in some changes as follows:
- (a) Brazil: One-year tour of duty was continued and rotation of the entire contingent once a year was established as of March 1967.
- (b) Canada: Yearly rotation was continued in small groups throughout the year.
- (c) Denmark, Norway and Sweden: These countries were unable to change the length of the tours of duty of their contingents, which remained at six months, but they agreed to absorb the cost of one of the two annual rotations. Their troops were rotated by air in October 1966 and in April 1967. During the first rotation the Danish hospital unit was replaced by Norway, and during the second rotation the DANOR battalion was replaced by a Swedish battalion.
- (d) India: One-year tour of duty was continued, and the contingent was rotated by ship in October 1966.
- (e) Yugoslavia: It was also unable to alter previous arrangements of six-month tour of duty. Its troops were rotated by air in November and December 1966.

Air transport support

- 31. The air-transport unit was provided by Canada and comprised three twin-engine Caribou and two single-engine Otter aircraft. With the reduction of the Force it was possible to phase out the two Otter aircraft during January 1967, and only the three Caribou aircraft remained. These were utilized for the following purposes:
 - (a) Observation along the IF;
- (b) Logistics flights for the movement of personnel, stores, supplies and rations to UNEF outposts in the Sinai at El Kuntilla, Ras el Naqb, and Sharm-el-Sheikh;
- (c) Scheduled flights between El Arish and Cyprus for the rotation of Canadian troops;
- (d) Scheduled flights to and from Beirut for postal, logistical and personnel movements;
- (e) Special flights as directed by the Commander, including medical evacuation flights:
- (f) Welfare flights as required and when aircraft were available, the costs of which were met by the personnel using the flights;
- (g) Scheduled flights for UNRWA, the costs of which were fully met by the Agency.
- 32. Long-range air-support of UNEF continued to be provided by aircraft of the Brazilian, Canadian, Scandinavian and Yugoslav air forces. The Royal Canadian Air Force continued to provide the main long-range logistics carrier. In addition, Canadian personnel were rotated by Royal Canadian Air Force Yukon flights via Cyprus. The cost of such flights was shared with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. The use of aircraft was kept under continuous review, resulting in many improvements and economies.
- 33. Detailed information on the deployment of the Force until the morning of 19 May 1967 is given in annex I and shown on maps 1 and 1 A.

III. DEPLOYMENT AND DAILY ROUTINE

Operational role and patrolling

34. The system of patrolling and the manning of observation posts and observation towers remained basically the same since the reorganization was completed in early 1966. But taking into account prevailing conditions on the ADL and the IF and the reduced strength of UNEF, the system of observation and patrolling was modified, and the intensity and frequency of the patrols was reduced. The detailed pattern of observation and patrolling was as follows:

Armistice demarcation line

(a) By Daylight

Two mobile patrols at all times, each consisting of three men in four hourly shifts.

(b) By night

One foot patrol per company, each patrol consisting of four men in four hourly shifts.

International frontier

The IF was patrolled in daylight only except as noted below. Each patrol consisted of two vehicles and six men.

(a) Brazilian battalion

- (i) One patrol per platoon in the 500-metre zone at all times;
- (ii) One patrol in the 2- and 5-kilometre zones every forty-eight hours;
- (iii) Three night patrols from each platoon.

(b) Yugoslav reconnaissance battalion

- (i) One daily patrol from the camps El Amr, El Qusaima, El Kuntilla and Ras el Naqb carried out;
- (ii) One long-range patrol from each of these camps once every six weeks;
- (iii) Two fortnightly patrols in the 5-kilometre zones from El Qusaima;
- (iv) One fortnightly patrol in the 5-kilometre zone from Ras el Nagb;
- (v) Three night patrols per week from each camp.

IV. INCIDENTS

35. The number of ground, aid, and sea violations during the period under review showed a slight decrease. The activity of the Palestine Liberation Army had increased. Prior to 16 May there was no indication of a deterioration along the line or of any developments likely to lead to a serious worsening of the situation. The type and number of incidents observed by UNEF troops between 1 August 1966 and 19 May 1967 are indicated in annexes II-V.

V. Well-being

36. The general health of the Force was good. In addition to military patients, a number of civilians were admitted to the UNEF hospital for emergency treatment. The hospital also treated a large number of military and civilian personnel as outpatients. A small number of patients had to be sent outside the area for treatment.

- 37. The welfare programme embraced the following activities:
 - (a) Leave centre;
 - (b) Entertainment and film shows;
 - (c) Welfare tours;
 - (d) Sports and athletic competitions.

Entertainment was provided by the following groups:

Norwegian show: February 1967;

Danish show: March 1967; Canadian show: May 1967.

The Canadian group, which had given only a few performances, had to leave before completing its programme of shows owing to the early withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. The semi-annual sports programme was conducted with fifteen events. Two full seasons were completed since last June, and trophies and medals were presented to individual and team winners of all events. This programme created lively interest and a high spirit of competition among all troops and contingents. All equipment and supplies necessary for the sports programme were supplied by UNEF. Besides the welfare-sponsored sports programme, there were two self-supporting golf clubs, one in Rafah and one at Gaza airport, where tournaments were organized. A large number of UNEF personnel became members of these clubs.

- 38. The public information programme consisted of the publication and distribution of literature, display kits, and films concerning the United Nations and its related agencies, including United Nations films in the languages of the troops represented in UNEF. The UNEF paper, "The Sand Dune", continued to be published every month. An information circular containing timely news was also issued five days a week.
- 39. In order to familiarize members of the Force with its background, each of the national contingents made a presentation on its country. The United Arab Republic liaison staff also participated in this programme. The presentations were of a high standard and included the use of film strips and other visual aids, lectures, demonstrations and exhibits of items of national products. Denmark and Norway sent leading exponents of their folklore and music to participate.
- 40. Contingent commanders continued to be responsible for the maintenance of discipline within their respective units. Disciplinary cases of a serious nature, however, were dealt with in consultation with UNEF headquarters. The Commander was assisted in the maintenance of discipline and good order by a military provost company composed of specially trained military personnel provided by each of the participating countries.

VI. Logistics

Equipment

Vehicles and vehicle repair

- 41. Unit requirements of motor transport and heavy mobile equipment were very carefully reassessed on the basis of the established role and substantiated needs of each unit, and greater use of light type 4-by-2 vehicles instead of the expensive, heavy 4-by-4 types was introduced. This resulted in an over-all reduction of approximately fifty vehicles. Old and heavy vehicles which were uneconomical to maintain were discarded and disposed of.
- 42. Because of a lack of flow of maintenance parts for military type M-151 jeeps, which were used mainly

for patrolling along the ADL and the IF where the terrain was not negotiable by normal vehicles, the vehicles were replaced by comparatively cheaper non-military CJ-5 jeeps which proved to be a satisfactory substitute.

- 43. One hundred and fifty vehicles were procured in 1966, and 111 were provided for in the 1967 equipment procurement programme.
- 44. UNEF workshop responsibilities continued to be limited to field repair, and the "major assembly exchange" method continued in use. Scales of issue for parts for vehicle repair were reviewed to conform with this new policy.
- 45. The 1967 budget for vehicle parts reflected a decrease of nearly \$90,000, and this was mainly attributable to the procurement of new vehicles, such as 100 new CJ-5 jeeps and thirty-one Dodge pick-ups, and to the comparatively large reduction in the vehicle establishment. Contractual repairs remained at the lowest level of \$5,000.

Generators

- 46. Generators of 25 kVA capacity and below remained a major problem. In order to standardize to one available type of equipment, England Listers in 10-, 15- and 25-kW capacities were selected to replace the old, uneconomical generators of the Hampson type. However, in view of the total funds involved, the replacement programme had to be phased over a period of three years, commencing with an initial order of \$31,000 which had not materialized by 19 May 1967.
- 47. New engines and generator units for generating sets in the capacities of 50 kVA and over were procured in quantities sufficient to ensure trouble-free service of these sets, which were installed in large vital installations. The generator scale of issue was reviewed during the early part of 1967, and a reduced scale was adopted. The 1967 allotment for generator parts reflected a reduction of approximately \$20,000 from the 1966 expenditure. This was due mainly to the procurement of a comparatively large number of new sets in 1967. As a result a reduction of \$7,000 was reflected in the cost of contractual repairs.

Communications equipment

48. The poling of lines and standardization of switch-boards continued throughout the period under review. Provided for in the 1967 budget was one 45-50 Mc Motorola radio for UNEF mobile and emergency radio nets. Five ANGRC 9s were also to be procured to replace worn-out sets of the Yugoslav reconnaissance battalion.

Buildings and engineering equipment

- 49. An allotment of \$110,000 was made for the 1967 Engineer Works Programme as compared with \$150,000 in 1966, mainly for the upkeep of maintenance and facilities occupied by UNEF. The procedure for the maintenance of buildings, the repairs of refrigerators, bottle coolers and deep freezers, and the procurement of furniture was being revised to ensure efficiency and economy.
- 50. Continued budgetary limitations made it impossible to replace all the old, deteriorated special engineer equipment. The Engineer Company's ability to act in any emergency involving earth-moving therefore continued to be affected. The engineer establishment of permanent and casual employees was under constant

review. As a result, expenditure on labour during the period 1 January to 15 May was negligible as compared with that for the same period in 1966.

Fire prevention

51. Fire prevention measures continued, and adequate equipment was provided during 1966. However, the purchase of fire-fighting equipment had to be curtailed sharply in 1967 because of budgetary limitations. During the period under review there were only a few fire incidents, and these were of a minor nature.

Disposal of surplus stores and equipment

52. Disposal of all surplus stores and equipment continued to be affected in accordance with established policy.

Supplies

Water

53. No major problems were encountered in the supply of water to all camps, and the Sharm-el-Sheikh distillation plant continued to operate satisfactorily.

Rations

- 54. The 1967 appropriations reflected a decrease of approximately \$70,000 from the 1966 allotment. This was due mainly to reduction in the strength of the Force. Except for one consignment of coffee and a few other items, the quality of rations was generally satisfactory. All holdings in the Force of pack rations of 1962 vintage (approximately 44,000 rations) were consumed in 1966.
- 55. A committee was formed to review the ration scales of all nationalities. This was done to avoid frequent requests of different contingents for changes in ration scales or items. A report on the action taken by this committee was due by 30 September 1967.

Petrol, oil and lubricants

56. The 1967 allotment for petrol, oil and lubricants (excluding kerosene) reflected a reduction of approximately \$45,000 from the 1966 appropriations. This was due mainly to a reduction in the scale of vehicles and stricter control in the use of the above-mentioned products. As a result the average monthly consumption in 1967 was to be 50,000 gallons as opposed to 64,000 gallons in 1966.

Transport

Road

57. In addition to the routine transport service between Rafah, Port Said, and Cairo, road convoys continued to be operated between Rafah and Beirut to transport UNEF stores and equipment, as well as eggs. However, the Beirut convoys were required to be discontinued in April 1967. The source of supply of eggs was therefore changed from Beirut to Cairo, an arrangement which proved satisfactory.

Sea

58. Movement of personnel and freight continued to be carried out through Port Said, and no major problems were encountered in this respect.

Air

59. Movement of personnel and freight continued to be carried out by United Nations aircraft in accordance with normal routine. However, whenever leave parties or special airlifts had to be provided, civil aircraft were hired.

60. Repairs to the UNEF runways at El Arish which were done in 1965 were re-examined at the end of 1966, and the contractor was called upon to effect further repairs to the portions which were found unsatisfactory. The UNEF runway had to be closed again temporarily because of the appearance of surface cracks, but the airstrip was repaired satisfactorily at a cost of \$13,000.

VII. WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF

General

- 61. Developments leading to the withdrawal of UNEF have been reported in the special reports of the Secretary-General on UNEF (A/6730 and Add.1-3).
- 62. Subsequent to the withdrawal of all observation posts along the ADL and the IF, the Commander of UNEF ordered concentration of the contingents in preparation for their final withdrawal from the area. On 19 May 1967, the Yugoslav detachments at El Sabha and at Ras Nasrani were withdrawn to Camp El Qusaima and Camp Sharm-el-Sheikh, respectively; platoons of the Swedish battalion at Camps Kastellet, Dan and Goeta were withdrawn to their parent company camps. On 20 May, a platoon of the Swedish battalion at Camp Freja was withdrawn to its parent camp; platoons of the Indian battalion at Camps Agra, Bombay, Jaipur, Madras and Poona were withdrawn to their parent company camps; the Yugoslav battalion started withdrawal of its detachments from Camps El Amr, El Qusaima, El Kuntilla and Ras el Nagh; and the Brazilian battalion started withdrawing its detachments from Camps Fort Saunders, Fort Robinson, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Rio de Janeiro and completed these movements by the following day. On 21 May, the Indian battalion withdrew its platoons at Camps Varberg and Falkenberg to its parent camp. The detachment of the Yugoslav battalion at Sharmel-Sheikh was withdrawn on 23 May.
- 63. The deployment of UNEF on 24 May 1967 was as follows:

Swedish battalion: platoon, Asgard; company, Camp Beit Lahiya; company, Beit Hanun; battalion headquarters, Camp Hill 88.

Indian battalion (1 Sikh Light Infantry): company, Camp David's Field; company, Camp Calcutta; company, Camp Lucknow; company, Camp Chandigarh; battalion headquarters, Camp Delhi.

Brazilian battalion: company, Fort Worthington (within boundary of Camp Rafah); battalion less one company, main Brazilian Camp, Rafah.

Yugoslav battalion: main camp, El Arish.

UNEF Support Group and UNEF Hospital: Camp Rafah.

- Air Transport Unit: Marina Camp, El Arish.
- 64. Orders had been issued to units to return all UNEF stores to the depots at Camp Rafah, to pack their national stores and to prepare for an early departure from the area. All requisitions were reviewed, and those which had not been processed were cancelled,
- 65. The authorities of the United Arab Republic offered airlift and port facilities at Port Said for the departure of UNEF troops. Accordingly, under a senior headquarters UNEF officer a camp was established at Port Said. Adequate movement control staff, vehicles, supplies, vehicles for loading and unloading, and hotel

accommodation for transit personnel were provided. The United Arab Republic authorities also agreed to provide adequate rail rolling stock for the movement of troops and their baggage.

66. There were about 2,800 men and over 1,000 tons of contingent stores to be transported. Besides a large part of the Force's vehicle fleet, engineer and communication equipment, and several tons of specialized items were to be transported to the United Nations stockpile at Livorno near Pisa. Furthermore, since the only exit made available for the withdrawal of the Force was the airfield and port at Port Said, UNEF personnel and stores had first to be brought by train to this point. UNEF trains were permitted only during hours of darkness, and the capacity of the rolling stock was limited. All this entailed a largescale transportation problem. The United Nations has no transportation of its own for such needs, and therefore shipping and aircraft had to be obtained on commercial charter. Based on inquiries made from commercial organizations around the world and depending on the availability of transport, withdrawal of the troops from the area was planned as follows:

22 May: Canadian advance party, by air;

22-27 May: All dependants by air to Beirut pending finalization of their further travel;

3-4 June: Half of Yugoslav battalion by air in transport already contracted for routine rotation of half the battalion planned for this time;

5-7 June: Swedish battalion, by air;

19 June: Brazilian battalion, by sea; remainder Yugoslav battalion, by sea; Canadian main party, by air;

20 June: Norwegian hospital, by air;

21 June: Indian contingent, by sea;

30 June: Canadian remaining personnel, by air.

Withdrawal of the Canadian contingent

67. On the morning of 27 May 1967 the Secretary-General received the following communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic:

"I have the honour to bring to your attention a serious and grave situation resulting from the regrettable attitude of the Government of Canada, in connexion with the United Nations forces, to the withdrawal of which you have agreed upon the request of the United Arab Republic Government. From the beginning, the Canadian Government has persistently resorted to procrastination and delay in the departure of these forces. We noted from the outset that the Canadian Government took an unfriendly position towards my Government.

"Furthermore, the Government of Canada took certain military measures, concerning which we have received the definite information that some Canadian destroyers have already sailed towards the Mediterranean, an act which inflamed public opinion in my country to the extent that, I fear, the point of hatred against Canada has already been reached.

"In view of these serious acts and in the light of the present situation in the Middle East, and desirous to prevent any probable reaction from the people of the United Arab Republic against the Canadian forces in UNEF, which might reflect undesirably on the United Nations forces as a whole. I urge you to order the complete withdrawal and departure of the Canadian forces immediately, and not later than forty-eight hours from the time my cable reaches you.

"I hasten to inform you that our forces are ready to provide all the necessary facilities for the transportation of the Canadian forces, to the nearest possible place, namely Cyprus.

"(Signed) Mahmoud RIAD"

68. On the same day, after consultation with the Permanent Representative of Canada for the United Nations, the Secretary-General sent the following reply to Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your cable of 27 May 1967 in which you urge me to order the complete withdrawal and departure of the Canadian contingent in UNEF immediately and not later than forty-eight hours from the time of the receipt of your cable. As you know, the Commander of UNEF and United Nations Headquarters have been working on plans for the expeditious evacuation of UNEF, and these plans, of course, included the speedy withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. I deeply regret the circumstances which have led to the request for the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent as stated in your cable. To avoid any further aggravation of the situation, I have immediately instructed the Commander of UNEF to accelerate the evacuation of the Canadian contingent. I am sure you will understand that, while the Canadian Government and the Commander of UNEF will co-operate in implementing this evacuation as quickly as possible, it cannot be absolutely guaranteed that it will be fully completed within forty-eight hours of the receipt of your cable, although all concerned are agreed that the Canadian contingent shall be evacuated with the minimum delay possible. I note with appreciation your offer to provide transportation facilities if necessary to take the Canadian contingent to Cyprus. I do not believe, however, that Cyprus would be an appropriate destination for the Canadian contingent, and we are therefore arranging to evacuate it elsewhere. May I request you, Excellency, to take all possible measures to ensure that, for the very short period of time in which the Canadian contingent of UNEF remains on United Arab Republic territory, their status as members of UNEF will be fully respected and any unnecessary friction or unpleasantness avoided.

"(Signed) U THANT"

69. The Secretary-General, also on 27 May, addressed the following note to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the communication of 27 May 1967 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic urging that an order be issued for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Canadian contingent in UNEF. The Secretary-General in his cabled reply of the same date informed the Foreign Minister that the necessary instructions would be given.

"Reference is made to the statement in the message from the Foreign Minister to the effect that 'From the beginning the Canadian Government has persistently resorted to procrastination and delay in the departure of these Forces'. For the sake of clarification and accuracy it may be pointed out that, as indicated in the Secretary-General's reply, plans for the evacuation of the Canadian contingent were a part of the over-all plan and schedule for withdrawal of the Force formulated by the Commander of UNEF and United Nations Headquarters and that part of the schedule affecting Canadian troops had been accepted by the Canadian authorities and was being implemented without delay.

"However, in view of the warning in the communication from the Foreign Minister about a possible hostile reaction by the people of the United Arab Republic against the continued presence of Canadian troops in their territory, it was decided to abandon the original evacuation plan for the Canadian troops and to arrange for their immediate departture."

70. On 27 May, at 2145 hours local time, Brigadier Eiz-el-din Mokhtar of the Armed Forces Headquarters in Cairo handed the following letter to the UNEF Commander, Major-General Rikhye:

"Owing to the biased attitude of the Canadian Government towards Israel, the general feeling among the people and the Armed Forces has become mobilized against Canadian policy. Being concerned for the safety of the Canadian troops and for the reputation of the United Nations emergency forces, which have done their best in carrying out their task, we demand the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian troops from the United Arab Republic territory within 48 hours, and we are ready to give all facilities if required for their transport by air or any other means.

(Signed) Mohamed FAWZY
"General of the Army,
"Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the United Arab Republic"

71. On 27 May, the Secretary-General addressed the following message to the Prime Minister of Canada through the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and has the honour to request him to transmit the following message to the Prime Minister of Canada:

"'In view of circumstances which have developed in relation to the Canadian contingent of UNEF, the possibility of accelerating the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent from the area was discussed with the Permanent Representative of Canada on 26 May 1967. On the morning of 27 May I received a message from Mr. Mahmond Riad, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, on this same subject, the substance of which has already been communicated to you by the Permanent Representative of Canada. In the light of these developments and after consultations with the Permanent Representative of Canada, I have now given instructions to the Commander of UNEF that the Canadian contingent of UNEF should be evacuated from United Arab Republic territory as quickly as possible, I therefore request the Government of Canada to undertake urgently the necessary transportation arrangements to carry out this evacuation. I have made it clear in my reply to the message of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic that, while all possible efforts will be made to evacuate the Canadian contingent as soon as possible, it cannot be absolutely guaranteed that the evacuation can be completed within forty-eight hours. I have also asked him to take all possible measures to ensure that, for the short period of time in which the Canadian contingent of UNEF remain on United Arab Republic territory, their status as members of UNEF will be fully respected and any unnecessary friction and unpleasantness avoided."

72. On 29 May the Secretary-General received the following reply from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations:

"The Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's message of 27 May 1967 to the Prime Minister requesting that the Government of Canada undertake urgently the necessary transportation arrangements to evacuate the Canadian contingent from United Arab Republic territory as quickly as possible. The Secretary-General explained that this request stemmed both from the discussions initiated by the Permanent Representative of Canada on 26 May concerning the possibility of accelerating withdrawal of the Canadian contingent and the request of the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic of 27 May, the substance of which was communicated to the Permanent Representative of Canada.

"The Permanent Representative has been instructed to say that the Canadian Government has acted on the Secretary-General's request to provide transportation for the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. The Canadian Government is ready to commence the withdrawal as soon as the Secretary-General has concluded the necessary arrangements with the Government of the United Arab Republic for withdrawal operations.

"The Permanent Representative of Canada is also instructed to record with the Secretary-General that the Canadian Government does not accept the reasons advanced by the United Arab Republic authorities in justification of the request that the Secretary-General order immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. The reasons advanced are without foundation in fact and are based on a regrettable misunderstanding by the United Arab Republic of Canadian policy. For example, timing of withdrawal of the Canadian contingent was part of the evacuation plans developed by the United Nations; as the Secretary-General has indicated in his note, the Canadian Government had already, on 26 May, questioned the timetable in these plans and had requested that the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent be expedited.

"While it is acknowledged that some of the considerations advanced by the United Arab Republic Government in support of their request for the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent are beyond the competence of the United Nations, the Canadian Government assumes that nothing which is or may have been said in the communications with the United Arab Republic authorities in this connexion could be construed as indicating that these reasons have been accepted by the Secretary-General."

73. The Secretary-General replied to the Canadian note of 29 May on the same day as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Permanent Representative's message of 29 May 1967 concerning the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent of UNEF. The Secretary-General notes with appreciation that the Canadian Government has acted upon his request to provide transportation for the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent.

"The Secretary-General wishes to emphasize what has been stated to the Permanent Representative orally by Dr. Bunche, that the sole basis for his decision to accelerate the evacuation of the Canadian contingent of UNEF was the fear expressed by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic of possible hostile reactions on the part of the population of his country to the continued presence of Canadian troops and the Secretary-General's unwillingness to expose the Canadian troops to this risk. The Permanent Representative of Canada has also already been informed of the position of the United Nations as conveyed to the authorities of the United Arab Republic concerning the over-all plan for the evacuation of UNEF, of which the evacuation of the Canadian contingent was a part. It has been pointed out to the authorities of the United Arab Republic that the part of the original United Nations plan affecting the Canadian contingent had been accepted by the Canadian authorities and was being implemented without delay, and that the present plan for the immediate evacuation of the Canadian contingent was decided upon only because of the warning from the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic mentioned above."

- 74. The authorities of the United Arab Republic agreed to the use of El Arish airfield for the evacuation of the Canadians. The Commander ordered immediate concentration of all Canadians in Camp Rafah. He also replaced the Canadian guards at El Arish airfield and Camp Marina, El Arish, with Yugoslav guards and the Canadian guard unit at Camp Rafah with two companies of infantry from the Brazilian battalion.
- 75. The Canadian contingent was evacuated by twenty-one Royal Canadian Air Force C-130 aircraft flights on 29 and 30 May. The Canadian Air Transport Unit (115 ATU), which continued to provide support to UNEF operations till the last hour, departed on 31 May from Gaza at 0645 local time for Beirut on their final UNEF flight, completing the Canadian contingent's evacuation from the area.
- 76. With the early withdrawal of the Canadian contingent, UNEF was left without its logistics and air support. In accordance with the withdrawal plans described above, it had been arranged that Canadian service troops would be amongst the last to leave the area. It was intended that the Canadian contingent would complete stock-taking and packing and would prepare UNEF stores, vehicles, and equipment for removal or disposal before their departure from the area. They would in turn transfer the depots in Camp Rafah to the Chief Administrative Officer of UNEF and a group of international staff and Field Service personnel who would then be responsible for the orderly disposal of United Nations equipment and matériel.

As all other contingents were also to withdraw in the next few days, the Chief Administrative Officer and his group assumed all responsibilities from the departing Canadian service troops. On an ad hoc basis personnel were found to take charge of the orduance and supply depots, medical stores, the transport company workshops, and engineering equipment and stores. In addition, personnel had to be found to continue to run camp installations such as the power house, water plant, fire brigade, petrol, oil and lubricant installations.

- 77. The departure of the Canadian contingent and the consequent unemployment of a large number of their local civilian staff resulted in the looting of billets, messes and barracks at Camp Rafah. This was firmly dealt with by Brazilian troops who brought the situation completely under control within two days. Furthermore, at UNEF's request, additional security outside the camp perimeter was provided by the authorities of the United Arab Republic. The departure of the Canadians had also caused an interruption in all work and duties in the camp, resulting in a serious hygiene and sanitary situation. This too was dealt with promptly.
- 78. There were substantial supplies of food and petrol, oil and lubricants which had to be kept under control and distributed to the troops. Receipt of UNEF stores being returned by departing contingents, and their security inside the camp, had to be organized.
- 79. The collection and planning for the disposal of UNEF property was well in hand before fighting broke out in the area. The Service Institute Warehouse was closed on 3 June, the bulk of its stocks already having been issued to troops before their departure.
- 80. With the withdrawal of the Canadian Air Transport Unit it was essential to have an alternative means of air transportation. In view of the restrictions placed by the authorities of the United Arab Republic on providing air clearances to El Arish airfield, a Misrair Antonov 24-B was obtained on charter. The aircraft was painted white, marked with "U.N." crests, and numbered UN-90. This aircraft, however, could make only three flights—on 2, 3, and 4 June—before the fighting broke out. The aircraft was at Cairo at that time and was not available to UNEF thereafter.

Outbreak of hostilities in the area

81. When hostilities broke out on 5 June, the detailed deployment of UNEF was as follows (see also map 2):

Swedish battalion: The battalion was concentrated at Camp Hill 88 in preparation for its departure by train for Port Said that night. An advance party with all the contingent's heavy baggage had left for Port Said by train on the evening of 4 June.

Indian battalion (1 Sikh Light Infantry): The battalion, less three companies and a reinforced platoon, was at Camp Delhi. A company each was at Camps David's Field (including a platoon at Gaza airfield), Chandigarh and Lucknow as adequate accommodation and administrative facilities were not sufficient at the main battalion camp. A reinforced platoon replaced the Swedish guards at UNEF headquarters and Camp Tre Kroner.

Brazilian battalion: The battalion, less two companies, was at the main camp at Rafah. The other two companies had replaced the Canadian guard unit after its withdrawal on 30 May to provide guard duties at UNEF Support Group Camp, Rafah.

Yugoslav battalion: Approximately half the battalion had already departed on 3-4 June for their home country. The remainder was at the main camp at El Arish.

- 82. When fighting broke out, the Commander ordered immediate concentration of the Indian battalion, less one company, at Camp Delhi. Just before the planned departure of the Swedish battalion, the Indian battalion had taken over guard duties from them in Gaza. The Indian company at David's Field had also assumed responsibilities for the security of Gaza airfield, which had added importance in the withdrawal plan of UNEF. This company was now cut off from its main battalion because of the fighting. Therefore, the Commander ordered the company at Camp David's Field and at Gaza airfield to withdraw to Camp Tre Kroner.
- 83. The Commander took the following security measures to protect the personnel and installations:
- (a) All UNEF movement was stopped except on an emergency basis with the authority of the commanding officers of units and senior headquarters staff.
- (b) UNEF military and international staff in Gaza were moved into Camp Tre Kroner by the afternoon of 5 June. A few villas in the immediate vicinity of the Commander's mess provided billets for female staff and key personnel to their maximum capacity. The headquarters mess and all other accommodations were closed down before sundown that day.
- (c) All camps were ordered to stock up food and supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants for fifteen days' use.
- (d) All camps and vehicles would prominently display the United Nations flag and markings so that they would be clearly visible from ground and air.
- (e) All camps would take necessary precautions against air and ground attack.
- (f) In the event any camps, vehicles or personnel were involved in actual fighting between the two parties, they would display large white flags and identify themselves. They would also attempt to establish contact with local commanders.
- (g) In the event of the breakdown of normal radio and telephone communications, commanding officers would use mobile Motorola sets.
- (h) All units were ordered to prepare for an emergency evacuation at one hour's notice as from 6 June.
- 84. Details of the events of 5 and 6 June have been reported in the statement of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the morning of 5 June at the 1347th meeting of the Council and in the supplemental information reported by him.⁴ After the end of fighting many UNEF personnel who had been missing returned. Some personnel were held by the Israel authorities but were returned by 7 June. A thorough search for the remaining missing personnel was conducted. It was not possible to account for all killed and wounded until the evening of 9 June.
- 85. Casualties suffered by UNEF contingents were as follows:

Brazil: one killed and one wounded.

India: fourteen killed and twenty wounded.

86. Early reports from UNEF were inevitably based on incomplete information. Details could be obtained

- and verified only after interrogation of the wounded and the missing personnel when they returned. It was also not until 9 June that contact was re-established with the international staff at Camp Rafah. The information given below is based on this more complete picture of the events affecting UNEF. When fighting began on 5 June, UNEF had been withdrawn from the line and was no longer operational. Therefore, it was in no position to report on what actually happened in the area. Its means of observation, investigation and verification were no longer available to it.
- 87. Fighting in the UNEF area of operations in the Gaza Strip broke out on the morning of 5 June. The first indication of hostilities in the area came at 0915 hours local time when an Israel Defence Forces jet aircraft was shot down by anti-aircraft fire near the Gaza beach. Fighting then continued in the Gaza Strip for two days.
- 88. Immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, the Commander addressed personal appeals to Israel and United Arab Republic military authorities to ensure the safety of UNEF personnel and installations. In his appeal to Major-General Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff, Israel Defence Forces, conveyed through Lieutenant-General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, he requested that safety of UNEF installations be ensured and that Israel forces refrain from firing into those areas. The Israel defence forces were fully acquainted with the detailed deployment of UNEF. General Rabin replied to the Commander's appeal in the affirmative but stated that he could not guarantee 100 per cent safety. In a similar appeal to General Abdul Mohsen Kamul Mortaga, Commander Eastern Front and Commander of Land Troops of the United Arab Republic, the Commander of UNEF requested that the United Arab Republic forces in the immediate vicinity of UNEF camps, building and installations be removed to prevent Israel counter-fire.
- 89. On the evening of 5 June, when the Commander of UNEF selected Camp Tre Kroner and the beaches nearby in Gaza as a safe area for the concentration and embarkation of UNEF personnel, at his request the authorities of the United Arab Republic removed their troops from the area, which later proved to be the only UNEF area in Gaza which escaped Israel fire.
- 90. The effect of the fighting on UNEF troops can best be described in relation to general areas where the troops were located during this period. These areas were:
 - (a) Gaza area, including Hill 88 and David's Field;
 - (b) Deir el Balah and Khan Yunis;
 - (c) Rafah;
 - (d) El Arish;
 - (e) Port Said.

Stationing of troops

Gaza

91. On 5 June, at 1200 hours local time, the area near the Swedish battalion at Hill 88 came under artillery fire. Sniping in the area continued up to 1600 hours, and at 1622 hours the area again came under artillery fire. At 1830 hours, the Swedish battalion was ordered to withdraw to Gaza from Hill 88. The move was completed by 2015 hours.

⁴ See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, documents S/7930 and Add.1. Information reported subsequently was incorporated into further addenda.

- 92. The company from the Indian battalion at David's Field Camp, which had a platoon at the Gaza airfield, was withdrawn to Gaza at 1300 hours.
- 93. At 2235 hours, Gaza town came under intermittent shelling, and the radio antenna on the UNEF headquarters building was damaged, thereby disrupting communications until 2330 hours when the antenna was repaired under fire by Field Service technicians. Shelling of Gaza town was resumed on the morning of 6 June, at 0430 hours, and continued throughout the day. UNEF headquarters building was continuously under artillery fire from 0900 to 1430 hours during which period three Indian soldiers were killed and two wounded while on duty at headquarters. There was extensive damage to the buildings, offices and vehicles. At about 1130 hours, UNEF headquarters received direct hits, and all its radio links were broken. It became necessary to evacuate the remaining personnel under fire and to re-establish the headquarters at Camp Tre Kroner. During the afternoon small arms fire was heard around Gaza town, but by 1730 hours the situation was stabilized after Gaza had been occupied by the Israel forces. A small Indian guard had been left behind for security of the offices at UNEF headquarters. This unit was disarmed by the Israel soldiers. Later, on the Commander's personal intervention, the weapons were returned to the Indian

Deir el Balah and Khan Yunis

- 94. On 5 June, at 0920 hours, UNEF vehicles came under air strafing, small arms and tank fire on the road between Deir el Balah and Rafah. At about this time a supply convoy of the Indian battalion, while returning from Rafah, was fired upon by Israel aircraft, tanks and machine-guns, resulting in the death of five Indian soldiers. One Indian group (one officer and two other ranks) and one Swedish group (one officer and two other ranks), who were also in the area of Khan Yunis at this time, came under fire from both sides. The groups took cover during the fighting until they were escorted back to the Indian battalion headquarters at Camp Delhi on 7 June by Israel military personnel. The Israel military personnel also brought back one Brazilian soldier along with the two groups.
- 95. On 5 June, at 0930 hours, the Indian battalion companies located at Camps Chandigarh and Lucknow were ordered to withdraw to Deir el Balah. At this time troops of the United Arab Republic had moved away from their positions in the area, and when the Israel attack came, the Israel tanks directly confronted the Indian soldiers who had taken cover in trenches to protect themselves from the firing from both sides.
- 96. At 1525 hours, mortars of the United Arab Republic started firing from a location close to the Indian battalion's Camp Delhi. This drew Israel counter-mortar fire, and as a result the Indian battalion suffered three killed and fourteen wounded.
- 97. Because of the deteriorating conditions and in order to prevent further casualties to the Indian troops at Camp Delhi, the Commander of UNEF ordered the Indian battalion to withdraw to a safe area on the beach. This withdrawal unfortunately could not take place owing to the continuous heavy shelling and mortaring of the area.
- 98. On 6 June, at 0900 hours, an Indian officer evacuating two seriously wounded soldiers in a vehicle to the hospital in Gaza ran over a mine on the Deir el

Balah-Gaza road, resulting in the deaths of all three. Rafah

- 99. On 5 June, at 1130 hours, artillery fire was heard two to three kilometres from Rafah Camp. At 1135 hours Israel Defence Forces aircraft were bombing areas close to the camp, and from 1205 to 1600 hours there was an exchange of small arms fire outside the camp. One Brazilian soldier was killed by machine-gun fire in the Brazilian main camp at Rafah during this period. At 1610 hours the camp came under artillery fire. Between 1610 and 1810 hours large concentrations of troops and the landing of helicopters were observed near the camp. At 1810 hours the camp came under artillery and tank fire, and by 1900 hours Israel Defence Forces tanks were inside the camp firing on the local UNEF civilian employees. By 2000 hours fighting in the area had stopped.
- 100. The Israel forces, on arrival in Camp Rafah, separated the United Nations international and military personnel from the United Nations local civilian staff. An Israel officer ordered the United Nations international and military staff, who had identified themselves as such, to lie on the ground where they remained until the morning of 6 June. Only the personnel of the Norwegian hospital unit and the patients there were unmolested. The commanding officer of the Norwegian hospital unit succeeded in providing blankets to the UNEF group who were forced to spend the night on the sand in the open without food or water. On 6 June, at about 0900 hours, the Israel officer in charge allowed this group to return to its normal quarters.

El Arish

- 101. On 5 June, at 1540, anti-aircraft firing on Israel Defence Forces aircraft started near the Yugoslav camp. At about 1720 hours the area of the Yugoslav battalion was strafed by Israel Defence Forces aircraft, and thereafter small arms fire was heard around the camp up to 1930 hours. At 2030 hours a few shells were fired inside the camp by tanks moving on the road outside, resulting in the blowing up of two water tanks.
- 102. In order to ensure their safety, the Commander suggested that the Yugoslav battalion withdraw to the beach and bivouac there. However, the Yugoslav battalion encountered certain practical difficulties, and after re-examination of the situation, it was agreed that the battalion should remain in its main camp. Thereafter the situation in the camp was quiet and no incidents were reported during the night.

Port Said

- 103. UNEF personnel at Port Said reported that the town was under an air raid during the morning of 5 June. Thereafter, for several hours there were no communications with Port Said until later in the afternoon when the UNEF office reported that the advance party of the Swedish battalion, which had left Gaza by train on the night of 4 June, had reached Qantara East. The United Arab Republic authorities had stopped the train there; however, arrangements had been made to move the Swedish personnel and their baggage by train to Port Said. This move was completed that evening.
- 104. On 6 June, instructions were received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic to close down the UNEF radio at Port Said.

Contact was maintained, however, through the UNEF liaison office at Cairo. All UNEF personnel, less Swedish contingent stores and two Field Service staff in charge of UNEF stores, were evacuated by sea to Cyprus where they rejoined their national contingents and ultimately returned to their home countries.

Evacuation

105. Immediately after fighting broke out in the area, the Secretary-General received a most urgent request from the Commander of UNEF to arrange for the immediate evacuation of the Force by ship from the Gaza beaches. Immediate action was taken by the Field Operations Service to find shipping in the area for the immediate evacuation of UNEF from Gaza. A Swedish ship was made available to proceed to Gaza on 6 June. This was followed subsequently by three more ships under the flags of Greece or Yugoslavia and a Brazilian Navy ship which was already on its way to transport the Brazilian contingent.

106. During the afternoon of 5 June the United Arab Republic liaison staff had agreed to assist with the embarkation of UNEF at Gaza port. Since there were no docking facilities, motor launches, lighters and fishing boats were to be made available for embarkation. The occupation of Gaza by Israel forces, however, made new arrangements necessary.

107. On 6 June, at 1945 hours, an Israel liaison officer arrived at Camp Tre Kroner and invited the Commander of UNEF to meet the Commander of the Israel forces at his command post in Gaza. At this meeting the UNEF Commander requested (a) permission to reinforce the guard at UNEF headquarters to protect UNEF property and documents: (b) that assistance be provided to him and his staff to return to UNEF headquarters on 7 June; (c) that assistance be given to run a convoy to Camp Rafah to bring food and to contact UNEF personnel there and the Indian and Brazilian battalions situated along the road; and (d) that information be provided, if available, about the missing Indian personnel.

108. The Commander of the Israel forces gave assurances of his co-operation, agreed to the requests in (a) and (b) above, and offered armed escorts as isolated pockets of resistance and snipers remained in the city of Gaza. He also promised to obtain any information available concerning the missing Indian personnel. He was not able at that time, however, to assist UNEF in collecting food from Rafah or in establishing contact with its units elsewhere in the Gaza Strip.

109. On 7 June, the Commander of UNEF with his senior staff returned to UNEF headquarters and was able to retrieve all his and some other official documents. The radio was found only slightly damaged, although there was extensive damage to spare parts and to the vehicles in the car park. All important documents and equipment were removed to Camp Tre Kroner thereafter. As repairs to the communications equipment were not practicable, it was decided to retain Camp Tre Kroner as the location of UNEF headquarters.

110. Later on the morning of 7 June the Commander of UNEF had a meeting with Colonel Itzhak Shany who had been appointed liaison officer to UNEF by the Israel Defence Forces. The Commander was informed that the United Arab Republic Governor-General of the Gaza Strip had signed a surrender

document about 17.00 hours on 6 June. He was also informed that Israel forces had not completed clearing the remaining snipers, especially in the northern part of Gaza. Israel authorities believed that there was a large number of small arms in the area. In view of this it would not be possible to authorize the use of Gaza port facilities in time to permit UNEF evacuation from there. Therefore, the Israel authorities had arranged for the Swedish ship to proceed to Ashdod, a newly developed port for cargo ships north of Gaza in Israel. The Israel authorities offered transportation and other assistance for the movement of UNEF troops.

111. The Commander of UNEF was also informed that there were remaining pockets of resistance in the Khan Yunis area. The Israel authorities would, however, permit the use of a bypass through Israel territory to Camp Rafah. The Commander requested assistance to restore the water supply which had been put out during the fighting in the town. The Israel authorities already had measures in hand and expected to restore the water and electric supply in a few days.

112. During the remainder of 7 June, scattered firing was heard in Gaza, and there were reports of Israel activity against isolated pockets of resistance from Deir el Balah and Khan Yunis. At about 1900 hours, the Commander was invited to meet Israel's Minister of Defence, Major-General Moshe Dayan, at the residence of the former United Arab Republic Governor-General of the Gaza Strip. The Chairman of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and the Director of UNRWA in Gaza were also present. The Commander requested the Defence Minister's assistance in the early evacuation of UNEF from Gaza. After discussions with Israel officers, the Minister stated that as it was not practicable to use Gaza, facilities at Ashdod would be made available. At the Commander's request the Minister offered every facility for the speedy evacuation of UNEF from the area.

113. On 9 June, the Israel authorities permitted the Chief Administrative Officer of UNEF to visit Camp Rafah. The same day contact was established with all the contingents in the Force. On 10 June, the Commander carried out a personal inspection of units in the Force. As indicated above, the Indian battalion at Camp Delhi had suffered a number of casualties. The Commander found, however, that the damage to UNEF and Indian national stores was slight. The Commander also decided to evacuate immediately the Indian wounded, who had by then been collected at the Indian Medical Inspection Room, for proper hospitalization by the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. Twelve stretcher and four sitting cases, accompanied by the senior Indian medical officer and nursing assistants, were evacuated by special charter aircraft from Lod Airport for Nicosia on the afternoon of 11 June.

114. While it was preferable for UNEF to embark from Gaza, there were a number of factors militating against it. The Israel Army had yet to clear the northern part of the town, including the embarkation area. It was known that a number of Arab armed personnel, after discarding their uniforms but still retaining their weapons, had disappeared among the local population in the area, including the large refugee camp in the vicinity. All the motor boats and lighters had disappeared, and the fishermen remained in their homes and were inaccessible. The Israel authorities, who had first thought that it might take two or three days to

clear this area, stated their inability to do so for about seven to ten days.

115. Meanwhile the situation of UNEF personnel had become most difficult. As already stated, Gaza was without water and electricity. UNEF had been unable to procure any food, and there were only two days' supplies left. Some twenty serious medical cases, including wounded, needed immediate hospitalization. Because of lack of water, sanitation in Camp Tre Kroner had already reached a dangerous stage. It had thus become essential to commence the evacuation of personnel from any point from which embarkation could be effected. Accordingly instructions were issued to ships under charter to proceed to Ashdod, and the Commander was authorized to embark his troops from there if the situation, in his view, demanded it. Israel authorities provided civilian buses for the transportation of UNEF personnel, while the Force made its own arrangements on an ad hoc basis for the transportation of unit stores and heavy baggage. UNEF personnel carried their personal weapons and equipment with them and moved under UNEF arrangements with Israel guides only. The evacuation of the Force from Ashdod was completed on 17 June as reported in document A/6730/Add.2.

VIII. DISPOSAL OF UNEF PROPERTY

General

116. In a cable sent by the Secretary-General to the Commander of UNEF on 18 May 1967 instructions had been issued as follows:

"A small working team will be sent from Headquarters by the Secretary-General to assist in the arrangements for, and effectuation of, the withdrawal.

"The Commander shall take all necessary steps to protect United Nations installations, property and stores during the period of withdrawal.

"If necessary, a small detail of personnel of the Force or preferably of United Nations security officers will be maintained as long as necessary for the protection of United Nations properties pending their ultimate disposition." (A/6730/Add.3, annex, paras. 10-12.)

In accordance with the above instructions a senior representative from United Nations Headquarters was sent to Gaza. The arrangements under way for the disposal of UNEF property have been described above.

Looting of UNEF property

117. With the exception of small losses of Indian national stores caused by Israel fire in Camp Delhi, no other damage or loss of contingent property occurred. Contingents were able to remove all national stores. With the exception of some barrack furniture which was uneconomical to transport, all UNEF property was removed from UNEF camps before they were abandoned. The water distillation and power plants in Sharm-el-Sheikh could not, however, be removed owing to the technical problems involved. Two UNEF installations were occupied by Israel forces, namely, UNEF headquarters in Gaza and UNEF depots in Camp Rafah.

118. When the Commander and his party returned to UNEF headquarters on the evening of 6 June, documents and office equipment were untouched. Some items, including radios, tape recorders and clocks, belonging to UNEF and to individuals had, however,

been looted, presumably by the Israel forces who occupied the building. As it was no longer feasible to retain a UNEF guard at UNEF headquarters owing to the presence of a large number of Israel troops, many of whom were inside the headquarters compound, the Israel Army authorities were requested to assume security responsibilities there in order to prevent further looting. Thus, from the evening of 7 June the Israel forces in Gaza were responsible for the security of UNEF headquarters. A subsequent visit to the offices showed that most of the office furniture, typewriters, fans and other UNEF property had been removed by the Israel military personnel. In fact, UNEF representatives actually witnessed the removal of these items but were unable to secure any effective action by the responsible Israel authorities to prevent it. All of the United Nations vehicles in running condition had also been removed by Israel forces and were seen in use in the Gaza area.

119. When on 9 June representatives of UNEF paid their first visit to Camp Rafah the Israel forces were in occupation of the entire camp. UNEF representatives found that Israel forces had removed almost all UNEF vehicles in the park, barrack furniture, bedding and other portable property. Some pilfering by local civilians was also observed in the area. UNEF representatives called on local military authorities as well as the Israel military government of the Gaza Strip and protested the looting and removal of UNEF property. The Israel authorities gave every assurance that measures would be taken to prevent such looting and that orders would be issued for the return of all vehicles. A subsequent inspection of Camp Rafah indicated, however, that even more UNEF property had been removed since the initial appeal.

120. On 28 June, the Secretary-General addressed a note to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations in which he described the situation at Camp Rafah, protested against the looting and pilfering of UNEF property by soldiers of the armed forces of Israel and requested immediate remedial measures, including the return of vehicles and stores and the ensuring of the unrestricted access to Camp Rafah for United Nations representatives. The Secretary-General pointed out that it was the intention to turn over to UNRWA all of the food and medical stores of UNEF, other suitable stores and vehicles which were appropriate for UNRWA use.

121. Since the note of 28 June was written, further reports received by the Secretary-General indicated that continued pilfering, vandalism, organized removal of UNEF property by members of the armed forces and disorderly conditions within the camp, including incursions by parties of the local population, had combined to make the task of the United Nations representatives extremely difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, in a further note to the Permanent Representative Israel, the Secretary-General protested most strongly to the Government of Israel against the continuance of this situation and requested it most urgently to take the necessary measures to put a stop to looting, pilfering and the removal of UNEF property from Camp Rafah, so that the United Nations representatives in the area and the representatives of UNRWA could go about their task in an expeditious, orderly and effective manner.

122. On completion of the withdrawal of all military personnel of UNEF and after establishing a proper organization under United Nations international staff

for the disposal of UNEF property, the Commander left the area on 17 June. Remaining on duty are about thirty civilian personnel under the supervision of the representative of United Nations Headquarters and the Chief Administrative Office of UNEF. They have arranged for the transfer of some medical stores and some of the food still remaining in Camp Rafah to UNRWA. They are also arranging to transfer some vehicles and radio equipment to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization or to ship them to the United Nations office in Pisa. Instructions have been issued to this group to compile detailed information on UNEF property which has been looted for purposes of record and of claiming compensation.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

123. Pending the receipt of claims from Governments for reimbursement of their extra and extraordinary

costs in respect of pay and allowances for their contingents which served in UNEF during the first half of 1967 and their claims for reimbursements in connexion with losses or depreciation of contingent-owned equipment and the closing of other expenditure accounts, including repatriation costs, it is not possible to include in this report any reasonably precise estimate of the total costs for 1967 of the operation. On the basis of information now available it would nevertheless appear that the final expenditures and obligations for 1967 will not exceed the amount of \$14 million which the General Assembly in its resolution 2194 (XXI) appropriated for the operation of the Force for 1967.

124. The Secretary-General will, of course, report to the General Assembly on the financial aspects of the operation as soon as it is possible to establish the costs involved with the necessary precision.

ANNEXES ANNEX I

LOCATION OF CAMPS AND SUB-UNITS OF OPERATIONAL UNITS

Serial number	Name of camp	Grid reference	Sub-unit located
	Scandinavian	battalion	
1	Hill 88 (Scandinavian Main Camp)	1014 1015	Battalion headquarters, head- quarters company, and two platoons
2	Asgard	1029 1103	One platoon
3	Kastellet	1069 1076	One platoon
4	Beit Lahiya	1067 1067	Company headquarters and two platoons
5	Beit Hanun	1067 1050	Company headquarters and one platoon
6	Dan	1088 1049	One platoon
7	Freja	1055 1026	One platoon
8	Goeta Lejon	1037 1012	One platoon
	Indian ba	ttalion	
9	Delhi (Indian Main Camp)	0895 0912	Battalion headquarters, sup- port and administrative companies
10	David's Field	0999 0981	Company headquarters and one platoon
11	Falkenberg	0982 0969	One platoon
12	Varberg	0960 0952	One platoon
13	Jaipur	0954 0932	One platoon
14	Calcutta	0936 0926	Company headquarters and one platoon
15	Madras	0923 0907	One platoon
16	Poona	0917 0898	One platoon
17	Lucknow	0896 0878	Company headquarters and one platoon
18	Agra	0896 0875	One platoon
19	Chandigarh	0886 0856	Company headquarters and two platoons
20	Bombay	0897 0795	One platoon
	Brazilian b	attalion	
21	Brazil (Brazilian Main Camp)	0792 0763	Battalion headquarters and headquarters service com- pany
22	Rio de Janeiro	0876 0776	One platoon
23	Santa Catarina	0820 0730	Company headquarters and one platoon

ANNEX I (continued)

LOCATION OF CAMPS AND SUB-UNITS OF OPERATIONAL UNITS (continued)

Serial number	Name of camp	Grid referen ce	Sub-unit located
	Brasilian battalio	u (continued)	
24	Rio Grande do Sul	0803 0715	One platoon
25	Fort Worthington	0773 0731	One company and one platoon
26	Fort Robinson	0815 0640	Company headquarters and one platoon
2 7	Fort Saunders	0858 0417	One platoon
	Yugoslav b	attalion	
28	El Arish (Yugoslav Main Camp)	8863 9408	Battalion headquarters, head- quarters company, ad- ministrative company, and four platoons
29	El Amr	0900 0329	Company headquarters and one platoon
30	El Sabha	0937 0158	One section
31	El Qusaima	0893 0088	One platoon
32	El Kuntilla	1197 9360	Company headquarters and one platoon
33	Ras el Naqb	1356 8907	One platoon
34	Sharm el Sheikh	0800 6971	One platoon

ANNEX II

VIOLATIONS

(1 August 1966 to 19 May 1967)

			1966					1967			t	Total
Type of violation	Aug. Sept.		Oct.	Nov.	Nov. Dec.		Jan. Feb.		Apr.	May	Total 1966-67	1965-66
(a) Crossing violations												
(i) Crossing of ADL/IF involv-												
ing firing	promise.		-					_		-	0	0
(ii) Firing across ADL/IF		1			1		1				3	3
(iii) Firing on UNEF troops		*****	-		2004-000	,		3	_		3	0
(iv) Crossing of ADL/IF involv-								_	_			
ing theft		******			-			1	3	-	4	1
(v) Crossing or attempted cross-												
ing of ADL/IF not involving firing, theft or kidnapping	9	1	7	3	2	2	5	6	11	5	51	59
ming, mere or kidnapping			***************************************									
TOTAL	9	2	7	3	3	2	6	10	14	5	61	63
(b) Air violations												
(i) United Arab Republic air-												
craft				-							0	0
(ii) Israel Defence Forces aircraft	29	38	47	49	52	60	72	18	41	41	447	524
(iii) Unidentified aircraft	3	5	5	6	7	8	10	2	7	10	63	44
		-				-					-	
TOTAL	32	43	52	55	59	68	82	20	48	51	510	568
(c) Sea violations												
(i) Violations of Israel coastal												
waters by boats from United												
Arab Republic coastal waters	4	13	11	7	2	4	3	_	_		44	79
(ii) Violations of United Arab Re-												
public coastal waters by boats	4	1 2	2	4	2	2	2	,	2	2	40	7 8
from Israel coastal waters	4	15	3	4	3	2	3	1	3	2	40	
TOTAL	8	28	14	11	5	6	6	1	3	2	84	157

ANNEX III

LOCAL INCIDENTS

(1 August 1966 to 19 May 1967)

	1966					1967							Grand
Type of incident	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	Мау	Total	total
Firing on UNEF personnel Movement of local civilians or military in area close to ADL in United Arab							<u> </u>		2	*******		2	2
Republic coastal waters of Sinai	. 1			2	3	6	4	3	4	7	3	21	27
Тота	. 1			2	3	6	4	3	6	7	3	23	29

ANNEX IV

SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS CAUSED BY PERSONS FROM UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC-CONTROLLED TERRITORY

(1 August 1966 to 19 May 1967)


			1966						1967				Grand
Type of incident	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	Ian.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	Мау	Total	total
crossing of ADL/IF involving firing						-				*****			
iring across ADL/IF and at UNEF						*****		1	3			4	4
Crossing of ADL/IF involving theft or occasionally kidnapping					_		-		1	3	_	4	4
rossing or attempted crossing of ADL/IF not involving firing, kidnapping or theft	2	MANAGE	2	2	*****	6	waterw	1	******	3	1	5	11
Total	2	***************************************	2	2		6		2	4		1	13	19


ANNEX V

SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS CAUSED BY PERSONS FROM ISRAEL-CONTROLLED TERRITORY


(1 August 1966 to 19 May 1967)

			1966						1967				Grand
Type of incident	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	Мау	Total	total
Involving mines													
Crossing of ADL/IF involving firing					-	-							
Firing across ADL/IF and at UNEF		1	-		1	2	-		-				2
Crossing of ADL/IF involving theft or occasionally kidnapping		-		*Aprenor*	Mariena.	and the same of th	Applicamen	BOOK And program	aga frontieres	фринку	**********		************
Crossing or attempted crossing of ADL/IF not involving firing, kidnapping or theft	7	1	5	1	2	16	2	4	6	8	4	24	40
TOTAL	7	2	5	1	3	18	2	4	6	8	4	24	42





MAP NO. 1728 JULY 1967 UNITED NATIONS



JULY 1967

UNITED NATIONS

DOCUMENT A/6672/ADD.1

[Original text: English] [15 July 1967]

Through inadvertence, the following communication was left out of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Report (A/6672). It should be read in the context of paragraphs 120-121 of the report.

Note verbale dated 1 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and in referring to the Secretary-General's *note verbale* of 28 June 1967 relative to recent acts in the UNEF Base Camp Rafah, has the honour to state as follows:

The Secretary-General's *note verbale* was immediately transmitted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which is giving it the closest attention.

At the same time the Secretary-General is informed that all cases of pilferage which come to notice are brought before an appropriate Court Martial or Military Court.

It is understood that free access to the Camp has been accorded to a representative of UNEF, Mr. Seward, who visited the Camp on the morning of 30 June.

(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force

DOCUMENT A/6933

Revised cost estimates for 1967 Report of the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[1 December 1967]

- 1. The Secretary-General in his final report in the series of annual reports on the United Nations Emergency Force (A/6672 and Add.1) stated, inter alia, that it was not possible to include in that report any reasonably precise estimate of the total costs of the operation in 1967 pending the receipt of claims from Governments for reimbursement of their extra and extraordinary costs relating to the pay and allowances for their contingents and in respect of losses and depreciation of equipment owned by the contingents. He added, however, that he would report to the General Assembly on the financial aspects of the operation as soon as the costs involved could be established with the necessary precision.
- 2. While the Secretariat has not yet received many of the claims for reimbursement which Governments providing contingents to the Force will submit for their extra and extraordinary costs—and it now appears that it will not be possible to establish the final costs for 1967 with precision before the end of 1968, or even later—the Secretary-General submits herewith for the information of the General Assembly his revised cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force, based on the latest information and estimates available to him.
- 3. Precise data regarding the costs actually incurred will be shown, of course, in the annual accounts of the United Nations as of 31 December 1967 and 31 December 1968.

- 4. It will be recalled that the Secretary-General's original cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force during 1967, which were set forth in document A/6498⁵ dated 3 November 1966, totalled \$14,304,000. This estimate was based on the expectation that the Force would consist throughout the year of approximately 3,400 officers and men, and the estimate made no provision, other than an estimate of \$100,000 for contingencies, to cover unforeseen and exceptional costs that might be incurred during 1967. This contingency provision, however, had it been maintained, would not have been sufficient to cover the exceptional costs that had to be incurred as the result of the withdrawal of the entire Force in May and June 1967.
- 5. As the General Assembly, by its resolution 2194 B (XXI), appropriated \$14 million for the operation of the Force during 1967, it was necessary for the Secretary-General to reduce certain of his original estimates and eliminate the provision for contingencies in order to conform to the total amount appropriated by the General Assembly.
- 6. The following table shows the original estimates as adjusted to conform to the total amount appropriated and the current revised estimates for the UNEF costs for 1967:

⁵ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 21.

	Original estimates adjusted to conform with the General Assembly's appropriation	Revised estimates
Part A. Operating costs incurred by the United	United State	s dollars
SECTION 1. MILITARY PERSONNEL		
Chapter I. Allowances	1,065,000	456,300
II. Rotation of contingents	910,500	1,678,000
III. Travel and subsistence	60,000	26,200
Total, section 1	2,035,500	2,160,500
Section 2, Operational expenses	Harting and a second	
Chapter		
I. Purchase of equipment		
(i) Motor transport and heavy mobile equipment	358,500	140,000
(ii) Miscellaneous operational equipment	107,000	36,000
II. Maintenance and operation of equipment		
(i) Maintenance and operation of motor trans- port, heavy mobile equipment and stationary		
engines	538,000	331,000
(ii) Operation of aircraft	411,000	255,000
III. Supplies and services		
(i) Stationery and office supplies	50,000	29,500
(ii) Operational supplies and services	685,000	451,500
IV. Communications services	30,000	29,600
V. Freight, cartage and express	235,000	258,800
VI. External audit	17,000	17,000
VII. Claims and adjustments	5,000	136,000
Total, section 2	2,436,500	1,684,400
Section 3. Rental of premises	149,000	68,000
Section 4, Rations	830,800	362,000
Section 5. Welfare		
Chapter	220,000	01.700
I. Leave centre	230,000 11,000	91,700 5,500
III. Films	57,000	26,000
IV. Live shows	6,000	4,500
V. Postage for personal mail	40,000	20,100
Total, section 5	344,000	147,800
Section 6. Non-military personnel.		Wasan Additional Section of the Sect
Chapter		
I. Salaries of international staff	778,500	650,000
II. Salaries and wages of locally recruited staff	775,000	800,000
III. Common staff costs	223,000	240,000
IV. Travel and subsistence	222,500	258,300
Total, section 6	1,999,000	1,948,300
Section 7. Contingencies	Assessments	****
Total, part A	7,794,800	6,371,000
Part B. Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs incurred by Governments providing contingents		
SECTION 8. REIMBURSEMENT IN RESPECT OF EXTRA AND		
EXTRAORDINARY COSTS RELATING TO PAY AND ALLOW-	5 670 200	4 200 000
ANCES OF CONTINGENTS	5,670,200	4,200,000

	Original estimates adjusted to conform with the General Assembly's appropriation	Revi sed estimates
Part B. Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs incurred by Governments providing contingents (continued)	United Sta	tes dollars
Section 9. Reimbursement in respect of equipment, materials and supplies furnished by Governments to their contingents	460,000	750,000
Section 10. Reimbursement in respect of death and disability awards on behalf of members of contingents	75,000	75,000
TOTAL, PART B	6,205,200	5,025,000
GRAND TOTAL	14,000,000	11,396,000

- 7. The withdrawal of the military contingents of the Force was completed by 17 June 1967, with the result that savings in expenditures under many sections and chapters of the UNEF budget for the financial year 1967 were possible. On the other hand, this unforeseen development has caused the 1967 expenditures incurred under certain other sections and chapters of the budget to exceed the amount originally envisaged for the entire year. The categories of expenditure where the original estimates now appear to have been exceeded are the following:
- (a) The cost of the repatriation of all military personnel, which more than offset the savings resulting from the fact that no rotation of contingents was required after the withdrawal of the Force;
- (b) The cost of travel and subsistence of the international staff associated with the Force, many of whom had to be repatriated or reassigned to other duty stations during 1967 rather than after the end of the year, as originally envisaged;
- (c) The cost of salaries and wages of locally recruited staff and the common staff costs for international personnel to whom it was necessary under their employment contracts to pay termination indemnities upon separation from service;
- (d) The cost of claims in respect of the loss of personal effects, personal injuries and property damage attributable to service or resulting from the operation of the Force:
- (e) The estimated cost of Governments' claims for reimbursement in respect of loss of or damage to equipment, materials and supplies owned by the contingents, which were greater than anticipated as a result of the outbreak of war in the area; and
- (f) The costs of freight, cartage and express for the manticipated need to ship such equipment and supplies from the area of operation in order to prevent their loss from looting or their destruction by military action.
- 8. Since the Secretary-General proposes to claim compensation from the Government or Governments responsible for some of the loss or damage to property belonging to UNEF or its staff, it is expected that some of the costs referred to in paragraphs 7 (d) and (e) above will be recovered. The amount of any such compensation, however, cannot be determined at this time.
- 9. As indicated in paragraph 5 above, the General Assembly, by its resolution 2194 B (XXI), appropriated an amount of \$14 million for the operation of

- the Force in 1967. Of this amount \$740,000 was apportioned among 96 economically less developed Member States and \$13,260,000 was apportioned among 26 economically developed Member States. The total amount for each of the two groups of Member States was apportioned among the members of the particular group in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1967. In addition, for the 26 economically developed members, the General Assembly apportioned an additional amount equal to 25 per cent of their basic assessments in order to meet reserve requirements, such additional contributions to be reimbursable on a pro rata basis when the General Assembly shall determine that all or part of these additional contributions are no longer needed.
- 10. The total amount assessed in respect of UNEF for 1967, including the additional 25 per cent for reserve requirements, is \$17,315,000. As at 30 November 1967, a total of \$5,203,065 had been received from 45 Member States in payment of the UNEF assessments for 1967. Of the 45 Member States that have so far contributed to UNEF for 1967, 38 have paid their assessments in full and 7 have made partial payment. Of the 38 Member States that had paid in full, 11 were economically developed States and their payments included the additional 25 per cent assessments for reserve requirements to a total of \$417,376. In accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2194 B (XXI), some part of the latter amount may ultimately have to be repaid to the contributing countries.
- 11. While 38 Member States have paid their 1967 assessments in full and 7 others have made partial payments thereof, the total amount of contributions paid to 30 November 1967 represents less than one-half of the amount required to cover the revised estimated expenses of UNEF in 1967. The Secretary-General accordingly urges that all Members which have not paid their original UNEF assessments for 1967 in full, including for the economically developed Members the 25 per cent additional assessment, should do so at the earliest possible date.
- 12. It is not possible to determine at this time when a final settlement of all claims in respect of UNEF can be effected and the accounts closed, but it is certain that a limited number of staff will be required for these purposes and that certain other liquidation costs will have to be incurred in 1968. In order to make provision to cover these necessary expenditures in 1968 the Secretary-General ventures to recommend that the

General Assembly should decide that, in connexion with any necessary expenditures after 31 December 1967 relating to the disposal of equipment and supplies owned by the United Nations and the termination of the United Nations Emergency Force operation in the Middle East, including the closing of the accounts, the Secretary-General, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, be authorized to utilize for these purposes after 31 December 1967 any balance remaining in the Special

Account for UNEF as at 31 December 1967 and, not-withstanding the provisions of rule 111.9 of the Financial Rules of the United Nations, the proceeds from the sale or other disposition after 31 December 1967 of assets recorded in the Special Account for UNEF. A similar decision was taken by the General Assembly in resolution 1885 (XVIII) in connexion with the expenses that were to be incurred after 30 June 1964 for the termination of the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

DOCUMENT A/6949

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

[Original text: English]
[7 December 1967]

- 1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report by the Secretary-General (A/6933) on cost estimates relating to UNEF in 1967 and on the possible financial arrangements for 1968. The Advisory Committee noted that the revised cost estimates submitted by the Secretary-General for 1967 contain an element of uncertainty and that, in the Secretary-General's opinion, the final costs for 1967 could not be established with precision before the end of 1968, or even later.
- 2. By its resolution 2194 B (XXI) of 16 December 1966 the General Assembly, having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the Force for the period from 1 January to 31 December 19676 and the report of the Advisory Committee thereon, decided to appropriate an amount of \$14 million for the operation of UNEF in 1967. Developments in the area led to the withdrawal of the entire Force in May and June 1967, with the result that decreases in requirements are anticipated under most of the sections and chapters of the Special Account for UNEF. These decreases have been offset, however, by unforeseen and exceptional costs attributable to the withdrawal of the Force.
- 3. In part A, increased estimates have been submitted in respect of section 1, chapter II (Rotation of contingents), section 2, chapter V (Freight, cartage and express) and section 2, chapter VII (Claims and adjustments). Under section 1, chapter II, the Secretary-General now indicates an amount of \$1,678,000 which is attributable to the withdrawal of the entire Force, as against the original estimate of \$910,500 for the rotation of contingents. The increase under section 2, chapter V, from \$235,000 to \$258,800, is also attributable to the withdrawal of the Force. Claims and adjustments show an increase from \$5,000 to \$136,000. The Advisory Committee has been informed that most of the claims submitted by international staff have already been settled by the United Nations, and that the Secretary-General hopes to settle the balance of all outstanding claims by the end of the year.
- 4. The Advisory Committee inquired into the reason why the revised estimate under section 6 (Non-military personnel), which covers salaries, common staff costs, travel and subsistence of non-military personnel, in the amount of \$1,948,300, was only some \$50,000 below
 - mount of \$1,948,300, was only some \$50,000 6 Ibid., document A/6498.

- the original estimate of \$1,999,000, despite the fact that the Force was withdrawn half-way through the year. The Committee was informed that, since many of the staff recruited specifically for service with UNEF had been employed by the Organization for considerable lengths of time, the termination indemnities payable to them under their contracts of employment offset the savings in respect of salaries and wages realized as a result of their separation from service. Repatriation or reassignment costs for international staff also proved to be higher than had been originally estimated.
- 5. As regards part B, the revised estimate under section 9 (Reimbursement in respect of equipment, materials and supplies furnished by Governments to their contingents), amounts to \$750,000 as against the original estimate of \$460,000. The Advisory Committee understands that the revised estimate is subject to adjustment in the light of claims by Governments.
- 6. The Advisory Committee has been informed that it is the intention of the Secretary-General to claim compensation for loss of or damage to property, as appropriate, belonging to UNEF or its staff, but that the amount of any such compensation cannot be determined at this time.
- 7. The revised estimates submitted by the Secretary-General in document A/6933 amount to a total of \$11,396,000, i.e. \$2,604,000 less than the amount of \$14 million appropriated by the General Assembly in resolution 2194 B (XXI).
- 8. The Advisory Committee notes that, in the opinion of the Secretary-General, it is not possible to determine at this time when a final settlement of all claims in respect of UNEF can be effected and the accounts closed, but that it is certain that various liquidation costs will have to be incurred in 1968. Bearing in mind the decision taken by the General Assembly in resolution 1885 (XVIII) of 18 October 1963 with regard to the disposal of United Nations-owned equipment and supplies and the closing of the accounts attendant upon the termination of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the Committee concurs in the suggestion by the Secretary-General (A/6933, para. 12) that similar arrangements be approved in the case of UNEF.
- 9. The Advisory Committee accordingly recommends that the General Assembly decide that in connexion with any necessary expenditures after 31 December 1967 relating to the disposal of United Nations-owned equipment and supplies and the termination of UNEF,

including the closing of the accounts, the Secretary-General, with the concurrence of the Arvisory Committee, be authorized to utilize for those purposes, to the extent required: (a) any balance remaining in the Special Account for UNEF as at 31 December 1967;

and (b) notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in the Financial Rules for the Special Account for UNEF, the proceeds from the sale or other disposition after 31 December 1967 of United Nations-owned property.

DOCUMENT A/6967

Report of the Fifth Committee

[Original text: English] [11 December 1967]

- 1. The Fifth Committee considered agenda item 21, part (b), relating to the cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force, at its 1222nd meeting on 11 December 1967. In this connexion, the Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General (A/6933), a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/L.928), and a report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/6949).
- 2. One representative informed the Committee that his delegation's position of principle regarding this item remained unchanged and that he would therefore vote against the proposed draft resolution.
- 3. The Fifth Committee, by a vote of 61 to 9, with 5 abstentions, approved the draft resolution contained in the following paragraph.

Recommendation of the Fifth Committee

4. The Fifth Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

Α

The General Assembly

Takes note of the revised cost estimates submitted

by the Secretary-General (A/6933) for the financial year 1967 in the amount of \$11,396,000.

В

The General Assembly

Decides that, in connexion with any necessary expenditures after 31 December 1967 relating to the disposal of United Nations-owned equipment and supplies and the termination of the United Nations Emergency Force, including the closing of the accounts, the Secretary-General, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, is authorized to utilize for those purposes to the extent required:

- (a) Any balance remaining as at 31 December 1967 in the Special Account for the United Nations Emergency Force;
- (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of rule 104.1 of the Financial Rules for the Special Account for the United Nations Emergency Force, the proceeds from the sales or other disposition, after 31 December 1967, of United Nations-owned property.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1629th plenary meeting, on 13 December 1967, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General (A/6672 and Add.1).

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 73 to 10, with 8 abstentions, adopted the draft resolution submitted by the Fifth Committee (A/6967, para. 4). For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, resolution 2304 (XXII).

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 21 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

Document No.	Title or description	Observations and references
A/6669 and Add.1-2	Special report of the Secretary-General	For the text of this document, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 5, documents A/6730 and Add.1-3
A/C.5/L.928	Note by the Secretary-General containing a draft resolution	For the text of the draft resolution, adopted without change, see A/6967, para. 4, draft resolution B

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

Official Records

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 22:* Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General**

CONTENTS Document No. Page A/6885 Report of the Secretary-General 1 Action taken by the General Assembly 2

1620th meeting.

** This question was also discussed by the General Assembly at the following sessions: twentieth session (agenda item 108),

DOCUMENT A/6885

Report of the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [1 November 1967]

- 1. By its resolution 2011 (XX) of 11 October 1965, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it as appropriate on the means of promoting co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
- 2. In reports submitted on 16 December 1965,1 and 8 September 1966,2 the Secretary-General described the measures of co-operation agreed upon in the course of various consultations and the steps taken in that regard. Some of the recent developments are noted below.

REPRESENTATION AT MEETINGS

- 3. During the period under review, the Secretary-General was represented at the eighth session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU held at Addis Ababa in February-March 1967 and at the ninth session of the Council held at Kinshasa in September 1967.
- 4. On the invitation of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU, the Secretary-General attended the closing meeting of the fourth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU held at Kinshasa from 11 to 14 September 1967 where he delivered an address.

TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

5. At the end of 1966, the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU requested the Secretary-General to arrange for the training of a few staff members of the OAU administrative secretariat at United Nations Headquarters. Following consultations, the United Na-

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 108, document A/6174.

² Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 22, document A/6408.

- tions Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) agreed to assist OAU in this respect and a two-month training programme for four OAU officers at United Nations Headquarters was arranged in April-May 1967 under the auspices of UNITAR.
- 6. Besides receiving training in the fields of committee work, conference co-ordination and documentation, the officers were also able, in accordance with their respective functions in the OAU secretariat, to study the United Nations work and programmes in personnel administration, economic development, and the problems of Non-Self-Governing Territories.
- Co-operation between the Organization for Afri-CAN UNITY AND THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (ECA)
- 7. During the period under consideration OAU and ECA continued to co-operate closely. The OAU participated in the meeting of the ECA Working Party on Manpower held at Addis Ababa from 26 September to 1 October 1966 and in the Sub-Regional Meeting on Economic Co-operation in West Africa, held at Niamey from 10 to 22 October 1966. Continuous co-operation at the working level was also maintained between the secretariats of the two organizations. The ECA secretariat provided administrative and conference staff to the meetings of the OAU Council of Ministers and the third session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in November 1966 at Addis Ababa.
- 8. At the eighth session of ECA held at Lagos from 13 to 25 February 1967, the Executive Secretary of ECA submitted a note on the measures taken in pursuance of Commission resolution 132 (VII) on cooperation between ECA and OAU.3 An item on rela-

^{*} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings,

³ Document E/CN.14/INF.32.

tions with OAU was included in the agenda for the session and the secretariats of ECA and OAU reported on recent developments and on problems concerning the co-operation between the two organizations. Delegations participating in the discussion emphasized that the Commission should follow the instructions it had

received from the Heads of Government and promote collaboration between the two organizations on the basis of the agreement between them.⁴

⁴ Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 5 (E/4354 and Corrigendum 1), para. 550.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1620th plenary meeting, on 5 December 1967, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General (A/6885).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

Official Records

NEW YORK, 1967

Agenda item 23:** Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples***

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^{*}An addendum to agenda item 23, issued as a separate fascicle, contains the report (A/6700/Rev.1) submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

^{**} Since 1961, this question has been discussed by the General Assembly at the following sessions: sixteenth session (agenda item 88), seventeenth session (agenda item 25), eighteenth session (agenda item 23), twentieth session (agenda item 23), twenty-first session (agenda item 23).

^{***} For the discussion of this item, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Fourth Committee, 1683rd-1686th, 1688th-1697th, 1700th-1704th 1707th, 1719th 1729th-1731st, 1737th, 1741st, 1743rd and 1745th-1756th meetings; ibid., Fifth Committee, 1227th and 1229th meetings; and ibid., Plenary Meetings, 1594th, 1613th, 1627th, 1628th, 1630th, 1631st, 1633rd, 1634th, 1636th, 1641st and 1642nd meetings.

DOCUMENT A/6661

Letter dated 3 February 1967 from the representative of Argentina to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[3 February 1967]

I have the honour to address Your Excellency with reference to your note TR 300 FAIS (MALV) of 19 January 1967, drawing the attention of the Argentine Government to the text of the consensus on the Malvinas approved by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting of 20 December 1966.

My Government has instructed me to acknowledge receipt of the above-mentioned communication and at the same time to inform you that due note has been taken of the consensus and in particular its request to "both parties to continue with the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible", as also the request that the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6628, para. 13.

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples be kept informed about the development of the negotiations.

The Argentine Government wishes to reaffirm at this time its willingness fully to implement the consensus approved by the General Assembly on the question of the Malvinas, as also the terms of resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, which also invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a solution to the problem.

I request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee.

(Signed) José María Ruda Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/6662

Letter dated 3 February 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[3 February 1967]

I have the honour to address Your Excellency with reference to your note TR 300 FAIS (MALV) of 19 January 1967, drawing the attention of the United Kingdom Government to the text of the consensus on the Falkland Islands approved by the General Assembly in its 1500th plenary meeting of 20 December 1966.²

My Government has instructed me to acknowledge receipt of the above-mentioned communication and at the same time to inform you that due note has been taken of the consensus and in particular its request to "both parties to continue with the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible", as also the request that the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

2 Ibid.

be kept informed about the development of the negotiations.

The United Kingdom Government wishes to reaffirm at this time its willingness fully to implement the consensus approved by the General Assembly on the question of the Falkland Islands, as also the terms of resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, which also invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a solution to the problem.

I request Your Excellency to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee.

(Signed) CARADON
Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/6664

Letter dated 18 March 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [27 March 1967]

I have the honour to refer to the decision taken in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 8 and 15 March 1967 (498th and 503rd meetings), not to circulate as official petitions a number of communications relating to the situation in southern Arabia.

I have been instructed by my Government to inform Your Excellency that the United Kingdom Government deplores this decision of the Special Committee, which must call in question the determination of the Committee to establish and to maintain a scrupulous respect for impartiality.

This denial of fair dealing and free speech could do serious harm. The Committee's refusal to circulate officially petitions giving all points of view tends to undermine the confidence which people place in the impartiality and justice of the United Nations Organization.

It was argued in the Committee that petitions should not be circulated if they contain allegations against a Member State of the United Nations other than a colonial Power. The Committee has circulated many petitions in the past which made grave and damaging allegations, frequently entirely untrue and unfounded, against Member States which happened to be administering authorities. It has never been suggested that such petitioins should be suppressed. It therefore seems to the United Kingdom Government to be blatantly discriminatory to argue that an allegation of subversion by a non-colonial Power must be automatically rejected.

Such discrimination runs counter to the letter and spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which proclaims that the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. Neither in the Charter nor in the work of the various organs of the United Nations is special protection afforded to non-colonial Powers.

For this reason my Government has instructed me to register its grave concern at the harm which the Special Committee's decision will do to the reputation and effectiveness of the United Nations. I shall be grateful if Your Excellency would circulate this letter as a document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Caradon Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/6665

Letter dated 4 April 1967 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [5 April 1967]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the decision adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on the situation in Aden, at its fortyseventh regular session held in Cairo in March 1967.

"The Council of the League of the Arab States at its forty-seventh regular session:

"Having reviewed the situation in Aden and the occupied South in all its aspects,

"Having taken note of the recent developments of the colonialist policy which aims at maintaining aggressive colonialism and at renouncing previous pledges by the British Government to evacuate the area and to recognize its independence,

"Decides to:

- "1. Condemn British colonialism and hold it fully responsible for the assassination of nationalists, particularly during the recent period, and for the atrocious crimes it has committed which have been condemned by the world conscience everywhere;
- "2. Hail the Arab people in Aden and the occupied South in their struggle against British colonialism for the attainment of their freedom and sovereignty, and express its sincerest condolences to the Arab struggler Abdel Kawee Mackawee, whose sons fell martyrs in the battle of freedom, and to the families of all other innocent martyrs;
- "3. Give maximum support to the Arab struggle in the area against colonialism and its agents and

consolidate it by all material, moral and human means;

- "4. Recommend that the Arab delegations at the United Nations continue to follow up and intensify the measures they may deem necessary for emphasizing the independence of Aden and the occupied South, the complete evacuation of the colonialist forces, the liquidation of the military base, and for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the struggling Arab people under the supervision of a neutral government during the transitional period;
- "5. Pledge support to the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), and to extend all material and moral assistance to it, being the legitimate frame of the struggle of the people of the area;
- "6. Denounce the attempts of the British colonialist Government and those who co-operate with it which aim at impeding the withdrawal of the British authorities in 1968, and the liquidation of military bases in the area."

I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will circulate this letter as an official document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Mohamed Awad El Kony Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/6802

Letter dated 18 September 1967 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish] [21 September 1967]

In accordance with my instructions, I have pleasure in informing you that the Spanish Government decided on 15 September 1967 that the Constitutional Conference to determine the future of Equatorial Guinea would open on 30 October 1967.

During the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, as you will recall, my delegation announced in the Fourth Committee on 10 December 1966 (1665th meeting), and repeated in the plenary on 20 December 1966 (1500th meeting), that the Spanish Government

had decided to convene in 1967 a constitutional conference at which all segments of public opinion in the Territory would be represented.

During the recent debates in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, my delegation stated at the 551st meeting on 5 September 1967 that, although my Government had been willing that the Conference should begin on 20 May 1967, it had agreed, in view of the extreme importance of the occasion, to a request for a postponement from various segments of opinion in Equatorial Guinea. My delegation also stated

that this did not affect the intention of holding the Constitutional Conference.

In conformity with this position, my Government now announces the opening date of the Constitutional Conference, thus proving once again its willingness to collaborate with the United Nations.

I shall be grateful if you will arrange for a copy of this communication to be given to the Chairman of the Special Committee and for the text to be circulated to all delegations and as a General Assembly document.

(Signed) Jaime de Piniés Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/6828

Letter dated 31 August 1967 from the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [5 September 1967]

With reference to Your Excellency's note (document A/AC.109/260 dated 24 August 1967) transmitting the text of a communication addressed to the Secretary-General by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, we the representatives of the Arab States have the honour to state the following:

1. The Islands of Perim, Kuria Muria and Kamaran and other off-shore islands came under British control as a result of colonial occupation.

It must be conceded, however, that neither colonial occupation nor the convenience of colonial administration justifies the establishment of a separate identity for the Island of Perim and other off-shore islands.

These islands are an integral part of the Arab homeland, inhabited by Arab people whose culture, history and aspirations have been inseparable from those of the Arab people of southern Arabia.

2. General Assembly resolutions 2023 (XX) and 2183 (XXI) specifically affirmed that the off-shore islands, including the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria and Kamaran, form an integral part of the Territory of Aden.

It is further reaffirmed in these two resolutions that the people of the Territory, as a whole, are to achieve their independence in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), where it is stated that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations".

Moreover, resolution 2183 (XXI) takes special note of the assurance given by the representative of the United Kingdom, in the Fourth Committee on 10 November 1966 (1633rd meeting), concerning the territorial integrity and unity of South Arabia as a whole.

The suggestion put forward by the United Kingdom, which will result in disruption of the territorial integrity of South Arabia, is therefore clearly in contravention to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and resolutions 2023 (XX) and 2183 (XXI).

Now, while the United Kingdom is acknowledging that Perim would adhere to South Arabia when the latter became independent, reference is made in the letter dated 11 August from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General (see A/AC.109/260), to the fact that the United Kingdom Government informed the United Nations when resolution 2023 (XX) was under discussion in 1965 "that Perim was not part of Aden State and that it would consult the people about their future when the time came". The letter of the Deputy Permanent Representative does not mention, however, that no such reservation about the status of Perim was expressed when resolution 2183 (XXI) was under discussion in 1966. This latter resolution, which specifically includes in the Territory the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria and Kamaran and the other off-shore islands, was in fact endorsed by the United Kingdom, whose affirmative vote nullified the reservation made in the previous years.

The representatives of the Arab States categorically reject this British proposal which aims at the dismemberment of the Territory.

We further wish to state that the United Nations should not be called upon to act in contravention of its Charter and solemn resolutions in order to further the political ends of one Member State. The scope of United Nations responsibility as it was most clearly defined in the resolutions of the General Assembly was to assist in the attainment of full independence.

The Special Mission on Aden cannot therefore be called upon to consider this proposal as it does not only exceed the Mission's terms of reference but is also contrary to the basic purposes and objectives of resolution 2183 (XXI).

It is our considered opinion that if the Government of the United Kingdom has "no undeclared interest of its own with regard to Perim", it would be well advised to abandon this proposal and affirm its adherence to the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as stated in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)

and its commitments to carrying out the provisions of resolution 2183 (XXI).

Assuring Your Excellency of our highest consideration, we should be very grateful if you would kindly arrange to have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Special Committee.

(Signed) T. BOUATTOURA (Algeria)
A. PACHACHI (Iraq)
H. EL-FARRA (Jordan)

M. AL-MUDHAF (Kuwait)
S. CHAMMAS (Lebanon)
M. R. KIKHIA (Libya)
A. BENHIMA (Morocco)
J. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia)
M. FAKHREDDINE (Sudan)
R. JOUÉJATI (Syria)
M. MESTIRI (Tunisia)
M. EL KONY (United Arab Republic)
A. AL-FUTAIH (Yemen)

DOCUMENT A/6876

Letter dated 25 October 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [26 October 1967]

I have the honour to transmit, on my Government's instructions, a report on Gibraltar by the United Kingdom Government, prepared in accordance with the request in operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966.

I shall be grateful if you will arrange for this letter and the report to be forwarded to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, together with the reports of the Referendum Administrator and of the Commonwealth Observers on the conduct of the referendum, which are annexed to the report. I should also be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and the report to be circulated as documents both of the Special Committee and of the General Assembly. Finally, I should be grateful if you would arrange for copies of the reports of the Referendum Administrator and the Commonwealth Observers to be sent to the Permanent Representatives of all States Members of the United Nations.³

(Signed) CARADON
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

REPORT TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, on Gibraltar, the United Kingdom Government proposed to the Spanish Government that talks should start in London on 18 April 1967. But on 12 April Spain declared a large new prohibited area for flying near Gibraltar. This prohibited area was clearly designed to interfere with access to Gibraltar Aerodrome and its announcement caused the United Kingdom Government to postpone the talks. The reasons for this postponement were explained in the United Kingdom Permanent Representative's letter of 21 April to the Secretary-General (see A/6700/Rev.1, chap. X, annex I, para. 8), circulated under cover of the Secretary-General's note of 1 May 1967.

In the event, the talks which the United Kingdom Government had proposed for April were never held. Technical talks to discuss the effect of the prohibited area on flying at Gibraltar Aerodrome took place in Madrid from 5 to 8 June. But these broke down because Spain would not continue them unless Britain first agreed that the land on which the aerodrome stands is Spanish.

In the enclosure of a letter of 13 June to the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/254), the United Kingdom Permanent Representative explained the United Kingdom Government's reasons for a decision (announced in London on the following day) that a referendum should be held at Gibraltar. In this the voters were asked to indicate if they considered that it would better serve the interests of the people of Gibraltar:

- (A) To pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government to Her Majesty's Government on 18 May 1966; or
- (B) Voluntarily to retain their link with Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its present responsibilities.

The United Kingdom Permanent Representative emphasized that the referendum would represent an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). He also said that the United Kingdom Government would welcome the presence of any observers the Secretary-General might wish to send to Gibraltar during the referendum proceedings.

The United Kingdom Government also expressed its readiness to welcome an observer from Spain and to give the Spanish Government facilities to explain their own proposals to the people of Gibraltar if they so wished. And before the referendum was publicly announced the United Kingdom Government had invited the Spanish Government to comment on the formulation of alternative (A) in the referendum. The Spanish Government rejected these offers.

The referendum took place on 10 September. Out of an electorate of 12,757 the number of valid votes cast was 12,182. Of these, 44 were for alternative (A) and 12,138 for alternative (B). Attached are the official report of the Referendum Administrator, Sir Robert Fowler, and the report of the four Commonwealth Observers who were present at Gibraltar for the referendum. In their report the Observers have said

³ To be forwarded under cover of a note verbale.

⁴ See Gibraltar Referendum, September 1967: Report of the Commonwealth Team of Observers to the Commonwealth Secretary-General (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1967).

that they were impressed by the administrative arrangements for the referendum and considered them to be conducted in a fair and proper manner. They found that there were adequate facilities for the people in Gibraltar freely to express their views in the referendum and that these facilities were in fact used. They recorded the unanimous view that the actual conduct of the referendum fully conformed with the requirements for the free expression of choice through the medium of the secret ballot.

Meanwhile, on 1 September, the Special Committee adopted a further resolution on the question of Gibraltar (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 215). The United Kingdom representative voted against this resolution and the United Kingdom Permanent Representative's

letter of 6 September to the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/268) explained the United Kingdom Government's attitude towards it.

In reply to a subsequent Spanish note of 6 September (see A/6882) stating that the Spanish Government's main objective with regard to Gibraltar was "to remove an obstacle in the way of good relations between Spain and Great Britain" and in the light of the conversation in New York on 25 September between Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Spanish Foreign Minister, the United Kingdom Government proposed to the Spanish Government on 20 October that talks on Anglo-Spanish relations, including the question of Gibraltar, should begin in Madrid in the latter part of November.

DOCUMENT A/6882

Letter dated 30 October 1967 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[31 October 1967]

On 6 September 1967, the Ambassador of Spain in London delivered to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a *note verbale* reading as follows:

"The Spanish Embassy in London presents its compliments to the Foreign Office and takes pleasure in informing it of the following:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations has brought it to the attention of the Spanish Government that on 1 September the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted the following resolution, whose text, it seems, has also been communicated to Her Britannic Majesty's Government:

[For the text of the resolution, see document A/6700/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 215.]

"The Spanish Government is prepared to resume immediately the negotiations with Her Britannic Majesty's Government recommended by the above resolution of the Special Committee and by General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar, and wishes to state once again that its main objective so far as Gibraltar is concerned is to remove an obstacle to good relations between Spain and Great Britain and to lay the foundations for effective co-operation beneficial to both countries and to the people of Gibraltar.

"The Spanish Embassy takes this opportunity to reiterate to the Foreign Office the assurances of its highest consideration."

As you will see, the above note reflects the Spanish Government's belief that the only possible way to remove the obstacle to good relations between Spain and the United Kingdom constituted by Gibraltar is that recommended by the United Nations in the Special Committee's consensus of 16 October 1964,⁵ in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) and in the Special Committee's resolution cited above,

5 Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 209.

which explicitly denies the validity of the referendum held in Gibraltar on 10 September.

On 25 September, during a meeting held in New York, Mr. Brown, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, informed Mr. Castiella, the Spanish Minister for External Affairs, that the United Kingdom Government would reply to the Spanish note verbale of 6 September towards the end of October.

On 20 October Mr. Brown delivered to the Spanish Ambassador in London, the Marquis of Santa Cruz, the following note:

"Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to His Excellency the Spanish Ambassador and has the honour to return the following reply to the Note which the Ambassador delivered to him on the 6th of September.

"Her Majesty's Government note that in proposing further talks on Gibraltar the Spanish Government has stated that its main objective is to remove the obstacle in the way of good relations between Spain and Great Britain and to establish the basis of an effective co-operation beneficial to both countries and the people of Gibraltar.

"Her Majesty's Government welcome this statement and are prepared to hold further talks with the Spanish Government with these objectives in mind. The meeting which took place between Mr. Brown and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in New York on the 25th of September has already furnished the occasion for a useful exchange of views. Her Majesty's Government believe that this can best be followed up, in the immediate future, by a more detailed exchange between senior officials of the two Governments.

"Mr. Hohler, who led the British Delegation in the talks with Spain which took place during 1966, has been appointed Her Majesty's Ambassador in Berne and will be handing over his present responsibilities in the Foreign Office to Mr. J. G. S. Beith within the next two weeks. Mr. Beith will wish to visit certain capitals, including Madrid, very soon thereafter. Her Majesty's Government therefore

propose that Mr. Beith should visit Madrid towards the end of November and should take the opportunity to begin talks on Anglo-Spanish relations, including the question of Gibraltar, with senior Spanish officials. The opening of these talks would of course be without prejudice to the legal views of either Government on that question. Arrangements for continuing the talks could be considered by the two Governments in the light of the results of this meeting."

On 28 October Mr. Castiella handed to Sir Alan Williams, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid, the following Spanish reply to the most recent United Kingdom communication:

"I have the honour to inform you that the Spanish Government, having studied the United Kingdom's note No. C.S.4/29 delivered on 20 October to the Spanish Ambassador in London by the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has come to the conclusion that Her Britannic Majesty's Government has not replied in that document to the Spanish note of 6 September, in which the United Kingdom was requested to resume negotiations with a view to carrying out the resolution on Gibraltar adopted on 1 September by the Special Committee.

"The Spanish Government still does not know whether or not Her Britannic Majesty's Government intends to carry out all the United Nations resolutions on Gibraltar and whether or not it is prepared to begin negotiations with Spain with a view to putting and end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar. The Spanish Government would therefore be grateful to Her Britannic Majesty's Government for its prompt reply in explanation of these two points, so that it may have the information it needs to determine its position on the matter.

"The Spanish Government is glad to learn that Mr. J. G. S. Beith, Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, proposes to visit Madrid toward the end of November: it believes that talks between a senior British official and senior Spanish officials regarding the state of relations between the two countries must always be desirable and useful. However, it considers that talks such as those contemplated in the United Kingdom note of 20 October have nothing in common with negotiations designed to put an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar as recommended by the United Nations, which would appear at present to offer the only logical and honourable basis for a constructive approach by both countries to the problem of Gibraltar.

"I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration."

As you will observe, the Spanish Government welcomes the visit of a senior British official to Madrid, but it feels that the United Kingdom appears reluctant to carry out the United Nations resolutions with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar, and considers that—as may be seen from the United Kingdom note of 20 October—the talks which the official in question proposes to hold in Spain have nothing in common with the decolonization of Gibraltar.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated to all Members of the United Nations as a working document, a General Assembly document and a document of the Special Committee for incorporation in the chapter of its report relating to Gibraltar.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/6884

Report of the Fourth Committee on Southern Rhodesia

[Original text: English]
[1 November 1967]

- 1. At its 165th meeting, on 20 September 1967, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". At its 167th meeting, on 22 September, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the allocation to the Fourth Committee of all of the chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories.
- 2. At its 1564th plenary meeting, on 23 September, the General Assembly, by adopting the recommendations of the General Committee (A/6840), included the item in its agenda and allocated to the Fourth Committee those chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories (A/6851/Rev.1).
- 3. At its 1682nd meeting, on 2 October, the Fourth Committee decided to consider separately the chapter of the report of the Special Committee relating to

- Southern Rhodesia (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III). At the same meeting, the Committee decided to consider this question as the first item on its agenda.
- 4. The Fourth Committee considered this question at its 1683rd to 1686th, 1688th to 1697th and 1700th to 1704th meetings, from 4 to 19 and 25 to 27 October.
- 5. At the 1683rd meeting, on 4 October, the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples introduced the chapter of the report of that Committee concerning Southern Rhodesia.
- 6. The general debate on the question took place at the 1683rd to 1686th and the 1688th to 1697th meetings, from 4 to 19 October.
- 7. At its 1687th meeting, on 11 October, the Committee considered a request for hearing from Dr. Robert John, President of the International Council for Rhodesia, on behalf of that organization and national committees of Friends of Rhodesia in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Scotland and the United States of America (A/C.4/

- 691). At the same meeting, the Committee, after discussion, decided by 66 votes to 1, with 25 abstentions, not to accede to this request.
- 8. At the 1700th meeting, on 25 October, the representatives of Zambia and India introduced a draft resolution on behalf of the following Member States: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (A/C.4/L.870/Rev.1). Subsequently, the following Member States became sponsors of the draft resolution: Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon (A/C.4/L.870/Rev.1/Add.1).
- 9. At the 1704th meeting, on 27 October, the representative of Zambia submitted a revised draft resolution (A/C.4/L.870/Rev.2) on behalf of the sponsors of the forty-seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.870/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1) and of the following Member States: Ceylon and Cyprus.
- 10. The revised draft resolution (A/C.4/L.870/Rev. 2) was adopted at the same meeting by a roll-call vote of 90 to 2, with 18 abstentions (see paragraph 12 below). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Portugal, South Africa.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

11. At the same meeting, on the proposal of the representative of Yugoslavia, supported by the representatives of India and Ethiopia, the Fourth Committee decided to request its Chairman to transmit to the Chairman of the Sixth Committee, in connexion with that Committee's consideration of the item entitled "Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations", the statements made by the representative of South Africa at the 1697th and 1704th meetings, on 19 and 27 October. These statements concerned the presence of South African armed forces in Southern Rhodesia.

Recommendation of the Fourth Committee

12. The Fourth Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following resolution:

QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The General Assembly.

Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling further all the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia,

Recalling further that the situation in Southern Rhodesia has been declared by the Security Council in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 as constituting a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling further that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has declared on several occasions that the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia is illegal, that it will not negotiate with that régime on the future of Southern Rhodesia and that it will not grant independence until majority rule is established in the Territory,

Noting that the economic sanctions applied so far have failed to bring down the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia,

Noting with profound regret that the Government of the United Kingdom has not found it possible to take the measures necessary to bring down the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia,

- 1. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the restoration of their inalienable right to freedom and independence;
- 2. Condemns the policies of oppression, racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;
- 3. Reaffirms the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power without further delay to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted according to the principle of "one man, one vote";
- 4. Condemns the failure and the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in its capacity as the administering Power, to take effective measures to bring down the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe;
- 5. Affirms its conviction that the sanctions adopted so far will not put an end to the illegal racist minority régime and that sanctions, in order to achieve their objective, will have to be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force;
- 6. Further reaffirms that the only effective and speedy way for the administering Power to put down the rebellion in the Territory is through the use of force;
- 7. Calls once again upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take immediately all the necessary measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions:

- 8. Considers that any future consultations undertaken by the administering Power to determine the future of Southern Rhodesia must be with the representatives of all the political parties and not with the illegal régime, and calls upon the administering Power to enter immediately into consultations with the representatives of the political parties favouring majority rule;
- 9. Condemns the activities of all those States which, contrary to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, are still trading with the illegal racist minority régime in the Territory, and calls upon such States to sever immediately all economic and other relations with that régime, in accordance with those resolutions;
- 10. Condemns the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, and by their exploitation of the human and material resources of the Territory, are undermining the effective implementation of the sanctions imposed so far, and are impeding the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and calls upon the Governments of the States concerned to take all the necessary measures to bring such activities to an end;
- 11. Condemns in the strongest terms the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal of continued support for the illegal racist minority régime in blatant defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions;
- 12. Further condemns the presence of South African armed forces in Southern Rhodesia and the arms aid extended by the authorities of South Africa to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of suppressing the legitimate struggle of the people of Zimbabwe to achieve their freedom and independence;
- 13. Expresses grave concern at the serious threat constituted by the forces referred to in paragraph 12 above to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African States in the area;
- 14. Calls upon the administering Power to ensure the immediate expulsion of all South African armed

- forces from the colony of Southern Rhodesia and to prevent all armed assistance to the rebel régime;
- 15. Strongly condemns the detention and imprisonment of African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia and invites the administering Power to secure their immediate and unconditional release;
- 16. Urges all States, as a matter of urgency, to render all moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe, either directly or through the Organization of African Unity;
- 17. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the need for applying the necessary measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in view of the deterioration of the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia;
- 18. Appeals to the specialized agencies concerned and to other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and, through it, with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia;
- 19. Requests the Secretary-General to promote through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, in order that world public opinion may be sufficiently aware of the grave situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe;
- 20. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to keep the situation in the Territory under review and invites the Secretary-General to report to the Special Committee on the extent of the implementation by Member States of the resolutions of the United Nations relevant to the Territory;
- 21. Calls upon the administering Power to report to the Special Committee on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution;
- 22. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda.

DOCUMENT A/6920

Report of the Fourth Committee on Aden

[Original text: English] [29 November 1967]

- 1. At its 165th meeting, on 20 September 1967, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". At its 167th meeting, on 22 September, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the allocation to the
- Fourth Committee of all of the chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories.
- 2. At its 1564th plenary meeting, on 23 September, the General Assembly, by adopting the recommendations of the General Committee (A/6840), included the item in its agenda and allocated to the Fourth Committee those chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories.
- 3. At its 1706th meeting, on 31 October, the Fourth Committee decided to consider separately the chapter

of the report of the Special Committee relating to Aden (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. VI).

- 4. The Fourth Committee considered this question at its 1729th to 1731st meetings, on 28 and 29 November.
- 5. At the 1729th meeting, on 28 November, the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples introduced the chapter of the report of that Committee concerning Aden (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. VI). Included as an annex to this chapter was the report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden which had been submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) of 12 December 1966.
- 6. In connexion with the consideration of this item, the Fourth Committee had before it: (a) a letter dated 18 March 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/6664); (b) a letter dated 4 April 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/6665); and (c) a letter dated 31 August 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/6828).
- 7. The general debate on the question took place at the 1729th to 1731st meetings, on 28 and 29 November.
- 8. At the 1731st meeting, on 29 November, the Chairman submitted to the Fourth Committee a consensus concerning the question of Aden (see paragraph

9 below). At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the consensus, it being understood that the reservations expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy, Israel and Australia would appear in the records of the Committee.

Recommendation of the Fourth Committee

9. The Fourth Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following consensus:

"Having considered the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Aden (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. VI), including the report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden (*ibid.*, chap. VI, annex III), the General Assembly takes note of that report and expresses its appreciation of the work done by the Special Mission. In wishing peace and prosperity to the Territory on its accession to independence, the General Assembly reaffirms the unity and territorial integrity of the whole Territory, including all the islands as prescribed in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, and considers any action to disrupt the unity and territorial integrity of the Territory as a violation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and of resolution 2183 (XXI). The General Assembly also expresses the hope that the Territory will consolidate its independence in unity and harmony, overcome the problems confronting it in consequence of colonial rule and play a constructive role as a member of the international community.'

DOCUMENT A/6999

Financial implications of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.541/Rev.1

Report of the Fifth Committee

[Original text: English] [15 December 1967]

- 1. At its 1227th meeting on 15 December 1967, the Fifth Committee considered a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1160) and an oral statement by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The Advisory Committee suggested that, in the absence of a detailed work programme for 1968, the General Assembly may wish to approve an additional credit of \$150,000 under section 17 (Special missions) [formerly section 16] of the budget for 1968 to cover the initial requirements of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, on the understanding that the Advisory Committee would be prepared to consider any further needs on the basis of a more detailed work programme for 1968.
- 2. The Fifth Committee decided to inform the General Assembly that, should it approve the proposals contained in draft resolution A/L.541/Rev.1, an additional appropriation of \$150,000 would be required under section 17 of the budget for 1968. Should actual requirements exceed \$150,000, the Advisory Committee would consider these requirements on the basis of the submission of a more detailed work programme for 1968 and under the terms of paragraph 1 of the General Assembly resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1968.

DOCUMENT A/7013

Report of the Fourth Committee on Territories not considered separately

[Original text: English] [18 December 1967]

- 1. At its 165th meeting, on 20 September 1967, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". At its 167th meeting, on 22 September, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the allocation to the Fourth Committee of all the chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories.
- 2. At its 1564th plenary meeting, on 23 September, the General Assembly, by adopting the recommendations of the General Committee (A/6840), included the item in its agenda and allocated to the Fourth Committee those chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories.
- 3. At its 1706th meeting, on 31 October, the Fourth Committee decided to consider, as one item, the chapters of the Special Committee's report concerning the Territories which it would not be considering separately. The Territories concerned and the relevant chapters of the Special Committee's report (A/6700/Rev.1) are set out below:

	Chapter
Equatorial Guinea	VIII
Ifni and Spanish Sahara	IX
Gibraltar	X
Swaziland	XI
French Somaliland	XII
Oman	XIII
Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena	XIV
Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon	
Islands	XV
Niue and the Tokelau Islands	XVI
New Hebrides	XVII
Guam and American Samoa	XVIII
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	XIX
Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru,	
Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea	XX
Brunei	XXI
Hong Kong	XXII
United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands,	
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-	
Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Bermuda,	
Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman	
Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and British	
Honduras	XXIII

- 4. The Committee considered this item at its 1719th, 1737th, 1741st, 1743rd and 1745th to 1755th meetings, between 15 November and 16 December.
- 5. At the 1741st meeting, on 7 December, the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples introduced the relevant chapters of the report of that Committee concerning this item, as listed above.
- 6. The Fourth Committee had before it the following communications addressed to the Secretary-General;
- (a) Letter dated 3 February 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (A/6661);
- (b) Letter dated 3 February 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (A/6662);
- (c) Letter dated 18 September 1967 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations concerning Equatorial Guinea (A/6802);
- (d) Letter dated 28 September 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations concerning British Honduras (A/6845);
- (e) Letter dated 25 October 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations concerning Gibraltar (A/6876);
- (f) Letter dated 30 October 1967 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations concerning Gibraltar (A/6882);
- (g) Letter dated 14 December 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (A/C.4/703);
- (h) Letter dated 14 December 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (A/C.4/704).
- 7. In connexion with the consideration of this item, the Committee granted the following requests for hearings:

Petitioner	Territories concerned	Meeting at which the request was granted
Mr. Philip S. W. Goldson, Leader of the Opposition, British Honduras (A/C.4/694)	British Honduras	1699th
Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga, Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) (A/C.4/695)	Equatorial Guinea	1699th
Mr. George Price, Party Leader, People's United Party (A/C.4/694/Add.1)		1727th
Mr. Jeremiah Gumbs and Mr. Roger Fisher (A/C.4/694/Add.2)	Anguilla	1730th

Petitioner	Territories concerned	Meeting at which the request was granted
Mr. Donald A. Halstead, Vice-President, Antigua Workers Union (A/C.4/694/Add.3) Sir Joshua Hassan, Association for the Advancement of Civil	Antigua	1738th
Rights, and Mr. Peter Isola, Independent Parliamentary Group, elected members, Legislative Council, Gibraltar (A/C.4/702)	Gibraltar	1744th
Mr. Fernando Fugardo and Mr. Pedro Hidalgo (A/C.4/702/Add.1) Mr. Atanasio Ndong Miyone, Secretary-General, Movimiento	Gibraltar	1744th
Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) (A/C.4/695/Add.1) Mr. Francisco Macías Nguema, Vice-Chairman, Consejo de	Equatorial Guinea	1741st
Gobierno Autónomo, leader, Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) (A/C.4/695/Add.2)	Equatorial Guinea	1746th
Mr. Francisco Salomé Jones, Vice-Chairman, Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE) (A/C.4/695/Add.3)	Equatorial Guinea	1746th
Mr. Antonino Eworo Obama, Chairman, Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) (A/C.4/695/Add.4)	Equatorial Guinea	1746th

- 8. At the 1719th meeting, on 15 November, Mr. Philip S. W. Goldson addressed the Committee concerning British Honduras.
- 9. At the 1737th meeting, on 4 December, Mr. C. Lindbergh Rogers made a statement concerning British Honduras on behalf of the People's United Party.
- 10. At the 1743rd meeting, on 8 December, Mr. Jeremiah Gumbs and Mr. Roger Fisher made statements concerning Anguilla and replied to questions put to them by members of the Committee.
- 11. At the 1747th meeting, on 13 December, Mr. Peter Isola, Sir Joshua Hassan, Mr. Pedro Hidalgo and Mr. Fernando Fugardo addressed the Committee concerning Gibraltar and replied to questions put to them by members at that meeting and the 1748th meeting, on the same day.
- 12. At the 1748th meeting, on 13 December, Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga, Mr. Atanasio Ndong Miyone, Mr. Francisco Macías Nguema, Mr. Francisco Salomé Jones and Mr. Antonino Eworo Obama, accompanied by Mr. José Leori Comba, Mr. Tomás Ecoca and Mr. Armando Balboa, appeared before the Committee. At the same meeting, Mr. Macías, Mr. Eworo, Mr. Salomé and Mr. Ndong made statements concerning Equatorial Guinea and they and the other petitioners replied to questions put to them by members of the Committee.
- 13. At the same meeting, Mr. Donald A. Halstead made a statement concerning Antigua and replied to questions put to him by a member.
- 14. The general debate on the item took place at the 1741st, 1743rd, 1745th, 1746th and 1749th to 1753rd meetings, between 7 and 15 December.
- 15. In connexion with the item, the Committee adopted five draft resolutions and a consensus concerning the following Territories:
 - I. Gibraltar
 - II. Ifni and Spanish Sahara
 - III. Equatorial Guinea
 - IV. French Somaliland
 - V. American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada,

- Guam, Mauritius, Montserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands
- VI. Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (consensus)
- 16. An account of the Committee's consideration of the draft resolutions and of amendments thereto as well as of the consensus is given in sections I to VI below.

I. GIBRALTAR

17. A draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, Colombia, Honduras and Panama was circulated on 1 December (A/C.4/L.876). Subsequently, the following Member States became sponsors: Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Syria and Yemen (A/C.4/L.876/Add.1-7). The draft resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the question of Gibraltar,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power and of the representative of Spain,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further the resolution adopted on 1 September 1967 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 215), General Assembly resolutions 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965, and the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964⁶ by the Special Committee,

"Considering that any colonial situation which partially or completely destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and specifically with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

- "1. Regrets the interruption of the negotiations recommended in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI);
- "2. Deplores the holding of the referendum of 10 September 1967 by the administering Power as being a contravention of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and those of the resolution adopted on 1 September 1967 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- "3. Invites the Governments of Spain and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume without delay the negotiations provided for in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population upon the termination of that situation;
- "4. Requests the Secretary-General to assist the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom in the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session."
- 18. On the same day, a draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was also circulated (A/C.4/L.877). The draft resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having examined the question of Gibraltar,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain,

"Recalling its resolutions 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 16 October 1964.7

"Concerned by the actions of the Government of Spain aimed at the interests of the people of Gibraltar in contravention of resolution 2231 (XXI), in particular, the measures aimed at the economy of Gibraltar and the freedom of movement of its people,

"Further concerned by the action of the Government of Spain in declaring a prohibited air zone near Gibraltar in such a manner as to prejudice the holding of the negotiations recommended by resolution 2231 (XXI),

- "Regretting that the negotiations recommended in resolution 2231 (XXI) have not as yet taken place,
- "1. Calls for the termination of the restrictions imposed on free access to Gibraltar and of other measures designed to damage the interests of the population of Gibraltar;
- "2. Takes note of the report submitted by the administering Power in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2231 (XXI) and included in the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the General Assembly (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. X);

- "3. Further takes note of the result of the referendum conducted in Gibraltar on 10 September 1967, according to which the overwhelming majority of the people of Gibraltar have voted in favour of retaining their links with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland rather than passing under Spanish sovereignty;
- "4. Draws the attention of the parties to the provisions of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which the interests of the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territories, including Gibraltar, are paramount, and under which the administering Power has accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to develop self-government and to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions;
- "5. Urges the necessity of avoiding any act which might impede the holding of negotiations in accordance with resolution 2231 (XXI);
- "6. Calls upon the two parties to continue their negotiations, taking into account the freely expressed aspirations and interests of the people of the Territory, and asks the administering Power to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible, and in any case before the twenty-third session of the General Assembly;
- "7. Requests the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the present resolution."
- 19. At the 1764th meeting, on 12 December, the representatives of Norway and Jamaica introduced a draft resolution on behalf of Ceylon, Denmark, Gambia, Iceland, Jamaica, Malta, Norway and Singapore (A/C.4/L.884). The draft resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having examined the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on the question of Gibraltar (A/6700/ Rev.1, chap. X),

"Noting the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 1 September 1967 (ibid., para. 215),

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain,

"Recalling its resolution 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, and the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 16 October 1964,8

"Recalling further its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Regretting the delay in the conclusion of the consultations between the administering Power and Spain, and the consequent delay in the process of decolonization and the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Gibraltar,

"Taking into account the stated readiness of the administering Power and the Government of Spain to resume their negotiations on the question of Gibraltar in accordance with the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI),

"1. Calls upon the two parties to continue their negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of the resolutions referred to in the foregoing, and asks the

administering Power to expedite, without any hindrance and in consultation with the Government of Spain, and taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory, the decolonization of Gibraltar, and to report to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as soon as possible, and in any case before the twenty-third session of the General Assembly;

- "2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to assist in the implementation of the present resolution."
- 20. On 12 December, Algeria, Gabon, Iraq, the United Arab Republic and Uruguay submitted an amendment (A/C.4/L.887) to the nineteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.876 and Add.1-7), by which operative paragraph 2 would be replaced by the following:
 - "2. Declares the holding of the referendum of 10 September 1967 by the administering Power to be a contravention of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and those of the resolution adopted on 1 September 1967 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;".

Subsequently, Cambodia became a sponsor of the amendment (A/C.4/L.887/Add.1).

- 21. On 13 December, Yemen submitted an amendment (A/C.4/L.888) to the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.884), by which the following paragraph would be added as operative paragraph 1:
 - "1. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples concerning Gibraltar and the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 1 September 1967;".
- 22. On 14 December, Guyana submitted an amendment (A/C.4/L.889) to the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.884), by which the following new paragraph would be added as the fourth preambular paragraph:

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,".

- 23. On the same day, Guyana submitted a subamendment (A/C.4/L.890) to the amendment of Yemen (A/C.4/L.888) to the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.884), by which, in operative paragraph 1, the word "Approves" would be replaced by the words "Takes note of".
- 24. At the 1753rd meeting, on 15 December, the sponsors of the nineteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.876 and Add.1-7), accepted the amendment (A/C.4/L.887 and Add.1) submitted by the six Powers, who then became sponsors of the revised draft resolution (A/C.4/L.876/Rev.1).
- 25. At the 1754th meeting, on 16 December, the representative of Norway proposed that the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.884) should be voted on first. The proposal was rejected by a roll-call vote of 62 to 30, with 24 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Ceylon, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Ice-

land, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Against: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Cyprus, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Pakistan, Portugal, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United States of America.

26. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the twenty-five-Power revised draft resolution (A/C.4/L.876/Rev.1) by a roll-call vote of 70 to 21, with 25 abstentions (see paragraph 30 below, draft resolution I). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraugay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Gambia, Guyana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Israel, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, United States of America.

27. At the same meeting, the draft resolutions submitted by the United Kingdom (A/C.4/L.877) and by the eight Powers (A/C.4/L.884) were withdrawn.

II. IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

28. At the 1753rd meeting, on 15 December, the representative of Mali introduced a draft resolution, which was finally sponsored by the following Member

States: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Syria, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (A/C.4/L.893 and Add.1).

- 29. At the 1775th meeting, on 16 December, the Secretary-General submitted, in accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, a statement of financial implication (A/C.4/L.901) concerning this draft resolution.
- 30. At the same meeting, the Fourth Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.893 and Add.1) by a vote of 97 to none, with 3 abstentions (see paragraph 39 below, draft resolution II).

III. EQUATORIAL GUINEA

- 31. At the 1753rd meeting, on 15 December, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced a draft resolution, which was finally sponsored by the following Member States: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Togo, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia (A/C.4/L.894 and Add.1).
- 32. At the 1755th meeting, on 16 December, the Secretary-General submitted, in accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, a statement of financial implications (A/C.4/L.902) concerning this draft resolution.
- 33. At the same meeting, the Fourth Committee adopted the draft resolution by vote of 94 to none, with 6 abstentions (see paragraph 39 below, draft resolution III).

IV. FRENCH SOMALILAND

- 34. At the 1753rd meeting, on 15 December, the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and Sierra Leone introduced a draft resolution, which was finally sponsored by the following Member States: Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia (A/C.4/L.898 and Add.1).
- 35. At the 1755th meeting, on 16 December, the Fourth Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.898 and Add.1) by a roll-call vote of 71 to 1, with 27 abstentions (see paragraph 39 below, draft resolution IV). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United Republic of

Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Portugal.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, India, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

- V. American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Mauritius, Montserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands
- 36. At the 1753rd meeting, on 15 December, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced a draft resolution on behalf of the following Member States: Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia (A/C.4/L.899).
- 37. At the 1755th meeting, on 16 December, the Fourth Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.899) by a vote of 72 to none, with 26 abstentions (see paragraph 39 below, draft resolution V).

VI. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

38. At the 1755th meeting, on 16 December, the Fourth Committee, on the proposal of the representative of Uruguay, approved a draft consensus concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (see paragraph 40 below).

Recommendation of the Fourth Committee

39. The Fourth Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolutions:

Draft resolution I

QUESTION OF GIBRALTAR

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Gibraltar,

Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Recalling further the resolution adopted on 1 September 1967 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 215), General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee,9

Considering that any colonial situation which partially or completely destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with

⁹ Ibid.

the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and specifically with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

- 1. Regrets the interruption of the negotiations recommended in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI);
- 2. Declares the holding of the referendum of 10 September 1967 by the administering Power to be a contravention of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and of those of the resolution adopted on 1 September 1967 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- 3. Invites the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume without delay the negotiations provided for in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population upon the termination of that situation;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to assist the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom in the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

Draft resolution II

QUESTION OF IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

The General Assembly,

Having examined the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. IX),

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also the resolution adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee, 10

Reaffirming its resolutions 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,

Noting that the Spanish Government, as the administering Power, has not yet applied the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV),

Recalling the decision concerning the Territories under Spanish administration taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity as its third ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 1966,

Noting the statement of the administering Power that a high-level dialogue had already begun between the Governments of Morocco and Spain concerning Ifni,

Noting further the statement made by the administering Power on 7 December 1966 relating to Spanish Sahara,¹¹ in particular with regard to the sending of a special United Nations mission to the Territory, the return of exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous population of its right to self-determination,

Considering the consensus adopted by the Special Committee at its meeting of 14 September 1967 (*ibid.*, para. 38),

I

- 1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Ifni to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- 2. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Ifni and endorses the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 14 September 1967;
- 3. Requests the administering Power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, the procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- 4. *Invites* the administering Power to continue the dialogue which has begun with the Government of Morocco, with a view to implementing the provisions of paragraph 3 above;
- 5. Requests the Special Committee to continue its consideration of the situation in the Territory of Ifni and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

H

- 1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Spanish Sahara to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- 2. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Spanish Sahara and endorses the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 14 September 1967;
- 3. Invites the administering Power to determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination, and, to this end:
- (a) To create a favourable climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, democratic and impartial basis by permitting, *inter alia*, the return of exiles to the Territory;
- (b) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that only the indigenous people of the Territory participate in the referendum;
- (c) To refrain from any action likely to delay the process of the decolonization of Spanish Sahara;
- (d) To provide all the necessary facilities to a United Nations mission so that it may be able to participate actively in the organization and holding of the referendum;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately the special mission provided for in paragraph 5 of General Assembly reso-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, chap. IX, para. 112.

¹¹ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Fourth Committee, 1660th meeting, paras. 1-4.

lution 2229 (XXI) and to expedite its dispatch to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum and submitting a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;

5. Requests the Special Committee to continue its consideration of the situation in the Territory of Spanish Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

Draft resolution III

QUESTION OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Equatorial Guinea, Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

Having also heard the statement of the representative of the administering Power,

Having considered the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Equatorial Guinea (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. VIII),

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling further the provisions of its resolutions 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966.

Having noted the constitutional conference which opened in Madrid on 30 October 1967,

- 1. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Equatorial Guinea;
- 2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- 3. Regrets that the administering Power has not yet set a date for the accession of Equatorial Guinea to independence in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Territory;
- 4. Reiterates its request to the administering Power to ensure that the Territory accedes to independence as a single political and territorial entity not later than July 1968;
- 5. *Invites* the administering Power to implement as soon as possible the following measures:
- (a) To ensure full respect for all democratic freedoms;
- (b) To institute an electoral system based on universal adult suffrage and to hold, before independence, a general election for the whole Territory on the basis of a unified electoral roll;
- (c) To transfer effective power to the government resulting from this election;
- 6. Urges the administering Power to reconvene the constitutional conference referred to above in order to work out the modalities of the transfer of power,

including the drawing up of an electoral law and of an independence constitution;

- 7. Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate action, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to ensure the presence of the United Nations in the Territory for the supervision of the preparation for, and the holding of, the election envisaged in paragraph 5 (b) above and to participate in all other measures leading towards the independence of the Territory;
- 8. Further requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the administering Power and to report to the Special Committee on its implementation:
- 9. Decides to maintain the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda.

Draft resolution IV

QUESTION OF FRENCH SOMALILAND

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of French Somaliland (Djibouti),

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and its resolution 2228 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,

Having considered the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to French Somaliland (Djibouti) (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. XII),

Considering the circumstances in which the referendum organized by the administering Power took place on 19 March 1967,

- 1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of French Somaliland (Djibouti) to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- 2. Regrets that the administering Power has not co-operated with the United Nations in the application of resolution 1514 (XV) and did not implement General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI);
- 3. Calls upon the administering Power to create the political conditions necessary for accelerating the implementation of the right of the people to self-determination and independence, including the full exercise of political freedoms, and to allow the return of all refugees to the Territory;
- 4. *Urges* the administering Power to co-operate fully with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and with the United Nations in accelerating the process of decolonization in the Territory and to grant independence to the inhabitants at an early date;
- 5. Requests the Special Committee to continue its consideration of the situation in French Somaliland (Djibouti) and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;
- 6. Decides to keep the question of French Somaliland (Djibouti) on its agenda.

Draft resolution V

Question of American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Mauritius, Montserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Mauritius, Montserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands.

Having examined the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to these Territories (A/6700/Rev.1, chaps. XI, XIV-XVIII, XX and XXIII),

Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2288 (XXII) of 7 December 1967,

Noting the constitutional changes that were introduced in February and March 1967 in the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and St. Lucia and that are envisaged for the Territory of St. Vincent,

Noting further the decision taken by the Special Committee that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and other relevant resolutions continue to apply to these Territories,

Deeply concerned at the information contained in the report of the Special Committee on the continuation of policies which aim, among other things, at the disruption of the territorial integrity of some of these Territories and at the creation by the administering Powers of military bases and installations in contravention of the relevant General Assembly resolutions,

Deploring the attitude of some administering Powers which continue to refuse to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit these Territories,

Conscious that these situations require the continued attention and assistance of the United Nations in the achievement by the peoples of these Territories of their objectives, as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Aware of the special circumstances of geographical location and economic conditions of some of these Territories,

- 1. Approves the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to these Territories;
- 2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of these Territories to self-determination and independence;
- 3. Calls upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
- 4. Reiterates its declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- 5. *Urges* the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance;
- 6. Decides that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status;
- 7. Requests the Special Committee to continue to pay special attention to these Territories and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide all possible assistance in the implementation of the present resolution.
- 40. The Fourth Committee also recommends that the General Assembly should adopt the following concensus:

QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

The General Assembly, having regard to its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and to the consensus approved by the General Assembly on 20 December 1966 concerning the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), takes note of the communications dated 14 December 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General (A/C.4/ 703, A/C.4/704), and, in this connexion and bearing in mind the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. XXIII), approves a consensus in favour of urging both parties to continue the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible. It likewise urges the parties, bearing particularly in mind resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus of 20 December 1966, to keep the Special Committee and the Assembly duly informed during the coming year about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

DOCUMENT A/7019

Administrative and financial implications of draft resolution II submitted by the Fourth Committee in document A/7013

Report of the Fifth Committee

1. At its 1229th meeting on 18 December 1967 the Fifth Committee considered a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1163) on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolution II contained in the report of the Fourth Committee (A/7013, para. 39).

2. Under operative paragraph 4 of section II of draft resolution II, which the Fourth Committee adopted at its 1755th meeting on 16 December 1967, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to appoint immediately the special mission provided for in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI), and to expedite its dispatch to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions. In particular, the special mission would be responsible for determining the extent of the United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum and submitting a report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee. Although provision was made in the 1967 budget for this mission, it did not prove possible to dispatch the mission in that year.

3. On the assumption that the mission would be composed of at least 3 members, accompanied by a supporting staff of 5, and that it would remain in the field for a period of at least three weeks, including time for travel from New York to Spanish Sahara and return and stopovers en route, the related costs are estimated at some \$9,500, as follows:

[18 December 1967] United States dollars Travel and subsistence for 3 members and sup-

[Original text: English]

TOTAL

porting staff of 5 persons 8,000 Miscellaneous supplies and services, including communications 1,500 9,500

- 4. In his statement (A/C.5/1160) concerning draft resolution A/L.541/Rev.1 on the report of the Special Committee, the Secretary-General had informed the Fifth Committee that, should the General Assembly adopt the draft resolution, it would be necessary to make provision, inter alia, for visiting missions of the Special Committee, including visiting missions to certain Territories in Africa. The financial requirements for the visiting mission to Spanish Sahara could be accommodated within the estimate submitted by the Secretary-General in regard to the financial implications of draft resolution A/L.541/Rev.1. Accordingly, as the General Assembly has adopted that draft resolution (resolution 2326 (XXII)) and approved the appropriation required therefor, the Secretary-General would not need to request additional funds in the amount of \$9,500 in the budget for 1968 for the special mission to Spanish Sahara.
- 5. Accordingly, the Fifth Committee decided, without objection, to inform the General Assembly that the proposal contained in draft resolution II submitted by the Fourth Committee would involve no additional expenditure, as a provision has already been approved in connexion with the proposal contained in General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII).

DOCUMENT A/7025

Administrative and financial implications of draft resolution III submitted by the Fourth Committee in document A/7013

Report of the Fifth Committee

[Original text: English] [18 December 1967]

- 1. At its 1229th meeting on 18 December 1967, the Fifth Committee considered a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1164) on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolution III submitted by the Fourth Committee in its report (A/7013, para. 39).
- 2. Under operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, which the Fourth Committee adopted at its 1755th meeting on 16 December 1967, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to take appropriate action, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to ensure the presence of the United Nations in the

Territory of Equatorial Guinea for the supervision of the preparation for, and the holding of, the election envisaged in operative paragraph 5 (b) of the aforementioned draft resolution, and to participate in all other measures leading towards the independence of the Territory. Such a request was made by the General Assembly in its resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, but it has not been possible for the Secretary-General to comply with this request in 1967.

3. In the absence of the necessary details concerning the proposed United Nations presence and pending consultations with the administering Power on the scope and nature of the arrangements to be made, it was not possible for the Secretary-General to furnish the Fifth Committee with any estimate of the costs which might have to be met by the Organization in the event of the adoption of the draft resolution.

4. When the necessary information became available, the Secretary-General would seek the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to meet the expenses involved under

the General Assembly resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1968.

5. The Fifth Committee decided, without objection, to inform the General Assembly that, in the absence of precise information on the costs involved, the Secretary-General should be authorized to meet the expenditures under the resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1968.

DOCUMENT A/C.4/703

Letter dated 14 December 1967 from the representative of Argentina to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish] [15 December 1967]

I have the honour to address you in connexion with General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus approved by the Assembly on 20 December 1966, 2 concerning the question of the Malvinas Islands.

On instructions from my Government, I am pleased to inform you that, following the letter sent by this Permanent Mission on 15 December 1966, ¹⁸ the Government of Argentina has continued negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in accordance with resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus approved on 20 December 1966, with the object of solving the problem of the dispute regarding the Malvinas Islands referred to in the above-mentioned resolution.

As a result, progress has been made towards narrowing the area of divergence between the two Governments. Both Governments are continuing the talks with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement as soon as possible, as recommended by the United Nations, and they hope to report to you on the subject during the course of next year.

On behalf of my Government, I request you to arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Fourth Committee in connexion with item 23 of the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) José María Ruda Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/C.4/704

Letter dated 14 December 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [15 December 1967]

I have the honour to address Your Excellency in relation to resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly and the consensus approved by the Assembly on 20 December 1966, 14 with reference to the problem of the Falkland Islands.

In that respect and on instructions from my Government, I am pleased to inform Your Excellency that, following the letter sent by this Permanent Mission on 15 December 1966, 15 Her Majesty's Government has continued negotiations with the Government of the Argentine Republic in accordance with resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus approved on 20 December 1966, for the purpose of reaching a solution to the problem of the dispute over the Falkland Islands therein mentioned.

As a result, progress has been made towards narrowing the area of divergence between the two Governments. Both Governments are proceeding with the talks

¹² Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6628, para. 13. 13 Ibid., document A/C.4/682.

¹⁴ Ibid., document A/6628, para. 13.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, document A/C.4/683.

with a view to reaching a peaceful solution as soon as possible, as recommended by the United Nations, and hope to report to Your Excellency on the subject during the course of next year.

I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

(Signed) CARADON

Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

DOCUMENT A/C.5/1160

Financial implications of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.541/Rev.1 Note by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [15 December 1967]

- 1. In terms of rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, it will be necessary for the Fifth Committee to report to the General Assembly prior to its decision on agenda item 23 as to the effect on the budget for 1968 of the proposals contained in the draft resolution circulated as document A/L.541/Rev.1, which is presently before the Assembly and is to be read in conjunction with the proposals of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in regard to its future work, as contained in paragraphs 325 to 331 of its report (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. I).
- 2. By operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would approve the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1968, including the sending of visiting missions. This programme of work is described in the aforementioned paragraphs of the report of the Committee.
- 3. In paragraph 328 the Special Committee draws attention to the recommendations contained in the relevant sections and chapters of its report with regard to the sending of visiting missions, to which it attaches special importance, to various colonial Territories and the establishment of a United Nations presence in other Territories in connexion with the exercise by the peoples concerned of the right to self-determination. It is the intention of the Special Committee to pursue these recommendations during 1968 and to continue to seek the co-operation of the administering Powers in that endeavour. In particular the Committee proposes, subject to any decision the General Assembly might take in that regard, to dispatch visiting missions to the Territories in the Caribbean, and in the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas and to certain of the Territories in Africa.
- 4. In paragraph 329 the Special Committee indicates that, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2239 (XXI) concerning the pattern of conferences, it has approved a tentative programme of meetings for 1968 as well as a provisional time-table for 1969. Further, in the context of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which authorized the Special Committee to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its functions, it may consider during 1968 the question of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters.

- 5. In paragraph 330 the Special Committee suggests that, in order to enable it to carry out the tasks envisaged, the General Assembly may wish to endorse the foregoing proposals when it concludes its examination of the question of the implementation of the Declaration at its twenty-second session.
- 6. In paragraph 331 the Special Committee recommends that, in approving the programme of work outlined in that report, the General Assembly should also make adequate financial provision to cover the activities of the Committee during 1968.
- 7. In the estimation of the Special Committee, the sending of visiting missions as envisaged in paragraph 328 of chapter I of its report would give rise to an expenditure of \$80,000, and a series of meetings away from Headquarters, should the Committee decide to meet elsewhere as indicated in paragraph 329, would result in an expenditure of about \$160,000.
- 8. The level of expenditures which might be incurred in 1968 in giving effect to the foregoing proposals cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy pending the formulation of more definite plans for the missions to be dispatched by the Special Committee and a decision regarding whether and where it will hold meetings away from Headquarters. Experience has, however, already been gained in respect of various visiting missions sent by the Committee and by the Trusteeship Council, and in the holding of meetings of the Committee in Africa on previous occasions.
- 9. As far as visiting missions to specific Territories are concerned, for purposes of a provisional cost estimate, it is assumed that each of the visiting missions will consist of 5 representatives and 5 staff members, namely 1 principal secretary, 1 political affairs officer, 1 administrative and finance officer, 1 interpreter and 1 secretary. It has also been assumed that each of these missions will conclude its visit within three weeks. Therefore, on the basis of these assumptions, the total expenditures in 1968 for this purpose may provisionally be estimated as follows:

	United States dollars
Visiting missions to:	
(a) Territories in the Caribbean	15,000
(b) Territories in the Pacific Ocean	25,000
(c) Territories in the Indian Ocean	20,000
(d) Certain Territories in Africa	20,000
Total	80,000

- 10. Paragraph 141 of chapter I of the report indicates that at the outset of its work in 1967 the Special Committee accepted in principle the invitations extended to it by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia to hold meetings at their respective capitals. The Committee further decided to avail itself in 1967 of the invitations received from the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, and to inform the Governments of Ethiopia, Mauritania and Morocco that, subject to their convenience, it would prefer to take advantage of their invitations at a future date. Subsequently, in the light of prevailing conditions in the Middle East in 1967, and having regard to communications made to it in that regard by the representatives of Iraq and Syria, the Committee decided to take advantage of the invitations of their Governments at a future date.
- 11. Should the Special Committee decide to avail itself during 1968 of the five invitations which, as indicated above, it had agreed to take advantage of at a future date, then the amount of \$160,000 proposed by the Committee would seem a reasonable tentative estimate for this purpose.
- 12. It will be recalled that a provision was made under section 16 (Special missions) of the budget for 1967 for purposes similar to those now proposed. In the event, therefore, that the General Assembly should approve the recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee, the Fifth Committee might wish to recommend that similar action be taken in respect of 1968. In that case, the total amount of \$240,000 proposed by the Special Committee would seem reasonable in the circumstances as presently anticipated.
- 13. In operative paragraph 15 of the draft resolution the General Assembly would request the Special Committee, in the performance of its tasks, to take account of the special activities envisaged in connexion with the International Year for Human Rights, and in particular to participate, as it considers appropriate, in the International Conference on Human Rights to be held at Teheran in April 1968. On the assumption that 7 representatives of the Special Committee would attend

- the International Conference on Human Rights, accompanied by 1 principal secretary, 1 political affairs officer and 1 secretary, the expenditures in regard to travel and subsistence are estimated at a total of \$18,500, comprising \$13,700 for representatives and \$4,800 for staff.
- 14. In operative paragraph 20 the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to take concrete measures through all the media at his disposal, including publications, radio and television, to give effect to the provisions of its resolutions 2105 (XX), 2189 (XXI), 2262 (XXII), 2270 (XXII) and 2288 (XXII) concerning the widespread and continuous publicizing of the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization, of the situation in the colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation being waged by the colonial peoples. To meet this request the Secretary-General would propose to issue four special pamphlets in various languages on the matters covered by the relevant resolutions. The cost solely for translation and printing of these pamphlets is estimated at \$44,000. The substantive preparation of these pamphlets will be undertaken within the existing staffing facilities of the Office of Public Information in consultation with the appropriate substantive department concerned.
- 15. Should the General Assembly, therefore, adopt draft resolution A/L.541/Rev.1, the Fifth Committee might wish to inform the Assembly that this would give rise to additional expenditures in 1968 in a total amount of \$302,500 under section 17 (Special missions) [formerly section 16] of the budget for 1968, for the following purposes:

	United States dollars
 (a) Possible meetings of the Special Committee to be held away from Headquarters (b) Visiting missions to Territories in the 	160,000
Caribbean, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in Africa	80,000
the International Conference on Human Rights	18,500
(d) Publication of material covering the work of the Special Committee	44,000
Total	302,500

DOCUMENT A/C.5/1163

Administrative and financial implications of draft resolution II submitted by the Fourth Committee in document A/7013

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [18 December 1967]

1. Under operative paragraph 4 of section II of draft resolution II (see A/7013, para. 39) which the Fourth Committee recommended at its 1755th meeting on 16 December 1967, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to appoint immediately the special mission provided for in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) and to ex-

pedite its dispatch to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum and submitting a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee. Although provision was made in the 1967 budget for this mission, it did not prove possible to dispatch the mission in that year.

2. On the assumption that the mission would be composed of at least 3 members, accompanied by a supporting staff of 5, and that the mission would remain in the field for a period of at least three weeks, including travel time from New York to Spanish Sahara and return and stopovers *en route*, the related costs are estimated at some \$9,500 as follows:

	United States dollars
Travel and subsistence for 3 members and supporting staff of 5 persons	8,000
communications	
Total	9,500

3. In his statement (A/C.5/1160) concerning draft resolution A/L.541/Rev.1 on the report of the Special

Committee, the Secretary-General had informed the Fifth Committee that, should the General Assembly adopt that draft, it would be necessary to make provision, inter alia, for visiting missions of the Special Committee, including visiting missions to certain Territories in Africa. The financial requirements for the visiting mission to Spanish Sahara could be accommodated within the estimate submitted by the Secretary-General in regard to the financial implications of draft resolution A/L.541/Rev.1. Accordingly, as the General Assembly has adopted that draft resolution (resolution 2326 (XXII)) and approved the appropriation required therefor, the Secretary-General would not need to request additional funds in the amount of \$9,500 in the budget for 1968 for the Special Mission to Spanish Sahara.

DOCUMENT A/C.5/1164

Administrative and financial implications of draft resolution III submitted by the Fourth Committee in document A/7013

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original text: English] [18 December 1967]

- 1. Under operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution III contained in document A/7013 and which the Fourth Committee, at its 1755th meeting on 16 December 1967, recommended, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to take appropriate action, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to ensure the presence of the United Nations in the Territory of Equatorial Guinea for the supervision of the preparation for, and the holding of, the election envisaged in operative paragraph 5 (b) of the aforementioned draft resolution, and to participate in all other measures leading towards the independence of the Territory. Such a request was made by the General Assembly in its resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, but it has not been possible for
- the Secretary-General to comply with this request in 1967.
- 2. In the absence of the necessary details concerning the proposed United Nations presence and pending consultations with the administering Power on the scope and nature of the arrangements to be made, it is not possible to furnish the Fifth Committee with any estimate of the costs which might have to be met by the Organization in the event of the adoption of the draft resolution.
- 3. However, in that event the Secretary-General, when the necessary information became available, would seek the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to meet the expenses involved under the arrangements to be approved by the Assembly concerning unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1968.

DOCUMENTS A/L.541/REV.1 AND REV.1/ADD.1*

Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia: revised draft resolution

[Original text: English] [15 December 1967]

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Recalling its resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, 1956

(XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples covering its work on this item during 1967 (A/6700/Rev.1, chaps. I-XXIV) and having adopted resolutions on specific Territories considered by that Committee,

^{*} Document A/L.541/Rev.1/Add.1, dated 16 December 1967, indicated the addition of Dahomey to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution.

Having considered also the relevant report of the Special Committee (A/6868 and Add.1) and General Assembly resolution 2288 (XXII) of 7 December concerning the item entitled "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa",

Taking into account the report of the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa, held at Kitwe, Zambia, from 25 July to 4 August 1967 (A/6818 and Corr.1),

Noting with grave concern that seven years after the adoption of the Declaration many Territories are still under colonial domination,

Deploring the negative attitude of certain colonial Powers which refuse to recognize the right of colonial peoples to self-determination, freedom and independence and, in particular, the intransigence of the Government of Portugal, which in defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations persists in perpetuating its oppressive foreign domination, and of the Government of South Africa, which flagrantly repudiates the validity of General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967,

Concerned at the policy followed by colonial Powers of promoting the systematic influx of foreign immigrants and displacing, deporting or transferring the indigenous inhabitants in violation of the economic and political as well as the basic human rights of these people,

Bearing in mind that the continuation of colonialism and its manifestations, including racism and apartheid, and the attempts of some colonial Powers to suppress national liberation movements by repressive activities and the use of armed force against colonial peoples are incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Deploring the attitude of certain States which, in disregard of the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Special Committee, continue to co-operate with the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and with the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia, which are continuing to repress the African peoples,

Convinced that further delay in the speedy and effective implementation of the Declaration remains a source of international conflicts and differences, which are seriously impeding international co-operation and endangering world peace and security,

Recalling its resolution 13 (I) of 13 February 1946 concerning the public information activities of the United Nations and the relevant provisions of its resolutions 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, 2262 (XXII) of 3 November 1967, 2270 (XXII) of 17 November 1967 and 2288 (XXII) of 7 December 1967, stressing the need for large-scale and continuous publicizing of the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization, of the situation in the colonial Territories and of the con-

tinuing struggle for liberation being waged by the colonial peoples,

Recalling its conviction that the celebration in 1968 of the International Year for Human Rights, including the holding of the International Conference on Human Rights, will contribute significantly to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

- 1. Reaffirms its resolutions 1514 (XV), 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII), 1956 (XVIII), 1970 (XVIII), 2105 (XX) and 2189 (XXI);
- 2. Notes with satisfaction the work accomplished by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and expresses its appreciation to the Special Committee for its efforts to secure the complete and effective implementation of the Declaration;
- 3. Approves the report of the Special Committee covering its work during 1967 and urges the administering Powers to give effect to the recommendations contained therein and to take all other necessary steps for the implementation of the Declaration and the relevant United Nations resolutions;
- 4. Approves the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1968, including the sending of visiting missions, the study of military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration, and the review of the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies;
- 5. Reiterates its declaration that the continuation of colonial rule threatens international peace and security and that the practice of apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination constitute a crime against humanity;
- 6. Reaffirms its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the colonial peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and notes with satisfaction the progress made in the colonial Territories by the national liberation movements, both through their struggle and through reconstruction programmes, and urges all States to provide moral and material assistance to them;
- 7. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have so far given, and requests them to increase their economic, social and humanitarian assistance to the refugees from Territories under colonial domination;
- 8. Requests all States, directly and through action in the international institutions of which they are members, including the specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind from the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and from the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;
- 9. Draws the attention of all States to the grave consequences of the development in southern Africa of the entente between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia, the activities of which run counter to the interests of international peace and security, and calls upon all States, particularly the main trading partners of the entente, to withhold any support or assistance to the members of the entente;

- 10. Requests the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones and from using those that still exist to interfere with the liberation of the peoples in colonial Territories in the exercise of their legitimate rights to freedom and independence;
- 11. Once again condemns the policies, pursued by certain administering Powers in the Territories under their domination, of imposing non-representative régimes and constitutions, strengthening the position of foreign economic and other interests, misleading world public opinion and encouraging the systematic influx of foreign immigrants while displacing, deporting and transferring the indigenous inhabitants to other areas, and calls upon those Powers to desist from such manœuvres:
- 12. Requests the Special Committee to continue to perform its task and to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which have not yet attained independence;
- 13. Requests the Special Committee to make concrete suggestions with a view to assisting the Security Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations with regard to developments in colonial Territories which are likely to threaten international peace and security, and recommends the Council to take such suggestions fully into consideration;
- 14. *Invites* the Special Committee, whenever it considers it proper and appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people and the provisions of the Declaration;
- 15. Requests the Special Committee, in the performance of its tasks, to take account of the special activities envisaged in connexion with the International Year for Human Rights and in particular to participate, as it considers appropriate, in the International Conference on Human Rights to be held at Teheran in April 1968;
- 16. Requests the Special Committee to examine the compliance of Member States with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries

- and Peoples and other relevant resolutions on the question of decolonization, particularly those relating to the Territories under Portuguese domination, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;
- 17. Invites the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence;
- 18. Urges the administering Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee by permitting access to the colonial Territories by visiting missions, in accordance with decisions previously taken by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee;
- 19. Requests the Special Committee to consider and submit recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session regarding the holding early in 1969 of a special conference of representatives of colonial peoples for the purpose, inter alia, of considering the most effective means by which the international community can intensify its assistance to them in their efforts to achieve self-determination, freedom and independence;
- 20. Requests the Secretary-General to take concrete measures through all the media at his disposal, including publications, radio and television, to give effect to the provisions of its resolutions 2105 (XX), 2189 (XXI), 2262 (XXII), 2270 (XXII) and 2288 (XXII) concerning the widespread and continuous publicizing of the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization, of the situation in the colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation being waged by the colonial peoples;
- 21. Requests the administering Powers to co-operate with the Secretary-General in promoting the large-scale dissemination of information on the work of the United Nations in the implementation of the Declaration;
- 22. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all the financing and facilities necessary for the implementation of the present resolution.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

At its 1594th plenary meeting, on 3 November 1967, the General Assembly took note of the decision of the Fourth Committee (A/6884, para. 11) to transmit to the Chairman of the Sixth Committee, in connexion with that Committee's consideration of agenda item 87 (Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations), the statements made by the representative of South Africa at the 1697th and 1704th meetings of the Fourth Committee, on 19 and 27 October 1967.

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 92 to 2, with 18 abstentions, adopted the draft resolution submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/6884, para. 12). For the final text, see resolution 2262 (XXII).¹⁶

At its 1613th plenary meeting, on 30 November 1967, the General Assembly adopted the consensus concerning Aden, as set forth in the report of the Fourth Committee (A/6920, para. 9).

At its 1636th plenary meeting, on 16 December 1967, the General Assembly, by a vote of 86 to 6, with 17 abstentions, adopted the draft resolution submitted by thirty-eight Powers (A/L.541/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1). For the final text, see resolution 2326 (XXII).¹⁶

¹⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16.

At its 1641st plenary meeting, on 19 December 1967, the General Assembly, by a vote of 73 to 19, with 27 abstentions, adopted draft resolution I submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/7013, para. 39). For the final text, see resolution 2353 (XXII).¹⁶

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 113 to none, with 4 abstentions, adopted draft resolution II submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/7013, para. 39). For the final text, see resolution 2354 (XXII).¹⁶

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 111 to none, with 5 abstentions, adopted draft resolution III submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/7013, para. 39). For the final text, see resolution 2355 (XXII). 16

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 86 to 1, with 29 abstentions, adopted draft resolution IV submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/7013, para. 39). For the final text, see resolution 2356 (XXII).¹⁶

At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 86 to none, with 27 abstentions, adopted draft resolution V submitted by the Fourth Committee (A/7013, para. 39). For the final text, see resolution 2357 (XXII).¹⁶

At the same meeting, the General Assembly adopted the consensus concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), as set forth in the report of the Fourth Committee (A/7013, para. 40).

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 23 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.

	ion of agenda item 23 which are not reproduced in the present lastic	.10.
Document No.	Title or description	Observations and references
A/6700/Rev.1	Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples	Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23
A/6701/Add.1	Introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (16 June 1966-15 June 1967)	Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A
A/6818 and Corr.1	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the International Seminar on <i>Apartheid</i> , Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa	Mimeographed
A/6840	First report of the General Committee	Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Annexes, agenda item 8
A/6845	Letter dated 28 September 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary- General	Ibid., agenda item 9
A/6851/Rev.1	Allocation of agenda items for the twenty-second session	Replaced by A/6851/Rev.2
A/6851/Rev.2	Allocation of agenda items for the twenty-second session	Mimeographed. For the printed text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, p. v
A/6868 and Add.1	Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples	Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- second Session, Annexes, agenda item 24
A/6941	Letter dated 21 November 1967 from the representative of Bulgaria to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/6985	Letter dated 11 December 1967 from the representatives of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/6994	Letter dated 12 December 1967 from the Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/7030	Letter dated 18 December 1967 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/7036	Note verbale dated 11 January 1968 from the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/7037	Note verbale dated 12 January 1968 from the Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/7038	Note verbale dated 12 January 1968 from the Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.

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Document No.	Title or description	Observations and references
A/7049	Note verbale dated 24 January 1968 from the Permanent Mission of Poland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/7056	Note verbale dated 15 February 1968 from the Permanent Mission of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/7063	Note verbale dated 2 March 1968 from the Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly	Ibid.
A/AC.109/	Documents of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples	Documents in this series are mimeographed
A/C.4/691 A/C.4/694 and Add.1	Request for a hearing concerning Southern Rhodesia Requests for hearings concerning British Honduras	Mimeographed Ditto
A/C.4/694/Add.2	Request for a hearing concerning Anguilla	Ditto
A/C.4/694/Add.3 A/C.4/695 and Add.1-4	Request for a hearing concerning Antigua Requests for hearings concerning Equatorial Guinea	Ditto Ditto
A/C.4/702 and Add.1	Requests for hearings concerning Gibraltar	Ditto
A/C.4/L.870	Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia: draft resolution	Replaced by A/C.4/L.870/ Rev.1
A/C.4/L.870/ Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1	Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia: revised draft resolution	Replaced by A/C.4/L.870/ Rev.2
A/C.4/L.870/ Rev.2	Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia: revised draft resolution	Adopted without change. See A/6884, para. 12
A/C.4/L.871 A/C.4/L.876 and Add.1-7	Draft report of the Fourth Committee on Southern Rhodesia Argentina, Bolivia, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Syria and Yemen: draft resolution	Same text as A/6884 See A/7013, para. 17
A/C.4/L.876/ Rev.1	Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Syria, United Arab Republic, Uruguay and Yemen: revised draft resolution	Adopted without change. See A/7013, para. 39, draft resolution I
A/C.4/L.877	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution	See A/7013, paras. 18 and 27
A/C.4/L.884	Ceylon, Denmark, Gambia, Iceland, Jamaica, Malta, Norway and Singapore: draft resolution	Idem, paras. 19 and 27
A/C.4/L.887 and Add.1	Algeria, Cambodia, Gabon, Iraq, United Arab Republic and Uruguay: amendment to document A/C.4/L.876 and Add.1-7	Idem, paras. 20 and 24
A/C.4/L.888	Yemen: amendment to document A/C.4/L.884	Idem, para. 21
A/C.4/L.889	Guyana: amendment to document A/C.4/L.884	Idem, para. 22
A/C.4/L.890	Guyana: amendment to document A/C.4/L.888	Idem, para. 23
A/C.4/L.893 and Add.1	Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Syria, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia: draft resolution	Adopted without change. See A/7013, para. 39, draft resolution II
A/C.4/L.894 and Add.1	Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Togo, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia: draft resolution	Idem, draft resolution III
A/C.4/L.898 and Add.1	Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia: draft resolution	Idem, draft resolution IV

Document No.	Title or description	Observations and references
A/C.4/L.899	Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia: draft resolution	Idem, draft resolution V
A/C.4/L.901	Administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/L.893: note by the Secretary-General	Mimeographed
A/C.4/L.902	Administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/L.894: note by the Secretary-General	Ditto
A/C.4/L.905	Draft report of the Fourth Committee on Territories not considered separately	Same text as A/7013
A/L.541	Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia: draft resolution	Replaced by A/L.541/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1

(Part I)*

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



ANNEXES TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Official Records

Agenda item 23: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

DOCUMENT A/6700/REV.1

Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

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^{**} The present version of chapters I to IV is a consolidation of the text of the following documents as they appeared in mimeographed form: A/6700 (part II), dated 5 December 1967: A/6700 (part II), dated 2 October 1967; A/6700/Add.1 and Corr.1, dated 27 September and 12 October 1967; and A/6700/Add.2, dated 31 October 1967. For a check list of relevant documents, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23.

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

5 December 1967

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith to the General Assembly, in accordance with resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This report covers the work of the Special Committee during 1967.

The report of the Special Committee concerning the "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination" which was the subject of operative paragraph 20 of the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution has previously been circulated in document A/6868 and Add.1.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) John W. S. Malecela Chairman

His Excellency U Thant Secretary-General United Nations New York

CHAPTER I*

ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

- A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
- 1. The General Assembly, at its fifteenth session, by resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
- 2. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly considered the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration and adopted resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, by which it established a Special Committee of seventeen members to examine the application of the Declaration, to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration and to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session. The Special Committee was directed "to carry out its task by employment of all means which it will have at its disposal within the framework of the procedures and modalities which it shall adopt for the proper discharge of its functions".
- 3. At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee, adopted resolution 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, by which it enlarged the Special Committee by the addition of seven new members. It invited the Special Committee "to continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all territories which have not yet attained independence".
- 4. At the same session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on the question of South West Africa, requested the Special Committee to discharge mutatis mutandis the tasks assigned to the Special Committee for South West Africa by resolution 1702 (XVI) of 19 December 1961. By resolution 1806 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, the General Assembly decided to dissolve the Special Committee for South West Africa.
- 5. The General Assembly, at its eighteenth session, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee,² adopted resolution 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963. In this resolution, it requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek the best ways and means for the immediate and total application of the Declaration to all Territories which have not yet attained independence, and to report to the General Assembly not later than at its nineteenth session".
- 6. At the same session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 on the Committee to continue its efforts with a view to dis-

question of South West Africa, requested the Special

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700 (part I). The list of delegations in annex III to that document appears at the end of the present report as an annex.

charging the tasks assigned to it by resolution 1805 (XVII).

- 7. The General Assembly at the same session, by resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, decided to dissolve the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and requested the Special Committee to study the information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations. It also requested the Special Committee to take this information fully into account in examining the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration in each of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and to undertake any special study and prepare any special report it might consider necessary.
- 8. At its nineteenth session, the General Assembly was unable to consider the report of the Special Committee on its work during 1964.3 The Special Committee, however, continued to discharge its mandate during 1965 in the context of the declaration made by the President at the 1330th plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, on 18 February 1965, to the effect that the General Assembly should for its own official records note that reports relating, inter alia, to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had in fact been received and that those bodies which had continuing responsibilities such as the Special Committee should continue to function. subject to the agreed budgetary limits for 1965.
- 9. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, following its consideration of the reports of the Special Committee,⁴ adopted resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965. In this resolution it requested the Special Committee "to continue to perform its task and to continue to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of resolution 1514 (XV) to all Territories which have not yet attained independence".
- 10. The General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee,⁵ adopted resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966.

For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

11. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted a number of other resolutions assigning certain specific tasks to the Special Committee. Among these were the following resolutions concerning the items indicated:

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238.

² Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1.

³ At its nineteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2005 (XIX) on 18 February 1965, authorizing supervision by the United Nations of the elections which were to be held in the Cook Islands in April 1965.

⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8, document A/5800/Rev.1; ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1.

⁵ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6300/Rev.1.

Resolution No.	Adopted on	Item
2134 (XXI)	29 September 1966	Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland
2138 (XXI)	22 October 1966	Southern Rhodesia
2144 (XXI)	26 October 1966	Violation of human rights and fundamental free- doms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all coun- tries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and Territories
2145 (XXI)	27 October 1966	South West Africa
2146 (XXI)	27 October 1966	Petitions concerning South West Africa
2151 (XXI)	17 November 1966	Southern Rhodesia
2183 (XXI)	12 December 1966	Aden
2184 (XXI)	12 December 1966	Territories under Portuguese administration
2185 (XXI)	12 December 1966	Fiji
2200 (XXI)	16 December 1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
2202 (XXI)	16 December 1966	Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa
2226 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Trust Territory of Nauru
2227 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea
2228 (XXI)	20 December 1966	French Somaliland
2229 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Ifni and Spanish Sahara
2230 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Equatorial Guinea
2231 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Gibraltar
2232 (XXI)	20 December 1966	American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Mauritius, Montserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands
2233 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations
2234 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories
2235 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Consolidation and integration of the special educational and training programmes for South West Africa, the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration and the educational and training programme for South Africans
2236 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa
2237 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration
2238 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Oman
2239 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Pattern of conferences

12. At the 1500th plenary meeting, on 20 December 1966, the President of the General Assembly announced the nomination of Finland to fill the vacancy created by the withdrawal of Denmark from the membership of the Special Committee. The Special Committee therefore is composed of the following twenty-four members:

Iran
Iraq
Italy
Ivory Coast
Madagascar
Mali
Poland

Sierra Leone

Syria

United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland
United Republic of Tanzania

Tunisia

United States of America
Uruguay
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Venezuela
Yugoslavia

13. This report covers the work of the Special Committee for the period 9 February 1967 to 5 December 1967 during which it held 89 plenary meetings, including thirty-two meetings away from Headquarters. In the same period its working group and sub-committees held over 100 meetings.

B. Opening of the Special Committee's meetings in 1967

14. The first meeting of the Special Committee in 1967 (484th meeting), held on 9 February, was opened by the Secretary-General.

Opening statement by the Secretary-General

- 15. The Secretary-General said he was very glad to have the opportunity of being present at the opening meeting of the session of the Special Committee. It gave him much pleasure to extend a warm welcome to all the representatives, and in particular to the representative of Finland, the newest member of the Committee.
- 16. As members would recall, he had had occasion to make the following remarks in the introduction to his last annual report on the work of the Organization:
 - "The extent to which decolonization has progressed in the last few years serves only to underline the anomaly of the fact that several million people are still subject to colonial rule—and, worse still, that most of these live under régimes which offer them no hope of an early and peaceful emancipation. It must be admitted that, while the United Nations has been in the forefront of support for the principle of self-determination, and while it has done much to encourage and at times to assist the emergence of dependent peoples, it has so far failed to provide or facilitate effective solutions to the several difficult and serious colonial problems which remain."
- 17. It had been with great interest that he had noted during the debate in the General Assembly at its twenty-first session concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that that assessment corresponded with the views of the majority of the Members. A large number of Members had observed, as he himself had done, that the failure of the United Nations in regard to the problems referred to had not been due to lack of concern or effort. Rather, as they had pointed out, that failure had been principally due to the non-compliance of certain administering Powers with the relevant United Nations resolutions, and to the reluctance of some others to extend their full co-operation in giving effect to those resolutions.
- 18. That, then, was the context in which the General Assembly, in its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, had requested the Special Committee to continue to perform its tasks and to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which had not yet attained independence. In amplification of that mandate, the General Assembly had invited the Committee, whenever it considered it proper and appropiate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory, to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to make any concrete suggestions to the Security Council which might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures regarding developments in dependent Territories which might threaten international peace and security.
- 19. The increasing concern of the United Nations at the delay in the implementation of the Declaration, as also the wide consensus existing among Members with regard to questions of decolonization, had been equally

- manifest in the proceedings of the Fourth Committee during the twenty-first session. Impelled by that concern, the Fourth Committee, as it had done during the twentieth session, had given separate attention not only to the more serious and difficult colonial problems but also to many other individual questions, the special character of which required careful examination. In consequence, it had become possible for the Assembly, on the recommendation of that Committee, to adopt a number of specific resolutions which, taking account of the peculiarities of each situation, outlined in concrete terms the measures and procedures required in particular Territories for the attainment of the objectives laid down in the Charter and in the Declaration.
- 20. It went without saying that the work of the Special Committee in that regard would include following up and supervising the implementation of those resolutions, reviewing the situation in each Territory, carrying out other tasks as requested by the Assembly, and, in the light of developments, recommending further measures as appropriate for the speedy application of the Declaration. In addition, there were a number of specific points arising from other resolutions of the General Assembly and from previous decisions taken by the Committee itself to which members would wish to give attention in establishing the Committee's programme of work for the year. That programme of work would undoubtedly be strenuous; furthermore, many of the problems which the Committee was called upon to examine had themselves increased both in difficulty and gravity.
- 21. The question of Southern Rhodesia, the universal and serious concern regarding which was registered in the resolutions recently adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, was one of those problems. When it took up that question, the Special Committee would, he was sure, be guided, as it had been in the past, by the need to secure rapid and positive movement towards a solution in keeping with the aspirations of the people of the Territory.
- 22. Concerning South West Africa, members were of course aware that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa was examining the practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence. As the Secretary-General had stated elsewhere, the question of South West Africa also remained the concern of the Special Committee within the context of the implementation of the Declaration, and would no doubt receive the attention of the Committee as appropriate.
- 23. With regard to the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, no progress could be recorded in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Considering that the need to enable the peoples of those Territories to exercise fully and in freedom their right to self-determination and independence was more imperative than ever, he was certain that the question would be the subject of further examination by the Special Committee.
- 24. On Aden, his consultations in regard to the appointment of a special mission, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI), were still in progress. It was his confident hope that the work of the proposed mission would be of assistance to the Special Committee and the General Assembly in

⁶ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6301/Add.1), p. 11.

enabling the people of Aden to attain independence in conditions of peace and harmony.

- 25. The emphasis placed by the General Assembly on the importance of sending a special mission to Aden was, in his judgement, a reflection of the widely held conviction that the United Nations could play an increasingly useful role in bringing dependent Territories to independence. It was in line with that conviction that stress was laid, in the General Assembly's resolutions on Fiji and on Territories in the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, on the sending of visiting missions. In that connexion, it would be pertinent to reiterate that, especially with respect to the small Territories, visiting missions had an indisputable value; they were a means of securing adequate information on conditions in the Territories and on the views, wishes and aspirations of their inhabitants.
- 26. As a further indication of the role envisaged for the United Nations by the majority of Members, it was also noteworthy that on French Somaliland, Ifni and Spanish Sahara and Equatorial Guinea the relevant General Assembly resolutions called for various forms of participation by the United Nations in the processes involved in the exercise by the inhabitants of those Territories of their right to self-determination. He was in communication with the administering Powers concerned regarding the discharge of the mandate entrusted to him by the General Assembly in those resolutions, and he would of course report to the Special Committee and the General Assembly on developments in that regard.
- 27. In conclusion, he wished to express to the Special Committee his best wishes for the success of its work and the earnest hope that the necessary co-operation would be made available by the administering Powers. He was as conscious of the magnitude and difficulty of the tasks facing the Committee in 1967 as he was convinced of their importance. He was, however, confident that the Committee's work during the year would represent a further positive contribution towards the realization by dependent peoples of their aspirations to freedom and independence.

Election of officers

28. At its 484th meeting, on 9 February 1967, the Special Committee unanimously elected the following officers:

Chairman:

Mr. John W. S. Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania)

Vice-Chairmen:

Mr. Kadhim Khalaf (Iraq) and

Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela)

Rapporteur:

Mr. Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary (Iran)

Statement by the Chairman

- 29. The Chairman said that he considered his election an indirect tribute to Mr. Julius Nyerere and to the Government and People of Tanzania for the vigorous struggle which they had never ceased to wage against colonialism.
- 30. Recalling that the task of decolonization was still unfinished, as a large part of the human race, particu-

- larly in Africa, was still subjected to merciless oppression, he pointed out that that situation was due to the non-co-operation of certain colonial Powers. Portugal, in particular, remained adamant, while the practice of cruelty and massacre was being intensified against the African people of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The South African racists also were persisting in their brutal suppression of the aspirations of the people of South West Africa. Although the question of South West Africa had that year been referred more particularly to an Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly, it still remained within the realm of the Special Committee. It was therefore to be hoped that the latter would maintain its vigilance on the problem and give the Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa its fullest co-operation.
- 31. In Southern Rhodesia, the situation could only be described as tragic, because the issue at stake was the possible establishment in Africa of another apartheid régime. The way in which the United Kingdom Government had reacted to the situation in Southern Rhodesia was regrettable, especially as more than a year had passed since the unilateral declaration of independence and no concerted effort had been made by the United Kingdom Government to put down the rebellion. The Tanzanian delegation wished to reiterate that the proposed sanctions would never work in Southern Rhodesia. The whole question of Southern Rhodesia had to be approached realistically, because the Smith régime would never fall without the use of force. For the Africans, it was a question not of the white racists' power of resistance but of the moral obligations the United Nations had towards 4 million Africans. That moral consideration should supersede all other considerations and, in particular, all kinds of relationships, whether economic or military.
- 32. The situation in Aden seemed to be the reverse of that in Southern Rhodesia, and he hoped that the members of the Committee would give that question the full attention it deserved.
- 33. In the case of the Territories administered by Spain, the Committee had witnessed a new departure in its work, namely, an invitation by Spain to visit one of the Territories administered by it. The results had so far been encouraging. In particular, that new trend had encouraged the General Assembly to call for more of that co-operation between the Special Committee and the administering Powers. He therefore took that opportunity to appeal to those Powers to agree to the sending of visiting missions to the various colonies—for example, to the numerous islands in the Caribbean. He personally was convinced that the process of decolonization would as a result be considerably accelerated.
- 34. In 1965 at Addis Ababa, Mr. Coulibaly, then Chairman of the Special Committee, had appealed to the Security Council to meet in Africa. He himself wished to renew that appeal and ask the Council seriously to consider meeting in Africa during 1967 to examine the many African problems, especially the Rhodesian problem. It would be more advantageous for that important organ of peace to meet near the roots of the trouble if it was to help Africa avoid becoming the scene of bitter conflict.
- 35. He wished to pay a tribute to Ambassador Collier, the outgoing Chairman, whose untiring devotion to the cause of decolonization would never be forgotten. After expressing his appreciation to the representatives of Chile and Iraq, the outgoing Vice-

President and Rapporteur, respectively, and to the Danish delegation, which was no longer a member of the Committee, and after welcoming the representative of Finland and the new Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, he said that he would endeavour—in particular, by organizing as many consultations as possible at all levels—to achieve the widest possible agreement within the Committee in order to solve the grave problems still remaining.

C. Organization of work

- 36. The Special Committee discussed the organization of its work for the year at its 484th to 487th meetings.
- 37. The Chairman recalled that the Special Committee had decided to hold two sessions in 1967, the first ending on 31 May and the second lasting from 17 July to 25 August. In order to assist the Committee, he wished to make some suggestions that might be referred to the Working Group for consideration, together with the views expressed by members.
- 38. Regarding the scope of its work, the Committee might wish, in addition to the assignments referred to it by the General Assembly in the relevant resolutions, to consider on its own initiative some problems of special interest. Referring in particular to operative paragraphs 12 and 20 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) and operative paragraph 1 (b) of Assembly resolution 2160 (XXI), he mentioned two matters on which the Committee might decide to undertake a study. These were "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination" and the role of military activities and arrangements by the colonial Powers which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration. It was pursuant to a recommendation of the Special Committee (A/6300/ Rev.1, chap. III, para. 1134 (f)) that the General Assembly had decided to include in the agenda of its twenty-second session an item concerning the activities of foreign economic interests in colonial Territories.
- 39. The Working Group should be constituted and might be requested to submit recommendations without delay, regarding the order of priority of items to be considered in plenary meeting, bearing in mind the views expressed by members and taking into consideration the nature of recent developments in the various Territories, especially in the Caribbean area.
- 40. It might also be desirable for the Working Group to consider recommending that the Special Committee should maintain Sub-Committees I, II and III and request them to begin their work immediately. In addition to their existing terms of reference, the Special Committee might ask them to carry out the specific duties assigned by the General Assembly concerning the items referred to them. Any special studies which the Special Committee might decide to undertake could probably be referred to Sub-Committee I. The Sub-Committees might also be requested to submit specific recommendations without delay regarding the sending of visiting missions to the Territories with which they were concerned.

- 41. Any visiting missions that the Special Committee might dispatch to the various Territories should be sent before the third week of April 1967, whether the Territories were those studied by sub-committees or those which the Special Committee had discussed in plenary meeting the previous year. In either case account should be taken of the forthcoming special session of the Assembly, the decision previously taken by the Special Committee regarding its programme of meetings, and the further series of meetings which it might hold in Africa shortly.
- 42. For some of the missions, namely those to be sent to Aden, Equatorial Guinea, Spanish Sahara and French Somaliland, consultations were called for between the Secretary-General and the administering Powers and, as appropriate, with the Special Committee. It was to be hoped that the Secretary-General would report to the Special Committee on those matters at an early date.
- 43. The Special Committee would also have to decide on the establishment or prolongation of various sub-committees. Regarding Fiji, the Chairman would make the necessary arrangements for the appointment of a sub-committee in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). He intended to begin appropriate consultations with the administering Power and to make an announcement as early as possible.
- 44. Concerning Aden, the Special Committee might wish to maintain the existing Sub-Committee and to request it to keep the situation in that Territory under continuous review. On Oman, the Special Committee could consider whether to set up a sub-committee to examine the situation in the Territory on the basis of General Assembly resolution 2238 (XXI) and to submit recommendations to the Special Committee.
- 45. The Chairman recalled the possibility of the Special Committee holding another series of meetings in Africa in 1967. There were indications that invitations might be extended by some Governments, and the Special Committee would no doubt wish to refer them to the Working Group for its consideration.
- 46. Finally, referring to resolution 2202 (XXI), in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to organize as soon as possible an international conference or seminar on the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa, he observed that the Special Committee would be called upon to express its views on certain matters relating to the organization of the proposed seminar and the participation of the Special Committee itself. The Working Group might also be requested to submit recommendations thereon.
- 47. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, at the outset of another year, the Special Committee should devote a certain amount of time to taking stock of what had been achieved and analysing the problems and tasks facing it. The continuation of colonialism was a challenge to all the freedom-loving and peace-loving forces of the world. Human freedom was indivisible, and colonialism was the enemy of freedom. Today, the threat to freedom and peace represented by colonialism was more serious than ever. In Africa, especially the southern part of Africa, colonialism was taking on a particularly dangerous form. It was manifested in the illegal régimes of the racist white minority in Southern Rhodesia, the prophets of apartheid in South Africa and South West Africa and the Portuguese aggressors in Mozambique

and Angola. Those forces, which in their turn were tools of international imperialism, represented a threat not only to peace in southern Africa but also to international peace and security in general.

- 48. Although their activities had been condemned by the freedom-loving peoples of the world and in countless United Nations resolutions, the Portuguese colonialists continued to flout the basic principles of the Organization and persisted in their criminal war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea. It was able to do so only because of the hypocritical attitude of its military allies which, while professing allegiance to the principles of freedom and peace, supplied Portugal with weapons. Meanwhile, their nationals exploited the resources of the Territories. Foreign financial monopolies, in order to safeguard their super-profits, co-operated with the Portuguese in impeding the attainment of independence by the Territories. Although those monopolies might be private undertakings, the Western countries where they originated, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, profited indirectly from the sweat and blood of the African peoples. Exports from the Territories helped to reinforce the economic structures of the industrialized nations of the West. Some of the financial monopolies were making direct cash contributions, amounting to millions of escudos, toward the Portuguese war effort in Angola and Mozambique, and thus contributing to the crime against humanity being perpetrated by the Portuguese aggressors. The legitimate rights of the African peoples to freedom and independence were being denied and a threat to international peace and security was being perpetuated, particularly as the Portuguese imperialists were aiding and encouraging the illegal racist white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.
- 49. The continuation of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was another source of danger for peace, security and freedom in southern Africa. The racist minority, having obtained control of the Territory by means of the notorious 1961 Constitution, which had been imposed by the United Kingdom against the wishes of the people, remained in power, and the current situation in Southern Rhodesia was simply a prolongation of colonialism. Despite eloquent statements by representatives of the administering Power, all measures which would have put an end to the racist régime had been frustrated, and responsibility for the continued sufferings of the African people of Zimbabwe lay with the United Kingdom Government. Although the heroic people of Zimbabwe, who were in the front line of the struggle against the forces of colonialism and racism, must play the main role in bringing about their liberation, the United Nations could do its part to help them achieve their goal. Part of the Committee's task during 1967 should be to study all the different elements of the Southern Rhodesian situation.
- 50. It was true that resolutions had been adopted calling for selective mandatory sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian régime. His delegation had always maintained that sanctions as proposed by the United Kingdom would not be effective. To put an end to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, force must be used, the racist minority must be isolated from its Portuguese and South African allies and the so-called rebellion must be crushed. As the Secretary-General had noted in his opening address, the failure of the Organization to resolve colonial problems had been due mainly to the non-compliance of certain administering Powers with

- relevant United Nations resolutions and the reluctance of others to co-operate fully with the United Nations. His delegation also fully supported the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee should undertake a study of the role of foreign interests in impeding the attainment of independence by the peoples of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese domination and other colonial Territories. The activities of such financial interests were coordinated with those of the colonial Powers and formed part of a plan to establish neo-colonialism in the Territories concerned.
- 51. In South West Africa, the Pretoria régime was resorting to neo-fascist methods in suppressing the people. Although the question of South West Africa was under study by the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa, his delegation considered that the Special Committee must still undertake the task of making an over-all analysis of the situation in that Territory and formulate its own recommendations which could be adopted in conjunction with those that might be submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee.
- 52. His delegation welcomed the proposal in General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI) for a seminar on the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa. In its view, apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism were all aspects of a single system. The Committee should consider the possibility of creating an ad hoc sub-committee to propose guidelines for that undertaking. He also hoped that the Chairman would, without delay, enter into consultations with the Secretary-General regarding the venue and other arrangements for the seminar.
- 53. He fully supported the Chairman's suggestions regarding those various matters. He would also like to suggest that the Office of Public Information should devote more attention to the dissemination of information concerning developments in colonial Territories.
- 54. Turning to the immediate question of the organization of the Special Committee's work, he supported the Chairman's view that certain recent developments called for urgent action. The announcement by the United Kingdom of preparations to convert the British colonies in the Caribbean into what were termed "associated States" was highly disturbing. The United Kingdom had not kept the United Nations fully informed of its intentions regarding the Territories concerned. The Committee should take into account the urgency of the situation and consider whether a mission should be sent to the area.
- 55. The colonial Powers had so far failed to implement the General Assembly resolutions on the dismantling of military bases in colonial Territories. He strongly supported the suggestion that a special study should be devoted to the question.
- 56. His delegation had always favoured the sending of visiting missions to colonial Territories. To secure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Committee must be given facilities for visiting such Territories and appraising itself of the situation there. He welcomed the co-operation shown by the Spanish Government in that regard. The decision of the United Kingdom Government finally to agree to a mission to Aden was welcome. He hoped that the Committee would seek still more co-operation from the administering Powers in that respect.

- 57. His delegation would support a proposal for the Committee to hold some meetings in Africa during 1967.
- 58. The representative of *Syria* fully agreed with the Chairman that the Committee should pursue the study of specific aspects of colonialism with a view to helping the Assembly implement resolution 1514 (XV). The decision of the Assembly in resolution 2189 (XXI) to include in the agenda of its twenty-second session an item concerning the activities of foreign economic and other interests in colonial Territories was particularly important, and the Sub-Committee which dealt with such activities should resume its useful work without delay.
- 59. Almost all United Nations resolutions relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories emphasized the need to dismantle military bases established by the colonial Powers against the wishes of the people. The independence of such Territories could never be genuine until such sources of overt or covert coercion disappeared. The administering Powers, however, when they actually acknowledged that such bases existed, described them as small and benign military installations or as staging posts for port facilities. In view of the situation, the question of military bases should be studied by a special sub-committee.
- 60. The Sub-Committee on Aden should keep the situation in that Territory under constant review; it seemed that no real improvements had taken place since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) and that the administering Power was still determined to consolidate its grip on the Territory. Similarly, the United Kingdom's complete disregard of United Nations resolutions on Oman meant that the situation in that Territory was deteriorating; it was therefore urgently necessary for a sub-committee on Oman to be established, particularly since oil exploitation was about to begin in that Territory.
- 61. The change in the composition of the Sub-Committee on Petitions might perhaps be accompanied by a clarification of the terms of reference of that body. In his view, the Sub-Committee had full competence to scrutinize petitions and the status of petitioners. It was inconceivable that the Sub-Committee should serve any purpose contrary to that of the Special Committee, namely, decolonization.
- 62. In conclusion, his delegation strongly supported sending visiting missions to Non-Self-Governing Territories, organizing seminars on specific items and holding a further series of meetings in Africa. The Special Committee's visits to Africa were now a well-established tradition, and the Syrian people and Government would be most grateful if the Special Committee decided to accept their invitation to visit Damascus. He agreed that the Special Committee should visit Africa during the first part of its session although he felt that the Chairman and the Working Group should make specific recommendations on the time-table for the visit.
- 63. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation fully agreed with the Secretary-General and the Chairman that in 1967 the Committee should make new efforts to secure immediate implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It should make full use of the right granted to it by the General Assembly to recommend dates for the independence of colonial Territories, it should make recommendations to the Security Council to help it

- settle situations in dependent Territories threatening international peace and security and it should give attention to the situation of the so-called small colonial Territories. His delegation also agreed with the Secretary-General that the failures of the United Nations in decolonization were not its fault, but were due to the unwillingness of the colonial Powers to carry out the Declaration, to their opposition to other United Nations resolutions and to their determination to maintain colonial domination in their own economic and strategic interests. The Committee should therefore make a special point of reviewing the application of resolutions already adopted by the United Nations.
- 64. His delegation fully supported the Chairman's statement on the tasks facing the Committee in 1967 and the organization of its work. It agreed that the Commission should concentrate on the decolonization of Africa, keeping a watch on the course of events in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa and on imperialist and colonialism manœuvres and making appropriate recommendations where necessary. That did not mean, however, that it should neglect other matters, such as the decisions taken by the General Assembly on Aden, Oman and other small colonial Territories, or, in general, any resolutions designed to help the struggle of colonial peoples for their rights, freedom and independence. Such resolutions included the General Assembly's appeals to Member and non-member States, especially the NATO Powers, and to the specialized agencies and their member States not to grant any aid, whether military, economic, financial or other, to Portugal, South Africa or Southern Rhodesia until they renounced their policy of racial discrimination and colonial supremacy. The Committee should consider as soon as possible the question of compliance by IBRD and IMF with the General Assembly's recommendation that no loans be granted to South Africa or Portugal. The Committee did not know how those various resolutions were being applied. The Secretariat should be asked to provide it with information showing which countries were complying with the resolutions and which were not and what diplomatic, economic and other ties countries maintained with the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The whole world would then know where those régimes got their support.
- 65. His delegation supported the Chairman's proposal that the Committee should consider the consequences of the activities of international monopolies in South West Africa, the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia and other colonial Territories. The Committee had prepared reports on the activities of monopolies in South West Africa, Angola and Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, but they had not included the latest data and had not contained information on other colonial Territories. It was therefore most desirable that a general report on the subject should be submitted to the General Assembly. The Soviet Union also agreed with the Chairman's proposal to consider military and related activities of the colonial Powers in dependent Territories. Such activities were becoming more and more important. The colonial Powers not only had not dismantled their military bases and installations in colonial Territories, as recommended by the General Assembly, but were taking steps to expand them. Such behaviour was an obstacle to self-determination and created a threat that the Territories might be used for aggression against independent States and for the suppression of independence movements. The colonial-

ists claimed that their military bases were no obstacle to independence, but the way they used their military bases on Guam and Ascension Island, in Aden and elsewhere showed that claim to be false. The Committee should supply the General Assembly with material showing the true nature of colonial military activity in dependent Territories.

- 66. His delegation supported the Chairman's proposal that missions should visit small colonial Territories to study the local situation and determine the wishes of the people regarding their future. The Committee should not permit neo-colonialist decisions on such Territories and should prevent the colonial Powers from absorbing them under the guise of "association" or "integration". Such missions would also help to reveal the effects of the presence of military bases and the nature of military action taken to suppress independence movements. His delegation also agreed with the Chairman's proposal that the question of an international conference or seminar on apartheid should be entrusted to a working group and with his proposals concerning the work of the sub-committees.
- 67. In 1966 the Committee had not been able to take a decision on the Cuban proposal to include the question of Puerto Rico in its agenda. Further delay would be inadmissible; the Committee should take a decision on the substance of the matter in 1967. Another question to which the Committee should give attention was the General Assembly's recommendation that all United Nations channels should be used to publicize United Nations activities in the field of decolonization, the struggle of oppressed peoples to win freedom and the reasons preventing implementation of the Declaration. The situation at present was not satisfactory. Accomplices of the colonialists used their influence to prevent publicity about the achievements of the United Nations and to whitewash the policy of the colonial Powers. The Committee should study the matter thoroughly and recommend improvements.
- 68. At its twentieth and twenty-first sessions the General Assembly had taken a number of important decisions in which it had recognized the legality of the struggle of colonial peoples for freedom and independence, had declared colonialism, apartheid and racism to be crimes against mankind and had condemned the policy of the colonial Powers. Those resolutions had given substantial political support to the peoples in question. In their struggle to eliminate colonialism their own efforts and the support given them by the many States opposing imperialism and colonialism were of vital importance. At the same time, the United Nations and particularly the Special Committee, could play a useful role. The forces of imperialism and colonialism did not want to surrender their positions in the remaining colonial Territories and resorted to various cunning devices to maintain their domination. It was the duty of the United Nations to unmask the colonialists' plots, protect the interests of enslaved peoples and do everything possible to assist them in their struggle. The Soviet Union, which had gone through a great revolution to secure equality and end the exploitation of man by man, would continue to give full support to peoples oppressed by imperialism and colonialism.
- 69. The representative of *India* said that since the establishment of the Special Committee only thirteen former colonies had been restored to freedom and independence—hardly a satisfactory record. Moreover, the Special Committee could not really consider

that it alone had been responsible for the independence of those thirteen territories. However, while not spectacular, its work was essential if only because it served as a constant reminder to the colonial Powers that it was their sacred obligation to transfer power to the true representatives of the people and to allow the people to determine their own future in accordance with their own wishes. The Special Committee also provided a forum which enabled those suffering under the colonial yoke to voice their grievances and obtain moral support.

- 70. He endorsed the suggestions which the Chairman had made at the previous meeting regarding the organization of the Special Committee's work and hoped that the Committee as a whole would accept them so that it could take up its substantive work as soon as possible. He agreed that the working Group should be established without delay and that Sub-Committees I, II and III should be maintained. While it was true that Mauritius would very probably become independent during 1967, he felt that Sub-Committee I should be maintained, since it had achieved some sort of expertise in economic matters; it would therefore be appropriate if the item on the activities of foreign economic and other interests in colonial Territories, which the General Assembly was to discuss at its twenty-second session, were assigned to that subcommittee.
- 71. He agreed with the comments made by the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* concerning the Office of Public Information. While the Office had been doing useful work in the field of decolonization, he felt that it could do still more. He had been surprised to learn during the Special Committee's visit to Africa in 1966 that the Prime Minister of Mauritius had been unaware of where the Special Committee was to hold its meetings, since he had been led to believe that the Committee's programme had been well publicized in advance.
- 72. He endorsed the suggestion made by the representative of Syria that the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee on Petitions should be defined more clearly. He fully agreed with the Secretary-General that visiting missions had an indisputable value, especially in the case of small Territories, because they were a means of securing adequate information on conditions in the Territories and on the wishes of their inhabitants. His delegation's views on the question of holding meetings in Africa remained unchanged.
- 73. The representative of *Poland* said that at each session of the Special Committee members were reminded that the task of decolonization was still incomplete. However, he was deeply convinced that the process of liberation of colonial peoples could not be stopped or reversed and that, with the help of all progressive forces, such peoples would finally free themselves and regain their rightful place among sovereign nations. Naturally, the decisive role would be played by the people themselves; however, the tempo of decolonization had to be speeded up and conditions had to be created so that decolonization could take place without unnecessary bloodshed and misery. To that end, the United Nations, and in particular the Special Committee, had an outstanding role to play. All avenues should be explored and all means used to exert pressure on the colonial Powers trying to counteract and halt the process of liberation.
- 74. He had been particularly interested by the suggestions made by the Chairman. Certainly, the Special

Committee should concentrate on the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. It was therefore advisable for the work of the Committee to be organized so as to ensure that developments in Non-Self-Governing Territories could be followed up and, if necessary, action taken. In his view, the most effective method would be to create an adequate number of permanent or ad hoc sub-committees to examine particular problems or Territories. Attention had been drawn to the problem of the small Territories. In view of all the difficulties deriving from the geographical location, size and limited economic potential of such Territories, it was all the more necessary to ensure that proper recommendations were made for their future development. Visiting missions could be particularly useful in that respect and the Committee should therefore repeat its appeal to administering Powers to allow such missions to visit the Territories under their administration.

- 75. General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) had made it clear that the establishment of military bases and installations in colonial Territories was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In addition, General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) had requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories, and to refrain from establishing new ones and from using those that still existed to interfere with the liberation of the peoples in colonial Territories in the exercise of their legitimate rights to freedom and independence. He therefore fully supported the proposal that the Committee should undertake a study of the military activities and arrangements of the colonial Powers which might be impeding the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). Also of great importance was the proposal that the Committee should undertake a study on the activities of foreign economic and other interests impeding the implementation of that resolution in colonial Territories. With all its accumulated knowledge and experience, the Committee could and should produce a comprehensive report for the next session of the General Assembly.
- 76. In conclusion, he hoped that the views expressed in the Special Committee would be taken into account by the Working Group; the Working Group should be able to examine during the present session those matters which had not been taken up at the previous session.
- 77. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that his delegation agreed with the ideas and suggestions concerning the Committee's work advanced by the Chairman and the Secretary-General in their statements. The Committee's work would also be facilitated by the decisions taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.
- 78. While it was true that decolonization was proceeding only slowly, the reason was not that the Committee had neglected its work. The slowness of the pace was actually due to the fierce opposition of those who sought to safeguard their own interests, sometimes at the cost of the blood of patriots and the sweat of oppressed peoples. The responsibility of the administering Powers had been emphasized also by the Secretary-General. In those circumstances, the Committee must ensure that its activities were more and more closely associated with the struggle of the colonial peoples themselves. In particular, it must continue vigorously to combat the colonialist policies of certain

- States and certain organizations which rendered assistance to the colonialists and the policies of those who, by their attitudes, encouraged the arbitrary actions of racist minorities.
- 79. One of the ways in which the Committee could draw nearer to the oppressed peoples would be to hold a session in Africa in 1967, in accordance with a practice already established. Meetings in Africa would give the Committee an opportunity to increase its awareness of the tragedy of the colonized peoples, and at the same time to make a detailed study of the progress achieved and of the continuing obstacles to the implementation of United Nations decisions on such important questions as Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa.
- 80. His delegation also supported the proposal that the Security Council should be requested likewise to hold a session on African soil. Such a session would be especially useful, in that its results could be coupled with those of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on South West Africa.
- 81. Nothing must be left undone to foil the schemes of the colonial Powers, and with that end in view his delegation believed that the Special Committee, at the present stage of its work, should set itself the primary goal of taking measures to compel those Powers to facilitate the implementation of the decisions taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session and, very recently, by the Security Council.
- 82. In view of the fact that at the twenty-first session the General Assembly had devoted particular attention to conditions in the smaller colonial Territories and the dearth of information about them, his delegation shared the view that visiting missions should be sent to those Territories for the purpose of establishing direct contact with the local inhabitants and their representatives.
- 83. The Committee should also undertake a study of the activities of foreign economic interests in South West Africa, the Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia, and in all the Territories under colonial domination, and submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly.
- 84. The question of military bases in colonial Territories should also be studied by the Committee, which should determine to what extent such bases had an adverse effect on the outcome of the liberation struggle of the peoples of those Territories and should make recommendations on the subject. In particular, the Special Committee could establish direct contact with international organizations and the specialized agencies, requesting them to supply it with information concerning measures taken or evisaged to implement United Nations recommendations on the cessation of economic. financial and technical aid to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia and to various Powers which were seeking to strengthen their domination over certain Territories. In that connexion, stress must be laid on the great importance of implementation by the specialized agencies of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence.
- 85. Under General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI), the Committee was to take an active part in the preparation and organization of a conference or seminar on the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa. In that connexion, his delegation wished to underline the importance of publicizing the struggle being waged by the

naitonal liberation movements and the constructive action being taken in the regions liberated by revolutionary movements, and also the role which the United Nations, and in particular the Committee, might play in that respect. It supported the proposals made by the representative of India concerning the part which the United Nations Office of Public Information should take in giving world-wide publicity to the struggle of the colonial peoples. A large section of the Press sought to conceal the truth from world opinion. It would therefore be proper for the Office of Public Information to become more active in the dissemination of information on the peoples' struggle for national liberation and on the sessions of the Special Committee and other bodies dealing with the question. It might be helpful if the Chairman or one of the other officers of the Committee were to contact the Office of Public Information with a view to making the necessary arrangements.

- 86. The representative of *Venezuela* observed that, as the Committee advanced towards the elimination of colonialism, it encountered increasingly complex problems, particularly in combating certain colonial practices which were an affront to the most elementary principles of universal morality.
- 87. His delegation had noted with great interest the Chairman's suggestions regarding the organization of the Committee's work. The dispatch of visiting missions was a practice which his delegation had always favoured. The question of the United Nations presence in French Somaliland called for a special comment, namely, that some degree of priority should be given to it, as a referendum was to be held in the Territory on 19 March 1967.
- 88. Visiting missions were an essential factor in the Committee's work and provided it with information of the highest importance on developments in the Territories with which it was concerned. While not wishing to attach more importance to one visiting mission than to the rest, he felt that the mission to Aden called for special mention. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the question of dispatching such a mission had been raised as a matter of urgency, owing to the political disturbances which had occurred in the Territory and the repressive measures which had been taken. It was disquieting to note that, more than a month after the Assembly had concluded its work, it had still not been possible to appoint the visiting mission and its dispatch would apparently have to be further delayed. He hoped that the Chairman could report on the status of the consultations and on any obstacles to the dispatch of a mission which, in his delegation's opinion, should be in the Territory already.
- 89. With regard to the visiting missions to other Territories, he shared the Chairman's hope that they would be dispatched as soon as possible, so that the information needed for the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its next session could be collected in good time.
- 90. With respect to the order in which the different Territories should be considered, his delegation thought that, if the Committee was unable to act immediately on the General Assembly's recommendations to it regarding the larger Territories, such as Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese administration and South West Africa, it could profitably begin a consideration of the smaller Territories of which it had not yet been able to make a thorough study.

- 91. His delegation agreed with the suggestion that the existing sub-committees should be maintained and that they must start their work as soon as possible. The Sub-Committees and the Working Group played an essential part in the work of the Committee.
- 92. The representative of the United States of America said that the members of the Committee were becoming increasingly aware of the difficulties of applying to small Territories the same methods as were used in the consideration of larger Territories. His delegation sincerely believed that those methods needed to be reviewed and that the Committee, in studying the situation in those Territories, should be guided by the aspirations of their people. It was because of the small size and remoteness of some Territories that their people appeared to be hesitant about their own future. The Committee should not place itself in the position of appearing to impose a status which the peoples of the smaller Territories might be reluctant to choose. They nevertheless had the right to determine their political status and their choice must be an educated one.
- 93. His delegation supported the Chairman's proposal that the three regional Sub-Committees which had been in operation the previous year should be reconstituted. It suggested that each sub-committee should continue to be responsible for serving a specific region and that the studies required by the Special Committee should be allocated to the three sub-committees on that geographical basis.
- 94. On another matter which had been the subject of proposals, his delegation firmly believed that travel by the Committee should be limited to such travel, in connexion with meetings away from Headquarters and the possible dispatch of missions, as represented the best means of accomplishing the tasks for which it was responsible. It would be strongly opposed to travel which would not only waste the limited funds of the United Nations but might jeopardize the Special Committee's reputation by suggesting that its work was not of the serious nature expected of it. His delegation would express its views on the question of travel when specific proposals were submitted to the Special Committee. For the present it urged representatives to take a careful and selective approach to that question.
- 95. Turning to another matter, he said that, since Puerto Rico had been mentioned, he was obliged to repeat his Government's position, which was that the Territory was a self-governing one whose status had been confirmed by the General Assembly and that there was therefore no reason for the Special Committee to deal with it.
- 96. In conclusion, he said that the problems which the Special Committee would have to tackle were not new. The fact that they had already been under attack for several years should not, however, give rise to any pessimism. The United Nations could, in fact, feel satisfied with the steps taken in 1966, such as the establishment of a Special Committee to deal with South West Africa, the adoption of a programme of mandatory sanctions with a view to ending the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia and the agreement on sending a United Nations mission to Aden.
- 97. His delegation was prepared to contribute in every possible manner to resolving the problems before the Committee. It believed that peoples everywhere were entitled to govern themselves in an atmos-

phere of social justice and political and economic freedom. Moreover, the United States believed that it was in its national interest to promote the application of the principles of freedom and self-determination, since the manner in which existing tensions were handled at the international level significantly affected the long-term prospects for world stability and peace.

98. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation wished to reiterate its disappointment at the fact that the Committee had been unable to achieve more since it was established. When its work began, it was dealing with about sixty Territories, of which it still had fifty-two left. Although that state of affairs was not the fault of the Committee, but of the administering Powers which had not applied all the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the Committee should nevertheless seek to increase the pace of attaining self-determination.

99. The Chairman had spoken of visiting missions. It was by means of such missions that the peoples of the various Territories, and the administering Powers concerned, could present their case fully to the Special Committee. A number of administering Powers, including Spain and the United Kingdom, had agreed to the sending of missions to the Territories administered by them and others should be urged to follow their example. His delegation would also like to know what progress had been made in the implementation of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly concerning Aden. It urged administering Powers in general, and Australia, Spain, the United States, France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, in particular, to co-operate with the Secretary-General, so that the Committee might know what missions could proceed during the current session and so that missions would have sufficient time available to report to it in July.

100. The Chairman had suggested that Sub-Committee I might deal with an item which was on the agenda for the twenty-second session of the General Assembly entitled "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination". His delegation agreed with that suggestion, as Sub-Committee I was familiar with the subject and that material would enable it to expand the scope of the work it had already done on Rhodesia.

101. Similarly, a study of the role of military bases in impeding progress towards self-determination and independence might be undertaken either by a special group or by a sub-committee whose work programme was less heavy than the others. His delegation left it to the Chairman to choose the sub-committee concerned.

102. His delegation would like visiting missions to be sent to the smaller Territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean, to which the Special Committee had not given sufficient attention in 1966, and would like the sub-committees concerned to begin their study of those Territories at an early date. The problems peculiar to them were acute and the Committee should devote as much attention to them as to the Territories in southern Africa.

103. On the subject of South West Africa, which had also been mentioned, his delegation believed that,

even if some aspects of the Special Committee's work were being considered specifically by other United Nations bodies, the Committee should also keep them under review.

104. He drew the Committee's attention to operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which concerned the list of Territories referred to in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He thought that the Committee should attempt to decide in 1967 which Territories to include in its agenda. With regard to operative paragraph 14 of the same resolution, he pointed out that some members had always resisted any attempt by the Committee to make suggestions to the Security Council, stating that it was not within the Committee's province to do so. He hoped that, as a result of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), the Committee would no longer be impeded in respect of such action and would be better able to help the Security Council and the Secretary-General than it had been in the past.

105. It was always difficult to decide on priorities, but the order should be determined in the light of the visits which the Committee would either make itself or entrust to missions, the interests of the peoples of the Territories and recent developments there. While the questions of southern Africa and Aden were, of course, particularly important, the smaller Territories should also be borne in mind.

106. Finally, the Committee should try during the current session to carry out all the tasks specifically entrusted to it by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

107. The representative of *Italy* supported most of the remarks made by the Chairman at the opening meeting, especially those concerning the importance of the work of the Sub-Committees, at least in the first stage of the Committee's work. He felt that the results achieved by sub-committees in previous years had been excellent.

108. In 90 per cent of the cases, the slow progress of the various Territories towards self-determination and independence was not necessarily due to ill-will on the part of the administering Power, but rather to built-in factors, such as political or ethnic divisions, economic difficulties and the small size or sparse populations of certain Territories. The Committee must therefore devote its attention to that specific and, in some cases, very difficult problem. It must request the co-operation of the administering Powers, but must also be ready to give them advice and guidance.

109. He agreed with the Polish representative that the Committee must guide the Territories in their progress towards self-determination and independence by showing them the best way to obtain genuine freedom from colonial rule, which meant helping them to solve their political and constitutional problems and to obtain the economic assistance they needed if they were not to become the prey of a new imperialism.

110. With regard to visiting missions, he suggested that the Committee should abandon the method of asking the administering Powers to grant a general consent to the sending of missions to Territories under their administration. It would be better if, whenever the Committee judged it necessary to send a mission to a specific Territory, the Chairman were to hold informal consultations with the administering Power and report the result of his negotiations to the Committee.

- 111. With respect to the planned session in Africa or the Middle East, he believed that it was too early to take any decision even of a general nature. Once the Committee had received invitations from Member States, it would be able to decide whether it was possible to visit each of the inviting countries without the journey becoming too long, too expensive or too taxing for members of the Committee. Moreover, to avoid any appearance of discourtesy, it should be made clear in advance that it might be impossible for the Committee to accept all the invitations extended to it.
- 112. He did not regard the holding of a session away from Headquarters as a sort of climax to the Committee's work. If the Committee took that view, it might fail to realize the urgency of the work it had to do at Headquarters. He hoped that most of that work would be concluded before 31 May so that the summer session might be devoted to a very limited number of items and to the adoption of the report to the General Assembly.
- 113. In conclusion, he assured the Chairman of his delegation's continuing devotion to the cause of decolonization and of its support for him in his new functions.
- 114. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* stated in answer to the United States representative's statement concerning Puerto Rico, that in his delegation's view Puerto Rico was indeed a colonial Territory. Its people should therefore have the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination under the auspices of the United Nations.
- 115. The representative of *Madagascar* said that in view of the importance the United Nations attached to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it was regrettable that certain Powers were refusing to respect the principles of the Charter and were doing nothing to facilitate the implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions.
- 116. In view of the effectiveness of the work done during the previous session by the sub-committees and ad hoc committees of the Special Committee, he would agree that such committees should be maintained. He welcomed the fact that some Powers had agreed to allow missions to visit the Territories under their administration, and hoped that before such missions left for the smaller Territories the information services of the United Nations would keep the Committee informed of political developments there. In conclusion, his delegation favoured holding another series of meetings in Africa in 1967.
- 117. The representative of Yugoslavia said that there were still no grounds for optimism regarding a settlement of colonial problems in conformity with General Assembly resolutions and in a manner which would satisfy the legitimate interests of the peoples concerned. Regrettably, many Territories were still deprived of the fundamental right to freedom and independence. Moreover, the peoples of colonial Territories, like the United Nations itself, were faced with the organized resistance of the colonial Powers and their allies, which were attempting by means of pressure and intervention not only to impede the process of decolonization but also to expand their political, economic and strategic positions. That was especially true of southern Africa, where racism, colonial wars and other forms of repression were preventing the indigenous peoples from achieving freedom and independence.

- 118. He thanked the Secretary-General for the great interest he had shown in the problems of decolonization. He fully supported the Chairman's suggestions regarding the organization of the Committee's work; however, he felt that African colonial problems warranted special attention. A study of the activities of foreign monoplies and other economic interests in colonial Territories would no doubt bring to light the reasons why such monopolies were preventing the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and would be of great assistance to the Assembly when it considered that question at its twenty-second session.
- 119. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, his delegation had suggested that the Special Committee might consider the possibility of summarizing its studies on the Portuguese colonies in a single document which would be translated into various languages, including Portuguese, and be widely circulated in order to mobilize world public opinion with a view to finding a solution to the problems of those colonies. Another important colonial issue which should be reviewed by the Special Committee was the question of Aden.
- 120. His delegation had devoted special attention to the question of the small Territories, and had always supported the dispatch of visiting missions to examine the situation prevailing in such Territories. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the Yugoslav delegation had suggested that the Special Committee might consider the possibility of convening a conference, under United Nations auspices, of representatives of the small Territories. Such a conference would enable representatives of the people of those Territories to describe their problems and propose appropriate solutions, on the basis of which the United Nations would be able to work out a broad action programme.
- 121. The military bases established in some Non-Self-Governing Territories against the will of the peoples concerned were a serious obstacle to the liberation of the colonial peoples and a means of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Since the General Assembly, at both its twentieth and twenty-first sessions, had requested the dismantling of such bases, his delegation supported the suggestion that the question of military bases should be given special attention by the Committee. On the question of holding another series of meetings in Africa, his delegation's views remained unchanged.
- 122. The representative of *Iran* said that the eradication of colonialism was an immense task, which was bound to take time. However, steady progress was being made towards that goal, and at the same time the Committee was helping to lay the foundations for new nations. The Committee should seek inspiration for its tasks by maintaining direct contacts with the peoples involved. It could thus derive confidence from the support of those peoples, while they in turn would be encouraged by the knowledge that they were not alone in their struggle for freedom and justice.
- 123. It was in that light that he viewed the questions relating to visiting missions, the establishment of a United Nations presence to supervise the exercise of self-determination in particular Territories, and the holding of meetings in Africa. The Committee had already received a certain measure of co-operation from some of the administering Powers, and he welcomed the policy pursued by the Spanish Government in that

respect, as also the change in the United Kingdom's attitude regarding the dispatch of a mission to Aden. He hoped that a similar attitude would be shown by all administering Powers with regard to other Territories, such as Fiji and the Territories in the Caribbean.

124. The dissemination of information, a matter which had been raised by other speakers, was also an instrument for focusing attention on the plight of subjugated peoples. However, he did not share the view that the Office of Public Information had been remiss in the performance of its duties; it had acquitted itself well in 1966 and he was confident that it would do even better in 1967.

125. The Committee should devote a major share of its attention to problems which concerned international peace and security in addition to the right to selfdetermination and independence, particularly the questions of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Portuguese Territories and Aden. Despite the Security Council's decision to apply economic sanctions against the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia, no progress had yet been achieved towards returning that Territory to its rightful owners, the Zimbabwe people. The Committee should also feel free to take up the question of South West Africa when it deemed it appropriate, although that question was currently under consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese domination, he hoped that the Committee would be able to offer new proposals for stronger action by the General Assembly to overcome Portugal's intransigence. On the question of Aden, he shared the anxiety expressed by other speakers. He sincerely hoped that the special mission called for by the General Assembly in resolution 2183 (XXI) would be appointed soon, so that it could proceed to the Territory without further delay.

126. With regard to the question of small Territories, he considered that the sub-committees should begin work without delay, in order to be able to give those Territories the attention they deserved. On that and other matters, he supported the suggestions made by the Chairman.

127. The representative of Australia said that although there were some quite deep philosophical differences within the Committee, he thought that there was an identity of aims among members. At the time of the drafting of the United Nations Charter, the Australian delegation had been among the most zealous in supporting the inclusion of the provisions concerning Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories. The aims of members of the Special Committee regarding independence, self-determination and the protection of the rights of the peoples of the Territories were the same, and while there might be differences in approach, it was the Committee's task to harmonize those differences to promote the common goal.

128. He recalled that the Chairman had referred to General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) and suggested that the Committee might make a study of activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding the progress of colonial Territories to independence. A report to the General Assembly on the results of such a study could constitute a really important document, and he would suggest that for that reason the Committee should be careful in sifting the evidence brought before it. What was required was a sound economic study based on hard facts and

statistics, not a polemical document. He also hoped that controversial doctrinaire views would not be injected into the report. His delegation, for example, saw no reason why foreign economic investment in certain forms should not be in the interests of the people of dependent Territories. The Committee should not allow preconceived views on such matters to colour its judgements. The only consideration should be the interests of the people of the Territories and the matter in which they themselves interpreted those interests.

129. He had some reservations about the Chairman's suggestion that all special studies should be referred to Sub-Committee I; experience suggested that detailed studies could best be carried out by a Sub-Committee which devoted its attention to a particular region. He would support what had been said by the representatives of India and Syria regarding the Sub-Committee on Petitions. During 1966, the Sub-Committee's work had not proceeded in an altogether satisfactory manner. The Sub-Committee had been unable to devote adequate time to the consideration of petitions, and there had sometimes been inexplicable delays between the Sub-Committee's approval of a petition for circulation and its actual circulation to the Special Committee. In at least two instances, petitions which might have altered the course of a debate had been delayed and had not been before the Special Committee at the time of its decision on the Territory concerned.

130. He agreed with the view that visiting missions could be of value, but they were impossible without the full co-operation of the administering Power. The administering Power was responsible for the Territories which it administered, and its decision as to the acceptability of a mission must necessarily be governed by many factors. The wishes and interests of the people of the Territory must also be a paramount consideration.

131. There were circumstances in which visiting missions could be very helpful; the proposed mission to South Arabia might have a great influence in helping the people of that area to reach independence, which they were about to attain in any case, with a minimum loss of life. On the other hand, unwelcome visits could antagonize the people of a Territory and make it difficult for the administering Power to bring them to full self-determination.

132. With regard to the possibilities of meetings of the Special Committee in Africa, he would suggest that the Committee should try to arrange its programme on a practical basis. He realized that it was difficult to refuse invitations, but he thought that the paramount consideration should be the practical usefulness of visiting a particular city. By keeping its aims within practical bounds, the Committee would be fulfilling the responsibility it shared with other organs of the United Nations to keep down costs.

133. The representative of *Tunisia* said the Committee's work was helped by the fact that its responsibilities had been clearly defined in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and would also be helped by the advice the Secretary-General had offered at the beginning of the session. However, the time had come for the Committee to ask itself whether it had really made any progress, and whether it should continue to repeat what it had done in previous years. It had proclaimed the rights of subject peoples and condemned the atrocious conduct of the colonialists, but

that had not stopped the colonial Powers from perpetrating their crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the Committee should not despair. The colonial Powers had become so used to the Committee's discussions and resolutions that they no longer took the trouble to vote against the latter in the General Assembly. They merely abstained, which was damaging to the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations and insulting, in particular, to the Special Committee. If the Committee was to fail, it would mean the failure of the Organization as a whole and of its Members, who adopted resolutions that they were powerless to apply.

134. The Committee must make concrete and effective proposals to the General Assembly for hastening the achievement of independence and national sovereignty by the dependent Territories. He wished to make a number of suggestions on how that could be achieved. First, although private consultations such as those the Chairman had already held regarding the organization of work with many delegations, including that of Tunisia, were an acceptable procedure, they could be fruitful only if all delegations were consulted. Secondly, the influence of foreign financial groups in the prolongation of colonial domination was a very important and complex question. The Committee should ask the Secretariat to provide it with the necessary documentation, and if necessary with the services of experts, to assist it in dealing with what was in some ways a highly technical problem. Thirdly, he agreed that it was advisable to send visiting missions, but they must be properly prepared, and must not be sent without the prior consent of the administering Powers. They must also be assured of complete freedom of action once they were on the spot. If those conditions could not be met, it would be better not to send any missions; the Committee would have to examine each case on its merits. Fourthly, although experience had shown that meetings away from Headquarters could be fruitful, their number should be kept to a minimum, for they involved serious practical problems for small delegations. It would be best to select one or two countries in which the Committee could make a fairly prolonged stay.

135. The representative of Mali said that the results achieved since the adoption of the historic Declaration set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) were not encouraging. Although the Committee had done its work conscientiously, it had to recognize that the administering Powers refused to co-operate fully with it and with the General Assembly. By denying freedom and independence to millions, those Powers openly violated the Charter. The Committee had always denounced such violations and would continue to do so as long as the administering Powers persisted in disregarding the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Secretary-General had referred to the increasing concern of Member States over the refusal of the colonial Powers to apply the resolutions of the General Assembly and over their covert support of the colonialists in Southern Rhodesia and the fascist régimes of Portugal and South Africa. The Special Committee must continue to draw public attention to the dangerous situation prevailing in the Territories of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific Islands which had not yet attained independence. United Nations information services should give priority to colonial questions, and should use all the media of communication, including radio, to inform the peace-loving peoples of the remedies for colonialism proposed by the United Nations and emphasize the enormous responsibility which the administering Powers took upon themselves in hesitating to honour their obligations to the peoples under their administration.

136. The Committee might well ask itself why the administering Powers were so unco-operative. In his view, it was entirely because they wished to hold on to the substantial advantages, including purely military and strategic advantages, which they derived from the shameless exploitation of the subject peoples and their natural resources. For that reason, the Committee should give attention to the economic and military aspects of colonialism. It was encouraging that the General Assembly had decided, in resolution 2189 (XXI), to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-second session an item entitled "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination as well as in all other Territories under colonial domination". The discussion of that item would show the public how the colonial Powers systematically pillaged the colonized countries under the cloak of their civilizing mission. He supported the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee should discuss that subject.

137. He also supported the other suggestions put forward by the Chairman. It was the Committee's responsibility to follow up the application of General Assembly resolutions, and the dispatch of visiting missions, particularly to small Territories, would help the Committee to follow developments in such Territories and obtain first-hand information. His delegation felt that it was bound by the decision already taken that part of the Committee's session should be held in Africa; he would comment further on that point at the appropriate time. He supported the maintenance of the sub-committees, which had done excellent work over the previous year. Lastly, he expressed the hope that the Committee would be able to complete its work in time; that would enable it to obtain more co-operation from the administering Powers, thus ensuring the speedy application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Decisions

138. At the conclusion of the debate on the organization of its work, the Special Committee, at its 487th meeting, requested the Working Group to consider and submit recommendations regarding the Committee's programme of work for the current year, including the order of priority for the consideration of items. In doing so, it requested the Working Group to take into account the various tasks assigned to the Committee in the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session as well as the tasks envisaged by the Committee itself for 1967, an outline of which is contained in the note by the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/L.366). Further, the Special Committee requested the Working Group to take into consideration the views expressed during its debate on the organization of work (A/AC.109/SR. 484 to SR.487), and the possibility of the Committee holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters during the year.

139. On the basis of the recommendation contained in the twenty-sixth report of the Working Group

(A/AC.109/L.368/Rev.1) the Special Committee, at its 488th meeting, decided to maintain Sub-Committees I, II and III and requested them to carry out, in addition to their existing terms of reference, the specific tasks assigned by the General Assembly in its resolutions concerning the Territories referred to them. The Special Committee also authorized the Sub-Committees to submit specific recommendations without delay regarding the sending of visiting missions to Territories with which they are concerned.

- 140. At the same meeting, the Special Committee decided to undertake special studies concerning the following items and referred them to Sub-Committee I for consideration and report:
- (a) Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese administration as well as in all other Territories under colonial domination:
- (b) Military activities and arrangements by the the colonial Powers which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration in Territories under their administration.
- 141. At its 507th meeting, the Special Committee, by adopting the twenty-eighth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.385), decided that: should accept in principle the invitations extended to it by the Governments of Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Iraq, Morocco, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Zambia to hold meetings at their respective capitals, with an expression of its deep appreciation (A/AC.109/221, 222, 224, 226-228, 230 and 232); and (ii) it should avail itself this year of the invitations received from the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, and it should inform the Governments of Ethiopia, Morocco and Mauritania that, subject to their convenience, it would prefer to take advantage of their invitations at a future date. Subsequent decisions by the Special Committee concerning its meetings held away from Headquarters are set out in chapter II of the present report.
- 142. At its 498th, 509th and 543rd meetings, the Special Committee took various decisions concerning its programme of work for 1967 including the order of priority for the consideration of the items before it, on the basis of the recommendations contained in the twenty-seventh, twenty-ninth and thirty-second reports of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.380, L.391 and L.418). These decisions are reflected in section E of this chapter.
- D. MEETINGS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND ITS WORKING GROUP AND SUB-COMMITTEES

Special Committee

143. The Special Committee held 89 meetings during 1967, as follows:

First session:

es Salaam

484th to 510th meetings, 9 February to 19 April 1967, United Nations Headquarters 511th to 518th meetings, 29 May to 1 June 1967, Kinshasa 519th to 528th meetings, 3 June to 9 June 1967, Kitwe 529th to 542nd meetings, 12 June to 21 June 1967, Dar Second session:

543rd to 572nd meetings, 22 August to 5 December 1967, United Nations Headquarters.

Working Group

- 144. The Special Committee, at its 486th meeting, decided to enlarge the Working Group by the addition of one member. Pursuant to this decision, the Special Committee approved the nomination of Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Italy and Mali to be members of the Working Group, in addition to the four officers of the Special Committee, namely, Mr. John Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania), Chairman, Mr. Kadhim Khalaf (Iraq) and Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela) Vice-Chairmen and Mr. Mohsen Esfandiary (Iran), Rapporteur.
- 145. During the period covered by the present report, the Working Group held thirteen meetings and submitted eight reports.⁷

Sub-Committee on Petitions

146. The Special Committee, at its 487th meeting, decided to continue the Sub-Committee on Petitions with the same membership as in 1966, except for the replacement of Venezuela by Chile. The Sub-Committee on Petitions therefore consisted of the following members:

Australia Poland Chile Syria India Tunisia Madagascar

- 147. At its 96th meeting, on 16 February 1967, the Sub-Committee on Petitions elected Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (Syria) as its Chairman and, at its 97th meeting, on 21 February 1967, Mr. Raymond Raoelina (Madagascar) as its Vice-Chairman.
- 148. The Sub-Committee on Petitions held twenty-six meetings and submitted twenty five reports to the Special Committee.⁸ The Sub-Committee on Petitions considered, during the period, a total of 479 communications, 427 of which it decided to circulate as petitions. The petitions circulated by the Sub-Committee are listed in the chapters of the present report dealing with the Territories to which they refer. These petitions included thirty-six requests for hearing, which it recommended to the Special Committee for approval. A list of petitioners heard by the Special Committee is given in annex I.

Sub-Committee I

149. At its 489th meeting, the Special Committee nominated Finland to fill the vacancy in Sub-Committee I created by the withdrawal of Denmark from membership of the Special Committee. The composition of Sub-Committee I was therefore as follows:

Ethiopia Union of Soviet Socialist
Finland Republics
Mali United Republic of
Syria Tanzania
Tunisia Yugoslavia

 $^7\,\mathrm{A/AC.109/L.368/Rev.1},\ L.380,\ L.385,\ L.391,\ L.392,\ L.410,\ L.418/Rev.1\ and\ L.432/Rev.1.$

⁸ A/AC.109/L.367, L.369, L.375, L.376, L.382, L.389, L.390, L.396, L.399, L.402-406, L.408, L.409 and Corr.1, L.421, L.425, L.426, L.430, L.435, L.436 and Corr.1, L.438, L.440 and L.441.

- 150. At its 33rd meeting, on 1 March 1967, Sub-Committee I elected Miss Kongit Sinegiorgis (Ethiopia) Chairman and Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (Syria) Rapporteur.
- 151. Sub-Committee I held fourteen meetings and submitted three reports to the Special Committee covering its consideration of the following items which had been referred to it for consideration (see para. 140 above):
- (a) Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC. 109/L.498);
- (b) Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination (A/AC.109/L.434);
- (c) Military activities by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration (A/AC.109/L.433).
- 152. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of the reports of the Sub-Committee relating to item (a) is contained in chapter XIV of the present report. Its consideration of item (b) is contained in document A/6868 and Add.1, while its consideration of item (c) is contained in section I of the present chapter.

Sub-Committee II

153. At its 489th meeting, the Special Committee decided to maintain Sub-Committee II with the same membership as in 1966. The composition of Sub-Committee II was therefore as follows:

Afghanistan Australia Chile India Iraq Poland Sierra Leone

United States of America

- 154. At its 56th meeting, on 23 February 1967, Sub-Committee II elected Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) Chairman and Mr. G. E. O. Williams (Sierra Leone) Rapporteur.
- 155. Sub-Committee II held fourteen meetings and submitted reports on the following items which had been referred to it for consideration:
- (a) Question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to the Sub-Committee (A/AC.109/L.395 and Corr. 1);
- (b) Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands (A/AC.109/L.395/Add. 1);
 - (c) New Hebrides (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.2);
- (d) Guam and American Samoa (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.3);
- (e) Niue and Tokelau Islands (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.4);

- (f) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.5);
- (g) Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.6).
- 156. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Sub-Committee's report relating to specific Territories are contained in chapters XV to XXII of the present report. Its consideration of the Special Committee's report on the question of sending visiting missions is contained in section F of the present chapter.

Sub-Committee III

157. At its 489th meeting, the Special Committee decided to maintain Sub-Committee III with the same membership as in 1966. The composition of Sub-Committee III therefore was as follows:

Bulgaria Iran Italy Madagascar Uruguay Venezuela

Ivory Coast
158. At its 60th meeting, on 23 February 1967,
Sub-Committee III elected Mr. Mohsen S. Esfandiary
(Iran) Chairman and Mr. G. I. Carresquero (Ven-

ezuela) Rapporteur.

159. Sub-Committee III held thirty-nine meetings and submitted a report dealing with the following items which had been referred to it for consideration:

- (a) Question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to the Sub-Committee (A/AC.109/L.401/Rev.1);
- (b) United States Virgin Islands (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.1);
- (c) British Virgin Islands (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.2);
- (d) Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.3);
- (e) Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos and Cayman Islands (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.4);
- (f) Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.4).
- 160. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Sub-Committee's report relating to specific Territories are contained in chapter XXIII of the present report. Its consideration of the Sub-Committee's report on the question of sending visiting missions is contained in section F of the present chapter.

E. Consideration of Territories

161. During the period covered by this report, the Special Committee considered the following Territories:

Territories	Meetings
Aden	490, 492, 493, 499, 504, 508, 543, 567, 571 (United Nations Headquarters)
French Somaliland	499, 500, 502, 503, 506, 508 (United Nations Headquarters) 537, 538 (Dar es Salaam) 557, 559 (United Nations Headquarters)
Ifni and Spanish Sahara	508, 547, 548, 552, 559, 560 (United Nations Headquarters)

TABLE (continued)

Territories	Meetings
Territories under Portuguese administra-	513-518 (Kinshasa) 524, 526 (Kitwe) 532-534, 538-541 (Dar es Salaam)
Southern Rhodesia	522, 523, 525, 527, 528 (Kitwe) 536 (Dar es Salaam)
South West Africa	524-526 (Kitwe) 535, 537, 539 (Dar es Salaam) 554, 556, 557 (United Nations Headquarters)
Gibraltar	543-550, 570 (United Nations Headquarters)
Fiji	546, 555, 558, 560, 561 (United Nations Head- quarters)
Equatorial Guinea	551-554, 556, 557, 564 (United Nations Head- quarters)
Swaziland	561, 568, 569 (United Nations Headquarters)
Oman	564 (United Nations Headquarters)
Territories referred to Sub-Committee I	
Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena	535-539 (Dar es Salaam)
Territories referred to Sub-Committee II Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands New Hebrides American Samoa and Guam Niue and the Tokelau Islands Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Brunei and Hong Kong	562 562 562, 563 562, 563, 564 562, 564
Territories referred to Sub-Committee III United States Virgin Islands British Virgin Islands	564 565
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos and Cayman Islands Falkland Islands (Malvinas) British Honduras	489-497, 500, 501, 504-506, 565 565 565 548

162. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Territories listed above and its conclusions and recommendations thereon are given in chapters III to XXIII of the present report.

163. At the 569th meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee, on behalf of the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee II informed the Committee that, owing to the limited time available to it, Sub-Committee II had decided at its 67th meeting to postpone its consideration of the Territories of Brunei and Hong Kong. At the same meeting, following statements by the representatives of the USSR, Poland and Bulgaria, the Special Committee agreed to take note of the abovementioned decision. Information concerning these two Territories is given in chapters XXI and XXII of the present report.

164. Sub-Committee III was unable to consider British Honduras owing to lack of time. Information on this Territory is contained in chapter XXIII of the present report.

F. QUESTION OF SENDING VISITING GROUPS TO TERRITORIES

165. In operative paragraph 5 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly approved "the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1967, including the sending of visiting missions and the possibility of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters, and requests the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to be sent to the Territories under their administration".

166. In approving the twenty-sixth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.368/Rev.1), the Special Committee at its 488th meeting, on 20 February 1967, requested its Sub-Committees I, II and III to submit without delay specific recommendations to the Special Committee regarding the sending of visiting groups in relation to Territories with which they are concerned.

The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria and Poland stated that since the question of Hong Kong was directly related to the People's Republic of China, the United Nations and its organs, including the Special Committee, could not consider this matter until the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China were restored in the United Nations.

- 167. At the 565th meeting, on 6 October, the Special Committee considered the reports submitted by Sub-Committees II and III concerning the question of sending visiting groups to the Territories referred to them (A/AC.109/L.395 and Corr.1 and A/AC.109/L.401/Rev.1, see annex II).
- 168. At the same meeting, the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia reaffirmed the positions of their Governments with regard to the sending of visiting groups, as recorded in the reports of the sub-committees.
- 169. At the same meeting, the Special Committee approved the sections of the reports of Sub-Committees II and III relating to this question, and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the record.
- 170. The conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committees are set out below:

Conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II

"The Sub-Committee notes that most of the administering Powers continue to maintain their same negative attitude towards the acceptance of visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee II.

"The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should strongly urge the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to these Territories at an early date. The detailed recommendations regarding the Territories to be visited and other modalities will be decided upon at a later stage."

Conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee III

"Recalling paragraphs five of General Assembly resolutions 2232 (XXI) and 2189 (XXI), the Sub-Committee notes with regret that the administering Powers, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, continue to maintain the same negative attitude towards the acceptance of visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee III.

"The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should strongly urge the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to these Territories at an early date."

- G. QUESTION OF THE LIST OF TERRITORIES TO WHICH THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPEN-DENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IS APPLICABLE
- 171. At its 471st meeting, on 10 October 1966, the Special Committee approved the proposals contained in the 25th report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.338) which read as follows:
 - "10. Following an exchange of views on various suggestions, the Working Group agreed that the question of the inclusion of these Territories, namely Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago, [in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable] required further detailed study and that, in view of the lack of time at this session, it should make such a study at an early date during the next session of the Special Committee. It further agreed that, at that time, it would also consider any other Territories which might be included in the list of 'all other Territories which have not yet attained independence'."

- 172. In operative paragraph 4 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly approved "the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee for the year 1967 with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies".
- 173. At its 509th and 510th meetings, on 17 and 19 April, the Special Committee considered a report submitted by the Working Group concerning the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable. The relevant paragraph of this report (A/AC.109/L.392) reads as follows:
 - "2. After discussion, the Working Group agreed, by consensus, to refer to the Special Committee the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable. The representative of Italy reserved the position of his delegation regarding this decision."
- 174. At the conclusion of its consideration of this question (see paras. 178 to 256 below), the Special Committee, at its 510th meeting, adopted a proposal made by the representative of Syria to adjourn sine die the debate on the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable. This proposal was adopted by 19 votes to 8, with one abstention.
- 175. At the same meeting, the Special Committee also decided to defer consideration of the question of the inclusion of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable.
- 176. At the 564th meeting, the Special Committee, by approving the 33rd report of the Working Group, decided to continue consideration of the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable at its next session.
- 177. The views of members on the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable, as expressed at the 509th and 510th meetings, are set out below.

Views of members

- 178. The representative of the *United States* of *America* said that the problem raised by the Working Group's report was purely procedural and the facts were clear. For a number of years the United States had transmitted information on Puerto Rico, as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, under Article 73 e of the Charter. In the 1948 general elections the people of Puerto Rico had voted unequivocally, by a vote of almost 6 to 1 for the party favouring commonwealth status over the party favouring independence, to become a commonwealth, or free state, associated with the United States, and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had come into force on 25 July 1952.
- 179. Since Puerto Rico had thereby achieved full self-government, the Government of the United States had concluded that it would no longer be appropriate to submit information on it under Article 73 e of the Charter and had duly informed the United Nations of that decision. Full documentation had been sent to the General Assembly's Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, which had discussed the question and approved a resolution noting that the people of Puerto Rico had achieved a new constitutional status after expressing their will in a free and demo-

cratic way and that the Commonwealth could be considered as falling outside the scope of Article 73 e of the Charter. On 27 November 1953, the General Assemby had adopted resolution 748 (VIII), which took favourable note of the conclusions of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and explicitly recognized that the people of Puerto Rico had effectively exercised their right to self-determination and had been invested with attributes of political sovereignty which clearly identified the status of self-government attained by the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous political entity. It had furthermore stated that it was considered appropriate that the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter should cease.

180. Since the General Assembly itself had found that Puerto Rico was no longer a colonial or Non-Self-Governing Territory but a self-governing Territory with a constitutional and international status chosen by the people themselves, it was difficult to understand how a subsidiary body of the General Assembly established to implement a declaration pertaining to colonial Territories could inscribe Puerto Rico on its agenda. To claim that Puerto Rico was a colonial Territory falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee would be to suggest that the latter was in a position to act counter to its parent body's findings and would expose any General Assembly decision to subsequent challenge by a subsidiary body. The question was one of the utmost importance since a proposal to inscribe Puerto Rico on the Committee's agenda would not only violate the basic rules and provisions of the United Nations Charter, but also constitute interference in a matter of direct concern to the United States and all its citizens, including those in Puerto Rico. About that, there should be no misunderstanding.

181. The status of Puerto Rico as an associated Commonwealth had been freely chosen in democratic elections based on universal adult suffrage and had been confirmed by the General Assembly. The United States delegation therefore formally proposed that Puerto Rico should not be included in the list of Territories to be considered by the Special Committee. This proposal was subsequently reworded to read as follows:

"Having regard to the thirtieth report of the Working Group and recalling General Assembly resolution 748 (VIII), Puerto Rico should not be considered by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."

182. The representative of *Uruguay* said that in considering the problem which had been referred to it by the Working Group, the Committee must first decide whether it was competent to pass judgement on the present status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. He would approach the question from the point of view of law, bearing in mind the importance of applying the law faithfully if the political, economic, humanitarian and social purposes of the United Nations were to be served and the interests of the people of Puerto Rico safeguarded.

183. The Special Committee was a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, established under resolution 1654 (XVI), to examine the application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution

1514 (XV)). Its powers were set forth in operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of that resolution. At the seventeenth session, in operative paragraph 8 of resolution 1810 (XVII), the Special Committee had been invited to continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all Territories which had not yet attained independence and to propose specific measures in that regard. It was clear from those provisions that the Committee was to concern itself exclusively with Territories which had not yet attained independence—an expression which was also found in paragraph 5 of the Declaration itself.

184. In 1953, by resolution 748 (VIII), the Assembly had decided that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico fell outside the category of colonial Territories which had not attained independence. The resolution in question contained a number of findings regarding the new political and constitutional status of Puerto Rico, but he would not go into them since they were outside the competence of the Special Committee. The fact remained, however, that the General Assembly had taken a decision on the matter. The competent principal organ had adopted a resolution, in the exercise of its characteristic powers under the Charter, eight years prior to the establishment of the Special Committee. To question the validity of the General Assembly's decision and attempt to revoke it would be a most serious violation of the legal order of the United Nations. and the Special Committee should therefore limit itself to stating its lack of competence in the matter.

185. A few days previously, at the 29th meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights, the representative of Poland had rightly maintained that the existence of an earlier General Assembly resolution on the point in dispute left the subsidiary organ in question no say in the matter. It had been pointed out that the General Assembly had already decided to make Russian a working language of the Conference and that the Preparatory Committee had no competence to question that decision. That thesis had been accepted. The Special Committee now confronted an identical situation, except that what was in question was not the exclusion of a language, but the inclusion of a Territory in a particular list. The subordinate organ clearly lacked power to modify the decision of its parent body.

186. He now wished to deal with a possible objection. The Working Group, in order to justify the referral of the question to the plenary Special Committee, had referred in document A/AC.109/L.392 to paragraph 10 of its twenty-fifth report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. I, para. 265). In the paragraph referred to, the Working Group had stated its view that the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago required further detailed study. That statement, however, in no way suggested a claim of competence in a matter which had been decided years earlier by the General Assembly. The Working Group had simply postponed the matter in view of its complexity, without taking any position on the Committee's competence to take a decision on the matter.

187. Any decision by the Committee to include Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to be considered would be null and void and give rise to a conflict of powers with the General Assembly. He realized that decolonization was a most important political duty and that appeals to legal arguments were unwelcome to

those who were deeply concerned for the freedom of peoples. Many essentially political goals were sought by the United Nations, but it was in the interests of all that its actions should conform to legal norms. No one would have faith in a world organization which disobeyed its own rules and encouraged conflicts among its own organs.

188. In the light of those considerations, Uruguay would support a motion to the effect that the Committee had no competence in the matter, and, as a corollary, would vote for the non-inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories which had not yet attained independence.

189. With regard to the Comoro Archipelago, he suggested that the matter should be taken up at a later date, in view of the complexity of the special factors involved.

190. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that his delegation had already expressed its position on the question of Puerto Rico in the Special Committee in October 1965 and October 1966 and had demonstrated that the proposal to include the question in the Committee's agenda was well founded. His delegation had based its position on the fact that, notwithstanding United States statements to the contrary, the people of Puerto Rico were being deprived of the opportunity of exercising their inalienable right to self-determination and that island continued to be a colonial Territory. His delegation continued to hold that view. United States representatives in various United Nations bodies sought to cast doubt on the Organization's competence to consider the question of Puerto Rico by claiming that the people of the Territory had allegedly been given the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination, that, as a result of the adoption of a new Constitution, Puerto Rico had become a fully self-governing State, and that that had been confirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 748 (VIII). Another argument, advanced by the Uruguayan and other delegations, was that since the Special Committee was a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, it could consider the question only on the basis of a relevant General Assembly resolution. In the Soviet delegation's view, both those arguments were invalid, since from the procedural and substantive points of view, the problem of Puerto Rico came within the competence of the Special Committee.

191. With regard to the procedural aspect, he recalled that the Special Committee had taken up the problem in 1965 and 1966 and that in its report to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly it had said that its Working Group had decided that the question of the inclusion of the Territories, i.e., Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago, required further study and that because of lack of time the Group would carry out that study at the beginning of its next session. As members were aware, in its resolution 2189 (XXI) the General Assembly had approved the Special Committee's report and the programme of work proposed for 1967. Thus, it was clear that the General Assembly had unequivocally entrusted the Special Committee and its Working Group with the task of studying the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda. It was also clear that such a study should be carried out at the beginning of the Special Committee's current session. Two conclusions could therefore be drawn up from the above-mentioned decisions: first, the Committee was empowered to

consider the question and to decide for itself whether or not to include it in its agenda, and, secondly, it had been given a clear direction to consider the question at the beginning of its current session. Thus, the argument that the Committee could not consider the question until it received instructions from the General Assembly to do so could not withstand scrutiny, for it had already received such instructions.

192. The Declaration of the Cairo Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries had, *inter alia*, condemned the manifestation of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Latin America. In particular, that Declaration had drawn the attention of the Special Committee to the question of Puerto Rico and had called upon the Committee to consider the situation in that Territory in the light of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It was clear that the large number of States which had participated in the Conference had been of the view that Puerto Rico was nothing more than a colony and that the General Assembly resolution in question was applicable to it.

193. With respect to the substantive aspect of the problem, it was also clear that the Special Committee was fully entitled to consider the question of Puerto Rico. The assertion by United States representatives that the people of Puerto Rico had been given an opportunity in the referendum of 1951 to choose between independence, statehood in the United States, and associated status in the form of a commonwealth, was in flagrant contradiction with the facts. An analysis of the relevant documents and the present situation in the Territory showed that the people had not been given the opportunity of deciding the question of their future and that Puerto Rico continued to be a dependent Territory. For example, the official responsible for recording the results of elections in the Territory had said on 18 March 1965 that his department had no documents indicating that a referendum had been conducted in Puerto Rico in which the people had been offered three options—independence, statehood, or commonwealth status. That statement clearly showed that the people of Puerto Rico had not been given an opportunity to decide on their future status. Secondly, in seeking to avoid responsibility for preparing its colony for genuine self-government, the United States had imposed the colonial status of commonwealth upon Puerto Rico by Public Law 600, adopted by the United States Congress on 3 July 1950. With a view to creating the impression that Puerto Rico had become selfgoverning, not as a result of the unilateral action of a colonial Power but in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Territory, the Law had provided that it would be adopted in the form of an agreement subject to approval at a referendum by a qualified majority of Puerto Ricans and that, after the referendum, a constitutional convention would be held to prepare a draft constitution. The Law had empowered the President of the United States to consider the question whether the constitution thus adopted was in accordance with the provisions of United States law and with the United States Constitution. In the event of an affirmative decision, the new constitution would be submitted to the Congress for approval. The resolution adopted on 3 July 1952 by both Houses of the United States Congress had approved the Constitution of Puerto Rico subject to certain changes in that document. As a result, the Constitution had included a provision to the effect that any amendment or revision of the Constitution must be consistent with the abovementioned United States Congress resolution, with the relevant provisions of the United States Constitution, with the Federal Relations Act and with Public Law No. 600. It was thus clear that the United States Congress in which Puerto Rico was not represented, continued to exercise legal control over that Territory.

194. The Uruguayan representative had sought to prove that the Special Committee was not competent to consider the question of Puerto Rico and that the Committee would be undermining the very basis of the United Nations if it discussed the merits of General Assembly resolution 748 (VIII). The Soviet delegation could not agree that the fact that a resolution had been adopted meant that it could not be discussed. To accept that argument would mean that the "Uniting for Peace' resolution was a basic United Nations document, although it had been adopted in violation of the Charter and all the principles of the United Nations and had been forced on the Organization by the United States at a time when it had enjoyed an automatic majority in the General Assembly. Referring to resolution 748 (VIII) he said that the General Assembly had in essence adopted the point of view of the colonial Power, namely the United States. In manufacturing its nefarious commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States had trampled on the principle of the equality of rights which was embodied in the Charter. The Committee should be guided by the Charter rather than by the above-mentioned resolution, which was contrary to the basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

195. With regard to the conclusions of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, he wishes to point out that there had been no unanimity in the Committee regarding the new constitutional status of the Territory. In particular, the Indian representative had said that Puerto Rico did not possess all the attributes of a fully independent or self-governing State. Furthermore, the resolution adopted by the Committee had been based on information submitted by the United States. In resolution 748 (VIII) the General Assembly had expressed the opinion "that it stems from the documentation provided that the association of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with the United States of America has been established as a mutually agreed association" and had considered it appropriate that the transmission of information on Puerto Rico under Article 73 e of the Charter should cease. In essence, the General Assembly had adopted the point of view of the administering Power, i.e. that relations between dependent Territories and the States responsible for those Territories were an internal matter and that only the colonial Power could decide whether a Territory was self-governing or not. In taking that decision and recognizing thereby that the United States was no longer responsible for the Territory, the General Assembly had failed to carry out one of its most important functions under the Charter, namely that laid down in Article 13 of initiating studies and making recommendations for the purpose of assisting in the realization of human rights. One of the most important of those rights was the right of peoples to self-determination. In the Soviet delegation's view, the Committee should not be bound by a resolution which had been adopted in violation of the provisions of the Charter.

196. Under the Charter all States Members of the United Nations had an obligation to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. By creating the "Commonwealth" of Puerto Rico, the

United States had retained its privileged position; thus it had flagrantly violated the principle of equal rights and self-determination. The United States continued to be responsible for Puerto Rico's foreign affairs and defence, the most important prerogatives of an independent State.

197. Puerto Rico was represented in the United States Congress only by a Resident Commissioner, who did not have the right to vote, although that body determined questions directly affecting the Territory. While the Constitution provided that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was a court of last instance, its decisions could be appealed from to a United States court. The Puerto Rican people had been deprived of the possibility of managing their own affairs. The United States Congress retained exclusive jurisdiction over military service, the declaration of war, customs, currency, shipping, air transport, external relations, citizenship, status of aliens, wages and labour legislation, stationing of armed forces, and so forth. United States monopolies continued to be the masters of the Territory's economy. Moreover, as the United Kingdom newspaper, The Guardian, had pointed out on 6 August 1965, one of the most important factors restricting the independence of Puerto Rico was the existence in the Territory of a large number of military bases. Thus, the referendum held in Puerto Rico in 1951 in order to serve as a "showcase" concealing the colonialist policy of the United States had been conducted in an atmosphere of political and economic domination by the United States, and United States imperialism had sacrificed the aspirations of the Puerto Rican people to its own economic and military purposes. The colonial status of Puerto Rico could not be concealed even in the official circles of the United States. In 1952, a United States Congressman had described the so-called constitution of Puerto Rico as a weak, insignificant colonial statute. In May 1963, a former Attorney General of Puerto Rico had called Public Law 600 a farce that left intact the structure of the colonial administration. In 1964, Luther Hodges, the former Secretary of Commerce, had said that in granting Commonwealth status to Puerto Rico in 1952, Congress had not intended to alter the status of the Territory as a "Possession" of the United States. It was clear that the statements of United States representatives to the effect that the people of Puerto Rico had exercised their right of self-determination and that the island had become a self-governing Territory were without any foundation whatever and were merely aimed at deceiving ill-informed public opinion.

198. The Puerto Rican Constitution, which had been dictated by the United States, was completely at variance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The very fact that the United States Government planned to hold a plebiscite in July of the current year showed that it could no longer maintain the fiction that the present status of Puerto Rico was in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Like the referendum of 1951, the planned plebiscite would be conducted under the control of the executive bodies of the colonial Power, in an atmosphere of repression and persecution, and under conditions of military occupation. The United States Government had not even promised to recognize the results of the plebiscite.

199. Puerto Rico came within the third category of Territories listed in paragraph 5 of the General Assem-

bly's Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV), and it was the duty of the Special Committee to include the question in its agenda.

200. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation rejected the contention that the Committee was not competent to discuss the inclusion of Puerto Rico in its agenda. The General Assembly, in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2189 (XXI), had approved "the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies", and had approved its report containing a reference to the Working Group's twenty-fifth report, in which it had stated its view that the question of the inclusion of certain Territories, including Puerto Rico, required further study, and that such study should take place early in the 1967 session. The General Assembly had clearly approved that decision, and the Special Committee's competence to consider the matter was thus confirmed. That decision by the General Assembly must prevail over any earlier decision inconsistent with it. Each session of the General Assembly was sovereign and the decisions of later sessions had precedence over those of earlier sessions. Thus the Committee was legally empowered to take up the question of Puerto Rico.

201. His delegation strongly supported the inclusion of the question of the colonial Territory of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda. In taking that stand it could derive support from the Declaration of the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. The anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces represented at that Conference had deemed it their duty to proclaim the right of Puerto Rico to independence. In resolution 1514 (XV), the General Assembly had laid down that immediate steps must be taken in all Territories which had not yet attained independence to transfer power to the people. Puerto Rico was a colonial Territory and was not independent. The representative of the Soviet Union had given a list of some of the matters which still remained in the hands of the administering Power. In such circumstances, Puerto Rico was clearly still a colony, and came within the purview of resolution 1514 (XV) and of the present Committee.

202. He recalled that in the case of the Cook Islands a decision had been taken that the administering Power should cease to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter. It had been stipulated, however, that the people of the Cook Islands had the right to avail themselves of their option under resolution 1514 (XV) at any time they wished. In so doing, the General Assembly had confirmed that the Declaration was applicable as long as a Territory did not enjoy complete independence. The same was true with respect to Puerto Rico. The question of Puerto Rico should therefore be included in the agenda so that it could be fully studied.

203. He also supported the inclusion of the question of the Comoro Archipelago in the Committee's agenda, particularly as the administering Power concerned, in connexion with another Territory, had refused to cooperate with the United Nations, with the result that a serious situation had arisen.

204. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that, as a member of the Working Group, his delegation had, in view of the importance of the matter, supported the suggestion that the question of the inclusion of Puerto

Rico in the agenda of the Special Committee should be referred to the plenary meeting.

205. As the representatives of the USSR and Tanzania had pointed out, the General Assembly, by adopting the reports of the Special Committee for 1965 and 1966, and by approving the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee for 1967 with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applied (resolution 2189 (XXI), operative paragraph 4), had authorized the Special Committee to discuss the question. In addition, many requests had been received asking for the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda.

206. His delegation's position was based on the terms of reference of the Special Committee under resolution 1514 (XV), and subsequent resolutions relating to its implementation, and was in conformity with his country's fundamental policy of defending the sacred right of dependent peoples to self-determination and freedom and of supporting them in their struggle. Under paragraph 5 of the Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV), the Special Committee had been given a clear mandate to deal with all colonial Territories, including Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories and all other Territories which had not yet attained independence, as in the case of Puerto Rico. The Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in October 1964, had drawn the attention of the Special Committee to the case of Puerto Rico and had called upon it to consider the situation in the light of resolution 1514 (XV). The Special Committee was fully qualified to discuss the question of Puerto Rico since the latter was still a dependent Territory, to which resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable. That resolution was the raison d'être of the Committee and all criteria for deciding whether a Territory was dependent or not must be based on it.

207. If it was true that the people of Puerto Rico had indeed exercised their right to self-determination and had attained self-government, it was difficult to see why a so-called plebiscite was to be held in July 1967. The main reason was obviously to give the impression that the people were being consulted, while the present situation of virtual colonialism was maintained. The plebiscite would offer the apparent alternatives of statehood in the United States or independence but the United States Congress would not commit itself in advance to abiding by the results. The plebiscite was clearly an attempt by the United States to evade its international responsibilities and postpone once again the solution of the colonial problem of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico must be included in the list of Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable and the Special Committee should discuss in detail all the political, economic, social and other conditions prevailing in the Territory.

208. The representative of *Syria* said that his delegation's position was based on three principles. The first was that each session of the General Assembly was master of its own business. If that was not so, many errors would be perpetuated. Even the history of the United Nations was not without instances of tragedies resulting from falsifications of the will of the majority. Truth was never decided by the number of votes. Secondly, as a non-aligned country, Syria was bound by the decisions of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which had called upon the Special Committee to consider, in

¹⁰ Document A/5763.

the light of resolution 1514 (XV), the situation in Puerto Rico and other Territories. Thirdly, there had been a significant change in the composition and political alignment of the United Nations since 1953, when resolution 748 (VIII) had been adopted. Of the fortysix countries which had attended the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, twenty-seven had not been Members of the United Nations in 1953, and that was more than the number of those States which had voted in favour of resolution 748 (VIII) since the result had been 26 in favour, 16 against and 18 abstentions. The fact that the result of the vote in the Fourth Committee, before the question had been referred to the General Assembly, had been 22 in favour, 18 against and 19 abstentions, appeared to indicate that the United States delegation had exerted pressure on some Members in order to gain four additional votes.

209. He pointed out that operative paragraph 9 of resolution 748 (VIII) stated that due regard should be paid to the political advancement of the people of Puerto Rico and to the will of the Puerto Rican and American peoples in the conduct of their relations and also in the eventuality that either might desire any change in the terms of their association. He hoped that some progress had been made since 1953, but, in his view, the will of the people could only be ascertained when they enjoyed political sovereignty and previous speakers had already referred to the rights of which the people of Puerto Rico were deprived.

210. The United States representative had said that it had been the people of Puerto Rico who had decided in favour of their present status. Other countries, including Syria, which had suffered under colonialism, had seen Governments set up and deposed, the will of the people falsified and parts of their countries ceded. In Puerto Rico, only 34 per cent of the population entitled to vote had in fact voted in favour of the present status, while 6 per cent had voted against and 60 per cent had abstained. Furthermore, no alternatives had been offered. That did not indicate that the people of Puerto Rico had been given the opportunity to express their will freely.

211. The only resolution which should guide the Special Committee was resolution 1514 (XV), in particular paragraph 5 of the Declaration, which fully confirmed operative paragraph 9 of resolution 748 (VIII). If the United States was convinced that it had right on its side, it should not try to prevent the Special Committee from considering the matter. He therefore fully supported the inclusion in the Special Committee's agenda of the two Territories of Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago.

212. The representative of the *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* fully agreed with the objections expressed by the United States representative to the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda. It was solely for the administering Power concerned to decide when a Territory under its formal administration had ceased to be non-self-governing within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. That was his Government's basic position. In resolution 748 (VIII), however, the General Assembly itself had recognized the new status of Puerto Rico as that of an autonomous political entity and had declared it appropriate that the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter should cease. He shared the view expressed by the representative of Uruguay that it was not for the Special Committee to question or seek

to reverse a clear, unequivocal and specific decision taken by the General Assembly itself. Furthermore, the Puerto Rican people had repeatedly been asked to express their views about their present and future status. Since 1952, support for the political parties favouring independence had declined to 21,000 in 1964, whereas the two main parties which supported Puerto Rico's present status had in 1964 obtained 479,000 and 277,000 votes respectively. It was therefore clear that Puerto Rico was not a Non-Self-Governing or colonial Territory and that the Committee was not competent to discuss it.

213. Similar considerations applied to the Comoro Islands. The former administering power, France, had informed the United Nations in March 1959 that the Territory had achieved full autonomy and that consequently Chapter XI of the Charter no longer applied. It had also supplied a considerable amount of documentary evidence in support of its decision, which had not been questioned by any formal or other United Nations decision at the time or since.

214. If it was once admitted that new Territories could be added to the Committee's already extensive list, even for the purpose of discussing whether they should be discussed, there would be no end to the controversies raised. If the Committee was to adopt a completely unrestricted view of what constituted a Territory which had not yet attained independence, the list might be endless, especially if the Committee reopened the subject of Territories whose decolonization had already been officially endorsed by the United Nations. His delegation fully supported the United States proposal.

215. The representative of *Italy* said that the reservations of his delegation, mentioned in the thirtieth report of the Working Group, related both to competence and methods. On the question of competence, his delegation strongly believed that the Special Committee did not have the power or authority to decide that a Territory had not yet attained independence within the meaning of operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) or to inscribe it on its agenda. During the five years of its existence, the Special Committee had not added a single Territory to its original list without a previous decision by the General Assembly. A decision of such magnitude which was tantamount to defining the status of a territory and involved legal and practical consequences could not be left to a subsidiary body of the General Assembly such as the Special Committee. The Special Committee was even less competent to discuss Territories which had already been the subject of a General Assembly resolution, such as Puerto Rico, or had been removed from the list of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and the implicit consent of the General Assembly, such as the Comoro Islands.

216. He agreed that in approving the reports of the Special Committee, the General Assembly had implicitly approved each part of the Committee's work, including the decision to postpone until 1967 a procedural debate as to whether a number of items should or should not be inscribed in the agenda. The General Assembly could not, however, express an opinion in advance on a decision which the Special Committee had not yet taken. The reasoning of the USSR and Tanzanian representatives on that point could therefore not be regarded as acceptable.

217. Similarly, his delegation could not be associated with another argument advanced, namely that a change in the membership of the United Nations made earlier

resolutions valueless and obsolete. To accept such an idea would deal a serious blow to the United Nations. The General Assembly could, of course, revise or reconsider an earlier resolution, but unless and until that was done, the resolution stood and could not be ignored without violating the spirit and letter of the Charter.

218. On the question of methods, under operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) the Special Committee had special responsibilities in the drawing up of the list of Territories which had not yet achieved independence. As his delegation had repeatedly maintained in the past, such responsibilities should be discharged by the Working Group which should study the relevant criteria and principles for submission to the General Assembly.

219. His delegation had therefore had serious reservations concerning the discussion of the question in the plenary meeting without previous exhaustive consideration by the Working Group. Consequently, his delegation would oppose the inclusion of any Territory not considered within the context of a comprehensive study of the more general problem of the list of the Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) applied. His delegation therefore supported the United States proposal.

220. The representative of Poland said that his delegation's position with respect to the status of Puerto Rico had been fully explained at the eighth session of the General Assembly and remained unchanged. Despite some changes in the political status of the Territory, there had been no justification for removing Puerto Rico from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, as Puerto Rico had not yet attained the stage of full self-government and independence within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. The United States Congress reserved the right to pass legislation on economic, social and educational matters affecting Puerto Rico, while the Puerto Rico legislature could enact such legislation only within considerable limitations. The people of Puerto Rico could not at its will change the constitutional status of the Territory; under the Federal Relations Act, the prior agreement of the United States Congress was required. Moreover, the United States Congress could at any time amend the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act. On the basis of those facts, his delegation had opposed the adoption of resolution 748 (VIII), which had in any case been adopted only by a very slim majority.

221. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) stipulated quite clearly that the colonial system should be abolished in all Territories, irrespective of whether or not a given Territory strictly fell into one of the two categories of a Non-Self-Governing or a Trust Territory. It should not be so interpreted as to delay the process of decolonization or to deny the enjoyment of "complete independence and freedom". The people of Puerto Rico did not yet enjoy "complete independence and freedom" and, consequently, the question of Puerto Rico still came under the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and, as such, could and should be discussed by the Special Committee.

222. United Nations work in similar cases had shown that the Organization had endeavoured to elaborate basic principles to ensure that what had happened in the case of Puerto Rico should not apply in the case of other Territories. That was exemplified by General Assembly resolution 2064 (XX) on the question of the Cook Islands. Although elections had been held in the Cook Islands under United Nations supervision and the

Constitution guaranteed the people a right to withdraw unilaterally from its association with New Zealand, the General Assembly had considered itself in duty bound to include in its resolution operative paragraph 6 in which it "reaffirms the responsibility of the United Nations, under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to assist the people of Cook Islands in the eventual achievement of full independence, if they so wish, at a future date". That resolution proved that United Nations responsibility in colonial cases did not cease automatically when the administering Power was absolved of its obligation to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter. Even though the United States Government had been absolved from that obligation in respect of Puerto Rico, the process of self-determination had not been completed in that Territory, and the United Nations still had responsibilities towards the Territory and its people.

223. The Special Committee had been instructed by the General Assembly to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of resolution 1514 (XV) to all Territories which had not yet attained independence. It was therefore the duty of the Committee to discuss the request contained in the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, and the request contained in the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba (A/AC.109/144) that the question of Puerto Rico and that of the Comoro Islands be included in the agenda of the Special Committee. His delegation also shared the view expressed by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Tanzania and Bulgaria that the Special Committee had already received a specific mandate from the General Assembly to study the problem of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) were applicable, inasmuch as the General Assembly at its twenty-first session had approved the report of the Special Committee covering its work in 1966, which explicitly stated that the Committee intended to study that question.

224. Guided by the principles of anti-colonialism and the rights of all colonial and non-self-governing peoples to complete independence and freedom, his delegation firmly supported the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the agenda of the Special Committee.

225. The representative of Australia said that he had been surprised by the discussion of the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration was applicable. He fully agreed with the representative of Uruguay that Member States must be guided in the matter by their obligations under the Charter.

226. Article 73 of the Charter was quite explicit concerning the obligations of Member States with regard to Non-Self-Governing Territories. At the twenty-third meeting of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, the USSR representative had stressed the need to adhere to the provisions of the Charter. The basic obligations of Member States were regulated by the Charter, which could not be changed, especially by extraneous meetings of some Members. The Charter had international treaty status and nothing could countermand its clear provisions. He would point out that his Government had played an instrumental part at the San Francisco Conference in drafting the Charter provisions relating to the rights of dependent peoples to self-government and independence and had

also played a responsible role in the decolonization operations of the last twenty years.

227. The resolutions of the General Assembly had great persuasive force, but could not amend the Charter. The present discussion raised the whole issue of the relation of General Assembly resolutions to the Charter, Under Article 73 of the Charter, the United Nations had the obligation to develop self-government in dependent Territories. By resolution 748 (VIII), the General Assembly had recognized that the people of Puerto Rico had expressed their will "in a free and democratic way" and had "effectively exercised their right to self-determination" and that the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter were, therefore, no longer applicable to that Territory. The United Nations function in relation to that Territory had ended with its achievement of self-government. Article 10 of the Charter provided that the General Assembly might discuss any question which came within the scope of the Charter, but the question of the self-government of Puerto Rico no longer came within the scope of Member States' obligations under the Charter. The contention that General Assembly resolution 748 (VIII) was invalid because it had been adopted fourteen years previously, when the number of Member States was less than at present, was untenable.

228. Again, much had been said about the power of the General Assembly and the sovereign nature of each separate session of the Assembly. That did not affect the fundamental and paramount status of the Charter. Resolutions on self-government differed from others, which might be varied or amended. A resolution accepting that certain provisions of the Charter had been fulfilled and stating that a particular people had asserted its right to self-determination could not be revoked so that the Territory concerned was demoted again to colonial status.

229. He had noted recently a tendency of certain Member States to wish to force complete independence on States which did not want it. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) declared the right of all peoples freely to determine their political status. For the United Nations to insist on independence as the only solution for all Territories would be limiting the right of peoples to make a free choice. General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) set forth the various options which were open to the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories when exercising that right of free choice. There was a tendency among certain States to regard the alternatives to independence as "second-class" solutions, as had been apparent in the debate on the Caribbean Territories, in whose case principles V, VI and VII of the annex to resolution 1541 (XV) had been applied.

230. The United States had clearly discharged its Charter obligations with regard to Puerto Rico, and that territory was no longer a Non-Self-Governing Territory and subject to consideration by the General Assembly or the Special Committee. He was surprised and perturbed that the question had been raised, and his delegation would definitely support the United States motion.

231. The representative of the *United States of America*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that in view of the number of delegations which wished to speak in the debate, her delegation was willing to postpone the vote on its motion until the Committee's next meeting. In replying to the false allegations which had been made by the USSR representative and others, she would keep her statement on a procedural basis and

not go into the substance of the matter, as the USSR representative had inappropriately done.

232. The allegation that the attainment of commonwealth status had made no significant change in Puerto Rico's position and that it was still under the authority of the United States Congress had no basis in fact. Congresswoman Bolton, as the United States delegate to the eighth session of the General Assembly, had stated clearly the full significance of the new status in the Fourth Committee in 1953. Mrs. Bolton had explained that there was now a bilateral contract of association between the United States and Puerto Rico, which had been established by a juridical decision based on the common consent of the Puerto Rican people. Previously, the Territory had been under the full authority of the United States Congress in all government matters, by virtue of an Organic Act which only Congress had the right to change. The new Constitution had been chosen by the people, which alone had the authority to alter it.

233. The USSR representative had questioned the act of self-determination of the people of Puerto Rico. In the elections, the people of the Territory had been given a clear choice between the alternative options: commonwealth status, statehood, and independence. The first option had been chosen by an overwhelming majority of the people, and that choice had been reiterated in a series of free elections since. Moreover, while the number of votes for parties in favour of commonwealth status had steadily increased, the number of votes for those in favour of independence had steadily dwindled, and in 1964, as indicated by the results of the most recent elections, 58.5 per cent of the population had voted for commonwealth status, 34.3 per cent for statehood and only 2.7 per cent for independence.

234. The USSR representative had made frequent reference to the fact that the laws passed by the United States Congress applied in Puerto Rico and that the Federal Government had authority in some areas of Puerto Rican affairs. Those statements showed a failure to understand the nature of the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. As Congresswoman Bolton had said at the eighth session of the General Assembly, Puerto Rico had agreed under its contract of association with the United States that the United States Government should have in respect of Puerto Rico the same functions that it had in respect of the states of the Union. That in no way detracted from the status of full self-government. The Resident Commissioner for Puerto Rico had said in his statement at the 348th meeting of the Fourth Committee in October 1953 that, as in the case of the forty-eight states of the Union, the United States Congress had no power to enact legislation relating to the domestic affairs of Puerto Rico, but only on matters relating to external policy. The authority of Congress in respect of Puerto Rico was subject to the same constitutional restrictions as in the case of the federal states.

235. Moreover, the Puerto Rican people could change its present status whenever it wished. The senior United States representative at the eighth session of the General Assembly had stated at the 459th plenary meeting on 27 November 1953 that he had been authorized to say on behalf of the President of the United States that if, at any time, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico adopted a resolution in favour of more complete or even absolute independence, he would immediately recommend to Congress that such independence should be granted. The Puerto Rican people was

thus free to choose its own status, and repeated elections had shown that the majority of the people in the Territory were in favour of commonwealth status or statehood, while the independence party had received little support.

236. In conclusion, she stressed that, since the General Assembly had recognized, in 1953, that the Puerto Rican people had exercised its right to self-determination and achieved self-government, the Territory was no longer a matter for consideration by the Committee.

237. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, recalled the United States representative's statement that the allegation that the attainment of commonwealth status had made no significant change in Puerto Rico's position had no basis in fact. She had referred to a statement made by Congresswoman Bolton at the eighth session of the General Assembly to the effect that there was a bilateral contract of association between the United States and Puerto Rico, which could not be altered except by mutual consent. The Soviet delegation had adduced facts to show that there had been virtually no change of any significance in the structure of Puerto Rico. Those facts had not been refuted by the United States representative.

238. The USSR delegation had said that Public Law 600, adopted by the United States Congress on 3 July 1950, had not repealed the Organic Act of 2 March 1917 and that the former colonial régime had continued in force. Although the new colonial structure was described in the so-called Constitution as an "Associated Free State" or "Commonwealth", in reality Puerto Rico was not a politically independent State. It was not free and the association itself was based on unequal conditions. Puerto Rico continued to be a colonial dependency of the United States. Section 4 of Public Law 600 stated:

"Except as provided in section 5 of this Act, the Act... approved 2 March 1917, as amended, is hereby continued in force and effect and may hereafter be cited as the 'Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act'."

Section 5 provided for the repeal of many sections of the earlier act but all of them related to local administration. The powers of the so-called Constitutional Convention authorized by Public Law 600 had thus been limited by that Law, which had fully maintained in force the Organic Act of 1917 and on the basis of which the United States Congress retained complete control over Puerto Rico. Furthermore, under the so-called Federal Relations Act, Puerto Rico was regarded as a "possession" of the United States. The first paragraph of that Act stated that its provisions applied to Puerto Rico and the neighbouring islands, which belonged to the United States.

239. In addition, Public Law 600, like the "Constitution" of Puerto Rico, could be amended, suspended or repealed by the United States Congress. Those facts fully refuted the statement of Congresswoman Bolton. It was clear that, since the United States Congress had acted unilaterally, the United States and Puerto Rico had never entered into a mutually agreed association. In no provision of Public Law 600 did the United States Congress renounce sovereignty over Puerto Rico or recognize Puerto Rican sovereignty. From the moment of the establishment of the colonial régime by the United States, there had never been any negotiations between the United States and Puerto Rico as a

sovereign State. When Public Law 600 had been adopted, the United States House and Senate Committees on Territorial and Insular Affairs had emphasized that the existing political, economic and social relations between the United States and Puerto Rico would remain unchanged. That showed that Puerto Rico continued to be a United States colony, that the United States had not renounced its sovereignty over Puerto Rico, that the United States could unilaterally alter the present structure of government in Puerto Rico and that Public Law 600 had not granted the Territory a full measure of self-government.

240. The United States representative had also referred to a statement by the senior United States representative at the eighth session of the General Assembly to the effect that if, at any time, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico adopted a resolution in favour of more complete or even absolute independence, such a request would be favourably considered by the United States Congress. But that promise had not been kept. In 1959, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico had adopted a joint resolution requesting the United States Congress to grant the Territory a greater measure of self-government. The Congress had refused to consider that request. Again, in November 1962, the Puerto Rican Assembly had adopted resolution No. 1 requesting the United States to settle the final political status of Puerto Rico on the basis of giving the island the right to sovereignty. That request, too, had been ignored by the United States Congress. At present, the United States was attempting to force a colonial plebiscite on the Puerto Rican people with a view to avoiding its international responsibility and postponing a definitive decision on the question of sovereignty.

241. The United States representative had referred to elections that had been held in the Territory in 1948, but the Soviet delegation's point was that the people of Puerto Rico had not been given the right to choose, or an opportunity to decide on the future political status of the Territory.

242. He read out the text of a letter he had just received that had been addressed to the United States representative by members of the Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico, the Government party, expressing shock at the inaccurate statements which that representative had made in the Special Committee and which were a complete distortion of historical facts. The members went on to say that they had voted for the Popular Democratic Party on the assurance that local elections were not of a plebiscitary character and that their votes could never be interpreted as precluding further examination by the United Nations of the Territory's political problem. They added that their votes had been cast to foster the struggle for recognition of Puerto Rican sovereignty and to elaborate a true association with the United States. The obstinacy of the United States had made such an association impossible since that Government sought to maintain a colonial relationship. They urged the United States delegation, in the name of United States prestige and the moral force which the United Nations represented, to withdraw its opposition to the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico in the Special Committee's agenda.

243. In his statement, the Australian representative had presented himself in the role of defender of the interests of the colonial peoples and had boasted about

the part played by Australia in the drafting of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. The Soviet delegation would point out, however, that the fact that the word "independence" was associated with the word "self-government" in the definition of the Trusteeship System was not due to the efforts of the Australian delegation. The word "independence" and some other progressive provisions had been included in the Charter at the demand of the Soviet delegation. If the Australian representative's statements concerning his delegation's role in the drafting of the Charter were true, the Soviet delegation wondered why, twenty years after the adoption of the Charter and the establishment of the Trusteeship System, Australia had not granted independence to its Trust Territories and refused to fix the date for the granting of such independence. Like other colonial Powers, Australia adopted a reactionary policy in the Committee with regard to matters concerning decolonization and voted against all progressive decisions in the United Nations. With regard to the slanderous attacks made by the Australian representative against the Soviet Union's policy, he would point out that the Soviet Union did not have the experience of repressing and persecuting people struggling for independence that the colonialists, including the Australian colonialists, had. The shameful participation of Australia in the Viet-Namese war, which had been unleashed by United States aggressors, was an example of the Australian Government's policy towards people who were defending their right to self-determination and independence.

244. In his view, the colonialists were presenting themselves as the champions of the self-determination and independence of peoples. However, whenever the peoples waged a struggle to defend their right to be free and independent, the colonialists always used the most modern weapons, tanks, aircraft and the like to suppress the desires of the peoples for freedom and independence, to deprive them of their right to self-determination, and to prevent them from deciding their own future. The sole purpose of the Australian representative's statement was to divert the Committee from considering the pressing political problem of Puerto Rico, which called for immediate solution.

245. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the statement of the Soviet representative had reiterated a large number of the quite baseless allegations which he had made in the past. She had already submitted detailed figures showing the genuine nature of Puerto Rico's self-determination. The United States delegation was not ready to take advice on the subject from the Soviet Union, and she thought it might be interesting for the Committee to investigate the extent to which the various nations and peoples of the Soviet Union had expressed their desires at any point regarding their association with the USSR, and the extent to which they were free, as the people of Puerto Rico were free, to dissolve the association.

246. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation regarded the question under consideration from two aspects: whether General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable in the case of Puerto Rico and whether the Special Committee was competent to include the question of Puerto Rico in its agenda. With regard to the first aspect, the Iraqi delegation continued to believe that resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable, since that resolution spoke of three kinds of Territories: Non-Self-Governing Territories, Trust Ter-

ritories, and Territories which had not yet attained independence. No one claimed that Puerto Rico was an independent State. The General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV) many years after resolution 748 (VIII) and he was sure that the sponsors of resolution 1514 (XV) had been aware of previous resolutions, such as resolution 748 (VIII), concerning Territories not yet independent.

247. As to the second aspect, it had been pointed out in the Committee that in adopting resolution 2189 (XXI) the previous year, the General Assembly had approved the "action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies" and had also approved the Committee's report containing a reference to the Working Group's twenty-fifth report, in which it had expressed the view that the question of the inclusion of certain Territories, including Puerto Rico, required further study, and that such study should take place early in the 1967 session. Nevertheless, he did not think that the General Assembly had taken a clear-cut position on the Special Committee's competence to consider the matter. In his delegation's opinion, it was not for the Special Committee to take any decision whether or not the item should be included in its agenda.

248. In those circumstances, he wondered why the United States representative was proposing that a decision should be taken by the Committee excluding the discussion of Puerto Rico.

249. The representative of *Venezuela* observed that his delegation had already expressed its position on the question in the Working Group and that it had stated its opposition to the inclusion of the item in the agenda. It was not for the Special Committee to consider the question of Puerto Rico. That was a matter which fell within the competence of the General Assembly itself and that body had already taken a decision on the question by adopting resolution 748 (VIII), which the Special Committee could not disregard.

250. The representative of Australia said that, despite the Soviet Union representative's assertions regarding his country's position as the defender of the interests of colonial peoples, the fact was that, of all the major Powers, the Soviet Union alone had declined to submit information on Territories—in some cases previously independent nations—which it had acquired following the Second World War.

251. The Soviet Union representative had referred to "peoples struggling for their independence". He recalled that Australia had gone to the assistance of Poland when it had been the victim of aggression in 1939; Australia had had no pact with the aggressor. Later, his country had gone to the assistance of the Federation of Malaya.

252. He only wished to state—since the Soviet Union representative had raised the question of Viet-Nam—that Australia believed that, in supporting the people of Viet-Nam in resisting aggression, it was acting in a manner fully in accord with the principles of the United Nations.

253. The representative of *Syria* proposed that the debate on the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable should be adjourned *sine die*.

254. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* supported the Syrian motion. Although his delegation was convinced that Puerto Rico was a colo-

nial Territory for the purposes of resolution 1514 (XV), since it was neither an independent State nor part of another State—as had been confirmed by a ruling of the United States Supreme Court—he believed that further consultations were required before the Committee took a decision.

255. The representative of the *United States of of America* opposed the Syrian motion. She thought that the procedural motion submitted at the previous meeting by her delegation had been adequately discussed and that delegations had had time to reach a position on it. In any event, if the Committee decided to adjourn the debate, her delegation would interpret such a decision as indicating that it was the Committee's will that Puerto Rico should not be considered by it. It would be her understanding that the adoption of a motion to adjourn the debate *sine die* would preclude further consideration of the issue.

256. The representative of Australia also opposed the motion for adjournment of the debate. The question at issue was clear and had been fully discussed; moreover, in view of its possible implications, the Committee had a duty to take a position on it as soon as possible.

H. Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2151 (XXI), 2184 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee: requests addressed to specialized agencies and international institutions

257. At the 569th meeting, on 30 October 1967, the Chairman drew the attention of the Special Committee to a decision taken by the General Assembly at its 1583rd plenary meeting, on 6 October 1967, to include the following item in the agenda of the twenty-second session and to allocate it to the Fourth Committee for consideration and report:

"97. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations."

258. The Chairman also drew attention to a note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/276) concerning the action taken by the specialized agencies and international institutions in response to the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2151 (XXI), 2184 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee. In that note reference was made to another note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/L.417) relating to the measures taken to extend material and other assistance to refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations in response to the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) and General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI). Reference was also made to the report by the Secretary-General on his consultations with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development¹¹ pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966. Also of relevance to

this question was the statement made at the 487th meeting, on 15 February 1967, by the director in charge of the New York Office of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization concerning the implementation by that organization of pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/SR.487).

259. At the 570th meeting, the Special Committee decided to draw the attention of the General Assembly, in connexion with its consideration of the item referred to above, to the information contained in the relevant report of the Secretary-General and the notes by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/276 and A/AC.109/L.417).¹²

I. Consideration of other matters

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967)

260. At its 541st meeting, held in Dar es Salaam on 20 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967) (A/AC.109/252). Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter II of the present report.

Co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States

261. The Special Committee during its 1967 session maintained close co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States. During the Committee's meetings in Dar es Salaam, the Organization of African Unity was represented by an official of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, who at the 531st meeting made a statement on behalf of that Organization.

262. At its 543rd meeting, the Special Committee decided to circulate a communication dated 23 June 1967, concerning the question of Aden, addressed to the Secretary-General from the permanent observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations (A/AC.109/256).

263. In a letter dated 13 June 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee, having regard to operative paragraphs 11 and 13 thereof, transmitted the text of a resolution concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248), adopted by the Special Committee at its 528th meeting, to the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity. Further, in another letter dated 20 June 1967, the Chairman, having regard to operative paragraph 11 thereof, transmitted to him the text of a resolution concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/251).

Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter

264. In accordance with its mandate as set out in General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 De-

¹¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/6825.

¹² The note by the Secretariat concerning the assistance to refugees from the Portuguese Territories mentioned above is appended as annex I to chapter V of the present report. The note by the Secretariat concerning the action taken by the specialized agencies and international institutions is appended as annex III of the present chapter.

cember 1963, the Special Committee considered, at its 557th to 559th meetings, on 12 and 13 September 1967, the question of information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter XXIV of the present report.

- Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination
- 265. Having regard to the decision taken by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 20 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the Special Committee decided to undertake a study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination.
- 266. At its 488th meeting, the Special Committee referred this item to Sub-Committee I for consideration and report. Sub-Committee I, accordingly, submitted its report to the Special Committee on 29 September 1967 (A/AC.109/L.434). The Special Committee's report to the General Assembly on this question is contained in document A/6868 and Add.1.
- Military activities and arrangements by the colonial Powers which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration in Territories under their administration
- 267. The Special Committee decided at its 488th meeting to undertake a study of the role of the military activities and arrangements by the colonial Powers which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration in Territories under their administration. It also decided to refer this item to Sub-Committee I for consideration.
- 268. In paragraph 14 of its report to the Special Committee (see annex IV) Sub-Committee I stated that "Owing to the refusal of the administering Powers to co-operate and in view of the lack of time and information available, the Sub-Committee decided to continue its consideration of this item at its next session".
- 269. At its 568th meeting, the Special Committee endorsed this decision and agreed that, subject to any decision which the General Assembly might take at its twenty-second session, it would continue consideration of the item at its next session, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the records. These reservations are set out below.
- 270. The representative of the *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* said that his Government's views, which were fully set out in paragraph 11 of the report, made it necessary for his delegation to reserve its position on the adoption of the report.
- 271. The representative of the *United States of America* said that her delegation had expressed certain reservations on the question under discussion and wished to reserve its position.

- 272. The representative of Italy said that his delegation wished to express reservations on both the substance and the method of the report. The Italian delegation had already stated that a broad consensus had never been achieved on the highly controversial question of military bases: for example, forty-six Member States had not supported General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). That question was only a part of the general problem of disarmament and almost all Member States were in agreement that it must be considered in conjunction with other disarmament problems, as was clear from their adoption of General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI), in which the Assembly had referred the question to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It would be inappropriate for the Committee to formulate conclusions on the matter while the Eighteen-Nation Committee was considering the problem. The procedure whereby the Sub-Committee felt justified in proceeding to a general condemnation of Member States on the inadequate basis of an exchange of letters with a few Member States could serve only to cast doubt on the seriousness of its work. The Italian delegation was unable to support the report. It thought that paragraph 13 should be deleted, as should the words "owing to the refusal of the administering Powers to co-operate" in paragraph 14, but it would not make a formal proposal to that effect.
- 273. The representative of *Australia* reaffirmed his delegation's strong reservations, which appeared in the report.
- 274. The representative of *Finland* recalled that his delegation had reserved its position on paragraph 13 in Sub-Committee I, since it considered that the question of military bases was a matter of conflict between the great Powers. That reservation, which had been made in accordance with Finland's policy of neutrality, was still valid.
- 275. The representative of *Madagascar* maintained the reservations which his delegation had expressed in the Committee and elsewhere.
- 276. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* recalled that his delegation had entered formal reservations on the question of military bases during the Committee's meetings in Africa, since his Government considered that the question was a domestic problem and that it was for colonial Territories themselves to negotiate the maintenance or withdrawal of military bases with the administering Power as they approached independence. The Ivory Coast also felt that the Committee was not the appropriate forum for a final decision on the question of military bases. These reservations remained valid.
- 277. The representative of *Uruguay* said that his delegation, which had already stated its position on the question of military bases, would abstain in the vote on the relevant paragraph.
- 278. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation would not enter any reservations on the report, since it contained no specific conclusions or recommendations regarding the military activities of colonial Powers in the Territories under their administration. That did not mean, however, that his delegation had in any way altered its position.
- 279. The representative of *Iran* reaffirmed his delegation's view that the question of military bases was distinct from the question of colonialism and must be decided by the people of the Territory concerned.

International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa

280. On 21 February the Secretary-General requested the advice of the Special Committee concerning the various aspects of the organization of the international conference or seminar envisaged in operative paragraph 6 (a) of General Assembly resolution 2202 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 on the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa. In a letter dated 20 April 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee, in response to that request, transmitted a report containing proposals concerning the organization of the international conference or seminar which the Special Committee had, by consensus, agreed to adopt at its 509th meeting, on 17 April 1967 (A/AC.109/236).¹³

281. Following an invitation by the Government of the Republic of Zambia, the Secretary-General organized the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa, which took place from 25 July to 4 August 1967 in Kitwe, Zambia. The Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. John W. S. Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania) presided over the International Seminar as its Chairman.

282. On 29 September 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly the report of the International Seminar (A/6818 and Corr.1) in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution.

Dissemination of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and publicity for the work of the Special Committee

283. In operative paragraph 18 of resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly requested "the Secretary-General to promote, through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations, the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the Declatation and of the work of the Special Committee, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the colonial peoples". In operative paragraph 13 of its resolution of 20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/252), the Special Committee requested "the Secretary-General to promote the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee, including in particular, the preparation, in consultation with the Special Committee, of publications covering the work of the Committee at its current session away from Headquarters, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by colonial peoples".

284. At the 569th meeting, on 23 October 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee conveyed to the Committee information which he had received from the Secretariat, relating to the measures taken and envisaged by the Office of Public Information to promote the publicizing of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee.

285. At the 570th meeting, on 30 October, following statements made by the representatives of Finland, the USSR, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Syria, India and Yugoslavia, the Chairman undertook to convey the views expressed and the suggestions offered by members

concerning this matter to the Office of Public Information.

Matters relating to the small Territories

286. By operative paragraph 16 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly invited "the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the population of those Territories to exercise fully the right to self-determination and independence".

287. In requesting its Sub-Committees I, II and III to carry out the tasks assigned to them, the Special Committee called their attention to the above-mentioned provision of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). Further, in arriving at its conclusions and recommendations concerning the small Territories, details of which are contained in the relevant chapters of the present report, the Special Committee took that provision into consideration.

288. In this connexion, the Special Committee decided to defer consideration of a proposal contained in paragraph 286 of the report of Sub-Committee III, to the effect that the Secretary-General should be asked to initiate a study of the feasibility of arrangements under which small territories which may wish to be fully self-governing might be enabled to have available to them the status of a sovereign entity associated with the United Nations. Reservations concerning that proposal were expressed by the representatives of Madagascar, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Deadline for the accession of Territories to independence

289. By operative paragraph 15 of its resolution 2189 (XXI), the General Assembly invited "the Special Committee, whenever it considers it proper and appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people and the provisions of the Declaration"

290. In requesting its Sub-Committees I, II and III to carry out the tasks assigned to them, the Special Committee called their attention to the above-mentioned provision of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). Further in its consideration of specific territories, the Special Committee took that provision into consideration.

Pattern of conferences

291. By its resolution 2116 (XX) concerning the pattern of conferences, the General Assembly decided, inter alia, "that a fixed pattern of conferences to govern the places and dates of the meetings of United Nations bodies shall come into force on 1 January 1966 for a further period of three years". By the same resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to submit to the General Assembly each year a basic programme of conferences for the following year, established in conformity with the present pattern and after consultation, as appropriate, with the organs concerned". It also urged "all organs of the United Nations... to review their working methods and also the frequency and length of sessions in the light of the present resolution, the growing volume of meetings, the resulting strain on available resources and the difficulty of ensuring the effective participation of members"

¹³ See also document A/6667 and Add.1-4.

292. In operative paragraph 5 of its resolution 2239 (XXI) on the same subject, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to draw up in August of each year, for submission to the General Assembly... the provisional calendar of meetings and conferences planned by the entire United Nations family of organizations for the two following calendar years". In operative paragraph 9 of this resolution, the Assembly recommended that "all competent organs of the United Nations, including subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, should bear in mind that proposals involving new meetings and conferences would be subject to the recommendations of the Committee on Conferences and to final approval by the Assembly".

293. By adopting the 33rd report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.432/Rev.1), the Special Committee at its 564th meeting, on 27 September, decided, subject to any decision which the General Assembly might take at its twenty-second session, to hold two sessions in 1968, the first from the second week of February to the end of June and the second from Thursday, 1 August to Friday, 30 August. This programme would not preclude the holding of extrasessional meetings on an emergency basis if developments in any dependent Territory so warranted. Further, the first session would include such meetings away from Headquarters as the Special Committee may decide to hold in 1968. During its second session, the Special Committee would take up the reports of any visiting groups it may dispatch to Territories.

294. As regards the provisional calendar of meetings in 1969, the Special Committee decided to adopt, on a tentative basis, the same programme as that planned for 1968.

J. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS BODIES

Security Council

295. The General Assembly, in operative paragraph 14 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, requested "the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of development in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations".

(a) Southern Rhodesia

296. In paragraph 1 of its consensus of 6 June 1967, concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia adopted at its 523rd meeting held in Kitwe, Zambia, the Special Committee decided "to transmit to the President of the Security Council the records of its debates on the question of Southern Rhodesia, including the testimony submitted by the petitioners, following the conclusion of its consideration of that question". The text of the consensus, together with the records of the debate on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 16 June 1967. 14

297. By operative paragraph 12 of its resolution of 9 June 1967 (A/AC.109/248), the Special Committee recommended to the Security Council, "in accordance with its decision contained in resolution 232 (1966)

of 16 December 1966, and, in particular, paragraph 1 thereof to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 13 June 1967.¹⁵

(b) Territories under Portuguese administration

298. In operative paragraph 7 of its resolution of 20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/251), the Special Committee drew "the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that border its colonies". In operative paragraph 8 of the same resolution, the Special Committee urgently recommended that "the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions concerning this question, particularly resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965 and those of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.16

(c) Colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967)

299. In operative paragraph 4 of its resolution of 20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/252), the Special Committee recommended "once again that the Security Council make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against Portugal, South Africa and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.17

Trusteeship Council

300. In accordance with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which requested the Trusteeship Council to assist the Special Committee in its work, the President of the Trusteeship Council, by letter dated 30 June 1967 (A/AC.109/255) addressed to the Chairman, informed the Special Committee that the Council at its thirty-fourth session examined conditions in the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, Nauru and New Guinea. The letter stated that the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, as well as the observations of the members of the Trusteeship Council, representing their individual opinions only, were contained in its report to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands¹⁸ and in its report to the General Assembly on Nauru and New Guinea.¹⁹

Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

301. The Bureau of the Special Committee maintained close contact with the Bureau of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa as regards matters

¹⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document 5,78006

¹⁵ Ibid., document S/8005.

¹⁶ Ibid., document S/8023.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, document S/8024. ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document S/8020.

¹⁹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/6704).

of common interest relating to the work of the two Committees. The two Committees co-operated in the formulation of proposals for submission to the Secretary-General regarding the various aspects of the organization of the International Seminar on *Apartheid*, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa which took place in Kitwe, Zambia in July/August 1967.

Specialized agencies

302. Collaboration of the specialized agencies with the Special Committee has been maintained by the presence of representatives of the International Labour Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization at meetings of the Special Committee.

303. During the period covered by the report, the Special Committee adopted the following consensus and resolutions which contained appeals or requests addressed to international institutions, including the specialized agencies:

Resolution adopted on	Territories concerned	Relevant paragraphs	
1 June 1967 (consensus)	Territories under Portuguese administration	third paragraph	
9 June 1967 (A/AC.109/248)	Southern Rhodesia	operative paragraph 13	
20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/251)	Territories under Portuguese administration	operative paragraphs 10, 11, 13	
20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/252)	Colonial Territories considered during the meetings away from Headquarters (1967)	operative paragraphs 8,	

304. The text of the consensus and resolutions was transmitted by the Secretary-General to the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as to the international institutions concerned for their attention. The substantive parts of the replies received from these organizations concerning the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions were reproduced and made available to the Special Committee in document A/AC.109/276 (see section H above), which is appended to the present chapter as annex III.

United Nations Special Mission on Aden

305. In a note dated 23 February 1967,20 the Secretary-General announced that following consultations with the Special Committee and the administering Power pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), he had appointed the United Nations Special Mission on Aden with the following composition: Mr. Manuel Perez Guerrero of Venezuela, Chairman; Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi of Afghanistan, and Mr. Moussa Leo Keita of Mali.

306. At the 567th meeting of the Special Committee, on 13 October, the Chairman drew attention to a letter dated 12 October 1967 addressed to him by the Secretary-General, appended to which was a letter of the same date from the Chairman of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden (A/AC.109/277) indicating when the Mission expected to submit its report.

307. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of the report of the Mission is contained in chapter VI of the present report.

United Nations Council for South West Africa

308. Having regard to its own mandate, the Special Committee has closely followed the work of the United Nations Council for South West Africa. By letter dated 12 September 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee transmitted to the President of the Council for South West Africa the text of a resolution on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/271) adopted by the Committee at its 557th meeting on the same date.

K. Review of work²¹

309. In its resolution 2189 (XXI), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue to perform its tasks and to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which have not yet attained independence. The Assembly also requested the Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories, to recommend whenever it considered it proper and appropriate, a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory, and to make any concrete suggestions which might assist the Security Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter regarding developments in the colonial Territories which may threaten international peace and security.

310. At the outset of its work during 1967 the Special Committee was aware that some constitutional progress had taken place in a few of the colonial Territories to which the Declaration applies, and Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Barbados, to which it had given close consideration in previous years, had acceded to independence during the latter part of 1966. However, many members observed that these developments served only to intensify their regret at the continued delay in the complete and effective implementation of the Declaration. They noted that although more than six years had passed since the adoption of that Declaration, many Territories remained under colonial rule, some of them with little prospect of emancipation in the near future. Indeed, in disregard of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, the administering Powers had persisted in their denial of the right of the people of these Territories to self-determination and had in some instances extended the application of their harshly repressive policies. Many Members viewed this state of affairs as a serious threat to international peace and security. In this connexion special concern was expressed regarding the situation in the colonial Territories in southern Africa where the authorities concerned, acting in collaboration with one another and supported by foreign economic and other interests. continued flagrantly to stifle the legitimate aspirations

²⁰ Document A/6636.

²¹ The views or reservations of individual members on matters reviewed in this section are set out in the relevant chapters of the present report (see chapters II to XXIII).

of the indigenous inhabitants to freedom and independence.

311. It was in this context that the Special Committee engaged in the discharge of its mandate during 1967. In the course of its work it re-examined the implementation of the Declaration and of General Assembly resolutions relating to the various colonial Territories and in the light of developments formulated recommendations for the application of further measures as appropriate. In addition to carrying out a number of specific tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly or arising from its own previous decisions, the Committee also undertook a study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese administration and in all other Territories under colonial administration, on the basis of which it submitted conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly. Moreover, having regard to the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), 2160 (XXI), and 2232 (XXI), the Committee initiated a study of military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration.

312. This programme of work proved to be strenuous; adding to its weight was the necessity of keeping the situation in certain of the colonial Territories under continuous review. What was more, many of the problems which the Special Committee was called upon to examine had increased both in difficulty and in gravity. Nevertheless by holding meetings continuously from February to November, except for one short recess, the Committee was able to give adequate consideration to all but a few items on its agenda.

313. As envisaged in its last report to the General Assembly, the Special Committee held a further series of meetings away from Headquarters during May and June this year. These meetings took place at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam, at the invitation of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania respectively. The Committee also accepted in principle similar invitations extended by five other Member Governments but it agreed to take advantage of them at a future date. As was anticipated by several Members the session away from Headquarters once again facilitated the appearance before it of representatives of national liberation movements wishing to express their views and to acquaint the Committee with the progress of their struggle. Further, the Committee was enabled to acquire more direct knowledge than would otherwise have been available to it of the realities of the situation in several colonial Territories. particularly those in southern Africa, and thus to strengthen its own capacity to assist the people in their efforts to achieve freedom and independence. The Committee was also enabled to assess the extent to which the provisions of previous United Nations resolutions had been implemented and to recommend such additional measures as were necessary for the attainment of the desired objectives.

314. The Special Committee devoted considerable attention to the question of Southern Rhodesia, recent developments regarding which had given cause for general and increasing concern. Following its unsuccessful talks in December 1966 with the illegal racist minority régime, the United Kingdom Government had indicated that it was withdrawing all previous proposals

for a constitutional settlement and that it would not submit to the United Kingdom Parliament any settlement involving independence before majority rule. However, most members urged that any future consultations concerning the future of the Territory should be carried out with the representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime. The majority of members also expressed the conviction that in order to succeed in bringing about the downfall of the illegal régime, the sanctions currently in force must be made comprehensive and mandatory. and must be backed by the use of force on the part of the administering Power. The Committee accordingly called upon the United Kingdom to take immediately all the necessary measures to this end and to transfer power to the people of the Territory without delay, in accordance with the Declaration, and on the basis of elections conducted on the "one-man one-vote principle". The Committee also condemned the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal in continuing to support the illegal régime, and recommended to the Security Council to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter for the implementation of its own previous decisions. Finally the Committee requested all States to give moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Southern Rhodesia and appealed to the specialized agencies to extend assistance to the refugees from the Territory.

315. With regard to South West Africa, the Special Committee noted that following the termination of South Africa's mandate by the General Assembly in its resolution 2145 (XXI), the question had been under consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee established under that resolution. The Special Committee also noted that having examined the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly by resolution 2248 (S-V) set up a United Nations Council for South West Africa with the responsibility, inter alia, of administering the Territory until it attains independence as envisaged by June 1968. At the same time, the question remained the concern of the Special Committee within the context of the implementation of the Declaration, and accordingly received its attention. Meanwhile the South African Government not only repudiated the validity of the above-mentioned resolutions, but also took measures to alter the status of Ovamboland, an integral part of South West Africa, by the establishment of so-called self-government aimed at consolidating the system of apartheid and fragmenting the Territory in furtherance of South African domination. Having reviewed these developments the Committee condemned as illegal, and contrary to the relevant General Assembly resolutions, as well as a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations, the measures taken and proposed by the South African Government with respect to Ovamboland and reaffirmed the territorial integrity of South West Africa, as also the inalienable right of the people to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration. Subsequently, the Committee also condemned the illegal arrest by the South African authorities of thirty-seven Africans from South West Africa in flagrant violation of its international status, demanded their immediate release, and called upon those authorities to cease all illegal acts in the Territory.

316. As regards the Territories under Portuguese administration, the administering Power continued to deny the people the right to self-determination on the

pretext of the legal fiction that these Territories were overseas provinces of metropolitan Portugal. Continuing to avail itself of military and other assistance from some States, it intensified its repressive activities and military operations against the African population of the Territories. In addition, Portugal continued to violate the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and the export of African workers to South Africa. At the same time the Special Committee received information, which it noted with satisfaction, regarding the progress of the struggle of the national liberation movements in these Territories and about their efforts to rehabilitate the liberated areas and to promote the material and social welfare of the people. The great and urgent need of these movements for assistance, particularly in the field of education and health was the subject of a request by the Committee to the specialized agencies and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Committee also appealed to all States to grant the peoples of the Territories the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights. Further, the Committee recommended that the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions as well as those of the General Assembly concerning this question. Finally, it addressed an urgent appeal to all States and to the specialized agencies to refrain from extending assistance to Portugal as long as it continued its present policies in the Territories.

317. As a result of the special study it undertook concerning the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination, the Special Committee noted the dominant and increasing role played in the economic life of the Territories, particularly those in southern Africa, by international economic and financial interests. In the opinion of the Committee the activities of these interests constitute a serious impediment to the implementation of the Declaration in the above-named and in other colonial Territories. The Committee noted that these interests, with the encouragement of the colonial Powers, were ruthlessly exploiting the human and natural resources of the Territories for the largest possible profits. The colonial Powers which enjoy a share in these profits were in their turn impelled to devote greater effort to the perpetuation of the existing situation and to the suppression of the indigenous people. The Committee also found that the countries having the largest economic interests in the colonial Territories in southern Africa were those providing moral and material support to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia in its defiance of international sanctions, to the Portuguese Government in the maintenance of its colonial attitudes and to the South African Government in its expansion of apartheid policies throughout southern Africa.

318. In the light of these findings, the Special Committee recommended *inter alia* that the administering Powers concerned should be condemned for depriving the colonial peoples of their inalienable right to the ownership and enjoyment of the natural resources of the Territories. Those Powers should also be condemned for their active support of foreign economic and other interests which exploited the human and material resources of the Territories without regard

to the welfare of the indigenous peoples or their need for technical economic development. Further, the Committee emphasized that, so long as the people were denied full participation in a government of their own choice, concessions and other discriminatory measures by the colonial Powers in favour of these interests were a violation of Article 73 of the Charter which affirms that the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory are paramount. In addition the Committee expressed grave concern about the assistance given by foreign economic and other interests to the administering Powers which enabled them to continue their colonial domination. Finally the Committee appealed to the Governments whose nationals own and operate enterprises in the colonial Territories, particularly in southern Africa, to put an end to their activities.

319. Another matter which was closely followed by the Special Committee was the question of Aden. During February 1967 the Committee was informed by the Secretary-General that following the necessary consultations, he had appointed a special mission in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including the establishment of a central caretaker government in the Territory. While the Committee was awaiting the submission of the report of the Special Mission on Aden, it was announced by the administering Power that the Territory would accede to independence by the end of November 1967. In order to enable the Fourth Committee to consider the report of the Special Mission, which became available during mid-November 1967, prior to the accession of the Territory to independence, the Committee decided to take note of the report and to transmit it to the General Assembly. At the same time the Chairman on behalf of the Committee expressed the confident hope that the Territory would become independent in conditions of peace and harmony.

320. In addition the Special Committee examined recent developments regarding Swaziland, which was expected to become independent during September 1968. Following this examination, the Committee called upon the administering Power to assure its accession to independence without delay and in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people. It also requested the administering Power to take all appropriate action to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence and to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of the international policies of the racist régime in South Africa. Moreover, the Committee requested the administering Power to take the necessary steps to bring about the economic independence of the Territory vis-à-vis South Africa, and in particular to give full effect to the recommendations previously approved by the Assembly to that end.

321. The delay in the implementation of the Declaration in several other Territories was also a matter of concern to the Special Committee. Regarding Equatorial Guinea, it was the desire of the Committee that the Territory should accede to independence as a single territorial entity not later than 1968. The Committee however noted that following a regrettable delay the proposed constitutional conference had recently been scheduled to take place during October/November 1967. On Ifni the Committee expressed the hope that the dialogue between the Governments of Spain and Morocco would be pursued in accordance

with the relevant General Assembly resolutions. As to Spanish Sahara, the Committee observed that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) had not been implemented, but owing to lack of time it was unable to give the question the full consideration warranted by its complexity. With regard to French Somaliland the Committee, convinced that the inalienable right of the people to self-determination and independence was beyond question and concerned that the process of decolonization should proceed with greater speed and in conditions of peace and harmony, urged that the referendum scheduled to be held during March 1967 should be conducted in a just and democratic manner under a United Nations presence.

322. As regards Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, the Special Committee urged the administering Power to transfer power to representative organs which should be elected by the people on the basis of universal adult suffrage, to return to Mauritius and Seychelles the islands detached from them in violation of their territorial integrity and to desist from establishing military installations therein. Subsequently it was announced that Mauritius would accede to independence during March 1968. On the question of Fiji, the Special Committee reaffirmed its view that the administering Power should expedite the process of de-colonization by holding elections on the "one-man, onevote" principle and by fixing an early date for independence. Concerning Gibraltar, the Committee considered that the referendum envisaged by the administering Power was in contradiction to the relevant General Assembly resolutions and invited the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain to resume the negotiations called for by these resolutions.

323. As requested by the General Assembly, the Special Committee paid particular attention to the small Territories with a view to enabling their populations to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence. With regard to a large number of the small Territories, the Special Committee recognized that their size and population as well as their geographical location and limited resources presented peculiar problems requiring special attention. At the same time, the Committee was firmly of the opinion that the provisions of the Declaration were fully applicable to them. Accordingly, it requested the administering Powers responsible for these Territories to ensure that the peoples concerned were enabled, in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the possibilities open to them in keeping with the Declaration, to express their wishes without delay concerning the future of their countries. The Committee also stressed the urgent need for measures to strengthen the economic infrastructure of these Territories and to promote their social and economic development for the purpose of fostering federations. In a few of these Territories, the Committee was deeply concerned by reports pointing to preparations for their use for military purposes.

324. The Special Committee once again underlined the indisputable value of sending visiting missions to the small Territories as a means of securing adequate information regarding conditions in these Territories and as to the views, wishes and aspirations of the people. Accordingly the Committee once again requested the administering Powers to extend their full co-operation by permitting access to the Territories under their administration. The Committee noted with regret that the responses of most of the administering Powers concerned to this request were either negative or qualified

in character. The Committee, therefore, considered that the General Assembly should again urge them to reconsider their attitudes in view of the vital importance to its work of the sending of visiting missions to the small Territories. In the same connexion the Committee expressed a belief in the desirability of a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise by the people concerned of their right to self-determination.

L. FUTURE WORK

325. In view of the large number of Territories remaining under colonial rule, the Special Committee believes that the General Assembly will wish it to continue to seek the best ways and means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which have not yet attained independence. Subject, therefore, to any further directives that the General Assembly might give at its twenty-second session it is the intention of the Committee in 1968 to continue to examine the situation in each of these Territories, including those Territories to which owing to lack of time it was unable to give adequate consideration during 1967, with a view to assisting in the speedy and effective application of the Declaration. In particular, the Committee will review developments concerning each Territory, examine the extent of compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and recommend any additional measures which may be appropriate to achieve the objectives of the Decla-

326. In this task the Special Committee will continue to be guided by the provisions of operative paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). In these paragraphs the General Assembly requested the Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations. The General Assembly also invited the Committee, whenever it considers it proper and appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people and the provisions of the Declaration. Further, the General Assembly invited the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully the right to self-determination and independence.

327. In addition the Special Committee proposes to continue its examination of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination. The Committee also expects to complete the study which it initiated during 1967 of military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration. Moreover the Committee will continue its consideration of the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies.

328. In the section of this chapter concerning visiting missions and in the chapters of the present report

relating to the small Territories, the Special Committee has set out recommendations with regard to the sending of visiting missions, to which it attaches special importance, and the establishment of a United Nations presence in connexion with the exercise by the peoples concerned of the right to self-determination. It is the intention of the Special Committee to pursue these recommendations during 1968 and to continue to seek the co-operation of the administering Powers in that endeavour. In particular the Committee proposes, subject to any decision the General Assembly might take in that regard, to dispatch visiting missions to the Territories in the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, and to certain of the Territories in Africa.

329. In accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2239 (XXI) concerning the pattern of conferences, the Special Committee has already approved a tentative programme of meetings for 1968 as well as a provisional time-table for 1969. Further, in the context of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which authorized the Special Committee to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its functions, the Committee many consider during 1968 the question of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters.

330. In order to enable it to carry out the tasks envisaged above, the Special Committee suggests that the General Assembly may wish to endorse the foregoing proposals when it concludes its examination of the question of the implementation of the Declaration at its twenty-second session. In addition the Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly should

renew its appeal to the administering Powers to take all necessary steps for the implementation of the Declaration and the relevant United Nations resolutions. The General Assembly should also urge the administering Powers to co-operate with the Committee by facilitating visits to Territories in accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Special Committee or with any other decisions in that connexion which the Committee may find it appropriate to adopt in 1968. The Assembly should also request the administering Powers to co-operate with the Secretary-General in promoting the large scale dissemination of the Declaration and of information on the work of the United Nations and in particular of the Special Committee in the implementation of the Declaration.

331. Further, the Special Committee recommends that in approving the programme of work outlined above, the Assembly should also make adequate financial provision to cover the activities of the Committee during 1968; the sending of visiting missions as envisaged in paragraph 328 above, will in the estimation of the Committee give rise to expenditure of the order of \$80,000, and a series of meetings away from Headquarters, should the Committee decide to hold one as indicated in paragraph 329 above, will result in expenditure of about \$160,000. Finally the Assembly should request the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Special Committee with all the facilities and personnel necessary for the discharge of its mandate.

M. Approval of the report

332. The Special Committee approved the present report, as a whole, at its 572nd meeting, on 5 December 1967.

ANNEX I List of petitioners heard by the Special Committee in 1967

Territory	Petitioner	Meeting
British Honduras	Mr. Philip Goldson, Leader of the Opposition in British Honduras (A/AC.109/PET.696)	548
Equatorial Guinea	Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga and Mr. Rafael Evita, members of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) (A/AC.109/PET.702/Add.1):	552
French Somaliland	Mr. Abdillahi Wabery, Vice-President of the Parti du Mouvement Populaire (PMP) and Secretary-General of the Central Committee for Deportees from French Somaliland, Mr. Abdulrahman Ahmed Hassan Gabot, Vice-President of the United National Front of French Somaliland and former member of the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland, and Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf, member of the Central Committee of the PMP and former Secretary of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the PMP and Union démocratique Afar (A/AC.109/PET.616/Add.1) Mr. Abdillahi Wabery and Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf (A/AC.109/PET.691)	508 537
Grenada	Mr. M. A. Caesar (on behalf of Mr. E. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition in Grenada) (A/AC.109/PET.573) Mr. M. A. Caesar (A/AC.109/PET.580/Add.2)	489 493
Mauritius	Mr. Teekaram Sibsurun, Secretary-General, Mauritius People's Progressive Party (MPPP) (A/AC.109/PET.689)	535
South West Africa	Mr. Solomon Mifima, chief representative in Zambia, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.3)	524 524, 525, 526
	Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Director, and Mr. Jacob Kuhangua, Secretary-General, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.4)	535
	Mr. G. H. Geingob, representative in the United States of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.5)	554

Territory	Petitioner	Meeting
Southern Rhodesia	Mr. T. G. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.681)	521, 522
	Mr. Herbert Chitepo, National Chairman, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.1) Rev. Bernard M. Zulu (A/AC.109/PET.687)	523 523
	Mr. L. P. Chihota, chief representative, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC,109/PET,596/Add.2)	536
Territories under Portuguese ad-		
Angola	Mr. Holden Roberto, President, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), and Mr. Emmanuel Kounzika, Vice-President (A/AC.109/PET.656)	513, 514
	Mr. Lara Lucio, Executive Secretary, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.650 and Add.1)	515, 516
	Mr. A. P. Matondo, President, Partido Progressista Angolano (PPA) (A/AC.109/PET.651)	516
	Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General Secretary, Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.654)	516
	Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant General Secretary, União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA) (A/AC.109/PET.652)	517
	Mr. François Lele, General Chairman, Nto-Bako Angola Party (A/AC.109/PET.644/Add.1)	517
	Mr. Simão Ladeira-Lumona, National President, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.653)	517
	Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector-General, Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO) (A/AC.109/PET.655)	517
	Mr. Emmanuel Tulengala, National Secretary, and Mr. Jacob Jacques Zimeni, President, Cartel des Nationalistes angolais (CNA) (A/AC.109/PET.663)	517
	Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, Confédération des Syndicats libres angolais (CSLA) (A/AC,109/PET,664)	518
	Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (A/AC.109/PET. 679)	524
	Mr. Agostinho Neto, President, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.650/Add.2)	526
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea	Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, President, Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional de Guiné dita Portuguesa (FLING) (A/AC.109/PET.662)	518
Mozambique	Mr. P. J. Gumane, President, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) (A/AC.109/PET.686)	526
	Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, President, Mr. Laurenço Mutaca, Secretary of Finance, and Mr. Mariano Matsinhe, Organizing Secretary, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)	532, 534

ANNEX II

Reports of Sub-Committees II and III: visiting missions

A. Report of Sub-Committee II [A/AC,109/L,395]

Rapporteur: Mr. G. E. O. WILLIAMS (Sierra Leone)

Introduction

- 1. At its 488th meeting on 20 February 1967, the Special Committee decided to continue Sub-Committee II with the same membership as in the previous year.
- 2. At its 56th meeting on 23 March 1967, Sub-Committee II elected Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) as Chairman and Mr. G.E.O. Williams (Sierra Leone) as Rapporteur.
- 3. At the same meeting, the Sub-Committee decided first to consider the question of visiting missions to the Territories referred to it, and then take up the Territories in the following order: Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn, Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, American Samoa, Guam, Niue, Tokelau Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Trust Territory of Nauru, the Trust Territory of New Guinea, Papua, Brunei and Hong Kong.

Visiting Missions

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

- 4. The Sub-Committee considered the question of visiting missions at its 57th to 62nd meetings held on 14, 23 and 29 March, and 5, 14 and 21 April 1967.
- 5. In accordance with a decision taken by the Sub-Committee, the Chairman sent letters to the delegations of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland asking if their Governments were prepared to receive visiting missions in the Territories under their administration.
- 6. The representative of New Zealand in his reply recalled the terms of the reply tendered the Sub-Committee in answer to the same request eight months ago and affirmed that this remained the view of the New Zealand Government. In that reply he had observed that it had been New Zealand's consistently held view that United Nations visiting missions may often have a constructive role to play in the development of Non-Self-Governing Territories and particularly in verifying, on behalf of the international community, acts of self-determination. He had further noted that the people of the Tokelau Islands and Niue would probably wish to exercise their right to self-determination in the relatively near future.

- 7. The reply went on to say that, since in present circumstances it would seem to be paying undue attention to two of the smallest Non-Self-Governing Territories were a mission to be sent exclusively to these islands, the New Zealand Government felt—and this continued to be its view—that it would be appropriate for a United Nations mission to visit the Tokelaus and Niue at this stage only if such a visit were to form part of a more comprehensive tour of the area.
- 8. The representative of the United Kingdom in his reply stated that its position remained as set out in Sir Roger Jackling's letter of 26 May 1966 to the Chairman of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/171). The question of visiting missions raised difficult problems of principle for the United Kingdom Government and the representative of the United Kingdom was unable, therefore, to say anything that might encourage the Special Committee to expect any change in his Government's previous attitude to the question, as frequently explained to the Special Committee and its Sub-Committees. The United Kingdom delegation would naturally be prepared to transmit to the United Kingdom Government, and seek instructions on, any specific request or suggestion for a visit to a particular Territory that the Committee might consider it appropriate to put forward. This could not, however, be taken as implying any commitment that the United Kingdom Government would be able to respond to such a request,
- 9. The representative of Australia, in his reply, stated that visiting missions from the Trusteeship Council made an extensive visit to the Australian Territories every three years. In accordance with this practice, a Trusteeship Council mission would visit these Territories early next year. In addition to the information available in the record of the findings of the Trusteeship Council and of its visiting missions, the Australian Government provided supplementary information on the Territories for which it was responsible in accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. In these circumstances, the Australian Government believed that a visit to the Australian Territories by the Special Committee would not be warranted.
- 10. The representative of the *United States of America*, in his reply, stated that the position of his Government with regard to visiting missions to the United States Territories on the Sub-Committee's agenda remained as communicated to the Sub-Committee last year. The United States continued to be of the view that United Nations visiting missions to these Territories were not warranted at the present time, and if such missions were to be proposed for this year, the United States Government would in all likelihood not be in a position to accept such a proposal.
- 11. The representative of *Poland* noted that, as had been recommended, communications had been sent to the representatives of the administering Powers requesting that a visiting mission be allowed to go to the Territories administered by them. His delegation appreciated the positive reply received by the Chairman from the New Zealand Government and hoped that other administering Powers would follow New Zealand's example, since a visit by a mission was the only means of obtaining first-hand information on developments in the Territories and ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants.
- 12. The representative of *India* stated that her own delegation believed that the Sub-Committee should visit the Territories covered by its agenda, in order to obtain first-hand information on the situation there. In that connexion, she appreciated the positive reply of the New Zealand Government to the Sub-Committee's request, although she hoped that it would withdraw the condition it had placed on its agreement to a visiting mission. She also hoped that the other administering Powers would reply favourably at an early date.
- 13. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation, which in 1966 had called for a visiting mission to be sent to the Territories under consideration, urgently reiterated that request. A visit by a mission would also be in the interests of the administering Powers, which should agree to it, as requested in General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966. Unfortunately, the replies received to date from those Powers had been far from satisfactory. The Sub-

Committee should not be content with statements that the situation in the Territories was continually improving.

- 14. The representative of *Chile* said that his delegation had noted with interest the reply of the New Zealand delegation concerning visiting missions. It constituted a first step, and the Chilean delegation welcomed the spirit of co-operation which New Zealand had shown in the matter. It would be encouraging if the other administering Powers concerned would follow that example and so enable the Sub-Committee to keep abreast of constitutional developments in the Territories under their administration. The Chilean delegation believed that small Territories, precisely because they were small, should be given special attention. No effort should be spared to help them exercise the right of self-determination and accede to independence in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
- 15. The representative of Afghanistan said that his delegation attached great importance to the sending of visiting missions to Territories under colonial domination, since that was the only way of knowing exactly what was taking place there. His delegation welcomed the spirit of co-operation shown in that regard by New Zealand, but regretted the fact that the United Kingdom was persisting in its negative attitude. He asked the United Kingdom delegation to reconsider its position. It was difficult to understand why an administering Power should fear the dispatch of a mission to a Territory if it was administering that Territory in conformity with the principles laid down by the United Nations. The Afghan delegation also hoped that a satisfactory decision would be received from the administering Power which had not yet given its reply concerning visiting missions.
- 16. The representative of Sierra Leone regretted that certain administering Powers refused to authorize the dispatch of visiting missions to Territories under their administration. They should realize that such visiting missions were more useful to the population of those Territories and to themselves than to the Special Committee, because direct contacts gave the Committee a better understanding of the situation in the Territories as it was described by the administering Powers in their statements in the United Nations. He therefore hoped that the administering Powers concerned would reconsider their position.

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

17. The Sub-Committee notes that most of the administering Powers continue to maintain their same negative attitude towards the acceptance of visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee II.

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

- 18. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should strongly urge the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to these Territories at an early date. The detailed recommendations regarding the Territories to be visited and other modalities will be decided upon at a later stage.
- B. Paragraphs 8 to 16 of the report of Sub-Committee III

Question of Visiting Missions

[For the Sub-Committee's report, see the annex to chapter XXIII below.]

ANNEX III

Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2151 (XXI), 2184 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee: requests addressed to specialized agencies and international institutions

Note by the Secretariat

Introduction

1. In the course of the past year, both the General Assembly at its twenty-first session and the Special Committee ad-

dressed requests to specialized agencies and international institutions asking them, inter alia, to (a) give assistance, or increase the assistance which they were already giving to refugees from Southern Rhodesia and Territories under Portuguese administration, and (b) withhold assistance of any kind from the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and from the illegal racist régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination.

- 2. In each case, the Sccretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution or consensus to a number of specialized agencies and other international institutions concerned, drawing their attention to the relevant operative paragraphs.
- 3. In addition, pursuant to a request contained in operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, the Secretary-General entered into consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the results of which are set forth in a report by the Secretary-General.^a
- 4. In the following sections, the Secretariat has reproduced the texts of the request addressed to specialized agencies and international institutions and the replies, other than formal acknowledgements, which have been received to date.

I. REQUESTS BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A. Texts of the requests

- 5. At its 1468th plenary meeting, on 17 November 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2151 (XXI) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, operative paragraph 11 of which read as follows:
 - "11. Requests the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia."
- 6. At its 1490th plenary meeting, on 12 December 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, operative paragraphs 9 to 11 of which read as follows:
 - "9. Appeals once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "10. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in order to secure its compliance with General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and with the present resolution:
 - "11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the aid they have extended so far, and requests them, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered and are still suffering owing to military operations."
- 7. At its 1492nd plenary meeting, on 13 December 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2189 (XXI) concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Operative paragraphs 8 and 9 of this resolution read as follows:
 - 8. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international relief organizations and the specialized agencies concerned to increase their economic, social and humanitarian assistance to the refugees from those Territories;
- "9. Requests all States, directly and through action in the international institutions of which they are members, includ-
- ^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/6825.

- ing the specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination;".
- 8. At its 1518th plenary meeting, on 19 May 1967, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2248 (S-V) concerning the question of South West Africa. Operative paragraph 2, part III of the resolution read as follows:
 - "2. Requests the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to render to South West Africa technical and financial assistance through a co-ordinated emergency programme to meet the exigencies of the situation."

B. Replies from specialized agencies and international institutions

- (a) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
- 9. In letters dated 2 February 1967, the FAO stated that the relevant operative paragraphs of the resolutions adopted at the twenty-first session had been duly noted.
- (b) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
- 10. With regard to the Bank's response to operative paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), see paragraph 3 above.
- 11. With regard to resolution 2189 (XXI), the IBRD replied that the resolution would be brought to the attention of the Bank's Executive Directors with particular reference to paragraphs 8 and 9 which were addressed to Member States.

(e) International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

- 12. With regard to resolution 2189 (XXI), the reply stated that the Council of ICAO had considered the resolution, particularly paragraph 8, at a meeting on 8 March 1967. As a result of the discussion, the Director-General had been requested to reply that, while ICAO had no resources within its regular budget to provide assistance of the type envisaged, it was willing to render assistance to the refugees by granting scholarships out of the limited funds available to it for regional projects in Africa under the United Nations Development Programme. The applicants should have the appropriate qualifications to receive training in the different specialized fields of aviation in any of the training institutions established as Special Fund projects and for which ICAO was or is the executing agency; the applicants should also be sponsored by a State as required by UNDP procedures.
- 13. The information contained in the above letter from ICAO was communicated to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for appropriate action.

(d) International Committee of the Red Cross

- 14. With regard to operative paragraph 11 of resolution 2151 (XXI), the reply stated that the International Committee was continuing to extend its assistance to persons detained or restricted in Southern Rhodesia for political reasons.
- (e) International Labour Organisation (ILO)
- 15. In letters dated 7 December 1966 and 6 February 1967, the ILO replied that the relevant operative paragraphs of the resolutions had been noted.

(f) International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

16. With regard to resolution 2248 (S-V) concerning the questions of South West Africa, the ITU, in a letter dated 30 June 1967, transmitted a copy of resolution No. 619 which had been adopted by the Council of the ITU at its twenty-second session in May 1967. In its resolution, the Council, after taking note of resolution 2145 (XXI), whereby the General Assembly of the United Nations had terminated South Africa's mandate in South West Africa, decided that the Government of South Africa no longer had the right to represent South West Africa in the ITU.

- (g) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- 17. In letters dated 3 January and 25 July 1967, UNESCO stated that resolutions 2151 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) would be brought to the attention of the Executive Board at its next session. In its letter of 3 January, UNESCO transmitted the text of resolution 11 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its thirty-fifth plenary meeting, on 28 November 1966 concerning "UNESCO's task in the light of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twentieth session on questions relating to the liquidation of colonialism and racialism". The text of this resolution is as follows:

"The General Conference,

"In accordance with the aims proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of UNESCO, and with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960,

"In accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of the 'Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' and with the other resolutions of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly mentioned in the report of the Director-General of UNESCO (14 C/20),

"Taking into consideration that the United Nations General Assembly, at its twentieth session, adopted a number of resolutions designed to promote the earliest possible elimination of all forms of racialism and racial discrimination and, in particular, approved and opened for signature the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and, at its twenty-first session, proclaimed 21 March as International Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination,

"Having considered the Director-General's report on the implementation of resolution 6.3 on 'the role of UNESCO in contributing to the attainment of independence by colonial countries and peoples', adopted by the General Conference at its thirteenth session, and resolution 8.2 on the same subject, adopted by the General Conference at its eleventh and twelfth sessions,

"Noting with deep concern that, six years after the adoption of the Declaration in 1960, many territories are still under colonial domination,

"Affirms its belief that all colonial countries and peoples should be granted independence with all possible speed;

"Roundly condemning all forms and manifestations of colonialism and neo-colonialism,

"Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism and the practice of apartheid and all other forms of racial discrimination constitute a threat to international peace and security and are a crime against humanity,

"Noting that, although UNESCO has made a certain contribution to the attainment and consolidation of independence by former colonial countries and peoples by assisting them to develop education, science and culture, by no means all the opportunities at its disposal in this field have been made use of,

"Authorizes the Director-General:

- "(a) To pay special attention in the practical execution of UNESCO's programme for 1967-1968, in the work plans and in future programmes, to the implementation of the resolutions of the governing bodies of the United Nations and UNESCO relating to this matter and, in particular, to provide the newly independent countries and peoples and those that have not yet attained independence, with the necessary assistance for the development of education, science and culture;
- "(b) To continue, within the framework of UNESCO's programme, to organize meetings and research projects on the harmful effects of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racialism on the social and economic life of countries and on the development of their education, science and culture, with a view to assisting in the application of practical measures to eradicate such after-effects;

- "(c) To make more active use of the Organization's information and publications programme and other forms of activities in order to unmask and to help to eradicate, with all possible speed, colonialism, neo-colonialism, the policy and practice of apartheid and racial discrimination, and also to give wide publicity to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the UNESCO General Conference:
- "(d) In accordance with the decision of the United Nations General Assembly to withhold assistance from the Governments of Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia in matters relating to education, science and culture, and not to invite them to attend conferences or take part in other UNESCO activities, participation in which might be considered as conferring technical assistance, until such time as the Governments of those countries abandon their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;
- "(c) In consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General, to use UNESCO's information material and publications and other forms of activity for the implementation of resolution 2142 (XXI) of the United Nations General Assembly which proclaimed 21 March as International Day for for Elimination of Racial Discrimination;
- "(f) To appeal to the Governments of members States of UNESCO which have not yet done so to accede to the 'International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination', adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twentieth session, and to the 'Convention against Discrimination in Education', adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its eleventh session;
- "(g) To report to the General Conference of UNESCO, at its fifteenth session, on the implementation of this resolution."
- (h) United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
- 18. Information concerning the measures taken to increase the assistance to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration under the High Commissioner's Programme is contained in document A/AC.109/L.417, dated 7 August 1967.
- 19. In letters dated 9 March 1967, it was stated that the High Commissioner had drawn the attention of the League of Red Cross Societies to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session and had received a reply from the Secretary-General of the League dated 2 March 1967. An excerpt from the reply, which was enclosed, read as follows:
 - "As we have already pointed out on various occasions to the above-mentioned Department, the assistance to people in need—destitute populations, disaster victims and refugees—is one of the peacetime responsibilities of the Red Cross. It accomplishes this task within the limits of its possibilities and in accordance with its basic principles. The League is prepared to approach its member Societies with a view to assisting these categories of people provided it is requested to do so by the National Society of the country in which they are living."
- (i) Universal Postal Union (UPU)
- 20. In a letter dated 8 February 1967, it was stated that note had been taken of resolution 2184 (XXI), particularly paragraphs 8 and 9, and that the resolution would be drawn to the attention of the Executive Council of the UPU at its next session in May 1967.
- (i) World Health Organization (WHO)
- 21. In letters dated 7 December 1966, 10 March 1967 and 22 July 1967, the Director-General of the World Health Organization stated that note had been taken of the requests contained in the resolutions and that they would be brought to the attention of the Executive Board and of the World Health Assembly. In the letter of 22 July, in reply to the request contained in operative paragraph 2, part III of resolution 2248 (S-V) concerning the question of South West Africa, the

Director-General stated as follows: "I wish to assure you of our readiness to co-operate within the constitutional functions and capacities of the Organization in the programme envisaged by the General Assembly when the specific requirements of that programme are known."

II. REQUESTS ADDRESSED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. Texts of the requests

- 22. During its 1967 session, the Special Committee has to date (25 September 1967) adopted one consensus and three resolutions which contained requests addressed to the specialized agencies and international institutions, as follows.
- 23. On 1 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a consensus concerning the provision of assistance to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration, the last paragraph of which read as follows:

"The Committee has nonetheless been deeply concerned by the statements of the petitioners concerning the insufficiency of the assistance which they are receiving from the specialized agencies of the United Nations and, particularly of their great and urgent need for direct assistance in the field of education and health. It accordingly expresses its regret that the specialized agencies have not yet to the knowledge of the Committee responded to the repeated appeals of the Committee and the General Assembly. The Committee therefore appeals to the specialized agencies and invites the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to make every effort urgently to intensify assistance to the above-mentioned refugees in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese domination.'

- 24. On 9 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/248) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, operative paragraph 13 of which read as follows:
- "13. Appeals to the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia."
- 25. On 20 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/251) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, operative paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 of which read as follows:
 - "10. Appeals once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have so far given, and requests them, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and through it with the national liberation movements, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portguese domination and to those who have suffered and are still suffering from the military operations;
 "...
 - "13. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into consultations with the specialized agencies referred to in operative paragraph 10 of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee."
- 26. Finally, on 20 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/252), concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to those colonial Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967). Operative paragraphs 8 and 12 of that resolution read as follows:

- "8. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the territories under colonial rule, their assistance to the refugees from these Territories;
- "12. Requests all States, directly and through their action in the international institutions of which they are members, including the specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, and to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination;".

B. Replies from specialized agencies and international institutions

- (a) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
- 27. In a letter dated 12 July 1967, it was stated that note had been taken of the reference to IBRD contained in operative paragraph 10 of the Special Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/251) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration and of the references to the specialized agencies in operative paragraphs 11 and 13 of the resolution (see paragraph 3 above).

(b) International Committee of the Red Cross

28. With regard to the request contained in operative paragraph 13 of the Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/248) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, it was stated in a letter of 5 July 1967 that the International Committee of the Red Cross had been assisting political detainees in Rhodesia for several years past. At that moment a delegate of the International Committee, Mr. G. C. Senn, was carrying out a series of visits to detention camps and prisons in that country. In keeping with established practice, his observations and any proposals he might make would be communicated to the detaining Power.

(c) International Labour Organisation (ILO)

- 29. In letters dated 7 and 12 July 1967, it was stated that the requests contained in the Special Committee's three resolutions $(A/AC.109/248,\ 251\ and\ 252)\ had\ been\ noted.$
- (d) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
- 30. In letters dated 19 July 1967, it was stated that the Special Committee's three resolutions (A/AC.109/248, 251 and 252) would be brought to the knowledge of the Executive Board of UNESCO at its seventy-seventh session.
- (e) United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
- 31. In letters dated 21 and 26 July 1967, it was stated that copies of the three resolutions (A/AC.109/248, 251 and 252) had been transmitted to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the International Committee of Voluntary Agencies.

(f) Universal Postal Union (UPU)

32. In a letter dated 16 August 1967, it was stated that note had been taken of the Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/251) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, particularly operative paragraphs 10 and 11.

(g) World Health Organization (WHO)

33. In a letter dated 9 August 1967 regarding the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 1 June 1967 concerning the provision of assistance to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration, it was stated as follows:

"The Special Committee's reference to the statements of the petitioners concerning the insufficiency of the assistance which they are receiving from the specialized agencies has been noted, as well as the reference to their great and urgent need for direct assistance in the field of education and health. The World Health Organization is ready to respond to requests for assistance from Governments and the competent organs of the United Nations in providing service to refugees, The Special Committee is doubtless aware that the World Health Organization does not provide direct aid to individuals, any assistance which is provided is at the request of or with the agreement of Governments, or the United Nations.

"I would add that the World Health Organization continues to co-operate with the United Nations in the special educational and training programmes for Africans which are now being consolidated in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2235 (XXI). In particular the World Health Organization has co-operated with the United Nations in making arrangements for post-graduate medical studies by two Fellows from Portuguese Guinea."

34. With regard to the Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/248) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, a letter dated 14 August 1967 contained the following statement:

"It is noted that in paragraph 13 of this resolution, to which you call attention, the Special Committee has repeated and further elaborated a request made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in paragraph 11 of its resolution 2151 (XXI). As you may recall, that request of the General Assembly has been brought to the attention of the directing organs of the World Health Organization."

35. In a further letter of the same date, it was stated that due note had been taken of the request made by the Special Committee in operative paragraphs 10 and 11 of its resolution (A/AC.109/251) on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration which repeated requests made by the General Assembly in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its resolutions 2107 (XX) and paragraphs 9 and 11 of 2184 (XXI). Note had also been taken of the requests made by the Special Committee in operative paragraph 8 of its resolution (A/AC.109/252) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967), which repeated the request made by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 8 of its resolution 2189 (XXI). It was recalled that these requests had been brought to the attention of the directing organs of the World Health Organization.

ANNEX IV

Report of Sub-Committee I: military activities by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration

[A/AC.109/L.433]

Introduction

(paragraph 1)

* * *

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

A. Mauritius, Sevehelles and St. Helena

B. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination

(paragraphs 2 to 8)

* * *

- C. Military activities by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration
- 9. In accordance with the request by the Sub-Committee, the Secretariat made available to members in May 1967 seven working papers on this item based on information available to it. These papers cover the following Territories: Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Territories under Portuguese administration, Guam, Papua and New Guinea and the Caribbean Territories.
- 10. On 11 April 1967, the Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, at the request of the Sub-Committee, sent letters to the Permanent Missions of Australia,

France, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the United Nations, requesting these Powers to provide information on military activities and arrangements in the Territories under their administration.

11. In July and August 1967, the Secretariat received replies from four Permanent Missions to the United Nations. Following are excerpts of their replies:

Letter dated 4 August 1967 from the Australian Mission to the United Nations.

"In reply to your request I am instructed to say that the Australian Government reaffirms its acceptance of its obligations under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. It has provided on a regular basis a wide range of information, as required of it under that Article of the Charter on 'economic, social and educational conditions'. It has also regularly furnished extensive information on the political developments in these territories. This information has been made available in considerable detail to the General Assembly, and to the relevant committees and sub-committees. Australia has always been willing, in honouring its obligations under the Charter, to assist to the fullest extent the discussions by the General Assembly and its appropriate subsidiary bodies of these reports.

"The Australian Government doubts, however, whether the present request for information comes within the functions and duties of the Special Committee or its sub-committees. It notes that Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter makes no reference to military information and states that the information to be submitted by members is 'subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require'. In these circumstances, the Australian Government regrets that it is unable to accede to the request for information that has been made. It wishes to reiterate that the defence arrangements which have been made in the territories for which it is responsible are entirely consistent with its obligations and rights under the Charter, including its obligations to the inhabitants of territories for which it is responsible. and its obligations to assist the cause of international peace and security.'

Letter dated 31 July 1967 from the New Zealand Mission to the United Nations.

"In reply to your letter, I am instructed to state that the New Zealand authorities know of no military activities or arrangements in non-self-governing territories for which New Zealand has responsibilities that are relevant to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)."

Letter dated 7 July 1967 from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations.

"In reply to your letter, I am instructed to recall that the United Kingdom Government has consistently fulfilled its obligation under the Charter to transmit to the Secretary-General information relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which it is responsible. In addition, my Government has gone beyond the obligation imposed upon it by the Charter and has voluntarily supplied to the General Assembly and to the Special Committee information of a political and constitutional character relevant to the work of those two bodies. My Government does not, however, regard the subject of military activities and arrangements in the Territories for which it is responsible as relevant to the work of the Special Committee, or of the Sub-Committee which has initiated the request for information, conveyed in your letter to my delegation.

"In these circumstances, it is in my Government's view only necessary to affirm that such defence activities and arrangements as may exist in the Non-Self-Governing Territories for which it is responsible are fully consistent with the United Kingdom's rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and also with the interests of the people of the territories concerned."

Letter dated 26 July 1967 from the United States Mission to the United Nations.

"Reporting obligations of Member States having responsibilities for Non-Self-Governing Territorics are contained in Article 73 e of the Charter. Under this Article such members have undertaken to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limits as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistics and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in territories for which they are respectively responsible, other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

"As you are aware the United States Government has cooperated fully in providing the Secretary-General with information on economic, social and educational conditions called for in this Article. In addition, for many years the United States has voluntarily submitted information of a political nature, having in mind its full adherence to the objectives of paragraphs 73 a and b of the Charter, calling *inter alia* for political advancement of peoples of territories and for development of self-government and of free political institutions. The United States has also voluntarily co-operated for many years, in examination of such information by the Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories and subsequently in the Special Committee.

"Bearing in mind the specific Charter recognition in Article 73 e that security considerations may legitimately limit transmittal of information even on economic, social and educational conditions, and the fact that there is no obligation to provide other information, the United States regrets it is unable to comply with your request for information on military activities and arrangements in the territories under United States administration. In any event, the United States Government questions the view that data on military activi-

ties are required for the performance of the duties of the Special Committee and rejects any implication that such military activities as exist in the United States territories are inconsistent with progress toward the achievement of self-determination, to which we are fully committed.

"In conclusion, allow me to emphasize that in carrying out its obligations to promote to the utmost the political advancement and well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, the United States takes full account, as provided for by the wording of Article 73 of the Charter, of the system of international peace and security which the Charter establishes."

- 12. The Sub-Committee began consideration of the abovementioned item at its forty-fifth meeting held on 6 September 1967 and the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made a statement.
- 13. After an exchange of views on the procedure, the Sub-Committee strongly disapproves of the attitude of non-cooperation taken by the administering Powers.^a
- 14. Owing to the refusal of the administering Powers to co-operate and in view of the lack of time and information available, the Sub-Committee decided to continue its consideration of this item at its next session.

D. Adoption of report

15. This report was adopted by the Sub-Committee at its 46th meeting on 27 September 1967.

CHAPTER II*

MEETINGS HELD AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS

Introduction

- 1. In its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, the Special Committee envisaged, as part of its programme of work for 1967, the possibility of holding another series of meetings in Africa during that year.
- 2. By operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2189 (XXI), the General Assembly approved the programme for work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1967, including the possibility of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters. Within the context of the programme thus approved, the Governments of Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Iraq, Morocco, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Zambia extended invitations to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/221, 222, 224, 226-228, 230 and 232) to hold meetings at their respective capitals during 1967.
- 3. During the discussions on the organization of work, which took place at its meetings held between 9 February and 17 April 1967, a wide measure of support was expressed by members of the Special Committee for the holding of a series of meetings away from Headquarters during 1967. Several members stressed the positive results achieved by previous sessions of the Committee away from Headquarters. These sessions had enabled the Committee to gain more direct knowledge of the realities of the situation in a number of colonial Territories and had strengthened its capacity to assist the colonial peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence. A further series of meetings away from Headquarters would not only yield similar results but would also enable the Committee to assess the

extent to which the provisions of previous resolutions had been implemented and to recommend further measures as appropriate. It would, moreover, facilitate the appearance before the Committee of petitioners who would otherwise find it impossible to travel to New York,

- 4. At its 507th meeting on 28 March 1967, the Special Committee considered recommendations for the holding of a series of meetings away from Headquarters which were contained in the twenty-eighth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.385). The Committee also had before it a report by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of these recommendations (A/AC.109/L.386/Rev.1). At the same meeting, the Committee decided to adopt the report of the Working Group, on the understanding that reservations expressed by some members would appear in the records.
- 5. By adopting the report, the Special Committee decided that it would accept in principle the invitations extended to it by the eight Governments to hold meetings at their respective capitals, with an expression of its deep appreciation; that it would avail itself in 1967 of the invitations received from the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, and inform the Governments of Ethiopia, Mauritania and Morocco that, subject to their convenience, it would prefer to take advantage of their invitations at a future date.
- 6. The Committee decided at the same time to leave Headquarters for the purpose of the above-mentioned meetings on 25 May 1967 and to hold meetings in the capitals concerned in the following order, and for the approximate duration indicated, exclusive of travelling time:

^a The representative of Finland reserved the position of his delegation in regard to the wording of this paragraph.

^{*} Previously issued as document A/6700 (part II).

Kinshasa six working days
Lusaka¹ six working days
Dar es Salaam six working days
Baghdad four working days
Damascus three working days

Reservations were expressed by some members regarding the justification for the visit and as to the proposed itinerary.

7. In adopting the report of the Working Group, the Special Committee also decided that the agenda for its meetings away from Headquarters in 1967 should include the Territories in Africa, Aden, Mauritius, Oman and the Seychelles, and that at the capitals indicated below, priority should be given to the hearing of petitioners concerning the following Territories:

Kinshasa Territories under Portuguese administration; Lusaka Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland and South West Africa;

Dar es Salaam Territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles;

Baghdad Aden and Oman; Damascus Aden and Oman.

- 8. On 12 April 1967, the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee issued a communiqué on the Committee's meetings away from Headquarters which was given wide dissemination. The text of the communiqué is appended to this chapter (annex I).
- 9. In a letter dated 11 May 1967 (A/AC.109/238), the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the United Kingdom Government would not be represented in the Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters.
- 10. In a letter dated 23 May 1967 (A/AC.109/242), the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that his delegation was unable for reasons beyond its control to participate in the Special Committee's debates during its meetings away from Headquarters. He expressed support for the work of the Committee and gratitude to the various host Governments for their invitation.
- 11. Members of the Special Committee² accompanied by members of the Secretariat arrived at Kinshasa on 26 May 1967. The Special Committee met in Kinshasa from 29 May to 1 June 1967, at the Palais de la Nation; it arrived at Kitwe on 2 June and met from 3 to 9 June 1967 at Buchi Hall; it arrived at Dar es Salaam on 10 June and met from 12 to 21 June 1967 at the Msimbazi Community Centre. The representative of the Secretary-General joined the Special Committee in Dar es Salaam.
- 12. In a letter dated 13 June 1967 (A/AC.109/247/Rev.1), the representative of Iraq to the Special Committee informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that as a result of the difficult situation facing the whole of the Middle East, it would not be opportune for his Government and people to receive the Committee at that critical time. He had been assured by his Government that the Committee would be most welcome to hold meetings in Baghdad at a later date. The repre-

¹ The venue for the meetings in Zambia was subsequently changed from Lusaka to Kitwe by the Government of the Republic of Zambia.

² A list of the representatives present at the meetings away from Headquarters can be found in annex II to this chapter.

sentative of Syria to the Special Committee made a statement to the Working Group on 13 June 1967 to the same effect as the above letter.

- 13. At its 534th meeting on 14 June 1967, the Special Committee considered in the light of the prevailing conditions in the Middle East further recommendations which were contained in the thirty-first report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.410 and Corr.1) regarding the meetings scheduled to be held in Baghdad, Iraq, and Damascus, Syria, from 22 June to 1 July 1967.
- 14. At the same meeting, the Committee decided to adopt the report of the Working Group. By adopting the report of the Working Group, the Committee decided to convey to the Governments of Iraq and Syria: (a) its gratitude for inviting the Committee to hold meetings at their respective capitals; (b) its full appreciation of the circumstances explained to the Committee by their respective representatives; and (c) the decision that having regard to the above-mentioned circumstances the Committee would wish to take advantage of their respective invitations at a future date. The Committee also decided to conclude its meetings away from Headquarters on the adjournment of its series of meetings in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania; to adjourn its meeting in Dar es Salaam not later than 21 June 1967, and to take up at subsequent meetings at Headquarters the items which it would otherwise have considered during its meetings in Baghdad and Damascus.
- 15. During its meetings away from Headquarters, the Special Committee held thirty-one plenary meetings and the Sub-Committee on petitions seven meetings. The Special Committee heard twenty-four groups of petitioners and circulated thirty-nine petitions exclusive of requests for hearings.
- 16. During their stay in Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam, members of the Special Committee were enabled, at the invitation of the organizations concerned, to visit camps and other facilities for refugees from Angola and Mozambique. In Kinshasa, they visited a reception centre, a hospital and school run by the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE) where they were enthusiastically received by several hundred refugees and met with teachers, doctors and others concerned with aid to refugees. In Dar es Salaam, members visited facilities run by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, including a hospital and the Mozambique Institute which provides secondary and vocational (nurses, aides) training at Dar es Salaam and conducts primary and other teaching programmes elsewhere.
- 17. At the opening of meetings in Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam respectively, the Special Committee was addressed by H.E. General Joseph Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, H.E. Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia and by H.E. Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, second Vice-President, on behalf of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. The Special Committee also had the honour of being received by the Heads of State or Government at each of the three capitals.
- 18. In accordance with the decision by the Special Committee at its 512th meeting on 29 May 1967 to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/AC.109/244), a delegation of that Government attended the meetings of the Special Committee in Kinshasa in an observer capacity. Further, in

accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 512th meeting on 29 May 1967, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of Czechoslovakia (A/AC.109/240 and Add.1), a representative of that Government attended the meetings away from Headquarters as an observer, Similarly, in accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 513th meeting on 30 May 1967, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of Spain (A/AC.109/245), a representative of that Government attended the meetings in Kinshasa as an observer. Further, in accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 519th meeting on 3 June 1967, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Zambia (A/AC.109/ 246), a delegation of that Government attended the meetings of the Special Committee in Kitwe in an observer capacity.

- 19. At its 517th meeting on 1 June 1967, the representative of Spain with the consent of the Special Committee made a statement relating to the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration. At its 527th meeting on 9 June 1967, the representative of Zambia, with the consent of the Special Committee made a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia. At its 531st meeting on 13 June 1967, a representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity, with the consent of the Special Committee, made a statement at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Dar es Salaam. At its 538th meeting on 19 June 1967, the representative of Somalia, in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee concerning a request submitted by his Government (A/AC.109/241), participated in the consideration of the question of French Somaliland.
- 20. Following consideration of the relevant items, the Special Committee adopted resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Territories under Portuguese administration and Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of these items is contained in chapters III, IV, V and XIV respectively of the present report.
- 21. With regard to the question of French Somaliland, the Special Committee decided at its 538th meeting held on 19 June 1967, following the hearing of petitioners and a statement by the representative of Somalia, to take up the question upon resumption of its meetings in New York.
- 22. In the light of its discussions on the above-mentioned items, the Special Committee also adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by it during its meetings away from Headquarters (see para. 744 below). It also adopted unanimously a resolution expressing its appreciation to the host Governments (see para. 751 below).

A. Meetings held at Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo

OPENING OF MEETINGS

Address by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

23. The President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that it was a great honour for the people and Government of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo to serve as host to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, thus giving them an opportunity to pay a ringing tribute to the work of the Organization in the emancipation of peoples. At the present time, twenty-two years after the signing of the United Nations Charter by fifty-one nations, and seven years after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the United Nations counted within its number 122 Members. Hundreds of millions of human beings had re-entered the ranks of free peoples. That great current of liberation, sweeping across the world, had overturned all barriers. The twentieth century had found in that movement what would be its true title to fame. The political, economic and social changes resulting from the accession of hundreds of millions of formerly oppressed men and women to the status of citizens of free countries were such that a new era in the history of mankind was now clearly being opened. That extraordinary development was in no small measure due to the efforts of the United Nations. It was there that the idea that every people had an inalienable right to decide its own destiny had found defenders and persons with the organizing skill to bring that idea from the realm of philosophical systems to that of political realities.

- 24. Considerable progress had certainly already been made, but there could be no yielding to complacency on that score as long as there was a single oppressed people, a single colonial people, left in the world. If the principles for which the former colonial peoples had fought were just, and if they had been recognized by the vast majority of States, there was no valid reason why they should be ignored and rejected in certain areas of the world.
- 25. The idea which had given direction to the decolonization of the entire world had been just and sound, and the Congo stood as a witness to that; it would therefore be contrary to elementary logic to admit that that idea could be flouted.
- 26. The Congo, as an African nation, was keenly aware of the obvious fact that the African continent remained the last refuge of those who would not accept mankind's decisive development. The Congo, which had extensive common frontiers with one of the principal supporters of moribund colonialism, was physically aware that the liberation of colonial peoples could not be regarded as fully achieved. As long as any territory in Africa was under foreign domination, the independence and peace of other countries of the continent, including the Congo, would be constantly threatened.
- 27. He would therefore like to be specific in the treating of the problems that were especially relevant to the African continent, that were found even on the frontiers of the Congo and only a few dozen miles away from Kinshasa. The Congo had a common frontier of thousands of miles with two countries under Portuguese domination-Cabinda and Angola. In more than one place that frontier even separated peoples who formed a single ethnic group. Father and sons, brothers and sisters, were thus separated not only by a frontier but by a veritable iron curtain. The Congo suffered directly as a consequence. Not far from where the Special Committee was meeting, Portuguese troops violated the frontiers of the Congo in armed forays and sowed death among the Congolese inhabitants. Under the pretext of the right of pursuit, bombs were dropped on Congolese

territory by Portuguese aircraft, shells were fired over the frontier by Portuguese guns, and the territorial integrity of the Congo was violated by Portuguese soldiers.

- 28. The members of the Special Committee could visit camps of Angolan refugees at Kinshasa itself, and there, out of the great destitution caused by colonialist repression, they could see emerging the will to resist which in the near future would ensure the victory of the Angolan patriots over their oppressors. Not far from Kinshasa there were many other refugee camps in which old people and men, women and children by the hundreds of thousands had found refuge. The sight of them told a great deal about the savagery of colonial repression and about the growing national awareness of the people under Portuguese domination; it was a constant reminder to the Congolese people of the mission which they had inherited of assisting in a particular way those brothers who were so close to them.
- 29. Portuguese colonialism was certainly the most obsolete and least defensible of all. It was more than anachronistic-it was mediaeval. Was it the ambition of Portugal, an under-developed country itself, to perpetuate under-development over immense African areas? It was at present encountering the stubborn resistance of peoples yearning to be free again. How could it hope to suppress their just demands by force of arms, obliging young Portuguese to perform four years of military service and wasting the meagre resources of the nation on war expenditure. In all parts of the world and within Portugal itself, regardless of religious or political philosophy, leaders and peoples regarded such antiquated colonialism as foolish and fruitless policy. Its continuance condemned Portugal, not to stagnation, but to decay. The final result could be only defeat, the more disastrous for its postponement.
- 30. It was clear therefore that the Congo would continue to extend its enthusiastic assistance to all liberation movements whose purpose was to put an end to colonial domination. It was giving the fullest support to the Angolan liberation movements and would continue to do so. It strongly urged them, however, not to regard Congolese national territory as an arena for the settlement of their disputes. Such fratricidal struggles moreover caused the Angolan people, still under domination, immeasurable harm. They meant a prolongation of their sacrifices and sufferings for the sole benefit of the common foe. Whatever the nature of the differences, it was a matter of honour and duty for the liberation movements to overcome them for the sake of the cause for which they had been fighting for nearly seven years.
- 31. The problem posed by the Rhodesian rebellion against the lawful authorities of the United Kingdom also directly affected the Congo because of its proximity to Zambia, with which it had important economic ties. The existence on Zambia's borders of an illegal force subject to no control could not but deeply preoccupy the Congo. The Rhodesian situation was not moving forward. The Congo had shown the patience asked of it, but patience could not be turned into tolerance.
- 32. Political responsibility for the Rhodesian rebellion lay with the United Kingdom. That great nation, the mother of parliaments, had helped to forge and spread through the world the idea of law, equal for all and from which none could escape. For centuries it had held up the image of a democracy in which power derived from the laws and from the will of the people. How, then, could that country permit the rule of law

- to be absent for so long from Rhodesia? In the name of its law the United Kingdom had succeeded in putting down rebellions and in militarily subjugating those who had attempted to escape its authority in other countries in Africa and elsewhere. Why should those now in command at Salisbury be able to avert the fate met by so many other rebels? The economic sanctions which were supposed to have produced the desired result showed themselves today to be inadequate and clearly ineffectual. It was inadmissible that a great Power responsible for world peace should leave at the Congo's borders an armed, illegal group over which no valid authority was exercised and which allowed itself to express feelings of hatred and detestation for the African nations. The Zimbabwe people, who suffered more than any other people from the establishment of an illegal régime at Salisbury, were clearly entitled to protection from the United Kingdom. The Congo would not abandon them to their fate.
- 33. The problem of South Africa was one which the Congo understood particularly well because it had itself suffered racial discrimination up until the end of the Belgian régime. The Congolese had known what apartheid was; different rules based on racial origin, or rather on differences of skin colour, had shaped the colonial system of government applied in the Congo. The Congolese had been belittled and humiliated; they had suffered in their flesh and in their spirit.
- 34. That abhorrent system must vanish, for its continuance was in itself a challenge to the fundamental principles of the United Nations. How could a Member country so blatantly disregard the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter? Under the system of apartheid a white minority concentrated all power in its own hands. It was organized to maintain and extend its domination. It proposed never to submit to the law of the majority. The black peoples in that immense territory were kept in a state of economic exploitation and intellectual stagnation. Their human rights and rights as citizens were regarded as nonexistent. It was inconceivable for the United Nations to remain aloof from so deplorable a situation. Millions of oppressed brothers were counting on help to hasten their deliverance. With the elimination of apartheid and the return to majority rule, a new State could quickly arise in southern Africa. Its natural riches could render it happy and prosperous. The important thing was to prevent the enslavement of its people from continuing.
- 35. There were, however, startling contradictions. He would not speak of the astonishing verdict rendered at The Hague. A resolution had been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which was clear, straightforward and consistent with the principles of law. A way to implement that resolution must be found. In the discussions concerning South West Africa much had been said about the defunct League of Nations, and it might be well to recall why that organization, in which the peoples had placed so much hope, had ceased to exist. The reason for its demise had been the egoism of the Powers which had refused to give effect to the decisions which they themselves had adopted. That reflection on the past should help to safeguard the future. It was unthinkable that the formal resolutions of the United Nations should be treated as meaningless, particularly by one of the Organization's own Member States. If such non-com-

pliance was tolerated further, the very future of the Organization would be in jeopardy.

- 36. He had touched on only a few problems—those closest to the Congo and most distressing to the African conscience. Clearly, much remained to be done in the sphere of decolonization. The time for sincerity had come. Procrastination was no longer possible. The questions had been clearly put and the principles agreed upon; the answers could be only positive. But without the necessary sincerity all that would be nothing but an exercise in deception for which the still-colonized peoples would pay the price.
- 37. The great Powers had decided that it should be they who bore responsibility for the peace of the world. The world was not, however, at peace when subjugated people rose up in revolt. It was not at peace when those entitled to live in freedom and dignity as citizens were held in subjection. If the implementation of the principles of the Charter and of the resolutions of the United Nations was sincerely desired, then there could be no doubt that the colonial régimes, a remnant of the past, would soon be coming to an end. If, unhappily, the acceptance of the principles and decisions should be only verbal, the liberation of subject peoples would come to pass anyway, through the will of the peoples themselves. But how much conflict and upheaval, how much delay in the building up of a true community of free nations, would result from the equivocal position in which those peoples would have
- 38. Therefore, on behalf of the Congolese people and Government and on his own behalf, he expressed the hope that the Special Committee's deliberations would be fruitful and his sincere wishes for the success of its work.

General statements

- 39. The Chairman expressed to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the Special Committee's deep appreciation of his inspiring address, which would be of great assistance in its work. He conveyed the Committee's sincere gratitude for the invitation to begin its meetings in Africa in the historic city of Kinshasa, and for the hospitality and fraternal welcome extended to it.
- 40. The vigilance and valour of the Government and people of the Congo against the forces of reaction, colonialism and neo-colonialism had earned for them a place in the hearts of freedom-loving people everywhere. The Special Committee therefore considered it a signal honour to be meeting at Kinshasa. The common concern for the liquidation of colonialism in all its manifestations had long made the Committee and the Government and people of the Congo comrades in arms. They shared the same ideals, set forth in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which asserted the absolute right of all colonial peoples to self-determination and independence.
- 41. Seven years previously the plight of the Congo had been a cause of international alarm and crisis, brought about by the despoliation of its material assets and the neglect of its human and spiritual resources during colonial rule, followed by the attempted sabotage of its independence and the sacrifice of one of Africa's most beloved martyrs, Patrice Lumumba. The resultant confusion had been intensified and prolonged by the manceuvres of the preposterous Tshombé, whose name

- had become the byword of treason and intrigue, and who had met the fate reserved for all traitors of Africa. It was not surprising that Africa's enemies had anticipated, and faint-hearted Africans had feared, a future for the Congo of continued economic and political instability, deteriorating into disintegration and possible recolonization. Those forebodings had been proved wrong, and the accession of General Mobutu to the presidency had been hailed as the return of dignity and integrity.
- 42. During the past year, the administrative structure had been overhauled and Congolese control over the national economy and natural resources strengthened. The Government and people had been tackling with vigour the vast work of national reconstruction and of consolidating their independence. The Congolese Government had moved to a commendable position of nonalignment internationally and into the forefront of support for measures to strengthen African unity and independence. Having saved itself by its own exertions, the new Congo was well placed to assist in the salvation of all Africa by its example.
- 43. The Special Committee was therefore honoured and privileged to be meeting now in the Democratic Republic; all its members looked forward to achieving fruitful and constructive results, inspired by the indomitable Congolese people and their dynamic Government. Its meetings at Kinshasa had opened at a time when the forces of colonialism had cast a gloomy shadow over the international scene in furtherance of their own sinister designs to hold the remaining dependent territories in perpetual bondage. The Committee was increasingly concerned that progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had fallen far short of expectations. In particular, owing to the deliberate opposition or non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, the serious colonial problems in southern Africa and in the Arabian peninsula had shown no perceptible progress towards a peaceful solution. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination, in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Aden, had deteriorated so seriously that it constituted a grave threat to international peace and security.
- 44. The Special Committee's desire to visit the colonial Territories and gain first-hand experience of the situation had been frustrated by the negative attitude of the administering Powers concerned, but its meetings in Africa and the Near East would facilitate the appearance before it of the representatives of national liberation movements who found it impossible to travel to New York. They would also reaffirm the solidarity of the United Nations with the colonial peoples in their legitimate fight to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and would further enhance the Committee's capacity to assist those peoples in fulfilling their desire for freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter.
- 45. The Special Committee's main function during its meetings at Kinshasa would be to assess the degree of compliance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as concerned the Portuguese colonies, particularly Angola. That resolution, embodying the Declaration, symbolized the passing of the barbarous system of colonialism, and ushered in a new era in international affairs, marked by the accession to independence of many Asian and African nations. The

fact that the people of Angola was not numbered among them was not due to any lack of desire or determination on their part. They had constantly signified their desire to be free, and had striven by every legitimate and constitutional means to exercise their inherent right to self-determination and independence. To all their appeals and legitimate efforts, the Portuguese Government had opposed a stubborn and vain refusal. Based as it was on the fascist system of repression and police rule, it had sought to stem the tide of nationalism and unity surging through Africa. In order to continue to drain the human and material resources of Angola for the benefit of their backward and stagnant country, the Portuguese authorities uninhibitedly practised wanton barbarism, mass terrorism and genocide in Africa.

- 46. The indigenous inhabitants had responded in the only manner compatible with dignity and honour: by taking up arms and opposing their fascist oppressors. The world was witnessing the killings and counterkillings and mainings which Portuguese obduracy and stupidity had made inevitable. While the United Nations might not condone in principle the use of force and the shedding of blood, in the case of Angola it was understandable. The rights of dependent peoples to self-determination and independence had been affirmed by the Charter and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Moreover, in several subsequent resolutions the General Assembly had explicitly recognized the legitimacy of the fight by the peoples of the Portuguese colonies for the exercise of those rights, and had invited all States to give them moral and material assistance.
- 47. The fight had been and would continue to be difficult, for the Salazar régime was aided by powerful allies—especially some Western Powers within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their collaborators in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia—who were determined to perpetuate the subjugation of the people of the Territories under colonialist domination. They would be sadly disappointed for, as history had shown, no human power could destroy a people's determination to be free and independent.
- 48. The Special Committee was mindful of the noble efforts of the Government and people of the Congo on behalf of their African brothers in Angola, where the Portuguese colonialists were waging a war of extermination against those who asked only to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. The Committee deplored Portugal's attempts to subvert constituted authority in independent African States and thus make it safe for the forces of reaction in southern Africa. It condemned the threats and molestations by the Salazar régime aimed at forcing the Governments of independent African States to abandon their sacred responsibilities towards the colonized part of southern Africa.
- 49. He wished to pay a special tribute to the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their courageous stand against the forces of Portuguese colonialism. Although preoccupied with internal problems and bedevilled by problems engineered by the neo-colonialists, they had gone to great lengths to give moral and material assistance to the African people of Angola who were denied their fundamental human rights. The Committee was happy to be able to learn at first hand, near the theatre of conflict, the progress of the struggle for freedom and

- independence in the Portuguese colonies. It confidently hoped that it would thus be enabled to formulate specific recommendations as a constructive contribution to the solution of the problem. Portugal was the poorest and most backward country in Europe: but for the aid received through NATO from some Western countries, it could not continue its barbaric acts. The Committee appealed to those countries not to help Portugal. They must know that those acts were incompatible not only with the United Nations Charter but also with the very democracy that they always professed to defend.
- 50. He addressed to the leaders of all liberation movements a sincere appeal for unity in the fight for freedom. They too were conscious of the fact that the forces of reaction would not hesitate to exploit and welcome any differences in the liberation movements with a view to postponing the ultimate liquidation of colonial régimes. Those leaders were painfully aware that the fight for the elimination of colonialism would be a particularly difficult one in southern Africa -the strongest bastion of colonial interests. As had been emphasized by all heads of African Governments, the independence of existing African States was meaningless unless linked with total liberation from colonial rule; any setbacks in the fight for the liberation of colonial territories in Africa was a setback to the vital interests of all African States, and any humiliation to the Africans under colonial rule a humiliation to all Africans. Hence his plea for unity of thought, purpose and action, which was indispensable if the elimination of colonialism was to be achieved with the least possible delay.
- 51. The representative of *Ethiopia* associated his delegation with the tribute paid by the Chairman to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for inviting the Special Committee to Kinshasa and for the excellent hospitality they had offered. He also thanked President Mobutu for his very inspiring statement to the Committee. The leader and people of the Congo had clearly shown their determination to be in the forefront of the fight for the total emancipation of Africa. Needless to say, Africans welcomed that determination, especially in view of all the sufferings and deprivation that the Congo had undergone in the colonial and post-colonial era.
- 52. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, was an expression of the common desire and readiness to abolish all vestiges of colonialism without delay. The colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, and the colonialist machinations in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, showed that the objectives laid down in the Declaration were still far from being achieved. It was for that reason that the Special Committee, as the moral conscience of humanity, once again raised its voice on behalf of the world's oppressed peoples.
- 53. Events in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe showed that colonialism was indeed a canker spreading evil, unrest and the danger of broader conflict. It was the duty of the Committee members to bring home to the remaining colonial Powers the futility of their policy of oppression and suppression, for no matter how long and bitter the fight might be, there could be no doubt about the outcome. For that reason he

called upon the freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique and other colonial areas to redouble their efforts to achieve freedom and self-determination for their countries, secure in the knowledge that all progressive mankind stood behind them.

- 54. The Ethiopian delegation would make known its views on the individual items of the agenda as they were taken up. It would do everything in its power to facilitate the Special Committee's work.
- 55. The representative of *India* expressed his sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Kinshasa, which gave it the opportunity of discussing some of the most important problems in the proximity of the colonial Territories concerned. By their invitation the Government and people of the Congo had manifested the deep interest they had always taken in decolonization since they had acquired independence nearly seven years ago. The name of the late Patrice Lumumba would continue to inspire millions of people in the colonial Territories throughout the world. It was not surprising that his successors, and in particular the new régime under the leadership of General Mobutu, should continue to keep the torch of freedom burning. He paid a particular tribute to the practical assistance which the Democratic Republic of the Congo was providing to the people of Angola in their fight for freedom.
- 56. The statement by the President of the Republic contained important points to which the Special Committee should give serious thought.
- 57. During its stay at Kinshasa the Committee would devote particular attention to the problems of Angola and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea. The Indian delegation attached the highest importance to the attainment of freedom by those and indeed all other colonial Territories. The people of India-like those of the Congo-had suffered from colonial rule for many years and were therefore fully aware of the indignities which colonial peoples had to undergo. India too had experienced Portuguese colonial rule for several hundred years. The Indian people had argued and reasoned with the Portuguese, but in the end they had had to use the only language which the Portuguese seemed to understand—the language of force. All those factors made India's commitment to help free its brethren in the colonial Territories irrevocable. It condemned the barbarous rule of Portugal in its colonies, which perhaps surpassed all previous colonial systems in the brutality of its suppression. He pledged his delegation's unreserved support in removing the ugly cancer of colonialism from the face of the earth.
- 58. It was also particularly gratifying to his delegation that the Committee was meeting in Kinshasa, because India enjoyed very friendly relations with the Democratic Republic. India had had the honour of assisting the Congolese people in overcoming the external forces of reaction which had sought to divide the country soon after its independence, and had thus helped to maintain its territory's integrity and sovereignty. The delegations of the two countries in the United Nations worked very closely together in all issues, particularly colonial issues. He had very pleasant personal memories of his previous stay at the Indian Embassy in Kinshasa from 1961 to 1963.

- 59. The Indian delegation wished the friendly people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo success in all their activities.
- 60. The representative of *Iran* sincerely thanked the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their kind invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Kinshasa, a city which had been so deeply involved in the fight for freedom and independence. The meetings would be a tribute to the memory of the Congo's national leader, one of the world's great champions of freedom, Patrice Lumumba, whose ideals, indomitable spirit and legacy could not fail to inspire the Committee's work. The opening address by President Mobutu had been a further affirmation of the Congo's determination to fight colonialism.
- 61. The interest of the Iranian Government in vigorously pursuing a policy aimed at the total eradication of colonialism derived from the conviction that lasting world peace could be attained only by striking at the roots of the injustices which so many suffered at the hands of so few. Colonialism was one of the world's most flagrant forms of injustice; it bred hatred and thrived on subjugation. Even though most of Africa was free, certain parts continued to suffer injustice and, as President Mobutu had said, freedomloving peoples could not rest content as long as any part of the continent remained the refuge of the oppressor. The valiant peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Zimbabwe and South West Africa, among others, were continuing the fight for independence, each in accordance with its own particular circumstances. Their struggle was also that of the States represented in the Committee; it was therefore the Committee's primary function to mobilize all international efforts to ensure its success. Any setback in the campaign to liberate the oppressed peoples in any part of Africa was a setback for the whole of Africa, but he was confident that, no matter how much longer the Portuguese, the South Africans and the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia clung to their oppressive rule, the day would soon come, when Africans would once again be born free. It was against that background that he wished to pay a tribute to the valiant contribution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the fight against tyranny and oppression in Africa.
- 62. The representative of *Venezuela* thanked the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their warm welcome and proverbial hospitality. The Democratic Republic—an independent part of the African continent—would provide a stimulating setting for the Special Committee's work. The progress of the Republic since its independence was a constant source of satisfaction and encouraged further efforts to uproot the anachronistic colonial system and eliminate the policy of racial discrimination which was unfortunately still being practised in many parts of the continent.
- 63. Venezuela and Latin America as a whole were bound to the African continent not only by historical ties but also by the interests common to all developing countries and, above all, by the ideal of liberty. His delegation wished to pay special tribute to those Congolese who had given their lives in the battle for freedom.
- 64. Venezuela's solidarity with the African nations was shown by its firm support of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and no political, economic or

strategic consideration would ever cause it to waver. The fifth special session of the General Assembly on the problem of South West Africa was self-explanatory. The joint draft resolution submitted by the African, Asian and Latin American groups reiterated their firm resolve to continue the fight against the forces of colonialism.

- 65. The opinion of his delegation could be summed up in a saying of Simón Bolívar, the Liberator: "He who does not cherish liberty will be hounded by misfortune and universal censure." Those words expressed a philosophy fully shared by his country. History was an irreversible process. Those who still practised colonialism would eventually be overcome by the determination of the countries which had chosen the path of history, as had the Democratic Republic of the Congo which had invited the Special Committee as a gesture of solidarity with its African brothers still under the colonial yoke.
- 66. The Special Committee's work during its meetings in Africa and the Middle East was of special importance in the decolonization process. Its presence was not only a symbol of its earnest concern for the development of self-determination and independence, but also a renewed effort to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism. Its meetings would certainly provide first-hand information and new material for inclusion in the already voluminous archives on those who defied the most elementary principles of the United Nations Charter and universal morality. It would thus be possible once again to appeal for justice in the General Assembly against the supporters of colonialism and the nations responsible for the policy of apartheid.
- 67. The various Territories included in the programme of work were of such importance that he would deal with each extensively in the individual discussions on each territory.
- 68. His delegation was, as always, ready to support unreservedly any measure in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations likely to expedite the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other dependent countries. It denounced, in particular, Portugal's action against the Congolese people, who had welcomed the Angolan refugees, and categorically condemned Portugal's colonial war.
- 69. He strongly deplored the absence of the United Kingdom delegation and the lamentable failure of that country to co-operate with the Special Committee in its work. Its absence was all the more regrettable because the United Kingdom was politically responsible for granting independence to Southern Rhodesia. However, he assured the Zimbabwe people that their struggle would not be in vain and that the days of Ian Smith's racist minority Government were numbered.
- 70. South West Africa would understand that the principles of human rights, which the South African Government did not respect, made it necessary to open the way for the peaceful transfer of the Territory, as a first step towards final independence.
- 71. The work of the Special Committee in Africa and the Middle East was therefore of special significance, as a step towards eradicating colonialism in accordance with the highest principles of the United Nations. Optimism and an unquestioning faith in Africa's destiny should be the keynote of the Com-

mittee's discussions. Until Africa was free world peace would always be in danger.

- 72. The representative of Sierra Leone expressed his sincere gratitude to President Mobutu for devoting some of his valuable time to opening the Special Committee's series of meetings. His address had provided much food for thought and would remain in the minds of the Committee members not only during their stay at Kinshasa but also throughout their travels and in New York. The President was leader of a people whose recent history was marked by upheaval and a grim fight for independence, and his people had first-hand experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The President's presence at the opening meeting emphasized the great interest of the Democratic Republic in the liberation of the African peoples. During their short time at Kinshasa, all delegations had had the opportunity of appreciating the spontaneous welcome of the Congolese, which was typical of all African peoples.
- 73. The Democratic Republic's proximity to the scene of the crimes committed in the Portuguese Territories, its own struggles to rid itself of colonial rule and its battle against neo-colonialism had commanded general respect. He had been requested by the Chairman and members of the National Reformation Council of Sierra Leone to express, on their behalf and on behalf of the people of Sierra Leone, their best wishes to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with which Sierra Leone had long-standing ties. Some of the people of the Congo had settled in Sierra Leone over 150 years before, on their return from slavery and had founded a town, called Congo Town, which they had made their home. People from Sierra Leone had also travelled to the Congo some fifty years before at the request of their employers and had settled there. Sierra Leone had taken part in the United Nations Operation in the Congo and a contingent of its soldiers had been there during those very difficult days.
- 74. Turning to the matter of decolonization, he recalled that, on 14 December 1960, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV), the Magna Carta of freedom for colonial peoples. Four months later, Sierra Leone had become independent and the one hundredth Member of the United Nations. Since then progress in decolonization had been slow. Africa was still burdened with the archaic thinking of Salazar, who wished to turn Africans into Portuguese; it was confronted by Ian Smith and his 200,000 Whites who insisted on ruling 4 million indigenous Africans. The Government of South Africa, not content with maintaining the policy of apartheid in its own territory, was also applying it in South West Africa and defying the United Nations its right to rule that Territory. No less important were the Spanish Territories of Equatorial Guinea, Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, although in them there had been some slight progress towards liberation. Swaziland was still on the list of colonial Territories and the question of French Somaliland had not yet been solved. A large part of Africa therefore was still under the colonial yoke. Aden and Oman continued to present difficulties, even though it had been agreed that the former would become independent no later than 1968. The important question was the type of independence contemplated. Another problem was that of the smaller islands in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, all of which should have the right

to self-determination, whatever their size. If they decided to remain associated in one form or another with a larger Power, they should be entitled to reconsider that decision at specified intervals and to terminate it unilaterally at any time.

- 75. The African countries had been accused of being emotional about racial matters and of making the struggle against them their main interest. They had however experienced colonial rule in the twentieth century, had seen their natural resources drained and justifiably intended to halt that trend. They had also suffered under colonial rule, insults and a consequent loss of human dignity. It was therefore not surprising that all Africans were united in the fight to free their brothers, who were still dominated by colonial Powers. They would continue the fight with greater vigour until all Africa was free of that scourge, but they would not rest there; they would also help their brothers across the seas until all nations became free.
- 76. Portugal continued to wage war on Africans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, so-called Portuguese Guinea; that small, poor European country continued its vicious attack on people whose only crime was their wish to be free and to exercise their rights under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The fight would continue, for the spirit of Africa never would be broken. Other colonial Powers had already learnt that lesson.
- 77. In Rhodesia Ian Smith was boasting that economic sanctions had failed. They had done so because unscrupulous businessmen in countries, which paid lip service to the Security Council's resolution but refused to restrain their citizens, continued to trade with Rhodesia directly or through third parties.
- 78. A few days before, the South African Government had dealt in first reading with a bill intended to extend powers of arrest and detention of Africans in South and South West Africa. As if to show its contempt for the General Assembly, it was timing the bill to coincide with the conclusion of the debate on that Territory. Such events could continue because some nations of the world did not practise what they preached. Great nations were spending thousands of millions of dollars in many areas to further the ideology that a great Power could not allow one country to dominate another. Many thousands of people had died for that cause, yet those great Powers did little to implement the fundamental right to freedom in Africa and elsewhere. The continued efforts of Salazar, Ian Smith and Vorster to force their will on the Africans both individually and collectively could only be regarded as the domination of one group by another. Those States and the people who assisted the enemies of freedom should be condemned. It was regrettable that the administering Powers continued to cling to their Territories and refused inspection by the United Nations, as if they had something to hide.
- 79. With all the energy it could muster, Sierra Leone would continue to strive for the expulsion of the colonial Powers from Africa. His Government reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the Charter and the principles of human rights. It would carry out their principles and continue the fight with all its might as it had done since Sierra Leone's independence six years before.
- 80. The representative of the *Union of Soviet So*cialist Republics expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Congolese Government and people for having

invited the Committee to meet at Kinshasa. He had listened with great interest to the address by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo setting forth his Government's position in the struggle against colonialism and stressing the irreversible character of national liberation movements. The Committee's present session was opening in the heart of Africa, in a country where racists and colonialists had done their utmost to perpetuate the colonial régime and where armed interventions had cost the lives of a great many patriots. Despite all those obstacles, however, the Congo had succeeded in gaining its independence. The Soviet people, celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, were gratified by the historic transformations of the old order that had taken place in Africa. The Africans' wish to put a permanent end to colonial régimes and to combat neo-colonialism had always had the support of the Soviet Union. The process of liquidating the colonial system in Africa had gone forward because of the struggle waged by the African peoples themselves, but the United Nations had played an important role in adopting, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, resolution 1514 (XV) setting forth the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That Declaration reflected the efforts of the greater part of mankind to put an end to the infamous manifestations of colonialism. Since the resolution's adoption in 1960. 50 million human beings had thrown off the colonial yoke and twenty independent States had been formed. The task was far from being completed, however, for bastions of colonialism still existed in Africa and the Near East.

81. The Committee's task was to contribute all it could to the final elimination of colonialism. That was the point of the present session away from Head-quarters, for the Committee could meet at places not far from where the colonialists were pursuing their reactionary policies and could learn of the methods they were using. There was no doubt that the direct participation in the Committee's deliberations of the African peoples fighting for freedom would make it easier to find the means of implementing resolution 1514 (XV). The Committee must pursue that task until no single piece of land remained in the hands of the racists. The struggle against colonialism must be intensified, for the continued existence of a number of reactionary centres posed a direct threat to the young States that had recently won their freedom. The basic purpose of the present session must be to work out measures for rendering political, moral and any other forms of aid to the national liberation movements and for forcing the colonial Powers to implement the decisions of the United Nations. To that end the Committee must co-operate with the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League and all others seeking to assist the peoples striving for freedom. The first objective of the Committee's work should remain the emancipation from colonial oppression of the large colonial territories of Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Guinea (Bissau) in Africa, and Aden and Oman in the Arabian peninsula.

82. The focal point of racism at present was South Africa, where the colonial Powers and imperialist monopolies exerted their influence. Acts of ruthless repression were perpetrated there. The region had witnessed the creation of a bloc of white countries—the Republic of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rho-

desia-into which the South African Government had drawn South West Africa. The object of the bloc, acting in league with the colonial Powers and imperialist monopolies, was to preserve the domination of the racists and colonialists in the colonial territories and exert pressure on the young African States. The activities of the monopolies, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, constituted an obstacle to the liberation of the African continent. The Committee should study the significant role the monopolies played in the perpetuation of the colonial order. It should make recommendations on that subject to the General Assembly, in whose agenda for the twenty-second session it had been decided to include a separate item on the activities of international monopolies in colonies. It was for the Committee to determine who was responsible for the failure to implement the decisions of the United Nations. His delegation also hoped that the Committee would devote attention to the military activities of the colonial Powers and to the presence in some territories of military bases, which were a further obstacle to the liberation of the oppressed peoples. The colonial Powers continued to establish military bases for use against the national liberation movement and the new independent States. The South African racists made use of the bases in South West Africa to suppress the national liberation movement and exert pressure on neighbouring countries. Portugal used its bases in Angola and Mozambique not only locally but also against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It continued to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congolese people, to enjoy the support of its partners in South Africa and to receive economic and military aid from the members of NATO, especially the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. It also received assistance from the United Nations and particularly from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The Committee should recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of decisions which would put an end to Portugal's colonialist activities.

- 83. In Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom was endeavouring to protect its own interests and to safeguard the position of the imperialist monopolies. The Committee should study the situation and find the means of solving the problem speedily.
- 84. The Soviet Union had always stressed the need for the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to be given effect. It had always declared its support for the demands of the African peoples and for the elimination of racist régimes. It believed that the day was near when the last centres of colonialism would be destroyed. It was gratified that the Committee's proceedings were being conducted by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, who discharged the important duties of Chairman with great energy and ability.
- 85. The Soviet delegation was prepared to cooperate in making the present session a success. It would unite its efforts with those of other delegations in order that the problem of colonialism might be solved in accordance with the lofty principles of the Charter.
- 86. The representative of the *United Republic of Tansania* thanked the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their invitation to the Special Committee to meet at Kinshasa, which

- was an expression of the deep-rooted tradition of hospitality of the African people. There existed strong fraternal bonds between the people of his country and those of the Congo, bonds which were being strengthened by the efforts to unite the peoples of Africa. By their unity and solidarity they would march ever more strongly forward to defeat the forces of reaction and the aggressive imperialist offensive and so achieve the complete liberation of the African continent. It was no secret that such forces feared the unity of the African people and the mammoth achievements of the liberated African countries.
- 87. The independence of the Congo had been won at the costly sacrifice of its heroic sons, the most eminent and beloved of whom had been Patrice Lumumba. The material and spiritual achievements of the Congolese people were evident, and his delegation was convinced that, under the leadership of their Government, they would achieve further and greater victories in developing their country.
- 88. He expressed his appreciation of the wise and precise observations made by President Mobutu in addressing the Special Committee and associated himself with the remarks made by the Chairman.
- 89. He agreed with the representative of Venezuela that it was indeed regrettable that the United Kingdom delegation had once again decided not to join the Special Committee at its meetings away from Head-quarters, a fact that was the more regrettable since the Committee would be discussing very serious situations which were the direct result of the colonial policies of that Government. Its absence cast doubts on the sincerity of the many professions it had made of its wish to co-operate with the Committee.
- 90. Since the present meeting was the first in Africa, it would be useful to analyse briefly the existing situation with respect to decolonization but, in doing so, he did not wish to minimize or magnify the problems facing colonial countries and peoples. Decolonization had to be viewed from a position of principle, but emphasis might rightly be placed on a particular situation in view of the consequences that might arise if the situation was prolonged. In that connexion, the colonial problem, created by the aggressive designs of the imperialist Powers, was undoubtedly most urgent in Africa.
- 91. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which, on the occasion of its adoption in 1960, had been hailed by all peace-loving peoples as an important stage in the revolt of the human conscience against the enormities of colonialism and as a milestone in the history of the United Nations, was an unequivocal condemnation of the exploitation of man by man through the colonial system. It was a declaration by the progressive forces that they intended to fight colonialism to the bitter end, in order not only to achieve the independence of the colonized peoples but also to liberate man's energy and resources for the general progress of humanity. Colonialism, which involved the brutal suppression of human beings, was definitely not a peaceful system and the fight against it was an integral part of the fight for peace.
- 92. The continued existence of Portuguese colonialism in Africa—a most shameful page in the annals of human history—was the direct result of the material support given to fascist Portugal by its NATO allies, for it was obvious that Portugal, a poor, weak, primitive and demoralized country, could not wage its current

costly and barbaric campaign if it was not a tool of international imperialism and a convenient overseer of the exploitation by foreign capitalist monopolies of the abundant riches of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique. Studies by the United Nations and other institutions had revealed the barefaced exploitation of the Territories under Portuguese domination by capitalist monopolies originating in the Western countries. Thus, the mining revenue alone from Angola in 1966 had been estimated at more than 3,000 million escudos, the bulk of which had gone to monopolies such as the subsidiaries of the former Union minière and the Angola Diamond Company. The latter had made a clear profit of over 170 million escudos.

- 93. Such exploitation, in itself immoral and unjust, formed part of the stratagems used to suppress the people of Angola, and a study by the Special Committee had revealed that the colonialists had received major donations from those capitalist sources for what was cynically called "the defence of Angola".
- 94. The gallant people of Angola had for years attempted to obtain by peaceful means their national right to sovereignty and independence and the United Nations had passed countless resolutions reaffirming those rights, yet the Portuguese colonialists continued to use the most modern and sophisticated forms of warfare to suppress them. The so-called "defence" was thus aggression against the Angolan people. Information available to the United Nations showed that there were more than 400 airfields and landing strips in Angola, twenty-seven of which could accommodate the largest aircraft capable of operating within the Territory, and that the Portuguese were deploying against the patriots an estimated 700 fighter planes, many of modern design, together with such aircraft as the Lockheed Harpoon PV-2 bomber.
- 95. That situation was contrary to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other General Assembly resolutions and was also incompatible with the principles of the Charter. Moreover, the continued existence of Portuguese colonialism constituted a dangerous threat to the peace and stability of adjoining parts of Africa. The henchmen of Portuguese imperialism had launched countless aggressive campaigns against independent and sovereign countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and the United Republic of Tanzania.
- 96. The patient African peoples had always considered that the problem of colonialism in general, and of Portuguese colonialism in particular, could be solved peacefully. It was for that reason that his country supported the principles of the Charter and the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Countless resolutions had been adopted by the United Nations calling upon Portugal and its Western allies to change their attitude and to restore to the African peoples their sovereign rights and liberties. Time and again the international forces of reaction and plunder had defied those resolutions. It was high time that Portugal and its allies took stock of their responsibilities. The United Republic of Tanzania, in its endeavour to ensure that the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV) were achieved with the minimum of further difficulties, was prepared to do everything within its power to enforce respect for United Nations resolutions and considered it the duty of every freedom-loving human being to join in the honourable struggle to achieve the liberation of the Territories under Portu-

- guese domination. It thus called upon the Angolan patriots to redouble their efforts to liberate their motherland and associated itself with the Chairman's appeal to them to make every effort to unite in their fight.
- 97. The same vicious and aggressive system as existed in Angola had brought about the usurpation of the African people's rights by the racist white minority in Southern Rhodesia and was holding South West Africa prisoner in defiance of international opinion. The same system was causing bloodshed in South Arabia and riding roughshod over the peoples in other parts of the world.
- 98. The Special Committee was well aware of the many resolutions adopted by the Committee and the General Assembly with a view to achieving the full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). In these resolutions certain action had been called for on the part of the various United Nations agencies and organs. He requested the Secretariat to prepare and distribute a working paper showing the various requests that had been made together with the action, if any, that had been taken to comply with them. Particular attention should also be paid to the aid, of whatever nature, which might have been given to the national liberation movements and what criteria they were required to meet in order to qualify for such aid.
- 99. The representative of *Mali* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its kind invitation to the Special Committee. Mali appreciated the true worth of that act of statesmanship by a sister Republic occupying a strategic position in Africa and the world. History had ordained that the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia should be islands of liberty and hope for millions of African nationalists waging a bitter and noble struggle against the colonialism and imperialism which oppressed that part of Africa.
- 100. By accepting that kind invitation, the Special Committee had wished to demonstrate its solidarity with the worthy sons of Africa who were bearing arms in the fight against the injustice of the colonial régimes. He recalled the sacrifice made six years previously by Patrice Lumumba, that great son of Africa, so that freedom and dignity might return to African soil. Patrice Lumumba had given his life so that Africa in general, and the Congo in particular, could again become free, so that the exploitation of man by man should for ever disappear from the continent and so that Africans could combine their energies, potential and genius to construct a better world, on a basis of respect for the right of peoples to self-determination recognized by the United Nations Charter.
- 101. The message left by Patrice Lumumba would guide the African people in their struggle for the final eradication of colonialism in all its forms. His delegation paid tribute to that great patriot and wished to assure its Congolese brothers of its support in their struggle for a better future. It was grateful to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who, by his presence, had lent added solemnity to the Special Committee's work. The wisdom of his statement would certainly assist the Committee in its search for practical solutions of the grave problem of colonialism, which, unhappily, still prevailed in Africa.
- 102. The Special Committee's meetings in Africa during the current year were being held in troubled

times. Imperialism had returned to the attack with increased ferocity and, to safeguard sordid interests, was making a mockery of the United Nations Charter and the noble principles it contained. The world was the powerless spectator of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States; the Viet-Namese people were being prevented from solving their problems by themselves and tension had been created in the Middle East while, at the same time, the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations proclaimed respect for the integrity of independent territories and for the right of all peoples to self-determination.

103. The failure to observe that fundamental principle was causing tension and daily menaced international peace and security. In areas not yet liberated, particularly in southern Africa, the situation grew more serious each day and was becoming a racial conflict. In Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination, white settlers who had usurped power were withholding all rights from the Blacks, the true owners of Africa. The Western Powers, by aiding such people as Ian Smith, Salazar and Vorster, were hampering the Africans in their struggle for freedom and independence. Every day the NATO Powers, disregarding the United Nations Charter and the Special Committee's resolutions, were selling conventional and even nuclear weapons to the racist settlers, thereby enabling them to prolong their domination despite the condemnation of international opinion.

104. The debates on the question of South West Africa during the General Assembly's special session had shown that colonialism understood only one language, that of force. His delegation did not believe that the Africans and Arabs would be condemned for having taken arms to free their countries. It therefore paid tribute to the patriots of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Aden, Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere, who were fighting valiantly for independence and freedom. It had always upheld their just cause and would not fail to meet its obligations. It would give moral and material assistance to all nationalists fighting for freedom and independence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was convinced that the Special Committee's work during the current year would once again be extremely successful since, despite the plots of the imperialists, the Africans were determined to regain their independence. Mali would denounce the activities of the colonialists who were shamefully exploiting the human and material riches of the Africans in the Territories not yet liberated, despite their obligation under the Charter to help such peoples and prepare them to manage their own affairs.

105. His delegation would make a detailed statement at a later stage on the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination. Nevertheless, it wished to take the opportunity afforded it to appeal to all Angolan nationalists to unite and drive the Portuguese occupier into the sea. Their disagreements served the cause of Salazar to the detriment of Africa. The African peoples could not understand the fratricidal struggle between the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil and the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola. It was time for them to unite, in order to speed the process of decolonization in the Territory of Angola. It was their duty to do so because, as President Mobutu had so rightly observed, there could be no peace for any African country as long as any por-

tion of African soil remained under the yoke of colonialism.

106. His delegation's references to the threat to international peace and security posed by colonialism were not abstract. It remembered the incursions by Portuguese mercenaries into Congolese territory, in violation of the United Nations Charter, and the numerous violent and provocative acts committed against the peaceful people of the United Republic of Tanzania by Salazar's hordes, who had not even spared the peaceloving Republic of Senegal. Mali had consistently condemned such barbarous actions and would continue to do so and to support its brethren in Senegal and the United Republic of Tanzania. If that situation continued it would inevitably lead to war, for which the Portuguese and their allies would bear the sole responsibility. Mali urged all the great Powers to suspend their aid to Portugal, which refused to respect the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly's resolutions.

107. Mali was confident of the outcome of the people's struggle for their right to self-determination and for the final eradication of colonialism. Colonialism was doomed. It would soon disappear if the signatories of the Charter at San Francisco and the other Member States of the United Nations were willing to respect the Charter and to implement fully the resolutions of the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. It was high time to implement resolution 1514 (XV) in order to spare the world the further upheavals which racial discrimination supported by international capitalism could not fail to provoke.

108. His delegation reserved the right to speak again on the problems to be considered by the Special Committee. It wished once again to express its gratitude to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the great interest it was taking in the Special Committee's work.

109. The representative of Yugoslavia, having expressed his thanks to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their kind invitation to meet at Kinshasa and for the heartfelt welcome they had extended to the Special Committee, said that the invitation bore further testimony to the readiness of the Democratic Republic to make the greatest possible contribution to the fight of those peoples of Africa who were still under brutal colonial domination. The Congolese people had suffered greatly in fighting for their freedom from colonialist and neo-colonialist forces but, as President Mobutu had stated in his impressive address, they were determined to help in the complete elimination of colonialism from African soil.

110. The colonialist and neo-colonialist forces, in their attempt to perpetuate their exploitation of the rich natural resources of the country, had resorted to the most brutal use of force and military intervention, and the Congolese people, in frustrating their plans, had made enormous sacrifices, particularly that of Patrice Lumumba, the great champion of the freedom of the Congo and of all Africa. He was confident that the ideals for which Patrice Lumumba had laid down his life would be attained and that all Africa would in the end be free of imperialistic threats, colonial subjugation and merciless exploitation, despite the use made by the racists and fascists of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa of their material superiority as a means of blackmail, pressure and interference.

- 111. His delegation was well aware that the fight of the African people for liberation, and the efforts of the Special Committee to assist them, would be no easy task. It fully realized that colonialist and neo-colonialist forces were doing everything in their power to halt decolonization and to retain and strengthen their strongholds in certain regions of Africa, especially those which they considered to be vital to their political, strategic and economic interests. It was obvious that the racist minority régimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and a backward and isolated country like Portugal, could not hold vast areas and peoples in their thrall, without material assistance from elsewhere. In the case of the Territories under Portuguese domination, for example, if the only opposition facing the international community had been that of Portugal, the peoples of those Territories would have attained their liberation years before. Owing, however, to the material, military and moral help which powerful NATO allies were rendering to Salazar, Portugal had been able to continue its domination of a considerable part of Africa. The meek denunciations of the fascist policy of Portugal and other racist régimes in southern Africa by some of Portugal's allies could not conceal the glaring truth.
- 112. The intensification of the activities of various international monopolies in the colonial Territories, which tended to consolidate the racist régimes of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, were seriously impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Portuguese armed forces, in their war against the fight for freedom of the peoples under its domination, were using weapons acquired through their membership in NATO, or under bilateral agreements concluded with some of their allies. Foreign military bases were being established or reinforced in the colonial Territories and constituted a fundamental obstacle to the liberation of the colonial peoples and an instrument of pressure on neighbouring States. Moreover, the moral support, which was manifested even in the United Nations, received by the racist régimes from their partners and the latter's refusal to put numerous United Nations resolutions into effect, made it possible for those régimes to continue their abhorrent policy. Colonial strongholds established on African soil not only served to perpetuate economic exploitation of the Territories for the benefit of colonial rulers but also enabled the colonialists to interfere directly in the affairs of independent countries and thus hamper their political and economic development. It was clear from the facts revealed to the Special Committee that colonial wars and repressive measures against the African populations were part of a larger plan devised by the reactionary forces to preserve their foreign, political and economic interests.
- 113. That policy of force and pressure was being applied not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world, the most extreme example being Viet-Nam. Dangerous activities by the reactionaries were also evident in the Middle East, where attempts were being made to impose feudal rule on Aden despite the determined fight by the great majority of its people for independence.
- 114. Yugoslavia had always supported the fully justified and legitimate fight for freedom of peoples under colonial domination. The international community and the United Nations had a special responsibility to help such peoples to exercise their rights and freely to de-

- termine their own destiny. The world Organization bore that responsibility not only in view of its emphasis on the principles of self-determination and independence but also because it was only by discharging that responsibility that it could fully carry out its primary mission of safeguarding and consolidating world peace. The great majority of the world's people had come to realize that the vestiges of colonialism constituted the most immediate threat to international peace and security.
- 115. The Special Committee had for years been entrusted with a highly responsible assignment: the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and, although, in view of the obstacles placed in its path by colonial and neo-colonial forces, it had not accomplished spectacular results, it had made a substantial contribution by bringing to the notice of the international community the conditions in which the colonized peoples were living and the legitimacy of their fight for national liberation.
- 116. The current visit to Africa, which would enable his delegation to learn new facts about the colonialist plans and activities and the efforts of the peoples in their fight for freedom, would also enable the Special Committee to help the United Nations to accelerate the decolonization process and to render more practical assistance to the national liberation movements.
- 117. The United Kingdom's decision not to participate in the Committee's work in Africa was very disappointing.
- 118. The representative of *Bulgaria* associated himself with previous speakers in expressing gratitude to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congolese people for the cordial welcome they had given the Special Committee. The invitation to meet at Kinshasa was a friendly gesture to the Special Committee and the United Nations which his delegation warmly appreciated and which showed how deeply the Congo was interested in the liberation of the African peoples still subject to colonialist oppression. Bulgaria was linked to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by strong bonds of friendship, which it hoped to strengthen further, and his delegation had noted with pleasure the progress achieved by the great countrymen of Patrice Lumumba.
- 119. The debate during the General Assembly's special session and developments during the current year showed that the struggle of oppressed peoples against colonialism had entered a decisive phase. The past year had been marked by further intensification of the armed struggle of the people of southern Africa, who had inflicted heavy losses on the racist and colonialist forces. The valiant patriots of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had already liberated considerable areas of their Territories, in which they were now organizing a free and democratic life for the people and laying the political, economic and social foundations for future independent States.
- 120. Another characteristic of the new phase upon which the struggle for national liberation in Africa had entered was the continually increasing solidarity of the anti-imperialist forces, particularly the African, Asian and socialist countries, which had redoubled their aid, both moral and material, to national liberation movements. The United Nations had also made a contribution by condemning the various manifestations of colonialism and racism in Africa, which it had described as crimes against humanity, and by appealing to all Mem-

ber States to give moral and material support to the peoples fighting against the colonial and racist régimes.

121. Unhappily, it was a fact that, despite the enthusiastic struggle for national liberation and despite the support which the overwhelming majority of countries had expressed for the national liberation movements, very large areas were still under the colonial yoke, although over seven years had elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That was a disturbing fact. It showed that the efforts of the anti-imperialist forces and the colonizing activities of the United Nations must be intensified and that the Special Committee and the General Assembly must find new ways to give their decisions greater effect. They must get to the heart of the problem. They must establish the reason for the lack of decisive success in the oppressed peoples' struggle for their liberation.

122. The debates in the General Assembly had again shown the harmful results of the political, economic and military co-operation of the great Western Powers, particularly the United States, with the colonialist and racist régimes in Africa. It was quite clear that without the assistance of its NATO allies a backward country like Portugal would not have been able to withstand the pressure of the national liberation movement in Africa. The Special Committee's reports and the statements by petitioners amounted to a veritable indictment of Western monopolies and high financiers, whose malignant activities were manifest in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa. All the expressions of sympathy which the United States and other Western Powers might make were rendered hollow by the facts. The time had come to tell the Governments of the Western Powers and the NATO countries that their assistance to the colonial and racist régimes and their participation in the exploitation of an enslaved Africa made them accomplices to the crimes committed daily by the régimes of Salazar, Ian Smith and Vorster. Unless it was ended, their co-operation with Portugual, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia would cause untold suffering and thousands of victims. It would aggravate racial hatred in Africa and that could not fail to have disastrous consequences. In resolution 2189 (XXI) on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Counties and Peoples, the General Assembly had once again requested the Governments of Member States to end their co-operation with the colonial Powers. That appeal had fallen on deaf ears and the debates of the Fourth Committee and the appeal to IBRD and other specialized agencies had had no greater success. It was distressing to note that even some international organizations and agencies within the United Nations system continued to co-operate with the colonial and racist régimes. The International Telecommunication Union had officially circulated the letter from the South African Government in which it had stated that it was acceding on behalf of South West Africa to the International Telecommunication Convention. The Soviet Union had rightly drawn the attention of Member States to that fact, which was incompatible with the General Assembly's decisions, in the letter which it had sent to the Secretary-General on 26 April 1967.3 Unfortunately, that was no isolated case. The General Assembly and the Fourth Committee must examine the problem and issue clear and unambiguous

guidelines and recommendations for the specialized agencies.

123. The Special Committee should take account of the fact that, as the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national liberation and independence intensified, there was a stubborn reaction in colonialist and neocolonialist circles. There was fierce opposition to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Nevertheless, the anti-imperialist forces were immense and capable of carrying the last bastions of imperialism. The time had come to impress upon the reactionary forces. once and for all, that the era of colonialism had passed; the time had come to mobilize all forces, including those of the United Nations, to help the oppressed peoples break the last chains of imperialism. The Committee must play its part in the achievement of those ends and, in so doing, could count on his delegation's unreserved support.

124. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed his sincere thanks and appreciation for the wise words addressed to the members of the Special Committee by President Mobutu, who had emphasized that the Committee could not wash its hands of the matter when people were deprived of their rights, both as human beings and as citizens, of their liberty and their dignity, but must persist in its efforts to aid all peoples to obtain majority government. His delegation, Government and people entirely supported those principles and objectives and the achievement of fully representative government for all men.

125. He recalled the powerful and consistent support provided by his country, both bilaterally and through the United Nations, to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic and re-emphasized the great importance which his Government and people attached to continuing their close and friendly relations with that country. The recent visit by the Under-Secretary of State and Mrs. Katzenbach reflected their deep interest in furthering those good relations.

126. The progress achieved under the leadership of President Mobutu had laid the foundations for the more complete realization of the Congo's great human and material potential.

127. Despite overriding internal problems since its independence, the Democratic Republic had nevertheless had the generosity to share its heavily taxed resources with more than 250,000 refugees from neighbouring Angola. He was proud to say that the United States was continuing to supply large quantities of food and medicines to relieve the hardships of those refugees.

128. His delegation was grateful for the generous hospitality provided by the Democratic Republic for the current meetings at Kinshasa.

129. He intended to deal factually at a later and appropriate stage with the numerous misrepresentations and innuendoes that had been made against his country by several delegates in their replies to the President's address.

130. The representative of *Poland* associated himself with the appreciation expressed by other delegations to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He had been deeply touched by the hospitality and cordiality shown. His delegation felt particularly honoured to attend meetings in the country of the great Congolese patriot and son of Africa, Patrice Lumumba.

³ Document A/6648 (mimeographed).

- 131. He had listened with great interest and attention to the important address by President Mobutu which would greatly assist the Special Committee in its deliberations.
- 132. The Special Committee's decision to meet in Africa and the Near East, where extremely difficult colonial problems still persisted, reflected the growing concern of the United Nations for those Territories and its determination to ensure that their peoples gained their freedom and independence under the best possible conditions. The Committee had come to Africa to make an on-the-spot examination of the situation, to acquaint itself with the problems of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa and to continue its search for ways and means of implementing the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Nevertheless, whatever part the United Nations had played and still had to play in the process of decolonization, it would be misleading to think that it was the deciding factor in the achievement of national objectives; their fulfilment depended essentially on the determination of the colonized peoples to free themselves from foreign domination.
- 133. Although considerable progress in decolonization had been made during the preceding decade, the dangers inherent in the continued existence of colonial régimes had by no means decreased. That was particularly true in southern Africa, where the colonial Powers were stubbornly refusing to comply with the recommendations of the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. It was that stubborn opposition to decolonization which constituted the common denominator of all the items on the Committee's agenda. The problems it was called upon to discuss were closely interrelated and connected with the policy of apartheid, since Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa were not merely colonies of Portugal or the United Kingdom but virtually economic colonies of the Republic of South Africa. The United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western Powers were together exploiting the natural resources and cheap labour of the richest part of Africa. The racial discrimination, aggression and direct military action of Salazar, Vorster and Smith were possible only because of the assistance given to them by leading NATO countries. It was clear that the colonial Powers were determined to preserve white domination in southern Africa and to further the interests of the monopolies and international financial groupings in the whole region. On the basis of studies made by the Special Committee, the General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, had condemned those foreign financial and economic combines in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination for supporting colonial régimes and for seriously obstructing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The General Assembly had, in addition, called upon the Governments concerned to take steps to end such activities.
- 134. Despite the sincere efforts of the international community, the situation with regard to the implementation of the various recommendations was far from satisfactory and had, if anything, deteriorated. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, for example, the so-called selective sanctions had proved ineffective and the minority régime was continuing its illegal existence. The colonial wars waged by Portugal against the national

- liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were gaining momentum and the military build-up in South Africa and the Portuguese-occupied Territories was continuing. Similar imperialist aggression was also manifest in other parts of the world, particularly Viet-Nam.
- 135. The many resolutions adopted by various United Nations bodies calling upon the administering Powers to release political prisoners, to end states of emergency, to dismantle military bases and to grant freedom to colonial Territories in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world had so far been ignored. That situation was of grave concern to the Special Committee, and the current series of meetings offered a further opportunity of bringing the colonial Powers and their supporters, including some United Nations specialized agencies, to book. It was to be hoped that the Special Committee's presence in Africa would encourage the freedom fighters of Angola and other Territories, which were still enduring humiliation and exploitation under oppressive colonial régimes, and would assure them of the legitimacy of their fight, which was supported by all progressive mankind.
- 136. The Government and the people of Poland, by virtue of their historic traditions and the very nature of the socialist structure of the country, were opposed to national and racial oppression and stood for the immediate and full implementation of the anti-colonialist Declaration and the exercise in the shortest possible time of the legitimate rights of the colonial peoples to freedom, self-determination and independence. They considered the fight for freedom and independence to be also one for peace since, as long as colonialism existed, there could be no lasting peace in the world. In view of its principles, therefore, the Polish Government had always supported national liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere and had strictly abided by all the decisions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council with regard to Portuguese colonial policy, apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa and those relating to the illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. As in the past, his delegation would continue to co-operate to the best of its ability and would support any effective measures designed to eliminate colonialism in all its manifestations and forms.
- 137. The representative of *Chile* thanked President Mobutu for his address and associated himself with the thanks expressed by the Chairman to the Congolese Government and people for the hospitality they had so generously extended.
- 138. Chile had great admiration and affection for the Congolese nation and was well aware of the extraordinary efforts made by its Government to achieve national reconstruction and economic and social development. The Democratic Republic was a giant by reason of its geographical situation, its vast natural wealth and, above all, its people. It was clearly destined to occupy a prominent place, not only in Africa, but also among the nations of the world. Like the Democratic Republic, Chile possessed considerable copper resources and wished to make use of them for the welfare of its people. His Government had taken important steps in that direction, on the national level, by "Chileanizing" the mines and, on the international level, by concerting marketing arrangements with the other copper-producing countries of Africa and Latin America. A meeting of representatives of those countries was shortly to take place at Lusaka for the purpose of framing a joint

policy which would enable them to obtain a just reward from their mining activities.

- 139. It was appropriate that the Special Committee should begin its work in the Congo since that country bordered upon the largest remaining colonial Territory. Members would have the valuable opportunity of hearing the Angolan political leaders who were fighting for their country's freedom and had already had the unforgettable experience of visiting the administrative offices, dispensaries and schools which they had so painstakingly established to aid the mass of Angolan refugees. He hoped that the Committee's presence at Kinshasa would enable it to collect and reveal to the world information which would help in the fight for Angolan independence and that it would encourage unity among the Angolan patriots.
- 140. Although decolonization had made great headway in the preceding fifteen years and many proud nations had emerged in Africa, a number of which were the modern representatives of old African empires that had reached a high degree of civilization, the future, though full of promise, was not without its difficulties. Nevertheless, the emergence of a free Africa was the political event of the century, although some Territories were still subjected to the hateful colonial régime, and they were precisely the most difficult cases—the ones in which foreign Powers showed the greatest obstinacy and cruelty in opposing the freedom movements. Those Powers endangered the rise of a free Africa and the harmful effects extended throughout the world since respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace were indivisible.
- 141. The peoples of Latin America fully supported Africa in its fight to end colonialism. They too had been colonized and rather more than 150 years before had had to sacrifice many thousands of lives to wrest their independence. In modern times, with the existence of the United Nations and the possibility of arousing the world's conscience, it might be possible to help decisively by peaceful means to liberate those peoples which were still under the colonial yoke. Although the United Nations was necessarily imperfect in that respect and could not be a substitute for the efforts of the subject peoples themselves, its activities could be important. The States of Latin America were co-operating with the African and Asian countries in their campaign within the United Nations to end colonialism. Only a week before, they had unreservedly supported a resolution on South West Africa. His delegation welcomed the unity of the third world in the common search for solutions of major economic and social problems, particularly with regard to colonialism and respect for human rights and dignity.
- 142. The representative of *Italy* associated himself with the speakers who had expressed their gratitude to the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the generous and cordial hospitality which they had shown to the Special Committee. The meetings to be held at Kinshasa would be doubly effective: the Congolese people would be able to follow the Committee's work closely while the Committee would benefit from the attention and whole-hearted support of Congolese public opinion in discussing problems which affected the Congo directly, concerning as they did the liberty and independence of all African peoples. The geographical and political position of the Congo was, in itself, a guarantee of the success of the Committee's work. His delegation was pleased to renew its assurances that it would co-operate to the utmost

- with the Committee so that its work during the current session could hasten the achievement of the objectives set forth in the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Italy had long had extremely cordial relations with the Congo, which were increasingly strengthened by economic, cultural and commercial ties.
- 143. The representative of *Finland* thanked President Mobutu for his kind words of welcome and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its generous invitation to the Special Committee and its hospitality.
- 144. Although Finland was very distant, it took great interest in the future of Africa and shared the deep concern of the United Nations about the problems of colonialism that still remained. He was sure that the Committee's meetings in Africa would make it easier to understand the problems involved and to help peoples still under colonial administration in their struggle for self-determination and independence.
- 145. The representative of Australia, speaking on behalf of his Government, expressed his appreciation of the honour done to the Special Committee by President Mobutu in addressing its opening meeting.
- 146. He was grateful for the hospitality offered by the Government of the Democratic Republic and for the excellent facilities placed at the Special Committee's disposal.
- 147. He hoped that the Special Committee's visit to Africa would contribute to his country's understanding and awareness of African problems, aspirations and achievements.
- 148. The spirit of co-operation shown by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would, he was sure, enable the Special Committee to approach its important work in a thoughtful and constructive manner.
- 149. The representative of *Syria* said he welcomed the fact that, for the fourth time since its creation, the Special Committee was holding its meetings away from Headquarters on African soil. His delegation was convinced of the value of the joint endeavour to examine the colonial problems before the Committee from close to.
- 150. His delegation had particularly appreciated the extremely fraternal welcome extended to the Special Committee by the people and Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Such generous hospitality was not surprising in a country which had been one of the battlefields in the fight against foreign domination and whose soil had been drenched in the blood of its sons to safeguard the independence won through very heavy sacrifices.
- 151. His delegation had been able to visit the Angolan refugee camps of the Angolan Republic in exile. The misery and suffering of those fraternal African people, driven from their homeland by the forces of colonial oppression, reminded him of the plight of other refugees, dear to him, who had also been driven from their homes and their country, Arab Palestine, by bands of foreign Zionists who had come from all parts of the world to settle in the country by violence, with the assistance and complicity of certain colonial Powers, the inalienable rights of a whole people being held in contempt.
- 152. The General Assembly had been considering the question of the Territories under Portuguese domi-

nation for more than ten years already and had unfortunately failed to reach a satisfactory solution. The people of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under Portuguese administration remained in thrall to the Portuguese colonizer. Under his yoke for centuries, they had known every indignity, racial discrimination, forced labour, ignorance and the denial of civil and political rights.

153. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee itself had vainly adopted numerous resolutions reminding Portugal of its obligations under the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and urging it to abandon its anachronistic policies in those Territories and to grant their peoples their inalienable right to independence and freedom. The Portuguese colonizers scorned those resolutions and continued to exploit the natural riches of the colonized Territories, sharing the profits with their foreign accomplices. They continued to use the assistance and weapons provided by their NATO allies to suppress the population of the Territories and even went so far as to send workers from them to South Africa, replacing them by foreign immigrants.

154. The Special Committee had already drawn the Security Council's attention to the serious threat to world peace and security arising from those activities and had asked it to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to ensure that Portugal respected the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. He reminded the Committee of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965, in which the General Assembly urged Member States to take measures against Portugal, separately or collectively, from breaking off diplomatic relations to boycotting all trade. He reminded it also that, after taking note of the chapter of the Special Committee's report dealing with the Territories under Portuguese administration, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, recommending the Security Council to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in resolution 2107 (XX).

- 155. Unhappily, those resolutions had had no tangible result. Portugal continued to ignore the existence of resolution 1514 (XV) and was encouraged in that attitude by its NATO allies and by groups of foreign financiers whose interests were carefully protected, while some of their profits went to increase Portugal's stock of arms.
- 156. All possible moral pressure and persuasion had been brought to bear in vain. Was it not time to use more effective means in order to force the obstinate colonizer to renounce such anachronistic practices?
- 157. The Republic of Syria, in keeping with its traditional policy, expressed its complete solidarity with the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under Portuguese domination. His delegation was prepared to support any radical, or even coercive, measure which the Special Committee might recommend in order to bring the Salazar régime to grant freedom and independence to the colonial peoples and countries which it held in subjection.
- 158. The representative of *Tunisia* expressed his deep gratitude to the Congolese Government and people for their kind invitation to the Special Committee to meet at Kinshasa and for the outstanding welcome

which they had extended to it. The important statement by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be a good guide for the Committee in its work.

- 159. All delegations were aware of the determination of the Congolese Government and people to work for the liberation of peoples still under colonial domination. They knew that they were actively supporting the patriots fighting to free themselves from the Portuguese yoke and that they received Angolan refugees as brothers, despite the reprisals and frontier incidents which that entailed. The situation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was similar to that of Tunisia at the time of the Algerian liberation. His delegation therefore realized the difficulties confronting that country and appreciated the true value of the efforts and sacrifices which the Congolese people had taken upon themselves.
- 160. As a result of the Congolese Government's invitation to meet in the great African capital of Kinshasa, the Special Committee would be able to hear petitioners and to form an exact idea of the situation.
- 161. The discipline and determination of the Angolan patriots had made a deep impression on the Special Committee when it had visited the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil. Sooner or later, their enthusiasm would overcome the Salazar régime.
- 162. Many African peoples were, unhappily, still under the yoke. Horrible atrocities were committed daily by the colonialists, who stubbornly maintained their domination, disregarding international public opinion and human rights.
- 163. The Special Committee had the heavy responsibility of finding solutions which would meet the aspirations of the peoples still under colonial rule. His delegation would co-operate in its work to the utmost in order to ensure respect for the principles of the Charter and the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 164. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* joined previous speakers in expressing his deep gratitude to the President and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the cordial and fraternal welcome which they had extended to the Special Committee.
- 165. At the present stage in the Special Committee's work, his delegation was not in a position to make a general statement on the problems with which the Committee was concerned. He reserved the right to express his delegation's views on certain agenda items at a later stage.
- 166. His delegation attached considerable importance to the problems of decolonization, as did all the other delegations present, and it very much hoped that other countries would follow the Congo's example, so that the United Nations, and more particularly the Special Committee, could better discharge their difficult tasks. His delegation hoped that the Committee's work would be an effective contribution to the complete liberation of the peoples still under foreign domination.
- 167. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation was particularly pleased to have an opportunity of seeing for itself the achievements of the newly independent African countries, of which the Democratic Republic was one of the foremost. He was grateful to the Congolese Government for its hospitality, and to President Mobutu for his address.

- 168. It was particularly significant that the Special Committee's work should have begun with a visit to the camps of the Angolan refugees. The courage, determination and patience of those refugees would inspire the Committee to help them in their plight and their fight for freedom. The United Nations had a sacred duty to help refugees from countries with illegally established Governments, such as Angola, Palestine and South Africa. The United Nations and the specialized agencies should do more to assist refugees in the attainment of the rights recognized by the international community.
- 169. Iraq had always supported the African countries in their fight for liberation, for it too had suffered from colonialism, racial discrimination and foreign exploitation. His delegation had co-sponsored scores of resolutions concerning African and Asian countries, the latest of which dealt with South West Africa. It would continue to support the fight of the people of Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and other Portuguese colonies, French Somalia, Aden, Oman and Palestine.
- 170. His delegation very much regretted the enforced absence of the delegations of Afghanistan and Uruguay, and the continued absence of the delegation of the United Kingdom.
- 171. The representative of *Madagascar* associated himself with the tributes paid by earlier speakers to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congolese people.
- 172. His delegation was gratified that the Special Committee's first meetings were being held in one of the greatest countries in Africa and had listened to the important and wise speech by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with great satisfaction.
- 173. Madagascar's position on colonial problems was well known, both in the United Nations and in the Organization of African Unity, and it was therefore unnecessary to explain it afresh. His delegation would have the opportunity of giving a detailed explanation of its views on the questions to which it attached importance at subsequent meetings of the Committee. It was convinced that the Committee's work at Kinshasa would be most fruitful and was ready to co-operate whole-heartedly with all delegations present in the search for ways and means to enable peoples and countries which were still under colonial rule to exercise, at an early date, their right to freedom, self-determination and independence.

CLOSING OF MEETINGS

Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

174. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo thanked the Special Committee, on behalf of the President of the Republic, Lieutenant-General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, the Congolese people, its Government and himself, for having accepted the Congolese Government's invitation to meet at Kinshasa. Now that the session at Kinshasa was coming to an end, it was time to pay a tribute to all the participants, who had spared no effort to make it a success. The cordial atmosphere which had reigned during the Committee's debates, the frankness with which the Committee had conducted its discussion, and the solicitude with which it had tackled the various problems

before it all proved its determination to find speedy and satisfactory solutions to the problems of decolonization.

- 175. In its exchanges of views with the petitioners, the Special Committee had evoked the thorny problems raised by the liberation of Angola, Cabinda and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The frank dialogue between the members of the Committee and the representatives of the liberation movements had contributed significantly to the definition of many questions raised by the struggle for national liberation and had also enabled the members of the Committee to realize how much work remained to be done. The Committee's visit to the Angolan refugees had amply brought out the fact that colonialism was still a reality, despite the irreversible current of decolonization and progress which characterized the twentieth century.
- 176. On the present occasion it would be appropriate to address a solemn appeal to the great Powers which, directly or indirectly, by their passivity, encouraged the countries which were perpetuating colonialism. They should be invited to help implement the relevant United Nations resolutions and persuade the countries which were lagging behind to accept the decolonization process. It was useless to extol the principles of freedom and democracy, while tolerating a situation in which much of the world remained subject to the colonial yoke.
- 177. On the eve of the Special Committee's departure to continue its mission, he wished to state that the Congo would never shirk its responsibility to aid Africa. He reaffirmed that his Government would aid Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the other African countries which had not yet been liberated. He also wished to reiterate the heartfelt appeal which the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Committee had made at the opening of the session at Kinshasa to all African combatants to work together in a united movement in order to speed the liberation of the whole continent.
- 178. The Congolese Government had been particularly touched by the kind words addressed to it by the members of the Special Committee, and wished to avail itself of the opportunity to reaffirm its faith in the work of the United Nations.
- 179. He congratulated the Special Committee warmly on the work it had done at Kinshasa and expressed his conviction that its recommendations to the General Assembly would advance the cause of the liberation of the Territories which had not yet gained their independence. He wished the Committee every success in the continuation of its mission.

General statements

- 180. The Chairman thanked the Foreign Minister for his encouraging address which clearly reflected the active support of the Congolese Government in the fight to liberate colonial countries, its dedication to the aims of the Charter and its complete solidarity with the Special Committee's objectives and efforts. The Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa had, thanks to the lavish hospitality, co-operation and goodwill of the Government and people of the Democratic Republic, taken place in an atmosphere which left nothing to be desired and none of the technical prerequisites for successful meetings had been lacking.
- 181. He expressed the Special Committee's deep gratitude to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic and assured them that the

impetus which the Congolese Government had given the Committee would be an important source of sustenance during the remainder of its journey.

- 182. The members had been very happy to visit Kinshasa, not only because of the opportunity thus provided to strengthen contacts and friendships with the warm, vital and dynamic Congolese people, but also because the visit had enabled them to sense at first hand the attachment of that people to the cause of liberty, its concern to eliminate all vestiges of colonialism from its system and its progress in consolidating its independence.
- 183. While at Kinshasa, the Special Committee had heard eleven groups of petitioners concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination and had been horrified by the additional and incontrovertible evidence provided concerning the atrocities and acts of genocide being carried out by the Portuguese colonialists against people whose only demand was to exercise the right of self-determination. Further evidence had been received of the continued assistance, both material and moral, which certain of the friends and allies of Portugal, together with foreign and other economic interests, were giving to the Salazar régime in the pursuit of its brutal colonial policies. There had, nevertheless, been encouragement in the news of the unremitting struggle being waged with increasing intensity by the national liberation movements seeking to free themselves from the yoke of the oppressors.
- 184. The Special Committee had also noted the commendable efforts being made by those movements to advance the social and material welfare of the Angolan people in the liberated areas and of the Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic, It had been directly informed of the difficulties and needs of the national liberation movements: their difficulties in assisting the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Angola, and their urgent need for assistance from the High Commissioner for Refugees and from the specialized agencies, particularly in education and health.
- 185. The Special Committee had thus acquired a greater understanding of the sufferings and legitimate wishes of the people of Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda, a fact which constituted yet another justification of the Committee's decision to hold a series of meetings at Kinshasa, since the information received would not have been available had that decision not facilitated the appearance of petitioners before it. It would be a disservice to the cause of decolonization if leaders of national liberation movements were always expected to relinquish their posts to appear before the Committee in New York. The Committee fully supported their fight, which was as just as it was urgent, and would redouble its efforts to hasten the independence of Angola.
- 186. The Special Committee had been unanimous in calling for the intensification of aid to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, through that organization, with the national liberation movements in those Territories. He reminded the petitioners that the Committee's action would not be limited to that consensus. After it had heard the other petitioners, who would appear before it at the other capitals to be visited, the Committee would proceed to the adoption of conclusions and recommendations concerning all aspects of decolonization,

- taking full account of the valuable testimony furnished to it at Kinshasa.
- 187. He reiterated his plea for unity among the liberation movements—unity of thought, purpose and action—since only through such unity could colonialism be eliminated and freedom and independence achieved for the people of Angola.
- 188. He requested the Foreign Minister to convey to the President of the Democratic Republic, to his Government and to his dynamic people the gratitude of the Special Committee for the hospitality and friend-liness with which it had been received.
- 189. The representative of *Ethiopia* associated himself most heartily with the Chairman's remarks. He had the honour to speak on behalf of the African and Asian countries and Yugoslavia in thanking the Foreign Minister not only for his inspiring address but also for the great hospitality the Special Committee had received from the Government and people of the Democratic Republic. That was not, however, unexpected, since such hospitality was an integral part of the best African tradition.
- 190. He assured Mr. Bomboko of the continually increasing interest of the delegations, for which he was speaking, in the development of the Democratic Republic and their sympathetic admiration and full support for the work of its people in the cause of national reconstruction. He also thanked them for the strong moral and material support they have given to the Angolan patriots. By inviting the Special Committee to Kinshasa, the Congolese Government had clearly demonstrated the great importance it attached to decolonization in general and to African freedom in particular. Despite the activities of Salazar, Vorster, Smith and their like, the flame of freedom would continue to burn bright and, though the pace might be slow, decolonization would continue on its inexorable march until all Africa-and, indeed, the whole worldhad won the basic human right of self-determination.
- 191. He thanked the Government of the Democratic Republic for the facilities it had extended to the petitioners in enabling them to appear before the Special Committee and to supply it with so much valuable evidence. He conveyed the fraternal greetings of the delegations for which he spoke to the Congolese people and its President and wished them every success.
- 192. The representative of Australia said that he was speaking for the representatives of Finland, Italy and the United States in addition to his own delegation. He expressed his thanks for the excellent facilities and great hospitality with which the Special Committee had been received. Meetings had been expedited in a most effective manner and, although his anticipations on coming to the Democratic Republic had been high, they had been more than completely fulfilled.
- 193. He offered the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic his most sincere wishes for their continued prosperity and happiness and assured them that the Special Committee was leaving their country with great regret and with many pleasant memories.
- 194. The representative of *Venezuela* said that, on behalf of the Chilean delegation and his own, he wished to congratulate the Foreign Minister on his inspiring statement and to thank him and the Congolese Government for the warmth of their welcome and the facilities

and hospitality they had provided. The reception given to the Special Committee was yet another sign of the devotion of the Congolese people to the cause of decolonization. The Government was also to be congratulated on the progress that the Democratic Republic had achieved and on its dedication to the cause of liberty which made countries great.

195. The Special Committee's presence at Kinshasa had enabled it to meet many important petitioners and obtain much valuable information which might not otherwise have been available. Its report would be much richer as a result of its stay in the Democratic Republic. That happy result could not have been achieved without the help and co-operation of the Congolese Government and people and the facilities they had so generously provided.

196. The representative of *Poland* said he was speaking on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as his own. He expressed his gratitude to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic for their generous hospitality and the facilities they had so kindly provided to assist the Special Committee in its work. The impressive statement by the Foreign Minister was further evidence of the determination of the Congolese people to assist the United Nations in the important work of decolonization.

197. It had been useful and, indeed, indispensable for the Special Committee to hold a series of meetings at Kinshasa, close to the battle-front, since members had thus been able to listen to spokesmen for the national liberation movements and to obtain further evidence of the atrocities committed by the Portuguese in their savage war against the Angolan people. There was no longer a shadow of doubt that the régimes in control of Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were engaged in a conspiracy to maintain white domination in southern Africa. The evidence which the Committee had heard at Kinshasa had enabled it to gain a closer insight into the situation and learn more concerning the needs of the national liberation movements.

198. He conveyed fraternal greetings to the patriots of Angola and assured them that they had the full support of the socialist countries in their fight for freedom. He associated himself with the Chairman's appeal for unity in the Angolan patriotic movement which would, undoubtedly, greatly assist it to attain its cherished goal.

199. The information obtained by the Special Committee at Kinshasa had been very valuable and would prove extremely useful in drawing up the report.

200. In conclusion, he wished the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic every success in their endeavours to build up a happy and prosperous future for their nation.

201. The representative of *Iraq* thanked the Government of the Democratic Republic for its prompt response to his appeal that permission should be granted to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola to produce captured weapons manufactured in Israel and elsewhere for the enlightenment of the Special Committee. That rapid action was typical of the helpful attitude adopted by the Congolese Government throughout the Committee's stay at Kinshasa and had enabled the Committee to identify the source of the arms that had been used to kill scores of Angolan freedom fighters.

B. MEETINGS HELD AT KITWE, ZAMBIA OPENING OF MEETINGS

Address by the President of the Republic of Zambia

202. The President of the Republic of Zambia, speaking on behalf of the Government and people of Zambia, welcomed the Special Committee to his country, which was greatly honoured to have the opportunity once again of acting as host to the Committee. This was the second very historic meeting held at Kitwe during the first half of 1967. In January he had addressed about 800 delegates attending the Zambia National Convention "Achievement 1967"—a convention of party and government officials, teachers, industrialists, miners, financiers and people from all walks of life, who had met to exchange views on various aspects of Zambian development plans and problems. He regarded the meetings of the Special Committee as a continuation of "Achievement 1967" from a different angle. The Committee had the blessing not only of the city of Kitwe but of the whole country.

203. As the Inter-governmental Copper Conference was being held at Lusaka it had been decided that the meetings of the Special Committee should be held at Kitwe. That gave members an opportunity of seeing another side of Zambian life, namely the Copperbelt. The memories of the Committee's last visit to Zambia were still fresh in his mind. At that time Zambia had been only eight months old as an independent nation, born out of a difficult fight for independence. Without help from the freedom-loving sons and daughters of Africa and from Africa's friends abroad, Zambia's fight for independence would have been much more difficult. In that respect he did not forget the support which the Committee had given to the people of Zambia in the darkest hour of its fight for liberty and justice.

204. The members of the Special Committee had been in his country for only a few hours, but he was sure they already had the feeling of the kind of life the people of Zambia were leading: the economic and social effects of the colonial and racial problems that plagued southern Africa. It was perhaps only fitting that the Committee should breathe such an atmosphere and get to know the problems it had set out to solve at grassroot level.

205. Five years ago, when he had appeared before the Special Committee in New York, the plight of the Zambian people had been so unbearable that it had made him weep at the sad realization that man, for no other reason than colour, should be the greatest enemy of man, and due to his selfishness and parochialism, should be the greatest single cause of unhappiness for all mankind. That state of affairs still continued east, south and west of Zambia.

206. Zambia was passing through the most critical period of its history. Since the Special Committee's last visit to Zambia, the white racialists in Southern Rhodesia had seized power from an apparently feeble and decidedly hesitant British Government. With the unilateral declaration of independence had come not only increased oppression of the majority of the people in Southern Rhodesia, but also immense economic difficulties for the young Republic of Zambia. Its transport and communication systems had suddenly had to be reoriented, costing millions of pounds in contingency measures and a great deal of inconvenience in that supplies of essential goods had not come in such quantities as formerly. What greater sacrifice could a young Member of the United Nations like Zambia make?

- 207. But thanks to God's blessings, to the kind help it had received from brothers and sympathizers, and thanks to the resoluteness of the people themselves, Zambia was still holding its own. It would continue in its efforts for peace, justice and happiness for all human beings, not only in southern Africa but in the world as a whole. The fight of the majority for democratic rights was a human one in which all men of goodwill the world over must be actively, and not just passively, interested.
- 208. If the Zambian people deplored the situation in which it found itself it was because the creators of the problems facing it—problems to which the Special Committee's mission was designed to find answers—were doing little to undo what they had done. But the Zambian people knew that its cause was noble and just and that right was on its side. The very presence of the Committee at Kitwe was an indication of mankind's determination to see that justice and freedom were brought to the oppressed millions the world over.
- 209. So far, he had spoken only in very general terms about the southern African political complex and the way Zambians had been battling with that problem. He would now turn, in equally general terms, to the various trouble spots that concerned the work of the Special Committee.
- 210. The question of Rhodesia had, of course, been exercising the minds of Committee members, who had doubtlessly been following the turns and twists of developments in that matter. He regretted to say that the international community seemed to be treading along a blind alley in its quest for a solution to the Rhodesian question.
- 211. Since the passage at the United Nations of the resolution on selective mandatory sanctions, there had been no sign of the rebel economy running down as a result and no indication that the objective of the resolution would be achieved. If anything, the Rhodesian economy was holding its own. Zambians were not at all surprised that that was so because, ever since the beginning of the Rhodesian crisis, they had held the view—and had repeatedly warned the United Kingdom Government—that sanctions would never bite deep enough to bring down the rebellion. How, indeed, could sanctions work when Southern Rhodesia's economy was secretly and openly supported by South Africa and Portugal through deliberate leakages in the sanctions wall, and when the United Kingdom Government was not prepared to seal off those leakages? Recent events had proved beyond all doubt how easily the rebel régime at Salisbury could defeat any sanctions which fell short of comprehensive mandatory sanctions backed by force. Rhodesia was selling its tobacco under iniquitously secret conditions; and brokers in South Africa, Portugal and other European countries were re-exporting many Rhodesian products to various countries under the guise of South African, Portuguese or European exports. Only a few weeks before, thanks to the vigilance of Zambian customs officials, the Zambian authorities had seized 1,000 tons of Rhodesian raw sugar which was being imported into Zambia by such devious means.
- 212. It should be clear to everybody that the United Kingdom Government's Rhodesian policy, to which some Members of the United Nations had, well-meaningly, but regrettably, lent their support, was not only a dismal failure but a disgrace to freedom-lovers. The most urgent question which the Special Committee and its parent body as a whole should now ask themselves

- was: after the failure of selective mandatory sanctions, what next?
- 213. The people of Zambia had never found an alternative to the use of force. They had been accused of being unrealistic and unduly pessimistic on account of their consistent stand that only force could solve the Rhodesian question. But if being realistic meant compromising moral principles for "kith-and-kin" sentiments, and if being optimistic meant making ill-conceived pronouncements that the situation created by the unilateral declaration of independence would be over in a matter of weeks as a result of inadequate and piecemeal voluntary sanctions, then the Zambian people would have nothing to do with such "realism" or "optimism".
- 214. The United Kingdom Government had tried persuasion, threats to use effective measures and voluntary sanctions. The problem had not been solved. Neither "realism" nor "optimism" had restored the rights of the 4 million human beings in rebel Rhodesia. In the meantime, United Kingdom troops were continually in action killing Arabs in Aden. Were the human beings in Aden different from the rebellious Whites in Rhodesia?
- 215. As the United Nations procrastinated, the rebels in Rhodesia were losing no time in tightening their grip on their unhappy country. It should be common knowledge to all members of the Special Committee that the rebels were now heading for a watertight apartheid State. A legislative move was under way in the rebel parliament that would soon empower them to do that. He strongly repudiated the unfounded allegations by the rightist supporters of Smith and his gang, that Zambia was bloodthirsty. Zambia was a peace-loving nation. All it said was that, if the United Kingdom Government found it worth while to mow down Arabs in an Arab country just to ensure its own presence there until 1968, then it saw no reason why that Government should not be equally resolute in a just cause. Was the world to be forced to conclude that the United Kingdom Government was following the "kith-and-kin" approach? Yet those who declared that that was a blatant form of racial discrimination were accused of being unrealistic and bloodthirsty. For him it was immaterial whether God's blood ran through veins that were under a red, brown, yellow or black skin. Its worthiness in God's sight was the same. Zambia demanded that the United Kingdom Government should hold the black blood in Rhodesia to be as sacred as the white blood. Rhodesia was a colony of the United Kingdom in the same way as Aden, at the moment, was a United Kingdom Protectorate.
- 216. He had always maintained that, if man's life was indivisible among white communities, it could not but be indivisible among the so-called dark races, unless God had created two species of man, but of that there was no evidence anywhere in the world. He asked the United Kingdom Government which had significantly contracted out of its responsibility to the Special Committee, what it wanted to achieve in Rhodesia and what its objective was. What was the killing in Aden about? If Members of the United Nations which subscribed to the ideals and principles of the Charter failed to honour its provisions, then their membership of the world body was but a mockery.
- 217. He then referred to a very well-organized smear campaign against countries which were fighting hard to achieve freedom and justice for all. A very vicious campaign was going on in the right-wing Press

of the United Kingdom and most other capitals of the West. They painted such a dark picture of what countries like Zambia were doing that, even if one quarter of it were true, those countries would have collapsed a long time ago. But that was designed to give a distorted picture of the efforts that Zambia and its friends were making to bring sense and realism to the politics of southern Africa. The campaign was well financed and well organized, and the tragedy was that people tended to believe what those ill-intentioned planners said to them.

218. On Africa Freedom Day, he had said that the United Kingdom Government had tricked the world and the United Nations into a false strategy, a false start in seeking a solution to the unilateral declaration of independence. After several months of protracted talks about talks with the rebels, the United Kingdom Government after the summit meeting on H.M.S. Tiger, had made the belated pronouncement that, from then on, it would have no more negotiations with the rebels and that it would not grant Rhodesia independence before majority rule. Those, in themselves, were very welcome assertions of noble principles—the principles that Zambia and its friends were at pains to make the United Kingdom recognize and live up to. But, coming so belatedly from a Government reputed for unpredictable and grasshopper tactics, they merited little appreciation from the Zambian Government: it saw, lurking beneath those seemingly well-intentioned pronouncements, the United Kingdom Government's design to wash its hands of the Rhodesian problem.

219. As early as last year, he had warned that the United Kingdom Government was pursuing a dangerous policy of "honourable defeat". He had described the policy of the "protracted war" as dishonourable and disastrous and he was now more than ever convinced that the United Kingdom Government did not intend to honour its obligations in Rhodesia. He had no reason to believe otherwise. He had been told that the United Kingdom Government was immune from criticism with regard to Rhodesia, but he believed that its impotence in quelling the rebellion, coupled with meaningless declarations, was part of a deliberate design to mislead the world. That was the tragedy of Rhodesia, The picture was dark and brutal.

220. It was clear that the United Kingdom Government knew full well that its present sanctions policy would not bring about the desired results. At the same time, the use of force was anathema to it. There was therefore no alternative but to conclude that that Government was trying to saddle the United Nations with the problem so that the world body took all the blame for the United Kingdom's failure to settle the problem. In that way, and taking advantage of the apparent present inability of the OAU to take effective action against Smith and South Africa, the United Kingdom hoped that the Rhodesian question would be buried and forgotten and that Smith would get away with it, as South Africa had done in 1910. That was what he had meant by saying that the United Nations was treading along a blind alley in following the United Kingdom Government's lead over Rhodesia.

221. During its deliberations, the Special Committee must pause for serious reflection on its responsibilities in the matter of freedom for the oppressed who cried for legitimate representation in the Government of their own country and in the United Nations. The Committee had a duty to maintain and it must discharge it without prejudice based on colour or race.

222. If the Rhodesian crisis had exposed the slipperiness of United Kingdom policy in southern Africa, the question of South West Africa had laid bare the collusion of some big Powers in colonial matters. It was also clear that the great Powers were being obstructionist in the United Nations. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) revoking South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa should have logically led to the establishment of United Nations administrative machinery in South West Africa. But, alas, that logical sequence of measures and events had been conveniently lost sight of by some big Powers; for some of them a United Nations presence in South West Africa meant a diplomatic as well as a physical confrontation with South Africa, the bastion of their economic and racial interests in southern Africa; for others, the implications of a take-over in South West Africa by the United Nations conjured up the image of the Congo situation of the early sixties, with its attendant financial commitments. So they had abstained from voting.

223. Here again, matters of principle had been thrown to the wind; some big Powers had found in the pursuit of their parochial interests a semblance of mankind's hopes and objectives. If that was not brute selfishness and a betrayal of world peace and happiness, then he did not know what else to call it. Certainly the fear of a confrontation with South Africa did not encourage support for the principles of the fight for human rights.

224. Out of all the fracas surrounding the question of South West Africa one very significant fact had emerged more prominently than ever before, namely, that the processes of democracy in the United Nations could be rendered impotent by the plutocratic influences of some big Powers. The majority of Member States had, by their vote, decided to take steps to implement the 1966 resolution on South West Africa. But without the support, money and arms of the big Powers resolution 2248 (S-V) adopted by the General Assembly at its fifth special session might very well be abortive. He added that Africa was not going to be weak for ever.

225. If the big Powers vacillated so much over the question of South West Africa, it was easy to imagine what they thought about South Africa proper. There one could see man in his crudest form, nakedly oppressing his fellow man, and, whereas the world had been prepared to fight the Nazis, there the big Powers were silent: they allowed themselves to be guided, not by the noble principles of the Charter but by their economic interests.

226. Recently the world had learnt of yet another tragic step taken by men who had little regard for the suffering of humble people in their society, black or white. A girl, Sandra Laing, born of white parents had been singled out by Vorster's all-powerful and crushing machinery, and Vorster, as was common knowledge, had been a wartime admirer and supporter of the Nazis. The poor girl had been classified as "non-white" and would therefore suffer non-white treatment in that country. Was it possible to think of anything more devastating to the human soul? The people concerned claimed to be Christians and to maintain Western values and civilizations. He preferred to be simple and down-to-earth and to believe in the importance of man regardless of his colour. That was what Zambia was trying to do and the Zambian Government made no apologies to anyone for being nontribal and non-racial.

- 227. The question whether or not Portugal should direct the destiny of millions of people in Angola and Mozambique from Lisbon against their will was a matter for serious consideration by the international community. Very few of the present generation of Americans and Europeans knew what it was to suffer the miseries of oppressive colonial régimes. In the present age of enlightenment, it was inconceivable that a foreign country should subject other people to a rule in which they had no voice in the administration of their affairs. The spirit that had animated the General Assembly in adopting its resolution on decolonization must be rekindled to bring reality into full focus once again. That depended on each and every member of the Special Committee as representatives of their respective Governments.
- 228. He implored the representatives to tell the States Members of the United Nations that the people of southern Africa were truly suffering; Angolans and Mozambicans were pleading for no more than the restoration of their birthright of freedom and justice, of fair play and full participation in the development of their homelands without institutional impediments calculated to stifle their efforts to build up stable and progressive societies.
- 229. Those powers which had the capacity to bring about stability in freedom and justice must be converted to the view that the consequences of delay, reluctance, selfishness or lack of timely action were grave in the extreme not only for the people of Angola and Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, but for them, too, for the Members of the United Nations and, indeed, for mankind as a whole.
- 230. One of the strange ironies of history was that the same countries which had been principally instrumental in the formation of the United Nations and in the formulation of its Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should today throw to the winds the very principles upon which their solemn affirmations had rested two decades before. It would be better for such countries to declare publicly that they no longer adhered to those principles than to pay lip service to freedom and justice.
- 231. Those were some of the ugly problems to which the Special Committee would have to find solutions. The problems of southern Africa posed a very serious danger to international peace and security. Southern Africa was, so to speak, like a dormant volcano: nobody knew when it would erupt, but everybody knew that it certainly would. When that happened, the results would be disastrous.
- 232. There was thus a grave risk of a third world war, fought not merely on racial but also on ideological grounds. Race being a very sensitive aspect of man's nature, such a war would be a war not of conquest but of extermination, and would certainly make the Second World War look like the rehearsal for a play. It would truly be a war to end all wars, for nobody would be left to tell the story or to talk of peace or war. It was tragic, therefore, that the big Powers should treat the problems of southern Africa with the lightmindedness of actors in a melodrama. If prevention was better than cure, then the United Nations, in the true spirit of its Charter, representing in a large degree what man stood for, must take effective preventive measures immediately.
- 233. He craved the indulgence of the Special Committee if, by saying those rather hard words about

- certain Members of the United Nations, he had given the impression that the Committee was standing trial in Zambia: that was far from being the case. He was merely trying to apprise the Committee of the seriousness with which the Zambian people viewed the situation in southern Africa and the failure of some States Members of the United Nations to see the situation in the same light. Fellow human beings suffering the pangs of oppression and inhuman laws needed the support of the United Nations, of the free international society of man. It was, however, his sincere hope that the Special Committee's visit to Zambia would arm it with more facts, so that from its on-the-spot observations it would be better able to find timely and more effective solutions leading to the humanization and liberation of that part of the African continent.
- 234. He hardly needed to remind the Special Committee of the high esteem in which it was held by the people of Zambia, for it was in it that the world's oppressed millions had vested their hopes for liberty and justice. What reason had anyone to feel happy and free, while the rest of mankind languished in the slough of serfdom and oppression? The Committee's mission, therefore, called not only for faith but for action as well.
- 235. The people of Zambia believed in the United Nations. The Special Committee could depend on the Zambian people even though they were beset by a multiplicity of problems. Zambia was barely three years old, and therefore not strong in the conventional sense, but it would do whatever was in its power to support the noble cause which had brought the Committee to Africa.
- 236. The Zambian people were only too conscious of the fact that the world body which the Special Committee represented was a true thermometer of the feelings of its individual Member States. If they decided to make it strong it would be strong and vice versa. The Zambian nation believed in the United Nations and wanted it to be strong and would therefore, small and young though it was, give it all the support it was capable of giving. It could do no better.
- 237. He assured the members that they were very welcome in Zambia and that the Zambian people would do everything possible to make their stay in the Republic a pleasant one. He wished the Special Committee success in its deliberations.

General statements

- 238. The Chairman, speaking on behalf of all members of the Special Committee, expressed deep appreciation of President Kaunda's extremely moving and sincere address, which deserved the most careful attention, coming as it did from one of Africa's most respected statesmen, highly regarded for his courage and magnanimity by friends and foes alike. Based as they were on the realities of bitter confrontation with the champions of colonialism in southern Africa, the considerations and views to which President Kaunda had given expression would undoubtedly be of great assistance to the Committee in its work.
- 239. The Special Committee was deeply grateful to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their invitation which had enabled the Committee to continue its meetings in Africa at Kitwe. In 1965, the Committee had had the signal honour of meeting at Lusaka at the invitation of the Government and people of Zambia. The records of the Committee bore

testimony to the important decisions taken at those meetings, which reflected the Committee's sincere appreciation of the fraternal hospitality and co-operation extended by the Government and people of Zambia. The address which President Kaunda had delivered at the opening meeting at Lusaka in 1965, had stood the test of time.

240. In that address he had stressed that the time had come for Member States to make the United Nations a force for action rather than a forum for speeches, and in support of that plea he had warned of the consequences of continued non-co-operation by the administering Powers concerned in the implementation of United Nations resolutions on the colonial Territories in southern Africa. Today, two years later, that address read like a prophecy which had come to pass, particularly in the case of Southern Rhodesia.

241. Personally, it was a great pleasure for him to be in Zambia: it was like being at home again. Few countries reflected so well the cruel past and the glorious prospects of the great African continent. The fact that that was so was no credit to, but a severe indictment of, the moribund colonialist system.

242. As was well known, Zambia had occupied an important part in the schemes of those megalomaniacs who had dreamed of an unbroken empire stretching from the Cape to Cairo. Ambitious and unscrupulous men, drawn by Africa's coveted wealth and backed by the imperialist Powers, had engaged in the ruthless exploitation of the human and material resources of Zambia to the exclusive advantage of the interests and powers they represented.

243. The culmination of all that deplorable process had been the creation, despite the opposition of the African peoples, of the Central African Federation. Conceived with the objective of delaying the inevitable demise of colonialism, of imposing a one-sided partnership of horse and rider, and of enabling the racist settlers of Southern Rhodesia to participate even more effectively in the merciless plunder of Zambia's wealth, that unworthy scheme had surely deserved to fail. That it had failed was due in large measure to the resoluteness and solidarity of the Zambian people under the leadership of the United National Independence Party and its President, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda.

244. Zambia was truly fortunate to have produced such a worthy son of Africa as President Kaunda. Being a forthright, sincere, dedicated and humble man, the virtues he possessed were exactly those calculated to evoke the finest response from the Zambian people. And there was need of such qualities and such response now, for Zambia found itself in the thick of the anti-apartheid campaign, one of the greatest epics of the latter half of the twentieth century. Caught in a vice between the all-African resolve to bring down the illegal racist régime in Rhodesia and its own undeniable necessity to survive, a less courageous and united country might long ago have weakened. Indeed, it might be said that some less dangerously placed countries of Africa had done so.

245. But Zambia under President Kaunda stood stalwart and undaunted. In doing so, it had given hope and courage to all Africa, and not least to the struggling African people of Zimbabwe. The example of Zambia would shine as a light to brighten and inspire the Special Committee's deliberations and endeavours during the present series of meetings.

246. At Kitwe, the Special Committee would concentrate on the situation of the people and Territory of Rhodesia. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was, and continued to be, applicable to that colony despite attempts to deny its applicability. The long and continuing denial of the rights of the indigenous people of the Territory to self-determination and independence had contributed materially to the present deplorable situation. The neo-apartheid system, the discriminatory land laws and the exclusion of the African peoples from any significant participation in economic and political life had been and were a flagrant violation of fundamental human rights.

247. After the collapse of the Federation, it had been hoped that at last the rights of the African people of Southern Rhodesia to self-government and independence on a genuinely democratic basis would be recognized. Instead, a series of manœuvres, covert and overt, had been carried out, resulting in the betrayal of the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population and in the entrenchment of the racist settler minority. During all those shameful manœuvres and preparations, a firm display by the United Kingdom Government of regard for, and determination to uphold, the legitimate rights of the indigenous population would undoubtedly have had a beneficial effect. Instead, vacillation and implicit collusion had resulted in the present grave situation. No one who had studied the problem in its entirety could refrain from saluting the Government and people of Zambia for the heroic stand they had taken against the Smith régime at great cost in terms of human and material resources. Through the colonialist manipulations of the administering Power, aided and abetted by foreign economic and other interests, Zambia at the time of its independence had been heavily dependent on Southern Rhodesia for its economic well-being: communications, transport power and many essential supplies. Hence the Smith régime, at the time of the unilateral declaration of independence had assumed, in its folly, that it had a trump card to play if Zambia did not fall into line with its sinister racist plans. Not surprisingly, attempts by the Smith régime to hold Zambia to ransom by a process of economic strangulation had met with a magnificently defiant response from the Government and the people of Zambia, even though that had entailed heavy sacrifices and serious dislocation. What was more, Zambia had not faltered in its whole-hearted support of the African people fighting against the racist Salisbury régime for their freedom and independence. Contrary to the expectations of the Smith regime, the Republic of Zambia had continued to keep faith with the African people of Zimbabwe.

248. The praiseworthy stand taken by the Government and people of Zambia against the reactionary racist Smith régime had won it the respect and admiration of all freedom-loving people. For that reason it was only fitting that the Special Committee should open its discussion on the question of Southern Rhodesia in Zambia. At Kitwe, the Committee would receive the testimony of the representatives of the freedom-fighters in Zimbabwe, seek additional information on recent developments in that Territory and study at first hand, near the theatre of conflict, all aspects of that very grave problem. The Committee would also give attention to and hear petitioners concerning Angola, South West Africa and Swaziland.

249. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia to be a most serious threat to

international peace and security. The defiance of the whole international community by the racist Salisbury régime called for decisive action against it and its supporters, particularly South Africa and Portugal. It must be recalled that if now, belatedly, the international community was obliged to come to grips with and put an end to an intolerable situation, that was because of the unprincipled failure of the United Kingdom Government to discharge what it had all along insisted was its legal responsibility.

250. The Special Committee's meetings at Kitwe would, he hoped, throw new light on the problem and enable it to arrive at conclusions and recommendations which would contribute to a speedy solution consistent with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

251. He would be failing in his duty if he did not appeal to the freedom fighters to unite because, in disunity, they would always find that the forces that could have been used to fight colonialism would be wasted in fighting among themselves. In disunity, they would find the prolongation of their sufferings and the postponement of their day of liberation. But in unity, they would find the strengthening of the fight against colonialism, the bringing together of all their forces against the oppressors and the bringing closer of their day of independence. He appealed to representatives of the freedom movement inside and outside the meeting room to show unity of thought, unity of purpose and, above all, unity of action.

252. He was confident that the Special Committee's work at Kitwe would lead to positive and significant results.

253. The representative of *India* expressed sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their generous invitation to the Special Committee to meet at Kitwe. The hospitality offered and the overwhelming enthusiasm of the people were deeply appreciated. The invitation was a practical demonstration of the genuine and profound interest of President Kaunda and his people in decolonization. It was hardly necessary to describe the vital contribution which Zambia was making to the eradication of injustices and indignities in all parts of the world. That the leaders of Zambia had selected 24 October, the anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, as their day of liberation from colonial subjugation was conclusive proof of their dedication to the ideals of the Charter. The election of Zambia by the African group at the United Nations to be one of the three countries to serve on the Council for South West Africa was further evidence of the leading role they played in African affairs. The experience of coming to Zambia and of listening in person to its President was for him the fulfilment of a long-standing wish.

254. President Kaunda's moving address could not fail to inspire anyone who had the slightest concern for the well-being of the millions of people still suffering under the colonial yoke. The President's reference to his appearance in the Fourth Committee some five years before was both a source of satisfaction and a reminder. It was a satisfaction to see a person who had appeared before the United Nations as a petitioner occupying such a distinguished position, and it was a reminder that the battle against colonialism was almost always long, bitter and often frustrating. The President's analysis of the colonial problems in southern Africa was unsurpassed in the history of the Special Committee. The Indian delegation had been

deeply impressed by the address and would endeavour to live up to the lofty goals he had set. It was to be hoped that President Kaunda's sombre warning that southern Africa was a dormant volcano which would one day erupt unless the colonial Powers joined those on the side of right and justice would be heeded in the appropriate quarters.

255. The subject to which the Special Committee would give particular attention during its meetings at Kitwe was, of course, Southern Rhodesia, on which his delegation would give its views in full at a later stage. It considered that the United Kingdom bore sole responsibility for the deplorable state of affairs in Zimbabwe. By its various acts of omission and commission, the United Kingdom Government had encouraged the blindly racist minority in Southern Rhodesia in its evil designs. Had the necessary measures been taken and a firm warning given to the Rhodesian racists, the present situation would never have arisen. The Indian delegation condemned in the strongest possible terms the illegal and unjust seizure of power by an insignificant proportion of the population to the detriment of almost 95 per cent of the rightful owners of Zimbabwe. The half-hearted and meaningless measures adopted so far had conclusively proved their impotence to deal with the situation. Unless and until the United Kingdom Government was prepared to use force against the rebel régime, Ian Smith and his henchmen would not be brought to heel. The appeal for the use of force made by a person known for his sincerity, his love of mankind and his preaching of non-violence should be taken with the utmost seriousness. India demanded for its brothers in Zimbabwe, to whom it would continue to lend whole-hearted support both in the Committee and elsewhere, immediate and unconditional independence on the basis of one man, one vote.

256. India was particularly gratified that the Special Committee should be meeting in Zambia, with which it enjoyed extremely friendly relations. Zambia and its President were held in the highest esteem, not only by the Government, but also by the common people of India, who greatly admired their dynamism and the firm determination with which they were tackling their manifold problems. Both countries belonged to the economically developing group of nations; there was therefore ample scope for co-operation between the two to their mutual advantage. The actual record of such co-operation since the early days of Zambia's independence was a glowing testimony to the friendship between them and the forthcoming visit of President Kaunda to India, to which the Government and people of India were eagerly looking forward, would bring the two countries yet closer together.

257. In conclusion, the Indian delegation extended its greetings to the people of Zambia and wished them every success in their undertakings.

258. The representative of *Ethiopia* thanked President Kaunda, the Government and the people of Zambia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Kitwe and for their warm hospitality. His delegation had been deeply touched by the President's frank, sincere and inspiring opening address. To those who had come to know him closely since the days of Zambia's fight for its own independence, his statement and delivery were no revelation, but characteristic of a man who had not been changed by the trappings of power, and who, in spite of the many vicissitudes of life, had the courage

of his convictions, a man whose devotion to duty had never flagged. Africa, and indeed the entire world of today, were in great need of more leaders of his calibre.

259. The Ethiopian delegation fully endorsed the comprehensive analysis of the Southern Rhodesian problem made by the Chairman and President Kaunda. It took a serious view of the worsening situation in Rhodesia since that Special Committee had last considered the problem. In spite of all protestations to the contrary, Ian Smith's rebel régime, by all evidence aided and abetted by the United Kingdom, the administering Power, had become even more defiant of international public opinion and had adopted far more oppressive measures towards the African masses of Zimbabwe. It was now devising a constitution which would permanently entrench minority rule and racism. In an attempt to suppress the African people's legitimate fight for independence, the illegal régime was imprisoning and massacring the gallant sons of Zimbabwe and, no doubt helped by South Africa, was attempting to introduce apartheid. It was difficult to believe that that was being done without the connivance of the United Kingdom. The crux of the problem in Southern Rhodesia had been and remained the refusal by that Power to face its responsibilities honestly and to put the interest of the majority of the population above that of the minority who happened to be its kith and kin. When viewed in the context of the problems of southern Africa, that attitude was fraught with great danger, President Kaunda's warning that the dormant volcano of southern Africa might erupt any time was therefore very opportune. The United Kingdom should be made to realize that the world could not be deceived by "talks about talks" and mandatory sanctions which were never meant to achieve anything substantial for the African masses of Zimbabwe. The Ethiopian delegation considered that the only honourable course open for the United Kingdom, if it was to retain its respect in the eyes of Africa and the world, was to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia.

260. Ethiopia deplored the United Kingdom Government's tendency to shirk its responsibilities which, no matter how much it wished to pass the problem on to the United Nations, should rest squarely on its shoulders.

261. While the fight for freedom from the ferocious brand of settler colonialism in Rhodesia continued on its inexorable course, the Special Committee should call upon the nationalist movements to close their ranks and present a united front to the enemy. The Chairman's fervent appeal to that effect had the full support of the Ethiopian delegation, for the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe could not afford the luxury of division at so critical a juncture in their nation's history.

Assembly at its fifth special session had further implemented its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, when it had voted unanimously to revoke South Africa's Mandate and provided for the United Nations to assume direct responsibility for the Territory. In its resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1697, the General Assembly had voted to establish a United Nations Council for South West Africa and a Commissioner responsible for the Territory's administration. That positive step had been acclaimed by all freedom-loving peoples, and it was to be hoped that the great Powers

who held the key to its successful implementation would see the wisdom of giving their unstinted support to the United Nations. The fascist régime of South Africa was still defying the resolutions of the General Assembly but Vorster and his war council, facing the last political battle both internationally and from within the Territory, had been driven to the futile expedient of attempting to impress the world by their so-called "one man, one vote" offer to some parts of South West Africa, a move which deceived nobody. South Africa should recognize that its status as the mandatory authority for South West Africa had ended in October 1966 and that, subsequently, the only body competent to lead South West Africa to self-determination and independence was that established by the United Nations.

263. Attention should also be drawn to the grave problem of racial discrimination in South Africa. The anti-colonial revolution had abolished racial discrimination as a criterion in international relations, but in some Territories the practice still continued, the victim being mainly the black race and the area in which it was practised—colonial Africa. The white man had been deprived of his power in most parts of the African continent and the hated system of racial discrimination eliminated in the process, but it was significant that the areas in which discrimination prevailed today were the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa. The Special Committee, which represented the moral conscience of mankind as a whole and which had been set up to act as a watch-dog and to work relentlessly for the total elimination of the evil of colonialism, should also adopt the same approach towards racial discrimination.

264. In conclusion, he recalled President Kaunda's call for a resurgence of the spirit which had led the United Nations to adopt the historic resolution on decolonization in 1960. If, as a result of the Special Committee's action and the heart-rending evidence supplied by petitioners from areas still suffering under the yoke of colonialism and racial bigotry, some headway could be made towards bringing the entire problem of colonialism into a new focus, the Committee would have achieved its purpose.

265. The representative of *Chile* expressed his delegation's sincere gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Zambia for the generous hospitality being extended to the Special Committee during its stay in Zambia. The Zambian Government's invitation had made it possible for the Committee to meet for the second time in that land of freedom, where it had been privileged to hear the lofty address—whose human content was stamped with the die of the most absolute sincerity—of President Kaunda, as ever indefatigable in the forefront of the struggle against colonialism.

266. The Chileans knew and admired President Kaunda's dynamic personality, for the Chilean Government and people had been privileged to receive him as a guest of honour, and his presence and words alike had made a deep impression on all sectors of the population. Everyone had recognized him as an eminent statesman who was leading his people with a sure hand and extraordinary clear-sightedness along the path of progress and ever increasing prosperity.

267. For the Chileans, President Kaunda was, above all else, a great African leader who stood at the lead of the battle being waged to overthrow the last bastions of a hateful colonial régime and put an end

to racial discrimination and infringements of human rights. By its sacrifices, Zambia had given proof of its devotion to the cause of African liberation and its determination to give effective support to that cause. In that most just struggle, President Kaunda and the Zambian people knew that they could count on Chile's sincere solidarity and full support. In that land of liberty, the Chilean delegation once more assured the people of Zimbabwe, subjected to the cruel tyranny of Ian Smith's racist minority régime, of its support. It would not be possible, without seriously endangering world peace, to tolerate for much longer the existence of that régime, which trampled human rights underfoot and presented a challenge to the conscience of the international community. The economic sanctions adopted by the Security Council had been applied in full by Chile and by the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations. Nevertheless, as President Kaunda had pointed out, those sanctions would not be enough in themselves to bring down Ian Smith's rebel régime because of the considerable assistance being given him by his allies in the criminal venture which aimed at maintaining colonialism and racial discrimination in southern Africa. That unholy alliance would not take anyone by surprise; it only strengthened the courage and determination of those who were fighting for the freedom of Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese domination and South West Africa. It would clearly be necessary to use infinitely more vigorous methods in order to attack the evil at its roots. If the United Kingdom was to crush the rebellion, it must use force, and the oppressed peoples themselves must, before all else, unite in order that that vitally important undertaking might be crowned with success. The Chilean delegation fully supported the appeal for unity which the Chairman of the Special Committee had just made. As, however, the international community too bore a collective responsibility for that lamentable situation, it had the obligation to take effective action to put an end to colonialism and racial discrimination.

268. The Latin American countries, and Chile in particular, had co-operated with their African and Asian brothers in the United Nations for the adoption of the resolutions calling for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The special session of the General Assembly which had been convened for the purpose of considering what means should be employed to give effect to the historic decision of October 1966, under which the United Nations was to assume full responsibility for South West Africa, had ended just a few days ago. On that occasion, the Latin American nations had given further proof of their solidarity with Africa and Asia by submitting and unreservedly supporting a joint resolution providing that the United Nations should assume the direct administration of South West Africa in order to enable it to attain independence by way of self-determination.

269. He felt sure that the work done by the Special Committee in that hospitable land would help to bring closer the liberation of the peoples still subject to the colonial régime in Africa. The Republic of Zambia would have the satisfaction of having made a noble and effective contribution to the common effort.

270. The representative of *Iran* recalled President Kaunda's farewell to the Committee after its visit in 1965, in which he had expressed the hope that it might never have to come back. That hope, cherished by all

freedom-loving peoples, was a fittingly sincere wish for the success of the Committee's work and the speedy liquidation of colonialism. That the Committee should again be in Zambia at the invitation of the President himself, who together with his Government and people were providing such generous hospitality, was due to the Committee's failure to fulfil its mandate, or rather to the failure of the Powers concerned to honour their obligations under the Charter. The unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia and the establishment of Ian Smith's rebel régime had taken place despite the action of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The situation had gone from bad to worse, and more fuel of the most explosive type had been added to the flames in southern Africa.

271. In his brilliant opening address, President Kaunda had outlined a picture of southern Africa which could not have failed to move even the most heartless. It depicted not only the sufferings and deprivations of the victims but also the irresponsible acts of the culprits. The address had been delivered by a man who was obviously deeply concerned with the human conditions and at the same time fully alert to the bitter facts of his environment. The Chairman had expressed the feelings of all members in saying that Zambia was truly blessed to have produced such a worthy son of Africa and that his virtues were likely to evoke the finest response from the Zambian people. The address would guide and inspire the Committee's work.

272. The Committee's return visit provided an opportunity of seeing at first hand the great strides made in Zambia's development. The gathering of 800 participants three months earlier in the same hall for Zambia's National Convention—"Achievement 1967" testified to the Government's determination to continue and intensify its development programme despite the obstacles created by the Southern Rhodesia problem. The Copper Conference at Lusaka was a further reflection of Zambia's achievements in the quest for progress and prosperity. The problems to be studied were the outcome of the explosive situation created by some racist colonizers in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration, who had persistently obstructed the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, In addition, they had systematically consolidated their stranglehold over the vast masses of Africans, intensifying the reign of terror they had instituted to shield them against the people's wrath in the hope of perpetuating their exploitation and domination. The Africans, however, remained steadfast in their determination to overcome the forces of darkness and oppression. During the hearings at Kinshasa, fresh evidence had been provided concerning Portugal's rule in the Territories under its domination and in particular in Angola and Guinea (Bissau). The Committee had also learnt that different Angolan organizations were actively engaged in the fight for liberation; a similar fight was being waged in Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique. In order to obtain maximum results in the shortest possible time, the nationalists had been repeatedly exhorted, especially by the Chairman, to unite.

273. In the beautiful city of Kitwe, the industrial centre of Zambia, the Special Committee hoped to hear petitioners from Zimbabwe, South West Africa and Swaziland. The information which they provided would be of immense value to the Committee,

which would at the same time, be able to assure them that they were not alone in their fight for freedom and independence.

274. The Iranian Government, one of the few original participants in the preparation and drafting of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, would spare no effort in seeking the speedy liquidation of colonialism. It had already taken the action called for by the Security Council and the General Assembly to bring down the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia and was continuing to urge the release of all political prisoners, particularly such African leaders as Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole.

275. In its anti-colonial and anti-racist policy, the Iranian Government was moved by a strong desire for peace and justice. It recognized that there could be no lasting peace in Africa until the dark forces of oppression and exploitation were overthrown and until every African regained his dignity and full freedom and rights. No peace was possible as long as the despicable episode of Sandra Laing could recur. The day of liberation from the remaining vestiges of colonialism in Africa was drawing near, but its coming could be hastened only if the various nationalist groups took a united stand against the oppressor. The paramount importance of unity among the ranks of the freedomfighters could not be exaggerated. He therefore reiterated the appeal which the Chairman had so wisely launched. With unity, not only would the attainment of freedom and independence in the remaining parts of Africa be greatly hastened, but President Kaunda's prophecy would also come to pass and Africa would be able to contribute much to world happiness and enlightenment during the second half of the twentieth century. It had, in fact, already begun to do so, but the full impact of its contribution would be felt only when all the continent was free.

276. The opportunity of holding some of the Special Committee's meetings in Zambia would enable it to co-ordinate its action, especially with the African freedom fighters, in the pursuit for freedom and justice. Reiterating his thanks to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their kind invitation, he assured them that the people and Government of Iran wished them every success in their tremendous and courageous efforts to better the life of the Zambian people and liberate the Zimbabwe people.

277. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the Government and people of Zambia for their invitation to the Special Committee to meet in their gallant country. Their typical warm hospitality was all the more praiseworthy in view of the fact that they were not perturbed by the aggressive designs of the henchmen of imperialism lurking south of their border.

278. The strong bonds binding the people of the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia had a historical background of long standing. The efforts of the Government and people of Zambia had always been a necessary and important complement to the United Republic of Tanzania's own efforts to liberate the African continent, to bring about the rapid development and progress of its lands and, above all, to achieve the unity of Africa which all the forces of reaction strongly feared. In those efforts, the people and Government of Zambia, headed by their wise and gallant leader, held a prominent position. Their fight for liberation was an illustration of the iniquitous manœuvres of the United

Kingdom colonialists and their efforts to coerce and suppress the African peoples. Under the steadfast leadership of President Kaunda and the unflinching dedication of the masses to their patriotic fight for national emancipation, the forces of United Kingdom colonialism had been defeated. The Zambian people's gigantic economic and other achievements had been possible only because they had routed the exploiters and wrested from them control of their motherland's destiny.

279. President Kaunda's opening address had been not only the counsel of a great statesman but also the inspiring appeal of a gallant fighter for the acquisition and consolidation of Africa's freedom and liberty in all parts of the world and reflected the militant spirit of his own country.

280. It was therefore only natural that the Government and people of Zambia had invited the Special Committee to meet in their country in order that, by direct contact, it could acquaint itself at first hand with the situation in Southern Rhodesia where Ian Smith and his racist minority régime were continuing the colonial subjugation of the African people. That situation was the result of the colonial policies of the United Kingdom Government, which had for decades, while exploiting the rich resources of their land, suppressed the African people of Zimbabwe and manœuvred the white minority into power, with the consequent usurping of state control. The illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia was a tool of international imperialism and the caretaker of the foreign financial monopolies which were even extending their illegal operations in Zimbabwe. The delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania would deal with that aspect in greater detail later, in order to expose the hypocrisy and opportunism of the forces of reaction which, because of their lust for profit, were boosting the illegal Smith régime and impending the attainment of independence by the African people of Zimbabwe.

281. It was such factors which revealed the true motives and hypocrisy of the opposing forces which had been calling the loudest for so-called economic sanctions and engaging in every possible kind of manœuvre in order to prevent the use of force which was the only effective way of crushing and eliminating that product of imperialism, the Ian Smith régime. The continuation of colonialism in any part of the world was a threat to freedom everywhere, and the situation in Southern Rhodesia was even more threatening because it was based on the racial policy of a fascist minority and deviously protected by the United Kingdom. The minority régime, as a tool of international imperialism, was committing all types of atrocities in order to maintain its illegal position. As late as 19 April 1967, its spokesman had announced that the oppressive forces had been reinforced. The budget of its aggressive army for the financial year 1966-1967 had been increased by roughly 20 per cent over the previous year. Such militaristic moves, with the introduction of the apartheid armed forces in Zimbabwe, not only revealed the desperation of the imperialist henchmen but also reflected the aggressive designs against the African peoples as a whole and those of Zambia in particular.

282. A similar situation prevailed in Mozambique and Angola, where the Portuguese colonialists were daily committing barbarous crimes against the population in order to exploit those lands for the sole benefit of the international financial monopolies. In South West

Africa, the apartheid régime of South Africa, in defiance of the international community, was desperately attempting to cling to the Territory. Those were, however, all temporary phenomena, because the revolutionary forces of the peoples of those Territories were waging a just and necessary fight which would finally triumph. The Africans and freedom-loving people everywhere had pledged themselves to rid humanity of colonialism. The delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania, therefore, appealed to the heroic people of Zimbabwe and to all freedom-fighters to close their ranks, and, in an irresistible wave, to eliminate the forces of colonialism from their homeland.

283. The Special Committee was most anxious to receive all possible information which would serve the interests of decolonization, as called for by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It was therefore grateful to the Government and people of Zambia for the opportunity of meeting the Zimbabwe and other liberation forces. His delegation was convinced that, under the wise leadership of President Kaunda, the people of Zambia would attain yet greater achievements which, in the final analysis, were those of Africa as a whole and a blow to the forces of colonialism and imperialism.

284. The representative of Venezuela thanked the President, Government and people of the Republic of Zambia, on behalf of his delegation, for their warm welcome and generous hospitality. The meetings which the Special Committee was holding in Zambia were of very special significance. In the short time which had elapsed since it had become independent, the Republic of Zambia had twice extended an invitation to the Special Committee and had welcomed it with unbounded enthusiasm. That gesture was a clear manifestation of that country's desire to serve the cause of decolonization. But the most irrefutable proof of its anti-colonial dedication was afforded by the sacrifices which that young country had had to make and the high price it had had to pay for its loyalty to the cause of freedom in that part of the African continent which was still dominated by colonial forces. Amid all those sacrifices, the President and people of Zambia had come before the Special Committee to give testimony to their firm resolve to support its work. At the most critical moment in their short history as an independent country, as President Kaunda had said, the Government and people of Zambia had come and told the Committee that their revolt against colonial oppression and their readiness to fight for the ideal of freedom remained unswerving. The Venezuelan delegation admired the Zambian people for their resolve to make their country a symbol of salvation for their oppressed brothers. Zambia's flank bore a wound which would heal only when colonialism and racism had finally disappeared from the African continent. It was a small country, but the cause for which it was fighting and the principles by which it was inspired would make it immortal. As long as Africa and the world had before their eyes examples like that of Zambia, the principles on behalf of which the Special Committee was opposing the paranoid madness of the racists of Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa and colonialism wherever it appeared would never perish. As long as there were freedomloving men like President Kaunda and peoples resolved, like the people of Zambia, to sacrifice themselves in the cause of freedom, the conspiracy being hatched in Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration against the most elementary principles of the civilized world would have no possibility of survival.

285. He expressed his heartfelt appreciation to President Kaunda for the constructive and moving address he had made before the Special Committee. His emotion had expressed itself in tears which would cease to flow only when the ignominious fate imposed on other African peoples had been ended for all time. The problem of Southern Rhodesia had reached its most critical point following the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith's racist minority Government. That declaration had been the consequence if not of the complicity at least of its complaisant attitude, an attitude that remained unchanged. The measures taken to put an end to the illegal situation in Southern Rhodesia had not only come too late but had proved incapable of affecting the Rhodesian régime mainly because the allies of its odious policy continued to disregard the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council. More effective measures must therefore be taken to bring the situation in that Territory to an end once and for all.

286. True to its anti-colonial tradition and unwavering in its support for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the Venezuelan Government had rigorously applied the measures adopted by the Security Council. Those who believed that the people of Zimbabwe could be deprived by force of their right to freedom and independence were mistaken. Venezuelan and Latin American solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe needed no comment; it was lasting and unshakable.

287. The representative of Finland thanked the Government of Zambia for its invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in that young, proud and dynamic country. Members had been struck by the warm welcome and felt the keen interest taken in their work.

288. He particularly wanted to thank President Kaunda for his moving address and to say that he was very much impressed by President Kaunda's sincerity and great understanding of the serious problems that concerned not only Zambia but all countries present.

289. Members were well aware that they were, geographically speaking, very close to the scene of one of the most difficult and serious situations which had confronted the United Nations: the situation in southern Africa and especially Southern Rhodesia, concerning which the Finnish delegation fully shared the indignation, frustration and impatience expressed by previous speakers. It was most unfortunate that the measures so far taken had not produced any decisive results. In spite of the weight of world opinion and contrary to all accepted principles of human rights, Mr. Smith's illegal régime continued to uphold its system of minority rule and oppression of the African people. The solution of that explosive problem called for concerted action. Unless all countries were united in their efforts to achieve a peaceful solution, the danger of violent racial conflict was bound to increase.

290. He was fully aware of the special problems posed by the situation for Zambia and appreciated the economic sacrifices referred to by President Kaunda in saying that his young country was passing through the most critical period in its history, but past experience had shown that sanctions, to be really effective, must be extensive and fully implemented. Finland had

fully responded to the recommendations and decisions of the Security Council. An act had recently been passed authorizing the Government to take all necessary measures to implement fully Security Council resolution 232 (1966), although, in fact, in pursuance of the recommendations contained in resolution 217 (1965), it had already decided to bring all trade between Finland and Southern Rhodesia under government control, as a result of which it had come to a virtual standstill.

291. He reiterated his belief that the Special Committee's fact-finding visit would lead to a better understanding of the difficult and serious problems of Territories still under colonial rule and facilitate their effective solution in keeping with the aspirations of their peoples.

292. The Finnish Government's attitude to the problem of colonialism was quite clear and well known. It followed the Nordic tradition of opposition to all forms of minority rule and racial discrimination, considering it to be self-evident that all peoples of the world should have the right to choose their own future and to live in a society based on equality of opportunity and freedom from discrimination.

293. As the representative of one of the Nordic countries, he expressed his appreciation that a visit to the Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial had been included in the official programme. It was very proper that a United Nations body in Zambia should pay homage to the late Secretary-General who had lost his life in the service of the Organization.

294. Finally, he thanked the Government of Zambia for its efficient organization of the Special Committee's visit. The contacts between Finland and Zambia were far closer than it would appear from the two countries' geographical position. In September 1966, Finland had had the pleasure of welcoming an important delegation from Zambia, headed by Vice-President Kamanga and including the Minister for Foreign Affairs which would contribute to the establishment of closer relations between the two countries.

295. The representative of *Syria* said that, on behalf of his delegation, he wished first of all to join the previous speakers in expressing his heartfelt gratitude to the people and Government of Zambia for the warm hospitality which the Special Committee was meeting throughout their beautiful country. Thanks to that hospitality, the Committee had been able to pursue its scrutiny of certain African questions and to seek out an equitable solution for the countries and peoples still living under the yoke of colonialism.

296. The Syrian delegation had been especially moved by the wise and impressive words addressed to the Special Committee at the opening meeting by President Kaunda. As it had listened to him, it had recognized clearly the sincerity of that great African leader's feelings and his unfailing dedication to the task of ensuring his people's prosperity and of helping other African peoples who were fighting to recover their inalienable rights to freedom and independence. Southern Rhodesia, about which Mr. Kaunda had spoken at length and which the Chairman of the Special Committee had himself mentioned in his brilliant address, had undoubtedly been one of the main focal points of that struggle for a number of years. The illegal racist minority régime which Ian Smith was stubbornly maintaining in that troubled part of southern Africa continued to present an explosive situation which was threatening international peace and security and was of

especial concern to the Special Committee and other principal organs of the world Organization.

297. The racial discrimination, segregation and other abuses committed by Smith's rebel régime for the benefit of a white minority which kept itself in power at the expense of the inalienable rights of the overwhelming African majority of the Zimbabwe people were rightly regarded by those forums of international opinion as an abominable crime against the whole of mankind. It was hardly necessary to recall that the ink of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, solemnly declaring the opposition of the United Nations to any unilateral declaration of the independence by the United Kingdom colony, had not yet been dry when Ian Smith had proclaimed that socalled independence on 11 November 1965, less than a week after the date of the General Assembly resolution. Since that date, Ian Smith had persistently continued to defy the United Nations and world public opinion.

298. He would not have been able to do so had he not enjoyed the solid support of his racist partners in Portugal and South Africa, which those régimes had, moreover, been obliged to provide in face of the rising tide of popular liberation movements. It would undoubtedly have been unable to persist in its defiance if it had not enjoyed the questionable complicity of the United Kingdom, which had consistently engaged in a complex series of clever manœuvres to spare a rebel minority that was usurping the rights of an entire people.

299. The Security Council meeting of 8 December 1966 [1331st meeting] which had been convened on the initiative of United Kingdom diplomacy in order to propose mandatory selective sanctions against the rebel régime had turned out to be just another link in that skilfully forged chain of manœuvres. It was, indeed, hardly likely that those sanctions against Smith's illegal régime could be effective so long as Portugal and South Africa firmly refused to apply them and Smith's other imperialist partners were determined to safeguard the strategic and economic interests of their business firms, which were continuing to direct Southern Rhodesia's production.

300. Africa had refused to endorse that new policy of the United Kingdom. In November 1966, a month before the Security Council had declared itself in favour of those sanctions, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting at Addis Ababa, had declared that the programme of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, as conceived and directed by the United Kingdom Government, was incapable of bringing down the illegal government at Salisbury, had condemned the United Kingdom's refusal to crush the rebel government of Southern Rhodesia and had once more urged the United Kingdom to bring about the immediate downfall of that government by every possible means, including force.

301. Syria, which had already taken successive decisions, on 31 May and 26 June 1966, to break off all economic and trade relations with the illegal Salisbury régime and to suspend all direct and indirect dealings with Southern Rhodesia, had been and remained convinced, together with the African States, that the United Kingdom Government bore full responsibility for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and was in duty bound to remedy that situation by all the means available to it in its capacity as administering Power, including the use of force. The Syrian Republic

had clearly stated its position in a letter which it had addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 16 February 1967.4

302. In his eloquent address, President Kaunda had made several references, when speaking of the Rhodesian rebellion, to the struggle of the Arab people in Aden. He had mentioned, in particular, how the people of Aden were still being ruthlessly held down by the British settlers, whereas the Salisbury rebels were still being treated with scrupulous circumspection. As President Kaunda had so eloquently put it: "Are the human beings in Aden different from the rebellious Whites in Rhodesia?". The logic of colonialism was, indeed, strange, and it was to be wondered how it could justify before the world its use of a double standard without fear of being discredited by such flagrant discrimination.

303. Under the impetus of Mr. Kaunda's profound observations, the Syrian delegation was led to carry the comparison somewhat further. The colonialism in Southern Rhodesia was in essence a colonialism based on settlement in the heart of Africa. A similar kind of colonialism had been rife for years in the Middle East, in the midst of the Arab nation, for a part of that nation, so dear to his own heart, had itself been invaded by bands of Zionists who, through the collusion of imperialism and colonialism, had come from all corners of the earth to settle in Arab Palestine at the expense of the inalienable rights of the indigenous population. The outrage committed in the Middle East had been more flagrant than those committed elsewhere because the original inhabitants of Palestine had been driven by armed force from their homes, which had then been occupied by the baneful alien usurper whose successive acts of aggression were still disturbing the peace in that part of the world. Just as it was true that colonialism based on settlement was by its very nature racist, it was also true that it could survive only by violence.

304. In the brilliant address he had made at the opening meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee had once again rightly stressed the importance of unity in the struggle of the popular liberation movements. The Syrian delegation fully endorsed that opinion. It was convinced also that the common cause of the liberation of peoples would be strengthened if, in the resolute struggle being waged in the three great awakening continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the national liberation movements continuously supported each other in their efforts to recover the inalienable rights of the peoples still subjected to the colonialist yoke.

305. The representative of *Poland* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their generous invitation to the Special Committee, which greatly appreciated their warm welcome. That it should issue a second invitation was further proof of the deep interest Zambia had always taken in the activities of the United Nations and of their dedication to the noble cause of liberating the millions of Africans suffering from colonialism and racism. Those members who had had the privilege of visiting Zambia in 1965 would be gratified to see the progress achieved under President Kaunda's great leadership and to admire the determined approach to

the great task of development adopted by Zambia since its independence in 1964.

306. The Polish delegation was grateful to President Kaunda for having spared the time to open the Special Committee's meetings in his country. It had been greatly impressed by his moving address in which he had described in the most touching terms the seriousness of the situation in southern Africa. Wedged in between Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, Zambia occupied a unique position in the heroic struggle against those strongholds of racism and colonialism and was playing a major role in helping the freedom fighters in those Territories. A special tribute should be paid to the young Republic for its gallant contribution and the sacrifices it was making at a crucial juncture in the fight for human rights and independence.

307. Poland's attitude on colonial matters was well known. For centuries it had been fighting to preserve or regain its independence and was therefore particularly sympathetic to the efforts made by other peoples in the same cause. The Polish Government had expressed those feelings on many occasions and in various forms and would continue to support the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe, South West Africa, Angola and Mozambique to freedom and independence.

308. Since the Committee had last met at Lusaka in 1965, important resolutions had been adopted by the General Assembly, which, if they had been implemented, would have led to the liquidation of the abhorrent colonial régimes in southern Africa. However, the events that had taken place during that period bore witness to the grave deterioration of the situation in the whole region. His delegation was particularly concerned at the situation in Southern Rhodesia and deeply regretted the absence from the Special Committee of the representative of the United Kingdom, which was politically responsible for the Territory. Blame for the unilateral declaration of independence and the continuing existence of the illegal minority régime lay with the United Kingdom Government which had reprehensibly failed to take any vigorous action in its capacity as administering Power to end the rebellion of the racist minority. As expected, the selective sanctions, initiated at the request of the United Kingdom, had proved ineffective because of the open defiance of South Africa, Portugal and Western Powers with vested interests in the area to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The illegal minority régime was taking full advantage of the apparent weakness of the United Kingdom Government and above all of its repeated announcements that force would not be used to quell the rebellion. It was also obvious that the Smith régime, confident of the support of the monopolistic industrial combines of the United Kingdom, United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and other foreign financial groups interested in the preservation of the colonial status quo in southern Africa, was engaged in an unholy alliance with South Africa and Portugal to perpetuate white supremacy. Smith had come out into the open with his apartheid policy of separate development and was tightening his grip on the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe. Thus the United Kingdom Government and its allies had once more paid lip service to the appeals and recommendations of the OAU and the many United Nations resolutions. The polish delegation shared the opinion expressed by

⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, document S/7748.

President Kaunda in his opening address that the United Kingdom's impotence in quelling the rebellion, coupled with meaningless pronouncements, was part of a deliberate design to mislead the world. In its view, the Committee and the United Nations were in duty bound to bend their efforts towards defeating those designs.

309. During its meetings in Zambia, the Special Committee would have ample opportunity of exploring more deeply the various items on its agenda, particularly the question of Southern Rhodesia, Zambia's immediate neighbour. The sons of Zimbabwe who would appear as petitioners would provide first-hand information and new evidence which would help the Committee to understand better the realities of the situation in the area.

310. The Polish delegation considered that the principal function of the Special Committee during its present series of meetings was to work out practical measures to assist the national liberation movements and secure the compliance of the colonial Powers with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those States which assisted the enemies of the people of Zimbabwe and were instrumental in building up the vast colonial empire in southern Africa should be denounced and isolated. It should be impressed upon the United Kingdom that it must live up to its responsibilities and introduce democratic institutions in Southern Rhodesia, based on the principle "one man, one vote", and grant independence to Zimbabwe.

311. In conclusion, he hoped that the Special Committee's meetings at Kitwe would achieve practical results and encourage the freedom-fighters in their legitimate fight for the liquidation of colonialism in Africa.

312. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the President of Zambia had delivered yet another of his very moving addresses to the Special Committee at the previous meeting. As the Chairman had said, it was undoubtedly the most striking address that the Committee had heard since its arrival in Africa. Zambia was not a new country for his delegation since it had been present in May 1965 when the President had expressed his strong conviction that Ian Smith would make a unilateral declaration of independence, a view rejected by the United Kingdom as unthinkable. Events had subsequently proved that the President's assessment of the situation was correct. On the occasion of the Committee's last visit, it had been able to share with the people of Zambia the joy of recent independence when that country became the newest Member of the United Nations. That, in the face of strong opposition, so young a nation had been prepared to extend an invitation to the Committee had kindled his imagination and commanded his respect. That courageous nation was currently facing economic, political and diplomatic problems created by the doubledealing United Kingdom Government, and the fact that it had once again invited the Committee to study the problem of Southern Rhodesia from close at hand, was not only a supreme act of sacrifice but also a tremendous reminder of the fact that President Kaunda and his people placed in the United Nations a faith he had once again reiterated in his address. It was vital that the Committee should not fail them and should convince its parent body that every endeavour must be made to persuade the administering Power with jurisdiction over Southern Rhodesia to cease its

vacillation, which only added to the strength of Smith, Salazar and Vorster.

313. The President had suggested that it might be a blessing in disguise that the Committee was meeting at Kitwe, in the heart of the copper belt. It would be able to judge for itself the impact of United Kingdom intransigence on Zambian life and realize the problems posed by the Rhodesian threat to the main source of the Zambian economy.

314. In the name of the people of Sierra Leone, he saluted the people of Zambia for their firm stand and assured them that his country would continue to support them to the best of its ability. His country had not changed its attitude towards the Southern Rhodesian crisis and would continue to insist that it was folly on the part of the United Kingdom Government to have told Smith in advance that force would not be used. It was still convinced that voluntary sanctions were a mockery and that the only effective way of quelling a rebellion was by force. If force could be used to suppress a strike, a minor tumult or a popular uprising, what logical reason was there why all the might that the United Kingdom could command should not be used to quell the rebellion of Ian Smith and his 200,000 partners who were trying to enslave 4 million indigenous Africans in Zimbabwe?

315. The confrontation between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia was between a multiracial society in which all men lived in harmony and one dedicated to white domination. The white Rhodesians, the white South Africans and the white Portuguese were welcome in the African continent, but Africans could not and would not tolerate a situation in which they were third-class citizens in their own lands.

316. When, in 1965 and earlier, the African and Asian countries had told the United Kingdom that it should not preclude the use of force, they had been accused of being unrealistic and unduly pessimistic. He agreed with the President's analysis that, if being realistic meant compromising moral principles for kith-and-kin sentiments and being optimistic meant making ill-conceived pronouncements that the situation created by the unilateral declaration of independence would be over in a matter of weeks as a result of inadequate and piecemeal voluntary sanctions, then he preferred to have nothing to do with such "realism" or "optimism". After the unilateral declaration of in-dependence in November 1965, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country, together with three other African Ministers, had attempted to convince the United Kingdom that only total sanctions with the possibility of using force could be meaningful, but no attention had been paid to them. The Security Council had ended its deliberations with the famous Manuela resolution (217 (1965)) of 20 November 1965 on the subject of two oil tankers. By 16 December 1966, the United Kingdom was initiating action for another Security Council resolution concerning voluntary sanctions, a resolution which was doomed in advance. Violations were a daily occurrence and governments and nationals turned a blind eye to leakages. Quite recently, as President Kaunda had mentioned, third parties had had the audacity to export to Zambia 1,000 tons of crude Rhodesian sugar.

317. Such flagrant breaches were symptomatic of the world's reaction to the crisis. The fact that sanctions had failed had become so notorious that even Wilson had accepted it. It was reliably suggested that, within the next few weeks, the United Kingdom would once again appear before the Security Council to ask for further sanctions. If such an application was made, his country would once again point out that it was impossible effectively to strangle an economy unless there was willingness to carry out enforcement action under Chapter XI of the Charter. As if to emphasize the United Kingdom's lack of faith in its own policy, the Foreign Minister of that country was reported to have said a week before that his Government would ask the Secretary-General to send a special representative to Southern Rhodesia for purposes of conciliation. His delegation wondered what conciliation was intended.

318. It was reminded of United Kingdom intransigence over another Territory. For many years, the members of the Special Committee and the Members of the General Assembly had been urging the United Kingdom to establish a United Nations presence in Aden. That Government had always refused. Suddenly, at the end of 1966, when its policy had created the worst relationship ever in that Territory, the United Kingdom had asked for a United Nations presence to clean up the mess it had created. Similarly, in Rhodesia where, having by its foolish attachment to kinship rather than the principles of human rights and the Charter made it possible for Smith to consolidate his illegal régime, the United Kingdom Government now wanted the Secretary-General's special representative and through him, the General Assembly, to take the blame for its failure. His Government had constantly maintained that Southern Rhodesia was a colonial question and that the responsibility for solving it lay with the United Kingdom. The United Nations was not empowered to negotiate with a colonial Territory but it could discuss with the administering Power how decolonization could best be effected, and an administering Power seeking such help should be prepared to accept the recommendations made. It was to be hoped that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom would have the courage to take an unpopular decision which would command world respect and contribute to the stability of southern Africa, namely, to make it perfectly clear to Ian Smith and his group that their days were numbered and the time had come for all the people of Zimbabwe, and not just white Rhodesians, to build a nation in accordance with the will of the majority.

319. He mentioned, in passing, the Southern Rhodesian White Paper which would bring the Territory nearer to apartheid and a diabolical union with South Africa. In that connexion, President Kaunda had warned the Special Committee of the grave danger of a racial and ideological war in southern Africa and of the duty of the world community to avert that threat. To do so it was necessary that the super Powers, the major Powers and all others should pool their efforts and not be separated by selfish parochial interests. Wherever the will existed, every nation, whatever its ideology, found a means of acting. The nations of the world had to unite to save southern Africa and ensure the freedom of all its peoples.

320. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the President, Government and people of Zambia for their hospitality, and President Kaunda for his address which manifested, once again, the readiness of the Zambian people to continue the fight for the freedom and independence of African countries from colonialism. The Soviet Union, which would shortly celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the

October revolution and had transformed itself from a backward and exploited country to a united and prosperous one, well understood the difficulties confronting Zambia on its path to independent development.

321. Zambia was an immediate neighbour of the colonial Territories of Portugal and the racist strongholds of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It was also close to South West Africa, whose people were suffering under the yoke of the South African racists who were illegally maintaining their hold on that Territory. Zambia's successes in overcoming the sequels of colonialism were an inspiration to its neighbours still under the domination of the colonialists. The Soviet Union would continue to co-operate with Zambia and other African countries in giving support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate fight for national independence.

322. The Special Committee again had to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia, involving the fate of the 4 million people of Zimbabwe. The racist minority in Southern Rhodesia, flouting world opinion and in defiance of a number of United Nations decisions, continued to deny the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence. That was because of the refusal of the imperialist Powers to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples because they did not want to give up their plans to maintain southern Africa as a stronghold of colonialism. Eighteen months ago when, as a result of the rebellion, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had become dangerous, the General Assembly had approved measures aimed at helping the people of Zimbabwe in their fight for freedom. The General Assembly had recommended that the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia should be discussed by the Security Council which, on 16 December 1966, had adopted resolution 232 (1966) imposing economic sanctions on the racist Salisbury régime. Those sanctions had proved to be insufficient and ineffective. The situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to deteriorate instead of the rebels in Southern Rhodesia being brought to heel, the racist régime had been able to consolidate itself; instead of the establishment of a government representing a majority of the population, the Zimbabwe people continued to be the object of cruel repression; instead of action to end the racist persecution of 1961 and its replacement by a democratic constitution, legislation was being promulgated which only strengthened racial discrimination and was designed to perpetuate the privileges of the white settler minority.

323. In violation of United Nations decisions and despite the imposition of sanctions, the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, with the support of its many patrons abroad and the help of the international monopolies, continued to build up a new bastion of racism in southern Africa which constituted a menace not only to the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia but also to the independent African States, since the Rhodesian racists were working in close collaboration with their spiritual brethren in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies.

324. The United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was unquestionably responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In December 1966, the Soviet delegation in the Security Council had drawn attention to the fact that the measures taken by the United Kingdom in relation to Southern Rhodesia were quite inadequate to divert the minority régime from its

criminal policy towards the indigenous inhabitants. The sanctions imposed did not cover oil, on which the economy of Southern Rhodesia was largely dependent. Even the partial sanctions imposed were ignored by the Western Powers, whose monopolies were ruthlessly exploiting the national wealth of Zimbabwe. Those monopolies had not limited and had in fact extended the scope of their operations in Southern Rhodesia. Exhaustive evidence of that fact was contained in numerous publications, in particular in document A/AC.109/L.393.

325. Investments by the United Kingdom monopolies in Southern Rhodesia amounted to £200 million; more than 180 United Kingdom firms had more than 290 branch offices in Southern Rhodesia. Other countries with large investments in Southern Rhodesia were South Africa with £75 million, the United States with £20 million, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Portugal and others. Seventy-five per cent of Rhodesia's mining industry belonged to foreign monopolies. Amongst western European countries, the Federal Republic of Germany in particular had increased its trade turnover with Southern Rhodesia. That showed that the West German Government was continuing to co-operate with the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. In chapter III of document A/ 6300/Rev.1,5 for instance, confirmed the striking fact that the Federal Republic of Germany took 40.8 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports to western Europe and provided 29.1 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports from western Europe. During 1966, the average monthly value of the goods delivered by Southern Rhodesia to West Germany had risen from \$3.8 million to approximately \$5 million. That stood in marked contrast to the policy of the German Democratic Republic, which had strictly complied with the United Nations resolution and had refused to recognize the Smith régime. As could be seen from document S/7794,6 the German Democratic Republic had reaffirmed its determination to fulfil without reservation the demands set forth in Security Council resolution 232 (1966). In conformity with its consistent antiimperialist and anti-colonialist policy, the Government of the German Democratic Republic was supporting the just struggle of the African population of Southern Rhodesia for freedom and independence and was actively working to bring about the end of the racist régime. In statements dated 13 November 1965 and 9 June 1966, that Government had already made it clear that it refused to recognize the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, which ran counter to the principles of international law, and that even at that time it had broken off all trade relations with Southern Rhodesia. That stood in marked contrast to the policy of the German Democratic Republic which had strictly complied with the United Nations resolution and had refused to recognize the Smith régime.

326. Air Vice-Marshal Hawkins of the Southern Rhodesian Air Force had recently claimed that, except for the South African Air Force, the Southern Rhodesian Air Force was the most powerful within a radius of 3,500 miles. The military budget of Southern Rhodesia had been increased by 20 per cent during the past year.

327. The delegation of the Soviet Union insisted that effective measures must be taken against the fanatical racists of Salisbury. The problem could be solved along the lines of the programme approved by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: through the repeal of the racist constitution of 1961, the release of political prisoners, the holding of elections on the basis of "one man, one vote" and the transfer of power without delay to a government representing the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. In order to implement that programme, the Western Powers, and above all the United Kingdom, must be required to fulfil without duplicity the decisions of the United Nations aimed at guaranteeing the rights of the people of Zimbabwe to true independence and freedom. States which undermined the United Nations decision on Southern Rhodesia, in particular South Africa and Portugal, deserved the severest condemnation.

328. The Soviet Union would continue to comply to the letter with the Security Council's decisions. It held the views that no decisions of the United Nations relieved the United Kingdom, as administering Power, of the full responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the tragic plight of the people of Zimbabwe. That applied not only to the United Kingdom but also to its NATO partners which supported the United Kingdom in its Southern Rhodesian policy.

329. True to its policy of supporting the national liberation movements of colonial peoples and countries, the Soviet Union was in complete sympathy with the people of Zimbabwe and was ready to co-operate with the African countries in providing full support to the people of Zimbabwe in its just fight for national independence. The Soviet Union would endorse all United Nations decisions aimed at eradicating colonialism and racism from Southern Africa.

330. The representative of Mali expressed his delegation's gratitude to the people of Zambia, to their party and to their Government under the clear-sighted leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda for the kind invitation which had been extended to the Special Committee and for the warm and brotherly welcome accorded it. Mali had not been surprised by the Zambian gesture because ever since that country had become independent, it had been the bastion of anticolonialism in an especially sensitive region where injustice, racism and the most flagrant kind of exploitation had unfortunately run rampant to the detriment of the African population. Mali respected Zambia's brave stand, expressed its full sympathy with that country and gave it its unconditional support in its struggle to endow the black man with the dignity which the racist settlers of Salisbury and Pretoria, with the support of the big Western Powers, were flouting with impunity in defiance of world public opinion.

331. The Special Committee could not do better than to study the situation in Southern Rhodesia from the vantage point of the mining region of Zambia, a short distance from Salisbury. Its presence there should give fresh confidence and courage to the nationalists of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union fighting against the racist minority of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The last General Assembly had considered the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia and had adopted important recommendations which had become binding

⁵ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

⁶ See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, document \$/7794.

upon all States Members of the United Nations. Since the previous autumn, the situation had continued to deteriorate in that United Kingdom colony. Ian Smith had consolidated his position, as the President of the Republic of Zambia had so rightly pointed out at the opening of the session at Kitwe. Ever since the unilateral declaration of independence by the clique of racist colonialists led by Ian Smith, the United Kingdom, the administering Power, had confined itself to statements of intention, while refusing to take any vigorous action to restore the rule of law in the country, despite the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

332. The delegation of Mali reaffirmed its consistent stand, which was one of condemnation for the unilateral independence of Southern Rhodesia. It considered that the United Kingdom bore full responsibility for the situation created in that country, and it denounced the manœuvres of Wilson's Government. The only purpose of such delaying tactics was to enable Ian Smith's clique to establish itself comfortably in its illegal position, in order the better to exploit the people of Zimbabwe for the benefit of the United Kingdom companies and foreign monopolies operating in Southern Rhodesia.

333. On the proposal of the United Kingdom Government, the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965) and, most important, resolution 232 (1966) imposing selective sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. Those resolutions had had no effect because of the negative attitude of the Pretoria and Lisbon régimes, which had vigorously supported Ian Smith. Thanks to that support and Wilson's procrastination, the Rhodesian economy was now even better off than before. Statistics published by the United Nations had shown the ineffectiveness of those sanctions, for the major Powers, from the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom included, had been expanding their trade with Ian Smith's régime even while their delegations, in their statements, had been condemning the stand taken by the racist settlers. That ambiguous situation had lasted long enough; the time had come for action. Document S/7781/Add.1,7 published on 23 February 1967, namely, more than two years after the adoption of the Security Council resolution, showed that the value of Southern Rhodesian exports of all commodities to the United States had totalled \$8,434,000 for the period from January to October 1966. During the same period, the value of Rhodesian exports to the Federal Republic of Germany had been \$25,579,000; to the United Kingdom, \$12,754,000; and to Japan, \$13,280,000. Sugar exports to the United Kingdom during the same period had totalled 20,486 tons, representing a value of \$1,278,000, and sugar exports to Canada had totalled 14,921 tons, representing a value of \$747,000.

334. During the same period, Southern Rhodesian exports of tobacco had amounted to: 714 tons, representing a value of \$933,000, to the United States; 1,751 tons, representing a value of \$1,742,000, to Belgium and Luxembourg; 6,293 tons, representing a value of \$7,267,000, to the Federal Republic of Germany; and 2,484 tons, representing a value of \$3,236,000 to Portugal (Mozambique).

335. Those were only a few examples selected from a list, which had been compiled by the Secretariat, of

⁷ Ibid., document S/7781/Add.1.

8 Ibid.

commodities sold by Southern Rhodesia to the major Western Powers. That document showed that the United Kingdom had imported from Southern Rhodesia, between January and November 1966, 6,904 tons of tobacco, representing a value of \$8,243,000, and that, in the case of commodities such as hides and skins, asbestos, chromium ore and concentrates, iron, pig-iron, copper and so forth, the major Powers were rushing to the support of Southern Rhodesia by purchasing those commodities at favourable prices, in violation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966). It was thus no longer surprising that Ian Smith was defying international opinion and strengthening his position by taking stricter coercive measures against the people of Zimbabwe. The reason why the major Western Powers refused to take the only valid and just course which could resolve the Rhodesian crisis, namely, the use of force, was obvious. It was to safeguard selfish interests and enable companies such as Hippo Valley Estates or Rhodesian Anglo American (subsidiaries of the trust company, the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, which had vast holdings in the sugar industry and in agriculture and other economic sectors of the country, to make bigger profits at the expense of the Zimbabwe people. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was drawing off from the Rhodesian economy 70 to 80 per cent of the profits which were transferred to London banks. There was thus an organized system of exploitation at all levels within that unfortunate coun-

336. Mali denounced that collusion of interests which was presenting the people of Zimbabwe from attaining self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Zimbabwe people had been betrayed, and their natural wealth was being pillaged for the benefit of the international trusts and monopolies. For that reason, Mali welcomed the inclusion of the following item in the agenda for the next session of the General Assembly: "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination". There could be no doubt that it was precisely those sordid economic interests which lay behind the attitude of certain major Powers, and of the United Kingdom in particular, towards Ian Smith and Vorster.

337. To the foregoing reasons must be added the alleged strategic value which the countries where racial discrimination prevailed represented for the hypothetical defence of the so-called free world. Mali rejected such a claim and considered that the principle of self-determination should apply for all alike.

338. Now that the world had realized the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions, it was time, if the worst was to be avoided, for the United Kingdom to use force to overthrow Ian Smith. It had been the United Kingdom which, four years previously, had armed the racist settlers by its refusal to comply with United Nations recommendations. It alone was thus responsible for the situation. In his country's opinion, economic sanctions, whether selective or total, would serve no purpose. The only suitable course was the use of force by the administering Power. That the United Kingdom was firmly convinced of that fact was demonstrated by its use of force to stifle Arab nationalism in Aden and the

Protectorates. However, as President Kaunda had said, the blood of the white Southern Rhodesians was the same as that which flowed in the veins of the Arabs of occupied South Arabia and in the veins of the people of Zimbabwe. The United Kingdom's procrastination could be accounted for, it seemed, only by the fact that the racist settlers were of British stock and that the British preferred to sacrifice 4 million Africans rather than shed a single drop of British blood. If that were so, the nationalists were left with no other choice than to take up arms to liberate their country.

339. The Malian delegation joined with the Chairman in calling upon all nationalists to unite their efforts in order to join battle against the Salisbury racists. They could be assured of the total support of the Republic of Mali in their fight for the liberation of their country. He recalled that his Government did not recognize the present régime in Southern Rhodesia. He reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence, as recognized by the United Nations Charter and all the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Mali recognized the legitimacy of the struggle being waged by all the oppressed peoples whether in Asia, the Middle East or right there in southern Africa-in order that man might live in freedom and dignity.

340. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed his warm appreciation for the invitation of the Government of Zambia, the hospitality of the people of Zambia and the excellent arrangements made for the Special Committee's stay at Kitwe. His delegation had been impressed and moved by President Kaunda's address in which he had spoken of the problems of colonialism, minority rule, and the denial of fundamental human rights in the area of southern Africa with which the Committee would deal during its meetings in Zambia.

341. Those problems were matters in which all free people were involved; they appealed to the conscience and the enlightened self-interest of the entire world community. The existence of colonial minority régimes in the countries surrounding Zambia created for it particularly pressing economic, political and social problems. His delegation was impressed with Zambia's progress in meeting those difficulties during the short time since its independence, notably in lessening its economic dependence on Southern Rhodesia and in strengthening alternative transport routes and sources of supply. In that connexion he recalled that the United States, immediately after the Smith régime's illegal declaration of independence, had assisted with a \$5 million emergency petroleum airlift to Zambia, and had supplied additional resources for road maintenance. Moreover, the United States Government was at present financing a full engineering survey of that portion of the Great North Road which lay in the United Republic of Tanzania. Zambia was progressing rapidly with practical plans for creating a dynamic, multiracial society, typified by its ambitious four-year development plan.

342. Relations between the United States and Zambia were characterized by mutual respect and understanding, although the two countries did not always agree on the best means of reaching mutually desired goals in the complex and potentially explosive political arena of southern Africa.

343. Turning to the two problems upon which the Special Committee would deliberate during its meetings

in Zambia, he said that the United States supported the principle that the people of South West Africa should be enabled fully to exercise their right to self-determination and independence under the Charter of the United Nations, that the hateful and doomed policy of apartheid should be brought to an end in South West Africa and that the United Nations should discharge its responsibilities with regard to that Territory. The General Assembly, in adopting resolution 2145 (XXI) which ended South Africa's mandate over South West Africa, had taken an important step. His Government supported that resolution and, in the words of the United States Representative, "would do whatever it could by all appropriate and peaceful means to implement it".

344. Concerning the critical and unsolved problem in Southern Rhodesia, his Government had given strong support to the measures taken by the Security Council to bring the illegal Smith régime to an end. He reaffirmed his country's support for a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem to ensure the achievement of its objective, which, in the words of President Johnson, was "to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia, not just 6 per cent of them".

345. His Government had voted for Security Council resolution 232 (1966) which imposed certain mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, and had complied fully with its provisions.

346. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the President, Government and people of Zambia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in the beautiful city of Kitwe, thus demonstrating that Zambia was ready to contribute to the elimination of colonialism from Africa. President Kaunda's remarkable address reflected Zambia's determination to contribute fully to the liquidation of all remnants of the brutal and inhuman régime of colonialism.

347. The major Western Powers, in particular the United Kingdom, were those most responsible for the present situation in Africa. They should regard President Kaunda's words as a serious warning of what would happen if they continued to support the illegal Smith régime. Moreover, President Kaunda's wise words would inspire the Special Committee in its work at Kitwe.

348. His own country was linked with Zambia by ties of friendship, a common policy of non-alignment, and a common desire to combat the threat of colonial and neo-colonial pressures and interference in the internal affairs of independent States. Both countries attached great importance to the United Nations and were doing all they could to make it an effective instrument for the achievement of its lofty aims.

349. The prompt eradication of colonialism was one of the primary responsibilities of the United Nations. All progressive peoples were gravely concerned at the recent stagnation in the process of decolonization. Colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers were doing their best to impede the process of development in the newly independent countries and were attempting to strengthen their rule over Territories still under colonial domination. The most glaring examples were the racist régimes in the south of Africa, and Zambia, because of its geographical position, was directly threatened by the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

350. Yugoslavia fully sympathized with the dangers and difficulties faced by Zambia. During its sessions at Kitwe the Special Committee would give special atten-

tion to the question of Southern Rhodesia. Because of the ineffective measures so far taken and the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to assume its responsibilities and employ military force, the situation in Southern Rhodesia was deteriorating, representing a direct threat not only to the future of the people of Zimbabwe, but also to that of Africa as a whole. The people of Yugoslavia full shared the fears expressed by President Kaunda in that respect. It was the Committee's duty to denounce the real causes of concern in southern Africa and to address its demands to those upon whose policies, in the final analysis, the solution of the problem of southern Africa and other colonial problems depended.

- 351. His delegation was confident that Africa, with the aid of the progressive elements in the international community, would succeed in uprooting the last remnants of racism and colonialism from its soil. Progress was too irresistible to be diverted by the selfish interests of the racists of southern Africa or by their allies. Yugoslavia would, as in the past, continue to support the people of Zimbabwe, South West Africa and others who were fighting for their independence.
- 352. The representative of *Bulgaria* associated himself with the expressions of thanks to President Kaunda, his Government and people. In inviting the Special Committee, the Zambian Government had demonstrated its sense of responsibility with regard to finding a solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Zambia had not only offered hospitality to thousands of refugees, but was also in the forefront of the fight against the criminal régime of Ian Smith and those who supported him.
- 353. The Special Committee would not forget President Kaunda's moving appeals to the conscience and goodwill of the Government of the United Kingdom to take effective measures against the Smith régime, nor his warnings to the United Kingdom and its Western allies that the illegal unilateral declaration of independence would have catastrophic consequences for Africa and the world as a whole. Members of the Committee had already had the privilege of hearing the remarkable statements of Mr. Kapwepwe, the Zambian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which he had declared that only the use of force by the United Kingdom could bring down the rebel régime. Unfortunately that country and its allies had not listened to those appeals. The United Kingdom was continuing blindly with its old imperialistic policies and had indeed encouraged the illegal régime by declaring before the unilateral declaration of independence that it would not use force against the rebels.
- 354. He assured the people of Zambia that Bulgaria admired their courage and determination to help their brothers of Zimbabwe at great personal sacrifice. Zambia's non-compromising policy was one of the most important factors in fighting the illegal Smith régime and in restoring the lawful rights of the Zimbabwe people.
- 355. His delegation had been deeply impressed by President Kaunda's address, by his evaluation of the present situation in Africa, and by his analysis of the unrealistic policy of the United Kingdom.
- 356. His Government's policy with respect to Southern Rhodesia coincided with that of the majority of the African States, which considered that only the use of force by the United Kingdom could bring down the

- illegal Smith régime. His delegation unhesitatingly supported President Kaunda's assertion that there was no alternative to the use of force by the United Kingdom, which bore full responsibility for the events in Southern Rhodesia. It also agreed that only thus could mandatory sanctions contribute to the elimination of the Smith régime.
- 357. The Special Committee would be discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia at a time when the Zimbabwe people's fight for liberty was entering a decisive phase. The Zambian invitation would give the Committee an opportunity of coming into contact with the genuine representatives of the liberation movement. His delegation hoped that those representatives would concentrate and not dissipate their efforts, and that they would inform the Committee of the role that the United Nations could play in mobilizing world opinion against the racist régimes in southern Africa. It also expected to hear new information concerning the support for those régimes afforded by the Western Powers and the members of NATO, and the activities of international monopolies and financial interests.
- 358. He asked the Observer for Zambia to transmit the cordial greetings of the Bulgarian people to the people of Zambia, and to assure them of Bulgaria's desire to develop friendly relations with them.
- 359. The representative of *Madagascar* said that he too wished to express sincere and profound gratitude on behalf of his delegation to the Government and people of the Republic of Zambia for their kind invitation, which had enabled the Special Committee to meet in Zambia once again. He was very touched by the hospitality and the brotherly welcome which the Zambian people had extended to the Committee.
- 360. His delegation also wished to state that it greatly appreciated the important and wise statement which President Kaunda had made at the Special Committee's first meeting in Zambia. That outstanding statement, which would undoubtedly provide the Committee with useful guidance in its work at Kitwe, had eloquently demonstrated the determination of the Government and people of Zambia to work for the liberation of the countries and peoples still under colonial domination.
- 361. Despite the long frontiers which it shared with the main proponents of colonialism, the Republic of Zambia was showing truly remarkable vigilance and courage in opposing the white racists of Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa.
- 362. His delegation shared the concern expressed by President Kaunda when he had denounced the United Kingdom's policy of "honourable defeat". It was the United Kingdom's duty to honour its responsibilities and obligations in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government was completely free to use all means at its disposal to solve the Rhodesian crisis. It was in that perspective that the Council of Ministers of the OAU, at its eighth regular session, at Addis Ababa, had adopted a resolution condemning the United Kingdom Government yet again for having evaded its moral and constitutional responsibilities with regard to the people of Zimbabwe.
- 363. Madagascar remained faithful to its policy of non-violence and did not advocate the use of force to solve colonial problems. However, if the use of force was considered the ultimate solution of the Rhodesian problem, in his delegation's view it was for the United

Kingdom, and the United Kingdom alone, to use it. That was the solution which the United Kingdom Government had already adopted to crush nationalist movements in other colonies.

364. In conclusion, he wished to reaffirm his delegation's firm resolve to work for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to assure the national liberation movements of Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration once again that the people of Madagascar supported their heroic struggle to exercise their right to freedom, self-determination and independence. Lastly, his delegation requested the Chairman of the Special Committee to convey Madagascar's brotherly greetings and sincere good wishes to President Kaunda, the Government of the Republic of Zambia and the dynamic Zambian people for their faith in the dignity of man and their determination to free Africa from colonialism.

365. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that his delegation was happy to salute the Government and people of Zambia and to thank them sincerely for the brotherly welcome they had extended to the members of the Special Committee. The warmth of that welcome showed the importance which Zambia attached to the United Nations and to international problems. The Ivory Coast was used to playing host to international conferences and knew that the organization of such meetings involved enormous efforts and sacrifices for the host country. It was for that reason that his delegation had appreciated the traditional African hospitality offered by the brother people of Zambia.

366. He particularly wished to thank the President of the Republic of Zambia and to congratulate him on the moving and masterly statement he had made before the Special Committee. In his delegation's view, that statement would stimulate the members of the Committee and lead them to reflect deeply on the serious situation in Rhodesia. By inviting the Committee to meet on its soil, Zambia and its distinguished President would enable the Committee to work more efficiently and give substantial assistance to the African peoples of the Territories still under foreign domination, who were struggling unceasingly for their lawful rights and freedoms.

367. The Ivory Coast was not indifferent to that struggle. It attached particular importance to the problems of decolonization and would therefore spare no effort within its means to make a full and complete contribution to the application of the principle of decolonization and to the Special Committee's work at its current session. Its desire to see all Africans, without exception, enjoying that essential nutriment, freedom, had been demonstrated on many occasions, in particular throughout the debates on the Territories under Portuguese administration, the problem of Rhodesia and South West Africa. Its position was clear and wellknown: the Ivory Coast believed it to be its duty, as an African State, to demand the liberation of all African territories and justice for their peoples. It had always believed and still believed that the most reasonable way to achieve that goal was to settle international crises by peaceful means, for as President Houphouët-Boigny had said, war had never really settled anything.

368. Unfortunately, the hopes of the Ivory Coast had been disappointed on more than one occasion, particularly with regard to the Rhodesian affair. It had

placed its confidence in those responsible for the Rhodesian crisis, because it had believed that under the wide powers which they held, it was their duty, as administering Powers, to lead the Rhodesian people to independence in conditions which would permit all citizens to enjoy equal rights. Economic sanctions had been in effect for over a year but it was an open secret that they had failed miserably.

369. His delegation was uncertain what steps should be taken to resolve that situation, but nevertheless wished to reaffirm emphatically that the African countries could not wait for ever. Ever since the beginning of the Rhodesian crisis the United Kingdom had been perfectly well aware of what world opinion expected of it, namely, to crush the rebellion which it had recognized as such, to destroy the illegal régime of Ian Smith, and in short to restore legality and grant independence to Rhodesia in the best possible conditions.

370. The Ivory Coast called on its African friends to join it in launching a new and urgent appeal to the United Kingdom to recognize the failure and ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and invite it to use the appropriate energetic means recommended on several occasions by the General Assembly and the majority of African States. At the same time, the Ivory Coast appealed to all the nationalist movements to unite in their struggle for freedom.

371. The representative of *Italy* recalled that, for its meetings in Zambia the Special Committee had one of the heaviest agendas outside Headquarters, which proved the wisdom of accepting the Zambian invitation. All the items for the meetings at Kitwe affected Zambia directly and deeply, since that country was so very near the scene of what might be termed "ultracolonialism". The events in southern Africa constituted a major political problem, often involving the denial of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

372. The defiance of the international community by the illegal Smith régime was a source of anxiety to the United Nations, and in particular to the Special Committee. Recent news, some of which was contained in document A/AC.109/L.393/Add.1, showed that the Salisbury régime was introducing even stronger measures of racial discrimination. It was easy to guess what the provisions of the new Rhodesian constitution in course of preparation would be.

373. The Special Committee's meeting at Kitwe would provide it with direct evidence concerning the unfortunate consequences of policies that denied fundamental human rights. His delegation looked forward to taking part in the careful examination of whatever additional information was submitted to the Committee for further action by the United Nations. President Kaunda's opening address had given the Committee a picture of the economic strain placed upon Zambia by the present situation. In spite of those difficulties, however, Zambia was maintaining and strengthening its measures to combat the Smith régime in pursuance of the United Nations decisions.

374. Italy's position was clear and had recently been reaffirmed in a decree promulgated by its President designed to ensure full and prompt compliance with the Security Council's decisions and which compounded and completed previous administrative decisions,

375. He endorsed the remarks made by the Chairman and previous speakers in expressing gratitude

to President Kaunda and his people for the welcome they had given the Special Committee and for the reaffirmation of Zambia's faith in the United Nations. No better words of encouragement could be given to the Committee in its work.

376. The representative of *Iraq* thanked the Zambian Government for its invitation to the Special Committee and for its warm welcome, good planning and foresight.

377. President Kaunda's brilliant address would greatly influence the Special Committee's work and decisions, for he had expressed his point of view with sincerity, thought and good judgement. The Arab countries ascribed particular importance to the Rhodesian situation since they had faced and were still facing similar problems; they understood the miseries involved when the majority of an indigenous population was subjected to the rule of a foreign authority which denied it fundamental freedoms. Rhodesia was, so to speak, another Palestine, for the racist Government of Ian Smith paralleled the racist leadership of Israel, which was supported by international Zionism and the forces of colonialism. Indeed, the administering Power, namely, the United Kingdom, was the same in both cases. Each country had to tackle the problem of protecting refugees from despotism and brutality. For that reason his delegation fully sympathized with the Zambian Government and people who were offering hospitality to many thousands of their brothers who had escaped from the Rhodesian dictatorship.

378. His delegation reserved the right to speak later on the problems created by the illegal racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

379. The representative of *Tunisia* said that first of all he wished to associate his delegation with all those which had spoken previously and to express to the President, the people and the Government of Zambia its sincere thanks and deep gratitude for their invitation to the Special Committee, which had enabled it to meet for the second time in just a few years, in a sister country whose hospitality did honour to Africa and whose faith in the work of the United Nations and of the Committee was well known.

380. He wished to pay a special tribute to President Kaunda for his untiring efforts to ensure the wellbeing of his people and country and for his continuing action on behalf of the countries which were still colonized and the peoples who were still oppressed and enslaved. The moving statement which he had made at the opening of the Special Committee's work had deeply impressed all those who had heard it. That statement revealed both profound humanism and an acute and moderate political sense, and every Government and individual of goodwill who desired peace would endorse the conclusions to be drawn from it. The significance of President Kaunda's statement was all the greater because it had been made by a Head of State whose levelheadedness, wisdom and sense of responsibility were recognized by all.

381. As a result of its geographical situation and its economic structure, Zambia had been deeply involved in the Rhodesian tragedy and had suffered the consequences of that involvement from the moment it had been independent. The courage of its President and the determination of its people alone had enabled it to survive the terrible ordeals to which it had been subjected. However, despite the warning notes which President Kaunda had long been sounding and the

efforts of the peoples of Africa and Asia, no serious steps had yet been taken to settle the problem of Southern Rhodesia once and for all; no steps had been taken to prevent the racist minority in Rhodesia from transforming that territory into a new field for experimentation in the widely criticized policy of apartheid. There was no doubt as to the United Kingdom's responsibility in the matter. In fact, the United Kingdom had always asserted its responsibilities, but by its hesitations, its tergiversations and its so-called negotiations it had allowed Smith and his accomplices to seize power illegally. By advocating the application of economic sanctions, it had enabled him to consolidate his régime, for it was obvious to all that the sanctions had failed. Because they were selective and because they could easily be circumvented, those sanctions had not weakened Smith's minority, illegal, racist régime or disturbed the country's economy. On the contrary, they had enabled Smith to gain time, to move closer to South Africa and to submit himself entirely to the orders of his masters in Pretoria. They had enabled the evil and criminal triple alliance to consolidate its position and to defy the conscience of the world with impunity. Smith now felt encouraged: his régime had been consolidated, the restrictions he had imposed in the country were being relaxed and a constitution even more racist than its predecessor was being prepared. The United Kingdom, like all the other Powers which had supported its policy, was responsible not only for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia but also for the explosion of violence which would unfailingly occur in the territory, for oppression and injustice could not continue. Law and justice would eventually triumph in Southern Rhodesia, as they had triumphed in other countries. The Zimbabwe people would eventually rise and expel the usurpers. Fortified by international support, they would ultimately recover their rights, their independence and their freedom. The Special Committee should make specific recommendations, for only energetic action could avoid bloodshed and an explosion of violence in the future.

382. In conclusion, he reaffirmed that the Tunisian people would always stand shoulder to shoulder with the Zimbabwe people and would defend their cause, support them in their combat and assist them in their struggle.

383. The representative of Australia thanked President Kaunda for his lucid and moving address, which revealed him as a man whose first consideration was always the well-being of his fellow men. His delegation was also grateful for the opportunity of visiting Zambia and had been impressed by the achievement and friend-liness of its people. To some extent Australia was itself still a developing country and could therefore appreciate Zambia's many problems. It had unreserved faith in the future of the vigorous and robust young Zambian nation under the leadership of its distinguished President.

384. His delegation was looking forward to hearing first-hand accounts of the situation in the Territories surrounding Zambia, which would be of great value to the Special Committee's work. Australia was deeply conscious of the problems arising for Zambia in an unhappy and difficult situation.

385. In many ways Australia could claim a special relationship with Zambia, since both countries shared a common heritage. Moreover, Australia was fortunate in having the opportunity to learn more about the African members of the Commonwealth because of

the significant number of Africans who were studying there. That special Commonwealth relationship was, he felt, best exemplified by Australia's action in imposing voluntary sanctions on the illegal Rhodesian régime within five days of the unilateral declaration of independence. That action had thus anticipated Security Council resolution 217 (1965). Since then, Australia has complied fully with the resolution requiring the imposition of mandatory sanctions. Australia opposed any system of government which denied basic human rights to any part of its people, and adhered unequivocally to the principle of self-determination.

386. His country's attitude towards colonialism, with particular reference to Southern Rhodesia, could be summed up by a quotation from recent speeches by Mr. Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister for External Affairs:

"... we have taken various steps including drastic restrictions of imports from Rhodesia, to try to induce the régime under Mr. Ian Smith to return to constitutional government. We continue to believe that the objective should be a government in Rhodesia responsible to all the people of the country and with effective safeguards for all elements of the population... Australia believes that a society and form of government cannot, and should not, persist where a minority dominates the majority and where basic human rights and opportunities are denied to any of the population. We in Australia believe in basic human rights and participation for all persons in the life of a country. We believe that neither a majority nor a minority should be oppressed, or denied human rights, or shut off from opportunities of participation in government.... Australia was one of the first countries in the world to apply sanctions against Rhodesia [and] has re-fused to recognize the unilateral and illegal declaration of independence by the régime in Southern Rhodesia."

387. Australia believed in the promotion and encouragement of the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations.

CLOSING OF MEETINGS

Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia

388. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia thanked the Special Committee for affording him the opportunity of addressing it. He knew that the past week had been a week of toil and moil for the Committee and perhaps also a period of frustration for some members, but he hoped the Zambian people would be forgiven for any mistakes they had made and for any inconvenience such shortcomings might have caused.

389. For the Zambian people, the Special Committee's deliberations had been a source of further inspiration in the very difficult situation in which, through no fault of their own, they found themselves. Members had not minced their words in condemning the United Kingdom's Rhodesian policy or in castigating South Africa and the Western Powers for their obstructionist policies on South West Africa. Now had they closed their eyes to the heart-rending sufferings of the millions of Africans under the feudalistic and

genocidal Portuguese oppression in Angola and Mozambique.

390. There was nothing more reassuring to the people of Zambia than to find that the Special Committee viewed the problems of southern Africa in the same light as they did. But the Zambian people were not armchair political philosophers: they did not content themselves with sitting back and philosophizing about problems which called for action. The unanimity of purpose which the Zambian people shared with the Committee was not enough. The Committee should go more than half way to meet the demands and wipe away the tears of southern Africa's oppressed millions. Words, and indeed resolutions and solemn pronouncements were meaningless, if they were not followed by action; it was pointless for the Committee to listen to the humble pleas and sad revelations of freedom fighters merely as a formality and to do nothing thereafter.

391. Thousands of families in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa were close to death from starvation. Some of them were homeless and without medical care. Freedom fighters needed substantial financial and material assistance if they were to wage a successful fight for independence. If the Special Committee was to rise above a status of a debating society, to which the passage of time seemed to have relegated it, it should engage in practical programmes designed to assist the oppressed peoples of dependent Africa and to help them attain independence. The colonial problems of southern Africa would not be solved merely by resolutions in the Special Committee, in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, but by action outside the conference halls—and daring action at that.

392. In that connexion, he reminded his brothers in Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and South West Africa that independence would not be won by petitions, nor by elaborate and academic denunciations of what the colonial and racist régimes in southern Africa were doing, but by blood and iron. The peoples of southern Africa must fight for their independence and not just shout from the roof-tops or stage war dances. That was the lesson taught by colonial history; and history was repeating itself every day.

393. He had unfortunately been unable to be present during the Special Committee's deliberations owing to prior commitments with another international conference at Lusaka. But he had tried to follow the trend of the discussions. It was instructive to note the statements by some delegations on the question of Rhodesia. Certain delegations had entered reservations on what should surely have been a unanimous appeal to the United Kingdom, as administering Power in Southern Rhodesia, to release all political prisoners and prevent the passage of the apartheid bill in the rebel Parliament. Those delegations had given as the reason for their reservations the argument that, because Southern Rhodesia was in rebellion, the United Kingdom Government was incapable of implementing such an appeal. Should that be taken as a confession of defeat by that Government? It appeared to him that, although the United Kingdom was absent from the Special Committee's tour, it was being effectively represented by those delegations. Perhaps it was sheer coincidence and, if so, it certainly was a very curious coincidence that the people who were defending the United Kingdom should be of the same stock. Did that not justify the conclusion that those countries were looking at the Rhodesian problem through the same "kith and kin" spectacles as the United Kingdom? The burden of proof to the contrary lay on their shoulders.

394. He found it strange that some of those countries should continue to have consular or trade missions at Salisbury. It had been said that the reason for the continued existence of such missions was to look after the interests of those countries' nationals in the rebel colony. But it was known that the rebels' flag was still flying in the capitals of those countries. Were the interests of their nationals more important than those of the international community? That was the hypocrisy of sanctions: to maintain trade relations and, at the same time, to enact ineffectual laws against trading with Southern Rhodesia was, according to those countries, to abide by the Security Council's resolution on Southern Rhodesia. Could there be any more transparent pretence?

395. The reason why the United Kingdom delegation had stayed away from the Special Committee's present series of meetings was that country's realization that the African people resented the United Kingdom's asking for United Nations support for such a "riderand-horse" partnership. What the United Kingdom Government had done was to try to avoid embarrassment over the confusion and failure of its policy towards Southern Rhodesia. That was why he had recently called it a toothless hyena. Some people in Zambia and southern Africa might regard that as a mere emotional outburst, but it was a serious matter because the picture was now very very clear. It was not a matter of playing politics but of an agreement between the big Powers. If behind Southern Rhodesia stood South Africa, and behind South Africa the United Kingdom, and behind the United Kingdom the rest of the imperialist Powers, that was part of a consistent, concerted policy to maintain white supremacy in southern Africa.

396. The original aim had been a white South Africa, just as there already existed a white Australia and a white North America; and everybody knew what had happened to the Australian aborigines and the Red Indians of North America. The only thing that had prevented that fate being repeated in Africa was the fact that the world had become a little more civilized than when the British had killed off the aborigines in Australia. Today there were committees, such as the Special Committee, to denounce them. Had it not been for that little advance in civilization, the African people in South Africa would have been wiped out to make room for the white colonists.

397. The problem of southern Africa was the problem of white people believing they were a *Herrenvolk*, born to rule, born to govern, born to inherit the earth. They claimed that the Africans could not govern themselves and had to be governed, dominated, exploited; white farms and white factories had to be manned by cheap African labour. That was why South African policy was supported in fact, though denounced in words.

398. Colonialism was a two-faced phenomenon: the colonists really thought it was their duty to educate the "natives", but in practice it turned out to be a duty to exploit them. When they said "We must teach the Africans to work" what they meant was "We must force them to work for us". All the high-minded intentions of certain white colonialists were distorted

and corrupted by the underlying greed and arrogance. What the Africans finally received from their "civilizing mission" was the barbaric régime of the pass-laws and detention camps. As far as the black man was concerned, the white civilizing mission was a smoke-screen for "gracious living" at the expense of black misery.

399. South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia were not separate problems: there was a single problem of southern Africa which, if not handled properly, would lead to a clash between black and white to a war of disaster for both races.

400. Portugal claimed that Angola and Mozambique were provinces of Portugal. A glance at the map was enough to show the madness of its claim.

401. The United Kingdom refused to exercise its constitutional rights in Southern Rhodesia because the latter had a special role marked out for it by the United Kingdom and the other imperialist Powers: to act as a buffer State protecting South Africa from direct contact with African nationalism. The United Kingdom and other Powers had thousands of millions of dollars worth of investments in South Africa which were highly profitable; Southern Rhodesia was the buffer which protected those investments and profits.

402. There was no mystery about what colonialism did for the colonialists. But while it gave them millions, it also robbed them of their human values. Humanity, ethnics, logic counted for nothing, and all that remained was the "kingdom of business' where reason was absent.

403. It was grim and painful for a people to see their country's policy manipulated from outside and the best of their natural resources and raw materials squandered without any hope of redress. When men believed in materialism, they forgot about mankind. Human values became secondary and money became their major preoccupation.

404. The time had come for all freedom fighters to stand together. They should not hope for any Government to set them free. They must free themselves. They must be prepared for sacrifice. They must accept death. No price was too high to establish their human dignity and the power to shape their own destiny.

405. The imperialists were cruel and had not left any colony by simply handing it over. They had to be driven out. The liberation movements would have to produce fighting men with wills and bones of iron. Africa would not rest till the whole of Africa was free. Africa would regain its self-respect and the world's respect only when the last of the colonialists was driven out. Today Africa was not respected. Africans were thought of as children who had to be guided and governed. Africans, it was said, did not deserve freedom because they had made no contribution to world culture, to thought and philosophy. But the truth was that, because Africa was not free, African thought and culture were ignored and neglected.

406. It was only since some African nations had become free that the world was waking up to the existence of the Africans as people. In the past, when tourists had come to Africa, they had stared at the elephants and the zebras and the antelopes; they had not seen the African people. They could afford to overlook the rich culture and wisdom of Africa and the fact that Africa had been the birthplace of civilization, because Africa was not free.

407. The story of South West Africa was sad indeed. The views of the Zambian Government had been stated on a number of occasions and he would not reiterate them. But he stressed that the future of the United Nations hung in the balance because of South West Africa. The sincerity and genuineness of the big Power's professed belief in the world body was perhaps undergoing the greatest test since the founding of the United Nations. Its future, for better or worse, must depend on the fate of the formerly mandated Territory. Compromise with the forces of apartheid would make the world body a futile institution which had lost sight of its cardinal principle of establishing and maintaining liberty and peace.

408. He was grateful to the Special Committee for coming to Zambia and providing an opportunity for those things to be said, and he hoped that the representatives would go back to the United Nations and impress upon the international community the urgency of the southern African problem. Their resolutions must not be buried but must result in practical and timely action. The Bible said that with faith man could move mountains; but that biblical truth hardly applied to the brutal facts and lessons of everyday life. Action was the prerequisite.

409. The people of southern Africa still clung to the hope that the big Powers would realize the dangers ahead and turn back to the path of truth and civilization, because no one who exploited other human beings could be truly civilized. No one who believed in exploitation could believe in Christianity, and anyone who said he did was a hypocrite. He asked the great Powers to show sincerity and not to mouth good words without acting on them.

410. Today Africa was weak, but it would not be weak tomorrow. Empires came and went; they ruled and disintegrated. Man was everywhere the victim of time and change. It would therefore be foolish to believe that Africa would always be weak and helpless. The African people prayed that those who controlled the destinies of mankind would realize that it was not colonialism, or cannibalism, that should guide their thinking, but the welfare of their fellow men.

411. He thanked the Special Committee for having considered Zambia worthy of the honour of acting as host for its deliberations. He hoped that the members' stay in Zambia had not been as unpleasant as it had been tiring and trusted that, in the future, they would again accord the Zambian people the privilege of their visit. On behalf of the President, Government and people of Zambia, he wished them a safe journey throughout their mission.

General statements

412. The Chairman expressed the Special Committee's deep appreciation of the address with which it had been honoured by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia. His address had touched the hearts not only of the members of the Committee, but of all who had heard it. As Chairman, he had, at the opening meeting at Kitwe, paid a tribute to the eminently wise, statesmanlike and courageous leadership of the President of Zambia, and had taken the opportunity of applauding and expressing solidarity with the resolute and heroic stand taken by the Government and people of Zambia, at the cost of enormous sacrifice and economic dislocation, in their bitter confrontation with the forces of colonialism and imperialism in southern Africa. He had expressed deep gratification at the

unswerving dedication of the Government and people of Zambia to the cause of freedom and independence for all peoples under colonial domination, and in particular at their whole-hearted support of the fight by the national liberation movements in that part of the world. Further justification of those sentiments had been more than amply provided by the eloquent address the Committee had just heard.

413. A week of deliberations as fruitful as they had been constructive had brought the meetings at Kitwe to a close. It was his pleasant duty, as Chairman, to express the warm gratitude of the Special Committee for the generous hospitality extended by the Government and people of Zambia and for the facilities which, unstintingly placed at its disposal, had ensured the smooth running of its meetings. It was no less grateful for the opportunities that had been afforded it to see something of the delightful country of Zambia, to renew its friendships and consolidate its fraternal links with the gentle and courteous but brave and indomitable people. It went without saying that it also set a very high value on the contribution the Government of Zambia had made to the success of its meetings by its co-operation and participation in its work. If its meetings could be said to have achieved positive results, of which he had no doubt, then due credit must be given to the President, Government and people of Zambia for making it possible for the Committee to hold them. In the course of its meetings at Kitwe, the Committee had heard seven groups of petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa. By virtue of the close proximity of those Territories to Zambia, the Committee had had a unique opportunity of studying the sinister role of the Salazar, Smith and Vorster conspiracy in entrenching racism and the most nefarious forms of imperialist exploitation in southern Africa. It had acquired more direct knowledge of the unscrupulous interest of that unholy alliance, aided and abetted by its friends and well-wishers, in perpetuating colonialism in southern Africa, and had gained a deeper understanding of the living realities of the continuing struggle against the forces of colonialism and reaction in that part of the world, and of the obstacles blocking the way to their effective elimination.

414. The situation in Southern Rhodesia, as outlined by the petitioners, was indeed grave and depressing. They had drawn attention to the consequences of the unprincipled refusal of the United Kingdom Government to take effective action to bring down the illegal minority racist régime, and to guide the Territory to independence in conditions of complete democratic freedom and equality of political rights. In its devotion to its kith and kin in the Territory, and in its concern to protect its economic interests in that part of the world, the United Kingdom, which had never been slow to intervene with armed force, often without justification, in its other colonies, was not even co-operating in the effective implementation of the selective mandatory sanctions which it had advocated in the United Nations with such sanctimonious urgency. It was common knowledge that Portugal and South Africa had shown flagrant disregard for the relevant United Nations resolutions. But, as the petitioners had pointed out, it deserved to be more generally known that a number of Western countries, while paying lip service to those resolutions, had maintained their trade with Southern Rhodesia at an only slightly reduced level.

- 415. Meanwhile, the economy of the Territory had shown no sign of serious damage, let alone of collapse. What was more important, none of the political objectives postulated by the United Kingdom—objectives deliberately limited for reasons which were easy to guess-had been achieved. It was small wonder then that the illegal régime had continued to ride roughshod over the legitimate interests of the African people of the Territory; nor was it surprising that the régime had intensified its suppressive and repressive activities, and had adopted new and even more Draconian measures aimed at the African people, nor unexpected that the régime should embark on a programme of legislation designed to entrench apartheid policies and minority dictatorship in the Territory. The so-called Constitutional Commission would soon be submitting its reports, which would undoubtedly provide the United Kingdom with the pretext it sought for carrying forward in discussion with the illegal régime the infamous arrangements made at H.M.S. Tiger in December 1966, to the further detriment of the interests of the African majority.
- 416. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese domination, Portugal continued to cling desperately to its anachronistic colonial policies and to insist, contrary to the most elementary notions of realism, that those Territories were integral parts of the so-called pluri-continental Portuguese nation. In contemptuous defiance of the will of the international community, it was determined forever to trample the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the African people of the Territories underfoot. In response to the legitimate demand of those people to exercise their right to self-determination, Portugal had vastly increased the intensity as well as the scope of its war of extermination, a campaign of genocide accompanied by savage brutality which was without parallel in the recent annals of colonial history.
- 417. Not content with ruthlessly exploiting the resources of the Territories, it had taken steps to transform their economic and social system in order to serve the purposes of a war effort far in excess of its own capabilities. In that effort it continued to enjoy diplomatic, economic and military assistance from a number of its friends and allies, including certain members of NATO, in addition to the support it received from its racist collaborators of Salisbury and Pretoria. It had also intensified its violations of the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants, and by adding to the system of forced labour the forcible export of African workers to South Africa. The Special Committee had also learnt how, in the face of those overwhelming odds, the national liberation movements had nevertheless pressed their just and honourable fight to free the Territories from the colonial yoke. It was much encouraged by the information it had received concerning the efforts of those movements to rehabilitate the liberated areas and to promote the welfare of the refugees from the areas yet to be liberated. In that connexion, the petitioners had also reminded it of their urgent need for more assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations.
- 418. Regarding South West Africa, the petitioners had informed the Special Committee that, far from offering its co-operation in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248

- (S-V), South Africa had recently stepped up its naked fascist oppression of the people of the Territory, including the use of organized terrorism and inhuman torture. Moreover, the white supremacists of Pretoria had taken steps to establish so-called self-government for Ovamboland. As the petitioners had rightly observed, that was a usurpation of the United Nations role and flagrant defiance of its authority. It was an extension of the Bantustan policy of the Pretoria régime aimed at fragmenting the Territory, at misleading indignant public opinion, and at setting up a smoke-screen for continued domination by South Africa.
- 419. The Special Committee had also heard testimony concerning the installation of new military bases, designed to crush the fight for liberation and to provoke and threaten neighbouring African States. It had been informed that, in spite of all those handicaps, the fight for national liberation in South West Africa was being waged in earnest and that the Vorster régime had been obliged to increase its military establishments on the borders of the Territory. It had also heard about the massive assistance which South Africa was receiving from its major trading partners, which no doubt made it easier for that régime to refuse to make any concessions either to reason or to the principles of the Charter.
- 420. Finally, all the petitioners from Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa had stressed the prominent role played in the economic life of those Territories by international economic, financial and related interests. They had all pointed to the merciless exploitation by those interests of the human and material resources of the Territories and had pointed out that those interests, acting in collusion and in support of the colonial régimes, had been instrumental in denying the African people the means of effective participation in the economic life of their country and in withholding from them the enjoyment of its resources and the means for economic, social and educational development. The conclusion was inescapable that the activities of those interests represented serious impediments to the realization of the wishes of the African people for freedom and independence.
- 421. The evidence received from the petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia had been duly taken into account, first, in the consensus adopted by the Special Committee by near unanimity a few days before (A/AC.109/SR.523) and, second, in the adoption of an important resolution by a vote of 17 to 1, with 3 abstentions (A/AC.109/SR.528). In the consensus, the Committee had appealed to the United Kingdom Government to ensure the release of all political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia, particularly Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole. It had also urged the United Kingdom Government to prevent the enactment of pending legislation by the illegal régime which would entrench apartheid policies in the Territory. It had reiterated in stronger language a number of considerations and demands contained in its previous resolutions. Moreover, it had stressed the need for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions backed by the use of force by the United Kingdom Government to bring down the illegal régime. In that connexion, the Committee had laid special stress on the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to achieve that objective and to ensure the immediate application

of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

- 422. To that end, the Special Committee had reaffirmed the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power without further delay to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted on the "one man, one vote" principle. Further, the Committee had, inter alia, condemned the support of Portugal and South Africa for the illegal régime, as well as the activities of the foreign financial and other interests to which he had referred. The Committee had also urged increased assistance by all States to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, and by all international organizations to the refugees from the Territory. Finally, the Committee had recommended that the Security Council take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to implement its own recent resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.
- 423. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese domination and South West Africa, it was hardly necessary to explain why the Special Committee had not taken any decisions. A number of other petitioners were to be heard at Dar es Salaam concerning those Territories, and it was only appropriate that the Committee should await their testimony before adopting any conclusions and recommendations. The Committee would, of course, take the valuable evidence it had so far received into full consideration in formulating its conclusions and recommendations.
- 424. Members of the Special Committee had been impressed by the way in which the freedom fighters had accepted the challenge in the colonial Territories. Victory would doubtless soon be theirs. He appealed to them to intensify their efforts. The tide of freedom could not be stemmed, and they must march on until all Africa was free. He appealed for unity among the various liberation movements, since the forces of colonialism and imperialism could scarcely be expected not to take full advantage of any gaps in the vanguard of the fight for their elimination, and such gaps would only delay the achievement of freedom and independence. The peoples under colonial domination and the African and other anti-colonialist States could not afford those gaps.
- 425. He thanked the members of the Zambian delegation for their help, expressed appreciation to those who had publicized the meetings, particularly the Ministry of Information and Zambia Radio, and voiced the sincere gratitude of the Special Committee to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their generous hospitality and for making possible the very fruitful meetings the Committee had held at Kitwe.
- 426. The representative of Sierra Leone, speaking on behalf of the African, Asian and Yugoslav members, expressed gratitude to the Government and people of Zambia. When they had invited the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings on their soil, it had been convinced that its presence so near to Southern Rhodesia would help it to understand more fully the problems to be faced. The Committee's proximity to the scene of crime had enabled petitioners who could not have gone to New York to describe in detail the sufferings of their people, and the members had been able to understand better the great dangers that threatened the world. As President Kaunda had pointed out, the situation could lead to a third world war not only on racial but on ideological grounds. Such a war

- would be one not of conquest but of extermination, a war indeed to end wars, for nobody would be left.
- 427. It was tragic that the major Powers should treat the people of Southern Rhodesia with the light-mindedness of actors in a melodrama. Effective and immediate preventive measures must be taken. President Kaunda had stated succinctly the same thoughts that were in African and Asian minds. The delegations for which he spoke would persevere in the fight and leave no stone unturned to bring freedom to the people of Zimbabwe.
- 428. The Government of Zambia and the Mayor and Council of Kitwe had spared no effort to ensure that the Special Committee's stay in Zambia was a pleasant one. He wished them and the Zambian people continued prosperity in their industrial growth. They were a particularly happy people, and it was heartening to see the different races working together to form one nation and one people. Their example should not be lost south of the Zambezi, and he hoped that the Committee's visit would contribute to a change of heart in that part of Africa. The extreme kindness, help and courtesy of the Zambian people would always be remembered. He thanked the Mayor and Council of Livingstone for having arranged the interesting visit to Victoria Falls.
- 429. The President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other members of the Government had voiced their faith in the United Nations and the Special Committee, and the members of the African and Asian group and Yugoslavia would not betray that trust but would endeavour to rise above the standard of a debating society and take action on the resolutions adopted. The most recent resolution had been sponsored by all the members of the group for which he spoke.
- 430. He appealed to the freedom fighters to unite against the common enemy. It had become clear that to attain freedom in the twentieth century, force was needed.
- 431. All the members of the group would take away with them fond memories of their stay in Zambia, and would rededicate themselves to the eradication of colonialism in Africa.
- 432. The representative of *Chile*, speaking on behalf of his own delegation and that of Venezuela, expressed his deep gratitude to the Zambian Government and people for their generous and cordial hospitality to the Special Committee.
- 433. During the meetings at Kitwe, the Special Committee had been able to hear many petitioners representing Angolan and Rhodesian liberation movements, and had collected a considerable amount of extremely important information which would enable it to assist the United Nations in its difficult struggle to eliminate colonialism throughout Africa.
- 434. The delegations of Venezuela and Chile had been greatly impressed by the progress achieved by the Zambian people and by the climate of freedom prevailing in Zambia. They had no doubts as to the great destiny reserved for Zambia.
- 435. He was particularly gratified that the copper conference recently held at Lusaka had led to a further strengthening of the bonds linking Chile and Zambia.
- 436. The representative of *Bulgaria*, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Poland, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, associated himself with the expressions

of thanks to President Kaunda and the Government and people of Zambia, and expressed gratitude to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his moving and thought-provoking address. Members would leave Zambia with deep feelings of gratitude for the excellent conditions in which they had been able to carry out their work.

- 437. The resolution which the Special Committee had adopted was the best proof of the inspiration it had drawn from President Kaunda's moving address. It had discussed the question of Southern Rhodesia at a time when the fight of the people of Zimbabwe for their liberty was entering a decisive stage. The contacts established with the liberation movements and the petitions that had been heard were therefore of the utmost importance. He hoped that the Committee had reflected their feelings in condemning the policy of the United Kingdom and those who assisted it, and in declaring that racial discrimination constituted a crime against humanity.
- 438. The Special Committee had had a unique opportunity of observing the patience and courage of the people of Zambia, who were helping their brothers of Zimbabwe at great personal sacrifice. It had noted the successes they had already achieved, which were the best proof of what a free nation could do when there were no colonial masters to suppress it.
- 439. On behalf of the three delegations for which he spoke, he asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to transmit their sincere thanks to the people of Zambia, and their best wishes for further success in their independent country.
- 440. The representative of *Italy*, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Finland, Italy and the United States, expressed to the Government and people of Zambia sincere gratitude for their generous hospitality. They had spared no effort to ensure good facilities, pleasant accommodation and a cordial atmosphere. The delegations for which he spoke were grateful to the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs for their addresses. He also thanked the Mayor of Kitwe and the Zambian delegation for their help.
- 441. The Special Committee was proceeding to the United Republic of Tanzania to pursue its work there, but its admiration for the impressive achievements of the young and energetic country of Zambia in the face of the sufferings caused by the illegal régime at Salisbury would remain. He expressed sincere wishes for the happiness and prosperity of the Government and people of Zambia.

C. MEETINGS HELD AT DAR ES SALAAM, United Republic of Tanzania

OPENING OF MEETINGS

Address on behalf of the President by the Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania

442. The Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania recalled that it was the third time that the Special Committee had included Dar es Salaam in the itinerary of its meetings outside New York. For many representatives, therefore, it would not be the first time they had tackled the question of colonialism in southern Africa from so close a vantage point. Their past experience of the problems of decolonization would be of great assistance to the Committee during its deliberations in the United Republic.

- 443. For some other members it would be their first visit to Dar es Salaam and perhaps even to Africa. He hoped that they would find the opportunity of co-operating with African nationalists rewarding and that, as a result, they would be better able to judge the issues involved.
- 444. On behalf of the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania he extended to all members a warm and sincere welcome.
- 445. During its meetings in the United Republic of Tanzania, the Special Committee would be considering the question of southern Africa, which was a compound of colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination. The two latter phenomena did not fall within its competence, but they were an integral part of the over-all problem of southern Africa and formed an unavoidable background.
- 446. Africa's fight in Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was in fact a fight against white minority domination and exploitation. Their realization of the fundamentals common to those problems had led the Special Committee and the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa jointly to sponsor the forthcoming seminar on *apartheid*, which would enable both Committees to benefit from an exchange of knowledge and experience, so that the issues involved and the possibilities for action would be clarified and each Committee would be better able to fulfil its mandate.
- 447. It was not his intention to talk at length on South Africa. That he did so at all arose from his conviction that it was impossible to talk of colonialism in Africa without mentioning apartheid and racial discrimination. They were closely linked in an unholy alliance; their methods and objectives were similar, as were their economic structures and their dangerous and corroding effects upon their victims.
- 448. No case was more typical than that of South West Africa, where colonialism and apartheid were wedded. For almost fifty years the international community had turned a blind eye on the nefarious abuses committed in that Territory under cover of the Mandate. Finally, all patience exhausted, and stirred to moral indignation by the International Court of Justice's shocking abdication of its duty, the United Nations had revoked the Mandate and had assumed responsibility for leading the South West African people to self-government and independence.
- 449. South Africa was still defying the United Nations resolutions, and it was still being suggested in some quarters that the United Nations should avoid a confrontation with South Africa. That policy was mainly advocated for reasons of national self-interest, but sometimes it was argued as a matter of tactics. It was suggested that by tackling South Africa, efforts and energies would be wasted which could more usefully be expended on weaker areas, such as Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola. But whatever the reasons advanced, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania could not agree with the suggestion. South Africa's international position in relation to South West Africa was very weak and the international community should ensure that its defiance was not successful. The attack on that front should not be weakened even while other aspects of the southern Africa problem were being tackled.

- 450. In Southern Rhodesia, the narrowly based, unrepresentative Government was grimly clinging to its illegal seizure of power. The Government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania were waiting, like the rest of the world, for the collapse of the régime through the weight of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, but they were not optimistic as to the result. It was their conviction that sooner or later force would have to be used to topple the Smith régime. It would then be the responsibility of the international community to ensure the independence of the Territory under conditions of genuine self-determination.
- 451. The subject of Angola had already been exhaustively dealt with by the Special Committee at Kinshasa and Kitwe; in the United Republic of Tanzania the Committee would confine itself to the matter of colonialism in Mozambique, but the problems of Portuguese colonialism were by and large similar in each Territory. In each, there were people living in misery, being tortured and denied their legitimate birthright. In each, people were being hanged and separated from their relatives and were experiencing all the suffering caused by those inhuman acts. The United Republic of Tanzania had a special interest in the problem of Mozambique, because its border was often violated by the Portuguese in their savage acts of repression and its people had close ties and relations with the neighbouring tribes.
- 452. Finally, the Special Committee would have the opportunity of hearing petitioners from French Somaliland. It was well known that the so-called referendum recently held in that Territory was a fraud unworthy of those who practised it. Nothing so exposed the ill-intentions of the present authorities as the proposed change of name. The Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania supported the wishes of the people of that Territory for true self-determination. Only when conditions permitted the inhabitants of the colony to choose freely the form of their government and their future could there be peace and security in that troubled part of Africa.
- 453. As the Special Committee was universally recognized as an authority on problems of colonialism and imperialism, he would not take much more of its time at the formal opening of its meetings in Dar es Salaam and extended to it once again the warm welcome of the Government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania, who were confident that its work would be crowned with increasing success.

General statements

454. The Chairman, speaking on behalf of all members, sincerely thanked the Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania for attending the opening meeting and expressed deep appreciation of his important address, which would, of course, be given the most serious consideration. The Special Committee was particularly appreciative of his concise and enlightening analysis of the very grave colonial problems which continued to plague the southern region of Africa and of his assurances of continued wholehearted support for its objectives and work. His address had once again underlined the contribution and irrevocable commitment of the United Republic of Tanzania to the struggle for the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism everywhere, and especially in Africa. It would be an inspiration to all those who, concerned about domination by colonialist and neo-

- colonialist forces, attached importance to the speedy liquidation of colonialism and racialism.
- 455. He also wished to convey, through the Second Vice-President, the Special Committee's profound gratitude to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the gracious invitation which had enabled it to hold yet another series of meetings at Dar es Salaam. All members were deeply impressed by the fraternal welcome and the traditional African hospitality so generously extended since their arrival and by the demonstrations at the airport, a reminder of their heavy responsibilities and of the confidence placed in the United Nations by the peoples still under colonial domination.
- 456. It would be invidious for him, as a citizen of the United Republic of Tanzania, to mention his justifiable pride in his country, his confidence in its leaders and his solidarity with its people. Yet, as Chairman, he would be wanting in courtesy and indeed failing in his duty, if he did not, on behalf of the members, acknowledge the special position and esteem enjoyed by the Special Committee in the United Republic. It was only necessary to recall that the Committee had held meetings at Dar es Salaam, at the invitation of the Tanzanian Government and people in 1962, in 1965 and again in 1966.
- 457. That the Special Committee was meeting in Dar es Salaam for the fourth time testified to the view expressed by the Second Vice-President in his address in 1966 that, for the United Republic, the Committee's work was fundamental to the whole purpose of the United Nations. For the United Republic, the very basis of the Committee's mission—to ensure without delay the eradication of colonialism—was the noble principle of human equality. For the United Republic, no durable peace was possible which allowed the abominable injustice of colonialism to persist. For the United Republic, the great and irresistible movement for the emancipation of Africa was inseparable from the unversal fight of progressive forces everywhere for freedom and peace.
- 458. It was only to be expected therefore that the Tanzanian Government and people should always have taken an uncompromising stand against colonialism. They were acutely and painfully conscious of the sufferings of their brethren under colonial bondage. After all, it was but a few years before that they had thrown off the colonial yoke and regained their independence. Moreover, the United Republic of Tanzania was physically as well as ideologically in the front line of the grim fight against colonialism. To the south lay Mozambique, dominated by the ruthless fascist régime of Salazar. Also in close proximity lay the colonial Territories dominated by the racist régime of Vorster and Smith. Inevitably, therefore, the United Republic had been a haven for thousands of African people seeking refuge from these oppressive régimes. In addition, it had been doing its utmost, at considerable hardship to itself, to give material as well as moral succour to the neighbouring national liberation movements in the confident hope that such assistance would bring closer the day of freedom and independence for the whole continent. It was therefore no coincidence that Dar es Salaam was the headquarters of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity and eagerly looked forward to its continued co-operation.

459. The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania was nevertheless not unaware of the implications of its unshakeable anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stand. In rejecting the path of indifference to the inhumanity of colonialism, in resolving fully to discharge its duty to assist all those striving to exercise their inalienable rights, it fully realized that the United Republic would be victimized by intrigues and threats of every kind from the forces of reaction. But it also appreciated that only thus could it find meaning in its declared objective of national reconstruction and development, only thus could it fully meet the aspirations of the people and only thus could it give even greater substance and reality to its own independence.

460. At its forthcoming meetings in the United Republic, the Special Committee would give further consideration to the more intractable colonial problems in Africa, including the question of South West Africa and that of the Territories under Portuguese domination, particularly Mozambique. It would no doubt hear further harrowing accounts of massive violations of fundamental human rights, of brutal atrocities and of monstrous crimes committed by the colonial régimes in those Territories.

461. The stubborn refusal of Portugal and South Africa to co-operate in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions was well known. But the Special Committee would no doubt receive further evidence of increased oppression and intensified military action against peoples who asked for no more than the rights proclaimed in the Charter. It would no doubt be told of the assistance which the anachronistic régimes of Salazar and Vorster were receiving from some of their friends and allies, without which their nefarious policies would be difficult if not impossible to pursue. It would no doubt be shocked by further information regarding the cruel exploitation of the human and material resources of those Territories and the pernicious role being played by foreign economic and other interests in impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It would also derive some encouragement from news of the unremitting struggle of the liberation movements to free themselves from the chains of their oppressors.

462. The Special Committee would probably hear petitioners on French Somaliland, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Ifni and Spanish Sahara in addition to the colonial Territories of southern Africa.

463. The Special Committee would no doubt be interested in examining the progress made in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) and its own resolution of 15 March 1967, concerning French Somaliland. The inalienable right of the people of that Territory to freedom and independence was beyond question, but attention would no doubt be given to the further measures necessary to ensure that decolonization proceeded without delay, and in conditions of peace and harmony.

464. With regard to Mauritius and the Seychelles, the Special Committee would consider whether political progress towards independence had been adequate and in conformity with the Declaration's provisions. The unsatisfactory economic situation of those Territories, and the creation of the so-called British Indian Ocean Territory in violation of their territorial integrity, would no doubt be the subject of serious concern.

465. The Special Committee would also be called upon to express its views on the latest developments in Ifni and the Spanish Sahara and in particular, the response of the Spanish Government to the relevant General Assembly resolution and the steps necessary for its full implementation.

466. In all those colonial Territories, it was the Special Committee's duty to consider the best ways and means whereby the United Nations could meet the just demands of the people. It would no doubt be asked whether the Committee was doing everything within its power in that respect and whether it was a tribute to its efforts that, in spite of four visits to southern Africa, only limited progress had been made in the elimination of colonialism from the region. Such queries would be unfair unless they were accompanied by recognition of the fact that the responsibility for the unsatisfactory situation lay principally, if not entirely, on the shoulders of the colonial Powers and their friends. At the same time it was the Committee's duty, in anticipation of such queries, to consider whether there might not be some way of improving the effectiveness of its work, by drawing the appropriate conclusions from its previous experience and applying the lessons of the past.

467. For instance, the Special Committee was to be commended for not contenting itself with general resolutions and pious exhortations addressed to the colonial Powers. It had rightly attached importance to the adoption of concrete resolutions, outlining in specific terms the measures, emphasis and modalities for the implementation of the Declaration in each Territory—a policy which should be continued. Moreover, he thought the Committee should place greater stress on its work of checking on and following up the implementation of its own and the General Assembly's resolutions, and of adopting further recommendations for remedial action as necessary. It was obvious that resolutions, however constructive in intention, which were not implemented might as well not have been adopted. The necessity for continuous supervision of their implementation was therefore evident, as was the need to set up appropriate machinery for the purpose. In addition, it would probably be advisable for the Committee to avail itself to a greater extent than before of operative paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) which authorized and requested it to make concrete suggestions and recommendations to the Security Council to assist the latter in considering the necessary measures to be taken under the Charter.

468. He reiterated the appeal for unity made to all freedom fighters, reminding them that every day they remained disunited meant another day's delay in their fight for freedom, another day during which people would be killed and tortured. Disunity between the liberation movements had even led to depletion of their forces, so that the means available were not properly utilized. When Africa as a whole decided to unite in the fight for its freedom, it would realize that the United Nations and especially the Special Committee stood solidly behind it. In that connexion, he emphasized the Committee's dedication to the cause of decolonization and its determination to leave no stone unturned until the whole of Africa was free.

469. In conclusion, he thanked the Second Vice-President once again for his inspiring address and through him the President, the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the

Special Committee to meet at Dar es Salaam. With the confidence inspired by the atmosphere of militant anticolonialism and revolutionary enthusiasm prevailing in the dynamic Tanzanian capital, the work of the Committee should yield important and constructive results.

470. The representative of *Ethiopia* sincerely thanked the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam and for their remarkable hospitality. As Ethiopian Ambassador to the United Republic he had had the unique opportunity and privilege of observing very closely the rapid progress of that country under the able, wise and dedicated leadership of President Nyerere and to obtain first-hand knowledge of the great work in development and reconstruction which had been going on in all sectors since its independence in 1962. In such a very short period the United Republic had made great strides, of which its people could rightly be proud.

471. Perhaps the most important aspects in which the United Republic had given a lead to Africa and the world were those of unity and decolonization. The union between the mainland and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania was a shining example worthy of emulation by the whole of Africa, especially at a time when the scourges of division and fratricidal strife were emerging elsewhere. The great sacrifice that the United Republic was making for the advancement of the cause of decolonization in Africa and the rest of the world could not fail to impress even the most casual observer. The growing number of refugees from neighbouring colonial areas such as Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had put a great strain on its human and material resources; the establishment of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity in the United Republic of Tanzania had made that country a target of imperialist attacks and machinations; yet, as the Vice-President's inspiring address had clearly indicated, the Tanzanian Government and people were moving forward undaunted on the path of militant anti-colonialism.

472. During the previous two weeks the Special Committee's attention had been drawn once more to the highly dangerous and potentially explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination. Racial confrontation was growing more critical and intolerable every year and if nothing was done to bring it under control, there was every reason to fear that it would one day reach such proportions as to engulf the entire continent in open conflict and bloodshed. The Committee's work was therefore of great significance to the whole cause of international peace and security and the States Members of the United Nations had to do all in their power to forestall a dangerous explosion.

473. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration the distressing information supplied by the petitioners was still fresh in everyone's mind, and the sinister aims behind the alarming measures taken by the Portuguese were abundantly clear, without even re-examining the brutality, killing and arbitrary arrests taking place every day.

474. It was well known that Portugal was neither rich nor militarily powerful and there was no need to ask what forces were helping it to continue its relentless fight against the irresistible forces of African

nationalism. It was clear that Portugal's anachronistic policy in Africa had always been inspired by the determination to exploit the abundant resources of its colonial Territories to the detriment of its indigenous population.

475. Since 1964, Portugal had been fighting a defensive war against the liberation forces in Mozambique—which by some fantastic trick of the imagination Portugal considered merely a province—with a consequent rise in the cost of military and related expenditure. The Territory's budget for defence and security in 1966 had been about 255 million escudos more than the allocation for 1965 and about twice the expenditure on the armed services in 1963, before the fighting had started. There had also been a progressive tightening of security measures in Mozambique to counter any possible subversion, and the same situation existed in Angola and Guinea (Bissau), Since 1960 the world community had been appealing to Portugal to cease its repressive measures and to undertake reforms with a view to the transfer of power to the indigenous population. The non-compliance of the Portuguese Government and the deteriorating situation in the Territories had been the subject of numerous resolutions by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council, but Salazar continued to turn a deaf ear to the appeals of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. The Committee should therefore once more call upon the Powers involved to honour the resolutions they themselves had supported, not only in the interest of the Organization's very existence but also in order to end the enslavement and degradation of millions of Africans.

476. Even during the past few months there had been fresh but poignant reminders of the dangers underlying the understanding between Vorster, Salazar and Smith. The current dilemma in the whole of southern Africa was inextricably tied up with the policies being separately pursued by the Governments of Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury. Unless those Governments were compelled to abandon their policies, their continued harassment and their violations of human dignity would remain unchecked.

477. The Vice-President had also touched upon the question of Djibouti—or so-called French Somaliland which was of vital concern to Ethiopia and its Government. In the referendum held on 19 March 1967 to decide the future status of the Territory, the vast majority of the people had decided to retain their links with France, a decision which might have been a surprise or even a disappointment to some members of a Committee dedicated to the cause of decolonization in its ultimate sense. The surprise or disappointment felt by some members of the Special Committee about this decision was not, however, the point at issue; the important point was that the people of Djibouti had been given a free choice and that in their own wisdom they had decided for themselves. If it was remembered that, in 1958, out of the many countries then forming the French community, only Guinea had opted for a complete break with France, the decision of the people of Djibouti might appear less surprising. The fact that almost all the countries which in 1958 had voted to retain their links with France had since become independent sovereign nations was a clear indication that, when deciding its destiny, a people always adopted its own tactics and methods of evolution. It should not cause disappointment that they did not always conform to cut-and-dried formulas.

478. The Ethiopian delegation was aware that attempts had been made from a certain quarter to challenge the decision of the people of Djibouti. Had the challenge been motivated by a true feeling for their welfare, it might have been taken seriously, but since it was common knowledge that it was aroused by an ulterior motive of a more selfish nature, it should be dismissed with the contempt it deserved.

479. In any case his delegation strongly held the view that the people of Djibouti should be the sole arbiters of their own destiny and that no outsider had the right to interfere or to challenge their decision; it would be the height of folly to pass judgement on their verdict.

480. As for the allegation, which had been heard continuously from the same quarter, that France did not conduct the referendum in a fair and impartial manner, he stated categorically that his delegation had not found a single shred of evidence to substantiate the claim. Unfortunately, it was an example of the current success of distortionist propaganda that so malicious a falsehood had gained currency among usually knowledgeable circles. On the contrary, the French Government should be congratulated on the timely steps it had taken to ensure that the referendum reflected the true feelings of the people of Djibouti at the time and on providing the inhabitants of that small Territory with the necessary protection from the coercion, intimidation and attempted infiltration to which they had been subjected by a neighbouring country in order to distort and negate their true democratic choice. The role of France under the enlightened leadership of that great European liberal leader, General de Gaulle, in the matter of decolonization was, he considered, beyond reproach. The Ethiopian delegation felt that the recent experience in Djibouti had clearly indicated France's dedication to and belief in the process of decolonization. His delegation considered that the decolonization process in Djibouti was proceeding at a satisfactory pace and hoped that France, in co-operation with the true leaders of the people of Djibouti, would continue the process until the ultimate goal was reached. The attempt to make a mockery of the people's decision was being continued by those who apparently did not agree with their choice. Alien interlopers had embarked on vicious propaganda in an attempt to cast aspersions on the validity of the referendum, assuming that the majority of the people of Djibouti did not know what was good for them and that their future should be decided by aliens. Those who were protesting against the decision were the same who in August 1966, had welcomed the holding of a referendum, had since tried and failed to subvert it and were lobbying to misrepresent it. That in itself was proof that what they had wanted to hear on 19 March was not the voice of the people of Djibouti but their own voices through their own agents.

481. Ethiopia accepted in principle and in practice the right of the people of Djibouti to decide their own destiny; it supported the decision of the people, whatever that decision might be, and opposed and would resist any attempts designed to make a mockery of the future of the Djibouti people. Ethiopia's attitude remained what it had always been, friendly and designed to maintain and strengthen even further the already strong ties of brotherhood and neighbourly interdependence based on mutual respect and common benefit. Ethiopia had no designs on Djibouti's political status

nor did it constitute a threat to its political future; it was to be hoped that others in the region felt the same. It was in that spirit that Ethiopia supported the recent exercise in self-determination in Djibouti and welcomed the steps taken by France to transfer power to the inhabitants, which, it hoped, would soon lead to their complete freedom.

482. That brief summary of the position of his delegation on an issue of vital concern to the peace and stability of the region was intended to clarify the policy pursued by the Ethiopian Government so as to leave no doubt in the minds of the Special Committee as to its exact position in that respect. His delegation reserved the right to intervene again in the discussions should the situation warrant further clarification.

483. The Ethiopian delegation has already expressed its views on the question of Mauritius and the Seychelles in Sub-Committee I, the report of which would soon be examined by the Special Committee. He reiterated his appeal to the administering Power to take effective measures to implement fully General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and to expedite the long-promised elections and the granting of independence to those Territories.

484. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his country's determination, in concert with freedom-loving countries throughout the world, to do all in its power to eradicate the evil cancer of colonialism and imperialism from the face of the earth. Ethiopia considered its own independence incomplete as long as any part of African soil remained under colonial rule. The heroic fight of the Ethiopian people for freedom and independence through the centuries and the glorious tradition of their long history as an independent and sovereign nation had taught them the great lesson that no sacrifice was too great for freedom and human dignity. It was a matter of satisfaction and pride for the whole Ethiopian nation that the example of dedicated sacrifice for freedom and independence it had set in its long and chequered history had not been ignored. It was in that spirit of dedication to the eternal cause of freedom and human dignity that it called upon the freedom fighters in the remaining areas of colonialism and imperialism to unite and redouble their efforts to achieve final victory. They could rest assured that, in the sacred fight which they were waging, Ethiopia and all freedom-loving men stood solidly behind them.

485. The representative of *India* associated his delegation with the thanks already expressed to the Tanzanian Government and people by the Chairman and the preceding speaker. Their invitation to the Special Committee to hold meetings at Dar es Salaam for the fourth time was evidence of the United Republic's irrevocable dedication to the cause of liquidating the remaining vestiges of colonialism. The election of Mr. Malecela as Chairman was yet another proof of his country's interest in the Committee's efforts to eradicate the evil of colonialism and racism from Africa. That the United Republic was the seat of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity was further proof of its deep concern to accelerate the process of decolonization. In that connexion, he renewed India's pledge of continued and whole-hearted support in the fight against colonialism.

486. The Second Vice-President's inspiring address and succinct analysis of the problems in southern Africa would be a most important contribution to the Special Committee's work. He had emphasized that racialism,

colonialism and apartheid were closely intertwined and formed an unholy alliance which should be attacked as a whole. He fully endorsed the Ethiopian representative's proposal that both the Vice-President's address and the Chairman's reply should be recorded in extenso.

487. During its meetings at Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee would be dealing with the problems of southern Africa and particularly the Territories under Portuguese domination, South West Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius and the Seychelles and his delegation would have the opportunity of stating its views on those matters more fully at a later meeting. He wished, however, to outline briefly his country's position. India was particularly interested in the Portuguese colonies, having itself suffered under Portuguese rule and, like the freedom fighters in those Territories, had realized that the language of force was the only one understood by the fascist dictators.

488. The question of South West Africa had been discussed at great length both by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly and his delegation had had an opportunity of stating its views on both occasions. It fully supported the resolutions adopted and hoped that all Member States would co-operate to ensure their speedy implementation. In spite of the almost unanimous endorsement of those resolutions, the racist régime at Pretoria had not abandoned its designs on South West Africa, and his delegation heartily condemned its manœuvres to detach Ovamboland with a view to forming a separate entity and extending the policy of Bantustan to South West Africa.

489. With regard to Mauritius, Swaziland and the other Territories mentioned, he pledged his delegation's full support in their fight for independence. It was in particular strongly opposed to the establishment of the projected Indian Ocean bases in Mauritius.

490. India had enjoyed extremely cordial and friendly relations with the United Republic of Tanzania since the latter's independence. Its Government and people had the highest esteem for President Nyerere, one of the most outstanding African leaders, who was successfully building up the country as a multiracial society in which people of different origins could live in peace and harmony. The treaties of trade and friendship concluded between India and the United Republic in 1966 were another step towards bringing the two countries even closer together. Developing countries had much to learn from each other's experience and he hoped that the co-operation between the two countries would be intensified to their mutual benefit.

491. In conclusion, he extended the greetings of his delegation to the friendly Tanzanian people and wished them happiness and prosperity.

492. The representative of *Iran* said that, for the third consecutive year, the Tanzanian Government had made it possible for the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam. He wished to express, on behalf of his delegation, his sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of the United Republic for their kind invitation and the the traditional African hospitality which they had shown. He had already had the privilege of attending meetings of the Committee at Dar es Salaam on three earlier occasions and was looking forward to renewing old friendships.

493. He had been greatly impressed by the inspiring and important address which the Second Vice-

President had delivered and was sure that it would guide the work of the Special Committee. As a centre for African liberation movements and the seat of one of the most important units of the Organization of African Unity, the United Republic of Tanzania offered a unique opportunity for the Committee to discharge its obligations. That country, under the wise and dynamic leadership of its President, had made a notable contribution to the fight against colonialism, oppression and injustice, both inside and outside the United Nations. Within the United Nations, the contribution made by the Tanzanian delegation was too well-known to require any comment. The moral and material support which the United Republic offered to the various liberation movements had enabled them to continue the fight against the usurpers of African freedom and wealth. It had also generously received numerous refugees from the oppressive rule of Portugal, South Africa and the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. Very soon the international seminar on apartheid and colonialism, which the representatives of more than fifty countries were to attend together with representatives of many non-governmental organizations and prominent individuals, would be held at Dar es Salaam at the invitation of the Tanzanian Government. That was a further indication of the United Republic's desire to remove racialism and colonialism from the African continent.

494. It was thus of particular value for the Special Committee to meet in the United Republic where it had the opportunity of making contact with people who shared its objectives and of obtaining first-hand information concerning the latest developments in Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies, Mauritius, the Seychelles and other colonial areas. It was to be hoped also that the Committee's presence would provide additional encouragement and assistance to the freedom fighters in those Territories. The Committee had already had the opportunity of hearing the views of various political organizations, particularly from Angola, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia at Kinshasa and Kitwe and, on the basis of those hearings, had adopted appropriate decisions, notably a resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In reaching such decisions, the Committee was bound to adhere to the facts, as well as to the principles which it had the duty to uphold. Any failure to implement the Committee's decision should not, therefore, be attributed to a lack of realism on its part. Reproaches should be addressed rather to those Member States, particularly Portugal, South Africa and the United Kingdom, which had failed to carry out the decisions.

495. His delegation would continue to give its full and unflinching support to every decision capable of accelerating the liquidation of colonialism in Africa, in the firm conviction that the only way to prevent the eruption of the live volcano in southern Africa was to uproot the outmoded colonialist and racist systems there. Peace and justice could not be restored in Africa until that had been accomplished. Although the picture appeared gloomy and the colonialists and racists seemed to have the upper hand, he had been much encouraged by the determination and fighting spirit of the leaders of the various political organizations which the Special Committee had already heard. Provided the nationalists were united and resolute, the day would soon come when Africa would be liberated from the last vestiges of colonialism and racism. Africa would then regain its rightful place in the sun and could move towards the full realization of its cherished aspiration—African unity—as championed by one of the continent's most brilliant leaders, President Julius Nyerere.

496. He was certain that, given the excellence of the arrangements made by the Tanzanian Government, the Special Committee's meetings would prove most fruitful and expressed, on behalf of the Government and people of his country, his best wishes for the success and prosperity of the people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

497. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their generous invitation to the Special Committee to meet once again at Dar es Salaam to consider some of the most urgent and threatening colonial problems which still existed. He had been gratified by the warm hospitality and welcome with which it had been received. His own delegation felt particular pleasure at revisiting the United Republic, in view of the close links of friendship and co-operation between the two countries, which were both engaged in the fight for the removal of all colonialist and neo-colonialist pressures so that every country might be able to play an equal part on the world stage. The United Republic, under the leadership of its outstanding President, had done far more than most countries to help the national liberation movements in Africa and to succour the refugees from brutal colonial domination. In that connexion, his delegation had been greatly impressed by the important and inspiring address delivered to the Committee by the Second Vice-President, whose penetrating analysis of the dangerous situation developing in southern Africa was very enlightening.

498. It was obvious that the colonialist and neocolonialist forces were making every attempt to slow down and check the process of decolonization in order to maintain their strongholds in certain areas which were of particular importance for their political and economic strategy. Those strongholds were intended not only to enable them to continue their economic exploitation and oppression of the majority of the population but also to serve for interference in the internal affairs of the newly independent African countries. The most obvious example of such designs was the fascist and racial system in southern Africa. A backward country like Portugal and minority racist régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were incapable of carrying out such plans alone. It was only the help they received from their Western partners which enabled them to continue their policy and to defy the numerous United Nations decisions. Verbal denunciations by some Western Powers of the racial policies of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia could not conceal the harsh reality.

499. The activities of foreign monopolies and their unscrupulous exploitation of the wealth of the colonial Territories were seriously impeding the decolonization process. The Portuguese armed forces were waging a criminal war against the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), using weapons acquired through the NATO military alliance. The United Kingdom, which was solely responsible for the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia, had, by its refusal to use the only language the racists understood, allowed the illegal régime to consolidate its position, to intensify its oppression of the people of Zimbabwe and to introduce the criminal apartheid

system. Foreign military bases in colonial Territories not only impeded the liberation of colonized people but also served to exert pressure on independent countries. The means of pressure and interference were used today not only in Africa, but also in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

500. It was vital that rapid measures should be taken to liquidate the last bastions of colonialism which constituted a threat to the peace and tranquillity of the whole world. The fight for independence of those people who still suffered under colonial domination was just and legitimate and deserved the full support of the United Nations.

501. Yugoslavia had always staunchly supported any people fighting for its freedom and independence and would continue to do so. He believed that the international community and the United Nations had a special responsibility to assist colonized peoples freely to determine their own destiny. The Special Committee had a most important part to play, and his delegation would continue to do its utmost to ensure that the Committee effectively carried out its mandate, particularly the implementation of the various General Assembly decisions on decolonization.

502. He paid a tribute to the able and energetic guidance of the Chairman, which had contributed much to the work of the Special Committee both at Headquarters and during the current visit to Africa.

503. The representative of *Mali* thanked the people, the Tanganyika African National Union party and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for their kind invitation to the Special Committee and for the warm welcome accorded his delegation.

504. The people of the Republic of Mali, its party, the Union soudanaise RDA, and its Government admired the effort being made by the courageous and hard-working people of the United Republic of Tanzania under the enlightened leadership of Mr. Julius Nyerere. Since independence, the United Republic breaking with its colonial past, had courageously taken the path of independent development. Its valiant people were day by day winning fresh victories in the building of their nation. The recent decisions of the party and Government of the United Republic of Tanzania would undoubtedly clear the way for important new successes in the fight against underdevelopment. It was gratifying that the Special Committee could hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam in dealing with the serious situation prevailing in southern Africa-from Angola to Mozambique by way of Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa—for the United Republic was playing a leading part in the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, racial discrimination and injustice. It had lost no time in becoming the standard-bearer of anticolonialism, and it flew the colours of freedom and justice in a region of Africa still under the racist and fascist yoke.

505. His delegation would have an opportunity in a later statement of dealing in detail with the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination. It would then show how certain of the great Western Powers were acting in collusion and scheming to perpetuate colonialism so that the African peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa could be mercilessly exploited.

506. Mali, remaining faithful to its policy, reaffirmed its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stand. It had supported the historic Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and did not mince words in denouncing the backward policies of Salazar, who had learnt nothing from history and who would soon be driven back to the sea by the valiant freedom fighters of Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and Angola. Mali was confident that the national liberation movements would be victorious and assured them that it would make every effort to help them get rid of the Portuguese and of the white racists of Salisbury and Pretoria who pitilessly exploited the natural and human resources of southern Africa for the exclusive benefit of foreign monopolies.

507. The colonialist system which continued to exist as a baneful influence in the world, was a conspiracy by certain Western Powers, which violated the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter which they themselves had drawn up at San Francisco. It was very difficult to understand the position of some countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, which through NATO armed Salazar's mercenaries in an attempt to delay the liberation of Africa. Although the representatives of those countries would undoubtedly tell the Special Committee that they condemned the policies of Portugal and South Africa or the position taken by Ian Smith, their statements were daily contradicted by facts. It was time for that to stop and for Europe and the United States of America to realize that it was in their interest to hasten the process of liberation of the remaining dependent Territories. A liberated Africa could be a better partner for the industrialized countries because of its natural wealth and its contribution to civilization and to the harmonious development of the world.

508. He referred to the good relations between his country and the United Republic, which were based on a common will to eliminate colonialism for ever and to build in each of their nations a country where there would no longer be any exploitation of man by man. The recent visit to the United Republic by the President of the Republic of Mali demonstrated their common viewpoint with regard both to African problems and to the great problems at present confronting the world.

509. The representative of Tunisia expressed, on behalf of his delegation, his sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the generous invitation which they had once again extended to the Special Committee and for the warm welcome which they had given it at Dar es Salaam. The fact that the Committee was meeting at Dar es Salaam for the fourth time showed how deep was the interest of the United Republic of Tanzania in the Committee's work and in the decolonization efforts of the United Nations. The United Republic, which had succeeded in freeing itself from the fetters of colonial law, had undertaken from the early days of its independence to assist the peoples who were still oppressed and enslaved. It was therefore not surprising that the present Chairman of the Committee should be Ambassador Malecela, who had distinguished himself in the United Nations by his devotion to the cause of decolonization. It was also quite natural that the seminar on apartheid and colonialism should take place at Dar es Salaam and that that town should be the headquarters of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of OAU and a refuge for freedom fighters.

510. When the Special Committee had met at Dar es Salaam in 1962, it had had seventeen members and its agenda had included such items as those relating to Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Zanzibar, countries which had since then obtained their independence. Even in 1966 it had still been discussing Bechuanaland and Basutoland, which had today become sovereign States. His delegation, and indeed all the African and Asian countries, would spare no effort both within and outside the Committee to ensure the complete and total elimination of colonialism in Africa and in other regions, for entire nations were still oppressed and enslaved in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and elsewhere.

511. It its meetings at Kinshasa and Kitwe, the Special Committee had heard petitioners and freedom fighters. The Committee would become the spokesman for those petitioners and would give voice to their aspirations; it would reveal to the eyes of the entire world the enslavement of the African peoples and the oppressive measures visited upon them. It would continue to fight against the colonial Powers and to denounce the collusion which enabled them to defy mankind. Tunisia, which had always supported and upheld liberation movements and defended the cause of decolonization, would continue to do so in the future. It would continue to appeal to the colonial Powers, as it had done in 1959 when President Bourguiba, in an effort to bring about a solution of the colonization problem, had suggested a meeting of the colonial Powers in order that they might come to some agreement on complying with the principles of the Charter and giving effect to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The forward march of history could not be turned back, and right and justice were on the side of the oppressed peoples. The Committee provided a forum where the demands of the liberation movements could find expression. Although much still remained to be done, all the peoples struggling for their independence could count on the support of the African and Asian countries and, in particular, on the moral assistance and material support which they would always receive from Tunisia.

512. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Tanzanian Government and people, on behalf of his delegation, for the warm welcome they had offered to the Special Committee. The Committee had frequently availed itself of Tanzanian hospitality and had always held very useful meetings in that country. He was sure that the excellent facilities provided constituted a favourable augury for the success of the Committee's work during the current series of meetings also, the more so since the Committee was meeting under the chairmanship of a valiant son of the United Republic.

513. He had listened with the greatest interest and attention to the statement by the Second Vice-President setting forth the position of his country on the various colonial problems of southern Africa. It had provided further evidence of the determination of that country to combat colonialism and racialism, acting in the spirit of solidarity which was characteristic of all progressive countries. The United Republic was making a noble contribution to the liberation of those peoples of Africa

still groaning under the colonialist yoke. It had earned the respect and esteem of all freedom-loving peoples. His country rejoiced at the success of Tanzania since its achievement of independence.

514. The Special Committee was called upon to take active steps to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. His delegation fully supported the forces that were attempting to implement the Declaration and the provisions of the Charter. Since the Second World War, colonialism had crumbled. Immediately after the war. 36.9 million square kilometres of territory with 660 million inhabitants had been under colonial rule; the current figure was 8 million square kilometres with 37 million inhabitants. Less than one eighteenth of the people who had been under the colonial yoke when the United Nations was first established were still not free. Scores of countries in all parts of the world had obtained their independence. In Africa, thirty-seven new States had emerged. It was no longer possible to imagine the United Nations without representation of the African and Asian States, all of which actively participated in its work on a basis of complete equality.

515. The liberation of those Territories had not been easy and many leaders of newly independent Governments had referred to the inspiration they had drawn from the October Socialist Revolution, the fiftieth anniversary of which was being celebrated in 1967. That revolution had awakened the under-privileged world. Constant to its principles, the USSR whole-heartedly supported the forces which were fighting to destroy the last bastions of colonialism. Nevertheless, colonialism was a tenacious creature which did not give up easily. The fight continued. The function of the Special Committee was to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which had been adopted on his delegation's initiative.

516. The major purpose of its meetings at Dar es Salaam was to consider the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination. The United Nations had constantly appealed to the Portuguese to grant immediate independence to their colonies, but, to the world's deep indignation, they had continued to trample underfoot the rights of the peoples in those Territories and to ignore United Nations resolutions and decisions. His delegation proposed that the Special Committee should study the question of the failure by the Western Powers to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations concerning the Portuguese colonies. The fascist Salazar régime was doing all in its power to perpetuate colonial rule and had, for many years, been waging a war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), thanks to the help it received from certain circles in some Western countries, in collusion with the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, had formed a bloc of "white countries" in that region of the world to perpetuate the domination of racists and colonialists in colonial Territories and to exert pressure on the young African States. All those reactionary forces were acting together in a dastardly conspiracy to perpetuate colonialism and exert pressure on the independent countries of Africa. It was obvious that, without assistance, a backward country such as Portugal would not be able to devote 40 per cent of its budget to military purposes, a proportion exceeding that of all other NATO countries except the United States, nor hold in thrall areas twenty-three times its own size. Ample evidence had been available to the

Special Committee—and information from recent petitioners had confirmed it—that arms were being supplied to Portugal by a number of its NATO allies. The arguments put forward by representatives of the NATO countries that assurances had been first received from Portugal that such arms would not be used in its colonies were very naïve and misled nobody. Thus, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany was supplying arms to Portugal in complete violation of numerous United Nations decisions. Krupp was among the many monopolies engaged in that sinister trade. Such activities were directly opposed to the interests of world peace and security. The German Democratic Republic pursued a very different policy: it gave no assistance whatever to Portugal which could possibly be used for its colonial wars. It maintained neither diplomatic nor consular relations with the Portuguese colonial régime. Furthermore, it had never in the past sold or delivered to Portugal weapons, ammunition or other military materials, nor would it in the future supply the Portuguese colonial régime with any such objects, as had been stated in the letter of Mr. Otto Winzer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, of 23 March 1966, setting out the position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic regarding Security Council resolution 218 (1965) on Territories under Portuguese administration. That letter had been circulated as a Security Council document.9 Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the German Democratic Republic had issued instructions to all foreign trade enterprises of the German Democratic Republic that no deliveries whatever were to be made from the German Democratic Republic to Portuguese enterprises in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

517. Military bases in colonial Territories were particularly dangerous to peace and an obstacle to decolonization. They were used not only against the national liberation movements but also against newly independent countries. The NATO network of bases extended into southern Africa. Portugal had a number of military and naval bases in the Territories under its domination which it used in the same way that the United States used its military base in the colonial Territory of Guam for aggression against the people of Viet-Nam. The United Kingdom made similar use of such bases as Aden.

518. The United Nations should not limit itself merely to adopting resolutions on the elimination of foreign military bases in colonial Territories. It must go further by condemning the use of those bases by the Western Powers against the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and by demanding unconditional compliance by the colonialists with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

519. In the course of its activities, the Special Committee had adopted many political resolutions. Its present task was to draw up and approve constructive resolutions aimed at the prompt implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to find more effective ways and means of giving effect to those resolutions.

520. The representative of the *United States of America* observed, on a point of order, that the representative of the USSR was diverging seriously from the subject under discussion by raising the subject of Viet-Nam which was not on the agenda of the Special

⁹ Ibid., Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7290.

Committee. He requested the Chairman to ask the representative of the USSR to desist and to return to the question on the Committee's agenda.

- 521. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, exercising his right of reply, said that the question of bases in colonial Territories, particularly Guam, and their connexion with the war in Viet-Nam were indeed germane to the work of the Special Committee because of their connexion with freedom and independence. The Viet-Nam situation was a serious danger to the peace of the world and was poisoning the atmosphere of international co-operation. He was fully entitled to raise the matter under paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) which called on States to demolish any bases they maintained in foreign countries and to refrain from building new ones.
- 522. The representative of the *United States of America* protested most energetically at what he considered to be highly contentious remarks made by the USSR representative concerning a very serious matter which was not pertinent to the Special Committee's work. His delegation was fully prepared to discuss the Viet-Namese war in the proper United Nations forum, which was the Security Council, but not in this Committee where it was totally irrelevant. He considered the attitude of the USSR representative foreign to the spirit of the Special Committee.
- 523. The representative of *Poland*, speaking on a point of order, drew attention to the fact that the USSR representative had referred to a military base at Guam, a colonial Territory being used in the war against the people of Viet-Nam. The point was perfectly valid and came within the Committee's purview.
- 524. The Chairman appealed to all representatives to confine themselves to the subject under discussion and to refrain from introducing other topics, however important they might be.
- 525. The representative of the *United States of America* agreed with the Chairman but wished to go on record as utterly rejecting the false allegations which had been made against his country. His delegation was perfectly ready to discuss the subject in the proper forum.
- 526. The Chairman said that the protest of the United States representative had been noted. He appealed to the USSR representative to continue his statement without introducing contentious material which was not entirely relevant to the subject under discussion.
- 527. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said he would follow the Chairman's advice but wished first to exercise briefly his right of reply, since the United States representative had insisted on so doing. As to the consideration of the Viet-Namese problem in the United Nations, the Soviet Union firmly supported the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The Viet-Namese question had been considered in 1954 at the Geneva Conference, outside the framework of the United Nations. The United States bore the responsibility for the fact that the United Nations was not a universal organization, and it had made consideration of that question in the United Nations impossible. That did not mean, however, that the States Members of the United Nations should not condemn the aggression against Viet-Nam. Although the question of Viet-Nam had not been on the agenda of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, a great many representatives in

- their statements had shown concern about the situation in Viet-Nam. They had demanded an end to the intervention against the Viet-Namese people and the aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, for not only the situation in South-East Asia and in Viet-Nam was being affected by those activities but also the situation of all nations throughout the world. The policy of preserving colonial and racist régimes was being pursued by the very ones who were carrying out a policy of intervention and aggression and insolently violating the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.
- 528. The military bases in the Territories under Portuguese control had been used against the national liberation movements in those Territories and also against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The same was true of bases in South Africa. The liquidation of military bases in colonial Territories was a vital part of the decolonization process. The abolition of foreign military bases should not, however, be limited to those set up in colonial Territories since such bases could be a threat to the independence of the country in which they were situated and to that of neighbouring countries also. It was the duty of the Special Committee to find ways of implementing General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) and all the other relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions, and to support the peoples who were fighting for their independence and trying to achieve true decolonization.
- 529. The representative of *Chile* thanked the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania, for having again invited the Special Committee to meet at Dar es Salaam, thereby showing their determination to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism in Africa.
- 530. The zeal with which the United Republic of Tanzania was striving to secure Africa's liberation and the sacrifices which it had accepted in order that that noble cause should prevail were well known. Its work within the United Nations, together with its assistance to national liberation movements, placed the United Republic in the forefront of countries fighting colonialism and racial discrimination.
- 531. As the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations, Mr. Malecela had spiritedly and vigorously defended the view of the Tanzanian Government and people that the African countries could never fully enjoy their liberty and independence until the whole of Africa had been liberated. His delegation had witnessed his fervent and untiring efforts to that end.
- 532. The Latin American countries, including Chile, had already given proof of their solidarity with the peoples of Africa and Asia still under foreign domination. They remembered having been colonies themselves and knew the price to be paid for freedom. For that reason, they supported the peoples of Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa and the other colonial peoples demanding their independence.
- 533. There had been criticism of the Special Committee's work by certain people who would like to see it adopt stronger measures to secure the immediate and complete liberation of colonial peoples. Such criticisms were readily understandable in view of the suffering and frustration of people who were unable to be free on their own soil and who saw that United Nations resolutions were not implemented by the administering Powers. For anyone not fully acquainted with the

operation of the United Nations, such a situation seemed incomprehensible. The Members of the Organization were, however, unhappily aware that its powers were limited. The United Nations was not a world government with supra-national powers. The General Assembly, a democratic body with representatives from all States, had only moral power, a power of persuasion which was effective only in so far as it influenced world public opinion. Only the Security Council had the power to take effective action and it was controlled by the great Powers, which explained why so many General Assembly resolutions were not implemented.

- 534. Consequently, his delegation believed that it was first for the oppressed peoples themselves to fight for independence. The United Nations would assist them by creating a favourable psychological climate and bringing pressure to bear on the colonial Powers to adopt a realistic attitude and grant the just claims of the oppressed peoples. If such pressure failed, the Security Council and the great Powers must be convinced that the enforcement action provided for in the Charter must be taken.
- 535. The Special Committee would have done useful work during its meetings in Africa since it would have collected extremely valuable oral testimony which would assist it in its future work, from petitioners and representatives of liberation movements in Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. His delegation was convinced that the new evidence which the Committee would collect on the situation in Mozambique and other colonial Territories would enable it to adopt resolutions that would serve the cause of decolonization.
- 536. The representative of *Bulgaria* thanked the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their generous hospitality and endorsed the expressions of gratitude to Mr. Kawawa for his thought-provoking address. By inviting the Special Committee, the Tanzanian Government had demonstrated its sense of responsibility for finding solutions of the grave colonial problems in southern Africa.
- 537. The Special Committee was meeting in the United Republic of Tanzania at a crucial juncture. Imperialist forces in the Middle East, South East Asia and especially Africa were using all possible forms of pressure to impede the fight of the oppressed peoples for freedom and independence, and economic influence and foreign monopolies were being employed to that end.
- 538. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination proved that the Western Powers, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, continued to ignore United Nations resolutions and to challenge world opinion. Not only did those countries disregard United Nations appeals to stop aid to Portugal, but they had also intensified their military and economic co-operation with Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The crux of the colonial problem in those regions as new evidence had shown was the co-operation between the régimes of Smith, Salazar and Vorster. on the one hand, and the United States and other Western Powers, on the other. Without the close cooperation of the NATO Powers, Portugal could never resist the liberation movements of the Territories under its administration. The patriots of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had, however, inflicted new defeats on the Portuguese colonialists and scored new

- triumphs in organizing the free life of the populations in the liberated zones. His delegation looked forward to hearing the petitioners from Mozambique and other Territories and hoped they could tell the Special Committee how the United Nations could contribute effectively to their fight and how it could mobilize world opinion against the pernicious co-operation given by the Western Powers and NATO to Portugal.
- 539. In spite of the short time the Special Committee had been at Dar es Salaam, his delegation had sensed a new atmosphere in that beautiful city. The Government had fixed new goals for the establishment of a modern society, where no man would be exploited by another. The Bulgarian people had always admired the courage of the Tanzanian people, who were not only building an independent and democratic nation but were also helping their oppressed brothers at great personal sacrifice. He conveyed to the Tanzanian people his delegation's thanks for their warm hospitality, good wishes for their success, and its assurance that, in their fight to liberate all Africa from colonial rule and to build a socialist society, they could count on the aid and solidarity of Bulgaria.
- 540. The representative of *Italy* said that the links between the Committee and the beautiful city of Dar es Salaam were already strong and almost traditional. As a newcomer to the Committee, he wished to express his gratitude for the kind hospitality and thoughtfulness with which the Committee had been received.
- 541. However, the reason why the Special Committee had had to return to Dar es Salaam was the international community's concern at the course of events in southern Africa, in Territories to which the Committee had no access, which it could only observe indirectly through the descriptions given by petitioners and refugees. Reports of oppression, inequality and the denial of fundamental human rights had been received by the Committee. Those events were a source of major political concern and showed that mankind's forward march towards a better world had not affected some areas where men were not considered equal to others for reasons of race, creed and colour, where a majority was ruled by a minority and where the people born in a country were denied the right to govern themselves.
- 542. The Special Committee was only too conscious of its responsibilities and, as the Chairman had stated recently, it was certainly unanimous concerning its goals even when, in a truly democratic way, different opinions were expressed. He hoped that the Committee's work at Dar es Salaam would be fruitful and free from sterile polemics.
- 543. He was happy that the links between Italy and the United Republic of Tanzania were increasing which was a good example of what could be achieved when relations between countries in different continents were based on mutual friendship and trust.
- 544. The representative of *Poland* thanked the President, the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania on behalf of his delegation for their generous invitation. His delegation had been honoured and touched by the welcome and friendliness extended to the Committee.
- 545. Members who had visited Dar es Salaam during previous visits were able to admire the achievements of the United Republic in all sectors since its independence, and could not fail to be impressed by

the vigour and zeal with which it was forging ahead with its development programme.

546. By inviting the Special Committee once again, the United Republic was demonstrating the importance it attached to eradicating colonialism in general and to the achievement of African freedom in particular. He was happy to pay a tribute to Tanzania's continuing contribution towards the attempts of the United Nations to ensure respect for the inalienable rights of all peoples to freedom and independence. That attitude was best expressed by President Nyerere's assurance that Tanzania was prepared to die a little for the final removal of the humiliation of colonialism from the face of Africa. The fact that Dar es Salaam had been chosen as the headquarters of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the OAU was itself eloquent testimony to the wide recognition of the United Republic's devotion to the noble cause of African freedom. The United Nations also recognized that country's outstanding record in decolonization, which was well illustrated by the unanimous election of Mr. Malecela as Chairman of the Special Committee.

547. His delegation endorsed the expression of thanks to Mr. Rishidi Kawawa for his inspiring address, which would be a useful guide for the Special Committee in its deliberations.

548. Poland was of the opinion that the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples must be implemented in all Territories under foreign domination without exception. It regarded the elimination of colonialism in all its forms as an act of historic justice. Poland and the other socialist countries had always supported the national liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other parts of the world. The legitimate fight of the Africans to achieve their inalienable right to self-determination and independence and the liquidation of colonial and racist régimes throughout Africa would continue to have Poland's sympathy and support.

549. As the Chairman had pointed out in his reply to Mr. Kawawa, the Special Committee had always sought to adopt recommendations aimed at peaceful solutions to the problems of colonialism and racialism. Responsibility for the continued suffering of the African people in southern Africa must be placed upon the shoulders of the colonial Powers, which were refusing to comply with their obligations under the Charter and continued to contravene General Assembly and Security Council decisions. While paying lip-service to those resolutions, the imperialist Powers were acting as the accomplices of the facist régimes of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. The same Powers had embarked on a series of aggressive acts elsewhere, including Viet-Nam and the Middle East, intervening to crush national liberation movements in flagrant violation of international law.

550. The Special Committee, at its recent meetings at Kinshasa and Kitwe, had heard evidence from petitioners from Territories under Portuguese administration and had been shocked by the crimes and atrocities committed by the Portuguese against the Africans engaged in the heroic fight for their liberation. Further evidence had been produced on the continued military, financial and other assistance given to Portugal by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States,

the United Kingdom and other NATO allies. Portugal was thus enabled to wage a savage colonial war in the Territories under its administration.

551. A similar situation prevailed in Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, where the illegal racist régimes were repressing the Africans in order to continue their exploitation of the natural resources of those Territories, for the sole benefit of international financial monopolies. That situation was a threat to the security of the newly independent African States.

552. The Special Committee was also aware that the Tanzanian frontiers had been violated and that plots were being hatched against the country because of its hospitality to African freedom fighters. Another serious impediment to the liberation of the peoples under colonial administration was the continued existence of military bases in Territories under foreign administration. Those bases were used to repress national liberation movements in flagrant violation of the many resolutions of the General Assembly calling for their dismantlement. The situation could not be tolerated by the international community. The United Nations had an obligation to denounce those of its Members that directly or indirectly impeded the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

553. Practical measures such as those suggested by the Chairman should be taken to sweep away the last vestiges of colonialism and to eliminate the servitude and humiliation of millions of Africans who were forced to live under racist colonial régimes in southern Africa.

554. His delegation looked forward to hearing additional first-hand evidence concerning the situation in the various Territories, particularly Mozambique, the United Republic's immediate neighbour. The evidence would be of great value to the Special Committee in carrying out its mandate. He was confident that the Committee's meetings at Dar es Salaam would help the leaders of national liberation movements to realize that they were not alone in their fight. His delegation associated itself with the Chairman's plea for unity of action against the common enemy, and assured the freedom fighters of Poland's continued support and earnest desire to contribute to the speedy fulfilment of their legitimate wishes.

555. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation appreciated the opportunity to express its appreciation to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. It was impressed with the pains to which that Government had gone to ensure the success of the Committee's visit to Dar es Salaam and thanked the Second Vice-President, Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, for his words of advice and welcome.

556. It was a great pleasure for the United States delegation to return again to the United Republic, a country with which its Government enjoyed close and cordial relations based on mutual respect and understanding and on a substantial record of fruitful economic and technical co-operation. He himself was particularly pleased to return to Dar es Salaam since he had had the honour to be a member of the United States delegation to the Tanzanian independence ceremonies in 1961. The vitality and continuing rapid rate of development of the United Republic were impressive, and President Nyerere's strong emphasis on hard work and self-reliance struck a sympathetic

chord with the Government and people of the United States who wished the Tanzanian people every success in their efforts. The Treaty on East African Cooperation which had been signed the previous week promised a further acceleration of Tanzanian development. The leaders of the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda were to be congratulated on their statesmanship. The Treaty would provide a firm basis for co-operation among the three countries involved and could serve as a model for regional co-operation in the interests of accelerated development in other parts of Africa and elsewhere.

557. At Dar es Salaam the Special Committee would be considering the important question of self-determination for the peoples of southern Africa, especially of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and Mozambique. The position of the United States on that subject had already been set forth by his delegation and would be made clear again in forthcoming debate. The basic issue in each of those areas was whether the African majority were to be entitled to control their own destiny. His Government believed that all men were entitled to justice, human rights and liberty and that all of Africa would not long be denied their exercise.

558. Over the past fifteen years the great majority of the people of Africa had achieved independence on their own initiative and, in some cases, ultimately with the co-operation of the administering Powers. In the case of the former Trust Territories the provisions of the Charter had enabled the United Nations to play a major role in bringing about such independence. In Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories administered by Portugal, the United Nations had to tackle the difficult problem of Territories that had not achieved independence or government by the consent of the governed. The Charter had foreseen such circumstances and provided means for bringing the pressure of the world community to bear. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the situation had been regarded as a threat to international peace and security. The problem was before the Security Council and the progressive steps provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter were being applied. In accordance with the Charter, efforts were being made to achieve compliance by peaceful means.

559. Men who sought their freedom and the right to majority rule were, and should be, impatient. But "instant freedom", regrettably, had seldom been achieved. Countries represented on the Special Committee, including his own, knew that the struggle for self-determination and freedom could be long and difficult, but the ultimate achievement of freedom by all people was certain. His Government and all States Members of the United Nations were committeed under the Charter to hastening the achievement of that goal as rapidly and peacefully as possible.

560. His delegation respected the non-aligned policy of the United Republic and would not introduce polemics or divisive arguments of a political "cold war" nature into the Special Committee's deliberations. However, his delegation reserved the right to reply to any misleading and inaccurate statements or false charges which were directed by certain delegations at his Government and its policies.

561. The representative of *Finland* thanked the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for once again having invited the Special Committee to

meet at Dar es Salaam which was closely associated with the work of the Committee in which the United Republic and the Chairman had played an important and dominant role. He also thanked the Second Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, for his kind words of welcome and his understanding of the Committee's work.

562. It was his impression that all members pursued in the main the same objectives with regard to colonialism: all would like to see the system of minority rule and oppression abolished as soon as possible. But a committee of the United Nations was likely to disagree on the methods to be used to achieve that end. As the Secretary-General had said, the weaknesses and shortcomings of the United Nations lay not in its constitutional purposes, objectives and procedures, but in world conditions. Working together to achieve common goals, representatives of independent States, with their own background and history, ideals and principles, were bound to disagree on methods. But there was nothing wrong in that as long as the objectives were the same: the speedy abolition of all forms of minority rule and racial discrimination.

563. Speaking as a representative of a Nordic country with no colonial background, he fully shared the common objectives and the impatience expressed by previous speakers, but Finland was traditionally against the use of force; it firmly believed that all international disputes should be settled by peaceful means and strongly supported the United Nations as the organization set up to solve world problems in an orderly and peaceful way.

564. In coming to the United Republic of Tanzania he felt close to his own country: outside Dar es Salaam was a large educational project, called the Nordic Tanganyika Centre, and he sincerely hoped that the fruitful co-operation between the United Republic and the Nordic countries would increase in the future, based as it was on the common understanding of the problems confronting smaller nations.

565. He welcomed the representative of Afghanistan to the Special Committee.

566. The representative of *Syria* expressed his deep gratitude to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their cordial and fraternal welcome to the Special Committee, which would enable it to pursue its work of decolonization.

567. It was not the first time that the Tanzanian Government had allowed the Special Committee to hold its meetings on the soil of the young and dynamic African Republic with which his country had the friendliest relations.

568. The wisdom of Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa's statement bore witness to the unswerving devotion of the Tanzanian people to the cause of the emancipation of peoples and to its firm determination to continue to assist those still fighting to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism from the face of the earth.

569. The evidence of the petitioners would help the Special Committee to take decisions and make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly. In the course of its travels in Africa, the Committee would have other matters to consider, with which it had long been concerned.

570. His delegation would have the opportunity of stating its position on those matters at later meetings. It wished, however, to state that it would spare no effort to secure the adoption of resolutions and recom-

mendations designed to ensure the implementation of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and to assist the freedom fighters in their noble and legitimate struggle. His country had carried on the fight against colonialism and imperialism and would continue until final victory, believing that its sacrifices in the fight would strengthen still further its solidarity with and support for freedom fighters throughout the world.

- 571. The representative of Australia thanked the Second Vice-President for his important address, and the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam. The Second Vice-President's address would be of considerable help to the Committee in its deliberations and he endorsed the Ethiopian proposal that it should be recorded in extenso.
- 572. The address was indicative of the understandably intense interest of the Tanzanian Government and people in the problems of colonialism in Africa, an interest which was a source of inspiration to those who had not yet been able to exercise their inherent right to self-determination. It was for that reason that Dar es Salaam had become a traditional meeting-place for the Special Committee.
- 573. He was very pleased to see at first hand the remarkable development that had occurred in the United Republic since independence under the dynamic and dedicated leadership of President Nyerere. The United Republic and Australia had many interests in common. They were both members of the Commonwealth and recent years had witnessed a steady development of their commercial ties. The presence of Tanzanian students in Australia had added greatly to the understanding of Tanzanian and African problems and aspirations in that country.
- 574. What was more important, the two countries shared a common interest in the development of a world governed by a proper relationship between nations and a proper relationship of equality between all men. He looked forward to hearing further useful evidence on colonialism in Africa and hoped that it would enable the Special Committee to make a profitable contribution on behalf of the people still striving for independence.
- 575. In conclusion, he expressed the conviction that the Special Committee would give careful thought to the Second Vice-President's interesting assessment of the situation in southern Africa to the effect that it was a compound of colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination.
- 576. The representative of Sierra Leone said that it was a particular pleasure for his delegation to revisit Dar es Salaam which was traditionally a "haven of peace" and security for refugees fleeing from the oppression and slavery in their Territories. The United Republic of Tanzania, and Dar es Salaam in particular, had come to be recognized as a stronghold of liberty and the Organization of African Unity had decided to establish its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa in that city.
- 577. His delegation was very keenly aware of the United Republic's contribution to decolonization and the fight for human rights and Mr. Malecela's own efforts for that cause had led to his being unanimously elected as the current Chairman of the Committee. Because of its leadership in the freedom movement

- and its assistance to the oppressed people of neighbouring Mozambique, the United Republic was constantly threatened by the friends of colonialism.
- 578. Nearly all the countries represented on the Special Committee had, at one time or another, been obliged to wage a bitter fight for their independence, but it seemed that some of them now hesitated to help the peoples still under the colonial yoke. But colonialism was such that it could only be overthrown by force; independence was not given on a platter.
- 579. The opening addresses by Mr. Kawawa, the Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Chairman merited careful consideration by the Special Committee and would be of great use to it in its deliberations at Dar es Salaam.
- 580. He thanked the President, Government and people of the United Republic for their invitation to the Special Committee and hoped that genuine progress towards the liberation of the oppressed peoples would result from the discussions at Dar es Salaam.
- 581. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* expressed his delegation's cordial and sincere thanks to the Tanzanian Government and people for having allowed the Special Committee to meet once again at Dar es Salaam. The United Republic's gesture was a further demonstration of the interest it took in international affairs in general and the problem of decolonization in particular.
- 582. Like all African countries, the Ivory Coast attached the utmost importance to all questions affecting the dignity and freedom of men, and of Africans in particular. It remained convinced that one cause of the serious threat now facing the world was the tendency towards hegemony, which smothered liberty and fomented rebellion.
- 583. The situation in Mozambique, Angola, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia was the result of the expansionist designs of certain countries which, turning back the pages of history, persisted in following outdated policies of assimilation in an Africa which was independent. Such selfish policies must be condemned; they were based on violence and could only engender violence.
- 584. The Ivory Coast again called on the Portuguese, South African and Southern Rhodesian Governments to adopt more realistic policies, based on respect for democracy and the right of self-determination of peoples. The Ivory Coast was persuaded that self-determination was the only just solution. Unhappily, that principle was not always respected and, as a result, world peace was continually threatened. All countries had a duty to see that international peace and security were maintained; that was why they had set up the United Nations. His country set great store by the United Nations, and particularly by the Special Committee for the complete liberation of Territories still under foreign domination. It was confident of the impartiality of the Committee's decisions for, while supporting decolonization, it believed that peoples must be able to choose their own destiny.
- 585. The representative of *Madagascar* associated himself with the previous speakers who had paid a tribute to the Tanzanian Government and people for having again invited the Special Committee to meet at Dar es Salaam.
- 586. His delegation had particularly appreciated Mr. Kawawa's welcoming address to all members of the Committee.

587. His delegation was aware of the United Republic's major role in the search for solutions of the problems of decolonization. In his important address, the Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania had emphasized that no African country could enjoy peace and freedom to the full while there were still some Territories in Africa suffering from colonial and racist oppression. The Malagasy Republic shared that view and therefore closely watched developments in the colonial Territories, particularly in Africa, with great attention. His delegation would do all in its power to secure implementation of the principle of self-determination set forth in the United Nations Charter and to ensure that the decisions of the peoples concerning their future were respected.

588. In conclusion, he asked the Chairman of the Special Committee to convey fraternal greetings and sincere wishes for success from the Malagasy people to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

589. The representative of *Iraq* said that it was a great pleasure for the Iraqi delegation to be able to participate in the Special Committee's meetings in the African "haven of peace" since, the historic name of the capital of Iraq, Baghdad, had also been Dar es Salaam. The Committee's thanks were due to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania who illustrated the new spirit of young and energetic Africa in their determined revolutionary drive against foreign influence and the last strongholds of foreign economic and military abuse in Africa and elsewhere.

590. Iraq had a particular regard for the United Republic and its achievements in international politics and economic development and its evident leadership on the African stage. The stand the United Republic had taken on behalf of all colonized, subjugated and oppressed peoples was clear and consistent. Especially impressive had been the messages recently sent by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania to President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, supporting his stand and urging him to continue in his courageous and unyielding opposition to the pressure of the racist Zionists of Israel, the insidious forces of imperialism and the well-known blood merchants. Those messages would be highly cherished by the Arab people everywhere as yet another link of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of Africa and the Arab Middle East.

591. He would deal fully with the items on the Special Committee's agenda at a later stage.

592. He extended his greetings to Mr. Samnah, the newly arrived representative of Afghanistan, and wished his predecessor, Mr. Ghaus, a speedy recovery.

593. The representative of *Venezuela* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold its meetings in the historic city of Dar es Salaam.

594. The Special Committee was meeting for the third time in the United Republic, which was preparing to receive delegations of every nationality and representatives of various organizations who, in a few days time, were to participate in a history-making seminar on colonialism and the policy of racial discrimination. That was further proof of its pioneering role in the fight for decolonization.

595. His delegation expressed its gratitude to the Chairman of the Special Committee, a son of that generous country, for his untiring devotion to the cause of freedom and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence. The torch burning on the summit of Kilimanjaro was not only the symbol of a nation in arms against dishonour, oppression and the paranoid behaviour of racists and their allies; it also symbolized the deliverance of peoples still under the colonial yoke.

596. The United Republic of Tanzania was one of the countries dedicated to peace and freedom which refused to watch human society foundering in the havoc wrought by its own lack of understanding, or to remain passive as its fundamental values were destroyed. For those and many other reasons, the Special Committee's discussions in the United Republic were of particular significance and importance.

597. The testimony of petitioners from various Territories which the Special Committee would be able to hear at Dar es Salaam would clearly be extremely valuable for its work. Those who denied the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling the aims of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) concerning the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples were mistaken. The proof of its effectiveness was so evident that it needed no comment. It could, in all certainty, be said that if the United Nations had not written the epilogue to the history of the liberation of peoples, it had at least written the prologue. Those who, for political, economic or strategic reasons, played the colonialists' game and supported the hateful policy of racial discrimination, were also mistaken. So too were those who attempted to establish a social structure which contradicted the most elementary principles of ethics and civilization. Likewise mistaken were those who set little store by the right to freedom and made no distinction between the fight for that supreme ideal and the defence of their own squalid interests. Those who strove to continue insolently disregarding the world's conscience were also mistaken. Right and justice would triumph over colonialism and racism.

598. His delegation had already had occasion to set forth its attitude to the problems concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration during the general debate at Kinshasha and Kitwe. Venezuela categorically refused to accept the juridical fiction. which the Portuguese Government was attempting to impose, that the African Territories under Portuguese administration were Portuguese overseas provinces and an integral part of Portugal's national territory. Venezuela had condemned the Portuguese Government's obstinate refusal to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. It also condemned the colonial war being waged by Portugal to perpetuate its colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. His country would do everything in its power to ensure the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) as it affected those Territories.

599. His delegation was convinced that the work of the Special Committee at Dar es Salaam would be crowned with success. It renewed its thanks to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for allowing the Special Committee to meet a second time in a country which was in the forefront of those fighting to uphold the aspiration of peoples to self-determination and independence.

- 600. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the previous speakers for their kind words which he would convey to his President and to the Second Vice-President. Their words would be of great encouragement to the Tanzanian Government in its uncompromising stand against all the evils of colonialism and imperialism. The United Republic had only recently become independent and it was too soon for it to have forgotten those evils; that was why it was determined to render all possible assistance to its fellow men who were still being dominated by foreign oppressors.
- 601. He wished the Special Committee every success in its complex deliberations and its efforts to promote the noble cause of the freedom of mankind.
- 602. The representative of Afghanistan associated his delegation with the thanks that had been expressed by other members of the Special Committee for the cordial welcome and generous hospitality offered by the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania.
- 603. He paid a tribute to the Second Vice-President for his important address, which would be of great assistance in the Special Committee's deliberations. The Committee's meetings among the peace-loving Tanzanian people under the chairmanship of one of its sons would be a source of inspiration to those who desired the complete elimination of colonialism and racism. The heroic efforts of the Tanzanian people to overcome foreign domination would serve as an example to those still fighting for their freedom and independence.
- 604. Afghanistan and the United Republic were bound by common ideals and spiritual ties. Afghanistan supported all those who were fighting for their freedom and had condemned all forms of colonialism. It considered the shameful policy of apartheid and racism in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration to be crimes against humanity.
- 605. Colonialism had reached a crucial phase, particularly in the African Territories, and the United Nations must take immediate action for its elimination.
- 606. He thanked the Chairman and committee members for their words of welcome to his delegation and expressed his heartfelt wishes for the happiness, prosperity and progress of the Tanzanian people.
- Statement by the representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity
- 607. The representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that he was extremely honoured to have the privilege of addressing the Special Committee and wished to convey the greetings and sincere good wishes of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU and the Executive Secretariat of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa
- 608. The Co-ordinating Committee sincerely hoped that the Special Committee's efforts during its work at Dar es Salaam would be crowned with success which would ensure the realization of the hopes of millions of Africans still enslaved under the cruel and inhuman system of colonialism. On behalf of the Co-ordinating Committee, he assured the Chairman that his wise guidance of the Committee was a matter of

- great pride and a shining example to every true son of Africa. The Executive Secretariat of the Coordinating Committee was at the Committee's disposal for any assistance it might require during its stay at Dar es Salaam.
- 609. The problem of colonialism had already been extensively studied. Many books and papers had been written on the subject. Some cheap authors and journalists from the colonialist countries were making a good living by producing superficial copies on that most serious problem.
- 610. The Co-ordinating Committee was an organ of action and not a debating society. It was therefore not his intention to repeat what had already been said. He wished, however, to draw the Special Committee's attention to some important points.
- 611. The Organization of African Unity viewed colonialism with grave concern, and for that reason it had set up a special committee to co-ordinate the work of African liberation. Imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism were words which were spoken and written hundreds of times each day. To certain people-some of them Members of the United Nations-those words had become meaningless, but in Africa they were a constant reminder of the inhuman treatment, tortures and degradation of the vast population of Africa. The OAU would keep drumming those words into the ears of the world until the last square inch of Africa was free from foreign domination. There would be no peace in the world so long as the shameful system of colonialism prevailed. The world could know no tranquillity as long as certain fanatics were allowed to continue the brutal policy of segregation and racial arrogance. To Africans the word "colonialism" was not an abstraction and when Africans spoke of the decolonization of Africa they were not merely expounding a theory: they meant the total eradication of colonialism in all its forms.
- 612. The OAU, being a peaceful organization, would be happy if the United Nations were to find an immediate and practical peaceful solution to the burning problem of colonialism. The OAU would be only too happy if the Special Committee were to use its influence to persuade Portugal, South Africa and other colonialist countries to stop their mad policy of oppression and subjugation. But, in the absence of any guarantee of an immediate peaceful solution, the OAU would feel free to use all means at its disposal to restore elementary human rights to the oppressed peoples of Africa. It had no intention of compromising on the question of decolonization.
- 613. Of late, the oppressors of the African people had been jubilant about certain setbacks and difficulties in Africa. Africa's enemies were rejoicing at its troubles. They were convinced that Africa's energy was spent and that decolonization had become a dream. He assured the Special Committee that the total decolonization of Africa remained a top priority on the OAU's agenda and that, failing an immediate and practical solution to the problem of colonialism on the part of the United Nations, the fight for liberation raging throughout the occupied Territories of Africa would be waged to the bitter end. The OAU believed that peace, freedom and human rights were not the monopoly of any particular nation and that it was therefore its responsibility to restore elementary and fundamental human rights to the African Territories still under foreign domination.

- 614. Colonialism took many forms: political, economic and cultural. Cultural colonialism was no less serious than political or economic colonialism. On the contrary, it could be its most pernicious form. It was a process whereby the colonial Powers dominated the very thoughts and minds of the oppressed and destroyed their soul so that they were made to feel inferior. It drove a wedge between the so-called *élite* and the masses of the colonized. In Africa, sad to say, it tended to drive a wedge between the English-speaking and French-speaking peoples. That state of affairs was incompatible with progress. He appealed to the United Nations to take immediate steps through its education programme to eradicate cultural colonialism from Africa.
- 615. In recent years another urgent problem had arisen in Africa: that of refugees and displaced persons, Portugal, South Africa and their colonial friends had uprooted thousands of innocent people from their countries and rendered them homeless. Hundreds of thousands of peace-loving Africans had been forced to flee their countries as a result of the manœuvres of the colonialists and their friends. While the OAU appreciated the good work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, it appealed to the Special Committee to use its good offices to inform the United Nations that the best solution of the problem of refugees and displaced persons was the abolition of colonialism. It also appealed to the United Nations to make provision for the education, medical treatment and social welfare of refugees and displaced
- 616. If the United Nations found a solution to the colonial problem, Africa's freedom fighters would lay down their arms forthwith. If the systems of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism came to an end, the OAU would be very happy to divert the resources it spent on decolonization to development purposes.
- 617. One of the functions of the United Nations was to work for world peace. The ending of the evil of colonialism would enable the OAU to concentrate all its efforts on the pursuit of world peace. He was quite confident that a free and united Africa would make a great contribution to that cause.

CLOSING OF MEETINGS

Statement by the Minister for Home Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania

- 618. The Minister for Home Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania congratulated the Special Committee and everyone who had made its meetings at Dar es Salaam possible on behalf of the people and Government of the United Republic of Tanzania.
- 619. The Tanzanian people were deeply committed to the cause of freedom for their brothers in Africa and elsewhere who were still living under colonialism. They knew the evils of that system both because they themselves had suffered under it and because they could compare it with the freedom and independence they enjoyed at present. In particular, the Tanzanian people knew that institutional racial discrimination, i.e. the humiliation of a man for being the colour he was born, was linked with colonialism. That such discriminatory policies were sometimes camouflaged by high-sounding names did not alter their character. Discrimination existed in the Portu-

- guese-administered Territories despite attempts to confuse the issue by talk of an "assimilation policy"; just as colonialism existed despite the pretence that the United Republic's southern neighbour was Portugal. Attempts were made to present a more attractive appearance, and the manner of oppression might be different, but the fact of oppression remained the same.
- 620. It was for that reason that Tanzania had always supported visits by the Special Committee to countries that were close to those colonies whose constitutional development they had been asked by the United Nations to keep under constant review. Such visits enabled Committee members to examine much more deeply and at close range the effects of colonialism and apartheid and therefore to pierce any disguise which might be worn. At the same time, because the petitioners had an opportunity of putting their case and answering questions, the rest of the world became better informed of the nature of the colonial problem.
- 621. The importance of that was obvious. Those in America, Europe and elsewhere who had never suffered colonial oppression needed to be constantly reminded of those evils if colonialism was to be quickly defeated. The imperialist Powers needed to be reminded too that they could not escape their responsibility for the continued oppression of people in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South West Africa, Aden and elsewhere.
- 622. In that respect the absence of a United Kingdom delegation from the deliberations of the Special Committee during its present African tour was a matter of regret. The responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for what was taking place in the southern half of the African continent was unquestionable. That country had created South Africa in 1910; it had laid the ground in 1923 for what was taking place in Southern Rhodesia; and, together with others, it was supporting Portugal through NATO and in the United Nations. When the United Nations had voted to end South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa in October 1966, it was significant that the United Kingdom had been among the abstaining delegations. As if that were not enough, the United Kingdom Government was making arrangements to buy islands in the Indian Ocean for the purpose of establishing military bases. The threat of such bases in that particular area had been discussed by the Committee and was covered in the resolution adopted by the Committee on Mauritius and its neighbouring islands. When so much of the Committee's work was of the United Kingdom's creation, surely the Committee was entitled to ask for that Power's co-operation in its endeavour to fulfil its mandate. It was to be hoped that the Committee's resolutions would be carefully studied and rapidly implemented by the United Kingdom Government and its allies. For, even if the United Kingdom refused to participate in the work of a Committee of which it was a member, it could not by default escape its responsibilities.
- 623. The Tanzanian people would continue to give the Special Committee all the co-operation and assistance within their power. It was a pity that the Committee could not visit the areas in the Middle East which it had arranged to visit, but the United Republic understood very sympathetically the events that had made Iraq and Syria unable to receive the Committee during

its present tour. It would be agreed that a great part had been played by those countries in the cause of freedom for oppressed peoples, and it was his Government's hope that it would be possible for the Committee to visit Syria and Iraq in the future.

624. The Tanzanian Government and people had been happy to receive the Special Committee in their country. They hoped that the visit to the United Republic and the other African countries had been helpful to the Committee in discharging its responsibilities.

General statements

625. The Chairman said that during the Special Committee's stay at Dar es Salaam, members had had yet another opportunity of appreciating the dynamism and revolutionary ardour of the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania, their unstinting support, second to none, of the fight for the total liquidation of colonialism and their active solidarity with the efforts as well as with the objectives of the Committee. All those attributes had been amply reflected in the address with which the Committee had just been honoured.

626. The Special Committee had come to the close of its meetings at Dar es Salaam and the end of a fruitful session away from Headquarters. The vigour with which the Committee had tackled its work at Dar es Salaam, the success of its meetings, and the importance of the conclusions and recommendations adopted had all been made possible by the invitation extended to the Committee by the Tanzanian Government, the environment it had been privileged to work in and the facilities which had been so generously placed at its disposal by the Government, As Chairman, he expressed the Committee's warm gratitude, through Mr. Saidi Maswanya, to the President, the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania, to whom the Committee was also deeply thankful for their kind hospitality. In addition, the Committee was happy to have had the opportunity of visiting the interior and further to develop long-established friendships and fraternal links with the valiant Tanzanian people.

627. In the course of its meetings at Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee had also been honoured by the participation in its deliberations of the representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of OAU. As Chairman, he acknowledged that contribution with gratitude and stressed the importance of developing further the ties of co-operation that linked the Special Committee to the OAU, as also the League of Arab States. For only in close collaboration could those bodies ensure the speedy attainment of their common objectives, namely, the elimination of colonial domination, respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination and to the free choice of their national institutions.

628. At Dar es Salaam the Special Committee had heard six groups of petitioners concerning Mozambique, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mauritius and French Somaliland. On behalf of the Committee, he thanked all the petitioners for the contribution they had made to the Committee's consideration of the various colonial questions. They could be assured of the Committee's continued whole-hearted support in the struggle of their peoples for freedom and independence in keeping with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. On its return to New York, the Committee, in addition to the

recommendations it had already adopted in Africa, would intensify its efforts to mobilize world opinion in support of their legitimate struggle, in order to achieve without further delay the exercise by their peoples of the right to self-determination.

629. The petitioners had reminded the Special Committee that the people of Mozambique totally rejected the thesis that their Territory was an overseas province of Portugal. The petitioners had also recalled that Portuguese colonialism, based on exploitation, oppression and repression, and accompanied by ruthless racial discrimination, continued to deny to the people their most elementary human right. The Committee had received further testimony of the savage brutality with which Portugal was intensifying its war against the people of Mozambique, a war which could not be prosecuted without the assistance extended to Portugal by a number of its friends and allies within NATO. The petitioners had again confirmed that, if the people of Mozambique had resorted to armed struggle, it was because Portugal had refused outright to accept all peaceful means for bringing them to freedom and independence.

630. The Special Committee had been gratified to receive additional information regarding the progress of that honourable and just struggle to free Mozambique from the yoke of the oppressor. It had been very much impressed to hear of the efforts being made by the national liberation movement to rehabilitate the liberated areas, amounting to one third of the country, to rebuild the economy and to promote the material and social welfare of the people. It had also been heartened to learn of the measures taken by the national liberation movements to assist the thousands of refugees from the areas still under Portuguese occupation, particularly as far as education and health were concerned. Nevertheless, having gained greater understanding of the magnitude of the task and of the difficulties involved, members had become more conscious than ever of the urgent need for vastly increased assistance from the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations, as well as from Governments.

631. As far as South West Africa was concerned, the petitioners had informed the Special Committee that the fight for national liberation continued unabated and that the fascist Vorster régime, responding with characteristic brutality and harshness, had imposed even more extensive repressive measures, involving mass arrests and inhuman torture. They had drawn attention to the merciless pillage of the human and material resources that was being carried out by the régime of Pretoria with the co-operation of foreign companies, and to the large-scale assistance that the régime was receiving from certain States Members of the United Nations in violation of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII). They had denounced with legitimate indignation the proposal to establish a Bantustan in Ovamboland, which they regarded as an attempt to dilute the essence of the struggle of the people for dignity. In conclusion, the petitioners had urged that in view of the unco-operative attitude that might be expected of certain big Powers with gigantic economic and financial interests in the Territory, Member States should have recourse to the Security Council in order to obtain the compulsory enforcement of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) under Chapter VII of the Charter.

632. Regarding the question of Southern Rhodesia, the petitioners had exposed the failure of the so-called selective mandatory sanctions to bring about the downfall of the illegal racist minority régime, let alone the establishment of conditions of equality and democratic freedom in implementation of the Declaration. They had condemned a number of Western and other Powers for circumventing those sanctions, and had called for the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions backed by force, both against the régime and against any countries refusing to co-operate in that regard. The petitioners had also registered the determination of the people of Zimbabwe to intensify their fight for liberation by armed force. Finally, they had insisted on the immediate establishment of African majority rule, followed by independence within the shortest possible time.

633. Once again most of the petitioners heard by the Special Committee—from Mozambique, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia—had referred to the role played by entrenched foreign economic and other interests in impeding the implementation of the Declaration. It was evident that those interests had not only been giving active support to the colonial régimes in those Territories, but that, acting in concert, they had also been relentlessly exploiting the human and material resources of those Territories, denying to the African people the means for their economic, social and educational development, and had thus stood in the way of the realization of their aspirations to freedom and independence.

634. On Mauritius and the Seychelles, the Special Committee had been told about the failure of the administering Power to take steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the recommendations of the Committee. In particular, dissatisfaction had been expressed about the inadequate rate of political progress and about the present electoral system. The detachment of a group of islands from those Territories in violation of their territorial integrity, to form the so-called British Indian Ocean Territory, and the establishment of military installations therein had come in for particular condemnation.

635. Regarding French Somaliland, the petitioners had referred with grave concern to recent developments in the Territory and had stressed that, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) independence should be granted in the shortest possible time after the holding of elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, under international supervision. They had also urged that all political prisoners should be released, that democratic freedoms should be restored and that all refugees should be enabled to return and to secure international assistance.

636. All the elements thus brought to the attention of the Special Committee by the petitioners had been taken into account in the highly important resolutions adopted during its last few meetings concerning Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena, South West Africa, Territories under Portguese administration, and on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to the colonial Territories considered by the Committee during its current session away from Headquarters.

637. The texts of those resolutions were, of course, available to members. Many of their provisions were not new but they were important in being stronger and

more far-reaching formulations of considerations and demands to which the Special Committee and the General Assembly had previously given expression. There were a number of significant new elements and ideas contained in them to which attention should be drawn.

638. For instance, in the resolution on Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC.109/249), the Special Committee had described the establishment of military installations and the carrying out of any military activities in those Territories not only as a violation of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI), but also as a source of tension in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. That was clearly a development of some importance in the Committee's consideration of those Territories. In another noteworthy move, the Committee in its resolution on South West Africa (A/AC.109/ 250) had condemned unanimously as illegal, contrary to the relevant General Assembly resolutions and a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations the measures taken and proposed by South Africa regarding Ovamboland.

639. The resolution concerning Territories under Portuguese domination (A/AC.109/251) also contained significant new ideas. In that resolution, the Special Committee had further developed the concept, which it had first advanced during 1965, of the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples to achieve freedom and independence. In the last preambular paragraph, the Committee had expressly noted with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements both by struggle and by a reconstruction programme. That implied at once an endorsement of the efforts of the national liberation movements to achieve freedom and independence for their countries, and a recognition of the valuable work they were carrying on in the liberated areas. By way of underlining their role, the Committee had requested, in operative paragraph 11, that the granting of assistance by the specialized agencies and other international assistance organizations to the victims of Portuguese military operations should be done in co-operation with the national liberation movements.

640. In operative paragraphs 7 and 8 of the same resolution, the Special Committee, availing itself of the provisions of operative paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), drew the attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation and recommended that the Council should make mandatory the provisions of its own resolution 218 (1965) and of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI). In doing so, however, the Committee had also drawn attention to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that bordered upon its colonies. Those provisions accordingly represented a further and notable definition of the serious implications of Portuguese colonialism for international peace and security.

641. Also, in operative paragraph 11 of the resolution, the Special Committee correctly attached importance to the role to be played by the OAU in any measures to be undertaken by international organizations to increase assistance to the refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration. Those provisions testified to the value of the co-operation with the OAU, to which he had already referred, and also to the Committee's confidence that the effectiveness of international assistance to refugees could be enhanced by means of such co-operation.

- 642. Lastly, emphasis had been rightly placed on the need for continuous and widespread publicity for the work of the United Nations in order to educate world opinion concerning the situation in the Portuguese colonies and the fight for liberation. At the same time the resolution visualized that efforts to meet that need would be made in consultation with the Special Committee. That was a logical development: it was obvious that efforts to publicize the decolonization work of the United Nations and to mobilize world public opinion for the eradication of colonialism would benefit from the participation of the Committee.
- 643. Those considerations were also reflected in the general resolution (A/AC.109/252) adopted by the Special Committee concerning the colonial Territories it had examined. With regard to publicity for the work of the United Nations on those Territories, particular reference had been made to the preparation of suitable publications in consultation with the Committee. Moreover it was noteworthy that, in operative paragraph 6, the Committee condemned in more categorical terms than previously the formation of an entente between South Africa, Portugal and the illegal Smith régime. Another significant development was that the Committee had not been content to request the dismantling of military bases and installations in colonial Territories. It had also, in operative paragraph 10 of the resolution, described such bases and installations as an obstacle to the liberation of the peoples of those Territories. Lastly, in seeking to ensure that the specialized agencies withheld assistance to the régimes of Salazar, Smith and Vorster, the Committee had emphasized, in operative paragraph 12, the responsibility of States to take appropriate action as members of those agencies.
- 644. He wished to record his conviction that the decision to undertake yet another series of meetings away from Headquarters had been more than justified by the results achieved. By reason of its closer proximity to the colonial Territories under discussion and of the easier availability of leaders of the national liberation movements, the Special Committee had been able to acquire additional and more direct knowledge of conditions in those Territories, as well as deeper understanding of the wishes of the people, and of the difficulties and obstacles hindering their fulfilment. He was confident that the capacity of the Committee to assist those peoples had thus been enhanced. Finally, the active solidarity of the United Nations with colonial peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence had once again been underlined.
- 645. It was true that several petitioners had expressed disappointment, even disillusion, with the results of the efforts of the United Nations. The reason was not far to seek. It was the reluctance, and in many cases the deliberate refusal, of the administering Powers to co-operate in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. At the same time the Special Committee would be failing in its duty if it did not give continuous consideration to ways and means of improving the effectiveness of its work. In that connexion, he commended to members for examination the ideas he had expressed at the Committee's opening meeting at Dar es Salaam.
- 646. The colonial Powers by their adamant refusal to grant the African peoples independence had forced them to resort to arms. He urged the freedom fighters to redouble their efforts, for force was the only language that the colonial Powers understood. He also appealed to them to unite, for only through unity of

- action and purpose could the sufferings and humiliation of the peoples in the Territories under colonial domination come to an end.
- 647. He also appealed to the international community, both inside and outside the United Nations, to realize the plight of the African people. The world community should not leave the people of Africa to be butchered; they deserved freedom as much as their fellow men in Europe or North America.
- 648. On behalf of the Special Committee, he expressed his appreciation to the Under-Secretary, who in spite of his heavy schedule, had been able to find time to attend the Committee's meetings at Dar es Salaam. The Committee's thanks also went to the members of the Secretariat and particularly to the interpreters, to the Information Services and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, to the Press, which had been particularly co-operative, and which could play a vital role in informing public opinion about the Committee's work on decolonization, to the management of the Msimbazi Community Centre and indeed to all who in one way or another had contributed to make the work of the Committee both possible and fruitful.
- 649. The Special Committee was also grateful to the President, Government and people of the United Republic for enabling it to hold such a constructive session at Dar es Salaam.
- 650. The representative of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of his own Government and that of Chile, warmly thanked the Tanzanian people and Government for inviting the Special Committee to Dar es Salaam. In that town, the Committee had found a favourable climate which had enabled it to carry out its work successfully. The United Republic of Tanzania was a country which loved peace and freedom and which served as a refuge for the nationals of countries still under the colonial yoke. He also thanked the petitioners who had come to tell the Committee about the progress they had achieved in their struggle. He supported the appeal for unity which had been made to the liberation movements, for it was only in that way that the people suffering under colonialism could achieve their independence.
- 651. He emphasized the solidarity which existed between the Latin American countries and the African continent, particularly the United Republic. That was an indisputable fact which had been clearly shown on many occasions. The Latin American countries were ready to support the cause of all peoples fighting for their independence.
- 652. The representative of Syria, speaking on behalf of the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia, expressed his deep gratitude to Mr. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as to the Tanzanian Government and people, for the generous hospitality and warm welcome they had extended to the Special Committee. The United Republic had thus once again revealed its awareness of its duty to help wipe out the last vestiges of colonialism which caused indescribable suffering. The wise and encouraging words which the Minister for Home Affairs had just spoken were eloquent proof of the importance of the task undertaken by the United Nations to bring about the complete emancipation of those peoples who were still suffering under the colonial yoke and who were fighting for their fundamental rights.

- 653. For a month the Special Committee had been following its itinerary in order to examine colonial questions more closely. At Kinshasa, it had heard the testimony of those who were fighting for the freedom and independence of the Territories under Portuguese domination, and particularly for the liberation of Angola. It had visited a camp for refugees and had seen at close range their sufferings and afflictions. It had understood the need to come to their aid and to increase the assistance provided by the specialized agencies and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. It had realized that the combatants were determined to continue their struggle against the oppressors.
- 654. At Kitwe, its second stop, the Special Committee had heard the testimony of victims of the racist régime of Pretoria which remained in power in defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and despite the indignation of world public opinion. In its resolution on Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248) the Committee had reaffirmed once again the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the achievement of their inalienable right to freedom and independence. It had condemned as a crime against humanity the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia. It had expressed the conviction that sanctions, in order to bring about the downfall of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, must be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power.
- 655. At Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee had heard the statements of petitioners from Mozambique, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena, and French Somaliland. It had thus obtained valuable information. The Committee had adopted a resolution on the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/251) in which it had strongly condemned the negative attitude of Portugal and its refusal to implement the provisions of resolutions adopted on that subject by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee. It had further condemned the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination and had requested all States to desist from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enabled it to continue its repression of the African people. It had recommended that the Security Council take measures to make mandatory the provisions of resolutions adopted on the subject by the Security Council and the General Assembly.
- 656. The Special Committee had adopted three other resolutions. In the first, concerning Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC.109/249), the Committee had deplored the dismemberment of the islands in question and had declared that the establishment of military installations and any other military activities in the Territories were a violation of General Assembly resolutions and constituted a source of tension.
- 657. In its resolution on South West Africa (A/AC.109/250), the Special Committee had reaffirmed the territorial integrity of South West Africa and the right of its people to freedom and independence and had condemned the measures taken by the Government of South Africa. Lastly, in its resolution (A/AC.109/252), the Committee had called for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

- 658. Those resolutions were evidence of the fruitful results achieved by the Special Committee. During its stay in the United Republic, the Committee had been able to appreciate the aid given by that country to the refugees from Mozambique in their legitimate struggle against Portugal. It also noted the remarkable progress achieved by the Tanzanian Government for its people in the economic, social and cultural fields. Lastly, it had been given an opportunity of admiring the beauty and natural wealth of the country. He extended to the Government his most sincere good wishes for the prosperity of the United Republic.
- 659. In conclusion, he congratulated the Chairman on the skill with which he had conducted the Special Committee's deliberations and thanked the Secretariat for their contribution to the work of the Committee.
- 660. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Tanzanian people and Government for the kind invitation they had extended to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam. The invitation testified to the great importance that the United Republic attached to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He hoped that his thanks would be conveyed to Mr. Kawawa, Minister of State, to Mr. Maswanya, and to other Tanzanian leaders who had personally participated in the Committee's work.
- 661. During its meetings away from Headquarters. the Special Committee had made a positive contribution to the implementation of the Declaration. The decision to hold those meetings had been fully justified by the practical and useful results that had been achieved. It had been able to study in greater detail the problems of many African Territories still under colonial domination and had become better acquainted with the efforts of the African peoples fighting for freedom and independence; it had heard petitioners who had provided new information which would be extremely useful for the Committee's subsequent work, and it had adopted constructive resolutions concerning Territories under Portuguese administration. Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other important questions and had also adopted a general resolution on decolonization. Those resolutions reflected the basic findings of the Committee's investigations and also certain desires expressed by the representatives of the liberation movements. They had also focused attention on the major obstacles which were retarding the progress of the African colonies towards the achievement of their legitimate rights to independence.
- 662. In his brilliant analysis of the situation in the colonial Territories, the Chairman had once again stressed the role of the capitalist monopolies and the use of military bases to crush the liberation movements of the African peoples. He had torn the mask from the bloc of white States in southern Africa and had exposed the role of the NATO bloc which gave open or clandestine support to the racists.
- 663. The Special Committee's visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to Zambia and to the United Republic of Tanzania had shown that the United Nations still had a great deal of work to do in order to find ways and means of implementing the Declaration in those areas of the world where the shameful remnants of colonialism still existed. The specialized agencies of the United Nations must provide

greater economic, financial, cultural, educational and health assistance to the colonial peoples.

664. The Security Council must warn the colonialists very seriously by stating clearly that it considered their activities to be contrary to the United Nations Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Those activities included the waging of aggressive war against the liberation movements, the use of neo-colonial manœuvres, the establishment of puppet régimes, support to the activities of financial monopolies, the building of military bases and the dismemberment of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

665. But the United Nations must not content itself with adopting resolutions calling for the liquidation of military bases and denonucing the use of military bases by the Western Powers against the countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa. It must take steps to ensure their immediate implementation. The destiny of the United Nations depended to a large extent on the energy and determination of its Member States in eliminating the shameful vestiges of colonialism and neo-colonialism and in securing strict adherence to the Charter. The socialist countries, in pursuance of their policy of over-all support for the peoples fighting for their national liberation, would not slacken their efforts until the last vestiges of colonialism had been wiped from the face of the earth.

666. The Bulgarian, Polish and Soviet delegations had been deeply moved by the welcome given to the Special Committee by the wonderful Tanzanian people and had been impressed by the way in which, under the inspiring leadership of President Nyerere, the Tanzanian people were advancing towards development and welfare and playing a leading role in the fight against colonialism and for international peace. The three delegations expressed their deep appreciation of the efforts of all those whose work had contributed to the success of the Committee's meetings in Africa.

667. The representative of Finland, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Italy, the United States and his own, thanked the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the warm and friendly hospitality and assistance offered to the Special Committee. The city of Dar es Salaam was closely linked with the work of the Committee and it was most fitting that the concluding part of its meetings in Africa should be held in the United Republic, a country which had played such an important role in decolonization. Thanks largely to the energy and dynamic personality of the Chairman, the Committee had succeeded in accomplishing a substantial amount of work and had completed its programme on time. Thanks must also go to those who had worked so hard to arrange the mission and who had assisted the Committee in its work.

668. The mission had brought the members of the Special Committee together and had given them a better understanding not only of the serious problems on the agenda, but also of the views of the various Governments which, in his opinion, did not differ so widely as might have appeared to an outside observer.

669. The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomed the opportunity of saying a few words to the Special Committee on behalf of the Secretary-General who, despite his many grave preoccupations, was following with keen interest the progress

of the Special Committee's work. By asking him to go to Dar es Salaam to represent him, the Secretary-General had sought once again to express his deep concern for the problems which the Committee was studying and to reaffirm his conviction that the continued existence of racism and injustice in those parts of southern Africa still under the domination of a racial minority was a festering sore in international politics. That sore must be healed if the United Nations was to achieve its objectives of justice based on the universal recognition of human rights.

670. He himself, as an African, could not help feeling deeply distressed over the sufferings of the people in the Territories under Portuguese control, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, which had been so movingly described by the petitioners. In an age when so many technical successes had been achieved and when man possessed the scientific knowledge which enabled him to conquer matter, it was appalling to realize that millions of human beings still had to live in conditions belonging to a bygone era and were deprived of the essential requirement for human dignity: the freedom to determine their own future. In the age of the atomic bomb, when man was at the same time under constant threat of massive destruction and on the threshold of important achievements, both material and spiritual, on earth as well as in space, the fact that people were still suffering under colonial domination and were deprived of the fundamental rights which were a corner-stone of the Charter of the United Nations could only be deplored as an inadmissible contradiction and a frightening anachronism. That was why the Secretary-General, referring to the problem of decolonization, had quoted the words of an eminent jurist, "Justice delayed is justice denied". Those, who like Portugal and South Africa sought in defiance of the United Nations to perpetuate colonialism or domination by a racial minority should perhaps be reminded that they were sowing the seeds of a whirlwind which would one day sweep them away. The least that the administering Powers could do for the colonial peoples was to recognize their right to self-determination and to give them the freedom to manage their own affairs in a democratic manner. Only then could those peoples take their place beside their fellow men and play their part in the world community.

671. The Special Committee had held thirty-two meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. It had heard a constant succession of petitioners who had described in detail the conditions prevailing in their countries in terms which could leave no doubt in anyone's mind. Some of the petitioners had criticized the United Nations for its failure to impose its will on Portugal, the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. But they forgot that the United Nations was not a world government and that it only drew its strength from the support and co-operation it received from all Member States. All that the Special Committee could do was to expose the facts, analyse the problems, propose measures to resolve those problems and mobilize world public opinion, as well as the appropriate organs of the United Nations, in favour of the speedy implementation of those measures. The Committee had done that ably in the resolutions which it had adopted during its meetings in Africa. It was now up to the individual Governments of States Members of the United Nations to exert the necessary pressures to ensure that those resolutions were implemented. All must co-operate, for in the final outcome the interests of all were at stake.

672. Before concluding, he thanked all those delegations which had paid a tribute to the work of the Secretariat during the series of meetings. It was obvious that when a committee met away from Headquarters many problems had to be resolved and the strain on the Secretariat was greater than usual. Yet, if the Secretariat had been able to provide the Special Committee with the services it expected, that had been due largely to the forbearance, understanding and co-operation shown by all the members throughout the Committee's work. That harmony was due not only to the members of the Committee but also to the competent way in which the Chairman of the Committee had conducted its work.

673. On behalf of the Secretary-General, he thanked the three host Governments which had once again shown their devotion to the United Nations and to the cause of decolonization by inviting the Special Committee to hold meetings on their soil. He also wished to express to them his deep appreciation of the resources they had made available to the Committee and to assure them that the facilities which they had provided had made a great contribution to the harmonious conduct of the Committee's work. He also thanked them warmly for the generous hospitality they had extended to all the members of the Secretariat. He could not complete his statement at the closing meeting in Dar es Salaam without paying a well-deserved tribute to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania; the kindness and friendly interest they had constantly shown in the work of the Committee had been appreciated by all delegations. His thanks also went, of course, to the President of the Republic, Mr. Julius Nyerere, one of the main pillars of African solidarity, to whom he was happy to pay a shining tribute for all that he had done and would continue to do in furthering the interests of Africa and the cause of world brotherhood.

674. The Special Committee's work was, of course, not finished; some of the most serious and pressing problems of colonialism remained, and it was the Committee's duty to seek in unity a constructive and peaceful solution to those questions which affected all Members of the United Nations.

675. Thanks to the generosity of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Special Committee members had had the opportunity of seeing something of that marvellous country. He asked the Tanzanian delegation to convey to the President, Government and people of the United Republic the delegations' wishes for a bright future in peace and prosperity.

D. Action arising from the Special Committee's meetings away from Headquarters

Adoption of resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967)

676. At the 539th meeting of the Special Committee on 19 June 1967, the representative of Sierra Leone introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1), sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia,

which dealt with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to the colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its 1967 meetings in Africa. He recalled that each group of petitioners had spoken of the oppression in the Territories under colonial rule, of the countless injustices, the conditions of near-slavery and the restriction of the right of the indigenous peoples to free expression and citizenship in their own land. The Committee had heard of conditions in Ovamboland and Southern Rhodesia, and of the existence of military bases which represented a threat to independent African States, particularly in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

677. With that information in mind, the sponsors had prepared their text, to which they wished to add, after operative paragraph 10, a new paragraph 11 to read:

"Urges the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance."

The sixth preambular paragraph had been included because the question of Southern Rhodesia had played an important part in the Special Committee's deliberations and it was highly regrettable that the United Kingdom had not been represented at the meetings in Africa.

678. The seventh preambular paragraph had been included because the co-sponsors felt that the attitude of Portgual and South Africa must change. Other colonial Powers had once adopted the same attitude, but had had to change it. Pressure should be exerted on those countries through their friends. At present expanding trade relations seemed to indicate that encouragement rather than disapproval was the latter's policy.

679. Operative paragraph 2 had been included because the petitioners had shown that the continuation of colonial oppression, apartheid and racial discrimination constituted a threat both to the peoples of the colonial Territories and to those of neighbouring independent countries. Indeed, dogs were better treated than Africans in those Territories.

680. Operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 had been included as a corollary to paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which read:

"The General Assembly,

"Requests the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations."

Friends of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal were finding constitutional methods of supporting those régimes on the pretext that their nationals who traded with and invested in those countries could not be controlled by their Governments. Foreign financial and economic interests were increasing their activities, exploiting cheap African labour and preventing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Moreover, countries that disapproved of the *entente* between the three racist Governments should demonstrate their feelings by action.

- 681. Operative paragraph 7, reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and urging all States to assist national liberation movements, had been included because, although most of the countries represented on the Special Committee had had to fight for their independence, some delegations had never supported the efforts of the freedom fighters in the Territories under colonial administration. The paragraph was intended to recognize the freedom fighters' right to fight for their independence.
- 682. Operative paragraph 8 had been included because many delegations had expressed the desire that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies should increase assistance to refugees from the Territories under colonial administration.
- 683. Operative paragraph 9 had been included because populations had been transferred and land annexed for purposes incompatible with the principles of the Charter. The annexed land should be returned to its rightful occupant.
- 684. Operative paragraph 10 requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases in the Territories under their administration, for the sponsors believed that such bases were being used to oppress the indigenous peoples, particularly in the Portuguese administered Territories. New operative paragraph 12, requesting all States to withhold assistance of any kind to Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, followed upon General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) which appealed to countries to discontinue giving help to those Governments. The paragraph included a reference to action through international institutions.
- 685. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414) dealt mainly with South Africa. That was because southern Africa had been the main topic discussed during the Committee's meetings in Africa; it was a chronic case and the sponsors considered that vigorous co-operative action was needed. They hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted unanimously.
- 686. The representative of *Mali* said that, since the adoption of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, his country had never faltered in making its contribution towards hastening the liberation of the Territories still under colonial domination. The Special Committee had repeatedly made concrete proposals to the General Assembly and the Security Council, drawing the attention of international opinion to the fact that the persistence of colonialism was a permanent source of tension, and consequently, a threat to international peace and security.
- 687. The Committee had heard numerous testimonies from petitioners from Territories under Portuguese domination, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other Territories. It had been able to form an idea of the crimes committed by the colonialists and racists in southern Africa, Aden and the islands of the Indian Ocean. It might therefore be asked why the colonial system continued in existence despite the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, which reflected the views of the international community. The system was in fact perpetuated only through the collusion of the financial interests of certain great Powers which gave their support to reactionary régimes and favoured the exploitation of the human

and material resources of the colonial Territories. There were many facts and documents to show that only the financial and economic interests of the Western Powers, together with strategic considerations, prevented the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

688. Many petitioners had spoken of the military aid which Salazar received from certain of his NATO allies. The Committee had been able to ascertain the extent of such aid and it must therefore once again launch an appeal to the States concerned to cease violating the United Nations Charter, and to stop all deliveries of weapons to the Salazar régime and the racist settlers of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. In the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414), the Special Committee made certain suggestions and recommendations for asking the States Members of the United Nations to help in speeding the process of decolonization. The Committee deplored the fact that, six years after the adoption of the Declaration, it should still be discussing, in the absence of certain colonial Powers, the continuation of the colonial system despite the wishes of the peoples suffering under foreign domination. The Committee also deplored the attitude of certain States which had continually refused to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and had given their support to the Portuguese in the war which they were waging in Africa. The Committee reaffirmed the right of the peoples to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and with the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. The General Assembly had already condemned colonialism as a crime against humanity. The Committee reaffirmed that view and urged the abolition of the hateful colonial system.

689. With regard to the economic and financial interests of certain Western Powers which were obstructing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the statistics compiled by the United Nations Secretariat had shown that the United Kingdom and the United States were deriving enormous profits from the Territories under foreign rule in southern Africa. Large concerns such as the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, the Angola Diamond Company, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company and the Pan American International Oil Company were exploiting the natural wealth of these Territories. One must therefore be cautious in accepting the theoretical declarations in the representatives of the Western countries when they claimed to favour decolonization. The delegation of Mali would be happy if the representatives of those countries could put forward concrete proposals for abolishing colonialism throughout the world and particularly in Africa. The peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, Zimbabwe and South West Africa had never been consulted regarding the exploitation of the riches of their countries. Of course, every country had the right to negotiate with private companies regarding the investment of capital in its national territory, but that had not happened in the case of the colonies. The Committee should therefore urge the suspension of such activities until the countries had become independent.

690. As to military bases, the problem was similar. Those bases had been imposed on the peoples of terri-

tories which were still dependent and they were a means of putting pressure on peoples demanding independence. There was another reason for dismantling them; they were a source of tension and insecurity for neighbouring countries. He would only recall in that regard the use which had been made of Ascension Island, and the raids of Salazar's armies on Senegal, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania. In other regions of the world military bases were used to stiffe nationalist movements, particularly in the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia. În view of the existence of those bases, it was impossible for the peoples of the areas concerned to accede to self-determination and independence and to settle their own affairs alone. The draft resolution therefore contained an appeal to the administering Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.

691. The representatives of the *Ivory Coast* reaffirmed the attachment of his Government to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. His delegation wished once again to express reservations regarding operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414), which related to military bases and installations. It supported the rest of the text and would vote for the draft resolution.

692. The representative of *Syria* said he had already explained at earlier meetings the views of his delegation on the colonial questions considered by the Special Committee during its African tour. He would therefore confine his remarks to certain particularly important paragraphs in the operative part of the general draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) submitted by the representative of Sierra Leone and supported by the representative of Mali.

693. He would like first to comment on operative paragraph 5, concerning the activities of foreign financial and other economic interests in colonial Territories, in particular in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination.

694. The testimony of the petitioners had clearly shown that the foreign monopolies were supporting the remaining colonialist régimes and that they constituted a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those monopolies were managed principally by commercial firms of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. They were perpetuating the exploitation of the human and material resources of the colonial Territories, supporting the criminal repression of the liberation movements by the colonialists and retarding the progress of the peoples of those Territories towards freedom and independence. The fact that those foreign monopolies were an obstacle to the liberation of the peoples in question had been repeatedly stressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions. In that connexion he cited resolution 2074 (XX), operative paragraph 8, resolution 2107 (XX), operative paragraph 6, resolution 2151 (XXI), operative paragraph 5, and resolution 2184 (XXI), operative paragraph 4. In operative paragraph 6 of the last-named resolution the General Assembly appealed to all States to prevent their nationals from taking part in the reprehensible activities of those monopolies. The States which sincerely wished to help the colonial peoples achieve their independence and freedom, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV), should take adequate measures to give effect to the repeated appeals addressed to them by the General Assembly.

695. In operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution the Special Committee requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories. The existence of those bases and installations, established against the wishes of the local population, was a continual source of tension and posed a constant threat to international peace and security, whether they were in Angola, in so-called Portuguese Guinea, in Mozambique, in the Seychelles and Mauritius, or in the southern and southeastern part of the Arabian peninsula. It could not be claimed that the question of dismantling those bases and installations fell outside the competence of the Special Committee, for it was at the very essence of the colonial problem; the existence of those bases permitted the colonialists to maintain their oppressive régimes and retarded the process of decolonization, which, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV), should be speedy and unconditional. If the Western Powers sincerely wanted to contribute to decolonization they should respond to the repeated appeals of the General Assembly requesting them to dismantle their existing bases and to refrain from establishing new ones.

696. All the liberation movements should unite so that they could more quickly overcome the obstacles which the colonialists and their accomplices were increasingly placing in the way of the emancipation of peoples. The Special Committee in its decisions would do its utmost to serve the legitimate cause of those who were fighting for their freedom.

697. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation fully supported the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) so ably presented by the representatives of Sierra Leone and Mali at the previous meeting. The meetings away from Headquarters had once again thrown light on the sad colonial problems which confronted the world, especially in the southern part of Africa. The adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) had given hope to many Africans that the United Nations had at last decided to come to the active aid of the millions of people suffering under colonial oppression, but to their great bewilderment, those hopes had not been fulfilled. The Tanzanian delegation therefore shared some of the disappointment expressed by the petitioners. The reason why, in spite of several resolutions, the solution of the terrible problems had eluded the Special Committee lay in the very evidence given by the petitioners. Colonialism and international imperialism had become one and the same thing; they were inherent in the theory of "kith-and-kin" in Southern Rhodesia and in the selfish economic exploitation in South West Africa and, above all, were being strengthened by military alliances in the case of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

698. Some of the Members of the United Nations which had voted for General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) were undermining its implementation. The United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and some other Western countries preached one policy in one part of the world and practised another in Africa. It was hard to reconcile the United Kingdom's policy in Aden with its policy in Southern Rhodesia or United States policy in the Far East with its policy in Africa. In

the Far East, the United States wished to make people believe it was defending so-called democracy, whereas in Africa the same Power was on the side of the fascist forces which were flouting democratic principles. Those Western countries appeared to have completely lost all sense of moral values and to be pursuing power for its own sake.

699. The Tanzanian delegation stressed once again that the march towards freedom and independence could not be halted. Whatever aid Portugal might receive from its allies, its colonial Territories would inevitably attain freedom. In spite of the United Kingdom's "kith-and-kin" policy in Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe would finally be free.

700. The Tanzanian delegation strongly appealed to the Western Powers not to allow the bloodshed to continue. They should know that power for its own sake was doomed to fail. It was in their interests to support the colonized people's fight for independence and to cease enriching themselves at their expense.

701. The Western Powers did not consider colonial oppression in Africa a crime against humanity simply because to them the oppressed people were merely chattels to be exploited, but the crimes committed by Portugal, South Africa and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia certainly constituted the most heinous crime of all. Those crimes were the same in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination, but any country pointing them out was accused of cold war semantics.

702. The Tanzanian delegation strongly condemned all the countries which were aiding Portugal. It was not concerned with the official objectives of NATO but only with the fact that arms provided by that giant instrument of European defence were being used to kill the peoples of Africa.

703. It was well known that the capital flowing into those Territories was not only exploiting the African people but also contributing to the forces intended to exterminate them. The Tanzanian delegation was not interested in the laws governing that capital in its country of origin but only in the destruction it produced. While not sharing in the so-called global strategy of the Powers using the military bases, his delegation condemned the existence of bases which were used to exterminate the African people and appealed to the Powers not to frustate the efforts of decolonization and thus cause more bloodshed.

704. The United Republic hoped that the draft resolution would be supported by all members of the Special Committee. Apologies were not required; what was required was definite action against colonialism.

705. He appealed to the freedom fighters to fight with all their might, for therein lay their hope. If they did so, it would not be long before their countries were welcomed into the family of free nations.

706. The United Republic would always be on the side of those who fought to the bitter end for the cause of liberation and the final liquidation of colonialism.

707. The representative of *Iraq* said that he would speak mainly on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L. 414/Rev.1) but would also make short references to the other draft resolutions before the Special Committee. Iraq had co-sponsored all the draft resolutions because it felt that they were relevant to the requirements of each particular situation and based on the work and inquiries of the Committee as well as the United Nations as a whole, and on the petitioners'

testimony. Iraq continued to believe in the right of all peoples to free themselves from foreign rule and subjugation. It maintained that peaceful changes could and should take place in and out of the United Nations in order to achieve the complete liquidation of colonialism and foreign economic control. It was undeniable that the trading and colonial Powers had no intention of willingly accepting those peaceful methods. It was for that reason that they continued to arm their racist allies in Africa and other areas of the world under different guises, ranging from partnerships and alliances to mutual agreements and even what they called "the dictates of national security", which were merely manifestations of neo-colonialism. It was in the mutual interest of the trading nations to support and reinforce the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and the dictatorial Portuguese rule in the African Territories. Vast amounts of capital and shiploads of arms and ammunition were continuously being made available, to those condemned régimes by the leading countries of NATO and by Israel, to be used against the African peoples and their brave freedom fighters. Military bases, the subject of paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, had played a leading part in the aggressive operations of the colonialist régimes in the past and were continuing to do so.

708. It was especially disheartening to listen to the elaborate statements made by the United States delegation in defence of the so-called "agreement of December 1966" between its Government and that of the United Kingdom, the administering Power in Mauritius, concerning the establishment of refuelling arrangements on the island. It sounded very fair and legal, but the people had not been consulted about whether they would accept the plan to refuel military and other aircraft on their islands. They had no assurance that the aircraft would not be used against their own people and against neighbouring nations in East Africa, Aden, Southern Arabia, Oman, the Indian sub-continent or even Viet-Nam. Such aggressive bases should be dismantled because they were a major handicap to the liberation of many oppressed peoples all over the world.

709. It was the Iraqi delegation's wish and hope that the trading Powers of the Western world would realize the dangers they were helping to foment in those parts of the world by their continued commercial and economic support to the aggressive régimes and would finally honour their international obligations to the family of nations. The day might then dawn when all men, regardless of colour, creed or national origin would live and co-operate together in mutual agreement and genuine understanding. The trading and colonial Powers had amassed wealth and built empires from the blood and sweat of oppressed peoples all over the world. They could still obtain a good return on their investments if they put a halt to their greed and tried to work out arrangements with the liberated peoples under which they could still continue, peacefully and with the consent of the other parties, to keep the profits of their skills and capabilities.

710. There was no need for the trading countries to depend so completely on the continued existence of the unpopular régimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia or the Territories under Portuguese domination: in fact, if they continued to do so, they would end by losing all their investments. The alternative was to implement various United Nations resolutions in the

colonial and subjugated areas by all possible means in order to re-establish sounder relationships, a better understanding and a more solid foundation for economic and other co-operation. The many leading African statesmen and dignitaries who had spoken before the Special Committee during its tour had emphasized that Africa was large enough, rich enough and wise enough to accommodate everyone who was willing to live and work with others without resorting to exploitation, discrimination or the illegal influence from outsiders.

- 711. It was in that spirit that the delegation of Iraq appealed to the specialized agencies which could render help to the oppressed peoples of Africa and elsewhere to do so generously without dwelling on technicalities which might hinder them from relieving human misery, hunger and pain. Such help was necessary as the Special Committee had seen in many places it had visited. The newly independent countries of Africa were doing their utmost to help, but their capabilities were limited. The refugee problem in particular was a major one and his delegation felt that the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned should play a bigger role in helping the victims of colonization, whose survival depended on such assistance, to see the day when their future would be decided by the United Nations or the responsible Powers.
- 712. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that he would like to make a few observations on the substance of the general draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) concerning all the questions considered by the Special Committee at that session.
- 713. On the whole the work of the Special Committee had been in keeping with the objective which it had set for itself. The overwhelming majority of the Committee, as well as all the petitioners, had expressed the desire to put an end to the odious manifestations of colonialism and racism, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the implementation of which constituted one of the most important tasks of the United Nations.
- 714. The general draft resolution as a whole reflected the opinion of the petitioners and the majority of delegations that the administering Powers were directly responsible for the intolerable situation prevailing in the Territories under Portuguese domination, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the other colonial Territories and that the States members of NATO which were continuing to ignore the resolutions of the General Assembly were also in part responsible for the maintenance of racist and colonialist oppression. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, had stepped up its technical, scientific and military assistance to the racist régimes. In recent years the political and cultural links between the Federal Republic of Germany and Southern Rhodesia had been strengthened and the resurgence of neo-Nazi activities in the latter country, where the anniversary of Hitler's birth was observed, could be noted. That demonstrated the connexion between racism and Nazi ideology. The support for the colonialist régimes in certain Western circles was explained by the stake which they had in the maintenance of those régimes. The statements of the Western countries to the effect that they were assisting the African countries and respecting the

decisions of the United Nations should not be allowed to obscure that fact.

- 715. The Special Committee had done well to include in the general draft resolution a paragraph concerning foreign monopolies, which were supporting the colonialist and racist régimes and were enabling them to continue exploiting the material and human resources of the colonized Territories. In South Africa, for example, it was the foreign monopolies which reaped the biggest profits. Those profits were increasing daily, as evidenced by increased investments. One had only to note the trend in the price of the shares issued by the companies in question to realize that such was the case. Those foreign monopolies exercised enormous political influence.
- 716. The racists and colonialists were arming feverishly. Political life was assuming an increasingly fascist character. The régimes were obviously seeking to establish a position of strength from which to negotiate with the liberated African countries. The Federal Republic of Germany was assisting South Africa even in the nuclear field. A uranium reactor had been built at Johannesburg and rocket tests had been made. All those symptoms were extremely disquieting and the Special Committee should examine closely the activities of the countries in question.
- 717. His delegation approved the draft resolution as a whole, the adoption of which would be a step forward in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, but it thought that some of its provisions should be worded in a slightly different way.
- 718. For example, it felt that the text did not condemn with sufficient vigour the countries which were members of NATO and the Western countries which were continuing to assist the colonialist and racist régimes. The Special Committee should make sure that those member States did not give any assistance to the colonialist and racist countries, or else take measures to put a stop to that assistance.
- 719. The Soviet Union would always support oppressed peoples who were fighting for their freedom. His delegation would do everything in its power to hasten the accession of those peoples to independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 720. The representative of *Madagascar* said that his delegation approved the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) as a whole, and considered it to be in conformity with the principles which the Malagasy Republic had always upheld. However, it felt that the question of military bases and installations did not fall within the Special Committee's competence. That was a question which the colonized Territories where such bases and installations had been established should decide for themselves when they became independent.
- 721. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he had carefully studied the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) which set out the conclusions reached by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters. His Government had supported and would continue to support the speedy implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). It noted with great regret that many areas were still under the colonial yoke. The task facing the Committee and the General Assembly was gigantic, and he reiterated the unswerving devotion of his Government and people to the cause of freedom and self-determination for all.

- 722. In his delegation's view, paragraph 4 of the draft resolution did not appear to make the necessary distinction between the various United Nations organs. His delegation would therefore abstain in the vote on that paragraph and also on paragraph 10 concerning the dismantling of military bases. He had repeatedly expressed his delegation's categorical opposition to the establishment of military bases in the colonial Territories, because they tempted the administering Power to perpetuate its presence in the Territory concerned, but the dismantling of existing bases was a matter for the General Assembly or the Disarmament Conference at Geneva rather than for the Special Committee.
- 723. His delegation would also abstain on paragraph 12 for the same reasons which had led it to abstain in the vote on paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI).
- 724. Although his delegation intended to abstain on those three paragraphs, it would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole. He therefore requested a separate vote on paragraphs 4, 10 and 12.
- 725. The representative of *Iran* said that it was unnecessary for him to dwell on his delegaton's reasons for supporting the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1), the object of which was the speedy liquidation of colonialism everywhere. He wished, however, to make a reservation with regard to operative paragraph 10 for the reasons which his delegation had given at the time when a similar resolution was adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 in Algiers (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619). That reservation, based on a question of principle, in no way detracted from his country's unflinching support for the liberation of all peoples from colonial bondage.
- 726. During the consideration of the various agenda items, his delegation had emphasized that lasting peace could only be established in the world by eradicating all the social, economic and political ills created by colonialism and racialism. For those reasons his delegation had taken a firm and unequivocal stand against colonialism and fully supported the draft resolution despite its reservations on operative paragraph 10.
- 727. The representative of *Italy* pointed out that the operative part of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) consisted mainly of paragraphs taken from resolutions previously adopted and in particular from two adopted by the Special Committee in the past two days. He had already mentioned the question raised by operative paragraph 10 in his statement concerning Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena. Other points, such as those in operative paragraphs 2 and 4 were contained in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) or in the Special Committee's resolution of 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) on which the Italian delegation had abstained.
- 728. The provisions in some of the paragraphs reflected a sound approach to the remaining colonial problems and his delegation could support them. Unfortunately, the general wording of the draft resolution was such that it gave an over-all impression of unbalance and, as previously stressed in many of his delegation's statements on similar decisions, did not constitute a wholesome contribution to the search for the best ways and means of coping with the serious problems still confronting the Special Committee.
- 729. The Italian delegation noted with regret that such texts, though obviously inspired by the noble

- and lofty motives of implementing the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), did not take into consideration the suggestions offered on many occasions by the Italian and other delegations on the best means of pursuing the search for the most effective and constructive measures for putting such principles into practice. That would not prevent his delegation from making a sincere contribution to the Special Committee's work on future occasions, since it was convinced that differences on methods and approach would not forever impede the common endeavour to achieve the ideals which it upheld.
- 730. For those reasons his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1).
- 731. The representative of *Finland* said that it was unfortunate that there had been so little time to study the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1). He would therefore confine his remarks to some very brief and general comments.
- 732. Part of the text, as formulated, did not meet with the Finnish delegation's approval. A number of operative paragraphs were not in conformity with its beliefs and, in some cases, it felt that the competence of the Special Committee had been exceeded. A different or more precise wording would have been preferable in many instances. Moreover, the resolution as a whole appeared somewhat unbalanced. For those reasons the Finish delegation would abstain in the vote.
- 733. In a recent statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland had stressed that Finland had always been against racial discrimination but that, like the other Nordic countries, it took the view that, in order to be effective, enforcement measures required the approval of the Security Council, as prescribed in the Charter. Finland had therefore never supported any General Assembly resolutions recommending sanctions or applied such sanctions unilaterally.
- 734. The remaining problems of colonialism were perhaps the most difficult and frustrating of all. Their solution required a joint effort by the permanent members of the Security Council as well as by the United Nations as a whole. The progress made might be slow, but all nations should maintain their confidence in the United Nations as a universal organ for peaceful co-operation between independent Member States.
- 735. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the United States delegation had numerous reservations with regard to the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1). It naturally joined in reaffirming the right of all peoples to freedom and independence. The search for a practical, speedy and peaceful means of making that right a reality, especially in southern Africa, was the essence of the Special Committee's mandate. His delegation had, however, found it necessary in the past, and continued to find it necessary, to register objections to some of the steps set forth in the general implementing provisions of resolutions both in the Committee and in the General Assembly.
- 736. His delegation believed that the draft resolution under consideration, like the one on the Territories under Portuguese administration, encroached in several places upon the responsibilities of the Security Council. Those incursions were contained in some very sweeping and inexact phrases, for example, operative

paragraph 4 which recommended that the Council should make obligatory against Portugal, South Africa and the Smith régime the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter. It also believed that the findings set forth in operative paragraphs 2 and 6 concerning threats to international peace and security were a matter not for the Special Committee but for the Security Council. Similarly, it considered the request concerning the dismantling of bases, contained in operative paragraph 10, an incursion into the Security Council's sphere of responsibility. Such a question, if it was to be considered at all, would most probably arise in the United Nations organ which had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. His delegation did not share the view of some that the existence of a military installation in a dependent Territory automatically operated to the detriment of the people of that Territory, or prevented or delayed the exercise of their right to self-determination or their political, economic, social and cultural development.

737. Those objections left the United States delegation no choice but to vote against the draft resolution. It was as anxious as any other that the United Nations should act to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories and to help them advance as rapidly as possible towards self-government and freedom. It wanted to ensure for all the unfettered exercise of their right to self-determination and independence and had supported, and would continue to support, the responsible and practical actions which it considered designed to meet those objectives. It could not support the draft resolution, however, because it would not further progress towards those goals.

738. The Chairman drew the Special Committee's attention to paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), because some members appeared to think that there were certain contradictions in the provisions of the draft resolution under consideration (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1). He thought that that paragraph was the one which the sponsors of the draft resolution had in mind.

739. The representative of Australia said that his delegation felt that little purpose was to be served by such resolutions as the draft under discussion. Its aim was clear enough, but it was an omnibus-type of resolution and, perhaps for that reason, was framed in general and therefore inevitably imprecise terms.

740. He had made it clear, in his statements on the resolutions on specific Territories, that Australia strongly supported the principle of self-determination but that it could not support several paragraphs some of which were repeated in the draft before the Special Committee. With regard to operative paragraph 4, for example, he reminded the Committee of the views he had expressed on the proposal to use force in Southern Rhodesia. As far as a number of others were concerned, his delegation would either have the strongest reservations or would be strongly opposed. It intended, for instance, to vote against operative paragraphs 10 and 12.

741. For those reasons the Australian delegation intended to vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

742. At its 541st meeting, the Special Committee voted on the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) by roll-call vote. Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 16 votes to 4, with 1 abstention. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Finland, Italy, United States of America.

Abstaining: Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 10 was adopted by 13 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Italy, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 12 was adopted by 16 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Italy, United States of America. Abstaining: Finland, Venezuela.

743. The revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L. 414/Rev.1) as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to 2, with 2 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America. Abstaining: Finland. Italy.

744. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/252) adopted by the Special Committee on 20 June 1967 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having held meetings from 29 May to 21 June 1967 at Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kitwe, Zambia and Dar es Salaam, the United Republic of Tanzania, and having heard the statements of the spokesmen for these Governments,

"Having heard the petitioners from Territories under colonial rule,

"Having considered the situation in various Territories still under colonial domination,

"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966,

"Regretting the failure of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to participate in the meetings of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Im-

plementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples away from Headquarters,

"Noting with deep regret that six years after the adoption of the Declaration many Territories are still under colonial domination, and deploring the negative attitude taken by certain colonial Powers, and in particular the intransigent attitude of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa which refuse to recognize the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence,

"Deploring the attitude of certain States which, despite the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, continue to co-operate with the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and with the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia which are continuing to repress the African populations,

- "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people in colonial Territories to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "2. Further reassims the declaration of the General Assembly¹⁰ that the continuation of colonial oppression seriously threatens international peace and security and that the practice of apartheid, as also all forms of racial discrimination, constitutes a crime against humanity;
- "3. Deplores the refusal of certain colonial Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee and their continued disregard of the relevant United Nations resolutions;
- "4. Recommends once again that the Security Council make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against Portugal, South Africa and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
- "5. Condemns the activities of those foreign financial and other economic interests in colonial Territories, in particular in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination, which support colonial régimes and thus constitute a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and calls upon the Governments concerned to take the necessary measures to put an end to those activities;
- "6. Condemns further the formation in the southern part of Africa of an entente between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and calls upon all States to withhold any support or assistance to this entente, whose existence and activities run counter to the interests of international peace and security;
- "7. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and urges all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories;
- "8. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to
- ¹⁰ See resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, operative paragraph 6.

- increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial rule, their assistance to the refugees from these Territories;
- "9. Reaffirms further that the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "10. Requests the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories which are an obstacle to the liberation of the peoples of these Territories and the exercise of their legitimate rights to freedom and independence, and to refrain from establishing new ones;
- "11. Urges the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories under their administration and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance;
- "12. Requests all States, directly and through their action in the international institutions of which they are members, including the specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, and to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination;
- "13. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee, including in particular the preparation, in consultation with the Special Committee, of publications covering the work of the Committee at its current session away from Headquarters, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by colonial peoples."
- 745. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.¹¹

Adoption of resolution expressing appreciation to host Governments

- 746. At its 542nd meeting, the representative of *India* introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.415) co-sponsored by twenty-one members of the Special Committee. He said that it was a rare but happy event for the Special Committee to adopt a resolution unanimously. It was even more rare for all delegations present to join in sponsoring it. He was sure that the other three members of the Committee, had they been present, would have wished to support the resolution as well.
- 747. The resolution sought to express the feelings of gratitude which the Special Committee members felt towards the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania, for their generous invitations to the Committee to hold meetings in their respective countries, and for their warm reception, kind hospitality and enthusiasm for the Committee's work.
- 748. The second paragraph of the resolution referred to the statements made by the spokesmen of the host Governments, distinguished personalities who had

¹¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document S/8024.

provided valuable guidelines for the Special Committee in its work.

- 749. All members of the Special Committee felt that the mission to Africa had been very successful. The Committee had had the opportunity of hearing a number of petitioners, many of whom could never have travelled to New York. The Committee had visited refugee camps and the Mozambique Institute, which provided a glorious example of what determined freedom fighters could do to lay down a firm foundation for their country's future independence.
- 750. The impact made by the Special Committee's visit in Africa had been substantial and notable. It was regrettable that the remainder of the Committee's programme of visits could not be carried out because of unfortunate circumstances. The draft resolution was a general expression of appreciation on the part of all delegations, to the three Governments concerned for their generous hospitality and for the provision of facilities to help the Committee hold its meetings near the operations of the liberation movements.
- 751. At the same meeting the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.415) unanimously. The full text of the resolution (A/AC.109/253) adopted by the Special Committee at its 542nd meeting on 21 June 1967 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having held meetings from 29 May 1967 to 21 June 1967 successively at Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kitwe, Zambia and Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, and having heard the statements by the spokesmen for those Governments,

"Expresses its profound gratitude to the Governments and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to hold meetings in Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam, for providing the Committee with the necessary facilities for its meetings, and for their generous and kind hospitality."

ANNEX I

Communiqué issued on 12 April 1967 by the Chairman of the Special Committee

- 1. Availing itself of invitations extended to it by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, the Special Committee has decided to hold a series of meetings this year in Kinshasa, Baghdad, Damascus, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.
- 2. This decision, like the decisions taken by the Special Committee in previous years to hold meetings at various African capitals, was taken in the context of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 which in establishing the Special Committee authorized it "to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters, whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its functions". The Special Committee was also aware that the General Assembly in its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966 approved "the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1967, including... the possibility of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters".
- 3. In deciding to hold another series of meetings away from Headquarters this year the Special Committee was particularly

mindful of the constructive results achieved by its previous sessions in Africa. While it remains the desire of the Special Committee to visit the colonial Territories themselves, and to gain first hand experience of the realities of the situation there, this desire has regrettably been frustrated by the negative attitude of the administering Powers concerned. Nevertheless, by reason of the proximity afforded by its previous sessions in Africa and the availability of representatives of national liberation movements from the colonial Territories, the Special Committee was enabled to acquire more direct knowledge than before of conditions in these Territories and deeper understanding of the wishes and aspirations of their peoples. The knowledge and understanding thus obtained by the Special Committee were duly reflected in a number of concrete and important resolutions which were the basis of the relevant decisions taken by the General Assembly at succeeding sessions.

- 4. Also valuable to the work of the Special Committee during its previous sessions away from Headquarters was the co-operation it established with the Organization of African Unity through the participation of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa as well as of its Administrative Secretary-General and with the League of Arab States through the participation of its acting Secretary-General.
- 5. The Special Committee is increasingly concerned that progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has fallen far short of the expectations aroused by its adoption over six years ago. In particular, owing to the deliberate opposition or non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, the serious colonial problems that remain in southern Africa and in the Arabian peninsula have shown no perceptible movement towards peaceful solution within the context of the Declaration.
- 6. The forthcoming session of the Special Committee in the above-mentioned African and Arab countries will therefore serve not only to underline once again the active solidarity of the United Nations with colonial peoples in their legitimate struggle to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. In addition, the session will further enhance the capacity of the Special Committee to assist these peoples in realizing their aspirations, which are enshrined in the Charter, to freedom and independence. Finally, in the light of past experience the session will facilitate the appearance before the Special Committee of representatives of national liberation movements wishing to express their views regarding the future of their countries, who would otherwise find it impossible to travel to New York.
- 7. The programme of the Special Committee's meetings away from Headquarters is as follows:

Retrueen

Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of	20000
the Congo	26 May and 1 June 1967
Lusaka, Zambia	2 and 10 June 1967
Dar es Salaam, United Republic	
of Tanzania	11 and 20 June 1967
Baghdad, Iraq	21 and 26 June 1967
Damascus, Syria	27 June and 1 July 1967.

8. The items on the agenda of the Special Committee for these meetings will include all the colonial Territories in Africa, Aden, Oman, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The Special Committee will of course wish to hear all petitioners desiring to appear before it concerning these or other Territories. It envisages that at the capitals indicated below priority will be given to the hearing of petitioners concerning the following Territories:

Kinshasa

Territories under Portuguese administration (Angola, Cabinda and so-called Portuguese Guinea).

Lusaka

Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland and South West Africa.

Dar es Salaam

Territories under Portuguese administration (Mozambique), Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mauritius and the Seychelles, French Somaliland.

Baghdad

Aden and Oman.

Damascus

Aden and Oman.

ANNEX II

List of representatives who attended the Special Committee's meetings away from Headquarters

Chairman

Mr. J. W. S. MALECELA, United Republic of Tanzania

Rapporteur

Mr. M. S. Esfandiary, Iran

Members

Afghanistan

Mr. M. A. SAMMAH

Mr. A. S. GHAUS

Australia

Mr. H. D. WHITE

Mr. A. P. Godfrey-Smith

Bulgaria

Mr. M. Karasimeonov

Chile

Mr. J. Illanes

Ethiopia

Mr. A. G. Mekasha

Miss K. Sinegiorgis

Mr. F. TADESSE

Finland

Mr. M. CAWEN

Mr. T. Brotherus

India

Mr. C. R. GHAREKHAN

Iraq

Mr. S. A. SALEEM

ANNEX II (continued)

Italy

Mr. C. M. Rossi-Arnaud

Ivory Coast

Mr. K. KOUAME

Madagascar

Mr. R. G. RALISON

Mali

Мг. М. М. Тніам

Poland

Mr. K. Smiganowski

Sierra Leone

Mr. G. E. O. WILLIAMS

Svria

Mr. A. NACHABE

Tunisia

Mr. H. BEN AISSA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. B. P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. V. K. Fedorinov

Mr. G. I. VEKILOV

Mr. V. I. USTINOV

Mr. A. S. Pokrovski

United Republic of Tanzania

Mr. C. Y. MGONJA

Mr. R. S. Wambura

Mr. R. D. Swai

Mr. M. A. Foum

United States of America

Mr. O. Deming

Mr. R. Johnson

Mr. E. C. GRIGG

Venezuela

Mr. G. I. CARRASQUERO

Yugoslavia

Mr. D. Pejic

CHAPTER III*

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

- A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council
- 1. The situation in Southern Rhodesia has been under continuous consideration by the Special Committee since 1962 and has been the subject of numerous General Assembly resolutions. It was also considered by the Security Council both before and after the illegal declaration of independence. By its resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, adopted after the illegal declaration, the Security Council, inter alia, called upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to quell the rebellion of the racist minority and called upon all States not to recognize the illegal authority and to do their utmost to break

all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. By its resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, the Security Council called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empowered the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the *Joanna V* upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo was discharged there.¹

2. At its 407th meeting on 21 April 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on the question

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.1 and Corr.1.

¹ For details of Security Council decisions of April-May 1966, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, paras. 589-592.

- of Southern Rhodesia (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 587). In this resolution the Special Committee:
 - "1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;
 - "2. Reaffirms in particular General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) which condemns the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;
 - "3. Condemns the failure of certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council by giving support and assistance to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
 - "4. Calls upon the administering Power to take all effective measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
 - "5. Considers that the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security;
 - "6. Recommends to the Security Council to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia;
 - "7. Decides to transmit to the Security Council the records of the discussions of the Special Committee on this question;
 - "8. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on the agenda of the Special Committee and to review the situation whenever it considers it necessary."
- 3. During its meetings in Africa the Special Committee adopted a further resolution relating to Southern Rhodesia (*ibid.*, para. 1097), as well as a general resolution on the question of the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with particular reference to the Territories in southern Africa (*ibid.*, chap. II, para. 619).
- 4. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, adopted two resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia.
- 5. By its resolution 2138 (XXI) of 22 October 1966, the General Assembly:
 - "1. Condemns any arrangement reached between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime which will not recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "2. Reaffirms the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle of 'one man, one vote'."
- 6. By its resolution 2151 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, the General Assembly:
 - "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, and the

- legitimacy of their struggle for the exercise of that right;
- "2. Deplores the failure of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland so far to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
- "3. Condemns any arrangement between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime in the Territory which would transfer power to the latter on any basis and which would fail to recognize the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "4. Condemns the Governments of Portugal and South Africa for their support of the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
- "5. Condemns the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, are preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and calls upon the Governments of the States concerned to take all necessary measures to bring to an end such activities;
- "6. Draws the attention of the Security Council once again to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, in order that it may decide to apply the necessary enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:
- "7. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take prompt and effective measures to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia;
- "8. Calls once again upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all the necessary measures, including in particular the use of force, in the exercise of its powers as the administering Power, to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions;
- "9. Calls upon the administering Power to report on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- "10. Calls upon all States to extend all moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle to overthrow the illegal racist régime and to achieve freedom and independence;
- "11. Requests the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
- "12. Requests the Special Committee to continue its study of the situation in Southern Rhodesia;
- "13. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."
- 7. As at the end of December 1966, replies had been received from seventy-four States in response to the *notes verbales* of the Secretary-General transmitting the text of General Assembly resolution 2022

- (XX) of 5 November 1965 and Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 on the question of Southern Rhodesia (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 14; *ibid.*, chap. III, part II, annex, appendix II, paras. 3 and 4; and A/C.4/671)². The seventy-fourth reply was received from the Government of the Sudan and is contained in documents A/6479 and S/7558.³
- 8. At its 1331st to 1333rd, and 1335th through 1340th meetings, held between 8 and 16 December 1966, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a letter dated 5 December 1966⁴ from the representative of the United Kingdom in which he stated that since the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had not been brought to an end, and following consultation with other Commonwealth Governments, he had been instructed to request an early meeting of the Security Council at which his Government would propose certain additional measures to be taken against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.
- 9. At its 1340th meeting on 16 December 1966, the Security Council adopted resolution 232 (1966) by a roll-call vote of 11 to none, with 4 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first year, Resolutions and Decisions, 1966.]

- 10. By a note dated 17 December 1966, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies and drew their particular attention to the fact that the Security Council had acted in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter and had reminded Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the resolution would constitute a violation of Article 25 of the Charter. He drew attention to the provisions of operative paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the resolution and requested information, as early as possible, on the measures taken by the Governments in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.
- 11. In a further note dated 13 January 1967 addressed to States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, the Secretary-General added that he would appreciate receiving a detailed account of the action taken by the Governments in the implementation of operative paragraphs 2 and 5 of the resolution, as well as such other measures they might have taken in accordance with the spirit and general intent of the resolution. The Secretary-General transmitted with the note a questionnaire on imports and exports of the commodities listed in paragraph 2 of the resolution in order to facilitate the supply of uniform data by States and to enable the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council from time to time with analyses of the progress of the implementation of the resolution with regard to trade in those commodities.
- 12. In his first report in pursuance of the above resolution,⁵ the Secretary-General stated that up to

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first

Session, Annexes, agenda item 23.

³ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966.

4 Ibid., document \$/7610.

5 Ibid., Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, documents \$/7781 and Add.1.

- 21 February 1967 he had received replies from seventytwo States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies. The substantive parts of these replies were reproduced in annex II of the report.
- 13. The Secretary-General also noted in his report that a substantial number of States, including certain States which had significant trade with Southern Rhodesia, had not yet reported in pursuance of operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 232 (1966).
- 14. The Secretary-General noted further that while several States had undertaken to provide the trade statistics requested in his note of 13 January 1967, full information on the effect of implementation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) on the trade of Southern Rhodesia was not at present available and might not be available for some time. It was his intention to utilize the data hitherto provided by States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies as a basis for estimating the effect of these measures. A report to this effect would be submitted to the Council later.
- 15. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies would submit information on the measures taken in accordance with the provisions of the resolution or, in the case of those States which had replied to the two notes, information on further measures they had taken, if any.
- 16. The report also provided the Security Council with certain data on the trade of Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and 1966. These data, set out in document S/7781/Add.1, show the direction of past trade in commodities listed in the resolution and the value of the trade of Southern Rhodesia with each trading partner.
- 17. The second report of the Secretary-General⁶ in pursuance of the above resolution showed that nineteen more States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies had replied to the above notes, bringing the total to ninety-one. In addition to the replies mentioned above, the Secretary-General also drew attention to a letter dated 27 February 1967⁷ from the representative of Bulgaria transmitting "a statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the implementation of resolution 232 (1966) adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 1966 concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia".

B. Information on the Territory

1. Political developments (June-December 1966)

Opening of Southern Rhodesian "Parliament"

18. On 22 June 1966, the first session of the Southern Rhodesian "Parliament" since the illegal declaration of independence, was opened. The official opening was not attended by the judges of the High Court. The "Speaker of Parliament" issued a statement on 16 June 1966 in which he said that the judges had informed him that certain litigation was pending in the High Court involving the standing of the Government and possibly of Parliament itself. In these circumstances, the judges considered it proper to stand aloof from the present parliamentary proceedings. The statement added that both the "Speaker" and the "Prime Minister" recognized the desirability of judges

⁶ Ibid., document S/7781/Add.2.

⁷ Ibid., document S/7794.

preserving their impartiality in all judicial proceedings and appreciated the difficulties facing them.

- 19. Mr. Clifford Dupont, "Officer Administering the Government", delivered "the speech from the throne" after the Speaker had formally declared "Parliament" opened. The speech from the throne, under the 1961 Constitution, is delivered by the Governor as the Queen's representative.
- 20. After reviewing the work of the "Government" and outlining future legislative, economic and social plans of the régime, Mr. Dupont stated, inter alia, that it would be imprudent for the régime to ignore the threat to security which faced Southern Rhodesia from those who resented the peace and tranquillity enjoyed by all people in the country and who for their own purposes would rather see chaos supervene. His régime had no intention whatsoever of relaxing its forces either to deter aggression from any external source or to eliminate internal subversion. The regular forces of the British South Africa police, the Army and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force would continue to be maintained at maximum efficiency and every endeavour would be made to provide the additional training, for which in their keenness to be prepared, all branches of the reserves were being called.
- 21. In the field of international affairs, Mr. Dupont said that the régime had assumed full responsibility for the conduct of external relations, and the possibility of establishing formal diplomatic relations with other countries was under constant consideration. His régime appreciated the action of other Governments which had retained missions in Salisbury, notwithstanding that some had been reduced in size. Indeed his régime noted with gratification that of the twenty countries represented in Salisbury before 11 November 1965, only two, regrettably both Commonwealth countries, had withdrawn their local missions, and three others had terminated the appointment of their honorary consuls.

"African Affairs (Amendment) Bill"

22. The "Minister of Internal Affairs" of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. William Harper, introduced an "African Affairs (Amendment) Bill" in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in July 1966. He stated that policy towards the Southern Rhodesian African population would be channelled through the chiefs. He said that the bill contained provisions which would give more dignity and power to the chiefs, and these new powers would fulfil the undertaking which had been given by the "Government" to the country's tribal leaders. In the tribal areas, Mr. Harper said, the chiefs would now become responsible for the administration of their people. The "Government" had a high regard for African traditions and customs and did not wish to see them removed when they were not offensive to common right. Opposition members criticized a provision in the bill which made it mandatory for Southern Rhodesian chiefs to notify district commissioners of all rumours which might affect the public peace. The bill was subsequently approved by the Legislative Assembly and signed by the "Officer Administering the Government".

Extension of state of emergency

23. On 28 July 1966, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly purported to have approved the extension of the state of emergency for a further

three months. The state of emergency was declared by the Government of Southern Rhodesia on 5 November 1965, and has since been extended in three-month periods. In moving the emergency resolution, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, said there was an obvious threat to lives and properties from terrorist activity directed from Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. For these and other reasons the security forces must have the power to detain terrorists and saboteurs who infiltrated from neighbouring territories. In view of the threats still facing the country, the powers must be available to deal with any deteriorating situation and they must be able to maintain the emergency measures at present in force to deal with sanctions. On 27 October 1966, the Legislative Assembly again extended the state of emergency for a further three months to expire on 31 January 1967. On 26 January 1967, the Legislative Assembly approved a further threemonth extension of the state of emergency to expire on 30 April 1967.

Restriction powers extended for two years

24. On 23 August 1966, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly purported to have extended for two years, from 31 August, the period during which the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order" might restrict people without trial for periods up to five years. These powers of restriction were conferred on the Government of Southern Rhodesia in 1962 and were extended in 1964 for a further two years. Mr. Lardner-Burke, speaking on the motion seeking the further extension, said that they were still at a critical stage in their fight to maintain law and order under present circumstances and to maintain the comparative peace and calm which existed in Southern Rhodesia today. He emphasized that the powers sought had nothing whatever to do with detention since restrictees were given basic freedom of movement within an area, communications and so on. The Government would continue to use the courts whenever it could but the normal processes of the court were extremely difficult to apply in cases of subversion.

"Constitution Amendment Bill"

- 25. On 25 August 1966, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order" introduced in the Legislative Assembly the "Constitution Amendment Bill" to amend a number of provisions of the Declaration of Rights which form an entrenched chapter of the so-called 1965 Constitution carried over intact from the 1961 Constitution.
- 26. A statement issued by the Commonwealth Office in London on 25 August 1966 said that the United Kingdom Government had learnt with concern of the intention of the illegal régime in Salisbury to introduce a "Constitution Amendment Bill" containing powers of preventive detention and making changes in the specially entrenched clauses of the 1961 Constitution. These changes would, of course, have no legal validity. Ministers were studying the implications of these new developments.
- 27. Speaking on the bill in the Legislative Assembly on 26 August 1966, Mr. Lardner-Burke said that the bill was designed to make possible the passing of legislation to provide for detention without the existence of a state of emergency. This new legislation, "The Public Security Bill", would be presented to the Legislative Assembly in due course. He recalled that

preventive detention had been introduced in Southern Rhodesia by an act passed by a previous Government in 1959. The act, which had a life of five years, was renewed by the Government in 1964, but when challenged in the courts, was declared to be outside the powers of the 1961 Constitution. Neither, he said, had the 1965 Constitution made any provision for preventive detention outside of a state of emergency. The Public Security Bill would therefore remedy this omission and regularize the laws relating to all restricted and detained persons and so restore the position as it was in 1959.

28. So that the detention of an individual should not be left entirely to the discretion of the "Minister of Justice", Mr. Lardner-Burke said the bill would provide for the establishment of an impartial body other than the Minister which would give consideration to each case. The powers of preventive detention without a state of emergency, he added, were absolutely necessary to permit the "Government" to maintain law and order in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Lardner-Burke denied that the proposed amendments to the Constitution were an attempt to give the régime more permanent and arbitrary power with the object of stifling the Opposition.

29. Mr. Harper, "Minister of Internal Affairs", also stated that the bill would empower the régime to introduce legislation to give the African chiefs greater powers in the administration of their areas. Among other powers, the proposed legislation would give the chiefs or their courts powers for dealing with certain criminal offences. The legislation would not force the tribal courts to adhere to the Declaration of Rights in so far as legal representation was concerned. It would also give powers to the chiefs for the removal of certain people from one position of tribal trust land to another. The legislation would also make some changes in relation to tribal trust lands.

30. During the debate on the second reading of the bill on 8 September, the Leader of the Opposition and most of the opposition United People's Party (UPP) members walked out of the Assembly; they had not returned when the vote was taken. There were 48 votes for the bill and 2 against (1 UPP member and 1 independent member). Mr. Ian Smith announced on 14 September that the bill had been signed by Mr. Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government".

Court judgement

- 31. Within the period under review, many cases which in one way or the other challenged the legality of the Ian Smith régime were brought before the courts of Southern Rhodesia. Of these, the most important in terms of the judgement delivered was the case before the High Court in which two detainees, Mr. Leo Baron and Mr. Daniel Madzimbamuto, had applied to be released on the ground that the orders detaining them were illegal. The Court held on 9 September 1966 that their application must fail.
- 32. One of the two judges, Mr. Justice Lewis, was reported to have stated his conclusions in the case, which came before the High Court in Salisbury in March 1966 as follows:
 - "1. The 1965 constitution is not the lawful constitution of this country and the government of this country set up under it is not the lawful government; it will not become the lawful government

unless and until the ties of sovereignty are severed either by consent or by acquiescence of Her Majesty's Government in abandoning the attempt to end the revolution.

- "2. The government is, however, the only effective government of the country and therefore on the basis of necessity and in order to avoid chaos and a vacuum in the law this court should give effect to such measures of the effective government, both legislative and administrative, as could lawfully have been taken by the lawful government under the 1961 constitution for the preservation of peace and good government and the maintenance of law and order.
- "3. The extensions of the state of emergency and of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations contained in Rhodesian Government Notice 71 of 1966 made thereunder are measures falling within the above category and neither in their purpose nor in their mode of enforcement in the present cases have they been shown to be hostile to the authority of the sovereign power or to have impaired the just rights of citizens under the 1961 constitution or to have been taken with actual intent to further the revolution.... In the result I am of the opinion that both applications must fail."
- 33. The other judge, Mr. Justice Goldin, agreed in a separate judgement with the conclusions of Mr. Justice Lewis. He was reported to have written:

"In my view, after careful consideration of the unprecedented situation in which the court finds itself, I am satisfied that the court can and should give effect to at least certain legislative measures and administrative acts performed by virtue of powers exercised under the 1965 constitution. I base my conclusion on the doctrine of public policy, the application of which is required, justified and rendered unavoidable in these circumstances by necessity."

An appeal by the two detainees against the judgement is currently being heard by the Court of Appeals in Salisbury.

Changes in Southern Rhodesian opposition leadership

34. The opposition UPP caucus on 31 August 1966 replaced Mr. Chad Chipunza by Mr. Josiah Gondo as party leader. Mr. Gondo, who became Leader of the Opposition, formerly led the party before Mr. Chipunza. On 22 January 1967, at a later party congress, Mr. Percy Mkudu was elected to succeed Mr. Gondo.

Deputy Prime Minister named

35. On 7 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith named as "Deputy Prime Minister" Mr. John Wrathall. The announcement said that Mr. Wrathall would continue to hold the portfolio of finance in addition to his new responsibilities.

Rhodesian Front Party Congress

36. The annual Congress of the Rhodesian Front Party was held in Bulawayo from 22 to 24 September 1966. It was reported to have been attended by more than 500 party delegates from all over the country. The open session, which started on 23 September 1966, was addressed by Mr. Ian Smith in his capacity as

president of the party. In his statement, Mr. Smith recapitulated the history of the party from the time of the 1961 Constitution to the period ending with the illegal declaration of independence and stated that as long as he continued to be president of the party, his régime would never deviate from the principles which the party stood for and the promises it had made to the electorate of Southern Rhodesia. Regarding the period after the illegal declaration of independence, he stated that "Rhodesians" had come a long way, which he described as an incredible success. So long as they continued to succeed, those friends that they had in the world today would not let them down. They were carrying on one of the most incredible exercises in contemporary history by standing up not to one great country, but almost to the whole world.

- 37. On 24 September, the Congress, in closed session, held the election of party officers. The results of the elections showed few changes from 1965. Mr. Ian Smith was re-elected president of the party. Mr. William Harper, "Minister of Internal Affairs", and Lord Graham, "Minister of External Affairs and Defence", were re-elected as deputy presidents. Four party vice-presidents were elected—two of whom have to be "MPs" and two drawn from party members. They were Mr. John Wrathall, "Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance", Mr. Jack Carey, Mr. Stan Eastwood and Mr. D. C. Lilford. Col. W. M. Knox was re-elected chairman of the party and Mr. Ralph Neilson was elected deputy chairman.
- 38. The Congress debated twenty resolutions on both local and national affairs. Of these resolutions, the most important was adopted on 24 September 1966, by which the Congress unanimously endorsed the action of the "Government" during the last twelve months and recorded its full confidence in the "Prime Minister" and his cabinet and caucus. The proposer and seconder and all the speakers mentioned not only the courage and determination that had been shown by the "Prime Minister" and his cabinet, but also the "unity that they had achieved amongst the people of Southern Rhodesia". In a statement after the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Smith said that by the resolution, the Congress had made him and his officers even stronger and more dedicated. After this they could not, even if they had any intention of doing so, deviate or let the party down.

Clashes with nationalists

- 39. On 13 May 1966, twenty Africans were sentenced in Salisbury to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour after being found guilty in the High Court of being saboteurs and spies. All were found guilty of preparing for an African nationalist attempt to overthrow the white minority régime. A twenty-first man was given five years with hard labour. In his judgement, the judge said that a sabotage training scheme had been organized in Lusaka, Zambia, by officials of the banned Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) with staging posts at Mbeya and Dar es Salaam.
- 40. A European farmer, Mr. Viljoen, and his wife were murdered in the farming district of Hartley, about seventy miles from Salisbury, on 17 May. A police statement said that they had been shot with an automatic weapon and that the murders were believed to be "the work of a dangerous gang". Later the same day in Lusaka, responsibility for the murders

- was claimed by the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).
- 41. On 1 June 1966, the Southern Rhodesian police announced that an African arrested on suspicion of being connected with the terrorist gang that murdered the white couple had died from wounds he received. The police had said earlier that he had been wounded when arrested by the security forces.
- 42. On 13 June 1966, there was a two-hour outbreak of violence in Salisbury. During the outbreak, a hotel about seven miles from the city near the African township of Highfield was stoned and petrol bombs thrown. A car in the hotel grounds was set on fire but the fire was extinguished. A furniture warehouse in the same vicinity was burnt out causing damage estimated at £50,000. A bus was burnt out in Highfield township when an incendiary device was thrown into it. Other stoning incidents in the African township and an attempt to set fire to an office in the industrial sites were reported. It was also reported that in the neighbouring township of Harare there were scattered outbreaks of stone-throwing.
- 43. On 22 June 1966, three Africans who were accused of having attacked a train with knobkerries and stones and set it on fire with petrol were sentenced to death in the High Court in Bulawayo. The sentence for such an offence is mandatory under Southern Rhodesia's Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.
- 44. On 23 June 1966, seven Africans who were reported to have been caught armed in Southern Rhodesia after entering the country secretly from Zambia were sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment each in the High Court in Salisbury. The judge found the men guilty of illegally possessing a large quantity of Soviet and Chinese weapons and explosives. Evidence was given that all the accused were members of the banned ZANU. The prosecution said they had entered the country secretly from Zambia on 1 April 1966, with orders to blow up the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline, attack white farmers and fight the army and police in an attempt to overthrow the "Government".
- 45. On 19 July, the Southern Rhodesian police stated that an "African nationalist terrorist gang" had opened fire on Southern Rhodesian security forces and hurled hand grenades at them in a gun battle in a remote part of the Zambezi Valley on 18 July 1966. The statement said that the security forces immediately returned fire, killing one "terrorist". The dead African was "positively identified" by the police as a member of the nationalist gang which had gunned down the white farming couple in the Hartley district, about seventy miles from Salisbury, in May. A member of the security forces was said to have been wounded but not seriously. The statement said that the terrorists fled shortly after the start of the battle.
- 46. On 22 July 1966, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, in reply to a question in "Parliament", stated that there had been eighty acts of sabotage since the illegal declaration of independence. There had been twenty attacks on railroads, twenty-three cases of interference with essential services, thirty-two Molotov cocktail cases, and five involving the use of explosives.
- 47. On 5 August 1966, the "Department of Information" announced that five African "terrorists" would appear in the Sinoia magistrates' court the same day to answer charges of carrying offensive weapons. The statement said that the terrorists had surrendered to

the security forces during the recent operations in the Zambezi Valley near the frontier with Zambia. It said that the terrorists had infiltrated Southern Rhodesia from Zambia and were members of a banned Rhodesian African nationalist organization. On 3 October 1966, four of the arrested Africans were sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment each for the above charges. The fifth African was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.

- 48. On 12 August 1966, the police reported that seven white people and an African waiter were taken to a hospital with slight injuries after an explosion in a café in the city centre near the Salisbury town hall. A subsequent police statement said that the bomb thrown into the café was a hand grenade. On 24 August 1966, it was reported that the Southern Rhodesian police had arrested four Africans in connexion with the grenade thrown into the café. On 21 September 1966, two Africans were sentenced to death by a Salisbury court for the hand-grenade attack in the café.
- 49. On 15 August 1966, the police reported that another group of African "terrorists" had surrendered to Southern Rhodesian forces. According to the statement by the police, they were captured in an area to the north of Matabeleland. It was alleged that these individuals who recently left Lusaka, Zambia, had received training in a communist or pro-communist country and were carrying weapons and materials of communist origin. On 29 September 1966, eleven of the terrorists were each sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment for possessing firearms.

Official statements on security forces

- 50. The annual defence report tabled in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 26 April 1966 stated that throughout the past year emphasis had been placed on counter-insurgency in training at all levels and on "the defence phase of limited war". Certain parts of the country's borders were now under continuous surveillance and troops were permanently stationed at Kariba. The Royal Rhodesian Air Force possessed a considerable strike ability which posed a valid deterrent to aggression. In almost 13,000 hours flown, a daily serviceability rate of 82 per cent had been recorded.
- 51. The "Ministry of Defence" of the illegal régime announced on 1 July 1966 that territorial force and army reserve training camps would be held between 24 July and 2 October 1966. An official announcement said that the camps would be held in areas not only in but outside the main centres of the country and training would include refresher courses, range firing, and night operations.
- 52. In a recorded interview which was broadcast on 26 August 1966 on the African Service of the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation, the "Minister of Internal Affairs", Mr. William Harper, said that nearly all the terrorists who had entered Southern Rhodesia had been captured and that the security forces had shot whole gangs of terrorists, not one surviving, when they had resisted arrest. Those people ought to know that when they resisted arrest that was the sort of treatment they were going to receive from the armed forces of Southern Rhodesia. Asked what sort of reception Southern Rhodesian Africans who had left their country and wished to return would receive, Mr. Harper replied that if those people were terrorists their chances of being rounded up were extremely high.

- 53. On Southern Rhodesia's security position, Mr. Harper said that there was no suggestion of a general breakdown in law and order. Since political hooligans had been removed from the townships and countryside he thought that everyone would admit that life for the average man and woman was far more peaceful than anything the country had known for a long time. He said that it had always been the case in Southern Rhodesia that it was only those who did wrong, the evil-doers, who had cause to fear the authorities. People who organized the terrorists should not think that they could work against Southern Rhodesia while they lived beyond its borders and then be welcomed back with open arms if they sought to return. Those people shared equally the guilt with the actual terrorists themselves. Mr. Harper said that if such people fell into the hands of the police they would be dealt with as the criminals they were, and they should remember that the police did not close cases on such persons until they had achieved their objective.
- 54. In a recorded interview on the African Service of the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation on 2 September 1966, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins, AOC, the "Royal Rhodesian Air Force", stated that apart from South Africa, the Royal Rhodesian Air Force was the strongest and best balanced force within 3,500 miles. He said that there was nothing like the Royal Rhodesian Air Force "this side of North Africa". The RRAF had the weapons and the bombs. Air Vice Marshall Hawkins said: "If anyone attacked us, if we were certain that anyone was about to attack us, then we reserve the right to defend ourselves in this way, by using our offensive force. But let us be clear for this moment and for the foreseeable future that we have no aggressive intention against anyone." The Rhodesian Air Force jet bombers were the country's strike effort. This meant that anyone with evil intentions towards the country would have to think twice before attacking it. It also meant that if anyone was misguided enough to launch a fairly large landbased assault against the country, it could withstand these forces and give support to the army and other security forces in repelling such an attack. The Rhodesian Air Force was also well equipped and capable of capturing and wiping out small groups of terrorists, In case of an attack the Rhodesian Air Force would, with transport aircraft and helicopters, get ground forces to any point, in some cases, within minutes. Asked if he could see any threat which the country could not meet, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins said he did not. He just hoped that no one was misguided enough to pose one.

Further clashes with Africans

55. On 2 September 1966, three alleged African "terrorists" were committed to trial in Bulawayo for being in possession of offensive weapons. A fourth African appearing with them was committed to a similar charge and was alleged to have hidden guns and ammunition for the terrorists. The men were reported to be handcuffed in pairs and wearing leg-irons when they were escorted into court by the police. At the preliminary hearing, the judge ruled, among other things, that the political parties they represented should not be published. They were reported to have crossed the border into Southern Rhodesia from Zambia. On 27 September 1966, the three African terrorists were each gaoled for eighteen years, and the fourth for six years.

- 56. The police announced on 27 September that two suspected "terrorists" had been killed and a number of others captured in a clash with security forces on 25 September 1966. The action took place in the Chirundi Valley near the Zambian border when a patrol of the Rhodesian Light Infantry ran into the alleged terrorist group, According to the report one member of the security forces suffered a slight injury. The clash, according to the police, took place near the spot where an African driver was found shot dead and his truck wrecked in the Chirundi Valley on 18 September. Since then the police had instituted a convoy and patrol system in the area. Seven Africans accused of the murder on 18 September of an African truck driver were found guilty and sentenced to death in Salisbury High Court on 14 December. In passing sentence, Mr. Justice Fieldsend said that the men were members of a gang who had entered the country with the avowed intention of raising a "rebellion riot". All seven men pleaded not guilty to the charges and appealed against the verdict.
- 57. On 6 October 1966, an African clerk was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for being in possession of offensive weapons.
- 58. On 1 November, Mr. Elisha Tarisayi, an African, was sentenced to death under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act in the Salisbury High Court. He had been found guilty for having thrown a hand grenade at a suburban house in August. No one had been injured in the ensuing explosion.
- 59. On 3 November, four Africans who had been found guilty of having been in possession of offensive weapons and of having entered Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of making war, received the death penalty in Salisbury High Court. The Court was told that the men had been captured by a patrol of the Rhodesian Light Infantry in the Zambezi Valley near the Zambia border.
- 60. Two Africans were each sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the High Court in Salisbury on 8 November for illegal possession of two machineguns of French manufacture and over 2,000 rounds of ammunition of Russian and Italian manufacture. A third African received a prison sentence of eight years for a similar offence.
- 61. Following an official report from Zambia that a Zambian woman had been shot while in a canoe on the Zambezi River near the Zambian shore, an official statement in Salisbury on 8 November said that Rhodesian security forces in the Chirundi area had surprised three Africans in a boat near the Rhodesian bank of the Zambezi and that the security forces had opened fire on the boat when the occupants, called upon to identify themselves, had paddled back across the river. The Rhodesian statement said it was possible that one person in the boat may have received fatal injuries, and emphasized that persons attempting to enter Rhodesia at places other than recognized border posts, particularly in areas known to be favoured by infiltrating terrorists, ran the risk of injury or possibly death.
- 62. The appeals of seven Africans, who had each been sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on charges concerning the bringing of arms and explosive materials into Rhodesia with the intention of using them, were dismissed by the appellate division of the High Court in Salisbury on 19 November.

63. On 23 November, four Africans were convicted by the High Court in Salisbury on charges of carrying offensive weapons and attempted murder. They were stated to have been captured by a Rhodesian Light Infantry patrol operating near the Zambezi Valley. The arms were reported to have included three Russian rifles, a Chinese rocket launcher with seven rockets, twelve American hand grenades and six British antipersonnel mines. The accused were all sentenced to death

Reports on clashes

- 64. A pamphlet prepared by the illegal régime on "terrorist" activities entitled *Nowhere to Hide* was issued on 17 October 1966. According to the pamphlet, as of the end of September 1966, twelve African "terrorists" had been killed and several score captured by the security forces with the co-operation of the local African population. According to the pamphlet, the terrorist campaign had been a dismal failure.
- 65. Reports issued by both ZANU and ZAPU in 1966 claimed that their forces had killed large numbers of the security forces of the illegal régime in the past months.

Restrictees and detainees

- 66. On 21 June 1966 it was reported that the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the banned ZANU, and some of his lieutenants had been moved from their restriction camp at Sokombela, near Que Que, to the remand prison in Salisbury. It was reported that this was believed to be a security precaution in view of recent outbreaks of violence which had been publicly claimed by the party.
- 67. Mr. Lardner-Burke stated in the "Legislative Assembly" on 1 July 1966 that ninety-five people had been detained under the emergency measures since the declaration of independence in November 1965. Of these, six had been released on permit and three had had their orders revoked. He declined to reveal where they were being held. He also stated that 331 people had been in restriction camps before "independence".
- 68. Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, was released from restriction on 18 October 1966, upon the expiration of his one-year restriction order.

Africans awaiting hanging

69. As at December 1966, it was reported that there were about seventy Africans convicted of murder and offences under the mandatory "hanging clause" of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act waiting indefinitely in the Salisbury death cells because of the constitutional and legal uncertainty surrounding the Ian Smith régime. Mr. Herbert Bowden, Commonwealth Secretary, and Sir Elwyn Jones, the Attorney General, were reported to have let it be known during their visit to Salisbury in September that the signing of a death warrant by Mr. Dupont under the present circumstances would have serious consequences for him and those concerned.

University College and the illegal régime

70. On 16 July 1966, a group of African students demonstrated against the illegal régime at the annual graduation ceremony of the University College of Rhodesia.

- 71. On 27 July 1966, the Southern Rhodesian police detained under the emergency regulations nine lecturers and an Asian student. Nine other students, three Whites, one Asian and five Africans, were also placed under restriction.
- 72. On 31 July 1966, eight of the nine lecturers detained were served with deportation orders and left Southern Rhodesia on 3 August. The ninth, a Britishborn Rhodesian citizen, was released on 31 July and escorted to the airport where he left for London on the same day. The Asian student who had been detained with the lecturers was also released and left for the United Kingdom by air on 2 August.
- 73. Of the nine restricted students, five of them—all African—were restricted at the Gonakudzinkwa restriction camp where the African nationalist leader, Mr. Josiah Nkomo, is being held.
- 74. It was announced on 2 September that a number of persons had been detained under the emergency powers regulations; these included another lecturer from the University College, Mr. John Andrew Conradie. On 5 September, Mr. Conradie and an employee of an industrial firm, Mr. Dixon, were charged in the Salisbury magistrates' court with offences against the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The prosecution alleged "that the accused, with others at the University College, were members of a group responsible for the reception, storage and eventual distribution of offensive materials for use against the European community, their property and homes", and that the group was "responsible for maintaining contact with infiltrated terrorists". Another allegation involved the possession of Russian hand grenades. It was stated that warrants had been issued for the arrest of two former lecturers at the college, both of whom were reported to have left Southern Rhodesia.
- 75. On 20 February 1967, Mr. Conradie was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for offences rising out of terrorist activities.

Exploratory talks between United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian officials

- 76. It will be recalled that on 27 April 1966, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Commons that informal talks between officials of the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia had been arranged, directed only to see whether a basis for negotiations genuinely existed, and that they were without commitment on either side.
- 77. Altogether, three rounds of informal talks were held between 9 May and 25 August 1966. The first round of the informal talks was held in London from 9 to 20 May 1966, followed by two sessions in Salisbury between 2 June and 5 July, and between 22 and 25 August 1966.
- 78. The talks were mainly directed, firstly, to the method and condition of a return to legality and constitutional rule in Southern Rhodesia, and the determination of the question of with whom official negotiations could subsequently take place; and, secondly, to an informal exploration in detail of constitutional problems to see what amendments to the 1961 Constitution would be needed to give effect to the six principles which had been the basis of discussions with the legal Southern Rhodesian Government up to 11 November 1965.

- 79. The six principles to which the United Kingdom Government was committed in the above and subsequent discussions with the Southern Rhodesian authorities were as follows:
- (1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
- (2) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
- (3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
- (4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
- (5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
- (6) It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.
- 80. The third round of informal talks ended on 25 August 1966, soon after the British officials were informed of the illegal régime's plans to introduce the Constitution Amendment Bill in the Legislative Assembly (see paras. 25-30 of this chapter). The bill was described by a spokesman of the Commonwealth Relations Office as a most provocative act. Mr. Smith, however, was reported to have stated that his Government had not introduced the bill to end the talks, although the United Kingdom had used it for that purpose.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference

- 81. A Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference was held in London from 6 to 14 September 1966 and was primarily devoted to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Twenty-two Commonwealth countries were represented.
- 82. In the separate communiqué issued on Southern Rhodesia at the close of the Conference, most of the Heads of Government urged that Britain should make a categorical declaration that independence would not be granted before majority rule was established on the basis of universal adult franchise and that this declaration should not be conditional on whether the illegal régime agreed to surrender or not. They further urged that Britain should refuse to resume discussions or to negotiate with the illegal régime.
- 83. According to the communiqué, the British Prime Minister stated that the British Government would not recommend to the British Parliament any constitutional settlement which did not conform with the six principles; that they attached particular importance to the fifth principle, namely that any settlement must be, and be seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; that they regarded it as implicit in this fifth principle that the test of acceptability must enable the people of Rhodesia as a whole to indicate whether or not they were prepared to accept any settlement which provided for the grant of independence before majority rule was achieved; and that there would be no independence before majority rule if the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be opposed to it.
- 84. The Conference noted the following decisions of the British Government:

- (a) After the illegal régime was ended a legal government would be appointed by the Governor and would constitute a broadly based representative administration. During this interim period the armed forces and police would be responsible to the Governor. Those individuals who had been detained or restricted on political grounds would be released and normal political activities would be permitted provided that they were conducted peacefully and democratically without intimidation from any quarter;
- (b) The British Government would negotiate, with this interim administration, a constitutional settlement directed to achieving the objective of majority rule, on the basis of the six principles;
- (c) This constitutional settlement would be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by appropriate democratic means;
- (d) The British Parliament and Government must be satisfied that this test of opinion was fair and free and would be acceptable to the general world community;
- (e) The British Government would not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be in favour of it.
- 85. The communiqué stated that the Heads of Government also noted that the British Government proposed immediately to communicate the British intentions, as indicated above, through the Governor to all sections of opinion in Rhodesia and to inform the illegal régime there that if they were not prepared to take the initial and indispensable steps whereby the rebellion was brought to an end and executive authority was vested in the Governor, the following related consequences would ensue:
- (a) The British Government would withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which had been made: in particular it would not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involved independence before majority rule:
- (b) Given the full support of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, the British Government would be prepared to join in sponsoring in the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of 1966 a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.
- 86. On 16 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have said that his régime was under no obligation to accept any decisions made at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, as it had not been invited to attend.

Discussion of the United Kingdom Government's proposals

87. The Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Herbert Bowden, and the Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones, visited Southern Rhodesia from 19 to 28 September 1966 for the purposes indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué on Southern Rhodesia. During the course of their visit, they met under the aegis of the Governor, a cross-section of representative opinion in the country, including Mr. Smith and members of the régime. In these talks they clarified the United Kingdom Government's requirements for a settlement of the Southern Rhodesian problem and what the consequences of the rejection of the United Kingdom proposals would be. Discussions of the proposals were continued during a visit to Southern

Rhodesia in October by Sir Morris James, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office. Further discussions of the proposals took place when the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, paid a second visit to Salisbury between 25 and 27 November 1966, and had talks with the Governor and also met Mr. Smith. Following the return of the Commonwealth Secretary to London, Sir Morris James left for Salisbury on 28 November to see the Governor and under his auspices to clarify certain issues which had arisen from the Commonwealth Secretary's report on his discussions in Salisbury.

Meeting between the United Kingdom Prime Minister and Mr. Smith

- 88. Mr. Harold Wilson told the House of Commons on 1 December 1966 that he was leaving that afternoon, together with the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General, for a meeting with the Governor of Southern Rhodesia and Mr. Ian Smith. The purpose of the meeting was to ascertain whether, within the programme of action to which the United Kingdom Government was committed by the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, a settlement of the Rhodesian problem could be reached on the basis of the principles to which successive British Governments had throughout adhered.
- 89. The meeting of the British Prime Minister and Mr. Ian Smith took place aboard H.M.S. *Tiger* off Gibraltar from 2 to 4 December. Also present were the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General; the Governor and the Chief Justice of Rhodesia; and another member of the Rhodesian régime, Mr. Howman.
- 90. The meeting resulted in a working document setting out proposals for an independent constitution which would accord with the six principles and arrangements within the requirements indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué for a return to legality.
- 91. A statement was signed by the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, in the presence of the Governor, on 4 December, indicating that this document was without commitment on either side and that both sides would decide by 12 noon (Salisbury time) on 5 December whether it was accepted in its entirety.

Proposals for a settlement

- 92. The working document was drawn up in accordance with the six principles and provisions were made for a return to legality and the testing of opinion.
- 93. As set out in the working document, Chapter III of the 1961 Constitution as modified would be entrenched in the new constitution, subject to the increase of constituencies ("A" roll seats) called for by the normal increase of population. This increase would be effected by an agreed formula which would safeguard against diminishing African representation. In modification of the Chapter, the number of "A" roll seats would be reduced from fifty to thirty-three, the "B" roll seats increased from fifteen to seventeen, and a new block of seventeen European seats created. A Senate would be created composed of twelve European seats and fourteen African seats, eight popularly elected and six elected by the Chiefs' Council; entrenched provisions could be amended only by a three-quarters vote of both houses and amendments could

not come into effect until the time-limit for appeals had expired. Appeals against amendments would be made first to a Constitutional Commission in Rhodesia and further to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In addition, the "B" roll franchise would be extended to all Africans over thirty years of age and cross-voting would be retained.

94. Steps for a return to legality required the appointment by the Governor of a broad-based interim government with Mr. Smith as Prime Minister which would include representatives of existing political parties, independents and Africans; the dissolution of the legislature; and the restoration of constitutional government based on the 1961 Constitution, modified (by Order in Council) to provide that during the interim period, which would last a minimum of four months, the ministers would be responsible to the Governor, who would have legislative powers and would normally act on their advice in all internal matters. In cases involving law and order and protection of human rights the Governor would be advised, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, by a Defence and Security Council comprising the responsible ministers, the heads of the Defence Forces, the Chief of Police, and a representative of the British Government. Furthermore, during the interim period, the test of acceptability of the new constitution would be carried out and new elections held; if the constitution was found to be approved, a further election on the basis of that constitution would be held. Failing acceptance, however, alternative proposals for a new constitution would be devised by both Governments. Additionally, before any testing of opinion, censorship would be removed, prisoners detained on security grounds released, and normal political activities permitted. Regarding racial discrimination, a Royal Commission would be set up to study the question and make recommendations, especially with regard to land apportionment; a standing commission would keep the problem under regular review. Finally, the proposals called for the negotiation of a treaty guaranteeing the independence constitution under which, in the event that unilateral action against the constitution was again taken by the Government in power, Britain reserved the right to use force.

White Paper on proposals for a settlement

95. A White Paper issued on the proposals for a settlement8 stated that the document provided for unimpeded progress to majority rule (i.e., the first principle), while finding a means of introducing European reserved seats (to give effect to the sixth principle). It met the second principle by establishing an effective blocking mechanism in a Senate and Lower House voting together, and by providing a right of appeal against the amendment of specially entrenched clauses of the constitution, in the first instance to a constitutional commission in Rhodesia, and from that commission, as of right, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It met the third principle (i.e., an immediate improvement of the political status of the Africans) by an extension of the "B" roll franchise to cover all Africans over thirty years of age; by increasing the "B" roll seats in the Lower House from fifteen to seventeen, and by a total of fourteen African seats in the Senate of which eight would be elected and six would be Chiefs.

96. Also, according to the White Paper, the fourth principle was met by a Royal Commission to study and make recommendations on the problems of racial discrimination and land apportionment. It also suggested satisfactory arrangements within the requirements indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué for a return to legality by means of the appointment by the Governor of a broad-based administration, and for the testing of the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole as required by the fifth principle after constitutional government had been restored.9

Working document rejected by illegal régime

97. On 4 December 1966, the United Kingdom Government accepted the working document in its entirety. On the evening of 5 December 1966, the Ian Smith régime informed the United Kingdom Government that it was unwilling to accept the document in its entirety. According to the White Paper on the working document, as had been made clear to Mr. Smith on the H.M.S. Tiger, and as he had recognized in signing the statement, the illegal régime had thus rejected the document.

98. In a subsequent statement on 5 December 1966, Mr. Ian Smith said that the Rhodesian Government was prepared to accept the constitutional proposals by Mr, Wilson which fulfilled the six principles as a basis for a constitution for an independent Rhodesia. He added, however, that the British Government's expectation that the Rhodesian Government would abandon the 1965 Constitution before a new constitution had finally been secured and put to the test of public opinion, was utterly irresponsible. The proposals also envisaged by Mr. Wilson under the heading "A Return to Legality" were repugnant to the Rhodesian Government involving as they did: (a) control of the armed forces and police being invested in the Governor; (b) the Governor being invested with discretion to appoint the ministers of the Crown, of whom no less than five were to be appointed outside the government party and not less than two must be Africans; (c) the dissolution of Parliament and the Governor being invested with legislative powers which in general would be exercised on the advice of his ministers, but which in certain cases might be exercised at his discretion.

Further action taken by the United Kingdom Government in pursuance of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué

99. On 5 December 1966, the United Kingdom Government requested an early meeting of the Security Council to propose certain additional measures to be taken against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia (see para. 9).

100. On 20 December, Mr. Wilson stated in the House of Commons that the British Government was from that time withdrawing all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement and that it would not submit to Parliament any settlement involving independence before majority rule. By this declaration the United Kingdom fulfilled its final obligation under the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué of 14 September 1966.

⁸ Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement—1965 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Cmnd. 3159.

⁹ For details covering the whole range of talks, see Rhodesia: Documents Relating to Proposals for a Settlement—1966 (Lendon, Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Cmnd. 3171.

101. In his statement Mr. Wilson explained that in the future a settlement could be brought about only by a legal government and that the settlement would consist of a return to the 1961 Constitution, the lifting of sanctions, and long-term progress to majority rule set out in the 1961 Constitution. At present, Mr. Wilson continued, there had been no change in the Government's position regarding the use of force, but if a change were necessitated by events the House would be informed.

Other developments between the United Kingdom Government and the illegal régime

102. The House of Commons on 10 November 1966 approved without a division the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1966. The Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, which empowers the United Kingdom Government to legislate for Southern Rhodesia by orders in council and provides for executive authority in Rhodesia to be exercised on behalf of the Queen by the Commonwealth Secretary (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, part I, appendix II), was due to have expired on 15 November. It now continues in force.

Relations with South Africa

103. Throughout 1966, the Government of the Republic of South Africa maintained its policy of "non-intervention" in "the Rhodesian dispute" as laid down by Dr. Hendrick Verwoerd in his policy statement of 11 November 1965 (*ibid.*, part I, para. 124). Accordingly, South Africa continued "to maintain the normal friendly relations" with both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia. Within the period under review, the social activities and public appearances of Mr. John Gaunt, the illegal régime's "plenipotentiary diplomatic representative in the Republic", were given wide publicity in the local newspapers of South Africa.

104. Throughout 1966, the "Friends of Rhodesia" organization in South Africa (which was set up soon after the illegal declaration of independence to buttress the Ian Smith régime) continued to open offices and branches in the major cities of South Africa which openly identified the struggle of the illegal régime with that of South Africa and canvassed support and collected funds to aid the illegal régime. On 20 June 1966, Mr. Ian Smith sent a message to the Friends of Rhodesia in South Africa in which he said that it was impossible to express adequately the gratitude Rhodesians felt towards their friends in South Africa for the support they were giving in the struggle to preserve the standards of Western civilization in that part of Africa.

105. On 23 July 1966, the "Minister of Local Government" of the illegal régime, Mr. Mark Partridge, speaking in a suburb of Salisbury at the opening of a fountain built as a symbol of thanks to South Africa and Portugal, said that without the help of Portugal and South Africa after the declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia could have lost everything.

106. The President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Charles Swart, in his speech opening the first session of the third Parliament on 29 July 1966, stated that his Government welcomed the resumption of talks between the British and Southern Rhodesian authorities and trusted that they would soon lead to beneficial results and the removal of sanctions.

107. On 15 September 1966, the former Rhodesian High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Brigadier

Skeen, told the Legislative Assembly in Salisbury that Southern Rhodesia's most important diplomatic mission was the one in South Africa, followed by those in Portugal and Mozambique, and appealed for increases in funds for the South African mission.

108. Following the assassination of the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 7 September 1966 unanimously moved a respectful address to Mr. Clifford Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government", asking him to express its shock and deep sorrow at Dr. Verwoerd's tragic death to the Government and people of South Africa and to Mrs. Verwoerd and her family. Introducing the motion, Mr. Ian Smith said that the world was poorer for Dr. Verwoerd's passing and that the people of Southern Rhodesia would never forget him. On 10 September 1966, Mr. Smith flew to Pretoria to attend Dr. Verwoerd's funeral in what South African officials called a private capacity.

109. In a statement to the South African Parliament on 21 September 1966, the new Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Johannes Vorster, said that he wanted to correct any wrong impressions which might be created by published reports of a statement by Mr. Wilson on Dr. Verwoerd's role as adviser to Mr. Smith.

110. There had been an exchange of correspondence not only between Mr. Wilson and Dr. Verwoerd, but also between Mr. Smith and Dr. Verwoerd. He had gone through this correspondence and what the late Prime Minister had said in it was in large measure what he had said in public. There had been an appeal to both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith to try to see if they could, through discussion, solve a domestic difference which in the interest of all should be solved as a domestic matter.

111. Also in his statement, the new Prime Minister stated that he intended to follow the same policy towards Southern Rhodesia as had been followed by Dr. Verwoerd. Mr. Vorster further said that neither under pressure nor force would South Africa take part in boycotts or sanctions. His Government was determined to carry on its policy of normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if this meant taking risks.

112. In an interview which was published on 5 December 1966, Mr. Vorster stated that although South Africa would welcome an agreement between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, it would in no circumstances take part in United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia if agreement failed. South Africa's policy was absolutely clear. It would neither take part voluntarily in sanctions nor would it allow itself to be forced into them. Asked what South Africa would do if the United Nations decreed sanctions against it on account of Southern Rhodesia or South West Africa, Mr. Vorster said that South Africa had made all necessary preparations to defend what legitimately belonged to it and its rights.

Relations with Portugal

113. Portugal has continued to maintain normal relations with the illegal régime which it describes as the "local government of Southern Rhodesia". Since 15 September 1965, Southern Rhodesia has had a "diplomatic representative" in Portugal who is officially referred to as "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission". He deals directly with the Portuguese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs concerning "all matters of interest to Portugal and Southern Rhodesia". Portugal has also continued to maintain its representation and its offices in Southern Rhodesia at the same level as before the illegal declaration of independence.

114. Speaking at a civic reception in Umtali on 21 May 1966, which was attended by people from Umtali and Mozambique, Mr. Smith expressed the gratitude of "Rhodesians" for the tremendous support being given by the Portuguese, particularly those who lived in Mozambique. Mr. Smith said that after the little upset "Rhodesia" was now going through was completed, and he had no doubt that it would be completed in the right way as far as Rhodesians were concerned, the bonds of friendship between his country and the people of Mozambique would be far stronger than ever before. He added that through the links now being forged there would probably come a movement for greater unification between Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa.

Zambia and Southern Rhodesia

115. Purported legislation to suspend in Southern Rhodesia the services of process and the execution of judgements made in the courts of Zambia was introduced in the "Rhodesian" Legislative Assembly in July 1966. The member of the régime responsible for justice, Mr. Lardner-Burke, said that the legislation was necessary as Zambia had recently repealed, as far as "Rhodesia" was concerned, the 1956 Federal Act which had made court judgements in one of the territories which at that time composed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland applicable in the others. Zambia's action, he said, meant that judgements of the "Rhodesian" courts would not be operative in Zambia whereas those of the Zambian courts continued to be operative in "Rhodesia".

116. It will be recalled that in response to an appeal by the Government of Zambia to the United Kingdom Government to send troops to help Zambia to defend the Kariba Dam, a Royal Air Force squadron of Javelin aircraft was sent to Zambia on 3 December 1965. The squadron was withdrawn from Zambia at the end of August. A Commonwealth Office statement, issued in London on 24 August 1966, said that the Zambian Government had been recently asked whether it wished the squadron of Javelins to remain in Zambia. The Zambian Government indicated it its reply that the Javelins could now be withdrawn. The arrangements for the withdrawal were consequently put into effect.

Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the question of Southern Rhodesia

117. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting in its third ordinary session at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 5 to 9 November 1966, adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In this resolution, the Heads of State and Government bitterly and unreservedly condemned the current talks between the British Government and the rebel settler régime in Southern Rhodesia as a conspiracy aimed at recognizing the independence seized illegally by the rebel settlers; called upon all member States of the OAU and all other States to continue to refuse recognition to any independent régime which the present talks between Britain and the Southern Rhodesian rebels might bring about unless such a government was based on majority rule; strongly con-

demned Britain for her refusal to crush the Southern Rhodesian rebel régime and repeated its demands to the United Kingdom Government to bring about the immediate downfall of that régime by any means including the use of force; reiterated the terms of paragraph 4 of its resolution of 5 March 1966, and accordingly recommended that the OAU, and all friendly Governments, give material and financial aid to the Zimbabwe people who were actually fighting inside Zimbabwe; condemned those States, especially Portugal and South Africa, which render support to the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia; called upon all member countries and all countries which wished to see human dignity and freedom in Africa and throughout the world to support a programme of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, repeated its calls upon all member countries to contribute to a special Southern Rhodesia Liberation Fund to enable all Zimbabwe nationalists to intensify the fighting against the rebels; called upon member States to give practical implementation to paragraph 3 of the resolution of 5 March 1966 by which it decided to establish a "Committee of Solidarity for Zambia composed of five members whose task shall be to seek appropriate measures of technical and economic assistance by Member States to Zambia". as to enable Zambia not only to withstand the effects of the unilateral declaration of independence but also to help all Zimbabwe freedom fighters more effectively.

Relations with other States

118. On 19 August 1966, Lord Graham, the "Minister of External Affairs", in answer to a question in the Legislative Assembly regarding the representation of foreign countries in Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence, said that five countries—Denmark, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of America—had withdrawn their heads of mission, but had not closed their offices. Eight other countries—Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland—had maintained their representation and their offices at the same level as before. Australia and Canada had closed their trade missions. Finland, Sweden and Turkey had closed their honorary consulates.

119. One of the two diplomatic missions in Salisbury, the United Kingdom, had withdrawn its High Commissioner and various members of his staff and closed its diplomatic office, but had left a residual mission in the city. The only other diplomatic mission, that of South Africa, had maintained its representation and its office.

2. Economic developments (June-December 1966)10

120. According to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury on 6 June 1966, Rhodesian trade reached record levels in 1965. Exports (including gold sales and re-exports) were worth £165 million (compared with £140.5 million in 1964) and imports, £120 million (£109.7 million in 1964). An economic survey, presented to the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 6 July 1966, stated that the country's gross domestic product was £354 million in

¹⁰ For economic developments since the adoption of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) on 16 December 1966, see paras. 322-363 of this chapter.

the year ended 31 December 1965, an increase of 7 per cent over the preceding year. *Per capita* income had risen by £2.2s. to £84.

121. It will be recalled that by operative paragraph 8 of resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, the Security Council, *inter alia*, called upon all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The resolution also called upon the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the measures it had announced, as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 of the resolution.

122. Pursuant to the above resolution and its own policy towards the illegal régime, the United Kingdom Government, by 30 January 1966, had imposed an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia and announced the imposition of a total ban on all British exports to Southern Rhodesia with the exception of essential humanitarian needs, essential requirements of the joint Central African organizations, and goods on the quay-side already paid for. On the same date it also announced that the ban on imports of goods from Southern Rhodesia had been extended to cover all imports from Southern Rhodesia.

123. By the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, 1966, the United Kingdom Government was empowered to embargo Southern Rhodesia's trade in any specified product to cover also trade transactions with third countries. The United Kingdom expressed the hope that foreign Governments would recognize its legal authority to impose this embargo as they had done in the case of oil. Under this Order, the United Kingdom Government had by the middle of 1966 imposed an embargo on the export from Southern Rhodesia of essential commodities, including chrome, sugar, tobacco, pig-iron, iron ore, copper and asbestos.

124. By the end of December 1966, seventy-four States had replied to the Secretary-General's notes transmitting the text of resolution 217 (1965) for appropriate action. In general terms, a substantial number of these replies showed a complete break in all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, while a number of replies showed a gradual phasing out of economic relations based on the banning of trade in specified products.

125. Since the imposition of international sanctions, the internal economy and trade patterns of Southern Rhodesia have undergone some reorganization. Statements made by officials of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia have confirmed that these changes have become necessary as a result of the international sanctions which have been imposed on Southern Rhodesia. Since February 1966, however, the Smith régime has suppressed the publication of relevant statistical information on the state of the national economy in addition to the imposition of censorship on economic news. Statements by the Smith régime regarding the state of the national economy in 1966 could not therefore be verified.

Rhodesian budget, 1966-1967

126. The Rhodesian budget, introduced on 21 July 1966 by Mr. John Wrathall, "Minister of Finance", provided for current account expenditure of £73.3 million (an increase of £500,000 over the previous

year) and revenue of £71.4 million (£2.5 million lower than in 1965-1966). Taking into account the previous year's surplus of £1.5 million, the deficit at the end of June 1967 was estimated at £400,000. Loan account expenditure was estimated at £26 million; £14 million of this was already available or certain to materialize and Mr. Wrathall said he was confident that the remainder could be raised locally. There were no increases in income tax or super tax rates, but the tax on undistributed profits was increased from 5s. 8d. to 7s. 6d. in the pound. The investment credit system was abolished.

127. The police, army and air force vote rose from £11.1 million in the original estimates for 1965-1966, excluding the instalment of £500,000 for purchase of aircraft but including army and air force buildings, to £12.7 million. In the increase of £1.6 million, the major items were £785,000 for pay increases awarded during the past year and £303,000 for the extended National Service Scheme. The biggest increase in expenditure was in the army vote, which rose by £600,000, or nearly 20 per cent. The police vote was increased by 6 per cent but the air force vote was reduced. Expenditure on health and education was estimated at £19.6 million, an increase of £1.5 million; provision for African education was increased by £590,000 to £6.97 million.

128. Mr. Herbert Bowden, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, said in reply to a parliamentary question on 11 August, that the United Kingdom Government's conclusion, after a close study of such figures as the régime had thought fit to publish, was that the budget was a deliberately slanted and misleading document which was more noteworthy for what it omitted than for what it revealed.

Official report on the state of the economy

129. In the budget statement of 21 July, Mr. Wrathall gave what amounted to a progress report on the economic activities and achievements of the Smith régime since the illegal declaration of independence.

130. In his statement, Mr. Wrathall said that since 11 November 1965, foreign exchange had been allocated for the establishment of new industries, the value of whose fixed investment totalled almost £4 million. Of this, over £800,000 was in the food, drink and tobacco industries; more than £900,000 in the metal, metallic and non-metallic mineral manufacturing industries; £1.9 million in the textile, clothing and footwear industries; and about £300,000 in rubber, wood, paper, travel goods, furniture, chemicals and various other industries. These projects would give direct employment to over 200 Europeans and nearly 2,000 Africans.

131. The Government was also examining new proposals for a projected fertilizer factory, estimated to involve an investment of £10 million. A major nickel project involving an investment of £4 million would add very considerably to the foreign exchange earnings. There were many other interesting developments in the mining field.

132. New expenditures to combat the effects of sanctions included £325,000 to enable the Industrial Development Corporation to establish a confirming house and to provide it with additional capital for assisting with the diversification and development of industry, particularly industrial projects directed towards economically sound import substitution. The

upsurge in cotton production made it necessary to bring forward the construction of the new ginnery at Bindura; this involved an additional allocation of £197,000, and £450,000 were made available to the Sabi-Limpopo Authority to finance the wheat scheme at Mkwasine in the lowveld, using water from Lake MacDougall, for growing about 2,600 acres of wheat.

133. According to Mr. Wrathall's statement, production continued at a high level in the first half of 1966 despite sanctions. Although 1965 had been a good year, the figures for the first five months of 1966 were even better for some industries, notably mining, food-stuffs and electricity. Industrial production as a whole, however, fell by about 7.5 per cent during this period compared with the same period in 1965. In the early months of 1966 there was a setback in some types of retail business, but in the food, clothing, footwear, drapery and general merchandise trade business was at a higher level than in the corresponding months of 1965. The building societies had continued to improve their position. Deposits and share capital increased from £44.6 million to £46.8 million between 30 June 1965 and 30 June 1966.

134. Mr. Wrathall also stated that the dark cloud over the agricultural industry could not be attributed primarily to sanctions. Sanctions might have brought matters to a head more quickly than would otherwise have been the case, but this meant that the problem was being tackled sooner rather than later, which was all to the good. The banking system and the money market were in a particularly sound position, and were braced to meet any further assaults which might be made upon them. The Government's own financial position was also highly satisfactory. On loan account it was probably in a stronger position than ever before; and on revenue account without any further increase in taxation, it expected to reach 30 June 1967 with a small accumulated deficit which could quite well be extinguished entirely by fortuitous savings and underspendings throughout the votes.

135. Claims that the economy was on the point of collapse were obviously arrant nonsense. On the other hand, the economy might well be subjected to more serious stresses and strains before it resumed the rapid rate of progress achieved in 1965.

Employment situation

136. According to the illegal régime, at the end of June 1966, the number of African registered workseekers stood at 4,586 or 11 per cent lower than at the same date in 1965. Africans in employment at 31 March 1966, the latest date for which statistics were available, numbered 655,000, the highest number ever achieved in Southern Rhodesia's history. In recent months the gap between the 1965 and 1966 numbers of European work-seekers had narrowed considerably. At the end of June the number stood at 768, only fifty-eight higher than at the same date in the previous year. The number in employment at 31 March was 1,300 higher than in 1965.

137. On 4 September 1966, the "Minister of Internal Affairs", Mr. William Harper, stated in the Legislative Assembly that since the assumption of "independence", nearly 3,000 appointments had been made in the public services. This had been a major influence in keeping down employment and had helped the morale of the country.

138. On 25 October 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, stated in reply to a question in the House of Commons that no detailed employment statistics had been published in Salisbury since February 1966, nor had the régime mentioned any figures which the United Kingdom Government could accept as accurately representing the extent of African unemployment. The increase in African unemployment was entirely the responsibility of the régime, which could remedy the situation by making a return to constitutional rule.

Commerce and industry

139. In his statement delivered at the opening of the Legislative Assembly on 22 June 1966, Mr. Clifford Dupont, "Officer Administering the Government", stated that the imposition of sanctions had led to the introduction of import controls. The resultant inconvenience to the people of Southern Rhodesia, and more particularly to the merchants, had been accepted in a most generous and co-operative manner. These controls had not been without positive advantages, which industrialists had been quick to exploit. Clear evidence was already to be seen of the accelerating development of industry, new products in substitution of imports constantly coming on the market. Industrialists were continuing to expand and diversify, and were producing goods now which they would not have thought possible to make a few months ago. His "Government" would continue to provide to the maximum possible extent such foreign currency for capital goods and raw materials required for new investment

140. In the budget statement referred to above, Mr. Wrathall stated that import control was one of the steps being taken by the régime to safeguard the balance of payments and the value of the "Rhodesian" pound. Although these measures had been successful, it remained vital to Southern Rhodesia's economic strength to continue to husband its resources.

141. The President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. C. J. Hughes, in a foreword to the Chamber of Commerce Annual Report which was published on 2 June 1966, stated that while the ingenuity shown by the Rhodesian businessmen in their efforts to overcome sanctions was outstanding, it would be unrealistic not to acknowledge that sanctions had had some effect. Mr. Hughes added that as at June 1966, the distributive sector of the economy had been hardest hit and some of the weaker and less efficient organizations in this section had succumbed. Mr. Hughes forecast that in the long term this cutting out might result in an over-all strengthening of the distributive sector of the economy. In reply to the régime's appeals to commerce in 1966 to try to help agriculture in Southern Rhodesia by supplying farmers hit by sanctions or drought with credit over a difficult period, the annual report stated that repeated warnings had been issued that, because merchants' credit facilities had been curtailed, the amount of money which it would be possible to advance to the agricultural sector would be extremely limited.

142. At the annual general meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia in Salisbury on 8 June 1966, Mr. Hughes was reported to have repeated that it would be dishonest and dangerous for members to delude themselves that sanctions were not having an effect on the economy. The distributive

sector had been hard hit and the position was not improving. Commerce was bearing the main burden. Many firms were incurring heavy losses to keep people in employment. They could not continue this holding operation indefinitely. Mr. Hughes was also quoted as having said that the savings campaign launched by the Government, by transferring money from the private to the public sector, was almost "robbing Peter to pay Paul". If it was the "Government's" objective to reduce private spending as a matter of over-all economic policy, then there was no point in many firms carrying on with the present holding operation.

143. On 19 August 1966, the president of the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce, Mr. G. J. Sichel, in a message published in the organization's annual report, was reported to have warned that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia would "take yet a larger toll of casualties". The message also stated that it would be foolish for members to allow themselves to be lulled into a sense of false security on the strength of short-term achievements and early successes in the economic war. He stressed the need for forward planning to counter long-term problems arising out of sanctions and added that tomorrow's problems would undoubtedly be more intractable than those facing Southern Rhodesia today.

144. On 1 September 1966, Mr. Sichel, speaking at the group's annual meeting, criticized the "Government" for withholding statistical information needed by businessmen for planning. He stated that the withholding of external trade and tobacco statistics was understandable but he seriously questioned the need for an embargo on such items as the retail sales index for motor vehicle sales and the cost-of-living index.

Finance

145. Prior to the illegal declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia's principal source of credit and finance was the United Kingdom. Almost all the major financial and banking institutions in Southern Rhodesia were net borrowers in London and net lenders in Southern Rhodesia. Credit facilities from London were the main prop of Southern Rhodesia commerce, industry, and agriculture. Credit from London was particularly important for financing the tobacco crop, which normally accounts for over 30 per cent of the domestic exports of Southern Rhodesia.

146. Following the illegal declaration of independence, the Government of the United Kingdom imposed financial sanctions on Southern Rhodesia to reinforce its economic sanctions. These financial sanctions involved the cessation of all aid, the removal of Southern Rhodesia from the sterling area and a ban on the export of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was denied access to the London money market and exchange control regulations were introduced against it. A stop was placed on practically all current payments by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, except for those rising out of the very limited trade in goods permitted and certain minor specified remittances. By the end of December 1965, virtually all Southern Rhodesia's accounts in London had been blocked or frozen and a new Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia appointed to ensure that the assets of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia held abroad were safeguarded in the interest of the people. Other sources of credit which were open to Southern Rhodesia in third countries outside Africa were also reported to have been closed as a result of representations from the United Kingdom Government.

147. Pursuant to the above policy, the United Kingdom Government by the end of 1966 had issued five major warnings to would-be subscribers to loans floated by the illegal régime. These warnings stated that the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia was not capable of incurring legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. Any person who lent money or otherwise gave credit to the régime or any agency or purported agency thereof did so entirely at his own risk. No permission would be granted to United Kingdom residents to subscribe.

148. Following the imposition of these sanctions, the Smith régime resorted to floating "Rhodesian Government" loans through the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia to be used in financing maturing debts and government development plans. By the end of October 1966, four such loans had been floated locally and fully subscribed to the value of £20 million. Sales of "independence bonds", introduced on 1 February 1966, were also reported by the "Minister of Finance" to have exceeded the target of £1 million by June 1966. He also stated that sales of saving certificates for the financial year ending 30 June 1966 amounted to £1.8 million, well over double the previous year's figure.

149. In addition to the above, it was reported that in 1966 Southern Rhodesia also had access to an estimated £10 to £13 million by its corresponding counter-financial sanctions against the United Kingdom. According to these estimates, Southern Rhodesia, by also blocking the payments of interest, dividend and profit payments etc. to the United Kingdom gained a net of between £10 to £13 million over the United Kingdom in the two-way blockade of interest, dividend and profit payments between the two countries.

150. Further financial counter-measures announced by the Smith régime on 18 July 1966 stated that Southern Rhodesian merchants would not be allowed to make payments to British and sterling area exporters for goods shipped to "Rhodesia" before 18 December 1965. It was stated that this step had been taken because the British Treasury was not prepared to release from the blocked account of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in London funds needed by Rhodesian merchants to pay for goods shipped from Britain and other sterling area countries before that date.

151. In his budget statement of 21 July, Mr. Wrathall stated that because of the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom Government, foreign bodies whose loans were under United Kingdom Government guarantee had been advised that they should look to the United Kingdom Government for satisfaction. "Rhodesia's" debt obligations to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are guaranteed by the British Government under the Colonial Loan Acts.

152. On 14 November 1966, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in the House of Commons that since the illegal declaration of independence, £1,854,860 had been paid by the United Kingdom Government as guarantor of the service of these loans to Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government has also stated that the money paid would be recovered from

Southern Rhodesia when constitutional government was restored.

153. The Minister of Finance of the Smith régime also stated that the skill with which the banks had met the nation's requirements had done much to stabilize the economy. Bank deposits at 31 May 1965 amounted to £75 million and advances to £49.1 million, giving a ratio of advances to deposits of 65.5 per cent. The comparable percentage for May 1966 was 58.4 per cent, which left a reasonable margin towards financing the coming agricultural season. Loss of the London market credit facilities had not had the effect which had earlier been assumed; nevertheless the loss of credit had brought problems. Credit would be made available to enable the agricultural industry to continue.

154. It will be recalled that by a joint arrangement reached between the Reserve Banks of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia on 18 November 1965, negotiations were concluded by which "permissible financial and trade transactions" between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were resumed immediately on the same basis as before 11 November 1965. Since then no statement has been made by the Ministry of Finance of South Africa on South Africa's financial relations with the Smith régime, although it has been reported that South Africa has become the main source of credit to Southern Rhodesia.

Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia

General

155. Agriculture is Southern Rhodesia's biggest and most important industry, and the largest single contributor to the national income as well as the largest single earner of foreign exchange and employer of labour. In 1965, it accounted for 40 per cent of all Africans in employment and contributed about 20 per cent to the gross domestic product, which was larger than any other sector.

156. Sales of the principal agricultural commodities in 1965 amounted to ± 63 million. Southern Rhodesia's main export crops, to bacco and raw sugar, together in 1965 accounted for ± 50 million, or about 35 per cent, of total domestic exports. In 1966, Southern Rhodesia was reported to have faced a farm crisis as a result of drought in nearly the whole of Matabeleland and in part the Midlands. The drought was reported to have affected Southern Rhodesia's agriculture, although to what extent was not known.

157. At the opening of the annual congress of the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union on 21 June 1966, the President, Mr. Tim Mitchell, said that, with the possible exception of the 1930s and the war years, agriculture in the country had never been in a worse position. This position, he said, had not been caused by drought and the actions of the United Kingdom Government. It had arisen because of an accumulation of many factors, including a number of past policies which in some instances had unwittingly increased the cost of production. Mr. Mitchell said the present situation in agriculture was that there was no over-all profit in the industry. The return on investment capital, he added, was undoubtedly less than 5 per cent. "Rhodesian" farmers were not only tired of receiving prices which were satisfactory to everyone but themselves, they were also in no mood to allow such a position to continue.

158. On 21 July 1966, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. Wrathall, stated in a broadcast that the agricultural industry was facing problems which had arisen from causes other than sanctions. Sanctions had brought them to a head somewhat earlier than would otherwise have been the case. In order to assist in stabilizing the situation and to help the industry to regain its confidence in the future, he stated that he had included an amount of £1,250,000 in the estimates for 1966-1967 to enable assistance to be given to those sound farmers who were in financial difficulties for reasons beyond their control, and particularly to enable them to come to a settlement with their creditors. Furthermore, credit would be made available to enable the industry to continue to operate during the new season.

159. On 4 September 1966, the Que Que Farmers' Association sent a resolution to the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union saying that, despite assertions in parliament, agriculture in Rhodesia was "bankrupt". The resolution demanded that the "Government" take immediate steps to forestall the complete collapse of the industry before it was too late. A similar resolution had been sent from the Lomagundi West farmers and another resolution had been sent to the Midlands branch of the Union calling for a £1 rise per bag for the price of wheat.

160. The "Minister of Agriculture", Mr. George Rudland, announced on 23 November 1966 two measures designed to assist farmers. The first of these was a subsidy on nitrogenous fertilizers purchased between 1 April 1966 and 28 February 1967. This subsidy, together with a rebate of £8.10s. per ton recently announced by the fertilizer companies, would reduce the total expense by farmers on fertilizers by about £450,000. The second measure was a rebate of 3d. per gallon in respect of diesel fuel purchased in bulk by farmers during the same period. The Minister said that this particular form of assistance had been chosen because it would give help over a wider field than any others. He regretted that the concessions could only apply to the 1966-1967 season and were therefore holding measures, but added that longerterm planning was not being neglected.

161. It was reported that the above subsidies brought the total allocation of government funds to farmers in 1966 (excluding special supplements for to-bacco) to about £3 million: £460,000 for drought relief; £500,000 for irrigation development; £1,250,000 for the Graylin Committee to provide interest-free loans to farmers in financial difficulty; a supplementary payment for maize expected to amount to £500,000; and subsidies of £330,000 for fertilizers and £100,000 for fuel.

Tobacco crop for 1966

162. Total exports of unmanufactured Southern Rhodesian tobacco in 1965 amounted to £47 million or roughly 30 per cent of the total value of domestic exports (£142,455,433). The major portion of this consisted of 246 million pounds of Virginia flue-cured tobacco auctioned for £33.8 million in Salisbury. The total crop for 1965 sold on the auction floors of Salisbury for about £35 million.

163. The Southern Rhodesian tobacco crop for 1966 was estimated at around 250 million pounds. The State Tobacco Corporation handled the sale of the tobacco crop.

164. On 7 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government made an order which banned the export of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia and the sale of tobacco in Southern Rhodesia with a view to its being exported. Under the order, it became an offence under United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law for traders or speculators to buy Southern Rhodesian tobacco and stockpile it until the return of lawful government.

165. In an official statement issued on that day, the Commonwealth Relations Office announced that, under the order, purchasers of tobacco in contravention of the order would have no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back once lawful government was restored. At that time, stocks of tobacco that had been illegally transacted would have to be re-auctioned before they could be exported. Only lawfully sold tobacco would be exported, under an export licence system; equally, only lawfully sold tobacco would be allowed into the United Kingdom.

166. By the end of March 1966, all the major consumers of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, namely, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Benelux countries, the Scandinavian countries and Australia, had announced that they would not buy any more tobacco from Southern Rhodesia while the Smith régime remained in power. In terms of the 1964 trade figures, over 90 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's tobacco had already been placed under an embargo by exporting countries before the auction sales of the crop for 1966.

167. On 19 January 1966, the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board announced new regulations for Southern Rhodesia's tobacco auction sale. A statement by the Tobacco Marketing Board said that all tobacco would be pre-classified and a reserve price fixed for each grade. Classification would be carried out by two independent classifiers, checked by a senior classifier. During classification, the classifiers would be completely isolated. There would be no appeal by buyers or growers against the classification. There would be elaborate precautions to ensure that classifiers had no idea whose tobacco they were grading. Once graded, the tobacco would be vested in a Tobacco Corporation. The leaf would then be offered on one or two tobacco auction floors at the reserve price or a price above it, and bales not bought would be taken by the Corporation at the reserve price. The Corporation would hold this in the pool and be responsible for its disposal. It would then be responsible for distributing the proceeds equitably among growers. Even if a grower's leaf was sold above the reserve price, he would only be paid the reserve price in the first instance. The surplus would be credited to a pool and shared among growers. There would be a separate pool for flue-cured and burley tobacco.

168. On 24 March 1966, the "Ministry of Agriculture" announced a list of reserve prices for different grades of tobacco. The crop would be classified into 273 grades for each of which a price ranging from 1d. to 48d. per pound was fixed. The announcements emphasized that these prices were those on which payments to growers would be based and did not represent the figure which would be the purchase price to tobacco merchants. On the whole, the reserve prices announced averaged around 26d. (about 31 cents (US)) per pound. The average price of the Southern Rhodesia leaf in 1965 was 33d. (about 39 cents) per pound.

169. When the tobacco sales opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1966, the régime abandoned the traditional public auction system for private treaty sales by which the buyer would decide what grade of tobacco he wanted and then make an offer to the Tobacco Corporation. This was reportedly done to protect the identity of the buyers. The sales were held in secret.

170. On 15 July 1966, Mr. Bottomley, then Commonwealth Secretary, stated that at the prices fixed by the Tobacco Corporation, the farmers could have expected to receive an average of 24d. per pound. But on the best evidence available, the prices paid by the "Government" had been averaging no more than 20d. per pound and there had been numerous complaints from farmers that the Tobacco Corporation had been deliberately down-grading the tobacco sent for sale to depress farming receipts. Since the régime had abandoned public auctions for private treaty sales, the farmer had no redress. If he did not sell to the Tobacco Corporation, he could not sell to anyone else, and if he did not sell he could not live.

171. The member of the Rhodesian régime responsible for agriculture, Mr. George Rudland, announced in the Legislative Assembly on 23 August that the Tobacco Corporation was to increase by 5 per cent the fixed prices paid to farmers for tobacco of all grades, except the lowest. The increase applied to tobacco already bought by the Corporation as well as to future purchases. Mr. Rudland said that the increase would cost about £1 million. On 8 November, he announced that the Tobacco Corporation would make further supplementary payments to tobacco growers. The scale of payments was reported to be 6.8 per cent on the grade price for Virginia flue-cured tobacco. 10 per cent for burley tobacco and 15.6 per cent for oriental tobaccos. It was estimated that the above supplementary payments would amount to £1.5 million, bringing the total value of bonuses for 1966 to £2.5 million. With these payments, it was calculated that the Tobacco Corporation's total payments to the industry for the 1966 crop would amount to £24 million. In 1965, the crop sold for £35 million on the Salisbury auction floors.

172. On 9 November 1966, the President of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association, Mr. Carol Heurtley, stated that the "Government's" 6.8 per cent payment to flue-cured tobacco growers meant that the national average cost of production (about 24d. per pound) had now been covered. While not every grower had received his cost, he was pleased that the Government had completed its promised obligations.

173. The deliveries of Virginia flue-cured tobacco from growers to the Tobacco Corporation ceased on 17 October 1966. There had been various reports about the proportion of the over-all crop sold. However, the reports agree in estimating that the majority of the crop bought by the Corporation remained unsold.

Tobacco crop for 1966-1967

174. On 14 July 1966, Mr. Rudland announced that the target for 1966-1967 flue-cured tobacco production would be 200 million pounds. He gave an assurance to growers that if sanctions made a return to free unfettered auction impracticable, the "Government" would guarantee the market for the crop at grade prices calculated to return to the growers an average of 28d. per pound. Mr. Rudland said this target was indicative of the "Government's" determination that

the country would continue to produce its tobacco, which had gained its place in the world markets on quality and price considerations alone. Buyers could therefore be assured that Rhodesian tobacco would continue to be available. A control scheme would be introduced, he said, and the details of this would be announced by the President of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association, Mr. Heurtley.

175. Mr. Rudland stated that the control scheme had been devised by the Rhodesian Tobacco Association in consultation with his Ministry, and had the full support of the "Government" and would remain in force for the coming season. The administration of the control scheme would be undertaken by the Tobacco Marketing Board and not by the Ministry. It would be possible, said Mr. Rudland, for all farmers to plan their individual production programmes for the coming season. He advised farmers to plan for maximum individual profit according to their own capabilities and that of their land.

176. Mr. Heurtley welcomed the announcement of the 200-million-pound target figure, which he said should be sufficient to guarantee continuity of supply to the country's established markets. The average price of 28d, per pound, he said, had been calculated to provide the grower with the possibility of regaining something above production costs.

177. On 15 July 1966, Mr. Heurtley stated that he felt confident that, following the Government announcement, commerce would react favourably towards Southern Rhodesia's 2,600 farmers by granting them credit facilities for planting the next crop.

178. Commenting on the announced target for the 1966-1967 crop, Mr. Bottomley, then Commonwealth Secretary, said in London on 15 July that if the new target were to be realized, the farmers would receive between £23 million and £24 million, compared with £32 million to £35 million which they normally received. This represented a crop of some £10 million in the farmers' receipts from tobacco. But the new figures were merely target figures. Credit was the life-blood of the tobacco farmers and they would need credit immediately for the seeds, fertilizers and equipment for the next twelve months.

179. Mr. Bottomley also stated that the new policy directive, to the extent that it was accepted by the tobacco farmers, would only put off the inevitable day of reckoning. Though a policy of internal subsidies would further delay the full impact of sanctions on the farmers, this in turn must raise many problems of economic management. Not the least of these would be the difficulties caused by the storage of the greater part of the 1966 crop and the effect on future demand should a large part of the 1966 crop be left unsold in the hands of the Tobacco Corporation.

180. On 24 July 1966, the Rhodesian Ministry of Agriculture announced that the target for the 1966-1967 burley tobacco crop had been set at 6 million pounds. Provision was made to guarantee to growers an average of 23d. per pound of tobacco. On 31 August 1966, the Ministry further announced that it would, if necessary, provide financial support for a crop of 1.5 million pounds of Samsun Oriental tobacco for the 1966-1967 crop at grade prices designed to give an average return of 26d. per pound.

181. On 20 October 1966, Mr. Rudland warned tobacco growers not to produce a crop in excess of their allocated quotas. He said any such action next season

would be irresponsible and would upset present marketing arrangements. Plans had been made, he said, to ensure that no grower who ignored the requirements of the tobacco control scheme would benefit by so doing.

Sugar crop for 1966

182. Southern Rhodesia's sugar industry has expanded almost tenfold during the last six years. The 1965 crop before the illegal declaration of independence was estimated at 250,000 tons and the total export of raw sugar in 1965 earned £3,482,485.

183. On 17 March 1966 the United Kingdom Government announced a ban on all exports of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. According to the order, which is effective under both United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law, it is now "illegal for speculators or others to buy Rhodesian sugar and hold it in Rhodesia or elsewhere in the hope of selling it at a profit when legal government is restored". Those who bought Rhodesian sugar in contravention of the order would acquire no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back. Furthermore, all transactions that took place in Southern Rhodesia aimed at the export of sugar were invalid whether the export was to take place immediately or in the future.

184. By February 1966, the main buyers of Southern Rhodesian sugar, namely the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, had already placed an embargo on sugar imports from Southern Rhodesia. United Kingdom authorities hoped that Zambia and Malawi, which have been dependent on Southern Rhodesia for their sugar supplies, would co-operate as well.

185. It was announced on 19 July 1966 that Japanese orders for about 50,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar had been cancelled. The orders were placed before the illegal declaration of independence and their cancellation was reported to represent a foreign exchange loss of £750,000.

186. Hippo Valley Estates, one of Southern Rhodesia's main sugar producers, reported on 19 July a loss of £372,345 for the year ended 31 March 1966. The chairman, Sir Raymond Stockil, was reported to have said that the loss was due primarily to low world prices and difficulties in commissioning a new sugar mill; he added, however, that the Zambian market had already been entirely lost and the market in Malawi, where the planting of cane had started, would be lost also.

187. It has been reported that cotton and citrus fruits have become alternative crops in place of sugar.

Cotton

188. It was reported from Salisbury on 30 September 1966 that official sources had estimated that a record crop of 120 million pounds of cotton would be grown in the 1967 season. This followed a recent government recommendation to double the size of the cotton crop, which was estimated at 60 million pounds for the 1966 season. (In 1965 the crop was 40,102,000 pounds.) The report stated that the indications were that this increased amount of cotton could be readily marketed both in Southern Rhodesia and in neighbouring countries. The actual price would be announced before the ginning season started about May 1967. The "Government" was reported to be analysing proposals put to it by the cotton marketing committee for future

marketing policy. The growers' committee had reached agreement in principle on government proposals.

Maize

189. On 23 August 1966, Mr. Rudland announced bonus payments to maize growers by which they would receive a supplementary payment of 2s. per bag (200 pounds) of maize on top of the basic price of 29s.6d. per bag already announced from the government Grain Marketing Board. It was announced that the supplementary payment would cost £500,000, which meant that the present maize crop sold to the Board had totalled 5 million bags. In 1964-1965, the Grain Marketing Board had bought 2,569,183 bags of maize from Europeans and 254,452 from Africans.

Mining

General

190. Mineral exports of Southern Rhodesia earned £32,353,669 in 1965, the highest ever attained. Asbestos remained Southern Rhodesia's most valuable mineral followed by gold and copper, these three accounting for over two thirds of the total value of all minerals mined. Coal and chrome ore were the next most important minerals. These two minerals, together with asbestos, gold and copper, accounted for 89 per cent of the total value of mineral production. Other minerals which accounted for the remaining 11 per cent of the mineral exports included iron (3 per cent), tin metal (2 per cent), limestone and lithium (1 per cent) and others (4 per cent).

191. By the end of July 1966, the United Kingdom Government, under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, had imposed embargoes on the export of chrome, pig-iron, iron ore, copper and asbestos, which together constitute the main mineral exports of the country.

192. No figures are available from within Southern Rhodesia on the operation of the mining industry since the illegal declaration of independence. However, activities within certain sectors of the mining industry were reported in 1966 by the "Government" and the mining companies themselves. While these do not provide an over-all picture, they are worth noting as indications of the state of the industry.

Copper

193. Despite sanctions, the operation of the copper mining industry was considerably extended in 1966. Southern Rhodesia's normal copper production is about 24,000 tons a year.

194. On 3 March 1966, the "Deputy Minister of Mines", Mr. I. B. Dillon, stated in an interview that three new copper mines would probably be opening in the northern area of Southern Rhodesia within the next twelve months, and that the ministry was aiming at 30,000 tons within the next two years. If that figure were reached then consideration would be given to the installation of a copper refinery. Consideration had already been given to a possible site for the refinery and it was hoped that its establishment would lead to another industry producing copper piping, sheeting and other products. Mr. Dillon also stated that sanctions would not affect Southern Rhodesian sales of copper. The current emphasis on copper mining in Southern Rhodesia was dictated simply by demand and value.

195. At the end of August 1966, the "Ministry of Information" announced that a new high-grade

copper mine, the first of its kind in Southern Rhodesia, had begun full operation in the Sabi Valley, 150 miles south-east of Salisbury. The first sample of the mine's cathode copper had already been accepted abroad at 99.9 per cent of purity and the first long ton fetched £600. Known as the Elephant Mine, it had been developed by private enterprise with government assistance. The ministry said it believed that the plant installations and processes used could now be duplicated on several other known copper-bearing properties in Southern Rhodesia. The statement added that at a conservative estimate of future copper prices, the new mine development could mean an increase of at least £250,000 in annual export figures.

196. On 20 September 1966, it was reported that Lonrho, Ltd., was to undertake a new drilling programme aimed at establishing the extent and value of the copper deposits in the Inyati block, a few miles north-east of Headland. The area to be explored covers about sixty square miles. Lonrho would operate through a subsidiary company.

Gold

197. Gold has been one of Southern Rhodesia's main exports. Net gold sales in 1965 amounted to £6,794,000.

198. According to the Barclays Bank, D. C. O. Overseas Review for April 1966, the Anglo American Corporation had sunk three new shafts at its mines on the Felixburg gold belt, near Umvuma. Another shaft at the Tchargwa mine, which was abandoned some years ago because of water difficulties, was being deepened and developed.

199. In June 1966, the Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, Mr. Oppenheimer, stated that an exploratory shaft was being sunk at the Champion mine in the region of Odzi, where bore holes indicated the possibility of mineable tonnages of both gold and silver ore.

200. It was reported in August 1966 that the country had launched its biggest gold prospecting programme to date, with most of the large mining companies throwing all their resources into an all-out bid to find new gold-fields and develop existing ones. Mr. D. A. Pretorius, Director of the Economic Geology Research Unit of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines, who had returned to Johannesburg after discussions with the régime and mining leaders, was reported to have said that Southern Rhodesia was determined to go it alone and intended to offset losses through boycotts by increasing gold production. The régime was well aware that gold was its most secure foreign currency earner and that little effort was required to sell it at an international level. Gold's countering effect against inflation, its lack of price fluctuation and the possible devaluation of sterling provided an ideal climate for the easy selling of gold.

Nickel

201. It was reported in May 1966 that a further £2.2 million a year was expected to be added to the country's foreign exchange income when the Trojan nickel mine, at Bindura, had been developed to full production. It was further reported that the Anglo American Corporation had bought an 85 per cent interest in the mine and was to invest £4 million (including the purchase price) to expand production to 600,000 tons of ore a year. Behind the plan to expand the

Trojan mine was the growing demand for nickel. On 20 September 1966, it was further announced that Anglo American Corporation would examine the economic potential of base mineral claims owned by the Shamva Nickel Mines under an option agreement between the Corporation and that company. The Shamva mine is located about forty miles from the Trojan mine.

Iron ore

202. Following the embargo on the export of iron ore and pig-iron, it was reported that the output of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO) had decreased. RISCO was declared a "designated industry" by the Southern Rhodesian régime to prevent it from being closed, and a manpower control order was issued to prevent dismissal of employees. In February 1966, it was reported that RISCO had shut down two of its three blast furnaces and one of its two open-hearth steel furnaces and had abandoned a £7 million expansion and modernization scheme. This has made about 400 workers, including 100 Europeans, redundant. However, an official industrial review published in Salisbury in July 1966 stated that RISCO had three blast furnaces with a combined annual capacity of more than 400,000 tons and two open-hearth furnaces which could produce 165,000 tons of ingots a year.

203. In October 1966, it was reported that the régime had lifted the manpower provisions on RISCO and on Richard Costain (Africa), who had a contract at RISCO. No explanation was offered officially, but it was understood that RISCO had managed to replace lost pig-iron markets, though at lower prices than in the past.

Coal

204. The Wankie Colliery Company's preliminary profits statement for the year ending 31 August 1966 showed that over-all sales were maintained during the year at 3,369,870 tons, compared with 3,348,455 tons in 1964-1965. The statement added, however, that sales for June and July had been adversely affected by the Rhodesia Railways dispute between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia which had resulted in a truck shortage for the transport of coal to the Copperbelt. In September 1966, sales amounted to 227,009 tons, comfortably above the July low of 127,009 tons, but still almost 100,000 tons less than those for September 1965. The monthly average in 1964-1965 was 280,822 tons.

205. On 15 November, Sir Keith Acutt, Chairman of the Wankie Colliery Company, stated that as a result of reduced sales to Zambia one of the two coal mines the company operated might have to be put on a careand-maintenance basis by the middle of 1967.

206. Wankie coal sales for November 1966 were later reported to have dropped by about a third in comparison with sales for November 1965. The report stated that the Anglo American Corporation had attributed the drop in sales mainly to rail transport difficulties with Zambia.

Scheelite

207. The "Ministry of Mines" announced at the beginning of October 1966 that two new scheelite mines were to come into production. Scheelite, a strategic mineral, is the basis for tungsten, and was reported to be in world demand.

208. One of the mines, known as the Tact mine, owned and operated by the Rhodesian Selected Development Company, Ltd., was said to be already producing a high grade of scheelite, and was hoping to produce six tons of refined mineral from every 1,000 tons of ore each month when a second mill comes into operation. The second mine, the Killarney, located in Filabusi, was expected to go into production within three or four months.

Graphite

209. The Industrial Development Corporation announced in May 1966 that the new graphite mining project near Karoi, 120 miles north of Salisbury, would go into production soon.

210. The statement said that the construction of the plant at the £50,000 project was almost complete and would be officially opened in the near future. The Industrial Development Corporation was backing the project in conjunction with Rhodesian Graphite and a Federal Republic of Germany company based in Munich. It was planned to produce about 500 tons of graphite a month, worth £150,000 a year.

Other reported developments

211. It appears from statistics compiled by the port of Beira authorities that exports of Rhodesian chrome through Beira in the first five months of 1966 totalled some 94,000 tons, compared with 100,000 tons in the corresponding period of 1965. Sundry ores exported totalled 183,000 tons, compared with 202,000 tons in the comparable period of 1965, and asbestos exports through the port of Beira totalled 7,000 tons, 2,000 less than in 1965. It was reported, however, that in the past asbestos had mainly been exported through Lourenço Marques.

Economic relations with Zambia

212. In 1965 the total value of exports, including reexports from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia, amounted to £46 million, of which domestic merchandise accounted for £36.1 million; imports from Zambia amounted to £4.3 million.

213. Since the illegal declaration of independence, Zambia has imposed a licence system whereby only certain commodities can be imported from Southern Rhodesia. The permitted imports from Southern Rhodesia are mainly essential commodities for which alternative sources of supply have not been found. Trade figures between the two countries for 1966 are not available, although, according to press reports, Zambia has cut its imports from Southern Rhodesia by an estimated 30 per cent.

214. It will be recalled that following the Southern Rhodesian oil embargo against Zambia on 18 December 1965, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States together started a regular airlift of oil and petroleum products to Zambia to beat the embargo. The Canadian and United States airlifts to Zambia ceased at the end of April 1966. The airlift by British civil aircraft to Zambia also ended on 29 May 1966. However, the airlift by Royal Air Force aircraft to Zambia partly to meet the fuel requirements of the air defence force there and partly to supply oil products to the civil economy ended on 31 October 1966. According to United Kingdom sources, the total cost of these British airlifts to the United Kingdom Government was nearly £6 million. The cost of the oil itself except for

that used by the Royal Air Force itself had been met by the Zambian Government.

- 215. In 1966 the Governments of Zambia and the United Kingdom held a series of talks on intensification of sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and the maintenance of the Zambian economy in all circumstances arising from the Southern Rhodesian rebellion. The discussions covered a great deal of ground concerning practical and technical problems associated with the changing pattern of Zambian trade.
- 216. On 1 November 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, stated in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government had offered the Zambian Government further aid up to a total of £13.8 million for expenditure up to 30 June 1967. The United Kingdom Government later stated that this was assistance for the intensification of sanctions and would cover any contingencies that arose during the coming months. Most of the assistance offered was intended to assist Zambia in developing alternative routes whereby one of the indirect outcomes would be a steadier supply of copper in the future. Since the illegal declaration of independence, ± 3.8 million had been provided by the United Kingdom towards the cost of alternative supply routes besides the £13.8 million on offer for the development of new import and export routes and new sources of supply.
- 217. On 1 February 1967, an agreement was signed in Lusaka between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Zambia for the provision by the United Kingdom of £13.8 million in contingency aid to Zambia for the above-stated projects. The agreement provided for the United Kingdom Government to join the Government of Zambia in the implementation of the above-listed projects.
- 218. On 23 February 1967, the Government of Zambia informed the Secretary-General (S/7783)¹¹ that since the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority white régime in Southern Rhodesia, Zambia had spent well over \$US90 million implementing its policy of severing its trade and economic ties with Southern Rhodesia.
- 219. In his address before the General Assembly on 15 November 1966, the President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, stated that the common services owned jointly by Zambia and Rhodesia, like the railways, the Kariba hydroelectric scheme and the Central African Airways, 12 which provide Zambia with its vital power supplies and its communications and external trade links and whose headquarters were all in Rhodesia and for all practical purposes were controlled from Salisbury, could not be properly operated and administered in the absence of a legal government in Rhodesia. 13
- 220. In its letter dated 23 February 1967, the Government of Zambia informed the Secretary-General that:
- (a) Negotiations to separate the jointly owned Rhodes a Railways were going on;
- (b) Similar negotiations to separate the jointly owned Central African Airways were also going on;

12 Malawi is a third partner in Central African Airways.
13 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1464th meeting, para. 50.

(c) Payments received by the Kariba Power Corporation from Zambia were being blocked and not allowed to go over to Southern Rhodesia to supplement their foreign exchange.

Rhodesia Railways

- 221. The chairman of the board of Rhodesia Railways (jointly owned by Rhodesia and Zambia) said on 18 May 1966, after a two-day meeting of the board, that although the three Zambian members of the board had cast dissenting votes, a decision had been made on future operations of the railways. The member of the Southern Rhodesian régime responsible for transport, Brigadier Andrew Dunlop, said on 20 May that Rhodesia Railways needed to move about £1 million a month from Zambia to Southern Rhodesia in order to continue their operations. No such transfers had been authorized by the Zambian authorities for the month of April and he understood that they had refused to authorize any further transfer. This meant that there would be no contribution from Zambia towards the costs of operating that part of the railway system outside Zambia.
- 222. It was later announced that from 24 May the Southern Rhodesian authorities would require payment to be made in advance in convertible currency for Zambian traffic by rail through Southern Rhodesia unless the Zambian Government agreed to the transfer of railways funds from Zambia to Rhodesia.
- ² 223. The President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, announced on 21 May his Government's rejection of the arrangement whereby payment should be made in advance for Zambian rail traffic through Southern Rhodesia. On the same day, a spokesman for the Zambian Ministry of Transport in Lusaka was reported to have said that it might become necessary for the railways in Zambia to be operated as an independent system.
- 224. On 10 June 1966, the Government of Zambia introduced regulations which empowered an Administrator of Railways, appointed by the President, to control the movement of locomotives, rolling stock and railway equipment from Zambia to Southern Rhodesia.
- 225. On 11 June 1966, the illegal régime issued an emergency order signed by its "Minister of Transport", Brigadier Dunlop, which provided for impounding Zambian goods in transit through Southern Rhodesia for which freight payments had not been guaranteed. Following the issuing of the order, it was reported on 20 June 1966 that Southern Rhodesia was holding £10 million worth of Zambian copper destined for Mozambique ports. A Rhodesia Railways spokesman was reported to have confirmed that the copper had still not been moved through Southern Rhodesia because confirmation had not been received from the Portuguese authorities that payment had been made for railing the copper through Mozambique to Lourenço Marques or Beira.
- 226. On 22 June 1966, the Government of Zambia decided to authorize the copper companies to send a limited quantity of copper through Southern Rhodesia, on condition that the buyers would be responsible for paying the freight charges in hard currency as the Southern Rhodesian authorities had demanded. The transport of copper by that route was accordingly recommenced in August 1966.
- 227. It was reported that as a result of the dislocation in rail services, a stockpile of about 60,000 tons of

¹¹ Incorporated in substance in document S/7781/Add.2, annex (Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967).

Zambian copper had accumulated inside Zambia. Zambia's monthly production of copper is about 58,000 tons.

228. Coal supplies to Zambia from the Wankie Collieries in Southern Rhodesia continued to be transported by rail, but it was reported that since August trucks were being sent north by the Rhodesia Railways authorities only as trucks arrived from Zambia, on a truck-for-truck basis. This affected the coal supplies of the mines.

229. It was reported that Rhodesia Railways' report for the financial year ending June 1966 showed a loss of £383,000, compared with a profit of nearly £2 million in the previous year, despite an increase in traffic and total revenue.

Kariba Dam

230. The Central African Power Corporation, in its annual report published on 13 December, stated that, despite the Rhodesian crisis, the Kariba hydroelectric dam made a record profit of £1,010,810 in the year ending 30 June. Zambian purchases during the year increased by 5.8 per cent and accounted for 51.4 per cent of the sales. Purchases by Southern Rhodesia increased by 4.4 per cent and accounted for 48.6 per cent of the sales.

Central African Airways

231. The Central African Airways announced a record profit of over £600,000 for the year ending 30 June 1966. All its subsidiary airlines—Air Malawi, Air Rhodesia and Zambia Airways—realized operating profits for the year.

Economic relations with Malawi

232. In 1965 total exports, including re-exports, from Southern Rhodesia to Malawi amounted to £9.5 million, of which domestic merchandise amounted to £7.7 million; imports amounted to £1.4 million.

233. The Government of Malawi, between November 1965 and December 1966, imposed some trade restrictions in Southern Rhodesia. It continued, however, to trade with Southern Rhodesia in essential commodities while it appealed to importers to find alternate sources of supply outside Southern Rhodesia. Trade figures for 1966 between the two countries are not yet available.

Economic relations with Bechuanaland

234. In 1965 total exports, including re-exports, from Southern Rhodesia to Bechuanaland amounted to £2.3 million, of which domestic merchandise amounted to £1.6 million; imports amounted to £72,000. Bechuanaland became independent as Botswana on 27 September 1966. By the end of 1966, no reports regarding economic measures against the illegal régime were available.

Economic relations with South Africa

235. In 1965 the total value of exports, including re-exports, from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa amounted to £14.4 million, of which domestic merchandise accounted for £12.8 million. Total imports from South Africa amounted to £27.5 million.

236. Pursuant to its declared policy of not participating in any form of sanctions and boycotts, the Republic of South Africa has, since the illegal declaration of independence, continued to maintain "normal trade

relations" with the Smith régime. In clarification of the term "normal trade relations", the Government of the Republic explained that this did not mean continuing to sell the same commodities or quantities as before. It meant that everybody in competition tried to sell what and as much as he could. It also meant trade without inhibitions and without breaks.

237. In a statement to the South African Parliament on 21 September 1966, the new Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Johannes Vorster, stated that he intended to follow the same policy towards Southern Rhodesia as had been followed by his predecessor, Dr. Verwoerd (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 279). Mr. Vorster further said that neither pressure nor force would compel South Africa to take part in boycotts or sanctions. His Government was determined to carry on its policy of normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if this meant taking risks.

238. Although South Africa has not published any trade statistics on Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence, it has been openly acknowledged by official sources in Salisbury that the Republic is the main economic prop of the Smith régime. In a speech on 3 May 1966, the Southern Rhodesian "Minister of Local Government" was reported to have stated that it might well be no exaggeration to state that if it had not been for the steadfast and responsible attitude adopted by both the Republic and their Portuguese neighbours, Southern Rhodesians would have lost not only their possessions but also their liberty and perhaps their lives.

239. On 16 August 1966, the South African Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. N. Diederichs, was asked in the Assembly for a breakdown of import-export values between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique for each month since June 1965. In reply to the question, Dr. Diederichs stated that he did not regard it as being in the national interest to give the statistics separately. In a further question as to whether the monthly abstract of trade statistics included figures of trade between the Republic and each African country, the Minister said that it did not because he did not regard it in the national interest to have these figures published separately.

240. According to trade figures released by the South African Department of Customs and Excise in September 1966, trade figures for the first eight months of 1966 showed that while South Africa's exports as a whole had risen about 12 per cent over the same period in 1965, exports to the rest of Africa increased by 30 per cent to a little over £60 million. Imports from the rest of Africa for the first eight months of 1966 reached about £35 million. The Department of Customs and Excise ceased some time ago to provide detailed breakdowns, by countries of destination, of exports to African countries.

241. Although no details were given, it was reported that the bulk of the increase in exports of about £15 million to the rest of Africa was in the main due to a sharp rise in the flow of goods to Southern Rhodesia. Imports from the rest of Africa at about £35 million were reported to be around the same level as in 1965 although imports as a whole had fallen by 15 per cent. The difference in the general trend was also attributed mainly to an increase of imports from Southern Rhodesia.

242. Quite apart from South Africa's own trade with Southern Rhodesia, it has been persistently reported

that South Africa had been providing cover for clandestine trade between third countries and parties with Southern Rhodesia. According to these reports, goods ostensibly directed to South Africa from third countries eventually find their way into Southern Rhodesia under prearranged contracts. Conversely, South African ports were reported to have increased their tonnage of Southern Rhodesian exports which pass through the ports under cover of South African goods. It should here be noted that since the illegal declaration of independence, South Africa has ceased to differentiate between its exports and re-exports.

243. Since the illegal declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesian industrialists have embarked on a sales promotion campaign in South Africa with a view to increasing sales in the Republic. There have also been exchanges of visits between manufacturers and industrialists of the two countries to discuss marketing problems and how best to facilitate the flow of trade between the two countries.

244. One of the most important such visits to be publicly announced was that of a six-man delegation from the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut in June 1966, at the invitation of the Rhodesian Promotion Council. The Handelsinstituut is the most important organization in South Africa of Afrikaans-speaking leaders of industry, mining, commerce and finance. While in Southern Rhodesia, the party met with the régime's "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. Mussett, and other officials. They also met leading personalities in the business and financial sectors of the country's economy and visited Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, the Midlands and the Lowveld. On 22 June 1966, the Director of the Handelsinstituut, Dr. Van den Berg, stated in Johannesburg that the delegation had returned with a proposal to the Government of South Africa that factories in Southern Rhodesia should be granted quotas to export goods to the Republic duty free, or under rebate. In this way, Southern Rhodesia would help to ensure that South African productive capacity would not be fully expanded at a time when such expansion was not in the Republic's interest. At the same time, South Africa would be helping Southern Rhodesia to adjust to the loss of the Zambian export market.

245. The delegation was also reported to have recommended to the Government that South Africa should enter into a common market arrangement with Southern Rhodesia so that the origin of Southern Rhodesia products exported through South Africa could not be known; that South African capital should be used to help Southern Rhodesia industries lessen the force of sanctions; and that South Africa should provide £3 million for a sixty-mile rail link across the Limpopo joining the South African and Rhodesian Railways.

246. Among other important visitors to Southern Rhodesia was Mr. Hobson, the General Manager of the Durban Chamber of Commerce (South Africa) who was in Southern Rhodesia in the second week of November 1966. He was reported to have said in Salisbury that South African industrialists were more favourably disposed towards imports, especially those from Southern Rhodesia, than before. He added that Southern Rhodesian exporters should not be slow to take advantage of opportunities in the South African market. Also, a group of prominent South African businessmen led by the Chairman of Sasol and the South African Gas Distribution Corporation, Dr. Ettis Rousseau, visited Southern Rhodesia in the third week of November 1966, at the invitation of the Rhodesian Promotion

Council. The visitors were reported to have seen various aspects of economic development in Southern Rhodesia and to have met a number of leading businessmen.

247. On 6 June 1966 it was reported from Johannesburg that a new trading link between Rhodesia and South Africa had been forged with the formation in Johannesburg of Rhodesian Industrial Confirming (Private), Limited. The company is a subsidiary of Industrial Confirming (Private), which is backed by the Industrial Development Corporation of Southern Rhodesia, and commenced operations in April. In addition to ordinary confirming or export guarantee business—in both directions—Industrial Confirming and its subsidiary assist potential importers and exporters to promote trade between the two countries. The Johannesburg manager, Colonel R. Jones, was reported to have said that his company was also interested in guaranteeing trade between Rhodesia and other markets.

248. In order to facilitate trade between the two countries, Rhodesia Railways introduced a new fast freight service to Johannesburg and the South African ports. On 26 August 1966, a spokesman for Rhodesia Railways announced that a new fast goods service to be known as Rail Trader would come into operation on 27 August 1966. The new service would link Salisbury and Bulawayo with Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Cape Town. Trains from Salisbury would take four days to Johannesburg and six days to the ports. Trains from Bulawayo would take a day less to the ports. Negotiations were also under way to introduce a similar service from South Africa to Southern Rhodesian centres.

249. On 26 September Rhodesia Railways took over the control and operation of the rail line through Bechuanaland, which is the most direct rail link between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Control of the 400-mile line was formerly split between South African Railways and Rhodesia Railways, with the South Africa railways operating the line from Mafeking up to the half-way point at Mahalapye, and the Rhodesia Railways operating it over the rest of the distance to Plumtree, on the Southern Rhodesian border. According to a statement issued by the Bulawayo headquarters of the Rhodesia Railways, the entire Bechuanaland section of the railway line in question had been owned by the Rhodesia Railways since it was built in the 1890s although one half of it had been managed by the South African Railways.

250. In May 1966, the Smith régime appointed a three-man commission of inquiry to investigate an alternative rail link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa through Beitbridge. The commission, which held its first sitting on 15 June 1966, is composed of three South African experts, Mr. W. G. Muller, an advocate of Johannesburg, and two economists, Mr. H. G. Ashworth of Cape Town and Dr. M. D. Marais of Pretoria. The two possible connexions being considered by the commission are either from West Nicholson or from Rutenga to join the South African Railway line from Beitbridge. Any one of the two proposed connexions would give Southern Rhodesia a direct rail link with South Africa. According to South African sources. whichever route the alternative rail link would take, it would help to strengthen trade bonds between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

251. On 20 September 1966, a new road was opened between the Cape Province and Southern Rhodesia through Bechuanaland. The Bechuanaland Government

worked on the section between the Cape Province border and the Southern Rhodesian border while the South African Government worked on the connexion inside the Republic. The new road is reported to facilitate travel between Cape Town and Southern Rhodesia.

Economic relations with Portugal

252. Portugal has also continued to maintain trade relations with Southern Rhodesia, having declared on many occasions that it would not take part in sanctions that would affect the flow of trade in southern Africa. Although trade between Southern Rhodesia and Portugal and the Territories under Portuguese administration is almost negligible, Portugal occupies a predominant position in controlling the external trade routes of Southern Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi, through the seaports of Beira and Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. It also has rail links to all the three landlocked countries and South Africa. Southern Rhodesia's principal export and import outlet is the seaport of Beira in Mozambique, which also handles the main bulk of the external trade of Zambia and Malawi.

253. Portugal's policy of maintaining trade relations with Southern Rhodesia has therefore offered the illegal régime a most valuable outlet for exports and imports. Figures published by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique show that Beira has maintained its position as the main export-import outlet of Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence. According to press reports Portugal has become an outlet for re-exporting embargoed Southern Rhodesian commodities, primarily tobacco and sugar.

254. According to statistics compiled by the port of Beira authorities in November, total tonnage handled at the port of Beira dropped 24 per cent in the first ten months of 1966. It was estimated that about half the drop in tonnage represented the cut-back in the supply of crude oil to Southern Rhodesia, but no figures on individual traffic were available. It was reported that the changes which have taken place in southern African trade and communications since the illegal declaration of independence rule out precise interpretation of the Beira figures.

255. In a letter dated 3 February 1967, ¹⁴ addressed to the Secretary-General, the Government of Portugal stated that as a result of the carrying out of a number of measures envisaged in resolutions 221 (1966) and 232 (1966) of the Security Council, voted upon on 9 April and 16 December 1966, the economy of Mozambique was suffering severe financial and economic losses which the Portuguese Government estimated at about £10 million sterling, up to the end of 1966. Annexed to the letter were particulars of this amount by various items.

256. Within the year 1966, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration in southern Africa were brought closer together economically through visiting trade missions. In early April 1966, a delegation of the National Export Council of Southern Rhodesia visited Lourenço Marques. The Chairman of the Council was reported to have said that the contacts made by the delegation in Mozambique indicated possibilities for increased exports from Southern Rhodesia. In May 1966, a six-man delegation representing the Associated Chambers of Commerce of

Mozambique visited Southern Rhodesia at the invitation of the National Export Council. In June 1966, a seven-man trade delegation from Angola visited Southern Rhodesia for a seven-day tour at the invitation of the National Export Council of Southern Rhodesia. The leader of the delegation was reported to have said at Bulawayo that Angola had many markets which could be exploited by Southern Rhodesian manufacturers. The best openings in Angola were for the manufacturers of cotton goods, electric cabling and canned foods. He said that Southern Rhodesian goods appeared to be very competitive and would hold their own in any overseas market.

257. On 8 July 1966, the régime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Mussett, opened the Southern Rhodesian pavilion at the Mozambique trade fair in Lourenço Marques. In his statement, he said that the time had come for countries in southern Africa to support each other. In 1965 visible trade between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia left Mozambique with a favourable balance of £180,000, but when invisible transactions, primarily transit, were taken into account, the balance was increased to £6 million. For this reason, he said that he would like to see a greater level of purchases of Southern Rhodesian goods in Mozambique.

258. According to official figures released in Lisbon, Portugal's imports from Southern Rhodesia for the period January to September 1966 amounted to \$942,000, of which tobacco and sugar accounted for \$349,000 and \$111,000, respectively. Other imports included meat of bovine products, asbestos, copper and skins and hides. Exports from Portugal to Southern Rhodesia for the period January to September 1966 amounted to \$809,000.

259. A six-man trade mission from Southern Rhodesia headed by Mr. Maltas, Chairman of the National Export Council of Rhodesia, visited Portugal in the first week of November 1966. The mission included Mr. Graylin, Chairman of the Rhodesian Tobacco Export Council.

Southern Rhodesia and the oil embargo

260. It will be recalled that the United Kingdom Government imposed a total oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia on 17 December 1965. By the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, the United Kingdom, in exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, prohibited the import of oil and oil products into the Territory. It prohibited United Kingdom nationals from supplying or carrying oil products for Southern Rhodesian use.

261. The Commonwealth Secretary on 6 June 1966 made regulations under the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1966, permitting certain specified quantities of specialized lubricants (mainly greases) to be imported into Southern Rhodesia for the use of Rhodesian Railways. This was reported to be in keeping with the British Government's policy of excepting from its embargoes, goods essential for the continued running of the Central African Common Services. In view of the uncertainty concerning the future of Rhodesia Railways, the regulation, which can be revoked at any time, permits the import by Caltex Oil (S.A.) Ltd., at monthly intervals, of quantities sufficient for only one month's consumption.

262. On 9 May 1966, the Smith régime increased the price of petroleum products. The price increases,

¹⁴ See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, document S/7781, annex 11.

which with one exception were uniform throughout the country, were as follows: petrol, both regular and premium grades, was increased by ½d. a gallon; diesel fuel by 7d. per gallon; power paraffin by 9d. per gallon; illuminating paraffin by 5d. per gallon; aviation turbine fuel by 10d. a gallon; and aviation gasoline by ½d. a gallon. The one exception was the area within a radius of twelve miles of Beitbridge, where prices remained the same.

263. Rhodesian motorists at Umtali, who in the past were able to purchase petrol over the border in Mozambique at very low prices without paying any tax, were affected by these restrictions for the first time. All Rhodesian registered vehicles which entered Southern Rhodesia after an absence of less than two nights were required to pay a special import duty of £1 for motor vehicles and 2/6d. for motorcycles. Only vehicles used for the carriage of passengers or goods across the border for hire or reward, and vehicles of persons resident in Mozambique who worked in Rhodesia or vice versa, were exempt from the special import duty.

264. To ensure the successful implementation of the new regulations, petroleum products were removed from the open general licence category and could henceforth only be imported under licence. Any persons who imported or took out of bond any of the fuels enumerated above under authority of a licence issued by the "Secretary for Commerce and Industry" and under such conditions as the Controller of Customs and Excise might approve would pay the old rate of duty.

265. Some exceptions to the new regulation that petroleum products could only be imported under licence were also announced on 9 May 1966, by which the Controller of Customs and Excise was given a blanket authority to admit all gifts of motor fuel without the production of an import licence, subject to the payment of an increase of 3d. per gallon customs duty on all those products imported, with the exception of illuminating paraffin.

266. On 10 June 1966, the ration of diesel fuel to farmers which was fixed at 50 per cent of the 1965 consumption was raised to 70 per cent for the months of June, July and August. The additional 20 per cent was issued at the discretion of the oil companies.

267. Effective from the first week of July 1966, "off-ration" petrol coupons were made available to the public by which any person who needed extra petrol beyond the normal allowance could buy extra coupons at an additional price of two shillings a unit for six pints. This in effect meant that while petrol would cost the regular coupon holder 6s. for first grade and 5s. 8d. for second grade petrol, the "off-ration" coupon holder would, in terms of over-all cost, pay 8s.8d. a gallon for premium brands and 8s.5d. for regular. Effective from 4 August 1966, off-ration petrol coupons were also made available for the purchase of aviation fuel at the additional rate of 2/- a unit for six pints.

268. Statements made by Mr. Mussett on 9 May and 28 June 1966 in explanation of the price increases and the introduction of "off-ration" petrol coupons give some indication of the impact of the oil embargo on the economy. In his justification of the increase of the price of petroleum products on 9 May 1966, which according to him was inevitable, he stated that the Rhodesian Treasury could not be expected to absorb the enormous additional costs involved in the supply

and transport of fuel. On 28 June 1966, he also stated that prior to the introduction of formal rationing and with the disruption of the normal methods of obtaining supplies, an initial deficit was incurred. This was not being recovered in the present price of petrol. The Government therefore felt justified in asking the ordinary motorist who wished to obtain more petrol (under the "off-ration" petrol coupon system) to make a contribution towards this deficit.

269. On the basis of the above references, these measures were interpreted to reflect the extra cost to the Smith régime of importing refined petroleum products from South Africa and through Mozambique. In the past, the government oil procurement agency, GENTA, had been bearing the extra cost of these imports with prices remaining the same at the retail level.

270. In his statement in Parliament on 28 June 1966, Mr. Mussett also stated that since the introduction of the coupon system consumption of petroleum products had dropped and this had naturally added to the difficulties which were already facing the motor trade and ancillary activities. The only practical way of alleviating the petrol ration at this stage was through the "off-ration" petrol coupons.

271. Following the increase in prices, the President of the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union, Mr. T. Mitchell, was quoted as saying that the 7d. a gallon rise in the price of diesel fuel would raise the cost of agricultural production by £500,000 a year.

272. On 17 June 1966, the President of the Rhodesian Motor Trade Association was reported to have said in a speech at Umtali that petrol rationing had been catastrophic for the trade and to have spoken of the possibility of a breakdown. Since petrol rationing had been introduced, he said, new car sales had dropped by more than 40 per cent and commercial vehicle sales by more than 50 per cent. Workshop revenue and the sale of spare parts were also down.

273. In his statement before the Rhodesian Front Party Congress on 23 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith made reference to what he called "the battle for fuel, petrol and the oils". He said that there had been one or two sticky moments but that his régime was in the happy position of having more petrol than it did at the commencement of that exercise and that was a measure of its success.

274. Although no figures are available on imports of oil and petroleum products, an indication of the increased volume of oil reaching the country is given by the expansion of storage tank facilities. On 26 August 1966, it was reported that a request from the Smith régime to the Salisbury City Council to relax petroleum storage by-laws and thus enable oil companies to build more storage tanks had reached the committee stage. Similar requests had either been made or approved by other municipal authorities in Southern Rhodesia. It was reported on 1 August 1966 that three international oil companies were extending their storage facilities at Gwelo, a town 170 miles from Salisbury. According to the report, included in the monthly municipal building figures was the news that Shell, Mobil and Caltex had had building plans approved for storage tanks.15

¹⁵ On 21 December 1965, the oil companies operating inside Southern Rhodesia were put under the Emergency Regulations, giving the Ian Smith régime control over their operations.

275. According to press reports, petroleum and oil products reaching Southern Rhodesia from across the borders daily were far in excess of the amount required under rationing. Petrol tankers on the roads and the railways had become acceptable features of the Southern Rhodesian scene. Refined petrol continued to be railed up from South Africa through the then protectorate of Bechuanaland and from Mozambique. In addition, long convoys of trucks continued to carry thousands of gallons of petrol across the South African border town of Beitbridge into Southern Rhodesia.

South Africa and the oil embargo

276. From January to November 1966, the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation gave wide publicity to the arrival in Southern Rhodesia of consignments of refined petroleum products from South Africa. They were described as "gifts" from the "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements in South Africa which are spearheaded by the Friends of Rhodesia organization. According to the radio reports, these consignments of petroleum products varied from a few hundred gallons to 4,000 gallons per shipment by road. However, it was estimated that these "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements were only making a modest contribution to the Smith régime's stock as compared with the gigantic exercise organized by the illegal régime in 1966 to bring in petroleum products from South Africa. It was estimated that the petroleum products reaching Southern Rhodesia from South Africa reached the level of 35,000 gallons per day from February 1966 to May, when supplies were reported to have jumped to 140,000 gallons per day (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, paras. 216 and 734). It was stated that these reported huge daily supplies of petrol were not due to the "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements; they were mainly attributed to GENTA, a petrol haulage and procurement agency of the Smith régime. The statement by the Minister of Commerce and Industry of Southern Rhodesia on 9 May 1966 that the Southern Rhodesian Treasury "could not be expected to bear the enormous additional costs involved in the supply and transport of fuel" clearly indicated the Smith régime's role in the above-mentioned shipments of oil. Since the "enormous additional costs involved in the supply and transport of fuel" continued to be passed on to the consumer throughout 1966, it was obvious that the bulk supplies of petroleum products reaching Southern Rhodesia in 1966 were not "gifts" from South Africa but rather officially controlled exercises.

277. On 8 August 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson stated in the House of Commons in reply to a question that oil had been going through from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia although at a very high price and was very costly to the régime. He stated that the South African Government had explained that it was its policy to allow normal but not abnormal trade, whether on oil or anything else, to Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Wilson was also asked a further question on stories which were circulating that large quantities of oil were being exported from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia via Bechuanaland. In reply, Mr. Wilson stated that the United Kingdom Government had been watching this very carefully. Some of the stories and figures which he had seen were vastly exaggerated compared with the relatively small amounts going through Bechuanaland.

Portugal and the oil embargo

278. Since the illegal declaration of independence, the Government of Portugal has reiterated its policy of keeping transit facilities through Mozambique open to Zambia, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia, and of not interfering with goods destined to any of those countries. The Government of Portugal has also stated that it has not taken any initiative tending to ensure the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia nor purchasing it in the name of that country nor transporting it in Portuguese ships. It would not, however, permit any consignment of oil to be diverted to a country different from the one for which it was destined.

279. It will be recalled that in the first quarter of 1966, it was reported that oil and petroleum products had continued to reach Southern Rhodesia from South Africa by rail through Mozambique at the rate of about 100,000 gallons daily. In addition, it was also estimated that Mozambique was itself supplying Southern Rhodesia with 10,000 gallons of refined petroleum products daily.

280. In a press release dated 12 May 1966, the Government of Portugal "categorically rejected" reports stating that Mozambique had become the chief source of oil supply for Southern Rhodesia. In the statement, which was repeated on subsequent occasions in 1966 to counteract press and other reports, the Government of Portugal stated that Mozambique was not an oil-producing country and that its own annual requirement of crude oil amounted to 200,000 tons as against 400,000 tons for Southern Rhodesia. According to the statement, since the amount of crude oil imported into Mozambique had not increased since 11 November 1965, and further considering that no measures of austerity rationing of gasolene products had been introduced since that date, it was difficult to see from where the stocks needed for the so-called supply of Southern Rhodesia could have been provided by Mozambique.

281. On 8 August 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson stated in the House of Commons in reply to a question that one of the big problems (of the oil embargo) had been oil going through Lourenço Marques, passing from there into South Africa and from there to Southern Rhodesia.

282. On 7 June 1966, it was reported that bulk consignments of refined petroleum products from the SONAREP refinery in Lourenço Marques were believed to be reaching Bulawayo and Salisbury weekly by way of South Africa and the main Mozambique railway. Observers believed that the rate of supplies from Mozambique might average as much as 20,000 gallons a day—twice what it was in April 1966. According to this report from South Africa, the biggest single consignment was understood to have been dispatched in the first week of June 1966. It consisted of nineteen tankers, each carrying a maximum load of 8,020 gallons of petrol—a total of 152,380 gallons. Rail and refinery officials were reported to have maintained that these consignments were bound for Beira. It was pointed out, however, that the port of Beira was usually supplied by sea-a cheaper and more direct route.

283. On 17 May 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bottomley, stated in reply to a question in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government had agreed for the time being to help with the expenses of the Companhia do Pipeline Moçam-

bique-Rodésia and in particular the expenses of maintaining and repairing the pipeline installations, since the pipeline was out of use. The agreed contribution was £54,000 a month for a minimum period of three months from 7 April 1966. On 13 September 1966 the United Kingdom Government announced that it had decided to terminate the payments of £54,000 monthly to the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia. The termination of payments took effect from 7 October 1966.

Foreign trade

284. According to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury on 6 June 1966, total exports in 1965 amounted to £164.690 million, of which domestic exports accounted for £142.55 million; re-exports £15.145 million and net gold sales £6.794 million. Total exports in 1964 amounted to £140.55 million. Imports in 1965 amounted to £119.8 million as compared with £108.2 million in 1964. Foreign trade for 1965 thus showed an increase of 17 per cent in total exports and 10.7 per cent in imports.

285. The main customers of Southern Rhodesia maintained their order of importance as in 1964 and took domestic exports in 1965 as follows: Zambia (£36.1 million); United Kingdom (£31 million); South Africa (£12.8 million); Federal Republic of Germany (£12.8 million); Malawi (£7.7 million); and Japan (£7.4 million). The main suppliers for imports were the United Kingdom (£36.4 million); South Africa (£27.5 million); United States of America (£8.2 million); Japan (£6.6 million); Federal Republic of Germany (£4.9 million); and Zambia (£4.3 million).

286. The visible balance of trade after making allowances for stocks and internal freight showed an improvement over 1964. It rose by £5.3 million from £36.5 million in 1964 to £41.8 million in 1965. After deduction of net payments abroad for visible items, the current account balance amounted to a favourable £14 million.

287. Sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia by most of its normal trading partners outside Africa, in terms of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), generally exempted contracts concluded before the illegal declaration of independence, or, in certain cases, before the States concerned went through the necessary legislative processes to give effect to these sanctions. Other States put their trade with Southern Rhodesia under a licensing system by which trade in specified commodities was permitted pending their availability from other sources at competitive prices.

288. External trade statistics for 1966-1967, in conjunction with other relevant statistics since February 1966, have been suppressed by the illegal régime on the grounds that publication of such reports were detrimental to the national interest because they would aid and encourage opponents to take counter measures and embarrass the friends of the régime. However, data on the trade of Southern Rhodesia for 1966 were reported by certain countries of destination and origin. The data reported as of 23 February 1967 in the addendum to the Secretary-General's report¹⁶ are in no way complete and do not include any data from some of the normal major trading partners of Southern Rho-

desia, namely, Zambia, South Africa and Malawi, which together accounted for about 40 per cent of the total domestic exports and about 30 per cent of total imports in 1965. Data provided by countries of destination and origin for the foreign trade of Southern Rhodesia as contained in document S/7781/Add.1 did not cover a uniform period of time. Full information on the trade of Southern Rhodesia is not at present available and may not be available for some time.

289. As far as the Smith régime is concerned, the only statement of substance on foreign trade for 1966 was made by Mr. Wrathall, the régime's Minister of Finance, on 21 July. He said in his budget statement that with the imposition of sanctions, it was inevitable that there would be some decline from the high levels of exports achieved in the period July-December 1965. The drop for the six months to June 1966 was not nearly so large as had been predicted in some quarters. This was because of the efforts made by industrialists to search out and open up new markets and because of the ingenuity with which they had circumvented sanctions. During the six months to the end of June 1966, the value of exports other than tobacco was £46.4 million, or 17 per cent lower than that for the comparable period of 1965. Imports were reduced to the desired level without causing any widespread hardship or impairing the effectiveness of essential industry. For the six months to June 1966, the total value of imports was limited to £40.1 million, or 32 per cent below the 1965 figure. The substantial reductions in imports and the much smaller decline in the value of exports had a profound effect on the balance of trade and, in respect of trade other than tobacco, produced a favourable visible balance of £6.3 million, compared with an adverse balance of £2.9 million for January-June 1965.

3. Political developments (January-April 1967) Question of separate development of the races in Southern Rhodesia

290. On 27 January 1967, Mr. Ian Smith stated in the "Legislative Assembly" that his régime would establish an independent commission to advise on a new constitution for the country. He stated that the "ideal" after which his régime was striving was a system that acknowledged the different communities of Southern Rhodesia and provided safeguards which would enable the different communities to live according to their own wishes and with adequate protection for their rights and freedoms.

291. Commenting on Mr. Smith's statement at a press conference on the same day, the newly elected leader of the United People's Party (UPP), Mr. Percy Mkudu, stated that Mr. Smith's statement presaged Southern Rhodesian constitutional developments in the direction of South African apartheid.

292. On 30 January 1967, the *Rhodesia Herald* in a leading article forecast a move by the Smith régime towards *apartheid*. According to the article, the "ideal" announced by Mr. Smith was something more akin to South African policies than any previous Southern Rhodesian Government had contemplated.

293. On 17 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in an interview on the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation that it was the belief of his régime that the chiefs and tribal structure were more suited to represent the views of the Africans than the African members of the

¹⁶ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, document S/7781/Add.1.

Legislative Assembly. The democratic system of government was new to the African, and it was something which took time to adjust oneself to. He believed that for as long as there was separate development, it was more necessary to educate the African than otherwise. Without separate development he could live under the wing of the European, but if the African was expected to develop his own areas—the tribal trust areas—to the maximum there was all the greater need to educate him. The evidence he had from Africans was that they preferred to live according to their own customs in the same way as the Europeans did. What they wished to have was equal opportunity with the Europeans.

294. On 21 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in the Legislative Assembly that the crux of the problem in Southern Rhodesia was to devise a constitution which would assure the rights of both the African and the European people. All the evidence showed that the Europeans were deprived of their rights under African majority rule. It was obvious from evidence inside and outside Southern Rhodesia that the African was manifestly unable to govern himself. One of the roles of the European in Southern Rhodesia was to protect the African from himself. Referring to suggestions from the Opposition that the régime intended to introduce a policy of separate development, Mr. Smith stated that the new Constitution must provide adequate protection for rights. This did not mean taking anything away from the African.

Developments in the tribal trust land areas

295. At the end of February 1967, the Legislative Assembly purported to have given second reading to the tribal trust land bill. The bill, which was subsequently signed by the "Officer Administering the Government", made certain changes in the administration and distribution of land in the tribal trust land areas by which the chiefs and tribal leaders were given responsibility for the administration, distribution and parcelling of land under their jurisdiction. The various tribal land authorities to be formed under the act were given powers to make their own by-laws, subject to the approval of the "Ministry of Internal Affairs". The tribal land authorities would operate according to local custom. The purpose of the act, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was to enable the Africans to develop their own tribal areas.

296. During the debate on the bill, some members of the United People's Party criticized the bill for providing for separate racial development. Mr. J. M. Gondo, UPP member for Nganda, stated that the bill appeared to have been copied from the South African Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.

297. The "Tribal Trust Land Act" was a follow-up to the "Constitution Amendment Act" of 14 September 1966. In the course of the debate on the bill, Mr. William Harper, the régime's Minister of Internal Affairs, stated that in addition to the changes in the administration of the tribal trust lands, the bill would empower the régime to introduce legislation to give the African chiefs greater powers in the administration of their areas. Among other powers, the proposed legislation would give the chiefs or their courts powers for dealing with certain criminal offences. The legislation would not force the tribal courts to adhere to the Declaration of Rights in so far as legal representation was concerned. It would also give powers to the chiefs for the removal of certain people from one tribal trust

area to another. The legislation would also make some changes in relation to tribal trust lands.

298. On 19 April 1967, Mr. Clifford Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, stated in the Legislative Assembly that the régime would introduce legislation to clarify the field of African law and to specify the areas of civil and criminal jurisdiction for tribal courts.

Appointment of "Constitutional Commission"

299. On 28 February 1967, the Smith régime announced the composition and terms of reference of the Constitutional Commission to advise on a new constitution for the country. The chairman of the Commission is Mr. W. Whaley, a Salisbury lawyer. The other members are Mr. R. H. Cole, a Bulawayo lawyer, Mr. S. E. Morris, the chairman of the Public Service Board, Mr. L. C. Mzingeli, an African businessman, and Chief Simon Sigoda. The secretary of the Commission is Mr. Peter Claypole, a Salisbury senior magistrate.

300. Mr. Whaley is a member of two government statutory bodies and a member of the Rhodesian Front Party (RFP). Mr. Morris, a former Chief Native Commissioner, was a member of the Rhodesian team of officers which took part in the informal talks with United Kingdom officials in 1966. Mr. Mzingeli took part in the 1961 Constitutional Conference.

301. The terms of reference of the Commission are:

"To examine the provisions of the constitution of Rhodesia, 1965, and, having regard to any other constitutional precedents and to views and opinions made known to you, to advise the Government of Rhodesia on the constitutional framework which is best suited to the sovereign independent status of Rhodesia and which is calculated to protect and guarantee the rights and freedoms of all persons and communities in Rhodesia and ensure the harmonious development of Rhodesia's plural society, having regard to the social and cultural differences amongst the people of Rhodesia, to the different systems of land tenure, and to the problems of economic development."

302. The Commission was to conduct its inquiries in private. It was empowered to present interim reports to Mr. Dupont.

Developments in security matters

303. On 26 January 1967, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", stated in the Legislative Assembly that nearly 100 trained African terrorists had been captured or killed by the Southern Rhodesian security forces during the past nine months.

304. On 7 February 1967, Mr. Lardner-Burke announced that eight former students at the University College of Rhodesia had been released from restriction to enable them to continue their studies outside Southern Rhodesia.

305. The annual report of the "Secretary for Law and Order" was tabled in the Legislative Assembly on 15 February 1967. The report stated that apart from a sharp increase in the number of cases of house-breaking and theft, and offences under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, there was a considerable drop in serious crime last year. The number of cases of arson fell from 99 in 1965 to 24 in 1966, culpable homicide from 102 to 72, and murder from 166 to 156.

Law and order cases rose from 47 in 1965 to 60 in 1966, and housebreaking and theft from 136 to 195. During the year, 927 persons, including 21 Europeans, were charged with 1,086 crimes.

306. On terrorist activities, the Secretary said the state of emergency existing in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 had provided an essential weapon in dealing with the many threats to the maintenance of law and order. During 1966, a maximum of 159 detainees and a minimum of 52 at any one time were held under ministerial order. The number of restrictees, while constantly changing, showed a maximum of 444 and a minimum of 306. By far the most serious threat was the infiltration of trained terrorists from neighbouring territories. Arrests had proved that these terrorists had received their training in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republics as well as in certain African States such as Algeria, Ghana and the United Republic of Tanzania.

307. The report stated that as a result of the extraordinary powers given by the emergency regulations in force throughout the year and many successful prosecutions of subversionists, the internal threat to law and order in the country had not been as great as in preceding years.

308. On 31 March 1967, the Smith régime set up a tribunal to review the cases of all detainees. Mr. M. F. Garnett, provincial magistrate for Mashonaland, was named as chairman of the three-man tribunal. The sittings of the tribunal would be held *in camera* and the régime's Ministry of Justice and Law and Order would not be bound by its recommendations. On 19 April 1967, the Ministry announced that the 170 people in detention had all received letters inviting them to submit their cases to the review tribunal.

309. On 8 April 1967, Mr. Lardner-Burke stated that there had been no known cases of terrorist infiltration into Southern Rhodesia since September 1966. He stated that radio broadcasts from Zambia had caused a number of attacks on farms and crops but believed that this had now ceased. A total of 115 people had been arrested by the security forces while attempting to enter the country with illegal intent and had since been prosecuted.

310. On 19 April 1967, Mr. Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, in his speech to the third session of the "Eleventh Rhodesian Parliament", stated that the régime would introduce legislation to provide for preventive detention without the need for a state of emergency by making the necessary provision in the ordinary statute law of the country. Press censorship would be maintained but the régime would continue to keep it under review.

311. On 25 April 1967, the state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia was renewed for a further three months by the Legislative Assembly, effective from 30 April.

312. Among other developments, the Smith régime launched a "Guard Against Gossip Campaign" (GAG) on 19 March 1967 to prevent people from indiscreetly passing on vital information to strangers and so-called spies. Advertisement and posters aimed at curtailing free speech, particularly on economic issues, carried slogans such as "Loose tongues lose battles". Introducing the campaign on 18 March 1967, the "Minister of Information", Mr. Jack Howman, stated that secrecy and security must become increasingly Southern Rho-

desia's watchword. He appealed to Rhodesian journalists to be security minded.

313. On 14 March 1967, two members of a "terrorist gang" who were reported to have been caught in a running fight with Rhodesian security forces near the Zambian border on 18 July 1966, were each sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment.

Rhodesian Front Party Congress

314. On 22 April 1967, a special congress of the Rhodesian Front Party was called in Salisbury to consider, among other things, amendments to the list of the party's principles.

315. At the congress, the first principle of the party was amended to read:

"The party affirms its loyalty to the independent country of Rhodesia."

The first principle of the party prior to the above amendment had read:

"The party affirms its loyalty to the Queen but rejects the principle of subordination to any external government."

A further amendment urging the immediate assumption of republic status by Southern Rhodesia was defeated. Mr. Smith was reported to have opposed the amendment but to have urged that the question should await the report of the Constitutional Commission.

316. Other principles of the party adopted by the congress ran completely counter to the United Kingdom Government's six principles for a constitutional settlement which Mr. Smith had accepted at the talks with Mr. Wilson on the H. M. S. *Tiger* (see paras. 88-98 of this chapter).

317. The second principle stated that the party "will ensure that the Government of Rhodesia remains permanently in responsible hands". It was reported that there was a move to amend this to read "permanently in European hands" but that this was considered not necessary.

318. The sixth principle stated that the party would uphold the principle of land apportionment. The Land Apportionment Act of 1941 is the key legislation on racially discriminatory practices in the Territory.

319. The eighth principle presaged legislation on separate African and European communities. It reads: "The party opposes compulsory integration and believes that the peaceful coexistence of people can only be achieved when communities have the right and the opportunity to preserve their own identities, traditions and customs". It also refers to "the obligation of the Government and the respective communities where necessary to ensure the provision of such separate facilities as will make this possible".

Resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

320. The Council of Ministers of the OAU, meeting at its eighth ordinary session in Addis Ababa from 27 February to 4 March 1967, adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In this resolution, the Council of Ministers again condemned unreservedly the Government of the United Kingdom for shirking its moral and constitutional responsibilities to the people of Zimbabwe by allowing the illegal Smith régime to consolidate its position in defiance of the rights of the people of Zimbabwe and world opinion; reaffirmed that primarily the responsibility of toppling the illegal

régime in Rhodesia rested with Britain and remained convinced that the only way to do this was the use of force; strongly reaffirmed the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and self-determination; called upon the nationalist movements in Zimbabwe to unite their ranks, co-operate and intensify their efforts against the common enemy in order to expedite the liberation of their territory and also on African States to give every assistance to the nationalist movements to ensure the liberation of the territory and the establishment of majority rule; once again called upon the African members of the Security Council to continue to sponsor the necessary measures which would strengthen and complete the implementation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966), including the invocation of Article 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Visit of Mr. Smith to South Africa

321. On 1 March 1967, Mr. Smith arrived in Cape Town on a visit to South Africa "to enjoy his first holiday since becoming Prime Minister". He was met on arrival by the Foreign Minister of the Republic, Dr. Muller, and "the accredited diplomatic representative of Rhodesia in the Republic", Mr. John Gaunt. On 21 March 1967, Mr. Smith, accompanied by his wife, paid a courtesy call on the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, at his official residence in Cape Town. According to official South African sources, Mr. Smith and his wife had lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Vorster and returned to their holiday resort immediately afterwards. No details of the meeting were available. However, Mr. Smith was reported to have stated on his return to Salisbury that he had been greatly encouraged by his meeting with Mr. Vorster. Speaking at a newspaper interview on 26 March 1967, he was reported to have stated that he had found among South Africans an incredible amount of goodwill, a desire to assist in every possible way and at the same time a tremendous realization of the problems ahead.

4. Economic developments (January-April 1967) Official published figures and statements on the economy of Southern Rhodesia

322. On 9 February 1967, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. John Wrathall, made a statement in the Legislative Assembly on the economic situation of Southern Rhodesia in 1966. He described the economic situation, after twelve months of sanctions, as being far more satisfactory than most people had believed. There had been a drop of less than 5 per cent in the gross domestic product compared with the figures for 1965. The gross domestic product for 1965 was officially quoted at £351.6 million. Regarding employment, he stated that the indications were that the monthly average of European, Coloured and Asian persons in employment had remained on the same level as in 1965 but that there had been an increase of some 2,500 in the monthly average of African employees. There had been a net loss of Europeans by immigration of just under 1,000, compared with a net gain of 4,000 in 1965.17 Mr. Wrathall also stated that in 1966 the consumer price index increased by 2.5 per cent in the case of Europeans and by 2.3 per cent for Africans. 323. On 14 April 1967, the Smith régime reported that retail trade had recovered steadily throughout 1966 from a low level of turnover in the first quarter and was on the average 9 per cent below the average for 1965. Industrial production declined by 6.8 per cent to a level which was still above that of 1964. Since March 1966, the consumer price index had risen from 108.5 to 110.9, or a little over 2 per cent. There had been a net loss of 1,421 European emigrants in the first nine months of 1966. Since September 1966, there had been a reversal of the trend and Southern Rhodesia had experienced a net gain of 1,158.

324. On 17 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that although retail trade in 1966 was 9 per cent below the average for 1965, this decline was not a fair reflection on the majority of trades. Addressing the annual general meeting of the Bulawayo Chamber of Commerce, he stated that motor trade turnover in 1966 fell to 73.5 per cent of the 1965 figures. If this item were not included in the index, the level of turnover for all other retail trade would be only 1.6 per cent below the 1965 level. Explaining figures released on the cost of living, he pointed out that among increases in foodstuffs was a rise of more than 24 per cent in the cost of a four-pound packet of sugar, but other increases were small and some, including pork and butter, had declined in price. Thus, the over-all index for foodstuffs had risen by only 5.6 per cent since October 1965.

325. Mr. Wrathall also stated that seven of nine major groups of items in the household budget had increased since 11 November 1965. These increases were: 11.2 per cent for vehicle expenses; 10.6 per cent for drink and tobacco; 5.6 per cent for food-stuffs; 3.3 per cent for miscellaneous items; 2 per cent for clothing and footwear; 1.6 per cent for household stores; and 0.5 per cent for fuel and light. The other two groups, servants' wages and rents and rates, showed no change.

326. On 5 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced that, effective from the middle of the month, the Smith régime would resume publication of selected economic statistics in a quarterly digest. It will be recalled that although a number of statistics had been disclosed from time to time in statements by officials of the régime, there had been a ban on the regular publication of economic information since November 1965.

Foreign trade

327. Following the above statement by Mr. Wrathall, the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury, on 14 April 1967, issued a report on foreign trade figures and economic trends in 1966. According to the report, exports in 1966, despite sanctions, amounted to £104.7 million. Imports totalled £84.2 million, showing a visible trade balance of £20.5 million. 18

328. On 17 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that Southern Rhodesia had benefited by nearly £20 million, as a result of the two-way blockade of payments such as interests, dividends and debts between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom. According to Mr. Wrathall, the value of interest on debts and debt repayments not being paid in the United Kingdom had so far been £9 million. Current investment income which was due to residents in the United Kingdom

¹⁷ Figures issued by the Bureau of Statistics of South Africa on 17 January 1967 vary from Mr. Wrathall's quotation by a wide margin. The figures showed that Southern Rhodesia in 1966 lost on balance 3,000 residents to South Africa.

 $^{^{18}\,\}mathrm{In}$ 1965, total exports including re-exports and gold sales amounted to £164.7 million; imports amounted to £119.8 million.

but which was now blocked in Southern Rhodesia amounted to over £10 million.

329. It was reported that if the Southern Rhodesian statistics were accepted it would mean that the country's economy had been able to withstand sanctions with a much smaller reduction in its import bill than would otherwise have been necessary. In 1965, Southern Rhodesia ran a visible trade surplus of £42 million, but a deficit of invisibles of £28 million. The elimination by the United Kingdom of £20 million of this "invisible" bill—even taking into account the loss of dividend income due to Southern Rhodesia—must have meant that a favourable visible trade surplus of only £15 million would have been adequate to prevent any drawing on Rhodesian reserves.

330. On 15 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that according to Southern Rhodesian figures, United Kingdom exports to Southern Rhodesia in 1966 amounted to £11 million, while United Kingdom figures amounted to £2.7 million. He gave a list of total imports from the United Kingdom, of which £7.1 million was represented by various forms of machinery and transport equipment. He stated that if the United Kingdom figure of £2.7 million was correct, then British exporters had obviously made an effort to bring their goods into Southern Rhodesia by devious means. In a subsequent statement on 17 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that Rhodesian figures for British imports in 1966 were £25.4 million less than in 1965. The British overseas trade account showed a greater fall, namely, £28.8 million.

331. According to figures released in Zambia on 11 April 1967, Zambia's trade with Southern Rhodesia for 1966 was as follows: domestic imports from Southern Rhodesia amounted to £23.1 million, compared with £35.5 million in 1965; exports to Southern Rhodesia amounted to £2.5 million, compared with £5.4 million in 1965. It was reported that Zambia had achieved the reduction in trade with Southern Rhodesia through strict control of imports of non-essential items, among them clothing, footwear and food-stuffs for which alternative sources of supply have been found.

332. According to trade figures released by the Republic of South Africa in January 1967, exports in 1966 to "the rest of Africa" rose by 32 per cent to R 194 million (about £100 million). The South African Government has not published a geographical breakdown of its trade with the rest of Africa since mid-1965. However, assuming that exports to Southern Rhodesia rose by a corresponding proportion, it is estimated that, on a conservative basis, exports and reexports to Southern Rhodesia would have amounted to about R 100 million (£50 million). South Africa's imports from the rest of Africa increased by 18 per cent in 1966. On the assumption of past performances, imports from Southern Rhodesia can be estimated at R 50 million (£25 million), repeating the 1964-1965 increases.

Other developments in foreign trade

333. Effective from 9 February 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced that Southern Rhodesia would adopt a single column customs tariff system. All provisions for automatic preference, and in particular the remaining Commonwealth preferences, would be permanently abol-

ished, but South Africa, Portugal and its African territories, Malawi and Botswana would all continue to enjoy preferential treatment, as would Lesotho, Swaziland and South West Africa. Mr. Wrathall stated that he believed the change would do much to consolidate the new pattern of trading relations which had emerged in the past fifteen months.

Agriculture General

334. It was reported in February 1967 that sanctions were changing the farming pattern of Southern Rhodesia. According to press reports, about 160 million pounds (about two thirds) of the 1965-1966 tobacco crop bought by the tobacco corporation remained unsold and had been stockpiled in Salisbury. The sugar crop, which together with the tobacco accounted for over 30 per cent of domestic exports in 1965 (£50 million), was also reported to be in serious difficulties as a result of sanctions and low world market prices. Hippo Valley Estates, one of the main sugar producers, reported a net loss of £372,345 on 19 July 1966 and the Chirundu Sugar Estates, another big producer of sugar, ceased production in February 1967. In April 1967, Rhodesia Sugar Refineries Ltd. announced that it would no longer continue to subsidize the growing side of the industry by paying over all of its profits.

335. According to press reports, present diversification trends in Southern Rhodesia, necessitated by sanctions, show that tobacco is now giving way to beef, wheat and maize as principal agricultural crops.

336. The cattle industry had been expanded in acreage and production and was estimated in May 1966 by the régime's Ministry of Agriculture to be worth £200 million. In March 1967, it was reported that beef was "booming" and that the cattle industry had gone ahead of tobacco as the main agricultural produce. The value of the cattle industry in 1967 was estimated to be well in excess of the £200 million quoted for 1966.

337. The local usage of wheat in Southern Rhodesia is in excess of 700,000 bags annually. In 1965, wheat production amounted to 43,300 bags, compared with 20,900 bags in 1964. It was therefore pointed out that there was ample scope for increased production in Southern Rhodesia in 1966-1967. In a joint statement issued in Salisbury in April 1967, the "Department of Water Development" and the "Ministry of Agriculture" declared that a number of tobacco growers had indicated their intention of growing wheat. It was further stated that this was in the national interest.

338. On 7 March 1967, the régime's Minister of Agriculture, Mr. G. W. Rudland, announced the prices that the Smith régime would pay to farmers to encourage the diversification of agriculture. He stated that for the 1967 maize crop agreement had been reached with the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union on a price of between 27s. 6d. and 28s. per bag. He emphasized that farmers would get less than 30 shillings per bag. In 1966, farmers were paid 31s. 6d per bag of maize. For crops that would be planted at the end of 1967 and reaped in 1968, he gave a set of prices as follows: A grade ground-nuts, from 90 to 110 shillings a bag; B grade ground-nuts, from 78 to 85 shillings per bag; soya beans, from 50 to 80 shillings per bag; and wheat, from 60 to 67 shillings per bag. Mr. Rudland stated that the wheat prices would come into effect in 1967 but that the prices for soya beans and ground-nuts would apply

¹⁹ According to Southern Rhodesia figures, domestic exports to the United Kingdom in 1965 amounted to £31 million; imports amounted to £36.4 million.

to crops to be reaped early in 1968. He also stated that it had been decided to discontinue the £430,000 a year subsidy on diesel fuel and fertilizers to farmers, and to put the money available on to the end prices of the above-mentioned crops. Mr. Rudland gave an assurance to tobacco growers that there would be a crop in the coming year and that this would go on in perpetuity. In referring to the tobacco crop for the coming season, he stated that he wanted to make it quite clear to tobacco producers that he had not mentioned that he would announce the price and quantities of the crop in July 1967, as he had done in the previous year.

Tobacco crop

339. Secret tobacco sales of the 1966/1967 crop opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1967. The Smith régime had guaranteed the farmers a minimum price of 28d. per pound for Virginia flue-cured tobacco. The production target of the crop for the season was fixed by the régime at 200 million pounds. It was presumed that most of the sales were likely to be concluded on the basis of private negotiations, as was done in 1966, rather than auction sales, as was the case before the unilateral declaration of independence. Elaborate security arrangements were reported to have been made to protect the identity of buyers. Under the system introduced last year, the leaf was offered to buyers with a minimum guaranteed government price. If buyers were not prepared to meet this minimum price, the leaf was then bought in by the Tobacco Corporation, which undertook to dispose of the leaf itself.

340. On 11 April 1967, Mr. Carol Heurtley, President of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, stated that a further cut in the size of the tobacco crop could bring financial ruin to hundreds of growers, wholesale unemployment to the rural areas, impugn the livelihood of many people in commerce, and adversely affect the marketing of other crops due to over-production. The foundation of the country's agricultural industry would be rocked if the tobacco target for next season was cut below 200 million pounds. He further stated that there were about half a million people dependent on the tobacco industry—most of them Africans—and another cut in the size of the crop would jeopardize the livelihood of everyone connected with the industry.

Commerce and industry

341. On 3 March 1967, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B. H. Mussett, gave figures for the country's industrial growth for the previous eighteen months. He stated that since "independence" more than 200 new industrial projects involving a fixed capital investment of £4,750,000 and a sales potential of £13 million had been approved. Many of these projects were now either in operation or about to be put into operation. On the future of Rhodesian industry, he stated that the continued use of import controls would be necessary to achieve expansion.

342. On 18 February 1967, the chairman of the Board for Industrial Development, Mr. Sears, stated in Salisbury that more than £6 million was available for investment in Southern Rhodesia to local and overseas investors. The Board wished to hear from industrialists and potential industrialists who needed money for expansion or new ventures.

343. On 5 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced tax concessions for industrialists to help to stimulate Southern Rhodesia's export trade. The concessions related to bigger allowances for export market promotional expenditure.

344. On 6 April 1967, the Smith régime was reported to have drastically reduced import quotas for non-essential goods in an attempt to preserve the country's foreign currency reserves. Figures on the new import quotas were not released but it was reported that cuts on some luxury items were as high as 75 per cent. Imports hardest hit included clothing, table-ware, perfume, glassware and chocolate and other food-stuffs. The cuts were reported to be a move by the régime to carry out its pledge to protect local industry through quota cuts on goods which were once imported but could not be produced locally.

345. In his opening address to the third session of the "Eleventh Parliament of Rhodesia", Mr. Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, paid tribute to the industrial sector of the economy for the expansion and diversification of its products. He stated that import substitution, exports and the maintenance of employment had benefited from these endeavours. Mr. Dupont also stated that the régime acknowledged that the impressive achievements of the mining industry had been a major factor in the maintenance of the country's economic equilibrium.

Finance

346. On 24 February 1967, the régime's Minister of Finance, Mr. Wrathall, stated in the Legislative Assembly that the Smith régime considered itself to be entirely absolved from the responsibility for servicing all London market debts which were listed as debts due to the United Kingdom Government and its agencies and debts under United Kingdom Government guarantee. He stated that Southern Rhodesia had been relieved of obligations totalling £160 million, excluding sinking funds, which were under the control of the United Kingdom Government. There could be no question of Southern Rhodesia resuming responsibility for this obligation unless and until the United Kingdom Government had made adequate reparation for the damage done to the Rhodesian economy by sanctions. Holders of this debt must look to the United Kingdom Government for satisfaction.

347. On 31 March 1967, the Smith régime floated a new £7.5 million three-year loan at 5 per cent which was almost immediately over-subscribed when subscription lists opened. The loan was to be used to pay for government development projects and to finance maturing debts. It was the sixth such loan to be floated by the régime, bringing the total to £27 million, since the illegal declaration of independence. The United Kingdom Government, as in the case of previous loans floated by the régime, issued a warning to investors informing them that the illegal régime was not capable of incurring legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia and that anyone subscribing to the loan did so entirely at his own risk.

Rhodesia Railways

348. On 23 March 1967, the "Ministry of Transport and Power" announced that discussions had taken place between Rhodesian and Zambian senior government officials relating to the dissolution of the Rhodesia Railways. It had been agreed that, progressively,

operational control of the sections of the railway within each country would respectively be taken over by the authorities to be established in each country, and that this process would be completed by 30 June 1967. It was intended that Zambia, Southern Rhodesia and the Railway Board would co-operate in bringing this about. Negotiations would continue until all aspects of the dissolution of the railways had been resolved. It was hoped these would be completed as soon as possible after 30 June 1967.

349. The Government of Zambia also issued a statement on 23 March 1967 in which it announced that it had started negotiations with Southern Rhodesia for breaking up the jointly owned Rhodesia Railways system.

350. On 6 March 1967, Rhodesia Railways started a new fast freight rail service between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to speed up imports to Southern Rhodesia through South Africa's ports, In an official statement it was stated that initially the service would be available for urgent goods dispatched from the main ports and Reef complex to Bulawayo and Salisbury. Traffic for these centres in Southern Rhodesia would go forward from Bulawayo and Salisbury by the daily internal express goods service. Goods from the Johannesburg area should be available for delivery in Bulawayo in five days and in Salisbury in six days. A similar fast freight service has already been in operation from Salisbury and Bulawayo to Johannesburg and the South African ports.

351. On 30 January 1967, the three-man Commission of Inquiry which was appointed by the Smith régime to investigate an alternative rail link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa submitted its report to the régime's Officer Administering the Government. The report of the Beitbridge Rail Link Commission, which was composed of three South African experts, recommended a direct rail link from Rutenga to Beitbridge to join the South African railway. On 3 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in the Legislative Assembly that his régime had no intention of rushing in to implement the recommendations "on this vital issue".

Other developments

352. In January 1967, it was reported that the French textile company, Boussac, had made a barter deal with the Rhodesia Tobacco Corporation to import textiles to Southern Rhodesia in exchange for £2 million worth of Rhodesian tobacco. A company spokesman was reported to have confirmed reports that Boussac material was on sale in Salisbury but denied that the company had agreed to take Rhodesian tobacco at below world market value in return. The textiles were being paid for in sterling by normal commercial means.

353. On 8 February 1967, the Ford assembly plant in Salisbury, which had held the leading share in the market for the industry, closed down as a result of lack of parts. The British Motor Corporation plant at Umtali, the second major producer, was also reported to be running out of parts.

354. It was reported that on 16 February the British consul at Beira prevented the ship Clan Mac-Innes from unloading a cargo of automobile parts destined for Southern Rhodesia.

355. On 8 March 1967, it was reported that the Union Carbide Company of the United States of

America had established a new company incorporated in South Africa to take over responsibility for the southern African interests of the Union Carbide group. The new company—Union Carbide Southern Africa—would assume control of eight companies, three of them Rhodesian chrome mines. The three Rhodesian chrome mines affected were Rhodesia Chrome Mines of Selukwe, African Chrome Mines and Union Carbide Rhomet of Que Que. It was reported that the move was viewed as an effort to avoid any embarrassment for the parent company owing to the fact that the Rhodesian mines were attempting to evade sanctions on chrome exports from Southern Rhodesia.

Effects of the oil embargo

356. On 27 April 1967, Mr. Mussett, the régime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, announced that the present form of fuel rationing would continue after 30 April 1967. Rationing has cut petrol consumption by about one third since the oil embargo. Under the present rationing system, motorists get a basic ration calculated on the weight of the vehicle and a supplementary ration calculated on the distance from home to work. However, the public can buy as much petrol as they want through the off-ration petrol (and aviation fuel) coupon system by which they pay an extra 2 shillings for additional coupons outside their normal ration allocation. Under the off-ration petrol system, premium petrol costs 8s. 8d. as against 6s. per gallon for normal allocation under the ration system; the regular brand of petrol under the off-ration system costs 8s. 5d. as against 5s. 8d. for the officially allocated ration.

357. On 23 March 1967, Mr. Mussett announced that the validity of the off-ration petrol coupons was to be extended indefinitely. It had originally been announced that the validity of the coupons would expire on 30 April 1967. The statement added that while it was hoped that there would be no need in the foreseeable future to cancel the off-ration coupon system, the public would appreciate that the Government must reserve the right to do so should circumstances make it necessary.

358. On 8 March 1967, the Johannesburg Star reported in a leading article that since the beginning of the oil embargo Mozambique had supplied Southern Rhodesia with enough refined fuel to enable the Smith régime to stockpile against two years of sanctions. It stated that this was the minimum estimate of foreign observers who had kept a close watch on "clandestine' petrol and oil trains from Lourenço Marques to Southern Rhodesia since the initiation of the fuel run in November 1965, The observers calculated that at least 70 million gallons of petrol alone had reached Salisbury and Bulawayo from the SONAREP (Sociedade Nacional de Refinação de Petróleos) refinery in the past twelve months. The estimate did not take into account the supply from South Africa, which on its own had probably covered most of Southern Rhodesian requirements since the unilateral declaration of independence.

359. The article stated that observers along the Mozambique rail route north of Lourenço Marques reported that up to four but never less than three fuel trains a day passed through their check points with supplies for Southern Rhodesia. Each train consisted of ten or twelve tankers with a carrying capacity of 5,000 gallons a tanker. As a conservative estimate, the article stated, this would constitute a daily supply of

150,000 gallons, reaching nearly 240,000 gallons on certain days.

360. On 10 March 1967, the Portuguese oil company of SONAREP denied in Lisbon that its refinery at Lourenço Marques had supplied Southern Rhodesia with 70 million gallons of petrol. A spokesman for the company was reported to have said that a Cape Town newspaper, the Cape Argus, and the British Broadcasting Corporation had recently implied that SONAREP had furnished Southern Rhodesia with that amount of petrol. He explained that such quantities of petrol were quite incompatible with the production of the Lourenço Marques refinery, and stated that Southern Rhodesia had never been a client of SONAREP. He added that foreign newspapers had for some time been trying to implicate Lourenço Marques refineries with the Southern Rhodesian question.

361. Under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Amendment) Order, 1967, which came into operation on 15 March 1967, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Herbert Bowden, on the same day barred the United Kingdom firm of Lonrho, Ltd. from negotiating the sale of its share in the Beira-Umtali pipeline company without the approval of the British Government. A communiqué issued by the Commonwealth Secretary invoked the above law, which empowered the Secretary of State to prevent or restrict the transfer of ownership of property overseas, where such a move might lead to contravention of the embargo on oil for Southern Rhodesia. The ban followed confirmed reports that the Portuguese directors of the company had expressed the desire to sell the pipeline to an unnamed buyer. Lonrho, Ltd. owns 62.5 per cent of the shares of the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia, but the Portuguese directors outnumber the British.

362. On 12 March 1967, the Johannesburg Sunday Express reported that South Africa was supplying Southern Rhodesia with large quantities of aviation fuel from a new Rhodesian-built depot on South African soil. The reporter of the newspaper stated that he had seen the depot and interviewed Mr. Ben Van den Berg, an employee of the Rhodesian oil-supplying organization, GENTA, who ran the depot.

363. Also, according to the report, observers estimated that each day an average of eighteen road tankers, carrying various fuels, crossed the Limpopo bridge into Southern Rhodesia at the small town of Messina. The reporter of the newspaper described the dump near Messina as a dozen big tanks fed from rail tankers, each holding about 8,000 gallons, which came daily from coastal refineries and occasionally from an oil pipeline in Johannesburg.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee²⁰

Introduction

364. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 521st to 523rd, 525th,

527th, 528th and 536th meetings held in Africa between 5 and 15 June 1967.

Written petitions and hearings

365. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Southern Rhodesia:

Petitioner	Document
Mr. Carl-Axel Valén, Secretary General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.548
Mr. Omer Becu, Secretary-General, International Confederation of Free	
Trade Unions (ICFTU)	A/AC.109/PET.595
Zimbabwe African National Union	
(ZANU), Publicity Department	A/AC.109/PET.596
Mr. Omer Becu, Secretary-General,	
ICFTU	A/AC.109/PET.597
Mr. H. Imhof, General Secretary, Inter-	
national Transport Workers' Federa-	A/AC.109/PET.598
tion	•
Secretariat, WAY Miss Susan Bennet, Secretary, Irish	A/AC.109/PET.599
United Nations Students Association.	A/AC.109/PET.600
Mr. Gregory Calvert, National Secretary,	21/110.10//1121.000
Students for a Democratic Society	A/AC.109/PET.612
Mr. G. H. Coombs	A/AC.109/PET.629
Mr. Jyorti Shankar Singh, General Secre-	,
tary, WAY	A/AC.109/PET.695

366. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia:

Mr. T. G. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.681) (521st and 522nd meetings)

Mr. W. H. Chitepo, National Chairman, ZANU (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.1) (523rd meeting)

Rev. Bernard H. Zulu (A/AC.109/PET.689) (523rd meeting)

Mr. P. L. Chihota, Chief Representative of ZANU, United Republic of Tanzania (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.2) (536th meeting)²¹

367. Mr. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), thanked the Special Committee for having decided to look at the Southern Rhodesian case from close range, for its continuous vigilance over the situation and for permitting him to contribute to its work.

368. Since the presentation of evidence on the Southern Rhodesian question to the Special Committee in 1966, political developments had shown that the situation had worsened: the settler régime had adopted a more defiant attitude towards the international world community and had introduced far more oppressive measures towards the majority of the country's inhabitants. Moving along that disastrous path, it had established a commission to prepare a constitution -with the encouragement of South Africa and the connivance of the United Kingdom Government-for the permanent entrenchment of a minority dictatorship and racism. The commission was engaged in a fake exercise of receiving evidence from all over the country, but had not had, and would not have, evidence from the genuine leaders of the African people of Zimbabwe. It was an instrument for the implementation of an idea conceived by the United Kingdom Govern-

²⁰ This section includes those portions of the statements made on Southern Rhodesia in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the draft resolution are included in the succeeding section. It should be noted that additional comments on the question of Southern Rhodesia were contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. These statements are included in chapter II of the present report.

²¹ This petitioner was heard after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (see para. 609 below) at its 528th meeting on 9 June 1967.

ment for imposing the plans made during the conspiracy on H.M.S. *Tiger* in December 1966. The constitutional commission could not therefore be divorced from the imperialist tactics of the United Kingdom Government.

369. In adopting measures to oppress and suppress the undaunted African people, the régime was assuming powers to make Rhodesia a permanent police State. Following the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, under which brave sons of Zimbabwe had been massacred, imprisoned and thrown into death cells and detention camps, there was now a Preventive Detention Amendment Bill, under which the régime could detain for any length of time any number of people for any allegation conjured up by a policeman, without a state of emergency being declared or a report being made to Parliament.

370. The régime was whittling down the allocation for African education at a rapid pace, expenditure on it being limited to 2 per cent of the gross national product. African teachers were being dismissed in the hundreds, so that thousands of African children were cast into the streets and the remaining teachers had to take over about three classes each. There was a restriction on the development of new schools, and missionary bodies were being deprived of several that they had been operating. More than 75 per cent of the schooling for Africans had for long been provided by missionaries on their own initiative and at considerable cost to themselves, and the régime was taking action to discourage that development. The intention clearly was to add to African suffering and to the reservoir of cheap labour.

371. Africans were being ousted from types of employment earmarked for white workers, a measure aimed to ensure full employment for, and the elimination of discontent among, the white population. The discontent was thus transferred to the Africans, who then encountered force and oppression.

372. The most significant political development introduced by the régime was open apartheid. The mask of multiracialism used by the United Kingdom Government for many years had been removed, and the régime had prescribed separate facilities for various tribal and ethnic groups—a direct copy of the Group Areas Act and the Bantu Authorities Act of South Africa. Under that scheme, housing for Africans settled in towns was to be provided according to the areas of their original villages and chiefs. Education was planned in accordance with the language and cultural habits of the tribal group, but the syllabus was to be drawn up on the advice of industrialists in terms of the cheap labour required. In the rural areas, further measures were being implemented to increase the punitive powers of the puppet chiefs. To give them a semblance of authority, a Local Authorities Act had been promulgated authorizing chiefs to collect taxes, from which allocations would be made to them for implementing some of the régime's measures. They enjoyed the protection of the settler army and the police and were instructed to deport from their areas and hand over anyone who disagreed with the régime.

373. The régime had continued to expand its armed forces, on which it had spent in 1966 a total of £11 million—an increase of £5 million over 1965. In that connexion, the international conspiracy in support of the régime was very evident: military experts from the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey and Taiwan had been brought in to train the régime's armed forces

in their war preparations against the African masses of Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian army was equipped largely with United Kingdom arms, for which spares continued to pour in. Under the alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, there was an interchange of security officers for various operations. South African regular troops had been brought in to reinforce the régime's offensive line along the Zambesi border. Between 19 and 23 March 1967, 525 South African soldiers had entered Southern Rhodesia in civilian clothes and changed into uniform at Bulawayo before being sent to points on the Southern Rhodesian site of the border with Zambia. Of that number, 225 under Colonel Dries Kotzenberg were stationed near Chirundu, and the remaining 300, led by Daan Pretorius, were in the Zambesi Valley. In addition, five South African army officers had been seconded to the Southern Rhodesian armed forces during the first three weeks of April: Colonels J. A. du Plooy, H. F. van der Spuy and T. M. C. Diederichs, and Commanders M. Rupert and H. P. Brand. During the same period, 317 South African recruits had entered the Salisbury Police Training Depot for paramilitary training for the Southern Rhodesian fascist minority dictatorship.

374. In considering measures to solve the Southern Rhodesian problem, which was a threat to international peace, the United Nations had been led by the United Kingdom along the path of economic sanctions, on the assumption that the United Kingdom, as one of the great Powers and a Member of the United Nations, would finally respect and honestly implement the United Nations resolutions. It had been demonstrated beyond doubt that those assumptions had been wrong from the start, and that the programme of sanctions could never be a success. The United Kingdom, backed by its allies, had sponsored the programme of sanctions as a decoy and a device to give it sufficient time to make a success of the unilateral declaration of independence.

375. Meanwhile, the economy of Southern Rhodesia continued to flourish, without the slighest sign of collapse or any possibility of bringing about a political change. South Africa, which backed up all of Southern Rhodesia's international trade, was a haven for United Kingdom money, and trade had gone on between Southern Rhodesia and United Kingdom firms. United Kingdom commercial banks—Barclays, National Provincial and Grindlays—and the Standard and Ottoman Banks were continuing to operate in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was permitting the entry of capital under cover of necessary items for the University of Rhodesia and other schemes. The British-Dutch combine, Unilever, based in and controlled from London, had recently authorized the expenditure of £135,000 for the extension of its Southern Rhodesian subsidiary. Sixty per cent of the ships carrying oil to the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique were British. The British Petroleum Company was supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia and continuing its business. It was clear, therefore, that the first defaulter in the programme of sanctions was the United Kingdom itself, which while advocating a programme of sanctions in the United Nations, was adopting measures to undermine them in Southern Rhodesia itself. The conclusion was that it had in fact introduced sanctions in the full knowledge that they would harm not Southern Rhodesia but the economy of Zambia. If to that were added the conspiracy of the big international

capitalistic combines to prop up the economy of Southern Rhodesia, it became clear that the United Kingdom and its allies were intent on foiling any possible effect that sanctions might have because the economy of Southern Rhodesia was not so much in the control of the settlers as of those international financial combines. For example, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey handed over oil from the Middle East to the French company, Total, which carried the oil to Southern Rhodesia through depots in Lourenço Marques, and transferred the oil to British Petroleum, Shell and Caltex for direct sale to Southern Rhodesia. That was the pattern for many companies dealing in various lines. Those sustaining the Southern Rhodesian dictatorship by revenue included such companies as Lonrho, Anglo American and Rio Tinto Union Carbide Corporation, all of them based in the United Kingdom or the United States. Since it was impossible for them to refrain from expanding or diversifying the economy of Rhodesia, it was impossible for sanctions to have the required political effect.

376. The régime had established agencies to handle the sale of its products to international markets, some based in Southern Rhodesia and others in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. The Manica Trading Company, for example, was connected with several shipping lines, and delivered Southern Rhodesian goods. Sugar was sent to Mozambique where it was given a Portuguese label to conceal the source, and attempts were made to sell it even to African countries. Perhaps the best indication of the strength of the Rhodesian economy, in spite of sanctions, was the loan of £7.5 million floated in April, and over-subscribed within minutes.

377. It was clear that sanctions had a chance neither of being fully and effectively applied nor of bringing about a political change in Southern Rhodesia—their supposed original objective. Since Southern Rhodesia continued to be a threat to international peace, a change of strategy was imperative on the part of the progressive nations which were determined to liquidate the racist dictatorship and establish a popular African government in the interests of justice and peace.

378. In view of that enormous problem, the African people of Zimbabwe continued to resist the oppressive régime. They had always been convinced that the Rhodesian settler régime depended on force and could only be eliminated by the use of force. They were therefore being mobilized to sacrifice their lives in waging an armed fight against the enemy. The courageous sons of Zimbabwe were rallying to that fight within the country. The rigorous measures being taken by the racist régime through its enormous army to repress the African people were evidence of its awareness of the growing strength of the African people.

379. ZAPU therefore called upon the Special Committee to condemn the United Kingdom and its allies for deliberately misleading and deceiving the United Nations about the programme of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, to regard the United Kingdom as the real enemy, to recognize that the sanctions programme was a fraud which could never bring about the required political effect, and to encourage all nations that genuinely supported the African fight for the elimination of the racist minority dictatorship and the establishment of an African popular government, to support, by all means within their power, the African

people of Zimbabwe in their armed fight to attain their objective.

380. The international finance companies operating in Southern Rhodesia were putting pressure on the Smith régime and on the United Kingdom Government to impose their own policy. The financial magnate Oppenheimer, for example, had recently suggested that the United Kingdom Government should enter into talks with the régime for that purpose, and it had been announced that day that Smith had made a request to the United Kingdom Government for the resumption of talks.

381. He thanked the members for their words of support and encouragement, which he would convey to the African people.

382. In reply to a question concerning the number of people in imprisonment or detention in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that his latest information was that there were about 100,000, though the official figure for those in prison was given as some 34,000. There were a large number of detention camps in remote areas under more than 250 chiefs, in which many freedom fighters were detained. Most of the prisoners were taken to the small townships in remote parts of the country in order to conceal their true number.

383. With regard to the treatment meted out to prisoners, he said that various methods of torture were used. When a person was arrested he was taken to some remote area and interrogated by as many as ten policemen. Several had lost their sense of hearing from the treatment they had received. Some were given electric shocks, and electric sticks were sometimes used to frighten them into giving information. Other methods were to strip prisoners and drive pins through the penis, or hang them face down and beat their genitals in order to force them to sign statements prepared by the police. Another way of attempting to force them to give information was to tie them to a tree and light a stick of gelignite that had been fixed to it. Many had died rather than submit, A number of resisters in the countryside had been rounded up and shot, having been taken to European farms by white-settler constables, and the African police were not allowed in the area. Other prisoners were starved, some for as long as a month, though sixteen days was considered the normal period.

384. Asked what further help could be given to the freedom fighters by the international community, the petitioner thanked the international community for having recognized the legitimacy of the fight and replied that the Southern Rhodesian problem could only be solved by force. The members were aware of the support being given to the Southern Rhodesian army by a number of countries, particularly those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bloc, to enable it to entrench the racist policy. Since force could only be eliminated by force, those countries able and willing to assist could help by making equipment available to carry on the armed fight. It should be understood that the people of Zambia were threatened not only by the crippling of their economy, but were also faced with bayonets from South Africa and Angola. Since Zambia had taken a stand for justice, it should be given the full weight of international support.

385. Asked what aid the international community could give in respect of the refugee question, he replied that his organization's view was that everyone in

Zimbabwe was required to share the burden of the fight, and refugees were therefore not encouraged. Should the question arise, however, any material and educational assistance that could be offered through the international refugee agencies would be appreciated.

386. Asked for further details concerning the so-called Preventive Detention Amendment Bill and the introduction of the apartheid system, he said that the bill was intended to bring into permanent effect an act introduced, supposedly for five years, in 1959, when the African National Congress had been banned and hundreds of leaders placed in custody. It empowered the régime to imprison an individual without trial, but the minister was supposed to report to Parliament within three months. Under the amendment, however, that would not be necessary, and detentions could continue almost indefinitely. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act enabled the police to search any house or arrest anyone without warrant.

387. Southern Rhodesia had in practice been applying apartheid for many years, in the shops, in the provision of separate residential areas, and in the division of land under the Land Apportionment Act. It was now being extended, not only on the basis of colour, but tribally. Africans were to be settled in the towns according to their area of origin or the tribe from which they came, while all Whites regarded themselves as one community. The plan followed the same lines as the Group Areas Act of South Africa. Chiefs would have their representatives in the townships, so that if a township was divided into, for example, six tribal groups there would be six different representatives to identify those regarded as undesirable by the régime, and to send them to the rural areas under their respective chiefs. Such divisions were being introduced in order to create tribal conflict. It was intended to introduce total apartheid, including the provision of separate windows for the buying of bus tickets.

388. Asked whether anything could be done by the international community, through such agencies as UNESCO, to offset the restrictive measures adopted in respect of African education, the petitioner replied that the international community could play a part with regard to higher education. A number of countries had for many years been helping to fill the gap in education by taking students into their respective institutions, and further assistance in that respect would be useful.

389. Asked whether the establishment of some form of supervisory commission by the Security Council might help in the more effective application of sanctions, he replied that, although the aim of such a commission would be well intentioned, it could not, as a merely supervisory body, ensure that mandatory sanctions were effective. The fact that such sanctions were selective would give the régime a breathing space in its economy. What was missing was an enforcement measure, which could only be applied by the use of force to prevent the interflow of trade across the borders of Southern Rhodesia, particularly through Mozambique and South Africa. Sanctions themselves were not likely to be effective, and the idea of a supervisory commission was merely academic.

390. Asked to what extent the effectiveness of stricter mandatory sanctions would be enhanced if they were expanded into a complete and comprehensive system, incorporating all exports, imports, communica-

tions and transport, coupled with the setting-up of a co-ordinating agency, the petitioner recalled the words of the President of Zambia to the effect that nothing short of complete and mandatory sanctions coupled with force would bring about the fall of the régime in Southern Rhodesia and the establishment of a popular Government. That view was correct. There was no need to follow the United Kingdom line of applying piecemeal sanctions while preparing for presenting the world with a fait accompli.

391. Elaborating further on the statement he had made concerning the constitution being framed by the illegal régime with the co-operation of South Africa, he said that the five-man constitutional commission had failed to evoke any response from the African population because it was part and parcel of the system they rejected. The régime had recently obtained the assistance of a professor sent by the South African Government at its request to help to draw up the socalled constitution, which was being done with the connivance of the United Kingdom Government, whose agent Smith was. The meeting on H.M.S. Tiger had been a conspiracy disguised by a show of disagreement on whether the suggested commission should be appointed by Wilson or by Smith. It had now been appointed by Smith, and the United Kingdom Government had not taken a position on the matter. The United Kingdom Conservative Party had been used to appear to put pressure on the Government for a further meeting with Smith. Mr. Bowden had said in the House of Commons that, if Smith took the initiative for a meeting, the United Kingdom Government would be willing to resume talks. Oppenheimer had since remarked that such talks should take place, and that had been followed by an initiative by Smith, to which the United Kingdom Government's reaction, already forecast by Mr. Bowden, was awaited.

392. In reply to a request for further examples of how the United Kingdom Government had permitted the entry of capital into Southern Rhodesia in the guise of necessary items, the petitioner said that, in the case of the University of Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government was contributing £250,000, and that it had stated that it would not impose sanctions upon such items as medical supplies for international welfare agencies like the British-based Amnesty International, for which welfare funds were also allowed in. Under cover of humanitarianism, the United Kingdom was thus able to transfer capital into the country.

393. Asked whether he thought that the United Kingdom and United States oil companies had expanded their activities after the so-called declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner replied that those companies that had formerly competed against each other were now working in cooperation to promote and defend their business interests in Southern Rhodesia, and their activities appeared to be expanding. The Rio Tinto Union Carbide Corporation, for example, had recently purchased the Bronton Gold Mine, which had known overseas reserves of £11 million. A notice in the Rhodesian Government Gazette of 11 March 1967 disclosed that another large monopoly, Lonrho Ltd., had applied for an exclusive order in respect of an area of 253 square miles to prospect for coal, mineral oil and natural gas. There were many more examples of the extension of such companies in the country. Oil companies had further been diversifying their activities since the unilateral

declaration of independence by building storage tanks in various places.

394. With regard to the sources of the arms used by Southern Rhodesia, he said that the Southern Rhodesian régime had inherited almost the entire military equipment of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Most items were of United Kingdom make, though some had also been supplied by the United States. Since the unilateral declaration Southern Rhodesia had continued to receive arms through Portugal, whose supplies came from NATO countries, and through South Africa, assisted by the Federal Republic of Germany. Spares from the United Kingdom were still being received. Japan and Turkey had also furnished supplies, and the United Kingdom was continuing to do so through a factory in Brussels.

395. Asked whether he had any information concerning the reported increase in the income of the foreign monopolies which were mining minerals in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that copper, asbestos and chrome were produced in Zimbabwe. Italy bought copper concentrates and asbestos, and the United States, chrome. The largest buyer of copper concentrates was the Federal Republic of Germany, which also bought asbestos. The United Kingdom bought all three. According to recent figures, the Federal Republic of Germany had increased the value of its purchase of copper concentrates from £3 million to £5 million.

396. Mr. Chitepo, National Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), said that, in 1966, his organization had had occasion to present to the Special Committee a document outlining the grave situation then existing in Southern Rhodesia, a situation which had subsequently been described by the General Assembly and the Security Council as constituting a very serious threat to international peace and security. The current visit of the Committee and the hospitality offered to it by the President and Government of Zambia were continuing evidence of the concern felt by that country and by the international community at the dangerous situation existing in Southern Rhodesia. He extended a welcome to the Special Committee on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe, in the sincere hope that it would be able to study at closer range the problems arising from the Rhodesian crisis. The people of Zimbabwe and, indeed, the international community were faced with a crisis that had been deliberately created, encouraged, aided and abetted not only by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland but also by a number of other Governments and nations. The United Kingdom Government, in flagrant violation of its obligations under the Constitution of its own colony of Southern Rhodesia and under the Charter, had made use of naked falsehood, shameless pretence and every conceivable stratagem to deceive the world community concerning its role in the Rhodesian situation.

397. Some time before the unilateral declaration, when it had been well known that the crisis was approaching and the United Kingdom had already warned that any such action would be regarded as treason, the Prime Minister of that country had gone to Salisbury and carefully assured the would-be rebels that, whatever happened, he would not resort to force. It had been the first time in history that a duly constituted authority had given its permission to commit treason. The world had subsequently watched in amazement the antics and falsehoods of the Prime

Minister in his attempts to camouflage the real intention and role of his country in the crisis. There had been the rush to the United Nations to demand limited and voluntary sanctions, followed by fanciful statements that the rebel régime would fall within a matter of weeks; the pretended blockade of the port of Beira and finally, after a year had passed with nothing to show for voluntary sanctions, the request to the Security Council for mandatory sanctions.

398. In that connexion, it would be recalled that the United Kingdom had objected to the inclusion of oil and it had been only at the insistence of many other Members of the United Nations that oil had, in fact, been included. The reason for the disinclination to include oil among the mandatory sanctions was to be found in subsequent actions by the United Kingdom organizations. Another and more serious act of deception at the time of the application for mandatory sanctions had been the warning delivered by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom that there should be no provocation or general confrontation in southern Africa—a clear preparation for things to come. Voluntary sanctions were already being applied and it was notorious that voluntary associations had been formed in South Africa to supply oil to Southern Rhodesia, and that oil was also being obtained from Mozambique.

399. The United Nations and many of its Member States, both individually and collectively, had emphasized to the United Kingdom that the only way to suppress the rebellion was by force. The United Kingdom, which had thousands of its troops committed to the so-called defence of Malaysia and the Far East, thousands of others in the Federal Republic of Germany, and yet others to defend its colonial interests in the Middle East and Aden, had shuddered at the thought of using force to suppress the most blatant rebellion against its rule in modern history. The chief representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations had solemnly warned that the threat of racial conflict was the greatest danger currently facing the world. The President of Zambia had reminded the Special Committee and the world at large of the danger, not only of racial conflict but of ideological conflict also in southern Africa. Nevertheless, the racialist handling of the Rhodesian rebellion courted the very conflict that the United Kingdom pretended to fear. It had seen fit to treat the Rhodesian rebels with kid gloves for two reasons, the "kith and kin" idea and its own economic interests in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

400. The United Kingdom claimed to be one of the greatest champions of United Nations authority. It had clamoured for United Nations action in the Middle East, because its oil supplies had been threatened. It was all too evident that, like other major Powers, it wished to make use of the world body when its interests were threatened and when it could not find sufficient cover to enable it to act unilaterally contrary to the principles of the Charter. What did it matter to the United Kingdom that newly independent Zambia was, in some respects, more severely affected by the sanctions than Southern Rhodesia? When the United Kingdom had asked for mandatory sanctions, it had been well aware that the supply of oil to Zambia had ceased, while Southern Rhodesia was still obtaining supplies from South Africa and Mozambique. What did it matter to the United Kingdom that the black man in Southern Rhodesia was the greatest victim of the incidence of sanctions and that Zambia was living under the constant threat of Rhodesian sabotage, provided that United Kingdom interests and its kith and kin in Southern Rhodesia and southern Africa continued to be safeguarded?

401. Subsequent to the unilateral declaration, the Smith régime had amended the notorious 1961 Constitution—itself imposed by the United Kingdom against the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe—and was currently drafting a so-called "separate development constitution" which would institutionalize apartheid under another name.

402. Measures were being taken in Southern Rhodesia to link that country ever more closely to South Africa, not only administratively but also in philosophy and social attitude. The danger was not simply that of a group of racists desperately trying to hold its position, but a more sinister threat of a new outgrowth of that *Herrenvolk* doctrine which had already produce one of the world's greatest tragedies.

403. Although the United Kingdom had sanctimoniously urged the world to co-operate in the sanctions campaign, it was itself one of the chief blockaderunners. Sixty per cent of the ships carrying oil to Mozambique sailed under the flag of that country, although it was common knowledge that oil delivered to Mozambique was intended for Rhodesia as well. The United Kingdom continued to trade with Rhodesia through middlemen and third parties. What faith could the world continue to place in the Government of that country after such pretences and violations of solemn pledges?

404. The race issue pervaded the atmosphere of all southern Africa. Apartheid was spreading and growing in intensity. It had made deep incursions into the rights of the indigenous people of South West Africa, in utter defiance of United Nations guarantees. The rebel Rhodesian Government had seriously embarked on a programme of racial discrimination more intense even than the South African one since in that country the Whites were outnumbered by sixteen to one. It was clear that where such a small minority possessed all power, privilege and authority, it would have an even greater fear of democracy and thus make greater use of oppression. There was indeed a serious threat of racial conflict in southern Africa, not because Africans were racialists, but because the great Powers, devoted to their own narrow interests, were prepared to stand by and watch while the latter-day "Hitlers" of southern Africa propagated and implemented policies that were very little different from those of the nazis. Mr. Wilson, the modern Chamberlain of United Kingdom politics, had "done a Munich" in Southern Rhodesia, an act the bloody repercussions of which would surely spread beyond the confines of Zimbabwe.

405. On two occasions since the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Nations had been stampeded by the Government of the United Kingdom into imposing economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and, on both occasions, it had been adamant in resisting the full and comprehensive measures that alone might have guaranteed some limited success. It had solemnly promised that the measures contemplated would bring down the rebel régime and, trusting in that undertaking, the United Nations had acquiesced. Nineteen months had since passed and nothing had happened. The reasons were plain to see. The calculated forewarning given by the United Kingdom

had enabled the Smith régime to prepare countermeasures. Even the voluntary United Kingdom sanctions had been introduced individually, after due warning. It was hardly surprising that the rebels had been able to prepare for them. Furthermore, the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to co-operate in the sanctions programme had guaranteed easy channels for Rhodesian exports and imports. In fact, the missing link in the sanctions programme had been the failure to introduce enforcement machinery under Chapter VII of the Charter. When it was known that South Africa and Portugal would refuse to comply with the resolution, the decision should have been accompanied by the establishment of enforcement machinery. The Smith régime had defied the United Kingdom, but South Africa and Portugal had defied the United Nations.

406. Any effect that sanctions might have produced had been softened for the régime and its white supporters by the mass dismissal of African workers, including more than 500 school teachers. White workers, on the other hand, were protected from dismissal by new legislation under the emergency regulations. It was difficult to assess whether sanctions were in fact having any real impact. The United Kingdom pointed to the closure of the Ford factory, to a certain decrease in exports and to a fall in the Rhodesian gross national product as evidence that they were. However, the purpose of sanctions was not to reduce the gross national product or ruin the Rhodesian economy but to produce political changes, and no favourable political changes had resulted. That was due to the basic nature of the situation: a small number of white settlers were crushing 4 million Africans. Under such circumstances. even a complete breakdown of the economy would not necessarily produce the desired political change, namely, the replacement of a hierarchical society by an egalitarian one, which, of course, would mean majority rule. It was doubtful whether even a well-enforced sanctions programme could produce such a change. It was no longer a question of desire for white domination among rebel supporters but a definite growth of racist philosophy. Such a community might well resist until everything lay in ruins about it.

407. The Smith régime had switched to home industries to replace whatever imports had been effectively blocked, and the viability of the Rhodesian economy was such that a certain degree of diversification and reorientation had taken place.

408. Apart from the recalcitrance of South Africa and Portugal, other Members of the United Nations had, like the United Kingdom, merely paid lip-service to mandatory sanctions and continued to trade in embargoed goods with the rebel régime. Following reports that a Swiss consortium had bought Rhodesian tobacco and sold it overseas, the Swiss Government had stated that it was unable to restrict private Swiss companies and was maintaining a strictly neutral attitude towards Southern Rhodesia. France had exported £2 million worth of Marcel Boussac textiles to Southern Rhodesia, paid for under a tobacco barter arrangement, and there were plans to build a Peugeot assembly plant at Salisbury. United States exports to Southern Rhodesia in 1966 had totalled £2 million, as against £8 million before the unilateral declaration. The Federal Republic of Germany continued to trade with Rhodesia "to the extent of existing contracts", which earned Rhodesia £1 million in foreign exchange. Southern Rhodesia's exports to the Federal Republic

- of Germany under so-called "existing contracts" totalled £13 million, including £7 million worth of tobacco, £3 million worth of copper and £1 million worth of asbestos. Rhodesian imports from the Federal Republic, which were worth £5 million, covered a wide range of products sorely needed in Rhodesian markets.
- 409. United Kingdom trade with the rebels, also under so-called existing contract arrangements, exceeded £15 million. Other countries shielded under similar arrangements were Switzerland, Japan and the Netherlands.
- 410. A host of repressive legislative measures had been taken to prevent African workers from economic action which could have supplemented sanctions from within, including: the detention, restriction and imprisonment of more than 10,000 political activists and trade-unionists excluding those detained by sentence of the courts; a perpetual state of emergency restricting people's movements; the establishment of a harsh police régime; and rigorous censorship of news, and control by the régime of all news and information media.
- 411. In view of the foregoing facts, the United Nations must realize that only full and effective measures against South Africa and Mozambique could produce a solution by way of sanctions. Southern Rhodesia was linked with both those Territories by first-class road and rail connexions and, even if it were impossible to impose a blockade on those Territories, it was certainly possible to block the points of entry, either by the physical presence of United Kingdom or United Nations forces on Rhodesian territory, or else by bombing.
- 412. The crux of his argument was that selective mandatory sanctions had proved ineffective mainly through the resistance of South Africa and Mozambique and the lack of enforcement machinery. In calling for sanctions under Chapter VII, the United Kingdom had pledged its honour but, by adopting that resolution, the United Nations found itself in a position where it had to salvage its own reputation and not merely that of the United Kingdom. He therefore urged the United Nations to concern itself with enforcement measures as of right, since its own reputation—and possibly even its survival—were at stake. It had, in fact, been led into a trap by the United Kingdom. Any enforcement measures introduced should not be dependent on the United Kingdom's willingness or otherwise to implement them. Two methods were possible: either the application of sanctions against both South Africa and Mozambique, which had been feebly and deceptively tried when the United Kingdom had asked for authorization to intercept any tanker carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, or the physical removal of the channels through which those two countries continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia.
- 413. He would dwell for a moment on the conditions inside Zimbabwe, since the rebel régime had made many propaganda claims concerning its work for the benefit of all the people of that country.
- 414. The movement towards full apartheid was clearly reflected in the data concerning the yearly expansion of African education. In the period 1946-1957, that expansion had, in terms of expenditure, averaged 35 per cent per year. That period had seen the downfall of Todd, who had doubled the personal tax for Africans and had planned to step up the rate

- of expansion. In the period 1957-1961, the rate had fallen to 28 per cent. That also had been considered excessive by the white community, and by 1961 the Rhodesian Front, which had pledged to lower the rate, had been voted into power. The Front had kept that pledge, and the rate for the period 1961-1966 had fallen to 9 per cent while, in the current financial year, it had dropped to 6.5 per cent. In 1966, only 66 per cent of the hundreds of thousands of African children of school age had been enrolled, 15 per cent of whom were in the final year of the eight-year primary-school course and less than 1 per cent in secondary schools. The rebel régime had spent annually less than £10 on each African school child and more than £110 on each white school child. Education for Whites was compulsory and free up to the age of sixteen while African children had to pay school fees. African schools were understaffed and poorly equipped, yet the régime was currently implementing a scheme to dismiss some 3,500 of the less qualified teachers. It had cut the intake into training colleges by one half, the intake into secondary schools from one fifth of primary school leavers to one eighth and had stopped equipment grants to African schools. A so-called registration fee of 50 shillings per child had been imposed which raised the average African parent's expenditure on education for each school child from 14 to 17 per cent of his annual income.
- 415. Still harsher measures were to be imposed. As in South Africa under the so-called Community Development Plan, African education was going to be financed almost completely by the African communities themselves, which would be responsible for running the schools. That was designed to reduce the missionary contribution to African education which, in the past, had amounted to more than 75 per cent. African communities were situated in the most barren parts of the country, and the schools open to Africans in the European suburban areas had been closed to enforce segregation and disguise the injustice of the so-called open franchise based on stiff educational and income qualifications.
- 416. With respect to employment and working conditions, there had been marked and crippling discrimination against Africans. In theory, they could rise to any rung of the employment ladder but, in practice, settler employers and the settler régime had made sure that Africans were employed only in unskilled and in a limited number of semi-skilled jobs. No apprenticeship was available to Africans and even the handful trained outside the country could not find employment. During the period of partnership under the Federal Government, a Technical College for Africans had been established at Luveve, but it had been closed by the Smith régime. Where qualifications were equal, the African received about half the wage paid to his white counterpart. The average wage for an African was £140 per annum and that for a white employee £1,700 per annum. African workers were poorly housed and had to travel long distances to work from areas badly served by an inadequate transport system. To restrict the growth of African trade-unionism, the régime had passed oppressive legislation which it ruthlessly enforced, e.g., the Industrial Conciliation Act which, by categorizing sources of employment as "essential services", could forbid strike action. Since the imposition of sanctions, virtually every capacity in which Africans were employed had been so categorized. African tradeunion organizations were subjected to close scrutiny

and financial control, it being forbidden for them to use their funds for certain stipulated purposes, e.g., for political activities. Under current conditions, any strike action was regarded as political and the organizers subject to prosecution. The régime, having registered puppet minority unions, in which the votes were so weighted that the white workers could outvote much greater numbers of Africans, had decreed that only one union was permitted for each trade and that strikes by unregistered trade unions were illegal. Most Africans could only belong to unregistered trade unions.

- 417. African farm labour in Rhodesia was hardly distinguishable from slave labour. The Industrial Conciliation Act had been supplemented by the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, which provided that any person who advised, encouraged, incited, commanded, aided or secured any act likely to hinder or interfere with the carrying out of an essential service would be prosecuted.
- 418. The whole system was designed to maintain the status quo, with its appalling low wages and poor working conditions for the African. Since the imposition of sanctions, redundant white workers had begun to fill the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs previously held by Africans, since the law made it illegal to dismiss white workers. Under the Vagrancy Act, unemployed Africans were either forced into overcrowded rural areas or condemned to detention and restricted areas as vagrants.
- 419. The Land Apportionment Act, like the Group Areas Act in South Africa, was the cornerstone of the system of land discrimination which affected trade, commerce, industry, residence and education. The whole subject had been fully covered in documents submitted by ZANU to United Nations bodies in the past. All that remained to be said was that, since it had come to power, the Rhodesian Front had been implementing that Act more viciously and intensively than ever before.
- 420. Since it was currently a crime in Rhodesia to reveal trade figures or any other statistics, it was extremely difficult to obtain full details of what was happening, so that the shocking picture he had just revealed was only a partial reflection of the grave situation that had developed. In the inevitable clashes that had taken place, many people had been killed and whole villages razed to the ground as reprisals for their sympathy with or active participation in the war against the régime. The rigid censorship imposed since the unilateral declaration hid many such happenings, but much more was known than the rebels would admit.
- 421. Conditions in the restriction and detention camps where many thousands were confined were appalling, inhuman and calculated to break the morale of the prisoners. Inmates were confined in small crowded huts which were surrounded by barbed wire and heavily guarded by armed soldiers. Floodlights played on them all night. Their wives and families were not told of their whereabouts. They were not permitted reading material or news from outside. There were no sanitation or washing facilities. All visits, even by the clergy, were forbidden. Permission had been denied even to the Archbishop of Mashonaland. Photostats had been submitted to the Special Committee telling part of the story of the gallant resistance of his people to the régime. Their faith in peaceful solutions betrayed, the people had taken to arms. As soon as the first major battle had been fought at Sinoia in May 1966,

the régime had imprisoned all ZANU leaders, who were detained at Sikombela near Gwelo. The situation had developed to the point where any white man was "licensed" to shoot an African on sight and to go scot-free merely by pleading that he had suspected him of being a guerrilla. Both the President and the Vice-President of ZANU had been brutally assaulted by white prison warders. In an effort to cover up the facts of the fighting, the régime had publicized only such incidents as would give the impression that it had the situation under control.

- 422. In the meantime, it was using special hospitals—usually military barracks—to treat its wounded, the doctors being sworn to secrecy. The régime's special service police patrolled the African residential areas night and day to arrest anyone caught loitering or listening to foreign broadcasts. It had become common practice to imprison a person for a month without trial on mere suspicion. It was the height of cynicism for a régime that had held people who had never been convicted in a court of law in prison for more than five years to be considering a Preventive Detention Bill.
- 423. The people of Zimbabwe had taken a solemn pledge to fight to the bitter end. They had no illusions that the fight would be an easy one; their enemy was highly equipped and resolute. His was not only a racist régime but a military one also. In addition to the regular white army of 25,000 men (including reserves), the whole civilian white population was undergoing military training. All white men between eighteen and fifty-five years of age were liable to conscription. All white Rhodesians were armed, even the women. Every policeman had unrestricted powers to arrest on suspicion.
- 424. Apartheid in housing had virtually existed since 1923 and every African area had recently become a prison all but in name. Police were to be seen everywhere. People were constantly being questioned and interrogated and road blocks were commonplace.
- 425. Despite all that display of apparently insuperable power, the people of Zimbabwe had not faltered in their decision to fight to the last. ZANU had reached that decision long before. The Reverend N. Sithole had taught its members that they were their own liberators and that, with the unilateral declaration of independence, all Zimbabwe might well be required to take up arms. The people had answered the call. The only language that the settlers understood was that of force and ZANU considered that force was legitimate when it was used to regain one's birthright. Had there been any doubts concerning the legitimacy of the fight, they would have been dispelled by the United Nations declaration that the cause of the people of Zimbabwe was a just one. That people was gratefully aware of the declarations by the Special Committee and the General Assembly calling upon all Member States to support them in their fight for liberation.
- 426. He had listened with interest to the opening statements by many representatives to the effect that the only solution to the Rhodesian problem was the use of force. He warned the Special Committee that it would be futile to expect the United Kingdom to provide force. The only possible force that could be used was that of the people of Zimbabwe themselves. The United Nations, having committed itself to sanctions, might find itself obliged to make some use of force to vindicate its authority. For its part, ZANU would use force to vindicate the dignity of the people

- of Zimbabwe. All ZANU required of the Committee was, in the first place, that it should repeat its call to all Members States to support the Zimbabwe liberation movement.
- 427. There had been a conspiracy between Wilson and Smith on H.M.S. Tiger to betray Zimbabwe. By a miraculous accident, the deal had not been accepted by the rebels. He was nevertheless sure that further attempts would be made by Smith and Wilson to reach a private agreement. Despite recent denials, he was sure that further talks were in the offing. The danger was that the United Nations might find itself faced with a fait accompli, i.e., a return to legality on the part of the rebels in exchange for a minority-oriented constitution from Wilson.
- 428. The second thing which ZANU required of the United Nations was that, under no circumstances, would it accept as justifying a grant of independence any constitution arrived at through private negotiation between Smith and Wilson. The only valid constitution would be one drafted or approved by the duly elected and acknowledged leaders of the people of Zimbabwe. It was vital that the Special Committee should expose the machinations of the United Kingdom and stick firmly to principle. There had been much talk after the failure on H.M.S. Tiger to the effect that all that was needed was for the Smith régime to return to the 1961 Constitution and sanctions would be lifted. ZANU hoped that the purpose of the sanctions was not to restore a mere technical legality but to ensure the establishment of majority rule.
- 429. He expressed his own gratitude and that of the Executive of ZANU for the opportunity afforded him to inform the Special Committee of the situation in Zimbabwe, a situation that should arouse the conscience of every Member of the United Nations. He assured the Committee that his people would not lay down their arms until they were able to work and live freely and be masters of their own destiny.
- 430. Asked to enlarge on the details he had already supplied on the fate of the Zimbabwe prisoners in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that figures for the political and other prisoners in Southern Rhodesia could not be assessed with any degree of accuracy since strict censorship had been imposed immediately after the unilateral declaration. His organization did, however, have contacts and sometimes direct correspondence with certain prisoners, and the figures published by the rebel régime bore no relation to the number of prisoners actually detained.
- 431. The figure of 10,000 to 15,000 which he had quoted referred to political prisoners only, i.e. people against whom warrants had been issued either for detention or restriction but against whom no charges would be brought. The régime had powers of summary arrest and there might be many other persons arrested for interrogation on trumped-up charges or on suspicion.
- 432. Political prisoners in detention were usually confined to prison: a number of them were in Salisbury Maximum Security Prison. Other prisoners were held under restriction, which merely meant that their area of confinement was larger than a prison cell. Restriction was generally ordered for people in remote areas, after incidents such as the recent Zimbabwe National Liberation Army's attack at Karoi. Africans were detained for long periods in appalling conditions, often with no medical facilities available, under close surveillance by

- police and the armed forces, and with severe restrictions on visits and mail.
- 433. The old Preventive Detention Act had provided for the holding of some kind of tribunal to make recommendations to the Government, but since the unilateral declaration no such tribunals appeared to have been held.
- 434. Asked to comment on the press reports that certain countries had not withdrawn all the technical experts who had been working in Southern Rhodesia prior to the usurpation of control by the Smith régime, he said that it was common knowledge that the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa were providing military assistance in the form of experts to Southern Rhodesia. According to information available to his organization, since the inception of armed resistance, Japan had been invited and had agreed to send experts in guerrilla warfare to help the rebels in Southern Rhodesia; it had also sent experts in steel and iron manufacture. He believed that the United Kingdom still gave technical assistance openly, by providing a certain amount of money for the University. He believed that France had also provided some technical experts. Other countries might also be giving technical assistance, but the situation was fluid.
- 435. Asked which countries were represented, diplomatically or otherwise, in Southern Rhodesia, he said that the United States maintained a consul at Salisbury and that the United Kingdom had a "residual mission". Other countries such as France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany were represented by trade commissioners. Portugal and South Africa were strongly represented and had exchange diplomatic personnel with Southern Rhodesia.
- 436. Asked what particular difficulties the freedom fighters were encountering and how they thought the international organizations could help the people of Zimbabwe, the petitioner said that medical facilities and other assistance were needed to help those who had taken up arms. Even more important, however, was the plight of the refugees. The definition of refugees used by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did not seem to include persons who were endeavouring to end the situation or system that caused them to become refugees; by taking up arms they ceased to be refugees for the purposes of the High Commissioner. Moreover, the families of the freedom fighters did not count as dependants of genuine refugees under the High Commissioner's definition. That definition was unfortunate, particularly in view of the General Assembly's decision that the fight of the Zimbabwe people was legitimate.
- 437. Asked about the possibility of the people of Zimbabwe organizing a passive resistance movement, the petitioner recalled that passive resistance had been made famous by the late Mahatma Gandhi in India and had been followed to some extent in other parts of the world. Such resistance could succeed in cases where the authority at which it was directed had some conscience that could be appealed to. The rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia, however, was devoid of conscience, and it had therefore been necessary to resort to armed resistance.
- 438. Asked about his reaction to the establishment of a co-ordinating and supervisory commission to ensure full implementation of comprehensive sanctions, to include communications and transport, he recalled

that, in his main body of evidence, he had stated that, if sanctions were to be applied, they must at least be comprehensive. He would have no objection to the setting up of a co-ordinating and supervisory body of the United Nations, provided that there was in addition effective enforcement machinery. If the aim of such a supervisory body was merely to give information to the Security Council concerning breaches of sanctions, it would be of little use, since the culprits were, to a large extent, already known and, in the case of comprehensive sanctions, any breaches would be even more obvious.

439. When questioned about the kind of assistance that could usefully be provided by such agencies as UNESCO for the promotion of education among the Zimbabwe people, he replied that the rebel régime had embarked upon a dehumanizing and cruel policy designed to ensure that the African people of Zimbabwe would always be available as cheap labour for the menial services required by the settlers. In the prevailing state of affairs, ZANU considered the fight for independence to be the primary objective. The provision of education relevant to the fight for independence would be welcome. If the Iranian representative's question referred to general education, however, he envisaged difficulties. The rebel régime had ensured that Africans were educated only to the level necessary for providing intelligent service, and few possessed the necessary qualifications to proceed to higher education. When the fight for independence had been brought to a successful conclusion, there would be a serious shortage of manpower in the higher administrative and technological grades, and ZANU would then welcome assistance in those fields from UNESCO or individual Governments.

440. Asked of what type the twenty aircraft were to which he had referred, and when they had been delivered, the petitioner replied that they were mainly of United Kingdom manufacture and all of the military type. They had been delivered during 1966.

441. Asked to furnish a comprehensive list of the foreign commercial interests operating in Southern Rhodesia, with their countries of origin, the petitioner said that he would like to have time for research in order to provide as comprehensive a list as possible. Meanwhile, he could name some of them: Lonrho, Anglo American, Lever Brothers and Rio Tinto. He later provided the following list:

Francisco Company Company		
Company and headquarters	Type of business	
Anglo American, South Africa	Mining, breweries and other industries	
Lonrho, United Kingdom	Mining estates	
Reupert, South Africa	Tobacco (Peter Stuyve-sant, Rembrandt, etc.)	
Rothmans		
United Kingdom } United States }	Tobacco	
B.A.T.		
United Kingdom \ United States \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	Tobacco	
Gallaher, United Kingdom	Tobacco	
Fraser and Chalmers, United Kingdom Monarch Steel, United Kingdom	Steel and steel construction	
British Insulated, United Kingdom Callender's Cables, United Kingdom	Steel and steel construction	

Company and headquarters	Type of business
Stewards and Lloyds, United Kingdom	Steel and aluminium tubes,
-	pumping equipment
Supersonic, United Kingdom	Radios
Phillips, Netherlands	Radios
Bosch, Federal Republic of Ger-	Tolonian and male
United Transport Co., United	Television and radios
Kingdom	Heavy vehicles (Leyland Albion, buses and lorries)
G.E.C., United Kingdom	Electrical equipment and parts
Shell, Netherlands	Petroleum
B.P., United Kingdom	Petroleum
Caltex, United States	Petroleum
Mobil, United States	Petroleum
Unilever, Netherlands	Soap, edible oils, toilet preparations
Ford	
United Kingdom \ United States \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	Cars
G.M.C., United States	Cars
B.M.C., United Kingdom	Cars
Peugeot, France	Cars
British Metal Corp., United	
Kingdom	Metal processing and engineering
B.S.A.	
South Africa United Kingdom	Land holdings and other investments
Coca Cola, United States	Soft drinks
Schweppes, United Kingdom	Soft drinks
Dunlop, United Kingdom	Rubber
English Electric, United Kingdom	Electric equipment
Fiat, Italy	Cars
Ozalid, Federal Republic of Ger- many	Photocopying equipment
Boots, United Kingdom	Medicine and drugs
I.C.I., United Kingdom	Medicine and drugs
Kodak, Federal Republic of Ger-	The state of the s
many	Photographic equipment
Burroughs, United Kingdom	Business machines and computors
C.B.R. Bental, United Kingdom	Diesel engines (Perkins Diesel, etc.)
Elna Sewing Machines, Switzer-land	Sewing machines
Nestlé, Switzerland	Dairy products
V.W. Car Parts. Federal Re-	want bronners
public of Germany	Cars and parts

He stated that many of the companies listed were subsidiaries of South African companies, which were also subsidiaries of other international companies. Rhodesian companies were kept alive by supplies from the South African companies.

442. The Reverend Bernard H. Zulu said that the description he would give of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a first-hand account of what he had seen. As a minister of religion he had moved among the Zimbabwe people and lived the same life. Conditions in the country were of grave importance not only to the people of Southern Rhodesia but to the world at large.

443. There were sixty-five parliamentary seats, fifty of which, known as "A" roll seats, were held by European members of the Rhodesian Front. Fourteen of the "B" roll seats were held by Africans, and the

other by a Mr. A. Palley, who had polled only sixteen votes. As only a two-thirds majority was required for constitutional change, the fifty white voters held effective control. To qualify for the franchise, educational, property-holding and income requirements had to be met. Few Africans considered it worth-while to register for the "B" roll vote, and African "A" roll voters were so widely spread across the country that it was doubtful whether they could win a single seat in parliament. It was very difficult for an African to obtain sufficient education to qualify for the "A" roll, and the income qualification was almost impossible except for the few favoured puppets. With the land-holding potential of the African strictly limited under the Land Apportionment Act, the fixed property qualification was also extremely difficult to meet. In 1965, an African with a Cambridge School certificate plus two years' teacher training would not have qualified as an "A" roll voter on his starting salary as a teacher.

444. Under the terms of the Land Apportionment Act, 37 per cent of the land was reserved for about 200,000 Europeans, and 46 per cent for almost 4 million Africans. Only 17 per cent of the 40 million acres of African Tribal Trust land was suitable for annual crops, and 9.5 per cent, or nearly three fifths, was in fact under cultivation. That represented reasonable maximum use, since there were limiting factors such as the grazing of cattle on small plots and the presence of poorer soils fit only for such crops as tobacco. Of the 33.4 million acres in European areas, 52 per cent was suitable for annual crop cultivation, yet only 2.8 per cent was cultivated. Ninety-eight per cent of the land in which the optimum conditions of good soil plus high rainfall were to be found was in European areas, and only 2 per cent in African areas.

445. Over ten times as much money was spent annually on the education of each European child as on that for the African—approximately £110 and £10 respectively. There was compulsory education for European children until completion of secondary school, while a large proportion of African children were eliminated from further training, owing to lack of facilities, and had less than a 5 per cent chance of obtaining a post-primary school certificate. Education was completely segregated, except in a few private schools, which helped to maintain the barrier between the races and prevent the development of mutual trust and understanding among Rhodesian youth. At the end of 1965 the Government had been moving against integrated schools in the European areas, basing its action on the Land Apportionment Act. The Smith régime was planning to pass the control of local village schools to chiefs' councils, taking them out of the hands of the missionary bodies that had established and developed them. As the majority of the chiefs were only semi-literate at best, the quality of the schools would thereby be downgraded. The chiefs, who were subsidized Government servants, were, through government propaganda, becoming increasingly suspicious of the better-educated and more politically minded Africans.

446. The Government had recently stated that the amount to be spent on African education would in future be limited to the tax money received from Africans—a ridiculous excuse to cut back government expenditure and keep the African in his subservient position. Moreover, at local school level, it was the African community that had to erect and furnish the school buildings and provide housing for the

teachers, while no European parent was ever called upon to make such a contribution.

447. Both of the two main African locations outside Salisbury were surrounded by high fences topped with barbed wire. Each location had two main gates, and had become a virtual concentration camp. Africans leaving them to go to work had their hands stamped with indelible ink to identify them as workers, and on return they had to approach with upraised hands to enable the police at the gates to see the mark. At night, police and army units went from door to door checking on house occupants. All children from the age of fifteen, whether gainfully employed or not, had to pay fifteen shillings a month to be allowed to stay with their families.

448. Beer halls were fenced with brick walls, twelve feet high, with broken glass affixed along the top. The walls had two small gates that allowed the passage of only one person at a time. The halls were more like fenced cattle kraals than drinking places. If any checks were to be made, the two gates were closed while police carried out their searches. The beer halls thus became useful devices for police dragnets.

449. Since 1965, the Government had relied heavily on bribery and coercing of the chiefs, paying them increased gratuities and telling them that the younger and better-educated Africans would rob them of their power. The success of that manœuvre was questionable. The first chiefs' indaba in 1965 had almost completely robbed the chiefs of any influence they might have held over the younger people. In one large area in southeastern Rhodesia, not one of the paramount chiefs had dared to consult his people before attending the Domboshawa indaba. They were kept in power and safety only by the continued movement of police and troops in the Tribal Trust areas.

450. The government-controlled radio had a programme called "PaDare"—an African forum for discussing the newly independent African States in a disparaging way, emphasizing the troubles in Ghana, the Congo and the East African States. It also denounced the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU.

451. The blatantly discriminatory legislation and action described had inevitably led to dissatisfaction and unrest, to deal with which the Government had been forced to the extreme measures embodied in the so-called Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Under it, anyone could be deprived of his liberty without trial for periods up to five years, which could be renewed indefinitely at the discretion of the minister. Hundreds of Africans were thus deprived of their liberty with no formal charge being made. Under the hanging clause, the death sentence was mandatory in certain cases, even for attempted arson. The clause had been condemned by world legal authorities. While many countries were moving to abolish capital punishment, Southern Rhodesia was extending its use, and there were almost 100 Africans under sentence of death in its prisons.

452. There were probably more than 10,000 Africans in detention and restriction in the country, though the exact figure was a government secret. Conditions were appalling. He had visited one of the detainee camps, Gonokudzingwa, at the time when Joshua Nkomo and others had been arrested. It was in a remote area previously occupied only by wild animals. Detainees could not escape because on the east there were Portuguese soldiers, on the south-west, South

African soldiers and to the north a game reserve. The detainees lived in inhuman conditions. There was no water system and water had to be carried in. The huts were of sheet metal and resembled ovens during the hot seasons; they provided no protection against the cold during the winter. There was no access road and no communications with the outside world, merely a Land-Rover track into the area. There were no recreational, educational or medical facilities. Detainees had had to start their own educational programmes, some money for the purpose having been provided by church groups. Those self-help projects had often been discouraged by the Government, and Mr. Josiah Chinamano had been moved from Gonokudzingwa to Wha Wha for his part in organizing them. Conditions in other camps-Marandellas, Gokwe and Wha Whawere similar, except that those places were not so remote. In most cases, the leaders had lost contact with the people, many of whom did not even know where the leaders were. No visitors were allowed at Gonokudzingwa, and detainees were completely cut off from the outside world. Visitors to the other areas were strictly controlled.

- 453. The families of the detainees were breaking up because of the indefinite absence from home of husbands and fathers. Children had become fatherless and had no means of support. Families had been evicted for failure to pay rent. Wives were not allowed to see their husbands, and children did not know where their fathers were. The Christian Action group had tried to help them with money received from the World Council of Churches—their only source of assistance—but even that organization had come under the scrutiny of the rebel Government.
- 454. Mr. Chihota, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), thanked the Special Committee for the opportunity of presenting his organization's views. Since his colleagues in Zambia had already appeared before the Committee at Kitwe and had given a full picture of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, he would be brief. Moreover, most, if not all, the members of the Committee were well aware of the problem in Southern Rhodesia and he therefore proposed to give only his organization's views on what it expected of the Committee and the United Nations as a whole.
- 455. He and his colleagues were appearing before the Special Committee on behalf of their President, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who was languishing in prison, and on behalf of the ZANU Central Committee and the masses who were suffering under the yoke of United Kingdom imperialism. He was also speaking on behalf of the fighting forces currently engaged in military operations in various parts of Southern Rhodesia and of the men in cells awaiting execution for their activities in the Chimurenga (war of national liberation).
- 456. He was glad of the opportunity provided to put the record straight and to expose the blatant lies of the United Kingdom imperialists at the United Nations in their attempt to perpetuate and justify their colonial policies in Southern Rhodesia.
- 457. He was also grateful to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to meet in the revolutionary atmosphere of Tanzania, whose people were in the forefront of the fight for the liberation of all southern Africa. The Co-ordinating Committee

for the Liberation of Africa was based in Tanzania, which was also a spring-board for ZANU's fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

- 458. It was well over sixteen months since selective sanctions had been imposed by the Security Council after the Salisbury rebels had declared unilateral independence. The sanctions had been imposed against the better judgement of ZANU, which had warned the Special Committee from the start that they would not succeed. ZANU had already told the Committee that South Africa and Portugal would continue to trade with Southern Rhodesia, and those countries were in fact still trading with Salisbury rebels in defiance of the Security Council's resolution. ZANU was not surprised: it had told the Committee that economic sanctions as an international offensive against the Smith régime must be supervised by the United Nations. But its recommendations had been ignored.
- 459. ZANU had a few suggestions to make concerning sanctions, not because it had any faith in them, but because it felt that the United Nations, to be worthy of its name, must carry out its own resolutions. ZANU still believed that force was the only solution to the Rhodesian problem and the people of Zimbabwe would continue to use force against the settlers under the leadership of ZANU and President Sithole.
- 460. The proposals of ZANU were as follows: sanctions must be made mandatory and comprehensive; South Africa and Portugal must be forced to comply with the United Nations decisions and, if they refused, as they had already done, sanctions must be imposed against them; the United Nations should send an observer force to the Rhodesian-South African border and the Rhodesian-Portuguese-Mozambican border to check all traffic to and from Rhodesia; the Security Council should adopt a resolution condemning the Western Powers and other United Nations Members for continuing to trade with the rebel colony. In that respect, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Belgium were the main culprits. The Chimurenga was steadily developing. In 1966, ZANU had informed the Special Committee of its military operations inside Southern Rhodesia, which were being intensified. They were being further intensified with the resources available. The Chimurenga forces had harassed and killed many settlers in Southern Rhodesia. A week before, forty-nine settler soldiers had been killed in an ambush near Karoi; nine others had been killed about eight miles from Banket on the Salisbury road. Another gun battle had taken place at Que Que between ZANŬ freedom fighters and members of the Rhodesian security forces, in which many settlers had been killed. Numerous other fights and incidents were erupting, but much more needed to be done.
- 461. ZANU was determined to use force against the settler community until Zimbabwe was free. ZANU asked the Special Committee to request the United Kingdom, that arch-imperialist and colonialist Power, to declare publicly:
- (a) That it would not engage in any military intervention in Southern Rhodesia under the pretext of maintaining law and order when the African nationalists were on the point of liberating their country. The United Kingdom had already refused to use force against the Salisbury rebels because of "kith-and-kin" considerations. If it tried to interfere after realizing the strength of the liberation movements, ZANU

would not hesitate to fight even the United Kingdom itself. So far as ZANU was concerned, Smith and Wilson stood for the same thing: the perpetuation of United Kingdom imperialism and settlerism in the country;

- (b) That there should be African majority rule immediately after the downfall of the present illegal régime;
- (c) That there should be no period of direct colonial rule after the termination of the present illegal Salisbury régime;
- (d) That independence should be granted to Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible after the establishment of African majority government in that country.
- 462. If the above conditions were not met there would, he warned, be trouble inside the country. It should be clear that ZANU was not fighting Smith in order to establish another colonial régime administered from London.
- 463. The people of Southern Rhodesia under the the leadership of ZANU had made up their minds to use armed force to win African majority rule and independence. They were convinced that that was the only effective way of recovering their birthright and human dignity in the land of their forefathers. ZANU was taking steps to ensure that every Zimbabwean was armed to meet the counter-revolutionary resistance of the settlers. Any attempt to intervene in Southern Rhodesia under the guise of maintaining law and order would be met with armed force.
- 464. He did not wish to leave the Special Committee with the impression that ZANU was happy with the performance of the United Nations in regard to the Rhodesian problem: far from it. ZANU was very disappointed indeed. The United Nations had regrettably turned itself into a debating society. It was capable of adopting resolutions, but incapable of implementing them. ZANU was appearing before the Committee but the matter always ended in the conference room. It was sad to have to say so in public, but there was no need for ZANU to hide its true feelings. The mission of liberating Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of its people alone, but the United Nations could help the oppressed and exploited inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia to liberate themselves. While the United Nations claimed to stand for peace and human dignity and equality, ZANU would continue to bring its problems before the Committee. But there was no point in adopting resolutions which the United Nations could not implement, for it made a mockery of the world body.
- 465. He appealed to the major Powers, and to the Western Powers in particular, to cease all trade with Southern Rhodesia. He also called on all the freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples represented in the United Nations and elsewhere to give support, moral and otherwise, to the struggling masses of Southern Rhodesia in their fight against the United Kingdom imperialists and settlers in their fatherland. ZANU was asking the United Nations to help it to help itself, and whatever support was given by Member States and other friendly countries would supplement ZANU's own efforts and local resources.
- 466. The United Nations had a moral obligation towards the oppressed masses all over the world, and the Special Committee had a special responsibility towards them.

467. Failure to grant independence to the Zimbabwe masses would mean the continuation of racial war in Southern Rhodesia and indeed in all southern Africa. ZANU would not lay down its arms until its objective of African majority rule was realized. In the meantime the war of liberation would continue and would be intensified throughout the country.

General statements²²

- 468. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, by their thorough and well-documented statements, the petitioners had shown that the usurpation by the illegal racist minority régime was a continuation of the same colonial system by which the people of Zimbabwe had been oppressed by the United Kingdom Government. They had also shown that the so-called sanctions were a farce and an impotent way of dealing with a serious problem. The petitioners had also revealed what amounted to a conspiracy on the part of Western capitalist monopolies which were upholding the illegal régime against the interests of the African people.
- 469. Colonialism was not an adventure arising from the romantic whims of eccentric explorers; it was the accumulation of capital in the industrialized nations of Europe and the quest for new markets and raw materials which led to the colonization and annexation of land. That interpretation of the historical development of society was fully applicable to the colonization of Southern Rhodesia and to the situation prevailing there.
- 470. The acquisition of the colony of Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom had been followed by the systematic institution of racial segregation. In order to exploit the rich resources of Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, through colonial legislation and force, had systematically driven the African people from their lands and introduced the white settlers who, in order to continue that usurpation, had established themselves as the "super race", maintaining the Africans as an inferior commodity—cheap labour. It was the systematic colonial policy of the United Kingdom which had not only denied freedom and land to the African people, but had established the domination of the racialist settlers who were the kith and kin of the colonizers. Thus the usurpation of State power by the illegal racist minority régime of Ian Smith was nothing but the continuation of the colonial policies of the United Kingdom.
- 471. It was abundantly clear that sanctions had failed. They had failed partly because they were being subverted by the very Powers that claimed that they would succeed. The leaders of Africa had said in advance that sanctions would not work. Why could not the Western Powers listen to the voice of Africa? And why was it, despite the fact that the representatives of many Western countries had spoken of what their parliaments had done to stop their trade with Southern Rhodesia, that Southern Rhodesia was still trading freely with those same countries? The socialist countries had had no dealings with the illegal régime. Socialism, in fact, was absolutely incompatible with everything that was going on in southern Africa.
- 472. The reason why Western countries continued to trade with the illegal régime was very simple: it was because those countries put profits above human

²² Additional statements on the question of Southern Rhodesia appear in chapter II of the present report.

values. They did what they did not so much for love of Smith and what he stood for but for love of the profits they could derive from him. The profits of the white minority were more important to them than the feelings of 4 million Africans. It was not surprising that the African people of Zimbabwe were bewildered by such policies. The Tanzanian delegation had been shocked to hear that some United States and United Kingdom companies were not only still trading with the illegal régime, but were also expanding their installations. He singled out those two countries because they had been loudest in the Security Council in calling for sanctions.

473. He affirmed once again the conviction of Africa that only force would bring down the illegal régime. While African history was stained with the blood shed by colonizers on very flimsy excuses, it was deplorable that force was not being used to crush the selfish, racist settlers. He hardly needed to remind the Special Committee of the thousands who had died in Africa to water the tree of freedom. In Tanganyika, during the Maji Maji war, the Germans admitted to having murdered 150,000 people. The story was the same in Algeria, Kenya, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), South West Africa and South Africa and, last but not least, Aden.

474. How long would the Western countries, especially the United Kingdom, continue to apply those double standards? He appealed to the United Kingdom and to the United States to practise abroad what they practised for their own people.

475. He assured the people of Zimbabwe of Tanzania's unqualified support. The Tanzanian people felt that the fight, suffering and humiliation of the people of Zimbabwe were their own fight, suffering and humiliation, and they would stand by them to the bitter end. Its stand had made Tanzania a target for propaganda and slander; that would never be a source of discouragement but rather of encouragement since it showed that the friends of colonialism were afraid.

476. The representative of Zambia, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, thanked the Special Committee for allowing a Zambian delegation to attend its meeting as an observer and said that his delegation was reassured by the concern with which the Committee was approaching the problems of southern Africa. He was very grateful for the goodwill which the members had shown towards Zambia in its present difficulties. The President of Zambia had already dealt with the problems of southern Africa in great detail in his address and there was very little to add.

477. The problem of Southern Rhodesia was far more a creation of the United Kingdom than a white settlers' conspiracy. With the unlamented break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, the United Kingdom had deliberately given almost the whole of the Federation's air force to Southern Rhodesia. That addition of considerable military strength to an already defiant white settler régime had made the Rhodesian question much more complex. The United Kingdom Government had deliberately strengthened Southern Rhodesia so that a unilateral declaration of independence could be made and white minority rule perpetuated in order to buttress the United Kingdom's economic and racial policies in southern Africa. If that was not so, then the politicians in Whitehall had been guilty of culpable political miscalculation and blindness. That was partly the reason why his country had always maintained that only

force could solve the Southern Rhodesian problem and that the United Kingdom was under an obligation to destroy what it had created. Southern Rhodesia was not only a threat to international peace and security, it was also a grave security problem for Zambia. The machinations of its intelligence activities had recently been exposed in the Press, in which connexion a significant fact had emerged from the evidence obtained, namely, that Zambia was being made to pay by the rebels and their allies for its human and noble principles both economically and in terms of security risks. Nevertheless, while he deplored those hardships, he considered that more than a fight for survival was involved. It was a political as well as a humane crusade and his people were proud to be active in the arduous but noble task of reclaiming lost human rights in southern Africa. Even if his country's geographical position had been different, it would still have applied itself with equal zeal to the liberation of mankind in Africa and throughout the world. It was an oasis of racial harmony and political and democratic justice in a desert of racism and oppression. His people believed that the Special Committee was charged with the responsibility of reclaiming that desert for all men, irrespective of colour, race or religion. He hoped that the Committee's stay in Zambia had helped the members to form a clearer picture of the situation and to realize how seriously Zambia regarded it.

478. The representative of *India* said that it was regrettable that, in spite of so many appeals, resolutions and condemnations, the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia continued to hold sway over 4 million African people, condemning them to slavery and subjugation. The petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee had provided very useful and material evidence which painted a dark and gloomy picture of the situation. His delegation thanked them for their efforts in collecting such valuable information and for presenting it in such an able and comprehensive manner.

479. The sole responsibility for encouraging the Rhodesian racists lay with the Government of the United Kingdom. It was pathetic to see how that Government had, over a period of more than forty years, allowed itself to be pressured by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia who had compelled it to grant them so-called self-government in 1923. Since that date they had demanded more power and had as constantly received it. In 1953 they had forced the United Kingdom Government to create the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, against the wishes of the African populations of the three federating units. The Federation had been dissolved at the end of 1963, thanks to the persistent and effective opposition of the African populations, but the Whites in Southern Rhodesia had managed to obtain control of such essential services as the air force, the railways and the vital Kariba Dam.

480. While the performance of the United Kingdom Government before November 1965 had been regrettable, its actions since that period had been inexcusable. It had announced that force would not be used against the Smith régime if it made a unilateral declaration of independence. The announcement made without any provocation or justification had eliminated whatever slight deterrent effect the United Kingdom statement of 28 October 1964 might have had on the minority régime at Salisbury. The United Kingdom Government had declared the action of the Smith régime to be

rebellion but had failed to take effective measures to crush it. The sanctions adopted so far had failed to produce the desired results. They might have had some effect on the economy of Southern Rhodesia but, as one of the petitioners had pointed out, their aim was to bring about the downfall of the Smith régime and in that they had failed miserably. They had, in fact, tended to unite the settlers behind the Rhodesian Front under the leadership of the fanatical Ian Smith who had stated, at the Party's annual congress in September 1966, that his régime would never deviate from the principles for which the Party stood and the promises it had made to the electorate. He had proudly told his co-gangsters that they were carrying out one of the most incredible exercises in contemporary history by standing up not to one great country only but to virtually the whole world.

481. Even on the economic front, sanctions had not been effective and were proving a blessing in disguise for the rebel régime. Many new industries had been established to reduce dependence on imports and the illegal régime had ready access to the world markets through South Africa and Portugal. He agreed with several delegations that the really effective and speedy means of bringing down the rebel régime was the use of force by the Government of the United Kingdom. As the President of Zambia had stated in his inaugural address, sanctions, to produce the desired result, needed to be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power, which was fully competent to take such action. His delegation and others had been accused of adopting double standards when the Committee had been discussing another item in New York but, if anybody was adopting double standards, it was the United Kingdom Government which had never before hesitated to use force in colonial Territories. The reason for the unwillingness of that Government to resort to force in Rhodesia was, of course, the fact that the rebels were whites and "kith and kin". In other words, the United Kingdom Government had one set of rules for Whites and another for non-Whites. The failure of the United Kingdom Government to crush the Salisbury rebellion would go down in history as its great betrayal of African interests,

482. All the petitioners had referred to collusion between Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal, an unholy alliance that had recently become both official and public. The defence ministers of South Africa and Portugal, at their recent conference, had proclaimed their common objective of resolutely pursuing the defence of their common objective of resolutely pursuing the defence of their common positions in Africa. The aim of that alliance was to preserve the last bastion of white supremacy in southern Africa.

483. His delegation had been concerned to hear the recent rumours of renewed negotiations between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith régime. Any arrangement so made, without consulting the majority African population and on any basis other than that of the independence of Zimbabwe with universal suffrage, would be unacceptable to his delegation.

484. He supported the Chairman's appeal to the freedom fighters to unite. Their enemies, the minority régime at Salisbury and the Governments of South Africa and Portugal, had realized that their own survival depended on closing their ranks. That was doubly true for the freedom fighters since they lacked the resources which each of those three parties in-

dividually possessed. He paid a tribute to the nationalist movements for their untiring efforts and sacrifices in the face of the inhuman and barbarous methods adopted by the Rhodesian racists, who seemed to be trying to compete with their Portuguese allies in that respect.

485. The sanctions, completely meaningless and ineffective in their main objective, had caused immense hardship to the young Republic of Zambia. His delegation and Government greatly admired the resolution of the President, Government and people of Zambia and their determination to aid in the liberation of Zimbabwe. As the representative of India had said in the Security Council, a concerted programme of aid to Zambia to counteract those effects would have to be pursued as a matter of highest priority. His Government, which had already made a modest contribution for that purpose, was ready and willing to participate in such a programme to the full extent of its resources.

486. The course of history was irreversible and irrevocable. Nothing could prevent the forces of freedom in Africa from advancing to their goal. The Special Committee should direct its efforts towards speeding up the process. The cost might be heavy but the stakes were high—the freedom and independence of the 4 million people of Zimbabwe and the peace of the African continent.

487. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the position of his country with regard to the problem of Southern Rhodesia was too well known to require any detailed elaboration. It was, as ever, united with the other African countries, and with all countries dedicated to the cause of freedom, in the fight to liberate the people of Southern Rhodesia from the rebellious, colonial, racist régime that was currently holding them in cruel bondage. The role and responsibility of the United Nations in the liberation of colonial peoples had been clearly affirmed in the Charter and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The question of Southern Rhodesia had been under constant consideration by the Special Committee and had been the subject of numerous General Assembly resolutions. It had also been considered by the Security Council both before and after the illegal declaration of independence. The Council was expected to take up the question once again in June 1967 when it considered the Secretary-General's report²³ on the implementation of its resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.

488. The General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, had adopted two resolutions on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee. In resolution 2138 (XXI) it had condemned any arrangement reached between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime which did not recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and reaffirmed the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote". In its resolution 2151 (XXI) the General Assembly, while reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, deplored the failure of the United Kingdom Government to put an end to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, and condemned the activities of

²³ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, documents S/7781 and Add.1 and 2.

those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, were preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In the same resolution, the General Assembly had also drawn the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia in order that it might consider whether to apply the necessary enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. Between 8 and 16 December 1966, the Security Council, at the request of the United Kingdom Government, had met to resume its consideration of the matter and, on 16 December 1966, had adopted resolution 232 (1966) in which it reaffirmed its previous resolution and, acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, had determined that the current situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security and had called on all States to take a number of measures laid down in operative paragraphs 2 and 5. The United Nations resolutions to which he had just referred were only a few of the very recent

489. When the United Nations had begun discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government opposed intervention by the world body in that Territory on the ground that it was self-governing. When in 1965 the Šmith régime had declared its independence unilaterally, the United Kingdom Government had assured the world that the rebels would be forced to surrender in a matter of weeks. Nearly two years later, the preposterous Smith régime was still holding fast. Had the United Kingdom been serious in giving its assurance? Certainly the assurance was in complete contradiction to what appeared to be the current policy of the United Kingdom Government, namely "to pass the ball" to the United Nations under conditions which would make any United Nations action either impossible or ineffective. Its policy had, from the outset, been characterized by contradictions and by what President Kaunda had described as "prohibitive procrastination". As if its indecisive attitude were not enough to encourage the rebellious spirit in Southern Rhodesia, it had continued to vacillate, engaging in negotiations with Smith while endeavouring to absolve itself of any responsibility for the situation and to convince the world that everything possible was being done to restore constitutional rule. The rebels had put the interval to good use. They had created a political vacuum by imprisoning opposition leaders and had strengthened their monopoly of power by introducing repressive measures aimed at keeping the 4 million Africans in a permanent state of servitude,

490. The current intolerable state of affairs was the sole responsibility of the United Kingdom Government and not of the United Nations, which had inherited the problems in southern Africa from that country. Most, if not all, of those problems would not have existed if the United Kingdom had faithfully discharged its responsibilities towards the majority of the people living in that unhappy region. A rebel régime had been in control of Southern Rhodesia for nearly two years and the administering Power was obliged to use all possible means, including the use of force, to suppress that rebellion. India had learned from bitter experience that half-hearted measures could not thwart aggressive designs. It was only when they were

faced with determined and decisive action that aggressors gave up their evil plans. It was time the United Nations "passed the ball" back to the United Kingdom Government and appealed to it to live up to its grave responsibilities.

491. The representative of *Iran* said he had studied with the utmost care and attention the information given by the petitioners about developments in Southern Rhodesia and the information contained in working papers prepared by the Secretariat. Those sources, together with the brilliant and descriptive analysis by the President of Zambia (see chapter II, paras. 202-237), had given him a very clear and complete picture of the problem in Southern Rhodesia, a picture that was indeed unhappy and disheartening. The continuation of the sordid tyranny inflicted upon the people of Zimbabwe had only been made possible by a combination of political, economic, military and social factors operating in favour of the rebel régime. The challenge to the United Nations was indeed serious.

492. Although Iran was geographically very distant from Southern Rhodesia, the determination of its people to eradicate colonialism, racism and all other forms of injustice made them comrades-in-arms of the people of Zimbabwe, and his Government under the dynamic leadership of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr had laid down as one of the foundations of its foreign policy the pursuit of world peace through justice. He stressed that the word used was "justice" and not "law" for the reason that the latter was a static concept primarily intended to maintain the status quo, while the former was a dynamic concept which offered the best hope of a lasting peace. To illustrate his meaning, he quoted the following passage from the book by Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr, Shahanshah of Iran, entitled The White Revolution of Iran:24

"Is it not a truism that the more rigorous the execution of the laws promulgated in a country where power is in the hands of a racist minority régime, the greater the injustice prevailing in that society? Is it not a truism also that under a fully democratic system where all political precepts are established but where a democratic distribution of wealth is lacking, those people who enjoy greater economic advantages are much better placed to secure for themselves the passage of laws necessary for the continuation of their existing conditions and advantages? Man's real progress in this day and age depends primarily on loosening the fetters with which, over the centuries, the privileged few have tied the hands and feet of the deprived masses. It is the duty of every Government and State to make its contribution to human society and world peace, through the establishment of justice in all its aspects, whether social or judicial, political or economic."

493. Southern Rhodesia was a vivid example of the type of society to which his sovereign referred. The laws enacted, or to be enacted, by the racist minority régime of Salisbury, such as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act or the proposed Preventive Detention Amendment Bill, were among the most oppressive in the world. Peace could only return to the Territory with the establishment of justice. United Nations efforts to obtain majority rule by persuasion had been of no avail. Selective mandatory sanctions had produced no results and, under existing conditions,

²⁴ Teheran, The Imperial Pahlavi Library, May 1967.

there was no hope of their toppling the minority régime. The only effective means of restoring the legitimate rights of the Zimbabwe people was the use of force by the authority responsible for the Territory, namely, the United Kingdom. That Power was morally bound to use every means at its disposal to discharge its responsibilities towards the population of Zimbabwe and the use of force in this case would be nothing more than a police action.

494. In accordance with its policy of opposing colonialism as a threat to world peace, his delegation had constantly sponsored or supported every resolution calling for an end to the Smith régime. Despite heavy financial losses, Iran had been the first to respond to the Security Council's call for economic sanctions against the rebel régime while, since the adoption of selective mandatory sanctions, all its commercial ties with Southern Rhodesia had been broken. If sanctions were to be effective, they needed to be complete and comprehensive, while the establishment of a co-ordination or supervisory machinery would be most valuable to implement and enforce them.

495. The African population of the Territory should also play its part in the joint effort to topple the Smith régime and the intensified activities of its two major political parties were very encouraging. He joined with the Chairman in appealing to them to redouble their efforts until freedom was won, in which connexion his delegation had suggested the organization of a passive resistance movement. He wished them every success and assured them of the full support of his Government and people as evidenced by his delegation's sponsorship of the draft resolution.

496. The representative of Chile said that he would not speak at length on the problem of Southern Rhodesia, the various aspects of which he had already discussed during a previous statement and when he had made the proposal, adopted by the Special Committee, to transmit the petitioners' statements to the Security Council and to appeal to the United Kingdom to secure the release of political prisoners and to prevent the introduction of the apartheid system in Southern Rhodesia. He merely wished to draw attention to a fundamental fact emerging from the petitioners' statements, namely that the selective economic sanctions had failed and that the rebel régime was in control of the situation and was in the process of consolidating the hateful yoke of tyranny and racial discrimination which it had imposed on the African majority of the population. The responsibility for that failure lay not only with South Africa and Portugal but also with certain companies and certain States which were cooperating with the minority régime.

497. When his country had supported the resolution on Southern Rhodesia adopted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, he had explained that the traditional attitude of the Latin American countries which opposed the use of force in international relations, did not run counter to the appeal to the United Kingdom to use all means, including force, to reestablish legality. Southern Rhodesia was not a State recognized by the international community. It was a Territory under British administration which had rebelled against the administering Power and installed a régime which was offensive to the international community. It was therefore proper for the administering Power to put an end to the rebellion. The failure of the sauctions justified the stronger and more effective

measures recommended by the Committee, namely the use of force by the administering Power.

498. The representative of *Finland* recalled that he had expressed the views of his Government on Southern Rhodesia in his opening statement a few days before (see chapter II, paras. 287-294), namely, that it was strongly opposed to the illegal Smith régime, which, in defiance of virtually unanimous world opinion, continued to oppress the African people.

499. His delegation considered that no peaceful effort should be spared to rectify the situation and enable the African people of Zimbabwe to choose their own future in their own country. In accordance with the Security Council's resolutions, trade between Southern Rhodesia and his country had ceased. It was very regrettable that the mandatory sanctions had not yet produced decisive results, and his delegation deeply deplored the fact that Portugal and South Africa, whose participation in the sanctions was of particular importance, had continued their political and economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, in defiance of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) which was legally binding on all Member States.

500. Sanctions, in order to be effective, needed to be comprehensive and to receive the full support of Member States, all of which should stand behind the Security Council's decision and should be prepared to take further and bolder measures if the sanctions produced no results. That was of vital importance not only for the people of Zimbabwe but also for the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. It should, however, be borne in mind that it was the first time the world body had resorted to mandatory economic sanctions in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter.

501. He thanked the petitioners for the valuable information they had furnished to the Special Committee. He had listened with great care and deep emotion to what they had said concerning their devoted struggle for freedom and the sufferings of their people. His country greatly sympathized with their noble cause and hoped that the day would soon come when they would be able to take their place in a society free from discrimination.

502. The representative of *Poland* said that the question of Southern Rhodesia had first come before the United Nations almost five years before. In 1962, the predecessor of the present Committee, the Committee of Seventeen, had established that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Article 73 e of the Charter. Since then, Southern Rhodesia had become a regular item on the agenda of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee. Many resolutions had been adopted requesting the administering Power to implement within that Territory the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

503. Until 1965, however, the United Kingdom had denied the right of the United Nations to consider the problem of Southern Rhodesia and had asserted that developments there were well under its control. It had ignored all recommendations and requests that it should use its residual powers to grant independence to the people of Zimbabwe. Events had shown that the passive inaction of the United Kingdom had given the white settler minority time to strengthen its position and to prepare for a unilateral declaration of independence. Its policy of non-compliance with United Nations resolu-

tions on Southern Rhodesia had paved the way for Smith's usurpation of power. Although the United Kingdom had stigmatized the unilateral declaration of independence by the South Rhodesian front as an act of rebellion, it had taken no effective steps to quell it but had adopted a hesitant and a weak attitude and had thus encouraged the settlers in their defiance by assuring them that, in no circumstances, would force be used against them. Despite warnings from African and many other Member States that half measures would never bring down the rebel régime, the Security Council had, at the instance of the United Kingdom, adopted a programme of selective mandatory sanctions. The evidence given by the petitioners and the working paper prepared by the Secretariat showed that South Africa and Portugal were assisting the régime in Southern Rhodesia to defeat the selective sanctions and that Southern Rhodesian minerals and crops were being sold to major international concerns established in Japan, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries. Sanctions had, in fact, proved to be a failure and the racist régime was continuing its illegal course in defiance of the administering Power and of various United Nations resolutions.

504. Since the General Assembly had last discussed the matter, the situation in the Territory had taken a turn for the worse: the régime had consolidated itself and had intensified its oppressive measures against the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe. It was assuming new powers and moving even further in the direction of a full police State with institutional apartheid. It was introducing legislation on separate development that would divide the country along racial and tribal lines. It was expanding its armed forces and increasing its military allocations by about 20 per cent. The petitioners had informed the Special Committee that military experts from the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries had been brought to Southern Rhodesia to train the Rhodesian armed forces.

505. It had always been his delegation's view that the question of Southern Rhodesia could not be considered in isolation from the other colonial and racial problems in southern Africa. The collusion between Vorster, Salazar and Smith in perpetuating white supremacy in southern Africa supported that contention. The whole area was covered by a network of foreign financial monopolies which ruthlessly exploited and provided an umbrella for the illegal Southern Rhodesian régime. In fact, the foreign companies and industrial combines were keeping the colonial régime in being since they considered that it created a favourable climate for their investments. The responsibility for that situation lay entirely with the administering Power and its allies, which, either directly or indirectly, were violating United Nations resolutions despite the fact that it was the duty of the United Kingdom Government to crush the rebellion and make it possible for the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their inalienable right to selfdetermination and independence.

506. The representative of the *United States of America* said that few issues in the history of the United Nations had produced such near unanimity among Members as the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. Previous speakers had emphasized that the United Kingdom must bear the heaviest responsibility for that situation, as was recognized by the Security Council and acknowledged by the United Kingdom itself.

507. Despite that clear-cut assignment of responsibility, most Members of the United Nations had viewed the matter from the outset as being of individual concern to themselves. The majority had dedicated themselves to attaining establishment of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and to taking specific action, in concert, to achieve those goals, in many cases at considerable sacrifice.

508. The reasons why the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) had evoked such a determined response from so many nations was because a basic moral issue was at stake: the principle of "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". The rebel régime was committed to the violation of that principle.

509. His delegation could well understand the apprehensions of the African countries, especially Zambia, concerning developments in Southern Rhodesia. Zambia had chosen to evolve a multiracial society, in which the majority ruled but where the rights of minorities were protected. His delegation considered that to be the only formula for political and social evolution which would further peace, freedom and progress.

510. When the efforts of the United Kingdom to bring majority rule to Southern Rhodesia had failed, the United Kingdom had called upon the United Nations in the belief that its co-operation was necessary if a peaceful solution were to be found. The basic aim of the United Nations action had been to make the illegal Smith régime understand that the international community would not tolerate the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of a discriminatory political system based on minority rule. The United Nations had sought to fulfil its aims by peaceful means, in accordance with its Charter. His Government had supported all the measures adopted by the Security Council and had scrupulously seen to their implementation. United States reaction to UDI had been quick and unequivocal. Immediately after the event the United States representative in the Council, Mr. Goldberg, had said:

"The event which has brought us into this Council this morning is one of the most shocking that has transpired since the dawn of the present era of decolonization and is fraught with the gravest of consequences.

"A small, stubborn and sadly mistaken minority has seized sole power in an effort to dominate the lives of the vast and unwilling majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia."²⁵

He had concluded his statement by exhorting the Council to "make resoundingly clear our conviction that a small and forlorn and misguided group of men cannot for long reverse the historic trend of twentieth-century Africa towards self-determination and freedom."²⁶

511. Since that statement had been made, the Smith régime had intensified its discrimination against the African majority. Under the extended Emergency Powers Act, new laws conferring broad powers of arrest, censorship and other curtailments of human rights had been introduced that were shocking to anyone concerned about civil liberties. Vivid evidence had been provided by the petitioners on that subject.

²⁵ Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, 1257th meeting, paras. 73 and 74.
²⁶ Ibid., para. 92.

- 512. The United States Government had given unstinting support to the increasingly strong measures adopted by the Security Council. It was irrevocably dedicated to the principle of self-determination by and for the people of Southern Rhodesia and independence on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. His own country had experienced the agonies of civil war a century before as the result of an effort to legitimize the principle of racial superiority, and had worked long and hard to rid itself of that false, hateful doctrine; it could hardly pretend to ignore overseas the very inequality it had fought at home.
- 513. In ordering, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, mandatory economic sanctions of a substantial nature, the Security Council had taken a historic step. That step meant that for the first time in the history of the United States, certain activities in international trade were to be prohibited pursuant to a Security Council order. As a major trading and investing country, the United States had had a wide variety of economic links with Southern Rhodesia before the unilateral declaration.
- 514. The process of economic disengagement had of necessity involved a complex series of economic controls. His delegation had reported to the Special Committee in 1966, in considerable detail, on the steps taken to carry out the Security Council's resolution of 20 November 1965 (217 (1965)). The Council's action of 16 December 1966 (resolution 232 (1966)) had immediately led to a new series of measures by the United States Government to broaden and tighten controls.
- 515. The Executive Order to carry out the Security Council's resolution had been signed on 5 January 1967. On 1 February 1967 the United States Commerce Department had issued an order to implement the terms of the resolution with regard to the transport of Rhodesian goods, and on 2 March 1967, the Treasury Department had issued orders covering restrictions on imports. Action to control exports had already been taken by the Commerce Department.
- 516. The United States sanctions programme was in full effect, with no loop-holes, and violation was a serious criminal offence carrying penalties of up to ten years' imprisonment, a \$10,000 fine, or both.
- 517. The process of economic disengagement had involved a loss of trade worth many millions of dollars to the United States. It had posed problems for United States industry because of the loss of an important source of some critically needed raw materials, and the dislocation of trade and investment patterns would no doubt have lasting effects. He mentioned that not to claim any credit for the steps taken by his Government, for as a member of the Security Council, his Government had strongly supported their adoption and implementation. Other countries, including Zambia, had suffered far more seriously, accepting very considerable sacrifices.
- 518. He had referred to the disruption of United States trade and investment because he had observed that, whenever the question of Southern Rhodesia was discussed, delegations representing countries whose trade with Southern Rhodesia was small or non-existent boasted of their supposed "full compliance" with the Security Council resolutions and levelled unfounded charges at countries that had had substantial economic links with Southern Rhodesia before the unilateral declaration of independence, and were there-

- fore encountering problems in implementing those resolutions. Some delegations had even claimed to see a sinister capitalist plot behind recent developments, arguing that the process of economic disengagement was in reality an effort to entrench capitalist interest in Southern Rhodesia. The fact was that the United States had reduced its exports to Southern Rhodesia from \$23 million to \$7 million, i.e., 65 per cent, between 1965 and 1966, before mandatory sanctions had been put into effect
- 519. The steps taken by his Government were specific and significant actions, not hollow statements. The United States was one of the twelve countries which by 15 May 1967 had supplied the Secretariat with full information on their trade. His Government was taking those steps willingly because it wished to play an active part in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia under the Charter. As President Kennedy had declared to the General Assembly in 1961: "Within the limits of our responsibility in such matters, my country intends to be a participant, and not merely an observer, in the peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That continuing tide of selfdetermination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support."27 That was still his Government's policy.
- 520. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Zambian representative, who had taken part in the Special Committee's work and had outlined the deplorable situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, where 4 million Africans were suffering under the control of the Smith régime.
- 521. The statements of a number of representatives and petitioners had drawn attention to the machinations of the Western Powers, South Africa and Portugal, which were directed towards maintaining the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.
- 522. The situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to be an abnormal one. If the United Nations resolution concerning the Territory was not implemented, the responsibility would rest with the United Kingdom and with those NATO countries which were supporting the United Kingdom's policy with regard to Southern Rhodesia. The statements of many delegations, including those of the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania, India, Bulgaria, Chile and Poland, showed clearly that the Western Powers, while urging implementation of the Security Council's decisions, continued to maintain economic relations with the rebel régime. The United States representative had attempted to justify his country's failure to apply sanctions. He had spoken of the economic relations between the United States and Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the arguments advanced would convince no one. It was sufficient to refer to an article in the current issue of the Times of Zambia, entitled "Rhodesia Laughs at Sanctions", which plainly stated which countries were giving assistance to the Smith régime. The United States representative's arguments merely emphasized the fact that the Western Powers' main reason for not implementing the United Nations resolution was to protect the interest of the monopolies. His delegation unreservedly condemned the activities of those foreign interests which were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining independence.

²⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1013th meeting, para. 76.

523. The representative of Sierra Leone said that all members of the Special Committee were aware that the sanctions imposed by the United Nations at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom after the the unilateral declaration of independence had failed miserably. Oil flowed into Southern Rhodesia from South Africa and Mozambique; Southern Rhodesian sugar and tobacco were sold all over the world; and ships of countries claiming to uphold the sanctions were taking goods to and from Southern Rhodesia. Machinery and spare parts banned under the Security Council resolution were supplied to the rebel régime by Portugal and South Africa. However, modern machinery was designed to last a long time and the effect of an embargo on spare parts would only make itself felt after years. Many Governments had stated that they would not ship arms or machinery to the rebel régime, but it was well known that Southern Rhodesia was receiving such goods. What, in fact, had those Governments done to check and to ensure that the goods banned under the Security Council's resolution were not sent?

524. Sanctions alone had failed, but his delegation believed that they could have been effective if they had been total and mandatory, and combined with the use of force. The rebellion had come about because of the intransigence of the United Kingdom Government, which had never really wished to give up Southern Rhodesia to the people of Zimbabwe. The Smith régime had been given time to consolidate its position. Industries were being diversified and items previously imported were being produced. The only group that had suffered were the Africans, who had been thrown out of jobs and whose educational facilities had been reduced, while employment and education for white men were safeguarded. In fact, sanctions had only hurt the Africans, and those countries that declared themselves against the use of force would make sure that the Africans continued to suffer.

525. Ian Smith was turning the Territory into another South Africa: a bill to that end was in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. It was hard for the Special Committee when meeting in New York to be aware of the radio and other propaganda carried out by the Smith régime; but during its visit to Zambia, members had been able to see for themselves the régime's attempts to influence the minds of Africans within and outside the Territory.

526. He had been impressed by the contrast between the Zambian and Rhodesian sides of the border. On the Zambian side the control post was some way away from the bridge; on the Rhodesian side it was at the very end of the bridge, and any movement towards the Rhodesian side aroused the attention of armed guards. No one was to be allowed to observe the crimes committed in the Territory. The situation had arisen because of the intransigence of the United Kingdom Government. Moreover the sword of Damocles was hanging over Zambia in the shape of the Kariba Dam, on the Rhodesian side of the border. The administering Power could not shirk its responsibility by attempting to turn it over to the United Nations. Mr. Wilson should have the courage to take a decision, however unpopular, to use force to end the rebellion. The United Kingdom must be bold if it wished the United Nations to have faith in it. Africans had fought and lost their lives for the United Kingdom in two world wars, for a cause that was not their own. The United Kingdom should show its willingness to fight for a cause for which it alleged support, and take the necessary steps to quell the rebellion. However, the main issue was not rebellion but independence for the Zimbabwe people.

527. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the petitioners who had provided vivid new evidence of the further crimes committed by the evil racist régime of Ian Smith against the gallant people of Zimbabwe. His Government and people would continue to support their just struggle for full independence and freedom.

528. In reviewing the problem of Southern Rhodesia, it was essential to bear in mind the fact that all measures thus far taken to liquidate the illegal Smith régime had been in vain. Indeed there was growing evidence that the régime was fortifying itself and extending its evil policies by introducing a new constitution and the abhorrent policy of apartheid. The racist régime had begun to follow in the footsteps of South Africa. Its reasoning was clear; the United Nations during the past twenty years had failed to overcome the racist policies of South Africa and there was every reason to believe that the Smith régime would obtain similar protection from the same countries. Those calculations had, regrettably, been justified.

529. The crux of the matter did not lie in the resistance of the Smith régime to the steps taken by the United Nations. The efforts of the countries responsible for the present situation to limit the issue to that resistance constituted an attempt to mislead public opinion and thus gain time to consolidate the régime. The real question at stake in the case of all the racist régimes in southern Africa was the wider interests of colonialists and neo-colonialists, forces and monopolies, who wished illegally to exploit the wealth of Africa, and to secure political and military outposts from which to exert pressure against the newly liberated countries and jeopardize their development. Such a policy, based as it was on the use of force, constituted a threat to the emancipation and free development of the world as a whole, and President Kaunda, in his wise and comprehensive address, had warned the Special Committee of the consequences of continuing it.

530. His delegation considered that the Special Committee's basic function was to shed light on the situation faced by the international community in Southern Rhodesia, and to take measures to eliminate the causes of that situation. Responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia fell upon the United Kingdom under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), with which that country had not complied. The delaying tactics of the United Kingdom had enabled Smith to carry out his plan. After the unilateral declaration of independence, the Government of the United Kingdom had stated that it would be responsible for crushing the rebel régime. The majority of States Members of the United Nations had stressed the need for military force as the only way to put down the régime, but the United Kingdom and other Western Powers had insisted that other methods could be used. The majority of Member States were doubtful, however, as to the sincerity of the United Kingdom Government's intentions to eliminate the Smith régime, and the continuance of the racist régime in Salisbury had proved that those doubts were justified. The present situation and the failure of the measures taken by the United Kingdom could only lead to the conclusion that certain Western countries with economic

and political interests in southern Africa had, from the very beginning, wanted the sanctions to fail.

- 531. The majority of the Special Committee members, including his own delegation, had from the very beginning pointed out that economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia could be effective only if they were carried out by all countries. The racist régimes of Portugal and South Africa had, of course, ignored the decisions of the United Nations and given Southern Rhodesia full economic, moral and political assistance. In view of the circumstances, belief in the effectiveness of economic sanctions would be extremely naïve. As the petitioners had confirmed, Southern Rhodesia continued to receive supplies; new industries were being established; more foreign investments were being made; and companies with capital from the West were continuing to co-operate. The fact that Southern Rhodesia had a two-year supply of oil was the best indication of the support received by the Smith régime.
- 532. In view of the failure of the measures taken, it was clear that only the use of military force could destroy the illegal racist régime. It would be quite in order to ask the United Kingdom Government what measures it intended to adopt since those which it had already taken had proved a failure. Judging from a statement by the United Kingdom Foreign Minister, Mr. Brown, to the Security Council at its 1331st meeting on 8 December 1966, it would be logical to infer that the United Kingdom would in the end decide to use military force. But in view of the fact that there were no indications that the United Kingdom was ready to take such an action, his delegation felt that sponsors of the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia were fully justified in recommending that the Security Council undertake the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Reluctance to undertake extreme measures would jeopardize the prestige of the United Nations.
- 533. The case of Southern Rhodesia had demonstrated that the action of the United Nations against racialism would not be effective in isolation. The Special Committee should, therefore, work out a series of measures to be undertaken in concert by all Member States against all racist régimes at the same time. Only thus would it be possible to prevent some racist Governments from helping other racist Governments. His delegation was confident that such action would finally end the growing danger in southern Africa and contribute to the removal of colonialism from the face of the earth.
- 534. The representative of Australia said that Australia had been one of the first countries to impose economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia after the illegal declaration of independence; its action had preceded Security Council resolution 217 (1965). His Government's policy was to oppose minority rule and the denial of basic democratic rights to the African population of Southern Rhodesia. It considered the present Government to be illegal and would support all peaceful measures to hasten the restoration of legal government. Australia would not consider equitable a situation in which any one group, majority or minority, imposed its will upon the other. In the Chairman's own thoughtful words: "The Europeans in Rhodesia must be prepared to live side by side with the Africans." In the words of the distinguished petitioner from ZANU, Australia would not consider equitable a situation in which any one group, be it large or small, imposed its will upon the other, denying it the elementary freedoms.

- 535. The Australian Government and people did not condone the practice of imprisoning one's political opponents, and condemned it even more severely when the opponent was denied the right of fair trial and had no recourse to due process of law based on the principle that all men were equal. His Government's opposition to the policy of apartheid, moreover, had been made clear on many occasions. It regarded the concept that one man was inherently inferior to another as quite untenable.
- 536. The representative of *Italy* said that the position of Italy on the question of Southern Rhodesia was very clear. The answers given by the petitioners had confirmed his delegation's concern about the situation created by the determination with which the Salisbury régime was persevering in its defiance of the United Nations and, according to the most recent news received, the progressive application of measures to enforce discrimination, *apartheid*, and the denial to the African majority of the benefits of education, social welfare, justice and equal employment opportunities. That was why the Italian Government had had no hesitation, even before the mandatory decision of the Security Council, in taking action to ensure the economic isolation of the Salisbury régime when persuasion and negotiation had apparently failed.
- 537. The representative of Iraq said that the petitioners' statements had shown beyond any doubt that the strategy of the imperialist and racist régimes was to stand together economically, financially and militarily in the face of the powerful tide of nationalism in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world. It had also become obvious that the cause of freedom was the same in Angola, South West Africa, South Africa, Mozambique, Palestine, Aden, Oman and every other land where the forces of exploitation were striving to ensure their continued existence in the subjugated areas. The fact had also been established that the United Kingdom and its business-minded allies applied a double standard of behaviour and values in their relations with the oppressed peoples and with the United Nations itself. Some leading countries had mastered the art of hiding behind what was described as "private" activities in continuing the flow of capital and material support to the bastion of racism, prejudice and fascism in southern Africa. Such tactics had preserved that bastion and had practically nullified the effects of sanctions under a well-calculated plan of action. Seventy-two countries had already declared their support of sanctions and others were in the process of doing so, including all Southern Rhodesia's major trading partners. But the colonial Powers had turned about and made even greater investments in the areas subject to sanctions.
- 538. All means of bringing about a peaceful change had failed and force was the only possibility left. It was high time that all freedom-loving nations started thinking of boycotting the colonial Powers that continued to deal with the racist Governments. Those Powers needed the markets, natural resources and goodwill of the freedom-loving peoples: they should be shown that those peoples stood by their fundamental objectives, which could not be sacrificed. Those Powers should be made to realize their need of the assistance and cooperation of the freedom-loving peoples. Such action would require much sacrifice and self-denial but, together with the use of force and the local mobilization of national liberation movements, it could bring the day of victory much nearer. It was no use waiting any

longer for the imperialists and business-minded Powers to further the cause of freedom. Their assistance was only weighed against calculations of the material return on the transaction. Human misery and sufferings had no place in their ledger books or cash registers. He appealed to the liberation movements to work together in Africa, the Middle East and wherever the fight for freedom and independence was going on. He assured them of Iraq's total and continuous support until the day that the victory over colonialism, racism and all types of exploitation was won.

539. The representative of *Tunisia* said that he had already stated his Government's views on the question of Southern Rhodesia at a previous meeting. His delegation had been much interested to hear the evidence of the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee. It was grateful to them for the valuable information they had given and assured them of the Tunisian Government's support. Their evidence had confirmed that there must be urgent and effective action if the situation in Southern Rhodesia was to be rectified and if the 4 million Africans were to be given back the rights of which they had been illegally deprived by the white minority. The sanctions so far applied had proved ineffective. The endless negotiations with the Ian Smith government appeared to have encouraged it to harden its position and intensify its repressive measures. All the peaceful solutions recommended by the United Kingdom had been unworkable. Recourse to force seemed now to be the only way to rectify the situation so that a referendum, based on the principle of "one man, one vote", could be held in the Territory. Such a referendum would allow the majority to express their wishes and choose their future. The United Kingdom, which had consistently claimed responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, must take the measures necessary for the restoration of the rule of law. The resolution co-sponsored by his delegation did no more than describe the situation in Southern Rhodesia and recommend solutions which were still possible. All States Members of the United Nations, and more especially the developed countries, should bring pressure to bear on the United Kingdom so that it might finally take the steps required to restore order in Southern Rhodesia and enable the Zimbabwe people to recover their legitimate rights and exercise their sovereignty.

540. The representative of Venezuela said that he had already explained his delegation's position on the question of Southern Rhodesia: it had condemned the illegal racist minority régime of Ian Smith in the most categorical manner; it had spoken of the United Kingdom's responsibility, as administering Power, for the failure of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council; and had pointed to the flagrant violation of those sanctions by South Africa and Portugal. Venezuela had no relations whatever with the illegal régime and had applied, and would continue to apply, all the requisite measures, just as it would continue to support the fight of the Zimbabwe people for self-determination. In conclusion, he thanked the petitioners for the new evidence of colonial oppression they had provided. The importance his delegation attached to their statements was shown by the support it had given to the Chilean proposal that the records containing the petitioners' evidence should be sent to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council. Venezuela unreservedly supported the people of Zimbabwe in its fight for liberation.

- 541. The representative of *Madagascar* said that the Malagasy people were closely following the course of events in Southern Rhodesia. The additional proofs furnished by the petitioners had strengthened the already strong case against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, which constituted a threat to international peace and security.
- 542. The policies of racial discrimination and segregation pursued in Southern Rhodesia, which rode roughshod over the rights and dignity of an entire people, had been unreservedly condemned by international opinion, as the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee amply demonstrated.
- 543. The peoples committed to peace and freedom were determined to support the Zimbabwe people in their heroic struggle. His delegation, in conjunction with the other delegations represented on the Special Committee, would spare no effort to seek appropriate ways and means to enable the Zimbabwe people to obtain their freedom and independence without delay.
- 544. The Malagasy Republic appreciated the United Kingdom's efforts to solve the Rhodesian problem at their true worth. His country had never believed in the efficacy of selective economic sanctions, and events had proved it right. The sanctions were not being applied by all States, and in particular not by South Africa and Portugal. His delegation considered, moreover, that economic sanctions should also be taken against those two countries.
- 545. Now that it was realized that selective economic sanctions did not work, the United Kingdom Government should be asked to take immediately, by resorting to force if necessary, whatever action was needed to end the illegal Ian Smith régime and ensure the immediate implementation of General Assembly resolution $1514 \ (XV)$.
- 546. The Malagasy Republic had consistently advocated a policy of non-violence and had always favoured the peaceful settlement of colonial crises. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, however, no peaceful solution was possible, and there was thus no alternative but to resort to force. Furthermore, his Government was surprised at the present inertia of the United Kingdom Government, which, in other colonies, had no hesitation in using force to crush nationalist movements.
- 547. It was for the United Kingdom, and for no other country, to use force to crush the Rhodesian rebellion. The United Kingdom was entirely responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia and had a duty to lead the Zimbabwe people to independence.
- 548. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that his delegation considered the situation in Southern Rhodesia extremely serious and a threat to international peace and security. The United Kingdom itself had recognized that that was so by twice appealing to the United Nations for help in finding ways to ensure the effectiveness of the economic sanctions. Those appeals to the international community had seemed sincere, and there had been grounds for believing that the administering Power was ready to use all the means at its disposal to restore order in Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, developments had proved the contrary to be the case. The economic sanctions had not worked, and the Ian Smith régime even appeared to have strengthened its position. His delegation still believed that the Rhodesian problem was a matter for the United Kingdom to deal with, and it was surprised that the adminis-

tering Power remained passive, displaying not the slightest intention of using other means.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. Consensus adopted by the Special Committee concerning recent developments in the Territory

- 549. At the 523rd meeting, on 6 June 1967, the representative of *Chile* referred to the statement by Mr. Chitepo (ZANU), particularly that part of the statement (see paras. 396-441) dealing with mandatory sanctions and a new system of *apartheid* in Southern Rhodesia and proposed that the Special Committee should draw the Security Council's attention to it and to the debate on it. The Council must be informed that, in many cases, the mandatory sanctions which it had decided to apply remained a dead letter. Moreover, the fact that Southern Rhodesia was promulgating legislation on *apartheid* similar to that in force in South Africa was a development with irreparable consequences.
- 550. He therefore asked whether the Special Committee was ready to adopt a formal resolution on the matter, or at least to take a majority decision on the three following possible courses of action: sending copies of the record of the petitioners' statements and of the debate on them to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; appealing to the administering Power to secure the immediate release of political prisoners in general, and Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole in particular; and asking the administering Power to oppose the promulgation of legislation to institute apartheid. The adoption of those three courses of action would by no means preclude the Committee's taking a decision on the problem of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.
- 551. The representative of *Venezuela* endorsed the Chilean representative's proposal.
- 552. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* endorsed the remarks of the representative of Chile and supported his very constructive proposal. It was high time that all evidence concerning the flouting of the Security Council's resolutions by countries which paid lip-service to them was submitted to the Council. The evidence collected would help the Council to take effective measures and show which nations were adopting a hypocritical attitude and which were in favour of freedom and peace.
- 553. The Chairman suggested that the Special Committee might reach a consensus on the basis of the Chilean proposal, which had been supported by the representatives of Venezuela and the United Republic of Tanzania.
- 554. The representative of *Italy* said that he would be willing to go along with that kind of proposal, which he thought might be useful.
- 555. The Chairman read out the text of a draft consensus on the question of Southern Rhodesia (see para. 564 below).
- 556. The representative of the *United States of America*, supported by the representative of Australia, said that his delegation could agree to the transmission of the records to the Security Council, but for practical reasons he would have to reserve its position on paragraphs 2 and 3. The United Kingdom Government was not in control in Southern Rhodesia and did not therefore have the power to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole.
- 557. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that there was no question of challenging

- the right of any delegation to reserve its position. It was common knowledge, however, that the United Kingdom Government had always claimed sole responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The consensus called directly upon the United Kingdom Government as administering Power, to take measures to ensure the release of all political prisoners. As long as the United Kingdom was the administering Power for Southern Rhodesia, it must be called upon to take those measures; no other country could be expected to do so.
- 558. The whole world had refused to recognize the illegal minority racist régime of Ian Smith and, if the United Kingdom Government did not take suitable action, it should be requested to join with the world community in taking effective measures to remedy the situation and to ensure the liberation of the African people in Southern Rhodesia.
- 559. The representative of *Venezuela* agreed with the representative of Chile that the release of political prisoners and the promulgation of laws on *apartheid* were matters within the exclusive purview of the administering Power, the United Kingdom.
- 560. The representative of *Bulgaria* asked for clarification of the United States representative's reservation. To whom was the Special Committee to address its appeal if not to the United Kingdom as administering Power?
- 561. The representative of the *United States of America* replied that he had not questioned the right or propriety of the Special Committee to reach a consensus or to transmit the records of its meetings to the Security Council; he had merely reserved his delegation's position, as had been done in the past. His reservation was based on the fact that it would be impracticable to address such an appeal to the United Kingdom Government, since that Government was no longer in control of affairs in Southern Rhodesia.
- 562. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation construed paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed consensus as an appeal to the United Kingdom Government to do what it could to implement the Special Committee's request.
- 563. The representative of *Finland* said that he would like to associate himself with the interpretation given by the representative of Italy.
- 564. On the basis of the proposal of the representative of Chile, the Special Committee, at its 523rd meeting on 6 June 1967, adopted a consensus on the question of Southern Rhodesia, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the records of the meeting. The full text of the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 6 June 1967, reads as follows:
 - "The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
 - "1. Decides to transmit to the President of the Security Council the records of its debates on the question of Southern Rhodesia, including the testimony submitted by the petitioners, following the conclusion of its consideration of that question;
 - "2. Urges the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent the passage of the bill now before the so-called Parliament of the illegal racist minority

régime, which would have the effect of entrenching apartheid policies in Southern Rhodesia;

- "3. Appeals to the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure the release of all political prisoners and detainees held by the illegal racist minority régime, particularly Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole."
- 565. The text of the consensus, together with the records of the debates on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 16 June 1967.²⁸

2. Adoption of resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia

566. At the 525th meeting, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407).

567. Introducing the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407), the representative of Yugoslavia said that although the text was self-explanatory, he wished to comment briefly on the paragraphs that the sponsors considered to be of particular importance. Referring to the preamble, it appeared logical to the sponsors to regret the absence of the administering Power, namely the United Kingdom, from the present deliberations of the Committee, since the administering Power alone was responsible for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and had an obligation to bring down the illegal régime in the Territory. It was also logical to recall General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which was the basis of the Committee's deliberations, as well as all other relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in particular Security Council resolution 232 (1966). With reference to operative paragraph 1, which reaffirmed the legitimacy of the people's struggle for their liberation, he recalled that the United Nations had on previous occasions confirmed that the struggle for liberation of the colonial peoples was both legitimate and justified. In the course of the Committee's meetings in Africa, many delegations and petitioners had underlined that point as being one of the most important ways in which the final liquidation of colonialism in Africa and other parts of the world could be achieved. Operative paragraphs 2 to 7 were directed to the United Kingdom as the administering Power in an effort to induce it to take the only effective action which the racists of Southern Rhodesia would understand, namely, military force. In formulating the draft resolution, the sponsors had been particularly mindful that all the measures so far taken to liquidate the illegal minority régime of Ian Smith had been in vain. Not only had the racist régime of white settlers not capitulated, but there was instead a growing body of evidence that it was doing everything possible to strengthen itself and to enlarge its arsenal of criminal and illegal policies. The main reason for such a situation was the failure and refusal of the administering Power to take effective action to bring down the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The sponsors considered that the proposed measures constituted the minimum which the Committee could recommend to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and they therefore hoped that the draft resolution would obtain the full support of all members of the Committee.

568. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the draft resolution recommended that the Security Council should take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. If the international community was to maintain its self-respect, action under Chapter VII was absolutely necessary.

569. He drew attention to operative paragraph 7, which called upon the administering Power, in any future consultation, to consult with the representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime. To continue negotiating with the illegal régime would completely destroy the faith that people had in the rule of law.

570. The draft resolution reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and appealed to all States to render them moral and material support. In his delegation's view, such support should be of a kind that could help them in their armed struggle against the forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

571. The draft resolution would show the people of Zimbabwe who was really on their side. He appealed to all delegations to support it for, in doing so, they would be telling the illegal racist minority régime in Salisbury with one voice that the days of its suicidal policy were numbered.

572. The representative of *Bulgaria* suggested three amendments to the draft resolution for consideration by the co-sponsors.

573. First, the notion of a crime against humanity had been introduced during the general debate in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and had been included in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) and in resolution 2184 (XXI) on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration. He suggested that the same idea should be included in the resolution on Southern Rhodesia, possibly as a new operative paragraph 2, to read:

"Declares that the continuation of colonial rule and the practice of apartheid as well as all forms of racial discrimination and oppression in Southern Rhodesia constitute a crime against humanity".

574. Secondly, the Secretary-General should be requested to take all necessary steps to ensure that the truth about the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the fight of the people of Zimbabwe for liberation was disseminated as widely as possible. Such a request might be included in a new paragraph 13 to read:

"Requests the Secretary-General to promote through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe".

A similar text was contained in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI).

575. Thirdly, he suggested that operative paragraph 12 of the draft resolution should be supplemented to take into account some ideas put forward by representatives of the liberation movements and also the consensus adopted at Kinshasa containing an appeal to the specialized agencies. The addendum might read:

²⁸ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document S/8006.

"... in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, through it, with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia".

576. The representative of Yugoslavia, speaking on behalf of the sponsors at a subsequent meeting, thanked the representative of Bulgaria for the three helpful and constructive suggestions he had made which the sponsors gladly accepted in principle. The revised text was contained in document A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1, with some minor textual changes.

577. The representative of *Bulgaria* thanked the Yugoslav representative and the other sponsors of the draft resolution for adopting his suggestions; that was a further example of the friendly co-operation between the African and Asian countries and the socialist countries represented in the Special Committee.

578. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor, covered all the points which the petitioners had so ably brought to the attention of the Special Committee, and he was convinced that its adoption would encourage efforts to alleviate the plight of the people of Zimbabwe.

579. Several eminent spokesmen had appealed to the Zimbabwe nationalists to forget their differences and close their ranks in the face of the common enemy, but their appeals had gone unheeded. He nevertheless appealed to them once again to do so, if they wished their fight to be a successful one.

580. He thanked all the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee and assured them that the day of their liberation was not far off. They should redouble their efforts, strong in the knowledge that Africa and the whole freedom-loving world were behind them in their fight.

581. The representative of *Chile* said that the facts amply justified the strong language in which the draft resolution submitted by twelve members of the Special Committee was couched. His delegation therefore supported the draft resolution and congratulated the delegations sponsoring it.

582. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the draft resolution reflected in a concise manner the position of the majority of States Members of the United Nations and also the demands of the Zimbabwe people. It reaffirmed the legitimacy of that people's fight for independence and, with the addition of the new operative paragraph 2, declared that racial discrimination and segregation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a crime against humanity. Reflecting the frequently expressed attitude of the majority of Member States, it declared that the United Kingdom Government bore full responsibility for the establishment of the Smith régime and called upon it to take all necessary measures to bring it down and to execute General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the other relevant resolutions.

583. The draft resolution contained a very important new element which went to the heart of the matter: it condemned the foreign financial interests and international monopolies which, by supporting and assisting the illegal régime, were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence.

584. A major preoccupation of most delegations during the session at Kitwe had been the role of the United Nations specialized agencies in assisting the national liberation movements. His delegation had always been intensely interested in the problem and

had frequently submitted suggestions concerning it. He was satisfied that paragraph 13 of the revised draft opened the way for the specialized agencies to assist the refugees from Zimbabwe, and all those suffering from oppression in connexion with the national liberation movement, through the Organization of African Unity. At the same time, the paragraph would help the General Assembly to formulate clear directives and recommendations to the specialized agencies at its twenty-second session. Paragraph 14 reflected the general feeling of most delegations that the United Nations could do far more to publicize the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and the fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The request to the Secretary-General could undoubtedly improve United Nations activities in that respect.

585. His delegation's position on the Southern Rhodesia problem was well known so it was unnecessary to elaborate on it further. The draft resolution, in its amended form, reflected his delegation's position on the problem and he therefore intended to vote for it.

586. The representative of *Finland* said that his delegation fully shared the aims of the sponsors of the draft resolution but had certain misgivings with regard to operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11. Many speakers had advocated the use of force as the only means of solving the problem but, in the opinion of his Government, all international conflicts should be settled by peaceful means. Despite the seriousness of the situation, he could not believe that all possibilities of a peaceful solution were exhausted and did not think that the means the United Nations had at its disposal to impose mandatory economic sanctions should be completely discounted.

587. Paragraph 12 recommended that the Security Council should take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. At a stage when the Security Council was about to begin its own study of the Southern Rhodesian problem, it would have been preferable, in his opinion, to submit the relevant information to the Council for its consideration rather than to make a recommendation. He would not go into further detail concerning his objections to other operative paragraphs, since time was short, but he regretted that his delegation would have to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as it stood.

588. The representative of Poland said that his delegation welcomed the draft resolution as amended to incorporate the suggestions made by the Bulgarian representative (A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1.) The time had come for the United Kingdom Government to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and to replace the racist 1961 Constitution by a new one based on universal suffrage. He wished, however, to make a slight suggestion for the modification of operative paragraph 4: the words "without further delay" should be inserted after the word "power". The time factor was all the more important in view of the "Tiger conspiracy", which had clearly shown that Southern Rhodesia might be granted independence after a period of ten or fifteen more years. His delegation considered that the people of Zimbabwe should have been granted independence long before, at the same time and in the same manner as had been done in the case of Zambia and Malawi, the other members of the former Federation.

589. He expressed his gratitude for the appreciative words used by the representative of the United Republic

of Tanzania in commenting on the positive stand taken by the socialist countries with respect to colonialism and racialism in general and Southern Rhodesia in particular.

590. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation supported the chief goal of the draft resolution and shared the deep concern at the apparently slow rate of progress towards it. However, as a responsible Member of the United Nations, his country believed that continued attempts must be made to find a solution by peaceful means. It did not feel that all peaceful means of solving the problem in Southern Rhodesia had been exhausted and for that reason and others his delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. His Government would continue in the determined search for a just and peaceful solution. Its constant objective remained, in the words of President Johnson, "to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia". The past fifteen years had witnessed remarkable progress towards selfdetermination and independence in Africa; his Government was convinced that that progress could and would not long be denied to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

591. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation supported the twelve-Power draft resolution and the Bulgarian amendments to it. The draft resolution could be improved by adding a provision concerning the political and military ties between Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which were a threat to the neighbouring new African States.

592. The Security Council resolution of 16 December 1966, providing for economic sanctions against the racist régime, had proved ineffective and inadequate. That was the reason for operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, which condemned South Africa and Portugal in strong terms. It would be logical to add West Germany to the list, since it supported the racist policies of those countries and flouted United Nations decisions, thus pursuing a policy which was directly opposed to the interests of the peoples of Africa

593. His delegation unreservedly supported operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution, which condemned the activities of those foreign interests which were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining independence.

594. Although certain provisions of the draft resolution might usefully have been clarified or strengthened, his delegation was prepared to support the resolution since his country had always favoured the final elimination of colonialism and racism from the African continent.

595. The representative of Australia, explaining his delegation's position on the draft resolution, said his Government believed sincerely and earnestly that the possibilities of a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem had not yet been exhausted. He wondered whether the draft resolution was practical and whether it might not create more problems than it solved. It was also relevant that the Security Council would shortly be reconsidering the matter.

596. The natural strength and potentialities of Southern Rhodesia should be preserved. If force were employed at that stage, his delegation felt that it would involve such a great cost in lives, suffering and material

damage that the country would take years to recover from it. Indeed, a number of petitioners had expressed the hope that bloodshed could be avoided. Moreover, the use of force would have as its inevitable aftermath an atmosphere of such bitterness, spreading far beyond the borders of Southern Rhodesia, that it would take generations to restore any semblance of interracial harmony. Was it not a corollary of the Special Committee's principal aim that the problem of colonialism should be solved in a manner that would enable every man to live in harmony with his fellows? Could any member view with equanimity a course of action that might destroy the prospects of such a solution for many years to come?

597. His delegation, while agreeing with many points in the draft resolution and sympathizing with the motives of the co-sponsors, felt compelled to vote against it. That did not mean, however, that his country was opposed to the exercise of the right of self-determination, to the attainment of complete freedom by all the people of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation believed that freedom, equality and the full exercise of human dignity were the rights of all men everywhere, and this belief had been confirmed by the moving testimony of the petitioners.

598. The representative of *Italy* said that the draft resolution combined many of the provisions contained in General Assembly resolutions 2138 (XXI), 2151 (XXI) and 2189 (XXI), with some important additions referring to the use of force. At the Kitwe meetings, statements had been made by other delegations and by petitioners on the need for the use of force: some had asserted that the force should be applied by the United Kingdom, and others that it should be applied by the international community through the United Nations. Others again had advocated the stricter enforcement of sanctions. That had strengthened his delegation's conviction that, given the different views on future action, the most reasonable attitude would be not to prejudge in any way the debates in the Security Council or any ensuing decisions that it might adopt when it took up the question of Southern Rhodesia in a few weeks' time. He was not minimizing the value of the Special Committee's recommendations, but stressed that the Council, responsible under the Charter for the maintenance of peace and security, was in the best position to appraise the situation on the basis of the information supplied by the Committee. He had no doubt that the Council. whose present composition rightly reflected the membership of the United Nations and the weight of African opinion, would deal with the problem most effectively and decide on the appropriate measures.

599. That was why his delegation considered that the wording of operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the draft resolution was such that the Special Committee could not adopt them without limiting the Council's freedom of action. Moreover, it considered that those paragraphs would debar other methods which could still produce fruitful results; they even implied that negotiations should be regarded as an evil per se and something to be condemned.

600. His delegation could not accept the paragraph which declared colonial rule, racial discrimination, apartheid and oppression in Southern Rhodesia to be a crime against humanity, owing to the legal implications of the expression "crime against humanity". It could accept the wording as an expression of moral condemnation; from the legal standpoint, however, it

was not in a position either to affirm or to exclude that such policies pursued by a given country were a crime against humanity within the definition of such crimes by the Nürnberg Tribunal and the London Convention of 1946. It might be correct to affirm that some specific results of apartheid, such as genocide, aggression or cruel repression, fell within the definition of crimes against humanity. But it was not appropriate for a political body, such as the Special Committee, to take a decisive stand on a point of legal interpretation; that was a matter for an appropriate judicial body.

- 601. Those were the reasons why the Italian delegation was not in a position to vote for the draft resolution and would abstain. He deeply regretted that necessity since his delegation supported the principles of freedom, self-determination and respect for the fundamental rights of man which would be upheld unanimously by the Special Committee and by the United Nations.
- 602. The Chairman said that he did not agree that the adoption of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the draft resolution would restrict the Security Council's freedom. Paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) "Requests the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations". The relevant paragraphs of the draft resolution had been put forward as recommendations suggesting appropriate action which the Council might take. An identical paragraph condemning apartheid as a crime against humanity had been included in General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI).
- 603. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation had sponsored the draft resolution because it thought it reflected the desires of the Zimbabwe people. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution provided the answers to the serious problems created for the international community by the continued existence of the racist Smith régime.
- 604. Operative paragraph 13 was of vital importance, since all the political groups with which the Special Committee had been in contact had stressed the need for help from the specialized agencies and other international organizations. That help should be provided in the shortest possible time because the effects of war, disease, illiteracy, etc., could not wait.
- 605. The representative of *Venezuela* said that the draft resolution coincided, generally speaking, with the Venezuelan delegation's position on the Southern Rhodesian régime, which it regarded not only as illegal but also as contrary to the basic principles of the civilized world. It would therefore vote for the draft resolution on the understanding that the reservations entered by his delegation in respect of paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2151 (XXI) also applied to it.
- 606. Venezuela was opposed to the unilateral use of force owing to the bitter experience of Latin America in that connexion. It would agree, however, with such a measure if ordered by the competent body, i.e., the Security Council, in which case it would be multilateral action carried out by the United Nations in accordance with the explicit provisions of the Charter.
- 607. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that the provisions of the draft resolution before the Special

Committee represented the minimum that the Zimbabwe people were entitled to expect. The draft resolution as a whole, and more especially operative paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, did no more than remind the United Kingdom of the precise extent of its responsibilities. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by a large majority and that the voice of the international community would be heeded so that justice might be done in that part of Africa.

608. At its 528th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1) as orally revised, by a roll-call vote of 17 to 1, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia.

Abstaining: Finland, Italy, United States of America. 609. The text of the resolution on Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248) adopted by the Special Committee at its 528th meeting on 9 June 1967, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners, "Regretting the absence of the representatives of the administering Power,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling further all the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling further that the situation in Southern Rhodesia has been declared by the Security Council in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 as constituting a threat to international peace and security.

"Recalling further that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has declared on several occasions that the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia is illegal, and that it would not negotiate with that régime on the future of Southern Rhodesia, and that the Government of the United Kingdom has also declared that it would not grant independence until majority rule is established in the Territory,

- "1. Reaffirms once again the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the achievement of their inalienable right to freedom and independence;
- "2. Condemns the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;

- "3. Deplores the failure and the unwillingness of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures, in its capacity as the administering Power, to bring down the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;
- "4. Reaffirms the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power without further delay to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted according to the principle of 'one man, one vote';
- "5. Expresses its conviction that sanctions, in order to bring about the downfall of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, must be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power;
- "6. Further reaffirms that the only effective and speedy way of bringing down the rebellion in the Territory is through the use of force by the administering Power;
- "7. Calls once again upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take immediately all necessary measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions;
- "8. Considers that any future consultations undertaken by the administering Power to determine the future of Southern Rhodesia must be carried out with representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime;
- "9. Condemns the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and by their exploitation of the human and material resources of the Territory, are preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and calls upon the Governments of the States concerned to take all necessary measures to bring to an end such activities;

- "10. Condemns in the strongest terms the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal of continued support for the illegal racist minority régime in blatant defiance of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions;
- "11. Urges all States, as a matter of urgency, to render all moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe through the Organization of African Unity;
- "12. Recommends to the Security Council, in accordance with its decision contained in resolution 232 (1966) and, in particular, paragraph 1 thereof, to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
- "13. Appeals to the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and, through it, with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia;
- "14. Requests the Secretary-General to promote through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, in order that world public opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe:
- "15. Calls upon the administering Power to report to the Special Committee on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution;
- "16. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."
- 610. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 13 June 1967.²⁹

CHAPTER IV*

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

- A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly
- 1. On 9 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,¹ chap. IV, para. 306) reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to freedom and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve this right. By this same resolution the Committee, among other things, set up a sub-committee to make a thorough study of the situation in the Territory and, among other matters, to recommend an early date for independence.
- 2. On 18 July 1966, the International Court of Justice delivered a judgement on the contentious case brought before it by Ethiopia and Liberia wherein it was charged that South Africa, the Mandatory Power, having violated its Mandate obligations, should be or-

- dered to abolish apartheid in the Territory and to submit its administration of South West Africa to the United Nations. In its judgement, the Court ruled that Ethiopia and Liberia could not be considered to have established any legal right in the subject-matter of the claim and that accordingly it could not decide on the merits of the case.
- 3. In its report to the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee expressed its grave concern at the situation in the Territory following the judgement and made specific recommendations regarding steps to be taken by the United Nations to prevent a serious threat to peace in the Territory. Among these recommendations were that the United Nations should decide to exercise the right to revert the Mandate to itself and that, the responsibilities of South Africa as a Mandatory Power having been terminated, it should assume direct administration of the Territory until independence. Independence would follow the holding of elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage and the formation of a government.

²⁹ Ibid., document S/8005.

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.2.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

- 4. The report of the Sub-Committee was adopted by the Special Committee on 15 September 1966, subject to reservations expressed by some members, and was submitted to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly together with the report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IV, appendix).
- 5. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly considered the question of South West Africa directly in plenary meetings, and on 27 October 1966, it adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), whereby it terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa and resolved that the United Nations must discharge the responsibilities with respect to the Territory.
- 6. Operative paragraphs 1 to 7 of the resolution read as follows:
 - "1. Reaffirms that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) are fully applicable to the people of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa and that, therefore, the people of South West Africa have the inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
 - "2. Reaffirms further that South West Africa is a territory having international status and that it shall maintain this status until it achieves independence;
 - "3. Declares that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate;
 - "4. Decides that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations;
 - "5. Resolves that in these circumstances the United Nations must discharge those responsibilities with respect to South West Africa;
 - "6. Establishes an Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa—composed of fourteen Member States to be designated by the President of the General Assembly—to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence, and to report to the General Assembly at a special session as soon as possible and in any event not later than April 1967;
 - "7. Calls upon the Government of South Africa forthwith to refrain and desist from any action, constitutional, administrative, political or otherwise, which will in any manner whatsoever alter or tend to alter the present international status of South West Africa".
- 7. The Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa, established pursuant to operative paragraph 6 of the above resolution, met between January and March 1967 and submitted a report (A/6640)² to the General Assembly at its fifth special session. In this report, the Committee, having been unable to arrive at an agreed conclusion, submitted to the General Assembly three separate proposals: one sponsored by Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and the United Arab Republic, later joined
 - ² Ibid., Fifth Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 7.

- by Pakistan; one by Canada, Italy and the United States of America; and one by Chile and Mexico, supported by Japan. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee also contained suggestions by Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reflecting a fourth position.
- 8. The proposal put forward by the African States and Pakistan called for direct temporary administration through a United Nations council for South West Africa assisted by a commissioner. The council, which would be given legislative authority, would proceed to South West Africa with a view to taking over the administration and ensuring the withdrawal of South African police, military and other personnel and their replacement by United Nations personnel, and would also, in consultation with the people, establish a constituent assembly to draft a constitution. New elections by universal adult suffrage would be held to establish a legislative assembly and, upon the formation of a government, South West Africa would be declared independent no later than June 1968. Any action by South Africa to impede the council's work would constitute a flagrant defiance of United Nations authority, calling for action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.
- 9. The proposal by Canada, Italy and the United States called for the appointment of a special representative who would make a comprehensive survey of the situation in the Territory, establish all contacts he deemed necessary and, among other things, determine the conditions necessary to enable the Territory to achieve independence. He would report to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.
- 10. Under the proposal by Chile and Mexico there would be a United Nations council and commissioner with functions similar to those proposed by the African States and Pakistan. However, rather than calling for enforcement action, this proposal envisaged contact with the authorities of South Africa to lay down procedures for the transfer of the Territory to the council.
- 11. Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stating that they were opposed to direct administration of the Territory by the United Nations, proposed that the General Assembly should declare the Territory independent immediately and allow the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to assist the national liberation movement and the formation of a new government.
- 12. On 19 May 1967, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2248 (S-V) on South West Africa. By this resolution the General Assembly decided, among other things, that: (a) all efforts should be made to ensure independence for South West Africa by June 1968; (b) during the period before independence a United Nations council for South West Africa, to be comprised of eleven Member States elected by the Assembly, should administer the Territory with the maximum participation of the people; (c) the Council should entrust executive and administrative tasks to a United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa and report at three-month intervals to the General Assembly; and (d) the Council should be based in and proceed to South West Africa where it would immediately enter into contact with the authorities of South Africa to lay down procedures for the transfer of the administration of the Territory. The resolution called upon the Government of South Africa to comply without delay with its terms and with those of resolution 2145 (XXI), and to facilitate the transfer of the administration of the

Territory. It also requested the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge its functions and requested the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to render South West Africa technical and financial assistance through a co-ordinated emergency programme to meet the exigencies of the situation.

13. On 13 June 1967, the General Assembly elected Chile, Colombia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia to the United Nations Council for South West Africa. Mr. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, Legal Counsel of the United Nations, was appointed Acting United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa.

B. Information on the territory

General

14. Information on the Territory is contained in previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly³ and in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa (A/6640). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

Position of the Government of South Africa

- 15. Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2145 (XXI), the South African Cabinet met specially to discuss the situation. A series of policy statements were later made by the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. B. J. Vorster, and other government ministers.
- 16. On 1 November 1966, at the Cape congress of the Nationalist Party, held in East London, South Africa, the Prime Minister stated that South Africa intended doing nothing about the General Assembly decision, which it regarded as illegal, unconstitutional, impossible to implement, and also dangerous in that it laid the foundation for further action against South Africa. He explained South Africa's position as follows:
 - "We are a small nation and we know it. We do not challenge anybody nor seek hostility. All we ever ask the world and ask anew is to leave us alone. We will solve our own problems in our own time and in our own way.
 - "... And as for the question of what we are going to do about this decision and what the Government's advice to you is—I say go on with your work. We will continue to administer South West Africa as we have always done and we will carry out what has been planned, taking into account the demands of the times.

"We are aware that there is peace and calm and progress not only in South Africa but also in South West Africa and as far as we are concerned it will continue like this." 17. The Prime Minister's statement followed an opening address to the congress by the Minister of Finance of South Africa. The latter maintained that South Africa's case was too sound and its faith too great to be frightened by resolutions of the United Nations. Stating that South Africa would stand firmly by the warning of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations to keep its hands off South West Africa, he added:

"We must therefore be prepared to stand by that warning. We must be prepared at all times but I can only hope that the more responsible nations will not ignore the warning and be misled by the false logic of appearement. They are the nations who will ultimately have to pay the price in money and lives.

"We must also be prepared to withstand mandatory sanctions, and the world may as well know that the Government is already taking steps to meet this eventuality."

- 18. On 3 November 1966, the South African Minister of Defence, addressing a civic reception in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, stated that South West Africa would remain an integral part of the Republic and that South Africa would "never allow this area to be taken away from us".
- 19. The South African Minister of Agricultural Technical Services and of Water Affairs, opening the Nationalist Party congress at Windhoek on 8 November 1966, emphasized that South Africa would stand with South West Africa to the utmost of its ability and would not give the area to the United Nations. He stated that the economy of South Africa was so strong that it could withstand trade sanctions for years. Internally, preparations had been made and the necessary goods stockpiled so that in case of sanctions, the country's factories could continue working. On the military front South Africa had prepared itself. The Minister, who had previously been Minister of Defence, explained that on his return from overseas he had brought back 128 licences to manufacture armaments in South Africa. "From a .22 cartridge to the newest in armoured vehicles, from the smallest item to the latest in bombs—today everything can be manufactured locally", he said.
- 20. Later, on 14 December 1966, he claimed that South Africa was strong enough to withstand sanctions for at least three years while, without strategic supplies such as gold and uranium, the countries applying sanctions could only keep them up for two years at the most. On this occasion, he referred in particular to the problem of Southern Rhodesia, stating that United Nations discussions of the issue made it clear that there was a possibility that sanctions could be extended to South Africa. However, he said the Republic was determined to continue its trade with Rhodesia as it had in the past. Referring to South West Africa, the Minister said there was no cause for alarm because there was no army in Africa, either singly or combined, which could attempt a military attack on South Africa. Even the United Nations was not able to do so. Only the major Powers could afford such a thing. He was also reported to have stated that South Africa was strong enough militarily to hold out until a third world war had been started.
- 21. Meanwhile, on 15 November 1966, the Prime Minister of South Africa affirmed that South Africa would resist all attempts to take over South West Africa.

³ Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238, chap. IX; ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. IV; ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IV, and annex No. 15, document A/5840; ibid. Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. IV; and ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IV.

22. In a New Year's message broadcast on 31 December 1966, after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 on Southern Rhodesia, the Prime Minister dealt with that issue as well as General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) on South West Africa. In his New Year's message, the Prime Minister referred to the possibility that South Africa might in 1967 consider withdrawing from the United Nations. He was quoted as stating:

"That question has not yet been considered nor has a decision been taken, but it remains in my thoughts all the time."

23. Describing South West Africa as "an annoying item on the agenda of 1967 as a result of the clearly unlawful and senseless decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations", the Prime Minister stated:

"While we must not allow this decision to worry us unduly and while it is equally unnecessary to reaffirm South Africa's standpoint in this regard, we must face the fact that it will create certain problems."

- 24. The Prime Minister described the Security Council decision on Southern Rhodesia as one which had "created a very serious problem for South Africa—a problem which if not handled very delicately can lead to confrontations with very far-reaching effects".
- 25. The Prime Minister summed up the situation as follows:

"From this it is clear that the year 1967 will find the peoples and nations of the world, including ourselves, confronted by the naked realities of ill-conceived decisions.

"I cannot minimize this problem. The year 1967 might be a year in which we too might get hurt. We might be bruised—but I verily believe—we will not be broken."

South African information campaign

26. In November 1966, according to publications of the Republic of South Africa Government Information Service, the Prime Minister of South Africa announced that the South African Government planned to undertake a large-scale campaign to inform other Governments and international organizations of South Africa's policies and of the progress made in their application. On 8 December 1966, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a statement in Pretoria concerning this matter. The text of this statement was transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations by letter dated 8 December 1966. The statement read in part as follows:

"I would emphasize that we, like previous South African Governments, continue to deny that we owe any accountability regarding South Africa's administration of South West Africa to the United Nations, and to affirm that the United Nations accordingly has no supervisory powers in that respect. Where we thus make information about South West Africa available, *inter alia*, to the United Nations, this will be in exercise of our own deliberate choice and subject to all juridical reservations.

"Subject to these reservations and to purely practical considerations we will, as mentioned above, make information on South West Africa available to Governments and international organizations, including the United Nations. We will seize every opportunity

for putting our case positively, without prejudice, of course, to the basic principles enunciated above.

"As a first step a detailed survey of our policy in South West Africa, its objective, and results achieved, is now being compiled for overseas distribution in the near future."

Later, by letter dated 23 March 1967 from the Acting Permanent Representative of South Africa, the South African Government transmitted to the Secretary-General a publication entitled South West Africa Survey, 1967.

27. In addition, the Prime Minister appealed to all South Africans to start a letter-writing campaign to inform those outside about conditions and the mood of the people. He stated that in the circumstances it was necessary to tell the world that the people were determined to solve their problems without outside help and that the various sectors of the population, whatever their differences, were unanimous in their determination to resist any attempt at interference to the last and to defend what was justly theirs with every possible means. Following the Prime Minister's appeal, the head of South Africa's largest mail advertising organization launched "Operation Friendship", a plan to send goodwill letters by the "hundreds of thousands" to people of influence overseas. His plan, sent to advertising agencies throughout South Africa, emphasized that the letters must go to the right people. To that end, lists of about 2 million influential people and opinion leaders in Europe and America were available.

Extension of sabotage legislation to South West Africa

- 28. The General Law Amendment Act No. 62 of 1966 extended to the Territory the sabotage provisions of the General Law Amendment Act No. 76 of 1962, making sabotage an offence, punishable by a minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment and a maximum sentence of death. Sabotage, as defined by the Act, includes any wrongful and wilful act whereby the accused damages or tampers with any property of any other person or of the State.
- 29. The 1966 Act also further amended the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which has been in force in the Territory since 1950. One amendment provides that if it is proved that a person on trial in connexion with military training or training in sabotage left the country without the requisite travel documents after the coming into force of the Departure from the Union Regulation Act of 1955, then he shall be presumed to have undergone or attempted, consented or taken steps to undergo such training, unless he can prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 30. Another amendment authorizes exemption from prosecution for witnesses who incriminated themselves in giving evidence. In commenting on this provision in the South African House of Assembly on 18 October 1966, the Minister of Justice explained: "We have in mind particularly such persons as receive illegal military training in foreign countries."
- 31. The 1966 Act introduces a new form of detention, applicable in South West Africa as well as South Africa, whereby a senior police officer may arrest any person whom he suspects of being a terrorist or of intending to commit certain security offences. The person may be detained for fourteen days, subject to such conditions as the Commissioner of Police may from time to time determine. During that period, no court of law

may order the release of the detainee and the conditions fixed by the Commissioner are not subject to review or appeal. Detention for longer than fourteen days may be authorized by a judge or a court on application in writing by the Commissioner of Police; pending the result of the application, the person may continue to be detained as if the application had been granted. The judge or court may afford the detainee an opportunity of submitting reasons in writing why he should not be detained and must then afford the Commissioner an opportunity of replying in writing. No provision is made for the detainee to appear before the judge or court and the latter are explicitly required, in considering an application, to have regard only to the information furnished by the Commissioner, the reasons advanced by the detainee and the reply of the Commissioner. The judge or court may amend the conditions of detention or order the immediate release of the detainee and their decision is final. The Act defines "terrorist" as follows: "'terrorist' includes any person who favours terroristic activities".

- 32. In addition to the new detention provisions, the "180-day" detention provisions earlier incorporated in the Suppression of Communism Act remain in force. The "180-day" detention provisions are also applicable under the sabotage legislation now extended to South West Africa.
- 33. Under the 1966 Act, South West Africans accused under the security laws may be tried in South African courts as well as in South West Africa itself.

Outbreak of guerrilla fighting in South West Africa

- 34. According to statements made by South African government ministers and other officials, Africans from South West Africa, trained and equipped with automatic weapons in other countries, have been returning to the Territory in small groups with instructions to start a campaign of terrorism.
- 35. The Deputy Minister of the South African police disclosed on 30 September 1966 that the first group to cross into the Ovamboland native reserve from Angola consisted of ten men, of whom eight were arrested in March 1966. The police are reported to have learned from them that others were grouping in Angola and were preparing to infiltrate into Ovamboland.
- 36. The information obtained by the police led to a gunfight in Ovamboland on 26 August 1966 between South African police and about sixteen Africans armed with two hand machine-guns and automatic pistols. Two of the Africans were killed and another later died of wounds received; eight others were arrested and the rest escaped. According to South African Government sources, none of the police was injured. According to a statement issued by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Dar es Salaam, the clash was with soldiers rather than police, SWAPO claimed that fifteen soldiers were killed.
- 37. On 22 September 1966, the Deputy Minister of the South African Police informed the House of Assembly that the police had already succeeded in arresting twenty-three trained Ovambo "terrorists". The police were aware that others remained in the northern Native reserve and were trying to apprehend them. The police also had at their disposal evidence that over 250 trained Ovambo "terrorists" were in transit camps in other African States waiting to return to South Africa.

- 38. In September 1966, a "terrorist" training camp in Ovamboland—the first to be discovered in South West Africa—was raided by the police and further arrests were made.
- 39. A few days later, in the early morning hours of 28 September 1966, between twelve and twenty Africans burned two administration buildings at Oshikango in Ovamboland—the house of a white clerk of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, and single quarters for unmarried white men. Shots were exchanged between the attackers and the white men who rushed out of the burning buildings. One man, an Ovambo night watchman, was wounded by the attackers, all of whom escaped (see, however, para. 46 below).
- 40. On 4 October 1966, it was reported that air and motor patrols had been increased in northern Ovamboland. On 19 October 1966, the chief of the South African security police went to Ovamboland. He stated that his visit would mark the launching of a new offensive intended to clear up the "terrorists". He explained:
 - "We have big problems in Ovamboland. The terrain and people are not known to our police. At places the border is only an imaginary one and it is difficult to apprehend these terrorists because they are moving continuously."
- 41. On 10 November 1966, the South West Africa Nationalist Party congress decided to ask the territorial Administration to provide white farmers in remote areas with practical means of communication such as radio communication, as a safety measure, since trained "terrorists" would be likely to cut telephone wires when they became active in the Police Zone, the area in which the white population has settled.
- 42. On 14 December 1966, seven armed Africans attacked and wounded a white farmer on a farm eighty miles north-east of the town of Grootfontein. This marked the first such attack in the Police Zone of South West Africa. A continuous search by police, supported by helicopters, Bushman trackers, tracker dogs and armed white farmers, resulted in the capture of five of the seven Africans by 27 December. One was wounded before being captured. One was captured on 16 December, three on 19 December and the fifth on 27 December. The two others had not been reported found by the end of January 1967.
- 43. On 28 December 1966, one of the guards of Headman Ashipala of the Ukuambi area of Ovamboland was shot and killed and two others were wounded. It was reported that the African assailants had not been arrested as of 5 January 1967. They were said to belong to a small group which had entered Ovamboland just prior to the clash with the police on 26 August 1966. As stated in the Special Committee's previous report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IV, para. 26), Headman Ashipala had shot and killed one SWAPO official and wounded another in March 1966. Following a trial in July 1966, Headman Ashipala was discharged on a plea of self-defence.
- 44. On 29 December 1966, the Commissioner of the South African police said there were only six "terrorists" still free in South West Africa.
- 45. The editor of *The Windhoek Advertiser* reported on 12 January 1967 that at least forty Africans had been detained by the South African police in South West Africa since the beginning of "terrorist" activities in August. It was said that ten of them would give

evidence for the State, leaving the others to face trial. According to the Attorney-General of the Transvaal, where the South West Africans were apparently being held, it would be weeks before any decision about their trial could be taken.

Arrests of South West Africans outside the Territory

- 46. On 30 September 1966, thirty "terrorists" who had escaped from South West Africa were reported to have been captured by Portuguese soldiers experienced in guerrilla warfare who had been sent to the Ovamboland border with instructions "to clean up". It was said that there had never before been "terrorist activities" in southern Angola. In addition, the Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), the Portuguese security police, have co-operated with the South African police in the Territory. Testimony was given in the South West Africa Supreme Court in November 1966 by an Angolan agent of PIDE who had been given an assignment in Ovamboland. The PIDE agent stated that the South African police had received information from the Portuguese security police concerning gun-running in Ovamboland and had begun observation of an Ovambo businessman. The PIDE agent, after meeting in Angola with a detective of the South African police, had proceeded to Ovamboland, befriended the Ovambo businessman and attempted to obtain diamonds, ammunition and rifles from him. According to testimony by a South African detective, a Portuguese member of PIDE accompanied South African detectives when they later arrested the businessman, on 17 February 1966. (He was charged and convicted of being illegally in possession of diamonds.)
- 47. Eight SWAPO members were declared prohibited immigrants by Botswana on 14 November 1966. This action followed reports that seven armed Africans, on their way to Ovamboland, had been arrested at Kasana, in the north of Botswana, on 29 September 1966, the eve of independence.

Arrest of African political leaders in South West Africa

- 48. Three SWAPO officials were arrested on 1 December 1966, reportedly under the Suppression of Communism Act; Mr. I. G. Nathaniel Maxuiriri, Acting President; Mr. John Ja Otto, Secretary; and Mr. Jason Mutumbulua, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. A week later, on 8 December 1966, Mr. Gerson Veii, the Acting President of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), was also arrested. All were residents of Windhoek except Mr. Nathaniel Maxuiriri, who was a resident of Walvis Bay.
- 49. These were reported to be the first arrests in South West Africa under the Suppression of Communism Act, which has been in force in the Territory since 1950.
- 50. Another SWAPO official, Mr. Toivo Ja Toivo, had earlier been arrested in Ovamboland, following clashes in that Native reserve, and was reportedly being detained in Pretoria.
- 51. The Acting Presidents of the two organizations had been the leading spokesmen at a joint SWAPO/SWANU public meeting in the old Windhoek location early in November 1966, at which they had criticized South Africa and any States supporting it, protested against the extension of the new security legislation to the Territory, and welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2145 (XXI).

- 52. Following an announcement by the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development that the Government intended closing the old Native location in Windhoek, Mr. Veii, after obtaining an official permit for the purpose, had called a meeting of non-whites in the old location. At that meeting, on 4 December 1966, at which members of the special branch of the South African police were present, Mr. Veii had spoken against the anticipated compulsory removal of residents of the old location to the new Native location. He was later charged with sabotage in that in his 4 December speech he had "incited, encouraged, instigated or advised people to injure police informers, members of the police and white people and thereby had threatened the maintenance of law and order". He was tried and convicted early in May 1967 in Swakopmund, South West Africa, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labour.
- 53. Charges against the other African political leaders and South West Africans detained in connexion with guerrilla activities had not been published by the beginning of May 1967.

Other incidents

- 54. During 1966, there were several instances of mass action by Africans in the Police Zone of a character not previously noted in the Territory. All appear to have involved migrant workers from Ovamboland.
- 55. In May 1966, about 300 Africans at the Ovambo compound at Katutura, the new Native location in Windhoek, stoned an African detective who had been called in after the Africans had marched into the kitchen demanding to be allowed to serve their own meat. They dispersed after the detective left and before the arrival of police reinforcements.
- 56. In June 1966, a crowd of Africans in Walvis Bay began throwing stones following a traffic accident in which an Ovambo was killed. Police, using gunfire to quell the crowd, wounded two Ovambos. A police officer was reported to have been slightly injured.
- 57. On 29 October 1966, when about thirty municipal police raided the Ovambo compound in the Katutura location in Windhoek for illicit beer brewing and arrested two Ovambos, some 1,000 Ovambos began throwing burning logs, pieces of iron, bricks and stones at the police. Three policemen reportedly suffered injuries. The brewing and selling of "Bantu beer" in urban areas of the Territory is reserved to the white local government authorities, which use the profits to defray some of the costs of administering the locations.

Removal of the old location in Windhoek

- 58. In South West Africa, a "Native location" forms part of a white urban area. It was defined as follows by former Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd:
 - "The Bantu residential area near the city is only a place where the European provides a temporary home in his part of the country for those who require it because they are employed by him and earn their living there."
- 59. South African Government policy requires that Native locations be established far enough away from the urban centres to permit the future expansion of separate racial areas while maintaining between them a "buffer strip" of 500 yards, on which no development is allowed. After the transfer of the administration of Africans from the Administrator of the Territory to the South African Department

- of Bantu Administration and Development, on 1 April 1955, a comprehensive review and planning of the urban areas in the Territory was made and "correctly situated" Native location areas were selected, entailing the replanning and removal of "incorrectly situated" and already segregated Native locations in all of the main urban areas of the Territory.
- 60. In Windhoek, African opposition to moving to the new location, named "Katutura", and their consequent opposition to preparatory measures such as the evaluation of homes in the old location with a view to compensating owners, led to the disturbances of 10 December 1959 in which a number of Africans were killed and wounded by police and South African Defence Force personnel (see General Assembly resolution 1567 (XV)).
- 61. Municipal and other government officials have since attempted by various means to persuade the remaining residents of the old location to move to Katutura. Nevertheless, some 1,000 houses in Katutura have remained vacant.
- 62. In January 1966, the Chief Native Affairs Commissioner for South West Africa sought the assistance of African members of the Katutura Advisory Board in the hope they might be able to persuade old location residents to move. Old location residents included friends and members of families of Board members.
- 63. In October 1966, each of the Board members reported on their unsuccessful efforts and indicated their reluctance to make any further attempt to persuade the old location residents to move. It was said that residents of the old location maintained that they would not move unless blood flowed.
- 64. In these circumstances, the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development announced on 30 November 1966 that, for reasons of health and sanitation, regulations would be framed for the transfer of residents of the old Native location in Windhoek to Katutura. He indicated that the residents of the old location would be offered aid and compensation to move. After preparatory work had been completed, the old location would be deproclaimed, and it would then be illegal to live in the old location and an offence to employ anyone living there; business rights and all services, including education and health services, would be withdrawn from the old location; and no compensation would be paid after the deproclamation.
- 65. At the time of the announcement, it was estimated that over 9,000 Africans, including some 3,000 migrant workers, lived in Katutura and that almost 8,000 Africans and some Coloureds remained in the old location.
- 66. In January 1967, the Windhoek City Council accepted a tender for the erection of 1,000 additional houses at Katutura at an average cost of R505 per house to accommodate all of the remaining residents of the old location. It served notices on every resident of the old location, offering assistance and compensation to those desiring to move and stressing the advantages of moving early and the better surroundings at Katutura. An appeal was also made to employers to assist those in their service still residing in the old location to move.
- 67. In a petition dated 1 December 1966 from Mr. Clemens Kapuuo, Chief Designate of the Herero people, on behalf of Chief Hosea Kutako, National

- Leader of the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), Mr. Kapuuo stated that the situation was explosive and that only the United Nations presence in South West Africa would save the situation. It was their view, the petition stated, that the South African Government had no right to make decisions concerning South West Africa after the termination of the Mandate in October 1966 and they would therefore ignore all decisions made by that Government.
- 68. At a public meeting called jointly by SWAPO and SWANU in the old location on 8 January 1967, speakers urged the people to face death rather than to move.
- 69. A statement issued to the Press by NUDO in January 1967 indicated that some employers were attempting to force their employees to move to the new location at Katutura. The organization asked non-whites to furnish NUDO with the names of any firms and other employers who dismissed them from employment for refusing to move to Katutura, so that it could keep a record of such employers. At a subsequent rally of location residents on 29 January 1967, Mr. Clemens Kapuuo urged the people not to move and to destroy posters and leaflets advising them to move. He also advised residents to clean the location themselves.
- 70. According to the annual report of the Mayor of Windhoek, only forty-two families comprising 245 people had moved from the old location to Katutura during 1966. At the end of February 1967, the manager of non-white affairs of the Windhoek municipality stated that families were still moving from the old to the new location. Some three to four families a week were said to be moving and officials were disappointed that the number moving had not come up to their expectations. Meanwhile, construction of the 1,000 new houses at Katutura, originally scheduled for completion in October 1967, was said to be proceeding well ahead of schedule.
- 71. In May 1967, as previously noted, the Acting President of SWANU was convicted of sabotage for statements he made on 4 December 1967 in connexion with the proposed removal of the old location.

Implementation of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission

- 72. During the last half of 1966, the implementation of the political recommendations of the Odendaal Commission preparatory to the partitioning of South West Africa reached an advanced stage.
- 73. The committee of experts from South Africa and South West Africa, formed in December 1964 to report on all the practical problems to be taken into account in connexion with the rearrangement of administrative and financial relations between South Africa and South West Africa pursuant to the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, submitted its report to the Prime Minister of South Africa during 1966. It will be recalled that the Odendaal Commission had recommended the transfer back to South Africa of the major portion of the government functions now carried out by the white territorial governing bodies.
- 74. In Ovamboland, a "Parliament" building for the proposed "homeland" of Ovamboland has been constructed at Oshakati, the future capital of the area. The new building, a conference hall capable of seating

about 230 people, is part of a complex including a residence for the Commissioner-General for South West Africa—the "diplomatic representative" of South Africa to the African population of South West Africa—houses for officials and other facilities. It was reported that the hall would be used for discussions between the Ovambo chiefs and officials of the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development, the consideration of draft law, and the showing of films.

75. Following these preparatory measures, on 21 March 1967, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development informed a gathering of chiefs, headmen and councillors at Oshakati that the South African Government was of the opinion that they were in a position to make important advances towards self-government and would assist them to advance in all spheres of their people's development including self-government; the Government intended making the same offer of self-government to other "national unfits" in South West Africa. He also informed them, inter alia, that a comprehensive plan had been prepared providing for the expenditure of approximately R30.6 million by his department in Ovamboland during the succeeding five years on stock-breeding, fencing, water affairs, electricity, towns, buildings, roads, airports, economic affairs, education, ambulance and welfare services.

76. Almost without exception, according to a report in *The Windhoek Advertiser*, the chiefs asked the Minister to convey their thanks to the Prime Minister for having sent him to Oshakati. They said their people did not want to be governed by any foreign Power, including the United Nations, but wanted to be led towards self-government by South Africa. They also stressed that they would give the Government every assistance to eradicate terrorists infiltrating into their territory.

77. By the end of September 1966, over 400 of the white farms or portions of farms recommended to form part of the proposed "homelands" for Hereros, Damaras and Namas had been sold to the territorial Administration on a voluntary basis and there were only some twenty white-owned farms still to be acquired, if necessary by compulsory arbitration procedure.

78. It may be recalled that according to official 1960 population figures classifying the population by ethnic groupings, a total of 9,017 of the 35,354 Hereros in the Territory were living in Native reserves to be included in "Hereroland"; in the same reserves, there were 10,313 Bushmen, Damaras, Namas, Basters, Ovambos, Tswanas and others. Of 44,353 Damaras in the Territory, only 2,400 lived in Native reserves to be included in "Damaraland" and those same reserves had 5,223 residents of various other ethnic classifications. Of 34,806 Namas, only 2,292 lived in Native reserves to form part of "Namaland" while 4,342 others lived in the same reserves. A total of 6,847 Africans, Basters and Coloureds lived in Native reserves to be abolished and 3,935 Africans lived in the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet. Under the Odendaal Plan, each "homeland" would be restricted to one ethnic group and all others included in the above figures would be among those having to move into the "homeland" established for them. Subject to exceptions for mining and other officially approved purposes, only the "white area" with its non-white majority would the "white area" and the subject to exceptions of the subject to the remain a multiracial area.

79. In October 1966, some of the Nama residents of the Bondels Native reserve, and their livestock, were being transferred to the proposed "Namaland" area. Approximately 10,000 sheep had already been transferred from the reserve by 24 October 1966. Bondels, to be abolished under the Odendaal Plan, is one of two Native reserves in the Police Zone which was throughout the Mandate period recognized by South Africa as the tribal property of the Bondelswartz Namas. Under the Odendaal Plan, the Herero and Baster residents of the Bondels Native reserve would be transferred to "Hereroland" and the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet; there were also Coloured residents of the Bondels Native reserve in 1960, for whom a "homeland" was not proposed. In the urban area of Gibeon, which the Odendaal Commission proposed be included in "Namaland", a school for white children was closed down permanently towards the end of 1966 and most other "white" establishments had been acquired by the territorial Administration.

80. For "Damaraland", the Odendaal Commission had proposed that the former "white" urban area of Welwitschia form part of the Damara "homeland". In that town, the local white governing body was abolished effective 1 July 1966.

81. In the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet, the one remaining white-owned farm was to be transferred to the territorial Administration following arbitration procedures, as a mutually acceptable price had not been fixed. In addition, a valuation committee met in September 1966 to set a value on the white-owned businesses in the Gebiet with a view to transferring them to the Administration for resale to Rehoboth Basters. If Baster purchasers could not be found, the properties were to be leased, but not permanently disposed of, to Coloureds.

Other developments

82. A new copper mine was opened in 1966 at Klein Aub, in the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet. The mine was established by Marine Products, Ltd., General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd., and Federale Mynbou Beperk, which have a concession covering over 120 square miles. The three parent companies are South African companies, which also have other interests in the Territory. Between March 1965, when extensive prospecting was commenced, and the end of 1966, over R2.5 million had been invested on plant and equipment, housing for twenty-three white officials and thirty-four Coloureds and a compound for 262 Ovambos. The mine was expected to produce about 150,000 short tons of ore a year, yielding about 6,000 short tons of copper concentrates. The Klein Aub mine is the second operating mine to be established in a proposed "homeland".

83. A still larger mining venture was undertaken by the South African Government Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), which holds a concession to mine zinc ore and other metals in the southern part of South West Africa. The concession area, which covers over 1,200 square miles in the southern part of South West Africa bounded by the Orange, Fish and Konkiep Rivers, has an ore reserve estimated at about 5 million tons with an average grade of somewhat over 6 per cent zinc as well as minor values of other minerals. Exploratory work on the mine known as the Rosh Pinah Mine was completed during 1966 and ISCOR had called for tenders for the erection of

large reduction works, capable of handling an estimated daily ore recovery of 2,000 tons. Expenditure for the mine, including a 5,600-yard tarred runway, was estimated at R5 to R6 million. Industrial Minerals Mining Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. (IMCOR), a wholly owned subsidiary of ISCOR, holds 51 per cent of the shares in the operating company, known as IMCOR Zinc (Pty.) Ltd., and the balance is owned by Moly Copper Mining and Exploration Co. (SWA) Ltd., a company in which Diamond Mining and Utility Co. has an indirect 26.9 per cent interest and Industrial Diamonds of S.A. (1945) an indirect 25.2 per cent interest.

84. It was subsequently announced, in March 1967, that a new R14.15 million electrolytic zinc industry, whose zinc requirements are to be entirely supplied from South West Africa, was being established in South Africa. Two new companies were being formed for the purpose: the Zinc Corporation of South Africa (ZINCOR) and Kiln Products.

85. ZINCOR, whose capital requirements were estimated at about R10 million, was to construct and operate an electrolytic zinc plant, with a capacity of 36,500 tons of zinc a year, on the site of the uranium plant at Vogelstruisbult in South Africa. It would have a fifteen-year contract to supply the entire zinc requirements of ISCOR. Most of the zinc concentrates required by ZINCOR would be supplied by IMCOR Zinc from the Rosh Pinah mine; the balance would be supplied by Kiln Products, which was to erect a Waelz kiln at Berg Aukas and buy zinc-bearing materials produced at the Berg Aukas mine from the mine owner, the South West Africa Company.

86. Consolidated Gold Fields would own 51 per cent of Kiln Products and 33 per cent of ZINCOR. The balance of Kiln Products was to be owned as follows: 34 per cent by Anglo American Corporation; 10 per cent by Vogelstruisbult Gold Mining Areas; and 5 per cent by Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company. The balance of ZINCOR would be owned 35 per cent by ISCOR, 22 per cent by Vogelstruisbult, and 10 per cent by Kiln Products. The owners of Kiln Products were to subscribe R2.25 million of that company's capital, and another R1.9 million was to be raised by loans. ZINCOR's issued capital was to be R5 million in ordinary shares, and the balance of about R5 million was to be raised by loans.

87. It was also reported that another South African company, the Van Ryn Mining Corporation, Ltd., would revive two former tin mines in South West Africa, the Schimanski and Sidney mines near Karibib and Omaruru.

88. In 1966, Otavi Minen and Eisenbahn Gesell-schaft, which formerly owned the Tsumeb copper mine and other properties seized by the South African Custodian of Enemy Property, was granted a two-year concession between the Swakop and Omaruru rivers extending to the western boundary of the proposed Damaraland "homeland". The concession entitles the company to prospect for minerals other than salt, oil, gypsum and limestone.

89. Other new foreign interests established in the Territory include a subsidiary of the French petroleum company, Total Oil Products. The subsidiary, Total Oil Products (Pty.) Ltd., was registered in South West Africa in September 1966 with a capital of R15 million. In terms of the registration, the company

intended to extract, refine, compound, store and transport animal and vegetable oils, grease and waxes. A French tanker discharged the first shipment of some 8,600 tons of petroleum products into the company's newly completed storage tanks in April 1967. Apart from Total, the Territory is served by Shell Oil, Mobil, Caltex, British Petroleum and Swasol.

90. At the end of January 1967, it was reported that capital investment in South West Africa had been estimated at R352 million, as follows: R82 million by foreign investors other than South African; R170 million by the South African Government, including R105 million invested in the railway system; and R100 million by local and South African private enterprise.

91. Other developments in the Territory during 1966 included the establishment of the first government hospital in Ovamboland, at Oshakati; the opening of the new building complex for the Commissioner-General for South West Africa at Oshakati (see para. 74); and the construction or planning of additional townships in Ovamboland and other northern Native reserves.

92. In addition, Africans in the Territory became eligible in 1966, from 1 April 1965, to pensions or grants under the South African Old Age Pensions Act No. 38 of 1962, the Blind Persons Act No. 39 of 1962 and the Disability Grants Act No. 41 of 1962. South West Africa legislation covering old age pensions and pensions for blind and disabled persons applies to Whites (since 1942) and to Coloureds (since 1962). The benefits vary considerably, being highest for Whites, next highest for Coloureds, and lowest for Africans.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee⁴

Introduction

93. The Special Committee considered the question of South West Africa at its 524th to 526th, 535th, 537th and 539th meetings, held in Africa between 7 and 19 June 1967.

Written petitions and hearings

94. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning South West Africa:

Petitioner

Document No.

Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary-General, Union of South West Africa Workers (USWAW)

Mr. Mburumba Kerina, Coordinating Secretary, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF)

Mr. John G. Ja Otto, Secretary, and Mr. Gottfried H. Geingob, representative in the United States, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) ...

Mr. Jacob Kuhangua, Secretary-General, and Mr. Sam Nujoma, President, SWAPO

A/AC.109/PET.585 and Add.1

A/AC.109/PET.586

A/AC.109/PET.587

A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.1

⁴ Additional comments on the question of South West Africa are contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam (see chapter II of the present report).

190	General Assembly—Twe
Petitioner	Document No.
Mr. Oretu Nganjone, Publicity and Propaganda Sec-	A / A C 100 / TNYYYY
retary, SWAPO Mr. Solomon Mifima, Chief Representative in Zambia, and Lucas Pohamba, De-	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.2
puty Chief Representative in Zambia, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.3
Mr. Peter Nanyemba, Chief Representative, SWAPO Chief Hosea Kutako, Na-	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.4
tional Leader, National Unity Democratic Organ- ization (NUDO) Mr. Carlos Hamatui, Presi-	A/AC.109/PET.588 and Add.1
dent, South West Africa Workers' Union (SWAWU) and representative of SWANUF in East Africa	A/AC.109/PET.589
Reverend Michael Scott Mr. Linekala Kalenga, President, National Union of South West African Stu-	A/AC.109/PET.590
dents (NUSWAS) Paramount Chief David	A/AC,109/PET.591
Goraseb	A/AC.109/PET.592 and Add.1 A/AC.109/PET.593
Fritz Gariseb, Mr. Aaron Shivute, Mr. Fanuel Kam- bara, Mr. Paul Male, Mr. Noah Gariseb	A/AC.109/PET.594
Mr. Omer Becu, General Secretary, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)	A/AC.109/PET.595
Mr. Keith Gottschalk Mrs. S. B. Bunting, World Campaign for the Release	A/AC.109/PET.621
of South African Political Prisoners	A/AC.109/PET.622
Chief H. S. Witbooi and Headman D. Isaak Unsigned petition from Tsu-	A/AC.109/PET.631
meb, South West Africa, forwarded by Mr. Vaku- lukuta Kasaka	A/AC.109/PET.632
Mr. Jorma Paukku, Secretary of the Seminar on Africa arranged by the Students of Political Science Association in the University of Helsinki and the United Nations Students	
Association in Helsinki Mr. R. Contreras, Deputy General Secretary, World Federation of Democratic	A/AC.109/PET.647
Youth (WFDY) Mr. Alfred Kgokong, Director of Publicity and Information, African Na-	A/AC.109/PET.648
tional Congress of South Africa (ANC)	A/AC.109/PET.649
Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) Mr. David M. Sibeko, Chief	A/AC.109/PET.680
Representative, in East Africa, PAC	A/AC.109/PET.680/Add.1

Petitioner	Document No.
Mr. Ferdinand R. Meroro,	
Chief Representative, South	
West African National	
Union (SWANU)	A/AC.109/PET.693
Mr. Tunguru Huaraka	A/AC.109/PET.694
Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh,	
Secretary-General, World	
Assembly of Youth	
(WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.695

95. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning South West Africa:

Petitioner Mr. Solomon Missima, Chief	Meeting
Representative in Zambia, SWAPO (A/AC.109/ PET.587/Add.3)	524th
Mr. T. T. Letlaka, Member of the National Executive	
Committee of PAC (A/AC.109/PET.680)	524th-526th
Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Director, and Mr. Jacob	
Kuhangua, Secretary-General, SWAPO (A/	
AC.109/PET.587/Add.4) .	535th

- 96. Mr. Mifima, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that the people of South West Africa had regarded the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), terminating South Africa's Mandate by the overwhelming vote of 114 to 2, as an historical and important occurrence in the history of the United Nations. However, they had been disappointed by the delay in the establishment of a Council for South West Africa. If the United Nations could not solve the problem of terminating South Africa's presence in South West Africa, all people throughout the world who believed in freedom and the equality of man would lose faith in it. Delaying action could do no good to the suffering people of South West Africa but would give the fascist Government of South Africa the opportunity to continue to administer and divide the Territory into the so-called Bantu homelands. The Special Committee was certainly well informed about recent developments in Ovamboland, through which South African Prime Minister Vorster had cunningly tried to deceive the world by announcing that South Africa wanted to give so-called self-government to the region. This selfgovernment was nothing but another Bantustan similar to that of the Transkei in South Africa.
- 97. South Africa had turned South West Africa into a battleground, killing innocent men, women and children. It had extended its repressive laws, such as those prescribing 180 days' detention and the suppression of communism, in a country which had international status.
- 98. According to the South African Sunday Times of 28 May 1967, the South African fascist Minister of Justice had introduced the so-called Terrorism Bill, dealing with "acts of terrorism" in the Republic and in South West Africa. Those convicted of terrorism or participation in terrorist activities were liable, after a summary trial by a judge without a jury, to the penalties laid down for treason.
- 99. Since the founding of SWAPO, the people of South West Africa had come to understand the weakness and failures of the United Nations and had decided to take up arms and free themselves from the racist

régime of Pretoria. Since March 1966 an armed struggle had been launched against the South African colonialists. In August 1966 two freedom fighters had been killed and eight arrested when they had exchanged fire with the South African police. Some of the arrested members of SWAPO had been flown to South Africa and detained in Pretoria prisons.

100. Vorster and his Government had launched an oppressive campaign, terrorizing innocent men, women and children and arresting everyone suspected of being a member of SWAPO. All the SWAPO leaders had been arrested and detained at Pretoria under the 180 days' detention system. More than seventy members of SWAPO, including its acting President, Deputy Secretary-General and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were detained at Pretoria. According to a report which had recently reached them in Zambia, those detainees were facing daily torture and the Deputy Secretary-General was reported to have been tortured to death. After two full years' detention, a member of the SWAPO National Executive, a former President of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), was still being held in a remote area on the border of South West Africa and the Republic of South Africa. He was not allowed to move outside a half-mile area and was forbidden to talk to anyone. It was reported that seven people had been killed recently by the South African police in the Caprivi Strip.

101. South Africa had also set up large military bases throughout the country; among those already completed was the air base at Mpacha in the Caprivi Strip, fifteen miles from the Zambian border, which was guarded by South African soldiers. The military bases and installations had been built not only for internal security but also for provocative and aggressive use against the newly independent African States, particularly Zambia, in the event of confrontations between the African forces and those of imperialism. However, military bases and installations could not prevent people from fighting for freedom.

102. Since the war of liberation had broken out, the South African police and soldiers had been patrolling Zambia's borders with South West Africa and Angola, using helicopters, military police cars and police dogs.

103. On 18 May 1967, Mr. Tobias Hainyeko had been shot dead by the South African police for shooting three South African policemen (two South African Whites and one African) in self-defence. Such provocation was a daily occurrence in South West Africa. The United Nations should therefore realize that the situation in that country was a threat to peace and the security of the African people.

104. He did not intend to criticize the United Nations as such but only to draw attention to the inhuman treatment inflicted by the fascist Government of South Africa in his country. If the United Nations wished to prevent bloodshed in South West Africa, it should act before it was too late.

105. The Special Committee should send a letter of protest to the South African Government demanding the release and return to their homeland of all South West African political prisoners detained in South African prisons. SWAPO felt strongly that South Africa's action was not only injustice but a violation of international law.

106. Despite all intimidation and torture, however, the South West African people were determined to fight to the bitter end. SWAPO was already committed

to the national fight for liberation and there would be no peace until all the people of South West Africa had achieved freedom and equality.

107. The petitioner then read out a letter from one of his colleagues who was in a Pretoria prison, in which he reported that more than seventy members of SWAPO were with him on 180 days' detention, including many top officials. They were tortured every morning and afternoon in the electric chair and by other means and those who refused to give information about SWAPO activities were killed secretly. He himself expected death at any time but exhorted his countrymen to continue their fight until their country was finally liberated.

108. He had also received a report from the Caprivi Strip to the effect that the South Africans had instructed teachers and loyal villagers to report any unfamiliar faces seen in their districts and the return of any people who had left the country. A reward of £25 was offered for such reports and £150 for reports on any leaders of the movement, who were to be shot on sight. Only four people had agreed to carry out the latter order. A new camp had been completed in the area for about 150 soldiers and policemen who constantly patrolled the Zambian border to check on the movements of freedom fighters. Some 150 members of SWAPO had been arrested but it was not known whether they were being detained in South West Africa or had been sent to Pretoria.

109. Answering a question as to whether South Africa was pursuing a policy of settling Europeans in and deporting Africans from parts of South West Africa so as to change the racial composition of the population in those parts, the petitioner said that there had, indeed, been a considerable increase in white immigration in recent years, the largest group coming from South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany.

110. In answer to questions concerning the reaction of the South West African people to General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) and South Africa's announced intention of granting self-government to Ovamboland, he said that Premier Vorster had already announced that South Africa would not recognize the United Nations Council for South West Africa and would forbid it to enter the Territory. The proposed referendum to be held in Ovamboland was yet another trick to prevent a United Nations take-over, for not only was it an attempt to separate South West Africa, but the conditions necessary for a genuine referendum would not exist. SWAPO had challenged South Africa to permit a referendum to be held throughout the whole Territory under conditions of freedom of association and movement, withdrawal of troops, police and administrators, release of political prisoners and return of political exiles; furthermore, the referendum should be conducted by the United Nations Council for South West Africa.

111. Since South Africa had refused to recognize the Council, it was the duty of the United Nations to enforce General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) by whatever means were required and it appeared that the only way to do so was by force.

112. Answering questions concerning the size and organization of his movement, the petitioner said that it was difficult to state the total membership of SWAPO since many persons were not able to join it openly. There were, however, 4,000 card-carrying members.

Despite the difficulty of movement, SWAPO had succeeded in establishing branches throughout the Territory. It was organized in regions and there were branches in mines, factories and other undertakings. SWAPO was in favour of a united front against the common enemy and was willing to co-operate with any organization actively opposing South Africa's rule in South West Africa.

- 113. In reply to further questions, Mr. Mifima said that in addition to the seventy members of SWAPO in prison at Pretoria, a number of other members, fiftyseven in all, had recently been arrested and their whereabouts were unknown. Moreover, chiefs in South West Africa had been given powers to detain people but he had no idea how many people had been detained under those powers. Large numbers of Africans had been arrested and held for questioning, for periods of varying lengths at Windhoek, the capital of South West Africa, but all the statistics that he was able to give concerned 200 people who had been arrested since January 1967 and, to the best of his knowledge, were still in detention. Any statistics he gave were bound to be approximate since the situation changed daily. Some people would be arrested; others would be released. The 200 detainees to whom he had referred had been under restriction for some time. Apparently, it was being considered whether they should be taken to South Africa or charged in South West Africa.
- 114. Mr. Letlaka, speaking on behalf of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), said that PAC's interest and deep concern about South West Africa derived not only from the fact that both South Africa and South West Africa had been taken over by the same robbers in the same manner, but also and primarily because both countries were subjected to the same type of oppression and shared the same fate. In both countries the white colonialists had appropriated to themselves total political, economic, military and social power.
- 115. The technique of herding Africans like pigs into sties called reserves was applied in both countries. Those ghettos were euphemistically called "homelands" or, derisively, "Bantustans". Invariably they were set up in the poorer and less productive portions of the country and split up into small units on tribal and ethnic lines. While Vorster constantly called for unity among all the white ethnic groups from Europe in South Africa and South West Africa, he put into effect a policy of disunity for the indigenous people, forcibly splitting them into meaningless and antagonistic tribal units. Whereas the purpose of the call to unity among the white Europeans was clearly to secure their political domination, military strength and economic hegemony so that they could better exploit the human and material resources of South Africa and South West Africa, the unmistakable purpose of the retribalization and division of the African people into small weak units was to inspire jealousy and fratricidal strife among them so that they could be better exploited by the white racialists and their partners in the Western imperialist countries who reaped astronomical profits from their large investments in both countries. The erudite but cheap talk about separate freedoms was infantile, designed to fool the United Nations and to dull the enlightened democratic conscience of mankind.
- 116. The advocates of white supremacy in South Africa had consistently applied the policy of apartheid, which facilitated the oppression of the African people by the imposition of racially discriminatory laws de-

- signed to enslave a whole people and perpetuate the policy of white supremacy. The proposed Bantustans of Ovamboland and the other regions were nothing but the studied sinister fragmentation of the South West African people in order to continue and intensify economic exploitation of the African people by the method of "divide and rule".
- 117. Much of the inhuman and ruthless legislation used to suppress the indigenous population in South Africa had been extended to South West Africa; under one of those laws the President of SWANU had been arrested. Those laws were still in force despite the fact that the United Nations had divested South Africa of its Mandate.
- 118. This system could obviously never be maintained unless coercion was used, cruelly and heartlessly. Both in South Africa and South West Africa the knock of the Gestapo and security police at midnight was well known and generally expected even by young children; the 90-day and 180-day persecution period was the cursed baptism of freedom fighters. Men and women were made to stand for long hours in narrow circles drawn on the floor; the strait jacket and the electric current shock were normal treatment to extract information and impose perjured statements; innocent and dedicated people went mad and even committed suicide; not infrequently brutal assaults were also resorted to.
- 119. Turning to the question of education, the petitioner said that it was used in South Africa as a method of oppression. Educational systems had always been used since the beginning of civilization to launch a new social revolution designed to produce a new people with a new philosophy of life.
- 120. In South Africa the racist régime aimed, through its separate educational systems, namely the so-called European Education, Bantu Education, Coloured Education and Indian Education, to create four species of human beings, each with its own philosophy. That system was based on the belief that the Whites, as a different nation, were a God-chosen people destined perpetually to dominate and exploit the Africans. The system denied all respect for human dignity, and thus condemned four fifths of the population in South Africa to the status of second-class citizens. The same callously inhuman system had been extended to South West Africa. The system did not tolerate attitudes and ideas foreign to those of apartheid; it was meant not only to imprison the African people's minds but totally to enslave their entire mental make-up. The division of the country's children started from the crèche, Furthermore, in South West Africa there was not a single university, not even a tribal one.
- 121. Turning to the question of economy, the petitioner said that the economies of South Africa and South West Africa formed an interdependent unit. The South African régime, having applied all the economic laws in force in South Africa to South West Africa, had fully integrated the two economies, creating a more viable economic system dependent on the precarious foundation of slave labour.
- 122. That economic interdependence had not been an accident, but the result of calculated scheming by the South African colonialist economic and political experts. Since the administration of the Territory of South West Africa had been vested in the racialist and colonialist régime of South Africa by the League of Nations Mandate in 1920, a well-calculated scheme of intertwining the two economies had been put into prac-

tice. South Africa had attempted to "swallow" South West Africa completely.

- 123. Access to the Territory by sea was via Walvis Bay (which had been part of South West Africa but had been forcibly taken over and converted into an armed base by South Africa), by rail to Lüderitz from Upington (South Africa) and by air from such places as Johannesburg and Kimberley. The railways in the Territory were part of the South African system.
- 124. South West African trade figures were included in those of South Africa. During 1954, the last year for which separate figures had been published, exports from the Territory amounted to R73.8 million (£36.14 million). The United Kingdom's share in the 1954 total had been 45.6 per cent, that of South Africa 23 per cent. Total imports during 1954 were valued at R45.4 million (£22.12 million). South Africa, with 62.1 per cent of the total, was the main supplier.
- 125. Notes of the South African Reserve Bank, of which a branch had been established at Windhoek in February 1961, were legal tender. The South African commercial banks maintained branches throughout the Territory. The duties payable in South West Africa were identical to those of South Africa. The taxation applicable in South Africa was levied in South West Africa at the same rate. The whole South African economy was based on inhuman cheap labour laws, such as the contract system, the Industrial Conciliation Laws, the "tot" system, etc. The extending of the Bantu Labour Act 67 of 1964 to South West Africa regulated the movement and kind of employment an African worker could obtain.
- 126. The establishment of the Ovamboland Bantustan was in keeping with the general Bantustan pattern formulated by the South African régime, which aimed, *inter alia*, at the establishment of vast reserves of cheap African labour.
- 127. South African capitalists and their United Kingdom collaborators had vast vested interests in South West Africa. The Anglo American Corporation of South Africa was the largest shareholder in South Africa. In co-operation with Federale Mynbou, the biggest mining combine in South West Africa, it virtually controlled financial interests in that Territory. Details of the ramifications of interlocking financial interests between South Africa, South West Africa and foreign investments had already been submitted to the Special Committee.
- 128. As a direct result of the slave labour system to which the Africans in South Africa and South West Africa were subjected by the racialists in South Africa and their imperialist masters, the average miner in South Africa earned less than \$18 per month, compared with almost \$90 per month in neighbouring Zambia. In South West Africa, African wages were even lower, averaging about \$9-\$10 per month. The average wage of Whites, about \$300 per month, and the high profits recorded by the various monopoly capitalists (United States companies netted profits of over \$90 million last year and United Kingdom monopolists over \$180 million) were in striking contrast with those figures.
- 129. Thus the average annual wage of the over 500,000 African miners in South Africa and South West Africa was only \$200 (less than 10 cents an hour) compared with nearly \$900 in Zambia. One South West African mine where the average wage had been 25 cents a day in 1960 had been able to pay a dividend of nearly \$10 million. Those statistics disproved the claim of the South African capitalists and the apologists for oppres-

- sion and apartheid that African wages were higher in South Africa and South West Africa than anywhere else in Africa.
- 130. Foreign companies which went to great lengths in their home countries to avoid being accused of racial discrimination had flocked to South Africa and South West Africa. A United States businessman, Marcus D. Banghart, Vice-President of Newmont Mining Corporation, had described profits in South Africa as "tantalizing", and had added pointedly, "We know the people and the Government and we back our conviction with our reputation and our dollars." (Africa Today, March 1964, p. 4.)
- 131. Since the Second World War, United States investments in South Africa had been increasing rapidly. Dollar investments were still second to sterling, but the share of the United Kingdom had been declining while the United States share had risen.
- 132. The sinister role played by foreign investments to bolster up the vicious colonial slave system in South Africa and South West Africa was evident in the role of United States bankers and monopoly capitalists during the Sharpeville incident. That event had caused a financial crisis resulting in the flight of capital from South Africa and thus from South West Africa. Some investors were afraid that the oppressive white Government's vicious massacre of Africans at Sharpeville and Langa might trigger off a long-expected revolution. Others had feared that the incipient boycotts by smaller countries might snowball, or that South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth might reduce profits.
- 133. The United States had come to the rescue, by contributing almost the entire amount of foreign exchange needed to reverse the precipitous decline of the South African economy. By June 1963, as a result of its help, South African gold and foreign-exchange reserves had more than tripled to a record and the boom was on.
- 134. The increasing financial involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany in South Africa and South West Africa was well known. The threat of the resurgence of fascism in the Federal Republic of Germany was also clearly to be seen in South West Africa, and, of course, in South Africa. There were many German experts in South Africa and South West Africa, including the Caprivi Strip, among them many military experts. The threat of that base to independent Africa, and especially independent Zambia, need hardly be stressed. The Federal Republic of Germany had also helped South Africa in building the huge military and naval base at Walvis Bay, in the Mandated Territory of South West Africa, which had been made part of South Africa and was under the complete control of the South African Navy. There, too, German instructors were active under the supervision of a well-known Nazi sympathizer.
- 135. South Africa's apartheid Government, as part of the "free world", received financial support and strategic materials from it. The crimes against the Africans in South Africa and South West Africa were committed in the name of the profits made by the investors from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Japan. Those countries derived profits from the sufferings of the African people of South Africa and South West Africa. They were partners in oppression and exploitation, and the props on which the oppressive régime of Vorster rested.

136. Those countries had aided the oppressive régime of South Africa to flout the Mandate of the League of Nations; they had abetted it in its refusal to recognize and apply to South West Africa the principles and ideas embodied in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and they had supported the extension of the policy and practice of apartheid to South West Africa. Their action was responsible for the present situation.

137. The United Nations as now constituted was unable to champion the cause of decolonization; some of its powerful Members still retained vested interests in colonial domination and imperialist exploitation, and it had failed to reflect the wishes of the newly independent countries and the oppressed peoples of the world. It had fallen prey to the imperialists who were using it to perpetuate their domination over the rest of mankind. He made those criticisms honestly and without malice.

138. The General Assembly resolution of October 1966 on which the United Kingdom and others had abstained, had terminated the Mandate for South West Africa exercised by South Africa since 1920 and brought South West Africa under the direct control of the General Assembly. That resolution must be put into immediate effect if the United Nations hoped to retain any of the confidence of the oppressed peoples of Africa, and especially southern Africa.

139. However, the indecisive attitude of the capitalist imperialists from the West within the United Nations had fully confirmed his party's belief that they had never had the slightest intention of pulling out of South West Africa. On the contrary, they were clearly intent, by trickery and subterfuge, on frustrating the genuine efforts of the African, Asian, Latin American and socialist countries in effecting decolonization. Consequently, PAC was immensely strengthened in its conviction that the United Nations, as now constituted, could never assist in driving the colonialist oppressors from South West Africa. There could be no doubt that the Western imperialist trading partners of racialist South Africa would not support any move by the United Nations to implement the resolution in question. Their prevarication was a clear danger sign for the peace of the world. The people of South West Africa, like those of South Africa, would be their own liberators. Only by their own armed struggle, supplemented by the help of the progressive people of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and the other freedom-loving peoples of the world, would they be able to attain that freedom and independence which was their legitimate and inalienable right.

140. Asked whether he could provide information concerning the supply of arms by NATO countries and Israel to put down the struggle in South West Africa, the petitioner replied that although it was known that there were weapons of Israeli origin in South and South West Africa, it was difficult to furnish precise figures. There was tremendous flow of capital from South Africa to Israel, and South African volunteers had recently gone there.

141. Mr. Garoeb, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that SWAPO had come before the Special Committee to describe the role played by the great Powers in sabotaging the African and Asian moves at the United Nations since the beginning of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly; to examine the role of foreign interests in southern Africa, and in South

West Africa or Namibia as it was known in Africa, in particular; and to disprove the myth that only the great Powers could do anything for Namibia and that their co-operation and participation was indispensable.

142. At the General Assembly session in September 1966, all Member States, except South Africa and Portugal, had seemed to agree that South Africa had "forfeited" its right to administer South West Africa. The African and Asian move to have the Mandate terminated forthwith had found apparent sympathy with the great Powers, although those Powers had not concurred in their demand that the United Nations should use force to wrest Namibia from South Africa. The great Powers, led by the United States, while supporting the African and Asian move to terminate the Mandate, had insisted on the establishment of a special committee to examine practical ways through which the Assembly could take over the administration of Namibia. At that point, the African and Asian countries, which had at first been opposed to the idea, had given in to the Western demand. Thus, on 27 October 1966. the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) ending South Africa's Mandate and setting up the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa, a move denounced at the time by SWAPO as a "delaying tactic". That was exactly what the great Powers had wanted; they had won the first round.

143. The Ad Hoc Committee duly opened its first meeting on 17 January 1967. Soon after, its fourteen members submitted their proposals to the Committee. The African proposal called among other things for the creation of a United Nations administrative council for Namibia, which was to run the country until the formal declaration of independence, at which time it was to hand over power to the Africans. It had also called for Security Council enforcement if South Africa failed to comply. The Western Powers had called for the establishment of a United Nations council, headed by a special representative whose duties would include making a comprehensive survey of the conditions prevailing in the Territory. The Latin American proposal had called for the establishment of a United Nations council for South West Africa.

144. However, while the members of the Ad Hoc Committee appeared to have been in agreement on the establishment of a United Nations administrative council, they seemed to have essentially disagreed on how the Council was to take over control of the Territory. For instance, while the African proposal called for Security Council enforcement in case of South Africa's failure to comply, the Western and Latin American proposals said nothing about it. The Latin American proposal even suggested that the United Nations council for the Territory should contact the Pretoria régime in carrying out its work, the most fantastic idea that had emerged from the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee had completely failed.

145. The Ad Hoc Committee had failed just as the Western Powers, led by the United States, had hoped, and, with the special session of the Assembly in sight, they had spoken of a "dialogue" with South Africa. They had won the second round too.

146. When the General Assembly opened its fifth special session on 21 April 1967, the African and Asian countries had called once more for the use of force to implement General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 1966. The great Powers had unanimously cautioned moderation and made it perfectly

clear that they would not support such a move. The African and Asian countries, in an attempt to obtain the great Powers' support for their fifty-eight-nation resolution, had decided to include a provision to the effect that they would be willing to make contact with South Africa if the Vorster Government accepted in principle the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, a major concession on the part of the African and Asian nations. But when the Assembly voted, all the great Powers had abstained. They had scored another victory.

147. All those events proved, beyond a shadow of doubt, the extent to which the great Powers had obstructed and sabotaged the cause of Namibia in the United Nations. Why had they acted in that way? The answer was clear: they had gigantic economic and financial interests in South Africa and Namibia. The leading investors in South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, firmly believed that South Africa was the most politically stable nation on the African continent. They might condemn its policy of apartheid and racial discrimination, but were not willing to jeopardize the millions of pounds and dollars they had invested in that country. That United Kingdom and United States investment was the foundation of the South African racist régime and its administration in Namibia. If the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy disengaged themselves economically from South Africa, even to the extent of withdrawing their investments, the racist régime of Vorster would inevitably collapse.

148. Prior to 1959-1960 the South African economy had gone through a spectacular boom. In December 1959, the South African police had opened fire on a crowd of Africans in Windoek who had been demonstrating against their forcible removal to a new segregated location. Thirteen Africans had been killed on the spot and more than forty wounded. In March 1960, the world had witnessed the brutal massacre of innocent Africans at Sharpeville, followed by general political unrest both in South Africa and Namibia.

149. Following these events South Africa underwent a severe financial crisis involving much flight of capital. It was obvious that, had the trend continued, had the Western Powers withdrawn their investments and suspended their huge trade with South Africa, the racist régime would have fallen. Unfortunately that had not been the case. What were the reasons behind South Africa's spectacular economic and financial recovery?

150. At the time of the economic crisis the Western Powers had come to South Africa's rescue before the innocent African victims of Sharpeville and Windhoek had been properly buried. An Italian bank consortium had extended a three-year loan of \$9.8 million; the Federal Republic of Germany had followed with another \$9.8 million loan from the Deutsche Bank. A United States banking consortium, including the First National City Bank of New York and the Chase Manhattan Bank, had made a generous loan of \$40 million. A United Kingdom banking consortium had had no small part in the rescue operation which had saved South Africa from complete downfall.

151. South Africa was again as strong as ever and its economy booming, thanks to Western investment and the support the Pretoria régime enjoyed from the United States and the United Kingdom.

152. It was more than obvious that, so long as Western economic and financial interests were so involved in South Africa, there would be no change in Namibia; most Member States had agreed that South Africa had "forfeited" its right to administer Namibia but, in spite of the general consensus, the great Powers were reluctant to embark on the only course—namely, military action—to evict the racists from Namibia. What could be done under those circumstances? Was the participation of the great Powers really required to change the *status quo* in Namibia?

153. SWAPO strongly believed that the intervention of the great Powers, in spite of their economic, military and political strength, was not essential to bring about a change in South West Africa.

154. There were 122 nations in the United Nations, five of which—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union—were recognized or regarded as the great Powers; they were also the permanent members of the Security Council. Any Security Council enforcement measure had to have their unanimous support. Using their veto, they were able to block what was unpalatable to them in the Security Council. The remaining members of the Council were automatically rendered ineffectual by the veto of the great Powers.

155. The United Nations had just appointed an eleven-nation administrative council for Namibia, on which no great Power was represented, as might have been expected, since they had all abstained in the vote. Vorster had made it perfectly clear that his Government would not allow the Council to enter the Territory to perform its duties as laid down in General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V). What did the other Members of the United Nations propose to do in the light of the great Powers' unco-operative attitude? Would they do nothing because the great Powers were not willing to participate?

156. SWAPO strongly believed that those Members could act without the great Powers and that certain conditions had to be created which would force the great Powers to take a positive and active stand on the question of Namibia. SWAPO wished to make some suggestions as to how that could be achieved: if South Africa refused to allow the United Nations to enter Namibia, thus obstructing it in the performance of its duties under the terms of the General Assembly resolution, the African, Asian and other friendly nations should take the matter to the Security Council for enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. If there was the expected veto in the Security Council, then the African, Asian and other friendly countries should take the issue back to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for peace" resolution (377 (V)).

157. SWAPO considered those steps to be vital in an over-all strategy which would eventually prompt the big Powers to bring about the expulsion of the racists from Namibia. It wished to explode the myth that only the great Powers could do anything to change the *status quo* in Namibia. The African, Asian and other friendly nations should try to use their power to bring about a change in Namibia. If it came to the use of force, the rest of the Member States should use whatever military power they possessed to implement the United Nations resolution. By doing so, they would not only fulfil their sacred obligation towards the people of Namibia, but such action would also enhance the prestige of the United Nations. The greatest threat

to the existence of the United Nations was its inability to implement its own resolutions. To avoid the recurrence of such a situation, the other nations should not wait for the great Powers, but should combine to do what was right and honourable.

158. SWAPO had decided long ago that it could not rely entirely on the United Nations to liberate the country. It recognized that the United Nations had an obligation towards the people of Namibia and strongly urged it to live up to it, but believed that Namibia itself should create the conditions which would bring freedom and independence to its people. When that happened—and it was happening—he urged the African, Asian and other friendly nations to come to its assistance without waiting to see what the great Powers would do.

159. Since July 1966, the situation in Namibia had changed drastically. On 26 August, following the verdict of the International Court of Justice, SWAPO, having realized long before that Namibia could be liberated, had launched an armed struggle, and had since fought many battles against the South African army in the northern region. South Africa had reacted with characteristic brutality, first by extending the Suppression of Communism Act to Namibia and then by arresting SWAPO leaders in their homes. The Government had since given a second reading to a more sweeping new repressive measure, the Anti-Terrorism Bill, which included a maximum penalty of execution by hanging for such offences as "terrorism", "with-holding information from the police" or "being in possession of fire-arms". About 200 Namibians, including SWAPO's Acting President, Acting Secretary-General and a senior member of its National Executive, were being held without trial in South African jails. The Acting Secretary-General had virtually disappeared; there were reports that he had been tortured to death at Pretoria. When SWAPO resorted to arms to liberate the country, it was under no delusions as to the reactions of the South African régime. It expected no mercy and would give none. The recent brutal laws were essentially aimed at SWAPO. It was the first time that South Africa had been challenged by Africans with

160. Having started the armed struggle for liberation, SWAPO would not falter until final victory. SWAPO's over-all aim was the establishment of a Republic of Namibia; to achieve that end, it was willing to engage in protracted war. It foresaw a period of death and destruction not only in Namibia but in the whole of southern Africa. If it took death, blood and destruction to liberate the country, then SWAPO promised the racist Republic of South Africa, the international community and the United Nations that there would be death, blood and destruction, such as the world had never witnessed before, until Namibia was completely free

161. Mr. Kuhangua, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that the African States were determined to rid South West Africa of colonialism and apartheid. The failure of their efforts to solve the problem peacefully through recourse to the International Court of Justice had confirmed not only that the problem was a political rather than a judicial one, but also that the composition of many United Nations organs should be revised in the light of changed conditions. The problem of South West Africa, notwithstanding its complexities, was in essence a simple one: the decolonization of the Territory.

162. Unless the United Nations was prepared to take effective action and the people of South West Africa were prepared to sacrifice themselves for their fatherland, South Africa would remain in control of the Territory. Nothing worth-while had ever been won without a fight. In any case, whatever SWAPO was doing was the decision of the people of Namibia as a whole. Although young South West Africans were dying even as he addressed the Special Committee, he did not regret their sacrifice.

163. Some Members of the United Nations showed apathy and a lack of initiative in the matter, while others were deliberately unco-operative. Quibbling and hypocritical statements did not deceive his people. The United Nations was directly responsible for the deaths of young South West Africans who were dying in the mines, on the farms, in the forests and in the mountains of their homeland. Nevertheless, he was confident that, just as the United Republic of Tanzania, a former German colony and Mandated Territory, had attained its independence, so, one day, his own people would become masters in their own house. No power in the world could obstruct the inevitable course of African history. Namibia, an integral part of Africa, was protected by the Declaration of the African Heads of State which provided that any attempt by the South African Government to annex any part of South West Africa would be declared an act of aggression.

164. On the basis of those principles, the people of South West Africa were determined to liberate their fatherland from foreign domination. It should be remembered that South Africa had not conquered the Territory but had been entrusted with it for the purpose of carrying out specific responsibilities: to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the indigenous inhabitants until such time as they were capable of governing their country and controlling their own affairs. In complete violation of that trust, the South African Government had introduced into the Territory its abominable policy of apartheid, which had divided the nation and hampered the progress of its people. South Africa was legislating for the Territory, determining the powers and forms of its administration and moulding the structure of its society. Not only did it trade with the Territory, it also largely dictated the conditions under which the latter could trade with other countries. It thus controlled the economy of South West Africa and the course of its development.

165. Contract labour, which was virtual slavery, was a normal institution in his country and had been introduced as part of a plan to exterminate the indigenous population and prevent the growth of the nation of Namibia. That notorious and destructive institution was managed by the administrators with the co-operation of various large companies active in the Territory. Those companies were mercilessly pillaging the natural resources of the area and plundering its indigenous inhabitants in direct violation of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963. They were active in both South Africa and South West Africa, aided by certain Members of the United Nations, and contemptuously ignoring General Assembly resolutions. They had helped South Africa to strengthen its military potential and had turned it into a nuclear Power in order to reap profits ranging from 25 to 45 per cent by the brutal suppression and exploitation of the indigenous population.

- 166. SWAPO denounced in the strongest and most indignant terms the South African racist régime's declaration that a Bantustan was to be established in Ovamboland. His movement would ignore any such declaration. Psychological stratagems of that kind would have no effect whatever on the outcome of the fight for freedom and independence. He insisted that, in its battle for emancipation, his country had no interest whatever in the cold war. On the contrary, it needed the co-operation of all Members of the United Nations acting together to achieve the desired goal. Ideological conflicts were a luxury it could not afford.
- 167. It had been a matter of deep regret to his people that some Powers had felt unable to vote in favour of the recent African, Asian and Latin American resolution—the most practical resolution ever drafted in the United Nations—and whatever their reasons, whether economic or otherwise, he appealed to them to realize the appalling consequences of pandering to South Africa and to reconsider their decision. He warned them that they were permitting the situation which had occurred in Europe in 1939 to be repeated in southern Africa.
- 168. During his stay at the Rusk Medical and Rehabilitation Centre, he had widely distributed a prospectus on the establishment of a school for young South West Africans, who were deprived of education in their fatherland. The project had unfortunately not materialized. The United Nations said that South West Africa would attain its independence in June 1968. Such independence would be a mockery if the people were not prepared in advance for their future responsibilities. It was SWAPO's aim to represent all the people of the Territory, irrespective of race, colour, religion or national origin. Its greatest desire was to achieve freedom, justice and respect for human dignity and it yearned to eliminate poverty, disease, illiteracy, racial inequality and all other affronts to the human personality. It sought to achieve the mutual understanding and co-operation of all Namibians in building a strong society founded on the will and voluntary participation of the whole people. All activities useful to society would be fostered in the common interest so that the real needs of the people could be met. All citizens would have equal opportunities of sharing in the progress towards prosperity. Education would be compulsory and private property respected.
- 169. In reply to a question, the petitioner stated that there were refugees from South West Africa in the United Republic of Tanzania, their chief refuge, and in Zambia and Botswana. All of them were very badly in need of educational facilities. They had been deprived of education in their own country under the so-called Bantu Education Act. His people would be extremely grateful if a formula could be found whereby some kind of school could be established, either in Tanzania or in Zambia. A missionary in the United Republic of Tanzania had told him that four establishments were available in which refugee students could be accommodated if the necessary funds were forthcoming. The same missionary was also in a position to find teachers. Unfortunately, without financing nothing could be done. If, through the good offices of any country, the necessary funds could be found, his people would be grateful.
- 170. Commenting on the statements by the petitioners, the representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that it was essential to condemn the South African régime unequivocally for its refusal to

- comply with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and also to condemn the countries which were obstructing the implementation of that resolution and helping to perpetuate colonial rule.
- 171. The newly announced policy of the Pretoria Government, which claimed to be granting self-government to Ovamboland, was extremely dangerous. The policy of "Bantustans" was not new. It had already been applied in South Africa. The so-called "self-government" being granted was a mere fiction designed to mislead public opinion and to prevent the country from attaining independence by dividing it up into a number of provinces.
- 172. It was essential to insist that South Africa should give up South West Africa immediately, withdraw its troops and administration from the Territory and allow the freedom fighters to return home. South West Africa could not attain independence until the racists had been expelled and until the racist administration which now ruled the Territory had been liquidated. The Western Powers—and particularly the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America—should therefore stop helping South Africa. Many delegations had stressed that the Western Powers with financial and economic interests in South Africa and South West Africa had a special responsibility in the matter. It was the duty of the General Assembly to call upon those States to take economic, diplomatic and other measures aimed at bringing pressure to bear on the South African Government to give up South West Africa.
- 173. It would be wrong to create the impression that the United Nations was merely replacing the Mandate in South West Africa with United Nations trusteeship. Trusteeship régimes of any kind represented a danger to liberation movements, and trusteeship might delay South West Africa's attainment of independence. An administration consisting of foreigners rather than representatives of the Territory could never create a new State.
- 174. The Soviet Union had serious doubts regarding the effectiveness of the measures envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) and had therefore been unable to vote for it. It advocated a more realistic and more radical solution, namely, immediate and unconditional independence for the people of South West Africa. Such a solution would not exclude the possibility of taking steps to hold elections and create the best possible conditions for the transfer of power.
- 175. The Soviet Union, like the Afro-Asian countries and all States which valued freedom and independence, would do everything in its power to devise effective measures for liberating the people of South West Africa from the racist colonial yoke.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

- 176. At the 537th meeting on 16 June 1967, the representative of Iran introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.412) on behalf of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.
- 177. In presenting the draft resolution, the representative of *Iran* emphasized that its sole object was to safeguard the territorial integrity of South West Africa in accordance with the wishes of virtually all members of the General Assembly.

- 178. On 27 October 1966 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), which declared that South Africa had forfeited the right and authority to administer the Territory of South West Africa. The South African Government had since taken steps to carry out the odious Odendaal Plan, designed to break up South West Africa into three or more divisions in the hope that that would enable South Africa to perpetuate its domination. The first step towards the fragmentation of the Territory had already been taken and was about to be completed in Ovamboland.
- 179. The Iranian delegation which, by sponsoring resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), had from the outset stood firmly for the independence and territorial integrity of South West Africa, was shocked by South Africa's complete disregard for those resolutions. That defiance of the world organization constituted a serious challenge which should not be taken lightly.
- 180. In the past there had been virtual unanimity on the reaffirmation of the territorial integrity of South West Africa, in particular in the statements on Ovamboland made at the fifth special session of the General Assembly. All the members of the Special Committee had expressed their full support of the territorial integrity of South West Africa. The sponsors of the draft resolution therefore hoped that all members of the Committee would agree to condemn the measures taken or proposed by the Government of South Africa with respect to Ovamboland as illegal and contrary to the above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions and as a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations. He appealed for a unanimous vote in favour of the draft resolution.
- 181. The representative of Afghanistan, seconding the draft resolution, fully endorsed the statement by the representative of Iran and urged the Special Committee to adopt the draft resolution unanimously.
- 182. The representative of *Madagascar* thanked the representative of Iran for introducing the draft resolution on South West Africa: his statement reflected the feelings of the majority of the members of the Special Committee. It was to be hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by a large majority.
- 183. The representative of the *United States of America* said, in explanation of his vote, that at the time the South African Government had announced its plans for Ovamboland, his Government had expressed its concern and regret. The establishment of Bantustans in the Territory was inconsistent with the resolution of the General Assembly which forbade South Africa to make any substantial change in the circumstances of that Territory. His delegation therefore intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.412) noting that South Africa's expressed intention regarding Ovamboland had not yet been implemented, in the hope that the new resolution would cause the South African Government to pause and consider.
- 184. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.412) was then adopted unanimously.
- 185. The resolution on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/250), adopted by the Special Committee at its 539th meeting on 19 June 1967, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965 and in particular operative paragraphs 5 and 6 thereof, as well as previous resolutions on the question of South West Africa, adopted by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and in particular operative paragraph 7 thereof and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and in particular section I thereof.

"Deeply concerned at the measures taken by the Government of South Africa to alter the status of Ovamboland, an integral part of South West Africa, by the establishment of so-called self-government,

"Considering that these measures are an extension of the universally condemned system of apartheid and racial discrimination and are a method of fragmenting the Territory with a view to covering up South Africa's domination,

- "1. Reaffirms the territorial integrity of South West Africa and the inalienable right of its people to freedom and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions concerning South West Africa;
- "2. Condemns as illegal and contrary to the abovementioned General Assembly resolutions and as a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations, the measures taken and proposed by the Government of South Africa with respect to Ovamboland."

E. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TERRITORY

Trial of thirty-seven South West Africans by South Africa for alleged terrorist activities

186. As reported above (paras. 34-53), numerous arrests of South West Africans have been made by the South African police since the beginning of guerrilla activities in Ovamboland in 1966. Many of the persons arrested were apparently transferred to prisons in South Africa and held incommunicado for many months without being charged or brought to trial.

187. On 22 June 1967, however, the Attorney General of the Transvaal, Mr. R. W. Rein, announced that thirty-seven South West Africans were to be formally charged with taking part in terrorist activities and committed in the Pretoria Magistrate's Court for summary trial by a judge without jury. Those arrested included the Acting President of SWAPO, Mr. Nathaniel Maxuiriri, the Acting Secretary-General, Mr. Ja Otto, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jason Mutumbulua, and the Regional Secretary of the North, Mr. Toivo Ja Toivo. Twenty-one of the men were described either as labourers or unemployed; there were also four peasants, three farmers, two teachers, one mechanic and one clerk. The occupations of the

remainder were not known. The trial was set to begin in Pretoria on 7 August 1967.

- 188. Mr. Rein was said to have stated that evidence would show that eighteen of the accused had received training in several countries and that seven of the accused were political leaders of SWAPO.
- 189. Mr. Rein was reported to have added that evidence would be given that SWAPO was responsible for the training of terrorists in foreign countries and in Ovamboland. According to Mr. Rein, the evidence would be that all the accused were members of a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the existing government of South West Africa and replacing it with a government consisting of SWAPO members.
- 190. Fire-arms, including automatic weapons, ammunition and various other weapons, were also to be handed in as exhibits. It was further reported that the State intended to call between 150 and 160 witnesses and hand in about 500 exhibits of a documentary nature.
- 191. It was later announced that the thirty-seven men were to appear before the judge on a main charge under the recently published Terrorism Act (Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967) and on two alternative charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. Under the Terrorism Act the accused may be sentenced to death if found guilty of some of the alleged charges they are facing.
- 192. The Terrorism Act was passed during this year's session of the South African Parliament and was promulgated on 21 June 1967, only the day before the announcement of the charges against the accused and subsequent to the adoption of General Assembly resolutions depriving South Africa of the Mandate for South West Africa.
- 193. Under this Act, any person who commits the following acts shall be guilty of the offence of participation in terrorist activities and liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by law for the offence of treason, provided that, except where the death penalty is imposed, a sentence of imprisonment for a period of not less than five years shall be compulsory whether or not any other penalty is also imposed:
- (a) Any person who with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic or any portion thereof, in the Republic or elsewhere commits any act or attempts to commit, or conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit, or incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person to commit, any act; or
- (b) Any person who in the Republic or elsewhere undergoes, or attempts, consents or takes any steps to undergo, or incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person to undergo any training which could be of use to any person intending to endanger the maintenance of law and order, and who fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not undergo or attempt, consent or take any steps to undergo, or incite, instigate, command, aid, advise, encourage or procure such other person to undergo such training for the purpose of using it or causing it to be used to commit any act likely to have any of the results referred to in subsection (2) in the Republic or any portion thereof; or
- (c) Any person who possesses any explosives, ammunition, fire-arm or weapon and who fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend

- using such explosives, ammunition, fire-arm or weapon to commit any act likely to have any of the results referred to in subsection (2) in the Republic or any portion thereof.
- 194. The Act provides that acts likely to have such effects as hampering or deterring any person from assisting in the maintenance of law and order, promoting by intimidation the achievement of any object, causing or promoting general dislocation, furthering or encouraging the achievement of any political aim by violence or forcible means or with the assistance of any foreign Government or international body, causing substantial financial loss to any person or the State, or embarrassing the Administration of the affairs of the State shall be presumed to have been committed with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the State, unless it is proved otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 195. The Act further provides that any person who harbours or conceals or renders any assistance to a terrorist shall be guilty of an offence and liable to the same penalties as for the main offence.
- 196. The Act provides that any commissioned officer of or above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel may, if he has reason to believe that any person who happens to be at any place in the Republic is a terrorist or is withholding from the South African Police any information relating to terrorists or to offences under this Act, arrest such person or cause him to be arrested without warrant and detain or cause such person to be detained for interrogation at such place in the Republic and subject to such conditions as the Commissioner of the South African Police may, subject to the directions of the Minister of Justice, from time to time determine, until the Commissioner orders his release when satisfied that he has satisfactorily replied to all questions at the said interrogation.
- 197. Under the Terrorism Act any superior court or the Attorney General in the Republic shall have jurisdiction in respect of any offence under the Terrorism Act committed outside the area of jurisdiction of such court or the Attorney General, as if it had been committed within such area. The trial of any person accused of having committed any offence under this Act may be held at any time and at any place within the area of jurisdiction of the division of the Supreme Court of South Africa concerned.
- 198. The Act also provides that any person charged in the Republic with having committed an offence under this Act, shall be tried by a judge without a jury.
- 199. The Terrorism Act is retroactive to 27 June 1962, the date when the law making acts of sabotage a criminal offence came into force. For the purposes of the Act, the Republic is defined as including South West Africa.
- 200. The thirty-seven South West Africans appeared at a magistrate's court in Pretoria on 27 June 1967 and were asked if any of them had arranged for his own legal representation. Mr. Jason Mutumbulua, one of the accused men, was reported to have replied that this was impossible as they were all thousands of miles from home and asked that the trial be heard at Windhoek, South West Africa, where they would be able to get attorneys to defend themselves. The magistrate explained that the Government had ordered the trial to be heard in Pretoria and that it could not be altered. Mr. Mutumbulua is reported to have

said that the accused were not prepared to conduct their own defence but wanted *pro deo* counsel to be appointed. In any event Mr. N. Phillips was appointed defence counsel; there is no information available as to how, or by whom, the appointment was made.

201. The trial was opened in Pretoria on 7 August 1967. The thirty-seven accused were charged with entering South West Africa with the intention of creating a violent revolution and taking over the government of the country. It was alleged that they had received training in terrorism in various countries and had set up training camps in Ovamboland where they taught others guerrilla warfare. It was also alleged that they were responsible for terrorist attacks on white and African government officials and farmers and their homes during the period from June 1966 until May 1967.

202. According to press reports the forty-one-page indictment set out a long list of charges and also contained thirty pages detailing places, times, and each man's part in the alleged terrorist activity. It also listed eighty-one co-conspirators not before the Court who were alleged to have taken part in the activities. It was alleged that some of the accused plotted the deaths of three pro-government headmen; one headman was alleged to have been killed.

203. The defence counsel, Mr. N. Phillips, was reported to have challenged the right of South Africa to hold the trial. In applying for the delay of the trial until 11 September 1967, the counsel made the point that one reason for adjourning was to consider if the Terrorism Act, retrospective to 1962, was within the legislative competence of the South African Parliament as it applied to South West Africa. He added that that involved questions of international law. The defence counsel also submitted at the hearing that many of the accused were illiterate and could only speak Ovambo.

204. It was also reported that Mr. Phillips requested the Court for further particulars of the indictment, including precise details of the aims and objectives of SWAPO during the period covered in the indictment; in what manner and when SWAPO became party to the alleged conspiracy and how it was involved in the alleged training of guerrillas; how SWAPO conspired to bring about hostility between Whites and non-whites, and how the organization attempted to intimidate headmen in Ovamboland to withdraw their support from the Government. The defence counsel was said to have further stated that as the defence of each man must be separately considered, this was complicated by the fact that each of the accused was said to have acted in conjunction with others. Further, the counsel was said to have stated that the acts alleged were numerous and covered a period of five years in some cases. In other cases the acts were said to have been committed in foreign countries.

205. The judge granted the application for a post-ponement of the trial until 11 September 1967.

F. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

206. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of South West Africa at its 554th, 556th and 557th meetings held in New York between 8 and 12 September 1967. The Committee had before it information on the trial of thirty-seven South West

Africans by South Africa for alleged terrorist activities, contained in a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras, 186-205 above) at the request of the Committee. The Secretariat paper was introduced by the Chairman at the Committee's 556th meeting, on 11 September 1967.

Written petitions and hearings

207. The Special Committee also circulated the following written petitions concerning South West Africa:

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Petitioner	Document No.
Mr. D. Nokwe, Secretary-General, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC)	A/AC.109/PET.649/Add.1
Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary- General, Union of South West Africa Workers (USWAW),	
and Chief Representative in Eastern Africa, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF)	A/AC.109/PET.585/Add.2
Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary of Labour, Mr. Isaiah Emvule, Mr. Thomas Nepaya, South West Africa People's Organi-	
zation (SWAPO) Mr. G. H. Geingob, representative of SWAPO in the United	A/AC.109/PET.585/Add.3
States of America	A/AC.109/PET.585/Add.4
Mr. Ewald Katjivena, representative of SWAPO in Algeria	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.6
Mr. Sam Nujoma, President,	

203. The Special Committee heard the following petitioner concerning South West Africa:

Paramount Chief David Goraseb A/AC.109/PET.592/Add.1

Mr. Preston T. Gibson, Jr. A/AC.109/PET.711

A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.7

SWAPO

209. Mr. Geingob, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that Namibia, or South West Africa, had been misruled by South Africa from 17 December 1920 until 27 October 1966, when the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, had adopted resolution 2145 (XXI). Despite that action, however, South African racists were still continuing their barbaric system of white supremacy in South Africa. They had illegally arrested thirty-seven South West Africans and transported them to South Africa, where they had been remanded in custody until 11 September 1967. Those arrested included the Acting President, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Acting Secretary of SWAPO. The majority of the patriots had been charged with entering South West Africa with the intention of creating a violent revolution and taking over the Government. Some countries called the freedom fighters of South West Africa terrorists; however, he would recall that the Declaration of Independence of the United States maintained that it was the right of people to alter or abolish any form of government which did not derive its powers from the consent of the governed. The revolutionary struggle now taking place in southern Africa was the proper reflection of the real demands and aspirations of the people of that part of the world, who were suffering intolerable oppression, exploitation, repression and humiliation.

210. Even viewed in purely legal terms, the arrest of the freedom fighters was wrongful. First, they had been arrested illegally in the United Nations Territory; secondly, they had been denied a speedy trial, since some of them had been kept in gaol for more than a year before appearing in court; thirdly, they were on trial under an ex post facto law; fourthly, they were being tried away from their country and thus were deprived of legal advisers. Moreover, their illegal arrest and transportation to a foreign country violated United Nations resolutions and was a defiance of United Nations authority. He therefore urged the United Nations to demand the unconditional release of those patriots, whose land, cattle and other possessions had been stolen by South Africa.

G. Further action taken by the Special Committee

- 211. At the 556th meeting on 11 September 1967, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.428) for the consideration of the Special Committee.
- 212. Introducing the thirteen-power draft resolution, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the South African régime's arrest of the thirty-seven African patriots of South West Africa was an act of international piracy and abduction which flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of the United Nations decision establishing the international status of South West Africa and constituted a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations. His delegation, together with those of the overwhelming majority of Member States, had always called for the most concrete and speedy action to eliminate the crimes arising from the policies and practices of apartheid.
- 213. Despite categorical denunciations by the United Nations, apartheid and colonialism still existed, mainly because of the complacent attitude of those who pursued selfish interests. At the same time, it was gratifying to observe that colonized peoples and freedom-loving peoples throughout the world, as exemplified by the petitioner heard by the Committee at its 554th meeting, were determined to carry on the struggle to eliminate those inhuman systems once for all.
- 214. The African and Asian members of the Special Committee and Yugoslavia had prepared a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.428) condemning the illegal arrests and calling upon the South African authorities to cease all illegal acts in South West Africa and to release the arrested African patriots immediately. The adoption of that draft resolution was the minimum action the United Nations could take. He hoped that the Special Committee would unhesitatingly adopt the draft resolution and thereby indicate its solidarity with the people of South West Africa who were dedicated to achieving their liberation.
- 215. The representative of *India* said his delegation was gratified that its suggestion should have been taken up so promptly by the Special Committee and embodied in a draft resolution. Ever since the International Court of Justice had delivered its judgement on the South West Africa case in July 1966, the international community had exercised the utmost vigilance over the question of the future of the Territory's inhabitants. The question had been under almost continuous consideration in the United Nations, and it

- was proper that the Committee charged with the task of looking after the interests of colonial peoples should be seized of the matter once again. The occasion was not a happy one, since it concerned the deprivation of the fundamental rights of the people of a colonial Territory.
- 216. As far as his delegation was concerned, the thirty-seven nationals of South West Africa who were being detained by the South African Government were not terrorists by any standards. They were patriots fighting for their right to freedom and independence, and India had always recognized the right of colonial peoples to wage their struggle for independence in any form they chose. Since the trial of the thirty-seven South West Africans was due to open that day, at Pretoria, it was very fitting that the draft resolution should have been introduced concurrently. He hoped that it might be possible for the Special Committee to vote on it immediately, as it contained nothing controversial.
- 217. The representative of Bulgaria said that he fully supported the draft resolution. Having listened with indignation to the statements by the petitioners from South West Africa concerning the criminal activities of the apartheid régime at Pretoria, he considered that the draft resolution called for the minimum that the United Nations could do at the present stage—namely, to condemn the illegal acts of the South African régime and demand the release of the thirty-seven South West African patriots. He hoped that the Special Committee would not hesitate to condemn the apartheid régime in South Africa in the strongest terms.
- 218. The representative of *Chile* said that he entirely agreed with the draft resolution. His country had participated in the work of various committees dealing with questions of decolonization, and at the last regular session of the General Assembly his delegation had unequivocally stated its views on the South African Government's policies of *apartheid*. The draft resolution before the Special Committee recalled resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), which had been adopted by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly. Considering how it had voted on those occasions, Chile was bound to support a draft resolution which condemned the illegal arrest of thirty-seven South West African nationals by the Pretoria régime.
- 219. Chile also endorsed the call to South Africa, which was unlawfully maintaining its rule over South West Africa, to cease its illegal acts. For all those reasons, his delegation considered itself to be in effect a sponsor of the draft resolution, which it would unreservedly support. The latest action by the South African Government merely confirmed the policy which it had been pursuing for a number of years and which the General Assembly had categorically condemned.
- 220. The representative of the *United States of America* said that she shared the concern of members of the Special Committee at the arrest and trial of thirty-seven inhabitants of South West Africa under the Terrorism Act. While she did not have the full facts about the cases against the accused and must therefore reserve judgement about many questions that might arise, it was clear that the Act itself violated the rights of the inhabitants of the Territory and the international status of South West Africa. This re-

troactive legislation which made it possible for the accused to be stripped of rights essential to a proper and fair trial also shut off avenues of peaceful dissent in the Territory, thus generating the behaviour it sought to punish. It was another instance of violation of the terms of the Mandate of the kind which had led the General Assembly to adopt resolution 2145 (XXI), depriving South Africa of its right to continue its administration of South West Africa. In its application to South West Africa, the legislation was without lawful authority and in violation of the international status of the Territory.

221. Although it had thus forfeited its rights in South West Africa, the South African Government still remained obligated to the people of the Territory, to the United Nations and to the international community, to respect the rights vested in the inhabitants of the Territory by the Mandate and to account for its conduct in respect to the Territory through the United Nations and otherwise. In the view of the United States Government, the nature of the legislation and the responsibilities of the United Nations toward the inhabitants of the Territory required that the Committee call on the Government of South Africa to halt the prosecutions and cease to apply the Terrorism Act in South West Africa, That did not mean, of course, that the Territory should be without law and order or that an independent judiciary should not apply the law, but the Terrorism Act was so contrary to the principles of fairness and justice that its application to South West Africa was inadmissible. Her delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

222. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution; however, he wished to clarify his delegation's position with regard to the legal grounds for the condemnation contained in the draft resolution. On the basis of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), the illegality of the South African Government's action lay in the decision to extend the application of a South African law to South West Africa. Italy would therefore have preferred a wording for operative paragraph 1 that would give a broader scope to the condemnation, since he believed that it was directed not so much against the arrest of thirty-seven persons as against any arrest or trial of South West Africans under an Act illegally extended to the Territory.

223. At its 557th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.428) by a roll-call vote of 21 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

224. The representative of Australia, speaking in explanation of his vote, recalled that his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and abstained from voting on resolution 2248 (S-V). Having examined the draft resolution in the light of the provisions of those two General

Assembly resolutions, his delegation had concluded that it could not vote in favour of it. Resolution 2248 (S-V) recognized that although its Mandate over South West Africa had come to an end, South Africa still exercised physical control over the Territory, and the use of the word "illegal" in the draft resolution might imply that all acts of the South African Government in South West Africa were illegal. Australia believed that, until an international administration was established in South West Africa, the South African authorities remained in effective control of the Territory. For those reasons, his delegation had abstained from voting.

225. The representative of the *United Kingdom* recalled that the draft resolution which had been adopted derived directly from General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V). His delegation, which had abstained from voting on both those resolutions, had frequently explained the reasons for its reservations with regard to them, and it did not think it necessary to repeat them. In its view, the adoption of the resolutions had given rise to many legal doubts and uncertainties. Consequently, his delegation had been obliged to abstain from voting also on the draft resolution now adopted, but it wished to state that its abstention did not imply any judgement upon the merits of the draft resolution.

226. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, thanked those members of the Special Committee who had found wisdom in recognizing justice and in condemning the brutality of the South African Government's methods.

227. When introducing the draft resolution, his delegation had explained the reasons motivating its sponsors. To them, as to those who had voted in favour of the draft resolution, the status of South West Africa was perfectly clear: the United Nations had revoked any and all rights that might have been vested at any time in the South African Government. Only the United Nations had authority over the Territory of South West Africa. Consequently, the Pretoria régime could not deal with even the most minor offences. In any event, the Special Committee believed that it should express its solidarity with the people of South West Africa and assist them in their struggle for independence and international peace; for peace would be threatened so long as South Africa continued to pursue its policies of apartheid in South West Africa.

228. The representative of *Uruguay* said he regretted that, for reasons beyond its control, his delegation had been unable to participate in the voting. However, it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution, which concerned a matter on which its position had been stated in some detail, both in the Special Committee and in the General Assembly at the time of the voting on resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V). On both occasions, his delegation had explained its views on the question, which was of concern not only to the United Nations but to the entire world.

229. The Chairman stated that in view of the urgency of the question, it was to be hoped that the Secretary-General would ensure that the resolution which had been adopted was acted upon as soon as possible. The text of the resolution should also be transmitted to the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa.

- 230. Although it was not customary for the Chairman to speak after a draft resolution had been adopted, he would like, on behalf of the Special Committee, to urge the Republic of South Africa to heed the appeal addressed to it. He would also like to ask those Governments which still had some influence on the Pretoria Government to draw its attention to the international community's desire that South West Africa should be respected. In view of the position taken by the United Nations with regard to South West Africa, any attempt by South Africa to extend its racist laws to that Territory was illegal and should continue to be condemned by the international community.
- 231. The Chairman also expressed the hope that all organizations, both those affiliated and those not affiliated with the United Nations, would assist it in making its appeal heard in the Republic of South Africa.
- 232. The text of the resolution on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/271) as adopted by the Special Committee at its 557th meeting on 12 September 1967, reads as follows:

- "The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
 - "Having heard the statement of the petitioner,
- "Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967,
- "1. Condemns the illegal arrest by the authorities of South Africa of thirty-seven African nationals from South West Africa in flagrant violation of the international status of the Territory;
- "2. Calls upon the authorities of South Africa to cease all illegal acts in the international Territory of South West Africa and demands the immediate release of the thirty-seven African nationals mentioned above."
- 233. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa on 12 September 1967 (see A/AC.131/2).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ANNEXES

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

NEW YORK, 1967

Official Records

Agenda item 23: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

DOCUMENT A/6700/REV.1

Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

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- XX. Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and Trust Territory of New Guinea
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- XXII. Hong Kong
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- XXIV. Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations and related questions
- ** The present version of chapters V to XI is a consolidation of the text of the following documents as they appeared in mimeographed form: A/6700/Add.3 and Corr.1, dated 11 October and 3 November 1967; A/6700/Add.4 and Corr.1, dated 22 November and 1 December 1967; A/6700/Add.5, dated 3 November 1967; A/6700/Add.6, dated 16 November 1967; A/6700/Add.7, dated 16 November 1967; A/6700/Add.9, dated 28 November 1967; and A/6700/Add.10, dated 29 November 1967. For a check list of relevant documents, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23.

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CHAPTER V*

TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

A. Action previously taken by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee

- 1. In 1960, the General Assembly, by resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, decided that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations and requested the Government of Portugal to transmit to the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI, information on the conditions prevailing in the Territories concerned.
- * Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.3 and Corr.1.
- 2. Early in 1961, following the outbreak of disturbances in Angola, the General Assembly (at its resumed fifteenth session) and the Security Council became seized with the question of the situation in that Territory and a sub-committee was appointed to study and report thereon.¹
- 3. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1742 (XVI) of 30 January 1962 concerning Angola, whereby it reaffirmed the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence and called on Portugal to cease repressive

¹ General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and Security Council resolution 163 (1961). See also Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978 and Corr.2).

measures and undertake reforms with a view to the transfer of power to the people of Angola. The General Assembly also considered as a separate item the "Noncompliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV)". In connexion with this item, the Assembly, by resolution 1699 (XVI) of 19 December 1961, established a special committee to examine the available information on Territories under Portuguese administration and to submit observations, conclusions and recommendations to the Assembly and any other body appointed by the Assembly to assist it in the implementation of its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.2

- 4. At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, in which it approved the Special Committee's report and urged the Portuguese Government to give effect to the recommendations contained in that report, in particular by taking the following measures:
 - "(a) The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence;
 - "(b) The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;
 - "(c) The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;
 - "(d) Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "(e) The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;".
- 5. Between 1962 and 1965, the Territories under Portuguese administration were the subject of resolutions by the Special Committee,³ by the General Assembly (1913 (XVIII), 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX)) and by the Security Council (180 (1963), 183 (1963) and 218 (1965)), all of which sought to obtain fulfilment by Portugal of the measures referred to above. The resolutions also contained appeals for supportive action by other States and international institutions, including the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Thus, the Security Council, in its resolution 218 (1965) requested all States:

"to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the people of the Territories under its administration; and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manu-

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 54, documents A/5160 and Add.1 facture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

A similar appeal was made by the General Assembly in its resolution 2107 (XX). In addition, however, the Assembly, inter alia, urged Member States to take certain coercive measures, including the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations and a boycott of trade with Portugal, and appealed to all specialized agencies of the United Nations to refrain from granting assistance to Portugal so long as the latter failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

- 6. During 1966, the Special Committee considered the question of Territories under Portuguese administration at meetings held in May and June during its visit to Africa and again in October at Headquarters.
- 7. At the first series of meetings, the Special Committee heard petitioners from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe. It also considered the situation of refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration and measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and Member States in response to the resolution of 10 June 1965 of the Special Committee and General Assembly resolutions 2040 (XX) and 2107 (XX).
- 8. At its 455th meeting, on 22 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,4 chap. V, para. 675) whereby, in addition to reaffirming its previous decisions and recommendations, it recommended that the Security Council should make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). The Special Committee also requested all States, and in particular, the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to take the following steps: (a) refrain forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its administration; (b) take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal; (c) stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition. It appealed once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It also reiterated an earlier request to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase their assistance to refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration and to the people who had suffered and were still suffering from military operations.
- 9. By his letter of 1 July 1966,5 the Chairman of the Special Committee transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of this resolution and the text of another resolution also adopted by the Special

³ Ibid., addendum to item 25, document A/5238; ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23. document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 251; ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (Part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 352; ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 415.

⁴ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

item 23.

⁵ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1966, documents S/7394 and S/7395.

Committee on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), in operative paragraph 3 of which it recommended to the Security Council "to make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter against Portugal...".

10. Continuing its discussion on the Territories under Portuguese administration in October, the Special Committee had before it a supplementary report, submitted by Sub-Committee I in connexion with a study initiated in 1964 on the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration. On 6 October. the Special Committee adopted the supplementary report of the Sub-Committee and included it in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, together with the background papers prepared by the Secretariat on agriculture and processing industries, foreign-owned railways and Mozambique's economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In doing so, the Special Committee reaffirmed all its conclusions and recommendations contained in its 1965 report on this subject (A/6000/Rev.1,6 chap. V), and decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it inscribe on the agenda of its twenty-first session as a matter of urgency the following item:

"The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration and in other colonial Territories".

- 11. In a letter dated 21 September 1966, the acting Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that Portugal was allowing foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of his country and requested that the Security Council be convened. The Security Council discussed this question at four meetings held in September and October, and on 14 October, adopted a resolution (226 (1966)). In this resolution, the Security Council urged the Government of Portugal, in view of its statement denying the charges, "not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo"; called upon all States "to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo", and requested the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the resolution.
- 12. In operative paragraph 8 of resolution 218 (1965), the Security Council had requested the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of that resolution, to provide such assistance as he may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council not later than 30 June 1966.
- 13. In his report (S/7385 and Add.1-4),⁷ the Secretary-General made public the replies of Governments, including an exchange of correspondence he had had

with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal with a view to fulfilling his mandate from the Security Council. Although in one of his letters the Minister for Foreign Affairs had indicated that while the Portuguese Government had made the most explicit reservations regarding Security Council resolution 218 (1965), without prejudice to those reservations, it was prepared to discuss problems of regional co-operation in Africa and questions of international peace and security in that continent. Within this context, the Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that conversations could be initiated immediately following the termination of the general debate at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly and that a date could be then fixed in view of the circumstances. However, although the general debate ended on 18 October, as at 14 November 1966 no further information had been received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal and no discussions had taken place with the Secretary-General.

- 14. The Fourth Committee considered the question of Territories under Portuguese administration on the basis of the Special Committee's report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V).
- 15. On the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly, on 12 December 1966, adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) on the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, twenty-first session, supplement No. 16.]

B. Information on the Territories

1. THE TERRITORIES IN GENERAL

Constitutional and political developments: general policy

- 16. There were no major constitutional or political changes in the Territories during 1966.8 Despite continued and intensified fighting in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, Portugal remains committed to "a military solution" of the problem of its Overseas Territories regardless of the criticisms and doubts that have again been raised in recent months both in Portugal and the Territories themselves.
- 17. Determined to retain the Overseas Territories by armed force, Portugal during the past year introduced some new measures in preparation for a lengthy war. The period of compulsory national military service was extended, the Portuguese navy is being strengthened and modernized, and all sectors of the population are being called upon to share in the sacrifices needed to "safeguard national unity". As part of its long-term strategy, Portugal increased the civil and military defence and security forces in Angola and Mozambique; it is improving road and telephone communications and transportation both between Portugal and the Territories and within the Territories; it reorganized and centralized various administrative services and, with the gradual coming into force of the Portuguese common market and escudo zone, the economic development of the Territories is to be integrated in an over-all plan.

⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23.

⁷ For document S/7385, see Official Records of the Security Council. Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966; for documents S/7385/Add.1-3, ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1966; and for document S/7385/Add.4, ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1966.

⁸ Information on the central and local government of the Territories and political rights is contained in the Report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly: Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V.

18. During 1966, a number of official statements emphasized and explained Portugal's determination to remain in Africa. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Angola uprising, Prime Minister Salazar, in a speech to a delegation from that Territory, recalled the decision taken in 1961 to defend Angola "at once and on the largest scale". Looking back, he found the decision was justified because the Portuguese in Angola had been determined to stay, and because "any man who stays, alive or dead, does in fact occupy the land; he who leaves, deserts and abandons it. It is only the former with his posterity who gains the right of occupation and possession, [a right] that history recognizes as the basis of society and a share in authority"

19. On another occasion, explaining Portugal's overseas policy in a press interview, Prime Minister Salazar said:

"One thing is certain, that the Portuguese Government refuses to adopt a policy that would lead to the disintegration of the nation. The advantages of collaboration and integration of vast areas and units are becoming increasingly clear and the Portuguese nation, being integrated and multi-continental, meets fundamentally the real needs of all its peoples far better than could their division into impracticable political units, that would sooner or later become economically subject to other countries and would end up by losing their national independence."10

20. During a visit to Mozambique in July 1966, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Mr. Franco Nogueira, took the occasion to answer certain criticisms and doubts regarding Portugal's overseas policy and also to explain why the Government had no alternative but to continue its present course:

"Some in our country seem to be perturbed by doubts in the scrupulousness of their consciences. Even if our position is based on valid political and legal justifications, is it equally secure on a moral basis? We should unhesitatingly reply in the affirmative, for the generous idealism of others, as it were, hardly conceals national aims; and, besides, the principles that are proclaimed in order to accuse us are not in fact being carried out; and, finally, our own principles are not less noble or honourable than those. Some in our country might ask if there is no other more practical, more advantageous method of defence, some other doctrinal construction, any other process of argument. Is not our position characterized by its rigidity and inflexibility, a refusal to listen to others, as if we surrounded ourselves by an iron wall? Would it not be better to try to soothe away others' hate, by yielding a little in what is secondary, the better to save the fundamental, or trying to gain the support of some great Powers, at least to satisfy them in theory, by mere declaration of intention, even if in our hearts we do not intend to carry them out in practice? To all this I would answer that those who think in this manner are not realists, but naïve people. Our position must be as rigid as the enemy's, because the latter neither alters nor restricts his aims. Our adversaries know that if they can make the slightest breach in any of our principles, we should at once be at their mercy; we should then be fighting on our critics' ground, not on our own; we should be throwing up the logic of our position to submit to

the enemy's logic; without our enemy's having accepted anything of our aims, we should have accepted everything others want to thrust on us. There can be no partial transigence, no half compromises, no possible stops halfway down a slope. We must realize once and for all that the enemy's aim is not to bring into Angola or Mozambique human rights, individual liberty and collective progress, so that the methods that would lead to such ends could be discussed. No, the aim is to dominate Angola and Mozambique, to include them in the spheres of foreign influences, to utilize their economic and strategic position for the benefit of major policies of other Powers"11

21. Portugal's overseas policy and guidelines for future action were also discussed by various leaders participating in the series of lectures under the title "Praise the past and build the future" as part of the eight-month-long commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of Portugal's national revolution. Speaking on Portugal's national defence, 12 Brigadier-General Kaulza de Arriaga, former Secretary of State for Air, said that from the point of view of world strategy, Portugal with its Overseas Territories was a unique nation both as regards its ethnic composition and its geographical discontinuity. The future of the Portuguese nation depended, he said, on a policy of unity and the exercise of full Portuguese sovereignty over all the Territories comprising the nation. Measures required "to strengthen the national structure" involved in order of priority: in the short term, improved inter-territorial communications; in the medium term, economic development; and in the long term, national population growth, settlement of Angola and Mozambique, raising the level of development of both Europeans and Africans and a special effort in the field of research. In terms of strategy, Portugal's position in the western world could remain significant only if it was based on a participation in military installations and bases which kept pace with general developments.

22. In Africa, the speaker said, Portugal had to face the fact the war against it would continue, with varying intensity, for an indefinite period. This was a prolonged war which demanded great economy in its conduct and operation. Thus Portugal's strategy in regard to its struggle in Africa must be developed along the following lines: externally on the diplomatic, psychological, economic and military fronts; internally it must counter subversion (see section 2 below on Angola) and be prepared for traditional large-scale military actions; and finally it must obtain wherever possible the necessary war materials.

23. Discussing the situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, he said that land communications in these Territories were inadequate to allow rapid military action, and this was one of the main obstacles to counter subversive action. He urged that if necessary, infantry units should be used to help build the roads urgently needed.

24. In the Overseas Territories, defensive forces needed to be supplemented by highly mobile airborne striking forces. This required a better supply of aircraft and better intelligence work. Commenting on the problem of obtaining military supplies, he said that while some foreign sources had been obstructive, others had

⁹ Boletim Geral do Ultramar (July 1966), p. 317, English

text.

10 "Dr. Salazar on 40 years of Portuguese Progress" (an interview) in Southern Africa, 18 April 1966.

¹¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, An Old Debate. An address by A. Franco Nogueira, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Lisbon, 1966, p. 18, English text.
¹² Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 21 October 1966.

managed to furnish arms on a more or less regular basis. The real solution lay in substituting arms manufactured in Portugal. Although Portugal was self-sufficient as regards a great deal of the material used by the army, it was dependent on foreign sources for much of its naval and air material.

25. The importance of the Overseas Territories to Portugal was also stressed by other speakers. Professor Daniel Barbosa, former Minister of Economy and at present Governor of the Banco de Fomento Nacional, in a long speech entitled "New directions of economic policy",13 explained that the economic integration of the Portuguese realm was intended not only as a means of accelerating progress and to enable Portugal better to face the world but also to strengthen the political unity which was the essential feature of the Portuguese nation. He also said that Portugal's survival as a nation could depend on its retaining sovereignty over its African Territories. It was necessary for Portugal to try to divert to the Territories the hundreds and thousands of emigrants now going to foreign countries, but he warned that large-scale settlement would be possible only if conditions of living and economic opportunities in the Territories were improved so as to attract settlers in sufficient numbers.

26. Only one speaker in the series of commemorative lectures referred to the question of the future political and administrative relationship of the Overseas Territories with Portugal. This was Admiral Lopez Alvez,14 who had been Overseas Minister at the time of the Angola uprising. Any changes, he said, had to be guided by the fundamental principle of the indestructible unity of the composite parts of the Nation. Although many changes were hypothetically possible, he suggested that the two basic directions should be towards creating national services and the progressive administrative decentralization of authority by granting each Territory, in accordance with its special circumstances, wider powers of decision. Changes in both directions had to be undertaken together to ensure the best use of technical resources. While the goal of administrative decentralization was to increase the authority of the local government bodies and elected groups, two safeguards had to be kept in mind: (i) there should never be any service in any Territory which did not come under the Governor's authority, and (ii) the territorial governments should never be given authority in matters which were not under the control of the Overseas Minister. On the other hand, it could be expected that the participation of the Overseas Territories in central government matters would become more prominent as a result of their increased representation in the "higher organs of sovereignty", such as the Overseas Council, the Corporative Chamber and the National Assembly.

27. Towards the end of 1966, Portugal's continued pursuit of a military solution to the problem of its Overseas Territories appeared to be causing increased concern in Portugal as fighting in Angola extended to the eastern border and military expenditures continued to rise. First, in October 1966 in Lisbon, a group of five persons asked permission from the Government to take part in a series of lectures commemorating the national revolution because they did not share the views expressed or the official conception of the New State, particularly so far as its future was concerned. Then in November, 118 Portuguese of Socialist, Christian Democratic and Liberal views, including many Catholic

leaders, claiming that they represented "millions of Portuguese who are opposed to the present régime", issued a manifesto in which they accused the Government of political oppression, forced labour and racial discrimination in favour of capitalism in the Overseas Territories. They said that "the Government of Mr. Salazar has not the competence, the moral authority, the prestige, or the open intelligence to allow it to face the historical problem of decolonization of the Overseas Territories". They found the Government's choice of policy in the Overseas Territories "ill-fated", as self-determination was a principle above discussion. In a further statement addressed to the President of Portugal in March 1967, forty-six members of the Social Democratic Action group criticized the Government's overseas policy and called on it to recognize the right of the Territories to self-determination. The statement cited at length the errors which, its authors said, had been committed by the Government in India and Macao, and called for a full discussion of this subject. The statement also called on the Government urgently to take a position on the question of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (on Portugal's position as regards sanctions, see section 3 below on Mozambique). Finally, the statement protested against the censorship of the Press and "the excessive use which is made of it"

28. As if replying to the earlier criticisms, the Minister for Overseas Territories of Portugal, Mr. Silva Cunha, at the swearing in of the new Governor-General of Angola in November 1966 (see below), described Portugal's approach to the Overseas Territories as a form of decolonization.¹⁵ He explained that, since colonization was a form of contact between peoples of different cultures and civilizations, it was inherent in the relationship established that colonization tends to replace itself because of the evolution it brings about. Decolonization could be achieved either through a process of cultural unification and "the integration of the colonized in the same social and political unit" or through the separation of the colonizers and the colonized, the latter taking over the management of their own affairs. However, he said, real decolonization only takes place when integration or emancipation lead to a real and profound transformation of the colonized, either when there is a real union of cultures, which did not imply uniformity, or when the colonized can live autonomously and independently.

29. Mr. Silva Cunha said that the characteristics of the present politico-juridical situation in the Overseas Territories were: (a) political unity expressed through equality in status of all Portuguese nationals irrespective of race, religion or culture; (b) economic solidarity of all the separate units comprising Portuguese Territories, expressed especially in the legislation establishing the Portuguese common market, which had already begun to come into effect; and (c) extension to all elements of the Portuguese population benefits or social legislation strictly in harmony with international conventions, especially those of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). This theme, that economic development and social integration constitute Portugal's approach to the problem of decolonization, has been echoed recently also in Angola. Thus for instance, on taking office, the Provincial Secretary for Rural Development, Mr. Vasco de Sousa Dias, expressed his satisfaction at being chosen "to return to the front line" with responsibilities for "activities which the Minister for Overseas Territories has designated as decolonization

¹³ Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 11 October 1966.

¹⁴ Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 21 December 1966.

¹⁵ Diário de Luanda, 15 November 1966.

practiced by Portugal without any racial discrimination". Such decolonization, he said, had as its ultimate goal the integration of the less developed peoples through their social advancement to the full extent of their capacities.

Military activities and defence expenditure

30. For Portugal, as President Thomaz noted in his 1967 New Year's address, 1966 was overshadowed by the "defence of the Overseas Territories". 18 Owing to intensified fighting in Angola since August (see addendum), it is estimated that Portugal now has over 120,000 troops in its Overseas Territories. To meet the growing needs of the armed forces, towards the end of the year new regulations were introduced in Portugal extending the length of compulsory military service for all citizens from a previous maximum period of twenty-four months (eighteen months of active service and a maximum training period of six months) to a period of three years, extendible up to a maximum of four years.

31. Since the new regulations apply to all citizens, Africans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration will be subject also to military service, which, as now defined, will no longer be limited to participation in the armed forces but will include any work contributing to national defence "within the military framework". For the first time, women will be admitted into the armed forces in capacities other than nurses. To ensure the full use of national manpower, men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two will not be allowed to emigrate until they have completed their military service, and special provisions have been included to enable persons with professional training to serve in their own fields whenever possible, especially in the Overseas Territories. A further new measure is the introduction of subsidies to be paid to families of servicemen who are without adequate means of support.

32. In December 1966, Portugal took a further step (Decree 47,381 of 15 December) to accelerate the modernization and expansion of the Portuguese navy, begun in 1964, by authorizing the purchase of six additional corvettes. The fleet expansion is part of Portugal's long-term overseas defence programme with emphasis on ships for coastal defence and protection of maritime routes between Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Eleven new ships are under construction: four escort destroyers and four submarines (to be paid for entirely by Portugal) are being built in France under the agreement concluded in 1964 (Decree 45,889 of 24 August) and another three escort destroyers are being built in Portugal. For the purchase of the first four of the six new corvettes, a total of 580 million escudos have been authorized to be paid over the period 1966-74. Apart from the additions to the fleet, Portugal has also increased considerably the number of small craft of various types to be used on lakes and rivers by the defence forces in the Overseas Territories.

33. According to the 1967 budget estimates, the total revenue of the Portuguese Government is expected to reach 20,206 million escudos and expenditure 20,204.3 million escudos, leaving a surplus of 1.7 million escudos. Ordinary expenditure has been kept to a minimum, amounting to 14,962.1 million escudos so that there will be a surplus of 2,356.7 million escudos to finance part of the extraordinary expenditures totalling 7,598.9 million escudos.

34. Of the extraordinary budget, a total of 5,347

million escudos is allocated for national defence (5,341 million escudos) and public security (6 million escudos). This represents a 33 per cent increase over the 1966 defence allocations, which amounted to 4,011 million escudos, and is the largest increase since the Angola uprising in 1961. Of the total defence allocations for 1967, 3,500 million escudos, an increase of 1,000 million escudos over 1966, are for the "extraordinary military forces in the Overseas Territories". For the acquisition of the four destroyers and four submarines now being built in France, 500 million escudos are allocated, which together with an initial sum of 45 million escudos for the first four new corvettes and 85 million escudos for the construction of escort ships (navios escoltas) brings the total expenditure for the year on modernization of the navy to 630 million escudos.

35. In his commemorative lecture referred to above, Brigadier-General Kaulza de Arriaga¹⁷ pointed out that Portugal's defence expenditure was 6.6 per cent of the gross national product¹⁸ and 34.3 per cent of the total public expenditure. These percentages were higher than corresponding figures for Belgium, France and Denmark. In terms of absolute value, Portugal's defence expenditure, which was below 6,000 million escudos,19 was only about half of that which each of the other three countries spent. The annual contribution per person in Portugal was only about 700 escudos and this was also lower than the other European countries. In his view, Portugal's low per capita income seriously affected the country's defence capacity and therefore accelerated economic development would be an essential factor affecting national strategy and defence. While it was not possible for Portugal to reach a stage of economic development in the near future which would ensure it "strategic tranquillity", such a stage was a possibility as an intermediate goal and the nation should be required to make the effort.

36. To finance the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, Portugal raised two foreign loans of \$US20 million each by bond issue in the United States in 1965 and 1966 and it has issued another series of development bonds totalling \$US18 million at 7 per cent interest, which, however, were not offered for sale in the United States. An examination of the extraordinary budget²⁰ in recent years shows a growing reliance

19 The actual amount is probably higher since it has been reported that already for 1965 defence costs were 7,705 million escudos (Financial Times, 10 August 1966).

20 Sources of extraordinary budget (in million escudos)

1967 1965 1966 1964 Total extraordinary revenue, the sources of which include: 5.187.0 6,027.2 6,383.8 7,598.9 Minting 68.5 67.8 78.5 162.5 Overseas defence and development tax 100.0 1,602.8 1,901.1 1,350.0 Internal loans 3,120.4 Development bonds (internal) 348.4 673.0 232.0 432.0 External loans 1,726.7 1,058.5 1,365.7 220.0 Surplus from ordinary 200.0 1,791.0 2,354.8 budget Ordinary budget 910.7 707.0

¹⁶ Diário de Luanda, 2 January 1967.

¹⁷ Diário de Noticias, Lisbon, 21 October 1966.

¹⁸ This figure of 6.6 per cent of the gross national product is close to the figure reported in a United States State Department survey of defence expenditures by NATO countries and published in the Diário de Noticias, Lisbon, 27 December 1966. It may be pointed out that the figures given in the 1966 background paper on Territories under Portuguese administration (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 35) were taken from the Portuguese budget report and refer to budgetary allocations for defence and not to actual expenditures.

on Portuguese domestic financial sources. Whereas in 1964 almost one third of the extraordinary expenditure was financed from external loans, in 1967 almost half of the total (46 per cent) is to be raised by internal loans and bonds, over 30 per cent from the ordinary budget surplus and only slightly over 3 per cent from external loans. Since both ordinary sources of revenue and the capacity of the internal market to buy bonds depend on the economic development of the country, it is apparent that, if this trend continues, Portugal's capacity to afford increased defence costs in the future may depend upon an acceleration of its economic growth.

- 37. Since 1961, though extraordinary budgetary allocations for development had increased by 72 per cent to 2,145.4 million escudos in 1967, in the same period defence allocations increased by 220 per cent from 1,670 million escudos to 5,347 million escudos (and actual expenditures were probably at least 50 per cent more than original estimates). Comparing the 1967 budget with that for 1966, it is seen that development allocations have been cut back by 2.5 per cent, while defence allocations rose by 33 per cent. Allocations for the item "other investments", which includes public buildings and utilities, have also been cut back, dropping from 731.6 million escudos in 1961 to 106.5 million escudos in 1967.
- 38. In Portugal, the burden of defence on the economy has already become noticeable in the guise of rising inflation,²¹ shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour, mounting taxes and a growing trade deficit. Since 1961, revenue from direct taxes has increased by 72 per cent (from 2,673.5 million to 4,602 million escudos in 1967); revenue from indirect taxes, which up to last year had increased less rapidly, is expected to total 5,297 million escudos in 1967 as a result of a new sales tax which will yield around 1,000 million escudos.
- 39. External and internal borrowing has led to an increase in the annual cost of servicing the public debt by 128 per cent since 1961 to 2,114.5 million escudos in 1967. Because of the general slowing down of the rate of economic growth in 196622 and the shortage of capital (the total volume of credit granted by the Central Bank showed a decline of 16.6 per cent in 1966 from that of 1965) some economists have expressed concern that defence efforts could compromise Portugal's development aims. According to a recent report,23 Portugal's gross domestic product in 1966 compared with the preceding year showed an increase of much less than the average annual rise of 6 per cent envisaged in the Transitional Development Plan for 1965 to 1967, and it was also lower than the average annual increase since 1960.

Economic integration and development

40. Although Portugal is officially considered to be an integrated multi-continental nation (see para. 19 above) and though in fact the politico-juridical framework has now been completed, economic integration of

21 The consumer price index (1960 = 100) rose from 109 in the third quarter of 1964 to 119 in the first quarter of 1966 (Diário de Noticias, Lisbon, 27 December 1966), and the index of food prices rose from 116 to 130 in the first four months of 1966 (Financial Times), 5 December 1966, p. 43).

The increase in the gross national product in 1966 was less than in 1965 and 1964, and the rate of formation of fixed capital in 1965 and 1964 was less than in 1963 (Diário de Noticias,

Lisbon, 22 November 1966).

23 Report to the Annual General Meeting of the Bank of Lisbon and Azores by the Chairman of the Board of Directors (Diário de Noticias, Lisbon, 28 January 1967).

the Overseas Territories with Portugal is yet to be achieved. The goal of economic integration, as a Portuguese author has expressed it,²⁴ is to forge together into an organic whole and for the greater benefit of each of the parts, the medium level economy of Portugal with the under-developed economies of the Overseas Territories which are characterized by the existence side by side of subsistence and market economies and social groups of disparate productivity.

- 41. What is called the "Portuguese realm" (o espaço português) comprises an area of 2.2 million square kilometres with a population of over 23 million. Portugal and the adjacent islands, however, account for only 4.4 per cent of the area (91,970 square kilometres) and about 40 per cent of the population. Because of the disparities existing among the different components of the realm, particularly as regards their size, the nature of their economies and their different stages of economic development, the basic economic integration law (Decree Law 44,016 of 8 November 1961²⁵) provided that the removal of barriers to the free circulation of goods, capital and persons should be progressive over a period of ten years.
- 42. In setting out various steps for the establishment of the Portuguese common market and an escudo zone, the law recognized that the process of economic integration had to be closely associated with the development of the individual Territories. Thus, while economic growth is a pre-condition for the successful elimination of restrictions on movements of goods, capital and persons, the progressive freeing of such movements would in turn give a decisive impulse to accelerated economic development of each of the complementary units and stimulate a more efficient division of labour.
- 43. As a first step towards the establishment of a Portuguese common market in 1962, duties were abolished on imports into Portugal of all "national goods" of which the total trade with Portugal in 1960 did not exceed 50,000 escudos (less than \$US2,000). Also eliminated at the same time were duties on exports from Portugal and the adjacent islands to the Overseas Territories. Later, in 1963, import duties were abolished on goods from the Territories, the total value of which amounted to 20 per cent of the purchases by Portugal in each Territory, and in 1964, import duties on goods from the Territories entering Portugal were eliminated. The next step was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 1967 with the removal of import duties in each Territory on goods from Portugal and the adjacent islands, the total value of which represented at least 40 per cent of their respective imports in 1960. Remaining duties on "national goods" traded within the espaço português are to be progressively eliminated according to the special circumstances of each unit.
- 44. As noted above, the original plan envisaged that the economic integration of Portugal with its Overseas Territories should be completed by 1972, half of which period has already elapsed. Although no official assessment of the progress made has been published, available data on the changing pattern of trade, the movement of capital between Portugal and the Overseas Territories give some indication of the effects of the changes in stimulating economic development of the separate units and what Premier Salazar

²⁴ Henrique Cabrita, "Integração económica do espaço português", Ultramar, No. 10 (October-December 1962), Lisbon, p. 59.

²⁵ Extracts of this Decree Law appear in document A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, pp. 66-70.

described as "the advantages of collaboration and integration of vast areas". The data on Portugal's trade with the Overseas Territories and the way in which capital movement has affected Portugal's balance of payments are reviewed in the following paragraphs. Information on the situation in the individual Territories will be given in the relevant sections on each Territory.

(a) Effects on trade between Portugal and the Territories

45. Figures published in the first quarter of 1966²⁶ show that from 1962 to 1965 Portugal's imports from the Overseas Territories increased by 67 per cent from 2,122 million to 3,575 million escudos. In contrast, exports to the Overseas Territories increased from 2,391 million to 4,104 million escudos, or about 72 per cent. Over the same period, Portugal's imports from countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) rose from 3,940 million to 5,567 million escudos and exports to EFTA countries from 2,208 million to 4,500 million escudos, representing increases of 41 per cent and about 102 per cent respectively. An article in the Portuguese Press²⁷ suggests that so far Portugal has benefited more from the reduction in tariffs than the Overseas Territories and that more effort has to be made to develop the Territories to enable them to benefit from the metropolitan market.

(b) Exchange transactions and balance of payments between territorial units

46. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the Overseas Territories, while forming an "integral part of the Portuguese State", are "financially independent" but are nevertheless subject to the government's superintendence. Each Territory has its own budget and is responsible for its own revenues—except for revenue resulting from common property or services and those assigned to common funds (Organic Law, article LVIII). Each Territory also has its own currency which, though nominally on par with the metropolitan escudo, is subject to exchange controls.

47. In order to facilitate the free transaction of goods, services and capital, in addition to the removal of quotas and customs duties, a multilateral clearing system for payments within the escudo zone was envisaged under the 1961 legislation (Decree Law 40,166). Details of the system were set out in legislation enacted in 1962 (Decree Law 44,703 of 17 November) and the system came into effect on 1 January 1963. The major feature of the new system of payments is the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund which acts as a centralized escudo reserve fund for all the Territories by providing funds on a temporary basis to cover interterritorial transactions that the Territories themselves are not able to meet. However, the new system of payments has not only not eased exchange restrictions, but, as shown below, it has created new difficulties which many consider inimicable to the expansion of free trade in the escudo zone.

48. Although the escudo zone is intended to "free" capital movement between the separate territories, the existing restrictions have led some observers to consider that it represents the cornerstone of Lisbon's control over the Overseas Provinces. At present, each of the Territories has its own budget, tax system, currency, issuing bank and exchange fund. Within the Portuguese realm (i.e., both between the Territories and between the Territories and Portugal), payment transactions are cleared through a central exchange which is the Bank of Portugal in Lisbon. The exchange holdings of each Territory (in metropolitan escudos, gold and foreign exchange) are kept in separate reserve funds in the Bank of Portugal. When a Territory has inadequate exchange reserves to pay its own accounts, it may borrow from the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund which is operated by the Bank.²⁹ However, since all accounts cleared with the Bank are in metropolitan escudos, the net gold and foreign exchange earned by the Territory benefit Portugal's own account. The following table shows the important role played by the foreign exchange earnings of the Territories in the escudo zone balance of payments.

PORTUGAL'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(Million escudos)

1964	Metropolitan	Overseas Provinces	Escudo zone
Trade	6,162	+ 929	5,233
Invisibles	+2,958	+2,757	+5,715
Capital movemen	t . +3,040	60	+2,980
To	ral — 124	+3,626	+3,502
1965 Trade	—8,058	— 781	8,839
Invisibles	+4,991	+3,398	+8,385
Capital movemen		- 163 +2,454	+2,711 +2,323

49. Although complete figures are not yet available for 1966, according to a recent report,³⁰ the foreign exchange earned by the Overseas Territories is becoming an increasingly important factor in Portugal's balance of payments with foreign countries. The report noted that, during the first nine months of 1966, despite Portugal's own growing trade deficit (which amounted to 8,000 million escudos as compared to 7,100 million escudos in the corresponding period of 1965), the surplus from foreign exchange transactions (saldo de balança de liquidações combiais) including Portugal's own invisible earnings in the Bank of Portugal amounted to 750 million escudos and this was 550 million escudos more than that of the same period of 1965.

50. The difficulties caused by the present system of exchange controls have been the subject of criticism

30 Report to the annual general meeting of the Bank of Lisbon and Azores by Dr. Guilherme Moreira, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Diário de Noticias, Lisbon, 28 January

²⁶ Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 5 April 1966.

²⁷ Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 5 April 1966.

²⁸ The Fund has a total capital of 1,500 million escudos in which each Territory has a proportional share as follows: Cape Verde, 60 million escudos; Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, 140 million escudos; São Tomé and Príncipe, 60 million escudos; Angola, 750 million escudos; Mozambique, 450 million escudos; and Macau and Timor each 20 million escudos.

²⁹ Each Territory may borrow on an "automatic" basis up to one third of the capital it has subscribed (see foot-note 28), which for Angola is therefore 250 million and for Mozambique 150 million escudos. The Territories may also obtain one or more special loans from the Fund under certain conditions negotiated beforehand between the Government of the Territory concerned and the Fund. As a general rule, the total amount a Territory can borrow may not exceed the amount of its own share in the Fund.

in Portugal and in the Territories. Reference was also made to this problem in an order from the Ministry of the Economy on wine-growing policy.⁸¹ Since wine is one of Portugal's principal exports to the Overseas Territories,³² attention is being given to the expansion of their markets for wine through: (i) directly or indirectly stimulating the increased consumption of wine and other allied beverages; and (ii) reducing the intermediary charges in the marketing chain but maintaining the quality of wine reaching the consumer. The order notes that the expansion of the markets in the Overseas Territories, not only for wine but also for other non-essential consumer goods from any other "national territory", would require a larger amount of capital than people were willing to risk in the interruptions of transfers due to the inadequacies of the present system of payments. The risks involved not only prejudiced investments but also resulted in the consumer Territories going into production themselves which was not the most economical solution.33

- 51. As reported last year, the freeing of movement of goods without a more liberalized system of payments had already created a serious situation in Angola in 1965 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 126-130). During 1966, difficulties in securing exchange continued in Angola and became more serious in Mozambique. Towards the end of the year, stiff penalties were introduced in Portugal to put a stop to an increasing number of illegal transfers of capital (Decree 47,413 of 23 December). According to certain estimates, the amount of money transferred abroad runs into thousand millions of escudos mainly in Europe and the United States and that the shortage of medium-term and long-term capital available from commercial banks makes the recovery of this money important.
- 52. Clandestine dealings in foreign exchange have also increased in Angola. Early in 1967, the Governor General issued a statement³⁴ saying that the judicial police and PIDE were being called upon to put a stop to such activities and that heavy penalties would be applied to all persons who violated the exchange regulations or who collaborated directly or indirectly with foreign organizations enticing the exodus of capital. The Portuguese Government is now studying how to put into effect fully the system of payments envisaged in Decree Laws 44,016 and 44,703, which, in turn, will depend on the results of a survey being made of the economic structures and current determinants of the balance of payments of the various Territories.
- 53. The illegal exodus of capital from Portugal is due partly to the fact that interest rates in other countries are substantially higher than in Portugal. In Portugal, although the statutory interest rate is set at 5 per cent per annum, most of the Government's borrowing has been at lower rates. Pending the revision of measures affecting the money market, and without prejudice to such future measures, the Government in January 196785 authorized a new series of 5 per cent treasury bonds (obrigações do tesouro 5 por cento 1967, fomento económico) totalling 1,000 million escudos. The Government hopes that the higher interest rate will attract savings and will reduce the exodus of capital. The proceeds from the bonds are to be used

exclusively for investments in plans approved by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs.

(c) Effect on development of the Overseas Territories

(i) Planning

54. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, which is now in its last year, was intended to bridge the gap between plans which were drawn up for each geographical unit and the next plan which will deal with different sectors of the "national economy" of the Portuguese realm. Thus, in the Territories, the Transitional Plan was intended mainly to stimulate private investment, to co-ordinate and to set out the lines of orientation towards the forging of a national economy. As a means of ensuring a greater degree of consultation and co-ordination, it was decided in 1966 to provide for increased territorial representation in the working groups preparing the Third National Development Plan.

55. During 1966, both the Overseas Services and the statistical services in the Territories were reorganized. The new statute unifies the Overseas Services and establishes the conditions of service in the Overseas Territories. To meet the growing need for statistical data by national and international bodies and to facilitate economic planning of the Portuguese realm as a whole, the national statistical services and the statistical system have been reorganized (Decree Laws 46,925 and 46,926 of 29 March 1960). The over-all responsibility is vested in the National Council of Statistics as a policy-making and co-ordinating body. The National Institute of Statistics will be responsible for the collection, study and presentation of statistics both in Portugal and the Overseas Territories. It is intended that the present statistical services in the Territories will become branches of the Institute. Heretofore, the lack of statistical data has hampered economic and development studies.36 Among all the Overseas Territories, Cape Verde is the only one for which an attempt has been made to calculate the gross national product. For Angola and Mozambique, the difficulties in obtaining statistics relating to the subsistence sector and services have made such calculations impossible. Under the new system, there are to be regular (every ten years) censuses of population, agriculture, extractive and transforming industries, distribution and services and housing.

56. Under the new laws (Decrees 46,925 and 46,926 of 29 March 1966), transgressions in the preparation and use of statistics are subject to fines varying from 50 to 10,000 escudos. For instance, fines range from 50 to 6,000 escudos for giving inaccurate information or failing to give the information required or, in the time allowed, publication of statistics without prior approval of the Institute or publication of statistics not in accordance with the standards of the Institute. Since it is officially claimed that Portugal does not maintain statistics on a racial basis, it appears likely that, in future, publications trying to analyse social data on such a basis could be prosecuted under these provisions.

(ii) Financing of development

57. In addition to the measures affecting trade and balance of payments referred to above, steps have been taken to accelerate the economic development of the

³¹ Ministério da Economia, Despacho, "A política vitivínicola," Diário do Govêrno, Series I, 9 December 1966.
32 In 1966 the Overseas Territories imported 35.7 million gallons of wine from Portugal (Cape Times, 6 January 1967).
33 Diário do Govêrno, Series I, 9 December 1966, p. 2178.
34 Diário de Luanda, 27 January 1967.
35 Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 27 January 1967.

³⁶ Mário de Oliveira, Problemas do Ultramar no Plano Intercalar de Fomento, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1964, p. 16.

Territories by easing the regulations on foreign investments, expanding banking and credit facilities and relaxing some of the controls over local industries (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 52-68). Although conditions for foreign investments have been eased and some new foreign investments were made in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration during 1966 (see sections on each Territory), there are indications that, in order to strengthen economic integration, preference is given to national companies and national capital in the development of certain sectors in the Overseas Territories. For instance, the selection of ANGOL to participate in petroleum exploitation in Angola was said to be guided by this policy (see section 2 below on Angola).

58. To facilitate development financing, the banking system in the Territories was revised in 1965 (A/ 6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 62-64). This has enabled existing banks in Angola and Mozambique to establish new branches and a number of other banks have been authorized to establish offices in these Territories; thus during 1966 the Banco Standard-Totta, controlled jointly by the Banco Totta Aliança of Portugal and the Standard Bank of South Africa, opened branches in both Angola and Mozambique as did a new credit bank, the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial, which supplies credit to industries producing for home consumption.

59. In spite of the measures to stimulate development, economic growth in most sectors of Angola was at a slower rate than in 1965, while in Mozambique the effects were visible mainly in the industrial sector and in new investments in sugar production (see section 3 below on Mozambique), agricultural production remaining, in general, below the level of earlier years. Credits granted by the National Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Nacional) to the Overseas Territories in 1965 dropped to a total of 549 million escudos, compared with 1,030 million escudos in 1964. These credits included fifteen direct loans to Angola amounting to 126 million escudos, eleven loans to Mozambique totalling 248 million escudos and one loan each to Guinea under Portuguese administration and to Timor for 4 million and 5 million escudos respectively. Other operations of the Bank consisted of a 25 million escudos participation in the financing of a paper goods factory in Angola, investment of 40 million escudos in a soft drink factory in Mozambique and a guarantee of 71 million escudos to an industrial concern in Mozambique.37

60. So far, the most immediate effect of the 1965 legislation on the co-ordination of industrial development has been the establishment or projected establishment of several new cotton spinning mills in Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, the cotton regulations presently in force in these Territories still require them to export most of their raw cotton to Portugal in order to supply the metropolitan textile industry. A similar situation also applies in respect of sugar, production of which is being increased, especially in Mozambique. Under the existing regulations, which have been extended until 1982 (Decree 47,337 of 24 November 1966), the Overseas Territories are assigned guaranteed quotas for the supply of sugar to Portugal. Recently, however, the existing sugar refineries in Portugal have been authorized to increase their refining capacity to 300,000 tons per annum³⁸ to meet

the anticipated increase in Portugal's sugar consumption over the next ten to twelve years. Since other sugar producing countries are cutting back production in order to stabilize world prices, this presumably means that in the Overseas Territories priority will still be given to the supply of sugar to Portugal in a semi-refined state.

61. A study by the National Institute of Statistics published in 196639 showed that almost half of Portugal's imports from the Overseas Territories consisted of agricultural products and recent developments do not indicate any significant change in this trade pattern. On the contrary, efforts are being made to expand the exports of the primary products of the Territories to meet Portugal's needs. Thus, in June 1966, the Junta Nacional dos Produtos Pecuários in Lisbon was authorized to set up with representatives of producers in Angola and Mozambique a scheme for supplying Portugal with meat.40 However, instead of giving producers in the Territories a subsidy, as is paid to meat producers in Portugal and in the adjacent islands, frozen meat imported from these Territories will be guaranteed the price quoted on the international market. It is hoped thereby to encourage production to the extent that Portugal may gradually reduce its foreign imports. The difference in the price paid to producers and the sale price in Portugal (which is lower) is to be made up from the Fundo de Abastecimento as in the case of meat imported from foreign countries (see also sections on Angola and Mozambique).

62. The central Government is also taking measures to increase fruit exports from the Territories to Portugal. Early in 1966, on the recommendations of a special working group, the Minister for Overseas Territories laid down guidelines for the production and transportation of banana exports to Portugal. Several refrigerated ships have been acquired for this purpose and have begun operations. Banana production is being encouraged especially in Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe and in Cape Verde and citrus fruit production in Mozambique. In January 1967, another working group was established in the Overseas Ministry to stimulate fruit production in the Overseas Territories and to assist government and private undertakings. The working group is to collaborate with the territorial Governments in the establishment of producer associations, to co-ordinate and advise on the production of the most suitable varieties both for the national and international markets and to propose measures necessary for the marketing and transport of the fruits.

Social integration and cultural assimilation

63. Since the abolition in 1961 of the Native Statute, more emphasis is being given in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea to the problem of the progressive integration of the indigenous populations in the non-indigenous organization of these Territories.

64. From the Portuguese point of view,⁴¹ the social problems in these Territories are different from those

in Angola and Mozambique.

1 Narana Coissoró, "Os princípios fundamentais do direito Ultramarino português", Estudos Políticos e Sociais, vol. IV,

No. 1, Lisbon, 1966, offprint, p. 6.

³⁷ Banco de Fomento Nacional, Relatório Anual, 1965, p. 17.

³⁸ Diário, Lourenço Marques, 16 November 1966.

³⁹ Boletim Mensal, August 1966, as reported in the Diário, Lourenço Marques, 6 November 1966.

⁴⁰ In order to help stimulate livestock reproduction in the Overseas Territories, the Veterinary Services were reorganized and strengthened and veterinary research institutes were set up

in the smaller Territories where no "cultural competition" exists (in Cape Verde and São Tomé because the inhabitants are predominantly mestiço, in Macau because they are "Luso-Chinese", and in Timor because they are "Luso-Indonesian-Malayan"). The three Territories in Africa are characterized by the fact that, whereas the indigenous population constitute a numerical majority, they live mainly in traditional societies and it is the small number of originários from Portugal who are considered to form the "sociological majority" because as a group they are considered to possess "enlightenment" and education and control political power, technological and economic development.

65. In the past, because of these differences, the African population in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea were governed by the Native Statute⁴² and their integration within the normative Portuguese pattern of local government and administration depended on their attaining the "state of development" (estado de evolução) 43 deemed necessary for them to be governed by Portuguese civil law. As a result of the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 (Decree 43,896 of 6 September 1961), Africans may now opt to be governed by Portuguese civil law without having to meet any educational or cultural requirements. Nevertheless, though it has been suggested that this means that an African's juridical status no longer depends on his "state of development",44 in practice the administrative division of the African Territories still retains the dual pattern as before, with the predominantly African areas organized into regedorias, forming administrative posts because, as provided in the Revised Overseas Organic Law of 1963 (article XLV), these are considered to be regions which have not attained the "economic and social development deemed necessary" for the normative administrative pattern of the concelho to be established.45

66. Up to 1961, when the Native Statute was repealed, most of the regions predominantly occupied by Africans were classified as *circumscrições*, almost entirely made up of *regedorias*, in which native custom and usage applied. In recent years, there has been a progressive increase in the number of *concelhos* (especially in Angola) reflecting economic and social changes brought about partly by increased European settlement and, in the coffee growing areas, partly due to the changing role of the African farmer.

67. During 1966, further changes in administrative divisions were in process or under consideration in

both Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, special rural reorganization committees have been established at the district level to plan and regroup the rural population (see section on Angola). In Mozambique, more particular attention is being given to the north, where the administrative division of each district is to be revised and brought in line with actual needs in order to facilitate the "stabilization of the local population" (fixação de populações) and to promote the better use of resources. However, as the Minister for Overseas Territories noted in May 1966,46 the actual division of the districts had to take into account as a basic consideration the "equilibrium and co-ordination" (equilibrio e articulação) between the self-governing local bodies and the administrative units which were not self-governing. He said that it was therefore necessary to use the maximum prudence in the creation of new local government bodies because these, by their nature, were only justified when they possessed the human and material resources which enabled them to be truly self-governing as the law envisaged.

68. In practice, the administrative areas which are not "self-governing" are the *regedorias* in which the majority of Africans live. Since, according to the explanation provided by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, self-government in the Overseas Territories is to be developed through increased number of local government bodies, it is not clear whether the statement by the Minister for Overseas Territories foreshadows a slowing down of the previously envisaged progress of transition of the African areas towards self-government or the need to provide greater safeguards for the African population coming under the control of the mainly European elected local government bodies. The new Overseas Administrative Code may be expected to provide a clearer picture of any changes introduced in the administrative structure of the Territories.

69. In Angola, where plans for rural regrouping of the population were first formulated in 1962 (A) 6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, paras. 168 ff.), a few pilot projects have only recently come into operation after a complete reorientation. As will be seen in the section on Angola, rural regrouping, which had been intended "to establish a natural hierarchy of classes" with zones of influence radiating from "a civilized nucleus", will now form an integral part of the general plan for social promotion and settlement with a view to improving rural communities and developing their resources. However, the regrouping is to be based on areas with geographical, economic and social unity. Particular consideration is to be given to changes necessary in agriculture and livestock raising and the incorporation (enquadramento) of traditional infrastructures in the "national complex". It appears from the orientation to be given to regrouping and delimitation of regedorias, which are to be planned with the co-operation of the inhabitants, that recognition is now being given to the importance of economic development as a basis of social change and that transformation cannot be imposed from above but requires the willing co-operation of those involved.

70. In Mozambique also, there are indications that a need is felt for a new approach to rural reorganization and the economic and social progress of the African population. Speaking before the National As-

⁴² The special status of Africans under the Native Statute is described briefly in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session (Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 54, document A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, paras. 99-105) and in greater detail in document A/AC.108/L.6, part II.

⁴³ The requirements laid down in article 56 of the Native Statute are given in detail in document A/AC.108/L.6, paras. 88-94. Among other requirements, he had to speak the Portuguese language "correctly"; be engaged in an occupation, trade or craft from which he derived sufficient income to support himself and his family or else possess adequate resources for that purpose; and be of good conduct and have attained the level of education and acquired habits which are a condition for the unrestricted application of the public and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens.

⁴⁴ Coissoró, op. cit., p. 10.

⁴⁵ For details on the administrative structure of the Territories under Portuguese administration see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. III.

⁴⁶ J. M. da Silva Cunha. Na posse do Secretário Geral de Moçambique, 26 May 1966, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1966, pp. 12-13.

sembly in January 1967, a representative of Mozambique, Dr. Nunes Barata, said:

"Portugal cannot only affirm its presence in Africa by armed force. The great battle of peace is one of economic and social development . . . and of the social and cultural progress of the 'populações nativas'. It is urgently necessary to increase education in all its aspects. At the same time it is necessary to assure them work and guarantee their standard of living. These are indivisible aspects because if we declare our intentions without promoting harmonious economic development and a just division of wealth we shall only be making candidates for terrorism."⁴⁷

71. It may be noted that while in theory⁴⁸ the form of law under which an African chooses to be governed is a matter of personal juridical status, in practice his political, social and economic rights are limited so long as he is not fully governed by Portuguese civil law. In particular, while Africans living in regedorias and ruled by African custom and usage have a right to free and joint use by the regedoria of five times the area occupied, it is only in special circumstances that they may appropriate land on an individual use. Since under the present laws, Africans living in regedorias do not have full economic rights, it seems that until further changes are made in the regulations governing the concession and occupation of land, it will not be possible to bring Africans into a really integrated modern society in these Territories.

72. According to press reports in January 1967, new measures were introduced (Decree 47,486 of 6 January) 49 to enable persons or local government bodies now occupying public land illegally in the Overseas Territories to obtain legal title to it. 50 First, persons or local government bodies who have occupied land for more than fifteen years and who can prove that they have developed it will, on application to the authority concerned, be granted full title to the land free of charge. Secondly, persons who occupy land illegally but who have not improved it may obtain an aforamento (leasehold) title to it directly without the procedure of public bids.

73. According to one speaker in the National Assembly,⁵¹ the new measures are intended not only to benefit farmers (agricultores) but also to enable the African autóctones who have occupied land with the effective recognition of the authorities, now for the first time, to acquire legal title. Since land in the regedorias is reserved for the use of Africans living there, the new measures can only apply to Africans occupying land outside the regedorias. If this is the case, it does not appear from the information available so far that the new measures will substantially improve their situation since the present land concession regulations already provide that Africans may acquire rights over land outside regedorias "by bona fide, peaceful and continued possession during ten years of previously

vacant or abandoned land, on which permanent trees or crops have been established"52 (italics added).

74. In Mozambique there have been litigations over land occupied by Africans. It seems that for various reasons the 1961 land concession legislation has not been effective and many Africans who could qualify for a title over the land they currently occupy and farm have not yet acquired legal rights. Thus once again the problem is not the letter of the law but its implementation on the local level in the Territories.

75. Apart from the physical regrouping of populations, special efforts are being made through the schools, youth activities and mass information media to accelerate the development among the inhabitants of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration of a conscious identification with Portugal.

76. In July 1966, at the Atlantic Conference on Education which was held in Lisbon and at which eighteen countries were represented, Portugal's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Franco Nogueira, after explaining Portugal's deep concern for the provision of education, went on to say that "education had been developed throughout the whole nation without distinction between metropolitan and Overseas Territories because all these parts make up the Portuguese Nation, and it is our fundamental policy to expand and improve educational activities in the Overseas Territories". 53

77. Nevertheless, a wide disparity still exists between the opportunities for education in the Overseas Territories and those in Portugal. As noted by Professor Leite Pinto in a speech during the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the national revolution, there is not yet a unified national school system applying equally to Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Differences exist in the text-books used, the structure of classes, the period of compulsory education and the availability of training facilities at different levels.

78. In the Overseas Territories, the 1964 reform of primary elementary education made school attendance compulsory for all children between the ages of 6 and 12 living within five kilometres of a school. While considerable sums have been spent in Angola and Mozambique for school buildings, especially of rural school posts, most of these are in the more economically developed areas, 54 as for instance Uige district in Angola (see section on Angola), and it may be some time before all school age children are able to attend school. In rural areas, even where schools are available, they are staffed at present, not by fully qualified primary school teachers but by "monitors", and African children who do not speak Portuguese have to go through a pre-primary adaptation class before they can enter the first grade of the primary school.

79. According to the 1964 legislation, children who are already 7 years old (or who will be 7 before the end of the calendar year in which they enter school)

⁴⁷ Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 14 January 1967.

⁴⁸ Mr. Adriano Moreira said on the occasion of the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 "there is no connexion whatever between status in private law and political status".

⁴⁹ At the time of writing the present report, the Secretariat had not received the Government Gazette, *Diário do Governo*, containing the text of this decree.

⁵⁰ For details concerning the land concession regulations in the Overseas Territories see document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, chap. III.

⁵¹ Diário, Lourenço Marques, 5 February 1967.

⁵² Decree 43,894 of 6 September 1961, article 230, paragraph c (English translation in document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V appendix annex II. para, 52).

[,] appendix, annex II, para. 52).

⁵³ Boletim Geral do Ultramar, July 1966, pp. 241-242.

[&]quot;We force ourselves to act simultaneously in the economic and educational fields because education and economic development have to progress together. The economic development of the people . . . is not possible without education, and education not accompanied by economic expansion only succeeds in throwing the evolved persons into political agitation and subversion—i.e., persons to whom employment cannot be guaranteed in economically under-developed societies." (Boletim Geral do Ultramar, April 1966).

may be excused from attending the pre-primary class at the request of the parent or guardian if they speak Portuguese fluently and "possess the development sufficient for them to attend first grade, in accordance with the regulations governing primary education, and with the approval of the provincial school inspection service". Nevertheless, it appears that for many African children, the pre-primary class is a major hurdle, and the six years of schooling do not necessarily ensure a retaining literacy.

80. Recent events in Angola suggest however that an African child, who is already 7 years old, who speaks Portuguese fluently and can count in Portuguese, may not be able to enter first grade as a Portuguese child would but may have to go through the pre-primary class, where he will be "made to acquire the social habits necessary for attending common schools with the same success as children from a European type of environment". As the OECD study on education and development showed that school children in Portugal are slow in completing each class and, in a sample year (1961-1962), as about 33 per cent of the children had to repeat the first class, ⁵⁵ it can be expected that with the present requirements even fewer African children can complete the first four classes by the time they are 12 years old.

81. The fact that education in the Overseas Territories is separate and different from that in Portugal is also underlined by the existence of the Co-ordinating Council for Education in the Overseas Territories (Conselho Coordenador das Actividades Dependentes da Direcção Geral do Ensino do Ministério do Ultramar).56 When it last met in September 1966, the Council recommended that future educational policy in the Overseas Territories should concentrate on measures strengthening national unity.⁵⁷ It recommended, in particular, intensified efforts to disseminate Portuguese language and culture in the Overseas Territories, strengthening of the relationship between the Mocidade Portuguêsa (Portuguese National Youth Organization) and the schools, an extended student exchange programme including visits between the inhabitants of the Overseas Territories as well as between those of Portugal and the Territories, improved school attendance statistics and the establishment of a uniform procedure for the final classification of primary school teachers in all national Territory.

82. In his report to the Council, the Director-General of the Department of Overseas Education in the Ministry for Overseas Territories, Dr. Justino Mendes de Almeida, referred to the approval of textbooks for use in the Overseas Territories as one of the most difficult problems facing the Council, especially since the approved texts would replace ones already in use. Although originally in 1964 it had been decided that the textbooks approved in Angola would be uniformly used in all Territories, since then the Coordinating Council has established a special procedure for approving textbooks. Each textbook is now reviewed by a committee comprising as wide a representation as possible from the Overseas Territories and specialists in the subject. Speaking on this procedure which inevitably involved delays, the Director-General ex-

pressed the hope that "the day would arrive when a compendium of books could be drawn up for use in Portugal and the Overseas Territories alike without infringing on the principles of national unity and affecting the economy of the nation".

83. Irrespective of the degree of literacy children attending rural schools in African Territories may expect to achieve, it is evident that much is expected of the primary school years in inculcating Portuguese values and way of life. This process of transforming the indigenous population into good Portuguese citizens will also be carried forward in the schools through obligatory extra-curricular activities for which the Portuguese National Youth Organization (Mocidade Portuguêsa) was given sole responsibility after its reorganization in 1966. The Mocidade Portuguêsa's activities are to stimulate and reinforce patriotism and a sense of national unity, to inculcate moral and social values and to familiarize the young people with "the realities of Portuguese life".

84. In Angola, public information media and especially radio broadcasting are also to play an important role in disseminating the Portuguese language and culture and in explaining government activities to the people (see section on Angola).

85. To strengthen the feeling of unity between the separate territorial units of the "Portuguese nation", a number of important conferences were held in different Territories as part of the celebration of Portugal's national revolution. These included the Fourth National Colloquium on Labour Corporative Organization and Social Security held in Angola in September 1966 and the National Tourism Conference held in Mozambique. The Overseas Territories are also being given more publicity in Portugal through exhibitions and participation of the Territories in such events as agricultural and industrial fairs, for which special allocations have been made.

86. As reported previously in some detail (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, paras. 87-198 and 258-329), Portugal considers that increased white settlement in Angola and Mozambique is an important means of transplanting Portuguese culture to those Territories and of strengthening their ties with Portugal. Several speakers in the commemorative lecture series again stressed the need for a massive settlement of Europeans from Portugal in the African Territories as a matter of urgency. Because emigration from Portugal to other European countries and the American continent has increased in recent years, the Government last year introduced new penalties for illegal emigration. Towards the end of 1966, legislation was also introduced under which ex-members of the armed forces who wish to migrate to any of the Overseas Territories will be entitled to have their passage paid by the Government (Decree 47,349 of 28 November 1966). Other measures for diverting emigration to the Overseas Territories are under consideration.

87. In Angola and Mozambique, various government bodies have also been concerned with increasing settlement from Portugal both in the interest of stimulating economic development and as a means of securing Portugal's sovereignty in these areas through actual occupation. During 1966, new legislation was introduced in Mozambique (Legislative Instrument No. 2,671 of 4 January 1966) to encourage a wider spreading of the povoações (population centres usually of European families) along the main arteries by requiring commercial centres to be located at least five

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
 Education and Development, Country Reports, The Mediterranean Regional Project, Portugal,
 Paris, p. 26 (English text).
 The membership of the Council includes education inspec-

⁵⁶ The membership of the Council includes education inspectors, provincial educational inspectors and heads of departments of the *Direcção Geral do Ensino do Ultramar*.

⁵⁷ Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 4 September 1966.

kilometres apart. In Angola also, spacing requirements have been laid down for farm houses.

88. In order to attract and retain settlers from Portugal in both Angola and Mozambique, efforts are being made to improve living conditions. A number of special allocations have been made in 1965-1966 for "local improvements" in Angola, especially electricity and water supplies. In Benguela District alone, which in 1960 had the second largest European population after Luanda, some 56 million escudos were spent on local improvements in 1966. In Mozambique large sums were also spent on municipal development, including electricity and water supplies, sanitation services and low-cost housing, in the main urban centres.

International relations of Portugal affecting the Territories under its administration

(a) Participation in international and regional organizations

89. In May 1966, the Nineteenth World Health Assembly considered the recommendation (AFR/RC15/R2) adopted by its Regional Committee for Africa, and taking into account the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in regard to the African Territories under Portuguese administration, decided to: (a) suspend the right of Portugal to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and in regional activities until the Government of that country has furnished proof of its willingness to conform to the injunctions of the United Nations; and (b) suspend technical assistance to Portugal in accordance with the request contained in operative paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). (The full text of this resolution appears in document A/AC.109/194, pp. 9-10.)

90. In November 1966, the General Conference of UNESCO, acting in accordance with the appeals contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), adopted by 72 votes to 11, with 26 abstentions, a resolution entitled "Tasks in the light of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twentieth session on questions relating to the liquidation of colonialism and racialism". In this resolution, the Conference noted that although UNESCO had made a certain contribution to the attainment and consolidation of independence by former colonial countries and peoples by assisting them to develop education, science and culture, it had by no means made use of all the opportunities available. The General Conference therefore authorized the Director-General of UNESCO to take measures to expand the work in this area. The Director-General was also authorized, "in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, to withhold assistance from the Government of Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia in matters relating to education, science and culture, and not to invite them to attend conferences or take part in other UNESCO activities, participation in which might be considered as conferring technical assistance, until such time as the Governments of these countries abandon their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination". In a further resolution, adopted by 60 votes to 38, with 4 abstentions, the General Conference of UNESCO confirmed the decision taken by the Executive Board at its seventieth session (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 41) not to invite Portugal to attend meetings of UNESCO subordinate bodies pending the conclusion of an in situ study of educational conditions in the African

Territories under Portuguese administration. Accordingly, it also rejected the request of the Portuguese Government (*ibid.*, para. 43) that the question be referred to the International Court of Justice. In the preamble of the resolution, the General Conference stated inter alia that "the Government of Portugal continues to pursue in the African Territories under its domination a policy of colonialism and racial discrimination which deprives the peoples of those Territories of their most elementary rights to education and culture, thus violating the fundamental obligations of every member of UNESCO"; "that this behaviour on the part of Portugal violates the fundamental principles of the Convention and Recommendation against Discrimination on Education"; and that the General Conference, as the sovereign organ of UNESCO, had the right to interpret the provisions of the Constitution, particularly the provisions which give the Executive Board authority to carry out the programme in accordance with the decisions of the General Conference.

(b) New bilateral agreements

- 91. In September 1966, Portugal and Brazil signed agreements on trade, technical and cultural co-operation and a joint declaration on economic co-operation. The new trade agreement, which revokes those of 1949 and 1959, aims at encouraging the growth and diversification of trade between Brazil and Portugal as well as the Territories under its administration which are specifically included. The agreement provides that payments shall be made under a régime of free exchange and that free trade zones for products from Portugal or Brazil may be established in either country. The agreement also provides for mutual assistance in regard to industrial investment, freer movement of capital, freer convertibility and the reciprocal application of "most favoured nation treatment" in so far as this is compatible with existing international obligations. The agreement is to remain in force for five years, and if not revoked by the end of the period, it will be automatically extended for successive periods of one year.
- 92. The Luso-Brazilian Economic Committee established under the provisions of the new agreement met in December 1966 to discuss problems of transport, free trade zones, customs duties, complementary industrial establishments and questions concerning technical assistance. The terms of the new treaty will be put into effect on a provisional basis pending ratification by the Brazilian Congress.
- 93. The joint declaration on economic co-operation, which also explicitly includes the Overseas Territories, provides for mutual treatment of Brazilian, Portuguese or Brazilian-Portuguese industrial companies established in Brazilian or Portuguese territory as if they were national companies. The basic criterion for the establishment of such companies is that they must fill the needs of the country concerned. The two Governments agree to stimulate joint companies exploiting mineral resources.
- 94. In January, four ships of the Brazilian Navy carrying 2,800 men visited Angola for five days.
- Membership of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration in the Economic Commission for Africa
- 95. At its eighth session, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) adopted a resolution (151 (VIII) of 21 February 1967) on the admission of Angola,

Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and South West Africa as associate members.

96. In the preamble of the resolution, the ECA reaffirmed its conviction that the active participation of all African countries and territories in its work was an essential condition for the attainment of its objectives. Taking into account the decision of the Economic and Social Council in resolution 974 (XXXVI) of 1963 by which it expelled Portugal from the Commission's membership, and having ascertained that there were no valid juridical considerations against the participation of Angola, Mozambique, socalled Portuguese Guinea and South West Africa in its work, the Commission recommended that the Organization of African Unity designate representatives of the Territories concerned.

97. Economic and Social Council resolution 974 (XXXVI) also revised the Commission's terms of reference which provides that the following "shall be associate members of the Commission": the Non-Self-Governing Territories situated in the area of the Commission's competence and "Powers other than Portugal responsible for international relations of those Territories".

2. Angola

General

98. Angola lies on the south-west Atlantic coast of Africa between 4°22'S and 18°03'S in latitude and between 24°05'EG and 11°41'EG in longitude. Except for the Cabinda enclave which is administered as part of it, the entire Territory of Angola lies south of the Congo River. The total area of the Territory is 1,246,700 square kilometres. At the 1960 census, the total resident population was 4,830,449 of whom 172,529 were listed as Branco, 53,392 were listed as Mestiço and 4,604,362 as Preto (Provincia de Angola, Boletim Mensal, No. 10, October 1963, p. 5).

Government and administration

99. The fundamental constitutional provisions relating to all the Overseas Territories are the same and are set out in the Constitution of Portugal⁵⁸ and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963.⁵⁹ According to those instruments, which establish the structure of the Portuguese State, each of the Overseas Territories is a province of Portugal, subject to the authority of the central Government, but having its own territorial organs with limited powers and functions which are defined in a separate political and administrative statute for each Territory. În the case of Angola, this is contained in Decree 45,374 of 22 November 1963.60

100. The organs of the State and central Government of Portugal which are most directly concerned with the Overseas Territories are the Council of Ministers, the Overseas Minister, the National Assembly, the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber. The National Assembly, the Government and the Minister for Overseas Territories all have power to legislate for the Overseas Territories.

⁵⁸ Portugal, Political Constitution of the Portuguese Repub-

lic, SNI.

59 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978), paras. 160-167.

60 For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and ries, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73; see also sections on each Territorv.

101. At the territorial level in Angola, the Governor General, as the representative of the central Government, possesses both legislative and executive powers. The power to propose legislation of purely territorial concern and not including additional expenditure is also vested in a Legislative Council which meets normally twice a year for not more than a total of three months, during which time the Governor General is precluded from legislating on matters within the Council's competence. The Council comprises 36 members, of whom 2 are ex officio, 19 are elected by "organic groups" (such as employers' and workers' associations, cultural and religious groups, local government bodies and others) and 15 are elected by direct vote on a franchise which, in practice, includes only a minority of the population.⁶¹ There is also in Angola an economic and social council comprised of representatives of high officials and representatives of special interest groups whose function is mainly to advise the Governor General.

102. The Territory is divided into fifteen administrative districts, each under a district governor. These in turn are divided, according to circumstances, into concelhos (municipalities) or circunscrições; the concelhos in turn are divided into freguesias (parishes). Elected councils exist at the district level and in the concelhos, freguesias and circunscrições where there are sufficient qualified voters. Finally, Africans living in traditional societies are organized in regedorias which are administered under native law and custom.

103. Angola is represented in the National Assembly of Portugal by seven representatives who are elected by direct vote on a franchise different from those governing elections to territorial bodies, but which also contains qualifications which restrict the right to vote to a minority of the population. 62 It is also represented in the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber of Portugal by representatives chosen from the Territorial Economic and Social Council and in the electoral college which elects the Head of State.

Appointment of new Governor General

104. In November 1966, Lieutenant-Colonel Camilo Augusto de Miranda Rebocho Vaz was appointed Governor General of Angola. His appointment appears to have been unexpected as he had initiated a movement earlier in the year to petition for the extension of Colonel Silvino Silvério Marques's term as Governor General. Lieutenant-Colonel Rebocho Vaz first earned his reputation as a military leader in the important coffee growing Uige district where in 1960 he checked an insurrection of over 100,000 men and after 1961 successfully recovered areas occupied by guerrillas. His appointment may therefore be considered as reflecting Portugal's determination to face a long-term war in Angola.

105. In a speech delivered at his swearing in ceremony in Lisbon (in reply to the Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr. Silva Cunha, who entrusted him to make Angola ever more consciously Portuguese) and in various speeches made since then, the Governor General outlined his Government's future policy and some of the immediate measures under consideration

Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 55-64.

62 Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 54, document A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, para. 113.

⁶¹ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/

for dealing with the urgent problems with which the Territory is faced.

106. The principal goal of his Government, he said, is to build up all sectors of the Territory to secure it for all time against attempts to subvert it or to wipe out Portuguese civilization there. As there had been a feeling of expectation and uncertainty in some circles because changes in the territorial Government had not yet been completed63 he wished to make it clear that his Government would follow "only the policy of the President of the Council and which was supported by the whole authentic nation". Any solution which did not lead the Overseas Territories to a closer relationship with Portugal could only result in personal ruin and loss to the national patrimony. He stressed that there would not be a policy for Europeans or a policy for Africans (não haverá política de europeus ou de africanos); there would be only one national policy, through which people are integrated on the basis of their individual merits and not for any other reason.

107. More than ever before what Angola needed was to unite around the same ideas.⁶⁴ The truth was that the enemies who opposed Portugal's presence in the "Portuguese world" were not yet convinced of the futility of their struggle and continued to try to disrupt the life of the Territory. It was therefore necessary for all the people to be aware that in the near future many developments could be expected indicating continued subversive attempts against values that were most prized.

108. Late in December 1966, the Governor General addressed a speech to the people of Angola warning them against rumours then current in the Territory. On this occasion he noted that there was disquiet in large and small population centres, in government offices and homes, in the streets and in the cafes where extravagant rumours were circulating. Without stating what the rumours were, he said that they were partly attributable to the holding of civil defence exercises (see below). He explained that the exercises were intended to train the population in preventive and defensive activities and did not in any way indicate that the internal situation of the Territory had deteriorated. He considered that what was needed was "a policy of truth". Anyone who helped in circulating rumours was committing a crime against the security of the Territory, and it was everybody's duty to search out rumours and destroy them. The Government would take measures to improve the information services, which had been inadequate; exchange of information between Portugal and the Territory, as well as within the Territory, would be increased and radio broadcasting would be improved with stronger transmitting stations

and special programmes for certain areas and certain groups. He stressed that what was necessary was to make the reality in Angola understood externally and internally and to show both to the neighbouring countries and to the people in Angola the progress which had been made in the Territory. On the domestic front, he urged that greater effort should be given to: (a) research into public information to isolate and put a stop to rumours which aimed at destroying Angola; (b) civil defence, so that full use would be made of people and materials; (c) permanent vigilance, so that the enemy should never be able to gain advantage by surprise attacks; and (d) increased production in order to support the defence expenditures.

Registration of voters

109. Local newspapers in Angola have recently carried notices concerning the 1967 registration of voters for elections: (a) to the National Assembly and (b) to the Legislative Council and members of parish boards. The notices set out the documentary and other evidence required as proof of, among other things, marital status and the ability to read and write Portuguese.

110. The ability to read and write Portuguese may be proven by submission of a diploma from public examination, by an official statement from a government department, by an application written and signed by the applicant and with the signature and handwriting certified by a notary, and by an application written, read and signed before the appropriate authorities.

111. A Portuguese citizen who does not read and write Portuguese may also vote in the direct elections to the Legislative Council if he is a head of family, that is to say, if he has "a legitimately constituted family living with him under his authority and sharing his board", and pays taxes (contribuições) of any kind of not less than 100 escudos. Proof of status as head of family for this purpose must be certified by the administrative authority where the applicant resides. Marital status is to be proven by a certificate from the civil registry or from a Catholic parish or mission, or registered in terms of the law in force prior to the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961.

The war in Angola

112. In the latter part of 1966, the war in Angola entered a new phase when fighting flared up again with intensity in Cabinda and what has been called "a second front" was opened on the eastern border of Angola. In late December, Vila Teixeira de Sousa, near the Zambian border, was the target of a surprise attack and thus, by the end of 1966, Portuguese military units were engaged on the eastern, northern and north-western borders of the Territory.

113. According to press reports, since the first outbreak of fighting at Cazombo, large numbers of Portuguese troops have been moved to the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia and all settlements have been cleared from a strip several miles in depth along the frontier. New airfields are completed in this region and defence measures are being strengthened. In January 1967, eastern Angola had become the main centre of military activities.

114. In the north, the border between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was closed by the Portuguese authorities in December following a

⁶³ Since Mr. Rebocho Vaz's nomination as Governor General, new appointments in Angola have included those of three of the six provincial secretaries, namely those for rural development, health, welfare and labour, public works and communications.

⁶⁴ There are indications that Portuguese businessmen and settlers in Angola both have grievances against Lisbon. A recent newspaper article quoted the following statement as expressing the feelings of at least one section of the Portuguese residents:

residents:

"If we had economic autonomy, every White in Angola could be a millionaire! But the Government [in Lisbon] allows us no economic autonomy. Our European community falls into two groups: those who do too much for the African and then get out; and those who stay behind and keep what we have built up. Portugal's recent prosperity at home is our doing, and they owe us much in Angola."

series of events which began with an attack on the Portuguese consulate in Kinshasa. In September, the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted to the Security Council charges that Angola was being used as a military base for mercenaries planning to attack it. Portugal denied these charges and suggested an on-the-spot investigation. Following the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 226 (1966) of 14 October 1966, the Democratic Republic of the Congo ordered the closing of all Portuguese consulates within its borders. Then, in early December, Portugal charged that troops inside Angola had been fired on from the Congolese side of the border.

115. In their military communiqués, the Portuguese admit that they are fighting three nationalist movements: the Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA), the Gouvernement revolutionaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE) and the newly formed União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). Early in January 1967, a Portuguese military communiqué reported that whereas there had been no incidents in Cabinda during the period reviewed, there had been fighting around Noqui near the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a surprise attack on the Canga Lucossa road, and also continued fighting in the area north of the Uíge mountains and in the Dembos area. Moxico District, according to press reports, was the main centre of military activities, with fighting north of Lumbala, in Nhamihia and Sacair, Lucolo and at the juncture of the Henrique de Carvalho-Luso road (near Buçaco) and the Luando River. For the week ending 21 January, Portuguese casualties were reported heavier than usual, with eleven dead, including three civilians, and eighteen wounded.

116. Although on 15 March 1967, on the sixth anniversary of the Angola uprising, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal announced that the situation in Angola "has returned to normal on the political, military and economic planes", as is indicated by the Governor General's speeches (see paras. 107 and 108 above), the war has again become the main concern overshadowing the everyday life of Angola. Reflecting this, the 1967 budget allocates 782 million escudos for national defence and the armed forces, representing a 25 per cent increase over that of 1966 and almost three times as large as the allocation in 1961. In terms of the budget estimates, allocations for defence and the armed forces have increased from 10.8 per cent in 1961 to 12.4 per cent in 1965, 16.3 per cent in 1966 and 18.4 per cent in 1967.

Civil defence and security measures

117. Apart from the armed forces, Angola has two other quasi-military organizations engaged in defence activities. One of these is the traditional militia, a military corps composed of vizinhos das regedorias (Africans living in traditional societies) (Legislative Instrument 3,252 of 6 June 1962) which is under the direct command of the local administrative authority and responsible to the Governor General. In case of war or emergency, the militia may be placed under the authority of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps as necessary.

118. In Angola, the Volunteer Corps was first created in 1961 following the uprising and was composed of Portuguese citizens resident in the Territory. Now known as the Provincial Organization of Volun-

teers and Civil Defence (Organização Provincial de Voluntários e Defesa Civil de Angola (OPVDC), it has a permanent staff and organized units throughout the Territory which is divided into civil defence zones corresponding to the administrative districts.

119. The Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps has an autonomous budget supported mainly by special taxes. In 1965, estimated expenditure for the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps was 58.5 million escudos. The 1966 budget provided for an estimated expenditure of 56.0 million escudos, of which 49.1 million escudos (87.7 per cent) was for salaries and allowances, 500,000 escudos for civil defence courses and 250,000 escudos for public information.

120. During 1966, civil defence courses and exercises were held in Luanda and Moçâmedes and in various towns in the border districts including Silva Porto (Bié District); São Salvador and Vila do Ambrizete (Zaire District); Cabinda, Guilherme Capelo, Dinge and Buco Zau (Cabinda District); and Luso (Moxico District). Towards the end of 1966, there were frequent courses for training the local population in active defence, special training courses for civil defence leaders (commanders and assistant instructors) and general orientation courses. Both men and women participate in the courses which end with a civil defence exercise.

121. To co-ordinate the various new defence and security units, a separate Provincial Security Department was established in January 1966 (Legislative Instrument 3,609 of 3 January) under the head of the Services for the Co-ordination and Centralization of Information who thereby becomes the Provincial Security Authority. The Provincial Security Department is responsible to the Governor General and is in permanent relation with the Security Department of the Overseas Ministry and, through the latter, with the National Security Authority in Portugal. There is also a Provincial Security Commission which is responsible for the planning of security policy to be adopted in the Territory in accordance with the general security policy of Portugal. The Commission is composed of the Provincial Security Authority, all the provincial secretaries and one representative from each of the following: Angola's intelligence police, the Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), the Public Security Police and the Civil Defence and Volunteer

122. As a further security measure, the Governor General issued an order in January 1967 under which persons who serve in public buildings belonging to the State or to local governments or public bodies automatically become members of the OPVDC and must render such services as they may be called upon to give in the defence of the buildings or the area in which they are located.

123. Although there have been no recent reports of arrests for political reasons, speeches by the Governor General (reported above) and by other government officials, including the new District Governor of Uige, as well as newspaper editorials seem to suggest that there may be some disaffection in the Territory. The Public Security Police force is reported to have been increased to 10,000 men, and during the year the personnel of the PIDE (intelligence police) was increased by almost 50 per cent from 355 to 567. The increase in the PIDE force in the Territory followed the trials in Lisbon of eight Angolans charged with being mem-

bers of the MPLA. Of these, three men and one woman were sentenced to between 2-1/2 and 8-1/2 years' imprisonment for subversive activities in Angola and three others were acquitted but lost their civil rights for fifteen years. No information has been published on the result of the trial of the eighth person, a twenty-six-year-old student.

Economic conditions

- 124. General. Despite the growing importance of the mining sector in recent years, the economy of Angola is still based mainly on the production and export of agricultural commodities. The most important export crop is coffee, which in 1965 accounted for almost half of the Territory's total exports by value. The other export crops are sisal, maize, sugar and cotton which in an average year account for 10 to 15 per cent of the value of exports.
- 125. Until 1960 diamonds were the most important mineral exported, on the average accounting for about 14 per cent of exports by value. Since then, owing to the increase in petroleum and iron ore production, the share of minerals in the total value of the exports has risen to over 20 per cent.
- 126. Most of the export crops are controlled by European capital. African independent farmers grow for their own account about one quarter of the coffee exported. Otherwise, Africans are mainly employed as wage earners or engaged in traditional agriculture, growing food crops, including maize, manioc, palm oil, beans and peanuts, largely for their own subsistence.
- 127. Although the gross value of industrial production increased by 198 per cent between 1960 and 1965, the industrial sector remains small, the most important activities being concerned with the processing for export of such primary products as petroleum, sugar and cotton (i.e., ginning). Except for a few larger units producing cement, paper, beer, textiles, soft drinks and tobacco, most of the manufacturing industries are relatively small and the total number of wage earners in industry (excluding mining) is less than one quarter of those in agriculture. The range of consumer goods produced locally is growing, however, and now includes various items of food, fertilizers, tools, electric batteries, other electronic equipment, bicycles, tires, shoes and some clothing. However, consumer goods, including flour, canned foods, wine and textiles, still account for a substantial part of the Territory's imports.
- 128. Angola's trade is characterized by a favourable balance with those foreign countries to which it exports most of its coffee, diamonds and iron ores, and a deficit with Portugal, to which it exports its lower-priced commodities such as maize and sugar in return for manufactured goods. Under the existing trade and currency controls, this situation has enabled Portugal to benefit from Angola's foreign exchange earnings but at the same time it has affected the Territory's economic growth.
- 129. In 1965, there was less expansion in the main sectors of the economy than in the two preceding years. This was reflected in a deteriorating balance of trade, as imports increased more rapidly than exports of both agricultural and mineral products, and by a lower rate of capital investment compared with 1964. By the middle of 1966, the Territory's exchange problems,

rising cost of living and shortage of capital began to cause concern.

- 130. In November, the new Governor General warned that the Territory would have to face a period of austerity and indicated that new legislation would be introduced to help solve some of the economic and financial problems which the Territory was facing. As noted above (section B. 1, para. 52), the Governor General recently ordered the judicial police and the secret police to put a stop to the illicit export of capital from the Territory and heavy penalties have been imposed on transgressors. Since 1967, all government departments have been ordered to reduce expenditures to a minimum compatible with the administrative needs and the interests of national defence. The departments have been placed on a monthly budget system under which any surpluses automatically revert to general revenue.65
- 131. In March 1967, one of Angola's deputies in the National Assembly pointed out that Angola's exchange problem and its balance of trade and payments deficits with Portugal tended to reinforce each other in a vicious circle, making it difficult for the Territory to attract the investments needed for a more rapid growth. But so long as there existed a wide disparity in the level of economic development between Portugal and the Overseas Territories, economic integration without safeguards would only make Portugal increasingly a supplier of manufactured goods with the Territories as the consumer markets. He therefore asked the Government to take measures to help bring Angola out of its economic plight and suggested that, among other steps, the Government should restrict its exports, especially of wine and textiles, to Angola as this would encourage the Territory to develop import substitutes. Subsequently the Industrial Association of Angola sent a telegram to the President of the Assembly giving its support to this request.

Balance of trade and payments

- 132. Preliminary reports for 1966 show a continuation of the decline in the volume of exports which began in 1964. Exports in 1966, totalling 1,700 million tons, were 200 million tons less than in 1965, though the value rose by more than 10 per cent from 5,747 million escudos to 6,361 million escudos. Imports continued the upward trend and increased from 430,000 tons in 1965 to 514,000 tons in 1966 with a corresponding increase in value from 5,601 million escudos to 6,002 million escudos. Thus, although the net trade surplus in 1966, amounting to more than 350 million escudos, was slightly higher than in 1965, it was only 55 per cent of the surplus in 1961 anl only 31 per cent of that in 1964.
- 133. Detailed trade figures for 1966 are not yet available but it is unlikely that there was much change in the general pattern of trade and its deficit relationship with Portugal. In the period 1960-63, Angola's annual trade deficit with Portugal fluctuated around 800 million escudos, with imports from Portugal averaging 1,600 million escudos. Although in 1964, some diamonds were shipped to Portugal for the first time and as a result the trade deficit with Portugal dropped to 552 million escudos, imports from Portugal have continued to rise and in 1965 the trade deficit had again increased to 638 million escudos.

⁶⁵ Known in Portuguese as the duodécimo system.

134. Although much of Angola's imports in recent years have been for production needs, in 1965 more than one third of the total imports by value (5,600 million escudos) consisted of consumer goods, including wines, beverages and foods (about 18 per cent) and textiles (17 per cent). Metal goods, machinery, equipment and vehicles accounted for about 10 per cent and chemical products 8.2 per cent. Portugal supplied 48 per cent of the imports: goods supplied by Portugal, valued at 2,661 million escudos, included wine (414 million escudos) and textiles, dyed and other fabrics (389 million escudos).

135. Continuing the pattern of recent years, in 1965, agricultural exports, led by coffee and followed by sisal, maize, sugar and raw cotton, accounted for about two thirds of the total value of exports. Next in importance were minerals, which accounted for about 20.4 per cent of the exports. Portugal's share in the Territory's exports rose from 30 per cent in 1964 to 35 per cent in 1965 (2,023 million escudos out of a total of 5,747 million escudos). In contrast, Angola's exports to its other major clients decreased slightly: exports to the United States were 23 per cent of the total (compared with 25.8 per cent in 1964); to the Netherlands 11.8 per cent (compared with 13.9 per cent in 1964) and to the Federal Republic of Germany 5.4 per cent (compared with 7.6 per cent). Exports to France increased from 2.4 per cent in 1964 to 4.3 per cent and those to South Africa increased from 0.6 per cent to about 1 per cent. South Africa in return supplied about 2 per cent of the Territory's imports in both 1964 and 1965.

136. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev. 1, chap. V, paras. 126-130), in recent years Angola had suffered chronically from exchange problems because of its deficit trade with Portugal and the other Overseas Territories, and because of currency regulations which make Portugal the beneficiary of the Territory's foreign exchange earnings. Angola's visible and invisible transactions with Portugal have increased since 1960 but, except for 1962, the Territory has each year had a balance of payments deficit with Portugal, which reached a peak of 883 million escudos in 1963.

137. In 1964, outgoing invisibles exceeded incoming by almost 1,000 million escudos but this difference was largely compensated for by a surplus balance of trade and favourable capital movements, so that the balance of payments deficit was only 253 million escudos. In 1965, there was an adverse balance of trade resulting in a balance of payments deficit of 629 million escudos at the end of the year.

138. Figures for 1966 are not yet available but reports indicate that there has been little improvement although export earnings are expected to be higher than in 1965. However, as reported above (section B. 1, para. 52), as in Portugal, the financial situation in the Territory has led to the illicit export of capital and the Governor General has already issued an official statement calling attention to the penalties applicable to such transgressions. He has also announced that various measures are being drawn up to help the Territory get out of its present difficulties regarding foreign exchange and to improve the economic and financial situation.

Agriculture and livestock

139. As in Mozambique, available information shows that the output of most of the important crops

has remained fairly static since 1962. In fact, with the exception of coffee, the production of which continued to expand, in 1965 most of the other export crops fell below the level reached in 1962, Sisal production dropped to 60,000 tons from 68,000 tons in 1964 and 70,000 tons in 1962; maize dropped to 131,000 tons from 152,800 in 1964 and 160,000 in 1960; and though cotton production was 19,506 tons compared with 13,609 tons in 1964, it was lower than that of 1962 when the output was 22,500 tons. Wheat output was also lower, 26,305 tons compared with 34,696 tons in 1964, which was a record year. Rice, on the other hand, increased from 18,000 tons in 1964 to 22,000 tons in 1965. Statistics for 1966 are not yet available but government sources expected at the end of the year that, except for maize and sisal, the output of most crops would be equal to or exceed slightly those of 1965.

140. Although coffee production in 1965 was 4 per cent higher than in the previous year (205,000 tons compared with 198,232 tons) and exports rose by 15 per cent (from 138,700 to 159,168 tons), the value of coffee exports dropped by about 6 per cent, from 2,859 million escudos to 2,687 million escudos. As reported previously (ibid., annex, appendix II, para. 70), under the International Coffee Agreement, to which Portugal is party, Angola has an annual quota for exports to traditional markets (2.38 million sacks for 1966-1967) and expansion of the Territory's exports in recent years has been due to additional allowances and export waivers (given to members who experience special difficulties concerning production and stocks) and sales to new markets. Because of continued surpluses in world production and accumulated stocks, early in 1966, the Government introduced legislation (Decree Law 3,623 of 7 February) prohibiting the planting of new areas with robusta coffee. In July 1966 (Order 14,437 of 23 July), it raised the annual registration fee for green coffee exporters from 1,000 escudos to 50,000 escudos. As the International Coffee Council, in September 1966, adopted measures to induce members to reduce coffee production, it may be expected that Angola's coffee output will gradually level off. Recently Portugal applied for a quota of another 30,000 sacks to cover coffee produced in Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor. The International Coffee Council is reported to be considering this request. In the meantime, in order to reduce the number of exporters, it was decided early in 1967 that monthly export quotas of green coffee will be given only to traders who have minimum reserves totalling 500 tons (for washed coffee, the required reserve is lower).

141. Sisal, which is Angola's second most important export crop, in 1965 accounted for only 4.8 per cent of the Territory's exports by value as compared with 8.2 per cent in 1964 and 12.4 per cent in 1963. This drop was due mainly to smaller demands from overseas markets and lower prices but, as noted above, production also dropped and about 9,000 tons were retained in the Territory. There is no information on the output of the new rope factory, COFIANG, established in 1965 (*ibid.*, para. 90), which was expected to absorb 30 per cent of the sisal produced in the Benguela District.

142. Although cotton has always been one of the Territory's important cash crops, between 1955 and 1960 production fluctuated around 20,000 tons of seed cotton annually. Between 1961 and 1964, it oscillated

between 22,500 and 13,099 tons, returning in 1965 to about the same level as in 1960. However, in 1965 more of the cotton was retained in the Territory so that cotton exports to Portugal in 1965 represented only about 25 per cent (4,175 tons) out of a total production of 19,506 tons. In 1965, it ranked tenth in value of exports. Efforts are being made to mechanize cotton growing and in 1967 it was reported that in the Baixa do Cassange area Africans are being paid to grow cotton under the supervision of agricultural specialists. In this region, sunflower is also to be grown on a larger scale to provide Africans with a second cash crop.

143. Unlike Mozambique, there have been no large new investments in sugar and the only new unit planned in the late 1950s has not materialized (*ibid.*, para. 94). Since 1960, sugar production has fluctuated between 65,000 tons and 71,000 tons and in 1965 it was 67,000 tons. Like cotton, however, the proportion exported dropped from 70 per cent of the production in 1960 (46,900 tons out of 67,500 tons produced) to about 38 per cent of production (24,600 out of 65,400 tons) in 1964. In this period, the share of sugar in the value of the Territory's total exports dropped from 3.5 to 1.2 per cent. In 1965, about 50 per cent of sugar was exported and the share in the value of the total value of exports rose to 2 per cent. It is likely that this change may have been due to the higher c.i.f. Lisbon price introduced in 1964, since most of the Territory's sugar exports go to Portugal.

144. In contrast to the rather recent levelling off in the production of European-owned or -financed crops, exports of traditionally grown African crops including maize, palm oil, coconut, beans and manioc have generally declined since 1950. Exports of maize, for instance, reached a peak of 190,000 tons in 1950 which has not been surpassed since. For many years the Government has considered plans for regrouping the rural African population and for introducing modern farming techniques. However, from the information so far available, there do not seem to be any special plans to inject capital and to improve production in the subsistence sector. It appears to be still hoped that the distribution of improved seed, higher purchase prices and better marketing and storage facilities will suffice to make available larger surplus production for sale.

145. As regards maize, past experience seems to indicate that better official purchase prices do not necessarily increase African production though they may affect exports. In 1965, for instance, the *Grémio* for purchasing maise (*ibid.*, paras. 164 ff.) acquired 131,000 tons but exports amounted to 168,200 tons, valued at 283 million escudos, which represented 4.9 per cent of the total value of the Territory's exports. In both 1960 and 1964, production was considerably higher (160,000 tons and 152,800 tons respectively), though for those years exports were lower. There are no data available for 1966.

146. Before 1961, only European farmers could obtain credit from the various export boards for special crops (*ibid.*, annex, appendix I). The main source of agricultural credit is now the Agricultural and Livestock Credit Bank (Caixa) which was established in 1961 with an initial capital of 100 million escudos. Although the Caixa may grant loans up to 500,000 escudos without guarantees and it is required to give priority to small farmers, in general, loans can

only be obtained by those who have a legal title to their land or can offer other acceptable security. African growers or livestock owners who do not possess security can only obtain loans when a government body superintends the use of the loan. In both 1963 and 1964, the loans granted by the Caixa amounted to over 100 million escudos but some 80 per cent of these were short-term loans which went mainly to coffee growers and, to a lesser extent, sisal and cotton producers. In 1964 (Ministerial Legislative Order No. 1) and 1965 (Order 13,792 of 22 May) the Caixa's operations were extended to provide shortterm loans for revolving expenses and medium-term and long-term loans to industries processing agricultural and livestock products. Further changes were made in 1966 (Decree 47,057 of 25 June 1966): on the one hand conditions governing collateral for short, medium and long-term loans have been tightened and on the other the credit resources of the Caixa have been increased with a further loan of 50 million escudos from the National Development Bank in Lisbon, so that the total available credit in 1967 is expected to amount to some 180 million escudos.

147. In the interest of introducing new cash crops in the Territory and with the metropolitan market in mind, government support is being given to banana and pineapple production as plantation crops and, to a lesser extent, to tobacco grown both by Africans and by Europeans. Recently the development of cashew has begun along the coast in northern Angola.

148. Bananas, which are grown throughout the Territory, were first exported in large quantity to Portugal in 1960 (1,273 tons, valued at 1.1 million escudos). By 1964, the amount and value of bananas exported had doubled and in 1965 rose to 3,619 tons, valued at more than 6 million escudos. In 1967, exports are expected to reach 15,000 tons and several ships have been acquired by the Overseas Ministry especially for carrying fruit. Of particular interest is the 1,200-hectare banana project in the Cavaco valley in Benguela District which is expected eventually to produce 120,000 tons of green bananas annually, with an export value of 132 million escudos.

149. In December 1966 (Angola, Order 14,751 of 29 December), an export tax of 20 centavos per kilogramme was imposed on bananas and 25 centavos per kilo on pineapples. The banana tax is about 20 per cent of the average export price of 1.1 escudos per kilogramme.

150. Increased efforts are also being made to expand the livestock resources both for the domestic market and for export to Portugal of frozen meat (see above). According to the livestock census taken in 1962,66 there were over 1.5 million head of cattle in the Territory most of which are owned by the African population. The census showed that since 1935 there has been a significant decline in the cattle population in the Territory as evidenced by the drop from over 1 million head to 705,000 head in Huíla District, and from 300,000 head in Moçâmedes to 87,000 in 1962.

151. Since 1961, in addition to the establishment of the Agricultural and Livestock Credit Bank, new regulations have been introduced to facilitate land concessions to stockbreeders and to facilitate imports of breeding cattle. Subsequently, special committees were created to draw up plans for organizing pasture land

⁶⁶ Vasco Sousa Dias "Notas sobre a Produção de Carne", Planeamento e integração económica (July 1966).

in order to ensure its optimum use and to help stabilize the rural population.

152. According to the plans adopted in 1965 (Order 13,906 of 4 September), Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts have been divided into pasturage zones in accordance with the size, character and degree of evolution of the population, the actual number of livestock and the type of livestock industry, the area of potential and developed pasturage and the water resources. Where the livestock is being bred for commercial purposes or can be developed for this purpose, government services are to assist, particularly in the delimitation of the land and in the provision of water. African livestock farmers are to be given all the assistance needed, especially by the granting of land to them on a communal or individual basis. In November 1966 (Order 14,013 of 20 November), guidelines were laid down for the work to be done by the Veterinary Services which is to be organized by "livestock zones", beginning with Huila and Moçâmedes Districts. Water supplies will be developed under a co-ordinated plan for pastoral regions in southern Angola as a whole.

153. In 1966, there were reports of a sudden increase of requests for concessions of vacant land for raising livestock in Uige and Cuanza North Districts. As these districts are fairly densely occupied and much land had already been concessioned (see A/6000/ Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, tables 3 and 4), the new influx has created difficulties sometimes involving African land rights. The Government has therefore issued an order that all concession boundaries in those districts are to be marked only by the official teams (brigadas de demarcação e vistorias). These teams will also be responsible for boundary marking of land in cases where a demarcation licence has already been obtained but the land has not been used for the purpose intended67 or the concession has not yet been duly registered.

154. In February 1967, boundary marking difficulties were also reported in connexion with livestock concessions under the pastoral zoning plan in Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts. In this area too, boundaries of concessions for livestock raising may henceforth only be marked by the official teams.

155. Angola's fresh meat exports, which amounted to 26 million escudos in 1961, dropped to 19 million escudos in 1962 and 1963. In 1964, 67,000 head of cattle were slaughtered, producing 9,689,000 kilogrammes of meat of which about one fourth was exported. The value of fresh meat exported was 2.3 million escudos, representing just under 0.4 per cent of the total exports. In 1965, only 60,000 cattle were slaughtered and while the quantity exported remained about the same, the value rose from 21.6 million to 30.5 million escudos. According to the study published in 1966, Angola's cattle output is estimated at present at 135,000 head per year of which 75,000 head may be expected to reach the market.⁶⁸

156. Recent reports from Angola stress the important role played by government supervised rural

68 Vasco Sousa Dias, op. cit. According to the Bank of Angola report for 1965 (p. 62), 81,710 head of cattle were slaughtered, producing 11,913,670 kilogrammes of meat.

markets in encouraging African agricultural production. The present system of officially controlled rural markets was established in 1963 (Angola, Governor General's Order No. 12,788 of 22 June 1963) to facilitate and regulate trading in African-grown crops and livestock. 69 These markets are held at officially designated places and times for the sale by local inhabitants of their produce. The district governors may limit any market to traders, exporters and industrialists of only the district concerned or of one locality. Official minimum prices are fixed for products according to grade and are publicly posted. All sales have to be paid for in cash and traders are free to negotiate sales above the minimum prices, which in the case of export crops are fixed in relation to the prevailing f.o.b. prices, less costs of transportation, packaging and other expenses and profits to the middleman, which may amount to as much as 20 per cent.

157. The first rural markets were held in Uige District in 1962. The quantity of Mabuba coffee traded in these markets increased rapidly in the first three years: 2 million kilogrammes at 4.3 million escudos in 1962; 7.7 million kilogrammes at 32 million escudos in 1963; and 12 million kilogrammes at 56.7 million escudos in 1964. In 1965, the amount traded dropped to 10 million kilogrammes (51 million escudos) but in 1966 almost 13 million kilogrammes were traded at 65 million escudos.70 Although about half of the total number of market days are held in Uíge, in 1964 some markets were held in all but two (Cabinda and Moçâmedes) of the fifteen districts. In 1965, a total of 5,108 market days were held in all districts and 270 million escudos were paid for the 70 million kilogrammes of produce traded, including coffee (35.5 million kilogrammes, 170 million escudos),71 tobacco (251,550 kilogrammes, 1.7 million escudos), beef cattle (6.4 million escudos) and hogs.

158. In December 1965 (Legislative Order 3,593 of 13 December), the legislation establishing rural markets was revised. Products which may be traded in these markets now include simple or manufactured agricultural and livestock products and handicrafts. As sales of goods in the rural markets increased in 1966, there were rumours that money paid to Africans had been illegally exported to support nationalist movements outside the Territory. In late February 1967, the Angolan Government published a detailed report on the rural markets in Uige District,⁷² showing how the money paid in the markets had been spent locally or deposited in banks, thus refuting the rumours.

⁶⁷ Under the existing land concession legislation, much larger areas of land may be requested for livestock purposes than for agriculture. As in the case of the latter there are certain development requirements and, to obtain free title, a certain number of cattle have to be raised according to the size of the concession.

⁶⁹ As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix I, paras. 60-63), the Native Statute made provision for the regulation and control of sales of African agricultural products. The repeal of the Native Statute made it necessary to introduce new regulations. Although Africans have to sell their produce through the rural markets, in practice, they are intended to protect the African from unscrupulous traders.

⁷⁰ The government report to which reference is made below estimated that there were in 1965 some 12,000 African coffee growers, of whom about 1,000 employed an average of four men during the period of four months in the year.

⁷¹ Representing about 17 per cent of the Territory's total production in 1965.

⁷² This report showed that out of 65.5 million escudos paid to African growers, the Government received 2.52 million escudos in general taxes (350 escudos per person, 7,200 taxpayers) and an additional 3.22 million in taxes and licences paid in the markets and to the Carmona Municipal Council. In addition, 2 million escudos were paid in the form of interest on loans. The report also gave figures of purchases of bicycles, radios, motorcycles and the number and value of new houses built.

159. Information is not yet available for all districts, but preliminary data suggest that in 1966 there were large increases especially in Huíla District where purchases in the one month of April 1966 are reported to have amounted to more than 280 million escudos.

Settlement and land utilization

160. Since the last report on land settlement (A/ 6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II), there has been very little new information on settlement schemes in Angola. Although it remains Portugal's policy to increase settlement in both Angola and Mozambique, the emphasis in the Territory is now more on the need for a sound economy and for the development of its human and natural resources—especially in the rural areas-in order to attract and retain new settlers. Recent statements reflecting this view include one by the Governor General who said that in principle he agreed that the increased settlement of whole families was indispensable to the Territory but that such settlement would be really viable only if more industries were established throughout the Territory. A similar statement was made by the District Governor of Uige who said that it was necessary to diversify agricultural production and to introduce new industries which would improve the purchasing power of the people, a condition which in turn would attract the surplus population from Portugal,73

161. In Angola, emphasis is given to rural reorganization as part of the general plan for social promotion, settlement and improvement of rural communities. Plans first approved in 1962 were revised in 1964 and what seems to be envisaged now is the regrouping of the rural African population in units which have "geo-economic and social unity". This is also to be the criteria in establishing new regedorias or in the delimitation of existing ones. The regrouping is intended to make it easier to provide health, education and agricultural services, to improve housing and production and to develop the private ownership of land

162. In the first instance, the Territory is to be divided into basic regrouping regions subdivided into zones, each under a zone regrouping committee comprising members appointed by the district governor and presided over by the local administrative authority. In drawing up plans for regrouping, the government departments are to seek the co-operation of the local population which is also to be consulted in the establishment of priorities. The main considerations are the need to introduce changes in farming and stock-rearing methods and the inclusion or assimilation (enquadramento) of "the traditional infrastructure in the national structure".

163. So far, complete plans for the whole Territory have not been published. There appear to be some pilot projects under way. In 1966, 25 million escudos were allocated from the extraordinary budget for rural regrouping projects as follows: Cabinda and Huambo Districts, 2 million escudos each; Bié and Malanje and Zaire Districts, about 1 million escudos each; Cuanza North, Moxico and Huíla Districts, about 650,000 escudos each; Benguela and Luanda, 500,000 escudos each and Lunda, 400,000 escudos.

164. There is no information on the progress made under the rural regrouping plan, nor is there any information on whether or not there has been any increase in the number of African farmers who own land on the same basis as Europeans.

165. Government efforts to improve the rural areas have varied from district to district. Recent information suggests that more has been done in Uige District to help African farmers than anywhere else in the Territory, but now there are also plans for developing the northern parts of Zaire District and Cahinda. In November, an Angolan newspaper, reporting on progress in Uige District since Mr. Rebocho Vaz became District Governor in 1961, listed a large number of new "rural villages" (aldeamentos rurais) in each of which a two-room school had been built and in many of which a new house had been built for the headman (soba) and health facilities or water supplies had been provided. According to the article, there is now a shortage of labour in this district since the local inhabitants do not work for others and all manual labour for European farms has to be imported. Only a few settlers have been established and in the mountain regions some of the abandoned coffee farms have been turned over to workers from the south who are now being organized into a new village.

166. Plans are being made along the border of Zaire to improve the standard of living of the rural African population and to introduce European settlement. Around Santo António do Zaire (on the south bank of the Zaire River which divides the Territory from the Democratic Republic of the Congo) it is planned to plant hundreds of hectares with cashew and oil palm for the usufruct of Africans. In Quinzau (which is about half way down the coast to Ambrizete) 80,000 State-owned cashew trees will be turned over to Africans who will be responsible for their care. Agricultural assistance stations under headmen (capatazias agricolas) will be established at Quelo (on the Lucula River) and Sumbo (on the Zaire River). Centres for European settlement are also under study and in January the District Governor, together with other civil and military personnel, made an aerial and land survey of possible locations. It is reported that speakers in the Legislative Council and the Press in Angola are all in favour of establishing new settlements along the frontier because the settlers are to be given special training and will help the armed forces in defending the Territory.

Industry

167. The industrial sector in Angola is still limited and plays a relatively small role in the economy of the Territory. Most of the industries are concerned with the production of consumption goods for local use or processing of primary products for export. Except for a few larger units producing sugar, beer, cement, petroleum and textiles, most of the industries are small in size. Figures for 1962 showed, for instance, that with some 2,800 million escudos invested in 3,050 establishments, eleven units alone accounted for about one third of the total capital and another 320 units (processing vegetable oil, fish and sisal) accounted for a further 20 per cent of the total, so that the average capital per unit in the remaining 88 per cent of the industries was about half a million escudos (less than \$US20,000) each.

168. Between 1958 and 1961, the rate of capital investment rose to almost 250 million escudos annually.

⁷³ He also complained that there were far too many traders whose sole activity was as intermediaries and who did not contribute to the economic growth of the area.

New industries established in this period included a cement plant (established in 1958 with a capital of 150 million escudos), two beer factories (established in 1959 and 1961 with a total capital of 63 million escudos), a vegetable oil plant (established in 1960 with a capital of 70 million escudos) and a petroleum refinery (established in 1961 with a capital of 150 million escudos). Since 1962, annual investments in transforming and manufacturing industries in Angola have been at a lower rate; although there was a slight improvement in 1964, the total for 1965 was only 103 million escudos; and the average annual rate of investment over the period 1962-1965 was less than 120 million escudos.

169. Complete data are not yet available for 1966. Preliminary figures for January to May suggest an upward trend as investments during those five months already surpassed 230 million escudos, which was more than double the total investments in the preceding year. New industries established in 1966 include a cardboard packing material factory, financed by the Companhia União de Cervejas de Ángola (CÚCA) in association with the South African company, Amalgamated Packaging Industries Ltd. (API); a flour factory, subsidiary of CUCA in association with Sungold of South Africa; a textile factory known as Sociedade Angolana de Tecidos Estampados, S.A.R.L. (SATEC) which has contracted a 70-million escudos loan from the Interamerican Capital Corporation of New York (the Interamerican Capital Corporation has already financed various projects in Angola, including a hydro-electric installation, roads, airports and factories, as mentioned in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap V, para. 122)); a 40-million escudo tobacco factory in Benguela owned by the Fábrica de Tabacos Ultramarina; a match factory, the Indústria Fosforeira Angolana (IFA), with an initial capital of 15 million escudos which is owned by the Borges and Irmão group (owners of the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial and the tire factory Mabor Angolana); two electrical appliance factories, one in Nova Lisboa with a capital of 18 million escudos and the other in Luanda (Indústrias Electrónicas Angola, S.A.R.L.) with a capital of 2 million escudos; a new fish oil and fish meal factory in Porto Alexandre established by the Sociedade Industrial Alexandrense. Limitada (SIAC) with a 12-million escudo loan from the Fisheries Assistance Fund (Fundo do Apoio às Indústrias de Pesca); a 26-million escudo tile factory known as Fábrica de Cerâmicas de Angola; a 30million escudo pineapple juice factory in Lobito; and a plant for industrial chemicals, including sulphuric acid, with an investment of 500 million escudos owned by the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos. An existing metal works has been expanded to become Siderurgia Angolana, S.A.R.L. with a capital of 100 million escudos.

170. During the period 1961-1965, the value of the output of almost all the processing and manufacturing industries increased steadily. The major exceptions were sugar and cotton ginning (see above). Large gains were made in beer (160 per cent increase, from 127 million to 331 million escudos); petroleum (70 per cent increase, from 304 million to 516 million escudos); tobacco (64 per cent increase, from 138 million to 226 million escudos); and milling (800 per cent increase, from 20 million to 163 million escudos). Smaller gains were registered in cement, soft drinks

and sausage making. Wood pulp, which came into production for the first time in 1963, rose from 52,000 to 75,000 tons in 1965 and paper increased from less than 3,000 tons in 1961 to 33,000 tons.

171. As yet, however, local production meets only a small part of the Territory's consumption needs as evidenced by the still-growing value of such imports as the following: tobacco, which increased 46 per cent between 1964 and 1965; textiles, 10 per cent; wheat flour, 35 per cent; paper, 12.4 per cent; conserved milk products, 17 per cent.

172. As noted in a Portuguese study published in 1961,⁷⁴ the industrial structure of the Territory is almost entirely directed from Portugal. According to that study, of the 40 more important industrial establishments in Angola, 10 had their headquarters in Lisbon, 16 at least had their main offices there and 14 were represented there. Official information⁷⁵ further shows that a large share of the profits and earnings from industrial and other enterprises are transferred out of the Territory. In the period 1960-1962, for instance, transfers out of the Territory exceeded 2,000 million escudos of which profits and earnings (including earnings on property) amounted to more than 600 million escudos and the remainder consisted of private transfers. The transfers of profits and earnings alone exceeded the new capital invested in industries in Angola in that period.

173. Another characteristic feature of the industrial sector in Angola is its high concentration in three main regions: (a) Luanda-Dondo-Malanje, which is supplied with electric power by the Cambambe station on the Cuanza River; (b) Lobito-Benguela-Nova Lisboa, supplied by power from the Catumbela River and (c) Moçâmedes-Sá da Bandeira with power supplied from the Matala station on the Cunene. 76 However, a greater proportion of the capitalized industries and a majority of the transforming industries are located in the Luanda region. Although the areas of concentrated industries act as "poles of development", the concentration has tended to aggravate development problems in the rural areas from which there has been considerable exodus of manpower. Recent information from Angola indicates that there is growing support in both government and business circles for a more balanced distribution in the location of industries throughout the Territory.

174. In January 1967, the Governor General was authorized to introduce any changes he thought necessary in the collection of industrial and other taxes and he has since offered industries locating in the border districts a 50 per cent reduction in their tax rates.

175. In Angola, building was seriously affected by the uprising in 1961. The number of new constructions dropped from 761 in 1960 to 494 in 1961 and to 320 in 1962, while the value dropped from 340 million escudos to 273 million escudos and to 160 milion escudos. There has been a partial recovery in 1966 and 1967, and in 1965, 628 units were built with a value of 213 million escudos.

176. Electric power production and consumption have more than doubled since 1960. In 1965, production was 320,000 kWh compared with 143 kWh in

⁷⁴ L. M. Teixeira Pinto and Rui Martins dos Santos, Angola Polos e Perspectivas de Desenvolvimento, Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Financeiras, Lisbon, 1961.

75 Presidência do Concelho, Projecto de Plano Intercalar de Fomento para 1965-1967, Lisbon, 1964, vol. II, p. 153.

76 L. M. Teixeira and R. M. dos Santos, op. cit., pp. 35 ff.

1960 and representing a 31 per cent increase over 1964 (260,000 kWh). In this period consumption increased from about 82 per cent of production to 95 per cent in 1965.

177. The present generating stations are distributed as follows: Cambambe station on the Cuanza River, 260,000 kWh; Mabubas station on the Catumbela River, 15,000 kWh; and a private station, 12,000 kWh. A recent estimate by the Junta de Electrificação puts Angola's potential capacity at 10 million kWh.⁷⁷

178. In December 1966, the Minister for Overseas Territories of Portugal signed contracts with three French companies for the supply of electrical equipment under the loan guaranteed by the General Trade Company. The three French companies are Ateliers de montages électriques, which will supply radio-electric parts valued at 1,440,501 francs,⁷⁸ the Société de monteurs thermiques, which will supply electric generators and parts valued at 2,407,860 francs; and the Société générale de constructions électriques et mécaniques Alsthom, which will supply 28 Diesel generators and replacement parts valued at 936,330 francs.

Mining79

179. Although in the period 1960-1965 the gross value of mineral production increased at an average rate of about 14 per cent per annum to 1,458 million escudos in 1965, the share of minerals in the value of the Territory's exports dropped from a peak of 23.4 per cent in 1963 to 20.4 per cent in each of the two succeeding years.

(a) Diamonds

180. The output of diamonds rose from 1,083,571 carats in 1963 to 1,149,068 carats in 1964 and to 1,155,726 carats in 1965. The number of carats exported was lower in 1965 than in 1963 but owing to price increases in 1964 the value of exports increased steadily to 904.3 million escudos in 1965, representing 15.7 per cent of the value of the total exports.

181. So far, the Angola Diamond Company remains the only diamond producer in the Territory as no finds have been reported from prospecting concessions granted since 1964. Towards the end of 1966, it was reported that Anchor Diamonds, a South African company, had requested exclusive diamond prospecting rights over an area of 1.1 million hectares south of Luanda. No details are available, however.

(b) Petroleum

182. Owing to technical difficulties, crude petroleum production dropped in 1965 to only 655,000 tons, compared with 905,000 tons in the previous year. Exports of crude petroleum to Portugal also dropped by more than 50 per cent, from 361,000 tons to 114,000 tons, valued at 39 million escudos, representing less than one per cent of the total value of the Territory's exports. But exports of refined petroleum products to Portugal amounted to 214,047 tons (32 tons of butane gas, 455 tons of gasoline, 12,838 tons of airplane fuel, 4,894 tons of gas oil and 195,828 tons of fuel oil). The Angola refinery has an annual capacity of 660,000 tons and in 1964 and 1965 the amount of crude oil

78 \$US1 equals 5 francs.

processed was 15 per cent higher than in 1963 (an average of 542,000 tons compared with 482,000 tons in the earlier year).

183. Angola's petroleum production is expected to rise substantially in the next few years as a result of the reorganization and refinancing of Petrangol and the extension of its concession and the new discoveries of petroleum by Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in the Cabinda enclave.

184. As reported last year (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 117), at the end of 1965, the Portuguese Government signed a new contract with Petrangol which is the only petroleum producer and owns the only refinery in Angola. The new contract extended Petrangol's concession area and also envisaged that the Government would select another company to participate in the exploitation of the concessions on a joint venture basis. Although several foreign companies had been included in the list from which the choice would be made (including the South African company Federale Mynbou), in July, a Portuguese company, ANGOL (Sociedade de Lubrificação e Combustíveis), was selected.

185. ANGOL is reported to be closely associated with the two principal oil companies in Portugal, SACOR (Sociedade Anônima Concessionária de Refinação de Petróleos em Portugal) and SONAP (Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos, S.A.R.L.).

186. SACOR, which owns a refinery and has distributing rights in Portugal, also holds rights to process the surplus crude oil from Angola and is currently building a new refinery which is expected to cost over 2,231 million escudos, part of which is being financed by government-guaranteed loan bonds.

187. The statement by the Government announcing the selection of ANGOL, which holds petroleum distributing rights in Angola, said that this move was in keeping with the policy of encouraging activities by national companies and national capital in the development of the Overseas Territories. At the same time, the Government's participation has increased as it has a one-third share in SACOR which in 1964 held 78.4 per cent of ANGOL's registered capital.80

188. Since their association in the development of petroleum in Angola, both companies have changed their statutes. Petrangol's new statute published in October 1966 requires it to raise its present registered capital of 150 million escudos to 900 million within 90 days upon notice from the Government after consultation with the company. This is to be done by the issue of new shares, one third of which are to be given free of charge to the Government. Under its new statute approved in September 1966, ANGOL becomes Sociedade Portuguêsa de Exploração de Petróleos and its capital, which was raised in April 1966 from 70 million to 120 million escudos, is to be further increased to 220 million escudos by an issue of new shares, 100 million escudos of which will be for public subscription in Angola. The company has been authorized to increase its capital further to 320 million escudos when necessary. The Government is to receive free of charge 10 per cent of the new shares issued. Participation of foreign capital is envisaged

⁷⁷ Diário, Lourenço Marques, 29 January 1967.

⁷⁹ This information supplements the study on mining in Angola contained in document A/6000/Rev.1, chap V, appendix, annex I.

so In November 1966, SACOR issued \$US6 million bond series at 634 per cent interest which was reported to have been underwritten by a Luxembourg bank. Previously, in 1961 and 1962, SACOR issued two other bond series in European units of account. The Portuguese Government has undertaken to guarantee a total of 580 million escudos of SACOR's loans.

through purchase of shares, but, in accordance with the 1965 regulations governing foreign investments (Decree Law 46,312 of 28 April) there is to be a Portuguese majority in the administration, direction and management.

189. In December 1966, ANGOL was granted a contract for petroleum mining in the Territory under which it will have a 50 per cent share in the existing Petrangol petroleum mining concession (excluding the deposits already discovered and excluding refining rights) and exclusive rights in other areas. It is required to invest an equal amount of 750 million escudos in the joint concession by the end of 1970 and an additional 300 million escudos in the areas over which it has exclusive rights. Thus ANGOL's investments in the Territory will amount to more than 1,000 million escudos during the first five years of its contract. In addition, ANGOL undertakes to contribute 1.5 million escudos annually to the Mining Development Fund when established, ANGOL is specifically authorized to co-operate with other national or foreign enterprises. If foreign capital is associated with this project, the amounts required to be spent in prospecting will be further raised. If oil is found, the company must begin exploitation as soon as feasible and must give Portuguese refineries priority of purchase.

190. At the end of 1966, Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC) found oil in Cabinda where it has had an exclusive concession since 1957 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex I, paras. 188-194). The original contract having expired in November 1966, a new contract has since been signed under which the company is granted until the end of 1968 an exclusive concession for the prospecting and exploitation of hydrocarbons, especially petroleum, in a large part of the Cabinda district and off-shore. The contract may be extended for another two years. Reports indicate that the company has already spent 360 million escudos on prospecting in the area. Under the new contract, instead of paying the surface rent of 630 escudos per square kilometre during the period of prospecting only, the company will pay during the whole period of the concession a rent of 600 escudos a square kilometre during the first two years, 750 escudos in 1969 and 900 escudos in 1970. The company undertakes to invest a minimum of 150 million escudos before the end of December 1968 and to pay one million escudos a year to the Mining Development Fund. The Government of Angola will receive 50 per cent of the company's profits.

191. In September 1966, Texaco, Inc. filed an application for the prospecting and exploitation of hydrocarbons, including raw petroleum, in the Congo district and off-shore Cabinda.

(c) Iron

192. The largest foreign and Portuguese investments since 1961 have been in iron mining in the Territory, mainly for the development of the deposits at Cassinga which are estimated to be over 120 million tons of high grade ore and many thousand million tons of lower grade deposits.

193. Average production over the period 1960-1965 was around 800,000 tons a year and exports averaged around 650,000 tons. In 1964, exports reached an all-time high of 1.27 million tons (which included reserve stocks), but dropped to 693,000 tons in 1965. According to reports, production and exports have been held back pending completion of rail and port

facilities for handling the ore. With the exception of 1964, the value of iron exports has averaged slightly less than 150 million escudos annually but it has not kept pace with the total value of the Territory's exports, dropping from 4.3 per cent in 1960 to 2.5 per cent in 1965. (In 1964 exports were valued at 234 million escudos and represented 4 per cent of the value of total exports.)

194. The two principal mines in production are those at Cuima and Cassinga, both owned and operated by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito which is closely associated with the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige. Although, according to previous estimates, ore reserves total more than 10 million metric tons at Cuima and production from this mine has probably accounted for about half of the annual exports in the last few years, it is now reported that the mine will be closed next year when the Cassinga mine comes into production.

195. The Cassinga mine is being financed partly by foreign capital, which is being used for the purchase of rolling stock, mineral handling facilities and equipment. Up to the end of 1966, financial assistance in connexion with the project included (a) 1,300 million escudos provided by a consortium comprising-Fried Krupp (Essen), Jojgaard and Schulz A/S (Copenhagen) and the Sociedade de Empreitadas e Trabalhos Hidráulicos, Lda. (of Lisbon and Luanda); (b) a loan of 300 million escudos from the Bank of Angola to the territorial Government for the development of Moçâmedes port facilities; (c) 1,500 million escudos furnished by Krupp in 1965 for locomotives and wagons; and (d) a loan of 32 million escudos in 1966 by the Danish firm. In December 1966 (Decree 47,380 of 16 December), the Portuguese Government. on behalf of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige, guaranteed foreign loans totalling 2,700 million escudos (approximately \$US97 million).81 Total investments in connexion with the project already exceed 3,000 million escudos, making it the most expensive current project in the Territory.

196. The guarantee by the Government has been made to enable the preparatory work to be accelerated so that the mine will start producing in 1967 and output will increase from 5 to 5.5 million tons annually in 1968, instead of at an annual rate of 1.5 million tons as previously planned. It is reported that contracts have already been signed for deliveries of ore to the Federal Republic of Germany and to Japan. In January 1967, it was reported that 75,000 tons were ready for shipment to Japan and a further 10,000 tons of scrap was waiting transportation. Total value of exports of ore are expected to reach 1,300 million escudos annually (about half the value of coffee exports in 1965) and, during the period of amortization (about ten years), foreign exchange earnings are expected to amount to about 500,000 escudos annually, and after amortization to about a million escudos annually.

197. The work of the mine is currently being carried out under some sixty contracts most of which are expected to be completed by the end of this year. The mining operations will be highly mechanized so that very little manual labour will be involved. Transport facilities include sixty locomotives, twenty vans and 800 freight wagons. The Moçâmedes port is being equipped with a mineral quay capable of handling 3,000

⁸¹ This guarantee is reported to cover both the initial 1,300 million escudo loan and additional loans made since then or to be made.

tons per hour and a storage area for at least 1 million tons of ore.

198. Early in 1967, the registered share capital of the Lobito-Lombige companies was increased and Portuguese holdings will be increased by 500 million escudos through the subscription of shares by the Portuguese and Angolan Governments and other governmental bodies. The Government of Angola is already a shareholder in both companies.

(d) Other minerals

199. There have also been recent developments relating to the mining of manganese, copper and phosphate deposits. New manganese deposits have been reported and the Portuguese Government has authorized the territorial Government to subscribe to 10 million escudos in shares in the Companhia do Manganês de Angola, which has hitherto been the main producer of manganese, although production and exports have been insignificant during the last three years.

200. New deposits of copper have also been reported at Tetelo in the Mavio region. There are reports that the Nippon Mining Company plans to invest \$US25 million in the development of these deposits. A new company, Empresa Mineira de Angola, is reported to be actively prospecting for copper in the Alto Zambezia region.

201. In January 1966, the Companhia Mineira do Lobito is reported to have filed a claim to exploit natural phosphate deposits in northern Angola. The International Mineral and Chemical Corporation (reported to be a United States company) is said to be interested in developing the phosphate deposits.

Fisheries

202. In the 1950s the fishing industry was one of the Territory's most important economic activities and was also a source of foreign exchange. Since the drop in world fish meal prices in 1959, the industry has been seriously depressed and in spite of various government measures to help reorganize and finance it, production of fish derivatives (conserves, fish meal, fish oil and dried fish) dropped from an average of about 80,000 tons a year in 1961-1962 to under 60,000 tons in the two following years; thereafter production rose to 93,000 tons in 1964 but in 1965 it was again only 81,000 tons. Annual exports of fish derivatives have fluctuated around an average of 70,000 tons annually, but as a result of improved prices their value rose from an average of 250 million escudos a year in the period 1960-1961 to over 300 million escudos a year in 1964-1965, and in 1966, fish meal alone ranked fifth in value of the Territory's exports.

203. As in the case of several of the important export crops, government measures have aimed at the structural reorganization of the industry and the provision of technical assistance and credit facilities. Among other measures, the Government has set up a Fisheries Industries Institute and a Fishing Industry Assistance Fund which acts both as a marketing fund, producing subsidies in times of low prices, and as a credit institution. Since its establishment, the Fund has helped to modernize and re-equip the fishing fleet and has added a floating factory to help process the catch at sea. In 1962, the fisheries industry was reorganized along corporative lines with fishermen and other producers engaged in this sector organized into grêmios through which the industry can co-ordinate and regulate its

own activities and provide insurance and welfare assistance to its members.⁸²

204. In March 1966, the South African company, Marine Products, which had intended to set up a \$1.5 million fish processing plant in Angola, decided to withdraw. The company is reported to have made this move because "Portuguese legislation promulgated in November [1965] had the effect that foreigners are not permitted to control fishing vessels". Source In addition to the Sociedade Industrial Alexandrense reported above (para. 169), another new Portuguese fisheries company known as Sociedade dos Armadores de Pesca em Angola, S.A.R.L. (ARAN) was established with an initial capital of 7.5 million escudos. The new company, which has its counterpart in Mozambique, plans to supply fish to Portugal and the local market. A third Portuguese-owned fisheries company, the Sociedade de Pesca, has begun operations with the first of five vessels equipped to freeze the catch at sea.

Transport and communications

205. In Angola, priority has been given to transport and communication facilities under the successive development plans since 1953, not only as a necessary part of the Territory's infrastructure but also as part of the Government's long-term plan to occupy and settle the Territory with surplus population from Portugal. The importance attached to this sector is reflected in the proportion of the total expenditure successively allocated for roads, rail transport, ports and harbours, and airport facilities and equipment: 66 per cent (1,478 million escudos) under the First National Development Plan, 1953-1958; 54 per cent (2,147 million escudos) under the Second National Development Plan, 1959-1964; and almost 30 per cent (1,930 million escudos) under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967.

206. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix IV), the railways in Angola have in the past operated continuously below their capacity and do not make an important contribution to the territorial revenue. This situation may be expected to change, however, when the Cassinga mine comes into operation later in 1967, as the Moçâmedes line is expected to run more than twenty trains a day, eventually carrying a daily load of more than 10,000 tons of mineral ore. The equipment of the Luanda Railway is also being modernized under a recent government guarantee for the purchase of electric engines from the United States amounting to 82 million escudos.

207. Of the three main lines, only the Benguela railway traverses the whole Territory and carries transit trade. Nevertheless, competition from other lines has in the past prevented the Benguela railway from carrying more traffic. Only since the early part of 1966 has the Benguela railway come into greater use for exporting copper ore from Zambia. General inbound traffic to Zambia rose 65,000 tons over that of

⁸² For a brief description of the Portuguese corporative system of economic organization see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix I, paras. 6-15. In this system, "Institutes have the function of co-ordinating all activities in relation to those commodities which are mainly for export, which already have fully developed corporative organized production and commerce sectors, but which because of their importance require official guarantees as to quality and type of product".

⁸³ It appears that the legislation referred to is Decree 46,666 relating to the co-ordination of industrial development in the Portuguese realm which is briefly reported in document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 65-68.

1966 and by the end of 1967, with the exception of November and December, exports of copper were around 15,000 tons a month. Although the Benguela railway put forward a plan in early 1966 for doubling its capacity if it could be guaranteed a minimum of 120,000 to 140,000 tons of mineral traffic a year (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix IV, paras. 59-60), there is no recent information on whether the plan is being implemented.

208. The three main ports are at Luanda, Lobito and Moçâmedes. Under the first two development plans, more than 660 million escudos were allocated to port development and of this about half was spent in the expansion of Lobito and the installation of ore loading facilities to serve the Cuíma mine (see above). Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, of the 278 million escudos allocated for ports and navigation, more than half (150 million escudos) is for improving the Luanda port, the main coffee port. In 1966, two new wharfs were opened and ten South African manufactured cranes were installed. A new naval dock was also opened.

209. As reported above, the improvements to the Moçâmedes port are being financed mainly by the mining companies and special allocations. However, under the contract, all port and rail facilities financed and built by the companies become government property immediately upon completion. The Moçâmedes port will be able to handle ships of up to 100,000 tons even at low tide.

210. According to a recent official statement expenditure on roads has averaged 445 million escudos a year since 1962, representing about 55 per cent of the Territory's annual expenditure on all public works. The Territory's road programme is the responsibility of the Roads Board set up in 1962 and is financed through regular and special taxes on fuel imports and exports from the 850 million escudos allocation under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 and by the 1965 loan from Petrangol amounting to 250 million escudos.

211. In 1966, Angola's road system comprised some 72,000 kilometres. During 1967, it was expected to build about 1,000 kilometres of roads and to asphalt about 500 kilometres, bringing the total length of paved roads to 3,500 kilometres compared with 600 kilometres in 1962. By 1970, all district capitals are expected to be linked by paved roads. One of the major projects, which is expected to cost 240 million escudos, is the extension of the highway from Sá da Bandeira to the border of South West Africa from whence it will eventually link with Mozambique through the South African highway system.

212. Next in importance to roads has been the expansion of internal airports, airfields and landing facilities, mainly for military use. In 1965, Angola had two international airports, capable of receiving DC-8s, one at Luanda and the other at Nova Lisboa; two airports serving district capitals; twenty smaller airports; and 400 landing fields (compared with 100 in 1961). In 1966, four new airfields were built in the eastern part of the Territory: a large field at Gago Coutinho in the Moxico district near the Zambian border, capable of receiving aircraft of the DC-6 type, and three other smaller ones. Another runway is to be completed at Serpa Pinto early in 1967.

213. Since 1961 also, the telephone, telegraph and radio-telephone network in the Territory has been greatly expanded. In 1966, there was a very high fre-

quency system linking Luanda with the principal towns—Salazar, Carmona, Malanje, Nova Lisboa, Benguela, Lobito and Sá da Bandeira—with supplementary systems linking the secondary towns and especially those along the borders with Luanda. In 1967, a permanent telephone line between Portugal and Angola came into operation.

214. Radio broadcasting facilities are to be expanded under a new allocation of 47.4 million escudos to be spent within the next eight years. In 1963, the last year for which data are available, there were eighteen broadcasting stations with forty-six transmitters with a total power of 47.25 kilowatts. Under legislation enacted in 1944, business concerns may establish telecommunications for their own use between their different branches. Such installations, which have to be approved by an order of the Governor General, have increased steadily since 1961.

Public finance

215. Under the Portuguese system, as the budget for the following year is usually published in December and the final accounts are only available six months after the closing of the financial year, there is an eighteen-month period before actual expenditures can be studied. For Angola, the final accounts for 1966 have not yet been published, and although there have been brief reports of the 1967 budget, the details are not yet available.

216. The report on the final accounts for 1965 shows that the actual ordinary revenue was 4,298 million escudos which exceeded estimates by about 483 million escudos, owing mainly to increased receipts from the extraordinary defence tax introduced at the end of 1964, which amounted to 224 million escudos (174 million escudos more than the original estimates). With one exception, expenditure by all government departments rose above the 1964 level: expenditures for development services rose by 170 million escudos to 1,608 million escudos, and defence rose by 173 million escudos (40 per cent over 1964) to 616 million escudos which was 30 per cent above the original estimates (474.4 million escudos).

217. As reported in the Press, the legislation governing the 1967 budget for Angola (Legislative Instrument 3,692) lays down the policy that there is to be stringent economy in all expenditures (excepting contractual and fixed commitments). Priority is to be given to national defence, internal security, education, health and development. Not only are government departments to be placed on the monthly budget system (see para. 130) but all expenditures are to be reduced by 10 per cent below the estimates.⁸⁴

218. For 1967, the estimated ordinary revenue is 4,247.5 million escudos representing an increase of 12 per cent over 1966, and estimated expenditures are also higher. The largest increase is for defence, rising by 156 million escudos to 782 million escudos. 85 Despite an increase of 32.5 million escudos, the 297 million escudos allocation for education, which includes 34.5 million escudos for the Estudos Gerais Universitários, represents only about 6 per cent of the budget. About 4 per cent of the budget is to be spent on public health and special services. In contrast to the sharp rise in

⁸⁴ Since defence expenses usually exceed estimates, savings from other expenditures provide the necessary margin to prevent a final deficit.

⁸⁵ This does not include internal security for which, in 1966, the allocation was 144 million escudos which was about two thirds that for education.

defence allocations, the 1,204 million escudos allocation to services concerned with development is less than 5 per cent above that of the previous year.

Development financing

219. The Transitional Development Plan covering the period 1965-1967 envisaged an investment target of 7,210 million escudos. This represents an average annual investment of 2,403 million escudos, which is more than the total investment envisaged under the First National Development Plan for 1953-1958 and almost three times the annual investment targets under the Second National Development Plan for 1959-1964. As noted above, over 2,068 million escudos (about 30 per cent of the total) are to be invested in the industrial sector, and 1,930 million escudos (27 per cent) are to be invested in transport and communications. Other sectors to receive more than 5 per cent of the total investments are: education and social welfare, 820 million escudos (11 per cent); electricity, 850 million escudos (about 12 per cent); agriculture, 130 million escudos (8.8 per cent); fisheries, 370 million (5.2 per cent). Of the total investment, about 40 per cent is expected to be derived from external sources, about 33 per cent from private investment, about 14 per cent from the central Government and the remainder from territorial funds.

220. Although there have been no reports published on the progress made under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the preceding sections give some indication of the extent to which the targets are being met. For 1966, the investment target was 2,415.5 million escudos, or almost exactly one third of the total. External sources were expected to provide 970.5 million escudos (40.2 per cent) including 211.8 million escudos in foreign loans. The remaining 60 per cent was to be financed as follows: 320 million escudos from the central Government (13.3 per cent); 250 million escudos (10.3 per cent) from the Angolan Government; 530 million escudos (22 per cent) from private industry as "selffinancing"; 200 million escudos (8.3 per cent) from development bonds; and the remaining 145 million escudos from credit institutions and private investment companies.

221. It was officially reported in July 1966 (Boletim Geral do Ultramar) that France would finance projects up to a total of 1,000 million escudos under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. The sectors in which projects were to be financed included agriculture, fisheries, communications, hydro-electric power and public health. Some of the projects were already in progress while others were awaiting authorization from the Portuguese Government.

222. Bond issues totalling 200 million escudos were authorized in April 1966 as the third and fourth series of the Obrigacções de Tesouro de Angola, 5 por cento, 1965, Plano Intercalar de Fomento, 1965-1967. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 56), these bonds may be used for settling both visible and invisible accounts with escudo zone, and when used for this purpose, the payment of interest on the bonds and amortization outside the Territory of issue receive priority over other transfers to the same area.86 In this

connexion it may be noted that the total bond issue of 200 million escudos represents only about one fifth of the yearly total capital transfers out of the Territory in 1960 and 1961 and one third of the transfers in 1962. Thus although on the one hand the exchange control seeks to keep money in the Territory, the lack of convertibility and the difficulties in transferring funds do not encourage new investments in the Territory.

223. According to press reports, Angola's 1967 budget provides a preliminary allocation of 1,137.5 million escudos for the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. This sum is to be financed as follows: 180 million escudos from ordinary budgetary surpluses; 510 million escudos from the metropolitan loan; 115 million escudos from the loan from Petrangol; 70 million escudos from the sobrevalorização taxes; 62.5 million escudos from credit institutions; and 200 million escudos from a further issue of the development bonds.

224. In March 1967, one of Angola's deputies in the National Assembly (see para. 131) renewed the plea he had made in 1965 to the Government to introduce measures to protect Angola's economy. He pointed out that so long as there existed a wide disparity in the level of development of the component Territories to be integrated in the Portuguese realm, economic integration itself would only increasingly make the less developed Territories markets for the manufactured goods of the more developed part. The currency exchange restriction and the difficulties of Angola's balance of payments formed a vicious circle and, until some solution was found to these problems, it was difficult for the Territory to attract capital investments needed for economic growth.

Education

225. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, for Angola, the three goals in education are: (a) total enrolment of primary school children within twenty years; (b) increased adult education; and (c) raising the actual school enrolment. The Plan also established priorities for the building of a number of technical, secondary and middle-level (ensino médio) schools. In all, for the three-year period, 540 million escudos (about 7.5 per cent of the total) were allocated for education.

226. Since the primary education reform of 1964, in Angola, the former adaptation schools have been abolished and a uniform primary school system established. During 1965, a large number of new school posts were established in the rural areas, especially in the more populated districts which have a greater density of European population. The rural school posts, which are often buildings with one to two rooms, must now provide all of the first three primary classes with a pre-primary class for teaching oral Portuguese. Whereas previously, adaptation schools were mainly the responsibility of the Catholic missions, the Government now helps to provide the necessary staff.

227. Budgetary allocations for the territorial education services which increased almost fourfold between 1963 and 1966, rising from 62 million escudos to 242 million escudos, will be increased by only 9 per cent in 1967 to 263.6 million escudos. Thus it seems that following the 1966 trend, the expansion of education services will continue at a slower rate compared with 1965 when almost 500 new school posts were added in a single year.

228. As already noted above in section B.1, great importance is attached to the extension of primary

⁸⁶ The Jornal Português de Economia e Finanças in January 1967, noting that the Angola Inspectorate of Credit and Securities had invited persons wishing to make transfers to use the development bonds, considered that this implied that no real solution to Angola's exchange problem could be expected in the near future. (The bonds can only be amortized beginning in the sixth year after the date of issue.)

education to the rural populations to raise their level of living and to make them even more consciously Portuguese. In particular, it is hoped that the spread of the use of the Portuguese language will strengthen "national unity".

229. Although there is now a "unified" school system, African children have not yet been truly "integrated" in the primary schools and there are still differences between the programmes in the school posts in rural areas and those in the primary schools in the more populated urban or semi-urban areas. This difference is underlined by the officially defined objective of the pre-primary class, which, despite the repeal of the Native Statute and abolition of the adaptation schools, continues to be defined in the official teachers' handbook for the pre-primary class (Livro de Didáctica das Lições da Classe Pré-Primaria do Ensino Primário Elementar) in the following terms:

"The [pre-primary] programmes of education have to reflect distinctly the determination to give the pupils a sufficient knowledge of the spoken Portuguese language and to make them acquire the social habits necessary for attending common schools with the same chances of success as children who have a European type of living."

230. Based on this policy, in January 1967 in Luso (Moxico district), children who already could speak Portuguese were not admitted to take the pre-primary exemption examination because they came from a different environment and were therefore required to go through the pre-primary adaptation class.

231. Compared with the previous school year, during 1964-1965 there was an increase of 339 schools, 439 teachers and a school enrolment of 39,000. The school statistics for 1964-1965 are given below.

SCHOOL STATISTICS FOR 1964-1965a

	Number of schools	Number of teachers	Number of pupils
Total 1964-1965	2,036 (1,697)	3,259 (2,766)	191,693 (153,088)
Government Primary School posts Catholic Missions	197 898 752 (663)	894 } 1,121 }	148,597 (111,207)
Primary	75 3	214 \ 939 \ 91 \	43,096 (41,881)

a Comércio do Porto, 3 February 1967. Comparable figures for 1963-1964 are given in parentheses. These figures vary slightly from those reported in A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 136

232. One of the main problems in Angola is the small number of teachers completing training each year. Because there are not enough fully qualified primary teachers available, the rural school posts are taught by "monitors". These may be persons who have completed as little as four years of primary education and one special 2½-month intensive monitor training course (though to become fully qualified rural teachers, they must complete the four-year primary teachers' training courses and have three years of teaching experience). In June 1966, there were 1,685 monitors and seven monitor training schools, of which one was for

male and female teachers, five for female teachers and one for male teachers only.

233. In contrast, the regular primary schools must be taught by teachers who have had at least five years of secondary education and have completed a two-year primary teachers' training course (Escola de Magistério Oficial). In 1966, there were still only three training schools for such teachers, one of which graduated only sixty-four teachers in the period 1964-1966.

234. Teachers for the academic secondary schools (liceus) have to complete a special four- to five-year university level course leading to the licenciatura. To qualify for tenure, they must in addition have completed two years of teaching (estágio pedagógico) at an approved school. Although courses are given in the Estudos Gerais Universitários (EGU) for training of some technical professional teachers, complete training for secondary school teachers is only available in Portugal. As a transitional measure, however, persons who do not have the full training required may be approved to teach in academic schools.

235. The total number of students enrolled in the university level courses (Estudos Gerais Universitários) has more than doubled since 1963-1964, rising from 286 to 467 in 1964-1965 and to 601 in 1966-1967. Of the students enrolled in the current school year, 281 are in engineering courses, 178 in medicine, 40 in agronomy and silviculture, 52 in veterinary medicine, 23 in pedagogical science (decreased from 112 in 1963-1964) and 27 in special secondary teacher courses. How far these figures fall short of the Territory's needs can be seen from the fact that, in January 1967, the Overseas Agricultural and Forestry Common Services (excluding Veterinary Services) had more than 93 vacancies in the professional and administrative levels; these included vacancies for 11 first class and 33 second class agronomists, 18 silviculturists, 2 agronomy engineers, 15 civil engineers and 3 entomologists.

236. The large number of vacancies in the various overseas technical services has been mainly due to the small annual output of trained personnel in Portugal, the competitive examination system and the generally higher pay offered by private industry. As a transitional measure, since October 1966 (Decree 47,261 of 17 October) the conditions for appointment to the Overseas Services have been eased so that middle level and senior technical posts may now be filled by contracting qualified candidates without examination, provided that there are no other candidates available or that the number of vacancies exceeds the number of candidates.

Labour

237. According to a recently published study,⁸⁷ in 1964, there were 367,815 persons employed in Angola as wage earners which represented 13.7 per cent of the economically active population. Of these, 45.3 per cent were engaged in the primary sector (agriculture 144,667, fisheries 16,225, livestock 5,721); 28.3 per cent in the secondary sector (including 30,249 in mining, 29,838 in industries and 40,747 in construction); and 26.4 per cent in the tertiary sector (including 31,683 in communications and transport, 25,000 in commerce, banking, etc., 40,500 in services).

238. Almost all the workers in the primary sector are engaged in rural areas and they are almost ex-

⁸⁷ Alfonso Mendes. O Trabalho Assalariado em Angola, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina, Lisbon 1966.

clusively African. As "rural" workers they are governed by the Rural Labour Code for the Overseas Territories (Decree 44,309 of 27 April 1962)⁸⁸ which replaced the Indigenous (Native) Labour Code approved by Decree 16,199 of 6 December 1928.⁸⁹ Whereas one of the principal features of the Native Labour Code was the provision under which idleness could render indigenous persons liable to compulsory labour on public work projects, the Rural Labour Code of 1962 is silent on the obligation to work.

239. The study shows that the number of rural workers has decreased since the 1950s, dropping from a maximum of 393,325 in 1954 to 241,351 in 1964. It attributes the decrease to mechanization, higher productivity, more rational use of labour as well as better wages and other benefits.

240. It appears that, following the introduction of the new Rural Labour Code, minimum wage rates were not only raised but better enforced so that there was no shortage of labour. In 1966, complaints of labour shortages in agriculture began to appear in the local newspapers. In December it was suggested in the Legislative Council that the Government should introduce measures to make it obligatory for persons over 18 years of age to work if they were not students or did not have income on which they could support themselves.

241. One of the districts most affected by the recent labour shortages is Uige, where African farmers have been able to grow coffee on their own account (see above). Although the Governor General has not agreed to the introduction of legislation to make work obligatory, he has expressed the view that in a modern society every citizen is expected to work either for himself or for others. Subsequently he announced that the Government intended to launch an intensive campaign "to convince the great masses of the population" to work harder and to increase their productivity.

3. Mozambique

General

242. Mozambique lies south of the Equator between latitudes 10°30′ and 27″. It is bounded on the north by the United Republic of Tanzania, on the west by Lake Nyasa, Malawi, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, on the south by South Africa and Swaziland, and on the east by the Indian Ocean. It has a total area of 771,125 square kilometres. At the 1960 census, the total resident population was 6,578,604, of whom 6,430,530 were Africans. The non-African population comprised 97,268 Europeans, 31,465 mistos and 19,341 Asians.

Government and administration

243. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Mozambique is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute is contained in Decree 45,375 of 22 November 1963.

244. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Angola (see section B.2). The

Territory is, however, divided into 9 administrative districts and the Legislative Council consists of 29 members, of whom 2 are *ex officio*, 18 are elected by "organic groups" and 9 are elected directly. Other provisions are the same as those for Angola, including the composition of the Economic and Social Council, the franchise qualifications and the number of representatives in the National Assembly, which for each Territory is seven, despite the difference in the size of their populations.

245. The election of representatives to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and information pertaining thereto is contained in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 146-149). Elections to local bodies were held in 1964, the next elections being due in 1968. In January 1967, it was announced that registration of voters for the elections to the Legislative Council would be completed by 15 May.

The war in Mozambique

246. In Mozambique, as in Angola and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, Portugal is engaged in a defensive war against insurrectionary forces, directed in this case by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO). The fighting began in September 1964 when small bands of guerrillas entered Mozambique from the north and has since grown and spread until now it includes large areas of the Territory. Owing to the nature of guerrilla warfare and the fact that both sides issue conflicting reports, it is not possible to state precisely what are the zones within which the guerrilla forces are operating but it appears that, aside from minor outbreaks of fighting near the borders of the Tete, Zambézia and Moçambique Districts, the main fighting is confined to the sparsely populated northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado which share a common border with the United Republic of Tanzania. Portuguese sources describe the fighting as being confined to two zones: first, a coastal zone in Cabo Delgado extending from the Tanzanian frontier to the Montepuez River and stretching inland for about 100 miles to include the country around Mueda and the Makonde plateau; and secondly, in Niassa, the eastern shore of Lake Malawi from the Tanzanian frontier southwards to beyond Vila Cabral, a distance of about 140 miles, and inland for an indeterminate distance. One objective of Portuguese strategy is apparently to confine guerrilla activity within these zones and to prevent the guerrillas from infiltrating further south into economically more developed areas. In Cabo Delgado district, Portuguese forces have established a cordon sanitaire, whence the inhabitants, numbering about 250,000, have been removed to defended settlements and in which most crops have been destroyed.

247. Within the fighting zones and along the northern frontier, the Portuguese have established a network of military bases from which ground and air patrols are sent out. These are supplemented by large-scale combined operations for the purpose of seeking out and destroying guerrilla bands and their encampments. At the same time, a programme of "psycho-social" measures, consisting of propaganda and other inducements, is employed to encourage the return and resettlement in fortified villages of refugees and others in hiding or aiding the guerrillas. The insurgents, for their part, operate principally in small, well-armed groups, engaging in raids, ambushes, mining of roads and acts of sabotage, such as the destruction

⁸⁸ English text contained in the ILO Legislative Series 1962, Por.1.

⁸⁹ Some of the main provisions contained in the Native Labour Code of 1928 have been summarized in A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, paras. 354 ff. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 54). Under the Native Labour Code, idleness could render indigenous persons liable to compulsory labour on public work projects.

of bridges. In July 1966, they severed the railway line under construction at Catur, near Vila Cabral. Since 1965, they have undertaken larger operations, including attacks by groups of 65 to 150 men on defended localities and military bases. Thus, in mid-1966, they claimed to have made a mortar attack on the town of Mocímboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado District and, in October and November, FRELIMO reported attacks on Vila Cabral and a Portuguese army camp at Nova Coimbra in Niassa District.

248. It is difficult to assess the progress or extent of the fighting because both sides make conflicting claims. FRELIMO sources report numerous victories, claiming that, during the two years of warfare, the guerrillas killed or wounded 7,000 Portuguese and destroyed 20 aircraft. According to FRELIMO, most of the countryside in Niassa and Cabo Delgado Districts is under guerrilla control. The Portuguese military command describes these claims as mainly fictitious. Although it admits that raids have been made on towns near the Tanzanian frontier, it asserts that during two years of fighting it inflicted more than 4,000 enemy casualties with only relatively small losses among its own troops and that the guerrillas are able to continue their attacks only because they can operate from outside the Territory and receive foreign aid. Portuguese official communiqués enumerate repeated successes against the guerrillas and report that the local population is being won over or "recuperated" in increasing numbers.

249. Both sides agree, however, that the guerrilla forces are now more numerous and better trained and equipped than they were in 1964. Portuguese sources estimated their number at 3,500 in November 1966 while FRELIMO recently gave a total of 7,000 guerrillas under arms supported by 3,000 cadres serving in various capacities. FRELIMO further claims that in the areas under its control it has established nuclear administrative services with schools and hospitals of its own. At the same time, the number of Portuguese troops in Mozambique has nearly doubled and was believed by foreign observers to be in the region of 40,000 at the end of 1966. In addition to regular troops, the defence forces include, as in Angola, a locally recruited volunteer corps and a militia comprised of Africans recruited in the regedorias. The militia is divided into a "protection militia" which is responsible for the local defence of villages and settlements, and an "intervention militia" which participates with the volunteer corps and regular army in the pursuit and destruction of guerrilla bands. There are also two mobile companies of police, but it is not clear whether these are used in the fighting zones or whether they are solely for internal security.

250. Although the fighting is sporadic and on a limited scale, it resulted, especially in late 1964 and early 1965, in the exodus of large numbers of African refugees to the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. At the end of 1965, some 12,000 refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania were being cared for by the Tanzanian Government with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Lutheran Church and the UN/FAO World Food Programme; a further wave of 3,000 refugees was reported to have arrived in January 1966. Similar groups of 3,000 and 2,000 were reported to be still in Malawi and Zambia respectively. By mid-1966, the warfare had also resulted in incidents involving Mozambique's northern neighbours; in November 1966, it was reported that a Portuguese patrol had penetrated

three miles into Malawi territory and had taken 50 prisoners who were subsequently released; later in the month, according to a formal charge addressed to the Security Council by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 December 1966 (S/7605), Portuguese troops were accused of having crossed into Tanzania and laid mines causing the death of four persons. Both charges were denied by Portugal, which replied to the Tanzanian complaint in a letter dated 5 December 1966 (S/7622).

251. One immediate result of the fighting can be seen in the rising cost of military and related expenditures both for Portugal (see section B.1) and Mozambique. For 1966, the Territory's share in defence and security expenditures included, according to a decree of 21 January, an allocation of 724.4 million escudos for the regular expenses of the armed services, or roughly 255 million escudos more than the amount allocated in 1965 and about twice the actual expenditure of the armed services in 1963 before the fighting started. In addition, the budget estimates for 1966 contained allocations of 45.2 million for extraordinary military expenditure, including 5 million for the volunteer corps and 111.9 million for police, "psycho-social" measures, including resettlement of refugees, and other related costs. The sum of all these allocations, including subsequent additional appropriations totalling 52 million, is equal to approximately 23 per cent of the estimated budget of Mozambique for 1966. This substantial expenditure is in part financed by special taxes (notably the defence tax introduced in 1964 and the defence stamp tax introduced a year later), which it was estimated would yield about 131 million escudos in 1966, and by a special levy on the receipts of the various autonomous bodies and economic funds, which was estimated to yield 222.7 million escudos. Nevertheless, despite this increased revenue, the rising expenditures resulting from the guerrilla war, added to the anticipated loss of transit earnings due to the international embargo on trade with Southern Rhodesia, are straining government finances (see section on public finance below).

Security measures

252. Although precise information is lacking, there appears to have been a progressive tightening of security measures in Mozambique to counter any possible subversion. In 1966, the regular budgetary appropriation for police services amounted to 93 million escudos or more than twice the sum appropriated in 1960.90 The largest increase, from 2.7 million to 23 million escudos, was for the Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) (intelligence police) and it may be noted that, between 1965 and 1966, the numbers employed by PIDE increased from 355 to 475. In September, new legislation was enacted requiring all persons entering or leaving the Territory to possess valid passports.

253. In October, there began in Lourenço Marques the retrial before a military tribunal of nine persons accused of subversive activities against the State. The defendants were among a group, including several well-known intellectuals who had been arrested in 1965 as members of a clandestine unit of FRELIMO. The nine had previously been absolved by the Tribunal but the verdict had been rejected on review by the Supreme Military Tribunal in Lisbon which had ordered a retrial

⁹⁰ A decree enacted on 21 February 1967 authorized the Governor General to disburse additional expenditure for the expansion of police services, including the formation of new mobile police units.

with different judges. At the conclusion of the second trial, seven of the defendants were found guilty and received prison sentences ranging from two to three years with loss of political rights and restriction of movement for further periods.

Economic conditions

General

254. The structure of Mozambique's economy and the main problems connected with it have been described in detail in the previous reports of the Special Committee and, particularly, in the background material accompanying the Special Committee's reports on the activities of foreign economic interests.91 Briefly, the two dominant sectors are agriculture and transportation services. In agriculture, the emphasis is upon about eight principal export crops, of which cotton, cashew, sisal and copra are outstanding. Except for cotton, which is grown by Africans for sale at controlled prices to large ginning and export companies, production is mainly on plantations and farms owned by non-Africans. Africans produce, in addition to cotton, a certain amount of smoke-cured copra which is sold to local oil mills, about half the cashew nuts, rice and food crops which are sold to dealers and quasi-governmental agencies. For the most part, however, Africans are either subsistence farmers or wage earners.

255. Despite recent growth, transforming industries are few and the Territory imports most of its requirements of manufactured goods. It has a chronically adverse balance of trade which, in the past, was largely offset by invisible foreign exchange receipts in the form of revenue derived by its railways and ports, mainly from the highly lucrative transit trade of neighbouring land-locked areas, notably the Transvaal, Southern Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi. Since 1958, however, as a result of increasing imports, the trade deficit has each year exceeded invisible earnings and resulted in a growing adverse balance of payments, mainly with metropolitan Portugal (see below). The trade deficit reached a peak in 1965 and, according to preliminary data, continued to grow until in 1966 it was announced that measures would be taken to restrict the issue of import licences.

256. The years 1965 and 1966 were also characterized by: (a) rising public expenditures, particularly for defence and for services affected by the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967; and (b) increased public and private investment, both at the infrastructural level (i.e., port installations, railways and roads) and in secondary and light transforming industries. During this period, there was a marked increase in private industrial investment which coincides with the recent easing of controls over the establishment of industries and of regulations governing foreign investments in the Overseas Territories (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 52-68). Important among these were new investments in sugar production and cashew processing which in time are expected to increase significantly the value of the Territory's exports.

257. During 1966, Mozambique's transport industry felt increasingly the effects of the international boycott on trade with Southern Rhodesia. Since nearly all Southern Rhodesia's overseas trade passed through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques and much of

Zambia's trade followed the same routes, the revenue derived from this source by the Territory's railways and ports constituted an important segment of its invisible earnings of foreign exchange (see below). In addition to the effects of the boycott, Mozambique may also suffer in 1967 a probable set-back in the production of some of its export crops, especially sugar, as the result of severe floods which occurred during February and March.

258. Further information on recent developments by sectors is given below.

External trade and payments

General

259. As already noted, the year 1965 saw a marked deterioration in Mozambique's balance of foreign trade. Whereas the value of exports, at 3,107 million escudos, was 7.3 per cent higher than in 1963, imports increased over the same period by 22 per cent, from 4,075 million escudos to 4,981 million escudos. This resulted in an adverse balance of trade in 1965 of 1,874 million escudos, which was 69 per cent more than in 1963. Data for the first six months of 1966 showed continued growth of imports and an actual drop in the value of exports compared with the previous year.

260. The comparatively poor performance of the export sector in 1965 and the first half of 1966 was partly due to adverse climatic conditions and a temporary drop in sugar exports, but the data also reflect a reduced rate of growth of agricultural exports generally (see below). The sharp increase in imports was attributed to several factors, among them increased public spending, especially for defence, and increased industrial and infrastructural investment, both undoubtedly contributing to an upsurge in consumer demand. Analysis of imports in 1965 by categories reveals that the largest increases were in capital and production goods, which in 1965 accounted respectively for 33.9 per cent and 23.3 per cent of total imports by value. Consumption goods accounted for 42.8 per cent.

261. To what extent the reduction of trade barriers within the escudo zone (see section B.1, para. 43) may have affected the over-all balance of trade is not immediately apparent. Between 1963 and 1965, there was, however, a significant increase in Mozambique's trade deficit with metropolitan Portugal, imports from Portugal rising by 32.8 per cent in value, whereas exports to Portugal rose by 11.8 per cent. At the end of 1965, Mozambique's adverse balance of trade with metropolitan Portugal stood at 569 million escudos, or nearly one third of its total trade deficit. At the same time, as the figures show, Portugal's share of Mozambique trade increased significantly. In 1965, nearly 40 per cent by value of Mozambique's external trade took place within the escudo zone. The other principal trading partners were South Africa with 10.9 per cent, the United Kingdom with 8.2 per cent and the Federal Republic of Germany with 6.1 per cent. Despite the signing of a trade agreement with Southern Rhodesia early in 1965 (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 47), and a subsequent exchange of unofficial trade missions, Southern Rhodesia's share of Mozambique trade underwent little significant change either in 1965 or the first quarter of 1966. In 1965, it amounted to only 2.2 per cent of the total.

262. Up to 1957, invisible earnings, derived mainly from the transit trade of neighbouring territories,

⁹¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session. Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chap. V.

sufficed to offset the Territory's negative trade balance. Thereafter, the combined effect of rapidly increasing trade deficits, together with a growing outflow of investment earnings, amortizations and other private transfers, resulted in a continuously adverse balance of payments, amounting to 218 million escudos at the end of 1965.92 In consequence of this drain, Mozambique's exchange reserves, including foreign exchange and metropolitan escudos held by commercial banks, dropped from 1,549 million escudos in 1960 to 412 million escudos at the end of 1965, sufficient to cover about one month's imports.

263. In 1965, Mozambique's balance of payments showed a net inflow of foreign exchange under the heading of transport earnings amounting to 1,151 million escudos, or nearly one fifth of its foreign exchange earnings. Most of this was attributable to the transit trade of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the latter accounting for about 700 million escudos and the former for about 311 million escudos. The difference was due in part to the fact that Southern Rhodesian trade consisted largely of high value goods for which higher transit rates are charged, and also, in part, to the fact that much of Zambia's external trade passed through Southern Rhodesia.

264. Following the unilateral declaration of independence by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, the transit trade has been affected, first by the cessation of petroleum shipments through Beira in December 1965 and later by the application of a more general international boycott called for by the Security Council. The international measures taken against the illegal régime also resulted in partial interruption and rerouting of Zambian transit trade. Full data which would permit a detailed appraisal of the effects of these changes on Mozambique's invisible receipts, however, are not yet available in published form (see below).

Trade relations with Southern Rhodesia93

265. As stated above, for Mozambique, the revenue derived from the transit trade of Southern Rhodesia, which passes mainly through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques, represents a major source of foreign exchange. Since much of Zambia's external trade normally follows the same routes, it is difficult to determine from the published statistics precisely what proportion of the total transport receipts is directly attributable to the trade of Southern Rhodesia. However, according to the data published in Mozambique, revenue from transit trade entering from Southern Rhodesia totalled about 700 million escudos in 1965. In comparison, special trade between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia is small, totalling in 1965 only 179.4 million escu-

 92 This figure represents the balance of all exchange transactions. In fact, Mozambique's balance of payments with metropolitan Portugal shows a much larger deficit, which is normally offset by favourable balances with other countries, particularly South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Hence the Territory is a net contributor of foreign exchange to Portugal. This is illustrated by the following data for 1964:

Balance (+ or +)**

	in million escudos
Metropolitan Portugal	1,192.7
Southern Rhodesia	+1,100.7
South Africa	
Rest of world	— 656.4
TOTAL	— 223 <u>.</u> 4

⁹³ A more detailed description of Mozambique's economic relations with Southern Rhodesia is contained in document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix V, paras. 42-79.

dos, or 2.2 per cent by value of Mozambique's external trade. 94

266. Portugal's own attitude on the question of Southern Rhodesia has been officially described as one of strict neutrality. While it has not accorded diplomatic recognition to the illegal régime, for several reasons it has not felt obliged to participate in international sanctions against the régime or to deny to Southern Rhodesia the right of transit for its external trade; according to a recent statement by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Portugal considers that it is bound by international conventions which guarantee the right of transit for the trade of land-locked countries. Portugal's policy of maintaining trading relations with Southern Rhodesia has in effect meant the application of the provisions of the trade agreement signed early in 1965 whereby the parties undertook to promote increased trade and closer economic co-operation between them. Accordingly, during 1966 there was an exchange of unofficial trade missions and other contacts on a more or less unofficial basis. As yet, official trade statistics are not available to show whether or not these exchanges resulted in any significant increase in trade. Data published by the Mozambique Government for the period January to April 1966 indicate that the items and quantities traded95 were much the same as in the corresponding period of 1965. Subsequent press reports to the effect that the Portuguese-owned SONAREP refinery at Lourenço Marques had supplied 70 million gallons of gasoline to Southern Rhodesia were formally denied by the president of the parent company, SONAP, in a statement issued on 10 March 1967. The President said that not only was such an amount beyond the capacity of the refinery, but the Southern Rhodesian market had never been among its clients. A similar denial had been made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal on 28 December 1966.

267. As regards the transit trade, even less data are available for 1966,96 and the complexity of the situation (particularly the changes which have occurred in the transit trade of other territories) makes difficult any assessment of the effects of the boycott on the basis of partial information. According to the report of the Mozambique Ports, Railways and Transport Administration, the volume of cargo handled at Beira during the period January to June 1966 decreased by 342,991 tons, or 18 per cent compared with the corresponding period of 1965,97 while the volume handled at Lourenço

⁹⁴ In 1965, exports from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia were valued at 93.4 million escudos and consisted mainly of vegetable oils and husks (34 million escudos); wood products (20.8 million escudos); bananas (5.5 million escudos); and petroleum products (4.4 million escudos). Imports from Southern Rhodesia were valued at 86 million escudos, the principal items being maize (14.3 million escudos); copper (4.7 million escudos); iron and steel products (4.4 million escudos); coal (3.3 million escudos); automobiles and parts (2.3 million escudos); and agricultural machinery (3.1 million escudos).

⁹⁵ For instance, according to the official statistics, Mozambique's exports of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia in the first four months of 1966 consisted of only 576 tons of gas oil and diesel oil and less than one ton of gasoline.

⁹⁸ According to press reports, Southern Rhodesian exports of chrome and amianto amounted to 94,000 and 7,000 tons respectively during the first six months of 1966. Tobacco exports amounted to 69,003 tons during the first seven months, compared with 100 200 to the property of the proper

with 190,300 tons in January to July 1965.

97 Later figures obtained from press reports indicate that for the first ten months of 1966, the decrease was in the vicinity of 24 per cent. These data relate to a period before the adoption of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) and probably reflect in large measure the cut-back in the supply of crude oil to Southern Rhodesia after December 1965.

Marques increased by 184,662 tons. These figures throw very little light on the effects of the boycott, however, in view of changes in the volume of traffic from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Zambia known to have taken place during the same period.

268. On the other hand, global figures of the losses in revenue up to the end of 1966 due to the boycott were contained in a letter dated 11 February 1967 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal to the Secretary-General (S/7734/Rev.1). These figures showed a loss to the Mozambique economy of £9,796,000 (783.68 million escudos) apportioned as follows: 98 transit receipts and port dues, £6,705,000 (536.4 million escudos); additional losses from transit trade, £1,341,000 (107.3 million escudos); special trade, £1,750,000 (140 million escudos). In citing these losses, which he reserved the right to document at the appropriate opportunity, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked that consultations should be initiated between the Security Council and the Portuguese Government pursuant to Article 50 of the Charter "in order that the modalities for paying the compensation to which the province of Mozambique has a right, may be agreed upon".

Agriculture

269. Detailed statistics showing the production of the main cash crops are not yet available beyond 1964. In so far as exports reflect production, they show that output of several major crops has remained fairly static or has decreased over the past three years. Thus, exports of cotton lint, which in 1960, before the abolition of obligatory cultivation, exceeded 44,000 tons, decreased to 31,339 tons in 1965. Copra, owing to falling world prices, dropped from over 46,000 tons in 1963 to 28,574 tons, and sugar from 124,896 tons to 94,936 tons. Sisal exports at 31,381 tons were above the average of the previous six years but below the high levels of over 32,000 tons attained in 1957 and 1958. The principal increases registered since 1963 were in tea (from 8,438 to 10,091 tons) and vegetable oils (from 14,963 to 20,189 tons). In the first quarter of 1966, exports of cotton dropped by nearly one half compared with the corresponding period of 1965 (from 8,018 to 4,242 tons); sisal by about 20 per cent (from 6,900 to 5,528 tons); and cashew nuts by about 7 per cent (from 33,594 to 31,209 tons). There were, however, significant increases in sugar (from 13,178 to 18,568 tons); tea (from 3,306 to 5,018 tons); and a small increase in copra (from 5,578 to 5,703 tons).

270. The increases in exports in 1965 and 1966 were partly attributable to the effects of adverse climatic conditions including a cyclone and extensive floods in January 1966 which did severe damage to crops, especially cashew and fruit. 99 In the case of sugar, there was a temporary drop in production during 1965 due to the installation of large-scale irrigation work by one of the leading producers. Sena Sugar Estates. Cotton production generally declined after 1961, due probably to the abolition of compulsory cultivation and falling

world prices. 100 Cashew production, exports of which increased remarkably from 82,378 tons in 1962 to 127,796 tons in 1964, appears to have reached a plateau in the vicinity of 100,000 tons annually.

271. The present trend in regard to the main cash crops is towards more capital-intensive production and the establishment of processing industries. The most important developments in 1965-1966 were the introduction of mechanized processing of cashew nuts and the investment of large sums in projects which will substantially increase sugar production. At the same time, new factories were established to process sisal, soap, wheat, tea, cotton, coir fibre, fruit and condensed milk (see section on industries below). The progressive mechanization of cash crop production is illustrated by the increasing number of tractors imported, from 449 in 1964 to 642 in 1965. Particular attention is being given to the development of tea growing as a medium for increasing European settlement, and tobacco, fruit and meat, mainly to supply Portugal and substitute for imports in Mozambique. It is estimated that Portugal at present expends nearly 150 million escudos in foreign exchange on the purchase of tobacco which could be produced in Mozambique and could furnish the basis for new settlement schemes. Measures instituted during 1966 to improve the productivity of agriculture included the establishment of an Institute of Agronomic Studies and reorganization of the Agricultural Credit Bank (Caixa de Crédito Agrícola) (see below). In early 1967 it was announced that a separate water development service would be created in view of the major irrigation and river development projects now under study, notably the Zambezi river valley scheme (see section on settlement and land utilization schemes).

272. The most important development in agricultural production was the movement towards expansion of the sugar industry. As previously noted (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix III, paras. 73-77), Mozambique supplies about 70 per cent of Portugal's sugar consumption, most of the sugar produced (163,969 tons in 1965-1966) being exported to Portugal under a special régime whereby quotas and prices are determined annually by the Portuguese Government. In 1966, a decree law was enacted continuing this régime, with minor changes, until 1 May 1982, and the Portuguese Government also approved a reorganization and expansion of the sugar refining industry in Portugal, involving an increase in productive capacity to 300,000 tons annually in order to allow for increased sugar consumption over the next ten to twelve years. Prior to this, plans had already been laid to increase sugar production in Mozambique. In 1965, Sena Sugar Estates, one of three existing producers, began a 360 million escudos irrigation programme aimed at nearly doubling its output by 1970, and in addition, two new companies have already been formed. The greatest progress has been made by the Mozambique Sugar Company which plans to begin production in 1969 with an initial sugar output of 30,000 tons to be increased eventually to 90,000 tons. The company is Portuguese-owned with French participation. In April 1966, the territorial Government was authorized to underwrite bank loans to the company in the amount of 280 million escudos, the money to be raised by the bank from foreign sources (thus ensuring that the majority of the capital remains Portuguese). Part of its plantations, which are located

⁹⁸ According to the letter, the sums cited, in addition to imports and exports, losses of receipts from normal traffic, loss of compensation from the Beira oil pipeline and losses resulting from failure to fulfil contracts drawn up and signed for exports from Southern Rhodesia.

⁹⁹ Even more extensive floods occurred in February and March 1967. Heavy crop losses are reported, especially in the Limpopo and Incomati river valleys, the latter being an important sugar producing area.

¹⁰⁰ Partly owing to reduction of export subsidies by the United States of America.

on the Púnguè River near Beira, will be allocated among 100 settlers. The other company, the Maragra-Marracuene Agricola Açucareira, located at Manhiça near Lourenço Marques, was reported in April to have obtained additional bank loans, bringing its working capital to 130 million escudos, but it has not yet announced when it will begin production. The company, which is also Portuguese-owned, with some of its capital subscribed locally, will have an initial capacity of 40,000 tons of sugar, to be increased eventually to 60,000 tons. About 60 per cent of its sugar output will be refined (one third of it will be exported to Portugal, the remainder going to the local market), the remaining 40 per cent being exported as raw sugar for refining in Portugal. Construction of the refinery began in October 1965. There is no new information concerning plans by a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation to develop sugar production in the lower Zambezi Valley (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix III, para. 89).

273. As previously mentioned (section B.1, paras. 61-62), steps were taken in 1966 to develop the production of meat and fruit in the Overseas Territories in order to supply metropolitan Portugal. In Mozambique, various factors, among them the prevalence of the tsetse fly in several regions and the limitations of the local market, have been obstacles to the development of a large-scale meat industry. Although there are about 1.1 million head of cattle, most of them are owned by traditional African pastoralists or are raised by large agricultural companies to feed their own employees. Commercial cattle-ranching, as a principal activity, is mainly confined to the district of Gaza, where cattle are raised to supply Lourenço Marques and the Angónia plateau, near the border of Malawi. In 1965, exports of meat and meat products were valued at only 5.2 million escudos. In 1966, however, steps were taken to develop this sector, namely the establishment of an Institute of Veterinary Research and the reorganization of the veterinary service which in 1965 consisted of some fifty-four veterinary officers. The intention, in particular, is to build up extension services and foster the growth of co-operatives among the small cattle breeders in the southern districts of Lourenço Marques and Gaza. During 1966, several commercial enterprises were reported to be considering the establishment of meat factories, and one meat and dairy products factory, representing an investment of 25 million escudos and owned by a producers' cooperative, was completed. In addition, during the year, refrigerated warehouses for meat and fruit were built at the ports of Lourenço Marques and Beira (see below), and by the end of the year frozen meat was for the first time exported to Portugal.

274. Fruit growing is at present mainly confined to the south of Mozambique and to the Manica highlands. The fruit consists of bananas, which are exported to South Africa and other neighbouring territories, and citrus which is marketed overseas under arrangements with the South African Citrus Marketing Board. Exports are small, valued in 1965 at only 16.8 million escudos for bananas and 17.3 million escudos for citrus. One reason for developing citrus exports is that the fruit reaches the European market during the winter season.

275. As may be seen from the above, the principal emphasis has been placed so far on expanding the output of export crops. In 1966, however, greater

attention was given to the need to develop food crops in order to eliminate imports of such products as maize,101 wheat, vegetables and fruit, which together accounted for about 400 million escudos in 1964 and 1965. It appears to be the contention in Mozambique that the best way to achieve an all-round growth of the agricultural sector, excluding large-scale production, is through assistance to small, predominantly non-African, farmers and through settlement schemes which would have an impact on the surrounding African subsistence economy. Among the measures taken in 1966 to assist small farmers may be cited the grant of a 10 million escudos loan to an agricultural co-operative in the Maputo valley and the reorganization and expansion of the Agricultural Credit Bank into a governmental agency receiving regular budgetary allocations and with power to make or underwrite loans (including crop loans) against minimal guarantees (in exceptional circumstances, loans may be granted up to 500,000 escudos without guarantees). The loans may be granted either to private (i.e., non-African) farmers or to Africans engaged in "traditional" farming, but in the latter case the recipients will be mainly collective groups. There is also to be increased public expenditure on roads serving agricultural areas, especially in the north (see below).

276. It appears that attention is still focused very largely on the development of agriculture on farms held under individual ownership, i.e., mainly owned by non-Africans. Of the major cash crops, which together account for about 80 per cent of Mozambique's agricultural exports, only cotton, about half the cashew nuts and some copra are produced by African farmers. For the rest, Africans are mainly engaged in subsistence farming, selling their surplus produce to dealers or through government agencies. So far, apart from the work of specialized bodies such as the Cotton and Cereals Institutes, which provide supervised loans and technical assistance for specific purposes or in specified regions, comparatively little appears to have been done to raise the level of the "traditional" farming sector. The relative stagnation of subsistence farming is revealed by comparing the data on purchases of food crops from Africans for the years 1960-1963 (the latest years for which such data is available) with the same data for 1950-1953. The comparison shows that whereas purchases of a few crops, such as wheat, cashew nuts and beans, increased significantly, purchases of many import crops, such as rice, ground-nuts, copra and manioc, were about the same or actually less than a decade earlier.

277. During 1966, several commentators in the Territory referred to the need for a new approach to the development of the "traditional" farming sector. Thus, one speaker in the Legislative Council called for the creation of organized rural markets similar to those in Angola. Another observer, writing in a local periodical, called for a policy of agricultural credit which would help to transform subsistence farming and bring it into the cash economy. He pointed out that since its creation in 1945 until 1966 when it was absorbed into the Agricultural Credit Bank, the Rural Credit Fund, which was intended to aid "traditional" farmers, had been inactive because it lacked machinery for supervised loans. While the new bank was intended to aid "traditional" as well as organized farming, it could aid the

¹⁰¹ For the first time for many years, in 1966, Mozambique had a surplus of 20,000 tons of maize available for export.

former on a significant scale only if the extension of credit formed part of a general approach to the problem and steps were taken, either by developing cooperatives or by furnishing systematic technical assistance, to provide the machinery whereby credit could be injected into the "traditional" farming sector and used as a means to promote improved techniques.

278. The need for greater efforts to promote the economic progress of Africans in the subsistence sector was also emphasized by deputies from Mozambique in the National Assembly during January and February 1967. As noted previously (section B.1, para. 70), Dr. Nunes Barata stressed that the improvement of living standards and the "harmonious economic development" of the African peoples was an essential ingredient in the struggle against subversion. Dr. Manuel Nazaré and Dr. Satúrio Pires developed this theme, urging the necessity of concerted measures to hasten the economic and social advancement of the rural African communities. Among the measures which they considered necessary was the granting of individual land titles to farmers of proven ability. They believed that, done on a mass scale, this would help to reduce the practice of shifting cultivation and would provide incentive to the individual farmer. They also considered necessary the formation of rural farm settlements (ruralatos), agricultural education, research and extension services supplemented by agricultural credit, guaranteed markets and finally the stimulation of rural cooperatives.

Settlement and land utilization schemes

279. Great importance is attached to the settlement in Mozambique of Europeans, both as a means of developing the economic wealth of the Territory and to promote its closer integration within the Portuguese realm. Among the main settlement schemes initiated in the past are the Limpopo, Revuè and Maputo valley settlements and smaller schemes in Niassa and near Guruè (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix II). Allocation of land for settlers is also a feature of several large agricultural projects (i.e., sugar and cashew). A particular concern at present is to encourage exsoldiers to settle in the northern districts or in border areas, where their presence would contribute to defence. Recent results have not been spectacular, only one new settlement for ex-soldiers being established in 1966. The settlement is at Mahinga, near Vila Pery, and it is believed that it will accommodate some thirty to fifty settlers on 200 hectare estates. A small group of South African farmers is also reported to be settling in the same general area.

280. Although the main emphasis has been on the settlement of Europeans, provision has been made, notably in the larger settlement schemes such as those in the Limpopo, Revuè and Maputo valleys, for the allocation of part of the land to Africans. In addition to these specific settlement schemes, efforts were made under the First National Development Plan to stabilize Africans on the land and to form permanent settlements (ruralatos), but since 1963 there have been few reports of progress in this direction, presumably because of the immensity of the task and lack of available funds and personnel. Recently, however, as noted above (para. 278), two deputies in the National Assembly urged a renewed effort in this direction, calling for the grant of individual land titles to Africans, their organization into rural communities (ruralatos) and the creation of

planning and executive machinery to promote and supervise this form of settlement.

281. Potentially the most important settlement and land utilization scheme, which has been under study since the early 1950s, is a multipurpose project for the development of the Zambezi River valley, based on the control and utilization of the river flow. The project envisages the construction of a high dam at Cahora Bassa, north of Tete, and a series of smaller dams down river, which would permit the development for settlement and other purposes of an area of 140,000 square kilometres, or one tenth of the whole Territory. At the same time, hydro-electric power produced at Cahora Bassa would be used to develop iron and coal reserves in the Tete District, and construction of the dams would make possible navigation on the river between Tete and Chinde, at the mouth of the Zambezi, where it is proposed to construct a new port.

282. The completion of such a vast project, the ultimate cost of which is estimated at 10,000 million escudos, is necessarily dependent on several factors and must, in any case, take a number of years. One of the problems is to find suitable markets for the electricity produced, which is estimated at about 17,000 million kWh, per year; according to press reports, the possibility of selling this electricity either to the Transvaal or to Southern Rhodesia has been considered. In August 1966, Portugal took an initial step towards carrying out the project, by appropriating 20 million escudos for expenditure on plans for the Cahora Bassa dam. Negotiations were later reported to be in progress for the creation of an international consortium to finance the dam which is expected to cost 500 million escudos, plus an additional 250 million escudos for rechanneling of the river and relocation of the local population living in the area of the future reservoir.

Industry

283. Manufacturing and transforming industries so far constitute a relatively small sector of Mozambique's economy when compared with agriculture. Although there are over 1,000 industrial enterprises, the majority are small and are concerned with the processing of agricultural products or the production of food-stuffs and consumer goods. Most manufacturing industries are light, involving only limited capital, the principal exceptions being a petroleum refinery at Lourenço Marques, cement factories, a cotton textile factory and spinning mills, a jute factory and a metal work which serves the railways, ports and construction industry. In 1961, there were only eighty-two enterprises with capital in excess of 5 million escudos, their combined capital amounting to 1,874 million escudos; these included two sugar refineries, oil and grain mills, breweries and cotton ginneries.

284. Commentators in the Territory have on a number of occasions urged an expansion of secondary industry as a remedy for Mozambique's chronic trade deficit, citing, among other things, the substantial imports of consumer goods, particularly cotton textiles, which the Territory could produce itself. In the past, various factors inhibited industrial development, among them the policies pursued by Portugal in regard to the licensing of new industries in the Overseas Territories and the conditions governing foreign investment. In recent years, however, the development of this sector has received closer attention as may be seen from the fact that, under the Transitional Development Plan for

1965-1967, it was allocated the second largest investment target (1,350 million escudos) after transport and communications. The development of industries has also received stimulus from a recent extension of banking and credit facilities in Mozambique and from legislation enacted in 1965 (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 62-68) providing for a greater decentralization of controls over the establishment of new industries and the relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment.

285. As a result of these measures, industrial production is now expanding more rapidly than other sectors of productive activity. According to published statistics, the value of output of transforming industry (excluding construction and electricity and most processing of agricultural products, except sugar, tea and tobacco) increased by approximately 30 per cent between 1963 and 1965, most of the increase taking place in the latter year. 102 The principal increases between 1964 and 1965 were, by sub-sectors: food stuffs, which increased from 908 million escudos to 1,024 million escudos; chemical products (including soap and vegetable oil) from 406 million to 542 million; cashew kernels from 92 million to 129 million; construction materials from 177 million to 216 million; and petroleum derivatives from 326 million to 337 million escudos. Preliminary data for the first five months of 1966 suggest further over-all increases in the region of 11 per

286. In the agricultural processing sub-sectors, the most important innovations concerned sugar (see section on agriculture) and the mechanical processing of cashew. During 1965-1966, several companies were authorized to establish cashew processing factories or to expand existing operations. The largest of these, MOCITA, which is financed by South African and Italian interests, was opened in August 1966 at João Belo (Gaza District) at an initial cost of 72 million escudos. When finally completed, the MOCITA operation will represent an investment of 170 million escudos and will have a processing capacity of 30,000 tons anually, employing 800 workers. In December 1966, a second factory was opened, owned by Spence e Pierce, Lda., which is jointly controlled by a local private firm, Pierce and Leslie and Co., and by Gill and Duffus of London. The factory represents an investment of 48 million escudos and will have an eventual capacity of 25,000 tons. Another company, which is expanding its operations, is the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Caju, S.A.R.L. (SOCATU). This company was formed in 1965 with an initial capital of 120 million escudos. It is controlled by Portuguese and local interests, among them the C.U.F. group of Portugal. The company is authorized to establish three factories with a combined capacity of 80,000 tons per year at Nacala, Porto Amélia and Nampula. The first of these, at Nacala, was to be opened in April 1967. It is estimated that the total investment will eventually be about 250 million escudos. A fourth company, Sociedade Industrial de Caju e Derivados (CAJUCA), which was formed in 1962 with Italian participation and began operations in the following year with three small experimental factories, commenced large-scale production in 1965 with the opening of a new factory at Lourenço Margues; this new factory represents an investment of 45 million escudos and

has a yearly capacity of 15,000 tons. In April 1966, the Portuguese Government underwrote bank loans to CAJUCA totalling 60 million escudos. This sum will be used for the construction of a larger factory at Nacala. Two other smaller enterprises were also authorized to establish factories of up to 15,000 tons capacity.

287. Other new agricultural processing industries established in 1965-1966 included a sisal products factory, a soap factory costing 80 million escudos, a rice decorticating factory, grain mills, and factories for the processing of tea, fruit, milk and meat products. Among these, the factory producing rope and other sisal products, Companhia Industrial de Cordoaria de Moçambique (CICOMO), was formed in May 1965 and represents an investment of 50 million escudos. Fortyfive per cent of the capital is held by subsidiary companies of the Portuguese C.U.F. group, the remainder being held by four agricultural companies in Mozambique. The factory is located at Nacala and employs 200 workers. During 1966, the first year of operation, it exported 7,000 tons of sisal products, mainly to the United States and Canada. Of the two grain mills, the larger is at Machava and is owned by the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Moagem (SOCIMIL). The mill, which is still under construction and will be completed in 1967, will process wheat and will have a yearly capacity of 30,000 tons. Costing 50 million escudos, it is entirely Portuguese-owned. The second grain mill, which is being built at Beira, will process maize. It is owned by the Moagem de Beira, S.A.R.L. (MOBEIRA) and is Portuguese-financed, the total investment of 11.84 million escudos being furnished by the Banco Nacional de Fomento. The milk and meat products factories, located near Lourenço Marques, are both owned by a local producers' co-operative, the Cooperativa de Criadores de Gado, the combined investment being 27 million escudos. The rice-processing factory, which is located at Manhica (Lourence Marques District), is owned by a private entrepreneur, Mr. Inácio de Sousa Mostra. Representing an investment of several million escudos, it is financed by loans from banks, including the Banco Nacional Ultramarino; the factory has a production capacity of 1,000 tons a year and uses machinery purchased from the Federal Republic of Germany. Among new processing industries authorized in 1966, are a tea factory to be built by Monteiro e Giro. a company which owns tea plantations at Sacone, a fruit preserves factory to be built at Nampula at a cost of 10 million escudos, a mechanized bakery to be built by a Portuguese concern, SAIPAL, at a cost of 4 million escudos, and a large abattoir, to be built near Lourenço Marques, which will serve the livestock industries of Southern Mozambique and Swaziland. Also announced were two condensed milk factories, one of which will be built by Nestlé, South Africa (Pty.) Ltd. at a cost or 40 million escudos. The factory will be located at Lourenço Marques and will have a capacity of 7,500 tons. It will employ 120 workers and will begin production in 1968. The second, which will cost 30 million escudos and will produce 1,000 cans per day, will be owned jointly by a local company, PROTAL, and by the Cooperativa Condens Fabriek Friesland of the Netherlands.

288. New manufacturing industries established in 1966 include a bicycle factory near Lourenço Marques, the Fábrica de Bicicletas de Moçambique, built at a cost of 30 million escudos. The factory is Portuguese-owned and produces about 36,000 bicycles and 3,000 motor-

¹⁰² In 1965, 389 licences were issued for the establishment of new enterprises, involving a total capital investment of 304 million escudos. This includes, however, servicing and trading enterprises.

bicycles yearly. An automobile assembly plant, the Fábrica de Automóveis de Moçambique, Lda., which began production in 1966, is also Portuguese-owned, assembling trucks and other heavy vehicles on behalf of a Japanese manufacturer, ISUZU. The company's programme aims at the production of 2,000 automobiles yearly. Both companies plan to export their products to the neighbouring territories of Malawi, Southern Rhodesia and Zambia, after supplying local demand. In addition, a salt factory, costing 10 million escudos, was opened in 1966 by Portuguese interests, and plans were completed for the construction of an ammonia and fertilizer factory to be built at Beira. The factory, which will be completed by the end of 1967, will cost about 200 million escudos and will, according to its directors, produce sufficient fertilizer to satisfy most of the present demand in the Territory. The factory is being built by a French firm, GEXA, on behalf of the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos de Moçambique, and will use patents developed by the Societé Belge de l'Azote. Licences were granted during 1966 to Portuguese firms, one of them the Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, for the construction of three cotton spinning mills with a combined capacity of 12,000 tons, two of which will be established in the south (at Lourenço Marques and Chibuto, in the Gaza District) and the other either at Beira or at Monapo (district of Manica e Sofala). Other new industries under construction or authorized in 1966 include a match factory, a cellulose fibre factory and factories for the manufacture of paper bags, electrical batteries, automobile tires, pharmaceuticals, furniture and parquetry, glass bottles and light metal products. The automobile tires will be produced at two factories, one of them to be built at Beira by the Companhia de Refrigerantes MacMahon, S.A.R.L., a Portuguese company presently producing beer and soft drinks in the Territory, and the other by Firestone Portuguesa; the latter plans to invest 150 million escudos in a factory which will have a productive capacity of 60,000 to 100,000 tires yearly. Other companies which, according to press reports, have requested authorization to build factories in Mozambique include the Standard Electric Company which has asked for a licence to produce telecommunications and electronic equipment, the Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique, which has asked authorization to establish an iron and steel foundry with a yearly capacity of 250,000 tons (see para. 50), and the Fábrica Colonial de Borracha, Lda., which requested authorization to establish a shoe factory at Beira. According to the local Press, a private entrepreneur in the United States also made application to establish petro-chemical factories at Lourenço Marques and Beira and a foreign financial group, RHOMOC, was reported to have proposed several industrial projects, including a rope factory at Nova Sofala and a chemical industry at Dondo. Other light industries established during 1965-1966 included electrodes and electronic cables, clothing, bedding, paints and varnish. In 1966, the petroleum refinery owned by SONAREP (a subsidiary of the Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos of Portugal) at Lourenço Marques was expanded to include the production of asphalt and liquid gas for domestic and industrial use. The additional investment to finance this expansion was 130 million escudos. Finally, towards the end of 1965 a request was made for authorization to build a dockyard at Lorenço Marques which would include two floating docks and other installations for ship repairs, the whole representing an investment of 600 million escudos.

289. Other sectors of industrial activity, namely construction and electricity production, have also shown marked expansion. After three years of relative inactivity, there was a sudden upsurge in the building industry during 1965 and 1966, the number of new buildings under construction rising from 750 in 1964 to 1,317 in 1965. In most of the major municipalities, important public works were undertaken or initiated to cope with a rapid expansion of the urban areas. The largest programme of urban renewal was for Lourenço Marques, where the municipality is utilizing a loan of 150 million escudos from Portugal, contracted in 1966, for, among other things, the construction of low-cost housing estates for African workers.

290. Apart from the hydro-electric project at Cahora Bassa, which is described above, two other hydro-electric projects are under construction; the first is at Massingir, on the Elefantes River, one of the main tributaries of the Limpopo River, from which power would be supplied to industries in Lourenço Marques and the Sul do Save; and the second is at Chicamba on the Púnguè River near Vila Pery. The latter represents an expansion by the Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revuè of its existing facilities to meet the growing needs of industry in the area, particularly in view of the proposed construction of a large cotton-spinning mill in addition to the existing textile factory, and also to supply Beira. The estimated cost of the project is 80 million escudos, of which 20 million were obtained during 1966 in the form of a local bond issue underwritten by Portugal. A third hydro-electric project being considered is on the Umbeluzi River. The project, which would take six years to complete and require a prior agreement with Swaziland, would furnish electricity to the whole Sul do Save and permit irrigation of an extensive area. Also during 1966, thermal electricity plants were constructed to supply a number of centres, including the port town of Nacala and the Limpopo valley settlement.

Mining

291. In 1965, the output of the mining industry was valued at approximately 50 million escudos, equal to less than 2 per cent of the value of agricultural cash crops. Mineral production at present consists mainly of coal (valued at 29.7 million escudos) and smaller quantities of pegmatitic minerals, mainly beryl and colombotantalite, together with some bauxite and very minor quantities of gold, copper and semi-precious stones. The Territory is known to possess unused mineral deposits, especially coal and titaniferous magnetites, together with vanadium, and possibly some other minerals, including manganese and chrome in the north-west, but insufficient funds and transportation difficulties have so far prevented their full utilization. One of the arguments for the Zambezi valley development scheme, referred to above, is that it would permit the establishment of an iron and steel industry near Tete where there are proved magnetite reserves of 35 million tons. Most of these reserves are controlled by the Uranium Company of Mozambique which has held an exclusive licence to prospect for iron at Mavudzi since 1961. According to a press report, the company, in September 1966, requested authorization to establish an iron ore smelting plant with an annual production capacity of 250,000 tons. It has already expended a substantial sum on housing and other installations.

292. In 1965, the United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, which has been prospecting for petroleum for the past sixteen years, discovered a major

deposit of natural gas at Pande; the former, however, became ignited and over 100 million escudos were spent on efforts to extinguish the fire which was finally accomplished in March 1967. In August 1966, it was reported in the Press that the South African Government had approved a project for the construction of a 220-mile pipeline to supply the gas to the Transvaal once the fire could be brought under control. The Mozambique Gulf Oil Company denied the report which, however, reappeared in the Press in January 1967.

Fisheries

293. Although the offshore waters of Mozambique are known to be rich in fish, especially rock lobster and shrimp, these resources are not yet fully exploited. Most of the fishing so far has been done by small private companies or individually owned boats, the total catch landed averaging only 60 million escudos yearly over the period 1963-1965.

294. In the past three years, there has been increasing awareness of the extent of this unexploited wealth. This was largely due to research undertaken by a South African-financed company, INOS, which in 1963 obtained extensive fishing rights as well as licences to establish a shrimp and lobster cannery and a refrigeration plant. Between 1963 and 1965, the company invested approximately 180 million escudos, mainly in studies, but for technical reasons it was not able to begin large-scale industrial activities, which it now plans to commence in 1968. In the meantime, revelation of the fisheries potential increasingly attracted ships of foreign nationality, leading to incidents which were reported in the Press during 1966.

295. During the past year, the Government took several measures to stimulate Portuguese investments in and to expand this sector. Besides extending the limit of territorial waters to twelve miles, it established an official fisheries research body in Mozambique and enacted legislation providing for the corporative organization of fishing (casas de pescadores) and for the establishment of trade schools. In June 1966, a new company, ARPEN, was constituted in Lisbon by important Portuguese fishing interests to develop commercial fishing in the Overseas Territories, and other projects were also reported to be under consideration in Portugal. Later in the year, the Minister for Overseas Territories, speaking in Lourenço Marques, announced that ARPEN had formed a Mozambique Fisheries Development Company. The project involves the establishment of a commercial fishing fleet, based on a new fishing harbour, with refrigeration, storage and ship repair facilities, to be established at Lourenço Marques. At the same time, a decree was enacted in Portugal to control the transfer of fishing boats from Portugal to the Overseas Territories. It was later reported in the Press that ARPEN had placed orders for the construction of two deep-sea trawlers for Mozambique. It was also reported that several foreign companies, notably South African and Japanese, were interested in obtaining licences to operate in the Territory, and that the Mitsui financial group of Japan, in collaboration with South African interests, planned to establish a fish-processing factory at Lourenço Marques, involving an investment of about 80 million escudos.

Transport and communications

296. After agricultural exports, Mozambique's second most important source of foreign exchange consists in the services provided by its railways and ports.

Invisible earnings from the transit traffic of its neighbours, together with earnings derived from the sale of supplies and services to visiting ships, are equal to approximately one third of its receipts from special trade and one fifth of the total inflow of foreign exchange. Because of Mozambique's strategic location, the volume of transit traffic has increased with the economic growth of the hinterlands so that the amount of trade handled at Lourenço Marques is now only 20 per cent less than that at Durban. In 1965, before the boycott on Southern Rhodesia, the ports of Mozambique handled 14 million tons of cargo. This combined total, the largest in Mozambique's history, was 2.5 million tons more than in 1964, the increase being partly due to new exports of mineral ores, sugar and other commodities from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia.

297. To meet the growing needs of the transit trade, as well as Mozambique's own exports, substantial sums have been recently invested in the ports and railways, part of the cost being paid by the exporting countries. According to the Mozambique Ports and Railways Administration, the total value of the improvements completed or in progress in 1965 was in the vicinity of 2,000 million escudos. Among the major port projects completed during 1965-1966 at Lourenço Marques were the construction of a mechanized iron ore loading wharf for the export of Transvaal and Swaziland ore under long-term agreements with Japan, a sugar terminal to handle sugar exports from Southern Rhodesia, refrigerated warehouses for fruit and meat exports, and also a 320-metre extension of the main deep-water berth, this last costing 600 million escudos. A grain loading wharf and a petroleum wharf, costing 100 million escudos, are under construction. At Beira, about 650 million escudos were spent on the extension of berthing facilities, the construction of a dry dock, completed in September 1966, warehouses for refrigerated goods, tobacco and general merchandise, and a chrome ore loading wharf to handle exports from Southern Rhodesia. Important extensions were also made at Nacala which is being developed as a supply port for Malawi to relieve congestion at Beira and at Quelimane, which serves the district of Zambézia.

298. The expansion of harbour facilities was accompanied by substantial investment in railways. During 1965, orders for the construction of 1,020 railway wagons, amounting to 247 million escudos, were awarded to a local metal foundry which was thereby enabled to double its production capacity; other orders for railway equipment, including twenty-five diesel engines, totalling 40 million escudos, were placed in the United States. In 1966, a new main railway terminal and a goods terminal were completed at Beira at a cost of 81 million escudos, major construction work was undertaken on the line from Beira to Umtali and the Britishowned Trans-Zambézia Railway announced that orders had been placed for the acquisition of five diesel engines by 1967. In the north-west of Mozambique, work was continued on the extension of the Niassa railway from Catur to Nova Freixo where, under an agreement signed in 1966, it will link up with an extension of the Malawi railway system, thus enabling the overseas trade of Malawi to pass through Nacala beginning in 1967.

299. The effects of the boycott on trade with Southern Rhodesia cannot yet be fully estimated in the absence of detailed statistics on transit traffic for 1966 (see paragraphs 265-268). Whereas the volume of cargo

handled at Beira decreased by 342,991 tons in the first six months of 1966, compared with the same period of 1965, the tonnage handled at Lourenço Marques increased by 184,662, any decrease in Southern Rhodesian traffic at that port presumably being offset by the growing South African and domestic trade. Rerouting of Zambian trade through Malawi contributed to a sudden upsurge in the gross receipts of the Trans-Zambézia Railway, by 37 per cent during the first half of 1966.

300. With current plans for investment in ports and railways now largely completed, particular attention is being given to the extension and improvement of roads, for reasons which are both economic and military. The need for better roads has been repeatedly and urgently stressed in newspaper articles and in statements by local bodies in many parts of the Territory, especially the districts of Manica e Sofala, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado, according to which the poor condition of roads is a serious obstacle to the development of commercial agriculture. The inadequacy of the roads in the north has also been cited as a major problem in combating guerrilla activities. In speeches delivered in October and November 1966, the Minister for Overseas Territories stated that improvement of roads, particularly in the north, would be given special attention in the Third Development Plan now in preparation. He also said that a rationally planned system of roads was needed for the expansion of agriculture and to enable the armed forces to move about freely at all seasons in areas where guerrillas were active. He stressed that the planning and construction of the road system required co-ordination between the various services, including the military engineering services. To achieve this, a decree, enacted in October, created an autonomous Road Board for Mozambique and, in the following month, the Minister appointed as Provincial Secretary of Public Works and Communications an army officer who had previously been in charge of army engineers in the Territory.

301. The current Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisages the expenditure of 600 million escudos on roads, of which loans of 200 million and 130 million escudos from the National Overseas Bank were authorized in 1966. The first loan was earmarked for new roads and feeder routes in the districts of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete and Zambézia. The second was made in connexion with a major highway now under construction between Lourenço Marques and Beira, which is scheduled for completion by 1968. It is intended subsequently to extend this road to the extreme south of Mozambique and north to Quionga near the border of the United Republic of Tanzania, thus providing the Territory with a north-south artery linking all major ports. The additional cost of the road, which will involve building a bridge four kilometres in length over the Zambezi River, is estimated at 700 million escudos. Other contracts concluded in 1966 were for the construction of an all-weather road, extending 110 kilometres between Macomia and Diaco in Cabo Delgado District, to be completed within one year, and another road, of 215 kilometres, from Matema to Fingoè in Tete District, which is currently an area of European settlement. The cost of these roads will be about 17.5 million and 6.5 million escudos respectively.

Public finance

302. Although the final budget accounts for 1966 have not yet been published, and only preliminary in-

formation, based on press reports, is available concerning the estimates for 1967, it is clear that government expenditure for these years was the highest on record. Excluding financing of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the estimated expenditure for the year 1966, which totalled 4,213 million escudos, was 272 million escudos more than in 1965, and 41 per cent more than ordinary expenditure in 1960. Among the factors contributing to the increase were growing recurrent expenditures resulting from development and the rising cost of defence and security measures.

303. The total sum of the budget estimates is somewhat misleading since over 50 per cent consist of earmarked funds, being the revenue and expenditure of autonomous bodies such as the Ports, Railways and Transport Administration, the latter amounting in 1966 to 1,340 million escudos. Apart from this, the items which showed the largest increase compared with the previous year were national defence, which increased by 80.2 million to 549.4 million escudos (supplementary appropriations brought this figure considerably higher) and public debt servicing, which increased by 34 million to 240.5 million escudos. Other items of expenditure which increased were public health, which rose by 17.8 million to 175.1 million escudos, and public education, which rose by 14.5 million to 158.2 million escudos. 104 As has been noted previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 159), expenditure on education also includes assistance paid to Portuguese Catholic missions (69.5 million escudos) and the Estudos Gerais Universitários (19 million escudos). In 1966, allocations for education represented about 6 per cent of the budget, and for public health about 4 per cent.

304. The increase in the budget estimates for 1967 (see above) is of particular significance in view of the fact that the legislative instrument enacted in November 1966, which laid down guidelines for the forthcoming budget, called for restriction or elimination of non-essential expenditures or those not related to the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. Earlier in the year, the Governor General, in an order to all government departments and services, had called for austerity measures during the balance of the year. He specified, among other things, that there should be no increase in the number of teachers or new schools during 1966-1967. The reasons for this can only be conjectured, but it must be noted that: (a) the Territory was facing a severe loss of revenue from Southern Rhodesia's transit trade; and (b) actual defence expenditure had substantially exceeded the original estimates in 1965. Pending the availability of the budget for 1967, there is no information as to the sources from which revenue will be obtained to meet the increased expenditure.

305. Up to 1966, however, rising expenditures were made possible by substantial increases in direct and indirect taxation and by special levies on the receipts of autonomous services, such as the railways and ports. Between 1961 and 1965, revenue from direct and indirect taxes (including taxes on industries, subject to special régimes, such as cotton and sugar) increased by nearly 50 per cent from 1,302 million

104 The estimated budget for 1967 allocates 160 million escudos for public education.

¹⁰³ According to press reports, the estimated budget for 1967 envisages a further rise in expenditure of 387 million escudos. Of the total expenditure of 4,600 million escudos envisaged for 1967, 640 million escudos is allocated for defence, an increase of 91 million escudos over the estimate for 1966.

to 1,918 million escudos. The most significant increase, in direct taxation, was mainly due to the introduction in 1964 and 1965 of new taxes, including defence taxes and a supplementary personal tax, or to the increase of rates, particularly of taxes on income and commercial and industrial activities. In 1966, decrees were enacted increasing tax rates on imports and consumption.

Development financing

306. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisaged for Mozambique an investment target of 5,400 million escudos. This represents an average annual investment of 1,800 million escudos, or about three times the yearly investment under the previous plan. The principal sectors chosen for investment were: transforming industries, 1,350 million; roads, 665 million; irrigation and settlement, 560 million; social services, 500 million; ports and railways, 495 million; electricity, 400 million; and fisheries, 308 million escudos. Approximately 31 per cent was to be derived from private investment, 28 per cent from external loans, 21 per cent from the Government of Portugal and the remainder from territorial funds.

307. The preceding sections have already given an indication of the extent to which the targets are being fulfilled. Actual expenditures under the Plan during 1966 amounted to 1,769.5 million escudos. This included loans from the Government of Portugal totalling 400 million escudos, external loans guaranteed by Portugal totalling 150 million escudos, and 143 million escudos from territorial funds. The remaining 1,061.5 million escudos consisted of private investment capital, of which 165.5 million escudos was non-Portuguese.

308. One of the objectives of the plan was to mobilize savings available in the Territory for revenue-producing projects. Following the enactment in 1965 of legislation relaxing restrictions on the establishment of banks in the Overseas Territories (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 62), there was a considerable expansion of commercial banking facilities. Among the new banks were the Portuguese Banco Pinto e Sotta Mayor, which opened the first of five branches in Mozambique, the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial and the Banco Standard-Totta, resulting from a merger of the activities in Mozambique of the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Totta-Alianca of Lisbon. In 1966, a public loan of 100 million escudos was raised in Mozambique to finance the development plan.

Educational conditions

309. The latest available statistics on education published by the Government of Mozambique relate to the school year 1963-1964. Data extracted from these statistics were included in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev. 1, chap. V, paras. 171-175). The statistics showed, among other things, the number of children enrolled at primary schools, as officially redefined in September 1964,105 and their composition by ethnic groups. According to this data, out of a total primary enrolment of 44,725 pupils in primary schools, 23,093 were known to be Africans. Similar statistics of secondary school enrolments showed a total of 18,415, including 2,781 Africans. Compared with population figures for Africans of all ages in 1960, this represented a percentage of 0.35 per cent at the primary level and 0.04 per cent at

105 Decree Law 45,908 (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 81).

the secondary level. These figures were cited solely in order to indicate the spread of educational facilities among Africans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

310. It should be noted, however, that, as previously explained, the statistics of primary school enrolments related only to children in schools which provide at least the pre-primary class and the first three elementary classes. In Mozambique many rural schools, mostly run by religious missions, furnish less than this minimum and, under the reform of primary education effected in September 1964, are not classified as primary schools strictu sensu. In 1963-1964, there were 3,233 schools of this kind, known as "adaptation schools", with an enrolment of 373,587 African children, representing 5.82 per cent of the total African population in 1960. Of this number, 70,867 obtained promotion from one class to another or were successful in examination.106

311. According to the same source, the number of pupils of all races enrolled at the secondary level in 1963-1964 was 18,415, of whom 7,369 were at grammar (liceal) schools, 10,388 in technical professional schools (including commercial and trade schools and training institutions for the Public Service) and 405 in religious seminaries. More recent information from press reports gives a figure for 1964-1965 of 7,969 pupils at grammar (liceal) schools107 and 11,794 at technical professional schools.

312. Criticism of the situation in regard to education was voiced in a speech delivered in the National Assembly by Dr. Satúrio Pires, a deputy from Mozambique. He pointed out that, according to the provisional audit of the territorial accounts, actual expenditure on the public education service amounted to only 183.4 million escudos in 1965, or less than 3.4 per cent of the territorial budget, and that even when the subventions paid to religious missions were added to this, it still represented only about 5 per cent of the budget. 108 He referred, in particular, to what he described as the "penury and the seriousness of the problem of secondary education in Mozambique", remarking that out of 214 teaching posts, 24 were unfilled and that 41 per cent of the existing teachers were only temporary.

313. Though there appears to be some increase in expenditure on education (the estimates for 1966 and 1967 showed increases of 14.5 million escudos and 4 million escudos respectively in anticipated expenditure on public education), the increases which have occurred since 1965 do not appreciably alter the situation described by Dr. Pires. Indeed, as mentioned above (see paragraph 304 above), during part of 1966, expansion in the number of schools and teachers was temporarily halted under an order of the Governor General owing to a shortage of available funds. Nevertheless, some improvements were achieved during 1966. Among them may be cited the graduation of fifty-two new secondary teachers, of whom seventeen will teach in grammar

108 Not including the expenditure on the Estudos Gerais Universitários; see para. 315.

¹⁰⁶ These figures do not include 16,055 adolescents and adults

attending special literacy and other classes in the evenings.

107 There is considerable difficulty in comparing statistics from different sources, probably because of differing methods of computation. In his statement before the National Assembly in March 1967, Dr. Satúrio Pires was reported to have said that there were only 4,495 pupils in grammar (liceal) schools in 1965-1966.

(*liceal*) schools and the remainder in vocational schools. Also, work was in progress on two new grammar schools (*liceus*) and land was acquired at Porto Amelia for the construction of a new elementary technical school.

314. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, which assigned an investment target of 220 million escudos for education, priority is being given to the expansion of secondary, vocational and agricultural training. As reported previously (A/6300/ Rev. 1, chap. V, para. 83), agricultural education in the Overseas Territories was reorganized in 1965. As a follow-up of this reorganization, decrees were enacted in Mozambique during 1966 setting out the curricula for agricultural training at both the elementary and secondary levels. In addition, a Co-ordinating Council for agricultural education was created, which will have among its functions the issuing of grants and scholarships from funds to be donated by governmental bodies and private sources. Towards the end of 1966, a new agricultural school was opened at Chimoio in the Manica highlands.

315. In his criticism of the inadequacy of funds available for education, Dr. Satúrio Pires noted that the budget of the General University Studies (Estudos Gerais Universitários) in 1965 was only 22.8 million escudos, or less than 0.5 per cent of the actual budget of Mozambique. For 1966, the original figure cited in the budget estimates was 19 million escudos, later increased by supplementary appropriations to a total not much more than that of the preceding year. Despite the limited funds available for recurrent financing, the college continued to expand, the number of students enrolled rising to 603 in 1966-1967, compared with 329 in 1964-1965. Of the total, 298 students were studying engineering, 144 were studying medicine, 40 veterinary science and 32 agronomy. The institution provides three-year courses in general studies, agronomy, forestry, veterinary science, biology, chemistry, and teaching and, since 1966, a four-year course in medicine. During 1966, land was acquired by the Government for the construction of a permanent campus at Lourenço Marques. So far, the college, which was founded in 1963, has been housed in temporary buildings. During 1966, however, a sum of 7 million escudos was allocated for the conversion of an existing hospital into a teaching clinic to be completed by mid-1967, and projects were also approved for the construction of permanent buildings to house the schools of agronomy, chemistry and physics. Also in 1966, laboratories were opened for the study of radioisotopes and electronic microscopy in application to medicine. It was announced that a school of economics will be created shortly.

316. In his commencement speech delivered in October 1966, the rector of the institution stressed the need to bring the college up to the status of a full university by extending the courses up to licentiate level in humanities and sciences in order to supply the urgent demand in the Territory for secondary school teachers.

4. Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea

General

317. Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, lies on the west coast of Africa between 12°40'N and 10°52'N in latitude and between 13°38'WG and 16°43'WG in

longitude. Situated between the Republics of Senegal and Guinea, the Territory extends 198 miles inland from the coast at its widest point. Besides the mainland, it comprises the Bijagós Archipelago and a string of islands. The total area of the Territory is 36,125 square kilometres, of which approximately one tenth is periodically submerged by tidal waters and largely covered with mangrove. As previously reported, 109 the preliminary results of the 1960 census showed a total resident population of 544,184, compared with 510,777 at the previous census in 1950 when there were reported to be 2,263 Europeans, 4,568 mestiços, 11 Indians, 1,478 assimilated Africans, and 502,457 non-assimilated Africans. A Portuguese source¹¹⁰ published a revised figure for the total resident population in 1960 of 519,229. According to the United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1965, the estimated population at mid-1965 was 527,000.

Government and administration

318. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the Territory is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,372).¹¹¹

319. The Territory is divided into nine concelhos and three circunscrições, and for purposes of direct elections, it is considered to form one electoral district. As in other Territories with a governor, namely Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor, a Legislative Council was established for the first time in 1963. It is presided over by the Governor and comprises 14 members, of whom 3 are ex officio, 8 are elected by "organic groups" and 3 are elected directly. No workers' or employers' interests are represented in the Legislative Council. There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor. It is comprised of the Commander-in-Chief, 3 exofficio members and 3 members elected by the Legislative Council, one of whom represents the regedorias.

320. The Territory is represented in the National Assembly by one deputy. Elections to the National Assembly last took place in 1965; elections to the Legislative and Government Councils were held in 1964. The number of persons who voted in these elections are not known. The next territorial elections are to be held in 1968.

Military situation

321. Fighting in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, began in 1963 and is now entering the fifth year. Since about May 1964 the fighting has gradually grown in intensity and has become more widespread. By mid-August 1966, Portuguese troops had increased to some 23,000 but were reported to be generally based on the main population centres.

322. In June 1966, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which is reported to have some 5,000 uniformed guerrillas, was already claiming that it had "liberated almost half

¹⁰⁹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1), chap. I, para. 35.

¹¹⁰ Portugal, Anuário Estatístico, vol. II, Lisbon, 1964.

¹¹¹ For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V.

of the Territory, including in the south, Catió, Fulacunda, half of the Xitoli and Boé regions". In the north, it claimed that it "controlled the Oio and Farim regions, about half of the S. Domingos region, approximately 30 per cent of the Cachungo region and approximately 25 per cent of the Gabú region". 112

323. Portuguese official military bulletins for the period September-December 1966 reported fighting in eight out of the nine concelhos, often close to, or around, the administrative headquarters, including those of S. Domingos, Cacheu and Farim in the north, those of Batafá and Gabú in the east, and those of Mansôa, Fulacunda and Catió in the south. In mid-February 1967, fighting intensified and Portuguese casualties rose to thirteen in one week, compared with an average of about three deaths a week last year. The Defence Minister flew to the Territory to review military operations. While he was there, the Portuguese military command announced that patrols were being launched throughout the Territory. This action was interpreted by the English language Press as confirming that guerrillas had in fact infiltrated the whole Territory.

324. On his return to Lisbon, the Portuguese Minister for Defence reported on the high morale of the Portuguese troops fighting in the Territory and stressed that "there was no war between Portuguese Guinea and the neighbouring countries". He described the war as one "on a higher level" involving, on the one hand, those who wanted to take over the Territories under Portuguese administration because of their wealth, and, on the other hand, those who wanted to control these Territories because of their strategic position in the East-West struggle.

Economic conditions

325. General. The economy of the Territory is exclusively based on agriculture. The main crops are ground nuts and coconut, which together account for about 90 per cent of the exports, and rice and millet, which are the main subsistence crops. As the climate is not suitable for European settlement, there are no European farmers and almost all the agriculture is in the hands of the local population. The Companhia União Fabril (CUF) is however reported to have some large estates in the Territory. Livestock and fishing supply local needs, though some hides and skins are also exported. Except for a few factories processing rice, ground-nuts and vegetable oil, there are almost no industries. A concession has been granted for petroleum prospecting but so far no discoveries have been reported.

326. Trade and balance of payments. Over the past decade the Territory's external trade has been characterized by a growing deficit due to both rising imports and falling exports. Thus, while the value of imports increased by about 210 per cent, from 198 million escudos in 1956 to 417 million escudos in 1965, the value of exports, which had averaged around 200 million escudos annually up to 1961, dropped sharply thereafter to only 106 million escudos in 1965. As a result, the Territory's trade surplus, which amounted to 4.9 million escudos in 1956, has given place to annual deficits which increased by over 350 per cent between 1961 and 1965 (from 86 million escudos to 311 million escudos):

Balance of external trade
(Million escudos)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Imports Exports	297.2 211.1	327.3 188.9	407.2 166.5	421.4 156.2	417.2 105.8
Deficit balance	86.1	138.4	240.7	265.2	311.3

327. The sharp deterioration in the Territory's balance of trade in the past four years appears to be due in a large measure to the effects of the war which has disrupted the already stagnant agricultural sector and increased the need for additional imports of supplies and food replacements. Available data show that, although the Territory was in the past a rice exporting country, since 1960 it has had to import rice. There has also been a severe drop in exports of unshelled ground nuts (from 24,000 tons in 1963 to less than 2,000 tons in 1965 with a corresponding drop in value from 69 million escudos to less than 5 million escudos). The quantity of coconut exports also decreased in this period by almost 25 per cent, though due to rising prices the value of exports did not drop but rose from 24 million escudos to over 30 million escudos.

328. The Territory's imports consist mainly of consumer goods. In 1958 (the last year for which the territorial statistical yearbook is available) cotton fabrics, wine and tobacco accounted for more than one third of the total imports by value. In the period 1963-1965, these three items accounted for about 20 per cent of the total imports, and automobiles, gasoline and gas oil accounted for another 20 per cent. In 1964, rice imports amounted to 30 million escudos, or 6 per cent of the total.

329. Portugal has always been the Territory's most important trading partner, taking on an average about 90 per cent of its exports and supplying over 70 per cent of its imports. In the period 1963-1965, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and France accounted for the remaining 10 per cent of the Territory's exports while the remaining imports were supplied mainly by the United States of America (6 per cent), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (5 per cent) and the Federal Republic of Germany (2 per cent).

330. In spite of its adverse balance of trade, the Territory's balance of payments registered a surplus of 19.1 million escudos in 1965 compared with a deficit of 16.3 million escudos in 1963 and 5.2 million escudos in 1964. The 1965 surplus resulted from governmental transfers from Portugal to support defence costs. In 1965, except for the transfers from Portugal, all the other items in the balance of payments were negative.

Agriculture, livestock and fisheries

331. It is officially estimated that about 90 per cent of the economically active population of the Territory is engaged in agriculture and that about 77 per cent of the production is consumed locally. The total arable land is estimated to be about 263,000 hectares of which in an average year 159,000 hectares are under food crops, 59,000 hectares under cash crops (mainly ground nuts), and 59,000 hectares are fallow. At the 1960 agricultural census, there were 86,951 farming units (explorações) each with an average area of 3.2 hectares

¹¹² A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 450-452.

and four units of labour. Production that year of food crops (based on the average prices over the five previous years) was estimated at 355 million escudos and cash crops at 90 million escudos.

332. Most of the ground-nuts for export are grown in the north and north-eastern part of the Territory, where the main food crops are maize, manioc, rice and sweet potatoes. In the south, where rice is the main food crop, some ground-nuts are grown in the interior part of the Territory, but oil palm, which grows naturally along the coastal areas, provides the main export crop. It is estimated that oil palms occupy about 90,000 hectares of which about 30,000 hectares are exploited. The Territory has good timber resources which are being opened to exploitation.

333. There are no recent data on the output of food crops except for rice, which amounted to 10,581 tons in 1961, 11,304 tons in 1962 and dropped to 5,643 tons in 1963, after which no figures are reported.

334. A survey of the economy of the Territory, published in 1965 in the quarterly bulletin of the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino), suggests that the main economic problem of the Territory is the disinterest and the lack of understanding among the population of more advanced farming techniques. Although assistance has been provided through the distribution of improved seeds and fertilizers, it is felt that little progress can be expected in increased production until the people have acquired a better basic knowledge of farming through the spread of primary education especially geared to their needs.

335. Efforts are being made to introduce new crops and to encourage livestock production. As there are already some semi-spontaneous cashew trees in the Territory, several new projects have been started for growing cashew on an organized basis. A cashew shelling factory has also been established. Some fruits, including bananas and pineapples, and vegetables, are being developed with a view to eventual canning or direct export.

336. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, projects to improve agriculture include bringing into cultivation 4,000 hectares of rice, 1,000 hectares of manioc, 5,000 hectares of oil palm and 10,000 hectares each of cashew and bananas.

337. The Territory is considered to have considerable livestock potential. In 1966 it had a cattle population density of seven head per hectare. To provide credit to farmers and livestock farmers, an agricultural and livestock credit bank (Caixa de Crédito Agro Pecuário), similar to the one in Angola, was established in April 1966 in the Territory. The bank will provide credit for agriculture, livestock raising for commercial purposes, and real estate. The initial funds of the bank will be furnished from the territorial budget but, as in other Territories, the bank may issue bonds to obtain more working capital.

338. Most of the fishing carried on in the Territory is for local consumption. The fish catch increased from some 500 tons in 1963 to 760 tons in 1964 and 853 tons in 1965. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 18 million escudos are to be spent on developing the fisheries industry for local consumption. The plan envisaged the gradual motorization of the fishing boats and the installation of freezing, salting and drying plants, either through mixed enterprises involving government and private capital or

through private enterprises in which Portuguese and foreign capital would be associated.

339. In 1966, the Government of the Territory was authorized (Decree 47,101 of 16 July) to invest 2 million escudos in a newly established Sociedade Frigorifica da Guiné (SOFRIGO) which will install freezing facilities in Bissau and plans to organize a distribution network throughout the Territory. The Government also announced plans for creating a pilot fishing co-operative on Bolama.

Industry

340. Apart from a few factories processing agricultural products, there are practically no industries in the Territory. In 1965, there were only four factories for shelling rice, three for shelling ground-nuts, three vegetable oil extraction plants, a soap factory, a rubber processing factory and a petroleum refinery, owned by SACOR, at Bandim.

341. The Territory has many waterways but it does not have much hydro-electric potential. In 1965, the total electric power capacity was 3,109 kW. No provisions are made under the Transitional Development Plan for the development of transforming industries. Of the total allocation of 16.5 million escudos under the heading "industry", 9.3 million escudos are for mining, 7 million escudos are for water supplies and 200,000 escudos are for geological mapping.

Mining

342. Little is known of the actual mineral resources of the Territory and some geological surveys are being carried out as part of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. Some bauxite has been found at Boé and the Companhia Lusitana do Alumínio da Guiné e Angola, S.A.R.L. was reported to be interested in developing the deposits. An exclusive concession to prospect for, and exploit, petroleum deposits is held by Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc., a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

343. The company, which at that time was incorporated in Delaware, United States, and had its head offices in New York, held a previous concession from 1958 to 1961. During that period the company found no petroleum but is reported to have spent some 250 million escudos (just under \$US9 million), which exceeded the minimum of 118 million escudos it was required to spend under the contract.

344. In December 1965 (Decree 46,796 of 29 December), Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. was again granted an exclusive concession for petroleum mining in the Territory and following approval of the basic terms of the contract in February 1967 (Decree 46,878 of 19 February), a supplementary contract was signed in March by the Minister for Overseas Territories of Portugal, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Esso Exploration Co. Inc.

345. Under the new contract, Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. is to have its headquarters in Portuguese Territory and to be subject to Portuguese law. The chairman of the board of directors and the majority of its members are to be Portuguese citizens. The company is to have a minimum initial registered capital of \$US1.5 million and 20 per cent of the initial as well as of any future shares are to be given free of cost to the Government of the Territory.

346. The concession, which is estimated to cover some 50,000 square kilometres, includes all the land area of the Territory and the sea, lake and river shores. The term of the concession is for 45 years, and may be extended for another 15 years. It grants the company exclusive rights to prospect for and exploit deposits of solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, including petroleum, naphtha, ozokerite, natural gas and asphalt, as well as sulphur, helium, carbon dioxide and saline substances.

347. During the initial period of five years, the company undertakes to spend not less than a total of 297 million escudos (about \$US10.6 million). This amount is to be spent as follows: 24 million escudos in the first year, 59 million in the second, 78 million in the third and 68 million escudos in each of the fourth and fifth years. Within six months of the end of this five-year period, the concessionaire must request demarcation of the areas it wishes to retain. The area of the concession is to be successively reduced as follows: after the initial five years to 75 per cent of the original area granted; after eight years to 50 per cent; and after ten years to 25 per cent.

348. The surface rent for the first five years is 400 escudos per square kilometre and, within three months of the signing of the contract, the company is to pay to the territorial Government a sum of 40 million escudos (in dollars) as a down payment of the first year's surface rent (20 million escudos) and 25 per cent of the rent for the next four years. The annual surface rent is to be increased to 800 escudos per square kilometre after the tenth year and to 1,500 escudos after the fifteenth year.

349. The territorial Government is to receive a royalty of 12.5 per cent of the sale value and has the right to purchase a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the quantity of crude oil produced each year. In return, the company is granted "full freedom to produce, save, sell and export any and all substances extracted from the area of the concession". It is exempt from all taxes "whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal, present or future", with the exception of the 50 per cent income tax on profits from oil operations, the statistical tax of one mil ad valorem and the stamp tax customs clearance documents. It is also exempt from present or future taxes on shares, capital and debentures of Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. so long as these remain in the ownership of the concessionaire, its parent companies or any foreign affiliate of its parent companies.

350. As in the case of Petrangol and Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in Angola, Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. has the same privileges as regards use of the public domain, duty-free import of goods and machinery, facilities of entry into and exit from Portuguese territory for its personnel. The employment of aliens as well as of nationals is subject to the legislation in force in the Territory, but there is no obligation to employ a fixed percentage of Portuguese personnel.

351. The company is subject to the exchange control measures of the Territory. It must pay to the Territorial Exchange Fund all the foreign currency it earns from sales outside the Territory after deducting the company's local taxable income less taxes paid, expenses and depreciation. The Government undertakes to facilitate the granting of foreign exchange to the company for transfers specified in the contract, including payments for goods and services, interests and

loans and dividends to shareholders. However, the total amount of the foreign exchange made available to the company shall not exceed the total amount it has invested in foreign currency, plus the amount it has given to the Territorial Exchange Fund.

352. The terms of the contract are apparently comparable in benefits to those of other petroleum concessions in Africa. If at any time during the life of the contract, Standard Oil of New Jersey or its subsidiaries offer better terms for petroleum concessions in Africa or the Persian Gulf area, consultations may be opened between the two parties for a revision of the terms of this contract.

Transport and communications

353. Internal transport is mainly by the network of waterways, supplemented by over 1,000 kilometres of roads. The two main ports are Bissau and Bolama. In 1965, ninety-six ships with a total of 310,000 tons entered the port of Bissau.

354. The largest allocations under both the First National Development Plan for 1953-1958 and the Second National Development Plan for 1959-1964 were for expenditures on transport and communications. Under the first plan, 87 per cent of the total of 86.2 million escudos was for improving the harbour of Bissau and transport facilities on the Geba River. The second plan allocated 52 per cent of the total of 180 million escudos mainly for road construction, improving river transport and telecommunications. The implementation of both plans was slow in starting, however, and not all the funds were committed.

355. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 51 million escudos (representing 28 per cent of the total) are allocated for transport and communications. The major project under this heading is the establishment of an air service linking the Territory with Cape Verde at a cost of 24 million escudos for airport equipment and carriers. Other expenditures envisaged in this sector are: roads, 12 million escudos; ports and navigation, 10 million escudos; and telecommunications, 5 million escudos.

356. The new airline, Transportes Aéreos da Guiné, was established in 1965 (Decree 46,511 of 2 September 1965) and has since come into service.

Public finance

357. Because of the generally low level of economic development, the Territory's ordinary revenue has risen very slowly in the last ten years; the estimated ordinary revenue for 1967 was only 20 per cent higher than the revenue collected in 1957 (156 million escudos compared with 127 million escudos). Revenue from indirect taxes has remained at almost the same level since 1962 and revenue from direct taxes has decreased, largely due to a drop in receipts from the *imposto domiciliário* (the personal tax which replaced the former Native tax after the abolition of the Native Statute in 1961). Actual receipts from this source dropped from 23.2 million escudos in 1962 to 19.5 million escudos in 1964¹¹³ (probably because of the

¹¹³ The imposto domiciliário is levied on all active males between eighteen and sixty years of age. The annual rate varies from 150 escudos for a single male or a man with one wife, rising by 50 escudos for each additional wife, to 400 escudos for a man with six wives (Guiné, Legislative Instrument 1,771, of 26 June 1962).

exodus of refugees into neighbouring territories and to difficulties in collecting the tax).114 On the other hand, there has been a significant increase in the revenue derived from the general consumption tax introduced in 1964 (Legislative Instrument No. 1,814, 29 August 1964). This tax is levied at an average rate of 10 to 20 per cent ad valorem on almost all imported goods (including matches, textiles, fruit juices, beer, wine, tobacco, firearms, tools, machinery and parts) and at a lower rate on various local products. The tax produces about 20 million escudos in revenue annually.

358. The accounts of the Territory show that, in 1964, actual ordinary revenue was 153 million escudos and exceeded the estimated total by about 8 million escudos. Although receipts from general direct taxes were 6 million escudos less than estimated, the difference was more than compensated by the receipts from the new consumption tax (which yielded some 6 million escudos more than had been anticipated) as well as by larger revenues from indirect taxes and also larger revenues in the closed budget accounts. Expenditure also exceeded estimates (148.7 million escudos compared with 145 million escudos), the difference being partly due to an increase of 2 million escudos in the public debt servicing charge. In 1964, the Territory's share (12 million escudos) in the cost of the armed forces represented 8 per cent of its total expenditures. This compared with 4.2 per cent spent on education and 13.7 per cent on health services.

359. For 1966, the sources of budgetary revenue are as follows: direct taxes, 45.4 million escudos, of which about half is to come from the imposto domiciliário; indirect taxes, 34.7 million escudos; the special consumption tax, 20.5 million escudos; revenue from independent accounts (closed revenue), 30.2 million escudos; and other taxes and fees, 22 million escudos. Estimates of ordinary expenditure for 1966 allocated 16.4 million escudos for servicing of the Territory's public debt (an increase of 30 per cent compared with 1964)¹¹⁵ and 12 million escudos to its share in the total cost of the Territory's armed forces, which in 1966 amounted to 67.4 million escudos (distributed as follows: army, 29.2 million escudos; navy, 17.5 million; and air force, 20.7 million). Except for the share paid by the Territory and a contribution of 2.1 million escudos from the Overseas Defence Fund, the remainder of the cost of the armed forces was charged to Portugal's extraordinary budget, as follows: 19.1 million escudos for the army; 15.5 million escudos for the navy; and 20.7 million escudos for the air force.

360. Although no details are available on the 1967 budget, it is anticipated that there may be a rise in the allocations for general administration in view of the fact that members of the public services received a salary increase of 12.7 per cent in December 1966.

114 At the above rates, the difference of 3.7 million escudos represents the loss due to non-collection of taxes from 10,000 to 15,000 persons.

115 In 1962, the Territory's public debt totalled 135.7 million escudos of which 76 million escudos represented the amount outstanding on two loans, one raised in 1948 and the other in 1953. The remaining amount represented loans from Portugal to the Territory at 4 per cent per annum (Decree 43,519 of 28 February 1961) for the implementation of projects under the Second Development Plan for 1959-1964. At the end of 1964, the Territory's total public debt had risen to 188.3 million escudos of which 126.2 million escudos was for development.

It may be recalled that the need for a salary increase had been raised in the National Assembly in January 1965 by Mr. Pinto Bull, the former Secretary-General of the Territory.

Development financing

361. As reported previously, 116 the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 contains an allocation of 180 million escudos for the Territory's development projects. The envisaged expenditures, in millions of escudos, in the different sectors are as follows: industry, 16.5; transport, 51; education, health, etc., 33.2 agriculture, 33.3; fishing, 18; housing, 10; energy, 3; and other sectors, 15. Since the Territory's budget is so limited that, according to the Governor, it cannot afford even the staff and services that it needs, the entire amount of 180 million escudos was originally to be financed by annual loans from Portugal (Decree 46,683 of 3 December 1965) (see A/ 6300/Rev. 1, chap. V, para. 57).

362. In 1965, the first year of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the budget estimates envisaged expenditure totalling 54.2 million escudos for development, but actual expenditure amounted to only 25.6 million escudos, or slightly less than half the sum estimated. This was, moreover, 50 per cent less than the expenditure on development in 1964. Expenditure on research and surveys amounted to less than one per cent of the sum allocated for this purpose and, of the 6.2 million escudos allocated for social welfare, including education, less than 15 per cent was spent.

363. Following the conclusion of the new contract with Esso Guiné Exploration, Inc., the central Government decided to use part of the 40 million escudos down payment (see above) for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. For 1966, financing of the development plan projects included: a loan of 12 million escudos from the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino) (Decree 47,132 of 3 August 1966); 6.9 million escudos from loans from Portugal (Order 22,107 of 7 July 1966); 4.4 million escudos from the territorial budgetary surpluses; and 32.2 million escudos from the money received for the petroleum concession¹¹⁷ (Order 22,153 of 5 August 1966). Envisaged expenditures, in escudos, were: ports and navigation, 2.5 million; telecommunications, 1.9 million; development of agricultural, forestry and livestock resources, 7 million; roads, 20 million; air transport and airports, 5.2 million; the port of Bissau and telecommunications, 12 million.

Educational conditions

364. The latest available education statistics are for the school year ending in 1964 (for comparison, the figures for 1963, which were reported in 1966, are given in parentheses).

365. The statistics show that in 1964 there were a total of 156 (163) government primary schools, including 33 school posts, with a total of 241 (212) teachers and 13,040 (12,000) pupils. The Territory's one academic high school had 19 (20) teachers and

sion, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/ Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 35, 108 and 109.

117 Of the remaining 7.8 million escudos, 2.8 million have been allocated to the payment of the Territory's public debt charges (Order 22,226 of 26 September 1966).

¹¹⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Ses-

an enrolment of 305 (272) students; the commercial industrial high school had 31 (26) teachers and 482 (308) students; the elementary professional school had 5 (4) teachers and 40 (19) students. The 79 koranic schools had 81 teachers and 758 students. There were 85 people in government training programmes of whom 55 were attending courses in agriculture and veterinary science and 30 were undergoing training in the fields of public health and welfare.

5. CAPE VERDE ARCHIPELAGO

General

366. The Cape Verde islands lie off the west coast of Africa, the nearest point being about 600 kilometres from Dakar (Senegal). They form a crescent-shaped archipelago facing west and extending between 14°48′N and 17°12′N latitude and between 22°41′WG and 25°22′WG longitude. There are ten islands and five islets divided into two groups: the Barlavento (windward) and Sotavento (leeward) islands. The Barlavento group comprises the islands of Sando Antão, São Vicente, São Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista and Santa Luzia. The Sotavento islands are Santiago, Fogo, Maio and Brava. The islands range in size from 991 square kilometres (Santiago) to 35 square kilometres Santa Luzia, the total land area being 4,033.3 square kilometres.

367. The islands are of volcanic origin and most are mountainous with deep, eroded valleys and rocky shorelines. The appearance of the islands during most of the year is one of barrenness. There has been extensive deforestation and the climate, influenced by winds from the Sahara, is arid, rainfall is uncertain and the Territory suffers from prolonged droughts; the islands are also subject to severe cyclonic storms originating in the Atlantic Ocean.

368. Despite difficult conditions of life, and considerable emigration, the population is increasing rapidly, at an estimated yearly rate of about 3.5 per cent between 1950 and 1960. In 1964, the total population was unofficially estimated at 221,770. There are no recent data available concerning its composition by ethnic groups, but in 1950, according to the census of that year, 69.09 per cent of the population was mestiço, 28.84 per cent was African and 2.06 per cent was European. Except for the five islets and the small island of Santa Luzia, all the islands are inhabited, but according to the 1960 census, nearly one half of the population lives on Santiago where the capital of the territory, Praia, is located.

Government and administration

369. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Cape Verde is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,371).¹¹⁸

370. Although the governmental and administrative framework is similar in its broad outlines to that in other Territories under Portuguese administration, there are certain differences deriving from the fact that the Native Statute was never applied to Cape

Verde and consequently the inhabitants all have the same legal rights and obligations as citizens living in metropolitan Portugal. Hence, there are no regedorias, the local administration consisting, as in Portugal, of concelhos (municipalities) and freguesias (parishes), each with its elected council or parish board. There are twelve concelhos and for purposes of direct elections to the National Assembly and the Legislative Council of Cape Verde the Territory comprises two districts, namely, the Barlavento and Sotavento island groups.

371. The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of eighteen members, of whom three are ex officio, twelve are elected by "organic groups", and six are elected by direct franchise, three from each of the two districts. Of the twelve representatives of "organic groups", two are chosen by bodies representing interests of employers and two by bodies representing workers' interests. 119 There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which is comprised of the Secretary-General, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and two other ex officio members, as well as three members elected by the Legislative Assembly from among its members, one of whom must be a representative of the administrative bodies.

372. Elections to the Legislative Council were last held in 1964 at which time approximately 18,000 voters, or about 10 per cent of the population, participated in the election of the six representatives chosen by direct suffrage, a percentage believed to be higher than in the other Overseas Territories. In the elections to the National Assembly held in 1965, 86.5 per cent of the registered voters were reported to have participated, though the actual number is not known. The next elections to the Legislative Council will be held in 1968.

Economic conditions

373. General. Economically, Cape Verde presents a picture of chronic poverty and heavy dependence on financial assistance from Portugal. With very few natural resources and a growing problem of overpopulation, its main economic importance lies at present in its function as a refueling station for shipping and aircraft travelling between Western Europe, South America and southern Africa, and as a relay point for trans atlantic telephonic communications.

374. As already stated, the Cape Verde islands suffer from general aridity and uncertainty of rainfall, experiencing periodic droughts which formerly decimated the population. Of the nine inhabited islands, three are almost barren of natural vegetation and on most of the others soils are poor and farming is mainly restricted to the narrow valleys and higher regions of the interior. Apart from salt, pozzolana earth and lime, which are exported, they have no known mineral resources and there is little industry other than that concerned with food-stuffs and the processing of primary products. Fishing is potentially a source of wealth and is now attracting significant investment (see below), but for many years the industry languished owing to poor techniques and insufficient capital.

375. For the most part, the inhabitants are small tenant farmers, principally engaged in growing food crops and rearing livestock (mainly goats and pigs)

¹¹⁸ For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73, and the subsection on the Territory.

¹¹⁹ Details of the composition of the Legislative Council are found in document A/5800/Rev.1, paras. 187 and 188.

for local consumption. There is a limited export of bananas, coffee, purgueira (an oil-seed), peanuts and castor seeds, but exports are small and their value in 1965 was only 8 per cent of the total value of imports. Not only must the Territory import nearly all its requirements of manufactured consumer goods, but, since food production even in good years is insufficient for consumption needs, it also imports large quantities of food-stuffs, including maize and beans, which are among the main subsistence crops. In times of drought, the need to supply purchasing power for subsistence has led to the rescheduling of development expenditure, financed predominantly by loans from Portugal, as a means of providing employment. It is not surprising, therefore, that Cape Verde is traditionally a Territory of emigration with a net annual outflow of between 1,000 and 4,000 persons, most of whom go to São Tomé and Principe.

376. Faced with a rising population, increasing imports and almost stationary exports, the Portuguese Government is endeavouring to find ways of stimulating production and increasing foreign exchange receipts. Attention is being directed particularly to the rehabilitation and expansion of the fishing industry, the production of bananas for export to Portugal and the fostering of a tourist industry. Measures are also being taken under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 to improve agricultural techniques, promote land reform, improve water supplies and communications and develop technical training.

377. External trade and payments. Because of its generally low production and lack of industries, Cape Verde's exports cover only a fraction of the value of its imports. In recent years, moreover, this fraction has been growing smaller owing to rapidly increasing imports. Between 1963 and 1965, for instance, whereas the value of exports rose by 16 per cent (from 24.1 million to 28.0 million escudos), the value of imports increased by 34 per cent (from 170.2 million to 228.3 million escudos). In 1965, exports covered only 8 per cent of imports by value, leaving a deficit of no less than 200.3 million escudos.

378. Despite this, however, Cape Verde's external payments showed a favourable balance of 23.2 million escudos at the end of the year. This was because the Territory derives substantial invisible receipts from the sale of services and supplies to ships in transit, mostly in the form of water and of fuel (which is imported for the purpose) and because its development expenditure (54.6 million escudos in 1965 and 72.9 million escudos in 1966) is financed by loans from metropolitan Portugal.

379. The Territory's main exports consist of fish and fish products, bananas, salt, coffee, pozzolana and ground-nuts. Of these, only fish and bananas have shown appreciable increases in recent years. Between 1963 and 1965, exports of fish and fish products increased in value from 5.1 million to 8.0 million escudos, while bananas increased from 2.9 million to 3.4 million escudos. There are, unfortunately, no data available for 1966, but according to plans for the expansion of banana exports to Portugal, it was forecast that the quantity supplied would increase from 3,391 tons in 1965 to 4,600 tons in 1966 and 6,500 tons by 1968. Other exports have, in contrast, remained static or declined. Thus, salt declined in value from 3.4 million escudos in 1963 to 2.7 million escudos in 1965. poszolana from 1.6 million to 1.3 million escudos and ground-nuts from 1.1 million to 0.9 million escudos.

Exports of coffee are extremely small, amounting in 1965 to only 45 tons, valued at 1.5 million escudos.

380. More than half of the Territory's imports consist of consumer goods, the major items in 1965 including, in descending order, textiles, maize, sugar, wheat flour, rice, automobiles, wines and petroleum products. It is noticeable that among the leading imports are such food-stuffs as maize, beans and sugar, all of which are grown in Cape Verde, but not in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population. Imports of food-stuffs, and of maize in particular, vary substantially from year to year, depending on whether or not the local crop has been affected by drought, but in recent years imports of all the main food crops have shown progressive increases; thus, maize imports rose from 8.7 million escudos in 1963 to 18.1 million escudos and rice from 5.5 million to 7.8 million escudos. In 1966, authorization was given for the duty-free import of 10,000 tons of maize.

381. Cape Verde's main trading partners are metropolitan Portugal and the other Overseas Territories, especially Angola. In 1965, metropolitan Portugal supplied about 50 per cent by value of all imports and purchased about 55 per cent of exports, mainly food crops. Next in importance was the United States of America, supplying 5 per cent of imports and taking about 9 per cent of exports.

382. Agriculture and livestock. Although agriculture constitutes the principal economic activity of the Cape Verde islanders, agricultural production is limited by the availability of suitable soils and water and by the uncertainty of the rainfall. Except in the case of Fogo where rainfall is more plentiful, all the larger islands have substantial areas of barren land, cultivation being mainly restricted to the valleys and higher regions of the interior. Farming is mostly by small individual farmers who use rudimentary methods and are primarily concerned with the growing of food crops. Of the total cultivated area of about 54,000 hectares, some 31,000 hectares are reportedly devoted to maize and beans. Other food crops include sweet potatoes, manioc, vegetables and fruits. Sugar cane is grown, not for export but for the production of a locally consumed alcohol. Permanent crops include purgueira, which grows in the arid coastal areas and produces an oil-seed which is exported for the manufacture of soap and fertilizer, and, in the more humid areas, bananas, coconuts and coffee. In the valleys, castor and ground-nuts are cultivated, in addition to maize and beans. There are no data available concerning production but, except for bananas, exports are small and have followed an erratic pattern in recent years. Thus, purgueira exports have varied between 666 tons in 1963 and 443 tons in 1965, castor seeds from 54 tons in 1963 to 126 tons in 1964 and 65 tons in 1965 and ground-nuts from 205 tons in 1963 to 559 tons in 1964 and 184 tons in 1965.

383. In recent years, government efforts have been directed towards the expansion of coffee and bananas for export. As concerns coffee, legislation enacted in 1959 (Decree 42,390 of 15 July) made the cultivation of coffee compulsory in certain designated areas of irrigated land. Despite this, coffee exports have declined, from 132 tons in 1959 to 37 tons in 1963, and in 1965 amounted only to 45 tons (valued at 1.5 million escudos). More success has attended efforts to promote banana exports, which rose progressively from 1,125 tons in 1957 to 3,392 tons in 1965 and.

it is hoped, will increase to 6,500 tons by 1968. This is partly the result of expenditure under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 on irrigation and partly because of recent measures (see para. 62) to develop a guaranteed market in Portugal. During 1966, the Government acquired a refrigerated cargo ship for the inter-island transport of fruit and one of the purposes of the road-building programme (see below) is to facilitate the export of produce.

384. Reference has already been made to the low productivity of agriculture in Cape Verde, which is amply illustrated by the importation of food crops, especially maize, of which 12,000 tons were imported in 1965 and 10,000 tons in 1966. This is partly due to adverse natural conditions but it is also attributable in part to outmoded agricultural methods, lack of capital and to a system of land tenure whereby most of the land is owned by hereditary landlords and is farmed by leasehold tenants or share-croppers under contracts which, hitherto, were often of short duration and subject to frequent revision by the land-owners. In November 1966, a legislative order made applicable to Cape Verde Law 2,114 of 15 June 1962. Under this law, farming contracts and deeds are henceforth subject to government regulations; they must be reviewed by the administrative service and they must have a threeyear term, renewable for nine more years; the law also contained provisions for an equitable division of produce in the case of share-cropping contracts and established arbitration commissions for any litigation between proprietor and farmer.

385. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, emphasis is placed on the extension of irrigation wherever possible, improved land use and soil conservation; a total of 42 million escudos being allocated for this purpose. In 1965, a special enlarged team of experts (brigada técnica) was established to promote agricultural co-operation, draw up plans for land use, ensure the maximum use of existing and new irrigation works and encourage reafforestation and soil conservation.

386. In addition to their crops, the farmers of Cape Verde also rear livestock, especially goats and pigs. In 1963, there were reported to be about 30,500 goats, 12,363 pigs, 13,900 cattle and about 7,000 donkeys, the latter used mainly for transportation.

387. Fisheries. Fishing is potentially an important economic activity in Cape Verde. The seas around the islands are known to be rich in tuna and lobster and fish constitute a major element of the islanders' diet, especially on the islands of Sal and Boa Vista where the aridity is such that there is almost no agriculture. Though fishing plays a role in the domestic economy second only to agriculture and fish and fish products are the Territory's principal exports by value, the industry was for many years in a state of decline, carried on by out-dated methods, with insufficient capital and only limited access to external markets. As late as 1957, a report on the fishing industry described it as stagnant and the processing factories as lacking in adequate facilities and equipment, unhygienic and bordering on insolvency. 120

388. Efforts to improve industrial fishing in the islands date principally from 1957 when scientific research into the fisheries potential was first initiated. This was followed in 1958 by the establishment of two

industrial freezing units on the island of São Vicente and by the introduction of a few motorized trawlers. As at 1964 it was estimated that there were about 3,000 persons engaged in fishing, most of them still fishing from small boats by traditional methods and five processing companies engaged in the production for export of frozen and canned fish and fish-meal. Exports of fish products increased from 4.9 million escudos in 1958 to 6.8 million escudos in 1964.

389. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, more than half of the total investment envisaged (250 million escudos) is allocated for the development of the fishing industry. Part of this is being devoted to fisheries research now being undertaken by a research unit, the Centre for Aquatic Biology, which was established in May 1966 (Order No. 21,916 of 30 May). The largest part of the investment is, however, being used to improve the fishing fleet and to provide needed capital for the transforming industry. In May 1966 (Decree 46,990 of 21 May), a government loan of 30 million escudos was granted to the largest processing company, Companhia de Pesca e Congelação de Cabo Verde (CONGEL), raising its total investment to 50 million escudos. At the same time, foreign interests are reported to be turning their attention to Cape Verde. In April 1966, an agreement was concluded between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany permitting the latter to establish a fishing base in the islands. Under the agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany will undertake a sixmonth study of tuna resources and fishing methods in the neighbouring waters. Deep-sea tuna fishing is already being carried out by boats of the Japanese Mitsui Company, based on São Vicente. In November 1966, it was reported in the Press that a German financier was considering the possibility of joining with other foreign interests in a company to be established on Santiago. According to the report, the investment contemplated was between 200 and 300 million escudos.

390. Extractive and transforming industries. Apart from the processing of fish and of food-stuffs for domestic consumption, the only sizable industries established in Cape Verde are concerned with the extraction for export of salt, lime and pozzolana earth, the last being the raw material for the manufacture of cement and concrete. Salt, which at present ranks third in importance among the Territory's exports (2.7 million escudos in 1965), is produced by evaporation from salt pans on the islands of Sal, Boa Vista and Maio. Owing to loss of the traditional export market, namely Brazil, the industry suffered a setback after the Second World War, the quantity exported decreasing from 34,780 tons in 1939 to a low figure of 20,269 tons in 1965. Since then it has slowly increased, attaining 39,626 tons in 1965.

391. Pozzolana deposits were first discovered in 1948 and were initially developed mainly for export to Portugal. Although production increased rapidly until 1959, when 9,102 tons were exported, it has since oscillated between a low figure of 3,668 tons in 1960 and a high of 11,825 tons in 1963. In 1965, only 4,139 tons were exported.

392. In August 1966, plans were announced to establish a cement industry based on *pozzolana* on the islands of Maio and Boa Vista. According to press reports, the Companhia Pozzolana de Cabo Verde, S.A.R.L., which controls the deposits, will invest 400 million escudos in two cement factories to be built with technical and financial support from European

¹²⁰ J. Gutteres and others, "Estudos das Pescas em Cabo Verde" in Estudos, Ciencias Politicas e Sociais (Lisbon, 1961), vol. I, No. 47.

cement interests. The factories will, it is reported, employ more than 100 technicians and 450 local workers and will have a productive capacity of 300,000 tons yearly, valued at approximately 135 million escudos. Exports will be directed to African markets.

393. Transport and communications. As already stated, Cape Verde's main economic importance derives from its role as a service station for long-distance shipping, aviation and telephone communications. The main harbour for shipping is Porto Grande on the island of São Vicente. At one time São Vicente ranked in importance with such ports as Singapore, Malta and Port Said as the chief bunkering station for ships travelling in the Atlantic. With the establishment of better and larger ports such as Dakar, São Vicente has gradually declined.

394. In 1960, the harbour area of Porto Grande had an area of about 700 hectares and several wharves accessible to large ships. In 1961, a deep-water berth was built in Porto Grande. Ninety per cent of all sea traffic stopping at Cape Verde, including nearly all foreign steamers, were served by the port. Eight smaller ports, namely Praia, Santa Maria and Pedra de Lume (Sal); Palmeiras and Fura (Brava); Porto Novo (Santo Antão); São Felipe (Fogo); and Sal Rei (Boa Vista) generally handle smaller Portuguese ships. The number of ships stopping in Cape Verde has not increased since 1953, the yearly average being approximately 600 to 650 ships with a total tonnage of between 2.4 million to 3.9 million tons. In 1966, a new port was constructed on the island of Fogo under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 and, as noted above, the Government was reported to have purchased a new cargo ship for the inter-island transport of fruit.

395. The Territory has a major international airport at Espargas, on the island of Sal. The airport has increased in importance since 1961 due to the growth in Portuguese air traffic between Europe and Africa. Following the closing of several African airports to its aircraft, the Republic of South Africa is reported to have concluded an agreement with Portugal for the use of the Espargas airport and, according to press reports, is expected to contribute investment capital to expand the existing facilities.

396. São Vicente had long been a relay point for submarine telephonic cables between Europe, Brazil and South Africa. In August 1966, a press report announced that the largest submarine cable in the world would be completed by 1968 and would use Cape Verde as a relay point.

397. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a total of 96 million escudos is allocated for expenditure on transport and communications. Approximately two thirds of this is to be used for improvement of ports and air transport facilities and 30 million escudos for roads. Considerable importance is attached to the construction of new roads, partly to increase exports and partly as a means of promoting tourism which is, at present, in its infancy. The first organized tour to Cape Verde visited the island of Santiago in May 1966.

398. Public finance. The budget of Cape Verde shows a progressive increase in both ordinary and extraordinary expenditures during recent years. Actual expenditure under the ordinary budget rose from 68.24 million escudos in 1963 to 78.98 million escudos in 1965 and an estimated 85.84 million escudos in 1966. Extraordinary expenditure, mainly for the im-

plementation of development plans, rose from 52.99 million escudos in 1964 to 54.63 million escudos in 1965. The allocation for 1966 was 72.95 million escudos.¹²¹

399. For 1965, Cape Verde contributed 1.7 million escudos towards a total expenditure of 23.8 million escudos on the armed services in the Territory, the remainder being paid from Portugal's budget and from the Overseas Military Defence Fund. Estimated expenditure on defence in 1967 amounts to 19.7 million escudos, of which 2 million is chargeable to the Territory (Orders 22,455; 22,460 and 22,496 of 16 and 31 January 1967). Other budgetary allocations included 10.36 million (12 per cent of the ordinary budget) for education and 7.9 million (9.1 per cent) for public health.

400. Because the Territory has so few resources, extraordinary expenditure, mainly for development, is financed almost entirely by loans from metropolitan Portugal with the result that the ordinary budget must bear a growing charge for servicing of the public debt, amounting to 2.9 million escudos (3.3 per cent of the ordinary budget) in 1966.

401. Development financing. Under the two previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 347 million escudos was allocated to Cape Verde: 137 million escudos under the first plan and 210 million escudos under the second plan. Both plans allocated more than half of the total sums to be invested to the improvement of harbour facilities and roads, the second largest allocations going to agriculture including, especially, irrigation projects. With supplementary allocations, actual expenditure came to 374 million escudos.

402. The pattern of investment planned under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 shows a new orientation in the economic development of the Territory. The plan allocates a total of 500 million escudos to be invested during the three-year period, of which 258 million escudos, or more than half, is for the development of the fishing industry, other sectors receiving much smaller investment targets, namely: 70 million escudos (14 per cent) for transport and communications; 18 million (3 per cent) for education; 30 million (6 per cent) for public health; and 42 million (5.4 per cent) for agriculture.

403. Expenditure under the plan in 1965 amounted to 54.6 million escudos, or 18.4 million escudos less than the original appropriation. Of the original appropriation, the largest allocation was for roads (20 million), followed by ports and navigation facilities (20 million), agriculture (8 million), public health (6 million) and industries (5 million).

404. Because of the increasing burden of public debt servicing on Cape Verde's slender economy, a decree (Decree 46,683) of 3 December 1965 authorized the Portuguese Ministry of Finance to make interest-free loans, repayable over twenty-four years, for implementing the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. Accordingly, expenditure during 1967, which will amount to 70 million escudos, is being provided in the form of a "reimbursable subsidy" (Order 7,496 of 19 March 1966). Of this sum, 21.5 million escudos are to be used for housing and municipal improvements, 17 million for transport and communica-

¹²¹ Due to carry-overs, there are considerable discrepancies between estimated and actual expenditures on development for any given year.

tions (including 6 million for harbours and 5 million for roads), 11.7 million for agriculture, reafforestation and livestock, 4 million for electricity supplies, 6 million for public health, 5 million for education and 1.25 million for new transforming industries.

Educational conditions

405. According to the most recent statistics available (Boletim Geral do Ultramar, May 1966), there were in 1964 a total of 427 primary school classrooms, 122 of which 200 were in primary schools strictu sensu and 227 were in rural schools (postos escolares). The total number of primary teachers was reported to be 549 and the number of children enrolled 24,334, indicating an average ratio of 53 pupils per teacher and 57 children per classroom. This would seem to imply a substantial recent improvement in primary facilities since, according to a semi-official study, 123 the ratio in 1960-1961 on the island of Santiago was 325 children per class and 207 per teacher.

406. At the secondary level there were, according to the same statistics, two grammar (liceal) schools with 52 teachers and 1,103 pupils and three technical professional schools with 454 pupils (one of the three being an agricultural school). There was also a religious seminary with 60 students. Above the secondary level, there were no institutions other than government training courses, all post-secondary education being given outside the Territory on government scholarships, of which 35 were granted in 1964.

407. If the above statistics are correct, they represent an increase of 120 primary classes and 5,741 pupils enrolled at the primary level since the preceding year (these may include adult literacy classes). This increase is probably due to the introduction in 1964 of compulsory primary education. At the secondary level, there was an increase in pupil enrolments of 27 in the two grammar (*liceal*) schools and 39 in the three technical professional schools.

408. No statistics are available for the years after 1964, but it may be noted that of the total investment target of 18 million escudos for education contained in the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 2.5 million escudos was allocated for expenditure in 1965 and 5 million escudos in 1966. The programme for 1966 provided for the construction of nineteen new schools, most of them rural school posts (postos escolares). A decision was also taken to establish a primary teachers' training school in the Territory, the cost of which would be shared by other overseas Territories.

Public health

409. There is very little new information concerning public health in Cape Verde. In March 1966, it was reported that, following a study of hospital facilities and needs in the Territory, plans had been completed for the construction of new central hospitals on the islands of São Vicente and Praia and of a psychiatric hospital at Pedra Badejo, which will serve the whole Territory. The plans also provide for expansion of the existing hospitals on Sal (to meet needs resulting from the existence of the Espargas airport) and

at Ribeira Grande, Study is at present being given to hospital facilities needed for the treatment of tuberculosis

6. São Tomé and Príncipe

General

410. The two islands of São Tomé and Príncipe are situated in the Gulf of Biafra, west of the Republic of Gabon. Their total area is 964 square kilometres, and they lie between 1°44'N and 0°1'S latitude and 6°28'EG and 7°28'EG longitude. São Tomé and Príncipe are volcanic islands. The area of São Tomé is 854 square kilometres; the area of Príncipe, which lies about 120 kilometres north of São Tomé, is 110 square kilometres.

411. According to the 1950 census, the population of São Tomé was 55,827 and that of Principe was 4,332, a total of 60,159. The provisional 1960 census figures give the total population as 63,485, of whom 58,880 were in São Tomé and 4,605 in Principe. In 1960, about 60 per cent of the population were considered to be "autoctone"; the remainder were from Portugal and other "national" territories, mainly Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, including 2,655 Europeans. The local (autoctone) population is of mixed origin; it includes descendents of the original settlers, elements from Gabon and other parts of the Guinea coast and "Angolares" from Angola.

Government and administration

412. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, São Tomé and Príncipe are considered to be a province of Portugal. Their Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,373).¹²⁴

413. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea (see paras. 318-320). The Territory comprises two concelhos (São Tomé and Príncipe), which are divided into freguesias (parishes). The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of thirteen members, of whom three are ex officio, seven are elected by "organic" groups and three are elected directly. There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which comprises the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, three ex officio members, and three members elected by the Legislative Council, with one representing the freguesias.

414. Elections to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1964. Electoral registers organized for the first time under the 1963 electoral law (Decree 45,408 of 6 December) resulted in a 20 per cent increase in the number of people entitled to vote. However, no actual figures are available. For reference, it may be recalled that in the 1956 elections to the National Assembly only about 4,400 people voted, which was about one tenth of the population then listed as assimilated (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 203).

the Territory.

125 For details on the composition and structure of local government bodies see document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI,

paras. 46-53.

¹²² According to a report (Boletim Geral do Ultramar, January-February 1966) special measures were taken to expand primary school facilities because of an alarming rise in illiter-

acy. 128 Idídio do Amaral, "Santiago de Cabo Verde", Memórias da Junta de Investigaçães do Ultramar (No. 48), Lisbon 1964, p. 318.

¹²⁴ For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73 and the subsequent section on the Territory.

415. In contrast to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the Native Statute has never applied to São Tomé and Príncipe. Although since the end of the last century the local inhabitants have been considered Portuguese citizens governed by Portuguese civil law, at the 1950 census, two thirds of the population were classified as assimilated and one third as non-assimilated. Since the last census in 1960, no distinction is made between assimilated and non-assimilated persons.

Economic conditions

- 416. General. Plantation agriculture is the main economic activity and traditionally cocoa has been the most important export crop, followed now by coffee, copra, oil palm and coconuts. Because of the concentration on cash crops for export and because there are few industries, the Territory has to import most of its food (including wheat flour, rice, dried fish, sugar and maize) as well as manufactured goods such as textiles and tobacco.
- 417. In the last few years, government policy has aimed at establishing the economy on a broader basis by introducing new crops and encouraging the development of fisheries and transforming industries.
- 418. External trade and payments. São Tomé and Principe have traditionally had a sizeable foreign trade surplus. In the peak years 1953 and 1954, when exports amounted to almost 250 million escudos, imports were only about half of that amount and the trade surplus exceeded 120 million escudos. However, by 1960, the surplus balance had dropped to 76 million escudos. Since then, the trade balance has further deteriorated. Over the period 1961-1964, due to a continued drop in the quantity of the principal exports and to falling market prices, total exports averaged less than 160 million escudos annually. In 1965, the value of exports was 146 million escudos, which left a trade surplus of only 1 million escudos, an all-time low.
- 419. The Territory's trade is now mostly within the escudo zone. Since 1961, Portugal's share in the Ter-

ritory's trade has increased and in 1965 accounted for 48 per cent of its imports and 55 per cent of its exports. Angola supplied another 20 per cent of the Territory's imports, followed by the Netherlands (5 per cent), the Federal Republic of Germany (4 per cent), and the United Kingdom and the United States (3 per cent each). After Portugal, the Netherlands is the Territory's next most important client, taking 21 per cent of its exports in 1965.

- 420. São Tomé and Príncipe's balance of payments surplus increased from 15.8 million escudos in 1963 to 28.4 million escudos in 1964 and 34.7 million escudos in 1965. In 1965, the Territory's invisible receipts included private transfers (48.8 million escudos) and remittances to the Territory from the central Government for development (amounting to 31.3 million escudos).
- 421. Agriculture, forestry and livestock. Agricultural activity in São Tomé and Príncipe is concentrated in some 150 large companies which own 90 per cent of the cultivated land. Most of the export crops are grown on large plantations with paid labour which used to be recruited mainly from Angola. As a result of the changes introduced in labour recruitment in Angola and the 1962 Rural Labour Code, São Tomé and Príncipe has experienced a shortage of agricultural workers which has affected production. Part of the local population is engaged in small-scale farming but most of it is underemployed (see below).
- 422. In the period 1963-1965, copra and coconuts accounted for an average of 92 per cent of the value of the annual exports. In 1965, cocoa accounted for 58 per cent, copra 24 per cent and coconuts about 10 per cent. Coffee exports dropped from 202 tons in 1963 to 168 tons in 1965, but the value rose from 4.8 to 5.6 million escudos. Palm oil exports, which had dropped about 12 per cent since 1963, amounted in 1965 to 871 tons, valued at 4.4 million escudos. In recent years the Territory has begun to export some quinquina and cinnamon, as well as bananas and pineapples.
- 423. The output of principal crops (in metric tons) for the period 1963-1965 is shown in the table below:

Year	Сосов	Сорта	Bananas	Coconuts	Palm oil	Coffee
1963	 0,541	5,304	3,069	2,096	1,640	256
1964	 7,995	6,001	4,926	1,813	1,371	196
1965	 10,577	6,970		1,989	1,732	214

Source: Banco Nacional Ultramarino, S.A.R.L., Boletim Trimestral (No. 66/67), Lisbon, 1966.

- 424. The drop in the export price of cocoa from an average of 20,000 escudos per ton in 1955-1958 to 10,000 escudos per ton in 1965 has seriously affected the economy of the Territory. Despite government measures to provide relief by reducing export duties and introducing new credit facilities, many companies were reported in 1966 to have transferred their operations to Angola.
- 425. In 1966, new legislation was introduced to regulate timber exploitation (Governor's Order 3,994 of 28 April). Annual licences are now issued which in each case specify the quantities of timber that may be cut and exported. These regulations, however, do not apply to farmers who own less than 10 hectares of land.
- 426. Timber exports may be prohibited in order to assure the satisfactory supply of the local market. Minimum export prices are fixed by the Territory's Governor. A tax (taxa de exploração) varying from 20 to 50 escudos per cubic metre is levied on timber for export.
- 427. Livestock are kept mainly for local consumption. In 1965 there were 4,459 hogs, 3,025 oxen, 2,652 sheep, 1,300 goats and 480 horses.
- 428. In 1963, it was estimated that only about 2,000 of the local population were employed on the plantations and some 20,000 were probably engaged in farming on their own account. In order to increase production and stimulate economic activity, the Government is encouraging the development of more small-

scale farming by acquiring land from private owners and turning it over to individual small farmers. This scheme, which is estimated to cost about 70,000 escudos per family, is being financed out of the allocation of 30 million escudos for agriculture under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967.

429. The Government is also trying to encourage the permanent settlement of agricultural workers from other Territories. Under the labour legislation of 1948 (Decree 36,888 of 28 May), the territorial Government is responsible for building villages for workers who "in accordance with their background, appear to be able to become independent farmers". During the 1950s, the Government built two villages, Riba Santana and Neves, where workers have been provided with housing and plots for cultivation free of charge. In 1965, the Government decided to open these houses and the attached plots (terrenos) to individual ownership (Governor's Order 3,767 of 6 May). The heads of family who so desire may purchase their houses and plots in monthly instalments over periods of up to ten years. Prices of houses and plots are fixed at 6,000 escudos for small properties, 7,200 escudos for medium properties and 8,400 escudos for large properties. Those who do not want to purchase their houses and plots may stay on free of charge, provided they keep their houses in good condition and cultivate their plots.

430. Two government credit institutions have been created to provide loans for agricultural and livestock schemes: a fund for development of small agricultural and industrial undertakings (Fundo de Fomento de Pequenas Empresas Agrícolas e Industriais) and a special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito de São Tomé e Príncipe).

431. The fund for development of small enterprises was established in 1964 (Legislative Instrument 695 of 24 September). The fund may itself purchase or guarantee the purchase of tools and equipment for agricultural and industrial schemes or provide loans for such activities. The maximum loan is 12,000 escudos (less than \$US500) repayable in 16 months at 2 per cent annual interest. For 1966, the fund's budgetary resources totalled 510,097 escudos (compared with 251,000 escudos in 1965). The special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito) was authorized in 1965 to provide loans for agriculture, livestock raising, industry (including mining and fishing) and building construction (including housing). 126

432. In 1966 (Legislative Instrument 716), the Caixa was established on a provisional basis under the authority of the Governor, who may determine the credit policy to be adopted. Under its present regulations, the Caixa grants short term loans of up to one year for the purpose of financing exports or purchase of supplies, such as fertilizers, insecticides, etc., by agricultural and industrial companies; medium term loans (up to eight years and 90 per cent of the value of the total investment) for development projects including the establishment of new plantations, purchase of equipment and cattle, irrigation, installation or remodeling of industrial units, purchase of boats and fishing equipment and other investments, including mining; long-term loans (up to 20 years and 60 per cent of the value) for the building of houses in São Tomé, Santo António do Príncipe and "classified" villages (vilas e povoações classificadas). The fund is to be financed from the Territory's own resources and by local savings.

434. Industry. Industrial activity in São Tomé and Principe is mainly limited to the processing of agricultural products. Apart from the extraction of palm oil and the processing of cocoa and coffee for export, there are a few small factories, including manufactures of soft drinks, soap, tiles and sawmills. Although no allocations were made to the industrial sector under the first and second national development plans, the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 allocates 12 million escudos for the establishment of new industries, including three cocoa processing factories and three factories for the extraction of palm oil.

435. Mining. In February 1967 (Decree 47,549), exclusive rights were granted to a company to be formed by Mr. Manuel Rodrigues Lagos to prospect for petroleum, ozocerite, asphalt and natural gases. The terms of the concession are similar to those of the mining concessions in Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. 127 The concession area includes the total area of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe (except for a central area on São Tomé island) and their continental shelves. The exclusive prospecting rights are for three years and are extendible for another five years; the exploitation rights are granted for fifty years, extendible for another twenty years. The new company is to be organized under Portuguese law and it will have an initial capital of 30 million escudos which may be increased up to 100 million escudos. Ten per cent of the capital will be given to the Territory. The concessionaire will pay a surface rent of 350 escudos per square kilometre during the first three years, 500 escudos during the fourth and fifth years, 750 escudos during the sixth, seventh and eighth years, and 1,000 escudos from the ninth year on. When the exploitation of a deposit begins, the surface rent of the area demarcated for this exploitation becomes 1,000 escudos per square kilometre irrespective of how long the company has been prospecting. The company is required to invest a minimum of 30 million escudos during the initial period of the prospecting concession (three years), 30 million escudos during the first extension of this period (two years) and a minimum to be fixed by the Government (but not more than 30 million escudos) during the second extension (three years). The territorial Government will receive a royalty of 12.5 per cent of the sales value and 50 per cent of the company's profits, and it will have the right to purchase up to 37.5 per cent of the quantity of crude oil produced each year. The company will pay 500,000 escudos a year to the Mining Development Fund when established; this amount is included in the minimum investments required. As in other similar contracts, the company is exempt from "duties, imposts or taxes, whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal, present or future". On imported equipment, the company will pay only the sta-

^{433.} There is also a special housing development fund for the low-income groups (Fundo de Fomento de Habitação para classes econômicamente débeis). The fund may provide guarantees for the purchase of construction material, purchase directly construction material to be loaned and it may build villages and urban housing projects. Guarantees and loans may be granted for families with a maximum annual income of 25,000 escudos. The maximum value of loans is 15,000 escudos

¹²⁷ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex I.

¹²⁶ See A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 218.

tistical tax of one per cent ad valorem and the stamp tax on customs clearance documents.

- 436. Fisheries. The development of fishing is a new trend in São Tomé and Príncipe. An industrial fishing centre is to be established in the Territory by fishing companies of Cape Verde. The first fleet of forty-three motor boats, which will replace the fishing canoes, began operation in 1966. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 15 million escudos (8 per cent of the total) were allocated to fisheries development for the first time. Of this, 4 million escudos are for research and technical assistance, 2.5 million escudos for improvement of equipment and 8.5 million escudos for the organization of local supply. It is hoped that the fish available for local consumption will be sufficient to meet the needs now supplied by dried fish imports, which have to be paid for in other than local currency.
- 437. Transport and communications. The largest allocations under the various development plans for São Tomé and Príncipe have been for transport and communications. A total of 137 million escudos was allocated to transport and communications under the first two development plans. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 42.5 million escudos representing 24 per cent of the total is allocated to this sector. Of this total 30 million escudos are for roads, 1 million escudos for ports and navigation, 9 million escudos for air transport and airports, and 2.5 million escudos for telecommunications.
- 438. In 1964, the Territory had 323 kilometres of public roads, to which there is being added a road linking the airport to the main town in Príncipe and a road around the island of São Tomé. Both roads were to have been completed in 1966.
- 439. The two principal harbours are Ana Chaves on São Tomé and Santo António on Príncipe. Shipping entering these harbours has averaged about one million tons annually since 1950. Up to 1964, port facilities at Ana Chaves could only handle 600 tons of cargo a day and ships drawing up to three metres, so that larger ships had to remain at sea while goods and passengers were ferried to land. In 1965, facilities at Ana Chaves were being improved to accommodate larger ships.
- 440. There is an airport on São Tomé, an airfield at Porto Alegre (São Tomé island), and on Príncipe. The São Tomé airport is a strategic stopover between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique. It was completed in 1964 and can be used by jet planes in an emergency. It is jointly maintained and operated by funds from Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. Annual maintenance is 4 million escudos, of which Angola and Mozambique are each to pay 1.7 million escudos and São Tomé and Príncipe 600,000 escudos (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 213).
- 441. Public finance. São Tomé and Príncipe's annual ordinary budget increased from 57.2 million escudos in 1959 to 70 million escudos in 1963. The budget estimates for 1967 amount to 77.2 million escudos which represents a 10 per cent increase over 1963 and a 35 per cent increase over 1959. Export duties have been the main source of increased revenue. However, this increase has been partially offset by a drop in the revenues from various services. Other items have remained stable. Almost all the extraordinary budget is for financing development.
- 442. The 1967 budgetary estimates provide 9.4 million escudos for public debt servicing, 23.3 million es-

- cudos for general administration, including 6 million escudos (some 8 per cent of the total) for education, and 8 million escudos (some 10 per cent of the total) for health.
- 443. Estimated expenditure on the Territory's armed services for 1967 amounts to 10.5 million escudos for the armed forces, including 7.4 million escudos for the army, 2.3 million escudos for the navy and 846,000 escudos for the air force. The Territory's total share in these defence expenditures is 5.5 million escudos.
- 444. Development financing. Although between 1955 and 1964, a total of 305 million escudos was allocated to the Territory under the two national development plans, of the original 150 million escudos allocated under the first plan, only 60.8 million escudos were actually spent. Under the second plan the original allocation of 155 million escudos was subsequently increased to 216.2 million escudos, and of this sum 213 million escudos were spent.
- 445. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a total of 180 million escudos has been allocated for development projects in the Territory. As in the case of the other small Territories under Portuguese administration, the entire amount is to be financed from annual loans from Portugal at 4 per cent interest, repayable in twenty-four annual instalments after the fifth year (Decree 46,683 of 3 December 1965).
- 446. Implementation of the Transitional Development Plan has also been slow. In 1965, for instance, an allocation of 55.4 million escudos was made for development (36 million escudos from Portugal and 19.4 million escudos brought forward from the unspent balance from the previous year), but only 33.6 million escudos were actually spent.
- 447. As has been noted above, the largest allocation under the Transitional Development Plan for São Tomé and Príncipe is for transport and communications, representing 42.5 per cent of the total. Allocations for agriculture, forestry and cattle raising amount to 30 million escudos (17 per cent); education and public welfare, 15 million escudos (8 per cent); and housing, 3 million escudos (1.6 per cent).

Educational conditions

- 448. The latest education statistics show that the total primary school enrolment in government and private schools rose by 15 per cent, from 4,992 in 1963 to 5,738 in 1964. These figures appear to indicate a new trend in the Government's education policy because, although the Territory has had compulsory primary education for many years, between 1950 and 1960, school enrolment increased only slightly more than 20 per cent, from 2,202 to 2,864. Further evidence of the Government's interest was the creation in 1965 of a territorial Department of Education.
- 449. According to the Government, in 1966, almost all the children of school age were enrolled in school and as a result it had become necessary to employ as teachers persons who did not have adequate training. In order to remedy this situation the Government has established special courses for training school monitors and teachers for school posts (Legislative Instrument 727 of 3 February 1966). It was reported subsequently that enrolment in government primary schools alone was 6,000 at the beginning of the 1966-1967 school year.

- 450. There are no recent school statistics. In 1964, the latest year for which such data are available, there were a total of 30 primary schools, of which 14 were government schools with 103 teachers and 4,370 pupils, and 16 were private schools with 30 teachers and 1,368 pupils. In addition there was one academic secondary school (*liceu*) with 35 teachers and 601 students, and an elementary vocational school with 7 teachers and 93 students. In 1965, a new technical elementary school was established, and the Territory received from Portugal 250,000 escudos towards the building and equipment of an elementary agricultural school.
- 451. The Territory provides scholarships for university studies in Portugal. For the school year 1966-1967, the budgetary allocation for various scholarships amounted to 86,000 escudos, compared with 151,500 for the preceding year.

7. MACAU AND DEPENDENCIES

General

- 452. Macau is located on the south coast of China, on the west side of the Canton River. It is almost directly opposite Hong Kong, which is thirty-five miles away. The total area of the Territory is about 15.5 square kilometres comprising a peninsular area and two small islands, Taipa and Colowan.
- 453. Most of the population is Chinese but the exact number is not known. At the time of the 1960 census, the resident population was 169,299 of whom about 8,000 were Portuguese. In 1966, the population was estimated to be between 250,000 and 300,000.

Government and administration

- 454. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Macau is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute is contained in Decree 45,377 of 22 November 1963. 128
- 455. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Cape Verde (see paras. 369 and 370). The Territory comprises two *concelhos;* for the purpose of elections to the National Assembly, which last took place in 1965, the Territory constitutes one electoral district.
- 456. The Legislative Council, which was established for the first time under the 1963 Political and Administrative Statute, consists of twelve members, of whom three are ex officio, one is nominated by the Governor to represent the Chinese community, and eight are elected (three by direct suffrage and the other five by special interest groups). Macau is the only Territory in which there is a nominated member in the Legislative Council, probably because most of the Chinese would be excluded from standing for elections to the Council, since candidates must be "original" Portuguese citizens (cidadão portugués originário). There is also a Government Council similar to that in Cape Verde with the exception that one of the members has to be the president of the municipal council of Macau.
- 457. There is a municipal council in each of the two concelhos. The members of these councils are elected

according to law with due representation of Chinese interests. The Governor may also nominate two members of the Chinese community to each council. There is no information on the last elections.

Status of the Territory

- 458. Portugal has always recognized and accepted the Chinese character of Macau and the role of the Portuguese administration has been mainly one of maintaining law and order. The Chinese population own and operate most of the business, schools and hospitals in the Territory. Even though the Portuguese Government claims that "the existence of Macau as a land subject to Portuguese sovereignty" is based on past treaties, the Portuguese realize, as Prime Minister Salazar said in 1961, that "if we leave the sphere of legality and take into account other factors, it is true that whatever resistance we might make, Macau would finally be absorbed by China, on which it depends in its daily life". 129
- 459. The reality of this situation was underlined by developments since December 1966. The trouble began in November when Portuguese police used force to disband a group of Chinese who were purportedly attempting to build a school on Taipa without authorization. Early in December, when organized demonstrations were held to protest the official action, police opened fire, with the result that eight persons were killed and over 100 persons were wounded. Subsequently, the Macau Government imposed a curfew and called out troops (total strength estimated at some 3,000) armed with automatic weapons, who joined in patrolling the streets with squads of police similarly armed.
- 460. The riots were followed by further demonstrations and demands by local Chinese leaders. Among other conditions, the Portuguese authorities in Macau were asked to: apologize to the Chinese residents and the families of the victims; punish the four officials (the army commander, the police commandant and his deputy, and the acting administrator of Taipa Island) who were held responsible for the deaths which had occurred; pay compensation to the families of the victims; suppress the activities of groups supporting the Republic of China; and hand over seven Chinese held in the Territory who were accused of intelligence activities.
- 461. As the Portuguese authorities in Macau did not agree immediately to all the conditions, further demonstrations and unrest continued through December 1966 and part of January 1967. One of the main difficulties was reported to be the wording of a statement the Governor was asked to sign. Late in January 1967, some Macau residents began to take economic measures against the Portuguese, refusing to sell them food, boycotting Portuguese-run buses and refusing to pay taxes to the local government. It was also announced that water and electricity supplies to Portuguese residents would be cut off but, before this happened, an agreement was reached at the end of January on the settlement of the incident.
- 462. In the agreement which was finally signed by the Governor, the Macau Government is reported to have "admitted the guilt" of the Portuguese officials in the eight deaths during the riots and it was acknow-

¹²⁸ For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.l, chap. V, paras. 17-73 and the subsequent section on the Territory.

¹²⁹ Oliveira Salazar, "The Portuguese Overseas Territories and the United Nations Organization" (speech delivered on 3 June 1961, Lisbon), quoted in A/AC.108/L.12, para. 8.

ledged for the first time that the officials concerned had been sent back to Lisbon "for trial". In addition to apologizing to the eight families, the Macau Government agreed to pay hospital expenses and compensation totalling \$US360,000. It also agreed to turn back refugees entering the Territory, to put a stop to activities of groups in sympathy with the Republic of China and to hand over the seven men who were accused of being political agents.

463. Since then, various Chinese schools, trade unions and refugee centres have been given notice to close down. By the end of February, several groups of refugees seeking asylum in Macau had been turned back to the authorities on the mainland of China (including one group of five persons on 10 February and a second group of nine refugees later in the same month). The Republic of China has filed several protests with the Portuguese Government over the new policy of returning mainland Chinese refugees. In February and again in April, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of China to the United Nations addressed communications to the Secretary-General, with a request that they be circulated to all Member States, protesting that the return of refugees is contrary to international practice and in total disregard of human rights and specifically constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of "non-refoulement" embodied in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Portugal is a Contracting State.

464. Portugal rejects these charges. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General in March 1967, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations stated that the Portuguese Government "is certain that it has not violated any humanitarian principles nor shown any disrespect for international conventions". The communication went on to say that the measures taken were within the competence of any Government and were taken to prevent illicit activities by persons who styled themselves refugees but whose true purpose was to endanger the security of lives and property.

465. At the opening of the Legislative Council meeting in April 1967, the Governor noted that while the good understanding of the local population, both Chinese and Portuguese, had made it possible to settle the crisis, some changes would have to be introduced. He stressed that the Government's policy in Macau would continue to be a realistic one—as it had always been—based on good neighbourliness and that hostile acts against the People's Republic of China would not be permitted.

466. According to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (A/6311/Rev.1, paras. 162-165), there were 75,000 Chinese refugees in Macau at the beginning of 1965 and some 80,000 by the end of that year. In addition to assistance provided by local voluntary agencies, the local government and the UNHCR also provided help to enable the refugees to become self-supporting.

467. In 1965, assistance provided by UNHCR amounted to \$US170,000. Of this sum, \$US65,000 was for building a causeway which provided employment for a large number of workers including a majority of refugees (including \$US10,000 for the extension of a refugee-rehabilitation centre); and \$US105,000 was given for the construction of housing. In 1966, UNHCR provided \$US184,000 which again included an allocation for \$US100,000 for the construction of 122 apart-

ments. Another amount of \$US100,000 has been approved for 1967 to continue assistance to the local housing projects. In addition, \$US24,000 will be provided for the extension of a school and \$US21,000 out of a two-year allocation of \$US42,000 for vocational training, bringing the total 1967 allocation to \$US145,000.

Economic conditions

468. Because of its location, Macau's main economic asset is its harbour which in the past has made the Territory an important gateway for *entrepôt* trade with China. As there is little land available, agricultural activities are limited mainly to horticulture and the Territory is therefore dependent on imports from the mainland for almost all of its food. There is some fishing which is partly for local consumption.

469. Since the early 1950s, the economic structure of the Territory has gradually been undergoing a change as a result of new trends in trade movements and the growth of local manufacturing industries financed by Chinese capital. Tourism which has increased in the last few years is believed to have considerable potential. According to estimates made in 1964 of the Territory's gross national product the most important sectors were then, in order of importance, salaries and wages, small business (rendimento das emprêsas não constituídas em sociedades), income from property, and government income from its private domain and enterprises (rendimento do estado proveniente do seu domínio privado e emprêsas).

470. Trade. As a result of the increase in the number of established industries, the value of the Territory's exports rose from about one third to approximately one half of the value of its total merchandise imports between 1960 and 1965. Trade in gold has continued to play an important role in the economy of the Territory (it is reported that gold is taxed at the rate of \$US.04 per gram and that this source provides about one sixth of the Territory's annual revenue); but whereas in 1960 the value of the gold traded exceeded that of the merchandise trade by about 20 per cent, in 1965 it was 20 per cent less, amounting to only 1,430 million escudos, compared with merchandise valued at 1,970 million escudos.

471. Unlike the African Territories under Portuguese administration, Macau's trade with Portugal is almost negligible, though its exports to Angola and Mozambique have substantially increased since 1961, with the gradual removal of trade barriers within the escudo zone (see paras. 40-45). In 1965, over 25 per cent of its total exports were traded within the escudo zone, of which 2.7 per cent went to Portugal and over 22 per cent went to other Territories, principally Angola and Mozambique. Macau has a particularly close trade relation with Hong Kong from which, in an average year, it obtains about two thirds of its imports (776 million escudos out of a total of 1,205 million escudos in 1963) and which takes about one third of its exports (180 million escudos out of a total of 600 million escudos in 1963). However, since Hong Kong is also a trans-shipment point, these statistics probably conceal to some extent the true origin and destination of some of the merchandise trade.

472. Fishing. Fishing is one of the Territory's main economic activities, and a considerable number of the local population are fishermen. Most of the fishing boats are now motorized, and fuel for the boats is supplied by the port authorities at a special rate. The catch

of fish increased from 7,336 tons in 1961 to 9,462 tons in 1965. About one third of the fish is consumed locally; the rest, which is exported, accounts on the average for about 13 per cent by value of the Territory's merchandise exports.

- 473. Industry. Macau has a wide range of light manufacturing industries, most of which, except for the manufacture of fireworks and matches, have been established since the early 1950s. In 1965, industrial production was valued at almost 500 million escudos, of which about 65 per cent was accounted for by furniture and another 15 per cent by non-metallic (mostly plastic) manufactures. Food, drink, tobacco, clothing, shoes and paper articles make up the rest of the industries. During 1965, thirty new industries were established, including two factories for the manufacture of nonalcoholic beverages (with a capital of 2.8 million escudos); one textile factory (capital, 1.1 million escudos); twenty-one clothing and footwear factories (with a combined capital of 2.1 million escudos); a leather factory (1 million escudos); and a chemical industry (550,000 escudos).
- 474. As in Angola, the present system of payments within the escudo zone (see paras. 46-53) has also created difficulties for traders in Macau. At the opening session of the Legislative Council in April 1967, the Governor said that the Government was aware of the situation and was trying to work out a solution which would at least make it possible for Macau to continue to trade with Angola and Mozambique.
- 475. Transport and communications. The Territory has two ports, an inner port located between Macau and Lapa and an outer port between Macau and the island of Taipa which has large modern wharves that serve hydroplanes and various ships. A separate harbour is used for the hydrofoil service between Hong Kong and Macau. However, large ships have to remain over one mile outside the harbour and their cargo is transported to land by barges.
- 476. Between 1960 and 1964, the number of ships visiting the Territory rose from 3,289 to 6,728 and the tonnage from just under 2 million tons to over 3 million tons. Slightly less than one third of the total allocations under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 will be spent on improving transport and communications of the Territory, including dredging of the harbour, improving wharf facilities and acquiring eight hydrofoils for a new service to and from Hong Kong.
- 477. Public finance. During the past ten years, Macau's ordinary budgetary expenditure has been rising by an average of about 20 per cent annually (from 91.5 million escudos in 1955 to 297 million escudos in 1964). Extraordinary expenditure, however, has fluctuated, dropping from 44.2 million escudos in 1955 to 12.4 million escudos in 1960 and rising to 39.6 million escudos in 1964. The 1967 budgetary estimates provide for a total ordinary and extraordinary expenditure of 257 million escudos (Macau Legislative Instrument No. 1,730 of 31 December 1966). Of the total, less than 3 per cent is for education, about 7.3 per cent for public health and about 9.3 per cent for public security police, the local PIDE force and the volunteer corps. In addition, 28.1 million escudos are allocated for the Territory's share in military expenditures including 26.9 million escudos for the Army (Order 22,453 of 16 January 1967) and 1.2 million escudos for the Navy (Order 22,458 of 16 January 1967). The entire military

budget is to be paid out of the Territory's local resources and its contribution to the Overseas Defence Fund. 130

- 478. Development financing. Under the two previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 300 million escudos was allocated to Macau: 120 million escudos under the first plan and 180 million escudos under the second plan. Both plans allocated almost half of the total sums to be invested to the improvement of harbour facilities and roads and urbanization; town hygiene received the remaining allocations under the first plan and 12 per cent of the total under the second plan, which also allocated 30 per cent to development of resources and industries and 11 per cent to school buildings and hospitals.
- 479. According to official estimates from 1959 to 1962, planned investments amounted to 162.8 million escudos, but only 156.8 million escudos were authorized and only 51.8 per cent of this amount (84.3 million escudos) was actually spent.¹³¹
- 480. The pattern of investment under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 aims at: improvement of the electrical power and port facilities; improvement of health, education, and housing and sanitation; creation of conditions to enable Macau to become a commercial entrepôt in the Orient for products from the escudo zone; development of tourism; and improvement of fishing, horticulture and aviculture. Of the 660 million escudos to be spent during the three-year period, about 30 per cent is for developing tourism, another 30 per cent for improvement of ports, harbours and transport, and 24.5 per cent for housing and local improvement.
- 481. During 1966, several allocations were authorized under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 which included over 15 million escudos for housing and local improvements, 1.8 million escudos for transport and communications, about 1 million escudos for studies and surveys, and 880,000 escudos for improving agriculture, irrigation and settlement.

Educational conditions

- 482. The Territory has two school systems, an official one similar to those in other Territories and a Chinese school system, financed and run by the Chinese community and in which more than half of the student body is enrolled. Although the primary education reform of 1964, which introduced compulsory primary education, has been extended to the Territory, with modifications, school attendance is not a main problem, since already in 1962 over 90 per cent of the school-age children were enrolled in school. The greatest need has been to provide enough school buildings and teachers, but this has been met by private sources as, on the average, less than 3 per cent of the Territory's budget is for education supplemented by an approximately equal amount in subsidies to missions, while under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 just over 1 per cent is allocated for this purpose.
- 483. The latest available school statistics (1964) show that out of a total enrolment of 56,104 pupils, 33,386 were in Chinese schools (27,890 in primary, 5,477 in secondary and 19 in special schools). Of the

¹³⁰ Only Angola and Mozambique are also responsible for the full share of the territorial military budgets; in all the other small Territories Portugal also bears a share of the cost.

¹³¹ Portugal, Planeamento e Integração Económica, Boletim do Secretariado Técnico da Presidencia do Conselho, October 1964, p. 37.

22,718 pupils enrolled in the official school system, there were 3,415 in kindergarten; 13,796 in primary schools; 5,146 in secondary schools; 80 in higher secondary schools and 281 others including 133 in public service training courses. Over 90 per cent of the primary and secondary pupils were enrolled in private or missionary schools.

8. Timor and dependencies

General

484. The island of Timor is located at the tip of the chain of islands forming the Republic of Indonesia. It lies between 8°17'S and 10°22'S latitude and between 127°19'EG and 123°25'EG longitude. The western part of the island is part of the Republic of Indonesia. The eastern part, administered by Portugal, includes an area of about 18,990 square kilometres and comprises also the enclave of Oé-cussi (Ocússi) and Ambeno, the island of Atauro off the north coast and the small uninhabited island of Jacó off the extreme eastern tip.

485. According to the 1950 census, the population of Timor was 442,378, of whom 568 were persons of European origin, 2,022 mesticos and 3,128 Chinese. There were 436,448 indigenous inhabitants, almost 98 per cent of whom (434,907) were listed as não civilizado. According to the 1960 preliminary census figures, the population was 517,079.

Government and administration

486. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Timor is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,378).132

487. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea (see paras. 318-320). The Territory, which in 1960 comprised one concelho (Dili) and nine circunscrições, is now divided into ten concelhos (Baucau, Bobanaro, Cova Lima, Díli, Ermera, Lautém, Manatulo, Same, Viqueque and Ainaro) and one circunscrição (Oé-cussi). Nevertheless, most of the rural areas are still organized as regadorias, implying a traditional form of administration by regedores. For purposes of elections to the National Assembly, the Territory constitutes one electoral district. The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of fourteen members, of whom three are ex officio, eight are elected by corporative groups and three are elected directly. 133 There are no workers' or employees' interests represented. There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which is comprised of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, three ex officio members and three members elected by the Legislative Council, with one representing the regedorias.

488. Elections to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1964. The number of persons who voted in the elections is not known. The next territorial elections are to be held in 1968.

132 For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73 and the section on the Territory.

133 For details on the composition of the Legislative Council

see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 223.

489. Elections to the local administrative bodies were held in November 1965. Local legislation enacted in 1965 (Order No. 3,703 of 25 September) regulates elections of members to local administrative bodies, namely municipal councils in concelhos, municipal commissions in circunscrições and local boards in administrative posts and parishes.¹³⁴ Elections to these bodies are henceforth to be held in November every four years. Candidates must be of age, be able to read and write in Portuguese, have lived in the electoral district over six months (the electoral district being the area under the jurisdiction of the administrative body) and in the Territory over three years, and not be an active civil servant. Aliens may be candidates if they have lived in the Territory at least five years; however, not more than one third of the membership of any administrative body may consist of aliens.

490. Legislation introduced in 1965 (Legislative Instrument No. 688 of 8 May) fixed the salaries of regedores (chiefs of regedorias) and chefes de grupo de povoações (chiefs of group of villages). The salaries vary according to the number of taxpayers (imposto domiciliário, formerly called "native tax") under the jurisdiction of each chief. The regedores are classified into four basic echelons with monthly salaries varying from 400 to 1,200 escudos. The chefes de grupo de povoações are classified into six basic echelons with monthly salaries varying from 200 to 500 escudos. Those who are not included in the established echelons, as well as the chefes de povoações (village chiefs), are entitled to 3 per cent of the personal tax (imposto domiciliário) collected in the area under their jurisdiction.

491. Legislation enacted in 1966 (Legislative Instrument No. 721 of 18 June) approved revised regulations of the annual personal tax (imposto domiciliário). Although the rate of the annual tax remains at 160 escudos (except in the Oé-cusse circunscrição where it is 130 escudos because of local economic conditions), there is an additional 30 escudos which is paid to local government bodies.

Economic conditions

492. General. The Territory's economic potential is only partly developed. Its resources include many fertile areas, valuable forests and minerals, which are believed to include some copper, gold, manganese, chrome and petroleum. Despite this, it has so far held little attraction for investment. Mineral prospecting by private concerns has been limited and few industries have been established. Timor's economy remains purely agricultural. Although a great variety of crops are grown, the main exports are coffee, copra and rubber. The Territory was formerly an important producer of sandalwood but exports of this commodity are now small (see para. 503 below).

493. Portuguese sources attribute the slow economic development of the Territory to lack of European settlement and shortage of indigenous labour. A recent report¹³⁵ considers that the main obstacle to development is the low productivity of local labour and suggests that, in addition to providing tools and technical knowledge, the Government should take steps to improve the local diet.

¹³⁴ For details on the composition and structure of local government bodies see A/5800/Rev. 1, paras. 46-53.

135 Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral, Nos. 66/

^{67,} Lisbon, 1966, p. 107.

494. External trade and payments. Because of its generally low production and lack of industries, Timor has a continuous and growing foreign trade deficit. Between 1963 and 1965 for instance, whereas the value of exports increased by 77 per cent (from 42.9 million to 75.8 million escudos), the value of imports rose 87 per cent (from 80.4 million to 130.5 million escudos). As a result, the trade deficit was 54.7 million escudos in 1965, compared with 37.5 million escudos in 1963, and 37.2 million in 1960.

495. The Territory's main imports are textiles, cement, combustible oils, sugar, wheat flour, medicines and manufactured tobacco. As local production has apparently not risen sufficiently to keep pace with growing needs, the Territory has also had to import some basic food crops. Although there are no trade statistics available for 1965 and 1966, government notices published in the official gazette show that over 700 tons of maize, some 50 tons of rice and some 30 tons of potatoes were imported duty free for local consumption from Singapore and Hong Kong in 1965. Similarly, in March 1966, the import of 60 tons of potatoes from Hong Kong and 20 tons of maize from Singapore was authorized for local consumption.

496. The Territory's exports are limited. In an average year, coffee, copra and rubber account for more than 90 per cent of the total value of exports. By far the most important crop is coffee, which in 1964 and 1965 made up 80 per cent of the total value of exports (2,368 metric tons, valued at 43.7 million escudos, in 1964, and 2,493 metric tons, valued at 45.1 million, in 1965). Copra, which ranks second in exports and which has accounted for an average of over 11 per cent of total exports by value, dropped to only 9 per cent in 1964 and 1965 (1,628 metric tons, valued at 4.9 million escudos, in 1964, and 1,435 metric tons, valued at 4.6 million escudos, in 1965). Rubber, which ranks third in exports, dropped from 9 per cent of the value of total exports in 1962 to 5 per cent in 1964 and 1965 (238 metric tons, valued at 2.6 million escudos, in 1964, and 243 metric tons, valued at 2.6 million escudos, in 1965).

497. Timor's foreign trade has traditionally been more closely linked with the countries in the region and with countries maintaining good shipping connexions with the Territory, such as the Netherlands and Denmark. In 1964, the Territory's principal clients were Denmark (24.9 per cent of total export value), the Netherlands (15.7 per cent), Portugal (13.9 per cent), Macau (11.1 per cent) and Singapore (10.2 per cent). In 1965, the Netherlands ranked first (25.6 per cent of the total export value), followed by Denmark (21.6 per cent), Portugal (18.5 per cent), Singapore (11.2 per cent) and the United States of America (8.4 per cent).

498. In recent years, despite its chronic trade deficit, Timor has generally registered a net surplus in its balance of payments because of remittances made to the Territory from Portugal. These amounted to 105.3 million escudos in 1964 and 167.9 million escudos in 1965. The net surplus at the end of 1965 was 12.9 million escudos.

499. Agriculture, forestry and livestock. Apart from coffee, rubber and coconuts, the Territory produces a wide range of food crops, including maize and rice, which are the two most important cereals, and sweet potatoes, beans, wheat, barley, ground-nuts, cocoa, castor seeds, tobacco, bamboo, tea and tung (aleurites

moluccana). There are no recent data available on the output of these crops.

500. Available information indicates that local production of food crops has not been able to meet the growing needs of domestic consumption. (The increased needs are partly due to the larger number of local troops mobilized and to the better diet provided to them.) To check rising prices, the Government in 1966 imposed fixed retail prices for locally produced food crops; however, as the prices fixed were so low, smaller amounts were offered for sale and, as noted above, the Territory had to import considerable quantities of potatoes (at a price differential of 2.4 escudos/kg.), maize (at a price differential of 4 escudos/kg.) and rice (at 3 escudos/kg.).

501. Although some export statistics are available, there is difficulty in ascertaining the actual situation due to wide discrepancies in the figures reported by the two principal government bodies concerned. According to the customs services in 1964 and 1965, the average annual coffee exports were larger than in 1962 (2,400 tons compared with 1,860 tons); copra exports also rose slightly (1,550 tons compared with 1,401 tons); but rubber exports dropped. According to the same source, in terms of value, coffee accounted in 1965 for 83 per cent of the total visible exports, copra 9.2 per cent and rubber only 4.8 per cent.

502. There are only a few agricultural companies in Timor, which employ some 3,000 persons normally and some 6,000 persons during the coffee harvest. The traditional sector, however, accounts for most of the agricultural production.

503. Although Timor has valuable forests, most of these have not yet been exploited commercially. In the past, exports of sandalwood led to the destruction of some forests and further cutting was prohibited for many years. Though now permitted, exports of sandalwood are small. Since June 1966, Japanese have been surveying the forest resources and there are prospects for the establishment of a joint Portuguese-Japanese company for timber exploitation.

504. Livestock plays an important part in the economy of the Territory. In 1963, there were over 750,000 head of livestock, or about 1.3 head per inhabitant. In 1965, the livestock population comprised 226,650 goats, 225,257 hogs, 119,865 buffaloes, 94,396 horses, 47,760 sheep and 36,213 oxen. The Government considers that the natural environment does not favour commercial cattle-raising and assistance to improve livestock has been limited to development for local consumption and for agricultural work.

505. From 1953 to 1964, special allocations under the national development plans for the development of agriculture, livestock and forestry totalled 60 million escudos. This included 15 million escudos under the first plan and 45 million escudos under the second, but of the second allocation only about two thirds was spent. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, emphasis is placed on improving the productivity of traditional agriculture. The stated objec-

¹³⁶ Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral, Nos. 66/67, Lisbon, 1966. According to the Commercial Banking Inspectorate, in 1964 and 1965, territorial exports amounted to 44 and 76 million escudos respectively while, according to the customs services, the corresponding figures were 53 and 55 million escudos respectively. The discrepancies are attributed in part to the use of "fiscal values" for customs purposes and possibly to different periods covered by the reports of the two agencies.

tive is to increase the production of food crops to meet the needs of the population by 1975 and at the same time to increase production of export crops, such as coffee, copra, rubber, pepper, vanilla, fruits and green vegetables. Out of the total of 270 million escudos allocated for development expenditure during the period 1965-1967, 39 million escudos (14 per cent) are destined for these sectors.

506. In recent years, various measures have been introduced along the lines of those taken in Angola to encourage agriculture and European settlement. Early in 1965 (Timor, Order 3,521 of 6 March), an Agriculture and Livestock Credit Bank (Caixa de Crédito Agro-Pecuário) was set up with an initial capital of 10 million escudos to provide medium-term and long-term loans for agriculture and livestock schemes. The Caixa is similar in structure and functions to those established in other Territories, but exceptionally it may grant loans for tax purposes. Early in 1967, the Caixa obtained a 10 million escudo loan from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino at 2.5 per cent interest per year for 10 years. This brings the total capital available for loans to 20 million escudos.

507. Land concession. In 1965, the Government extended to Timor (Ministerial Order 21,283 of 11 May) the land concession legislation of 1961 (Decree 43,894) to encourage agricultural development.137 Thus, in Timor, land concessions may now be granted free of charge to settlers as well as to military personnel on indefinite leave (militares licenciados) even if they are not stationed in the Territory. In 1966, local legislation (Legislative Instrument No. 718 of 7 May) was introduced regulating the enforcement of the land concession legislation in the Territory. The Provincial Department of Public Works and Transport is responsible for processing and regulating the land concessions. Under the 1961 legislation, the right to grant concessions is vested in the Governor, except for larger and more important concessions which are the responsibility of the Minister for Overseas Territories. 138

508. Internal trade. As part of its plan to ensure that the maximum amount of local production reaches the domestic market, the Government introduced new legislation in 1965 regulating and limiting traders and trading stores. In urban areas, stores are to be established in permanently constructed buildings (contrução definitiva) which fulfil all legal hygiene requirements; in rural areas they may be built with local materials, but they must be torn down if and when so determined by the authorities. The itinerant purchase of agricultural crops is permitted only to traders who own a fixed trading establishment duly authorized by the Governor. All purchase of agricultural crops must be done in cash.

509. To facilitate price controls (see para. 500 above) and regulate trading of locally grown crops, the Government established in Timor a system of local markets, in 1966, similar to those in Angola. There is no recent information on the results obtained.

510. *Industries*. Apart from the processing of rice for local consumption and of coffee for export, there are only a few small factories, which produce, among other things, soap, pottery and soft drinks. Under the

Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the total planned investment in processing industries amounts to only 9.1 million escudos (3.4 per cent of the total expenditure envisaged for Timor). Priority is to be given to the following industries: pottery, rice, soft drinks, soap, alcohol; ice, fruit juices, milling and freezing facilities for meat, vegetable oils (ground-nuts and copra), dairy products; and soluble coffee and coffee roasting, hides and shoes, soda water, sausages and caustic lime.

511. With a view to protecting local industries, especially tobacco, soft drinks, oil and soap manufactures, the Government in 1966 made it compulsory for local stores selling imported products to display equivalent local products, whenever available and to post their price and origin.

512. Mining. In September 1964, a mining concession was granted to the Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho, Limitada. The company has an exclusive licence to prospect for copper, iron, manganese, magnetite and zirconium for an initial period of three years, renewable for two more years if all the terms of the contract are fulfilled (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 131). In 1965, the Governor of Timor authorized the company to start its prospecting activities in accordance with a plan approved by the Government. In order to make possible the appraisal of mining possibilities in the areas of the concession, the company was required to complete by August 1965 the following projects: (a) a study of the available documentation on the geological and mineral resources of the Territory; (b) establishment of administrative services at the office of the company in Dili; (c) establishment of an analysis laboratory in Dili; (d) intensive prospecting in the zones of Vemasse, Uato-Carbau and Subão Grange; (e) detailed topographical surveys of these same zones; and (f) a preliminary survey of the Ossú zone. No further information on these projects is available, but prospecting activities are continuing.

513. Although exclusive concessions for petroleum prospecting have been granted in the past (including, for instance, one in 1939 to the Companhia Ultramarina de Petróleos and one in 1947 to Carlos da Câmara Pinto Coelho), there is no information on new concessions. So far no large commercially exploitable deposits have been found, though small quantities are extracted at Suai for local use. Some petroleum also exists in the Manatuto concelho.

514. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a sum of 6 million escudos (some 2 per cent of the total expenditure envisaged) was allocated to mining development.

515. Fisheries. Commercial fishing is not yet developed in the Territory. The catch is very small and it is almost totally consumed at Díli, which has 10,753 inhabitants. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisages the expenditure of 10 million escudos (3.7 per cent of the total expenditure) on the development of fish culture centres in the interior of the Territory, on improving the catch and on the provision of facilities for freezing or drying and salting fish for distribution inland.

516. Transport and communications. Timor has neither railroads nor inland water transport. In 1964 there were 1,941 kilometres of roads.

517. The only important port is at Dili, the capital of the Territory. The wharf facilities at Dili, which were built during the Second World War, were ex-

¹³⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 10-38.

¹³⁸ For details of the land concession legislation, see document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 58-155.

panded under the first and second development plans. Traffic at the port of Díli declined from 158,000 tons entering the harbour in 1954 to 54,500 tons in 1960 and 22,167 tons in 1964. In 1965, a Díli Port Authority was established with responsibility for the administration, operation, maintenance and extension of the port of Díli and the development of trade with neighbouring countries, especially Macau.

518. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 100 million escudos, or 37 per cent of the total amount, is allocated to transport and communications. Of this amount, 20 million escudos are for the improvement of roads, including the construction of the roads between Dili and Suasi and between Dili and Baucau; 30 million escudos are for ports and maritime navigation, including the construction of four small ports on the south coast (Suasi, Betano, Beaco and Loré), two on the north coast (Baucau and Latém), one in the Ocússi-Ambeno enclave and one on Ataúro Island; 45 million escudos are for airports and air transportation, including the construction of a 1,200metre airstrip at Díli Airport and improvements of the facilities of the airfields at Baucau, Ocussi, Atauro and Con; and 5 million escudos are for the improvement of telecommunications, especially the connexions with Portugal and foreign countries.

519. Public finance. Although Timor ranks fourth in area among the Territories under Portuguese administration, its annual budget is among the lowest, being only a little larger than that of São Tomé and Príncipe, which have only 7 per cent of its area and one eighth of its population.

520. From 1956 to 1961, the Territory's annual ordinary budget increased less than 3 per cent, from 52.4 million escudos to 54.6 million escudos. Since 1962, when for the first time ordinary revenue and expenditure rose to 65 million escudos, the budget has continued the upward trend with actual revenue reaching 66.5 million escudos in 1963 and 75 million escudos in 1964 and actual expenditure reaching 62.5 million and 67.8 million escudos respectively. Although, in accordance with the established practice, the ordinary budget has usually provided for a surplus, exceptionally in 1966 no significant surplus was expected, ordinary revenue being estimated at 77.9 million escudos and expenditure at 77.8 million escudos.

521. On the other hand, the Territory's extraordinary budget, which mainly reflects development expenditures, rose by more than 220 per cent between 1959 and 1962; it increased from 19.7 million to 64.8 million escudos, but dropped to 53 million escudos in 1963 and just under 50 million escudos in 1964. Estimated extraordinary revenue and expenditure for 1966 were balanced at 51.6 million escudos.

522. For 1966, the total estimated expenditure on the armed forces for the Territory was 28.3 million escudos, of which the Territory's share was 5.1 million escudos, to be paid out of the ordinary revenue (some 6.5 per cent of the total ordinary budget), the remainder being paid by Portugal. For 1967, estimated military expenditure rose to 33.3 million escudos, but the amount to be paid by the Territory remained 5.1 million escudos. The territorial budget estimates for 1966 allocated 11.3 million escudos for public health services (14.5 per cent of the budget, compared with about 10 per cent in the early 1960s) and 3.2 million escudos for education (4.1 per cent).

523. Development financing. Under the previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 332 million escudos was allocated to Timor: 92 million escudos under the first plan and 240 million escudos under the second. Annual expenditures were, however, considerably below the allocations and by the end of 1962, for instance, only 80 per cent of the annual allocations under the second development plan had been spent (actual expenditure totalled only 154 million escudos, compared with an allocation of 190 million escudos). 139

524. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a total investment of 270 million escudos is envisaged. The entire amount is to be financed by loans from the central Government of Portugal. The largest allocations are for transport and communications (100 million escudos or 37 per cent of the total). Allocations for education and public welfare amount to 40 million escudos (15 per cent of the total); agriculture, forestry and cattle-raising, 39 million escudos (14 per cent); and housing, 30 million escudos (approximately 11 per cent).

525. Although the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisages an annual expenditure of 90 million escudos (which is more than double the allocations under the previous development plans), implementation has in fact been slow. Recent information shows that, although initial estimates for 1965 provided for a total investment of over 57 million escudos under the Transitional Development Plan, actual funds committed amounted to only just over 36 million escudos. If continued at that rate, only slightly more than one third of the total investments will have been made by the end of the period of the plan.

Educational conditions

526. There are kindergartens at the religious missions and one at Díli (Portuguese Youth), but no figures are available regarding enrolment in recent years. There were 147 primary school classrooms, which include the pre-primary classes for children whose native language is not Portuguese. Of the primary schools, 51 are government schools, 78 are Catholic mission schools and 18 are Arabic and Chinese private schools. There were also primary classes conducted by the military units. In 1965-1966, the total enrolment in primary schools was 18,488, which included 7,268 pupils in Catholic schools, 6,970 in government schools, 3,004 in schools run by the military and 1,246 in private schools. There were 450 primary teachers, of whom 155 were in Catholic schools, 120 in government schools, 100 in private schools and 75 in military schools. The Catholic missions maintain primary boarding schools subsidized by the Government and some tuition is paid by the pupils.

527. As of 1966 there was as yet no complementary primary school providing the 5th and 6th classes, although the elementary technical school at Díli (established under Decree 46,519 of 4 September 1965) was expected to come into operation in the school year 1966-1967. There is a preparatory technical school in

66/67, Lisbon, 1966, p. 109.

^{139 &}quot;Análise Sintética da Execução do II Plano de Fomento no Quadriénio 1959-1962 (Províncias Ultramarinas)", Planeamento e Integração Económica, October 1964.

140 Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral, Nos.

¹⁴¹ The statistics do not show the actual number of schools, which may be full primary schools or school posts (postos escolares) with a limited number of classes.

Fuiloro which will be transferred to the new school of Díli. An agricultural elementary school is under construction at Fatu-Maca, near Baucau; this school is expected to begin its activities in October 1967.

528. There are also evening courses for illiterate adults at government schools and at those run by the military. No figures are available on these courses.

529. At the secondary level, there is one government grammar school (*liceu*) and a private Luso-Chinese school at Díli. In 1965-1966, there were a total of 671 secondary pupils: 562 pupils (and 29 teachers) at the government *liceu* and 109 pupils (and 9 teachers) at the Luso-Chinese school. There were also 54 students enrolled in the Catholic Seminary at Díli. In a speech delivered in 1966, the Governor of the Territory emphasized the importance of teaching the Portuguese language at the Chinese schools. The schools run by the military provide some courses at the secondary level.

530. According to official information, 142 most of the teachers in primary schools and school posts were trained in Portugal, Angola and Mozambique, and formerly some were trained in "the Portuguese State of India". New teacher-training facilities established since 1965 include a training school for school post teachers and courses for school monitors (teachers of pre-primary classes). In the school year 1965-1966, there were 60 students studying to be school post teachers in the first two classes of the four-year course; there were 180 monitors in training in 1965 and 110 in 1966. Monthly salaries of school post instructors range from 1,000 escudos for those who have completed the first year of the monitor course to the maximum of 1,500 escudos for those who have been on the job for over 20 years with good reports from the inspecção (the school superintendence).

531. There are also training courses for public service personnel. The Health and Welfare Department has had training courses since 1947; by 1966, it had trained 9 nurses, 45 midwives, 281 assistant nurses and 12 assistant pharmacists. In 1964, the Health and Welfare Department established a technical school; its initial enrolment was 58 students. In 1966, 16 public servants attended training courses at the Agriculture and Veterinary Department.

532. In 1965-1966, seventeen scholarships (compared with fifteen in 1964-1965 and seven in 1963-1964) were granted for the completion of studies abroad. Allocations for scholarships in the local budget amounted to 65,500 escudos in 1963, 81,250 escudos in 1964 and 124,662 escudos in 1965.

533. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 21 million escudos are to be invested in the extension and improvement of school facilities.

Labour

534. Although the Native Statute never applied to Timor, before 1961, the majority of the inhabitants of the Territory were designated as não-civilizados and were organized into regedorias; the local labour legislation was moreover patterned after the Native Labour Code of 1928, which applied to the African Territories under Portuguese administration. The Rural Labour Code of 1962 (Decree 44,309 of 27 April) now applies also to Timor.

535. For rural labour and manual workers similarly classified, 143 the local government has established minimum daily wage rates and determined conditions of employment, including the guarantee of food and lodgings on days of rest or holidays and extra pay for overtime work (Legislative Instrument No. 670 of 28 November 1964).

536. For rural agricultural workers, the established minimum daily wage rate is 6.60 escudos, of which 3.60 represent the actual wages and 3.00 escudos are for food. For agricultural workers under 18 years of age, the minimum daily wage is 1 escudo less, but the other entitlements are the same. For manual workers engaged in mining, industry and civil construction who are similarly classified as rural workers, the daily wage rate is 10 escudos in Díli and 9 escudos elsewhere; if they are under 18 years of age, the corresponding rates are 7 and 6 escudos respectively. A clothing allowance of 1 escudo is payable to workers with contracts for four months or more, and employers who do not provide officially approved lodgings have to pay an additional allowance for housing.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee¹⁴⁴

Introduction

537. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration at its 513th to 518th, 524th, 526th, 532nd to 534th, and 538th to 541st meetings held in Africa between 30 May 1967 and 20 June 1967.

538. On the question of refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Special Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat (see annex I) concerning the situation with regard to refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, and the measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations in response to operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) and resolution 2184 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966.

539. During their stay in Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam, members of the Special Committee were able, at the invitation of the organizations concerned, to visit camps and other facilities for refugees from Angola and Mozambique. In Kinshasa, they visited a reception centre, a hospital and school run by GRAE where they were enthusiastically received by several hundred refugees and met with teachers, doctors and others con-

¹⁴² Portugal, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Panorama Actual e Perspectivas Futuras do Ensino na Província Portuguêsa de Timor, Lisbon, 1966.

¹⁴³ Under the Rural Labour Code (for English text see: ILO Legislative Series July-August 1962), "rural worker" means any manual worker of unspecified trade engaged in activities connected with the farming of land and harvesting of produce, etc. In the absence of any special regulations, a worker "shall be placed on the same footing as a rural worker", if his services involve no more than the performance of manual labour and the nature of such services does not place him in any class of salaried employee or specially skilled worker.

the nature of such services does not place him in any class of salaried employee or specially skilled worker.

144 This section includes those portions of the statements made on the Territories under Portuguese administration in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the draft resolution are included in the succeeding section. It should be noted that additional comments on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration are contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. These statements are included in chapter II of the Committee's report.

cerned with aid to refugees. In Dar es Salaam, members visited facilities run by FRELIMO, including a hospital and the Mozambique Institute which provides secondary and vocational (nurses' aides) training at Dar es Salaam and conducts primary and other teaching programmes elsewhere. Also, during their stay in Kinshasa and in Kitwe, members of the Committee were able to examine weapons captured from the Portuguese

to examine weapons capture armed forces in Angola, an made by the petitioners in the	d to which reference wa
1. Written petitio	ns and hearings
540. The Special Committed written petitions concerning to tuguese administration:	tee circulated the following the Territories under Por
Petitioner	Document No.
The Territories in general Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh, Secretary-General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.695
Angola Mr. Marcus Kassanga, Minister for External Affairs, Governo do Conselho do Povo Ango- lano no Exílio (GCPA)	A/AC.109/PET.576
Mr. João Chisseva, Secretary- General, United States Sec- tion, União Nacional dos Es-	A/AC,109/FE1.5/0
tudantes Angolanos (UNEA) Mr. Pedro Simba Macasso, Prime Minister, Gouverne- ment provisoire des révolu- tionnaires fiotes en exil	A/AC.109/PET.581
(GPRFE) Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, União Progressista Nacional de An-	A/AC.109/PET.641
gola (UPRONA) Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, União Pr General Chairman, União Progressista Nacional de An-	A/AC.109/PET.642
gola (UPRONA) Messrs. Henriques Tiago N'Zita, Secretary-General, and Henri Charles Tembo, Deputy Secretary, Comité révolutionnaire	A/AC.109/PET.642/Add.1
cabindais (CRC) Messrs. François Lele, President, and François Kuta, Secretary-General, Parti dé-	A/AC.109/PET.644
mocrate Nto-Bako Angola Messrs. François Lele, General Chairman, and François Kuta, Secretary-General, Parti dé-	A/AC.109/PET.644
mocrate Nto-Bako Angola Mr. Domingos da Silva, Vice- President, Mouvement popu- laire de libération de l'An-	A/AC.109/PET.644/Add.1
gola (MPLA) Mr. Luiz de Azevedo, Jr., Member of the Executive Committee, Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola	A/AC.109/PET.650
(MPLA) Mr. Alfred Kgokong, Director of Publicity and Information	A/AC.109/PET.650/Add.1

of Publicity and Information,

African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), on

behalf of Mr. Agostinho Ne-

Petitioner Document No. Angola (continued) to, President, Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA) A/AC.109/PET.650/Add.2 Mr. A. P. Matondo, President, Parti progressiste angolais (PPA) A/AC.109/PET.651 Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant General Secretary, Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA) A/AC.109/PET.652 Mr. Simão Ladeira-Lumona, National President, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA) A/AC.109/PET.653 Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General Secretary, Ligue générale des travailleurs de l'Angola (LGTA) A/AC.109/PET.654 Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector-General, Ngwizani A Kongo (NGWIZAKO) A/AC.109/PET.655 Mr. Holden Roberto, President, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE) A/AC.109/PET.656 Mr. Antonio Mpululu A/AC.109/PET.657 Mr. Noé Pedro, President, Jupa, Moerbeke Branch, Camp Beton A/AC.109/PET.658 Mr. Tuwumo Emmanuel A/AC.109/PET.659 Mr. Manuel Costa A/AC.109/PET.660 Messrs. Emmanuel Tulengana, National Secretary, and Gracia Dongala, Vice-President, Cartel des nationalistes an-A/AC.109/PET.663 golais (CNA) Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, Centrale nationale angolaise, Confédération des syndicats libres angolais (CSLA) A/AC.109/PET.664 Mr. Pedro Raoul Malaquitas, President, Union des populations de l'Angola (UPA), A/AC.109/PET.665 Thysville Mr. Ndonga Fernandes A/AC.109/PET.666 Messrs. Henriques Nzita, Foreign Affairs, and Ranque Francque, President, Front pour la libération de l'enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) A/AC.109/PET.667 Angolan People of the Makala Section of Parti démocratique de l'Angola (PDA) A/AC.109/PET.668 Mr. Pedro Nocolas, President, Angolan Refugees of the Ozone Section, Kinshasa A/AC.109/PET.669 Mr. Mayanda, President, Angolan Notables of the Kinshasa Section, Parti démocratique de l'Angola (PDA) and Union des populations de l'Angola (UPA) A/AC.109/PET.670 Mentale Section of the Parti démocratique de l'Angola A/AC.109/PET.671 (PDA) Miss Therese Kisevesa, Angolan Women's Democratic Movement (MFDA) A/AC.109/PET.672 "Angolan People of Lembart

Rifflart and Mdjili Brasserie"

A/AC.109/PET.673

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Petitioner	Document No.	Petitioner	Meeting	
Angola (continued) "The Assembly of Angolan Scouts and Guides"	A/AC.109/PET.674	Mr. A. P. Matondo, President, Parti progressiste angolais (PPA) (A/AC.109/PET.651)	516th	
Mr. André Kitabia	A/AC.109/PET.675	Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General		
Miss Suzana Belina, President, Association of Angolan Women	A/AC.109/PET.676	Secretary, Ligue générale des travail- leurs angolais (LGTA) (A/AC.109/ PET.654) Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant	516th	
Primary School Children of Angolan Refugees and other Groups	A/AC.109/PET.677	General Secretary, Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA) (A/ AC.109/PET.652)	517th	
"Movement of Angolan Women Workers"	A/AC.109/PET.678	Mr. François Lele, President-General, Parti démocrate Nto-Bako Angola (A/	317(11	
Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) Mr. Jean Kiaka, President,	A/AC.109/PET.679	AC.109/PET.644 and Add.1) Mr. Simão Ladeira-Lumona, National President, Confederação Geral dos Tra- balhadores de Angola (CGTA) (A/	517th	
Committee of Barumba Section, Parti démocratique de l'Angola (PDA), Kinshasa	A/AC.109/PET.683	AC.109/PET.653) Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector- General of Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO) (A/AC.109/PET.655)	517th 517th	
President, Union nationale etu- diants angolais (UNEA) Secretary-General, Mouvement	A/AC.109/PET.684	Mr. Emmanuel Tulengala, National Secretary, Cartel des nationalistes angolais		
jeunes ouvrières angolaises (MJOA) Mr. Lamvu Emmanuel Norman,	A/AC.109/PET.685	(CNA) (A/AC.109/PET.663) Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, Confédération des syndicats libres angolais (CSLA) (A/AC.109/PET.664)	517th 518th	
President, Comité de bons offices angolais (CBOA)	A/AC.109/PET.688	Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, União Nacional para a Independência Total de		
Mozambique		Angola (UNITA) (A/AC.109/PET.679)	524th	
Mr. P. J. Gumane, President, Comitê Révolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO)	A/AC.109/PET.686	Mozambique Mr. P. J. Gumane, President, Comitê Révolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO)		
Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Secretary for External Af- fairs, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)	A/AC.109/PET.690	(A/AC.109/PET.686) Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, President, Mr. Lourenço Mutaca, Secretary for Finance, and Mr. Mariano Matsinhe, Organizing	526th	
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea		Secretary, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)	532nd-534th	
Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Secretary- General, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, Presi-	A/AC.109/PET.661	Guinca, called Portuguese Guinea Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, President, Front de lutte pour l'independance nationale de la Guinée dite portugaise (FLING) (A/AC.109/PET.662)	518th	
dent, Front de lutte pour l'in- dépendance nationale de la		Petitioners concerning Angola		
Guinée dite portugaise (FLING)	A/AC,109/PET,662	542. Mr. Holden Roberto, speaking	on behalf of th	

542. Mr. Holden Roberto, speaking on behalf of the Gouvernment révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), said that despite the fact that the Portuguese periodically announced that the armed struggle in Angola was ended and although 85,000 Portuguese troops were engaged in the tragic conflict, in reality, the struggle, now six years old, was still being waged and there was no longer any limit to the atrocities practised by the enemy. Napalm bombs continued to be dropped on civilians, poison gas was used and whole villages were burnt to ashes. The Special Committee would have found such a situation, if it had visited the region controlled by the Angolan National Liberation Army (ALNA), which had an area of 250,000 square kilometres and a population of 400,000. He mentioned those few aspects of the Angolan people's daily life simply to place the tragedy in its proper context. In accepting their responsibilities, after having exhausted all peaceful means, the Angolan people knew the consequences of their decision and the immense sacrifices which they must bear.

543. Since 1966, the military operations conducted by the forces of the Angolan National Liberation Army

Executive Committee, Comitê de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP)

A/AC.109/PET.682

São Tomé and Principe

541. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:

Petitioner	Meetina		
Angola			
Mr. Holden Roberto, President, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE) (A/AC.109/PET.656)	513th and 514th		
Messrs. Domingos da Silva, Vice-President, Mr. Lara Lucio, Executive Secretary, and Mr. Luís de Azevedo, Jr., member of the Executive Committee.			
Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.650			
and Add.1)	515th and 516th		

had inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 523 Portuguese soldiers killed, 37 tanks destroyed, 2 helicopters and 1 aircraft shot down, 44 lorries destroyed, a large quantity of arms seized and 2 Portuguese soldiers captured. Economically, the plantations and crops of the Portuguese settlers, a principal source of finance for the colonial war, continued to suffer attack by the Angolan forces and were confiscated and restored to the people. Contrary to the lies of the Portuguese, the war had never ceased in Angola and, despite the many United Nations resolutions, Portugal, calling its repressive activities a civilizing mission, had no intention of leaving Angola.

544. It was perhaps paradoxical to discuss selfdetermination with the Portuguese colonialists, since Salazar, who did not believe in democracy, had never taught them what it was. For Angolans, there was only one kind of self-determination, which implied the expression of the people's will, genuine freedom to manage their own affairs and freedom of choice-and they had made their choice abundantly clear by a cruel six-year fight for independence. But it implied the exact opposite for the Portuguese. To Salazar, selfdetermination meant forcing the people to agree to a specific administrative system. To limit a people's choice to consenting to or accepting something already decided was tantamount to controlling that choice and thus to denying them in advance a free choice of the various possible solutions which could fundamentally affect their future. If the principle of self-determination was to be applied to the full, two essential factors must be taken into account. First, the de facto separation of the Territories concerned from the metropolitan State—which was the case with Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)-in the light of General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), and, second, the right of peoples to independence, as defined in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

545. Those factors had emerged very clearly in all General Assembly debates, whether on the occasion when the right of peoples to self-determination had been proclaimed or in connexion with other colonial problems. The right to independence could not be divorced from the concept of self-determination, as defined during the General Assembly's thirteenth session in 1958, in the Fourth Committee's discussion of international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. The idea of veiled or disguised integration which the Portuguese continued to advance had been specifically raised and condemned during that debate. It was an idea which the United Nations had categorically rejected, with the approval of all its Membersincluding Portugal's friends who had also had to assume responsibility for colonial Territories.

546. As to the reforms which the Portuguese Government frequently mentioned, Africans in general, and the Angolans in particular, were sufficiently on their guard not to allow themselves to be deceived by so-called reforms thought up by a colonial Power unwilling to show itself for what it was. Furthermore, the Angolan people had not taken up arms in order to reform colonialism. The Special Committee had itself stated in 1962 that it was not through Portuguese reforms that the situation in the African Territories under Portuguese domination could be improved and the problem solved, since what the people of those Territories wanted was independence, immediate and complete. The Special Committee's report on Angola in 1961 showed that the reforms announced by Portugal

were basically designed to strengthen the political integration of Angola with that country, that the Portuguese Government was maintaining its grasp on the Territory, militarily and politically, and was taking steps to increase its economic integration with Portugal, that it had undertaken no major political reforms and that, in particular, it had not created any representative political institutions composed of freely elected members in order to transfer power to the Angolan people. As far as GRAE was concerned, all possible arguments in that connexion had been finally disposed of when the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and after the Security Council itself, in its resolution 180 (1963) had once again confirmed that the right of the peoples dominated by Portugal freely to decide on their own future should entail complete independence.

547. None of the provisions of the resolutions adopted, whether by the Security Council or the General Assembly, had yet been implemented by the Portuguese Government. In short, Portugal had in no way altered its position since then, in theory or in practice, and there were no grounds for believing that it was willing to do so.

548. Consequently, the colonial war was being intensified and military repression continued in Angola and other Portuguese colonies. The military forces in those Territories, most particularly in Angola, continued to be reinforced. No amnesty had been promulgated and no genuine provision had been made for political parties to operate freely in the Territories, as Security Council resolution 218 (1965) expressly demanded. Following various frontier incidents with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea and Senegal, the Portuguese colonialists had recently cut the Dilolo-Lobito railway in order to strangle the Congolese and Zambian economies. It would be recalled that in 1963 the Portuguese had also threatened to block the channel at the mouth of the Congo by sinking three boats full of cement at Santo Antonio de Zaire. That would have rendered unusable the Democratic Republic of the Congo's only outlet to the sea and established a veritable blockade of the country.

549. The situation resulting from Portugal's policy towards both the African people in its colonies and the neighbouring States thus seriously disturbed international peace and security.

550. It was impossible to avoid the conclusion that Portugal, an under-developed country with extremely slender resources, could only carry on a war through the assistance it received from NATO, which was also the reason for its obstinacy regarding the implementation of United Nations resolutions. That was not only inconsistent with the so-called free world's principles but also with any desire to maintain peace. He was forced to point out, for the benefit of all the Western countries, the NATO Powers, and particularly the United States of America, that the Angolan people would never forgive the fact that all means of destruction employed against them came from the arsenals of the West. There were those who hoped to persuade the Angolan people that the NATO weapons delivered to the fascist Portuguese were not intended for the oppression of African peoples. It might be argued that the Atlantic Treaty, which enabled Portugal to maintain an army of 85,000 in Angola, 40,000 in Mozambique and 30,000 in Guinea (Bissau), was not

directed against those Territories and their peoples. Unhappily, while that might be true according to the terms of the Treaty, the facts indicated otherwise. NATO weapons were actually used in Africa solely against colonized peoples. The 5 million Angolans would never agree that it was by chance that Western arms were used against them. The assurances which they had demanded must be reinforced by preventive measures. The Angolan people urged the United States of America to enforce the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, as provided for by Security Council resolution 218 (1965), and called on all concerned, including the Brazilian people whose Government had recently sent a naval squadron to visit Angola, to admit in their hearts that they were a party to the Angolan people's sufferings. He considered them accomplices to the abominable crimes perpetrated by Salazar's henchmen in Angola and elsewhere. They must alter their policy.

551. The Angolan people would not be satisfied by theoretical explanations. They called on the United Nations to condemn the odious arms traffic and the alliance harmful to peoples whose only desire was for freedom and peace. The Security Council should strengthen and supplement the measures already taken in order to make them fully effective. It was for the Council, as the body primarily responsible for international peace and security, to devise effective and efficient ways of persuading the Portuguese to adopt a sane attitude to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the principles contained therein and the right of peoples to self-determination and to respect the relevant United Nations resolutions as scrupulously as the situation demanded. For the time being, and while waiting for signs of understanding, the Angolan people would continue the war, which was a hard one and threatened to be long.

552. The members of the Committee had been able to visit the GRAE camps and also to see for themselves how much the Government in Exile was doing to help the refugees in regard to medical care and education for their children. They had been able to understand how great and acute were the problems facing the Service d'assistance aux réfugiés angolais (SARA), which GRAE had set up to assist the evergrowing number of Angolans fleeing from Portuguese atrocities. There were more than 600,000 Angolan refugees in the Congo, who had been welcomed by their Congolese brothers from the very beginning. Land had been given to them all along the frontiers, where they had settled and started plantations. The problem did not end there, however; there were cases of sickness and refugees coming out of the bush, where they had sometimes been for two or three years and needed to be clothed. There was the additional problem of feeding those who had recently arrived and had not yet been able to settle themselves. Nor should it be forgotten that assistance was not only given on the frontiers; GRAE was trying to deal with the impoverished situation of the Angolan people in the liberated areas. As often as possible, it provided them, like the refugees, with the means of survival. The same applied to the schools GRAE was operating inside Angola, which were maintained by contributions from Angolans, as were those it operated in Kinshasa.

553. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that Angola was the most valuable of all Portugal's colonies. There were almost 350,000 Portuguese settlers, work-

ing a subsoil infinitely richer than that of Mozambique or Guinea (Bissau). It was therefore only to be expected that the Portuguese Government should do everything possible, whatever the price, to retain Angola. On the other hand, to judge by its recent statements, it might agree to abandon Guinea (Bissau), where considerable investment was needed to obtain indifferent profits, and even Mozambique. The subsoil in Angola was extremely rich in iron, petroleum, diamonds, manganese, etc. These resources were extracted by companies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, which were openly assisting the Portuguese Government to maintain its grasp on Angola. He himself, while on a journey, had met a representative of the Krupp group, who, in confidence, had admitted that his cartel gave money to the Portuguese Government, ostensibly to improve the Angolan people's living standards. The following list of foreign companies and monopolies operating in Angola was the so-called list of the "300 families" who were helping to prolong the misery of the Angolan people.

Diamond's

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Morgan Bank The Oppenheimer Group De Beers Guggenheim T. F. Ryan Forminière Guaranty Trust Bank Société Générale de Belgique

Petroleum

Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétroles (Petrofina) Chase National Bank National City Bank of New York Cabinda Gulf Oil Company

Transport

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Westminster Bank British South Africa Company Cooper Brothers Company The Angola Coaling Company Tanganyika Concessions

Palm Oil

La Luinha, Société Anonyme Agricole et Industrielle

Aluminium

Pechiney, shareholder in Aluminio Português (Angola)

Bauxite

Biliton Maatschappij

Mice

Standard Oil (represented in Angola by União Comercial de Automoveis)

Banking

Banque Belge d'Afrique (shareholder in the Banco Comercial de Angola)

Coffee

Banque Rallet et Cie (shareholder in the Companhia Agrícola de Cazengo and the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura (CADA)) Trade

Anglo American Corporation (represented in Angola by the Sociedade Luso-Americana)

Casa Americana

Devon Estates

Loanda Trading Company

Robert Hudson and Sons, La Luinha

Société Anonyme Agricole et Industrielle

Sugar

Barton Mayhew and Co. (shareholder in the Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel)

Cotton

Société générale de Belgique (represented by the Companhia Geral dos Algodões)

Banque Belge d'Afrique

Compagnie Cotonnière Congolaise

La Luinha

Société Agricole et Industrielle

Hydraulic Works

Hydrotechnic Corporation, New York

Marshall Aid Funds (loan of \$US25 million in 1951)

Mining Prospecting

E. J. Longyear Co., Minneapolis

Remina

Aero Service Corporation, Bethlehem Steel

Carbide

Mutual Security Agency (financed the Portuguese Government in 1952 with a loan of \$US1.3 million)

554. In 1963, a representative of one of those companies had approached him in New York to propose that GRAE should be given the money which, until then, had been paid to the Portuguese Government as a tax to support the war effort, which all firms operating in Angola were bound to pay. That approach had been motivated by the anxiety of the company's directors at the irreversible course of events, which made them doubt whether the Portuguese could remain in Angola.

555. Replying to questions about the activities of GRAE, the petitioner said that the total surface area of Angola was 1,246,700 square kilometres, and that the zone at present controlled by the National Liberation Army, 250,000 square kilometres, was therefore approximately one fifth of the whole Territory. It was not true, as Portugal claimed, that Portuguese troops were fighting on one front only, in the far north. There were at present three separate fronts. There was the first front in the far north. A second front had later been opened on the north-east Angola-Congo frontier, with the rear base at Kasongo-Lunda (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The third front, relatively recent, was in the south, with the rear base in Katanga. It was therefore clear that, contrary to the claims of those criticizing the national liberation struggle, the fighting was spreading and would continue to spread. The area controlled by the ALNA was, and would remain, free. As the opportunity arose, the ALNA intensified its struggle with all the means at its disposal. In the other areas, the leaders of the movement had organized a system of mass mobilization led by political activists, whose task was to explain the reason for the action undertaken to the population. The political dangers were very great.

556. Regarding the organization of GRAE, he said that GRAE maintained both a military organization

in Angola to assert its authority within the country and a system to enable refugees to escape. In each area there was a commander who was also in charge of the camp. He was assisted by an adjutant. There was also a political commissioner, an officer in charge of social services and population movements, and an information officer. The officer concerned with schools and hospitals worked in collaboration with the area commander.

557. In reply to a question concerning the treatment of prisoners by the Portuguese, the petitioner said that reports of the way in which the Portuguese authorities treated prisoners were extremely disturbing. Several escaped Angolan combatants reported that the Portuguese troops tortured their prisoners in an attempt to obtain information. They frequently killed them in cold blood. Prison conditions were inhuman. At GRAE headquarters, the members of the Committee could see women and men mutilated by the tortures inflicted on them. One escaped Angolan prisoner had returned to his brothers with his lips pierced and closed by a padlock.

558. Asked whether the bombings and military operations were confined to the liberated territories under GRAE control, the petitioner said that terrorist attacks were made from time to time in areas not under GRAE control and terrible repressions then followed. If those regions were accessible by land, the infantry intervened; otherwise, the Air Force conducted operations. The liberation movements were not of equal strength in all regions; but repression extended everywhere. It was mainly the forests that were bombed. It could be said that the territory as a whole was subjected to bombing, but the bombing was more intense in the areas under GRAE control. The refugees were forced to leave those areas, since they were destroyed and gutted by fire. When they could, they fled to the Congo.

559. In reply to a question, the petitioner informed the Committee that, in addition to the regular army of 85,000 men stationed in Angola, there was also a provincial civil defence organization. Weapons were distributed to everyone, including women. Further, in the Lunda area the British-run Angola Diamond Company had its own private army and employed foreign mercenaries. However, for the Portuguese, the most effective way of combating subversion and terrorism was to populate heavily the areas inhabited by the whites, particularly with "soldier-settlers". The people received not only weapons but also directives. The prisoner in question had said that, in his area, the motto was: "A black on the road is a dead man", meaning that he would be killed instantly.

560. Asked whether there were any military experts not of Portuguese nationality at present active in Angola in any capacity, the petitioner said that he had been informed by prisoners that the head of the commandos was French and that soldiers not of Portuguese origin were also stationed in Angola. The prisoners had been unable to say what country those soldiers had come from.

561. Replying to a question concerning the assistance Portugal received, the petitioner said the military budget was a heavy burden on a poor country like Portugal and was causing economic difficulties. Portugal, although a small Power, maintained over 150,000 soldiers in Africa. It was quite clear, however, that its Government did not have the resources to meet

the needs of that army by itself. It was receiving assistance from NATO in the form of weapons, and even money. The United States had given \$20 million to the Portuguese Government for the improvement of its roads network, but there was no doubt that the money had been diverted from its original purpose and used to finance the colonial war. Furthermore, Portugal had joined NATO and thus received arms, which were used to massacre those fighting in Angola. Arms had been provided by the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium.

562. Asked whether shipment of arms made in Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany continued, the petitioner said that only two or three weeks previously the Angolan free forces had captured a machine-gun with markings showing that it had come from Israel. Some officers had confirmed that they had seen machine-guns of the same type in the hands of the Katangese mercenaries. The weapon in question had been a very old one. It was the only weapon found which had come from Israel.

563. Elaborating on the assistance being received by Portugal, the petitioner said that he had heard of a man who had received eighteen months' military training as a parachutist in the Federal Republic of Germany, near Bonn. Funds were being supplied to Portugal, ostensibly to improve its infrastructure; in fact, however, those funds were being used for the purchase of arms and for the maintenance of the 150,000-man army stationed in Africa, Portugal's war needs were enormous, and it needed funds. Portugal was also receiving assistance from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. It was undeniable that Portugal was receiving assistance, since it was a poor, under-developed country and was only able to continue the repression because of the assistance it was receiving. He could state further that Portugal had received funds from the United States for the alleged purpose of improving its road and highway system. That was an incontrovertible fact because statements had been made by the Portuguese authorities on the subject.

564. Replying to a further question, the petitioner stated that much had been said about the solidarity between South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories. An article entitled "The White Bastion in Southern Africa", which had been published in a semi-official Angolan newspaper, dealt with the co-operation between the NATO Powers and Portugal and the contacts existing between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia. It clearly stated that the purpose of Portuguese activities in Africa was to defend the white man in southern Africa. It stated that nothing the Africans could do could destroy that fortress. There was a possibility that the Portuguese Government might seek to follow the Rhodesian example by giving "self-determination" to the white settlers of Angola. In a Portuguese newspaper the previous year he had read a statement by a Portuguese settler in Angola who was disturbed that after almost six years, the Portuguese Government, despite all its assurances, had proved unable to end a worsening conflict which was degenerating into massacres and killings. The settlers had added that if the Portuguese Government was not capable of waging war against the Angolan freedom fighters, the settlers would take things into their own hands and appeal to their Rhodesian brothers. It was by no means impossible that the Angolan settlers, following the example of the French extremists during the Algerian war, would combine with the army, organize an uprising, seize power and then secede and proclaim Angolan independence unilaterally. The gravity of the situation could not be overemphasized.

565. To the 85,000 Portuguese soldiers stationed in Angola should be added the 300,000-odd Portuguese settlers in the Territory, which meant that there were more than 400,000 white Portuguese now living in Angola. The policy of encouraging white settlement, begun in 1930, had forced the Africans to leave their land and settle 50 or 60 kilometres at least from their villages along the main roads (estradas). Thus prevented from cultivating their plantations, such "displaced persons" had been considered as unemployed and recruited by force to cultivate their own lands for the benefit of the new settlers. He had recently seen a poster encouraging Portuguese soldiers to settle in Angola, the Portuguese Government promising them plots of land in Angola after victory. The illustration showed the soldier-settler with a gun in his right hand and a machete in his left.

566. Replying to a question concerning refugees, the petitioner said that the total number of Angolan refugees was 627,350. There were two types of Angolans in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: those who had emigrated, had been settled in the Congo for some time, and were now working and playing a part in the life of the country; and those who had fled from Angola after 1961 and were living in conditions of hardship. There were 45,000 refugees in Kinshasa, 500,000 in the Central Congo, 40,000 in the northernmost region, 7,000 in some other regions and 35,000 in Katanga. After the repression had begun, refugees had also come to the Congo from Cabinda. There was a general tendency to separate Cabinda from Angola, but in 1963 the United Nations had adopted a resolution including Cabinda in Angola. There were also some refugees in Zambia, but they were very few in number. The Special Committee would gain first-hand knowledge of the number of those refugees when it went to Zambia.

567. With regard to education, GRAE had received no assistance from UNESCO and that made its task more difficult. Nevertheless, that agency's failure to contribute was doubtless due to its anxiety not to take sides rather than to any deliberate intention of undermining action undertaken for the benefit of the Angolan people.

568. The schools maintained by GRAE were supported by the Angolans themselves. Since it was very difficult to obtain outside assistance, GRAE made the Angolans contribute to them. The Angolans could count on no one but themselves. Apart from the schools at Kinshasa and near the borders, there were some schools inside Angola which were supported by the Angolans.

569. With regard to aid to the Angolan refugees, GRAE was receiving assistance from some philanthropic organizations and from some Governments. For example, it was receiving medicines from the Indian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments. Some organizations like the Catholic Relief Services and the Protestant Organization for Aid to Refugees were providing assistance independently of GRAE. Apart

from a few scholarships, the Angolan refugees were receiving no direct assistance from the United Nations. UNESCO granted scholarships to a few students. GRAE would have welcomed UNESCO co-operation. Unfortunately those students were compelled to leave the schools run by his organization and to go to subsidized schools in the Congo. In addition to UNESCO, Lovanium granted some scholarships to the refugees; GRAE would have preferred the assistance to be granted to the schools under its control and not to other schools. He had written to that effect to the official in New York responsible for granting scholarships and had been told that the students must apply directly to New York. The situation was much the same with regard to medical aid. The fact that Portugal was a member of most of the specialized agencies unquestionably meant that certain States would oppose any move conflicting with the interests of the colonial Power. To take only one example, in 1961, at the beginning of the Angolan people's fight for independence, the International Committee of the Red Cross and begun to give help to the refugees. It had withdrawn that support shortly afterwards, doubtless as a result of political pressure. At present, only philanthropic organizations were demonstrating their support for the struggling Angolan people by gifts of clothing, food, and so forth.

570. Mr. Lara Lucio, speaking on behalf of the Mouvement populaire de libération đe (MPLA), stated that the ten-year-old movement had played a leading role in the fight of the Angolan people for their independence. Although MPLA was currently involved in a bloody war against the oppressors of the Angolan people, it was nevertheless devoted to the noble universal principles proclaimed by the United Nations. The Angolan people had been forced into war. Long before the bloody events which had started on 4 February 1961, many Angolan leaders had made dramatic appeals to the United Nations, in the hope that the Organization would intervene and bring the crimes of the Portuguese colonialists to an end. MPLA itself had sent an appeal to the States Members of the United Nations and, foreseeing the war which the colonialists had been hastily preparing, in a statement addressed to the Portuguese Government in 1960, it had laid the responsibility for the bloody consequences of its obstinacy on the shoulders of the Lisbon Government. It did not hold the Portuguese people responsible for the crimes of the régime in power and was ready to establish ties of friendship with all the peoples of the world, including the Portuguese people.

571. All the efforts of MPLA to arrive at a peaceful solution had met with blind intransigence. For over six years, the colonialist army, rendered powerless by the mobility and effectiveness of the Angolan armed forces, had been committing all kinds of violence against the civilian population. The continual bombing of suspected resistance areas, the poisoning of crops, the cold-blooded liquidation of anyone suspected of nationalism, the increasing debasement of the Angolan people and the frantic exploitation of their wealththose were the main characteristics of a doomed policy desperately aimed at surviving the radical changes of the modern world. The Portuguese régime persisted in its attempts to turn the clock back by emphasizing the myth of a "multiracial and pluri-continental community", which was completely meaningless.

572. Portugal allowed a certain measure of reform and some evolution, provided that it did not bring the myth of a pluri-continental and multiracial Portugal into question. The armed revolt of the Angolan people had forced the Portuguese administration to make a pretence of introducing reforms for the benefit of the Angolan population.

573. The features of colonialism, although they had been rendered slightly less severe for the sake of appearances, had been intensified in many respects. The Angolan people were still under foreign domination, they were still governed by Portuguese and all important matters were decided at Lisbon by the Portuguese authorities, which conveyed the decisions to the Governor General, also a Portuguese, and to the administrative organs in Angola, headed by Portuguese. The pretence that there were local executive organs did not stand up to the most cursory scrutiny. The Angolans did not have the right to vote because voters had to know how to read and write and pay at least 200 escudos (\$7) in taxes, while 95 per cent of the Angolan population was illiterate. Only three of the Legislative Council's thirty-six members could be considered Angolans. There had been no political freedom before the war but now anyone—even some settlers -who dared to criticize the Government was accused of high treason. The Angolans had even fewer fundamental freedoms than before, and recently ANANGOLA (Association des originaires de l'Angola)— which had already been under the direction of the colonial administration—had been found to be dangerous and obliged to disband. The special courts which tried those suspected of nationalism were at Lisbon, so as to avoid explosion of anger by Angolans during the trials. The prisons of Luanda and the concentration camps at Bié and Roçadas could no longer hold all those whom the PIDE (Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado) considered to be a public danger. Many political prisoners were gaoled in Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands. The nationalist Angolan priests who had been deported to Portugal and the Protestant ministers who had survived the massacres of 1961 and 1962 were still not allowed to contact their congregations.

574. Although there had been some reform in the laws governing forced labour, it continued to be practised in Angola. That shameful but profitable practice was threatening the stability of the family and reducing the workers to slavery. The minimum wage laws were not observed and Angolan workers still could not form trade unions to press their claims.

575. The influx of Portuguese immigrants and particularly the authorities' campaign to encourage soldiers to settle in Angola had considerably increased the number of settlers to about 300,000. The continual increase in the number of settlers, in violation of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), was a factor in the impoverishment of the entire Angolan population, who were still being robbed of the best land and denied access to better paid employment because of competition from the poor immigrants. The competition encouraged discrimination in wages, since the African worker was often obliged to accept a quarter of the wages paid to a European for the same work.

576. An important question arose: who was paying for Portugal's war in Africa? Portugal levied a "defence tax" on companies whose profits exceeded 500,000 escudos, and the public debt now amounted to 32,000 million escudos (over \$1,000 million). However, it

was foreign investors who were helping Portugal to meet its military expenses. They had been granted favourable terms in Angola by Decree 46,312 of 28 April 1965 and now many financial groups—South African, West German, Spanish, Japanese, American, Dutch, Norwegian, British, Belgian, French, Italian and Swedish—were competing for licences to exploit the wealth of Angola put up for auction by the Portuguese Government. Instead of being used to raise the level of living of the Angolan people, the vast economic resources created by foreign investments in Angola served to strengthen Portugal's limited capacity to pay for the colonial war.

577. All who were contributing to that situation should therefore be roundly condemned. The United Nations General Assembly had realized that and consequently, in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2184 (XXI), it condemned the activities of the financial interests which were exploiting the human and material resources of the Territories under Portuguese domination and preventing the people from exercising their legitimate right to freedom and independence. That was an important contribution by the United Nations to the Angolan people's fight for liberation. The financial interests currently involved in Angola were universally recognized to be the enemies of the independence of the people and therefore could not complain if they were the target of reprisals by the freedom fighters. The most regrettable fact was that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, like financial circles of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, was not implementing General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX), 2107 (XX) and 2184 (XXI). The five loans totalling \$57.5 million granted to Portuguese enterprises as at 25 November 1966 had also helped to swell the Portuguese military budget. The fact that the enterprises belonged to the private sector in no way invalidated that conclusion. The Portuguese military budget for 1967 provided for expenditure of the order of 8,000 million escudos (about \$300 million), or over 44 per cent of the State budget. For a country whose per capita income was the lowest in Europe, that represented an effort which could not be maintained for very long.

578. All aid, whether public or private, swelled the general Portuguese budget. Without aid, the Portuguese Government would be obliged to spend funds inside the country, which would prevent it from continuing the fight against the Angolan people. Thus, even if the assistance given to Portugal was not military in character, it still threatened the Angolan people's right to freedom.

579. It was common knowledge that some Powers were taking advantage of Portugal's need for aid. For instance, NATO in general and some of its members in particular were continuing to provide Portugal with the means to decimate the African peoples.

580. It was not true that weapons were being supplied to Portugal on condition that they would not be used in wars against the Africans. MPLA had salvaged several kinds of weapons made in Germany, the United States, Belgium and Israel, but none made in Portugal except, of course, ammunition and certain types of grenade. Something must be done to make States Members of the United Nations undertake to comply with the numerous resolutions and appeals to stop supplying and selling to the Portu-

guese Government anything it needed to pursue the the war against the colonized peoples. It was not enough to note that the Federal Republic of Germany had set up a military base in the Portuguese town of Beja, in exchange for very substantial financial and military assistance; or that the United States was also giving financial and military support in exchange for the facilities in the Azores; or that France—the same France which had understood in time the irreversible process of national independence—was supplying Portugal with helicopters and warships; it was not enough, in short, to draw up a black list of all those who were helping Portugal to prolong a war which it had already lost.

581. MPLA considered that only attitudes such as that recently adopted by Sweden—whose Minister for Foreign Affairs had unequivocally condemned Portuguese colonial policy, causing excitement in official Portuguese circles—helped to make Portugal understand that the only outcome of the war would be the victory of the patriotic forces.

582. In addition, Portugal's alliance with the racists of South Africa and Rhodesia posed a serious threat to the African peoples in southern Africa. Africa and the world could not stand aloof while the political, economic and military ties between those Powers grew steadily closer. The identical positions held by the inseparable partners in United Nations votes were well known. So were the affairs of the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd., the embryonic link between the economies of the Territories under Portuguese administration, South Africa and Rhodesia. In addition, two months previously, an official Portuguese source had announced joint manoeuvres by Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian firemen along the frontier between Mozambique and Rhodesia. Nobody had any doubt about the kind of fire which those makeshift firemen were meant to put out. The military nature of the visit to Lisbon in April 1967 by the South African Minister of Defence, Pieter Botha, the Chief of General Staff and the Commandant-General of the South African Armed Forces also aroused justifiable concern, which had been intensified by South Africa's recent defiance of the United Nations in connexion with South West Africa. MPLA hoped that the Special Committee would work closely with the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and not allow the United Nations to neglect that serious problem, which was indeed a threat to world peace.

583. Concern had also been aroused by the visit to Angola of four Brazilian warships—the cruisers Tamandaré and Barroso and the escort vessels Paraná and Pernambuco—with 2,000 men on board. The Brazilian Government had made such whole-hearted declarations of support for Portugal's policy that the African Ambassadors in Brazil had been constrained to protest. However, MPLA was sure that the brotherly solidarity between the Brazilian and the Angolan peoples would prevent the worst from happening.

584. MPLA had on several occasions described to the Special Committee the goals it was pursuing and the work it had done in the six years since its establishment. During 1966, MPLA had succeeded in implanting itself more firmly in some regions of the country which had not yet been able to organize resistance. For example, in May 1966, MPLA had opened the sizable eastern front, in the districts of Moxico

and Cuando-Cubango. The size of that new front had alarmed the Portuguese General Staff and particularly the Minister of Defence, General Gomes de Araújo, who, on his return from an inspection tour in September 1966, had not concealed his pessimism. With the eastern front, which had rapidly been extended to the areas of Cazombo, Bundas and Sandando and along the Benguela railway, excellent prospects had been opened up for MPLA's armed struggle, particularly since there was a possibility of extending the front to the south and mid-west of Angola. On 12 December 1966, Le Monde had reported the Portuguese authorities' concern about the expansion of the war in Angola. According to that newspaper, an official Portuguese source had announced a considerable increase in the Portuguese forces in Angola. The same source had said that 50 per cent of the Portuguese troops in Africa were in Angola. In addition, during 1966, MPLA had been able considerably to strengthen the northern front, which now had a large number of better trained and better armed members, leading a population of tens of thousands in regions entirely controlled by patriots. There had been action on that front in the districts of Luanda, Kuanza Norte and Congo, particularly in the valley of the Dange and along the Luanda-Uige roadway. At the same time, on the Cabinda front, guerrilla activities had continued normally in the areas of Cacongo and Mayombe.

585. In 1966, MPLA guerrillas had carried out over 2,000 missions. The enemy had lost at least 1,610 men, including some officers and non-commissioned officers. MPLA forces had destroyed six bridges, ten motor launches, three military aircraft, six barracks and over a hundred military vehicles. A large amount of equipment, including weapons, grenades, ammunition and medicaments, had been salvaged.

586. Very significant results had already been achieved in the first quarter of 1967—the year in which MPLA's armed struggle would spread throughout the national territory.

587. There were very clear signs of a decline in the morale of the enemy troops. The general mobilization decree promulgated by the Portuguese Government in 1966 had already created considerable anxiety among the Portuguese population and soldiers. Compulsory military service had been fixed at a minimum of three years but could last as long as four years. Young people who were physically unfit for military service were no longer given an exemption; anyone could be called up until the age of forty-five. In addition, women had been taken on as volunteers in the Portuguese army for the first time. Following on the decree establishing provincial branches of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, the general mobilization showed how concerned the Portuguese Government was.

588. The violations of the frontiers of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also showed how much the military were on edge. The mutiny of Portuguese soldiers in some Angolan barracks, particularly at Huambo (Nova Lisboa) in December 1966, gave some idea of the disarray which, despite all appearances, reigned in the colonialists' ranks. Indeed, that disarray had been mentioned by Deputy Commander Cunha who, at a meeting of the Portuguese National Assembly in March 1967, had

criticized the confusion which reigned in the various sectors of government activity. According to him, there was no co-ordination of Portuguese economic, political and military activities.

589. MPLA's activities were not only military. MPLA had embarked on an intensive political campaign to mobilize more forces in support of the sacred cause of Angolan independence. For that purpose it had participated in many international meetings, contributing to the study of a series of problems connected with Angola's fight for freedom and many other African and international questions. At the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguêsas (CONCP), MPLA had also continued to coordinate its activities with progressive organizations in the other Portuguese colonies, such as PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP. MPLA welcomed the decision by the United Nations to organize an international seminar on apartheid, to be held shortly at Dar es Salaam, which MPLA would attend as an observer.

590. There was some misunderstanding about the district of Cabinda, MPLA wished first of all to emphasize Portugal's hold on certain people who were spreading confusion about that district of Angola. That was what the traitor Alexandre Taty was doing; with a handful of irresponsible men, he was copying the role played by the harkis during the Algerian war, arousing the indignation of the entire oppressed population of the district. MPLA respected the specific course taken by history of the Kingdoms of Ngoyo and Kakongo and the Realm of Mayombe before the Conference of Berlin in 1885 which, in the arbitrary manner adopted for other regions, had integrated those territories with the others that made up Angola today. MPLA considered that, once all Africa was free, the African countries would be able to remedy the evils caused by the arbitrary demarcation of 1885, as part of their efforts to achieve African unity. In that connexion, MPLA fully endorsed the principles defended by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with regard to existing frontiers. It therefore considered that the region of Cabinda was at present part of Angola and was suffering like the rest of the country from Portuguese colonial oppression. That was why MPLA was fighting, weapons in hand, in Cabinda, as it was at Nambuangongo, Moxico and throughout Angola. That was why MPLA was fighting for true national unity against regionalism and tribal-

591. The important problem of the Angolan refugees was a matter of serious concern to MPLA, which was continually using the material and human resources that could be spared from the war of liberation to assist the Angolan refugees. The problem was very complex and MPLA had made some suggestions to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in two documents: one on the education of the Angolan refugees and one on general aspects of the Angolan refugee problem (see paragraph 596 below). The latter document had been prepared for the seventeenth session of the Executive Committee on the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, held at Geneva on 22 May 1967.

592. The attention of the Special Committee was drawn to those two documents, which reflected the opinion of a group fighting to solve the social problems of the Angolan people. They described MPLA's efforts

to provide the refugees with medical and educational assistance and the difficulties which were preventing a more rapid expansion of that assistance. They showed the results of the school experiments and the reasons why the results of the training programme for the Territories under Portuguese domination outlined in General Assembly resolution 2108 (XX) were unsatisfactory, contained MPLA's suggestions for improving it and described the method used to meet the need for intermediate, secondary and vocational education. The collaboration and material assistance of agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, the ILO, UNDP and FAO would be extremely useful.

593. Generally speaking, MPLA encountered prejudice because it was a liberation movement, with which international agencies were afraid to get involved, even in purely social matters, despite the principle approved in the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 28 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) of "co-operation with the liberation movement of all the Territories under colonial domination" in connexion with programmes of assistance to refugees.

594. That was one matter in which MPLA wanted to enlist the co-operation of the Special Committee: the specialized agencies could co-operate openly with the national liberation movements which submitted sound social welfare (cultural, medical, etc.) programmes. MPLA had every reason to believe that the Special Committee would make even greater efforts to persuade the Portuguese Government to abandon its criminal attitude and would do its utmost to make the struggle more effective until the Angolan people triumphed. The Committee should urge Angola's neighbours, who were still hesitant, to grant MPLA the freedom of action it needed to expedite the routing of supplies to its fighters, particularly those hundreds of kilometres away from the frontiers, Such backing of MPLA would be one of the strongest weapons against the aggressive scheming of the Salazar-Vorster-Smith alliance in Southern Africa.

595. In conclusion, he invited the members of the Committee to go and see the military and social activities of MPLA inside Angola and at the frontier zones—in the Congo (Brazzaville) and in Zambia.

596. The two documents referred to by the petitioner in paragraph 592 above are reproduced below.

"(a) Statement of MPLA views on the education of Angolan refugees

"(1) The peoples of the African Territories under Portuguese administration could not but be moved by the resolutions which the United Nations has adopted since 1961 with a view to inducing Portugal to comply with the United Nations Charter by respecting the legitimate aspirations of these peoples for freedom and independence. By adopting resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and resolutions 1807 (XVII), 1819 (XVII), 1913 (XVIII), 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX), the United Nations established a point of departure for concerted action to accelerate the demantling of the Portuguese under colonial domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

"(2) More effective action to liberate the peoples of these Territories was not initiated until the United Nations established a special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration (resolutions 1808 (XVII), 1973 (XVIII) and 2108 (XX)).

Under this programme, numerous countries offered fellowships for victims of Portuguese colonial oppression. Furthermore, in order to assist the refugees from these Territories, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees instituted measures to facilitate their adaptation to a new way of life by providing them with work or a minimum of education.

"(3) Since its establishment in 1956, the Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA) has been very active in the field of education. Long before the armed struggle began, MPLA had established clandestine schools in the towns and villages of Angola, and despite constant persecution by the police, these were never altogether suppressed. At the present time, too, MPLA is trying to provide educational as well as medical assistance for the refugees. It therefore wishes to express its views on the matter to all the specialized agencies dealing with these questions. Indeed, it has a duty and a right to do so in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of the resolution which was adopted on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) by the Special Committee and which requests:

"...the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination, their assistance to the refugees of these Territories . . ."

In any case, the views of the liberation movements of the Territories under Portuguese domination are helping the United Nations and the specialized agencies to prepare aid programmes adapted to the conditions and particular circumstances of each recipient people and of the countries of asylum.

"(4) Education programmes for our peoples are particularly important, as education is a matter which the colonial administration always treated with scorn. Everyone knows that the illiteracy rate in countries under Portuguese domination averages 98 per cent. The present state of war has obliged the administering Power to announce an increase in the number of schools, which, in fact, continue to serve the interests of the settlers. Consideration must also be given to the ever-increasing number of Angolan refugees living in neighbouring countries who are destitute. MPLA believes that the education programmes of the United Nations, voluntary agencies and liberation movements should be analysed and adapted to the actual needs of the peoples for whom they are intended, having in mind that these peoples will be reintegrated in their own countries once they become independent.

"(5) MPLA, for its part, has accepted direct offers of fellowships from relief organizations in Africa, Europe and America, and has sent more than 200 young people abroad for technical and higher training. For some years, too, it has tried to provide primary education—in Portuguese—along the frontiers with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo. More than a thousand pupils have attended these 'improvised' schools. After the prohibition of MPLA activities at Leopoldville (September 1963), educational activities were transferred to Congo (Brazzaville) where a better-organized MPLA school service has been established. Reading and writing primers have been produced

and readers for the more advanced classes are now in the preparation. On the basis of the experience acquired, it is possible once again to envisage the extension of primary education to Angolan refugees in all countries bordering on Angola.

- "(6) A very careful analysis should be undertaken now to ensure that future education programmes for the Angolan people (the present programmes are only for Angolan refugees) are properly oriented from the very outset. Fellowships alone cannot produce the desired results. Students receiving fellowships have to learn a foreign language; the majority of the candidates do not have an adequate basic education; the planning of courses is often ill-adapted to the real needs of the student's country of origin; and the very different conditions and standards of living in the countries of study produce an unfavourable reaction when the students return home. Furthermore, there are at present no facilities for secondary education, and the efforts being made in regard to primary education are quite inadequate, as there is no special programme to support them. Lastly, there is the difficult problem of the method to be used for launching a comprehensive programme that would make use of all the kinds of assistance which are available for educational purposes. The question here is whether refugee education should be integrated with the programmes of the host country.
- "(7) MPLA does not, unfortunately, claim to have found the key to these problems, but it does feel that it should help in trying to solve them. It believes that the main effort should be concentrated on basic education at the primary, secondary and technical levels. For secondary education, there could be an accelerated programme leading to higher education. UNESCO might be asked to prepare secondary education programmes with special emphasis on science (mathematics, physics, chemistry, mineralogy, biology). One foreign language (French or English) would be compulsory. After three or four years of secondary education, students could apply for admission to higher educational institutions in the various countries collaborating in the implementation of the programmes. A primary education programme could also be prepared, with the minimum periods of schooling to be determined later. All organizations dealing with primary education for refugees would be expected to follow these programmes, the preparation of which would be entrusted to UNESCO working in conjunction with the education departments of the liberation movements.
- "(8) Furthermore, MPLA believes that education in these categories (secondary and primary) should be given in Portuguese. There are several reasons for this choice, including the following:
- "(i) As English is spoken in some of the countries bordering on Angola, and French in others, Angolans would otherwise receive their primary or secondary education in different languages, depending on the country of asylum. The programmes in each host country would also be different.
- "(ii) The host countries have no room in their schools owing to the increasing influx of students after independence, which put an end to the limited schooling facilities of the colonial era. They would therefore find it difficult to accommodate refugee children as well.

"(iii) The situation of the refugees is still uncertain, in spite of all the measures taken to integrate them in a new society. Most refugees want to return home, and their country needs them. It would seem, therefore, that any education programme should be based on the principle that it will be continued in an independent Angola, where the official language is not likely to be French or English.

There are other problems too, such as the choice of suitable sites for secondary schools, when these are established. This too will call for discussions with the authorities of the host countries.

- "(9) The implementation of resolution 1808 (XVII) seems to be the responsibility of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, supported by the United Nations Development Programme. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is responsible for several refugee aid programmes dealing with education, particularly primary education. Up to now, UNESCO has not been involved in these programmes. However, of all the international agencies concerned, UNESCO seems to be best equipped for ensuring the success of the combined efforts which the international community is making to provide education for our peoples. Its long experience in basic education, its experts, its professors and teachers, combined with its vast network of permanent missions and first-class technical resources-all these assets could well be mobilized on behalf of the refugees from the countries under Portuguese domination. UNESCO itself has taken a step in this direction by authorizing its Director-General to 'co-operate fully with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the High Commissioner for Refugees in the planning and execution of any joint programme of assistance that may be undertaken... for the benefit of refugees from southern Africa with a view to enabling them to receive the education best suited to their needs.' In addition, provision has been made for a UNESCO official to collaborate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (item 249 of the draft programme and budget).
- "(10) These considerations lead MPLA to suggest that a meeting of representatives of the countries bordering on the countries under Portuguese domination, and of representatives of UNHCR, UNESCO and the liberation movements of the countries concerned, should be convened as soon as possible to undertake a detailed study of all the problems involved in the successful implementation of the education programmes, and of ways of solving them. A meeting of this kind, which could be held under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, would make it possible for all the parties concerned to co-ordinate their efforts for the voluntary funds to be distributed in an equitable manner and for an effective structure to be set up in order to provide education—without which freedom would be a mere illusion—for the peoples still under colonial domination.
- "(b) Contribution of MPLA to the study of the Angolan refugee problem
- "(Prepared for the seventeenth session of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

"Introduction

"No one today questions the legitimacy of the struggle for freedom by peoples who are still subject to colonial oppression. Portugal, almost alone on the African continent, still refuses, however, to comply with the universally recognized principles and has even resorted to war as a means of prolonging its shameless exploitation of Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and the islands of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe.

"Nearly all States Members of the United Nations have repeatedly protested against Portugal's refusal to yield to the aspirations of the peoples of the Territories under its domination.

"The United Nations resolutions on the Territories under Portuguese administration have become increasingly sharp in tone. Their intention is to give the oppressed peoples, whose right to express their views has at least already been recognized by an international personality. The participation of petitioners in some of the proceedings of the United Nations has proved to be a valuable aid to the United Nations in the discharge of the functions it has assumed in the matter of decolonization.

"Furthermore, the periodic visits made by the Special Committee for the sole purpose of obtaining from the representatives of the peoples struggling for their independence the information required for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) confirm the value of the contribution which these representatives are making to the work of the United Nations.

"Also, in regard at least to the refugee aid programmes, the United Nations has already recognized the principle of 'co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination', to which reference is made in operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619).

"In the light of these principles, MPLA believes that it has a duty to contribute to the work of the international agencies whose activities directly affect the Angolan refugees in all fields.

"It has therefore decided to address this contribution to the Executive Committee on the Programme of UNHCR, and requests the officers of the Committee to arrange for it to be circulated as a working paper during the session.

"The refugees

"After the Angolan people had taken up arms to challenge the Portuguese colonialist administration in February 1961 and the villages and countryside had been savagely bombed, thousands of Angolans crossed the frontiers of neighbouring countries in order to wait there until the time came to return to their country and resume their normal life.

"The main flow of refugees was into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), and particularly into the Lower Congo provinces. Other refugees went to Katanga, the Republic of Zambia, and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

"Although it has always been difficult to provide even a rough estimate of the number of refugees, information provided by non-official sources indicates that at the end of 1966 the figures were as follows:

Angolan refugees in the Democratic		
Republic of the Congo	more than	400,000
Angolan refugees in the Republic of Zambia	about	4,000
Angolan refugees in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)	about	20,000.

"Aid to refugees

"The influx of Angolan refugees soon attracted world attention. The relief organizations which tried to provide assistance for the refugees in the Congo (Kinshasa) encountered many difficulties—not least among them, the political instability in the country itself.

"MPLA was the first Angolan political organization which decided to make an active contribution to the aid operations for Angolan refugees. It set up a relief organization—the Angolan voluntary corps for assistance to refugees (CVAAR)—which succeeded in channelling to the refugees a large proportion of the international aid provided.

"Philanthropic organizations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Gabon, the Central African Republic, the Kingdom of Morocco, the United Kingdom, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the USSR, Bulgaria, Switzerland and Italy, as well as certain United States philanthropic organizations with offices at Kinshasa, provided CVAAR with gifts of foodstuffs, drugs, clothing and even equipment and cash.

"With this assistance, CVAAR was able to set up a vast network of dispensaries and schools along the Congo-Angola frontier. This was undoubtedly the main refugee aid network in the Congo (Kinshasa) during 1962 and 1963, and it was destined to become the backbone of aid operations which—even at that time—included the distribution of food, vaccination campaigns, disease diagnosis campaigns, education campaigns, etc.

"This network consisted of more than twenty dispensaries and school posts situated all along the frontier from the province of Kwango as far as the coast, and extending to the frontier of the Cabinda district. It was directed by a team of Angolan doctors, nurses and teachers. In addition to the central dispensary at Kinshasa, there was a dispensary and—in most cases—a school at other frontier localities such as Kimpangu, Lukala, Boma, Kimwenza, Matadi, Kipindi, Kindopolo, Tumbamani, Kahemba, Boko, Malele, Songololo, Moerbeke, Lufu, Kimongo, Luali, Mbata Manga, Nganda Binda, Iloupanga and Banga.

"CVAAR was also having some success with a programme for the distribution of agricultural requirements (hoes and seeds) so that crops would be grown to make up for the shortage of food-stuffs.

"Although CVAAR did not receive any contribution from the Office of UNHCR, this United Nations body was of course helping Angolan refugees, particularly by its contribution to certain projects undertaken by humanitarian organizations such as the Congo Protestant Relief Agency, Caritas-Congo, the Congolese Red Cross, the Baptist Missionary Society, etc.

"In September 1963, following the unilateral recognition by former Prime Minister Adoula of a self-styled Angolan government in exile, the network of dispensaries maintained by CVAAR in the Congo (Kinshasa) was paralysed, with regrettable results

for the refugee population, which was thus deprived of one of its most effective sources of aid.

"In 1966, CVAAR was authorized to resume its activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Two dispensaries for refugees were immediately opened, one at Kinshasa and the other at Songololo (on the frontier). Unfortunately, it has been difficult to do any useful work there, owing to the acts of pillage and banditry committed by representatives of the above-mentioned self-styled government in exile with the connivance of some of the local authorities. Only a short time ago, these persons broke into the CVAAR dispensary at Songololo, looted the drugs and kidnapped the male nurses on duty there. One of these nurses is missing (believed murdered), while the other two are detained with a few dozen other Angolans in the Congolese village of Kinkuzu, in a camp which the Congolese Government made available to the head of the self-styled government in exile in 1962.

"It seems that the political motives which have obstructed CVAAR action on behalf of the Angolan refugees have also had a direct or indirect effect on UNHCR action. The UNHCR programmes have not, of course, been suspended, but they have suffered—at least to outward appearances—from a certain stagnation. This apparent stagnation may be due partly to the success of certain programmes to integrate groups of peasants into the new conditions of the country of asylum. It is well known, on the other hand, that UNHCR has had some difficulty in finding agents to carry out larger-scale aid programmes for the Angolan refugees in the Congo.

"This explains the differences between the amount of funds allocated for programmes on behalf of Angolan refugees in the Congo, and those earmarked for refugees from Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and the Angolan refugees in other countries (to mention only the refugees from countries under Portuguese colonial domination).

"According to the note by the Secretariat on the question of refugees (A/AC.109/L.293 and Add.1), the number of refugees at the end of 1965 from the Territories under Portuguese colonial domination was estimated as follows:

Guinea (under Portuguese administration)

30,000 refugees in Senegal

"For Angola, at least, the figure given is certainly too small. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo put the number of Angolan refugees at 600,000, while other sources gave a figure of 379,000 for 1965. These estimates, in spite of their tentative character, give some idea of the difficulties encountered in providing extensive assistance to the great mass of Angolan refugees in the Congo.

"In 1965, UNHCR allocations for the three countries under Portuguese colonial domination were as follows (A/AC.109/L.293, annex):

	\$US
For refugees from Angola in the Democratic	
Republic of the Congo	
For refugees from Mozambique in the United	
Republic of Tanzania	213,000
For refugees from Guinea (Bissau) in Senegal	108.170.

"In 1966 the allocations were as follows (A/AC.109/L.293):

\$US

15,000

"In October 1966, the steady increase in the number of Angolan refugees in Zambia, which was rapidly approaching the figure of 4,000, prompted UNHCR and the Zambian Government, which was also providing aid, to make a number of emergency allocations. By the end of 1966, these allocations totalled \$US115,600 (A/AC.96/INF/61, Add.1).

"Even if allowance is made for the \$US89,238 spent on certain projects for Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the period 1962/1965, it is quite clear that, for reasons beyond the control of UNHCR, these refugees have been prevented from receiving assistance more commensurate with their numbers and needs.

"It is also clear that the 20,000 or so Angolan refugees, most of them from the district of Cabinda, who are now in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), have never received any assistance from UNHCR at all.

"It is true, of course, that the action taken by UNHCR on behalf of refugees in a given country depends largely on the programmes submitted to UNHCR by the Government of the country concerned. Many African countries, however, are so preoccupied with problems of reconstruction and the consolidation of independence that they do not have time to deal comprehensively with the difficult problem of the refugees to whom they have so generously offered asylum.

"This in itself is surely one reason why UNHCR, with the prior agreement of the Governments concerned, should try to encourage the organizations closest to refugees—that is, any liberation movements which are anxious to help—to draft aid programmes which would be implemented under the supervision of a representative of the host country and a representative of UNHCR.

"Education problems

"In October 1966, MPLA circulated to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Director-General of UNESCO and the Director of the United Nations Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories a statement of its views on the education of Angolan refugees. Of the various problems mentioned in that document, we should like now to revert to those which still seem to be of particular importance.

"MPLA was glad to note that, at its last session, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme took a number of decisions on problems of concern to us, namely:

- "(a) that UNHCR should now be associated with the implementation of the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese colonial domination;
- "(b) that UNESCO and UNHCR should collaborate closely in the implementation of education programmes for refugees;
- "(c) that the Executive Committee authorized the High Commissioner to open a special fund for refugee education.

"MPLA also notes that its concern with refugee education programmes is shared by a number of organizations dealing with the same problems. For example, after the statement by MPLA of its views had been circulated, meetings of organizations and public figures dealing with refugee education were held at Wickrath (November 1966), London (March 1967) and New York (April 1967).

"The conclusions and recommendations put forward at these meetings contain a number of valuable suggestions and could very profitably be applied in the implementation of large-scale projects. Most of the participants advocated discussions—or even close co-operation—with the liberation movements of countries which are still dependent.

"In the view of MPLA, however, much better results could be achieved if these meetings were held under the auspices either of UNESCO or UNHCR, and if they were attended by representatives both of the African countries and of the liberation movements concerned.

"In the conclusions reached at all these meetings, reference was made to the difficulties resulting from the low level of education of most of the refugees of school age, a situation which excludes any possibility of a coherent programme of higher education.

"It is therefore generally recognized that special attention should be given to primary, secondary and technical education and that the procedures to be established for solving these problems call for effective co-operation between the various groups concerned.

"There is talk of setting up pilot programmes designed to produce the maximum returns for the minimum time involved, and there is talk of finding material resources (premises, teachers, equipment, etc.) but in our view the most important thing is to make a start.

"The following is an example of one of the practical problems facing MPLA.

"About eighty Angolan children, aged from seven to eighteen years and selected from among the pupils of various MPLA schools along the frontiers, have been admitted as boarders to a school (a farm rented for the purpose not far from the Cabinda-Congo (Brazzaville) frontier), where they are receiving primary education in four classes. The plan of MPLA is that those who have completed the final class will, from the beginning of the following year, receive an accelerated secondary education lasting three or four years—depending on the performance of each pupil—to enable them to apply for admission to higher educational institutions. This would fill the existing gap at the secondary education level.

"For the moment, the special difficulties involved in providing technical education are preventing MPLA from establishing a similar programme in this field.

"The plan is very simple in outline but is not devoid of difficulties. These could be reduced considerably by collaboration with specialized bodies.

"Difficulties have been encountered, for example, in obtaining textbooks and some kinds of school equipment (laboratory equipment, maps, etc.) and, at another stage, in providing food and clothing for the school children once the improvised class-rooms are ready.

"MPLA has devised temporary solutions for some of these problems. Cyclostyled copies have been produced of readers, and of textbooks on the history and geography of Angola and Africa and on the natural sciences. Dormitories and blackboards have been improvised; notebooks and pencils have been kindly provided by certain organizations.

"Much more, however, is required.

"UNESCO should be invited to make a contribution, at least in regard to the teaching problems, and UNHCR should be invited to help in solving some of the material problems such as the provision of accommodation, food and clothing for the school children.

"In spite of all these difficulties, a small hospital with a doctor in charge has been opened on the premises of the boarding school. Apart from providing facilities for consultations and operations, the hospital serves as a school of nursing. Courses are given to ten trainees at a time, since this is the maximum number which can be accommodated.

"The teaching in these schools is given in Portuguese in accordance with the principles which MPLA advocated in paragraph 8 of the statement of its views.

"Health problems

"In this particular field there is no doubt that many voluntary organizations as well as persons devoted to the cause of the refugees have done magnificent work.

"It would obviously be over-ambitious to claim that a solution to the problem is already in sight, especially as the problem is not confined to refugees alone. In any event, the seriousness of the refugee health situation still gives ground for deep concern. Prolonged malnutrition, leading to diseases of various kinds, and a large number of infectious diseases are rife among refugees and are on the increase, but no projects have yet been launched to curb the incidence of disease.

"CVAAR, in co-operation with similar organizations, could play a very important role in this connexion if the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were to provide it with the necessary guarantees.

"A council or committee composed of representatives of all the voluntary organizations operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo might, with the co-operation of the United Nations specialized agencies (FAO, WHO and UNDP), provide lasting solutions for many of the problems involved.

"Status of the Angolan refugees

"All the independent countries bordering on Angola have received the Angolan refugees as brothers, often at great sacrifice to themselves. Even in his hour of distress, the refugee from Angola has found a welcome in neighbouring countries regardless of the difficulties which these countries have inherited from the recent colonial situation.

"The only thing marring this picture of fraternal solidarity is the apparent tolerance of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards the kidnapping, detention, murder and looting practised by the above-mentioned self-styled government in exile against Angolan refugees. These crimes and activities, which may be regarded as impugning the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

violate the rights of the refugees and seriously impede the implementation of the refugee aid programmes to mention but this one aspect of the problem.

"Conclusions

"The sole object of MPLA in preparing this document has been to contribute to the effectiveness of the United Nations effort on behalf of the Angolan refugees.

"MPLA believes that UNHCR, in the exalted task which it has assumed, needs the assistance of all persons of goodwill. In the light of this principle, MPLA is still convinced that UNHCR could improve its aid programmes for the Angolan refugees if it could find a way of discussing them with the specialized agencies, the host countries and representatives of the liberation movements concerned. Discussions of this kind would certainly lead to an intensification of aid to the Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; to the establishment of an aid programme for the Angolan refugees now in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville); to a study
—in collaboration with UNESCO—of model programmes of accelerated education to be followed by organizations providing education for the refugees; to a study of the possibilities of providing technical education to meet the requirements of an independent Angola; to a study of the problems involved in providing housing, food and clothing for school children; and to the implementation of new settlement and medical assistance programmes for the refugees.

"MPLA hopes that UNHCR and the Executive Committee of its Programme will regard this document as a response to the vast aid effort already contributed by the UNHCR, and as an expression of views by a group which is fighting for the right to assume legitimate responsibility for solving the social problems of the Angolan people."

597. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that emigration from Portugal to Angola was one of the weapons used by Portugal to prolong its domination over that Territory. In order to persuade emigrants to settle in Angola, the Portuguese Government was obliged to offer them inducements. It had established settlements (colonatos)—groups of farmers who chose the best land. The occupants were evicted and their place was taken by families of settlers from Portugal, the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands. The families were lent agricultural equipment and money, so that they would have everything they needed to farm the land. There were over 2,000 families in the largest settlement, which was at Cela. By evicting Africans to give the settlers the best land, the Portuguese Government was committing an act of piracy. In addition, it recruited "soldier-settlers" from the Portuguese expeditionary forces, who were persuaded to settle in Angola and send for their families. That policy, which was jeopardizing the economy of the indigenous population, had admittedly produced some results.

598. The petitioner said that Portugal was not implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories. Angola had become an enormous military base. Airfields were being set up everywhere for the latest military aircraft purchased by Portugal. More and more troops were being massed in Angola. The situation was becoming increasingly dangerous

for the whole of southern Africa due to the explosive situation in South West Africa and Rhodesia,

599. In reply to a question concerning the effects of the war in Angola on the economic, social and financial position of Portugal, the petitioner said that the current military budget had increased by 44 per cent, at the expense of public health, education and the small Portuguese taxpayers, who paid the indirect taxes levied on all imported goods in order to finance the war. Portugal was ruined. It had an enormous public debt, which showed the effort that Salazar's war in Angola represented for the Portuguese people.

600. Asked whether any reduction in Portugal's arms potential had been observed since the General Assembly had requested Member States to refrain from supplying arms to Portugal, the petitioner said that the United Nations General Assembly had repeatedly adopted resolutions aimed at preventing States from supplying arms to Portugal, in order to keep a ruthless war from continuing. The fact was, however, that nothing of that nature had been achieved. On the contrary, Portugal's arsenal of weapons was growing ever larger and more modern.

601. Portugal received weapons from NATO but it also purchased weapons abroad. The Angolan resistance fighters had captured from the enemy weapons made in Israel. Israel had been asked for an explanation. Apparently the weapons had been sold on a kind of "open market" for weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany, which had in turn sold them to Portugal. The weapons included a Belgian FAL rifle bearing the mark of the Herstal arms factory, Italian grenades, etc. Some of the countries supplying arms to Portugal said that their bilateral agreements with that country stipulated that the arms should not be used against the peoples under Portuguese domination. It was obvious that Portugal was violating those agreements. The Angolan resistance fighters had defused a foreignmade bomb weighing almost 400 kilogrammes, dropped from an aircraft. They had kept it to show the Special Committee, if necessary. France was still taking orders for warships (especially submarines) and supplying Portugal with helicopters which the Portuguese Air Force used against the maquis.

602. Asked for details about the weapons made in Israel and the quantity which Portugal possessed and was employing in its struggle against the Angolan fighters, the petitioner said that so far, the Angolan guerrillas had recovered only one weapon made in Israel, a UZI Lewis gun. As he had already said, the Israel authorities accounted for the presence of that weapon in Angola by the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany had purchased weapons made in Israel on the "free market" and resold them to Portugal. He was not in a position to give any details as to the quantity of weapons made in Israel at Portugal's disposal.

603. Asked whether he had any knowledge of special training programmes for Portuguese parachutists, either in Angola, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel or elsewhere, the petitioner replied that, with regard to Israel, no evidence against that country had so far been found. On the other hand, the military agreements concluded between the Governments of Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany were a matter of common knowledge. The important air base at Beja, in southern Portugal, was being used as a base for German Starfighter aircraft, and German instructors were training Portuguese pilots there. The Starfighters

had a very long range and were often used in Angola. The military agreements between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany even made provision for Portuguese wounded in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), who were transported to the Federal Republic for treatment in German hospitals.

- 604. Asked if there were any military experts other than those of Portuguese nationality operating with the Portuguese forces against the African patriots in Angola, the petitioner said that he thought the Portuguese forces were assisted by foreign experts. It was difficult to give proof, because the Angolans had not yet killed or captured any. Everyone knew, however, that certain foreign countries were giving Portugal military assistance. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany had given Portugal weapons and aircraft and German experts were training the Portuguese to use them. In addition, the Angolan partisans had reported that, during the fighting, they often heard shouts in a foreign language.
- 605. Asked whether Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany or any Western Power had given any help to the Angolan liberation movement, the petitioner explained that some of the countries which were helping Portugal in its war against the Angolan people offset that policy by certain forms of assistance, which were, moreover, the act of voluntary organizations rather than Governments. As well as material aid, those voluntary organizations sent some doctors and students to Angola, but, again, such action had no official character. For the sake of completeness, two exceptions to that rule should be mentioned: Denmark and Sweden were giving direct aid in the execution of the programme of assistance to Angolan refugees in the Congo.
- 606. Asked what particular difficulties were encountered by the Angolan people in their fight for national liberation, he said that MPLA was encountering tremendous difficulties. It had inherited a colonial situation which had deprived the Angolans of all means of progress. They had no leaders. They had to be trained during the fighting, but then they were not available for fighting. The war against the Portuguese was a terrible war. It was not possible to defend villages where there were no partisans. The Portuguese savagely murdered all those suspected of being connected with the maquis. They bombed villages with napalm and poisoned crops. It was extremely difficult for the Angolan people to hold out with the scanty means at their disposal. The Angolans needed schools where they could learn about the problems of their country. They needed medical assistance and hospital beds, since there were none for the Africans in Angola. They needed to recover their dignity.
- 607. The national liberation movement had other difficulties to overcome. There was a shortage of equipment. The Angolan forces could not come to the assistance of their people in time, because of the lack of equipment. It was also difficult to supply the *maquis*. It was high time that neighbouring countries realized the gravity of the situation and gave the Angolan patriots the freedom of action which they needed to function properly.
- 608. MPLA was glad to have an opportunity to describe to the Special Committee the difficulties it was encountering. It hoped that the Committee would help it solve the important problem of freedom of action. Indeed, that was why it had sent its representatives to appear before the Committee.

- 609. Asked about the political and psychological impact of MPLA's military successes on the people living in the non-liberated areas, the petitioner said that MPLA had always maintained combat centres about 20 kilometres from the capital, for instance in the Lower Congo region, where it had many partisans. For many years it had not been possible to keep them regularly supplied with equipment, weapons and ammunition. However, they had held out heroically until 1966. MPLA had at last succeeded in sending relief columns with good leaders and good weapons to revive the fight in those regions.
- 610. MPLA had then opened the eastern front, which was spreading continually. It was very easy to mobilize people in those regions, because MPLA enjoyed a certain freedom of action in Zambia. The people were only waiting for weapons to fight. Whole villages rallied spontaneously to the MPLA forces. Unfortunately, there were not enough weapons.
- 611. In addition, MPLA usually prepared the ground before unleashing an armed struggle, so as not to involve the people in a hopeless revolt. Political leaders went to the area to give the people a grounding in political and military matters, so that they would be able to participate more effectively in the war of national liberation.
- 612. He had already referred in his statement to the declining morale of the Portuguese forces. That was one result of the MPLA's military action. A communiqué in *Le Monde* of 15 September 1966 had stated that, upon his return from an inspection tour in Angola, a Portuguese general had announced that the rebels had opened a new front and were using Zambia as an operational base. That had been the first official reference to fighting near Zambia. The Minister had sent huge reinforcements to the eastern front but had made no secret of his pessimism.
- 613. The Angolan people, for their part, welcomed the guerrillas enthusiastically and gave them every support. Wherever there was one man with a rifle, forty more armed themselves with machetes. That spirit was making headway on all fronts. At Nova Lisboa, one whole barracks of Angolan soldiers dragooned into the Portuguese army had mutinied.
- 614. The eastern front was linked with the centre and the west of Angola by an important railway line which ran to the port of Lobito. That was the channel for transmitting MPLA's orders. The railway had been important, when the eastern front had been opened, in undermining the morale of the Portuguese troops.
- 615. Recently, in the Portuguese National Assembly itself, a deputy had cast doubts on the competence of his leaders and drawn attention to the complete lack of co-ordination in the military, economic and political spheres. That was a clear indication of the psychological climate created by the current situation.
- 616. In reply to a question about the extent of MPLA's control in Angola, the petitioner said that MPLA had always maintained a strong presence in Cabinda. It was eagerly awaiting the arrival of the OAU military commission, which would be able to see for itself the situation in the region. Some of the figures which had been given concerning the area of the territory liberated had perhaps not been understood rightly. It would be more correct to speak of controlled territories, rather than liberated territories. MPLA control over the liberated part of Cabinda consisted of such

activities as resisting the ambushes laid for its guerrillas and laying its own ambushes, preventing Portugal from dropping provisions for its troops by parachute and training guerrillas as parachutists.

- 617. It was difficult for anyone to give figures for the controlled areas, as it was not always possible to go there and check. That was the reason why MPLA had refrained from quoting figures and had merely mentioned certain villages. For example, in one sector, in the northern region, MPLA controlled thirty villages, with a total population of about 15,000. It was in such terms that MPLA tried to assess the relative importance of the liberated areas.
- 618. Replying to questions about the nature of MPLA's activities in the liberated zones, the petitioner said that this depended on the problems which arose. The liberated zones were encircled by Portuguese forces. Relations with the towns and villages controlled by the Portuguese were difficult. However, MPLA was trying to prepare the people for independence. Thousands of children were subjected to rigorous discipline. However, they often suffered from nervous diseases, because they were terrified of the bombing, and from malnutrition. Often, even when they went abroad to study, they could not control their panic when an aircraft passed overhead. As many of them as possible attended school, but they could not buy books. Moreover, even if they could buy Portuguese books, they did not want to.
- 619. MPLA had opened a small hospital, which was also used as a nurses' training school. The graduates trained the others. However, the whole organization was rather rudimentary.
- 620. At the administrative level, MPLA had set up an action committee in each village, which administered the village in agreement with the military command in charge of the liberated zones.
- 621. Co-operation between the military and political leaders of MPLA was maintained with the assistance of the political commissioner, who was also the second in command of the armed forces in each region. He was usually an experienced soldier and a wise man, who was knowledgeable about the various aspects of social life and was responsible for reconciling military and civilian needs.
- 622. While the fight went on, MPLA was constantly working to build the future, to provide a solid basis for the independence for which it was struggling and above all to ensure the country's economic development. In the liberated zones, the maquis had only limited means of action. All it could do was provide a minimum of medical assistance while at the same time caring for the education of the people. The latter was the essential problem and the only one towards whose solution the maquis could contribute. Without textbooks, exercise books or pencils, children of school age sat at the foot of trees and were given lessons by teachers seeking to prepare them for the future. Nothing more than that could be done for the present.
- 623. Asked how MPLA managed to maintain regular supplies to the garrisons operating in the regions which he had mentioned earlier, the petitioner said that the question of supplies was a very sensitive matter. The MPLA would be able to give information to the military commission of the OAU but it could not do so publicly to the Special Committee.

- 624. Regarding the possibility of obtaining freedom and independence for Angola through peaceful negotiations, he said that the movement which he represented was not a belligerent one. Well before the outbreak of war, it had made urgent appeals to the people and to the Portuguese Government, pointing out the threat of war which was hovering over Angola. MPLA had always hoped that the Portuguese people, unlike their Government, would give evidence of a desire to grant the peoples of Angola and the other Portuguese colonies the right to self-determination and independence. On 13 June 1960, MPLA had sent the Portuguese Government a statement in which it had analysed the situation created by the considerable reinforcements of troops and arms which the Portuguese had been sending to Angola. It had asked the Portuguese Government to accept, in particular, the following proposals: immediate official recognition of the Angolan people's right to selfdetermination; a total amnesty and the immediate release of all prisoners; recognition of political freedoms and the right to form parties; the withdrawal of Portuguese armed forces and the liquidation of military bases; and a meeting with Angolan political organizations to discuss the methods by which independence should be reached. The position of MPLA had not changed. If it had been obliged to resort to armed force, the reason had been because that was the only means of combating Portugal's activities. If the Portuguese Government would accept the conditions set forth in the MPLA statement, that organization would still be prepared to discuss the situation in Angola.
- 625. In reply to an appeal to the various Angolan parties to form a common front and mobilize their strength against the common enemy, the petitioner said that he fully agreed about the need for a common front in the struggle against Portugal. His movement's programme bore that point out. He read out provisions of both the minimum and the maximum programme. The minimum programme for which MPLA was fighting envisaged the speedy formation of an Angolan liberation front bringing together in a broad union all political parties, all popular organizations, all armed forces, all prominent persons in the country, all religious organizations, all national or ethnic minorities in Angola, all African classes of society and all Angolans living abroad, irrespective of their political beliefs, wealth, sex or age. The maximum programme towards which MPLA was working envisaged a common struggle waged with all patriotic Angolan forces in a vast popular movement leading to the taking of power by the Angolan people and the establishment of a democratic republican régime on a basis of total independence.
- 626. That position had been taken by MPLA since the beginning. It went back to the formation of a political resistance front in Angola in 1956. As the leaders of the movement had stated time and again, they had always been and continued to be prepared to meet the leaders of the other movements fighting against Portuguese domination. Thus MPLA had taken advantage of the gatherings that had taken place during 1960 in connexion with "Africa Year" to arrange such meetings, with the help of countries like Algeria, Guinea, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MPLA had done the same at the Monrovia Conference. It had taken part in the meeting of the Three-Nation Commission of the Organization of African Unity, doing its utmost to foster union among the liberation movements. Anyone would attest to MPLA's constant efforts

to establish a common front of resistance to oppression. It was to be hoped that those who were doing nothing to achieve a common front would understand that the difficulties increased with the passage of time and that internal division was virtually a crime in the existing circumstances. The Angolan problem could be solved only by the dynamic process of struggle. It was essential to dispel the confusion which minor dissension among the Africans themselves might create in the minds of those who shaped world public opinion.

627. The waverings of Angolans were understandable. Far too many people, including non-Africans, had meddled with their problems. As matters were at present, it was hard to draw together the threads of African resistance. That was all the more regrettable as Angola seemed clearly to be more capable of successful resistance than any other Territory under Portuguese domination. Unity was a pre-condition of success in the struggle and it must be achieved at all costs.

628. Asked whether a specific agreement existed between the liberation movements in all Portugueseoccupied Territories and, if so, how it was implemented, the petitioner stated that the collaboration between MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP had existed for some time. It was included in the programme of the Ligue d'action unitaire pour l'Angola. In 1960, it had been decided to establish CONCP (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas). At that time, it had been, above all, a question of mobilizing the opinion of international organizations by calling their attention to the situation of the colonies under Portuguese domination. Two years had sufficed to attain that objective. CONCP had then decided to extend its programme, because the situation had now become known and the issue had been brought before the United Nations. It had decided, therefore, to go further and apply itself, on the one hand, to a joint training scheme for future cadres in the three countries and, on the other hand, to the consolidation of military collaboration, which must remain secret and which gave rise to frequent meetings between leaders from the three regions.

629. Asked which countries he had in mind when he had asked the Special Committee to help him in obtaining the assistance of certain countries, the petitioner said that he would have to give a brief historical résumé of the problem. In 1963, certain African countries had considered that the best weapon at their disposal for fighting colonialism was to recognize the existence of an Angolan Government in exile. The idea had been an excellent one, but it had been put into practice too soon and under unfavourable conditions, because unity had not yet been achieved. The choice which had been made had dealt a very serious blow to the chances of achieving unity, because it had involved a value judgement which no one had been qualified to make and of which MPLA had been the victim. Following that decision, MPLA had been obliged to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula had forbidden it to continue its activities. It had always hoped and still hoped that that unfortunate matter would be cleared up. OAU itself had been obliged to recognize that one of the most important, if not the most important, of the liberation movements had been underestimated. The investigations which it had carried out through its liberation committee had led it to the realization that MPLA was a patriotic organization which deserved to be helped. Since then, many African countries had shown their sympathy towards MPLA and had given it their support.

630. Asked what, in his judgement, the United Nations could do in addition to what it was already doing, to assist the Angolan freedom movement, the petitioner said that the United Nations field of action was undoubtedly limited. The problem must be viewed in that light. The efforts of the United Nations were useful in that they helped to inform international opinion about the activities of the liberation movements. That was in itself a great deal. Through the Security Council, the United Nations should seek, on the one hand, to make Portugal respect the United Nations Charter and, on the other hand, make other countries respect the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

631. The Angolan freedom fighters did not fear a prolongation of the war from the military viewpoint. They would lay down their arms only when Angola had achieved total independence. The United Nations should intervene in order to spare human lives on both sides, for the number of Portuguese soldiers being killed by Angolan partisans was far greater than the number of freedom fighters being killed by the Portuguese army. The issue was thus a humanitarian one. In other fields, science and culture in particular, the United Nations specialized agencies could give the Angolan people invaluable assistance in making up for the time lost under colonialism.

632. Regarding economic conditions within Angola, the petitioner said that there were two sides to the economic picture in Angola. On the one hand, there had been a definite economic upsurge due to the investment rush of the past few years, and hence a development of Angola's economic potential that could not be ignored. On the other hand, the expansion was not benefiting the indigenous Angolan population. The gains went to the big companies investing in Angola, to the Portuguese Government's budget, to senior Portuguese officials and, to a lesser extent, to junior officials and Portuguese "poor white" settlers in Angola. So far as the people were concerned, not only did they derive no benefit from the economic development in Angola but the development had produced a rise in the cost of living whose consequences were borne by the African population.

633. Asked about the current flow of refugees from Angola and whether it was increasing or decreasing, the petitioner said that it was difficult to answer the question because it was a few years since MPLA had maintained health stations on the border between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and it could not therefore gather direct statistics on the rate of arrival of refugees. However, certain religious organizations, mostly Protestant and some Catholic. which received refugees, did keep a check on refugee arrivals. On that basis MPLA was able to affirm that the rate of arrivals remained high. Only Portuguese propaganda claimed that the rate had substantially declined in the past few years, but one had merely to examine the Portuguese reports critically to draw the proper conclusion.

634. Asked what efforts MPLA was making to help the refugees, how many it was doing something about and where they were, the petitioner said that it was very difficult to give any exact figures; MPLA had preferred to take an average estimate and say that

there were over 400,000 refugees. In addition to its military activities, MPLA was particularly concerned with medical and educational provision for the refugees. The work it was doing in that field in the Congo was well known. At the moment, the organizations which were especially concerned with refugees were the Protestant and Catholic missions, and MPLA was grateful to them for the work they were doing to help Angolan refugees. MPLA was primarily a political organization. It was giving the refugees all the help it could, because it had not managed to persuade the international assistance agencies to aid them directly. MPLA recognized the needs of the refugees. At Kinshasa there was a clinic, which was not yet organized on a very large scale but which the members of the Special Committee had been invited to visit. The Committee might also visit a small school near the Cabinda border. The school was not intended for the children of the maguis. MPLA had set it up as a pilot school, with approximately ninety resident students, with a view to carrying out a full educational programme, particularly at the secondary

635. The main emphasis of the programme drawn up by MPLA to solve the Angolan refugee problem was on education, as there were many children among the refugees. MPLA had tried to organize primary schools, which would enable them to go on to secondary school later. However, the primary instruction had to be given in the language of their country, or at least in Portuguese, and that naturally posed a problem. The education programmes of the international agencies and UNHCR specified that education for refugees should be "integrated" with education in the country of asylum. However, the Angolan refugees were scattered over Zambia, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the languages spoken were different from theirs and the way of life was not what they had been accustomed to. Instruction given in Portuguese would be more useful to the Angolan refugees, who all wanted to return to Angola eventually.

636. MPLA had opened a school where instruction was given in Portuguese. The school had ninety pupils. The curriculum had been drawn up by MPLA. Excellent results had been obtained. MPLA would be glad if members of the Special Committee or representatives of specialized agencies could visit the school.

637. Later that year, MPLA was going to open a secondary school. It was at the secondary school level that there was a serious gap to be filled. The United Nations had decided to grant fellowships to refugees from Territories under Portuguese domination, but there were no qualified candidates. In their efforts to assist the Angolan refugees, the United Nations and the specialized agencies should therefore concentrate on secondary and technical education. There should be a programme of accelerated secondary or technical training. MPLA had stated its views on the subject to the specialized agencies, and to UNESCO and UNHCR in particular. UNESCO should cooperate with the leaders of the political movements and help them to draw up education programmes. Unfortunately, UNESCO's financial resources were very limited. The United Nations should provide UNESCO with the means to give more effective aid in that sector.

638. The amount of assistance given by MPLA to the Angolan refugees depended on its resources,

the bulk of which were obviously being used to extend the military front. War needs had absolute priority. The Movement therefore had very limited means to help the refugees. Three kinds of aid were needed. After covering several hundreds of kilometres on forced marches, the refugees arrived in a country whose laws and language of communication were different from theirs. They were naked—or almost naked—exhausted, starving and often ill. The first step was therefore to look after those uprooted and unhappy people, to feed and clothe them and often to nurse them, as they were highly vulnerable to epidemics and tuberculosis.

639. Secondly, they had to settle down and earn a living. In that connexion, he wished to pay a tribute to Angola's neighbours and particularly to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose co-operation was beyond all praise. In most cases the farmers, who asked nothing better than to work, were given a parcel of land in return for farming it. Of course, they had not been able to bring tools, seeds or live-stock with them. MPLA had tried to help, so far as its means permitted, by giving them the bare minimum. Unfortunately, it could not help the refugees who were currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but aid to them was provided for in its programme.

640. Thirdly, there was the problem of the family and particularly the children, who were the future of the country and, as such, the focus of MPLA's attention. There was one international organization which specialized in aid to children: UNICEF. Yet it had so far done nothing for the Angolan children. That was surprising, since it should be bent on helping all children, even and especially if they were children of poor and wretched refugees. He asked the Special Committee whether it could bring that problem to UNICEF's attention.

641. Asked whether the Angolan organizations which had sent petitioners had tried to establish a joint programme for aid to refugees, with a view to strengthening the assistance given to such persons, the petitioner said that the Special Committee would undoubtedly already have realized that the situation of the Angolan patriots did not allow the establishment of a joint assistance programme. That was not, however, the fault of the Angolan political organizations. MPLA considered that the international organizations which were giving aid to the refugees had every interest in refraining from meddling in Angolan political problems. A joint programme could be established only if the specialized agencies agreed to deal openly with the liberation movements and supply them with the cadres, nursing staff and medicaments which they needed. MPLA had been able to maintain aid stations in the Congo under the direction of competent nursing staff. At Kinshasa it had even obtained assistance from several bodies which were looking after refugees in that city. Those bodies did not make distinctions between one political organization and another. They were concerned, above all, with the effectiveness of the aid they were giving to the Angolan refugees in the form of food-stuffs, clothing and so forth.

642. Replying to a question about the amount of assistance MPLA was receiving from UNESCO, the petitioner said that, unfortunately, UNESCO aid to Angola—fighting Angola or Portuguese Angola—was so far virtually non-existent. Portugal did not cooperate with UNESCO and UNESCO was prejudiced

against MPLA. However, UNESCO had been cooperating for the past year with UNHCR, which had set up a special education fund for refugees in November. Previously UNHCR assistance to the education programme had been given purely on an *ad hoc* basis. It was now organized under a complicated procedure, which was reducing the effectiveness of UNHCR's generous initiative.

643. It was encouraging to note that the UNHCR had succeeded in obtaining assistance from UNESCO and perhaps from other agencies in drawing up an education programme for the refugees. If the programme was to be implemented, however, an independent country would have to meet the needs of the refugees. The countries sheltering the refugees already had difficulty in solving their own problems. They lacked personnel and resources, especially when the refugees arrived in their thousands, as had been the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

644. Neither UNESCO nor UNHCR would talk with the representatives of the liberation movements. The Special Committee should persuade them to do so. MPLA had schools but no teacher training, no personnel qualified to draw up a sound literacy programme or a curriculum for primary or secondary studies. MPLA had prepared textbooks with the means available. They were poorly bound mimeographed textbooks, which rapidly disintegrated. Technical improvements were needed. Those concerned also wanted to know whether, from the educational viewpoint, the textbooks prepared for uprooted Angolan children in a foreign country should be altered and improved. That was where the assistance of UNESCO experts would be invaluable.

645. After members of the Special Committee had viewed a collection of captured Portuguese arms (see paragraph 601 above), the representative of Iraq thanked the representatives of MPLA for giving the Special Committee yet another opportunity to inspect a collection of arms captured from the Portuguese forces operating against the freedom fighters in Angola. The weapons and bombs had been manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium and Italy.

646. The representative of Italy, replying to the representative of Iraq, said that the Italian-made grenade exhibited by MPLA was of a type produced during, or even before, the Second World War and that such weapons had come into the hands of a great many people during the events in Italy in 1943-1945, so that it was now impossible to trace its origin.

647. The representative of Iraq said that the important fact about the weapons was not their age but the fact that they were still being used against the people of Angola.

648. The representative of Italy added that, when Italian-made grenades had been shown at Kinshasa, he had asked the petitioners if they could tell the Special Committee not only the country of manufacture of the arms, but also how they had been supplied to Portugal. He had been told that it was impossible to find out where they had come from. He once more stressed that Italy had not supplied any arms to Portugal. The weapons in question were very old stock which could now be found almost anywhere.

649. The Chairman said that the men fighting could not be expected to trace where the arms had come

from. If the freedom fighters captured weapons manufactured in a given country, the onus of proof was on the authorities of that country to establish how its arms had come into the possession of Portugal. If Italian arms were captured, the African people could only assume that the arms had been supplied from Italy, unless the Italian Government proved otherwise.

650. The representative of Iraq said that the arms shown by the MPLA included a 100-pound bomb manufactured in the United States in 1964. That bomb could demolish any building. It, and the other weapons shown, were just as deadly as those produced today.

651. The representative of the United States of America said that he supported the Italian representative's logic. The arms shown by the petitioners were very old. With regard to the 100-pound bomb, the Zambian Army expert had said that its origin was doubtful; it might have come from Belgium; it might have come from the United States; it might have come from any other country. The implication, however, was being made that the United States Government was knowingly making arms available to Portugal for the purpose of using them in its Territories in Africa. That was untrue. It had been the firm policy of his Government since 1961 to prohibit the export of all arms to Portugal for use in its Territories in Africa from public or private sources in the United States. But there were millions of arms manufactured by all countries on the second-hand market and it was impossible for the countries of origin to trace their movements. At the end of the Second World War, large quantities of weapons had been left overseas. To say that, because the weapons had been made in a given country, they had therefore been supplied by the Government of that country was quite illogical. He hoped that no more allegations of that kind would be made unless it was known that the arms had been deliberately supplied to Portugal in violation of the embargo.

652. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that arms manufactured in 1945 still worked. United States soldiers had used such arms to defend themselves, and the Portuguese colonialists were now using them to murder and mutilate the people of Angola and to destroy their homes. When the petitioners had given verbal testimony concerning the origin of the weapons used against the freedom fighters, they had been told to produce concrete proof. Now they had produced physical evidence and some delegations were still not satisfied. But what more could they do? The freedom fighters could hardly be expected to ask the Portuguese soldiers and airmen where they had obtained those arms. It was significant that all the weapons shown had been manufactured by Portugal's NATO allies. Although the United States and other countries claimed to have enacted legislation against the provision of arms to Portugal, the weapons were still trickling through. The whole world had heard of the twenty B-26 bombers that were being flown from the United States to Portugal. In other statements, it had been admitted that arms were supplied to Portugal through the NATO system, and the people of Africa knew what Portugal did with those arms.

653. The representative of the United States of America said that the case mentioned by the Tanzanian representative was the only violation to have come to the attention of the United States Govern-

ment. The B-26 aircraft were surplus stock which had been made available for private purchase for civilian use on the open market in accordance with existing legislation and within the limits of existing export regulations. Because United States law forbids unauthorized sales of military equipment to Portugal, the buyers had tried to smuggle them to Portugal, but they had been arrested and brought to trial. Two of the individuals involved were tried in Buffalo, New York. Although they were acquitted, the jury rejected implications that the United States Government was in any way involved in the transaction.

654. The Chairman said that it had never been charged that the United States Government, as such, openly and officially supplied arms to Portugal in the knowledge that they would be used against the freedom fighters. The arms were supplied through private channels. The African public, however, was amazed to learn that in the United States private individuals could deal in bombers. Nobody ever heard of private individuals in the United States supplying arms in Cuba, for instance, but arms sent through private channels to Portugal were used to kill Africans. At the meetings of the Special Committee in 1966, a captured Portuguese pilot had confirmed that arms provided to Portugal by NATO, and which were supposed to be used exclusively for NATO purposes, were in fact being used against African freedom fighters.

655. Mr. Neto, speaking on behalf of Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA), said that there was no hope that Portugal would change its attitude and accede to the demands of the peoples it had colonized. For Portugal, Angola would always be a Portuguese province and the Angolans would always be Portuguese with black skin. The Salazar Government was demanding an extraordinary effort from the Portuguese people in order to continue the war in Angola. As a result of the opening of the south-eastern front, the colonialists had been compelled to to increase their total military strength from 50,000 in 1965 to 80,000 in 1967. The period of compulsory military service had been extended from two to four years. All settlers and officials of the colonial administration had to join the colonial civil defence militia. Young people between eighteen and twenty years of age were prohibited from emigrating. Portugal hoped by those means to make certain of having enough soldiers to continue the war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

656. Portugal was also reorganizing the Angolan economy so as to be able to withstand a long war. It was attempting to diversify agriculture. It was encouraging banking investments and the investment of foreign capital in order to speed industrialization. It was building the infrastructure needed for industrial development—roads, dams, railways, harbours and airfields—was modernizing research services and was trying to develop the domestic market by creating new demands in order to replace Angola's traditional economy by a market economy. At the same time, it was intensifying its propaganda campaign for the community.

657. Angolans had no choice but to take up arms in order to force the withdrawal of the colonialists from the national territory and to attain independence.

658. Unfortunately, United Nations efforts to persuade Portugal to change its policies had not yet

produced very positive results—partly because of Portugal's obstinacy and partly because of the attitude of the Western great Powers. Since the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, petitioners and some Members of the United Nations had furnished proof of the assistance given to Portugal by the NATO countries. At the last session of the General Assembly and the present session of the Special Committee, the question of the military assistance received by Portugal from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Israel and France, not to mention Rhodesia and South Africa, had been raised repeatedly.

659. An appeal had been made to those countries to halt their aid to the Salazar Government. He hoped that that appeal would be heeded and that the resolutions and recommendations adopted at the present session would help to hasten the solution of the Angolan problem and the liberation of all the Portuguese colonies.

660. The MPLA was the principal Angolan organization and the only one which was actually fighting in the national territory. Its military activities were concentrated mainly in the Cabinda district, the Dembos and Nanbuangongo regions and the districts of Cuanza North and Luanda. It was supported by the great majority of the Angolan people. In the liberated zones, the MPLA was trying to organize education, production and medical care and to give the people political training.

661. Asked what specific and immediate support the people of Angola required to help them in their work of rehabilitating the refugees and the people in the liberated zones, the petitioner said that, under existing circumstances, military activities naturally absorbed the greatest part of the MPLA's resources, for its primary task was to supply arms and money to the combatants. Nevertheless, the refugee problem had not been neglected. The refugees were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Zambia. They had to be sheltered, fed and clothed; education also had to be provided, for that was one of the MPLA's first concerns. Newly arrived refugees were generally accepted by the schools in the countries adjacent to Angola; that meant, in practice, that Angolan children and adults had to start over again from the beginning the studies they had carried on in Portuguese in their own country. They had to adjust to instruction given in French in the Congo and in English in Zambia and thus lost considerable time. The MPLA should therefore be given the means to establish primary and secondary schools in which the refugees would find favourable conditions for resuming the studies interrupted by their departure. It was hoped that the United Nations specialized agencies would give substantial assistance; however, apart from the useful activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, no practical steps had yet been taken to meet that need.

662. As for primary education, the MPLA had opened a boarding school at Brazzaville for children between seven and eighteen years of age, but there was a shortage of clothing, food and books; indeed, the teachers were reduced to writing their own textbooks, particularly since the French and English textbooks proved difficult to adapt to the needs of the students. The problem of secondary education was

even more serious. There was nothing to work with in that field, and technicians, teachers and educators were in short supply. Assistance from the United Nations specialized agencies and from UNESCO, in particular, would be especially desirable. The Zambian Government had assumed responsibility for the education of refugees, but it had not yet found a satisfactory solution to the problem.

663. In the liberated zones, seated under trees in the middle of the forest, without schoolhouses, paper, pencils or ink, forty-five groups of children were studying from mimeographed texts. Surely the United Nations and the specialized agencies should take an interest in the problem, even if only by helping to prepare Portuguese-language textbooks for primary schools.

664. Asked for information about the difficulties encountered by the MPLA in training skilled cadres and about any assistance being provided to it by such specialized agencies as, for example, UNESCO and the ILO, the petitioner repeated that MPLA had not yet received assistance from any specialized agency. The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees was planning to deal with the problem of education in so far as the refugees were concerned. At the present time, the educational level was very low-so much so that it was necessary to begin by completing the primary education of the future cadres. One of the United Nations specialized agencies and some friendly countries had offered several dozen scholarships to Angolan students; however, they were good only for universities, so that it had not even been possible to use all of them. It was essential to establish, on a priority basis, one or more secondary schools which would provide a bridge between primary education and the opportunities for university study offered to young Angolans. Any international or national assistance for that purpose would be welcome. It was, of course, desirable that secondary education should be provided in the Portuguese language.

665. In the zones which had been free from Portuguese control, life was very hard. The people had to defend themselves against constant attacks by the Portuguese, who had a formidable air force whereas the Angolan fighters had no anti-aircraft defence. The Portuguese air force was not satisfied with bombing the population. It also dropped poisonous substances in the liberated zones. In addition, there was a shortage of everything, particularly clothing and certain foods such as salt; in some regions, the children born after 1961 did not know the taste of salt and were surprised when they discovered it in exile.

666. The situation in the liberated zones could obviously be mastered only through very strict discipline. The MPLA had organized military and political training of the population, setting up two centres, one in the north and the other in the south, for that purpose. It was fully conscious of the fact that the population must be made self-sufficient, especially with regard to food. It expected little in terms of outside assistance. The continuation of the liberation war depended mainly on the efforts of the people. The situation with regard to health care was also difficult, for there were very few Angolan doctors. They trained nurses, who acted as medical assistants, but such assistants were too few in number and lacked drugs. Many people were dying in the bush for lack of treatment. First-aid workers, trained in three-month accelerated courses, took care

of the wounded and also gave preventive care to the civilian population. They were called upon to treat deficiency diseases more often than infectious diseases.

667. The MPLA had thus created a civilian organization which, through action committees, guided all the communities liberated from Portuguese control. To achieve success it was relying on its own efforts and on aid from the OAU, from the African countries and from all friendly peoples whose assistance was enabling it to continue the fight.

668. Asked whether there were any fighting organizations other than the MPLA in Angola and, if so, what were the relations between the MPLA and the other organizations, the petitioner said that the MPLA was the principal Angolan nationalist organization and the only one actually fighting in the national territory.

669. Asked to cite facts to support the contention that the Federal Republic of Germany was supporting the Portuguese colonialists, the petitioner said that for some time past the Federal Republic of Germany had been giving Portugal substantial aid in various ways.

670. First of all, there was military aid. Portugal was forced to keep a considerable number of troops in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). At the outset, Portugal had had an army of about 120,000 men. At the present time, it was obliged to spread its troops throughout the Territories fighting to escape its control. It accordingly needed reinforcements, and that was where the Federal Republic of Germany had intervened. In 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany had established a military base at Beja in Portugal. There German advisers and other foreigners were training fliers to handle Portuguese Starfighter aircraft, the supplier of which was not known. The Federal Republic of Germany had sent 17,000 soldiers to Portugal to replace Portuguese troops which were being used to suppress the liberation struggle of the colonized peoples.

671. Mention must also be made of economic aid. Portugal benefited from very large investments originating in the Federal Republic of Germany. Krupp was exploiting enormous iron deposits there. The Federal Republic of Germany had aided in the construction of a railway. German capital was invested in the exploitation of manganese deposits and gold mines.

672. However, the Federal Republic of Germany did not merely give Portugal financial aid. It also supplied that country with weapons and even, through Brazil, with aircraft. That question had been raised at the last session of the General Assembly.

673. Asked whether there were any other military or para-military organizations in Angola and whether private companies operating in Angola had their own police or armed forces, the petitioner replied that until about 1955 repressive activities had been directed by the colonial administrators and heads of posts and in the towns by the police. In 1955, PIDE—a political police force which was similar to the one functioning in Portugal but which operated with even greater cruelty in Angola—had been established. At the present time, repressive activities were conducted by the administration, PIDE and the militia, a paramilitary organization composed of men and women settlers mobilized for civil defence. All Portuguese and Angolan officials were required to belong to the militia.

674. The companies which exploited Angola's wealth were controlled by the colonial administration,

with the exception of the diamond-mining company in the north of the country, whose private police and militia were not responsible to the Luanda Government. The diamond-mining company was very powerful; it was a kind of State within a State.

675. Mr. Matondo, speaking on behalf of the Parti progressiste angolais (PPA), said that PPA, which was resolved to achieve the national liberation of Angola amid national unity and understanding, had always preached territorial integrity and had always regarded Portugal as the one common enemy. PPA wished to point out that, with a view to the implementation of the resolution adopted by the OAU at the Accra Conference in 1965, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had convened a parliamentary session for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the existence of the Angolan movement in exile. As a result, the Chamber of Deputies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had applied itself to that problem and had prepared a report calling for the unconditional unification of all the Angolan movements at Kinshasa and elsewhere. President Mobutu was so deeply concerned about the problem of unification because the Congo felt the weight of Portuguese repression very heavily.

676. He gave a historical account of Portugal's colonizing activities in Angola from the time of the Portuguese exploratory mission led by the explorer Diogo Cão in 1482 up to the time when, in 1911, Portugal, changing its feudal régime for a fascist republican régime, had repudiated all the treaties which had been concluded by common agreement between Portugal and Angola. The Lisbon Government had decided at that time that Angola was a territory which had been conquered by Portugal and that its people were to be subjected to bloody and inhuman aggression. Forced labour and slavery had then been imposed on the Angolans. In order to strengthen its colonial rule, Portugal had decided to embark upon the decisive phase of the Portugalization of Angola, Numerous settlers had been established in Angola. Angolans were imprisoned without trial and paid shamefully low wages. The Supreme Chief of Angola had been reduced to just an ordinary chief and his authority no longer prevailed. Because of Portuguese colonial oppression, a great many Angolans had moved to the neighbouring colonies since 1930, in particular to the former Belgian Congo and the former French Congo.

677. Portuguese colonialism was continuing to develop. The Lisbon Government unashamedly asserted that there were no Angolans in Angola, but rather "Overseas Portuguese". Portugal had taken up arms against the innocent and unarmed Angolan people. It was supported by NATO, which provided it with the means of fighting against the Angolan people. Angolans were being burned alive by the Portuguese, while others were kept in prisons where they died for lack of medical care. By NATO's wish, Portuguese military training camps had long been established in Angola.

678. The historical facts which had been recognized by the Berlin Conference of 14 February 1885, the Brussels Convention of 25 May 1891, the Lisbon Protocol of 8 April 1892, the Brussels Declaration of 24 March 1894, the International Conference at Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919 and diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Spain showed the friendly

relations which had existed between Portugal and Angola before the Portuguese fascist Government had come to power. Legally speaking, those facts gave the Angolan people a very powerful weapon for the decolonization of Angola.

679. A people fighting for freedom must think about united action. If General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was to have effect, the Angolan liberation movements would have to unite their efforts to put an end to the crimes of colonialism in Africa. Any disorganized action would benefit colonialism, and the practical steps taken by the United Nations would remain a dead letter. The United Nations should endeavour to bring about the unification of the Angolan liberation movements. It was called upon to play a great role in mediating a conference between Portugal and the representatives of the Angolan people in a neutral country. The problem of liberation must be resolved, in order to put an end to the sufferings of the Angolan people, who needed both material and moral assistance from the United Nations. PPA therefore urged freedom- and peace-loving countries to turn their attention to the problem of the Angolans and to give them unconditional support.

680. Mr. Lulendo, speaking on behalf of the Ligue générale des travailleurs angolais (LGTA), said that the growing number of Angolan workers who were refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or still in the maquis inside Angola was a major concern of the LGTA leaders. That was the reason why that organization had ventured to submit a petition to the United Nations through the intermediary of the Special Committee. Portugal's policy in Angola was a flagrant violation of the principles set forth by the United Nations in respect of dependent Territories, LGTA had spared no effort in order to draw the attention of world opinion, and more particularly that of the most competent agencies, to the seriousness of the situation in Angola and in the other Territories under Portuguese domination. To that end, LGTA had, in 1963, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a report on forced labour and Portugal's inhuman attitude towards Angolan workers and the Angolan people in general. However, the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in July 1963, condemning Portugal, had not prevented that country from pursuing its criminal activities. It would be a very serious matter if those resolutions came to nothing. The Angolan people had received proof of the material and moral support afforded to Portugal by certain Powers and must express its displeasure. It thus had a right to demand, as had been done at the ILO Conference in May 1966, that Portugal should be expelled from the United Nations. For nearly seven years, the refugee workers and those who were still in the maguis had been suffering unemployment and exploitation. The United Nations had already taken radical measures enabling certain peoples of the world to govern themselves. It was because Portugal refused to implement the decisions of the United Nations that the Special Committee had decided to meet in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to observe in all objectivity the development of the Angolan struggle. Availing itself of that opportunity, LGTA, speaking on behalf of the Angolan working masses, called for United Nations intervention with a view to immediate and unconditional recognition by Portugal of the Angolan people's right to self-determination and independence.

681. Mr. Lele, speaking as President-General of the Parti démocrate Nto-Bako Angola, said that his party had been set up in 1960 by Angolans belonging to different ethnic groups, all of which were, however, equally nationalistic and equally determined to liberate the soil of their ancestors. Since it still believed in the possibility of maintaining friendly relations with Portugal and avoiding bloodshed, the Nto-Bako had espoused the doctrine of non-violence and had made a number of proposals to the Portuguese authorities; but, as it had turned out, it was a waste of effort.

682. In 1960, a delegation of the Nto-Bako Party, led by its then President, Mr. Angelino Alberto, had gone to Lisbon to contact the Portuguese authorities. Its proposals had had the following results: culturally and administratively, the Portuguese Government had granted a number of scholarships to Party militants; politically, the Portuguese Government had authorized the Party to carry on its political activities freely throughout Angola. But those had been merely vain promises.

683. In February 1961, fourteen scholarship holders had gone to Lisbon to study. In June 1962, thirty-seven Angolan students had returned to Angola with the permission of the Governor General of the country. Two months later, together with six members of Mr. Angelino Alberto's delegation, they had been arrested by the Portuguese political police (PIDE) and kept in prison without trial. Everything had been done to prevent the young students who had then been in Portugal from continuing their studies, in particular under the pretext that they did not yet have a sufficient grasp of the language to be able to follow the courses and enter the higher classes. Shortly thereafter, they had been compelled to adopt Portuguese nationality and to do their military service in the Portuguese army. Recalcitrants had had the remainder of their scholarships, their school equipment allowances and other benefits taken away from them. In 1962-1963, some of them had been expelled from the educational institutions in which they had been studying. Later, they had been expelled from Portugal, without being able to take any of their possessions with them.

684. Previous petitioners had described the miserable lot of the indigenous inhabitants of Angola to the Special Committee. Angelino Alberto had turned out to be a lackey of the Portuguese colonialists and was still free, protected by PIDE, whose ideas he shared. Consequently, he himself had succeeded Mr. Alberto as chairman of the Nto-Bako Committee, which met at Kinshasa, and his petition had been heard by the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in New York at its 1457th meeting. The Nto-Bako delegation in New York had, inter alia, demanded the following: a round-table conference similar to the one held in Brussels in 1960; recognition of the Angolan people's right to self-determination; the setting of a time-limit for Angola's independence; the drawing up of a detailed calendar for all interim stages during the transitional period preceding the country's independence; the proclamation of a general amnesty; and the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Angola and their replacement by United Nations forces.

685. Unfortunately, the experience of recent years was that all efforts were in vain and the results of the negotiations begun with the Portuguese Govern-

ment in an effort to obtain independence for Angola had been nil. The negotiations themselves had been demeaning. Whereas all the free and justice-loving peoples of the world had heard the voice of the Angolan people, Portugal remained entrenched in its inadmissible position as a colonial Power. It was understandable therefore why the Angolan people and the Nto-Bako Angola Party, which represented them, had no alternative but to associate themselves with the protest made by other movements and appeal to the United Nations and the OAU to help them find the right solution to that crucial problem. He wished to warn public opinion against some of the former members of the Nto-Bako Angola Party, who were trying to defame it by allegations of internal dissension in the Party. Those persons were mere lackeys of colonialism in the pay of the Portuguese, who were making use of such traitors to sow confusion in the minds of the Angolan people and to prevent them from shaking off the yoke under which they had laboured since the fifteenth century. The Nto-Bako Angola Party was a national, democratic party fighting by all available means for the independence of its country. It had moved from the era of non-violence to the era of revolution. The position of the Nto-Bako Angola Party should be clearly defined. International public opinion should know that that party was a unitary political party fighting by all means in its power, without either opportunism or sectarianism, to gain its country's sovereignty and free itself from the shameful colonial régime of Salazar.

686. In view of the problem's importance, he asked the Special Committee to draft and adopt unanimously a resolution inviting the Lisbon Government to take all necessary steps forthwith to ensure the implementation in Angola of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Any infringement of the interests of one people was ipso facto an infringement of the interests of the world as a whole, because the only sound basis for human relations was true political, economic and social interdependence. Peace could rest on a solid foundation only when colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism had become things of the past. In any case, the Nto-Bako was resolved to fight to defend the interests and rights of the Angolan people and to oppose any attempts by Salazar and his henchmen to perpetuate their domination of Angola.

687. The Special Committee was still trying to get Portugal, like other countries, to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, as everyone knew, Salazar's Portugal, Ian Smith's Rhodesia and Vorster's South Africa, whose cruel policies had been condemned by the United Nations, continued to endorse those policies, notwithstanding all United Nations resolutions, and were able to do so because of the increased assistance given by certain countries and international organizations.

688. The Nto-Bako Party was asking the Member States of the United Nations to adopt further resolutions aimed at putting an end to the increased assistance which the fascists, colonialists, neo-colonialists and imperialists were receiving from those who, while pretending to strive for world peace, were actually fomenting war. The international organizations might also be giving the enemies of peace indirect assistance by refusing to accept any responsibility in that regard, even if they were not giving them direct assistance. It was common knowledge that funds

passed from some organizations through countries which took responsibility for them into the hands of bandits, who were doing their utmost to worsen the international situation.

689. He urged the Special Committee to give special attention to the problems now facing the Angolan people with a view, in particular, to securing the release of all Angolan political prisoners and the convening of a round-table conference of all the leaders of the various Angolan political parties in order to achieve unity. He hoped that the conference would bear in mind the previously adopted resolutions concerning a diplomatic boycott of Portugal and the application of economic pressure to Portugal as long as it continued to treat Africa with contempt. The solution of Angola's problems depended on the unification of hitherto scattered forces at the sacrifice of all personal ambition.

690. That was, in brief, what the Angolan people demanded if Portugal wished to maintain normal relations with them after independence.

691. Mr. Ladeira-Lumona, speaking on behalf of the Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA), stressed the need for Angolan patriots to adopt a new and more positive attitude and to unite in order to succeed in their common struggle and eliminate ignorance, hatred and foreign influence. The CGTA, for its part, sought a round-table conference attended by all representatives of Angolan liberation movements. It appealed to all those who could in any way affect the drama being played out in Angola to enlist themselves in Angola's just cause. Angolan workers said "No" to the domination of Portugal, which was flouting human rights and Christian principles. They were asking the United Nations to help them gain independence. The régime imposed by the Portuguese was unacceptable. Politically, it meant the oppression of the black majority by a minority of Portuguese, in violation of democratic principles. Economically, the corporate system introduced by the Portuguese was an obstacle to the modernization of agriculture, industrialization and the integration of the Angolan economy into the African economy. It made it impossible to raise the standard of living of the people. Culturally, the régime meant the virtual suppression of the culture of the Angolan people, to whom freedom of conscience, religion and speech were denied. The régime had succeeded in depersonalizing the Angolan by destroying African folk lore, religion and languages. Lastly, the régime was equally pernicious in social terms: the standard of living of the Angolan people was one of the lowest in the world; and public health services served only the Portuguese and some assimilated blacks living in urban centres. The population was being decimated by illness, hunger and war. The educational system was designed to "disafricanize" the black man, whom it made unstable and uprooted.

692. Not only was that hypocritical and reactionary régime a brake on the Angolan people's development but it also posed a serious threat to peace in Africa and in the world. The provocative action of Portuguese troops and aircraft in bombing frontier zones and violating the territory of neighbouring African countries might lead to violent retaliation by those countries.

693. The United Nations, in which the Angolan people whole-heartedly placed their faith, should do everything possible to hasten Angola's attainment of

independence by demanding that its resolutions on decolonization should be carried out and by arraigning the oppressor before the bar of world public opinion. United Nations efforts at decolonization had so far been virtually unproductive because the world Organization lacked the legal and political means to take action and because of the hypocrisy and bad faith of the Portuguese Government. Nevertheless, the CGTA wished to thank the United Nations Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories for its initiative with respect to the training of Angolan cadres. It hoped that in the future the Angolan national organizations in exile would be consulted on the choice of scholarship recipients in order to take account of Angola's current situation and future needs. The CGTA requested the United Nations to do everything in its power to persuade the Vatican to review the Concordat it had concluded with Portugal, which favoured the perpetuation of colonial oppression and was contrary both to the principle of religious freedom proclaimed by the United Nations and to the spirit of the Papal Encyclical Progressio Populorum and of the Ecumenical Council. Vatican II; to induce the International Monetary Fund to discontinue the financial assistance it was giving Portugal for economic purposes, which was being used to perpetuate its colonial domination; and to influence the NATO Powers to discontinue their military assistance to Portugal and to urge them to take action in favour of Angola. It requested the ILO to continue its efforts to compel Portugal to respect Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 with regard to the abolition of forced labour and the colonization of Angolan lands in the economic interests of Portugal; to give material support to the educational activities of Angolan trade unions (the CGTA had a vehicle for the dissemination of its educational programmes, the Centre d'études sociales pour l'Afrique noire d'expression portugaise (Social Studies Centre for Portuguese-Speaking Black Africa) (CESANEP)); to associate Angolan trade unions with its information, training and research activities; to preserve the spirit which had led delegates to the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference to challenge the right of Portuguese delegates to represent Angolan workers; and to grant Angolan trade unions consultative status so that they could take part in ILO activities.

694. With respect to FAO, the CGTA hoped that the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign would co-operate with Angolan national organizations in giving relief to the helpless Angolan refugees, who were thought to number some 500,000 scattered over the countries adjoining Angola. The CGTA had set up a popular education institution for social betterment; the Centre (TEMO) was carrying out programmes in the fields of rural promotion, literacy, vocational and technical training, culture and health for the Angolan refugees. The Centre wished to play what part it could in the Freedom from Hunger Campaign.

695. The CGTA hoped that UNESCO, which alone among international institutions had expelled Portugal, through the efforts of the Afro-Asian countries, would grant Angolan national organizations consultative status to enable them to take part in its literacy programme. The CGTA was particularly interested in the training of teachers of functional literacy and in techniques and methods of adult education.

696. He expressed his satisfaction at Portugal's exclusion from the Economic Commission for Africa.

He hoped that the Angolan nationalist movement would be admitted as Angola's representative in that body, a step which would enable the independent Angola of the future to take its proper place more easily within the African economy.

697. Lastly, the CGTA hoped that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees would provide greater material assistance to Angolan refugees and would protect political refugees better, particularly so that they could travel abroad freely in order to discharge their political responsibilities. It also hoped that the High Commissioner for Refugees would use his training programme for future Angolan cadres to help any stateless Angolan without means of his own.

698. On behalf of all Angolan Christian trade unionists, he reiterated the solemn undertaking of Angolan workers and peasants to continue their struggle with even greater single-mindedness so that Angola could become a free and democratic country able to co-operate with all men of goodwill in building a better world founded on international morality, justice and fair play. He addressed a solemn appeal to all Members of the United Nations, to all religious persons and to the Western Powers, especially the United States, to combine their efforts and help the Angolan people attain independence in a suitable manner. He requested the People's Republic of China to put an end to its opium trade with Macau.

699. The CGTA hoped that the United Nations would not disappoint the hopes which millions of human beings had placed in it.

700. Angola possessed a sufficient number of able public servants to form a government, lead the nation and make it a valuable partner for other countries.

701. Mr. Medina, speaking on behalf of Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO), said that the Territory now called Angola had not been established by the will of the persons living in it but had been artificially created by Portugal. In an address delivered on 12 August 1963, Salazar had declared that Angola was a Portuguese creation and that it would not exist without Portugal. That territory had been a part of the great Kingdom of the Kongo, which Portugal, Belgium and France had divided among themselves. The Portuguese had called their part "Angola" to blot out its true identity. Not content with that, the Lisbon Government now considered that there were no longer any Angolans, but only overseas Portuguese.

702. In fact, the only treaty that had been concluded since the arrival of the Diogo Cão on Congolese territory in 1482 had been the treaty of friendship between the Kingdom of the Kongo and Portugal. The establishment of the colony of Angola had been no more than a stratagem employed by the Portuguese Government to make that part of Africa Portuguese. However, the lawful heirs of the throne of the Kongo were now asking for the return of their kingdom.

703. On 24 September 1960, at São Salvador do Congo, the leaders of the Royalist Party of the Kongo had met Mr. Lopes, the delegate of the Governor General of Luanda, and Mr. Eduard Matos de Pio, the Administrator of São Salvador, who had acknowledged the validity of NGWIZAKO's view on the subject of the Kingdom of the Kongo. On 17 February 1961, a 280-man delegation of NGWIZAKO members had been about to go to São Salvador when the Administrator of Luvo, a town sixty kilometres from São Salvador, had urged them to return to the Republic of

the Kongo and there await a summons by the Governor General of Luanda. On 22 February of the same year, at the request of the Portuguese Government, NGWIZAKO had decided to establish its headquarters at São Salvador and had, for that purpose, sent Mr. José dos Santos Kasakanga, Mr. Garcia Henrique Monteiro and Mr. André Pecado, respectively President-General, Secretary and Counsellor of the Party, to Abanza-Kongo. On 15 June 1962, a five-member delegation had been summoned by the Portuguese Government to Luanda. The Governor General, Mr. Venancio Deslandes, had told the members of the delegation to go to São Salvador to elect the King of the Kongo and to fix a date for his coronation. Several days later, Dom Pedro VIII had been elected King of the Kongo. He had been crowned on 9 September 1962. He had been due to address the people and the Portuguese Government on 10 September, but the Portuguese authorities had sent the members of NGWIZAKO to Kinshasa to fetch those who were to form the Government of the Kingdom of the Kongo. On 8 February 1963, a forty-member NGWIZAKO delegation had met at Songololo, while another delegation had gone to Brazzaville to get the passports of the members due to go to São Salvador from the Portuguese Embassy. However, the passports had carried the inscription: "Delegation of Portuguese Africans wishing to recett!" Africans wishing to resettle permanently in their countries of origin", instead of the inscription "Delegation of NGWIZAKO members invited by the Portuguese Government to go and set up their Government". The delegation had had to return to Songololo, where it had written to the Administrator of Luvo, who had replied that it must wait. Since that date, the Portuguese had made only empty promises.

704. Since 1960, the year of the foundation of NGWIZAKO, the Congolese Government had given hospitality to the members of the party. However, the members of NGWIZAKO regretted that their brothers in arms regarded them as enemies and that unity was impossible.

705. NGWIZAKO was prepared to enter into discussions with the Portuguese Government, but needed financial assistance in order to be able to send its delegates to Portugal and would prefer them to be accompanied by two or three representatives of the United Nations.

706. Mr. Tulengala, speaking on behalf of the Cartel des nationalistes angolais (CNA), said that his delegation was, of course, aware of the crimes committed by the Portuguese in Angola, but it did not intend to add to the recriminations which did not help to solve the essential problem: that of finding political and technical means of arriving at a settlement. A settlement should be negotiated in a conciliatory spirit by the Portuguese authorities with the free and independent Angolan people, The parties and organizations affiliated to CNA were entirely independent; they had no foreign ties and had made no promises to anybody. CNA strongly protested against some of the statements made about it by the representatives of other organizations who had addressed the Special Committee; being accustomed to encountering prejudice, it was not dismayed. Its determination, like that of the Angolan people, was unshakable. The Portuguese knew that too and that was why they would finally realize that it was in their own interests, in order to save Portuguese as well as Angolan lives, to negotiate according to the principles of the Charter.

- 707. The purpose of CNA was to save lives. The population of Angola was too small for it to be able to bear the burden of a full-scale war; moreover, there were Portuguese in Angola who had no intention of returning to Portugal and who would be a useful element in the future, when peace was restored.
- 708. Though there were grounds for doubting the good faith of the Portuguese, new and better methods should be tried of convincing them that the institution of peace, freedom and human rights in the Territories they administered was as much in the interest of Portugal as in that of the peoples of those Territories.
- 709. Since Article 73 of the United Nations Charter recognized the right of colonized peoples to independence, the Angolan people wished freely to choose their country's political, administrative and social system. Portugal was one of the signatories of the United Nations Charter. A colonized country's attainment of independence did not necessarily entail the complete breaking of the age-old ties between the colonizers and the colonized; on the contrary, it should strengthen those links through friendly and fraternal co-operation.
- 710. The Angolan political parties and non-political organizations—including Nto-Bako (Origem do Povo do Kongo Angola), MDIA (Mouvement pour la défense des intérêts de l'Angola), NGWIZAKO (Association des congolais d'expression portugaise), RCCKP (Rassemblement des chefs coutumiers du Congo portugais), CBOA (Comité des bons offices), UGTA (Union générale des travailleurs angolais), UREA (Union révolutionnaire des étudiants angolais) and UGEA (Union générale des étudiants angolais)—considered that Angola must attain independence by peaceful means. Too much blood had already been shed by the Angolan people.
- 711. Foreign Powers, particularly the United States of America, should assist the parties to the dispute to find an area of agreement. The Angolan people were weary of war. They longed for peace and prosperity based on the observance of their human rights. The Cartel would do its utmost to see the situation settled by peaceful means. But to do so, it needed the support of all Angolans.
- 712. In short, CNA wished, within a reasonable period of time, to negotiate with the Lisbon authorities with a view to finding a compromise solution that would pave the way for the transfer of power. It hoped that in the interests of Angola, the United Nations would serve as mediator.
- 713. Mr. Gracia Kiala, speaking on behalf of Confédération des syndicats libres angolais (CSLA), said that millions of Angolan workers were dying in the struggle to free their country. Of course, CSLA hoped that the Angolan liberation movements would unite, but an effort must be made to eschew demagogy and to tell the truth.
- 714. CSLA's slogan was "food, shelter and freedom for all". It hoped that the Special Committee would meet with real success and requested it to use its influence with the Angolan movements to make them understand that disunity, assassinations, kidnappings and fratricidal wars among exiles would not hasten independence. Nor would sporadic expeditions on the Angolan frontier bring Salazar to his senses. One would have to be very naïve to believe in the victory of the Angolan nationalist forces when their political armies were fighting separately. CSLA condemned the short-sighted policy followed by those Angolan move-

- ments and was indignant at the lack of conscience they showed in carrying out their activities. CSLA had always maintained that a congress should be organized, in which all the active Angolan forces would take part and from which would emerge a national liberation front with a specific programme. No single Angolan movement could hope to liberate the Angolan people, Angola would be liberated by mutual understanding and unity.
- 715. Mr. Chata, speaking on behalf of UNIÃO Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), said that UNITA felt deep concern and sympathy for its fellow freedom fighters in South West Africa, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and "Portuguese Guinea", who were the victims of the same imperialist and colonial atrocities, He condemned the racialist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa, which were solely interested in defending their minority rule; they were not champions of democracy, as they could not stand the challenge of the system of one man one vote.
- 716. The political situation in Angola was very complicated. The world was told that Angola was part of Portugal and that the Africans of that country were "Portuguese", yet they had no rights to participate in the affairs of their own country. Since 1965, however, the same African masses, labelled as "Portuguese", had risen up together under the banner of the rekindled revolution, which was spreading widely and winning the confidence of the masses.
- 717. Portuguese brutality against Africans was traditional, but he would confine his account to events since 1965. With the political changes taking place in neighbouring countries, Portugal had intensified its acts of provocation against the masses in Angola. The Angolans were strictly prohibited from listening to foreign radio stations and anyone found doing so was arrested, the radio was confiscated, and, during periods of particular tension, the person concerned was even killed.
- 718. Houses were searched for suspected political cards or letters from neighbouring countries or local papers containing political literature; for those found in possession of any such items, the punishment was normally death.
- 719. The movement of people from one administrative centre to another was free only in zones controlled by UNITA. Soldiers always checked the movement of villagers and made sure that none left their districts. Troops were on guard on most bridges and army units had been established in many parts of the country to ensure the execution of orders.
- 720. Portuguese soldiers took cattle, goats, sheep and fowl without payment; they raped African women in public and countered the husbands' opposition with buliets. Many women had been widowed in that way. For example, one Senior Chief at Lumbala had reported that a certain woman had been raped in her home by ten Portuguese soldiers while her husband had been kept outside the house at gun-point. The same woman had later been raped by the same soldiers for the second time.
- 721. Taxation was very high, the minimum being £2.10s.0d. It was difficult for unemployed peasants to produce such an amount, but if they did not they were sent to prison for six months. On release they had to pay the same amount or face forced labour, but even after the period of forced labour, the same amount of tax was still owing.

722. If a man was dead or sick, the Portuguese asked his relatives to pay for him. Despite all oppression, the Africans had not abandoned the idea of political reform but in view of the Portuguese provocations and brutality, the Angolans had placed their hopes of salvation in the armed struggle.

723. Since 1965, Salazar's defence budget had increased steadily and, in 1967, had amounted to £81 million, mainly for its aggressive policies overseas and over half the sum was intended for Angola. With that money it was hiring white lunatics and criminals from South Africa and Rhodesia, armed with weapons from the NATO countries and Israel, to help suppress the African masses in Angola. Defenceless villagers were bombed, their houses smashed by bazookas and hand grenades, and their property stolen or destroyed. Fields were bombed and crops completely ruined. As a result, many thousands of families had been made homeless and forced to live in the bush or flee to Zambia and the Congo. The homeless had no clothes, food or medicine. Those who fled the country were bombed, if spotted before they reached their destination, and those who escaped death by bombs but fell into Portuguese hands were shot dead in public to frighten the masses. He could produce photographs to support the allegations of Portuguese atrocities and brutalities.

724. Angola was rich in natural resources, as could be seen from the number of investors interested in that country, including Krupp of the Federal Republic of Germany, Pechiney of France, Japan's Nippon Mining Company and several others, but Africans were not benefiting from such foreign investment. Most of the money was sent to Portugal to feed its starving population, and the little that remained went to the settlers.

725. The method of recruiting labour in those industries was shocking. A company in need of workers contacted the administrative officers; the Government hired labourers on contract for one year, during which time they were given nothing except food. On completion of the contract, the workers returned home where they expected to receive their full pay, but found they had first to pay the taxes for that period. The Administrative Office then decided how much they should be given so that the poor men received almost nothing, most of their earnings going to the Government.

726. The peasants who lived on subsistence farming also had to pay tax and were obliged to sell their food to do so. Unfortunately, the money paid for their crops was very little, and the Government did not help them to improve their yields. European farmers, however, were given all facilities by the Government. He drew the attention of all freedom lovers to the inhuman exploitation by the Portuguese.

727. With regard to social problems, the Portuguese had done practically nothing to promote education. In Angola, the oldest colony in Africa, 93 per cent of the African population was still illiterate, the other 7 per cent having received some education from foreign missionaries who merely taught them to read the Bible. The State-owned schools, found in towns only, were Catholic schools, the few Africans attending being children whose fathers had been assimilados. No Africans were allowed in secondary schools unless they and their parents were assimilados.

728. In rural areas or small administrative centres, no schools were built for the African population. None

of the refugees who had come to Zambia in 1966 had completed his primary education, yet the Portuguese claimed to have established education on a multiracial basis.

729. Health services were scarcely known to the people of Angola. In many rural areas, modern drugs and medicine were unknown. Venereal and other diseases were still unchecked. Villagers still depended on herbs from the bush. The death-rate exceeded the birth-rate so that the area of 481,250 square miles had a total population of only 5 million. The shortage of doctors was acute and it might well be asked what became of the money collected as taxes. The Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole should investigate the situation in Angola as a matter of top priority.

730. The Angolan masses would never flinch before NATO-supplied guns or bombs and their march to freedom would continue. Portugal should realize that Angola would eventually be free; the more it engaged in aggression, the greater African resistance would become and the sooner Portugal would be isolated. UNITA had confidence in the Special Committee and requested it to take the following action: to inform Portugal that Angola was not a province of Portugal, that the Africans of that country were not "Portuguese", and that it should quit Angola immediately as its presence was a menace to the Africans; to put pressure on the members of NATO and other countries to stop supplying arms to Portugal; and to encourage the Members of the United Nations to support Angola's fight through UNITA. The United Nations should not overlook the growing problem of refugees and the Committee in particular should seriously consider the demand for freedom of the oppressed Africans, Latin Americans and Asians.

731. Asked to explain what he meant by the term "assimilado" and to provide any information on the number of assimilados, their status and their attitude towards their non-assimilated African brethren, the petitioner replied that the assimilado system was a complicated one introduced by the colonialists which UNITA was trying to suppress. The Portuguese did not consider the Africans to be human beings but had allowed some with a little education to become "assimilated" (assimilado). To retain their assimilado status and be respected by the Portuguese, they had to break completely with their African friends and relations, and their complete isolation from all but Europeans was constantly checked by the secret police. Religion was another serious matter for the African assimilados, for they were almost always forced to become Catholics. As mentioned in his petition, only 7 per cent of the Angolan population were literate and not all of those had become assimilados. He was unable to quote an exact figure, but it probably represented a minute proportion of the population, restricted to those living in the towns.

732. Mr. Ndongala Mbidi, speaking on behalf of the Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA), regretted having to inform the Special Committee that, on 29 May 1967 at 2 a.m., the Portuguese army had crossed the border and intruded into Congolese territory as far as the outskirts of Malele, killing one woman, one child and two men and leaving several wounded. The refugees in the area had gone to warn the detachment of some twenty GRAE soldiers stationed there. However, the soldiers had fled, leaving the people defenceless. The Portuguese army had in-

flicted many casualties. Several of the wounded had been cared for at the hospital at Kisantu, 100 kilometres from Kinshasa. The refugees and the inhabitants of Kimbona, Kimpindi, Mpete, Kiyamgila and Yoyo had abandoned their villages and fled for their lives. UNTA requested the Congolese Government to guard its frontiers. It also asked the Special Committee to make an on-the-spot inquiry in order to establish the accuracy of the accusations made by President Mobutu, who had said that Portuguese forces frequently intruded into Congolese territory and attacked villages.

733. During the last six years, there had been daily bombings, burnings and massacres throughout Angola. The cause of that terrible war was the Portuguese Government's obstinate refusal to grant the Angolan people the right of self-determination, in accordance with the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations. The Portuguese Government had established a reign of terror in Angola. It perpetuated its domination with the assistance of its NATO allies, including the United States of America, which had sent into Angola hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, some of which had been manufactured in Israel, and hundreds of military aircraft. The United States had also sent men to officer the Portuguese forces. Some of the large Portuguese companies established in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were also financing the military action in Angola. The Portuguese had been torturing and killing for six years. They spared neither women, nor children, nor old people. In the circumstances, UNTA saw no alternative to armed combat. The leaders of the Angolan political parties realized that they could win independence for their country only by waging a war without quarter. If the struggle was to be successful, all the popular forces must be mobilized into a broad national liberation front. Unfortunately, the Angolan political parties were divided and the Portuguese Government, supported by capitalist and imperialist forces, took advantage of their feuds. At the present time, those parties could be divided into the moderate group, composed of several inoffensive parties, and the strong group, consisting of three parties. The Lisbon Government had tried to make the moderate group accept the Community as the price of success. Secret negotiations had been held at Lisbon and Luanda, but had not led to any result. The Portuguese authorities had consistently refused to recognize the strong parties, which were taking direct action against them. The customary chiefs, for their part, had tried to negotiate at Luanda. The Portuguese authorities had hired faithful lackeys. The Portuguese Ambassador at Kinshasa, who had been replaced by the Spanish Ambassador, was co-ordinator for the Lisbon and Luanda Governments' policy of corruption.

734. The Portuguese Government was carrying on a mendacious propaganda campaign in Angola. The UNTA delegation, which had just returned to Kinshasa after a tour through Angola, had confirmed that the Portuguese were distributing leaflets extolling the advantages of the Community. They forced prisoners to make propaganda statements in favour of the Community. Portuguese soldiers went into the villages preaching peace and understanding. They claimed that henceforth all inhabitants of Angola would be equal and that the evils suffered by the Angolan people had come to an end. However, the lackeys of the Portuguese colonialists forgot that there could be no Community without the consent of the Angolan people.

735. The Angolans were determined to fight on until final victory. They were encouraged by the example of the Algerian patriots who, after seven years of fierce struggle, had thrown off the age-old chains of French imperialism. However, once again, the Angolans could not vanquish Portuguese imperialism, which was supported by international imperialist forces, except by uniting to form a solid front. Unity of action was essential for success. UNTA deplored the political squabbles dividing the Angolan parties. UPA and PDA refused to make common cause with MPLA and the trade unions. For six years, UNTA had unceasingly attempted to arrange meetings between the leaders of all political and trade union groups in Angola in order to persuade them to unite. In 1961, it had set up a Consultation Commission for the purpose of welding all parties into a single front. However, it had encountered only misunderstanding. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had, for its part, appointed conciliation commissions, which had not achieved very satisfactory results because of the partisanship of some of their members. The divisions among the Angolan nationalists were kept alive by foreign capitalists. The United States, United Kingdom and German imperialists, who had made common cause with those who wished to supplant the Portuguese colonialists in Africa, like Israel, were using a handful of Angolan exiles to arrange the kidnapping and murder of patriotic Angolan fighters. The Angolan people demanded that all the national liberation movements should unite and take concerted action. It now remained to find out whether Angolan politicians were prepared to admit their mistakes and abandon their pettiness. UNTA hoped for the convocation of a national congress whose purpose would be to unify all the fighting forces into a single front; to give the Revolution a programme based on truly revolutionary, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist principles; to train a body of political leaders who would concern themselves with the education of the masses in accordance with the programme laid down by a representative front; and lastly, to analyse the historical position of the Angolan people.

736. UNTA would never cease its fight until it had attained the objective it had set itself, namely the reunification of the fighting forces and the liberation of Angola. It hoped that the Special Committee would make itself the spokesman for Angolan patriots. It also hoped that the United Nations would assist Angolan refugees, who were dying of hunger and disease. Since 1961, UNTA had done much for them: it had distributed food and medicine. But it also needed agricultural implements. The refugees were farmers; if they were confined to large towns, they would become bandits.

737. UNTA was at one with all the workers of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who were fighting for the same cause, and especially its brothers in Viet-Nam, Somalia, Aden, Palestine, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the other Portuguese colonies, who were dealing death blows to imperialism and colonialism.

738. Asked what firm evidence the petitioner could advance to support the wild allegations he had made with regard to the United States support of Portugal's action, he replied that he could show the United States representative an article stating that Portuguese officers were being sent abroad for training in how to wage "a Viet-Nam type of war". In 1964, moreover,

there had been fifty-four United States officers in Angola: for what purpose had they been in the country?

739. The representative of the United States of America, commenting on the petitioner's allegation that United States officers were serving in Angola and that hundreds of United States aircraft and hundreds of thousands of United States arms were being used by the Portuguese there, said that it was preposterous and incredible. His Government did not support such action by Portugal in its overseas Territories, to which not a single United States officer, aircraft or gun had been sent. No firm evidence for the allegations made had been advanced by the petitioner.

740. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, replying to the statement made by the United States representative, recalled that many resolutions had been passed by various United Nations organs calling upon Member States to cease giving assistance to Portugal. There was, however, evidence to show that it was because of the moral, financial and military assistance which Portugal received from Western Powers, particularly the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO allies, that the dictatorial régime of Salazar was continuing to ignore the legitimate demands of the people under its domination, and to wage war against them.

741. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated the facts in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 25 November 1966. They had now been corroborated in the Special Committee by statements which vividly illustrated the magnitude of the economic assistance received by Lisbon from its Western allies, particularly the United States.

742. In 1962, Portugal had received two loans, one of \$20 million from the United States and one of DM150 million from the Federal Republic of Germany. Similar assistance had also been given by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a specialized agency of the United Nations in which, however, the United Nations rule of one country one vote did not prevail, votes being based upon the volume of capital subscribed, which gave the United States the greatest share. The Bank had its headquarters at Washington, D.C.

743. Evidence had been given in the Special Committee that F-86 and Lockheed aircraft were being used in the Portuguese colonies, and there could be no doubt concerning the economic and moral assistance being given by the United States to the Portuguese colonialists, who were violating the Charter and waging a foul war against a heroic people.

744. The representative of Spain, commenting on the petitioner's reference to the help given to the Portuguese by the Spanish diplomatic representative at Kinshasa, explained that the help was confined to protecting Portuguese interests in consular matters and in no way implied support of Portuguese policy as a whole. Although the two nations were alike in many ways, he disapproved the tendency to confuse Spain with Portugal.

745. The representative of the United States of America, in exercise of his right of reply concerning what he referred to as certain aspersions cast on the policies of the United States and of NATO towards Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa, said that his Government's policy was based upon its conviction that all men were entitled to live in justice and liberty under political and economic systems of

their own choosing, and that the prospects for a stable peace in Africa depended largely upon steady, orderly and rapid progress towards true self-determination. It also believed that the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa should continue to be considered as non-self-governing within the meaning of Article 73 e of the Charter, and that the people of those Territories should have the right to the full and free exercise of self-determination. It did not consider that the limited measure of self-determination contemplated by the Government of Portugal took the wishes of the inhabitants fully into account.

746. United States policy concerning the shipment of arms and military material to Portuguese-administered Territories in Africa had been clear and consistent. Since 1961, the United States Government had been aware that it would be unwise and unjust to permit arms supplied to Portugal under NATO commitments to be used in its overseas Territories. United States policy thus preceded by four years Security Council resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965. The United States did not supply Portugal with arms or military equipment either from public or private sources for use in those Territories, and exports of those items to Portugal itself required specific assurances that the material would not be used in Africa. His Government was aware of no confirmed reports that material shipped under its present policy to Portugal was in fact reaching the overseas Territories.

747. Tendentious accounts had recently been given in the Special Committee concerning alleged NATO support for military action in the Portuguese-administered Territories. He stressed that no NATO member could dictate policy to Portugal, a sovereign State, although the United States Government had not hesitated to make its views known to the Portuguese authorities. It was perhaps because of Portugal's unyielding resistance to those views that some delegations in the Committee had focused their attention on NATO. That approach was wholly unwarranted and perhaps motivated, in certain cases, by considerations of foreign policy which lay outside the Committee's purview. Indeed, it sometimes brought back to mind "cold war" polemics.

748. NATO was not in fact supplying weapons or armaments to Portugal for use in the African Territories under its administration. NATO was committed to the defence of, and was operational only in, the North Atlantic area. There were no secret protocols extending that area of operations. Moreover, NATO itself did not supply arms, although some NATO countries supplied arms to others under their common defence commitments. The United States did not provide arms to Portugal under NATO arrangements for use in the Territories under Portuguese administration; the policies of the other NATO countries were matters. of public record. The Portuguese Government's unyielding attitude could not be attributed to its membership in NATO; logic would indeed suggest the contrary, for the NATO countries other than Portugal which still had dependent Territories had generally accepted the principle of self-determination laid down by the United Nations, and most of them had expressed disagreement with Portuguese policy. Indeed, the NATO countries had "decolonized" extremely rapidly in the last decade or so, implementing policies that were in direct contrast with those applied by Portugal.

749. Most of the arguments advanced by certain delegations concerning his country's present policy towards Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa were very old and discredited. It had, for example, been alleged that Lockheed Harpoon, F-84 and F-86 aircraft were being used by the Portuguese military authorities in Africa. But those were old Second World War aircraft, sold as surplus to Portugal long before the present restrictions had been introduced in 1961. The sabre jets supplied to Portugal under the military assistance programme were stationed only in metropolitan Portugal; those previously stationed in Africa had been withdrawn at the request of his Government.

750. Another frequently reiterated statement was that arms and ammunition of United States manufacture were being used by the Portuguese in Africa. Such arms and ammunition had, however, been manufactured during the Second World War and were on sale throughout the world. Stocks had existed in a number of countries other than the United States for many years. His Government had not approved the export of such material for use in Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa since 1961, nor was it aware that any arms or equipment supplied to Portugal for NATO purposes were being used in those Territories. Such use would indeed constitute an unauthorized diversion from the NATO defence area. His delegation deeply regretted that armed warfare was being conducted in the Territories under Portuguese administration, and that some old weapons and aircraft manufactured in the United States were apparently involved, but it rejected the accusation that those facts reflected upon the integrity of United States policy or upon NATO.

751. Turning to the allegations bearing on economic policy, he recalled that claims had been made that Western economic interests somehow played a sinister role in impeding the self-determination of the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa. It was, however, surprising that no statistics had been provided on certain economic relationships that would complete the picture; nor had any attempt been made to show how such relationships benefited the Portuguese authorities more than the people in the Territories under Portuguese administration. Complaints about the evil influences of private investment in that part of the world often came from individuals who, because of their basic conviction, regarded all private investment and private economic activity as exploitation. That viewpoint, however, was not one which a United Nations body could afford to adopt if it wished to maintain its representative nature. In that connexion, he pointed out that thirty independent African countries had signed investment guarantee agreements with the United States Government; they would hardly have done so if they had feared exploitation by the United States.

752. In his country, trade and investment were mostly privately controlled, and were not channelled and directed by government authorities on the basis of political or other considerations. United States foreign investment did not seek out colonial areas for political purposes: it sought economic opportunity. In Africa, the United States found such opportunity mainly in the independent countries north of the Zambezi, and the volume of its trade with and investments in those countries were about double that with southern Africa. Investment in Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa was less than in independent African States of comparable size and natural resources.

753. United States Government aid to the Territories under Portuguese administration was limited to supplying, through the World Food Programme, surplus food-stuffs for refugees from those Territories living in the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

754. His Government had consistently supported those provisions in United Nations resolutions that called upon Portugal to speed up the economic and social advancement of the peoples in the Territories under its administration. It had never been demonstrated to his delegation's satisfaction that the economic relationships he had mentioned influenced Portugal's policies towards those Territories, and he did not consider that their termination would improve the present situation.

755. He had been surprised to hear the representative of the USSR repeating charges concerning United States policy towards Portugal that had already been shown to be groundless. He rejected the allegations that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was controlled by the United States. The Bank was an international body whose leadership included representatives from all over the world, and its Articles of Agreement and terms of operation prevented it from being controlled by any individual member State. The charges made by the USSR representative implied disrespect for the integrity of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. In point of fact, the Bank had twenty executive directors, five of whom were appointed by the five members with the largest number of shares in the Bank (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, India, the United Kingdom and the United States), the other fifteen being elected by the remaining members. The executive directors were responsible for the conduct of the Bank's general operations. In that connexion, he referred the USSR representative to the official record of the 1645th meeting of the Fourth Committee, held on 28 November 1966.

756. The statement of the USSR representative that the United States Government had made a grant of \$US20 million to Portugal in 1965 was incorrect. Perhaps he had meant the \$US20 million loan contracted by the Portuguese Government in the New York private market to help finance projects in Portugal under a three-year economic development plan. The loan was therefore not a United States Government transaction.

757. As the United States representative in the Security Council had stated when the matter had been last discussed, the United States Government "believes strongly that Portugal should recognize the right of self-determination of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories. We have urged Portugal in this Council and outside of this Council to make this right a reality. We ourselves have no question, nor do we believe that in this body there can be any question, as to what that concept of self-determination ought to be." The United States considered that the self-determination that should be applied in the Territories under Portuguese administration should be that specified in Security Council resolution 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963, for which his delegation had voted, which was: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-The Government and people of the United States unequivocally supported the application of that

concept to the people in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

758. The Chairman recalled that, in his opening statement, he had appealed to the Western Powers, and in particular to the NATO countries, to cease helping Portugal. Many delegations had followed his example, and for that reason he felt that he owed the Special Committee an explanation.

759. His appeal had been made in all seriousness and was intended to draw attention to the plight of the people under Portuguese administration and to demonstrate that Portugal, a Western State, was responsible for what was happening there. Portuguese soldiers were being trained under NATO arrangements; since Portugal was carrying on no war in Europe, those soldiers were being used in the Portuguese-administered Territories in Africa.

760. In making his appeal he had only been reiterating the one already made in General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), adopted by the majority of Member States, which would hardly have adopted a text that was not based on facts. Moreover, in 1966, the Special Committee itself had received evidence on the subject from a Portuguese pilot. Certain principles had been laid down, as described by the United States representative; it was time that they were translated into action.

761. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, exercising his right of reply, said that the United States representative had not adduced any convincing argument to invalidate his previous assertions. Those statements had been repeated for some three years because the United States and other members of NATO continued to ignore United Nations decisions concerning aid to Portugal, thus violating the Charter. His delegation was not suggesting that NATO countries should dictate policy to Portugal, but only that States Members of the United Nations should comply with the decisions of the General Assembly, which expressed the opinion of the overwhelming majority of its Members.

762. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been adopted by the General Assembly on the initiative of the USSR delegation. It had been supported by some ninety Governments; nine countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium and Spain, had abstained. Some of the abstaining delegations, representing major colonial Powers, were members of NATO, thus proving that the colonizers did in fact act in concert. The United States and NATO had continued to assist Portugal, which in its turn continued to repress the freedom fighters in the Territories under its administration.

763. His delegation did not, however, wish to bring "cold war" polemics into the Special Committee, which had important work before it, and he would therefore say no more on the subject.

764. The representative of India said that the representative of the United States, while speaking about the functioning of the IBRD, had made a reference to India and, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be made clear that India condemned Portuguese rule in Africa and stood for the rights of the people in the Portuguese-administered Territories to self-determination and independence.

765. Unlike certain others, the Indian delegation had not only voted for but had also co-sponsored all

resolutions on the Portuguese-administered Territories, and had stood by them. His Government had not given any assistance to Portugal to enable it to strengthen its economy and thus to continue its armed aggression against the people under its rule.

766. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation had never questioned the right of any group of States to form an alliance, whether for defensive or for economic reasons. It was for each country to determine its policy in that respect. However, the United Nations needed a guarantee that no arms would find their way, by whatever means, into the Portugueseadministered Territories of Africa for use against the people there. No such assurance had been given, even though a request had been made more than a year previously, and he therefore continued to believe that the arms given to Portugal under NATO arrangements found their way into Africa. The members of NATO were well aware of Portugal's Constitution and her doctrine that since her Colonies were an integral part of the realm, arms could therefore be used anywhere in her Territories.

767. So far as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was concerned, the system of weighted voting ensured that the United States, with by far the largest number of shares, wielded considerable influence in that body and could determine the direction in which aid was channelled.

768. The United States representative had stated that no direct assistance was being given by his Government to Portugal and that the loan referred to by the USSR representative had been floated on the New York Stock Exchange. The United States Government had, however, been able to ban trade with and loans to other countries, including some in the western hemisphere, and it was hard to see why it could not do the same in the case of Portugal. Perhaps it did not feel that the slaughter of Africans in the Portuguese-administered Territories was a threat to international peace and security and that its economic involvement caused it to support Portuguese policy in its African colonial Territories.

769. With regard to United States help to Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the World Food Programme, he pointed out that the most important need was not to help but to prevent. It was for the United States Government to take measures to prevent a situation arising in which refugees had to leave their homes because of cruel treatment, to try to convince Portugal that its policy was entirely wrong and to help the Portuguese-administered Territories to gain independence. As to the United States representative's reference to "self-determination", he believed that the Members of the United Nations generally agreed that the Territories under Portuguese administration should have not "self-determination" but independence.

770. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that he had stated that the assistance which the Western countries, and in particular NATO, gave to Portugal was the crux of the problem. It was for that reason that he wished to exercise his right of reply to the statement by the United States representative.

771. He noted with regret that in the four years during which he himself had been a member of the Special Committee, the tone and content of the United States representative's speeches had not changed. The United States delegation denied all the facts reported

by the delegations of countries which were not members of NATO. Furthermore, the United States representative had tried to isolate the socialist countries, particularly the USSR, but had succeeded only in isolating the United States. He associated himself fully with the Chairman's reply to the United States representative's statement.

772. The United States representative had said that criticism of the economic assistance which the monopolies gave to the Portuguese colonies was based on ideological, political and other concepts. That was not the case. The point at issue was not the financial interests or financial relations of the United States with certain independent countries, but the fact that the United States interests operating in the Portuguese colonies were impeding the struggle which the people of those colonies were waging for their freedom.

773. That problem was related to the problem of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It had already been pointed out that in the Bank votes were proportional to the capital invested. The United States had invested the most capital in the Bank and was therefore responsible for its policy and the loans to Portugal. In 1966, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly had invited a representative of the Bank to speak at one of its meetings, and he had not denied the existence of the loans. The Fourth Committee had also heard the views of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations and, at his suggestion, had included in a resolution on the Portuguese colonies a paragraph requesting all States to abandon policies that assisted Portugal and to ensure that their representatives in international organizations supported United Nations policy and took no decisions that would result in Portugal being granted assistance. Before adopting General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), the Members of the United Nations had thus examined all the facts; they had consulted the competent United Nations organs and even the Legal Counsel. The Fourth Lonmittee's suggestions should therefore be acted apon; the peoples who were struggling for their freedom needed help. It was to be hoped that the United States representative would accept those suggestions, so that the Committee could work in satisfactory conditions and complete its task, which was to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

774. The representative of Spain, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union representative had first mentioned Spain's abstention on a General Assembly motion submitted by the USSR and had then stated that the members of NATO had abstained from voting on the said motion, he wished to put it on record that Spain was not a member of NATO.

Petitioners concerning Mozambique

775. Mr. Gumane, speaking on behalf of Comité Révolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), said that his party wished to bring urgently to the Special Committee's notice the threat to peace which prevailed in Mozambique, and Africa as a whole, as a result of the present political turmoil in Mozambique and to request that, through its good offices, the crucial matter should be referred to the Security Council, in order to avoid the outbreak of a racial war. A popular uprising was the only solution for the oppressed people

of Mozambique if they were to regain their human dignity within the present generation.

776. In spite of Portugal's protestations to the United Nations that Mozambique was an extension of Portugal, that was not so and never would be. The simple and absurd phrase "overseas province" in itself reflected political and administrative discrimination and was geographically meaningless.

777. In the regional administration of the so-called "overseas provinces" the indigenous population, apart from the four hand-picked chiefs in the Legislative Council, had no access to any senior administration post nor was it admitted to any higher post of the legislative or executive system of Portuguese public administration.

778. Because Portugal did not put into effect laws which would offer fair chances of education to the indigenous African people of Mozambique, the result was the legal chicanery being openly practised in the colony, and the inadequacy of education for the African population remained chronic.

779. In the family circle, where education supposedly began, the system of *shibalo* (forced labour) disunited families. The mother was forced to cultivate large cotton and rice fields and the father was arrested and sent to forced labour, leaving the children without anyone to care for or educate them and without parental love.

780. In the social sector, the majority of the population in Mozambique was not admitted to public places such as hotels, restaurants, cafes, cinemas, etc., except as servants.

781. The Portuguese claimed that Mozambique was a province, yet they always used the discriminatory adjective "overseas"; there were customs barriers between Mozambique and Portugal and members of all races required a passport to travel from one to the other.

782. Portugal had enacted a number of laws concerning its so-called provinces; some of them were good, but had never been put into practice, especially those referring to the rights of the African population. Reverting to political and administrative discrimination, he said that Portugal had two distinct ministries, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for Overseas Territories, the former responsible for the Portuguese European provinces, and the latter for the so-called "overseas provinces".

783. Racial discrimination was current in the medical services and, in the hospitals, white patients were allocated small double rooms, whereas Africans were put into large dormitories.

784. In the judicial sector, there were courts to try the Africans ironically called *Tribunais Privativos*, while the white settlers were judged in regular courts, proving once more the inequality of treatment between the *autóctone* and the *não-autóctones*.

785. Portugal had constantly and energetically refused to permit inquiry committees from the United Nations or any other international organization to visit its colonial Territories and examine freely the real situation. It was unbelievable that any country, proud of its internal administrations, if accused unjustly, should refuse to accept the visit of an international press committee to enquire into the validity of the accusations. That had never been accepted by Portugal. If the Government had nothing to fear or hide, why did it not allow an international press committee, composed

of at least two members from each of the countries represented on the Special Committee, but excluding the United Kingdom and the United States, to visit Mozambique freely without being followed by the police censorship authorities, to enter whatever part of Mozambique it wished and to interview whomever it chose.

786. Equality in employment was non-existent and access to higher positions was available first to whites, then to mulattos and finally to the blacks.

787. Although the Portuguese colonial Government claimed that there was no forced labour in Mozambique, the fact remained that all government and private enterprises in Mozambique employed forced labour.

788. In the Mozambique Railways and other government enterprises, under the law against forced labour, the supply of forced labourers had been interrupted for the purpose of replacing them by voluntary workers with a maximum salary of twenty escudos daily. For two months a large deficit had emerged in the government accounts. Then the law had been secretly revoked by the Governor General who had ordered all local administrations to reintroduce the *shibalo*, the recruited workers thereafter being called *shibalo* volunteers and the six escudos they had been receiving daily was increased to eight.

789. The *shibalo* system would continue so long as United Kingdom colonialism and United States neocolonialism existed in Africa. The British and Americans were responsible for that system in Africa, although they put the blame on Portugal, a small and under-developed European country, a mere pawn in the hands of larger Powers in Western Europe which supported another white brother nation in the family of colonial exploiters.

790. Those nations thrived and made Portuguese colonialism thrive with them on the sacrifices and misery of the Mozambican people through unscrupulous investments.

791. The big companies in Mozambique belonged to the British, Belgians and Americans who operated them through the Portuguese Government offices in Mozambique and more than 250,000 Mozambicans were sold yearly to work in the mines and farms of the exploiters in Rhodesia and South Africa.

792. The Convention of 1928 allowed agents of the mining companies of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) to recruit up to 150,000 Africans annually and established that 47.5 per cent of the sea traffic to and from the Transvaal should pass through the port of Lourenço Marques. That was highly profitable for the colonial Government of Portugal but it meant misery, suffering and exploitation to the indigenous African people. Not only was the port of Lourenço Marques one of the best in southern Africa but the colonial Government also collected taxes and wealth from each worker who brought back his salary to spend in Mozambique. The mortality of mine workers was sometimes as high as 456 per 1,000.

793. Until 1960, the Mozambican people had been suffering, but they had reacted intermittently against the barbaric so-called Public Security Police. When the independence of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi had been proclaimed, the Portuguese Gestapo—PIDE (Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado)—had started a new wave of terror. That had been followed by a wave of imprisonment. Old men, women and young people had been crowded into gaols and some were still within the PIDE's torture

chambers. Innocent people committed without trial, families without bread and help, all were fighting desperately for their freedom. People like Dr. Agostinho Ilunga, Tomas Nhatumba and Deniz Mondlane were expatriated to Lisbon and were still in Portugal serving indefinite sentences. Prisoners of the PIDE often had to live on bread and water for ten days at a time.

794. It should be noted that in the interrogation room, the prisoners went through indescribable tortures, being left for thirteen or more days in standing positions without sleeping, while being watched by arrogant guards who were changed every four hours. The prisoners had no communication with the outside world and were not allowed to receive visitors.

795. Since 22 October 1965, the barbaric Portuguese régime had intensified its war of genocide in the districts of Tete, Manica e Sofala and Zambezia, arresting, torturing and killing people and burning the villages. Since then over 3,500 innocent and defenceless Africans had been killed by the Portuguese colonial troops, and many thousands were languishing in concentration camps in all parts of Mozambique. As a result, many Mozambicans had fled to Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Malawi to take up refuge in those friendly African countries.

796. At that time, his organization had protested to the United Nations through its permanent representative in Zambia, pointing out the war of genocide being carried out by the Portuguese colonial Government against the oppressed African people of Mozambique. He had been surprised that no action whatsoever had subsequently been taken.

797. COREMO therefore wished to inform the Special Committee that, since it had failed to bring Portugal to its senses and to give the peoples of Mozambique the right of self-determination and self-rule, COREMO would be forced to liberate its country with the help of peace-loving and freedom-loving countries of Africa and elsewhere.

798. Portugal should realize that COREMO was well aware that the war would be long, but was confident of eventual victory. It would be better to fight the Portuguese for more than fifty years than remain under Portuguese domination for another 465 years. That determination should also be appreciated by the imperialist and neo-colonialist countries which were helping Portugal, materially, financially and otherwise, to perpetuate the war in Mozambique so as to safeguard their investments in southern Africa.

799. With the aid received from the NATO Powers and especially the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Portugual had been able during the past six years to construct twelve new military bases as well as maintain a force of about 46,000 troops in Mozambique.

800. Flying box-cars laden with Portuguese soldiers landed frequently at Lourenço Marques and Beira. Apart from the existing military air bases, civil airfields were being used by the Portuguese air force. Others, some with runways long enough to take jet aircraft and troop carriers, had been and were still being hastily built in the wild inland terrain throughout the country, with the use of African forced labour working from dawn to dusk under the ever-present threat of death.

801. Some 200 bush airstrips had been laid out in the territory, ready for landing troops and other security forces. All troops were armed with the latest auto-

matic rifles, mortars, heavy and light machine-guns and other forms of military equipment supplied to Portugal by its NATO allies. Portuguese farmers working in cottage communities in rural areas could freely buy sub-machine-guns or rifles and revolvers at their local stores, and ammunition also was readily available to white settlers. In view of Portugal's colonial policy, the aid being supplied to Portugal, mainly by NATO Powers, could only increase its determination further to enslave and exterminate the Africans.

802. In carrying out its oppressive policies, the colonial Government of Portugal was also backed by the fascist Government of South Africa and the white minority rebel Government of Southern Rhodesia, led by Ian Smith, which were also bent on the further enslavement of the African people, their principal aim being to suppress the liberation movements of Africa and entrench colonialism and imperialism.

803. Through agreements between the three colonial Governments, Mozambicans living in South Africa and Rhodesia were being kidnapped by the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) with the assistance of Vorster and Smith.

804. A recent eye-witness report from the interior of Mozambique described the brutal policy of destruction and extermination of the indigenous African population by the Portuguese colonialists and of the poisoning of food and water supplies. Other eye-witnesses had reported similar incidents. In January 1967, in the port of Lourenço Marques, a Portuguese supervisor had poisoned two casks of wine with sulphate of soda causing the death of thirty-three African dock workers. The criminal had not been brought to justice.

805. It was difficult to understand how the United Nations, which believed in peace, justice, dignity and human rights, could harbour a Member which proudly boasted that in Mozambique there were no Mozambicans, only Portuguese, and that Mozambique could not exist without Portugal.

806. Portugal had long spoken of its civilizing mission, the essence of which was to raise the moral and social levels of the African in its colonial possessions. The policy of assimilados had failed and the African people had rejected the alternatives of becoming Portuguese citizens or living as indigenas; they wished to live as free people in their own country.

807. Because of the inherent right of every human being to a government of his choice, all people had the right freely to determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development. COREMO, therefore, proposed that the statement that the colony of Mozambique was a province of Portugal should be rejected; that the widely circulated claim by the Portuguese Government that the African people enjoyed the same rights as any Portuguese citizens should be denounced as a deliberate falsehood; and that the economic exploitation to which the African people were subjected under Portuguese colonialism, which was marked by naked fascist repression, savage brutality and organized terrorism, should be strongly condemned.

808. It demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees in Portuguese prisons in Mozambique, Portugal and other territories under Portuguese colonial administration, the immediate dismantling of all military bases detrimental to the interests of the African people in Mozambique

and the immediate granting of complete and unconditional independence to the African people of Mozambique.

809. Asked about the settlement of immigrants from the metropolitan country in Mozambique, the petitioner explained the difficulty of obtaining exact figures, but thought that about 1,250 Portuguese immigrants arrived in Mozambique each month, in addition to the troops who, on the completion of their two to three years' service in the country, were entitled to become settlers there. The number of Portuguese settlers was increasing so rapidly that many areas which before had been traditionally African were being cleared to make room for them.

810. Asked whether the twelve military bases mentioned by him were being or had been used by forces other than Portuguese and especially those of any NATO Power, the petitioner said that they were also used by South African and Southern Rhodesian forces and that the South African Government had recently sent in troops to be trained in guerrilla fighting. The air bases were primarily used by the South African and Southern Rhodesian air forces, which also used the civil air base at Lourenço Marques when training nearby. He had also heard from Portuguese deserters that, about a month previously, South African and Southern Rhodesian forces had been in action against the combatants in the Tete district. The bases could certainly also be used by the NATO Powers, because Mozambique was considered a Portuguese province and all the NATO allies had the right to overfly and use bases in each others' territory.

811. Asked whether troops of any other nationality were fighting with the Portuguese against the freedom fighters, the petitioner said that soldiers from the Federal Republic of Germany had been sent to Portugal and that some were being used in Mozambique as technicians. It had been reported that Spain also was sending technicians. Ian Smith was in contact with the Portuguese colonialists and there had been exchanges of soldiers between the Portuguese Government and South Africa.

812. Regarding COREMO's membership, the petitioner said that, while there were 152,000 official party members, since 1965 about 25,000 people had been living in the forests and mountains with the combatants and those should also be considered members of COREMO. It was difficult to give exact figures because many members had had to flee to Zambia and Malawi.

813. With regard to the methods the Portuguese used to kill the freedom fighters, the petitioner said that there had been many deaths after the Tete uprising when the villagers had been rounded up by troops. Some had been shot when crossing the Zambezi river and others kept for days in a concentration camp without food. Many members of political parties had been shot and their leaders taken in military aircraft to the Lourenco Marques concentration camp. In February 1966, thirty-five people had been shot, their bodies thrown into a pit and burnt. People were dying daily in the forests and mountains from untended bullet wounds; many refugees arrived in Zambia wounded, including a boy of fourteen who had to have a bullet removed from his leg on arrival. Men, women and children were all shot indiscriminately and the treatment of prisoners in the concentration camps was no different from that in in the German camps during the Second World War; it might, if anything, be worse.

- 814. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), said that the petition, although it should be considered as a whole, consisted of three parts. He would present the first part, and he and his two colleagues would then each present the part with which he was concerned.
- 815. Portuguese colonialism denied the people the most elementary human rights. Exploitation, oppression and repression were the principles upon which Portuguese policy in Mozambique was based. Ruthless racial discrimination was the order of the day in all relations between the settlers and the majority of the Mozambican people, who wished to regain their freedom and bring to an end such exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination. They had tried to obtain independence by peaceful means, through negotiation with the Portuguese Government, which, however, had only tightened its hold over Mozambique by sending more troops and declaring, in the words of Salazar quoted in Life, that "Portugal will not abandon her overseas Territories, in spite of the demands of the United Nations". In view of that attitude. FRELIMO had decided to resort to an armed struggle for freedom and independence. It had been necessary not only because of oppression and exploitation but also because Portugal had refused to admit the people's right to freedom and independence. That point must be stressed, because it justified all the moral and material support that could be given by those who genuinely loved freedom.
- 816. The Portuguese Government had put into operation an international propaganda machine aimed at convincing the world that peace, well-being and progress reigned in its so-called overseas provinces. To make certain that that image was accepted, it had enlisted the services of some unscrupulous foreign journalists and political figures willing to tell a false story for a free holiday or a few thousand dollars, who, on returning to their countries, had painted an idyllic picture of Mozambique where there was racial harmony, economic progress and peace.
- 817. Mr. Matsinhe, speaking as a member of FRELIMO, denounced the Portuguese Government for its policy of repression, which was costing the lives of thousands of innocent and peaceful people, whose only crime had been to desire a happy life, peace and freedom, in order to call the attention of the world to the Portuguese colonial problem so that it could exert strong pressure on Portugal to renounce its inhuman colonialist activities and its criminal war of systematic genocide.
- 818. The atrocities committed by the Portuguese colonialists against the Mozambican people were not a new development in the history of Portuguese oppression. The chapter of suffering had started with their first arrival. At the present stage of armed struggle, the savagery of the Portuguese knew no bounds and went beyond the limits of human decency.
- 819. When the Portuguese suffered heavy and humiliating losses from guerrilla activities and were unable to retaliate against FRELIMO's armed forces, they turned on defenceless and innocent people and indiscriminately tortured pregnant women, children and the aged to death in the vain hope of annihilating the national liberation movement.
- 820. Portugal, a Member of the United Nations, continued insolently, with the connivance of other Members that claimed to be staunch defenders of peace and

- liberty, to disregard that Organization's resolutions. FRELIMO was convinced that, without the encouragement of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other NATO members, Portugal would not dare to show its present intransigence. It was economically a very poor country and without material and moral support it would be physically impossible for it to maintain such a costly war throughout its three colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau).
- 821. Portugal had been condemned by the world for the monstrous and inhuman crimes it had committed against the African people. In order to hoodwink world opinion, it had recently instituted a military tribunal to try a number of Mozambican patriots accused of being members of FRELIMO at the Portuguese army headquarters in Mozambique, under the chairmanship of Colonel Almor Baptista, assisted by an all-white jury of senior Portuguese army officers. The accused had not been prisoners of war, but thirteen Mozambican patriots accused of being members of FRELIMO. Their only crime had been that they were members of a nationalist movement. The first three, tried on 11 March 1966, were Matias Zefanias Mboa, sentenced to five years' imprisonment and fifteen years' preventive detention, Luis Bernardo Honwane, a well-known writer and journalist, sentenced to twenty-three months' imprisonment and one year's preventive detention, and José Gomes Neto, sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. Judgement on the remaining ten patriots had been pronounced on 25 March 1966, when the court had sentenced Joel Monteiro Guduane to four and a half years' imprisonment and fifteen years' deprivation of political rights. The others had been acquitted for lack of evidence.
- 822. Dissatisfied with the judgement of its own fascist military court, the Portuguese Government had immediately decided to institute another military tribunal to judge those who had been acquitted, had given it stricter instructions and had selected the most obedient members of the military establishment to serve as judges. That was one clear illustration of the odious machinations of the colonial authorities. Another was the fact that hundreds of Mozambican patriots had been arrested at the same time as the thirteen sent to that farcical military tribunal, and that thousands of Mozambican men and women had been sent to prisons and concentration camps in various parts of Mozambique. Why then had the court dealt with only thirteen, and where were the rest? The new military tribunal had not only meted out severe sentences to those acquitted by the first court, but had also retried and imposed stricter sentences on the others. Joel Monteiro Guduane's sentence of four and a half years' imprisonment had been changed to five years, plus an indefinite period of preventive detention. The others had been awarded sentences ranging from six months' to three years' imprisonment. In 1964, the Portuguese had announced the arrest of five other Mozambican patriots, Daniel Malhayeye, Bombarda Tembe, Jose Nkovane, Jose Lameke and Alexandre Machel, also accused of being members of FRELIMO and of having plotted to overthrow the Portuguese colonialist Government. Soon after their arrest, the Portuguese Press had been handed out sensational fabricated stories of their so-called crimes; since then nothing was known of their whereabouts. What had happened to them; and why had they not been included among the thirteen sent to court?

Knowing the Portuguese sense of justice, it could only be concluded that they had all been murdered.

823. FRELIMO's policy so far in connexion with Portuguese civilians and soldiers who fell into its hands had been to apply the best humanitarian standards, as laid down in international conventions. But, if the Portuguese continued to treat civilian and military patriots as they did, appropriate steps would have to be taken to force them to correct their behaviour.

824. The show of justice that the Portuguese colonialists were presenting to the world was not convincing enough to hide their true nature. They were and always had been cowardly assassins and criminals, who revelled in torturing, maining and killing defenceless people, and had no respect for the most elementary human rights. They had publicly refused to grant permission to members of an international association of jurists to send a delegation to the trial of the thirteen patriots. Fearing that the true picture of the situation might be exposed, they had also barred foreign journalists from attending, the right to do so having been exclusively reserved to members of the Portuguese Press under the control of Salazar's fascist censorship.

825. Since the Special Committee's last appearance at Dar es Salaam, cases of atrocities involving individual Mozambicans had been reported, including the torture of old people, women and children in an attempt to extort confessions of complicity with freedom fighters or to secure information on FRELIMO guerrilla movements. Thousands of innocent Mozambicans of all races and tribes had been the victims.

826. In 1966, a group of Portuguese soldiers had arrested the Paramount Chief of the district of Maniamba, in Niassa Province, and had accused him of being a member of FRELIMO and of harbouring guerrillas. In an attempt to extract the information they wanted, they had beaten and tortured him, to no avail. They had then buried him alive up to the neck and had threatened to let him die of suffocation if he did not speak, but even that had not frightened him into giving any useful information. Hours later, however, he had begun to weaken, and fearing that his end was near he had decided to talk. The Portuguese soldiers had dug him out and with his last breath he had confessed that he was a member of FRELIMO because he was convinced that it would liberate Mozambique. He had told his torturers that they could do what they liked with him, but it would not alter the fact that Mozambique would be free, for the people would fight until the Portuguese left the land. With those words, he had collapsed and

827. A young Mozambican girl had told of an experience she had undergone in the village of Mueda, Cabo Delgado. When asked why she had decided to join the armed struggle against the Portuguese, she had replied that in May 1967 her family had been surprised, while tilling their fields, by a group of Portuguese soldiers, who had demanded information on FRELIMO guerrilla movements. Since the family had refused to betray the freedom fighters, the Portuguese had cut open the pregnant womb of the girl's sister and extracted the foetus. Cutting open the abdomen of one of her uncles, they had placed the foetus in it, laughing hilariously as if it had been a very funny joke. They had then killed as many of the villagers as they could. The girl had escaped miraculously and joined the guerrillas, determined to avenge her family's death and help to free her land.

828. Those cases were only two of thousands of examples of cruelty by the Portuguese in Mozambique. They felt themselves weak and resorted to a system they had used throughout the centuries because they were unable to conquer the determined Mozambicans who wished to be free.

829. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that his people often asked what the attitude of the United Nations was, whether the people represented in it really cared, and whether it had a role to play in the revolution. He reminded the Special Committee of the position taken by the FRELIMO representatives when they had appeared before it in 1965 and had asked it to take a much more positive attitude.

They had said then:

"The time of condemnations and platonic censures belongs to the past. We believe that all the future condemnations of Portugal's policies should be accompanied by a clear programme of direct action. Our people are tired of hearing that another international organization has voted on another motion of condemnation censuring Salazar's colonialist policies. For these resolutions do not serve even to attenuate the misery in which our people live. . . . These resolutions do not give the people any hope for even a remote possibility of a better life.'

In 1966, they had repeated the request for more effective action, again without success. They had taken action themselves by proclaiming an armed struggle in September 1964, and some two years later they had achieved important successes, of which a few examples could be cited.

830. Mr. Mutaca, speaking as a member of FRELIMO, said that, at the beginning of the armed struggle in September 1964, the Mozambican people inhabiting certain areas had decided to establish alternative village settlements in order to prevent the Portuguese armed forces from destroying their property. That had been one of several defensive measures that the people had been forced to adopt as a precaution against Portuguese air bombing such as had been experienced in Angola.

831. In abandoning their homes, the people had taken with them food-stuffs, household utensils and livestock to enable them to survive under the difficult conditions that lay ahead. Settling in the forests, mountainsides and river valleys, they had begun to cultivate the land, planting as much as they could under the guidance and protection of the freedom fighters. At the end of the first year of war, they had been able to produce several times more bushels of rice, maize, beans and other agricultural products than before. At times, the freedom fighters had been unable to protect the civilian population from indiscriminate and ruthless air attacks, and sometimes even direct invasion by hundreds of Portuguese soldiers, who had ravaged everything in sight. Such attacks had often resulted in mass migrations of old men, women and children seeking shelter in Malawi, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. There were thousands of Mozambican refugees in those States, many of them being directly assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

832. Not only those taking part in FRELIMO's military programme but also hundreds of thousands of civilians, who believed that the best way to hasten the destruction of the enemy was to stay and contribute by direct action and labour, had chosen to remain in the country.

833. At first, the economic activities of the people living in the liberated and semi-liberated areas had continued without any visible control or guidance by FRELIMO. Nor had the Frente supervised the people's efforts to provide minimum educational, social and medical services: they had decided to organize their agricultural work so as to support such services, and in so doing had made use of whatever talents were available locally. The FRELIMO leaders, however, noting the difficulties encountered by the civilian population in producing for their own needs and for those engaged in the armed struggle, had formulated a number of agricultural, educational, social and medical programmes to meet the situation.

834. Thus, in Cabo Delgado District, they had revived the agricultural producers' co-operatives that had been deliberately discouraged or stopped by the Portuguese. In 1965, a petitioner, Mzee Lazaro Kavandame, had told the Special Committee of the difficulties he had encountered in Cabo Delgado District in trying to help the people by establishing such co-operatives among African peasant farmers. He was now back in Mozambique, not only helping the people to reorganize their economic life but also directing political and military programmes aimed at helping the people to attain immediate independence.

835. The people of Cabo Delgado were producing more cereals, beans, oil seed and small livestock than ever before. In spite of constant harassment by Portuguese bandits sent by the desperate and decadent colonial administrators of Lisbon, the people of Cabo Delgado were fighting courageously on all three vital fronts: political, military and economic. During 1966, the people had cultivated more land than ever before and had planted crops of more direct use to them than the cotton and sisal which the Portuguese colonialists had forced them to produce.

836. The people must first be organized politically and a programme of military action must then be launched in view of the Portuguese Government's refusal to discuss their demand for freedom. In the part of the country that had severed its relations with the Portuguese administration, the people were sufficiently free to remodel their economic life in accordance with their needs and wishes. Having cultivated the land to produce what they wanted, they worked harder and grew more. During the current agricultural year, the variety and volume would be bigger than ever before, especially in the areas of Mocimboa do Ruvuma, Macómia, Nangade, Sagal, Muidumbe, Miteda, Mutamba Dos Macondes, Chia and Negumano in Cabo Delgado District.

837. To encourage more agricultural activity in that province, various techniques had been devised in addition to the organization of co-operatives. It had been necessary to redistribute as much arable land as possible to those eager to increase the acreage under cultivation, including the areas set aside by the Portuguese colonialists for the exclusive cultivation of cotton and sisal. It had also been necessary for FRELIMO to help the people to acquire simple working tools, which could not be bought in Mozambique because Portuguese and Asian traders were not allowed to move about without the constant presence of the Portuguese army. FRELIMO had therefore had to buy thousands of hoes, hatchets and

pangas and distribute them among the farming population. In 1966, it had distributed in Cabo Delgado District alone 5,000 hoes, 5,000 hatchets and 5,000 pangas, which had greatly helped to expand the acreage of cultivated land. The most common crops in Cabo Delgado were sorghum, rice, cassava, millet, maize, beans, cotton, sisal, cashew nuts, palm oil, tobacco, coffee and ground-nuts. There were many kinds of hardwood which, under normal peaceful conditions, could be converted into commercial timber for domestic use and export.

838. The cultivation of cotton and other non-consumer crops had been suspended until more territory had been liberated. But for the intensified air attacks against cultivated areas, production would have been much higher; but everything possible was being done to alleviate the effects of those bombardments, which were not only directed against crops but also intended to exterminate the civilian population.

839. The fight for liberation was as well advanced in Niassa District as in Cabo Delgado. In the former, the population density was much lower than in Cabo Delgado, owing to the fact that the region was extensive and that a higher proportion of the population had had to flee to the United Republic of Tanzania and Malawi in the past two years because of the ruthlessness with which the enemy had bombarded villages and crops. The people who had remained had nevertheless intensified their agricultural activities and had produced much more than before. As in Cabo Delgado, the soil was rich and the climate favourable and practically the same kind of props were produced. To enable the people to cultivate more land, the same kind of programme had been established. Agricultural co-operatives, bush schools, clinics and some rudimentary social services had been organized. In 1966, 4,000 hoes, 4,000 hatchets and 4,000 pangas had been imported.

840. As in Cabo Delgado, commercial activities had had to be drastically curtailed when the armed struggle had begun. The Portuguese colonial army would not allow any commercial relations between freedom fighters and Portuguese or Asian traders. Consequently, whenever the armed struggle had begun in any province or district, the Portuguese authorities had ordered the closure of business establishments except for those directly serving the military.

841. Since the people must continue to live as normal a life as possible in spite of the war, they had had to establish their own shops in which some of the most essential goods could be bought, including salt, oils, textiles and some household equipment. All other economic activity in Niassa District was the same as that in Cabo Delgado.

842. The plans for further economic development in the liberated and semi-liberated areas of Mozambique were designed, *inter alia*, to improve the people's cultivation techniques, intensify trade in and between the districts, export surplus produce to neighbouring African States, exploit timber, improve local textile production techniques and develop wood-carving. The people were skilful workers in iron and silver. Ways and means were being studied of improving and expanding those traditional crafts in order to produce goods for export that would earn convertible currency.

843. A start had already been made in training people to take over the management of cottage industries using local iron, silver, copper and hardwood for the production of simple household goods such as hoes,

pangas, hatchets, bedstands, needles and ornamental trinkets. The section of FRELIMO dealing with industrial development and production had recently been studying the various kinds of rubber produced in Mozambique to determine which kind should be encouraged for export. It had also been experimenting with various techniques of apiculture to improve the production of honey, which was a rich source of vitamins and energy for people in the liberated areas.

844. During the past two years, FRELIMO had been preoccupied with the need to acquire convertible foreign exchange. One of the best ways of doing so was to export agricultural produce and cottage industry products. It was now in the process of reorganizing the work of the traditional carvers of black hardwood, whose goods were of world-wide renown. They had so far been exploited by unscrupulous traders and foreign tourists, but it was hoped to organize the sale of Makonde art objects to enable the people to reap the benefits of their work.

845. During 1966, 500 tons of cashew nuts, 100 tons of sesame seed, 100 tons of ground-nuts and 10 tons of castor oil seed had been exported. It was hoped to export more, and also cereals, such as maize, rice, sorghum and millet and legumes, during 1967.

846. FRELIMO intended to continue to build up a stronger economic base in all the districts which fell under its control each year and in which the people were free to engage in agriculture, industry and commerce. The people of Mozambique were eager to work harder because they knew that the more they produced the better their lives would be and the sooner their country would be free.

847. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that the people in the liberated areas were in great need of social services of all kinds, including medical services. When the Portuguese army had been forced to retreat, the official health services, administrative services, schools and missionary institutions had been withdrawn. Immediately after the beginning of the armed struggle in some areas, the Portuguese administrative centres and mission stations had been turned into garrisons for the Portuguese army and any medical services which had remained had been reserved for wounded soldiers.

848. That situation had forced FRELIMO to provide some alternative services to those Mozambicans who had chosen freedom and were lucky enough to find themselves in areas controlled by the liberation forces. It had accepted the responsibility of giving as much assistance as possible to all those living in liberated and semi-liberated areas.

849. A medical system had been established to plan, organize and direct such medical services as could be afforded. The services were directed by two white Mozambican doctors of Portuguese descent, a married couple educated in Lisbon, and assisted by a team of Mozambican medical aides, nurses and nursing aides, most of them trained in Mozambique.

850. Several health centres had been established in each liberated area, to give different types of medical assistance. Some were limited to administering first-aid to casualties, or treating those with simple health problems. Those who could not be treated adequately in the first-aid centres were transferred as quickly as possible to centres equipped with better medical facilities and given better care by more experienced medical

officers. Every liberated district and circunscrição had several medical centres staffed by different types of medical officers. However, the lack of adequately trained medical staff and of funds for buying the minimum equipment necessary for even a modest bush clinic, together with the constant difficulty of finding moderately priced drugs and medical supplies, limited the medical services needed by the hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans living in the liberated and semiliberated areas. So far, however, the only real material support had been that given to those Mozambicans who had been forced to flee to neighbouring African States. Since most Mozambicans did not want to become refugees, the population in Mozambique would continue to suffer for a long time if that policy was not changed.

851. There had been some exceptional cases of States acting on the Committee's resolutions and sending a few boxes of drugs and medical supplies. That assistance, however, had been inadequate, since the goods sent were often surplus materials and, coming from temperate climates, not always suitable for treating tropical diseases, among the most common of which were malaria, yaws, scabies, protein deficiency diseases, bilharziasis, hookworm, intestinal parasitoses and pneumonia.

852. The United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya had rendered valuable assistance in the speedy supply of vaccines during epidemics among the displaced population of Mozambique. During the past two years, 100,000 people had been vaccinated against smallpox.

853. As was well known, it was impossible to establish and maintain any medical services, even modest ones, without funds, and because the people were at war the lack of funds was even more acute. It was therefore imperative that the United Nations or individual States should give special attention to financing the medical services. Those responsible for their direction were constantly bombarded with requests from the various medical centres for more drugs and medical supplies, clothing, vehicles, etc., for which funds were needed, and without which the medical workers were unable to save lives.

854. In addition to the two Mozambican doctors directing the medical programme, the medical staff of 400 consisted of three kinds of officers. The first kind included medical aides, who were graduates of Mozambican medical training centres and who, after working in the Portuguese system for a number of years, had decided to join the active fight against colonialism. A few were recruited every year, and they formed a valuable addition to the medical programme. The second group was composed of those who had graduated from the ordinary schools of nursing in Mozambique and who, after working for some time within the colonial medical services, had also decided to join in the fight. That group, representing the largest number of medical staff, was extremely useful, since its members had been trained to handle almost all conceivable types of cases.

855. The third group was composed of graduates of FRELIMO's own nurses' training school within the Mozambique Institute. That group was growing more rapidly than the others because its training was under FRELIMO control. The first thirteen nurses had graduated in 1966 and had all returned to Mozambique to work among the 800,000 people living in the 75,000 square miles of liberated and semi-liberated territory. Another class of nurses was about to graduate from the

Mozambique Institute, and after a short period of practical training they would join the others in Mozambique.

856. There was still a limit to the number of young candidates that could be enrolled each year, due mainly to the scarcity of those with an adequate academic background to follow the course. To minimize that academic handicap, which it was believed had been created intentionally by the Portuguese for obvious reasons, a secondary school programme had been launched within the Mozambique Institute.

857. The first African Mozambican physician was about to graduate and would shortly join FRELIMO at Dar es Salaam to participate actively in the programme being promoted by his two white fellow-countrymen. He was certain to be only the first of many African doctors who would join the ranks of the freedom fighters.

858. A well-organized programme of education had been included as an essential part of the action programme to facilitate the operation of which the Mozambique Institute had been established. FRELIMO's educational section co-ordinated all educational institutions and programmes. The idea of the Mozambique Institute had been conceived in 1962 and launched the following year. In 1963, a secondary school centre had been established; thirty-five students had been enrolled, and it had been hoped finally to increase their number to fifty-two. Within a few months, however, many more had sought places, and the residential quarters had been forced to take in more than 100. A nurses' training course had been added to the academic secondary programme. A document was annexed to the petition giving further details concerning the Mozambique Institute, from which it would be noted that two more primary school courses had been established, both of them to cater for the needs of Mozambican refugee children in Tanzania and neighbouring independent States and of some selected children brought out for the purpose.

859. The most important preoccupation of FRELIMO in that connexion was the planning, establishment and directing of schools in the liberated and semiliberated areas, a task that had already begun and that was expanding every year as the fight for liberation progressed. There were more than 10,000 Mozambican primary school children attending classes in about 100 bush schools, with an average of 250 pupils per teacher. Those children were privileged in that they had someone who, although ill-equipped to teach them, was able to share with them the little he did know, when there were many more thousands in both the liberated and occupied areas with no teachers at all.

860. The people of Mozambique were in the third year of the armed struggle, and were still suffering. One third of the country was at war, while the other two thirds were preparing to join in as soon as conditions were favourable. As long as the people were convinced of their right to be free, no matter what the Portuguese might do, they would triumph.

861. Asked for more details concerning the organization in the free zones under the effective control of the freedom fighters, the steps being taken to mobilize a greater number of people and intensify the fight for national liberation, and the organization of the other aspects of the people's lives, the petitioner replied that the organization could be divided into three phases. The first, which was sometimes called "illegal" but

which he preferred to call clandestine, covered the organization of the masses to prepare them for military action and applied mostly to the African population. The second phase was that of military action, which was undertaken as soon as the people were ready. There was a distinct division of the population into two groups: the administrators, army and police, on the one hand, and the masses, on the other, with certain liberal Europeans and Asians remaining uncommitted. The Portuguese troops and police dropped objects resembling bombs, intending to frighten the people and make them surrender but, in fact, they merely encouraged them to go into the forests and join the freedom fighters. The Portuguese administrative organization then broke down for lack of money usually obtained from taxes, while the people in the free zones established their own administrative system, which represented the third phase, that of reconstructing the social and other services necessary for daily life, organizing agricultural work, etc. Sometimes the dividing line between the white community and the mass of the population was not very clearly defined. European and Asian farmers and missionaries often wished to remain in contact with members of the liberation forces. On the other hand, the Portuguese army sometimes occupied large farms and mission stations. Where the administrative organization worked successfully in the free zones, the Portuguese army was very careful not to interfere. The administrators were often the traditional leaders and chiefs, although they could not always command enough respect among the people, and other leaders had to be chosen to form the administrative structure. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, Portugal had never considered Africans suitable for high administrative posts, and there had not been one African District Commissioner under their régime. The line between black and white was therefore clear, the former with some fanatical farmers, constituting the army and paramilitary organizations and the latter forming the new administrations in the free zones.

862. Asked whether FRELIMO's military successes had had an important political impact on the nonliberated areas of Mozambique and whether it was possible that a mass resistance movement might grow up within them, the petitioners informed the Committee that the armed struggle in the northern third of Mozambique had had considerable influence on the other two thirds of the country. It was significant that, in 1964, the Portuguese Government had been forced, for the first time, to appoint a soldier as Governor General. It had already done so in Angola in 1961 and in Guinea (Bissau) in 1963. In no case had any such military Governor General remained in office for more than two years. In any country, the budget was the most sensitive indicator. The Portuguese budget for 1967 provided for a 25 per cent increase over 1966 for the administration of the overseas "provinces". Of a budget of £252 million, £98 million had been earmarked for the colonial wars. The 120,000 men of the Portuguese armed forces in the Territories under Portuguese administration were to cost £43,750,000 in 1967, as against £31 million in 1966. For purposes of comparison, the item covering health and education for 1967 amounted to £34 million. In addition to those items, there had been numerous special provisions for expenditure on the overseas "provinces".

863. With respect to the situation in Mozambique itself, it was notorious that, in the southern half of

the country, people were constantly being harassed by the police and the army. It was estimated that some 10,000 people had been arrested or had disappeared, thirteen of whom had been brought before the courts. FRELIMO had approached the International Red Cross which, in 1966, had sent a mission to Mozambique. The mission had seen many thousands of prisoners, all wearing FRELIMO uniforms. The attempt had thus been made to persuade the Red Cross that all the prisoners in Portuguese hands were "terrorists". It had not been shown any "civilian" prisoners. The Archduke of Hapsburg, after a visit to Mozambique, had stated that the Portuguese authorities had succeeded in containing the "terrorist" movement and had wiped out any support it might have had in the southern part of the Territory. That statement was incorrect; there were thousands of FRELIMO members in the. as yet, non-liberated areas. It was, nevertheless, true that the Portuguese had made every attempt to annihilate them and had been prepared to destroy whole villages in order to be certain of wiping out FRELIMO leaders whom they knew to be among the general population. The police were ubiquitous in those areas. No meetings of more than five people were permitted. Those facts would be a sufficient reminder to anyone who had suffered under colonial rule.

864. Asked whether the movement had embryonic information services which could spread information in African countries on its work and on the situation in Mozambique, the petitioners said that FRELIMO had an information service that operated from three different bases: Dar es Salaam, Cairo and Algiers. The one at Dar es Salaam published weekly war dispatches indicating the problems that were being faced and the victories won. It also produced at least once a month a publication summarizing events during the month and containing political information, such as the extent to which the United Nations resolutions were being implemented, the actions of the Western Powers with regard to Portugal, etc. Radio Tanzania broadcast communiqués in English, Swahili and the languages of Mozambique.

865. The Cairo centre published summaries in English of the material produced at Dar es Salaam, which appeared in Middle East newspapers. Radio Cairo also had a section dealing with Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

866. The Algiers centre concentrated on publications in French for circulation in Europe and maintained contact with the other French-language agencies.

867. Countries interested in FRELIMO's activities made a special effort to receive and broadcast relevant material, and cuttings of articles published by friendly countries were sent in from various parts of the world. FRELIMO was in constant contact with as many newspaper groups as possible in those Western countries which followed the Portuguese line, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Some newspapers in those countries were willing to publish the facts, but they were less enthusiastic than those in socialist countries, and most Western newspapers were pro-Portuguese.

868. Giving further details on the strengthening of the military and police apparatus in Mozambique and on the activities of the PIDE, the petitioners said that Portugal was steadily expanding military establishment in Mozambique in response to the increased activities of the liberation movement. Every three months or so,

the Portuguese Government had to vote a supplementary appropriation to meet the rising cost of the war. About a year ago, the number of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been about 16,000; presently, it was approximately 65,000, although the Portuguese Government admitted to only 45,000. But besides the army, there were some 15,000 police; and there was also a so-called volunteer corps consisting of practically all adult white settlers and any Africans who could be persuaded or coerced to join them. Recently, the term of military service of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been increased from two to three or four years, depending on the needs of the situation.

869. There were about 1,000 detainees in prisons or concentration camps in Mozambique. The number was not larger because, when freedom fighters were captured by the Portuguese, they were mostly killed outright. There were two types of concentration camps: regular concentration camps in areas dominated by the Portuguese, and so-called "protected villages" in areas where the liberation movement was active. Those were villages surrounded by barbed-wire and minefields, the inhabitants of which were guarded by soldiers and escorted by them to work in the fields. The villages had practically no assistance from outside; there were no schools or medical services, and villagers were not allowed to leave the villages. Most of the crops grown were used to supply the Portuguese army. In southern Mozambique, there was a notorious concentration camp at Babana in which some seventy-five leaders of the liberation movement were imprisoned, FRELIMO had asked the International Red Cross to visit the camp and inspect the conditions in which prisoners were held.

870. Asked whether private firms maintained their own security forces in Mozambique, the petitioners replied that there were no such private defence forces in Mozambique, and it was unlikely that the Portuguese authorities would allow them, since there were no powerful private companies such as those in Angola. There were some United States companies exploiting oil and gas, but they were not yet sufficiently strongly established to require a defence force. FRELIMO's fight would discourage the investment of private funds for the setting up of further companies.

871. Asked which were the main factors that enabled Portugal, a small, backward European country, to continue its domination in Mozambique and its defiance of the United Nations decisions, the petitioners replied that Portugal was too weak to carry on a war in its colonies without outside support. As a member of the European community, it encouraged countries to send journalists and politicians on so-called fact-finding missions; they subsequently wrote articles and made speeches giving a biased view of the conditions there. The NATO Powers had pointed out that aid provided under the NATO system should not be used south of the Tropic of Cancer. That might technically be correct; Portugal might not be using equipment supplied by NATO in Africa, but the fact that it was able to use it in its own country freed Portuguese equipment for use elsewhere. It also received indirect aid from banks, and European-owned companies based in Portugal were manufacturing weapons which could be freely used. The NATO countries said that weapons should be examined to check the serial numbers, so that a protest could, if necessary, be made to Portugal, but that was almost impossible in guerrilla warfare. Arms might also be manufactured by another country under a NATO patent. There was, in any case, no restriction on the

use of NATO-trained personnel. Specialized training was being given in counter-guerrilla techniques and the Portuguese officers who completed those courses were immediately sent to serve in Africa. One of the Portuguese doctors working in the free zone's health services had originally been sent to Africa as a doctor in the Portuguese army. He had travelled on a mission to Lisbon on a NATO passport, had been transported in a NATO ship to London, and, once there, had decided against returning to Africa to fight against his brothers. The Ghana Mission in London had then helped him to return via Accra to Mozambique, where he had joined the liberation movement.

872. An official document published by the Portuguese Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Lisbon, analysing Portuguese achievements in 1966, made the following reference to the vote in the United Nations:

"In the vote on the resolution, these countries voted in favour of Portugal: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the other NATO countries; with two exceptions, all the Latin American countries abstained and some of the African Asian countries absented themselves deliberately. In all, 45 did not support the resolution against Portugal. However, it is not the numerical aspect which interests us ... What is of special interest is to know and note which were the real forces in the world among those which voted for or against us. We must underline this fact because it is incontrovertible that in the last vote in the United Nations, an anti-Portuguese draft resolution was not approved by the United States, nor by the United Kingdom or France or Brazil, which means that it was not approved by all those countries which have major responsibilities and great weight in the politics of the West; therefore it can be affirmed that among the major Powers and especially those which hold a veto in the Security Council, only the Soviet Union supported the resolution."

With that type of support, it was understandable that Portugal continued to suppress the African people.

873. In reply to a request for additional information on the extent of the assistance provided to Portugal by its allies, the petitioners replied that the newspapers had reported that the United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company was to start boring a new oil well to the south of Inhassoro. The American-owned Firestone Português was to invest £1,875,000 in a new tyre factory to be built at Beira. The United Kingdom firm Gill and Duffus, in a joint venture with Peirce Leslie and Co., had opened a plant for dehusking cashew nuts on 10 December 1966. The new factory would have an initial capacity of 6,000 tons of raw cashew nuts a year, as reported in The Times of 10 December 1966. The British-owned firm Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., had produced 113,868 tons of sugar (or 70 per cent) of the 163,669 tons of Mozambique output for 1965-1966. The Swiss firm Nestle was reported in the Diário da Manhã of 18 January 1967 to be opening a plant at Lourenço Marques with an initial production of 7,500 tons of condensed milk per year and an initial investment of £500,000. Mining investments by two Japanese firms were being planned. The United Statesowned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, in a joint venture with South African firms, was going to build a 359-kilometre pipeline to feed natural gas from Pande (southern Mozambique) to the industrial complex of

Witwatersrand. That, it was claimed, would make South Africa a serious competitor with Western industrialized countries. A daily volume of 200 million cubic feet of gas at prices four times lower than in South Africa was contemplated. There was also a £130 million hydro-electric scheme for which a United Kingdom consortium, including English Electric and AEI, was preparing proposals. The scheme, which would be larger than Kariba, was to be built on the Zambezi in Mozambique.

874. Portugal's NATO allies were a great source of material support to it. Since NATO troops had been removed from France, a new naval base had been built in Portugal and had been inaugurated on 23 February 1967. United Kingdom, United States and Netherlands forces had attended the inaugural ceremonies. That was further evidence of Western approval of Portuguese policy in Africa.

875. Asked for details on the extensive Portuguese propaganda campaign referred to in their statement, the petitioners replied that they would mention the agencies, individuals and countries which were cooperating with the Portuguese in that campaign. In 1961, when active resistance to Portuguese rule had begun in the colonies, the Portuguese Government had retained a number of agencies in various Western countries such as the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and Canada. The agencies were mainly public relations units and legal firms of high calibre and cost. In the United States, for example, they had engaged Selvage and Lee, a large coast-to-coast firm which, between 1961 and 1964, had earned an average of \$2 million per year from its Portuguese Government account. That firm fed information favourable to Portugal to leaders of public opinion and mass media and lobbied United States Congressmen and representatives in the Canadian Parliament. It had published many pamphlets against FRELIMO and other nationalist organizations and had gone to the extent of supplying photographs of alleged FRELIMO atrocities which had, in fact, been perpetrated by the Portuguese armed forces. It had arranged for journalists and editors to visit the Territories under Portuguese administration to "write what they saw". Needless to say, they had seen only what the Portuguese authorities had wished them to see. By mid-1965, the Portuguese Government had decided that Selvage and Lee were too expensive. It had therefore engaged Downs and Roosevelt Inc., a firm that concentrated on influential people rather than the population in general. The "Roosevelt" in the firm's title was a son of a former United States President, Theodore Roosevelt, which was an indication of how well-connected the firm

876. An example of the type of activities in which the firm engaged might prove enlightening to the Special Committee. The Mozambique Institute had originally been founded with a grant from the Ford Foundation. Early in 1966, a rumour had reached the Portuguese Government that FRELIMO was about to apply to the Foundation for a further grant. Downs and Roosevelt had engaged a very important United States lawyer—a former Under-Secretary of Defense—who had approached the trustees of the Ford Foundation saying that he had heard the Foundation intended to make a grant to FRELIMO to enable it to buy arms from China. The result was that the Ford Foundation guaranteed that it would not make any grants to organizations within Territories under Portuguese ad-

ministration without the prior approval of the Portuguese Government.

877. To give another example, one of the petitioners had received a communication from an old acquaintance, a United States lawyer, asking him to come immediately to Nairobi in order to present his side of the case to a group of thirty-two lawyers, including his acquaintance, who had been sent by Downs and Roosevelt, at the Portuguese Government's expense, on a tour of Portuguese colonies in Africa. Inspired newspaper articles and statements in Switzerland, France, the Scandinavian countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries indicated the activities of similar firms,

878. In 1966, Mr. Drew Middleton, a correspondent of *The New York Times*, had passed through East Africa. Attempts had been made to persuade him to meet FRELIMO. He had answered that he was interested only in visiting the newly independent countries of Africa. From Dar es Salaam he had gone to Mozambique and had written a series of articles in praise of the Portuguese régime there. As in the case of many other journalists, Mr. Middleton's expenses had been covered by Downs and Roosevelt.

879. The petitioners were asked whether certain United States aircraft reportedly delivered to Portugal during 1966 were being used in Mozambique. In reply, the petitioners stated that the aircraft concerned were eight bombers delivered to the Portuguese by the United States Central Intelligence Agency early in 1966. The petitioners had given some details concerning them during the Special Committee's series of meetings in 1966. The pilot, a United Kingdom national named John Hall, had been arrested in the United States and accused of flying military aircraft without the authorization of the United States Government. The action by the United States Court, however, had been independent of the Government because of the division of power between Congress and the Judiciary. Early in 1967, the pilot had been acquitted after he had explained that he had been working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Surprise at his acquittal had been expressed by many newspapers in various parts of the world.

880. Asked whether the white settlers in Mozambique had prepared programmes and plans for the Territory and, if so, who was to carry them out and finance them, the petitioners said that the plans and programmes of the white settlers in Mozambique were part and parcel of those of the white settlers in southern Africa as a whole. They were attempting to build a laager or stockade, within which they could continue to enjoy their material and other privileges. Various countries in other parts of the world, eager to take advantage of the material resources of southern Africa, were abetting them. Many countries in Western Europe and North America were doing so and, more recently, Japan had joined them.

881. The idea was to maintain an area in southern Africa, in which white men would be supreme and enjoy all possible power and advantages. With the assistance of their friends abroad, they hoped to continue the colonial economic system.

882. Until the end of the Second World War, the colonial Powers had been more frightened of one another than of the people they ruled. Portugal, which had maintained that attitude longer than most of its partners, had consistently refused to allow foreign invest-

ment in the Territories under its control. Since the liberation movements had begun, that attitude had changed and Portugal had actively encouraged such investment. For example, the railways in Mozambique were largely controlled from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which meant that ultimate control resided in the United Kingdom and the United States. All the harbour installations of Lourenço Marques and Beira were foreign-owned. More than half a million workers from Mozambique were employed under contract in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, while many others were working for foreign employers in Mozambique itself. The agricultural resources of the Territory were also being tapped, by means of plantations and large farms producing food for the white settlers or crops with a high cash value. Such plantations were owned by foreign capital and worked by forced labour. Maritime resources, e.g., the lobster fisheries, were similarly controlled by United Kingdom, United States and Japanese interests.

883. Considerable interest had recently been shown by foreign companies in exploring the mineral resources of the Territory and in assessing the volume of known resources. Surveys of gold, copper, bauxite, oil and natural gas resources were being carried out by firms from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries. All profits from such resources benefited in the first place the foreign shareholders, in the second the Portuguese Government and what little remained in Mozambique was largely enjoyed by the white settlers.

884. It appeared that a large project for the development of the Zambezi valley was contemplated. It would cost several hundred million pounds and would be financed by various groups from all parts of the West. It would be about twice the size of the Aswan Dam project. He warned companies that were considering taking part in the construction work that FRELIMO would do everything in its power to hinder it. Unless the employees of such companies were willing to act as Portuguese counter-insurgent troops also, they would find it impossible to carry out their commitments.

885. Mozambique had a population of 7 million, of whom about 100,000 were Europeans and between 15,000 and 20,000 were Asians. The Europeans were mainly Portuguese. In addition, there were between 15,000 and 16,000 soldiers who came for a minimum of two years and then returned to Portugal.

886. Portugal might well be trying to change the balance in the racial composition of the population, since it felt insecure because of the number of Africans. The Portuguese had started a project to send as many settlers as possible, but they had been poor people, sent by a poor Government to a poor land. The settlers had been attracted by the rich neighbouring lands in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and indeed in those countries there were more Portuguese than in Angola and Mozambique put together. The Portuguese had then decided to send out as many soldiers as possible in a last-minute attempt to fill the Territories with Europeans.

887. There was, however, no chance of the Europeans in Mozambique making their own unilateral declaration of independence. The free African world was in contact with that Territory and the Europeans would not dare to do such a thing. However, it was

possible that the Western Powers, which had invested so much money in the Portuguese Territories, might encourage the white settlers to declare their independence and provide them with the resources to do so. FRELIMO would, however, strongly oppose such a move.

888. The Portuguese Government was encouraging private individuals and companies to acquire large tracts of land in fertile areas, including those occupied by Africans. The policy was based on the production of the crops and raw materials required by Portuguese industry, particularly cotton, rice, sisal, wheat and tobacco. If an individual or company wished to use land for growing such crops, then no matter what its present use—unless it was held by European settlers—it would be taken away from the former holders and either sold to the individual or company in question or handed over to them. The criterion was always the estimated benefit to the Portuguese economy as a whole.

889. In the past, certain areas of Mozambique had been reserved for so-called *indigenas*, meaning Africans who lived within a tribal society. Since 1961, howover, the system had been abolished and the status of *indigena* was no longer recognized. All land was now placed at the disposal of the Governor General and the all-European Council, which could reallocate it to anyone who could prove that he would make the land yield a given amount of income per year. It was of course difficult for Africans to provide any such proof, and very many had lost their land as a result.

890. In some areas, the Portuguese authorities were trying to compel the Africans to grow cotton or rice, which they were forced to sell to concessionary companies set up with the approval of the Portuguese Government.

891. In liberated areas, FRELIMO tried to organize co-operatives which cultivated the land in common, cared for the crops and distributed the produce to the various individuals concerned. But the system was only provisional, since FRELIMO could not be sure of retaining control of the areas until complete independence had been achieved. FRELIMO helped farmers as much as it could by providing hoes and other tools and advising on farming methods. That was why it had invited agronomists and experts from other countries, for example, from the United Arab Republic, to help reorganize that part of its programme.

892. In reply to a question as to whether there had been any progress in the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on Territories under Portuguese administration, the petitioners replied that the resolutions had not been applied at all by certain Member States. On the contrary, Western interests had increased their investments in Portugal and Africa during the last twelve months, particularly in Angola.

893. Asked for information on the respective implementation by the two Germanys of the Security Council's resolutions of the Portuguese colonies, the petitioners said that all their statements regarding military help to Portugal applied to the Federal Republic of Germany and not to the German Democratic Republic. FRELIMO had been in contact with the Government of the German Democratic Republic and with some private organizations in the Federal Republic. The German Democratic Republic helped FRELIMO particularly by providing educational and

laboratory equipment and had also promised to send a science teacher. The Government of the Federal Republic had shown no interest in the liberation movement since it supported Portugal. However, FRELIMO had contacted a number of private groups and student organizations in the Federal Republic, some of which had protested against their Government's policy towards Portugal. They had also sent school books for refugees from Mozambique.

894. In reply to a question concerning what action they considered the United Nations should take to break the present deadlock, the petitioners replied that FRELIMO would like more support in its efforts to build a nation. Its most radical need was for the United Nations to recognize it as the true and legal Government of Mozambique, and expel Portugal if it persisted in clinging to the Territory. The Special Committee should prepare the United Nations for the eventuality of FRELIMO's applying for membership as the legal Government.

895. On the question of what further aid was needed, the petitioners said that the principal need was for simple means of helping the people of Mozambique to help themselves: nothing elaborate was required. Such simple tools as hoes and hatchets were in very short supply. There were no longer any stores or traders in the liberated areas. Another necessity was textiles for clothing. Their people were perfectly capable of paying for such items, but they were not available. They appealed to countries with textile industries to make cloth available. Some States (particularly the socialist countries) were already supplying textiles to the liberated area but more was required. They emphasized that they were not asking for material for uniforms but for normal civilian clothes. Another simple but very important item in short supply was chemicals for making soap.

896. There was a great need also for technical assistance in education. People with a minimum technical knowledge were required, not experts. FRELIMO was short of book-keepers and organizers. Although it had some economists, they were very young and inexperienced. They would be very thankful if the United Nations could supply assistance of that kind. FRELIMO had, for some time past, been trying to establish a school of public administration. Assistance in carrying out that project would be of incalculable value to the people of Mozambique.

897. Asked whether graduates of the Mozambique Institute going abroad for further studies had any problems, on their return, in finding an outlet for their new skills and knowledge, the petitioners replied that before the establishment of FRELIMO in 1962, there had been fewer than fifteen Mozambicans in higher educational institutions abroad. Between 1962 and 1967, the number had risen to 150, of whom about seventy were in Eastern Europe and about sixty in the United States. There had so far been no difficulties when students returned from abroad because the Mozambique Institute always had something for them to do. The situation of Mozambican students thus differed from that of students from some other countries. The Mozambique Institute always needed teachers and administrators to replace staff temporarily on loan from other countries. All the graduates had returned to the Institute except one, and there were still hopes that he would. Of those due to graduate in 1967, again only one had said that he did not want to return, while some others would go on to post-graduate courses. They hoped to find more countries that were willing to accept Mozambican students for post-graduate courses. Recently, the Institute had applied to Canada for a special course in administrative finance for an economics graduate, but it had been told that Canada had no places in its programme for students not from independent African States.

898. Replying to a question concerning the assistance given to FRELIMO by the specialized agencies, and in particular by UNESCO, the petitioners said it was difficult to answer because FRELIMO was receiving help from many sources-United Nations agencies, Governments and private groups and individuals—some of whom might be embarrassed if their help was mentioned and others hurt if it was not. Most help to refugees, in education and other sectors, was provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through the host country in which the refugees were sheltered. Help was also received from countries which were concerned at the situation in Mozambique. That help might either be channelled through the United Nations, or provided bilaterally. The countries providing educational assistance included the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. India was sending drugs and medicines, textiles and bandages. Much help was also coming either direct or through OAU from African countries, including Algeria, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Arab Republic and many others. A great deal of assistance, however, was still needed from the United Nations. UNESCO had not yet provided any assistance, but it was expected to do so in the near future.

899. There were particular conditions attached to the special UNHCR arrangements for education which made it difficult for students in Mozambique to make the maximum use of them: one was that the funds must be used exclusively in Africa. That made it difficult to find school places, first because there were a relatively small number of places available in African countries, which tended to need all the places there were for their own people; and, secondly, because African educational institutions were often modelled on the United Kingdom and French systems and demanded academic qualifications which Mozambican students lacked.

900. The Mozambique Institute aimed at providing sufficiently wide background knowledge to enable students to benefit from educational facilities abroad. But before they could pass the specific qualifying examinations of other countries, they usually needed an additional half-year course. It was impossible for the Institute to prepare students specifically for, say, the Cambridge School Certificate or the French Baccalauréat. That was why FRELIMO was particularly grateful to those countries, especially the Eastern European countries and the United States, which were willing to make arrangements whereby people with no certificates could, in a short time, be accepted into their higher educational systems. He hoped that other countries would be similarly willing to adapt their academic programmes to the needs of refugee students from Mozambique or other Territories striving for their liberation.

901. Asked what they considered the specialized agencies, especially UNESCO, could do to assist in

providing the refugees with educational facilities, the petitioners said that FRELIMO and the refugees from Mozambique had received very little assistance from the specialized agencies. They were, nevertheless, very grateful for what they had received. Aid came from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in two forms: first, assistance to refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia which was channelled through national organizations in those two countries. Since such aid did not involve FRELIMO, he suggested that members should apply for further information on the subject to the Tanzanian delegation. There were, however, many thousands of other refugees from his country in Malawi and, so far as they knew, they did not receive any such assistance. They could give no reason why that should be so and suggested that the Special Committee should approach the Government of Malawi so that aid might be obtained for refugees in that country. The second form of assistance, which came more directly, consisted of assistance given by specific Governments and institutions abroad which was channelled through the High Commissioner for Refugees. Although the names of such Governments and institutions were not secret, they felt that it would be more appropriate for the Committee to obtain details from the High Commissioner for Refugees.

902. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for aid to be given to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration and a special fund had been set up for that purpose. Eleven students from Mozambique were being boarded and educated at the Mozambique Institute by means of grants from that fund. FRELIMO had originally requested that the United Nations should finance an additional teacher for the Institute but the request had been rejected in favour of supporting the eleven students. Since the need for teachers was still very great, they availed themselves of the opportunity of renewing that request. FRELIMO was using its own limited resources to employ teachers and support students and had also approached several Governments for assistance. A number of Governments had agreed to help, and India, for example, was financing two teachers at the Institute. They thought that the United Nations could do much more in that connexion and repeated that the need for teachers and equipment was very grave.

903. FRELIMO had been trying to contact the World Health Organization (WHO) to obtain supplies of drugs and assistance in training nurses at the Mozambique Institute. They believed that some indirect assistance had in fact been obtained. Under its regulations, WHO could assist areas not represented in the United Nations only if requested to do so by the Secretary-General. They hoped that the General Assembly would adopt a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to make such a request. The matter was particularly urgent because there were epidemics of various contagious diseases, particularly smallpox, in the area of Mozambique under FRELIMO control. Although FRELIMO had made every endeavour to obtain vaccine, it had been able to vaccinate only 100,000 people out of a total population of 800,000 in that area. That situation was highly dangerous for the neighbouring countries of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi, all Members of the United Nations.

904. With regard to the number of refugees, the petitioners said that the estimates of those who had fled from Mozambique since 1964 were: 50,000 to the United Republic of Tanzania, 10,000 to Malawi and 1,500 to Zambia. A certain number of those had since returned home; the exact figure was not known, but it was not a large proportion. The United Nations Office at Dar es Salaam had given somewhat lower figures. The reason for the discrepancy was that the United Nations figures took into account only refugees in camps or who had been identified, but many refugees had relatives or friends in the countries of asylum because the populations were largely of the same race and language on both sides of the border, and the local tradition was that anyone in need could nearly always find someone to help him. That of course became impossible when the number of refugees amounted to tens of thousands but it was still true that there were large numbers who had not been identified and were not included in the official figures.

905. Refugees in Malawi had no help because the Government of Malawi did not assume any responsibility for the refugees and encouraged them to return to Mozambique. But rather than return or remain in Malawi where they were not welcome, many refugees went to the United Republic of Tanzania. That was not fair to the refugees, nor to the United Republic of Tanzania, nor to the refugee organizations which had to arrange for transport. Something should be done to induce Malawi, which was a Member of the United Nations, to recognize that those people were in need and should be helped.

906. The rate of flow into the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia was highly irregular: it depended on the operations of the Portuguese authorities in the Territories bordering on those countries. When the Portuguese authorities suspected the presence of the liberation movement in an area, their first reaction was to launch a campaign of terror in an attempt to frighten the local inhabitants. That usually induced a few inhabitants to flee, but most stayed. When the liberation movement had begun its operations, the Portuguese Air Force had first carried out simulated bombing which had caused an additional number to seek refuge: but the majority still stayed. Finally, the Portuguese had started real military operations, killing people and burning their huts and trying to herd the whole population into protected villages, a technique they had learnt from some of their Western allies. That had produced a much larger flow of refugees. In every case, however, the volume of the flow depended also on how close the area affected was to the border.

907. FRELIMO did what it could to persuade the inhabitants to stay where they were and, as a result, although operations by the Portuguese Air Force had increased, the number of refugees was declining. That situation might change, however, because it had been reported that the Portuguese Government had decided to wipe out the whole population of certain areas.

908. The main problem was to define the term "refugee". There was a certain discrepancy between the definitions used by the United Nations and that used by relief organizations in other parts of the world. Of the thousands of people who had had to leave their homes, only those who had sought refuge abroad, for instance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were considered by the United Nations

as refugees, and received assistance. Those who stayed in Mozambique received none. The help given to the people who went abroad was an inducement for them to do so. However, FRELIMO had set up institutions through which the United Nations could help Mozambicans, using its own definition of the term. The United Nations could also help by training Mozambicans in school and public administration, and WHO could give medical assistance.

Petitioners concerning Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea

909. Mr. Pinto-Bull speaking on behalf of the Front de lutte pour l'indépendance nationale de la Guinée dite portuguese (FLING) said that his party considered itself exclusively a national liberation movement, i.e., its only goal was the Territory's real independence. It would then be for the people of Guinea (Bissau) to choose a political régime adapted to their ideas and economic needs. FLING eschewed all political and philosophical considerations and concentrated exclusively on strategy and tactics, in order to win the country's independence.

910. Guinea (Bissau) was of no economic or strategic interest to the Portuguese. Salazar was prompted to maintain a Portuguese presence there by his desire to avoid displeasing the army, which would have unfortunate repercussions on Portugal's domestic policy, and by senile obstinacy. In Salazar's view, any evacuation would involve a loss of prestige and above all might give the other African colonies under Portuguese domination the hope that they too might eventually be freed. That meant that as long as Salazar was in power-or, what amounted to the same thing, as long as power was in the hands of the army-there was absolutely no chance of seeing Portugal simultaneously adopt a policy of decolonization. It costs Portugal very little to maintain its presence in Guinea (Bissau). Its troops had abandoned the bush and occupied only the important centres, where they were subjected to no serious disturbances. It should, however, be noted that boredom and inaction weighed heavily upon the Portuguese troops, particularly those who were doing their military service. Several deserters had confirmed that the war was not popular with the people and in fact benefited only the career soldiers. That situation could easily be exploited if the liberation movement possessed the necessary means of propaganda.

911. In those circumstances, FLING considered that it should orient its activities towards terrorist acts in the towns. To that end, it was applying the so-called "troika" system. Each cell consisted of three men and was completely separated from the others; each man was connected only with his immediate chief, who controlled three cells and was in turn responsible to a single individual. The aim of the cells was terrorism, and they would act only by means of terrorist attacks. In addition to easily accessible installations (transformers, water-towers, electricity lines), the main targets were Portuguese army officers and administrators. Of course, the attacks would provoke blind and bloody repression, but they were necessary in order to incite the people of Guinea (Bissau) to unite in the struggle for freedom.

912. FLING was aware of the difficulties and obstacles it would encounter. It was asking for assistance and making a special appeal to its sister coun-

tries of Africa and Madagascar. It was not asking for money, for its members were solidly united by the privations they had suffered together. It was not asking for statements of intention. It was asking for acts, which would enable it to recognize its friends and its enemies. It called on all countries to vote for resolutions concerning Guinea (Bissau). It called for the strict implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and Security Council resolution 180 (1963) which confirmed the right of the peoples under Portuguese domination to choose their future freely. It called on the Western countries to accept and apply the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, in accordance with Security Council resolution 218 (1965). The assistance which the NATO countries were giving Portugal encouraged the latter to continue flouting United Nations resolutions and violating the Charter, its principles and the right of peoples freely to choose their own future.

913. On the other hand, the assistance of the African countries was essential to the people of Guinea (Bissau) as far as the supply of arms and explosives was concerned. FLING wished to obtain that assistance not from individual African countries but from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a whole. Clearly, if the OAU did not intervene in that sphere, the liberation movement would be forced to rely on non-African countries. Free foreign aid had already been offered, but it was not wholly disinterested.

914. FLING was counting on the Special Committee to give maximum publicity to the repression inflicted on the people of Guinea (Bissau) to stigmatize Portugal's attitude and behavior in the eyes of world opinion and to isolate Portugal completely at the diplomatic level. FLING's activities, combined with those of the Committee, would force Portugal to yield.

2. General statements¹⁴⁵

915. The representative of Czechoslovakia said that the positive results achieved by the Special Committee during its African tour in 1966 had been duly appreciated by Czechoslovakia at the last session of the General Assembly. Czechoslovakia continued to pay close attention to the work of the Committee, which had been given the important but so far unfulfilled mandate of verifying the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and thus liberating millions of Africans and other peoples from colonial oppression and domination.

916. In the United Republic of Tanzania, a country lying close to the colonial and racial régimes of southern Africa, the Special Committee was once more realizing the seriousness of contemporary colonial problems. The international community, by adopting resolution 1514 (XV), had to exert every effort to liquidate colonialism in all its manifestations and forms. Colonialism had been generally condemned as one of the most negative and abusive phenomena in history created by forces of imperialist expansionism. It contradicted the concept of the dignity of man and of co-operation among nations and was the principal obstacle to the creation of a society of free men with equal rights. Experience also confirmed that it caused a division

of forces into those actively opposed to it and those trying to prevent its liquidation.

917. Czechoslovakia had always supported and continued to support measures leading to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The sending of an observer to the last two of the Special Committee's African missions had been proof of its interest in the speedy solution of the remaining colonial problems and also an expression of its high appreciation of the work done by the Committee.

918. The particular importance of the question of the Portuguese Territories could not be overemphasized. In the Territories under Portuguese domination lived approximately 12 million Africans, or about one quarter of the entire population suffering under colonial and racist régimes. The Special Committee had recently been given further evidence of the atrocities committed by the Portuguese in those Territories and it had been shown that, while Salazar's régime was denying the rights of the African population to self-determination and independence, it was strengthening colonial rule and oppression. It was stimulating the influx of Portuguese and other white immigrants, increasing the number of Portuguese troops deployed there and continuing its suppression of the African population which was fighting for its elementary rights. The Portuguese colonialists were supported by a network of international monopolies furthering their interests in those Territories. In addition, the Salazar régime enjoyed considerable support from various Western countries, mainly the members of NATO. That support was in direct opposition to the implementation of the resolution (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) and to Security Council resolution 218 (1965) and to General Assembly resolutions 2107 (XX) and 2184 (XXI). So long as Portugal continued to receive political, economic and military assistance from its allies, it would continue its present colonial policy and the brutal oppression of large sectors of the African population in its colonies. Both the petitioners' testimony and the Special Committee members' statements had stressed the urgency of the request addressed by an overwhelming majority of countries to Portugal's friends and allies that they should desist without delay from helping Salazar's régime in its policy of violating the political and economic rights of the African population in the Portuguese-administered Territories.

919. Operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) drew attention to the consequences of the intensification of political and economic ties between Portugal, South Africa and the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, and called upon all States to withhold any support or assistance to the unholy alliance which represented a serious threat for decolonization in Africa and the free development of the African peoples. The petitioners' testimony had shown that support of the colonial racist régimes was increasing, that their development was actively supported by large numbers of foreign monopolies in that part of Africa and that the goal pursued by the alliance was to prolong and consolidate their domination over the colonial peoples and at the same time to threaten the achievements of those African peoples which had already achieved freedom and independence. The colonial policy of Salazar's Portugal was therefore only part of a similar plot by colonial,

¹⁴⁵ Additional statements on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration appear in chapter II of the Special Committee's report.

racist and pro-colonial forces in southern Africa. It should be pointed out that the Western Powers, which had been reluctant to support the action of the world community against the unholy alliance, were also responsible for the continuing deterioration of the situation. Among them, the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was responsible for the continued existence of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

920. The petitioners' statements had shown, however, that in spite of the support Portugal was receiving from various sources, the African patriots in the national liberation movements were continuing their fight for freedom. They were not only in a position to withstand and fight colonial armies numbering tens of thousands, but were also laying the firm foundations of their eventual independence in the liberated zones and encouraging the economic, educational and social development of their inhabitants. The results achieved by the national liberation movements had been appreciated by most of the members of the Special Committee and were winning general sympathy and support everywhere in the world.

921. The Special Committee's fact-finding visit to Africa in 1967 had provided new evidence to support its endeavours to achieve the implementation of the the Declaration. In the past, it had done useful work in analysing colonialism in the contemporary world and had greatly contributed to the understanding of the problem both in general terms and in its many subtle aspects. Latterly, it had thrown much-needed light on the infrastructure upon which the colonial system of the exploitation of peoples and Territories rested and on the activities of foreign monopolies in colonial countries which, according to many of the United Nations resolutions, were impeding the colonial peoples' achievement of independence. At its last few meetings, the Committee had been provided with lists of companies responsible for the preservation of the colonial system and racial oppression in southern Africa.

922. In conclusion, he assured the Special Committee that the Czechoslovak Government would give due attention to the resolutions adopted by the Committee during its meetings in Africa. Czechoslovakia would do all in its power to further the noble goals of freedom, self-determination and independence for the colonial countries and peoples laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration and wished the Committee every success in its work in the interests of freedom.

923. The representative of Tunisia expressed satisfaction at the fact that during its current session the Special Committee had been able, at Kinshasa, Kitwe and, finally, Dar es Salaam, to hear petitioners and representatives of liberation movements from the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Committee had had an opportunity to hear their statements and ask them questions. It had thus been able to acquaint itself more fully with the situation in those Territories and to obtain information at first hand concerning the exactions and repression to which the African people were subjected. In Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea the most fundamental human rights were disregarded. Human dignity was trampled under foot and the Africans were denied all justice. From the extensive and concordant testimony which the Committee had heard it

was apparent that, despite the many decisions of the United Nations, Portugal was continuing its military build-up and further intensifying its repressive measures, thus obliging thousands of Africans to flee and take refuge in neighbouring countries. The latter were being threatened by Portugal because they were admitting the refugees and they were continually being subjected to violations of their frontiers and acts of aggression committed on their territory. Moreover, the statements made all confirmed that had it not been for the complicity of the great Powers and the pressures exerted by foreign economic and financial interests, Portugal, a poor country without resources, would have been unable to afford a war which had been going on for more than six years.

924. The Committee had received information concerning Portugal's war effort, the repressive measures it was applying in the Territories under its domination and the crimes it was continuing to commit against the inhabitants of those Territories. At the same time, it had gathered information on the activities of the liberation movements with reference to both their struggle against the colonial Power and their programme for the reconstruction of the Territories once they were liberated.

925. The representative of India said that, despite his awareness of the grimness of the situation, he felt a sense of cautious optimism. That was not generated by any indication of a change of heart on the part of the inhuman Salazar régime, since there was overwhelming evidence to show that it was actively engaged in intensifying its war of aggression in Africa, applying new and more barbaric methods of torture. Declaration after declaration had left no doubt whatsoever of that régime's criminal design. His optimism was based on the reports submitted by the petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), who had provided evidence of the heroic fight being carried on by the nationalists and their limited but real success. More than one half of Guinea (Bissau) and one fifth of the Territory of Angola were under nationalist control and, with regard to Mozambique, the Special Committee had been informed that an area containing 800,000 inhabitants had been liberated, that one third of the country had taken up arms against Portugal and that the remaining two thirds were expected to do so in the near future. According to conservative estimates, FRELIMO had 7,000 men and 3,000 "cadres" in its guerrilla forces. Portuguese administration had been brought to a virtual standstill in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. His delegation had been very much impressed by its visit to the Mozambique Institute where it had seen what fine work the nationalist movement was carrying out among the refugees. He wished to congratulate those brave freedom fighters, whose determination to oppose the colonial Power had only become stronger with the attempts to suppress them, and he wished them every success in their fight to regain their independence and dignity.

926. The grim realities of the situation were too obvious to be ignored. Portugal, intent on maintaining its illegal hold over its African possessions, was spending more and more money on what it called defence. Expenditure on development projects had diminished by 2.5 per cent from 1966 to 1967, while defence allocations had risen by 33 per cent, the largest increase since the Angola uprising in 1961.

The number of troops in the Territories under Portuguese domination was well over 120,000. Compulsory military service for all citizens had been extended to three years, with the possibility of a further extension of one year. Women were to be admitted into the armed forces for the first time in capacities other than as nurses. The modernization and expansion of the Portuguese Navy, which had been begun in 1964, was being accelerated by the purchase of additional corvettes, destroyers and submarines. Attempts were being made to ensure the self-sufficiency of the country with respect to armaments. All those facts clearly proved that the Portuguese Government had no intention whatever of renouncing its policy of enslaving the African people in its colonies. It had the audacity, in fact, to tell the world that its approach to its colonies was a form of decolonization. The Portuguese Minister for Overseas Territories had explained that decolonization could be achieved either through a process of cultural unification and "the integration of the colonized in the same social and political unity" or through the separation of the colonizer and the colonized, the latter taking over the management of their own affairs. He had stated that real decolonization only took place when integration or emancipation led to a real and profound transformation of the colonized. Salazar himself had said that his Government refused to adopt a policy that would lead to the disintegration of the nation, that the advantages of collaboration and the integration of vast areas and units were becoming increasingly evident and that the Portuguese nation, being integrated and multicontinental, satisfied fundamentally the real needs of all its peoples far better than if they were divided into impractical political units that would sooner or later become economically subject to other countries and ultimately lose their national independence.

927. In the face of such statements, and when it was realized that Portugal regarded its principles as being no less noble or honourable than those of others, it should be abundantly clear to all, including Portugal's friends and allies, that any attempts to solve the problem by appealing to that country were doomed to failure. The Governor of the National Bank of Portugal had stated that Portugal's very survival as a nation depended on its retaining sovereignty over its African Territories.

928. The various economic measures announced by the colonial Power to boost the economic role of the African Territories had not significantly changed the lives of the indigenous population, as had been amply testified by the petitioners. Even the Portuguese Press had acknowledged that the economic integration plan, intended supposedly for the benefit of all parts of the Portuguese empire, had in fact benefited only metropolitan Portugal itself. He was not surprised at that fact, since he was only too familiar with the ruthless methods of administration adopted by that country and its total lack of concern for the welfare of its dependent Territories, which were regarded primarily as suppliers of raw materials. Despite the abundant and rich mineral deposits in the colonies, the indigenous people remained primarily subsistence farmers or wage-earners.

929. As the people of India had realized, it was only after independence that a country was able to embark on a meaningful programme of economic development. The few measures which had been in-

troduced to improve living conditions and strengthen the economy of the Territories were primarily intended to attract European settlement. Ex-soldiers were being encouraged to settle in border areas. That deliberate and consistent policy of encouraging white settlement, supposedly in order to transplant Portuguese culture, was in fact designed to increase the proportion of Europeans in the population with a view to the effective suppression of the African nationalist movements. One of the petitioners had reported that 1,250 whites were arriving in Mozambique every month for permanent settlement. That policy, with its vicious implications, had already been condemned in General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) as a crime against humanity.

930. In that connexion, he warned of the possibility of another Southern Rhodesia in the Portuguese colonies. It was quite possible that the time would come when the white settlers would feel strong and audacious enough to make a unilateral declaration of independence. That might appear to be a somewhat far-fetched warning, but who would have predicted, forty years before, that a handful of whites in Southern Rhodesia would have been capable of defying the metropolitan country and the whole world? However, the successes achieved by the freedom fighters might well make it impossible for the Portuguese to continue their policy of settling whites in any appreciable numbers.

931. It was notorious that Portugal, the least developed country in Europe, was able to maintain and intensify its war in Africa only because of the active assistance it received from its friends and allies, Numerous appeals had been made to those Powers to stop aiding Portugal without any result to date. Nevertheless, he renewed that appeal, reminding those Powers that their own long-term interest would be jeopardized if they persisted in their short-sighted policy.

932. He paid a most sincere tribute to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the very substantial help it had rendered to the Mozambique nationalists, both freedom fighters and refugees. That contribution was yet another practical manifestation of that Government's interest in liquidating colonialism in Africa and elsewhere. Similar tributes were due to the Governments and peoples of Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea.

933. His delegation had consistently supported the right of the people in the Portuguese-dominated Territories to self-determination and independence. It condemned the inhuman policies of the Portuguese Government and the atrocities it had committed against the African people. India had made a modest contribution to the fight against Portuguese colonialism in the form of drugs, books, scholarships and teachers. His compatriots felt very strongly on that issue since they had themselves suffered under colonial rule for many years and had experienced Portuguese colonialism in a part of their country. He renewed India's pledge to support the just cause of the liberation of the Territories under Portuguese administration.

934. With regard to the future course of action to be taken, he believed that that was already well laid down in the General Assembly's resolutions. What remained to be done was to implement those resolutions. The only practical and effective way of dealing with the situation was for the United Nations to take

action to frustrate the evasive tactics of the Portuguese Government and to force it to comply with the verdict of the international community. That could easily be done if all Member States, especially those in a position to exert pressure on Portugal, had the will and intention to act effectively, thus fulfilling their responsibilities under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

935. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania thanked all the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee for their clear and factual material which had added to the already long chronicle of the brutal suppression of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, a chronicle which had roused the indignation of freedom-loving people the world over. It was now seven years since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The Declaration remained a constructive effort on the part of freedom-loving humanity to correct the crime committed by the aggressive forces of colonialism, to help the struggling masses in the colonized lands to regain their liberty and to restore peace.

936. The only response from the Portuguese imperialists had been increased brutality. It was thus inevitable that the patriotic forces of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) should have taken up arms for the achievement of liberation and the restoration of peace, for freedom and peace were indivisible and the fight against Portuguese colonialism was a fight for peace and liberty.

937. All the petitioners had stressed that Portugal could only continue and intensify its aggressive policy because of the support it received from its NATO allies. Those statements were corroborated by the weapons captured by the Angolan and Mozambican freedom fighters and exhibited before the Special Committee. The weapons had been manufactured in NATO countries. It was also well known that Portugal received war material from the United Kingdom and aircraft and submarines from France.

938. Portugal's NATO allies always maintained that whatever support Portugal received under NATO war for the purposes of European security. From the standpoint of the African people, the only support that Portugal needed was the support needed to eliminate the fascist and aggressive policies of the Salazar régime. The Portuguese people had only one enemy in Europe: the reactionary Salazar régime. There could thus be only one conclusion: that the weapons and support were given to Portugal to enable the imperialists' henchmen to maintain their stranglehold on the African lands which were being exploited by the giant capitalistic monopolies.

939. Portuguese aggression was an expression of the economic exploitation of those Territories and their peoples by foreign monopolies based in the Western countries. It was necessary to point out that the African people drew a distinction between the different kinds of investments. The question of foreign investments and capital was one that should be discussed only between equals, i.e., between the sovereign peoples of the countries concerned. When foreign investment was a factor impeding the attainment of independence by the people of a colonial Territory, and when foreign capital became an instrument, not of progress, but of suppression and exploitation, then it must be regarded as a negative factor which should be

opposed. That the activities of foreign financial interests of NATO countries in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) constituted an impediment to the liberation of the peoples of those Territories was not a matter of debate. The evidence had shown that certain foreign companies operating in Angola and Mozambique had gone to the length of maintaining private armies against the peoples of those Territories. Moreover, the activities of the foreign monopolies in all the Portuguese Territories in Africa directly contravened the decisions of the United Nations in various General Assembly resolutions. For example, the PETRANGOL Company, which exploited petroleum and other resources in Angola, had increased its output of jet fuel from 8,380 tons in 1962 to some 37,000 tons in 1965.

940. The petitioners had stressed the increasing cooperation between the members of the "unholy alliance" of Portugal, the apartheid régime of South Africa and the illegal minority racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. While, on the one hand, Portugal supplied the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia with what was necessary to frustrate the policy of economic sanctions, the Ian Smith régime had actively participated in the crimes being committed against the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. Again, while Portugal had supplied South Africa with slave labour, South Africa had been actively participating, especially from the Caprivi Strip, in the war against the heroic people of Angola, and in the East, against the people of Mozambique.

941. Another aspect of the inhuman policies pursued by Portugal in the name of colonialism was the threat to the peace and security of southern Africa. The Portuguese colonialists had launched brazen aggression against the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. Portugal had also committed acts of aggression against the United Republic of Tanzania, killing several patriots. Those crimes against humanity must be strongly condemned by all who sincerely supported the cause of peace and the freedom of all peoples and should serve as a serious reminder to Portugal's allies who continued to supply and arm it.

942. He saluted the patriotic forces of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) for their heroic struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Theirs was a just and legitimate fight which must be supported by all the forces of freedom, peace and progress. The United Republic of Tanzania would continue to render all the support necessary for the successful conclusion of the struggle.

943. The representative of Poland said that his delegation had listened with care to the evidence of the petitioners from the African Territories under Portuguese domination who had appeared before the Special Committee at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. It had also studied the working papers prepared by the Secretariat.

944. It was clear that, during the past year, the situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had taken a turn for the worse and that the crucial problem remained unchanged. Portugal continued to deny the African peoples' right to self-determination and also refused to recognize that the Territories under its administration were colonies for which it was accountable to the United Nations. The Portuguese armed forces were waging a criminal war against the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and the evidence showed that Portugal was intensi-

fying its colonial war and had raised the numbers of its troops in the three Territories to 120,000, while 40 per cent of its budget was allocated to the colonial wars. The militarization of the Territories was illustrated by the appointment of soldiers as governors in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). In addition, the period of compulsory military service had been extended and the Portuguese Navy and police forces in the colonies were being strengthened.

945. Portugal continued to exploit the human and natural resources of its African Territories and had taken steps to transform their economic and social systems in order to make them serve a war effort which far exceeded its own possibilities. The colonial wars against the African peoples were possible only because of the assistance fascist Portugal continued to receive from its NATO allies. The weapons captured by MPLA from Portuguese forces in Angola had all been manufactured in NATO countries. All the petitioners were unanimous in denouncing the military, political and economic assistance that the Federal Republic of Germany was providing to Portugal. The Federal Republic of Germany was selling arms and equipment to Portugal and its military instructors were training the Portuguese forces under arrangements between Bonn and Lisbon. The collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal also covered trade and capital investment in Angola and Mozambique. That clearly indicated that the fascist spirit which still prevailed in the Federal Republic of Germany was consistent with the fascist colonial policy of the Portuguese Government.

946. Portugal was receiving assistance on a growing scale from the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The unholy alliance of colonialism and racism in southern Africa was steadily increasing its co-operation with the support of its Western allies interested in preserving colonial strongholds in southern Africa. The situation in all those States and Territories could have been very different if the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States had complied with the many appeals and resolutions adopted by various United Nations bodies.

947. The exploitation of the Portuguese colonies constituted a source of profit not only for Portugal but also for the international monopolies, a list of which had been provided by the petitioners. In return for privileges which enabled them to reap enormous profits from the human and material resources of the African Territories, the international combines helped the colonial régimes to deny the African people the means of effective participation in the economic life of their countries. The petitioners therefore rightly claimed that the activities of those foreign interests were a serious obstacle to the freedom and independence of the Angolan and Mozambican peoples. Another feature of Portugal's colonial policy was the influx of foreign settlers to the Territories under its administration and the forcible exportation of African workers to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

948. Poland unreservedly supported the national liberation movements and had been happy to learn of the successes already scored by the freedom fighters in liberating extensive areas of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). It was encouraging to learn that FRELIMO and MPLA had established their own administrations and social, medical and educational organizations in the liberated areas. The Polish delegation supported the demand for increased help and as-

sistance to the liberation movements from the international community, particularly the specialized agencies.

949. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the representatives of the liberation movements for their very enlightening statements which had provided the Special Committee with new information on the situation in the Portuguese colonies, the new measures undertaken by the Salazar Government to thwart the justified wishes of the peoples for freedom and independence and on the intensified efforts of the liberation movements to rally the inhabitants of their respective Territories against the Portuguese colonialists. Most States Members of the United Nations had recognized the legitimacy of the armed struggle of the peoples still under colonial domination. And the resolute struggle of those peoples helped the progressive States to apply themselves with greater vigour to the final liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

950. The question of the Territories under Portuguese domination had been on the agenda of the United Nations for years, so that the conditions in the Portuguese colonies were well known. The Special Committee, through its debates and reports submitted to the General Assembly, had helped to make the world aware of those conditions. The material prepared by the Secretariat had revealed the frantic efforts of the colonialists, who were resorting to the most brutal means, including massacre, to perpetuate their domination of those Territories. In addition to intensifying the war against the indigenous populations by sending out thousands of fresh troops from Portugal, the Portuguese Government was seeking to alter the relationship between the European and the African populations by attracting greater numbers of settlers and offering them better facilities. Typical of that policy was the statement by the Governor of the Banco de Fomento Nacional that Portugal must divert to its African Territories the hundreds of thousands of emigrants now going to foreign countries. But it was obvious that in that particular respect the policy of the Lisbon Government was meeting ever greater difficulties, since Portuguese preferred to go to other countries rather than to the colonies where the African people were fighting for their liberation.

951. The problems of the Territories under Portuguese domination could not be viewed in isolation from what was happening in southern Africa and other parts of the world, where force was being used to obstruct the rights of the peoples to independence and to choose the system of government they desired. The colonial wars waged against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), the support of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa and the attempt-under the cloak of independence—to impose feudal rule on the people of Aden were all part and parcel of the same policy of checking the process of decolonization and preserving the strongholds which were to be used as a springboard for interference in the domestic affairs of the newly liberated countries. For the same purpose, military bases were being set up in the colonial Territories to exercise pressure on independent African and Asian countries.

952. It was in that context that it might well be asked how it was possible for a small and backward European country like Portugal to wage colonial wars against the people of Africa, to rule Territories and populations which far exceeded those of Portugal itself, and even to threaten aggressive acts against inde-

pendent African States, including the United Republic of Tanzania. Specific proof had been provided that that situation was only possible because of the extensive economic, political and military assistance that Portugal received from its powerful NATO allies. The protests and denials of some members of NATO were not sufficient to prove the contrary. NATO weapons, in addition to arms, received on a bilateral basis, were still being used in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). It was irrelevant whether the Portuguese Government was doing that with or without the authorization of the NATO countries. What was important was that the Portuguese Government was actually using such weapons, and the only way to prevent it from turning NATO into its accomplice was to take practical steps to make it physically impossible for Portugal to use those weapons against the African peoples. So far, no such steps had been taken by the NATO countries. Those countries were in fact actually extending their economic commitments in the colonies under Portuguese domination, thereby helping Portugal to preserve the status quo and obstruct the people's fight for freedom.

953. The Special Committee would be failing in its duty if it did not draw the General Assembly's attention to the real causes of the dangerous situation in the Portuguese colonies and recommend effective measures to enable the peoples of those Territories to achieve their independence.

954. Yugoslavia fully supported the peoples and national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and wished them every success in their legitimate struggle for freedom and independence.

955. The representative of Afghanistan said that six years had elapsed since the General Assembly had passed its historic resolution 1514 (XV), but many peoples—including those of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)—were still fighting for their undeniable rights to self-determination and independence and were still subject to the most ruthless forms of colonial exploitation.

956. The Portuguese colonialists still denied the most elementary human rights and tried to convince the world that Portugal's African Territories were "overseas provinces" of Portugal.

957. The atrocities perpetrated against the indigenous populations of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau) had aroused profound indignation throughout the world. It was quite clear that Portugal was holding those Territories by force of arms and that Portugal, being a very poor country, could not wage such a costly war without the military, political and economic support it received from its allies, especially the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The close collaboration between those three racist régimes had strengthened the determination of Portugal to maintain its supremacy in the Territories under its administration. That unholy alliance was a very dangerous development which had had an adverse effect on the situation. It was evident that the three racist and colonialist régimes had formed a sort of "common market" in African manpower which was forced to move from one country to another according to the interests of the colonizers.

958. It was encouraging to see that the atrocities committed by the colonialists had aroused the indignation of the peoples of those Territories and that the liberation movements were successfully defending their

freedom. The information provided by the representatives of FRELIMO was of great significance. His delegation had learned with satisfaction that FRELIMO had succeeded in establishing agricultural, educational, social and medical programmes in the liberated and semi-liberated areas and he had been greatly impressed by his visit to the Mozambique Institute. He congratulated FRELIMO on its great achievements.

959. Afghanistan was opposed to colonialism in all shapes and forms and was therefore gravely concerned at the slow rate of progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was indeed alarming that, despite years of discussion and the many resolutions passed by United Nations bodies, the racist régime of Portugal had not taken a single step to implement the General Assembly resolutions and had refused to co-operate with the United Nations.

960. The Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole had a special responsibility in the matter and it was essential that rapid means should be found to end the shameful and tragic situation.

961. The representative of Ethiopia said that numerous petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam had drawn attention once again to the atrocities, oppression and untold sorrow that Portugal had inflicted upon the defenceless peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), whose only crime was to demand their birthright—independence. The Ethiopian delegation had been deeply impressed by the fight the brave peoples of Angola and Mozambique were waging against the Salazar régime and congratulated the freedom fighters on the constructive work they were carrying out in the liberated areas of those Territories.

962. The war of extermination conducted by Portugal in the name of civilization was without parallel in recent colonial history. The archaic régime of Salazar, in flagrant violation of the Charter and many United Nations resolutions, deserved strong condemnation. But the United Nations had been considering the item for the past six years. In 1960, in resolution 1542 (XV), the General Assembly had decided that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of the Charter. In 1965, the Security Council, in resolution 218 (1965), had decided that the situation in the Portuguese colonies seriously disturbed international peace and security. At its twenty-first session in 1966, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) which, inter alia, condemned the policy of the Government of Portugal as a crime against humanity and as violating the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by settling foreign immigrants in the Territories and by exporting African workers to South Africa. It had requested all States to desist from giving assistance to the Government of Portugal that enabled it to continue its repression of the African peoples under its domination.

963. The policy of suppression pursued by Portugal in Africa was of concern to the whole international community. The world had to realize that the Portuguese colonialists were able to continue their evil policy, thanks not only to the connivance of the racist régimes in the southern part of Africa, but also to the support which Portugal continued to receive from its allies in Europe and elsewhere. Between 1961 and 1965, Portugal had spent 17,000 million escudos on the war in

Africa. In 1966, Portugal's total budget had been 17,410.3 million escudos, of which 4,011 million had been for overseas defence expenditure. That amount rose every year and increasingly heavier taxes were levied on the Portuguese population. Portugal itself was an under-developed country with a high national debt, and most of its defence expenditure was financed by help from outside.

964. It was most unfortunate that, despite the many appeals by the United Nations, Portugal continued to send troops to its African Territories to counter the action of the nationalist movements. It was deplorable that a Member State continued to challenge the authority of the United Nations. That was the kind of challenge which, if not faced in time, could break the backbone of the Organization.

965. It did not require much power of prophecy to foresee that the African peoples were bound to win in the end. No power on earth could change the course of history, nor could anyone turn the tide of freedom.

966. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics noted that the Special Committee was completing its consideration of the situation in the Territories in Africa which were under Portuguese administration. As it concluded the session which it had been holding away from Headquarters, it now had, thanks to the statements of the representatives of the liberation movements, a complete picture of the deplorable situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), which were being cruelly oppressed by the Salazar régime. The petitioners had given the Committee further proof of the fact that if Portugal was in a position to wage war against the African peoples under its rule, that was because it had the political, military and economic assistance of its partners in the "White States" bloc. South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and certain States which were members of the militarist and colonialist NATO alliance were constantly violating the decisions of the United Nations concerning the Portuguese colonies.

967. The members of the Special Committee were now likewise aware that the imperialist foreign monopolies were continuing to plunder the Territories in Africa administered by Portugal. They could study the scope of the activities of the capitalist monopolies in those Territories and draw conclusions with regard to the effects of such activities on the agriculture and industry of the Portuguese colonies. Apart from the Portuguese capital invested in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, South Africa, Belgium and a number of other countries had very substantial interests there. Those Powers had to all intents and purposes taken possession of the diamonds, petroleum, iron ore, coal and bauxite of the Territories in question, as well as of their cotton, sugar, sisal, coffee and copra.

968. The fact that the foreign monopolies were giving aid and assistance to the reactionary Portuguese régime, which was continuing to defy the decisions of the United Nations, should surprise no one. The foreign capitalists ceaselessly exploited the resources which belonged by right to the African peoples. They had obtained extensive agricultural concessions and they enjoyed the advantage of cheap labour. The United Nations had denounced the activities of all those companies, which were contrary to the principles of the Charter and to the Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Everyone knew, however, that when major financial interests were at stake, the international Powers turned a deaf ear to all appeals.

969. The representative of Italy recalled that his Government's position on the question of the African Territories under Portuguese administration had been stated on numerous occasions during the past few years, and it had repeatedly expressed to the Portuguese Government its conviction that, by refusing to co-operate with the United Nations in the matter, that Government was failing to meet its obligations under the Charter. Its concern had been intensified by recent fresh reports of discrimination and of the denial of the right of self-determination to which the people of the Territories were entitled.

970. With regard to the allegations that had been made concerning the role of members of NATO, his Government had no apology to offer. The fact that Italy had been a member of NATO since its inception had never prevented it from expressing its views freely on Portuguese colonial policies, or from strictly denying to the Portuguese Government assistance for carrying them out.

971. Rather than prolong the discussion on a point that had sometimes been raised more for petty political reasons than for real concern or conviction, he would turn to the substantive measures that the Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole should adopt.

972. One of the petitioners had told the Special Committee of the satisfaction expressed by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs at the fact that a large number of Member States had recently either abstained from voting or voted against resolutions on the matter. The interpretation and explanation of votes could, however, be given only by the voters themselves, and, moreover, his delegation did not share the satisfaction of the Portuguese Minister, since such a division of opinion did not enhance the Organization's effectiveness in dealing with one of its most complicated problems. The fact was that too often Member States were compelled to reserve their position on proposals that appeared too radical even when justified by the legitimate emotion aroused by the concern of the African peoples for their brothers still under colonial rule. His delegation had, during the Committee's series of meetings in Africa in 1966, stressed that point at length and had recalled how many Member States, in no way bound to Portugal by alliance or sympathy, had abstained from voting on resolutions on the subject thereby possibly creating the impression that they were supporting Portugal's policy. Since that was obviously not the case, the question must be asked again whether the right course of action had been chosen for implementing the provisions of the Charter and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

973. His delegation had advanced a reasonable answer to that question, during the Special Committee's previous series of meetings, by stating that the Committee should urge the enforcement of effective measures against the supply of arms to Portugal for colonial warlike actions, to help the people of the Territories through training for future independence and through direct assistance for their most urgent needs, to urge Portugal to heed the expressions of mounting concern by the international community and to continue to draw the attention of world public opinion to the serious problem created by the denial of the rights of self-

determination. In that connexion, he recalled that the Indian representative had told a petitioner that the Committee would not be discouraged by the passing of time because it was its duty to continue to debate the problem with all the determination deriving from the conviction that it supported a just cause. Impatience was understandable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances, but it would lead nowhere if not accompanied by a sound assessment of the realities of the situation and the limitations of the Organization in its present form. That might be called a legalistic approach but, if legality meant fundamental respect for the Charter, that definition could be accepted.

974. The representative of the United States of America said that the United States believed that the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa should be classified as Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Article 73 e of the Charter, and their peoples should be given the opportunity to exercise fully and freely their right to self-determination. The United States, in conformity with the measures adopted by the Security Council, neither supplied, nor permitted to be exported, weapons or military equipment for use in those Territories.

975. With regard to the nature and role of United States business activities on the African continent, he had earlier emphasized the relatively modest amount of United States private investment in and trade with the Territories under Portuguese administration. A FRELIMO petitioner had made certain statements concerning the operations of some United States private firms engaged in public relations activities, supposedly in support of the Portuguese cause, which called for comment by his delegation since they bore closely on relations between the United States Government and private business.

976. The petitioner had cited the case of one such firm retained by the Portuguese Government that was, he had claimed, seeking to influence United States opinion in favour of Portuguese policy in Africa. The United States placed no restrictions on the distribution of information on the various sides of any issue, domestic or foreign, the only requirement being that a firm conducting such activities on behalf of a foreign Government must register its connexion with the United States Government so that it could be known to all. The United States Constitution contained guarantees to ensure the free dissemination of information as a fundamental democratic right, but the utterances of those private firms in no way reflected government policy, and often conflicted with it.

977. The petitioner had omitted to mention that there were also in the United States private organizations that supported with considerable zeal and effectiveness the cause of self-determination and independence for the people in various areas of southern Africa, some of which were strongly supported by private United States business, academic and professional circles. Representatives assigned to United Nations Headquarters must have come into contact with officials of such organizations, one of which published a periodical on Africa that had been quoted by two petitioners in support of arguments they were expounding.

978. The representative of Australia recalled that his Government's policy on the question of the Portuguese colonies had been explained in detail on a number of occasions. Australia was firmly committed to the principle of self-determination in all colonial

Territories. The fact that its views on the means of implementation might not accord with those of all other delegations should not obscure the strength of its commitment. It did not accept the premise upon which Portugal's policy towards its overseas Territories was based and was deeply concerned at its failure to acknowledge its obligations to their peoples. Australia disagreed in particular with the failure to transmit information on the Territories in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter and had made those views known to the Portuguese Government at the highest level, making clear its belief that the Territories should be classified as colonial and that the principle of self-determination should be applied. It was disturbed at many of the aims and practices of the Portuguese authorities.

979. It was a matter for regret that no attempt was apparently being made to prepare the people for self-determination, self-government or independence, in accordance with the wish of the majority, and it was hoped that the Portuguese Government would accept the view that, by granting those rights, it would be acting in accordance not only with political realism but with generally accepted moral standards.

980. The representative of Iran said that the question had occupied the attention of the Special Committee from the very beginning of its meetings in Africa. Petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had been heard and had given a vivid picture of the conditions in which their peoples continued to languish. The Committee had been told of the obnoxious measures adopted by the Portuguese Government in order to tighten its grip on those Territories and to frustrate the legitimate wishes of their peoples. Moreover, Portugal had sought to strengthen its links with the like-minded régimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and to form what had been well described as an "unholy alliance". Portugal was the linchpin of the alliance. By its adamant and persistent refusal to implement the relevant resolutions, it had seriously challenged the United Nations.

981. Despite that depressing picture, his delegation had been greatly encouraged by the intensified activities of the various liberation movements. In Angola, GRAE and MPLA had stepped up their military and non-military activities. GRAE's work for the rehabilitation of the refugees from Portuguese oppression was striking. In addition, he had been highly gratified to learn that MPLA had further expanded its activities and had liberated many more Angolans from Portuguese subjugation. If those two organizations were to co-ordinate their efforts and adopt a united stand against the common enemy, the dawn of Angolan independence could not be long delayed.

982. FRELIMO's activities in Mozambique were also highly impressive. The nationalists, under the able and dynamic leadership of Mr. Mondlane, had, in the course of the preceding year, liberated even more of their country and people from the Portuguese colonialists. The Special Committee had also learnt with great interest of FRELIMO's national reconstruction activities. Even in the midst of its armed struggle, the movement was devoting considerable effort to the health, education, social welfare and economic development of its people. The Mozambique Institute, in particular, was a great monument to the self-sacrifice of a group of dedicated men and women and to the heroism of the Mozambique people. He earnestly hoped that the

liberation movement would receive all the aid it so richly deserved.

983. The fight waged by PAIGC appeared to be well on the way to achieving complete success, in which connexion the invitation extended by that movement to the Special Committee to visit the liberated areas was most noteworthy.

984. While fully recognizing the achievements of those liberation movements, he did not wish to discount the gravity of the problems involved. The nationalists were faced with a highly complex military and economic machine which Portugal had succeeded in building up to continue its exploitation of the natural and human resources of the Territories it controlled. It hoped that, by keeping the population at large in abject poverty and ignorance and by denying it the most elementary facilities for social development, it could be able to perpetuate its ruthless domination. In view of Iran's dedication to the cause of peace through justice, he took a most serious view of the situation and firmly believed that the social and economic ills inflicted by Portugal had to be eradicated so that the people of those Territories could enjoy their freedom and inde-

985. In that connexion, he drew the Special Committee's attention to a review of the book *The White Revolution* by His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr printed in the *Sunday News* of the United Republic of Tanzania on 18 June 1967. The author of the review had stated that the Shah felt that the only battles still worth fighting were those against ignorance, poverty and hunger and against social, economic and racial discrimination. Those words could fittingly be applied to the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration where all those ills persisted.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

1. Consensus adopted by the Special Committee concerning the question of refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration

986. At its 518th meeting, the Special Committee adopted, as its consensus, a statement made by the Chairman concerning refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration.

987. The text of the consensus adopted by the Special Committee at its 518th meeting on 1 June 1967 reads as follows:

"Since 1965 the General Assembly and the Special Committee have adopted five resolutions in which, among other things, they requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international relief organizations and the specialized agencies concerned to increase their assistance to refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered from military operations in those Territories. The first of these requests was contained in operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965, and similar requests were subsequently made by the Special Committee in a resolution adopted on 22 June 1966 during its meetings in Africa (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619), and again by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966.

"The Committee notes with appreciation that the High Commissioner for Refugees has responded to the above appeals by making some increases in the allocations for refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination, including provision for educational assistance.

"The Committee has nonetheless been deeply concerned by the statements of the petitioners concerning the insufficiency of the assistance which they are receiving from the specialized agencies of the United Nations and particularly of their great and urgent need for direct assistance in the fields of education and health. It accordingly expresses its regret that the specialized agencies have not yet to the knowledge of the Committee responded to the repeated appeals of the Committee and the General Assembly. The Committee therefore appeals to the specialized agencies and invites the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to make every effort urgently to intensify assistance to the above-mentioned refugees in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese domination.'

2. Adoption of resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration

988. At the 538th meeting, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413).

989. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of Tunisia said that the text incorporated the substance of the statements and testimony which had been heard. The sponsors of the draft resolution urged Portugal to apply without delay resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. They requested all the great Powers to desist from giving the Portuguese Government any military or financial assistance whatsoever. They urgently recommended that the Security Council should take the necessary measures for the application of its resolutions and those of the General Assembly; finally, they appealed to all the specialized agencies to refrain, in the present circumstances, from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance. Those were the main features of the draft resolution which he had been asked to submit to the Special Committee. He hoped that all members of the Committee would support it.

990. The representative of India said that he supported the draft resolution. Its text was self-explanatory and most of its provisions had been included in previous resolutions adopted either by the Special Committee or by the General Assembly. The sponsors expected and hoped that all members would agree with the reasoning which had led them to draft it in its present form. He wished to emphasize two particular provisions: the first was operative paragraph 4, concerning Portugal's policy of settling foreign immigrants in the Territories and exporting African workers to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which was a matter of grave concern to all the sponsors, because of its harmful effects on the living conditions of the African population. The second was the tremendous responsibility borne by Portugal's powerful friends and allies which was covered by paragraph 6. If Portugal's friends and allies realized their responsibility in the matter and decided to co-operate

to the full in the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, it would be almost impossible for Portugal to continue its oppressive measures. He therefore appealed to all countries to respect the spirit of the resolutions and not hide behind the legalistic argument that the General Assembly's recommendations were not mandatory. He added his own appeal to that of the Tunisian delegation that all members should take those factors into account and vote in favour of the draft resolution.

991. The representative of Chile said that, although he had not had sufficient time to examine the draft resolution in detail, it appeared at first sight to be one for which his delegation would be prepared to vote. He had, unfortunately, to leave the Special Committee very shortly and might not, therefore, be present when the vote was taken.

992. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation felt that the draft resolution was an objective summary and a step towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

993. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation believed that the draft resolution reflected the views expressed by the majority of Special Committee members and by the petitioners. It therefore hoped that the majority of delegations would give it their full support.

994. The representative of Ethiopia said that, though his delegation believed that Portugal was intransigent, it was prepared to support the draft resolution which was yet another appeal to Portugal to grant to the people under its administration their inalienable right. His delegation supported every paragraph of the draft resolution.

995. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Special Committee was aware that Salazar was using the military bases and installations in the Territories under Portuguese domination to maintain his sway in those Territories, to kill Africans and to commit acts of aggression against the neighbouring free countries of Africa. The Committee should therefore include in the text of the draft resolution a provision denouncing that violation of the decisions of the United Nations concerning the establishment of bases in colonial Territories, for there was no question that Portugal was using its bases to exert pressure on neighbouring African States and to oppress the colonized peoples.

996. The draft resolution submitted by the Tunisian representative on behalf of the Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia took due account of the information gathered by the Special Committee in the course of its present session. However, some of its provisions might well be strengthened and made more complete. He was thinking in particular of operative paragraph 6, in which the Committee once again requested all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in NATO, to take certain measures. It would surely be appropriate to mention by name in that paragraph all the States which were systematically violating the resolutions of the United Nations. That would help to make the colonial Powers respect the United Nations resolutions concerning the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Such a denunciation should certainly include Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which were parties to an unholy alliance and which were establishing a bloc of

"White States" on the African continent with a view to perpetuating the rule of the racists over that part of the world. It was impossible to ignore the danger inherent in the actions of the colonialists not only for the peoples of Africa who were struggling for their freedom but also for the newly independent African States, which were directly threatened by those forms of aggression.

997. The wording of the draft resolution was not entirely satisfactory to his delegation. However, since the draft as a whole was in accordance with the interests of the African peoples who were fighting for their independence, his delegation was ready to vote in favour of the text which had been submitted. It wished to assure the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea that it would not waver in its support of them and expressed its conviction that their struggle would lead them to victory.

998. The representative of Italy referred to the position taken by his delegation on a similar resolution adopted by the Special Committee at Algiers during its series of meetings in 1966, and on General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI). It would have no great difficulty in supporting those operative paragraphs of the present draft resolution that contained well-balanced provisions, but had reservations on many other, particularly operative paragraph 4.

999. He recalled the statement he had made on a similar point before the vote had been taken at Kitwe on the resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248). His delegation also had serious reservations concerning operative paragraphs 6 and 8. The provisions of operative paragraph 6 would be tantamount to the imposition of sanctions, an exclusive prerogative of the Security Council. His delegation regretted therefore that it would be compelled to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

1000. The representative of Bulgaria said that the draft resolution reflected the main ideas expressed during the Special Committee's discussions of the problem. First, there had been almost unanimous condemnation of Portuguese colonial policy as a crime against humanity, a definition—using a term first employed by the Nuremberg tribunal—that correctly compared Portugal's colonial crimes with the crimes committed by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The Committee and the General Assembly should follow new lines of action on the basis of that condemnation, for instance, by appealing to governmental and non-governmental organizations to disseminate the truth about Portuguese activity and to mobilize their members for a world-wide moral boycott.

1001. The second main feature of the draft resolution was that it reflected the almost unanimous opinion that the assistance given by NATO States, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, was the main reason for Portugal's stubborn and provocative attitude.

1002. Operative paragraph 3 condemned the activities of United States and West European monopolies and financial interests that exploited the human and material resources of the Territories and impeded progress towards independence. A complete list of those financial interests on which the petitioners had supplied valuable information should be furnished. The forthcoming discussion in the General Assembly would provide an opportunity to denounce once again the

pernicious role of the international monopolies that were the backbone of Portuguese colonialism, and to reveal the hypocrisy of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western Powers that took an active part in the exploitation of natural and human resources in the Portuguese colonies.

1003. The third main idea was the legitimacy of the fight for national liberation waged by the people in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). The ninth preambular paragraph developed that idea further by noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements, both in their fight and in their reconstruction programme. The reference to the great work done by those movements in the liberated areas was significant. The same paragraph expressed the opinion of the majority of Member States that the armed struggle was the main weapon for achieving independence. The reference to the reconstruction programmes, made for the first time in a United Nations resolution, expressed appreciation of the constructive work of the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), and the paragraph expressed the willingness of the United Nations to assist them. That willingness was reflected in several paragraphs dealing with the role of the specialized agencies. The forthcoming session of the General Assembly would afford an opportunity to address further recommendations to the specialized agencies calling on them to render effective assistance to the national liberation movements. Account should be taken of the requests made by the FRELIMO and MPLA representatives for action by UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF and other bodies.

1004. The draft resolution appealed to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to desist from assisting Portugal and thereby contravening United Nations decisions. They should be told that there was no legal ground that permitted them to disregard United Nations decisions. Having condemned the financial interests operating in the Territories dominated by Portugal, the United Nations could not allow those interests to assist that country through two of its agencies.

1005. The representative of Finland recalled that the question under discussion had been the subject of considerable debate in the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. In spite of numerous resolutions calling upon Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations, no progress towards self-determination for the peoples of the Territories could be discerned. Portugal had stubbornly refused to comply, and there was no indication that it intended to modify its policy.

1006. Finland was strongly opposed to all forms of colonial rule and had strictly complied with Security Council resolution 218 (1965). It had not offered and had no intention of offering any assistance to the Portuguese Government to continue its repression of the people of the Territories, and it had taken all necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms for the purpose.

1007. His delegation had sympathized with the intention of the draft resolution, believing strongly that the people of the Territories should have the right to decide their own future. It could not, however, support all the measures proposed.

1008. In accordance with its well-known and unreserved support for the United Nations, it had the greatest respect for the Charter, which should be the principal basis for all the Special Committee's actions, and it would be unable to support any recommendation inconsistent with the Charter. It firmly believed that, under the Charter, only the Security Council was competent to determine what constituted a threat to peace and security. His delegation therefore regretted that it was unable to support the draft resolution and would abstain from voting. It did not believe, however, that all possibilities for arriving at a peaceful solution that would enable the peoples of the Territories to exercise their right to self-determination had been exhausted.

1009. His delegation had been impressed by the serious approach of some of the petitioners to the problem and complimented them particularly on their humanitarian, educational and social achievements.

1010. The representative of the United States of America said that it should be clear from previous statements which he had made that the United States. while adhering to its basic aim of self-determination for the people of the Territories, would not be in a position to support the draft resolution. Its difficulties were largely identical with those applying to previous similar drafts and they had already been explained at length during earlier votes on the subject. Fundamentally, it believed that the Portuguese Government must accept the responsibility for its policies in Africa. The heavy emphasis placed in the draft resolution on the possible effect of foreign factors was, in his delegation's view, unwarranted, particularly in the light of the firm and effective prohibition by the United States of the export of arms for use in the Territories. His delegation's reservations applied in particular to the paragraphs relating to the supply of arms and military equipment and also to those on the supposed activities and influence of foreign economic and financial interests. A further objection was that the draft resolution seemed to encroach in several respects on responsibilities that properly belonged to the Security Council.

1011. Finally, the United States could not support any steps that would violate the statutory responsibilities of the IBRD and other specialized agencies, and was opposed to any infringement of their prerogatives and autonomies as set forth in the agreements for their establishment.

1012. In view of those reservations, his delegation regretted that it would be compelled to vote against the draft resolution. His Government continued, however, to support the view expressed in it that the people of the Territories were entitled to the full and free exercise of the right of self-determination and independence, and would continue to oppose by all legitimate and practical means any limitation of that right, so basic to the political and social evolution of all mankind.

1013. The representative of Australia said that his delegation, while respecting the motives of the sponsors of the draft resolution, considered that one couched in terms of reason and persuasion might have been more effective. The last four paragraphs of the preamble did not justify or sustain the operative paragraphs that followed. Operative paragraph 3 made no attempt to differentiate between those commercial interests that exploited human and material resources and those that

did not. No one could deny the positive contribution of overseas investment to the exploitation, in the widest technical sense, of the natural resources of developing countries. Australia could not have reached its present stage of development without the assistance of overseas investors.

1014. Operative paragraph 4 was unacceptable on legal grounds, while operative paragraph 6 could usurp the authority of the Security Council. If the Special Committee were to adopt a resolution in terms so severe and critical not only of Portugal but also of other unnamed States, it would be likely to defeat its own purposes.

1015. The representative of Iran said that in line with the policy laid down by his sovereign, he considered that everyone, and particularly those Governments which were supporting the Portuguese colonial régime, should make continuing and co-ordinated efforts to bring down that economic and military structure in order that the peoples involved might be liberated. In that way the explosive situation resulting from Portugal's colonial policy could be averted. The primary objective of the draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor, was to liberate the peoples under Portuguese domination by precisely such collective action. He earnestly hoped that, despite their differences in approach, all members would find it possible to vote for the draft resolution and so help to end Portuguese rule in Africa. The draft resolution also called upon the specialized agencies to play their part in the collective effort. He strongly urged the agencies concerned to do their utmost to assist the liberation movements.

1016. Although the international community should do all in its power to consolidate its efforts to overthrow Portuguese rule, it should be emphasized that the peoples of the Territories themselves should play their part and redouble their efforts.

1017. Finally, he reiterated the full, unflagging and unreserved support of his country for the liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

1018. The representative of Venezuela suggested that the phrase "which is likely to constitute a threat to international peace and security" should be inserted in operative paragraph 7.

1019. His delegation had already stated the reasons why it could not accept the wording of operative paragraph 4, which reproduced the wording of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), operative paragraph 3. The same considerations applied to operative paragraphs 6, 8 and 10. He therefore requested that paragraphs 4, 6, 8 and 10 should be voted on separately.

1020. His delegation also had reservations concerning operative paragraph 7 for it considered that in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, only the Security Council was competent to determine what acts constituted "acts of aggression".

1021. The representative of Poland said that the draft resolution, especially operative paragraph 6, reflected the views of the Polish delegation. With regard to operative paragraph 12, his delegation believed that the Special Committee could be of great assistance to the Secretary-General in his efforts to publicize the work of the United Nations concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese domination. He suggested that the words "... in consultation with the

Special Committee", should be inserted after "Secretary-General", in the first line of the paragraph.

1022. The representative of Tunisia, speaking on behalf of all the sponsors of the draft resolution, said that they were ready to accept the amendment proposed by the representative of Poland.

1023. At its 541st meeting, the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413), as orally revised, as follows:

(a) Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 3, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia

Against: Australia, Italy, United States of America. Abstaining: Finland, Venezuela.

(b) Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Italy, United States of America. Abstaining: Australia, Finland, Venezuela.

(c) Operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 4, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Finland, Italy, United States of America.

Abstaining: Venezuela.

(d) Operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 3, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Italy, United States of America. Abstaining: Finland, Venezuela.

(e) The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413) as a whole, as orally revised, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to 2, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Italy.

1024. The text of the resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC. 109/251), adopted by the Special Committee at its 541st meeting on 20 June 1967, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined the question of Territories under Portuguese domination,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling also all the relevant resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Deeply disturbed at the negative attitude of Portugal and its obstinate refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,

"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening international peace and security owing to the methods of oppression which continue to be used against the African peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination,

"Noting once more with deep concern that the activities of the foreign economic and financial interests in those Territories are being pursued as intensively as ever and continue to impede the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the African people,

"Noting further with deep concern that Portugal continues to receive aid and weapons from its military allies which it uses against the population of these Territories,

"Noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements both by struggle and by a reconstruction programme,

- "1. Reaffirms once again the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination to achieve freedom and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the enjoyment of this right;
- "2. Strongly condemns the negative attitude of Portugal and its obstinate refusal to implement the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- "3. Further condemns the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination which exploit the human and material resources of the Territories and impede the progress of their people towards freedom and independence;
- "4. Condemns as a crime against humanity, the policy of the Government of Portugal, which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of African workers to South Africa;
- "5. Urges Portugal to apply without delay the principle of self-determination to the peoples of the

- Territories under its domination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and calls upon it in particular to take the following action:
- (a) To recognize forthwith the right of the peoples under its domination to self-determination and independence;
- (b) To desist forthwith from all acts of repression and to withdraw all the military and other forces which it is using for that purpose;
- (c) To proclaim an unconditional political amnesty and create the conditions which will enable authority to be transferred to freely elected institutions representative of the populations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "6. Requests once again all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to take the following measures:
- "(a) To desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enables it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;
- "(b) To take all necessary measures to prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Portuguese Government;
- "(c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Portuguese Government of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition;
- "(d) To take the necessary measures to put an end to the activities referred to in operative paragraph 3 above;
- "7. Draws the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that border its colonies;
- "8. Urgently recommends that the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions concerning this question, particularly resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965 and those of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966;
- "9. Appeals again to all States to grant the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights, and to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities, particularly so far as investments in the Territories are concerned;
- "10. Appeals once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have so far given, and requests them, in co-operation with the Organiza-

tion of African Unity (OAU) and through it with the national liberation movements, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to those who have suffered and are still suffering from the military operations:

- "12. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee, to promote, through the various United Nations bodies and agencies, the widespread and continuous publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, so that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination and of the continuing struggle waged by the peoples of these Territories for their liberation;
- "13. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into consultations with the specialized agencies referred to in operative paragraph 10 of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee;
- "14. Decides to maintain the question of Territories under Portuguese administration on its agenda.'
- 1025. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.146

ANNEX*

Territories under Portuguese administration: Question of refugees

Note by the Secretariat

- I. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
- 1. During its visit to Africa, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on 22 June 1966 in which, among other provisions,

it requested "the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination, their assistance to the refugees of these Territories".a

- 2. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, after having considered the report of the Special Committee on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, in which it expressed its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the aid they have extended so far, and requested them "in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered and are still suffering owing to military operations".
- 3. The following information on the assistance provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to refugees from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, has been summarized from the report of the High Commissioner to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, the UNHCR programme for 1967 (A/AC.96/342) and the report on UNHCR current operations in 1966 (A/AC.96/ 364). Information on UNHCR assistance to refugees in Macau is contained in the background paper on that Territory (see section 7 of this chapter).

II. REFUGEE SITUATION AND MEASURES TAKEN

4. During 1966, the flow of refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, into neighbouring countries continued and by the end of the year the number assisted by the UNHCR had risen by another 100,000, that is, from 284,700 in 1965 to 385,600. The principal new influxes were from Angola into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and from Angola and Mozambique into Zambia. The following table shows the distribution of refugees in the four main countries of asylum.

NUMBER OF REFUGEES FROM TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION SUBJECT TO UNHCR PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

		At 31 December 1965	At 31 Dec	ember 1966
Territory of origin	Country of asylum	Number	Number	Number who received rations
Angola	Congo (Democratic Repub-	220,000a	300.000a	10.000
	lic of)	220,000-	3,800	3,700
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea	Senegal	50,000	61,000	21,000
Mozambique	United Republic of Tanzania	14.700	19,000	16,000
Mozamoique	Zambia	14,700	1,800	1,300
	Total	284,700	385,600	52,000

Source: Report on UNHCR Current Operation in 1966 (A/AC.96/364) passim. ^a According to the UNHCR, there were 270,000 Angolan refugees as at 1 January 1966 and during the year 30,000 more arrived. As reported previously (A/AC.109/L.293), the host Government puts the total number of Angolan refugees at 600,000.

5. Under the UNHCR proposed programme for 1967, global allocations amounted to \$US4.6 million as compared with \$3.5 million for 1966. UNHCR proposed allocations^b for refugees from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, and Cape Verde amount to \$683,500 as compared with \$502,550 in 1966, which represents an increase of more than 35 per cent. The separate proposed allocations are shown in the table below. Details of the settlement programmes in the host countries are summarized in the following sections.

¹⁴⁸ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document S/8023.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.417.

a A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619.

b As submitted to the sixteenth session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, held in Octoher 1966.

UNHCR 1967 ALLOCATIONS FOR REFUGEES FROM TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

(United States dollars)

Refugees from	Country of asylum	UNHCR alloca- tion for 1967
Angola	Congo (Democratic Republic of)	50,000ª
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea	Senegal	140,000
Mozambique	United Republic of Tanzania	172,900ъ
Angola and Mozambique	Zambia	310,600
	Total	673,500

Source: UNHCR Programme for 1967 (A/AC.96/342) passim.

A. Refugees from Angola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

- 6. During 1966, the number of Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo increased by some 30,000, mainly into Katanga near Dilolo and in the Lower Congo region, where most of them passed through the reception centre at Songololo and at Kibentele in the east. Towards the end of the year, the influx had slowed considerably. Emergency assistance in the form of food and clothing was provided by two voluntary agencies to the newly arrived refugees and no UNHCR contribution was involved.
- 7. According to the reports of the UNHCR, the settlement of Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has continued on the same basis as in past years with assistance provided mainly from voluntary agencies (including the Protestant Mutual Aid, Caritas Congo, the Danish Council for Refugees and the League of Red Cross Societies). This aid, together with favourable local conditions, has made it possible for the majority of refugees to reach a minimum subsistence level about one year after leaving the reception centre.
- 8. Assistance from UNHCR sources to Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be of a

marginal character. During 1966, the Kimpese Agricultural and Vocational Training Centre, set up by the Congolese Protestant Relief Agency, was completed. The UNHCR has contributed \$20,000 to this project which was supplemented by a donation of \$13,565 from the Swedish Government. In July 1966, the UNHCR contributed \$33,000 towards projects aimed at training or settling on the land Angolan refugees now at Kinshasa, Matadi and other cities.

9. An allocation of \$50,000 has been made to assist measures by the Congolese Government, the ILO and other voluntary agencies, and it is hoped to complete the long-term settlement of the Angolan and other refugees who still need help.

B. Refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic of Tanzania

- 10. The UNHCR reports that as at 1 January 1966 there were about 12,000 refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic of Tanzania. During 1966, there was a further influx of some 7,000 refugees from that Territory, mainly in the areas of Mbamba Bay and Muhukuru in south-western Tanzania. As a result, the Tanzanian Government has decided to establish two new rural settlements, one for about 6,000 refugees at Muhukuru and another at Lundo, about twelve miles north of Mbamba Bay. At the same time, the settlement of Butamba has been modified, as only 6,000 refugees are now living there instead of the 10,000 as originally planned.
- 11. Muhukuru settlement. During 1966, the UNHCR allocated \$25,000 from the Emergency Fund for the Mozambique refugees at Muhukuru and \$10,729 for those at Lundo for temporary relief prior to their settlement on the land. The World Food Programme provided food, the Lutheran World Federation/Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service provided tools, seeds, vehicles and help towards the construction of buildings, and OXFAM contributed \$4,200. By the end of 1966, some 2,500 refugees had moved into the new settlement and others were coming in from surrounding areas.
- 12. Lundo settlement. The Government has drawn up a three-year programme for settling some 4,000 Mozambique refugees at Lundo. In 1966, the UNHCR approved an allocation of \$70,000 for this project, and of this, \$25,000 was made available in October to start the programme. By the end of 1966, the Government had surveyed and marked most of the land to be allocated to refugees who will receive three to five acres for each family of five which will enable them to become self-supporting.
- 13. For 1967, the UNHCR had allocated \$127,300 for this settlement. This is part of the three-year programme which is being financed as follows:

In	United States d			
Source	1966 July- December	1967	1968 January June	Total
Tanzanian Government	1,800	3,800	2,000	7,600
World Food Programme	10,000	87,500	<i>77</i> ,500	175,000
Lutheran World Federation (in cash) Tanganyika Christian Refugee Ser-	16,250	20,000	8,750	45,000
vice (in kind)	3,750	5,000	1,250	10,000
Other sources	9,000	22,000	7,000	38,000
UNHCR	70,000	127,300	27,800	225,100
	110,800	265,600	124,300	500,700

14. Rutamba settlement. As the number of refugees at Rutamba is less than generally planned, the UNHCR 1966 allocation of \$192,550 was reduced to \$125,060. This amount has been fully disbursed. About 1,800 acres of the original target of 2,000 acres have now been cleared and plots have been allocated. It was expected that, after the April harvest

in 1967, it would be able to reduce the food rations provided by the World Food Programme. The UNHCR has allocated \$45,600 for this project in 1967, which brings its total allocation for Angolan and Mozambique refugees to \$172,900. The 1967 financing of the Rutamba settlement is shown below:

^{*} This allocation includes also funds for the long-term settlement of other refugees besides those from Angola.

b \$127,300 for Lundo and \$45,600 for Rutamba (see para. 14 below).

Source	U. S. dollars
Tanzanian Government	11,810
World Food Programme (in kind)	100,500
Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service:	
In cash	43,760
In kind	15,000
UNHCR	45,600
Total	216,670

C. Refugees from Angola and Mozambique in Zambia

15. The UNHCR reports that as at 1 January 1966 there were an estimated 5,700 refugees in Zambia, which included 5,000 from Mozambique and 100 from Angola. During 1966, there were some 5,585 new arrivals and about 5,000 were voluntarily repatriated. The largest influx was from Angola and by the end of the year out of the 6,285 refugees in Zambia, 3,800 were from Angola and 1,800 from Mozambique. The Zambian Government plans to settle the refugees from Mozambique at Nyimba and those from Angola at Lwatembo.

16. Nyimba settlement. Under the original plan it was intended to settle some 2,000 refugees from Mozambique at Nyimba and \$114,200 was approved by the UNHCR from the 1966 programme for this purpose. With the expectation that the refugees would be able to become self-supporting by mid-1967, a further contribution of \$16,550 was to be made for this year. However, owing to the voluntary repatriation of some refugees and the arrival of others, progress of the settlement has been delayed, and the original allocations have been readjusted to carry over into mid-1968, when it is hoped the settlement will be self-supporting. The UNHCR will contribute a total of \$160,080 as follows: \$92,080 for 1966; \$49,100 for 1967 and \$18,900 from 1 January to 30 June 1968. The Zambian Government will contribute a total of \$95,503 and the World Food Programme a total of \$186,067.

17. Lwatembo settlement of Angolan refugees. Refugees from Angola began entering the Valovale district in Zambia in May and June 1966 and by the end of June numbered over 2,000. An emergency plan was drawn up by the Zambian Government for the period 1 June to 31 December 1966 at a cost of \$115,600 and towards this the UNHCR contributed \$28,000 from the Emergency Fund.

18. As the refugees do not wish to return to Angola, the Zambian Government plans to settle them at Lwatembo. This settlement project is expected to be completed by mid-1968 and includes land clearance, agricultural development, the provision

of medical and educational requirements, village establishment and basic needs such as food and clothing.

19. The UNHCR contribution for 1967 amounts to \$251,500. The over-all project is to be financed as follows:

		1 January- 30 June	Total
Source	1967	(United Sta	tes dollars)
Zambian Government	34,680	4,645	39,325
World Food Programme	81,310	40, 655	121,965
Zambian Red Cross	14,560	11,760	26,320
UNHCR/other sources	251,500	28,500	280,000

- D. Refugees from Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, in Senegal
- 20. During 1966, the influx of new refugees continued and by June they numbered approximately 56,700 and by December, 61,500, as compared with 50,000 at the end of 1965. Of the refugees who arrived between 1962 and the end of 1965, 20,000 were settled under the 1964/1965 programmes; the 1966 programme was expected to assist another 20,000 and the 1967 programme the settlement of the recently arrived 20,000.
- 21. The Senegal Government's current programme for the settlement of refugees in Cassamance Province aims at providing emergency relief to new arrivals, the transfer of certain groups away from the border area and further measures to integrate the entire refugee population, including the earlier arrivals. Towards this scheme, the UNHCR proposes to allocate \$123,650 which will be used as follows: food distribution, \$32,000; health services, \$14,000; education, \$40,000; transfer of refugees, \$5,000; tools, seeds and fertilizers \$8,000; wells and bridges \$21,650, and transport and community development \$3,000. In addition, the UNHCR will allocate \$10,500 for assistance to the over 1,200 refugees in Dakar and provide \$5,850 for a contingency fund.
- 22. The value of current 1963-1966 UNHCR refugee projects in Senegal amounts to \$2,125,571 of which \$425,571 is from the UNHCR and \$1,700,000 from other supporting contributions. The UNHCR contribution is reported to represent only a fraction of the total cost of the land settlement programme. The Government of Senegal, the League of Red Cross Societies, the United States Government, Catholic Relief Services and the local population have also contributed cash or services. The estimated value of the land alone provided by the Senegal Government at five acres to each family of six amounts to \$2,143,000. The food donated by the United States Government is estimated at \$245,000 and the contribution of the League of Red Cross Societies at \$55,500.

CHAPTER VI*

ADEN

A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1966 and by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its meetings in 1966. On 22 March 1966, the Special Committee, acting on certain petitions from Aden, adopted a resolution whereby it deplored the action of the administering Power in effecting mass arrests of the Adeni people and called upon it to desist from these acts and cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory. The Sub-Committee on Aden submitted a report (A/6300/Rev.1,¹ chap. VI, annex II) to the Special Committee on 18 May 1966. Following its consideration of the report, the Special

Committee decided to approve it and endorsed the recommendations contained therein.

2. On 15 June, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Aden in which it deplored the setting-up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, reaffirmed the view that the responsibilities of the administering Power could not be circumvented through any action by such a régime and deplored any defence arrangement that the Government of the United Kingdom might enter into with that régime. The Special Committee appealed to all States not to recognize independence that was not based on the wishes of the people freely expressed through elections under universal suffrage and called upon the administering Power to declare unequivocally

^{*}Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.4 and Corr.1.

Corr.1.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

its acceptance of relevant General Assembly resolutions and its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in their implementation without delay. Reiterating previous conclusions and recommendations, the Special Committee again drew the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area. It requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections.

3. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Committee covering its work in 1966 (*ibid.*, chap. VI) and heard petitioners from Aden. On 12 December it adopted resolution 2183 (XXI).

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

- 4. On 23 February 1967, in accordance with the above resolution, the Secretary-General appointed the United Nations Special Mission on Aden as follows:
- Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela), Chairman; Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi (Afghanistan); and Mr. Moussa Leo Keita (Mali).
- 5. According to the terms of this resolution, the Special Mission on Aden is required to submit a report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee.

B. Information on the Territory²

Political and constitutional developments

Constitution

- 6. Aden Colony had its first legislative election in 1955; four members of an otherwise nominated Legislative Council were elected. In 1959, the Legislative Council was reorganized to include twelve elected members and eleven nominated and ex officio members. The Governor was assisted by a ten-member Executive Council. In the Aden Protectorate, the affairs of state and government were conducted by the traditional rulers with the advice of British resident advisers and political officers responsible to the Governor in Aden.
- 7. In February 1959, six States of the Western Protectorate joined in a "Federation of Arab Amirates of the South" with which the United Kingdom signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Protection. The Federation had a legislative body, the Federal Council, and an executive body of ministers, the Supreme Council. In 1962 the Federation was renamed "Federation of South Arabia", and by the end of that same year five more States had joined the Federation.
- 8. A new Constitution for Aden State came into force on 18 January 1963. Simultaneously Aden (ex-

- cluding Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands) joined the Federation, thus raising the number of States to twelve. The Aden Constitution provided for a Legislative Council composed of a speaker, sixteen elected members, six nominated members and the Attorney-General, the Executive Council was replaced by a Council of Ministers, and the Governor's title was changed to that of High Commissioner.
- 9. Since 1963, five more States have joined the Federation. Under the amended Federal Constitution, each State is free to select its representatives in the Federal Council by whatever means it considers appropriate. Each State has six representatives, with the exception of Aden, which has twenty-four, and four smaller sheikhdoms with three, two or one representative each. The total number of representatives is 103. The Supreme Council consists of twelve ministers elected by and from the representatives in the Federal Council, each State being allotted one ministerial post for every six representatives. The chairmanship of the Supreme Council is held by ministers in rotation.
- 10. In June and July 1964 a constitutional conference was held in London and was attended by ministers of the Federation and of Aden State, as well as by delegates of States not in the Federation. The conference decided, among other things, to recommend the granting of independence to the Territory not later than 1968. On 7 December 1964 the Federal Supreme Council and the Aden Council of Ministers announced that they had agreed on the creation of a unitary sovereign State in South Arabia. On 12 August 1965, a supplementary treaty between the United Kingdom and the Federation of South Arabia was signed whereby the Federation's obligation to accept British advice was restricted to matters concerning external affairs, defence and the public service. In Aden State, the authority of the High Commissioner prevailed in matters of internal security as well.
- 11. The last Aden election was held in October 1964 but was boycotted by the main political parties. In March 1965, the leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council, Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, was appointed Chief Minister and formed the Government. On 25 September, however, the United Kingdom Government suspended the Aden Constitution and Mr. Mackawee's Government was dismissed. Since then Aden has been administered directly by the Office of the High Commissioner.
- 12. At the request of the Government of the Federation, two British experts visited the Territory during 1965 and subsequently drafted constitutional proposals for an independent South Arabia. The United Kingdom, on behalf of the Government of the Federation, requested the transmission of these proposals to all permanent missions to the United Nations.

Postponement of the August 1966 conference

13. It will be recalled that in May 1966 the Government of the Federation of South Arabia announced its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions and decided to convene a conference of all South Arabian States and political groups to consider ways and means whereby the resolutions would be implemented (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VI, annexes I, III and IV). Invitations were addressed to the States not members of the

² The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 6 July 1966, for the year 1965.

Federation and to various political groups to attend the conference on 1 August 1966. Similarly a request was made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an observer to attend the conference. In June, however, the Qa'iti and Kathiri Sultanates rejected the invitation to attend the conference. In a letter to the Chairman of the Supreme Council, the ruler of Qa'iti stated that the Federal Government was not the party to call for such a conference because the United Nations resolution had been directed to the United Kingdom for implementation. A suitable atmosphere must first be introduced by lifting the state of emergency, freeing political detainees and establishing an effective United Nations presence. On 17 July, the South Arabian League (SAL) rejected participation in the conference and stated that the United Kingdom should have made an explicit declaration of acceptance of the United Nations resolutions. All governments and political parties and organizations in the area should enter into preparatory talks in order to determine and unify their stand as to the means, procedures and stages of implementing the United Nations resolutions. At the same time, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) declared that the conference would not support the national aspirations of the people and that the people would fight all imperialist plans. On 19 July, the Supreme Council of the Federation announced that the conference would be postponed.

Federal Council

- 14. On 10 August 1966, the Federal Council opened its session with the participation of twenty-two representatives from Aden out of a total quota of twenty-four. Eighteen of these representatives had just been appointed by the High Commissioner to replace members who resigned in July 1965 in protest against the sending of a constitutional commission to Aden. The newly appointed members were reported to have agreed among themselves not to discuss in the Federal Council any questions relating to the future of the Territory; such questions were to be left for a national government, representing the people of Aden, to deal with. They were also reported to have asked the High Commissioner to form such a government and to create a national guard for Aden similar to the guards in other States of the Federation.
- 15. On 19 August 1966, one of the newly appointed members of the Federal Council, Mr. Ahmad A. Basendwah, was assassinated in Aden.

Informal talks between certain opposition leaders and ministers of the Federation of South Arabia

- 16. In July 1966, a delegation of six ministers of the Federation of South Arabia met in Beirut with leaders of SAL and two politicians who had previously belonged to FLOSY, namely Mr. Ahmad Al-Fadhli and Mr. Je'bal bin Hussein Al Audhali. Among other things, the conferees reportedly "viewed with concern secessionist attempts being made in some parts of the South" and affirmed their determination to realize the unity of South Arabia. The meeting also agreed that the cases against all political exiles should be dismissed and that steps would be taken to allow them to return to Aden. Immediately following these talks, Mr. Al-Fadhli and Mr. Al Audhali returned to the Territory.
- 17. Another round of talks was held in Beirut early in October 1966. In addition to those representatives

who had participated in the earlier talks, the ruler of Beihan State, Sharif Hussein Al-Habili, the exiled Sultan of Lahej, Mr. Ali Abdul-Karim and a number of exiled tribal leaders were present; the Sultan of Kathiri was reported also to have joined in the talks. The Federal Ministers reportedly sought to obtain opposition agreement on the establishment of a presidential system to replace the present governmental structure before independence. However, the meeting failed to produce any agreement on these proposals. The League stated that it could negotiate with the Government on the basis of two points: (a) there must be a sincere willingness to submit to the will of the people; and (b) the purpose of any conference that was held should be to draw up a detailed plan for bringing about the unity, independence and sovereignty of the Territory.

Nationalist organizations

- 18. The formation by FLOSY of a National Council representing freedom fighters and civilian sectors from all areas of the Arab South was postponed in July 1966.
- 19. In Hadhramaut, a political party supporting FLOSY has been active during the past year; it is the Arab Socialist Party whose Secretary-General, Mr. Said Al-Akbary, defined its objectives as being freedom, socialism and union of the Arab South with the North as a step towards complete pan-Arab unity. A new wider group was reportedly formed in Hadhramaut following meetings held in Mukalla, Qa'iti Sultanate, in January 1967. It is the Popular Democratic Front, sponsored by the Arab Socialist Party.

Closing of the border with Yemen

- 20. On 22 August 1966, the Government of the Federation of South Arabia ordered the closing of the border with Yemen and a ban was imposed on all trade and travel between the two countries. Over 100 Yemenis residing in Aden were said to have been deported by the Federal authorities. On 29 August 1966, federal security authorities announced that a further group of forty-three Yemeni residents had been deported from various States of the Federation and that more deportations would follow.
- 21. The border was reopened and normal communications were resumed on 7 December 1966.

Treatment of detainees

- 22. The question of the treatment of Aden detainees by the British military authorities was discussed in the Special Committee in October 1966 and in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session. Attention was drawn to a report by Amnesty International, published on 18 October 1966, in which torture was reported to have been inflicted on detainees. It was based on evidence collected by Dr. Salahedin Rastgeldi, a Swedish medical doctor who had visited Aden between 28 July and 4 August, investigated about 300 cases and obtained sworn statements from former prisoners or relatives of people in prison. His report was transmitted to the United Kingdom Government by the Swedish section of Amnesty International.
- 23. The representative of the United Kingdom stated in the Fourth Committee on 8 November 1966 that before the publication of the report of Amnesty International, the United Kingdom Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs had sent a special representative to the Territory to examine the procedures for arrest, interrogation and detention and advise whether there were ways in which those procedures could be improved.

24. The representative of the Secretary of State, Mr. Roderic Bowen, visited Aden from 27 October to 8 November 1966. His report was published as a British Government White Paper on 19 December. In a speech to the House on 19 December, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, stated the following:

"Among Mr. Bowen's recommendations are a number for dealing with complaints by detainees in the future and these recommendations have generally been accepted. Mr. Bowen did not investigate specific allegations of cruelty to prisoners but he has criticized the handling by the Aden Administration of some such allegations in the past. I must emphasize here that his criticism relates to a short period in the past and centres on the activities of three interrogators at that time employed in the Interrogation Centre and the control exercised over their activities. Investigations into these allegations will now be pursued to a conclusion. While these investigations take place I think it right that nothing should be said publicly to prejudice the position of any persons who may be implicated, before they have had an opportunity of giving their own account of what took place to the appropriate authorities."

Developments in Hadhramaut

25. According to press reports from Hadhramaut, a student demonstration broke out in Saiyun, the capital of Kathiri Sultanate, on 10 September 1966, while the High Commissioner was visiting the area. Shots were fired and several persons were wounded; a member of SAL was later arrested and charged with having fired the shots. On 12 September, a grenade exploded among demonstrating students in Mukalla, Qa'iti Sultanate, as they were protesting the Saiyun incident. One student was killed and many others were wounded. Following those events, a curfew was imposed on Mukalla and communications between Aden and Hadhramaut were cut off. Searches were carried out by the authorities in Mukalla and other towns, arms and ammunition were reported seized, many members of SAL were arrested and all newspapers were closed down. The Sultanate was placed under the control of a military committee appointed by the Qa'iti Minister of State, Mr. Ahmed Al-Attass. The Office of SAL in Aden expressed its regret at the incidents; it accused Mr. Al-Attass of distorting the facts and trying to damage the reputation of the League. It also accused the Arab Socialist Party of Hadhramaut and the Hadhramaut Trade Union Congress of inciting the students against it. On 21 November, a military court in Mukalla began the trial of fifty-six members of the League, eighteen of them in

26. The Sultan of Qa'iti, Awadh bin Saleh, died in October 1966 and was succeeded by his son, Ghaleb bin Awadh. The Minister of State, Mr. Al-Attass, reportedly declared on 20 November that some moderate politicians in Mukalla were working towards the formation of a National Assembly consisting of some thirty members from the six provinces of Qa'iti. The proposed National Assembly would deal with the prob-

lems posed by the impending attainment of independence by the Territory.

27. In April 1967, FLOSY issued a statement warning against "a conspiracy" to separate Hadhramaut from the rest of the South.

Incidents and demonstrations

28. In September 1966, the High Commissioner issued an order banning passengers and crews of ships visiting Aden from disembarking or staying ashore during the hours of darkness. The order was issued under the state of emergency regulations. Incidents involving bomb explosions, grenade and gun attacks against British patrols, civilians and military posts and installations have increased in Aden and in other parts of the Federation of South Arabia. During 1966, over 500 incidents were reported to have occurred. Official casualty figures were as follows: 108 killed (including 14 British servicemen and 5 British civilians), and 876 wounded (including 319 British servicemen and 17 British civilians).

29. Beginning May 1967, the families of British military personnel and service-sponsored civilians were to be repatriated at the rate of about 500 persons a week. There are about 2,500 servicemen's families out of a total of 7,000 British families in Aden. According to reports, the evacuation process has recently been hastened owing to the worsening security situation.

30. Frequent general strikes and demonstrations have occurred in Aden. On 19 and 20 January 1967, the 128th anniversary of British occupation, on 11 to 14 February, on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the Federation of South Arabia, and on 28 February and 1 March, following the death of three sons of Mr. A. Q. Mackawee in an explosion at his house, violent demonstrations and totally effective strikes were reported.

Other developments

31. In February 1967, it was reported that a majority of the States of the Federation of South Arabia had approved a new amended version of the draft constitution prepared by the two British constitutional experts (see para. 12 above). The Federation's Minister for External Affairs visited London and was reported to have asked the United Kingdom Government to guarantee the safety of the Federation after independence. On the other hand, FLOSY has announced that it would create "a regular army of the revolution" and consider the formation of a government-in-exile.

Economic conditions

Agriculture and livestock

32. Arable land is very limited, the Territory consisting essentially of desert and barren mountains. The main agricultural products of the Federation are cotton and cotton seed, sorghum, millet, sesame, dates and vegetables, and some wheat, barley and coffee at the higher altitudes. The sesame seeds are used to produce cooking oil.

33. In 1965, the total acreage of cotton was 58,000 acres, compared with 68,000 acres in 1964. The decrease in acreage was due to the delaying of floods in the *wadis* which serve as dams and irrigation channels. The following table shows the acreage, production and value of principal crops during 1965:

Cotton	Area (acres) 58,000	Production (tons) 36,000	Value (pounds) 2,988,000
Sorghum and millet	70,000	26,500	1,060,000
Wheat	8,500	4,700	206,800
Barley	4,000	3,000	120,000
Sesame	3,800	1,100	88,000
Dates	12,000	7,500	525,000

34. The livestock population and value was estimated as follows:

	Number	Value (poun ds)
Cattle	71,000	2,840,000
Sheep and goats	4,500,000	18,000,000
Camels	194,000	11,640,000
Donkeys	44,000	440,000

The production of hides and skins amounted to 9,913 bales valued at £499,500.

35. Approximate expenditure by the Government on agriculture, veterinary services and irrigation services amounted to £304,978 in 1965-1966, as against £215,835 the previous year. In addition, £271,899 was approved for research stations and other capital expenditure under Colonial Development and Welfare schemes. In March 1965, the Government established a central wholesale produce market in Aden to facilitate storage, marketing and other auxiliary services for fruit and vegetable producers of the whole Federation. Funds available to the Agricultural Loans Board were increased from £165,000 to £190,000.

Fisheries

- 36. Fish landings showed a slight increase over the entire coast of South Arabia in 1965: production over the entire coast was 51,902 fresh tons; in the Federation it was 46,540 tons, an increase of 3,000 over the previous year. Most of the production was sold in Aden or exported in the form of dried salted fish. Cold stores were being built and modern fishing boats introduced in some outlying villages. In the Eastern Protectorate a pier and workshop were being constructed to enable fishing boats to be maintained and sheltered throughout the year.
- 37. The United Nations Special Fund has a project in the area for the biological survey of the Gulf of Aden. Sardine and tuna survey operations were carried out during 1965. Further exploratory fishing and scientific collection of data was to be undertaken under the project from 1966 to 1970.
- 38. There is a Department of Agriculture in the Qa'iti Sultanate. The expenses of the Department were just under £7,000 in 1965-1966. In Kathiri, no separate department exists, although some agricultural services are provided by the Administration. These services cost approximately £3,000 in 1965-1966.

Mineral resources

39. The administering Power has stated that there is little evidence of important mineral deposits in the Territory. The Pan American Hadhramaut Oil Company holds concessions for the prospecting and production of oil in Qa'iti, Kathiri and Mahra. A Joint State Affairs Organization has been formed in Qa'iti and Kathiri and is financed by the company. The two States have agreed that rentals paid by the company will be divided into four parts—two to go to Qa'iti, one to Kathiri and one to be frozen for the time being.

In case commercial oil is found, the States will receive 55 per cent of the profits and will have the option to take up 25 per cent of the issued capital of the producing company.

Trade

- 40. The port of Aden serves as an important trade centre for the whole Territory and for neighbouring countries. The value of goods imported through Aden from January to September 1965 was £72,957, 034, compared with £69,704,649 during the same period in 1964. Exports from Aden were valued at £45,939,601 and £49,258,087 respectively for the same periods. The value of petroleum products accounted for 39.5 per cent of import values, and with ship bunkers for over 79 per cent of export values. The Department of Commerce and Industry of the Federation publishes a monthly trade bulletin as well as an annual statement of external trade.
- 41. According to a report prepared by the Aden Chamber of Commerce in September 1966, business and the economy as a whole suffered greatly as a consequence of the closing of the border between the Federation and Yemen in August (see paras. 20 and 21 above). A high percentage of Aden imports are reexported to Yemen, while the Federation imports from Yemen qat, coffee, hides and vegetables.

Public finance

42. Total revenue in the Federation of South Arabia during the period 1 April 1965 to 28 February 1966 was £10,009,773, compared with £9,041,988 during the same period of 1964-1965. Of that total, the sum of £5,985,400 consisted of United Kingdom grants while the remainder accrued from local sources, including £2,228,412 from indirect taxes of £1,111, 400 from departmental revenue and reimbursements. Public expenditure totalled £9,628,314 (£7,305,364 the year before) of which £3,954,568 was spent on the Federal Army and the Federal Guard. While budget estimates for 1965-1966 had exceeded £14 million, the 1966-1967 figures stand at £18,967,284; revenue estimates stand at £18,675,725, of which £12, 617,121 are to be contributed by the United Kingdom. Nearly £9.2 million has reportedly been budgeted for defence. In addition to the increase in the annual contribution of the United Kingdom to the defence budget, a capital sum of £5.5 million is being spent on expanding and re-equipping the federal forces.

Economic development

- 43. The Federation's programme for road building was in abeyance in 1966 owing to lack of funds. Priority was given for the completion of the road to the Yemen border at Karsh and the road to Beihan which also connects most of the Federal States with Aden. During 1965, the mileage of bituminous surfacing was increased.
- 44. In the Eastern Protectorate, the 1963-1968 Development Plan incorporated previous development plans and is largely financed by Commonwealth Development and Welfare funds. A total of £2,100,000 has been committed for this period. Local state contributions have been of the order of £15,000 annually. Allocations for 1965-1966 were distributed as follows: 36 per cent for education, 20 per cent for agriculture and irrigation, 14 per cent for health, 12 per cent for roads, 7 per cent for co-operatives and marketing, 7 per cent for fisheries, 2 per cent for water supply, and

2 per cent for other public works. Qa'iti has had its own development programme since 1961 and, at 31 March 1966, the unspent balance of the Qa'iti Development Fund was £508,000, compared with £193,046 the previous year. The Special Funds for Harbour Development and Coastal Works totalled £330,000 against £300,000 in 1964-1965. In 1965, Qa'iti and Kathiri held balances totalling approximately £62,000 in joint development accounts, of which, however, £50,000 was committed to anti-famine measures.

Social conditions

Public health

- 45. During the financial year 1965-1966, government expenditure on public health was estimated at £1,075,123 for recurrent outlays and £56,250 for capital outlays, or nearly 6 per cent of the total budget.
- 46. There were 8 hospitals in the Federation, 6 of which were in Aden itself, with a total of 919 beds. In addition there were 52 dispensaries or rural health units, 3 specialized units (maternity and child welfare centres and a leprosarium) and 3 mobile units for trachoma and malaria control. Of these facilities, the government-owned institutions were the following: Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Aden, Lahej District Hospital, Makhzan District Hospital (situated on the borders of Lower Yafai and Fahdli States), Lodar District Hospital (Audhali State), 5 Aden dispensaries and 45 rural health units. Non-governmental institutions in Aden included the British Petroleum Company hospital, 2 military hospitals, 3 clinics maintained by religious missions and 3 charitable dispensaries.
- 47. Medical and health staff were distributed as follows:

	Govern- ment	Mission	Private
Registered physicians	. 60	4	35
Nurses of senior training		8	2 5
Locally certificated nurses	. 3 8	_	-
Midwives of senior training			25
Certificated midwives	. 13	_	_
Sanitary inspectors	. 27		1
Laboratory and X-ray technicians			5
Pharmacists		_	14

48. Fourteen per cent of development funds in the Eastern Protectorate were allocated for health expenditure in 1965-1966. These funds are provided by the United Kingdom Government under the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Acts, the latest of which was extended until 31 March 1968. Expenditure on health in the Kathiri Sultanate was £11,881 in 1965. No other information on health conditions in the Eastern Protectorate is available.

Co-operatives

49. At the beginning of 1966, there were 75 cooperative societies in the Federation, their position being as follows:

	Number	Member- ship	Total funds (£'s)
Cotton marketing	. 6	7,401	232,982
Farmer credit		1,229	7,161
Thrift and loan		52	1,249
School saving	. 52	12,501	10,476
Consumers	. 6	830	1,178
Fishermen	. 3	132	567
Better living	. 1	40	122
•	7 5	22,185	253 ,7 35

50. The marketing of cotton is carried out by the Cotton Producers' Associations which also undertake irrigation works and own agricultural machinery. They are run by committees drawn from their members. In 1965 the membership of these associations increased slightly over the previous year. The following associations existed at the beginning of 1966:

Cotton Producers' Associations	Membership
Audhali	. 953
Dathina	. 2,817
Ahwar	. 1,346
Yeramis	. 580
Fadhli	1,676
Bir Ahmad	. 29
	7,401

- 51. The Co-operative and Marketing Department is headed by a Commissioner; a number of its staff have attended co-operative courses in East Africa or the United Kingdom. Estimates of expenditure for the Department in 1965-1966 amounted to £69,050, while actual expenditure in 1964-1965 was £54,799.
- 52. In the Eastern Aden Protectorate, the estimated expenditure on the administration of the Cooperative and Marketing Department was £9,502 for the financial year 1964-1965. A number of officers of these co-operatives were receiving co-operative training in East Africa.
 - 53. The existing co-operative societies were:

	Number	Member- ship	Total funds (£'s)
Thrift and credit	. 4	608	12,053
Thrift	. 4	1,122	349
Consumers	. 5	627	4,462
Marketing	. 1	230	2,449
	1.4	2.507	10.010
	14	2,587	19,313

Labour

- 54. In July 1966, a protracted dispute between six Aden trade unions and the executive council of the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) was reported settled following negotiations held in Cairo under the auspices of the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, A joint committee representing the executive councils of both ATUC and the six unions was reported to have been formed on 13 August in implementation of the Cairo agreement.
- 55. According to unofficial sources, a trade union movement was established in the Eastern Protectorate towards the end of 1965. The Hadhramaut General Federation of Trade Unions, whose Secretary-General is Mr. Faysal Al-Attabi, consists of the following trade unions: the Union of Aviation Workers and Employers, the Union of Construction and Development Workers, the Teachers' Union, the Fuel Workers' and Employees' Union, the Union of National Organizations, Workers and Employees, the Municipal Workers' and Employees' Union, the Fishermen's Association, the Fuel Transport Association, the Customs Workers' and Employees' Union, the Bank Employees'

Union, the Agricultural Workers' Union and the Federation of Port Workers' Union.

Educational conditions

- 56. The report of the administering Power for the year 1965 stated that approximately 18 per cent of expenditure on all forms of education in the Federation of South Arabia was met by the United Kingdom Government. Total expenditure for 1965-1966 was estimated at £1,164,180 (recurrent outlays) and £65,580 (capital outlays). In Aden State, expenditure on education in 1964-1965 was roughly £820,000, of which £70,000 was grant-in-aid. In addition, Aden received £55,000 from federal public works funds for the renovation of existing premises and the building of a state office.
- 57. In 1965, throughout the Federation there were 179 government and 67 grant-aided and private primary schools, compared with 152 and 17 schools respectively the previous year; and there were 24 government, 10 grant-aided and 6 private intermediate schools, compared with 20, 10 and 5 schools respectively in 1964. The administering Power reported the opening of a new school at Lahej.
- 58. Secondary and technical education was provided in 8 government and 8 grant-aided or private schools, compared with 6 and 8 respectively in 1964. There were also 3 government teacher-training schools.
- 59. The number of children attending schools in the Federation during 1965 is set out below:

	Govern- ment schools	Aided and non-aided schools
Primary	25,992	7,005
Intermediate	6,157	2,841
Secondary and technical	2,767	890
Teacher-training	[^] 191	

- 60. In Aden State formal secondary education is provided for about 50 per cent of the boys and 42 per cent of the girls. In the remaining States of the Federation, only a limited number of those leaving primary schools gain entry to the intermediate schools and about 25 per cent of those leaving intermediate schools move to secondary education. Girls' education has moved forward during the last few years. There were 14 primary and 3 intermediate schools for girls in the States in 1965.
- 61. Fifty-nine students were on scholarships awarded by the Government, of whom 46 were in the United Kingdom.
- 62. In the Eastern Protectorate, educational expenditure in 1965 was as follows:

	£
(a) Qa'iti Sultanate	166,918 (recurrent)
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	89,395 (capital)
(b) Kathiri Sultanate	31,805 (recurrent)
. ,	36,366 (capital)
(c) Mahra Sultanate	Not available

63. The number of schools, teachers and pupils in Qa'iti and Kathiri during 1965-1966 is set out in the following tables:

PRIMARY

		Schools			Pupils		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Teachers
Government							
Qa'iti	86	10	96	10,252	1,973	12,225	310
Kathiri	8	3	11	1,211	289	1,500	46
Government-aided							
Qa'iti	5	2	7	507	267	774	24
Kathiri	21	3	24	1,800	317	2,117	64

INTERMEDIATE

	Schools			Pupils			
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Teachers
Government							
Qa'iti	15		15	2,565	223	2,788	122
Kathiri	4		4	439		439	21
Government-aided							
Qa'iti						_	_
Kathiri	2	_	2	93	_	93	5

SECONDARY

	Schools			Pupils			
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Teachers
Government							
Qa'iti	1		1	209		209	13
Kathiri	1	_	1	40		40	3

TEACHERS' TRAINING CENTRE

	Schools		Pupils				
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Teachers
Government							
Qa'iti	1	1	2	46	14	60	7

64. In 1965-1966 22 students were on scholarships abroad, of whom 12 were from Qa'iti and 10 from Kathiri. They were attending universities in the United Kingdom, Lebanon, and Iraq. In addition, an unspecified number were studying privately.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

- 65. The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its 492nd, 493rd, 508th and 571st meetings on 28 February, 1 March, 6 April and 21 November 1967.
- 66. At the 492nd meeting, on 28 February 1967, members of the Special Committee expressed their deep sympathy to Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee on the occasion of the tragic death of his three children. At the 493rd meeting, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that he had conveyed these statements to Mr. Mackawee.
- 67. At the 508th meeting, on 6 April 1967, the Chairman informed members of the receipt of a letter dated 4 April 1967, from the representative of the United Arab Republic transmitting the text of a resolution on Aden adopted by the League of Arab States at its meeting held in Cairo in March 1967.
- 68. In a note dated 24 August 1967, the Secretary-General drew the attention of the Special Committee to a letter dated 11 August 1967 (see annex I below) from the representative of the United Kingdom to to the Secretary-General on the possibility of placing the island of Perim under United Nations administration. The views of the Arab States on the proposal were set out in a letter dated 31 August 1967 from the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen to the Secretary-General (see annex III, appendix VI below).
- 69. In a note dated 17 November 1967 (see annex II below), the Secretary-General set out the text of the reply he had sent to the representative of the United Kingdom in which reference was made to the letter from the representatives of the Arab States and to the comments on the proposal made by the Special Mission on Aden in its report.
- 70. The Chairman of the Special Mission on Aden presented its report (see annex III below) at the 571st meeting on 21 November 1967.

Written petitions

71. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Aden:

Petitioner	Document No.
The Port Workers' General Union,	
the Customs Workers' General	
Union, the Transport Workers'	
General Union and the Various	
Industries Workers' General Union,	
Mukalla, Hadhramaut	A/AC.109/PET.602

2	40	14	00		
		Petitioner	_	Do	cument No.
the Yen	Liberation en (FLO	of Occup	Front for pied South ee, General	A/AC.	09/PET.603
Secr	etary, FL	OSY		A/AC.1 Add.1	09/PET.603/
Asn	ag. Head	om Mr. Al	dullah Al- al Bureau,	A/AC.1	.09/PET.603
Mrs.	Anisa Ah	med Mugl	oel Hamzi o Turkey	Add.2	
Muy Mr. A iden	vati Abdul-Rahi t and Mr.	man Girgi Hussain A		A/AC.1	09/PET.604
tiona Two	al Party of	of Aden.	Association	A/AC.1	.09/PET.605
of A Mr. J	Arab Wom affar Awa	ien d. Represe Liberation	entative of	A/AC.1	09/PET.606
Occi Four I	apied Sout	h Yemen. om the Na	tional Lib-	A/AC.1	09/PET.607
Yem	en				09/PET.607/ and 2
Ine A	den Trade other grou	Union Co	ngress and	A/AC.1	09/PET.608
Mr. A	bdullah Sa	lem Basen	dwah	A/AC.1	09/PET.609
The A	den Trade	Union Co	ngress and	A/AC.1	09/PET.610
Mr. F	awzy El S	roups ayed, Secre nal Confec	etary Gen-	A/AC.1	09/PET.611
Aral Mr. S Trai	Trade U alih Sulta nees' Uni	Unions (IC in, Secreta on, UNE: nunity De	ATU) ry of the SCO/Arab	A/AC.1	09/PET.613
Trai Mr. S man,	ning Cent alaheldeen General	re	id, Chair- of Agri-	A/AC.1	09/PET.614
Aral Mr. A	Republic Annad Mu Schalf of '	said and 'South Ara Eastern A	six others	A/AC.1	09/PET.6 24
Arat	oia"	its' Associa		A/AC.1	09/PET.625
versi	ty of Cal	ifornia ghani, Pre		A/AC.1	09/PET.633
Must Mr. Sayy	ulmans de aleh Moba ed Awad	France. rak and I on behalf	Mr. Salem of "The	A/AC.1	09/PET.634
Arab	Republic'	ents in th		A/AC.1	09/PET.635
Ceyle The C	on Moor General Ur	ssim, Vice- Youth Lea nion of W	gue, Orkers in	A/AC.1	09/PE.T.6 3 6
trica Mr. V	l Industrie Vafik Mesl	g, Metal s, Cairo. href, Pres	ident, Or-	A/AC.1	09/PET.637
Unit	ed States	Arab Stude	ia	A/AC.1	09/PET.638
Mr. A	Daniaziz (Othman on	penali oi	A /A C 1	00 /PET 630

A/AC.109/PET.639

A/AC.109/PET.640

Petitioner	Document No.
Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh, Secretary-General, World Assembly of Youth.	A/AC.109/PET.695
Mr. Ahmed Bin Ahmed Dagah, Secretary, Mayoonis United Society	A/AC.109/PET.697
The League of Yemen Students, USSR	A/AC.109/PET.698
Mr. A. Mohammad, representative of South Arabian League.	A/AC.109/PET.699
Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, President, South Arabian League	A/AC.109/PET.699
South Arabian League.	Add.1 A/AC.109/PET.699
The Arab Socialist Union	Add.2 A/AC.109/PET.700
The Graduates Congress, Aden Mr. Ali Musaid, Acting Minister for	A/AC.109/PET.701
Foreign Affairs, Government of the	A/AC.109/PET.712

Statements

- 72. The Chairman of the Special Mission, presenting its report (see annex III below), said that the Mission had endeavoured, at all times, to reflect faithfully the opinions which prevailed during the debates relating to this question in the Special Committee and the General Assembly and which were incorporated in various resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) setting forth the Mission's terms of reference.
- 73. The Mission regretted having been unable, due to the circumstances encountered by the Mission while carrying out its activities, to fulfil its mandate as was indicated in the report.
- 74. In approaching its task, the Mission knew that it entailed very serious difficulties, deriving mainly from the manner in which the administering Power was managing the Territory, leading it towards a form of government which did not represent the people's aspirations. However, the Mission's efforts seemed to have some chance of success owing to the fact that the United Kingdom had approved resolution 2183 (XXI) and its representatives had given their assurances, to the Special Committee as well as to the Mission, that they would co-operate in the implementation of the said resolution. The Mission's hopes in this respect were not fully realized because of the lack of a complete understanding demonstrated by the administering Power which, as indicated in its report, "seemed at times to choose a line of conduct not in harmony with the Mission's efforts".
- 75. In addition to laying a working basis with the administering Power, the Mission's efforts from the beginning were aimed at establishing direct contacts with all those who could contribute to the proper solution of this problem, with particular emphasis on the nationalist movements. The Mission had described in its report the difficulties it encountered in this respect. As could be clearly deduced from the debates and conclusions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, it was the Mission's conviction that the caretaker Government to lead the emerging country should not be an outgrowth or an extension of the so-called Federal Government which, because of its non-representativity, was a structure with no proper foundation, artificially sustained by the administering Power alone. In compliance with the relevant provisions of the resolution, the Mission understood that only a government with clean origins, broadly

based and, consequently, backed by a vast majority of the people, could ensure that the new State would accede to a genuine independence in peace and unity.

- 76. With respect to territorial integrity as well as in any other respects, the Mission was guided by the pertinent provisions of the resolution. Its attitude was always positive. Therefore, when the United Kingdom Government submitted its proposal on the internationalization of Perim Island, the Mission made it clear that it could not entertain this proposal since it considered it contrary to the provisions of the pertinent United Nations resolutions. The integrity of the Territory upon independence must be ensured.
- 77. During the last five days, the United Kingdom Government had taken decisions of paramount importance for the future of the Aden Territory. In this respect, he read the following letter dated 14 November 1967 sent to the Mission by the representative of the United Kingdom:
 - "I have been asked to inform you that my Government has now received an approach from the National Liberation Front in South Arabia addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, through the High Commissioner, in which they have expressed a readiness to negotiate without preconditions about the transfer of power in the Territory. Mr. Brown has agreed to this proposal from the National Liberation Front for negotiations, and expects to make a public statement on the matter later today. I wish to recall in this connexion that the British Government has been ready to negotiate with nationalist forces in the Territory for over two months, and indeed has actively sought contact with them for much longer, and that up to the present time no other body representing the nationalist forces has been prepared to come forward in response to the High Commissioner's statement of 5 September.
 - "I have also been asked at the same time to acknowledge the receipt of the message which you conveyed through me on 9 November. Mr. Brown has had very much in mind the Mission's concern for a broad-based government, which he fully shared. Unfortunately, circumstances with which you as Chairman of the Special Mission will be familiar, have made this impossible to achieve."
- 78. The representative of the United Kingdom referred to an appeal made by the Mission through him to the United Kingdom Government to do everything within its power to negotiate with all the nationalist forces directly and not through any intermediary, so that the Territory could attain a genuine independence in peace and harmony. This appeal was in line with the urgent suggestion made by the Mission at the end of its report to the Special Committee and other appropriate organs of the United Nations.
- 79. It was the Mission's conviction that the principles underlying resolution 2183 (XXI) were still valid at this late stage of the decolonization process in the Territory. Often, this process was painful, even in its last phase, when the tragic conditions under which subjugated peoples had lived became more evident. It was certainly so in the case of Aden whose people had undergone considerable sacrifices which might extend beyond the colonial period, depending on the conditions in which this period came to an end. It was still possible to prevent such a development.

- 80. The Mission, identified as it was with the feelings and aspirations of this valiant people, wished them whole-heartedly a future of peace and prosperity. That undoubtedly was the feeling of the Special Committee as well.
- 81. The Chairman, speaking on behalf of the Special Committee, expressed appreciation of the conscientious efforts exerted by the Chairman and members of the Special Mission on Aden in the performance of their unusually difficult task. The difficulty of the task was evident from the fact that the Special Committee and the Fourth Committee had devoted very close and prolonged attention to the question of Aden over the years. The circumstances leading to the appointment of the Mission also testified to the complexity of that task. In paying tribute to the work of the Mission, he wished to express the confident hope that the report of the Mission would assist the General Assembly in taking whatever measures might be appropriate to ensure that the Territory acceded to independence in conditions of peace and harmony. In conclusion, the Chairman paid tribute to the Secretary-General for establishing the Mission in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), for his continuing interest in its work and for extending to it all the necessary facilities.
- 82. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation would reserve its full statement on the question of South Arabia and on the report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden until those matters were debated in the Fourth Committee. Nevertheless, as representative of the administering Power, he believed that it would be inappropriate for the occasion to pass without his bringing the most recent information on the situation in the Territory to this Committee. He would, however, confine his remarks to a brief recapitulation of the main developments in statements of policy on South Arabia by the United Kingdom Government since the High Commissioner's statement of 5 September and to a very short comment on the report of the Special Mission.
- 83. On 5 September this year, the High Commissioner, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, made the announcement (see annex III, para. 268 below), the salient feature of which was a statement that the Federal Government had ceased to function and no longer exercised control in the Federation. The High Commissioner said that it was urgently necessary that a new government should take over, and he went on to say:
 - "I recognize the nationalist forces as representative of the people and am ready to enter into discussions immediately with them. These discussions will include the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of an effective government formed by the nationalist forces in place of the Federal Government, internal security in Aden, the withdrawal of British forces, the carrying out of United Nations resolutions and independence for South Arabia."
- 84. Two months elapsed. Talks started in Cairo between the two main political groups. Weeks went by, and no response was received from any of the nationalist forces to the High Commissioner's statement until 1 November. On that date, an announcement was made in Cairo that the groups negotiating there had reached agreement on the matters they had

- so far discussed, and that shortly they would be able to reach an agreement on the composition of a delegation to negotiate with the United Kingdom Government.
- 85. The following day, on 2 November, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, made a statement in the House of Commons (see annex III, appendix XI below). In that statement the Foreign Secretary welcomed the announcement by the groups in Cairo and stated that he looked forward to negotiations at the earliest possible moment. He recalled that conditions in south-western Arabia had been transformed since the summer, that a ground swell of revolt had overwhelmed the Arab State authorities in the Protectorate and that the Federal Government had ceased to function. He made it clear that in general terms the National Liberation Front (NLF) had played the major part and had established ascendancy in most of the States. The South Arabian forces had refused to take over political control, but had instead asked the United Kingdom Government to recognize the nationalists as representatives of the country as a whole and to express readiness to negotiate with them. Mr. Brown went on to announce that the objectives of the United Kingdom Government remained to withdraw its forces in good order and to leave behind, if possible, a united, stable and independent country. It had accordingly been decided to fix the date for independence in South Arabia during the second half of November, by which time all British forces would be withdrawn, and to make a further announcement about the precise date for independence by the middle of the month. Mr. Brown went on to say that it was quite clear to him that the radical nationalist and other groups in South Arabia must face their own problems and resolve them themselves. Finally, in that statement, the Foreign Secretary announced, in view of the changed international circumstances outside South Arabia, as well as the changes inside the Territory, the cancellation of United Kingdom plans announced in June this year to offer assistance from British naval and V-bomber deterrent forces after independence. He added that the question of United Kingdom aid after independence would be left for decision later.
- 86. On 7 November, one week after that statement by Mr. Brown and one week after the preliminary announcement on 1 November in Cairo of some measure of agreement between FLOSY and the NLF, the Foreign Secretary made a further announcement in the House of Commons. He stated that severe interfactional fighting had been taking place in three areas of Aden during the previous few days. Casualties among the Arabs involved in the fighting (in which British troops had not been involved) had been heavy. It appeared that the NLF had gained the upper hand. On Sunday, 5 November, the NLF High Command had sent a message to their delegation in Cairo calling for a suspension of the talks in which they were engaged with FLOSY. The following day, on 6 November, the South Arabian army, which until this point had been using its influence to bring FLOSY and the NLF to agreement on the formation of a government, issued a statement (see annex III, para. 315 below). In that statement, they made it clear that they were siding unreservedly with the NLF. The Foreign Secretary in that statement again reaffirmed that the United Kingdom Government's prime interest since September on the political

front had been to see the emergence of a government which would be able to take over from the United Kingdom Government and with which the United Kingdom Government could negotiate.

87. Finally on 14 November, the stage was finally set for independence in a further statement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons. This statement was made after the Special Mission had submitted its report to the Secretary-General. Because of its importance to this Committee, he would quote it in full:

"Since my statement to the House on 7 November, the situation in South Arabia has become clearer. In the course of talks between 7 and 10 November the officers of the South Arabian Forces told the High Commissioner that they fully supported the National Liberation Front which they said was in effective control. These officers also said that in areas from which British forces had withdrawn, the National Liberation Front themselves claimed at press conferences held on 8 and 10 November that they were exercising effective control and said that they wanted to enter into negotiations. They also demanded an end to violence against the civil community and called on the population to respect the persons and the institutions of the foreign community.

"On 11 November, the National Liberation Front sent me a telegram which they later published. In this telegram they asserted their claim to be a popular authority in control and said they had formed a delegation to negotiate with Her Majesty's Government on the transfer of political power. They asked for our agreement to open negotiations within a week. I replied immediately agreeing to open negotiations. They have now asked that these begin on or about 20 November and I have agreed. They will be held in Geneva. Lord Shackleton, who has a close knowledge of the problems of South Arabia, will lead our delegation.

"On 2 November, I told the House that by the middle of this month we should fix and announce a precise date for independence and withdrawal. I also said that it might be useful to vary the date a few days one way or the other if this would help us over starting negotiations with an emerging government. The High Commissioner, through his talks with the South Arabian Forces, is at this moment working out arrangements for the negotiations, and Her Majesty's Government has therefore decided, in order to help this process, that South Arabia should become independent and the withdrawal of our forces be completed by 30 November.

"There are important matters to be settled and preferably before independence. But if negotiations cannot be completed before independence, there is nothing to stop them continuing as between independent countries.

"Her Majesty's Government has not had an easy road to follow in bringing South Arabia to independence. I would like here to pay tribute to the many Britons, both civilians and military, who have devoted their labours and in many cases, to our great sorrow given their lives for this cause. I also grieve for the large numbers of South Arabians, who have suffered death or injury. The whole House will join me in hoping that South Arabia will enjoy a peaceful future."

88. It only remained for his delegation to report that the negotiations foreshadowed in that statement were expected to open in Geneva today.

89. United Kingdom Ministers and the High Commissioner had consistently made it clear that it was for the parties and peoples of South Arabia themselves to settle their political future, not for the United Kingdom Government; they had consistently declined to take sides as between the various factions, parties and groups. As the Foreign Secretary had said in reply to questions in the House of Commons on 7 November: "I have done my very best to avoid Great Britain being involved in the argument as to which nationalist group or groups should form the government." In this connexion he recalled that in his first statement on his arrival after appointment as High Commissioner in Aden on 9 June this year, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had issued the following appeal:

"We hope that all patriotic parties in South Arabia will co-operate in the government of the new State. I appeal especially to those political parties now using violent methods for political purposes to turn to peaceful political activity, to negotiation and to discussion between the parties leading to the formation of a fully representative caretaker government which will prepare the State for independence. I am willing to see the leaders of any party and shall do whatever I can to make these political discussions possible and to help towards agreement between the parties."

90. The Special Committee had before it the report of the Special Mission. Many members had received the full text of the report only recently and no doubt all delegations were also still studying this very full account. At this stage, his delegation wished to offer only a brief comment on the report of the Special Mission. The Special Committee had listened with great attention to the statement of the representative of Venezuela in presenting the report to the Committee as Chairman of the Mission and he wished to pay tribute to the efforts of the Mission which had extended over many months under his chairmanship. But it seemed obvious that the Mission had been prevented from carrying out its task by a number of circumstances and particularly the failure until too late of the two main political groupings in South Arabia to offer co-operation to the Mission, and the tide of events in South Arabia from August onwards. His delegation regretted that instead of giving the weight to those factors, the Mission had sought in the conclusion to its report to place responsibility principally on the United Kingdom Government. His delegation was bound to note at the same time that the report refrained from recognizing the consistent co-operation and help which they had received from his Government throughout their work. But, in fact, the report was itself the best witness on that point. All who had read through the whole report, and not limited themselves to the conclusions at the end, would have found ample and abundant proof of his Government's unremitting efforts to help and to co-operate with the Mission in its work, from the time of its appointment until the submission of its report. It was a matter of regret that the Mission felt that it had not been able—or to quote its own words "permitted"—to fulfil its mandate. But the crux of the matter was not what prevented the Mission from accomplishing its task. It was that throughout the eight months of the Mission's continuous endeavours there had been a dangerous and rapidly shifting situation on the ground, and that his Government as the administering Power of the Territory had of course had the responsibility of dealing with it.

91. As he had stated previously, the negotiations referred to by his Foreign Secretary in his statement of 14 November, which he had quoted, were on the point of opening in Geneva. His delegation would wish to make a fuller statement on the South Arabian item and at the appropriate time in the Fourth Committee.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

92. At the 571st meeting, on 21 November 1967, the Chairman stated that after consultations he wished to suggest that in order to enable the Fourth Committee to consider the question before the imminent accession of the Territory to independence the Special Committee should take note of the report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden and transmit it to the General Assembly together with the statements made by members and the Chairman of the Mission.

93. At the same meeting, the Committee decided, without objection, to adopt the suggestion made by the Chairman.

ANNEX I*

Letter dated 11 August 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to address you on the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim, in a way which will ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Babal-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea.

This island has been a British possession since 1857, when a British expedition occupied it. No question of its ownership was raised in the discussions before World War I leading to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, which among other things defined and demarcated the western section of the frontier between the Yemen and South Arabia. Until 1937, Perim was administered by the Government of India. In that year, responsibility for it passed to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and was devolved as a matter of administrative convenience on the Governor at Aden, Perim had in this period a separate identity and administration from those of Aden. The entry of Aden Colony into the Federation of South Arabia in 1963 made it necessary to enact certain legislation which had the effect of defining Perim's distinct identity in that year. The main external economic links of Perim have been with Aden, where some of its inhabitants have worked and from which two lighthouses, important to navigation, have been administered through the Aden Port Trust, an independent body on which both government and shipping interests are represented.

The assumption of the United Kingdom Government had been that, when South Arabia became independent. Perim would adhere to South Arabia as geographical propinquity and economic ties suggested. My Government did, however, inform the United Nations when resolution 2023 (XX) was under discussion that Perim was not part of Aden State and that it would consult the people about their future when the time came.

However, discussion in the United Kingdom Parliament of the bill to provide for the relinquishment of Her Majesty's sovereignty over both Aden and Perim (which received the Royal Assent on 23 July) revealed a strong feeling in the House of Commons that Perim's position on a narrow international waterway was of major importance and justified arrangements to ensure that that waterway could not be closed by wrongful use of the island. There was a consensus of opinion that this could best be achieved by United Nations administration of Perim, and the United Kingdom Government undertook to put forward a proposal to this effect.

I should therefore be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Special Mission on Aden in order that they may consider on what basis the United Nations might undertake the permanent administration of Perim, in a way which would ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-al-Mandeb. This is a unique proposal which could have important implications for the future, and the United Kingdom Government sincerely hopes that it will be given urgent consideration with a view to recommendations being made through the appropriate United Nations channels. In urging this proposal the United Kingdom Government has no doubt that it would be recognized that United Nations control of Perim should not impede but rather assist the economic and social development of the island with its 280 inhabitants.

I should like to emphasize that my Government has no undeclared interest of its own with regard to Perim. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made it clear in Parliament that the United Kingdom Government was completely opposed to keeping British sovereignty in Perim after South Arabia's independence, even for the desirable cause of internationalizing it. It wishes to have no more responsibility for Perim after South Arabian independence than that which any other Member State of the United Nations will have.

If the United Nations agrees to assume responsibility for the internationalization of the island, my Government would still attach importance to assuring itself that this was in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Perim.

(Signed) Leslie C. GLASS
Deputy Permanent Representative
of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

ANNEX II**

Note dated 17 November 1967 from the Secretary-General to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 11 August 1967 concerning the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim, in a way which will ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-Al-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea.

In a note dated 24 August 1967 (A/AC.109/260) I brought your letter to the attention of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I also transmitted a copy to the Chairman of the Special Mission on Aden.

I enclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter dated 31 August 1967 (A/AC.109/267) in which the representatives of the Arab States have addressed to me their observations on the matter.

I also wish to inform you that this matter was the subject of comment in the report which the Special Mission on Aden submitted to me on 10 November 1967 in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI). I have transmitted the report to the Chairman of the Special Committee which will no doubt wish to take it up as soon as it is circulated as an official document.

The relevant paragraph of that report reads as follows:

"The Mission was equally insistent on the need to give practical effect to the principle of territorial integrity as defined in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), which affirmed that the Eastern Aden Protectorate and the islands

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of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran, and other off-shore islands are an integral part of the Territory. In this connexion, the Mission had in mind that while the United Kingdom Government had voted in favour of the abovementioned resolution, it had not taken the necessary practical steps to ensure that the Territory acceded to independence as one unit. Indeed, during August 1967 the United Kingdom Government submitted to the United Nations a proposal for the internationalization of Perim, a proposal which the Mission could not entertain as it considered it to be in contradiction with the resolutions of the United Nations. Further, although the Mission stressed the undesirability of extending aid to any of the States which did not accept the principle of territorial integrity, the United Kingdom Government pledged military and other assistance to the Eastern Aden Protectorate."

(Signed) U THANT Secretary-General

ANNEX III*

Report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden

LETTER DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1967 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 12 October 1967 (A/AC.109/277) transmitting to you a letter of the same date in which the Chairman of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden indicated inter alia when the Mission would expect to present its report.

I now transmit herewith, in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), the report submitted to me today by the Special Mission on Aden.

> (Signed) U THANT Secretary-General

> > Paragraphs

Report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden

Chairman: Mr. Manuel PEREZ GUERRERO (Venezuela)

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United	have the honour to submit herewith the report Nations Special Mission on Aden in accordance aph 5 of resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General	ance v	vith
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In this connexion, we should like to refer to the Mission's communication of 12 October 1967 in which it was stated that the Mission considered it advisable to await the outcome of the meetings in Cairo between the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front before submitting its report.

We would like to take this opportunity of expressing to you our sincere appreciation of the most able and devoted assistance which all members of the Secretariat assigned to the Mission have provided at all times.

(Signed) Manuel Perez Guerrero Abdussattar Shalizi Moussa Leo Keita

The Secretary-General United Nations New York

Introduction

1. By operative paragraph 5 of its resolution 2183 (XXI), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General:

"in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, in particular, for the purpose of determining the extent of the United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the elections and submitting a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;".

2. On 23 February 1967, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced the appointment of the Mission in the following terms:

"Under resolution 2183 (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966, I was requested, in consultation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the administering Power, to appoint a special mission to be sent to Aden.

"Following such consultations, I have appointed the United Nations Special Mission on Aden composed as follows:

"His Excellency Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela), Chairman of the Special Mission;

"His Excellency Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi (Afghanistan); and

"His Excellency Mr. Moussa Leo Keita (Mali).

"I trust that the Mission will proceed to its work as a matter of urgency and that all concerned will cooperate to the full in a spirit of constructive goodwill to enable the Mission to succeed in its most important task.

"As I said in my statement to the Special Committee on 9 February: 'It is my confident hope that the work of the proposed mission will be of assistance to the Special Committee and the General Assembly in enabling the people of Aden to attain their independence under conditions of peace and harmony."

- 3. The Mission held meetings at Headquarters in New York from 7 to 18 March, at which it considered its programme of work. During this period the Mission also had discussions with representatives of the United Kingdom, and with the Secretary-General. On 17 March, the Mission issued a press statement announcing that it would leave for London on 20 March for talks with the administering Power and Italy, on its way to Aden, it expected to visit Cairo and Jeddah in order to meet with representatives of the people who were outside the Territory.
- 4. The Mission visited London from 20 to 25 March. It had discussions with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Brown, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Thomson, and with senior officials at the Foreign Office.
- 5. The Mission was in Cairo from 25 to 29 March. While in Cairo, it heard a group of petitioners. It also had useful talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, and other officials, and met with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Mr. A. K. Hassouna.
- 6. The Mission arrived in Jeddah on 29 March and remained there until 2 April. In Jeddah it heard twenty-two groups of petitioners. The Mission also had talks with His

Majesty King Faisal Abdul Aziz and senior officials of the Foreign Ministry.

- 7. The Mission left Jeddah for Aden on 2 April, arriving there the same day. The Mission left Aden on 7 April in circumstances which are set out in paragraphs 147 to 149 below.
- 8. On 8 April, the Mission arrived in Geneva where it had discussions with representatives of the United Kingdom, including the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. William Rodgers. Following these discussions, the Mission decided that it would accept an invitation from the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to visit London on its way to New York.
- 9. The Mission arrived in London on 16 April and had discussions with Mr. Brown and officials of the Foreign Office; it departed for New York on 18 April.
- 10. Mr. Mamadou Moctar Thiam (Mali) accompanied the Mission as alternate member on its visits to London, Cairo, Jeddah, Aden and Geneva until its return to New York on 18 April, in case Mr. Keita found it necessary to return to Headquarters to attend meetings of the Security Council.
- 11. The Mission pursued its contacts with the representative of the administering Power in New York and a number of delegations. It also had conversations with the British High Commissioner in Aden who came to New York during the latter part of July in response to the Mission's invitation. Subsequently, the Mission had a useful exchange of views in New York with a delegation of FLOSY. On 29 July it announced that it would have further meetings with the elements concerned and that, for their convenience, the meetings would start at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 11 August 1967.
- 12. The Mission was in Geneva from 10 August to 1 September. During that time it heard the views of four groups representing various shades of opinion in the Territory. The Mission had talks with Lord Shackleton, United Kingdom Minister without Portfolio and with the Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Geneva, Sir Harold Beeley. Being unable to meet the nationalist elements in Geneva and having regard to the inability of the United Kingdom Government to be represented at the appropriate level at any meetings to be held in Cairo, the Mission decided to proceed to Beirut and invited FLOSY and the NLF to join it there. It also invited the United Kingdom Government to send a delegation at the appropriate level for its meetings in Beirut.
- 13. The Mission arrived in Beirut on 1 September and had further talks with Lord Shackleton. It also heard a representative of the Aden Trade Union Congress and other spokesmen of various shades of opinion in the area. Following a request from FLOSY to meet with it in Cairo, the Mission decided to proceed to Cairo on 7 September in the hope that the NLF would be able to join in the meetings.
- 14. In Cairo the Mission had talks with FLOSY from 9 to 11 September. It also had an exchange of views with representatives of the United Arab Republic and with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. The Mission returned to New York on 12 September to prepare its report.
- 15. Since 13 September the Mission has continued its contacts with the representative of the United Kingdom and has received communications from the High Commissioner on the development of the situation in the Territory. It has also been in touch with a number of delegations and with the Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. John Malecela.
- 16. In a public statement issued on 26 September, it expressed the hope that efforts undertaken between leaders of the nationalist movements of the Territory to settle their differences and to establish co-operation between themselves would be crowned with success. On 12 October it informed the Secretary-General and the Special Committee that before presenting its report, it considered it advisable to await the outcome of meetings which were being held in Cairo between FLOSY and the NLF for the purpose of co-ordination between the two fronts and the establishment of a basis for the transfer of power from the United Kingdom.

- 17. The Mission wishes to express its gratitude to the Governments of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom for their kind hospitality and the facilities they afforded the Mission during its visits to their countries
- 18. The Mission also wishes to record its gratitude to the Secretary-General for his personal interest in its work and for making available the necessary supporting staff and facilities. Further, the Mission acknowledges with deep appreciation the services of the staff assigned to it from the Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories and of the technical staff detailed from other departments of the Secretariat, as well as the assistance extended to it by the United Nations offices at the various places it visited.

I. BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MISSION

- 19. The question of Aden was first examined in the United Nations in 1963 when the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples considered the situation in the Territory. In 1962, the Special Committee had distributed a number of petitions concerning the Territory, but it had not been able to begin any detailed examination of the Territory.
- 20. In 1963, after hearing petitioners and debating the question, the Special Committee established a sub-committee to visit Aden and the Protectorates and authorized it, if necessary, to visit neighbouring countries. The Sub-Committee was to ascertain the views of the population, especially those of the representatives and leaders of the various political parties, and hold talks with the administering Power. The Special Committee requested the Sub-Committee to make recommendations for the speedy implementation, in respect of these Territories of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants.
- 21. The Sub-Committee on Aden was not permitted by the administering Power to visit the Territory and was unable to hold talks with the administering Power. Nevertheless, it visited Cairo, Sanaa, Taiz, Jeddah and Baghdad where it heard many petitioners from the Territory. On the basis of its findings the Sub-Committee made recommendations for the speedy implementation of the Declaration in the Territory. These were endorsed by the Special Committee and later by the General Assembly following its debate of the question at the end of 1963.
- 22. In its resolution on the Territory, resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, the General Assembly called upon the administering Power to repeal all laws which restrict public freedoms; to release all political prisoners and detainees, to allow the return of exiles and to cease forthwith all repressive action against the people of the Territory. The Assembly also called upon the administering Power to make the necessary constitutional changes with a view to establishing a representative organ and setting up a provisional government for the whole of the Territory in accordance with the wishes of the population, such legislative organ and government to be constituted following general elections to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Assembly recommended that the elections should be held before the attainment of independence and that conversations should be opened without delay between the government resulting from the election and the administering Power, for the purpose of fixing the date for the granting of independence and the arrangements for the transfer of power. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during the elections. The Assembly also considered that the maintenance of the military base in Aden was prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal was therefore desirable.
- 23. After further examination of the question in 1964 the Special Committee adopted a resolution on 9 April in which

- it deplored the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to implement resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and urged it to implement the measures outlined in resolution 1949 (XVIII) without delay. It also urged the United Kingdom to lift the state of emergency which had been declared at the end of 1963. The Special Committee again established a Sub-Committee on Aden and requested it to study and keep under constant review the situation in the Territory, establish contacts with the administering Power with a view to implementing General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), arrange for visits to the Territory and make such other visits as necessary. In a further resolution adopted in May 1964, the Special Committee called the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of recent British military actions against the people of the Territory.
- 24. The Sub-Committee on Aden established in 1964 was again not permitted to visit the Territory nor was its offer to hold talks with the administering Power in London accepted. However, to meet the need for obtaining first-hand information it visited Cairo where it heard many politicians from the Territory. In its recommendations which were endorsed by the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee urged the administering Power to implement the General Assembly's resolutions, and in particular resolution 1949 (XVIII). It emphasized that the settlement of the question was not only in the interest of the prompt application of the Declaration, but also of the resolution of a dangerous situation which might be a threat to international peace and security owing to continued military actions.
- 25. During 1965 the Special Committee and its Sub-Committee continued to follow closely developments in Aden, calling upon the United Kingdom to implement the United Nations resolutions and drawing the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in the Territory. In September 1965, the Sub-Committee expressed the view that the failure of the United Kingdom's efforts to hold talks could be attributed to the refusal by the United Kingdom to accept the provisions of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1963 which, it pointed out, not only set out principles, but also outlined the methods whereby self-determination and independence might be achieved. It also emphasized the pressing need for the United Kingdom to take practical steps, without delay, to implement this resolution while widespread support for it remained. The Sub-Committee's conclusions were endorsed by the Special Committee.
- 26. On 5 November 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2023 (XX) on the question of Aden. By this resolution, the Assembly, deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation threatening peace and security in the area arising from the policies pursued in the Territory by the administering Power, deplored the administering Power's refusal to implement the resolution on the Aden question adopted by the Assembly and the Special Committee. It also deplored the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime in the Territory so as to grant it independence contrary to previous General Assembly resolutions. The Assembly appealed to all States not to recognize any independence which was not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage. Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and to freedom from colonial rule, the Assembly considered that the maintenance of military bases in the Territory constituted a major obstacle to its liberation from colonial domination and was prejudicial to the peace and security of the region, and that the immediate and complete removal of those bases was therefore essential.
- 27. Noting with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory were still being carried out, the Assembly urged the administering Power immediately to abolish the state of emergency, repeal all laws restricting public freedom, cease all repressive actions in the Territory (in particular military operations), release all political detainees and allow the return of those who had been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities. The

Assembly reaffirmed those paragraphs of its resolution of 11 December 1963 dealing with the exercise of the right of self-determination and steps to be taken in connexion with elections, and it urged the administering Power to implement them immediately.

- 28. The Assembly also appealed to all Member States to render all possible assistance to the Territory in its efforts to attain freedom and independence, drew the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory, requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations to offer all possible assistance to the people who were suffering as a result of the military operations in the Territory and requested the Secretary-General to take such action as he might deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee.
- 29. The Special Committee continued to consider the question of Aden in 1966. On 15 June, while in Cairo, the Special Committee adopted the following resolution:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the question of Aden,

"Having heard the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965,

"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security in Aden and Aden Protectorates, arising from the policies pursued by the administering Power in the Territory,

"Deploring the refusal of the administering Power to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the Territory of Aden and Aden Protectorates,

"Recalling the various statements and declarations made by the administering Power concerning the Territory,

- "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "2. Deplores the setting up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and appeals to all States not to recognize such independence as is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage;
- "3. Calls upon the administering Power to declare unequivocally its acceptance of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in their implementation without delay;
- "4. Reaffirms the view that the responsibilities which devolve on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the administering Power cannot be shifted or circumvented through any action by an unrepresentative régime referred to in paragraph 2 above;
- "5. Declares, consequently, that the conference envisaged in document A/AC.109/161/Add.1/Rev.1 or any other conference of a similar nature is not in accordance with the terms of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
- "6. Deplores any defence arrangement that the United Kingdom Government might enter into with the unrepresentative régime in the Territory and considers such arrangements as inconsistent with the objectives of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and a serious hindrance to the future free exercise of the right to freedom and sovereignty by the people of the Territory;

- "7. Notes with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory are still being carried out by the administering Power;
 - "8. Urges the administering Power immediately to:
 - (a) Abolish the state of emergency;
 - (b) Repeal all laws restricting public freedom;
- (c) Cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular, military operations;
- (d) Release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or deported for political reasons;
- "9. Appeals to all States to render all assistance to the people of the Territory in their efforts to attain freedom and independence;
- "10. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory;
- "11. Again invites the Secretary-General to enter into consultation with the specialized agencies and other international organizations with a view to providing assistance to the refugees from the Territory of Aden and Aden Protectorates;
- "12. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections and of making a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;
- "13. Decides to maintain the question of Aden on its agenda."
- 30. On 5 August 1966, the Secretary-General reported to the Special Committee that, on the basis of the Special Committee's resolution, he had begun consultations on the appointment of the Special Mission with the Chairman of the Special Committee, the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden and with the representative of the administering Power. He also reported that, on 1 August 1966, he had received the following letter from the representative of the United Kingdom:

"Her Majesty's Government welcome the assistance and participation of United Nations in achieving Her Majesty's Government's declared policy of bringing South Arabia to independence as a united sovereign state by 1968.

"Her Majesty's Government accept the operative clauses of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965, subject to its being recognized, first, that Her Majesty's Government's responsibilities for security cannot be limited or abandoned; and secondly, that Her Majesty's Government are bound by their existing treaties with the Federation of South Arabia and the unfederated South Arabias States until these treaties terminate. In particular, Her Majesty's Government are constitutionally unable to give directions to the 'Federal Government' except in matters of external affairs, defence and the public service, and have no power to impose changes in the Federal Constitution.

"Her Majesty's Government will be glad to co-operate with a mission appointed by the Secretary-General, subject to agreement on its composition, for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and, in particular, for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections subject only to the two reservations noted in the preceding paragraph.

"I should be grateful for your confirmation that any mission appointed will operate on the above basis."

The Secretary-General also reported that in his reply to this letter he had stated, *inter alia*, that when he undertook the necessary consultations with the Special Committee, he would bring to its attention the reservations recorded by the United Kingdom Government.

- 31. The Special Committee debated the report of the Secretary-General at its 462nd meeting on 16 August 1966. During the debate several delegations stated that they found unacceptable the conditions laid down by the United Kingdom Government concerning the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions on Aden and in particular the sending of a special mission there.
- 32. In a statement made at the 473rd meeting on 19 October 1966, the representative of the Secretary-General said that the Secretary-General had taken fully into account the views expressed by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, on behalf of that Sub-Committee, and by the members of the Special Committee at its 462nd meeting, on the letter dated 1 August 1966 from the United Kingdom Government and in particular on the reservations stated in that letter. The Secretary-General had had several consultations on the subject with all concerned, particularly with the Chairman of the Special Committee and the representative of the administering Power. He would report on the outcome of his consultations as soon as possible.
- 33. On 1 November 1966, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly began its consideration of the question of Aden. It had before it the chapter of the Special Committee's report on its consideration of the Territory during 1966.
- 34. The Fourth Committee began its consideration of the question by hearing the following groups of petitioners:
- Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee, General Secretary, Mr. Mohamed Salem Basendwah and Mr. Saif Dhalee, members of the Political Bureau, Front for the Liberation of Occupied South
- Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, President and Mr. Sheikhan Abdulla Alhabshi, Secretary-General, South Arabian League, Aden:
- Mr. Hussain Ali Bayoomi, General Secretary, and Mr. Saeed Ali Yaremi, executive member, United National Party, Aden;
- Mr. Ahmad Abdullah Al-Fadhli, President, and Mr. Je'bel bin Hussein Al Audhali, member, Front for the Liberation of South Arabia.
- 35. On 16 November 1966, the representative of the United Kingdom addressed a letter* to the Secretary-General in which, inter alia, he invited reference to the following extract from his speech in the Fourth Committee on 10 November:
 - "On 1 August, as you know, my delegation addressed a letter to the Secretary-General welcoming the assistance and participation of the United Nations in achieving the aim of early independence for South Arabia, and promising to co-operate with a Mission to be appointed by the Secretary-General. That letter stated two facts. We thought it right and necessary to state them. But this statement of fact has, I know, given rise to doubts and misunderstandings, and I have carefully studied the comments made in the Committee of Twenty-Four. I wish to remove the doubts and misunderstandings which have arisen by making the following formal declarations:

"By drawing attention to these two facts it was not, and it is not now, the intention of my Government in any way to place obstacles in the way of the Mission. On the contrary, my Government wishes to reaffirm its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in working out practical steps by which the relevant resolutions can be implemented, and it is our clear and confirmed intention to co-operate with the Mission to enable it to make a full and constructive contribution."

He also stated in the letter that the United Kingdom Government wished to reaffirm its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions at the earliest possible time and the working out of practical steps in this regard.

36. After a lengthy and thorough debate lasting almost five weeks,b the Fourth Committee, on 2 December, approved a

a Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6514.

b Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Fourth Committee, 1620th, 1622nd-1629th, 1633rd-1640th, 1649th-1653rd meetings.

draft resolution submitted by thirty-eight Member States, by a roll-call vote of 100 votes to none, with 3 abstentions. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Iraq, on behalf of the co-sponsors, made the following statement with reference to operative paragraph 7 of that draft resolution:

"Nothing in paragraph 7 should be construed as constituting a precondition to the appointment and/or dispatch of the Mission to Aden. But the co-sponsors strongly urge the administering Power to lift the state of emergency when the Mission is there so as to enable it to discharge its responsibilities on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 15 June 1966."

37. On 12 December 1966, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee, as resolution 2183 (XXI) by a roll-call vote of 96 to none, with 3 abstentions.

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.1

II. STUDY OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROGRAMME OF WORK

38. The Special Mission met in New York from 7 to 18 March 1967. It began its work by a study of its terms of reference as set out in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly, and by a review of the developments which had led to the adoption of that resolution. On 9 March, the Mission had its first meeting with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Lord Caradon. The Mission also had contacts with a number of other delegations of countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. It also had consultations with the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Mr. John Malecela. On the basis of all the elements it had gathered, the Mission established a programme of work which it made public on 17 March 1967.

A. Preliminary talks with the representative of the United Kingdom

- 39. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation was anxious to help in any way it could in the implementation of the Mission's task. He had in mind particularly the Mission's programme and the arrangements to be made in preparation for its visit to Aden. On behalf of his Government, he extended an invitation to the Mission to visit London at any stage of its work.
- 40. The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized that the problem at hand was not confined to Aden alone, but related to the whole of South Arabia. The work of the Mission was one of the most delicate tasks ever undertaken by the United Nations and needed the co-operation of everyone concerned. He hoped that the Mission, after taking a fresh look at the whole problem of South Arabia, would give a lead in bringing independence and prosperity to the Territory.
- 41. The Mission informed the representative of the United Kingdom that it realized the difficulties involved and expected the assistance of the administering Power which was the authority responsible for the Territory. It was anxious to know what steps the United Kingdom would take in order to facilitate its task under the resolution of the General Assembly. The Mission emphasized that its responsibility was not limited to Aden but covered the whole Territory. It would approach its task with complete objectivity.

B. Programme of the Mission

42. From the outset, the Mission was aware of the extreme importance of creating conditions which would be conducive to the success of its visit to the Territory. Within this context, the Mission felt that it was necessary to conduct talks with the administering Power in London, where it could meet the authorities responsible for the affairs of the Territory. Among the important points which the Mission wished to discuss in London were its own freedom of action and movement in the Territory, as well as the people's freedom of access to it. The Mission should be able to interview the detainees; it was necessary for it to ascertain the practical effects of some of the emergency regulations (such as those relating to the curfew and to protected areas) upon its future work; restrictions which would create an impediment to its activities would have to be lifted immediately. Resolution 2183 (XXI) had called upon the United Kingdom to take the necessary measures so that the Mission could discharge its responsibilities. The Mission was also conscious of the fact that the various resolutions of the United Nations had urged the United Kingdom to lift the state of emergency in the Territory.

- 43. The Mission was anxious that it should be thoroughly apprised of all factors relating to the situation in the Territory, so that it could give all elements of the problem due consideration. According to the information it had received, there were large numbers of people from Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia living outside the Territory and certain leaders of important nationalist movements were residing in neighbouring countries. The Mission was determined to try and be informed directly of all points of view and was therefore fully prepared to visit any place and meet with any representatives of the people in pursuance of its objective. The opportunity given to the Mission, after its initial contacts, to visit Cairo in the United Arab Republic and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia was welcomed by it. On 16 March it decided to proceed accordingly and to inform the Governments concerned of its decision.
- 44. As an immediate step the Mission felt that it would be useful for it to make a declaration on its future work. On 17 March it issued a statement (see appendix I below) which was widely publicized by the United Nations Information Services in New York, the Middle East and other centres concerned. In it the Mission particularly stated the following:

"As it prepares to leave Headquarters, the Special Mission wishes to stress that it is proceeding on its assignment in a spirit of objectivity and with a sense of urgency and determination to do its utmost to further the objectives contained in resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly."

C. Communications from the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)

- 45. As it began its work in New York, the Special Mission was informed that FLOSY had announced its decision not to enter into direct contact with the Mission. The head of the Political Bureau of FLOSY, Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag, in a communication to the Secretary-General dated 12 February 1967 and circulated as a petition (A/AC.109/Pet. 603) of the Special Committee, expressed the point of view that United Nations intervention should be suspended "till the United Kingdom Government had put into effect prerequisites laid down by the General Assembly since 1963". On 14 March 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Mission the text of another communication from Mr. Al-Asnag dated 18 February 1967. The main terms of this communication were as follows:
 - "... FLOSY is therefore keen to unmask British colonial conspiracy against our country. A United Nations Mission should not proceed to the Territory, until Britain has shown sufficient respect/adherence to the requirements outlined above.

"FLOSY has sufficient jurisdiction to accuse the United Kingdom of not being honest in its claim for a United Nations visiting mission. It needs no evidence to convince world opinion that the United Kingdom has planted enough mines and explosives to ensure interruptions causing the United Nations mission to fail in its noble task.

"In order to bring the picture closer to you, FLOSY would enquire in simple terms as to how the people of the territory could express their opinion freely while the following conditions prevail:

"1. The non-representative Federal Government is still in power, and the Sultans continue to exercise unlimited jurisdiction over farmers and tribesmen. In violation of United Nations resolutions, the United King-

- dom Government has formally declared its financial, military and political aid to that puppet government. An annual subsidy of 5-1/2 million pounds sterling is allocated by the United Kingdom for the Federal Government in 1966 for a period ending 1970. According to the British declaration of intent the region is expected to attain independence in 1968.
- "2. British troops continue to maintain positions in several parts of the region, in order to suppress the peoples' resistance against the rule of feudal lords.
- "3. Air/land raids continue to be organized by the British Army and Air Force against the defenceless local population who look for salvation from the yoke of the Sultans.
- "4. An atmosphere of terror prevails. Public liberties are suppressed. Mass arrests are carried out daily involving workers, students and clergymen. Curfew orders are imposed frequently in addition to the state of emergency which was put into effect as far back as 10 December, 1963.
- "5. British expatriates continue to hold senior positions in the public service, which allows them adequate influence on their subordinates from the local population.

"Attention is brought to the seriousness of the five points mentioned above, coupled with the recent statements made in the British House of Commons by leaders from both sides. Special reference is made to the British undertaking in the area, certain financial and defence obligations towards the Federal Government, and the possible intervention by governments in the Middle East hostile to our cause. (Statements made by Edward Heath, Sir Alec and Dennis Healey during February, 1967.)

"You may imagine the extent of impossibility for people living under such conditions to come forward and express their free will to a United Nations mission that intends to spend a month or so in the region leaving behind a distressed population at the mercy of hostile power.

"You may also understand why British policy towards the region is based on two factors:

- "(a) To ignore the effective clauses of the United Nations resolutions, after having rejected them all since 1963;
- "(b) To pretend being anxious to co-operate with a United Nations visiting mission while holding on to abnormal and most difficult conditions which should cause the mission to fail in its duty.

"Under these circumstances, FLOSY is left with no alternative, but to declare that its co-operation will not be extended to the mission unless the administering Power has stood up to its real responsibility and taken immediate measures to eliminate the obstacles as outlined in the five points above, before the despatch of any United Nations mission to the Territory. It must be stressed here that the position taken by FLOSY can best be described as in full agreement with all United Nations resolutions passed by the General Assembly in respect of the region over the last four years.

"It should also be remembered that FLOSY leads today the nation's armed struggle against the colonialists and their stooges, the Sultans and Amirs. It has a task to fulfil towards the people and the country, and in this spirit, FLOSY asks that its position should be well understood by those directly concerned, and that fraternal governments may please continue their support to our national struggle.

"Our people are being told by FLOSY to organize strikes, demonstrations and public gatherings in order to illustrate their unshaken resistance against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Liberation Army will maintain its sacred fight throughout the visit of the United Nations mission blowing off colonial military and economical enterprises..."

III. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ADMINISTERING POWER BEFORE THE DEPARTURE FOR THE TERRITORY

46. In London, the Mission began its work with discussions with senior officials at the Foreign Office, headed by Sir Denis

Allen, Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office. These were followed by a meeting with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Brown, and later the Mission met the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Thomson, who had just returned from a short visit to the Territory.

- 47. During these discussions, the Mission heard the detailed views of the administering Power on various aspects of the problems at hand. The Mission was anxious to elicit replies to several questions which had to be clarified before its visit to Aden.
- 48. The United Kingdom officials stated that the United Kingdom Government attached great importance to the Mission. They asserted that the United Kingdom Government was a strong supporter of the United Nations and believed that through the Mission the United Nations could play an important role in reaching a solution in South Arabia that would enable the Territory to achieve independence in accordance with the wishes of the people. It was looking forward to co-operating with the Mission and would give it every possible assistance.
- 49. The representatives of the administering Power stated that the aims of British policy in the Territory were those outlined in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 which called for independence for South Arabia and the withdrawal of the British base. Independence had been the goal since the first attempts to form a federation in 1959. Early in 1966, the United Kingdom had announced its intention not only to grant independence not later than 1968, but also to withdraw its base and to undertake no defence commitments afterwards. This remained the clear policy of the United Kingdom Government,
- 50. The United Kingdom Government wished South Arabia to reach genuine independence in unity, embracing all parts of the Territory as quickly as possible. It hoped that South Arabia would achieve recognition by neighbouring countries and be admitted to membership of the United Nations at an early date. In the achievement of these aims, there were three general considerations to be taken into account: (1) the existing situation in South Arabia; (2) problems related to the constitutional arrangements to be made before independence (the British officials considered that the Mission would have a most important role to play in this connexion) and (3) questions related to the time-table of independence and the modalities of the transition to independence. In their view the Mission could advise on these matters, but the administering Power had the right and duty to formulate its own ideas.
- 51. The officials informed the Mission that the United Kingdom Government had been formulating proposals on those three aspects. These proposals had already been presented to the "Federal Government" but had not yet been made public, largely because of the impending arrival of the Mission. They emphasized that in putting forward these proposals there was no question of the United Kingdom prejudging the issues; the United Kingdom Government wished only to assist the Mission in its work.
- 52. The United Kingdom was not committed to any particular form of government in South Arabia and was not seeking to impose an unrepresentative form of government; it hoped to see a more broadly based government representative of the people as a whole. It was simply untrue that it had a neo-colonialist desire in South Arabia; its concern was to evacuate its military personnel and to leave behind a stable government with prospects for a good future.
- 53. The Mission hoped that the discussions in London would result in facilitating its difficult and delicate task. While the United Kingdom Government had responsibilities in the matter, so too had the United Nations. The Mission emphasized that it was with the United Kingdom authorities that it would have to deal while in the Territory; it was bound by the position of the United Nations regarding the "Federal Government", as set out in the various resolutions. It hoped the United Kingdom would understand the Mission's position and assist it in overcoming any difficulties that might arise. While being firm on principles as established in the United Nations resolutions, it would be practical about the ways and means of

fulfilling its tasks. The Mission noted with pleasure the United Kingdom's reaffirmation of its intention to grant full and genuine independence and to withdraw the military base. It would be necessary, however, to look closely at the way in which the United Kingdom intended to achieve these objectives. The Mission agreed that it was important that the new independent State be recognized as such and that it be able to meet the conditions required to become a Member of the United Nations.

United Kingdom proposals

- 54. The representatives of the administering Power stated that the United Kingdom Government, in making its proposals, had to bear in mind also the views of the existing "Federal Government". Although not necessarily the best government, the "Federal Government" had authority, including the responsibility for internal security, in all the States of the Federation except Aden. In Aden the United Kingdom exercised authority because of its special position. Increasing terrorism stimulated from outside was of great concern to the inhabitants. Responsible people in the Territory were concerned also about the situation in the neighbouring State of Yemen and the pressure which might be brought to bear on their country after independence. All these matters produced anxieties and pressures within South Arabia. Representatives of the "Federal Government" had, therefore, put forward certain proposals which the United Kingdom had considered; the United Kingdom had then formulated its own proposals.
 - 55. The United Kingdom's proposals were the following:
- (a) On 1 November 1967, British sovereignty over Aden State would end, the protectorate relationships would cease and the treaties would lapse. The United Kingdom believed there might be an advantage in choosing a date when the General Assembly was in session: the independent South Arabia could then apply for United Nations membership. It could become a Member State and establish its own external relations. The date of 1 November was considered the earliest date by which the existing administration in the Territory could be ready to assume full responsibility for internal security in Aden. Federal forces were being equipped so that they could take over this responsibility.
- (b) On 1 November 1967, the British base would be formally closed, and the British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East would strike his flag. All British troops and stores would be withdrawn as rapidly as possible and within a matter of weeks, so that the whole process could be completed by the end of 1967. In consequence of these two proposals, from 1 November 1967, the South Arabian Government would have complete responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and all internal affairs, including internal security. It would enjoy all the attributes of independence. The United Kingdom would accord recognition to the new State, establish diplomatic relations with it and sponsor it for membership in the United Nations.
- (c) The third proposal was designed to meet the real concern that if independence came as early as 1 November 1967, there might be pressure from outside and the new State might not be able to sustain its independence. As the programme for equipping the local forces, including an air force, would not be complete by that date, the United Kingdom, if so requested by the independent South Arabian Government, would station in the vicinity of South Arabia certain naval units with air capabilities for a period not exceeding six months. They would have a purely deterrent role, and no role whatsoever in regard to internal security in South Arabia.
- 56. The representatives of the administering Power stated that although these proposals had been made to the existing "Federal Government", the arrangements would be made with the independent government of South Arabia. The United Kingdom hoped that this would be a different government which would embrace all South Arabia and would be much more representative. It was stated that, in general these proposals were not considered adequate by the "Federal Government", both for the present and the future. The Federal Ministers felt that the proposed date of independence gave them little time to prepare to take charge of the internal

situation and to be ready to defend themselves afterwards. They had insisted on more time to consider the proposals. In the meantime, they would neither accept nor reject them but would consider them. The United Kingdom had agreed to give them more time to consider the proposals and to discuss them with the United Nations Mission.

57. The Mission stated that it would have to consider the implications of the date proposed for independence and of the proposals connected with it. While it would not wish to delay independence, it had to be assured that independence would be genuine and in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. The Mission noted that the United Kingdom wanted the new caretaker government to be as representative as possible. However, it repeated its reservations concerning any contacts with the "Federal Government". The questions raised by the Mission and the discussion on it are contained in the relevant sections below.

Situation in South Arabia

(a) Unity of the Territory

- 58. The Mission raised the question of the complete unity of the Territory as defined in the United Nations resolutions on Aden.
- 59. According to the representatives of the administering Power the wish of the United Kingdom Government was that all the States, including those outside the Federation, should join to form one unit. They stated that the United Kingdom had done what it could towards this end, especially with regard to the States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate. At first those States had not wished to join the Federation of South Arabia. Later they had been willing to do so, but now they were unwilling again. The new State could be federal, confederal or unitary. There were five separate administrations in South Arabia, the federal administration and four separate state administrations. The latter included one small State in the western area, Upper Yafei, which had traditionally taken an independent view. It would make no sense for five States to come to independence as separate entities.
- 60. The officials emphasized that only Aden State was a British Colony, while the other States were not in a colonial relationship with the administering Power, but in a treaty, or protected, relationship. They denied allegations that Aden had been forced into the Federation; it had become a member of the Federation in 1963 by a vote of its Legislative Council, although the majority had been narrow. It was not correct also that there were two separate entities, Aden and the Federation, which were in conflict. Aden was part of the Federation and the Constitution contained provision for the secession of Aden. Aden State, however, was not typical of South Arabia; its population was not only Arab; there were also Yemenis, Somalis, Indians and Pakistanis. The standards of democracy in Aden were also quite different from those up-country where "tribal democracy" prevailed.
- 61. They stated that the basic difficulty the United Kingdom faced in South Arabia was in bringing together the port of Aden and the hinterland; there were a number of differences between these two areas, one of which was constitutional. Aden was a great port with a large military base (which was now being evacuated) and an oil refinery. A relatively sophisticated political community had developed in Aden, whereas in the Protectorates traditional forms of government and attitudes had persisted. However, although there were differences of views between the traditionalists and the nationalists in Aden, no one had suggested that all should not form part of one country, or that the port and the hinterland should not be joined in one State.
- 62. The United Kingdom representatives stated that the island of Socotra was part of the Sultanate of Mahra, while Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands were colonies and Kamaran was a Protectorate. The intention of the United Kingdom was that all of these islands should attain independence on the same day as the remainder of the Territory. The inhabitants would have to express their views concerning their future. It was pointed out that the islands were small in population: Perim had 400 to 500 inhabitants, the Kuria Muria

Islands had between 120 and 150, and Kamaran had about 1,500. Perim was near the Yemen-South Arabia border, and it would be natural if it became part of South Arabia. Kamaran was off the coast of Yemen and farther away from South Arabia. The Kuria Muria Islands were also farther away; they had little connexion with South Arabia, having formerly been part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. After having been ceded to the United Kingdom by the Sultan, the islands had been administered from Aden purely as a matter of convenience. The United Kingdom officials thought it unlikely that the inhabitants of the Kuria Muria Islands would wish to form part of South Arabia.

- (b) Lifting of the state of emergency and release of the detainees
- 63. The Mission pointed out that the United Nations resolutions called for the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of the detainees and other related measures. It raised the question of action being taken on this matter not only because it was called for in the resolutions, but as a means of reducing tension in the Territory and creating favourable conditions in which the Mission could carry out its work (see paras. 85-92 below).
- 64. The Mission inquired about statements in the Press relating to the possibility of Federal troops being brought into Aden because of the situation that had developed there recently. It was concerned that no new element should be introduced which would complicate an already difficult situation. The Mission was informed that this question had been raised by the "Federal Government" which desired a period during which their troops would be in charge of security in Aden. As a matter of principle, however, the United Kingdom found this difficult to accept. As long as the United Kingdom held sovereignty in Aden and was responsible internationally, it should hold power. The Federal authorities had been informed that the transfer of this responsibility should coincide with the transfer of all other powers. This did not exclude the possibility that some Federal forces should gain experience in Aden before the final transfer. The United Kingdom's decision on this matter could be affected by the formation of a new interim government.
- 65. The Mission expressed the hope that these responsibilities would be transferred to a representative authority instead of the "Federal Government".

(c) Security problems

- 66. The United Kingdom representatives stated that security problems existed mainly in Aden State, although incidents still occurred outside Aden from time to time. To some extent this could create complications for the Mission, especially with regard to the holding of elections. For example an attempt had been made recently to hold elections in Dathina State but these had to be called off as all the candidates were threatened with assassination.
- 67. Within Aden State there had been a real deterioration in the security situation and a tragic development of terrorism over the last few months, since the United Kingdom had made it absolutely clear that it would be withdrawing its military base and granting independence to the Territory. In those circumstances, violence made no sense. Violence had spilled over in all directions and had become increasingly internecine, being directed by one faction against the other and not so much against the British. However, the United Kingdom was confident that it could fulfil its duty to maintain law and order.
- 68. The Mission was informed that primary responsibility for security in Aden rested with the police. It was only when the police failed to cope with the problem that Federal troops were brought in. There had been an exception recently when troops had been brought in, in advance, following incitements to demonstrations from Taiz.
- 69. In reply to a question concerning the number of persons involved, the Mission was told that it was necessary to distinguish between persons involved in bomb-throwing and those involved in demonstrations. The number of demonstrators was large, but the number of bomb-throwers was small. These terrorists were made up of two elements: first, the convinced fanatics, anti-British and anti-colonialist, who thought that

violence was the only way to achieve their aims; these persons were motivated by genuine political reasons. Secondly, there were persons who had been hired to throw bombs. They were less important as they were not politically motivated and were not full-time terrorists. The strikes and demonstrations were organized by persons who went around from house to house ordering people to close their shops and to come out and demonstrate, or else they would be assassinated. The people were frightened and obeyed.

Arrangements to be made before independence

70. In reply to questions put by the Mission concerning the plans envisaged by the administering Power before independence, it was stated that the United Kingdom considered it desirable, particularly at the present stage, to attempt once again to bring together representatives of the various groups. Such attempts had been made in 1964 and 1965 but had not been fully successful. It was in the normal course of events in British colonies to convene a constitutional conference before independence attended by representatives selected on the widest possible basis; at the conference, the administrative, legislative and juridical measures to give effect to independence were discussed and decided upon. The British officials considered that ideally such a conference should be held not later than June 1967; representatives of the Eastern States should participate. The future of these States as well as of the islands should be discussed and decided upon. It would be desirable if the Mission could make recommendations concerning participation in a constitutional conference. In the past, some parties had been unwilling to participate, but it was possible that in the light of the Mission's approach they might change their views.

71. The United Kingdom understood that the "Federal Government" was preparing a new constitution to provide for the transition to independence and beyond. This was not primarily a matter within the administering Power's responsibility, and it would be for the "Federal Government" to present their proposals to the Mission. The United Kingdom hoped, however, that the Mission would be prepared to consider these proposals at least as representative of one point of view. They were based on the report prepared by two British constitutional lawyers, Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell, in 1966. The United Kingdom understood that the "Federal Government" had tried to take into account the procedures laid down in the United Nations resolutions. The proposals provided for a Council of Ministers, different representation for Aden, and the institution of universal suffrage. These constitutional proposals would have to be translated into law as a basis for elections. The views of the Mission thereon would be helpful as a basis for a constitutional conference; however, neither the United Kingdom nor the "Federal Government" expected the Mission to accept them as the only possible proposals.

72. The representatives of the administering Power believed that, in broad outline, the proposals of the "Federal Government" should be generally acceptable to the States outside the Federation and to the political parties in Aden. The report of the two constitutional experts had been sent to all States, including those outside the Federation. It was believed that the new proposals conformed closely to those contained in that report and therefore should command a wide measure of acceptance since there had been no strong criticism of the report by the other States or by the Adeni leaders outside the Territory. It was also remarked that the proposals provided for strong representation for Aden State and the Eastern States.

73. The United Kingdom officials stated that the federal rulers were very anxious to meet the Mission and to cooperate with it. Although in the past, the rulers had been reluctant to involve the United Nations, they now genuinely wanted to help. They wished to discuss with the United Nations Mission the proposals made to them by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom representatives added that the rulers were willing to see the basis of government broadened, and that they were willing to accept compromise and accommodation with leaders of other groups.

74. The United Kingdom officials remarked that the federal rulers were sometimes referred to as British stooges or puppets. They were sometimes described as an unrepresentative group of feudal sultans. These descriptions were not accurate, as the Mission would see for itself. The rulers represented a traditional form of Arab life in the Protectorates which could be described as feudal, although this pattern was changing fast. It would not be surprising that if elections were to be held, they were elected. In general, they had a more representative character than was sometimes allowed. In Aden itself, most of the Ministers represented the middle class, the merchant, lawyer and teacher elements. There was a great deal of intimidation in Aden and people did not speak freely; nevertheless, these persons represented a significant trend in Aden society. However, there was a big gap in representation in Aden in that there were no representatives of the workers. The task was to fill this gap.

75. According to the British officials, the existing local governments, although they might be unsatisfactory from a constitutional point of view, exercised authority and maintained law and order. It was necessary to start from them and move towards more representative authorities. While the representative character of the Federation could be disputed, one could not dispute the degree of co-operation between the various States in such fields as social welfare, education and communications: it would be a pity if all this were to be discarded.

76. In reply to the Mission's questions concerning elections, the administering Power stated that the necessary arrangements could only be made by the existing authorities, except in Aden where the United Kingdom would perform those functions. In most of the remaining States, the responsibility lay with the "Federal Government". The United Kingdom anticipated that there would be an interim government before the new government arising out of elections. All parties were agreed that elections were essential; however, elections were something new and needed much preparation. The franchise had not yet been introduced, there was no Nationality Act and electoral boundaries had not been established. Furthermore the necessary staff to conduct the elections would have to be recruited and trained. These procedures would take a long time, and the sooner a start was made, the better. The "Federal Government" had established five committees to consider these questions and they had been working on them since December 1966. The results of this study would be worth considering by the Mission.

77. The United Kingdom noted that it was important also to take into account the state of terrorism in Aden, and the fact that in some parts of the Federation there was a certain amount of dissidence. Elections should be held in freedom, uninfluenced from outside, and linked with real independence. The Federal Ministers and the United Kingdom felt that elections should take place after the withdrawal of British forces from the Territory.

78. In reply to further questions, the Mission was informed that any of the political leaders abroad could return if they were willing to obey the law and not organize illegal demonstrations or violence. For instance, one of the FLOSY leaders, Mr. M. S. Basendwah, had recently returned to the Territory and the Government had been pressed to arrest him. However, in view of the previous undertaking given by the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations, the Government had decided to release him. They had suggested that he make a broadcast on the Aden radio, but he had declined this offer. He had then been placed on an aircraft and left the Territory. In general, the United Kingdom welcomed the return of these leaders. It was also recalled that in 1966 the Federal Ministers had made definite attempts to establish working relationships with the opposition groups, including the leaders of FLOSY.

79. In the view of the administering Power, the basic problem was to bring together all elements and to reach agreement. The United Kingdom itself was trying bilateral approaches to the nationalist leaders. The difficulty about persuading the leaders to return to Aden was the increasing intimidation. This had been recently exemplified by the abominable murder

- of Mr. Mackawee's children, which had been aimed at dissuading him from coming back to the country and joining in the dialogue.
- 80. With regard to the question of a United Nations presence in the area, the administering Power felt that there were ways in which a form of United Nations presence could be useful, such as at the constitutional conference and in the supervision of the elections. In general, the United Kingdom favoured a continuing display of interest by the United Nations in the integrity of South Arabia after independence. The more this was assured and demonstrated, the less necessary a continuing British military presence should be. The best form of assurance for the security and integrity of South Arabia lay in recognition by other States and membership of the United Nations.
- 81. The Mission felt that it would not be realistic to think of holding the usual type of constitutional conference on the Territory since Aden did not fall into the normal pattern of decolonization. It would therefore be more practical to hold a different type of consultation, outside the normal pattern of a constitutional conference and under United Nations auspices. It stated that any constitutional proposals originating in the "Federal Government" would have little chance of being accepted by a widely representative body of opinion in the Territory.
- 82. The Mission pointed out that its position vis-à-vis the "Federal Government" was clearly set out in the resolutions of the United Nations. Consequently, the Mission could not accord any recognition to the "Federal Government" and all its dealings would have to be with the United Kingdom through the High Commissioner in Aden. The Mission would not have direct contact with the representatives of the Federal Authorities; however, it would listen to them as representing one shade of opinion in the Territory.
- 83. The Mission expressed the belief that the government to be established should be a new broadly based government and not an outgrowth of the "Federal Government".
- 84. The Mission hoped that it would be able to bring the various groups together for discussions on the interim measures to be taken before the independence of the Territory.

Matters directly related to the Mission's visit to the Territory

- (a) Measures the United Kingdom might take to reduce tension
- 85. The Mission stated that it was anxious to find out from all sides what could be done to improve the atmosphere in Aden, especially during its visit. Aside from the fact that a reduction in political tension would facilitate the Mission's work in the Territory, it was possible that a temporary reduction could lead to something more permanent. On the other hand, the Mission was anxious that its visit did not become the occasion for increased violence. The United Kingdom could play a significant part in improving the atmosphere. Measures such as lifting the state of emergency and releasing the detainees were embodied in the United Nations resolutions (see para. 63 above). It would be timely if the United Kingdom could take these steps or other related steps to ease tension at the time of the Mission's arrival. If the United Kingdom could give some assurances in this regard, the Mission would convey them to the groups it hoped to meet in Cairo and other places, in order to promote some kind of understanding.
- 86. The United Kingdom representatives pointed out that the state of emergency existed because of the terrorism and violence promoted from outside. It enabled the Government to carry out its basic tasks of maintaining law and order and protecting life and property. The situation was not normal and was not wholly within the control of the High Commissioner and other local authorities. In large part, control lay outside Aden and South Arabia. The United Kingdom welcomed the Mission's intention to pursue this question in Cairo. The strikes, terror and bloodshed would stop only if direct orders were to be broadcast from Taiz and Sanaa that there should not be any demonstrations or violence during the Mission's visit to the Territory.
- 87. The officials pointed out that, although the state of emergency had been in existence since December 1963, it

- had not prevented the holding of the state elections in Aden in 1964. The emergency powers were exceptional powers which were held in reserve and their application depended entirely on the situation.
- 88. With regard to the detainees, the administering Power stated there was a constitutional provision for a regular review of cases and large number of detainees had been released. It was not possible to release such persons as known multiple murderers. With regard to police and military patrols, these were necessary to maintain order. The number of patrols was directly related to the amount of violence. As long as FLOSY called for an increase in violence during the Mission's visit to Aden, the administering Power had no alternative but to increase measures of protection. It was also difficult to prevent reprisals and acts of revenge.
- 89. The Mission also raised the question of lifting the state of emergency and releasing the detainees with the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. George Brown stated that the United Kingdom would be prepared to take some risks and lift the state of emergency if there was some evidence that terrorism had subsided. If the Mission's conversations in Cairo should make progress he would be prepared to consider the release of the detainees provided the Mission took the responsibility.
- (b) Freedom of access to the Mission in the Territory
- 90. The Mission pointed out that, for the proper performance of its work, it was of the utmost importance that it should enjoy free and unimpeded access to all shades of opinion in the Territory. Simultaneously it wished to be assured that any person or groups who wished to speak to it there would be able to do so freely.
- 91. The representatives of the administering Power replied that the Mission need only let the High Commissioner know its wishes in advance as to any place it wanted to visit. If the Mission wished, it could see those persons held in detention. On the second aspect of the matter, namely free access to the Mission by the people, it was stated that the United Kingdom would do its best to ensure that anyone who wished to see the Mission could do so and that riots and demonstrations did not prevent people from seeing the Mission. However, the United Kingdom could not control the willingness of people to come forward.
- 92. It was agreed that after the Mission had arrived in the Territory, it would work out the practical details of how to ensure its freedom of movement and the freedom of access to it in consultation with the United Kingdom authorities there.

(c) Itinerary

- 93. The Mission sought the suggestions of the administering Power as to what itinerary it might adopt once it had arrived in the Territory. The United Kingdom officials drew up a tentative itinerary which they emphasized should be regarded as a set of suggestions and should not be construed as interfering with the responsibility of the Mission to decide on its own itinerary. This approach was in complete accord with the views of the Mission.
- 94. The suggested itinerary provided ten days based in Aden, five days based in Mukalla and a further six days based in Aden. From these centres, visits to various places would be made by road and air.
- 95. The Mission pointed out that it could not reach a final decision at that stage and that it would discuss its plans further when it reached the Territory.
- 96. The representatives of the United Kingdom expressed the hope that the Mission would visit the Eastern Protectorate; although the main problem relating to violence involved Aden, the main constitutional problem involved the three Eastern States of Qa'iti, Kathiri and Mahra. The Mission was told that on 5 April, a meeting was due to be held in Qa'iti State, which would be attended by representatives of all elements of the population. This meeting would decide what position to take with respect to the United Nations Mission.
- 97. The Mission stated that it would inform the United Kingdom authorities in the Territory of its wishes and would expect them to make the necessary arrangements. The Mission

was assured that the United Kingdom would do everything within its power to that end.

IV. VISITS TO CAIRO AND JEDDAH

A. Contacts with political groups and organizations

(a) Cairo

98. Before leaving New York, the Mission had taken steps to inform the public that it was willing to meet with all representatives of the people and was anxious to establish contacts with political groups and nationalist leaders who were outside the Territory. Its statement of 17 March to that effect had been publicized by the United Nations Information Centre in Cairo.

Views of FLOSY

99. Since FLOSY had an office in Cairo, the Mission hoped that it might be able to make contact with its representatives there. But it soon became clear that FLOSY had not changed its attitude regarding direct contacts with the Mission. However, since their main office was in Taiz, Yemen, it remained a possibility that the Mission would be able to visit Taiz, if a meeting with the FLOSY leadership could be arranged before its return to New York. Therefore, while proceeding according to its original plan, the Mission envisaged a visit to Taiz after Aden.

Views of the South Arabian League

- 100. On 28 March, a deputation of SAL members and supporters led by Mr. Al-Gifri, President, Sheikh Mohammed Abubakr bin Farid, member of the League's High Command, and Mr. Adnan Kamel, Mr. Awadh S. Bawazir and Mr. Mohsen Abubakr, members of the Aden Bureau, was received by the Mission at the United Nations Information Centre in Cairo. A closed meeting was then held with the representatives of the party. Mr. Al-Gifri made a statement and answered questions put to him by the members. A summary of his statement follows.
- 101. Mr. Al-Gifri was gratified by the establishment of the Special Mission on Aden which was the culmination of efforts at the United Nations from 1963 for the achievement of independence in South Arabia. The League had had a pioneering role in bringing the question of South Arabia before the international community. He estimated the population of South Arabia at two million, of whom half a million were emigrants residing in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirates, the Coast of East Africa and countries of the Far East, particularly Indonesia. Those emigrants hoped to return to their homes some day and take part in building the future of their country.
- 102. The objectives of the people were three: independence, unity and the transfer of sovereignty and all powers to the people through free elections under the supervision of a neutral body. Those objectives were embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations.
- 103. Mr. Al-Gifri stated that his party was the oldest political party in the South, having been established in 1950. It had carried the burden of the political and military struggle and had been active in various aspects of social life. About 500 students had benefited from scholarships made available to them by the League for studies in the United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia and other countries. The membership of the League included people from all walks of life.
- 104. He said that unanimity on the justice of the United Nations resolutions had been reached, both inside and outside the Territory. However, attempts were now being made to defeat some of the aims of the resolutions by separating Hadhramaut from the rest of South Arabia or creating from it a State loosely linked to the rest in a confederation. There were several organizations in South Arabia, the most important of which were SAL and FLOSY. The importance of FLOSY was in Aden only, on account of factors not related to the will of the people and which he would not care to mention. Although the League was more than anybody entitled to claim that it represented the people and its aspirations, it had no right to advance such a claim under the

- present complicated circumstances. However, FLOSY had lately made such a claim and it was absolutely false and baseless. Free elections were the only way to ascertain who truly represented the people. The attempt to impose such representatives was contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations.
- 105. Mr. Al-Gifri stated that South Arabia was genuinely burning with resentment against colonialism, the rule of agents and dismemberment of South Arabia, Strikes and demonstrations would meet the mission, particularly in Aden. However, some were trying to exploit those feelings by imposing a boycott of the mission. This was against the interests of the people. To those who said a boycott was necessary because the United Kingdom had not carried out the resolutions of the United Nations, he replied that had they carried out those resolutions, there would have been no need for a mission to recommend ways and means to carry out the resolutions, or even to keep the question of Aden on the agenda of the United Nations. The Mission should go to Aden and prevent the United Kingdom from executing its plans to consolidate the Sultan's rule. Should it be unable to do so, it could at least uncover and expose those plans on the international level.
- 106. He suggested that the Mission's meetings with the people should be private and that it should visit most regions, not only Aden. In Aden there were about 80,000 citizens of the Yemen Arab Republic who owed their allegiance primarily to Yemen. He felt that South Arabia should not be dragged into an international conflict or into the conflict in Yemen. He appealed for the neutralization of South Arabia from those overpowering conflicts. The United Nations could do a great deal in this respect.
- 107. The President of the South Arabian League made the following basic proposal. A conference of all parties concerned should be held either in South Arabia, which would be preferable, or in a neutral country. It should aim at the following.
- (1) A provisional constitution should be drawn up for the whole of South Arabia (the Eastern and Western Protectorates and the islands attached to them). This constitution would expire as soon as an elected constituent assembly had been established and had approved the permanent constitution.
- (2) A caretaker government should be formed with the agreement of the parties concerned. It should administer South Arabia and prepare for general elections for a peoples' constituent assembly.
- (3) A transitional period of one year should be proclaimed immediately after the conference had completed its task. Elections should be held shortly before the end of the period of transition.
- (4) As soon as the caretaker government was formed, all political organs of government in the South, namely the "Federal Government" and the three governments of Hadhramaut, should be abolished. All their powers should be transferred to the caretaker government.
- (5) An effective United Nations presence should be established during the period of transition, and should continue until the elected assembly had been established and a government appointed by it. The United Nations should supervise the elections to ensure their fairness.
- (6) Security powers should be vested in the caretaker government as soon as it was established.
- (7) The conference should accept the principle of compensation for the victims of oppression by the military forces of the British Government, whether their losses were personal or property losses, as well as for those who had been deported or exiled.
- 108. In reply to a question, Mr. Al-Gifri stated that the dissolution of the "Federal" and other Governments in the Territory should come after the formation of the caretaker government. If the Federation was to be dissolved first, there was a danger that each ruler could go back to his State and proclaim his own independence.

(b) Jeddah

- 109. The purpose of the Mission's visit to Jeddah was directly related to the hearing of people from Aden and the Protectorates who were living in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this connexion, while in New York the Mission had been informed by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations that there were large numbers of South Arabians employed in many walks of life in Saudi Arabia. The Mission had been invited, in the name of His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz, to visit the Kingdom in order to ascertain the views of those people (see appendix II below).
- 110. The Mission arrived in Jeddah during the night of 29 March 1967. On 30 March, the Mission issued an announcement through the Press and radio informing the people of the Territory residing in Saudi Arabia that it wished to hear their views in order to assist it in recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations concerning their future.
- 111. The Mission heard twenty-two individuals and groups of petitioners, including a deputation of the South Arabian League Office in Jeddah. It received fourteen written communications and fifty-one telegrams from South Arabians living outside the Territory (thirty-eight from Riyadh, eleven from Taef, one from Kuwait and one from Baghdad). The Mission was also handed a petition signed by 1,400 South Arabians living in Saudi Arabia.
- 112. From 30 March to 1 April, the Mission devoted a major part of its time to meeting people from the Territory who had come to express their views and to reply to questions put to them by members of the Mission. The names of the petitioners and the groups they claimed to represent are listed below:
- (1) Mr. Said M. Bamaz'ab, on behalf of people from Wadi-Rikhia, Wadi-Irmah, Duhr and Saut (Qa'iti Sultanate);
- (2) Mr. Ma'roof Al-Braiki, on behalf of people from Shabwah;
- (3) Mr. Ali Elwi Al-Mihdar, on behalf of a large number of people from Markhah;
- (4) Mr. Qasim bin Yaslem Amr, on behalf of South Arabians living in Mecca;
- (5) Mr. Hussein Al-Kaf, on behalf of people from Wadi-Amid (Kathiri Sultanate) living in Raiyadh;
- (6) Mr. Fadhil Mohsen bin Tawil, on behalf of South Arabian students;
- (7) Mr. Abdul-Rahman Gueilani, on behalf of Hadhrami merchants;
- (8) Mr. Omar M. Al-Awaithani, on behalf of South Arabians in Raiyadh;
- (9) Mr. Abdul-Qawi Al-Yafei, on behalf of people from Upper and Lower Yafei and Radfan;
- (10) Mr. Salem N. Mashjari, on behalf of people from the Al-Mashajiri tribe (Wahidi Sultanate).
- (11) Mr. Hassan Al-Baiti and Mr. Omar Bateis, on behalf of South Arabians born in Indonesia and Malaysia and living in Saudi Arabia;
- (12) Mr. Zannoon S. Adhal, on behalf of several Adenis who came to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage;
- (13) Mr. Mohamed Ali Al-Toomah, on behalf of people from Wahidi;
- (14) Mr. Said Al-Awaithani, on behalf of South Arabians living in Medina;
- (15) Mr. Saleh Al-Qarmushi, on behalf of people from Jordan;
- (16) Mr. Soleiman S. Al-Muhammadi, on behalf of the Seeban tribes (Hadhramaut);
- (17) Mr. Ali Salem Husamah, on behalf of people from the Upper Aulaqi Sultanate and Sheikhdom;
- (18) Mr. Mohamed Baharoon, on behalf of people from Lower Aulaqi;
- (19) Mr. Ali Abdul-Karim Fadhl, on behalf of people from Lahej;

- (20) Mr. Abubakr A. Bawazir, on behalf of South Arabians born in Africa and living in Saudi Arabia;
- (21) Mr. Mohamed Salem Bawazir and Mr. Ali Abdul-Karim, on behalf of the South Arabian League Office in Jeddah:
- (22) Mr. Ahmad Salem Al-Dini, on behalf of the Raidah-Dine tribes (Hadhramaut).

Views of the South Arabian League Office in Jeddah

- 113. The League members in Jeddah supported the statement made by the President of the League in Cairo. They added that certain groups in Aden, for their own selfish reasons, were committing sabotage and terrorism in order to defeat the resolutions of the United Nations and to bring about the failure of the Mission. Broadcasts from outside inciting the people to violence should be stopped. As to the British, while professing to abide by the United Nations resolutions, they were doing their best to dilute those resolutions and install an agent régime in South Arabia.
- 114. The League submitted the following practical suggestions on the implementation of the United Nations resolutions:
- (1) A general amnesty should be proclaimed, political detainees released and exiles allowed to return;
- (2) The state of emergency should be lifted and public freedoms restored;
- (3) The independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed and a law setting out judicial jurisdiction should be enacted;
- (4) Human rights and fundamental political freedoms should be guaranteed by law.
- 115. Elaborating on the functions of a central caretaker government, the petitioners stated that all the armed forces of the Territory should be unified and placed under its command. It should prepare and decide the date of the general elections for a constituent assembly, and should enact a citizenship law. The Special Mission itself should be transformed into an effective United Nations presence. An adequate international force should be provided and all armed forces in South Arabia should be placed under the command of the United Nations to keep order and prevent civil strife during the period of transition. No independence should be recognized without the unity of the Territory.

Views of other petitioners

- 116. The views of the petitioners as a whole are summarized below. Wherever a particular view was held by one petitioner or more, specific reference has been made thereto.
- 117. The petitioners expressed happiness with the arrival of the Mission in Jeddah and warmly welcomed it. Many of them stated that a boycott of the Mission was against the best interests of the South. The task of the Mission was a difficult one, owing to the deteriorating conditions and various problems in the South. There was a dangerous situation which might lead to bloodshed on a large scale.
- 118. The United Kingdom's colonial policy had led to dismemberment and disunity in South Arabia. Nothing had been done by the British to unify the various parts of the region. A number of petitioners stated that the sultans were the allies of the British and had subjected the people to tyranny and oppression. They were now trying, through threats and bribes, to influence the people and falsify their wishes.
- 119. The opinion voiced by some petitioners was that the United Kingdom supported the United Nations resolutions in words only; in fact it shared the responsibility for the disorder and acts of terror and exploited them for its own ends. It had helped in forming terrorist gangs in Aden under different commands which were struggling against each other. In some cases, it was stated, British soldiers had secretly committed acts of sabotage and terrorism.
- 120. A number of petitioners drew attention to the complete lack of economic and social development in the hinterland of the Territory. There were no schools or hospitals and the people were poor. Those conditions had led to waves of migration from Hadhramaut. Estimates of the number of South Arabians in Saudi Arabia varied between 100,000 and

300,000. The representatives of the students denounced the educational policy of the United Kingdom in the Territory. They asked that schools which had been closed down by the authorities in Aden be reopened.

121. Some petitioners stated that South Arabians, if left to themselves, would solve their own problems. They did not want any intervention from any side. However, there was now a campaign of terrorism in Aden directed by a handful of people who did not represent the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory. Aden was inhabited by various foreign communities, particularly Yemenis. These were being deceived and exploited by outside forces. They were being incited to violence by broadcasts emanating from Taiz in Yemen and Cairo in the United Arab Republic. The strikes and rioting were not the work of South Arabians but of foreign immigrants in Aden. Two petitioners denounced FLOSY and accused it of being the agent of a foreign state. The mission was asked to visit all parts of the Territory, particularly the interior of Hadhramaut, in order to ascertain the real views of the people.

122. The basic aims stressed by the petitioners were independence, unity and prosperity of South Arabia. It was emphasized that the whole Territory, including the islands attached to it, should be brought together before independence. General support was voiced for the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on the question of Aden, particularly resolution 2183 (XXI).

123. The petitioners supported SAL. In reply to questions, they all stated that they were in agreement with its objectives and principles, although only some of them were actually members of the League.

124. A number of petitioners referred to the need for the establishment of a strong army and for the unification of all the armed and security forces in the Territory under one command. A few demanded that the United Nations guarantee the country's independence. International forces, it was stated, should be sent to protect it from "external and internal pressures". Some demanded that the state of emergency be lifted, detainees be freed (particularly in Qa'iti and Kathiri), freedom of speech be restored and a general amnesty be proclaimed. During the period of transition, one petitioner said, a ban should be imposed on the use of firearms and all information media should be controlled by the Government to prepare public opinion for the elections.

B. Contacts with Governments

125. The Mission took advantage of its visits to Cairo and Jeddah to have contacts with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. In Cairo it had useful talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, and other officials. In Jeddah it had useful talks with His Majesty, King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz and senior officials of the Foreign Ministry. Those discussions enabled the Mission to have a clear understanding of the respective positions of the two Governments with regard to the problem of Aden.

C. Contacts with the League of Arab States

126. On its arrival in Cairo, the Mission was informed of the desire of the Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to meet with it. The Mission welcomed such a meeting. On 27 March, the Mission was received at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo by the Secretary-General, Mr. A. K. Hassouna and Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Sayed Nofal. At that meeting the Mission was informed of the views of the League of Arab States on the question of Aden and was presented with a copy of a resolution concerning Aden adopted by the League's council on 18 March 1967. The text of the resolution is as follows:

"THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED SOUTH

"Having reviewed the situation in Aden and the Occupied South in all its aspects, and after taking note of the recent developments of the colonialist policy which aims at maintaining aggressive colonialism and at renouncing previous

pledges by the British Government to evacuate the area and recognize its independence, the Council of the League of Arab States at its 47th ordinary session decides to:

- "1. Condemn British colonialism and hold it fully responsible for the assassination of nationalists, particularly during the recent period and for the atrocious crimes it has committed which have been condemned by the world conscience everywhere.
- "2. Hail the Arab people in Aden and the Occupied South in their struggle against British colonialism for the attainment of their freedom and sovereignty, and express its sincerest condolences to the Arab struggler Abdul Qawi Mackawee whose sons fell martyrs in the battle of freedom, and to the families of all other innocent martyrs.
- "3. Give maximum support to the Arab struggle in the area against colonialism and its agents and consolidate it by all material, moral and human means.
- "4. Recommend that the Arab delegations at the United Nations continue to follow up and intensify the measures they may deem necessary for emphasizing the independence of Aden and the Occupied South, the complete evacuation of the colonialist forces, the liquidation of the military base, as well as the exercise of the right of self-determination by the struggling Arab people under the supervision of a neutral government during the transitional stage.
- "5. Pledge support to the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) in its struggle, and to extend all material and moral assistance to it, being the legitimate frame of the struggle of the people of the area.
- "6. Denounce the attempts of the British colonialist Government and those who co-operate with it which aim at impeding the withdrawal of the British authorities in 1968, and the liquidation of military bases in the area."

(The head of the Saudi delegation objected to the fifth clause.)

V. VISIT TO ADEN

Introduction

127. Following its discussions with the administering Power in New York and London, the Mission was encouraged to believe that its position on essential points had been understood by the administering Power and that the necessary conditions for its work would be created in Aden. The Mission had also hoped that, as the objectives of its visit became known to the people in the Territory, there would be a lessening of tension and an improvement in the political atmosphere. Unfortunately, these hopes were not realized.

Arrival of the Mission in Aden

128. On 29 March, when the Mission arrived in Beirut on its way to Jeddah, it was informed that the commercial flight on which it was booked to Aden on 1 April had been cancelled on account of the general strike called to coincide with the arrival of the Mission there.

129. While exploring other possibilities for travelling from Jeddah to Aden, the Mission addressed a cable to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him of the situation and requesting, as a standby arrangement, an aircraft of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza to fly the Mission to Aden, After having considered various alternative arrangements, the Mission decided that, in the interest of its work, it should travel in the United Nations aircraft which the Secretary-General had promptly placed at its disposal as requested.

130. Three days before its arrival in the Territory, the Mission issued an announcement for the Aden Press and radio which was carried ahead to Aden by an advance group of the Secretariat. The announcement read as follows:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden wishes to announce that it will be in the Territory of Aden from 2 April 1967. Further information concerning the Mission's stay will be announced in due course.

"During its stay in the Territory, the Mission wishes to hear the views of the people in order to assist it in recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the future of the Territory.

"Persons wishing to present their views orally to the Mission should address requests for such oral presentations to the Chairman of the Mission at the Seaview Hotel. Similarly, those wishing to submit their views to the Mission in writing should direct their communications to the Chairman at the same address."

131. The Mission left Jeddah in the United Nations aircraft in the afternoon of 2 April 1967 and arrived at Khormaksar Airport in Aden at 2000 hours local time. It was met by the Deputy High Commissioner and other officials of the British administration in Aden. The Mission was driven under heavy security arrangements to its headquarters at the Seaview Hotel. The hotel had been requisitioned by the authorities under the emergency regulations; it was reserved for the sole use of the Mission and the British and local staff attached to it. The hotel was cordoned off with barbed wire and protected by large numbers of armed police who were also manning observation posts on and around it. Other buildings in the vicinity had also been vacated and no one was allowed to approach the hotel without special permission from the authorities. The telephone communications were also directed through a special switchboard operator by the authorities. There were several checkpoints which visitors had to pass in order to reach the hotel.

Contacts with the British High Commissioner and attempts to draw up a programme of work

132. The Mission held two meetings on 3 April 1967 with the British High Commissioner in Aden, Sir Richard Turnbull. At 10.30 a.m. the High Commissioner called on the Mission at its hotel; following that initial meeting, the Mission was flown by helicopter to Government House where a meeting was held with the High Commissioner and other officials. The main questions discussed at these meetings were the programme of work of the Mission and the position of the Mission in relation to the "Federal Government". Later in the evening, the Deputy High Commissioner and two other officials met with the Mission and put before it a tentative itinerary containing suggestions for the Mission's visits to other parts of the Territory.

133. On its arrival at the Seaview Hotel, it became evident to the Mission that the security arrangements surrounding it were a great hindrance to any direct contact with the people. The hotel was located away from the centre of Aden and the tight security arrangements around it made it impossible for people to have free access to the Mission. The Mission was also informed that, for security reasons, it could not move about freely in Aden. Although responsibility for security rested solely with the administering Power, the manner in which security arrangements had been made gave the Mission no access to the people. The essential condition for ascertaining the views of the people was thus lacking. Consequently the Mission's first concern was to see how it could, with the co-operation of the High Commissioner, lessen the restrictions and make itself more accessible to the people.

134. During the discussions with the High Commissioner, he pointed out that the security measures were needed not only for the Mission's protection, but also to protect the petitioners themselves who were under immediate threat from FLOSY if they defied the boycott and came to see the Mission. He added that certain potential petitioners had received telephone calls threatening them with reprisals if they contacted the Mission. It was pointed out that should the Mission use any other place for its meetings with petitioners, the same problems would arise. The High Commissioner suggested that the Mission might use Government House for the hearings. He hoped that after a few days conditions would become normal again and that the matter could then be reconsidered. However, the suggestion to use Government House for the hearing of petitioners was not acceptable to the Mission.

135. The Mission concluded that in the situation prevailing in Aden, it could not proceed with the hearing of petition-

ers there before the restrictions imposed by the security measures were removed. It therefore considered visiting other parts of the Territory. However, a visit to the Western Protectorate had to wait until the position of the Mission regarding the "Government of the Federation" was clearly understood by the High Commissioner. The only alternative therefore was to visit first the Eastern Protectorate. The High Commissioner had suggested that the visit to that region should last five days; two in Mukalla (capital of Qa'iti), one on the island of Socotra, the best part of a day in Kathiri and the rest in Qa'iti. The Mission was also informed by British officials that two days' notice would be needed to prepare for a visit to any place outside Aden; further, because of the heavy rains which had fallen just before the Mission's arrival, it was necessary to wait until 12 April for the visit to Mukalla. This explanation was contradicted, however, in the written itinerary, dated 31 March 1967, given to the Mission by High Commission officials (see para. 132 above) in which it was clearly indicated that the visit to the Eastern Aden Protectorate could not begin before 12 April 1967, "due to administrative considerations".

136. At its meetings with the High Commissioner, the Mission explained that, in accordance with the terms of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee, it would have official dealings only with the representatives of the United Kingdom in the Territory. The High Commissioner, however, seemed to be anxious to lead the Mission into direct dealings with the "Federal Government". He extended an invitation to the Mission to meet with Ministers of the Federation at a luncheon in Government House. The mission could not accept the invitation. The High Commissioner, however, continued to advise strongly in favour of a meeting between the Mission and the Federal Ministers. He pointed out that the Mission was obliged to deal directly with the "Federal Government" while in the federated States. He added that responsibility for the security of the Mission during its visit to the federated States rested with the "Federal Government"; his own responsibility was limited to making the necessary material arrangements for the Mission's movements and deploying to that effect the resources available to him. The High Commissioner further explained that the Federal Ministers were extremely anxious to talk to the Mission and wanted, among other things, to seek its help in bringing the Eastern States into the Federation.

137. Having carefully considered the situation in which the Mission found itself—the tight security measures surrounding the Mission and the High Commissioner's efforts to bring it into contact with the "Federal Government"—it decided that before proceeding further with its work, it should address a letter to the High Commissioner to clarify the two points.

138. Accordingly, the following letter was sent to the High Commissioner on 4 April:

"In the light of the conversations the Mission had with you yesterday, I should like, on its behalf, to reiterate the Mission's position concerning the Government of the Federation of South Arabia.

"The Mission has already referred to the resolution which qualifies the Federal Government as unrepresentative. Indeed, the text of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 15 June 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"' . . .

"'2. Deplores the setting up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and appeals to all States not to recognize such independence as is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely

expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage;

"' . . .

"'4. Reaffirms the view that the responsibilities which devolve on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the administering Power cannot be shifted or circumvented through any action by an unrepresentative régime referred to in paragraph 2 above;'.

"Further, the General Assembly in resolution 2183 (XXI), by which the present Mission was established, endorsed that resolution of the Special Committee.

"The Mission would like to make it clear that in carrying out its responsibilities it cannot take any steps which would involve it in any way with the Government of the Federation. This position, which was well known to the Government of the United Kingdom, was further stated by the Mission during its discussions in London at the Foreign Office. It appeared to the Mission that this was fully understood and that therefore all its official contacts in the Territory would be through you, as representative of the administering Power.

"If the Mission is again raising the question at this stage, it is because of the importance the Mission attaches to it and also because it has realized in the course of its conversations with you that the implications of this stand have not been fully appreciated. In these circumstances, you will agree that arrangements being made for the Mission to carry out its work in the Territory should not be in conflict with the mandate of the Mission as set out in the resolution. The Mission would therefore appreciate receiving from you a clarification of this matter so as to enable it to proceed with its work in the Territory.

"The Mission would also like to recall the statement made by Lord Caradon at the United Nations, which was noted by the General Assembly in resolution 2183 (XXI), in which, in response to statements made by various delegations, he gave an assurance that the United Nations Mission would have free and unimpeded contact with the representatives of all shades of opinion in the Territory. The representative of the United Kingdom also stated:

"'... only the mission could determine whether the situation prevailing in the Territory permitted it to carry out its tasks, and the most important thing was that it should go to Aden as soon as possible and accomplish what was called for in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution. Only the mission, after it arrived on the scene, could decide whether and how it should proceed with its work.'

"Having arrived in the Territory and observed the situation, the Mission has found that the necessary conditions to enable it to carry out its work effectively do not exist. In particular, the Mission is not satisfied that the requirements are being met to enable it to have free and unimpeded contact with the people. It would therefore like to know what steps you could take to establish the necessary conditions for the proper functioning of the Mission.

"The Mission is confident that in relation to the points it has raised you will take into account the assurances given by the United Kingdom in the General Assembly, which were reaffirmed by the United Kingdom Government during its discussions with the Mission in London, that it would give the Mission its full support in the discharge of its functions.

"The Mission is transmitting a copy of this letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to inform him of the situation in which the Mission finds itself.

"The Mission would appreciate an early answer to the points raised in this letter."

- 139. Meanwhile the Mission received the following communications (see appendix III below) from Federal Ministers:
- (a) A telegram dated 2 April from the Chairman of the Supreme Council welcoming the Mission to South Arabia;
- (b) A letter dated 2 April from the Chairman of the Supreme Council informing it that a revised draft constitu-

tion had been approved by the Government of the Federation of South Arabia and other State authorities;

- (c) A letter dated 3 April from the Chairman of the Supreme Council stating that the Ministers were looking forward to greeting the Mission in person and to discussing in detail the problems that faced the country;
- (d) Two letters dated 3 April from the Ministers of Education and Health containing general information on the activities of their respective Ministries and accompanied by various brochures and publications.
- 140. In addition the Mission received the following communications containing requests for hearings:

Name	Title
Mr. Nasser Hasson Mudaffar	
Mr. Hussein Nasser Hassan	Student
Mr. Salem Mohamed Baras and	South Arabian
Mr. Rabea Rajeh	League of
·	Hadhramaut
Mr. S. A. Alhabshi, Secretary-General;	
Mr. A. A. Al-Gifri and	South Arabian
Mr. A. O. Kutbi, Executive Members	League, Aden
Sheikh Mohamed Ajroomah	Delegate of the
•	Armed Resist-
	ance Forces
	for the Libera-
	tion of South
	Arabia ^c
Mr. Hussain Ali Bayoomi	Secretary-General
	of the United
	National Party
Mr. Mohamed Hassan Obali	

141. The Mission agreed that consideration of the above communications should be postponed until it had received the High Commissioner's reply to its letter. While awaiting this reply, the Mission, on 5 April, decided that it should ask the High Commissioner to arrange for the following:

Mr. Ahmad Abdullah Al-Fadhli

- (a) A visit to the detention centre at Al-Mansoura,d
- (b) A broadcast by the Mission to the people of the Territory.

A formal request to this effect was immediately conveyed to the High Commissioner.

Visit to the Aden detention centre

142. As requested by the Mission, arrangements were made for it to visit the detention centre. At 1700 hours on 5 April 1967 the Mission set out for Al-Mansoura in a convoy heavily protected by armed police and British military forces. Inside the camp, it had a brief meeting with the Commandant and his aides. It was informed that the number of detainees stood at 112 and that since the beginning of the emergency a total of 252 persons had been detained at one time or another. The detainees were currently separated into two main groups, FLOSY and the NLF, interned in four "blocks". The Mission was informed that the separation was preferred by the detainees themselves and was designed to prevent clashes between the factions.

143. The Mission walked around the compound of the detention centre. It did not meet with any hostility from the detainees. They indicated to the Mission that, in accordance with the decision of their respective organizations, they did not wish to have any direct contacts with it under present conditions. However, one of the detainees from FLOSY, on behalf of his colleagues, handed the Mission a copy of a statement dated 24 March 1967, describing the conditions "of repression and terror" in which the country lived since the

c From a preliminary inquiry, the Mission understood that this request emanated from an organization other than FLOSY or the NLF.

d The Mission had been informed by the High Commissioner that 108 persons were detained at Al-Mansoura, a section of the Sheikh Othman Township, under the emergency regulations. The Mission requested and obtained a list of these detainees and their period of detention.

proclamation of the state of emergency in December 1963. In this statement the detainees declared that they stood by the provisions of the United Nations resolutions of 1963 and 1965 which contained "the minimum demands of the people". The British were trying to evade those provisions, particularly with regard to the so-called Government of the Federation. The detainees wondered how the Mission could investigate conditions in an area where authority was concentrated in a structure fought by the people with the force of arms and opposed by the United Nations itself. The Mission's visit under such conditions could not help in implementing the resolutions; therefore they called on all national organizations to boycott the Mission. In conclusion they made three points: (a) the United Nations resolutions of 1963 and 1965 should be implemented in letter and spirit; (b) any conclusions arrived at by the Mission under the conditions prevailing in the Territory would not be binding; and (c) pressure should be brought to bear on the United Kingdom to negotiate directly with FLOSY, the leader of the struggle and the true and legitimate representative of the people.

144. A detainee who stated that he belonged to the NLF spoke briefly to the Mission in order to explain the attitude of his colleagues and to stress their support of the position of boycott adopted by their leaders. He added that their views and demands would be expressed by the leaders themselves.

Statement to the people of the Territory

145. The Mission was informed by the representative of the High Commissioner that, as requested, it could go to the studios of the South Arabian Broadcasting Station at 2200 hours local time on 5 April to make a live broadcast and telecast of its statement to the people. However, in order to do so, it would have to travel first by helicopter to a place about 400 yards from the studio and then by car up a narrow road through a village. Adequate protection could not be provided at night for the trip by road. In this connexion, the Mission was told that the Deputy High Commissioner's car had been wrecked recently by a mine planted on that road. The Police Commissioner stated that he could not assume responsibility for the safety of the Mission. It was therefore agreed that the Mission record its statement on videotape at the Seaview Hotel. For technical reasons, however, it was said that the recording would have to take place not later than 1700 hours. After further discussion, it was agreed with the United Kingdom officials that the mission would record its broadcast the next morning and that it would be broadcast in the evening twice, first at 2000 hours and next at 2100 hours.

146. On 6 April at 1300 hours, the Mission recorded the following statement at the Seaview Hotel as arranged with the High Commission officials:

"I am speaking on behalf of the Mission on Aden and am expressing the thoughts of my two colleagues and myself. I have on my right Mr. Abdussatar Shalizi from Afghanistan, Asia, and on my left Mrs. Moussa Léo Keita from Mali, Africa. I am from Venezuela, Latin America. We have been appointed by the Secretary-General U Thant to constitute this Mission on Aden, South Arabia, in accordance with a resolution approved by the General Assembly last December.

"You may know that the question of the independence of Aden and the Protectorates has been on the agenda of the Special Committee of the United Nations dealing with the question of self-determination and independence of colonial territories and of the General Assembly for over five years. The three countries that we represent, together with many other countries of our three continents and also of the other parts of the world, have shown their deep concern in this matter which is important not only for the people of the Territory, who of course are the main objective of the efforts being displayed at the United Nations, but also in terms of the peace of the region and of the world.

"I should add that the resolution of the General Assembly under the terms of which the Mission was appointed by the

Secretary-General was supported by 100 members of the United Nations, with no country voting against it. Under that resolution, the purpose of the Mission is to go to Aden and to recommend practical steps for the full implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular to determine the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of free elections. Furthermore, the Mission is to consider recommending practical steps for the establishment of a central caretaker-or transitional-government to carry out the administration and to assist in the organization of the elections. The three of us are determined to do our best to perform the task assigned to us by the United Nations in complete objectivity. This cannot be done without the full co-operation of all concerned, and we hope that such cooperation will be forthcoming.

"Since we were appointed at the end of last February, we have been discussing this problem in New York in close contact with the Secretary-General U Thant, also in London with the British Government as the administering Power, as well as in Cairo and Jeddah. Now, we have come to Aden, which is the goal of our mission. We know how difficult the problem is in view of the situation that prevails at the present time, but we are hopeful that through the efforts of the United Nations and the cooperation of everyone concerned, progress will be made towards reaching the objectives as set out in the resolutions of the United Nations: that is, the unity of the Territory and its achievement of a genuine independence in the shortest possible time. It is only when the people of this country will be able to decide by themselves, in complete freedom, their own destiny that the United Nations can feel assured that the principles embodied in the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly have been fully applied to the Territory.

"In the Territory we have been in touch with the High Commissioner and his staff as the representatives of the United Kingdom, which is responsible to the United Nations as administering Power. It is with them that we will deal officially in the Territory, and not with the Federal Government. We insist on having the assurance from the administering Power that we will have full opportunity of free and unimpeded contacts with representatives of all shades of opinion. It is in this manner, and only so that the Mission will be able to discharge its responsibility. To this end, the Mission has let it be known by the Press and radio, and we repeat it here, that we would like to encourage anyone who wishes to get in touch with the Mission to do so. We will spend in Aden as much time as is necessary and visit as well the other parts of the area, if we are convinced that it will serve the purpose of our Mission.

"We appreciate the confidence that is placed in the Mission as representatives of the United Nations, and you may rest assured that the Mission will spare no efforts to live up to the expectations of the people, knowing full well the difficulty of our task and recognizing the fact that no peaceful solution of this problem can be reached without the unified efforts of the people of the Territory as a whole.

"Our visit yesterday to the detainees at Al-Mansoura was another reminder of how important it is for this country to be liberated from colonial rule. Once this goal has been achieved, the energy of these young people and their brothers outside the prison walls will be available to build up their own independent country in peace and unity. It goes without saying that these aspirations could not be achieved unless all come together to work for the common goal.

"As soon as we have established beyond any doubt that we can have free and unimpeded contacts with the people of the Territory, the Mission will commence its study of the situation in the Territory, in accordance with the directives given to it by the General Assembly, and gather from anyone concerned such information and ideas as would contribute to the success of its assignment."

147. However, at 2000 hours, the scheduled time for the first broadcast, instead of its recorded message, the Mission heard over the television an announcement to the effect that if it wished to use the facilities of the broadcasting services in the Territory, it should address itself directly to the "Federal Government". That the "Federal Government" had anything to do with the Mission's broadcast had never been mentioned by the High Commissioner or his staff. The announcement therefore was a complete surprise to the Mission, particularly since the High Commissioner not only provided the necessary services and facilities for making the recording, but had originally offered to arrange for the Mission to go to the studio and make its broadcast live. Furthermore, Aden being a Non-Self-Governing Territory, the Mission had no doubt about the propriety of addressing itself directly to the High Commissioner. It immediately contacted the British liaison officer to try to obtain an explanation and notified the British liaison officer that it was taking a very dim view of the matter. It was told that the High Commissioner was investigating the reasons for not telecasting the Mission's programme.

148. The Mission noted with regret that the pattern of nonco-operation on the part of the High Commissioner was evident. No effort had been made to have the statement broadcast at 2100 hours as scheduled. Shortly after 2100 hours, the Mission met urgently to consider the new situation. Until that moment, many difficulties had arisen, but the Mission had tried to overcome them because it was counting on the cooperation and understanding of the administering Power. Foremost in its thinking was the need to maintain the confidence of all parties concerned and to avoid its actions being misinterpreted; it hoped that in due course it would be meeting with representatives of all groups, even with those who were boycotting it. This incident confirmed the consistently unco-operative attitude of the High Commissioner and other officials on the spot. The Mission could not help concluding that obstructions were being placed in the way of its proper functioning. The fact that free and unimpeded contacts with the people could not be assured, led the Mission to the conclusion that conditions as a whole did not permit it to discharge effectively its responsibilities inside the Territory at that time. In its view no useful purpose could be served by the Mission prolonging its stay, and it therefore decided to leave Aden without delay and explore other venues for the practical performance of its mandate. The Mission notified the British liaison officer that it was initiating preparations for it to leave Aden the next morning. It was simply told, on express instructions from the High Commissioner, that the latter was still investigating the matter.

149. The Mission left Aden on 7 April 1967 at 0800 hours. However, before boarding the aircraft, it was asked to submit to a search of its luggage "for security reasons". The Mission, after protesting against this action which violated the rules of international courtesy and diplomatic practice, submitted to it.

VI. Work of the mission after leaving the Territory

150. The Mission arrived in Rome on its way to Geneva in the afternoon of 7 April. The Mission's arrival at the airport in Rome coincided with that of the Secretary-General who was paying a brief visit to Rome from Geneva before beginning his tour of Asian countries. The Mission met with the Secretary-General at the airport before his departure. At this meeting, the Mission informed the Secretary-General of the circumstances which had given rise to its departure from Aden and of its intention to go to Geneva to consider its future programme of work.

151. On arrival at the airport, the Mission was met by the United Kingdom Ambassador to Italy, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, who presented to the Mission a personal message from the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, inviting it to visit London as soon as possible for discussions on the situation in South Arabia. In his message, the Foreign Secretary stated that he would welcome the Mission's "first-hand account" of its visit to Aden.

152. While at Rome airport, the Mission also authorized for the Press the following statement which briefly set out some of the reasons for its departure from Aden:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden regrets having had to leave Aden after only a brief stay there. The decision of the Mission to leave the Territory, in the existing circumstances, was made after a number of experiences which clearly showed that the United Kingdom authorities there were unwilling to extend to it the cooperation due to it from the administering Power.

"The Mission has always made it clear to the United Kingdom authorities that its official dealings in the Territory would be with the High Commissioner as representative of the administering Power and not with the Federal Government. It has also made it well known that it must have free and unimpeded contacts with the people of the Territory.

"Yesterday an unfortunate event took place which could not have occurred if the United Kingdom authorities in Aden, who knew the position of the Mission and of its acceptance by the United Kingdom Government, had wished to co-operate with it and enable it to discharge its responsibilities. As is well known by now, the Mission in the performance of its duty recorded a broadcast of a very important statement it wished to make to the people of the Territory over radio and television. This recording was arranged yesterday through the High Commissioner's office and was due to be telecast and broadcast at 8 p.m. last evening. However, neither the telecast nor the broadcast took place as arranged and the High Commissioner and his officials surprisingly appeared to be completely unaware of what was going on. Further, the Mission learned from Aden radio and television newscast that if the United Nations Mission wished to use the facilities of the broadcasting services in the Territory it should address itself directly to the Federal Government. No explanations were forthcoming from the High Commissioners' Office.

"This and other incidents demonstrated that the local British authorities were unwilling to co-operate with the Mission in the performance of its task. In the circumstances the Mission concluded that no useful purpose could be served by the Mission prolonging its totally fruitless stay in the Territory. It therefore decided to leave Aden without delay and explore other venues for the practical performance of its mandate. It must be clearly understood that existing conditions in the Territory are not conducive to the proper performance of the functions of the Mission there. Free and unimpeded contacts with the people, essential prerequisites for its work, were not made available by the British authorities in the field. The Mission will now continue its work outside the Territory and submit its report on its findings."

A. Geneva

153. The Mission arrived in Geneva from Rome on 8 April. It had come to Geneva to examine the new situation and to consider how it would be possible for it to continue its work in the performance of its mandate and, in this context, to consider the invitation from the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary.

154. First, however, the Mission felt it necessary to set the public record straight concerning its visit to Aden and its departure therefrom, since many of the press reports had been highly inaccurate and misleading. The Mission, accordingly, held a press conference at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 10 April.

155. The Mission then thoroughly reviewed the situation in which it found itself. Taking into account the importance of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly and what it had so far been able to accomplish, despite the difficulties and lack of co-operation it had encountered, the Mission decided that it should explore all possibilities of enabling it to continue with its work. In this context, it decided to accept Mr. Brown's invitation to have further discussions with him and to visit London for this purpose on its way

back to New York. Before taking this decision, the Mission had discussions with Mr. William T. Rodgers, United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

156. Before leaving for London, the Mission felt it would be useful to let the Foreign Secretary know in advance its views on the matters it expected to discuss. The Mission therefore set out in a memorandum some observations it wished to make about its approach to its work up to that point; it also indicated the lines along which it suggested all concerned should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden, on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions. This memorandum which was enclosed in a letter dated 15 April addressed to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary is set out below:

"I should like to take this opportunity to thank you on behalf of the members of the Mission for your kind personal invitation to come to London to discuss with you the difficulties the Mission encountered in Aden. The Mission's decision to accept your invitation has of course already been conveyed to you.

"It is the Mission's hope that during the forthcoming discussions it will be possible to overcome some of the difficulties that arose during its first visit to the Territory and to establish clear and agreed guidelines for the future work of the Mission.

"To facilitate our discussions, the Mission felt that it would be useful to let you know in advance some preliminary observations it would like to make about its approach to its task thus far and to indicate, albeit tentatively, the lines along which it suggests all should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden on the basis of relevant General Assembly resolutions.

"The Mission's observations and suggestions are set out in the enclosure to this letter and we would appreciate reaching an understanding with you on the suggestions it has made. The members look forward to discussing them as fully as possible with you in London."

"Preliminary observations and suggestions by the Special Mission on Aden

- "1. It may be useful, at the outset, to recall the resolution under which the Special Mission was established, namely resolution 2183 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966. By this resolution, the General Assembly endorsed the resolution adopted on 15 June 1966 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. These resolutions set out the tasks entrusted to the Mission and indicate the framework within which it should operate. The Mission is not a fact-finding mission; its task is to recommend practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections. The Mission is further requested to consider recommending practical steps for the establishment of a central caretaker government to carry out the administration of the whole Territory and to assist in the organization of the elections.
- "2. Before leaving New York, the Mission stressed that it was proceeding on its assignment in a spirit of objectivity and with a sense of urgency and determination to do its utmost to further the objectives contained in resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly.
- "3. The Mission believed that in London it had reached certain understandings with the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, which would considerably assist it in carrying out its task. Among the most important of these understandings were the following:
- "(a) That the Mission would have official dealings only with the representatives of the United Kingdom in the Territory;
- "(b) That the Mission would have freedom of access to the people of the Territory;

- "(c) That the people of the Territory would have freedom of access to the Mission;
- "(d) That, subject to certain conditions, the United Kingdom Government would consider lifting the state of emergency;
- "(e) That the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to consider the release of detainees if the Mission recommended it from Aden.
- "4. In Cairo, the Mission heard Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, the President of the South Arabian League, who outlined certain steps which, in the view of his party, would assist it in the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Aden. The Mission also had useful talks with the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic and with senior officials at the Foreign Ministry. While in Cairo, the Mission explored every possibility of making contact with the leadership of FLOSY, which had already decided to boycott the Mission.
- "5. In Jeddah, the Mission heard a large number of petitioners representing South Arabians living in Saudi Arabia, including representatives of the South Arabian League. It also had useful talks with His Majesty King Faisal and senior officials at the Foreign Ministry.
- "6. Because of the cancellation of the commercial flight it had intended to use to travel to the Territory, the Mission, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, arranged for a special United Nations plane to fly it to Aden.
- "7. On its arrival in the Territory, it was necessary for the Mission to take stock of the circumstances in which it found itself and carefully to prepare the ground for its future work. The Mission could foresee many difficulties, but it hoped that, with co-operation and understanding on all sides, they could be overcome. Of particular importance to the Mission was the need to maintain the confidence of all parties concerned. As a result of approaches made by the Mission before it arrived in the Territory, it entertained the hope that before it returned to New York it would be able to meet with representatives of all groups, even with those who were boycotting it. The Mission was therefore deeply conscious that its actions in the Territory should not be open to misinterpretation and that the key to success depended upon establishing and maintaining a climate of confidence on all sides.
- "8. Soon after its arrival, the Mission had two meetings with the High Commissioner. At both, the Mission made it clear that while in the Territory it would deal officially only with him as the representative of the administering Power. However, the Mission could not escape the impression that the High Commissioner and his officials were directing it into dealings with the Federal Government and into activities that, at the very least, would have been interpreted as according recognition to the Federal Government. Because of this, the Mission felt it necessary to seek a clarification. It did so in the letter to the High Commissioner on 4 April, a copy of which is attached.
- "9. In the same letter, the Mission also raised another matter on which it felt the need for further assurances. The Mission, in accordance with its terms of reference, had always stressed the need for it to have free and unimpeded contact with the people of the Territory. However, the situation in which it found itself in Aden, surrounded as it was by tight security arrangements, was not such as to lead it to believe that the necessary free contact between it and the people could be established. In spite of these difficulties, the Mission was directing its efforts towards establishing an appropriate basis upon which it could effectively proceed with its work, in particular the hearing of petitioners. Up to the time of its departure from Aden on the morning of 7 April, the Mission did not receive a reply to the above-mentioned letter.
- "10. Some of the circumstances surrounding the Mission's departure and the reasons which compelled it to take that decision were set out in a press statement issued at Rome airport on 7 April (copy attached). Finding itself cut off from the people of the Territory, the Mission had arranged

with the High Commissioner's Office to make a radio and television broadcast of a very important statement it wished to make to the people. The statement was recorded (copy attached), but was not broadcast at the scheduled time. Instead, the Mission heard an announcement to the effect that, if it wished to use the facilities of the broadcasting services in the Territory, it should address itself directly to the Federal Government. This incident, taken together with the attitude of the High Commissioner and his officials, led the Mission to the conclusion that the local British authorities were unwilling to co-operate with it and that no useful purpose could be served by prolonging its stay in the Territory.

"11. After discussing these developments with the Secretary-General at Rome airport, the Mission proceeded to Geneva to reflect on the situation and to consider how it should proceed further with the performance of its mandate. It is in this context that the Mission has agreed to accept the Foreign Secretary's invitation to go to London.

"12. It should be clear from the above that, from the outset of its work, the Mission, basing itself on the resolutions of the General Assembly, established a carefully planned programme of visits and contacts to enable it to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly. Now that the Mission's plans have not been realized and that it had to cut short its visit to the Territory, the Mission is of the belief that it must clarify the basis on which it can proceed further with its work.

"13. Therefore, the Mission would set out the main steps that should be taken in order to fulfil the objectives of the General Assembly resolutions on Aden. These are:

"(1) The creation of the necessary conditions to bring about a return to normal political life in the Territory—namely, the abolition of the state of emergency, the repeal of all laws restricting public freedom, the release of political detainees and the return of exiles;

"(2) The establishment of a central caretaker government for the whole Territory under transitional constitutional arrangements;

"(3) The holding of general elections in accordance with the provisions to be drawn up by the caretaker government;

"(4) The establishment of an effective United Nations presence in the Territory, whose functions would include assisting in the implementation of the measures provided for in (1) and (2) above and the supervision of the general elections provided for in (3) above.

"14. It is the hope of the Mission that it will be able to contact all the major political forces in the Territory and seek their co-operation in reaching agreement on the formation of a central caretaker government and on the transitional constitutional arrangements."

157. The letter, with the enclosed memorandum, was handed to Mr. Rodgers for delivery to the Foreign Secretary on 15 April. In handing the letter, the Mission explained the purpose of the memorandum. It also emphasized the importance it attached to the forthcoming discussions and to receiving satisfactory assurances on the matters raised in the memorandum.

B. London

158. The Mission arrived in London on 16 April and spent the whole day from 11 a.m. till midnight at Dorneywood in discussions with the Foreign Secretary. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thomson, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Rodgers, and senior officials of the Foreign Office also participated.

159. The Mission elaborated to the Foreign Secretary the problems it had raised concerning its future work in its letters of 4 and 15 April. The Mission also gave the Foreign Secretary a full and frank account of its stay in Aden and of the circumstances that had given rise to its decision to leave. The Mission took note of a number of clarifications on the position of the United Kingdom Government that it had received from the Foreign Secretary during this discussion.

It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary would send a detailed reply to the Mission's letter of 15 April and that, on receipt of that reply, the Mission would determine its future course of action.

C. New York

160. The reply to the Mission's letter and memorandum of 15 April was contained in a letter dated 26 April from the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary. The text of the letter is set out below:

"With your letter of 15 April you enclosed a memorandum containing some preliminary observations and suggestions by the Special Mission on how all should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden and South Arabia. A number of detailed points arose from the memorandum and also from your letter of 4 April to the High Commissioner, and, in the annex to this letter I have set out the British Government's comments and observations on those detailed points.

"Most of the matters dealt with in the annex to this letter concern the past, but the future is more important than the past and I wish in this letter to try to set out some of the purposes on which I believe there was broad agreement between the Mission and the British Government when we discussed these matters on 16 April, and also to describe the main objectives of the British Government's policy in South Arabia.

"Paragraph 13 of the Mission's memorandum describes a number of steps and objectives for the future. There is nothing in this paragraph with which the British Government does not whole-heartedly agree.

"One of the main points on which there seems to be general agreement between us is that there should be established a new central caretaker government for South Arabia which would be both politically and geographically allembracing. When the new central caretaker government assumed office, it would follow that the present government would automatically cease to function.

"Moreover, I have already made clear to the Mission my belief that as a first step towards the establishment of the caretaker government there should be a round-table conference representing all shades of South Arabian opinion. I hope that the United Nations can play a major role in this. If the conference is to be effective it is important that those participating should include representatives of all shades of opinion in Aden and elsewhere in South Arabia including those whose leaders are now abroad and including also those whose leaders are members of the various South Arabian Governments.

"I believe that the United Nations, through the Mission, could have a most constructive and valuable part to play in establishing the conditions in which such a conference could be held and I greatly hope that in its declared spirit of objectivity the Mission will seek to establish the widest possible contacts with all shades of opinion inside and outside South Arabia with this object in view.

"Paragraph 13 of the Mission's Memorandum also refers to certain other points about the steps that should now be taken. I gave the Mission my own views on certain of these points during the discussions on 16 April and I have the following to add:

"(i) It is easier to list the conditions needed to bring about a return to normal political life in the Territory than to create those conditions. Had the British Government, for its part, been able to create these conditions alone, it would certainly have done so long ago. Co-operation is needed from certain other parties who are at present intent on inflaming the violence which has led to the state of emergency. In passing, I should like to point out that the phrase 'the return of exiles' is inaccurate; there are no restrictions whatever on South Arabian citizens now living abroad returning to South Arabia. Lord Caradon has stated several times in discussions of this question at the United Nations that all South Arabians are free to return to their country and that the British Government is ready to lift

the state of emergency when there is evidence that terrorism has ceased. My predecessor and I have also made this clear in the House of Commons.

- "(ii) The caretaker government must clearly be created first, before it can draw up provisions for the holding of general elections, but I am fully agreed that this is an essential objective.
- "(iii) The Mission did not explain on 16 April what kind of effective United Nations presence in the Territory might, in their view, be established. This is one of the points which I shall most look forward to seeing developed in the Mission's report.

"I note that it is the hope of the Mission that they will be able to contact all the major political forces in the Territory for the purposes set out in paragraph 14 of the Mission's memorandum. This too is a point which the Mission did not develop in the discussions on 16 April and again I shall very much look forward to hearing their ideas about how this should be accomplished.

"In conclusion, let me state that we too believe that the key to success depends on establishing and maintaining a climate of confidence on all sides. To this end I think it may be helpful to the Mission if I summarize in five points the chief objectives of the British Government's policies for South Arabia. Our purposes are these:

- "(a) We wish to see peaceful conditions restored and the emergency ended.
- "(b) We intend as soon as possible to end colonial status in Aden and to withdraw from South Arabia.
- "(c) We intend to withdraw the British base.
- "(d) We wish to co-operate in achieving the purposes stated in the General Assembly resolutions and to work with the United Nations Mission to that end.
- "(e) We shall continue to work for the early and full independence of South Arabia with a stable and representative government."

"MEMORANDUM

"(This annex deals with certain points raised in the Mission's letters of 4 and 15 April to the extent that they are not already covered by the letter to which it forms an attachment.)

"The British Government entirely understands that the Special Mission to Aden was operating on the basis of resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly. They were also aware of the Mission's difficulty over relations with the Federal Government. They believe that the Mission for its part was equally aware of the constitutional situation resulting from the British Government's treaty obligations to the local governments in South Arabia. Thus, while the British Government fully understands that the Mission is more than a fact-finding Mission in the sense that its task goes beyond fact-finding to the recommending of certain practical steps, it considers it inescapable that the steps could only be practical if they were directly related to all the facts. Moreover, the British Government considered that the importance of the work of the Mission for the future of South Arabia and for the prestige of the United Nations was too great for it to be allowed to falter on a question of this kind. The British Government had also in mind that missions in other colonial Territories had not been deterred from contacts with local governments, e.g., last year in Spanish Equatorial Guinea. They therefore believed, and still believe, that with flexibility on both sides, the question of relations with the Federal Government need not be an insuperable obstacle to the Mission's objective, which the British Government entirely endorses, of consulting all groups and all shades of opinion in South Arabia.

"In the third paragraph of the Mission's memorandum, five points are listed on which the Mission believed that it had reached understandings with the United Kingdom Government. These five points are set out rather briefly and of course both the British Government and the Mission have their own full records of all that was said. The British

Government feels, however, that in order to put these five points in their context it should make certain equally brief comments on them:

- "(i) In paragraph 3 (a) the Mission said that it would have official dealings only with the representatives of the United Kingdom in the Territory. The British Government understood this and the High Commissioner was indeed fully prepared to act as a channel for this purpose. But it was also the understanding of the British Government that the Mission was ready to listen to those of all shades of opinion in South Arabia, including those represented by South Arabians holding ministerial positions in the Federal Government. There is nothing in any United Nations resolution debarring the Mission from meeting members of the Federal Government and the question of United Nations or other international 'recognition' does not in any case arise in the context of the government of a Non-Self-Governing Territory. As explained by Lord Caradon in the United Nations, and as Mr. Thomson explained to the Mission in London, the Federal Government is however validly established as a matter of local law and has been treated as such in the United Kingdom's own legislation.
- "(ii) Paragraphs 3 (b) and (c) of the Mission's letter concerned freedom of access. On the need for this there was no dispute and the British authorities in Aden wished to do their utmost to ensure that the Mission was free to go where it liked and see whom it liked. This included the detainees, although the latter unfortunately boycotted the Mission. The only limiting factor in this was the violence in Aden which laid on the local authorities a very heavy burden of responsibility for the safeguarding of the Mission from injury and death.
- "(iii) In paragraphs 3 (d) and (e) of their letter the Mission referred to the lifting of the emergency and release of detainees. In this connexion the British Foreign Secretary made clear to the Mission during its first visit to London that he would consider lifting the state of emergency and releasing detainees if the Mission was able to secure during its visit to Cairo a public declaration that terrorism should stop, even though he realized that he could not expect such a declaration to end terrorism entirely.
- "As a result of the long discussion with the Mission on 16 April, the British Government now understands more clearly the reasons why the Mission did not wish to make any early arrangements to see the petitioners who were asking to be heard by them during the four days they spent in Aden. These reasons are set out in paragraph 7 of the Mission's memorandum and the Foreign Secretary is only sorry that the basis of the Mission's thinking was not more clearly understood while it was in Aden. Had the Mission explained to the High Commissioner, during the two meetings mentioned in paragraph 8 of the memorandum, he would have understood that the Mission did not wish to prejudice any conceivable remaining chance that the political parties which had announced their boycott might after all change their minds. Since this was not clear to the High Commissioner, he was understandably puzzled that the Mission was taking no decisions to interview these people in Aden who asked to see them. It was for this reason that the High Commissioner persisted in his attempts to make what he hoped would be suitable arrangements for the Mission to meet petitioners. The fact that these petitioners consisted mainly of Ministers of the Federal Government and representatives of the South Arabian League, whose views had already been heard by the Mission in Cairo and Jeddah, was not of the High Commissioner's choosing: it was the inescapable consequence of the fact that other political parties had decided to boycott the Mission and, as the Mission discovered on its visit to the Al-Mansoura Detention Centre, that the members of those parties were carrying out the boycott instructions which had been issued to them. In this connexion, the British Government notes that even in the Mission's letter to the High Commissioner of 4 April, the fact that the Mission was still hoping for a change of mind by the boycotting parties was not explained.

"The tight security arrangements referred to in paragraph 9 of the Mission's memorandum were unfortunately necessitated by the conditions of violence prevailing in Aden at the time of the Mission's visit. It would have been inconceivable that the security authorities should have taken any risk of death or injury of the distinguished members of the Mission. Had the Mission succeeded, while in Cairo, in bringing about a reduction in this violence, the security precautions could have been correspondingly diminished, but unfortunately the Mission was not able to achieve this result. Nevertheless, there is a strong possibility, which the Mission did not put to the test, that if the Mission had begun to hear the petitioners who wish to be heard, numerous other petitioners would have begun to come forward and the Mission might have acquired valuable knowledge about various important shades of opinion in the Territory.

"In the last sentence of paragraph 9 of the Mission's memorandum, mention is made of the fact that no reply to the Mission's letter to the High Commissioner of 4 April had been received by the Mission up to the time of their departure from Aden on the morning of 7 April. As was explained to the Mission on 16 April, this was because the High Commissioner, recognizing the importance of the Mission's letter, had rightly felt it necessary to report it at once to the British Foreign Secretary. The letter was considered in London with the urgency and thoroughness which its importance merited. The discussions in London on 16 April will, it is hoped, be evidence that the reply would have sought constructively to meet the Mission's preoccupations and requirements. It had not crossed the Foreign Secretary's mind that there was any possibility of such a sudden departure from South Arabia, and in fact he sent instructions for a reply during the night the Mission decided to leave. It would have been with the Mission on the day on which it left.

"The Mission was also able to discuss with the Foreign Secretary at some length on 16 April the circumstances relating to the Mission's attempt to make a radio and television broadcast to the people of the Territory. As the Mission will recall, the Foreign Secretary explained on 16 April that broadcasting services were under the direct authority of the Federal Authority. Here again, if the Mission had stayed a further twenty-four hours in Aden, he is convinced that it would have been possible to overcome the difficulties with the broadcasting authorities to which one or two of the remarks in the text of the broadcast had unfortunately given rise. The Mission did of course receive a message from the Foreign Secretary to this effect before leaving Aden and he is sorry that the Mission did not feel able to reconsider their decision to depart. He is particularly sorry that in the statement made by a spokesman for the Mission at Rome airport on 7 April the Mission should have put forward a rather onesided account of this particular episode. For instance, the statement that 'No explanations were forthcoming from the High Commissioner' makes no mention of the fact that the High Commissioner personally made three attempts to telephone to the Mission on the night of 6 April and the Mission did not accept any of the calls."

161. After considering the reply of the Foreign Secretary, the Mission met with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations. The Mission drew attention to some of the statements contained in the memorandum annexed to the Foreign Secretary's letter which were at variance with the facts and therefore unacceptable. The Mission stated that, in due course, it would make an appropriate reply to these statements. However, the Mission, in a forward-looking spirit, wished to address itself to the Foreign Secretary's letter and, in this connexion, drew attention to a number of points on which it would welcome further clarification and elucidation. The representative took note of this request and informed the Mission that he was about to go to London for discussions with the Foreign Secretary and that he would pass on to the Foreign Secretary the matters the Mission had raised.

162. On 8 May, the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Mission of the results of his discussions

in London. He stated that the United Kingdom Government, believing that the United Nations had a very important role in South Arabia, confirmed its support for the purposes of the resolutions of the General Assembly, and further confirmed that it wished to give the United Nations Mission every assistance and full support. The United Kingdom Government welcomed the intention of the Mission to pursue its endeavours to sound all sections of opinion in South Arabia, and agreed that in order to do so the Mission must have unimpeded access to all sections of opinion. The United Kingdom Government did not expect the Mission to deal formally with the "Federal Government" and other local authorities. All political contacts in South Arabia would therefore be arranged through the British authorities. This should not preclude or impede the declared intention of the Mission to sound all sections of opinion, nor exclude hearing persons holding positions of local responsibility. None of this could carry with it any implication of international recognition of the "Federal Government".

163. The representative of the United Kingdom also stated that, with a view to establishing a central caretaker government as required by the United Nations resolutions, it seemed essential to try to achieve an early round-table conference of all concerned. This might well require further endeavours to make preliminary contact with various groups representing political opinion in South Arabia. The United Kingdom Government would welcome and support United Nations initiatives to these ends. The United Kingdom Government hoped that such initiatives would lead on to the early independence of South Arabia under a stable and fully representative government. The United Kingdom Government did not want to continue the present state of emergency and would warmly welcome all efforts towards the restoration of peaceful conditions. The Government was ready to lift the state of emergency when there was evidence that terrorism had ceased. As the Secretary of State had told the Mission in London, he would take some risks over this, but any government facing such conditions as those in South Arabia would need evidence that violence was no longer being promoted. Finally, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government had repeatedly promised that independence would be granted to South Arabia not later than 1968. This made it essential that all necessary steps should be taken as a matter of urgency.

164. After considering these further clarifications given on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, the Mission decided that it was now possible effectively to continue with its task and accordingly it intensified its efforts to establish contact with the leaders of nationalist movements outside the Territory.

165. The Mission conveyed these decisions to the representative of the United Kingdom, to the representatives of a number of Arab States and to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In conveying these decisions, the Mission sought the support and co-operation of all in bringing the efforts of the Mission to a successful conclusion.

166. During the latter part of April following the Mission's departure from Aden, Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio in the British Government, visited the Territory. On 11 May 1967, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, in a statement of policy on South Arabia delivered in the House of Common and communicated to the Mission, announced that he was arranging forthwith for Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to take over the High Commissionership in South Arabia. The Foreign Secretary stated that the aims of the United Kingdom Government would be: (1) the orderly withdrawal of British military forces and the establishment of an independent South Arabia at the earliest possible date; (2) to work in close consultation with all concerned and especially with the United Nations for the establishment of a broad-based government by the time of independence; and (3) on the basis of these two principles to leave behind a stable and secure government in South Arabia (see appendix IV below).

167. On 12 May, the Mission was informed that FLOSY had decided to meet the Mission and that, to this end, representatives of the party would be coming to New York.

168. The Mission's comments on some of the statements contained in the memorandum enclosed with the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary's letter of 26 April were forwarded to the Foreign Secretary in a memorandum accompanying a letter dated 25 May. The text of the letter and memorandum read as follows:

"On behalf of the members of the Mission, I should like to thank you for your letter of 26 April 1967 which was in reply to the Mission's letter of 15 April sent from Geneva and which enclosed a memorandum containing some preliminary suggestions on how all should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

"As you are aware, the members of the Mission, after careful consideration of your letter and its annex, were able to discuss its contents with Lord Caradon before his recent visit to London. The members have also carefully studied the additional clarifications provided by Lord Caradon following his discussions with you in London.

"As Lord Caradon has no doubt explained to you, the Mission cannot accept some of the statements contained in the annex to your letter of 26 April. While the Mission agrees with you that the future is more important than the past, it nevertheless feels obliged to reply to some of the statements concerning the past in order to set the record straight. The Mission's comments on these matters are contained in the memorandum accompanying this letter.

"The Mission, having taken into account the clarifications it has received from you on behalf of your Government, is continuing its efforts with a view to discharging its mandate as set out in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI). In doing so, the Mission has been imbued with a sense of the importance and urgency of its task and the welfare of the people of the Territory. As fore-shadowed in the memorandum attached to its letter of 15 April, the Mission is now taking steps to contact the various political forces in the Territory in order to seek their co-operation in reaching agreement on practical steps for the implementation of the resolution.

"The Mission will, of course, keep Lord Caradon informed of developments."

"MEMORANDUM

"Comments by the Mission on some of the statements contained in the annex to Mr. Brown's letter of 26 April 1967

"The annex to Mr. Brown's letter of 26 April contains some obvious misrepresentations of the facts as they actually happened, and several of the comments are likely to give rise to a wrong interpretation of the Mission's decisions, in particular that concerning its departure from Aden on 7 April. For example, it is stated that the Mission would have received the reply to its letter to the High Commissioner on the date on which it left, but this is at variance with the information given to the Mission during the night of 6 to 7 April that it would take at least another twentyfour hours for the Mission to receive that reply. Again it is stated that '. . . If the Mission had stayed a further twenty-four hours in Aden, he [the Foreign Secretary] is convinced that it would have been possible to overcome the difficulties of the broadcasting authorities to which one or two of the remarks in the text of the broadcast had unfortunately given rise' and that 'the Mission of course received a message from the Foreign Secretary to this effect before leaving Aden'. It is not true that the Mission received a message to this effect. What happened was that at the time when the baggage of the Mission members was being taken down, the Chairman was informed that a message was being received from the Foreign Secretary which would be ready for delivery to the Mission in an hour or so. The Mission had never been told that there were a couple of 'objectionable remarks' in the text. In fact, the Mission was told during the night that the High Commissioner was still investigating the reasons for not telecasting the Mission's programme.

"There are other statements which do not correspond to reality, as for instance the statement 'that the High Commissioner personally made three attempts to telephone to the Mission on the night of 6 April and that the Mission did not accept any of the calls'. In fact, there was just one such attempt, at a time when the Mission was in session. Immediately after the Mission had concluded its session, it asked to see the British liaison officer with a view to communicating with the High Commissioner. When the liaison officer arrived, he told the Mission, on instructions from the High Commissioner, that the High Commissioner was still investigating the matter."

169. In reply the Mission received the following letter dated 27 June 1967 from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom:

"It is clear that we must agree to differ on some of the facts of what happened in the past. But the important thing is to look to the future and I am glad to have learned in our recent conversation that you and your colleagues are determined to continue the execution of your important work. I should like to take this opportunity to repeat to you my good wishes for the success of your mission and the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to help in any way it can."

170. On 19 June 1967, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, in a statement made in the British House of Commons, put forward certain proposals concerning the future of the Territory. In this statement he appointed 9 January 1968 as the date of its independence.

171. The Foreign Secretary emphasized that the proposals should all be taken together and were subject to reconsideration; they consisted of three main parts which are summarized below:

(a) The United Kingdom Government had decided to accept, in respect of Aden State, a draft Constitution circulated by the Federal Government and based on the recommendations drafted by two British constitutional advisers in January 1966. This draft Constitution would include provision for a more broadly based caretaker Government as soon as possible.

(b) The United Kingdom had decided to increase its military assistance to the South Arabian Armed Forces (the Air Force and the Army), including the assistance of a British military aid mission after independence. It was prepared to continue to support the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in the Eastern Aden Protectorate for two years after independence. In addition, it would station a strong naval force including an attack carrier in South Arabian waters for the first six months after independence. A force of V-bombers would be stationed on the island of Masirah, off the Omani coast, within easy reach of South Arabia, for as long as the United Kingdom Government might determine after independence.

(c) The United Kingdom had decided to suspend trial by jury in Aden in respect of terrorists' offences, subject to suitable safeguards for the defence of the accused. Furthermore, it had decided to lift the ban on the National Liberation Front and to consider releasing some of the detainees.

172. The full text of the Foreign Secretary's statement was communicated to the Mission by the representative of the United Kingdom.

Further discussions with the administering Power

173. The Mission met with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Lord Caradon, on 14, 15 and 18 July. From 26 to 28 July it had conversations with the British High Commissioner in Aden, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, who came to New York in response to the Mission's invitation.

174. The Mission informed the representative of the United Kingdom that it did not consider the policy outlined by the

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, on 19 June, wholly consonant with the resolutions of the General Assembly. The Mission was disturbed by certain features of the Foreign Secretary's statement which were not in keeping with the resolutions of the United Nations; according to these resolutions the Territory included, in addition to Aden, the Eastern and Western Aden Protectorates and the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other off-shore islands.

175. The military arrangements outlined by the Foreign Secretary might be interpreted as a continuation of British domination. In spite of the understanding established between the Mission and the United Kingdom on the necessity of implementing the resolutions of the General Assembly, it seemed that developments were taking a different turn and that the United Kingdom was embarking on a course which rendered the role of the United Nations and the Mission ineffective. Thus, the mandate given a member of the "Federal Government", Mr. H. Bayoomi, to form a new government, was in direct contradiction to the agreement on the need for a representative caretaker government to be established before independence.

176. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that two points were absolutely firm in Mr. Brown's statement: the date of 9 January for independence and the removal of the British military bases by that date. The certain purpose of the United Kingdom was to achieve the unity of South Arabia and to bring the Eastern States within a unified government. The purpose of the defence arrangements was to provide some security against outside aggression. They constituted an offer which would be subject to acceptance by the caretaker government. No British officers would remain in the South Arabian Forces after independence. There would be a number of technical personnel, including hospital staff, as part of a military advisory mission totalling less than fifty persons. The advisory mission would be under British control and subject to the British Embassy not to South Arabia. The purpose of the United Kingdom was to see a fully representative caretaker government established as soon as possible. If this could be achieved, all other matters would fall into place. The military arrangements would depend on whether a genuinely representative government were established or not. He stressed that there were important sections of opinion in the Territory other than FLOSY which must

177. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the idea of internationalizing Perim had been put forward during a debate in the House of Commons. It was a novel and far-reaching idea and there was no previous case similar to it. The Foreign Secretary had not wished to reject it but had said that he was prepared to look into it.

178. The Mission pointed out that Perim under the resolutions of the United Nations was considered as an integral part of the Territory (see para. 174 above). The Mission could not envisage any plan which would lead to dismemberment or the detachment of any part, however small, from the Territory.

179. The representative of the United Kingdom communicated to the Mission the text of a statement made by Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio, on 17 July 1967 and containing clarification on certain points arising from Mr. Brown's statement of 19 June. The text of Lord Shackleton's statement reads:

"I do not want there to be any misunderstanding regarding the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. It is unfortunate that there has been some misunderstanding, even at the United Nations, because the bill relates only to Aden, Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands: and there is fear (which I should not have expected) that we are going to give independence only to those. As is made absolutely clear, and as I know your Lordships understand very well, it is the firm intention of the Government that all parts of South Arabia for which they are at present internationally responsible shall become independent.

"I wish I could give a guarantee of the stability and prosperity of every country in the world. There are other areas where dangers exist, both in unitary and federal

States. The fact that Mr. Bayoomi has been charged by the Federal Government with the formation of a new Government does not denote a perpetuation of the Federal Government. His task is to form a provisional Government in anticipation of the introduction of the Constitution for the independent Republic of South Arabia. I do not want this to be misunderstood. I am inclined to try to get away from the words 'Federal Government', and to talk about it as the South Arabian Government. But that means that there is a change from the existing Federal Supreme Council. If Mr. Bayoomi is successful in forming a government which will be more broadly based than the Federal Government, his government might carry South Arabia forward into independence. But it is our hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on the formation of a central caretaker government in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and one which would be all-embracing, politically and geographically. In this event, Mr. Bayoomi will have carried out a useful task in making possible the formation of a more broadly-based government. But the difficulties are great. I can only say that I admire his courage.

"The purpose of the naval force is to deter external aggression, obvious open aggression, against the independent South Arabia, and not to perpetuate—and this again, seems to have been misunderstood; it has been misunderstood both in the Labour Party and at the United Nations—any notion of British military dominance in the area. The air support from the naval force and the V-bombers stationed at Masirah will be given only at the request of the independent South Arabian Government. The decision whether or not to accede to the request must be one for Her Majesty's Government alone."

The Mission considered that Lord Shackleton's statement provided a useful clarification of some of the points raised in previous meetings with the representative of the administering Power.

Meetings with FLOSY

180. The arrival of the delegation of FLOSY was delayed until the first week of July. According to information received by the Mission, the delay was partly due to the crisis in the Middle East. From 11 to 19 July the Mission held a series of meetings with the delegation which consisted of Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, Secretary-General of FLOSY, Mr. Salem Zain and Mr. Ali Salamy.

181. At the outset of the discussions with the FLOSY delegation, the Mission gave an account of its recent contacts with the United Kingdom Government and clarified its views on the issues which had been the subject of these contacts.

182. Mr. Mackawee stated that the United Kingdom had not been serious in its intentions. The implementation by the United Kingdom of certain provisions of the United Nations resolutions was being shelved completely. First, instead of dissolving the illegal and unrepresentative "Federal Government", the United Kingdom wanted to reinstate the same régime through Mr. Bayoomi, a member of the "Federal Government", who had recently been asked to form a new Government. Secondly, although the United Kingdom had originally accepted to remove its military bases in the area, it had now declared that it would leave its forces in Arabian territorial waters. Thirdly, although the island of Perim was an integral part of the Territory, the United Kingdom was attempting to use the United Nations to implement its own plans which were at variance with the United Nations resolutions (see paras. 177 and 178 above). The FLOSY delegation submitted to the Mission the following memorandum:

"1. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen would like to present this memorandum in the name of our struggling people in the Arab South—Aden, the Eastern and Western Protectorates, Islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Socotra and the other important off-shore islands, in an attempt to explain all the developments that have taken place in our territory since November and December 1966, during which our delegation attended the

United Nations ordinary session, where they shed a great deal of light on our cause, which has invariably been receiving the consideration and attention of the United Nations since November 1962.

- "2. The United Nations has not isolated itself from our people's struggle against British colonialism and all its organs in the area. In fact, the United Nations has continued to play an effective and constructive role through its committees in foiling the imperialist plots hatched by the British Government in an effort to stem the mounting national tide in the area, since the eruption of the armed revolution of 14 October 1963, which was deemed by the people as a necessary means to resist foreign influence, when all other peaceful means to attain freedom and independence have failed.
- "3. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, which truly represents the people of the area whose delegation is now on a visit to the United Nations to plead its cause before sixteen Member States, would like to restrict its consultations and presentations of the South's case to the events that have occurred in the over-all situation since the General Assembly's resolution of December 1966, when the United Nations decided to send a Mission to the area to study and recommend the best possible means for ensuring the implementation of the United Nations resolution adopted on 5 November 1965.
- "4. Before discussing the basic problem, the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, however, to point out one basic fact to all Member States of the United Nations, the Special Committee of Twenty-Four and all other sub-committees—an established fact borne out by events which shall be detailed later—namely that Britain is not at all serious in her offer of granting the people of the area real independence, but merely makes a pretence of doing so both inside and outside the United Nations in furtherance of her colonial plans, and imposing her influence on the area by means that are no way different from its time-borrowed traditional means.
- "5. The British Government has evinced, through Lord Caradon, her United Nations representative during the General Assembly's last session (November-December 1966), more enthusiasm than other States for sending a mission from the United Nations to discuss the means of implementing the United Nations resolution, after Britain had strongly refused systematically to admit to the area any fact-finding mission from the United Nations. It had even denied admission to representatives of the International Red Cross Organization and the Red Crescent Organization of the Arab States. The stand of the British Government in suddenly deciding to welcome the admission of a United Nations mission has caused surprise, but the Member States, when supporting such an admission to the area, were in effect making a test to Britain's seriousness and true intentions as to whether or not she actually meant to grant the area its independence in execution of the United Nations reso-
- "6. Everything was from the outset crystal-clear to the Liberation Front. Suspicions and doubts surrounded Britain's stand from all directions. Britain, which had in the past refused permission for the fact-finding mission to visit the area and, likewise, refused to declare formally her unequivocal acceptance of the United Nations resolutions, agrees abruptly to admit a mission to Aden to study means of implementing the United Nations resolution! The Liberation Front had kept close watch on the situation. All the reports received by the Leadership Council from the area left no doubt that Britain had a plan for striking at the Revolution and obliterating the United Nations resolutions which the Liberation Front uphold, by taking the initiative of demanding the admission of United Nations mission under circumstances which ensured Britain's interests and perpetuated the rule of the puppet Sultans, and through means advantageous to Britain alone.
- "7. As soon as the United Nations General Assembly decided to send a Mission to the area, Britain immediately put into effect its plan designed to distort the pertinent

- facts and falsify all the basic aspects of the situation to the Mission and suppress any nationalist voice that may reach the ears of the Mission. It may be relevant in this connexion to outline the methods employed for this purpose by Britain through her forces and the Sultans in the spurious Federation Government which can be summed up as follows:
- "(a) A series of suppressive measures were taken by Britain against the nationalists, many thousands of whom were put in prison throughout the South, among whom were tribal chiefs in Lahej, Subbeiha, Yafei, Radfan, Dhala, Beihan, Aulaqi, Hadhramaut, Haushabi; for no crime other than that they had refused to accept the money and arms with which Britain tried to purchase their support for the Sultans during the United Nations Mission's visit to the area. The Liberation Front has in its possession ample evidence which it is willing to produce at the appropriate time.
- "(b) The British forces carried out various assaults on all the villages and towns of the South, arresting thousands of citizens, and using unethical means to search their houses and farms. By ignoring the existing realities in the area and the conditions of the Revolution which it is undergoing, the British forces imagine that such actions could suppress the armed popular resistance. They fail to see that this resistance is an integral part of the struggle of the people, and an expression of their absolute rejection of the British presence in the area.
- "(c) The British Government recruited mercenaries to substitute them for the British soldiers at inspection points and in patrolling the cities during the visit of the United Nations Mission to the area. The reasons were twofold: to prove that the puppet 'Federal Government' was capable of ensuring peace and security in the area; and to provoke an armed clash between the Arabs.
- "(d) British Intelligence planned a series of sabotages and assassinations against the nationalists to be carried out by her agents, using criminal and barbarous means. Not only did these gangs murder the nationalists, but also they blew up their houses. They even blew up a bus carrying a large number of students from Bilgis College. Seven girls less than ten years of age lost their lives in the incident. In addition, shops were looted and cars stolen from travellers. The purpose was to attribute these acts of terrorism to the revolution, and thus discredit it in the eyes of the United Nations Mission, and tried to prove to the latter that the situation is one of civil struggle between the nationalists themselves.
- "8. In spite of all these designs, planned and executed by the British Government as part of a broad campaign to falsify the truth about the will of the people, to discredit the revolution, to distort the United Nations resolutions, and to paralyse any possible effective action by the United Nations Mission; in spite of all this, the people's firm stand and their full support of FLOSY defeated all the imperialist manœuvres. In fact, our people succeeded in preserving their struggle at the same level which continues to have the support and sympathy of the United Nations.
- "9. All these measures taken by the British (which have been described above) convinced FLOSY that the United Nations would not be able to have the true picture of the situation. Furthermore, it was thought that the arrival of the United Nations Mission to the area under the existing suppressive conditions would not permit the people to exercise their daily activities and to express freely their wishes and hopes. All these factors raised further doubts which led FLOSY to adopt a reserved attitude towards the United Nations Mission's visit, leaving it up to the Mission to discover for itself the British plots aimed at deceiving world public opinion, and to verify the extent of the seriousness and honesty of the British Government in implementing the United Nations resolutions.
- "10. The attitude of FLOSY to the United Nations Mission was not one of hostility, as the imperialist circles tried to show. On the contrary, it was one of complete respect for the Mission, and deep appreciation of the good intentions of all the nations which supported the decision

to establish it. But the measures taken by the British, before and during the visit of the United Nations Mission to the area, arresting citizens and striking at all the elements which could give the Mission a true picture of the situation as well as the intensification of the British military measures, led FLOSY to take a reserved stand vis-àvis the visit of the Mission.

"11. The Arrival of the United Nations Mission to Aden. As soon as the members of the United Nation's Mission arrived at Aden on April 2, 1967, the British forces surrounded their hotel, transforming it into a military barrack, thereby preventing the Mission from getting a complete idea of the means of expression used by the people in their daily struggle against the imperialists. The people's response to the call of FLOSY for a general strike and the demonstrations held in all parts of the South during the visit of the United Nation's Mission to Aden. proved beyond doubt that FLOSY is the true representative of the people of the area.

"12. During these manifestations of the people's will, the name of FLOSY was written on cars, walls and shops, and FLOSY's flags were hoisted everywhere. Signs appeared calling on Britain to recognize FLOSY as the sole representative of the people. If Britain persists in denying these manifestations, and if she had barred the committee from witnessing them, the facts of the situation were completely covered by the foreign press agencies. radio and television and were widely reported everywhere. So was the behaviour of the occupying forces towards the masses of the people who participated in the demonstrations expressing their will for complete and genuine independence.

"13. When the United Nations Mission asked to broadcast a statement to explain its purpose to the people, and to dissipate the confusion with which the British mass media had surrounded its visit, the British suggested to its puppet Government of the Federation to refuse to broadcast the statement, unless the United Nations Mission agreed to deal directly with it. The stand taken by the British Government in this respect proved the suspicion of FLOSY that this Government had intended to divert the activities of the United Nations Mission into a new course which would run counter to its original intentions and obligations of trying to find appropriate means for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. Britain's aim was to manœuvre the United Nations Mission into some kind of recognition of the Government of the Federation, by forcing it to deal with the latter. It chose to ignore that the purpose of the Mission was to find means of implementing the United Nations resolution of November 5, 1965, which declared that the Government of the Federation was unrepresentative and illegitimate and would be abolished. The resolution also called for the establishment of a national Government, truly representative of the people.

"14. Britain was the first Government to call for and support the resolution creating the United Nations Mission to Aden. It pretended to be serious about granting the area its independence, and of removing her military bases from Aden and the South. Therefore, when the United Nations Mission was constrained to leave Aden abruptly, Mr. Brown, realizing the extent of the scandal, hurriedly contacted its members and promised to abolish the Government of the Federation. He further promised to form a provisional Government which would prepare for the election of a representative Government which would be legitimately entitled to receive sovereignty. These declarations were included in a statement made by Mr. Brown, in which he indicated that they were part of an agreement concluded by the United Nations Mission and himself. Pursuing his deceptive manœuvre, he sent his Minister Shackleton to Aden and replaced the High Commissioner with someone else in a further attempt to hood-wink world public opinion,

"15. During the events of the Israel aggression against the Arab Nations, an aggression supported by Britain and the United States, Mr. Wilson hastened to make clear his Government's real intentions, declaring that he would reconsider

his previous commitment regarding the withdrawal of the British troops from Aden. On June 19, 1967, Mr. George Brown, the British Foreign Minister, addressing the British Parliament, in what he called a major policy statement, completely revoked his Government's previous declarations in the United Nations and her promises to the United Nations Mission during the latter's visit to London. Mr. Brown set up January 9, 1968, as the date when Aden will be given her so-called independence, and stated his Government's intentions to keep the illegitimate puppet Government of the Federation, and to hand over to her the exercise of authority. He further made clear his Government's policy to keep air and naval bases in the area, for the protection of the puppet régime. In fact, the British Government has already sent reinforcements from London to Aden. The first battalion of British commandos reached the area during the last week of June.

"16. In his statement of policy before the House of Commons, Mr. George Brown, by suggesting the internationalization of the Island of Perim, clearly aims at using it as a naval base in the future. This Island, together with the Islands of Kuria Muria, Socotra and Kamaran form an integral part of the territorial boundaries of the South, as specified by the United Nations resolution of November 5, 1965.

"17. The British policy towards our area, which has now become crystal-clear, is no surprise to us. FLOSY has always emphasized that the British promises and offers are no more than political manœuvres to avoid the pressure of world public opinion, an opinion which materialized in a series of resolutions condemning the British policy in the area since November 12, 1962.

"18. FLOSY intends to prove in this memorandum that the latest British declarations regarding its policy in Aden and all the South, in fact defy the United Nations resolutions and run counter to the responsibilities of the United Nations Mission to Aden. In this respect we would like to emphasize the following points in Mr. George Brown's statements:

"(a) Mr. Brown's pronouncements frankly confirm his Government's intentions to support the illegitimate puppet Sultanate Government, and to keep naval and air bases in the area for its protection. Consequently, this proves Britain's aim to perpetuate its Protectorate agreements with the Sultanates, Amirates and Sheikhdoms of the South, agreements which the United Nations has declared illegal.

"(b) The United Nations resolutions clearly call on Britain to evacuate immediately its occupation forces from the area. Yet Britain now declares its determination to keep their forces there in the form of naval and air bases in territorial waters to protect the spurious Sultanate Government of the Federation. This fact was made clear by Mr. Wilson in the first week of June, 1967, when he declared that he would reconsider his Government's former policy regarding the withdrawal of its troops from Aden. This, despite the fact that Britain had already stated both in the General Assembly and in the Special Committee of Twenty-Four that they would evacuate immediately its forces and remove all its military bases from the area.

- "(c) Britain made January 9, 1968, the date for handing authority to the spurious Sultanate Government of the Federation. At the same time, it continues to discuss in the United Nations the practical means to implement the United Nations resolutions and to relinquish sovereignty over the area to a national representative Government.
- "(d) Mr. George Brown promised the British Parliament that his Government will retain the island of Perim, even though the United Nations resolution of November 5, 1965, had drawn clearly and definitively all the geographical boundaries of the South, which include Aden, the eastern and western Protectorates, the islands of Kamaran, Perim, Socotra, Kuria Muria and other off-shore islands.
- "19. These facts now presented by the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen give a clear picture of Britain's real stand and its criminal in-

tentions towards the people of the area. It plans to continue its domination of the people through granting phony independence to a handful of Sultans whose interests have been tied to the British presence in the area for more than a hundred and twenty-five years.

"20. The Existing Situation. British forces are still launching a brutal war against the citizens in all the regions of the South. The British air forces are continuously raiding the the villages in Radfan, Yafe'i, Audhali and Halimayn. The destruction of crops and the killing of cattle is still going on. Tens of thousands of citizens expelled from their homes by the British forces are still living in caves and under the trees in the areas bordering the Yemen Arab Republic. They suffer hunger and disease, while being barred from returning to their homes unless they consent to hand in their sons as hostages to the present authorities, to be held in custody as a guarantee for their relatives' loyalty.

"21. Arrests continue on an ever widening scale. In addition to the detainees in Aden, thousands of prisoners are subjected to the most outrageous and savage means of torture in the prisons of Aulaqi, Beihan, Fadhli, Lahei, Subeiha and Haushabi States. The unethical and revengeful treatment of their citizens by the British soldiers have been proved by the reports of the Organization of the International Amnesty and the Red Cross.

"22. In the light of the latest developments in the Arab lands, FLOSY has reconsidered its military strategy to bring it in line with the facts of the recent situation in the Arab homeland; since the joining together of the Arab army, the Liberation Forces and FLOSY's commandos in Aden and other fronts, as well as the occupation of the Crater town which remained under the control of FLOSY for a while. The forces of our Organization also controlled the regions of Dhala, Aulaqi, as well as the British camps in these two regions, after the withdrawal of the British forces at the wake of the fierce attack which our forces launched against them.

"23. The Stand of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen. Having described the nature of the struggle in the Occupied South Yemen, the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen would like to state clearly its position:

"(a) FLOSY is the sole representative of the people of the South, and therefore the British Government must negotiate directly with its representatives, regarding the future and independence of the area.

"(b) FLOSY does not recognize the Government of the Federation or any of its organs and institutions; the Front considers this Government illegitimate since it was created and imposed by British imperialism. It should, therefore, be dissolved immediately in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the committee for the liquidation of colonialism.

"(c) Britain must evacuate all its military bases from the area, immediately and unconditionally.

"(d) FLOSY will not give up its armed struggle, and the battle will continue until we achieve all our objectives, namely the complete and real independence which the people are struggling for.

"24. FLOSY, explaining clearly its position, calls upon all freedom- and peace-loving nations to lend their moral and material support to the people of the South in their struggle for genuine independence, until they get rid of imperialism and the corrupt conditions existing in the area.

"25. In concluding its memorandum, the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen would like to stress anew that the people will resist with all their might all and every British manœuvre and attempt to dominate them, and will continue this forceful resistance until they have brought these attempts to an end once and for all. The manœuvres can in no way destroy the will of people who have been fighting for their independence for the last three years. On the contrary, they will only increase our determination to continue resisting imperialism with the force of arms until final victory is achieved."

183. The delegation of FLOSY considered the appointment by the United Kingdom of a time limit for independence as a means of influencing the work being undertaken by the Mission. It felt that the United Kingdom wanted to separate Hadhramaut from the rest of the Territory in order to retain British influence after independence. FLOSY was confident that if it were to form a caretaker government it would be able to rule the whole country effectively with the support of the people. FLOSY embraced all nationalist elements and was represented not only in Aden, but in all other States including those of Hadhramaut. The two principal parties in Aden, the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South and the NLF, had dissolved themselves and merged into FLOSY; so had other groups. However, certain dissident elements of the NLF had decided to maintain their name. Mr. Mackawee and his colleagues had recently had discussions with them, and an agreement had been reached for them to be unified within the framework of FLOSY and to have seats in the Supreme Command of FLOSY. The South Arabian League had no effective presence; its offices in the Territory had been closed. As to the United National Party, it had no membership at all: it was considered by the people as a stooge party, as was SAL. The British and the Sultans had hired gangs to carry out assassinations against the nationalists. The nationalists would have nothing against the Sultans if they accepted to live in the country as ordinary

184. Mr. Mackawee and his colleagues pointed out that the provisions of the United Nations resolutions concerning a caretaker government and elections should have been implemented immediately after they had been adopted. They were sure that if elections were to be held, the people would give their solid support to FLOSY. But in the present circumstances the atmosphere was not conducive to free expression. The Sultans and their British advisers were at the head of the various States and many members of FLOSY were in detention. It was impossible to have fair and impartial elections until the British had evacuated the military base and the present unrepresentative government had been dissolved. A national government should first be established and elections deferred until the necessary atmosphere had been created.

185. The Mission reaffirmed its conviction that the unity of the Territory, including the Eastern Protectorate and the islands, should be preserved, and that the island of Perim could not be detached either by internationalization or otherwise. The Mission conveyed to the FLOSY delegation the assurance given by the representative of the United Kingdom that many features of Mr. Brown's statement of 19 June were subject to change and that only the date of independence and the withdrawal of the British military forces were to be considered as firm commitments. It also drew the attention of FLOSY to the statement of Lord Shackleton in the House of Lords as communicated by the British representative (see para. 179 above).

186. The Mission stated that it attached importance to the news furnished to it regarding the merger of the NLF with FLOSY. That development would have a very significant bearing on the formation of any government. Any attempt to form a government by the elements comprising the federal government would be considered totally unacceptable. The formation of a caretaker government had to be in accordance with the resolution; there should be interim constitutional arrangements formulated by the broadly-based caretaker government in order to pave the way for an elected government. The Mission agreed that the present atmosphere had to change before free elections could be held and noted that FLOSY was not against the holding of elections in due course.

187. The Mission stated that as a practical measure towards the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly, it was considering the possibility of having a second round of meetings with FLOSY and others, including the NLF. It did not contemplate any round-table conference as such, but rather a series of bilateral meetings with

elements concerned. In case of agreement among the various parties, the possibility of a round-table conference would not be ruled out. The meetings would take place at the United Nations Office at Geneva so as to facilitate access to the Mission by the various elements in the Territory. The objective of the Mission was to bring the various sectors together in order to find a common basis for the formation of a broadly-based national government. In the meantime, the Mission would continue its discussions with the administering Power to whose participation in the meetings in Geneva it attached great importance.

188. Mr. Mackawee and his colleagues stated that they had to report to the Revolutionary Council of FLOSY on these matters. They had embodied their preliminary views in a second memorandum which was submitted to the Mission. However, they felt that if any talks were to be held in Geneva, British participation should be on a policy-making level, and consequently the talks should be attended by a Minister in the British Government. This was also the view of the Mission. The text of Mr. Mackawee's memorandum, dated 17 July 1967, reads as follows:

"FLOSY wishes to conclude its discussions with you regarding the present situation in the South by submitting the present memorandum which contains points representing the basic position of FLOSY. This memorandum will help you understand all the issues referred to during the discussions which have taken place between the delegation and the mission since Tuesday, 11 July 1967. These points can be stated briefly as follows:

- "1. The task of the delegation of FLOSY which is visiting the United Nations at the present time is to bring the question before the delegations of Member States during the special session of the General Assembly, in the light of developments in the area and the attitude of Great Britain. This attitude was evident in the statement of Mr. George Brown in the House of Commons on 19 June 1967. It is in full contradiction of the United Nations resolution of 5 November 1965, to which FLOSY has reaffirmed its adherence on several occasions.
- "2. The delegation's task has also been to meet with the United Nations Special Mission on Aden to present FLOSY's point of view regarding recent developments in the light of Mr. Brown's statement. Mr. Brown has outlined the policy of Great Britain in the manner previously stated by the Front, namely, that Great Britain is not serious in granting genuine independence to the area, the policy declared by Great Britain is a blow directed mainly against the United Nations resolutions and the terms of reference of the United Nations Mission, as indicated in the memorandum submitted by the Front to the Mission on 11 July 1967.
- "3. The delegation of FLOSY has, during its discussions with the United Nations Mission, maintained that the Front is the legitimate and the true representative of the people of the area. The Front includes all national groups active in the area. The Front refuses to meet with any other group, as such other national groups do not exist.
- "4. The Front's delegation has clearly shown to the United Nations Mission that the Sultans and the so-called League of South Arabia and the party of Bayoomi are individuals and agents financed by Britain. Their views do not differ from those of Britain.
- "5. FLOSY's delegation has reaffirmed its position regarding the idea of round-table conference, namely that it is an old colonial plan aiming at undermining the revolution in the area. The Front rejects this idea completely and considers that the only parties concerned in the question of the South are Great Britain as the administering Power in the area, and FLOSY which leads the national and popular struggle; any solution should be the subject of a direct dialogue between Great Britain and FLOSY for the purpose of transferring sovereignty and independence to the people.
- "6. The Front's delegation has indicated to the Mission that the independence which Britain is preparing to grant

- on 9 January 1968, and to protect with naval and air bases, is a false independence. The people of the area, led by the Front of Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, shall resist it violently, since it is but an integral part of a colonial scheme aiming at preserving colonial influence over the area.
- "7. The Front's delegation has pointed out to the Mission that it is necessary, in its opinion, to establish a national government truly representing the people in the South. After its visit to the area the Mission has no doubt become convinced that the Front is the legitimate and true representative of the people of the South. . . . The Front insists that the formation of any national government to take over sovereignty from Great Britain is the sole right of FLOSY as the legitimate and true representative of the people of the area. Furthermore, in the formation of such a government, the Liberation Front is entitled to select the sincere national elements which it considers ready to adhere to the principles and national charter of the Front, and capable of working seriously and honestly at the service of the people.
- "8. The Front's delegation has stated that, in its view, it is necessary to hold general elections in all the Eastern and Western areas of the South. The delegation has maintained that the Front considers that, as a first step, and in order to ensure free and impartial general elections, it is first necessary to dissolve the puppet federal government, to abolish the Sultans' rule in all areas under their hereditary régime, to lift the state of emergency, to release all political detainees and to evacuate the British forces from the area. These steps should be implemented simultaneously and before holding any general elections in the area.
- "9. The Front's delegation considers that any constitutional arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty to the people of the area should derive from one basic principle; namely that FLOSY is the legitimate and true representative of the people of the area. Therefore, any constitutional laws should necessarily be in accordance with this basic principle.
- "10. The delegation has confirmed to the Mission that Britain has a scheme aiming at separating the Eastern region of the South and keeping the Island of Perim under its control. FLOSY categorically rejects this scheme. It considers that the geographical boundaries of the South as a whole are Aden, the Eastern and Western Protectorates, the Islands of Kuria Muria, Perim, Socotra, Kamaran, as well as other islands, as provided for by the United Nations resolution of 5 November 1965.
- "11. The Front's delegation reaffirms that Britain has no serious intentions of granting genuine independence to the area. All it wants is to stop the armed peoples' revolution led by FLOSY so that it can extend its influence over the area through a nominal and false independence entrusted to a handful of its agents.
- "12. The Liberation Front deems it necessary to point out to the Mission that the people consider themselves in a state of continuous war with Great Britain, as witnessed by the Mission during its visit to Aden. This war will stop only if certain conditions which the Front considers to be consonant with the aims of the revolution and the national struggle in the area are satisfied; it will not stop under conditions suited to the British side.
- "13. The Front wishes to preserve the closest relations with the United Nations Mission. It deems it important to state that the Mission cannot play a positive and effective role in securing genuine independence for the people of the South unless the British side recognizes FLOSY as the legitimate and true representative of the people of the area and enters into a direct dialogue with it, under the auspices of the United Nations Mission regarding all the modalities of the transfer of sovereignty and independence.
- "14. The Arabic text of this memorandum is the original."
 189. Following its meetings with FLOSY, the Mission issued a press release, the text of which read as follows:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden, in furtherance of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI), held a series of meetings with the delegation of FLOSY from 11 to 19 July 1967. The exchange of views which took place has, in the opinion of the Mission, been useful. The Mission will pursue its consultations in accordance with its mandate."

Conversations in New York with the British High Commissioner in Aden

190. The Mission held meetings with the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Aden between 26 and 28 July. The High Commissioner stated that terrorism and intimidation in Aden were inhibiting political activity; there was also some degree of dissident activity in some of the States outside Aden. South Arabian army units would shortly take over internal security duties in Aden. However, there was a real danger that these forces would disintegrate. If the present structure of government and the organs of internal security were allowed to collapse, South Arabia would fall victim to anarchy and civil war. There should be no gap in authority and governmental control between the present "Federal Government" and the broadly-based caretaker government to be established.

191. The High Commissioner informed the Mission that three battalions of the South Arabian Army would take over internal security duties in Aden beginning on or about 1 October. By the end of December, they would be fully in charge of Aden's security. It would be better that independence should be granted only after all British forces had been withdrawn, not as soon as a caretaker government had taken office. Independence should therefore await the withdrawal of British forces, which meant awaiting the readiness of local South Arabian forces to take over from them. In any case, the local forces would have to take over security in Aden, whether or not there was a caretaker government and a political settlement.

192. The High Commissioner stated that the elements now comprising the "Federal Government" were very willing to co-operate with other groups to form a more representative caretaker government. Following an initiative by himself, the "Federal Government" had asked Mr. H. Bayoomi to try to form a more representative administration which would be better able to negotiate with the political parties on the formation of a caretaker government. This was in no sense an attempt to pre-empt the other political groups or to make the "Federal Government" the nucleus of the caretaker government. The intention had been to reshape the "Federal Government" so as to bring it more into line with the provisions of the new draft constitution. There would be a Prime Minister and the Sultans would be replaced by other representatives of the States. The Sultans would then return to their States, in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution, whereby nobody could be both the ruler of a State and a member of the "Federal Government". The objective was at the same time to strengthen the control of the "Federal Government" over the Federal forces. However, on 27 July the "Federal Government" had terminated Mr. Bayoomi's mandate to form a new government.

193. The Mission believed that any new constitutional arrangements should be the result of the consultations to be held under United Nations auspices between the elements concerned. It was for the representatives of the people within a caretaker government to decide on a constitution, probably on a provisional basis until an elected legislature could ratify it. Sir Humphrey, although he agreed in principle with the Mission, felt that the United Kingdom could not hold up much longer the introduction of the new constitution prepared by the "Federal Government", unless there were political discussions on the formation of a caretaker government.

194. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan enumerated six main political groups which in his opinion might be considered for representation in the caretaker government and should have a part to play in any negotiations to that end:

- (a) The "Federal Party". This consisted mainly of State rulers with a few Adenis. They had little influence or credibility in Aden, but very considerable power in many of the States. He considered that any government of South Arabia which excluded them was unlikely to be able to establish itself or to take up the realities of power, and the result might well be civil war.
- (b) FLOSY. It had more influence in Aden than in the States but its main weakness was the absence of its leaders from the country. These leaders were free to return as far as the United Kingdom was concerned, but they were afraid to do so for fear of assassination by the NLF. He said that influence of FLOSY had tended to decline in recent months in comparison with the NLF.
- (c) The NLF. This had been a purely terrorist organization in the past, but was currently evolving a political wing. It was a growing power in Aden and had waged a largely successful campaign of violence against FLOSY. It also had some influence in certain of the States.
- (d) SAL. The South Arabian League had a respectable history and good leaders, but now had a waning influence and it no longer had a very significant following in the country.
- (e) PORF. The Popular Organization of Revolutionary Forces was the militant wing of FLOSY responsible for much of the violence, but its affiliations were not clear.
- (f) The TUC. Trade union affiliations were divided between FLOSY and the NLF.

195. The High Commissioner stated that recent events had belied the FLOSY claim that the NLF had no separate existence, and any NLF leaders claiming to have reached an understanding with FLOSY were unlikely to have effective control of NLF activities on the ground. The position in individual States varied considerably. In Beihan, the Sharif had full control and there was no FLOSY or NLF activity; in Audhali the Sultan had real influence and the NLF had some following; in Dathina the NLF and FLOSY had roughly equal influence; in Lahei FLOSY was considerably stronger than elsewhere outside Aden and in Dhala the NLF was stronger and the Sultan's control incomplete. There was little party activity in Aulaqi. The NLF was probably stronger than FLOSY in the Eastern Aden Protectorate. In his view it was now emerging as a genuinely national, indigenous South Arabian party not dependent on outside support. It seemed to have more support than FLOSY in the police and the army.

196. The High Commissioner emphasized that it was essential to recognize that the "Federal group" represented a genuine power interest in South Arabia. He hoped it would be treated on exactly the same basis as other political groups. He did not think FLOSY was capable of forming a government; any government formed around a FLOSY nucleus was unlikely to be able to wield real power in the country.

197. The Mission pointed out that, in accordance with its mandate, it could not recognize the existence of any "federal party or group". However, in line with its desire to hear all shades of opinion within the context of that mandate, it was prepared to receive the views of the traditional authorities, both in the western and eastern parts of the Territory. It would hear them in their personal capacity as spokesmen for particular shades of opinion, and not as office-holders in a particular governmental establishment, since the Mission was precluded from any official contact with a régime which the General Assembly had qualified as unrepresentative.

198. The High Commissioner said that most political groups recognized the desirability of holding elections, but in the present conditions in South Arabia it was impossible to hold elections before independence. The hope must be that the caretaker government could organize elections, perhaps with United Nations help as soon as possible after independence, although this would be a long and difficult job.

199. The High Commissioner considered that the three eastern rulers should be treated as a political group. The question of the Eastern Aden Protectorate uniting with the

rest of South Arabia was political rather than constitutional. He was prepared to encourage the three rulers to form a single delegation to meet the Mission and take part actively in discussions leading to the formation of a new government. He suggested that they might perhaps be offered one third of the seats in a caretaker government (the other two thirds perhaps going in equal proportions to Aden and the Western Aden Protectorate).

200. The Mission reiterated to the High Commissioner its concern for the integrity of the Territory and its reservations about the British promise of military and other aid to the eastern states. He replied that the United Kingdom had no power to compel the three eastern States to accede to South Arabia on independence. The United Kingdom had made it clear, however, that all development and other civil aid would be channelled through the South Arabian Government. It would consider provision of compensation for the loss of customs revenue which the eastern States would incur upon joining the rest of South Arabia. On the other hand, the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion should not be allowed to disappear, and the United Kingdom would continue financial assistance for the Legion for two years, if possible, channelling such assistance through the South Arabian Government. This offer of financial assistance was conditional on the establishment of a committee to control the Legion and the Eastern Aden Protectorate local forces and on the reaching of agreement with the South Arabian Government concerning co-operation between that Government and the Eastern Aden Protectorate on the use of these forces. All British representatives would be withdrawn from the Protectorate on independence and British protection would then cease. He hoped that the Legion woul eventually be integrated with the South Arabian security and defence forces.

201. The High Commissioner added that the United Kingdom Government had reached no firm conclusions on the islands. If the United Nations did not accept that Perim be placed under international control, the inhabitants, if and when consulted, would probably opt to be part of South Arabia. Kamaran was more of a problem since it had never been under British sovereignty and was a long distance from South Arabia. British protection would in any case be withdrawn on independence. The Kuria Muria islands had never had any connexion with South Arabia; they had been presented to Britain by the Sultan of Muscat and were administered from Aden as a matter of convenience. Finally Socotra was even less of a problem since it was for all practical purposes part of Mahra State in the Eastern Aden Protectorate.

202. The High Commissioner could not lift the state of emergency until there was some understanding with the political parties that they would end the violence. Meanwhile the "Federal Government" was enacting a new public security law which would give the necessary powers to the British forces before independence and the South Arabian forces thereafter. Under this law no detention without trial would be permitted beyond detention for interrogation of not more than twenty-eight days.

Communication from the South Arabian League

203. The following cable from the Secretary-General of the South Arabian League, Mr. S. A. Alhabshi, was received by the Mission on 27 July:

"The South Arabian League, the twenty-year-old political party still functioning only for the freedom, unity and healthy popular rule of South Arabia, and which boldly announced its unqualified support and co-operation with your Mission from the beginning, while welcoming recent move of other political and concerned parties terminating their boycotting your Mission requests: firstly, to refer and consider its two statements, one by its President, Mr. Al-Gifri in Cairo early April, the other by its Secretary-General, Mr. Alhabshi, airmailed to you from Aden dated 17 April 1967; secondly, that any resolution be in conformity with its said two statements; thirdly, reasserts the extreme urgent necessity to convene a conference which it should attend; fourthly, that your Mission kindly inform

date of opening debate or talks which it is willing take part anywhere."

Announcement by the Mission

204. On 29 July the Mission issued the following communiqué:

"In a recent press communiqué, the United Nations Special Mission on Aden announced that it had held a series of fruitful meetings with a delegation of FLOSY (Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South Yemen) in New York and that it would pursue its consultations in accordance with its mandate. Subsequently, from 26 to 28 July 1967, the Mission had conversations with the British High Commissioner in Aden, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, within the context of resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly.

"The Mission considers it important that it should have further meetings with the elements concerned. For their convenience, these meetings will start at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 11 August 1967."

VII. WORK OF THE MISSION IN GENEVA, BEIRUT AND CAIRO

Introduction

205. The Mission was in Geneva from 10 August to 1 September 1967. It heard the following groups representing various shades of opinion in the Territory:

- (a) The United National Party of Aden;
- (b) A delegation of the traditional authorities of the Western States:
 - (c) A delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra State;
- (d) A delegation of the traditional rulers of Qa'iti and Kathiri.

206. On 17, 18, 24 and 25 August the Mission had discussions with Lord Shackleton, United Kingdom Minister without Portfolio, who came from London for that purpose; it also had meetings with the representative of the United Kingdom in Geneva, Sir Harold Beeley.

207. In Beirut, where the Mission arrived on 1 September, the Mission had further talks with Lord Shackleton. It heard a representative of the ATUC, Mr. Ali Aswadi, and three other petitioners from the Western States. It left for Cairo on 6 September and departed for New York on 12 September. In Cairo, the Mission had further talks with a delegation of FLOSY and met with representatives of the Government of the United Arab Republic and with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

A. Work of the Mission in Geneva

Appeal by Mission to nationalist elements

208. Upon its arrival in Geneva, the Mission was informed that the National Liberation Front had called for a strike in Aden in protest against "the Mission's decision to meet with Sultans and stooges". While regretting that the discharge of its mandate should have given rise to any misunderstanding on the part of one of the political elements concerned, the Mission was hopeful nevertheless that the NLF would reconsider its decision not to co-operate with the Mission.

209. In view of the foregoing, and in the absence of information from FLOSY as to when its delegation might be expected in Geneva, the Mission issued the following public statement:

"Following the announcement made in its press communiqué dated 29 July 1967, the United Nations Special Mission on Aden has arrived in Geneva in order to hold further meetings with the elements concerned at the Office of the United Nations. In the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI), the Special Mission is ready to hear all shades of opinion in the Territory. At the same time, in order to dispel any misunderstanding which may exist, the Mission wishes to make it clear that it continues to adhere strictly to the spirit and the letter of the above-mentioned General

Assembly resolution, the objective of which is to bring the whole Territory of Aden to genuine independence.

"The Mission is convinced that this purpose cannot be achieved without the full participation of all the nationalist elements. The Mission is equally convinced that at the present juncture the full and sincere co-operation of these elements as well as of the United Kingdom as administering Power, is required for the attainment of the objectives of the General Assembly resolution. As previously indicated, the Special Mission will begin its work on 11 August 1967. Elements wishing to consult with the Special Mission are requested to communicate with the Principal Secretary, Special Mission on Aden, Office of the United Nations at Geneva."

Meetings with representatives of the United National Party of Aden

210. The Mission met with Mr. Abdul-Rahman Girgirah and Mr. Hussain Ali Bayoomi, representatives of the United National Party of Aden on 21, 25 and 26 August. They explained that the United National Party did not claim to represent the whole of South Arabia. Its activity and membership were confined to the State of Aden, where it had the support of the vast majority of Adenis. Nevertheless they were prepared to admit that the State of Aden had no viable alternative but to remain in association with the other States of South Arabia. Mr. Girgirah read out the text of a statement of policy previously conveyed to the Mission during its visit to Jeddah in March.

211. This document stressed the pledge of the United National Party to struggle for the freedom of South Arabia and its independence under a representative government. The United National Party believed in the need for co-operation between all individuals and political parties in establishing an independent government elected through the democratic process. It condemned the use of violence to impose a political solution, and was convinced that the best hope for South Arabia lay in the implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

212. The present situation of unrest and chaos was the result first of Great Britain's exploitation of the country and its neglect of the rights and aspirations of the people, secondly of the inadequacy of Adeni representation in the existing "Federal Government" and thirdly of the threat arising from "Egyptian imperialist ambitions". In order to remedy this situation, the United National Party statement outlined a number of constitutional measures which in its view would improve the present governmental structure and thus provide a suitable basis for the caretaker government envisaged in the relevant United Nations resolutions.

213. Mr. Girgirah affirmed that the presence of FLOSY, the NLF and SAL in the new caretaker Government would be highly desirable. He added that Mr. Bayoomi had recently attempted to form a new Government not on the basis of political parties but of personalities. His failure had been most unfortunate but the United National Party hoped that with the support of the Secretary-General, the Mission would succeed in uniting all the political elements and, in particular, FLOSY and the NLF. In his view, the claim of each of these parties that it was the sole representative of the people was unfounded.

214. The United National Party had thought in terms of an equal division of seats in a new South Arabian Parliament between Aden and the Western States. But if the Eastern States were to join the Federation the allocation could be one third for each component, notwithstanding the fact that Adenis were more sophisticated and more economically developed and more experienced in democratic life. The present Government was ready to give a pledge that it would hold elections under United Nations supervision within a reasonable time after independence. The United National Party was in favour of the Eastern States uniting with the rest of

South Arabia and was convinced that the United Kingdom Government could bring them within the framework of a new Government if it so desired. But it seemed that the United Kingdom Government was using the bad example of unrest, chaos and corruption in the Federation as a pretext to discourage them to join. The United Kingdom Government had also resorted to the tactic of refusing to compensate them for the loss of revenue which they would incur when, on joining the Federation, existing customs barriers were eliminated.

215. Mr. Girgirah assured the Mission that the United National Party would favour the dissolution of the present Government, provided that another structure was created in its place. The United National Party was prepared to make whatever sacrifice was necessary to assure the future of the country. To avoid a gap, Mr. Girgirah suggested that under the supervision of the United Nations and pending general elections, the civil servants be given authority to run the country. They were doing so at present and they were the healthiest and least corrupt element on the political scene of South Arabia. He also hoped that the United Nations recommendations would be made binding on all the parties and that the Government of the United Arab Republic would co-operate by putting the necessary pressures on the national-ist leaders concerned.

216. Mr. Girgirah and Mr. Bayoomi lodged a complaint with the Mission regarding the recent behaviour of the British troops in Aden; these troops had frequently subjected inhabitants of Aden to cruel and humiliating treatment, and such behaviour would clearly not contribute to a reduction of existing tension (see para. 252 below).

Meetings with the delegation of traditional authorities from the Western States

217. Between 21 and 26 August the Mission met with representatives of the traditional authorities of the Western States. The delegation was composed of Sheikh Mohammed Farid (Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom), Sharif Qaid bin Hussein (Beihan), Amir Ali Mohammed Said (Wahidi), Sheikh Ali Atif (Lower Yafai), Sultan Saleh bin Hussein (Audhali), Naib Saleh bin Abdullah (Upper Aulaqi Sultanate), Sultan Nasser bin Abdullah (Fadhli). Accompanying the delegation as advisers were Mr. M. H. Obali and Mr. S. A. Naika.

218. Sheikh Farid expressed the determination of the delegation to spare no effort to facilitate the task of the Mission and their conviction of the importance of ensuring the emergence in peace and unity of an independent South Arabia, Mr. Obali added that to this end the "Federal Government" was anxious to discuss with the other elements the draft constitution which it had recently prepared and circulated. Mr. Obali then read out the text of the following memorandum:

"We have the honour to submit for your information, and for the information of your colleagues in the United Nations Mission to South Arabia, the views of the States of the Federation of South Arabia on certain aspects of the situation in South Arabia today.

"First and foremost, I must emphasize that the States have accepted the United Nations resolutions without reservation and have publicly welcomed the appointment of a mission under your leadership. It is the intention of the States of the Federation of South Arabia to do all in its power to assist the Mission to obtain a resolution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

"It is the view of the Federated States, however, that it is of paramount importance that the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Rights of Man should be pursued by peaceful means, by democratic methods, and by orderly constitutional development. In particular it is desirable that constitutional development should evolve from within South Arabia and should not be imposed artificially by external forces; and that the steady progress of South Arabia to unity and independence should

e The petitioners addressed the Mission in their capacity as members of their party, although they were also connected with the "Federal Government".

f The members of this delegation were also connected with the "Federal Government".

not be hindered by campaigns of violence and bloodshed inspired by ambitious and self-seeking elements from outside our country. In pursuit, therefore, of full and genuine independence from the last vestiges of British imperial rule we strive to resist the campaign of violence, bloodshed and threats with the legitimate means at our disposal. We are determined that we shall not exchange the rule of one colonialist power for another and that South Arabia should not become a pawn in the selfish world of power-politics and international rivalries.

"The Federal Government has for more than eight years sought constitutional progress to independence and unity. We were working devotedly for these aims in the years before the issue of South Arabia was first raised in the Assembly of the United Nations. The Federation was created on the 11th February, 1959, and from that date began the culminating stages of South Arabia's peaceful development in independence and unity. Before 1959 South Arabia was divided into a number of sultanates, amirates and sheikhdoms and the British Crown Colony of Aden. The founders of the Federation foresaw even in 1959 that the unification of the various separate States in South Arabia was an essential pre-requisite for independence. As the years passed. other States joined the Federation including, in January, 1963, the State (or Crown Colony) of Aden. The creation of the Federation and the steady increase in the powers of the central Government led to the progressive divestment of power by the traditional rulers. These changes which laid the foundations for South Arabian independence and unity were not achieved by terrorism, bloodshed, threats and coercion but by the peaceful discussion and the freely-expressed wishes of the people of South

"After the successful integration of the State of Aden with the Federation of South Arabia in January, 1963, the Federal Government sought constitutional talks with the British Government in order to move further forward towards complete unity and independence. At the constitutional conference held in London in 1964, it was agreed that a united South Arabia should become fully independent by 1968. After the conclusion of the constitutional conference in 1964 a determined effort was made to obtain agreement with all parties within South Arabia on the next step to be taken on the road to independence and unity. With the agreement of the Federal Government the British High Commissioner appointed constitutional advisers under the chairmanship of Sir Evelyn Hone, the first Governor-General of Zambia, to assist the people of South Arabia in formulating their views. The other two members of the advisory commission were a retired Chief Justice from the Republic of the Sudan and a distinguished academic constitutional lawyer from Manchester University. Unfortunately the Government of Aden, of which Mr. Abdul-Oawi Makkawee was Chief Minister at the time, declared this international commission to be persona non grata and placed every possible obstacle in its way. When it became clear that the British High Commissioner had failed in this attempt at conciliation and compromise the Federal Government decided to take the initiative and appoint constitutional advisers. Sir Ralph Hone, the world-renowned constitutional lawyer and Sir Gawain Bell, the well-known administrator and diplomatist, were accordingly appointed in September 1965, and after extensive visits throughout South Arabia and prolonged discussion in every State submitted their report Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia, 1966, early in 1966. This report was published in Arabic and English and was widely discussed in newspapers and by political parties. After public opinion had had a chance to form, the Federal Government called a constitutional conference to discuss the next stage of constitutional progress towards unity and independence, All political parties and all the States were invited to this conference scheduled to start on August 1st, 1966, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations was invited to send an observer. All the States in the Federation, the Upper Yafa' State, one of the States in the Eastern Aden Protectorate and several of the political parties accepted

the invitation but, owing to the intransigence of Mr. Makkawee and his colleagues and owing to the delay of the Secretary-General in appointing an observer from the United Nations, it was decided to postpone this conference. Subsequently, in November 1966, a conference was being held between the State authorities and the Federal Government at which the constitutional proposals submitted by Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell were studied in the closest detail. As a result of this study which lasted into February 1967, a revised constitution was proposed and was approved in principle by all the States within the Federation. We have pleasure in submitting to you now a copy of this draft constitution. It will thus be seen that despite the threats of subversion from outside South Arabia the Federal Government has made every effort to achieve constitutional advance by recognized constitutional means.

"The crime at Aden airport marked the beginning of a campaign of violence and viciousness in Aden which we shall never forget. The peace and security of this commercial and trading centre were destroyed by the action of cruel and ambitious men who had no thought for the welfare of South Arabia. In these last four years many loyal and true South Arabians have been assassinatedtrade unionists, civil servants, traders, police officers and politicians-for no reason except that they sought freedom for their country. At the beginning of this campaign there may have been individuals in South Arabia who were not out of sympathy with this campaign although they had reservations regarding the violent methods used. It was felt that an aggressive campaign might be required to free South Arabia from a military base maintained by a colonialist Power. Some South Arabians expressed confidence that the campaign of violence and intimidation would end immediately it became clear that the British base would be removed. That confidence was, however, completely misplaced as the decision by the British Government to withdraw the base led to increased, not diminished, violence. It had been hoped that the announcement by the United Kingdom of the decision to leave South Arabia would lead to an immediate cessation of the campaign of terrorism and violence. To the surprise of some and to the consternation of all in South Arabia the campaign was intensified, not terminated, by the announcement of this decision. The violence was perpetrated in the name of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, but was in fact financed, directed and managed by members of the Egyptian intelligence service in the Yemen. Aden is a peace-loving mercantile community and it cannot be denied that the campaign of violence and intimidation has been effective within this community. By their vicious methods and their ruthless contempt for humanity, the terrorists have undermined the morale of the population of Aden with the result that to the superficial observer the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen appears to have a measure of popular support within Aden. Despite this appearance FLOSY has in fact little popular support and relies entirely on intimidation for the fulfilment of its aims.

"It would be useful to the Mission if we provide in more detail our views on the standing of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, First of all it should be emphasized that there is no justification either in history or in popular feeling for the description of South Arabia as Occupied South Yemen. Apart from certain sections of the Yemeni community working in Aden there is no one in South Arabia who regards his country as part of the Yemen. Furthermore when the present Secretary-General of FLOSY was Chief Minister of Aden under the British Colonial Government, he made his views clear on a number of occasions that he did not regard South Arabia and Aden as part of the Yemen. It was only after his departure from South Arabia that he adopted the Egyptian policy of describing South Arabia as the Occupied South Yemen. The other important point which we wish to place before you is that FLOSY has little democratic support. It is true that part of the Aden Trade Union movement and some of the office bearers in the Aden Trade Union Congress are sup-

porters of FLOSY. It is doubtful, however, if they represent the greater part of the trade union movement as, in complete breach of its own constitution no elections have been held by the Aden Trade Union Congress for more than four years. Although there has been constant pressure from the workers for fresh elections to be held the present office-bearers in the Congress have consistently refused to hold fresh elections with the result that six of the most important unions in Aden have divorced themselves from the ATUC and from FLOSY. The lack of popular support for the present leadership in the ATUC may be illustrated by the failure of the former Secretary-General of the ATUC, Mr. Abdulla Al-Asnag, now Chairman of the Politbureau of FLOSY to obtain re-election in 1965 as President of the Civil Aviation Employees Union: and it should be recorded that there have been four attempts by FLOSY to assassinate the present President of that Union, Mr. Husein Duqmi, who defeated Mr. Al-Asnag in the 1965 election for President and that Mr. Dugmi is now in hospital as a result of a further assassination attempt. It is therefore our view that FLOSY has little popular support except from certain sections of the migrant Yemeni community in Aden, and that it has no justification to claim to represent the people of South Arabia as a whole.

"Although we do not admit the justice of the claim of the FLOSY leaders to represent South Arabia, it should be made clear that we have endeavoured on a number of occasions to meet the leaders of all political parties including FLOSY in order to settle the problems of South Arabia in a spirit of conciliation and compromise. It is well known that a number of meetings have been held with the leadership of the South Arabian League in Beirut. Informal discussions have also taken place between Federal Ministers and SAL leaders in New York, Jeddah, Riyadh, London and Aden. At the same time similar invitations for discussions have been extended to the leaders of FLOSY. On one occasion Mr. Makkawee and Mr. Al-Asnag agreed to meet Federal Ministers in Beirut but at the last moment were prevented from attending this meeting. An invitation was sent to the leaders of FLOSY to attend the constitutional conference which was to be held in August 1966 but again the leaders of FLOSY refused. Subsequently efforts have been made to hold informal discussions with the leaders of FLOSY, but on every occasion the initiative has been frustrated by the obstinacy and obduracy of the Front leaders. Despite the failure of these attempts in the past we are still willing to discuss the future of South Arabia with the leaders of FLOSY if a meeting can be arranged through your mediation. If such a meeting could be arranged we would also willingly meet the leaders of the National Liberation Front as although we deplore the terrorist methods of this organisation we note that it is now less closely dominated by external elements than in the past. It therefore has a greater claim to be regarded as genuinely nationalist than FLOSY. We would also expect the leaders of the various political parties in Aden to be present.

"It is our view that if there had been no outside interference it cannot be disputed that South Arabia would now be in the final stages of constitutional development leading to complete independence and unity and that the work of the Mission would have been greatly facilitated. The campaign from outside has delayed not only constitutional progress but progress in the social services and economic development. Our opponents from outside South Arabia have not refrained from disrupting the education of our children especially in Aden by fomenting disturbances in schools and Mr. Makkawee has personally incited all the children in South Arabia to boycott the schools when his own daughter is being educated in the United Kingdom on a scholarship from the Federal Government. It is a matter for the deepest regret that the enemies of South Arabia carried their campaign to such lengths that they have endeavoured to destroy and hinder peaceful development in the rural areas by sabotaging water pumps in villages and farms and by placing mines in the fields to destroy agricultural tractors. Despite all the problems which have arisen as a result of this

external interference we have made substantial progress in all fields of development.

"Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would summarise our political attitude by stating that we seek to establish a free and democratic united Republic of South Arabia which would include the Upper Yafa State, the Qa'iti State, the Kathiri State, the Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra, and the Islands. To achieve this goal we support the United Nations proposal to establish a caretaker government to be responsible for the holding of elections under the supervision of the United Nations. It is our aim that full sovereignty should then be transferred by the protecting power to the Republic in a peaceful and orderly manner; and it is our wish that the independence and integrity of the Republic should be guaranteed by the United Nations. It is not the desire of the State rulers or the Ministers of the Federal Government to hold any office against the will of their people. It is our most earnest hope that your Mission will assist the people of South Arabia in obtaining the twin objectives of independence and unity for which our country has been striving for the last eight years."

219. Sheikh Farid stated that his colleagues supported wholeheartedly the resolutions of the United Nations. They were therefore in favour of holding general elections under United Nations supervision and were ready to accept participation in a caretaker government in which every political party would be represented. It was true that FLOSY enjoyed substantial support among the people of Aden State, but this did not justify its claim to represent the entire population of the country. According to Mr. Obali, the NLF enjoyed stronger support in the other States. As representatives of the existing authorities, they were ready to treat both factions as brothers but would not put up with their determination to achieve domination of the future government through violence and terrorism.

220. The delegation had been given to understand that the Mission was hearing them as spokesmen for traditional elements from the Western States and not as members of the "Federal Government". Sheikh Farid believed nevertheless that the "Federal Government" had not been without merit: it had for the first time given the people a sense of belonging to a common entity. Furthermore, removal of customs barriers by the "Federal Government" had improved the economic situation, as well as health and education. Thanks to the Federation, South Arabia had been set on the way to unity and to independence. Besides, the hereditary rulers were not only the embodiment of a tradition, they had assumed their powers as a result of the exercise of "tribal democracy". The Federation was a reality and any new structure must be built on it, with such changes as were necessary.

221. The delegation also stated that it attached the greatest importance to the question of the unity and integrity of the Territory. Hitherto the British had made no real effort to encourage the Eastern States to throw in their lot with the remainder of the Territory. This attitude was due to the British desire to keep a foot in the area and to use these States as a buffer between South Arabia and the neighbouring oil producing regions. The United Kingdom Government could still influence the Eastern States by stating unequivocally that. bound by the United Nations resolutions, it would desist from extending assistance and from financing the Bedouin Legion unless it were placed at the disposal of the country as a whole. On the other hand, the reluctance of the Eastern States to unite with the Western States was easy to explain. They were waiting for the result of oil prospection undertaken in the last few years, hoping to be able to negotiate from a position of strength at the appropriate time. They were apprehensive that the present unrest existing in the Federation would spread to their area. They were also fearful that in the event of a merger with the Western States, they would lose their customs revenue which accounted for 80 per cent of their income. It was the task of the Mission to see that the administering Power made a firm undertaking to ensure the integrity of the Territory.

222. The delegation suggested that a second round of talks, culminating, if possible, in a round-table conference, be held

in neutral territory closer to the area, possibly Addis Ababa, and that to this end the Mission make an appeal aimed at all parties concerned. The Mission should also fix a date, say 15 September or 1 October, for the ending of the state of emergency, detentions and violence. Further it asked the Mission to urge the various factions to stop fighting each other. The delegation also claimed to represent the true nationalists, who had the interests of their country at heart and were prepared to carry their responsibilities when others were trying to escape them.

223. The Mission took note of the suggestions made. It stated that it had already discussed with the United Kingdom Government on many occasions the question of the detainees and of lifting the emergency measures. Ever since its conversations in London, it had hoped to be able to persuade that Government to take the necessary measures in this connexion. The Mission had not lost contact with other political elements and was hopeful that its efforts would be fruitful.

Meeting with the delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra

224. The Mission met with the delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra on 21 August. The delegation also participated in a meeting held with the delegation from the other Eastern States on 1 September. The Mahra delegation consisted of Sultan Khalifa bin Abdullah bin Afrar (Chairman of the Mahri Tribal Council), Sheikh Abdullah bin Ashoor al Mahri (Secretary of the Mahri Tribal Council) and Sheikh Alawi bin Abdullah al Mahri (Member of the Mahri Tribal Council).

225. They stated that the Tribal Council was a genuine form of democratic government as it grouped the duly chosen representatives of seventy tribes. Sultan Khalifa had been elected chairman of the Council by these representatives. The people of Mahra had strong reservations about acceding to independence together with the South Arabian States. Mahra was, and had always been, a clearly distinct entity. Its population, language and traditions were different from those of both the other Eastern States and the Western States. Furthermore the Mahri people did not put much trust in a vague and ambiguous future government which would bring with it no promise of peace and stability. In any event, due to difficulties of communication they could not see how Mahra could be governed from Aden.

226. Mahra was desperately poor and in need of funds. The British had never made any serious effort to develop the country or contribute to its welfare and modernization. Their subsidy amounted to only South Arabian dinars 30,000 per year. The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in Mahra which the British helped to maintain was only 130 men strong and lacked armament and equipment. The State suffered from a complete absence of schools and hospitals. The State needed international assistance to develop its resources. The United Nations had been instrumental in assisting underdeveloped countries and they would be grateful to the Mission if it could direct the appropriate international agencies to provide them with financial assistance, even at the cost of being placed under United Nations trusteeship.

227. They emphasized the desire of the people of Mahra to be left to build their own future by themselves instead of being subordinated to another government, and stressed the importance of a visit by the Mission to the area in order to acquaint itself with the prevailing conditions of poverty and isolation. They drew attention to a letter addressed by the Tribal Council to the Mission (see appendix V below).

228. The Mission took note of the great need for financial assistance for development as outlined by the petitioners. However, it explained that any United Nations assistance to promote social and economic development in the future would probably have to be channelled through the independent Government of South Arabia.

Meetings with delegations from the other Eastern States

229. The Mission met with Sultan Ghalib bin Awadh of Qa'iti, accompanied by Mr. Salim Awadh Safi and Mr. Abdullah Salim Ba'shan, and Sultan Hussain bin Ali of Kathiri, accompanied by Amir Abdul Majid bin Ali and Mr. Moham-

mad Abdul Rahman Ubaidillah, on 31 August and 1 September. The delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra participated in the second meeting.

230. Sultan Ghalib stated that he had great hopes in the Mission. He and Sultan Hussain bin Ali were convinced that it was working with the sole interest of the people of South Arabia in mind. They were prepared to make great sacrifices provided it was for the good of their country and would contribute to a durable solution of the problem affecting the area. Nevertheless they were afraid that the interests of the Eastern States would be adversely affected by joining the Western States. Sultan Hussain emphasized that though they were not separatists, they were fearful of the consequences if they joined the Federation. The first concern of the Mission should be the maintenance of security and the cessation of hostilities. Chaos and unrest prevailed in the Federation whilst the Governments in the Eastern States were well established in accordance with Islamic law. The population of the Eastern States was more than half the total population of South Arabia and should not be subordinated to the wishes of elements from the Western States. Sultan Ghalib stated that he was most anxious to participate in discussions with the nationalist parties. However, these parties had no footing in the Eastern

231. The economy and livelihood of the Eastern States depended to a large extent on remittances sent home by some 400,000 emigrants, half of whom were working in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, they had no wish to alienate Saudi Arabia. The Sultanates had been in existence long before the British arrived and were the only form of government the people understood. The idea of a central government was totally foreign to them, constitutional reforms would have to be introduced gradually, on the basis of the Sultanate system, and linked to the growth of political understanding among the people.

232. Since the British presence was shortly to be terminated, they were concerned about what they should do to prepare themselves for the new situation. They would have passport difficulties for their nationals working abroad. They would be isolated and have no adequate means of communication. Mahra. for instance, could only be reached by air or by sea. In such conditions he wondered how Mahra could be governed from Aden.

233. Sultan Ghalib stressed the fact that the Eastern States had accepted the United Nations resolution and wished the Mission would come and visit their country to assist in its implementation. Such implementation should be carried out under the supervision of the Mission, in a free and democratic way. The Sultans were prepared to co-operate with the Western States, provided their interests and dignity were fully respected. However, they were very much exercised by the question of what their future would be as part of South Arabia if the present conditions of unrest, chaos and near civil war continued after independence. They were also preoccupied by the possible consequences, if the Mission failed in its attempts to bring together all the elements concerned.

234. Sultan Ghalib stated that they had come through Cairo in order to explain their problems to the Arab League. He drew attention to a communication which he and Sultan Hussain had submitted in this regard.

Communication received from the United Kingdom concerning the island of Perimt

235. The Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Mission a copy of a letter dated 11 August from the representative of the United Kingdom on the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim. The text of the letter was as follows:

g This document has been placed on the files of the Secretariat and will be available to Members on request.

h The United Kingdom letter has been reproduced in document A/AC.109/260. See also appendix VI containing a letter from thirteen Arab States on this question.

¹ Discussions of the Mission on this question are described in paras. 177, 178, 179, 182 and 185 above. See also appendix VII for a telegram from the South Arabian League on the subject.

"On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to address Your Excellency on the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim, in a way which will ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-al-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea.

"This Island has been a British possession since 1857, when a British expedition occupied it. No question of its ownership was raised in the discussions before World War I leading to the Anglo/Turkish Convention of 1914, which among other things defined and demarcated the Western section of the frontier between the Yemen and South Arabia. Until 1937, Perim was administered by the Government of India: in that year, responsibility for it passed to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and was devolved as a matter of administrative convenience on the Governor at Aden. Perim had in this period a separate identity and administration from that of Aden. The entry of Aden Colony into the Federation of South Arabia in 1963 made it necessary to enact certain legislation which had the effect of defining Perim's distinct identity in that year. The main external economic links of Perim have been with Aden, where some of its inhabitants have worked and from which two lighthouses, important to navigation, have been administered through the Aden Port Trust, an independent body on which both Government and shipping interests are represented.

"The assumption of the United Kingdom Government had been that, when South Arabia became independent, Perim would adhere to South Arabia as geographical propinquity and economic ties suggested. My Government did, however, inform the United Nations when resolution 2023 (XX) was under discussion that Perim was not part of Aden State and that it would consult the people about their future when the time came.

"However, discussion in the United Kingdom Parliament of the bill to provide for the relinquishment of Her Majesty's sovereignty over both Aden and Perim (which received the Royal Assent on 28 July) revealed a strong feeling in the House of Commons that Perim's position on a narrow international waterway was of major importance and justified arrangements to ensure that that waterway could not be closed by wrongful use of the Island. There was a consensus of opinion that this could best be achieved by United Nations administration of Perim, and the United Kingdom Government undertook to put forward a proposal to this effect.

"I should therefore be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Special Mission on Aden in order that they may consider on what basis the United Nations might undertake the permanent administration of Perim, in a way which would ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-al-Mandeb. This is a unique proposal which could have important implications for the future, and the United Kingdom Government sincerely hopes that it will be given urgent consideration with a view to recommendations being made through the appropriate United Nations channels. In urging this proposal the United Kingdom Government has no doubt that it would be recognised that United Nations control of Perim should not impede but rather assist the economic and social development of the island with its 280 inhabitants.

"I should like to emphasise that my Government has no undeclared interest of its own with regard to Perim. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made it clear in Parliament that the United Kingdom Government was completely opposed to keeping British sovereignty in Perim after South Arabia's independence, even for the desirable cause of internationalising it. It wishes to have no more responsibility for Perim after South Arabian independence than that which any other member state of the United Nations will have.

"If the United Nations agrees to assume responsibility for the internationalisation of the Island, my Government would still attach importance to assuring itself that this was in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Perim."

Information received from the United Kingdom High Com-

236. While in Geneva the Mission pursued its consultations with the administering Power. It was also interested to receive information from the British High Commissioner on the developments of the situation in the Territory, as well as his own assessment of those developments. A summary of the information received is set out below.

237. In a message dated 14 August, the British High Commissioner stated that there had been a two-day strike in Aden called by the NLF and FLOSY ostensibly in protest against unrepresentative parties at Geneva. He considered however that it was primarily a political demonstration. There were few casualties. The High Commissioner had no new information locally about the real intentions of either FLOSY or the NLF. In a message dated 16 August, the Mission was informed that there had been unrest in the Western State of Lahej, and that the State police had deserted and the ruler's brother who administered the State had fled to Aden. The situation had been taken in hand by a battalion of the South Arabian Army and Lahej was reported quiet. In the State of Dathina (which had no ruling family) there had been inter-tribal fighting and the administrator had resigned. There too, the Army had been put in control. The Sheikh of the small and remote State of Musiahi had been kidnapped. The High Commissioner found it difficult to assess how far those disturbances were due to "normal inter-Tribal disputes" and how far, specifically political influence had been involved; but he thought that local reasons were probably the more significant. They had taken place in the weaker section of the States, and he had no reason to believe that the South Arabian Army was unable to maintain essential internal security.

238. On 17 August, the High Commissioner informed the Mission that the South Arabian Army appeared to be generally in control of internal security in the affected States of Lahej, Dhala and Dathina and to be restoring the situation in the small State of Muslahi. The NLF might be controlling the civil administration in Dhala, but, as he had reported earlier, the reasons for unrest quite varied. Audhali and the States of the Western Protectorate further east were quiet and the South Arabian Army seemed wholly confident of its ability to restore and maintain order in the affected area.

239. The Mission was informed at a meeting with Lord Shackleton on 18 August that men of the liberation army of FLOSY had crossed the frontier post at Kirsh, between Lahej and Yemen and had taken the Fort. The South Arabian Army had moved on quickly and retaken possession of the Fort.

240. On 25 August the High Commissioner informed the Mission that a confused situation had developed in the States of Lahej, Dhala, Dathina and Muflahi. The South Arabian Army was in effective command of security, but the States administrations, which were never strong, were hardly functioning. The High Commissioner had heard of attempts by the NLF to form a combined administration for some of the States, but had no reliable information whether that amounted to anything in real terms.

241. The message said that both the NLF and FLOSY, in competition with each other, appeared to be separately trying to establish their presence on the Yemen border by force, but had not made any headway against the South Arabian Army. It went on to describe the clashes at Kirsh. In Aden, violence against the British continued, including a number of individual murders. All that seemed to be part of the competition for a dominant political position. In conclusion the High Commissioner's message stated that the situation in the Eastern Aden Protectorate had improved after the three States had succeeded in agreeing in principle about the arrangements for the control of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion.

242. On 30 August, the Mission received the following message from Sir Humphrey Trevelyan:

"There have been rapid developments here. The rule of Sultans in the Central and Western States of the Federa-

tion has been quickly eliminated following the withdrawal of British forces. Lower Aulaqi is now changing sides and we cannot predict how long the remaining States will take to go the same way. The Federal Government has virtually no control in the Federation and cannot be said to continue effectively in existence. The senior Arab civil servants with the agreement of the political groups are carrying on routine business. The Army are maintaining order on the surface in the States but are not opposing the activities of the political groups and have privately declared their political allegiance to them in general. They have publicly refused to accept a public proposal of one Federal Minister that they should take over Government. They say privately that they want us to negotiate with the groups. They are almost certainly split in their political allegiance between the groups, but these allegiances seem more to reflect the Tribal split than genuine adherence to one or the other group. The position in the States is very confused but in the main peaceful. Local administrations are beginning to grow up, but it is not yet possible to label them. In general, the Western and Central States of the Federation where the Sultans have been ousted seem to be predominantly the NLF, though the position in Lahej is indeterminate. Meanwhile the NLF and FLOSY are still contending for position in Aden. Cairo radio have called for a strike, while the NLF are pronouncing against it from the Mosques. The NLF seem to be stronger on the ground. The position of the Army is crucial and it is in everyone's interest that it should remain coherent.

"We may have to remove our representatives from the Eastern States sooner than we had planned, for reasons of air communications.

"The Mission will not in my opinion be able to establish a Government on the ground without an understanding with the NLF and would severely prejudice their own position if they propounded any solution without this. I am at the moment not in direct contact with NLF leaders, but I must warn the Mission that in view of the rapidly changing situation I may have to take some initiatives with the groups here, though I would try to associate the Mission with all attempts to reach a political solution."

243. The High Commissioner also informed the Mission about a press conference held by Mr. Qahtan Ash-Shaabi on 30 August, in which he said that the NLF leaders were prepared to meet the High Commissioner, provided the United Kingdom Government would make a public announcement that "the NLF was the true representative of the people". Mr. Ash-Shaabi had indicated that FLOSY was of no consequence and should not be admitted to the negotiations. He had said that "members of FLOSY would be permitted to live in peace in the NLF state" and "the South Arabian Army is the army of the NLF". He had also said the NLF would take Baihan and the Eastern Aden Protectorate in due course and that it believed in the ultimate unity of South Arabia with the Yemen, but only "in the long term".

Discussions with Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio

244. In discussions held between the Mission and Lord Shackleton, United Kingdom Minister without Portfolio, between 17 and 25 August 1967, the Mission re-emphasized that the United Nations considered that the Territory should be given independence as a whole. It was disturbed by the intention of the United Kingdom Government to maintain an armed establishment in the Territory and to continue subsidies to the Eastern States after independence; they were thus being encouraged to refrain from joining the rest of South Arabia. Under the resolutions, the question of ensuring the integrity of the Territory upon independence was a responsibility of the administering Power.

245. Lord Shackleton said that territorial integrity as such had never existed, since the Eastern States had never joined the Federation of South Arabia. The Eastern rulers were waiting to see what kind of government would emerge, since they did not wish to join the Federation or the "Federal Government" in its present state. They would probably agree to join a new government of the whole area, provided it was

sufficiently broad-based and had general support in the country, although they would be losing revenue from customs duties. With four fifths of the population living in Qa'iti State, the two other States would probably follow should the Qa'iti ruler agree to join South Arabia.

246. The United Kingdom Government was ready to cooperate in bringing the Territory to independence as one unit. However, its power to intervene in this situation had certain limitations; they had treaty relations with the Eastern States but were not responsible for their administration. It would take considerable military power to force them to join. As to the question of military aid to the Eastern States after independence, he himself had insisted on the necessity of continuing to support the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion for two years after independence. The Legion was the only effective authority in some places and recently it had been on the verge of disintegration. Without financial support, it would collapse and chaos would result. His Government would also continue to support the local forces of each of the three Eastern States.

247. The Mission noted the position of the United Kingdom in favour of the unity of the Eastern Protectorate with the rest of the Territory. Any other solution would be contradictory to the terms of the United Nations resolutions. The administering Power should make it clear that the Eastern States would not receive any assistance unless they were part of the whole country.

248. Lord Shackleton stated that the United Kingdom would be willing to compensate the Eastern States for the loss of customs duties and provide them with civil aid in case they joined South Arabia. But the real inducement for them to join would be the formation of a new government for South Arabia. All treaties would lapse on 9 January 1968. No new treaties would be signed and the United Kingdom would make every effort to encourage them to join.

249. Lord Shackleton drew attention to the reports which the High Commissioner was sending to the Mission on the situation in the Territory. It was not possible to evaluate from them with certainty the relative strength of the different forces, namely FLOSY and the NLF. The Army was quite an important element: it was unified, well disciplined and could have a stabilizing influence. His contacts with FLOSY were necessarily more limited than with other groups, but he was ready to contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual understanding. FLOSY and the federal leaders should both accept each other. The best hope for the formation of a caretaker government lay in an arrangement based on personalities rather than on political parties. The Sheikhs and Sultans were ruling with the consent of their people and could be deposed if their manner of governing was not satisfactory. He believed that when elections took place, some of them would probably be elected.

250. The Mission believed that the formation of a caretaker government could not be achieved without careful negotiations aimed at bringing the various elements together. In this connexion, the role of the British Government would be of major significance. The Mission still hoped that elements which had declined to participate would do so. It had been led to believe that FLOSY and the NLF might merge, but it looked now that they might have to come forward separately. However, it was essential that they should co-operate with each other as well as with the Mission.

251. Lord Shackleton said that the task of his Government would have been greatly simplified had FLOSY and the NLF been able to merge. There was no doubt that the NLF was very powerful, elusive and had great destructive power. As to the labour movement in Aden, it was split: one faction was inspired by the NLF, the other was associated with FLOSY. There was a continuing deterioration of the industrial and employment situation in the Territory.

252. The Mission drew Lord Shackleton's attention to the question of the behaviour of British troops in Aden and the complaints of brutal treatment which it had heard (see para. 216 above). It was perturbed by the reports it had received in this regard and was concerned about the political repercussions among the people. Lord Shackleton replied that it was always difficult to verify such allegations. As a whole

British troops had behaved well in Aden. There was a great deal of bitterness in the British Army after the incidents of 20 June in which several soldiers were shot down by local armed police. The bodies they had recovered had been mutilated. He conceded there might have been some display of "roughness" since then, but this was very difficult to prevent. He would convey the Mission's feelings to the British High Commissioner in Aden.

Messages from FLOSY in response to the Mission's invitation

253. On 12 August, the Mission received a communication from FLOSY to the effect that its leadership was awaiting the outcome of an important meeting of the national council of the Front to be held at Taiz, and for that reason could not avail itself of the opportunity to meet the Mission in Geneva. On 24 August the Mission received a message from FLOSY stating that the leaders of FLOSY would be ready to meet with the Mission before the end of August in Cairo or at any European capital to be selected by the Mission, preferably other than Geneva.

Decision to hold meetings in Beirut

254. In the light of recent developments in the Territory, and in the expectation that the nationalist movements which for different reasons had not felt able to come to Geneva, would agree to meet with the Mission at a place closer to the area, the Mission considered the possibility of holding meetings in Beirut and/or Cairo. In this connexion the Mission raised with Lord Shackleton the question whether it would be possible for a United Kingdom delegation at the appropriate level to be present in Cairo while the Mission was holding meetings there. Lord Shackleton stated that in view of the wider implications of this question he would convey the Mission's request to his Government.

255. Simultaneously the Mission decided to undertake urgent consultations on the subject directly with the Government of the United Arab Republic. One of the members of the Mission, Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi, left for Cairo on 26 August for that purpose and returned to Geneva on 28 August. As a result of his consultations, the Government of the United Arab Republic agreed to the Mission holding meetings in Cairo and gave assurances that it would make every effort to facilitate the Mission's work. Furthermore, the United Arab Republic Government would make possible the presence of a high-level representative of the United Kingdom Government in Cairo under the auspices of the Mission.

256. On 30 August, the Mission received a response from Lord Shackleton: after careful examination, the United Kingdom Government had decided that it would not be possible for a British Minister to go to Cairo in the present circumstances; in view of the situation in South Arabia, the High Commissioner in Aden could not attend either. However, in view of the importance attached to the Mission's contacts in Cairo, Lord Shackleton would be prepared to meet the Mission in any capital of the Middle East with which the United Kingdom had diplomatic relations, or in Geneva, to discuss the results of its work. The United Kingdom Ambassador in Geneva, Sir Harold Beeley, would join the Mission in Cairo if it was so desired.

257. Convinced of the importance of having a British Minister directly available for discussions during its consultations with the nationalist elements, and guided by the considerations outlined in paragraphs 253 and 254 above, the Mission decided to proceed to Beirut as envisaged. It accordingly issued the following communiqué on 31 August 1967:

"In the light of recent developments in the Territory, the United Nations Special Mission on Aden has decided to proceed to Beirut with the main purpose of facilitating its contacts with the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front, which it invites to join it there.

"The Mission is also inviting the United Kingdom Government to send a delegation at the appropriate level for its meetings in Beirut, which will begin on 2 September."

B. Work of the Mission in Beirut

258. Upon its arrival in Beirut, the Mission learnt that the NLF would continue to boycott it. Statements appearing in the Press and attributed to Mr. Q. Ash-Shaabi in Zingibar, South Arabia, as well as to NLF spokesmen in Beirut, purported to indicate in specious terms that the Mission had been disqualified by listening to the "Sultans and stooges" in Geneva, and that it was not serving the aims of the people. J Unfortunately, therefore, the Mission became increasingly convinced that its aim of meeting the two nationalist Fronts in Beirut would not be realized.

259. On 4 September, the Mission received a message that FLOSY would welcome a meeting with the Mission in Cairo. According to the message, there were many reasons which made it inconvenient for FLOSY to proceed to Beirut.

260. Having regard to the foregoing, the Mission issued the following press communiqué on 4 September:

"Taking into consideration the decision reached by the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen in response to the invitation issued by the United Nations Special Mission on Aden on 31 August 1967, the Mission has decided to proceed to Cairo on Wednesday, 6 September, in order to hold meetings there. With a view to achieving the desired harmony among the nationalist movements in the Territory, and in order to facilitate the complete and effective implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Mission earnestly hopes that the National Liberation Front will be able to join in these meetings."

Discussions with Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio

261. On 5 September, Lord Shackleton arrived in Beirut and at a meeting with the Mission transmitted the following message from the High Commissioner, who had been in London for discussions with the United Kingdom Government:

"The situation in South Arabia has changed radically. The Federal Government neither functions nor has control of the Federation. All shades of opinion expect an initiative from me. If I take this initiative, we have a chance of peace. If I do nothing, we risk total chaos. This is why I am issuing the statement which Lord Shackleton has brought to you. I am sorry I could not consult you on this occasion. Believe me, I am anxious to work with you to bring peace to South Arabia and carry out the United Nations resolutions. I hope to have an early talk with you in the light of reactions to this statement, as the best way of continuing our common task."

262. He also transmitted the following text of a statement that the High Commissioner was expected to broadcast in Aden at about the same time the meeting was taking place:

"The British are leaving South Arabia and wish to leave the country at peace. On a number of occasions I have publicly stated that I hope to have discussions with leaders of political groups with a view to the formation of a Government fully representative of the people of South Arabia, which would replace the Federal Government. A new situation has now arisen, since the Federal Government has ceased to function and no longer exercises control in the Federation. It is urgently necessary that a new Government should take over. I recognize the Nationalist forces as representatives of the people and am ready to enter into discussions immediately with them. These discussions will include the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of an effective Government formed by the Nationalist forces in place of the Federal Government, internal security in Aden, the withdrawal of British forces, the execution of the United Nations resolutions, and independence for South Arabia. In order to begin these discussions at the earliest possible moment, I shall be glad to meet representatives of the National Liberation Front at a place to be mutually agreed. I sincerely hope that the discussions will lead to a peaceful independent South Arabia."

263. Lord Shackleton explained that in considering the initiative embodied in the above statement, the United King-

For press reports on this matter, see appendix VIII.

dom Government had been reluctant to appear to be taking unilateral action, without prior consultation with the Mission. Further his Government had been unwilling to put off FLOSY which had in a sense lost the civil war. However, in view of the urgency of the situation his Government had authorized the statement in order that bloodshed may be avoided. The wording was so framed as to respond to the sentiments expressed by Mr. Qahtan Ash-Shaabi at his recent press conference.

264. He stated that the NLF had ousted the State rulers in the Western and Central areas of the Federation and had possibly gone as far as Beihan, Aulaqi and Wahidi. The NLF seemed determined not to deal with FLOSY, at least at that stage. This, in his view, was the reason for the unwillingness of the NLF to meet with the Mission. Lord Shackleton also mentioned that during his discussions in London the High Commissioner had refrained from accepting the view of the NLF that it was the sole representative of the people of South Arabia. The South Arabian Army was keeping order but had no wish to interfere with political activity or to take over political power.

265. In conclusion Lord Shackleton expressed the belief that there might still be opportunities for the Mission to play a crucial role, but that at that juncture and having regard to the situation on the ground there was no alternative but to leave the matter to the High Commissioner.

266. The Mission reiterated its position that the participation of the two nationalist elements, FLOSY and the NLF, was necessary for the formation of a solid caretaker government. It recalled that Lord Shackleton himself had only recently voiced the conviction that FLOSY should be included in any future caretaker government. The arrangements proposed in the High Commissioner's statement left open the question of integrating the Eastern States with the remainder of the Territory. The Mission also noted that the United Kingdom Government had not seen fit to consult it about its latest initiative in the spirit of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. Finally the Mission expressed doubt whether the course of action initiated by the United Kingdom Government would in fact result in the avoidance of strife.

267. Lord Shackleton replied that it was still the objective of the British Government to establish a caretaker government with the assistance of the United Nations. However, a revolution had taken place, the "Federal Government" had collapsed, and the concern of the United Kingdom Government to avoid a gap between the dissolution of that Government and the formation of a new one had been overtaken by events. He was aware that the United Kingdom initiative would not be acceptable to everyone, but in his view the only alternative to negotiation was for the United Kingdom Government to ignore the recent developments, to do nothing, and thus run the risk of civil war. The High Commissioner would have no choice but to deal with the effective force on the ground. He considered that the NLF would be well advised to negotiate with other forces, particularly FLOSY, and to seek to bring in the Eastern States. Though it was the wish of the United Kingdom Government that the Eastern States should form part of the Territory, it had no control over them and all British officials had been removed from there.

268. On 6 September, Lord Shackleton met briefly with the Chairman of the Mission. He emphasized that in his broadcast, the High Commissioner had not excluded the possibility of FLOSY taking part in the proposed discussions. The High Commissioner's appeal had been addressed to all nationalist forces. The High Commissioner had issued supplementary announcements to that effect over Aden Radio. The final version of the High Commissioner's statement as broadcast had come to hand and was as follows:

"The British are leaving South Arabia and wish to leave the country at peace. On a number of occasions I have publicly stated that I hope to have discussions with leaders of political groups with a view to the formation of a government fully representative of the people of South Arabia, which would replace the Federal Government. A new situation has now arisen, since the Federal Government has ceased to function and no longer exercises control in the

Federation. It is urgently necessary that a new government should take over. I recognize the nationalist forces as representative of the people and am ready to enter into discussions immediately with them. These discussions will include the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of an effective government formed by the nationalist forces in place of the Federal Government, internal security in Aden, the withdrawal of British forces, the carrying out of United Nations resolutions and independence for South Arabia. I wish to begin these discussions at the earliest possible moment. In this connexion I am glad to note the readiness of leaders of the NLF to meet me to discuss these questions as reported after a press conference on 2 September. I shall be glad to meet them and I am ready to co-operate in arranging such a meeting. I sincerely hope that these discussions will lead to a peaceful independent South Arabia."

269. Lord Shackleton said that notwithstanding the fact that the British had been forced to enter into discussions on the ground so as to prevent bloodshed, they did not consider the situation solved. FLOSY was exercising influence in some areas of the Territory. Unless FLOSY and the NLF came together he thought it unlikely that there would be a solution. He expressed the hope that the Mission would continue its work. Should any progress be made during the talks of the Mission with FLOSY in Cairo, he and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan would wish to meet with it again at any mutually convenient place.

Meeting with Acting President of Aden Trades Union Congress

270. On 5 September, the Mission met the Acting President of the Aden Trades Union Congress, Mr. Ali A. Aswadi who submitted to it the following memorandum:

"The Aden Trades Union Congress wishes to inform you that the strange and artificial moves being in the area to isolate the revolutionary forces represented in FLOSY are the work of British colonialism and of its intelligence. These moves are directed towards two objectives:

- "(i) To take advantage of the present circumstances of the Arab nation following the Israel aggression in order to hand over the area, if possible, to a band of criminals, assassins and bandits;
- "(ii) To weaken and embarrass FLOSY locally and internationally and force it to co-operate with a group of killers, assassins and traditional friends of Britain within an interim government.

"Suffice it to say that while your Mission is on its way to Cairo in order to meet with the leaders of FLOSY, the United Kingdom for its part has announced its readiness to come to an understanding with a group which it brought to life under the name of the NLF. This is the proof that Britain is creating contradictions and complicating the Mission's task.

"I wish to take this opportunity to appeal to you on behalf of the workers of the Occupied Arab South to stop imperialist plots in our area by implementing all resolutions of the United Nations in letter and spirit; you would be contributing in bringing stability to our people and in sparing them the horrors of destruction, the seeds of which have been planted by colonialism. The United Nations would have earned the increasing appreciation of our people who are now looking forward to a better life."

271. Mr. Aswadi denounced the latest plans of British colonialism in the region. He said that the British authorities had resorted to the creation of feeble forces whose members wanted power only. They had surrounded these forces with a false aura of struggle, magnifying their importance and fabricating news about their alleged successes. British colonialism had failed to deceive the true revolutionaries and fighters into making them work with it; it had therefore resorted to a group of people who had broken away from the revolution. It had tried to give the impression that these people were the only forces in the country. Having tried without success the old method of reliance on its traditional friends among the federal rulers and ministers, the United Kingdom had brought to the force forces which had already been rejected by the

people because they had fought against every revolutionary organism in the area.

272. He added that the astonishing ease with which the local rulers had fled their capitals, leaving behind their position and their power, was evidence of the clever way in which British colonialism was planning its moves and paving the way, through its powerful information media, to hand over the country to its new agents after having failed to reach a satisfactory solution accepted by all nationalist elements. The Front whose success had been hailed in the last ten days by Britain was nothing but a small group of opportunists who had been deceived by British policy.

Meeting with Sheikh Mohammed Farid, Sharif Qaid bin Husscin, and Mr. M. H. Obali

273. The Mission met with Sheikh Mohammed Farid (Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom), Sheikh Qaid bin Hussein (Beihan) and Mr. M. H. Obali at their request on 6 September.

274. Sheikh Farid informed the Mission that they were convinced that the United Kingdom Government had persuaded them to proceed to Geneva on a false errand so that no Government would be functioning in the Territory while the British plot was being implemented. Explaining why they thought that recent developments were the outcome of a British plot, he said that the British authorities had not encouraged the South Arabian Army to take any action when the disturbances began. The High Commissioner had said at that time that as there were no governments in the States, he could not give instructions. This lack of opposition had emboldened the NLF to extend its activities and to occupy several States. That a deliberate plot had been hatched to this end was clear from the fact that FLOSY elements had been repulsed by the British when they attempted to occupy Kirsh and other places during the same period. It was perfectly clear in their view that the object of the United Kingdom Government was to put the NLF in a strong position so that when the time came for negotiation on the formation of a new government that movement would be given correspondingly larger representation. The implementation of the plot had begun only a few days after their departure from Aden for Geneva. Sheikh Farid added that while they were in Geneva they had asked the United Kingdom representative why the British authorities had not intervened against the NLF, and they had been told in reply that the British authorities had no right to intervene outside Aden. Sheikh Farid pointed out there was a clear contradiction between this attitude and the deliberate attempt to bring the NLF to power.

275. He added that further evidence of British complicity in the recent developments had been furnished by the kidnapping of the ruler of Wahidi who had accompanied them to Geneva. On his return, the ruler had been provided by the British authorities, at his request, with air transportation, from Aden to his home State. In Ataq, he was picked up by a Royal Air Force helicopter for the remainder of the journey. Since then he had been neither seen nor heard of, but the helicopter had been discovered undamaged and in mysterious circumstances.

276. Sheikh Farid handed the Mission an extract of a statement he had issued to the Press (see appendix IX).

277. In conclusion, Sheikh Mohammed Farid said they were convinced that the United Kingdom Government had encouraged the NLF to boycott the Mission. In their view, the NLF by itself could not stay in power; there would be a repetition of the situation in Yemen. The only solution lay in a coalition between the various political parties, and the last hope for South Arabia was in the Mission bringing pressure to bear on the United Kingdom Government not to proceed with its plans. The Mission should clearly condemn the British manœuvre, persuade the parties to form a government and recommend United Nations supervision of elections to be held in the near future.

C. Work of the Mission in Cairo

Meetings with FLOSY

278. From 9 to 11 September, the Mission held three meetings with a delegation of FLOSY, which consisted of Mr. A.

Q. Mackawee, Secretary-General of FLOSY, Mr. Basendwah, Mr. Taha Muqbil and ten other civil and military representatives of the movement.

279. The FLOSY delegation thanked the Mission for its goodwill towards the nationalists and emphasized its confidence in the Mission. It was convinced that the Mission's efforts were geared towards the achievement of an honourable solution to the problem of South Arabia. As had already been conveyed to the Mission, FLOSY remained the sole and true representative of the people of the Territory. This legitimate claim was substantiated by facts: the recent events and particularly the general strike of 5 September had given ample proof that FLOSY was the leader of the masses. The success of the strike not only in Aden but in the Territory as a whole had been interpreted by world opinion as a form of popular referendum in favour of FLOSY. Neither the British authorities nor any other group were real masters of the land.

280. FLOSY accused the British authorities of fomenting clashes between the nationalist elements so as ultimately to eliminate all of them. He held them responsible for the prevailing chaos, disorder and bloodshed. Their recent attempt to hand over the country to the Federal Army would have plunged it into civil war, and would in consequence have enabled the British to emerge as the victors from a disorderly situation. He outlined the position of FLOSY as it had recently been determined by the party's revolutionary council in Taiz. First, FLOSY had established itself as the dominant political element in the Territory and, as such, it had the right to form a central caretaker government. Secondly, FLOSY was prepared to incorporate the NLF, which was a party of minor importance, in this government and to co-operate with it, provided that FLOSY was entrusted with the responsibility of forming the government, but it could not grant representation to any other force in the country such as the sultans or others. Thirdly, FLOSY insisted that the Territory was an integral unit including both the Eastern States and the islands; the British intention to internationalize Perim was totally inacceptable. Fourthly, FLOSY considered that the sultans, the Ministers of the so-called "Federal Government", South Arabian League and all other bankrupt parties should be eliminated. Finally it was vital that all British forces should be immediately withdrawn and all British military bases removed.

281. The Mission observed that it was less concerned with evaluating the strength of the various elements, than with bringing them together and attaining the objectives of the General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) and avoiding bloodshed. The Mission then asked to be informed about FLOSY's recent contacts with the NLF and hoped that the two nationalist parties could work together at reaching a settlement of their differences and thus facilitate the implementation of the resolution. Time was of the essence as the Mission had to report very soon to the Special Committee.

282. Mr. Mackawee stated that FLOSY was very openminded about the question of discussions with the NLF. He recalled that at the time of his visit to New York he had given the impression that FLOSY and the NLF were about to come to an agreement. Things had changed and trouble had developed that had prevented the agreement from materializing. It had been eventually discovered that those who had claimed to represent the NLF Supreme Council had had no authority to commit that body. New contacts had been made, the latest one a few days before the Mission's arrival, but the NLF had no one in Cairo who could speak with authority. FLOSY was now waiting for an official NLF delegation from the Territory to enter into serious discussions. It would welcome any assistance the Mission could give in this matter, with the understanding that FLOSY was supreme in the Territory.

283. FLOSY was convinced the Mission was genuinely anxious to bring the colonial régime in Aden to an end, but stressed that there would be serious trouble unless that régime was replaced by the true representatives of the people. It was because of its own restraint and confidence in its strength, that FLOSY had accepted to meet with the Mission while others were boycotting it. The hostility of the United Kingdom Government towards FLOSY stemmed from the good relations which FLOSY maintained with Cairo and with the progressive Arab

countries; FLOSY was the only party having official representation in Sudan, Algeria, Syria and Iraq and was recognized by the Arab League as the sole legitimate representative of the people.

284. The Mission emphasized the importance it attached to co-operation between the nationalist movements. The division if it continued would make more difficult the attainment of the objectives of the United Nations resolutions. Further the United Kingdom had recognized that FLOSY should be represented in the negotiations for the transfer of power. It was time for all to sit together and try to work out their differences.

285. Mr. Mackawee informed the Mission that a special messenger of the NLF had gone to Aden to obtain authority to discuss "certain terms provisionally agreed upon". He had been delayed because of the strike but a reply was expected any time, as the agreed deadline was 9 September. Mr. Mackawee agreed on the necessity of sitting together with the NLF but so far the NFL had shown no sign of goodwill. However, Lord Shackleton's statements to which the Mission had referred were contradictory. By making tempting offers to the NLF, the United Kingdom was presumably encouraging the NLF in its refusal to meet with the Mission. There was very little FLOSY could do about the attitude of the NLF. Showing open-mindedness and tolerance FLOSY had always treated the NLF like a younger brother. It did not deny the NLF's existence but the question was the extent of its importance; it was of less importance than FLOSY. FLOSY was prepared to co-operate with the NLF but it could not budge from certain basic principles; because of its predominance it should be entrusted with the task of forming the caretaker government.

286. The Mission expressed its readiness to meet and hold discussions with the NLF if its leaders were to come to Cairo within a few days, but it could not be kept immobilized indefinitely. It reiterated that its task was to promote the emergence to genuine independence of South Arabia, with its human territorial and national integrity unimpaired. In its view, an agreement between FLOSY and the NLF was very important even though it could not propose at that stage the manner in which this agreement should come about. In the final analysis it was up to the parties to decide, but it should be borne in mind that procrastination would only hurt the cause of South Arabia. In conclusion the Mission indicated that in the absence of a response from the NLF to its invitation it was preparing to leave for New York where it would submit its report. By so doing it was not closing the door; it would be ready to communicate further with FLOSY and to hold meetings in New York with the nationalists if there was a chance of a positive outcome. The Mission would be equally ready to go to Aden should a visit be necessary in the interest of the effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions concerning the Territory.

287. Mr. Mackawee stated his conviction that the Mission's recommendations would be formulated with the sole interest of the people of South Arabia in mind. He looked to the United Nations to put an end to the present disorder and bloodshed. It was the duty of the United Nations to do so if it wished to discharge its responsibility to the international community. Mr. Mackawee solemnly promised that should FLOSY take over the task of running the country, peace and freedom would prevail.

Contacts with the United Arab Republic Government

288. While in Cairo the Mission had a useful exchange of views with the United Arab Republic Presidential Assistant for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzy, and other senior officials. The Assistant to the President informed the Mission that the Government of the United Arab Republic as a United Nations Member and an Arab country was deploying its efforts to promote understanding among the nationalist leaders and cohesion between elements in the South. He hoped this would contribute to the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Mission welcomed the efforts of the United Arab Republic Government, and expressed itself in favour of collaboration between the leadership of the two nationalist movements. The success of its work depended to a great extent on

bringing together all important political elements in the Territory. It was essential that effective steps should be taken to bring the divergent views of these elements together so that a dialogue aimed at the formation of a caretaker government could be undertaken. The Mission was also anxious that the territorial integrity of the country should be preserved upon independence.

Communications from the United Kingdom Government

289. On 9 September, the Mission received the following message from Sir Humphrey Trevelyan:

"The following is my report on the situation here. As you are aware, I made it clear through Aden Radio that the expression 'nationalist forces' in my statement included both FLOSY and the NLF and that I was ready to have discussions with both. The South Arabian Army have now issued a statement declaring the area north of Aden and surrounding the Federal Capital to be a military controlled area. They have called for a cessation of interfactional fighting and have appealed to FLOSY and the NLF to come forward in answer to the British Government's call for negotiations, promising their support only to those who respond. I hope that this statement will have a stabilising effect on the present dangerous situation, that we can now move towards negotiations and that you will be able to persuade FLOSY to play their part accordingly. This would be a most valuable contribution to our task. I hope we can continue to keep in close touch and I shall send periodic reports of the situation as before.'

VIII. Subsequent work of the Mission

Introduction

290. Following its return to New York, the Mission undertook the preparation of its report, while pursuing its contacts with the representative of the United Kingdom, the representatives of a number of Arab States and the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Consultations with the representative of the United Kingdom

291. On 13 September 1967, the Mission was informed by the representative of the United Kingdom that the situation in the Territory was still confused, particularly in tribal areas. There had been armed clashes between the supporters of FLOSY and the NLF. The South Arabian Army was the only stabilizing factor, although there was still fear that it would disintegrate along factional lines. The Army had been making attempts to pacify the area in and around Aden and to get nationalist leaders to agree on a settlement. It had fixed the date of 20 September for the nationalist leaders to be ready to communicate to it their willingness to negotiate with the British authorities. The representative of the

^k The following is the text of the South Arabian Army statement broadcast on 9 September 1967, as transmitted to the Mission by the representative of the United Kingdom:

[&]quot;A meeting of the commanders of the South Arabian Armed Forces was held at 1200 hours on 9 September 1967. The following officers attended 1 SAA (a) Aqid Nasir Buraik Aulaqi (b) Aqid Muhammed Ahmad Aulaqi (c) Aqid Muhammad Sa'id Yaf'i (d) Aqid Ahmas Muhammad Hasana SAP (e) Aqid Abdul Hadi Muhammad Shihab (f) Aqid Abdullah Salih Aulaqi.

[&]quot;The following decisions were taken at the meeting:

[&]quot;(i) To call on the High Commissioner to issue a statement that there is no ban on any NLF or FLOSY leaders entering South Arabia and that they may enter the area whenever they wish;

[&]quot;(ii) To call on the leaders of the two fronts to come together in any part of South Arabia in order to meet a board composed of senior officers of the South Arabian Armed Forces for discussions about the decisions taken by the senior Arab officers on 6 September 1967, consisting in short of an end to fighting between the two fronts and negotiation on the resolutions concerning independence for South Arabia.

United Kingdom felt that the Mission should also concentrate on the aim of getting the nationalist forces to work together and to enter into negotiations with the Army and with the United Kingdom Government. There was a dangerous situation "on the ground", and little hope of a solution unless the NFL and FLOSY reached an agreement between themselves. He believed that the Mission could still made a contribution in promoting unity and harmony among the nationalists.

292. The Mission emphasized that it was always prepared to do whatever it could for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution. It realized that the situation was still far from being solved. While preparing its report, it would still be available for meetings with the nationalists, particularly the NLF. It had been willing to prolong its stay in Cairo for that purpose and had not excluded further contacts in New York. If an agreement was to be reached between the parties concerned before the completion of its report, the Mission would welcome it.

293. The Mission reminded the representative of the United Kingdom that while in Geneva it had warned Lord Shackleton of the necessity of careful negotiations to bring the various elements together. However, an initiative had been taken later on by the United Kingdom Government without prior consultation with the Mission, and although the statement broadcast by the High Commissioner on 5 September had been slightly modified from the original version shown to it, the appeal contained in it was still more oriented towards the NLF than towards FLOSY. The appeal had stipulated that any negotiations should take place in Aden, while FLOSY wished those negotiations to be undertaken elsewhere. In the Mission's view the offer made by the High Commissioner in his broadcast might have contributed to the NLF decision not to alter its attitude of non-co-operation with the Mission. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom Government not to send a British Cabinet Minister to Cairo had not been helpful in bringing the elements concerned together, as had been envisaged by the Mission.

294. In a letter dated 21 September 1967, the representative of the United Kingdom set out in detail the reasons and background of his Government's recent actions in South Arabia (see appendix X below). He stated that in the last week of August the situation had become extremely dangerous. The NLF and FLOSY had continued to contend for position; central authority had collapsed outside Aden, with persons acting in the name of the NLF taking over in most States. The Federal Government had ceased to be effective and the Army had refused to take over. Together with the Arab civil servants, the Army had pressed the High Commissioner to negotiate with the nationalist groups. There were no longer British troops in any of the States of the Protectorate. The South Arabian Forces had made it clear that if the British authorities could not at once agree to deal with the insurgents, they could not be responsible for the consequences.

295. The letter went on to say that the threat to order and public security had been a matter that had to be dealt with very rapidly; indeed it had not been physically within the power of the United Kingdom to hold the situation locally while efforts had been continued outside the Territory to get all the parties to agree to share power. This had been particularly so since the dominating insurgents of the NLF had flatly refused all suggestions, including that of the Mission, of discussions outside South Arabia with the Mission or with other factions, while FLOSY and others had been unwilling to negotiate in Aden on the only basis which had seemed possible in the short term. It had been feared that if the

An announcer then quoted a High Commissioner spokesman as saying that, speaking on behalf of the High Commissioner, he confirmed that there was no restriction on NLF or FLOSY leaders entering the Federation. British position was not made clear immediately, there would be rapid disintegration on all fronts, growing confusion and heavy bloodshed and human suffering; the divisions within South Arabia would be deepened. In order to hold the situation and make it possible for negotiations to take place before it was too late, the High Commissioner had been authorized to make his broadcast. He had made no distinction between the nationalist parties; he had been, and remained, ready to talk to any and all who would come forward.

296. Lord Caradon pointed out that the statement of the High Commissioner had been warmly welcomed on all sides in Aden and that the Army had since taken positive steps towards getting some compromise between FLOSY and the NLF. On 6 and 9 September, they had broadcast over Aden Radio a call to the leaders of the two Fronts to come together in any part of South Arabia to discuss an end to fighting between them and negotiation on the resolutions concerning independence. The Army had arranged a local truce and the reciprocal release of prisoners and had some hope of extending this to the political field. The security situation had improved and there was some revival of commercial activity. The High Commissioner had been able to step up the release of political detainees, while the planned withdrawal of British forces had continued on schedule. In all these respects, the purposes of the United Nations resolutions were being progressively ful-

297. The United Kingdom representative concluded his letter by stating that a new Government was urgently necessary in South Arabia. He foresaw more need for the close involvement of the United Nations especially in helping to ensure that the wishes of the people found their full and free expression in determining the future of the country.

298. The Mission replied with the following letter dated 22 September 1967 to the representative of the United Kingdom:

"I would like, on behalf of the Mission, to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21 September 1967, the contents of which have been duly noted. The Mission will refer to some of the points contained therein in the report which it is now preparing and the completion of which is its most urgent task. However, should circumstances warrant it, the Mission would be ready to undertake further discussions with those concerned in the hope of contributing towards the fulfilment of the objectives of resolution 2183 (XXI) and as long as its mandate continues to be in effect."

299. On 21 September the following message was communicated to the Mission from the High Commissioner in Aden concerning the situation in the Territory:

"The situation in Aden has considerably improved in the last fortnight. After a few days of inter-factional fighting, an inter-factional truce was arranged by the South Arabian Forces and now for some days there have been virtually no incidents of violence between the factions, and indeed very few against the British Forces. The South Arabian Army have taken over internal security in Little Aden and are taking over in Shaikh Othman and Mansura on 24 September. By this date the Mansoura Detention Centre will have been closed and only fifty detainees will remain in British custody. Locally there is some revival of confidence and hope for the future.

"The South Arabian Army have taken most useful action both in stopping inter-factional fighting and in stabilizing the situation around Aden. They have made it their principal aim to secure an agreement between FLOSY and the NLF, and are working hard to this end.

"In the Western Protectorate the situation is by no means clear. Inter-tribal fighting on traditional lines has broken out in a number of places, the political labels of the various factions being merely a reflection of old tribal antipathies. The NLF have a strong hold over the whole Central area and are predominant in the West, though there are areas of FLOSY influence, supported by reinforcements from the Yemen, in Western Lahej and the Radfan and one or two other places. There has been inter-factional fighting in Dhala. In the Eastern part of the Western Protectorate, FLOSY have at present the major influence in the towns of Wahidi, the Upper Aulaqi Sul-

[&]quot;(iii) To appeal to President Abdul Nasser to use his popularity and influence to end fighting between the two fronts and to help the revolutionary forces unite to preserve their revolutionary gains in accordance with the real situation in the area.

[&]quot;(iv) In view of the dangerous situation in the area, the two parties are requested to announce their replies on these requests before Wednesday 20 September 1967."

tanate and the Aulaqi Shaikhdom, though the NLF have considerable tribal support. The NLF appear to have taken over in Mukalla and claim to be expanding in their influence to other towns in the Qa'iti Sultanate. They may be expected to make a bid for power in Kathiri also very soon. In general, the situation is fluid, though the NLF seem to be the stronger.

"Both the NLF and FLOSY appear to be rather more willing to move towards an accommodation, the best hope of this being that it should be arranged through the South Arabian Army. We are encouraging them by every means possible to work towards an agreement between the parties."

300. In messages dated 23 and 24 September 1967, the High Commissioner informed the Mission that the South Arabian Army had just made a new attempt to bring the NLF and FLOSY together. Invitations had been issued to the two Fronts to meet by 30 September at Asmara or Khartoum, or possibly Beirut. In a pamphlet issued in Aden, FLOSY had proposed negotiations under the personal supervision of the President of the United Arab Republic, at Cairo, or if the NLF refused to go to Cairo, "in any Arab land—Taiz, Sanaa, Algiers. Baghdad, Damascus or Khartoum". An NLF leaflet issued in Aden later on stated that the NLF was ready to waive their insistence on meeting inside South Arabia and to meet as soon as possible outside.

Public statement by the Mission

301. The Mission took due notice of the above messages conveyed to it by the administering Power. Concomitantly, it was gratified to note from press reports that a joint statement had been issued in Cairo by representatives of FLOSY and the NLF, Mr. A. Q. Mackawee and Mr. Abdullatif Ash-Shaabi respectively, calling for an end to inter-factional strife as of Tuesday morning, 26 September 1967. The statement promised the reciprocal release of detainees and announced that the two Fronts would meet for discussions in Cairo beginning 3 October 1967. The delegations of FLOSY and the NLF would be fully empowered to conclude an agreement on national unity; on the formation of a central transitional government which would receive power from the United Kingdom; on the preparation of a programme of action for the period of transition, and on the preparation of a provisional constitution which would be applied during the transitional

302. Bearing in mind general developments in the area and the statements of the two nationalist movements, the Mission issued the following public statement on 26 September:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden has taken note of the recent efforts undertaken by the leaders of the nationalist movements of the Territory to settle their differences and to establish co-operation between themselves. The Mission considers that the importance of attaining these objectives increases as the date set for the independence of of Territory approaches.

"The Mission accordingly expresses the fervent hope that the efforts under way will be crowned with success and thus facilitate the effective implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolution in the interests of peace and unity in the Territory.

"The Mission is currently completing its report. However, if the situation demands, the Mission will be willing and ready to continue its assistance in bringing about the necessary understanding among the parties concerned."

Further messages from the administering Power

303. In a message from the High Commissioner dated 2 October, the Mission was informed that the NLF had issued a pamphlet in Aden in which it endorsed the statement issued in Cairo by Mr. Ashaabi and Mr. Mackawee, and called for a continuation of the inter-factional truce. The pamphlet said that national unity must be achieved by an agreement worked out by the NLF and FLOSY on the basis:

"(i) That the Fronts should reach a common attitude towards Britain;

- "(ii) That a coalition Government of the two Fronts should be established according to the measure of the support they enjoy in order to receive sovereignty from Britain;
- "(iii) That there should be agreement not to co-operate in any way with the South Arabian League, the Sultans or their representatives or Mr. Bayoomi's Party."

In conclusion, the pamphlet stated that the NLF would send a delegation to Cairo to put forward its point of view and details of its plans for co-ordination between the two Fronts.

304. On 3 October, the High Commissioner reported that the NLF Committee appeared to have established their control in the urban areas of the Qa'iti State both on the coast and in the Wadi Hadhramaut. A number of leading personalities in Mukalla connected with the former administration or with FLOSY had been arrested. The Qa'iti State had been nominally abolished and the provincial administration was being reconstituted. The NLF were also reported to have taken over the Kathiri State apparently at the request of the administration there. The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion and the State forces were reported to be co-operating with the NLF administration, but their precise relations with the NLF Committee were in doubt.

305. On 10 October 1967, the Mission received a further message from the High Commissioner informing it of his intention to issue a statement in Aden on 12 October, to emphasize the urgency of progress in securing agreement between the nationalists on an early negotiation with Britain. The text of the statement was as follows:

"The British Government welcome the Conference arranged between representatives of the two South Arabian political groups, FLOSY and the NLF. Independence is now imminent and there can be no advantage to South Arabia in the maintenance of the British presence. It is in the interests of the country that the British should soon withdraw and that South Arabians should assume the responsibilities of Government. The British Government wish to have good relations with the new South Arabia which will be completely independent.

"The preparations for the final withdrawal of British forces are now at an advanced stage and can be completed within a short period. The South Arabian Army has already taken over internal security in a large part of Aden and will soon have the military capacity to take over the remainder.

"The urgent decisions necessary before independence can, with good will, be taken quickly. The British Government sincerely hope that at the Conference in Cairo a representative body will be speedily formed to negotiate the final arrangements for independence. They are prepared to to enter into negotiations immediately with any body set up by the Conference for this purpose."

306. The Mission took due notice of the messages from the High Commissioner without being in a position to ascertain for itself the developments in the Territory.

Communication addressed by the Mission to the Secretary-General

307. On 12 October 1967, the Mission addressed the following communication to the Secretary-General, reproduced in document A/AC.109/277.

"As you will recall, on 15 September 1967 Ambassador Abdussattar Shalizi informed you, on behalf of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden. that the Mission expected to submit its report by the end of that month.

"A few days later the Mission received reports to the effect that the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front were to hold meetings in Cairo in order to discuss plans for co-ordination between the two movements and to establish a basis for the transfer of power from the Government of the United Kingdom.

"For all practical purposes the report of the Mission is complete in so far as its activities hitherto are concerned. Nevertheless, before presenting its report, the Mission considers it advisable to await the outcome of the meetings, which have already started, in view of their significance. In a press communiqué issued on 26 September 1967, the Mission has expressed the fervent hope that the efforts under way will be crowned with success and thus facilitate the effective implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, in the interests of peace and unity in the Territory.

"I would greatly appreciate your conveying the foregoing to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for its information."

IX. Announcement by the United Kingdom of Early Withdrawal from South Arabia

Communication from the administering Power

308. In a message communicated to the Mission on 26 October, the High Commissioner stated that pointless violence had been renewed in the middle of October and that there had recently been a real danger that the armed forces might split on tribal lines. The stability of the South Arabian forces remained the paramount requirement, but they would be subjected to increasingly severe strains until a Government took charge.

309. The High Commissioner considered it urgently necessary that the parties in Cairo should come to agreement, take over the Government and negotiate final British withdrawal. It had been nearly two months since the United Kingdom had offered to negotiate its withdrawal with the nationalist groups and since the South Arabian Army had urged negotiations on them. The South Arabians must now be prepared to take on the responsibility of government without further delay. The country was in a dangerous state through want of leadership and direction. The High Commissioner hoped the Mission would strongly urge the parties to finish their negotiations in Cairo and take over the Government of South Arabia now.

Agreement between FLOSY and the NLF

310. On 1 November 1967, an announcement was made in Cairo to the effect that agreement had been reached between FLOSY and the NLF on matters they had discussed so far and on the formation of a common delegation to negotiate transfer of power from the United Kingdom Government. Consequently, the Mission sent the following message to FLOSY and the NLF:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden has learned with gratification news of the agreement reached between FLOSY and the NLF to establish full co-operation between themselves and to lay down a basis for negotiation of the transfer of power from the United Kingdom Government. The Mission congratulates all nationalists on this important achievement which is in the interest of peace and unity in the area. The Mission wishes you all success in your efforts to establish a representative government."

Statement by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in the House of Commons

311. On 2 November 1967 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a statement in the House of Commons in which he announced "new and firm decisions" on the question of South Arabia. These decisions had already been communicated to the Mission by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations on 31 October (see appendix XI below).

312. The Foreign Secretary stated that it was over eight weeks since the High Commissioner in Aden had declared his readiness to negotiate with the nationalists and since the South Arabian Forces had called upon the two factions to resolve their differences and to form a common front for negotiation with the High Commissioner. It was a month since the groups had finally started talks between themselves in Cairo. Despite appeals from many quarters, there had been no sign of any progress until 1 November. On the contrary

there had been increasing tension between the factions in South Arabia itself who continued to press for supremacy. The British Government had to take account of the consequences of this prolonged uncertainty with its constant danger that the divisions in the country might divide the South Arabian Forces. Only the night before had the groups negotiating in Cairo announced that they had reached agreement on matters they had discussed so far, and that they would shortly be able to reach agreement on the composition of a delegation to negotiate with the British Government. The Foreign Secretary welcomed this development and looked forward to negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

313. The Foreign Secretary recalled that, in his statement on 19 June (see para. 170 above), he had warned that events in Yemen, South Arabia and the Middle East in general could have effects which might make it essential to reconsider the proposals he had announced at that time. He had also made it quite clear that the British Government had serious doubts about the soundness and durability of the Federation of South Arabia. Since then events had justified those warnings and reservations. The United Kingdom retained the objectives it had often stated, namely to withdraw her forces in good order and to leave behind, if possible, a united, stable and independent country; but the events since June had caused it to reconsider how best to achieve those objectives.

314. The Foreign Secretary stated that:

"The independence of South Arabia would take place in the second half of November and all British forces would be withdrawn at that time. The precise date for independence and withdrawal would be announced by the middle of November. Early withdrawal would reduce any danger that British Forces might become involved and sustain casualties in any renewed violence by or among the South Arabian factions. He considered that the radical nationalists and other groups must face and resolve their own problems themselves. In those circumstances some things which the United Kingdom had expected to settle before independence might have to be left pending.

"He stated that early withdrawal would also help the South Arabian Forces; they were ready to take over fully now; the High Commissioner and the British Commander-in-Chief in Aden were satisfied that these forces would no longer expect the support of British units,

"The changed circumstances in Yemen had removed the danger the Federal Government and the Federal Armed Forces had faced in June and thus the British offer of deterrent naval and air forces for a period after independence had become irrelevant. Consequently the United Kingdom had cancelled its plans for naval and V-bomber deterrent forces although a substantial naval force was concentrated at Aden to cover the period of withdrawal and independence.

"With reference to the offer of financial support to the Federal Government for three years after independence and the offer of support for the Eastern Aden Protectorate Forces, they had always been subject to review if political circumstances made their continuance inappropriate. These questions would be left for decision later, when the future might be clearer. The formation and attitude of a new government would be important factors, but it was impossible to prejudge them.

"With reference to the island of Perim, the view of both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Special Mission on Aden had been that the proposal for internationalisation could not be entertained since it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations resolutions. Moreover all Arab countries represented at the United Nations had sent a joint formal communication to the Secretary-General opposing the separation of Perim from South Arabia. It was clear that when the question was debated at the United Nations the proposal would be rejected. There was no question of retaining British sovereignty or responsibility for Perim after the independence of South Arabia. The island would stay with South Arabia, unless its inhabitants against expectation were to demand otherwise."

Statement issued by the Armed Forces of the Territory on 6 November

315. The following statement was issued by officers of the Armed Forces High Command on 6 November and was communicated to the Mission by the administering Power.

"They recognize the NLF as the only organization legally representing the people of South Arabia. They appeal to the NLF to enter into discussion with the High Commissioner to take over total power from Britain.

"They request that the British Government should recognize the NLF as the only representative organization of the people of South Arabia and to enter into negotiations with it to hand over sovereignty immediately.

"The South Arabian Armed Forces pledge their full support for the NLF.

"The South Arabian Armed Forces do not recognise any longer any other Front or Party claiming to represent the people of South Arabia and will oppose such Front or Party that stands against the will of the people which is represented only by the NLF."

316. The following message from the High Commissioner in Aden was simultaneously transmitted to the Mission:

"Inter-factional fighting, mainly in the areas under control of the South Arabian Army, has been intense in the last few days. This has been expected for some time, having followed a build-up of arms over a number of weeks. The Army tried without success to arrange a truce and finally, as you will have seen, declared yesterday that it supported only the NLF. It is generally considered that, though there have been some resignations, this decision will not seriously affect the Army's cohesion. Today the situation seems quieter and the Army appears confident, with whatever justification, that with the support of the NLF they will be able to deal with the FLOSY/PORF faction.

"Even before this, Adenis had given up hope of the Cairo Conference producing any agreement especially after the NLF command had telegraphed to their delegates in Cairo to withdraw. It now seems likely that, whether the NLF come forward to negotiate with us or not, they, with the support of the Army, will form the first Government on independence. Thus the disunity of the South Arabian factions has defeated all attempts to establish a caretaker Government representative of all of them and one group is emerging as, for the moment at any rate, the dominant political force, But one cannot of course prophesy events in South Arabia even in the shortest term.

"As you know, we have been supporting the Cairo Conference and had hoped that, long before this, it would have established a body with which we could conduct our final negotiations but the Conference did not proceed with the necessary sense of urgency and was overtaken by events on the ground. We can now only wait developments here."

X. Conclusions

317. At the time that the Special Mission on Aden undertook its assignment in March 1967, the situation in the Territory which the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 had described as critical and explosive had shown further deterioration. Disturbances and incidents involving loss of life, particularly in Aden, were occurring almost daily. The state of emergency in the "Federation of South Arabia" had been in force since December 1963 and hundreds of people had been placed in detention.

318. The Mission has approached its task with objectivity, constantly bearing in mind the letter and spirit of resolutions 2183 (XXI) and 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly, and of other relevant resolutions of the United Nations. It was bent on acting in consultation with and enlisting the cooperation of the administering Power, "the only authority responsible to the United Nations for the full implementation of the resolutions". Unfortunately, failure by the administering Power to establish a climate of confidence in the Territory added to the difficulties faced by the Mission—all the more so, since the administering Power at times seemed to choose

a course of action not in keeping with the efforts of the Mission.

319. The Mission was also guided by certain overriding considerations, such as the necessity of safeguarding the territorial integrity of South Arabia, the achievement of true and genuine independence by the Territory, the promotion of peace and harmony among all sections of the people, and the time-limit set for independence by the administering Power.

320. Having regard to this situation and bound by the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), the Special Mission endeavoured at the outset of its work to make as many contacts as were necessary and possible to enable it to assess conditions in the Territory. It was impressed by the need to proceed with a sense of urgency not only in order to forestall further aggravation in the situation but particularly to facilitate the full and effective implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Accordingly the Mission made efforts at all stages of its work to contribute to a reduction of existing tensions and to bring about the abolition of the state of emergency. Although later on as from September 1967, a substantial number of detainees were released, the maintenance by the United Kingdom Government of the state of emergency could not but have hampered normal political activity in the Territory and prejudiced the successful discharge of the Mission's task.

321. In the discharge of its task, the Mission constantly bore in mind that the "Federal Government" had been qualified in the relevant United Nations resolutions as an unrepresentative régime and therefore made it clear that all its official contacts in respect of the Territory would have to be made through the United Kingdom as the administering Power. During the discussions held in London during March 1967, the United Kingdom Government had given the Mission the assurance that it accepted these considerations as the basis for the Mission's activities in the Territory. Nevertheless that Government failed to ensure that the authorities in Aden cooperated with the Mission on that basis, or facilitated free and unimpeded contact with the people.

322. In its subsequent discussions with representatives of the United Kingdom Government, the Mission emphasized that the central caretaker Government as envisaged in the resolution of the General Assembly could not be an outgrowth of the "Federal Government". It should be a newly established Government which would take over upon the dissolution of the existing authorities, on the basis of agreement among the parties concerned. It pointed out that the process leading to independence could not be practically conceived along the traditional British pattern of decolonization. In the prevailing circumstances, there was no room for a constitutional conference but rather bilateral consultations aimed at an agreement of all parties concerned under the auspices of the United Nations.

323. The Mission was equally insistent on the need to give practical effect to the principle of territorial integrity as defined in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), which affirmed that the Eastern Aden Protectorate and the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other off-shore islands are an integral part of the Territory. In this connexion, the Mission had in mind that while the United Kingdom Government had voted in favour of the above-mentioned resolution, it had not taken the necessary practical steps to ensure that the Territory acceded to independence as one unit. Indeed during August 1967 the United Kingdom Government submitted to the United Nations a proposal for the internationalization of Perim, a proposal which the Mission could not entertain as it considered it to be in contradiction with the United Nations resolutions. Further, although the Mission stressed the undesirability of extending aid to any of the States which did not accept the principle of territorial integrity, the United Kingdom Government pledged military and other assistance to the Eastern Aden Protectorate.

324. Likewise the Mission emphasized the contradiction between the pre-emptive military arrangements proposed by the United Kingdom Government and the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Mission also expressed serious misgivings regarding the enactment of a new constitution

prepared by the "Federal Government" to be brought into effect on or before independence day.

325. The Mission directed its efforts at meeting as many groups as possible, representing different shades of opinion with due emphasis on the nationalist movements. While it had early contacts with SAL, it was unable to meet with FLOSY representatives in formal discussions during the first phase of of its work. However, it succeeded in having such meetings after its return from Aden to New York. These contacts were later resumed in Cairo. On the other hand, the Mission was unable to meet with the NLF for lack of response from that movement. It heard the views of spokesmen for traditionalist elements and the United National Party.

326. The Mission was unable to hear all shades of opinion in the Territory, as it had intended to do, for the following reasons: (a) conditions in the Territory were not conducive to performing this task; and (b) not all elements came forward to meet with the Mission; in particular, the NLF did not wish to co-operate with it.

327. The Mission acted upon the provision that a central caretaker Government, in order to lead the country to independence in peace and unity, should be broadly representative of the people. The Mission made it clear to FLOSY and all concerned that only through co-operation could their efforts lead to genuine independence for the Territory in conditions of peace and harmony, as envisaged in the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Mission also conveyed to the United Kingdom Government in unequivocal terms the conviction that any negotiations aimed at the formation of such a Government should include both FLOSY and the NLF, and that any effort centred on one of them to the exclusion of the other would not meet the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), and was fraught with dangers for the people of the area. In public statements, the Mission expressed the fervent hope that agreement between the movements would pave the way for the formation of a broadly based transitional government before the appointed date for independence.

328. While the Mission increased its efforts to bring the elements concerned together, events in the Territory were taking a different course. Since July, the administering Power has reported the "growing power" of the NLF. Since the end of August the NLF has reportedly "swept over nearly all the States outside Aden". According to the administering Power persons acting in the name of the NLF took over in most States. The Federal Army together with the Arab Civil Servants pressed the British High Commissioner to negotiate with the nationalist groups.

329. Ever since the Mission's contacts with the British High Commissioner in July, it became clear that the Federal Army would be led to play an essential role in further developments in the Territory. While the Mission had been unable to obtain an accurate account of developments, it was evident from the official reports of the administering Power that the Federal Army had gained control in the Western and Central areas, and that the civilian administrations had been carried out by civil servants under the over-all supervision of the Army. It was also reported that there were "Revolutionary Committees" of the NLF in many States. According to the British High Commissioner, the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion and the State Forces in the Eastern Protectorate co-operated with the "NLF administration" but their precise relations with the "NLF Committee" were in doubt.

330. In view of the developments resulting from the initiatives taken by the United Kingdom during the early part of September 1967, and having regard to the lack of response from the NLF to the desire for discussions, the Mission decided to keep the situation under constant review and to stand ready to extend further assistance in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

331. The situation in Aden during the first week of November was confused; on 1 November agreement was reached in Cairo between FLOSY and the NLF which gave rise to optimism. However, heavy fighting was reported and the number of victims was very high. Later the Army declared that it recognized only one nationalist organization, the NLF, and that

it had taken control in all sections of Aden, with the exception of Crater. The optimism to which the agreement between FLOSY and the NLF in Cairo had led was shattered, since the Army is still under the control of the administering Power. The announcement by the Army that it will not recognize FLOSY as a nationalist element is a cause of serious concern. The civil war which has partially existed during the last few weeks could spread engulfing other parts of the Territory. Useless bloodshed and dismemberment of the Territory are a most disturbing possibility.

332. As a result of the circumstances explained above, the Mission was not permitted to achieve the fulfillment of its mandate under resolution 2183 (XXI).

333. In these circumstances, the Mission recommends to the Special Committee and other appropriate organs of the United Nations to urge the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Authority, to do everything within its power to ensure that the objectives of resolution 2183 (XXI) are realized and that genuine independence is achieved in peace and harmony. To that end, the administering Power should be requested to deal directly with the nationalist movements.

Appendix I

STATEMENT BY THE SPECIAL MISSION ON 17 MARCH 1967

The Special Mission on Aden has met at Headquarters from 7 to 16 March 1967 to consider its programme of work and the ways and means of carrying out its preliminary phases.

As an essential and basic principle, the Mission considers that it should be thoroughly apprised of all factors relating to the situation in the Territory and that it should be directly informed of all points of view of the people. To this end the Mission is fully prepared to visit any place and meet with any representatives of the people who might wish to address it.

On Monday, 20 March 1967, the Special Mission will go to London where it will establish contact with the administering Power as a preliminary step to its visit to the Territory. The Mission expects also to visit Cairo and Jidda on its way to Aden, in order to meet with representatives of the people who are outside the Territory. It intends to arrive in Aden towards the end of this month.

As it prepares to leave Headquarters, the Special Mission wishes to stress that it is proceeding on its assignment in a spirit of objectivity and with a sense of urgency and determination to do its utmost to further the objectives contained in resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly.

Appendix II

Letter dated 6 March 1967 from the representative of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to communicate to you the contents of a message from His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz in connexion with the special United Nations Mission which is due to visit Aden and South Arabia in the near future:

"Owing to the fact that a great number of people of South Arabia including the Federated Emirates and Hadhramaut, work in Saudi Arabia, we believe that their views should be taken with regard to the self-determination of their country. For this reason we address an invitation to the United Nations Mission which is due to visit South Arabia for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the people. Therefore, we request you to invite the said Mission in our name to undertake a visit to the Kingdom for this purpose."

Taking into account the fact that the visit of the Mission to Saudi Arabia has financial implications and considering that it has to operate within the limits of the budget decided by the General Assembly during its twenty-first session, I have no doubt that my Government, in keeping with its customs and traditions, will defray all the costs that the presence of the Mission in Saudi Arabia would entail including transportation.

May I request you to be kind enough to make the necessary formal arrangements so that the Mission may visit Saudi Arabia for no other reason than to ascertain the wishes of the people of South Arabia and Aden who are present in large numbers in Saudi Arabia and are employed there in many walks of life.

(Signed) Jamil M. BAROODY Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

Appendix III

COMMUNICATIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE "FEDERAL GOVERNMENT"

A. Telegram dated 2 April 1967 from the Chairman of the "Federal Supreme Council" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

On behalf of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia it is my honour to welcome you and your colleagues of the United Nations Mission to South Arabia. All Ministers of this Government assure you of their fullest support and their whole-hearted co-operation in your praiseworthy efforts to bring independence to a United Republic of South Arabia and to free our beloved country from the perils that surround South Arabia at this time.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan Obali Chairman Federal Supreme Council

B. Letter dated 2 April 1967 from the Chairman of the "Federal Supreme Council" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Federation of South Arabia desires to take all possible steps which may lead at the earliest date to the full and orderly implementation of the United Nations resolutions on South Arabia. It is our intention in accordance with these resolutions to strive towards the establishment of a united and fully independent Republic of South Arabia under a constitution guaranteeing human rights and freedom. In pursuance of this intention the Federal Government in 1965 appointed Sir Ralph Hone, a famous constitutional lawyer, and Sir Gawain Bell, a distinguished administrator, as constitutional advisers. These constitutional advisers spent a considerable period in South Arabia visiting every State and after careful study submitted their report in a book entitled Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia, 1966. I now have the honour to forward a copy of that report to you.

I have to inform you that on receipt of the report from the constitutional advisers the Federal Government held a conference with representatives of all the States comprising the Federation of South Arabia. During this conference committees were established to consider various aspects of the draft constitution prepared by Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell which is contained in the book Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia, 1966. After these committees had prepared their reports the conference between the Federal Government and the State authorities was reconvened and a revised draft constitution was approved. This constitution in the view of the Federal Government is suitable for adoption as the provisional constitution specified in the United Nations resolutions. This constitution has now been accepted in principle by representatives of all the States within the Federation and may be adapted for the three States in the Eastern Aden Protectorate for the State of Upper Yafa' and for the islands in order that the new United Republic of South Arabia which we seek to establish may comprise the whole of South Arabia. I now have the honour to forward to you a copy of the provisional constitution which we hope will obtain the support and commendation of the Mission from the United

You will note that the provisional constitution provides for a President, a single legislative chamber, the members of which would be freely elected, and universal adult suffrage. It is therefore the view of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia that this provisional constitution would provide a representative government for South Arabia in conformity with the resolutions on South Arabia approved by the United Nations and would prove suitable for the caretaker government recommended by the terms of reference of your Mission.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan Obali Chairman Federal Supreme Council

C. Letter dated 3 April 1967 from the Chairman of the "Federal Supreme Council" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have the honour to inform you that I have dispatched the following telegram to you:

[For the text of the telegram, see communication A above.] I should now like to repeat that the Government of the Federation of South Arabia extends a warm welcome to you and your colleagues in the United Nations Mission to South Arabia. It is our heart-felt desire that your task should be satisfactorily achieved and for that reason the Government of the Federation of South Arabia is determined to give all possible assistance and co-operation to the Mission.

I have already forwarded a number of documents for you and I shall shortly be presenting a memorandum containing the views of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia on certain aspects of the situation in South Arabia. My ministerial colleagues and I now look forward to greeting you in person and discussing in detail the problems that face our country on its path to independence and unity.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan Obali Chairman Federal Supreme Council

D. Letter dated 3 April 1967 from the "Minister of Educacation" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have the honour to forward herewith for your information a copy of the Ministry of Education annual report for the year 1965, together with the annual summary for Aden State for 1966. The annual summary for the sixteen other states for 1966 is still being compiled.

It may be of interest to you to note that, despite criticism you may have heard levelled against the Federal Government, there has been steady progress. In 1963, prior to the absorption of Aden within the Federation, there were approximately 32,000 pupils in schools and institutions of Aden and the other states; there were some 700 teachers and the estimated expenditure on education was £840,000. At the present time after four years of federation these figures have increased to:

	æ
Pupils	43,000
Teachers	
Expenditure	

I take the opportunity to assure you of my highest esteem.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan Obali

Minister of Education

E. Letter dated 3 April 1967 from the "Minister of Health" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I wish to submit a brief summary of our activities in the field of health. Since the inception of the Federation in 1959 there has been steady progress in the field of health, particularly in the Protectorate. Prior to 1959 there was but one functioning hospital in the Western Aden Protectorate, and thirty-five health units. At the end of this year, we shall have seven rural hospitals and fifty health units, which will give medical coverage to the whole of our rural areas.

Since Aden entered the Federation in 1963, we have completed a new maternity hospital at Al Mansoura and a mental hospital of one-hundred beds in Sheikh Othman. The school medical service, which covers all of Aden, is now in the process of extending its activities to the States of Lahej, Fadhli, Yafai and Haushabi.

We are particularly proud of our training programme which has enabled us to staff all these institutions with South Arabians. Our nurse training school at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital provides three-year courses for nurses and a one-year course for practical nurses. Health assistants for the rural institutions receive a three-year training at our school at Mahkzan Hospital. Most of our senior nursing posts are now held by South Arabians.

We have eighteen doctors in the Federation who are South Arabians, seven of whom are taking post-graduate training in various specialities overseas.

I wish to mention briefly our Malaria Control Service, which is doing admirable work on the supression of malaria, mainly in our cotton-growing areas.

Tuberculosis, one of our major problems, is being actively tackled by a TB Control Unit based at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. There is registration of all cases of tuberculosis within the Federation, and a BCG campaign is being pursued in all areas. Trachoma is another disease which is yielding to our mass campaign organized by a mobile team.

One of our doctors, now studying public health in Beirut, is majoring in health education, and it is hoped that an active health education unit will be functioning later this year.

The medical services of the Federation of South Arabia compare most favourably with those of our neighbours, both in the Middle East and Africa. The problem of combating the disease load of our own people is one we feel confident of tackling. Unfortunately our services, which are free to everyone, tend to be inundated by the steady influx of our less fortunate brothers who come from Yemen for treatment. Thirty per cent of all our general beds and 50 per cent of all TB beds are occupied by sick people from Yemen. We gladly assist them in every way.

I enclose copies of our 1963 annual report. I regret that the 1964 and 1965 reports are still with the printers.

I and my staff will be at your service at any time to show you any of our institutions, both in Aden and in the other States.

> (Signed) Sheikh Ali Atif Al KALADI Minister of Health

Appendix IV

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 11 May 1967

I have given the most careful thought to the situation in South Arabia and what we need to do in order to bring about the transition to independence with the best practicable results, the least harm to our own interests and the greatest prospect of a stable and assured future for South Arabia. In these discussions I have had the advantage of the advice of my noble friend Lord Caradon, the Minister of State at the United Nations, and of very many of the officials who are actually stationed there and therefore have first-hand experience of the situation in Aden and South Arabia.

The final stages of the transition to independence will increasingly give rise to important questions of an international and diplomatic character, as well as those of colonial administration. I have concluded that it would greatly help the Government in dealing with these problems to have available someone with wide experience both in international affairs and in the affairs of the Arab world. I am arranging forthwith for Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to take over the High Commissionership in South Arabia. Sir Humphrey has been our Ambassador in a number of important posts at a very significant time and these include two ambassadorships in Arab countries. In addition to being as the House well knows, a man with an independent mind, I am confident he possesses the ability, experience and energy to accomplish the very difficult task, which he has agreed to undertake. He will take up his post in about ten days' time.

In making this appointment it will be necessary for me to recall the present High Commissioner, Sir Richard Turnbull.

Since there have been leaks which I must tell the House I deeply regret, and in consequence a lot of uninformed speculation on this change. I would like to make it clear that there is no truth in any suggestions that there have been differences between Sir Richard Turnbull and myself either personally or over policy. What is possibly more important is that the change casts no adverse reflection on Sir Richard to whom I should like to pay a special tribute. We should all be grateful to him for carrying out a task of the utmost difficulty with courage, resolution and high ability, after he had already completed a distinguished career in the public service.

Sir Richard Turnbull and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan are both public servants of notable distinction. The change is being made because I think that Sir Humphrey's experience and background will bring new and valuable assets to bear on the problems at this stage. As a result of all the consultations I have had, I have become convinced that the situation which will develop over the remaining months will require a different kind of background and experience from that which Sir Richard has had, and it is for that reason alone that I am making this change.

The new High Commissioner must clearly now be given time to settle in.

The House will understand therefore when I say that I believe that this is not the occasion to go into detail about the policy which I propose should be followed from here on. I realize, however, that the House will wish me to deploy and will wish to be able to debate a full statement of government policy. Discussions will take place through the usual channels immediately to arrange for such a debate to take place as soon as the House wishes after the recess.

I would like however today to assure the House that the policy I propose to pursue will be inspired by the aims announced by the Government which will be first, the orderly withdrawal of our military forces and the establishment of an independent South Arabia at the earliest possible date, secondly to work in close consultation with all concerned and especially with the United Nations for the establishment of a broad-based government by the time of independence, and thirdly on the basis of these two principles to leave behind a stable and secure government in South Arabia.

Appendix V

LETTER DATED 16 AUGUST 1967 FROM THE MAHRA STATE COUNCIL AT AL-GHAIDAH TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

The President and members of the Mahra State Council wish to convey their cordial and sincere greetings to you and wish you all success in your work. The Mahra administration for the mainland and Socotra wishes to state that they have unanimously decided to send a delegation consisting of Sultan Khalifa Bin Abdullah Bin Afrar as President, and Sheikh Abdullah Bin Ashoor Al Mahri and Sheikh Alawi Bin Abdullah Al Mahri. Sultan Khalifa is President of the Tribal Council of the Mahra State. while Sheikh Abdullah and Sheikh Alawi are prominent members of that Council. The said delegation would leave for Geneva on 17 August 1967 to have conversations with you concerning the future of the Mahra State. The delegation would inform you of all our aspirations and other matters we hope to realize for the general interest of our people.

The Mahra people as a whole strongly urge its State represented in the Council to take proper and practical measures within the framework of facts and realities as previously set forth in our letter to the United Nations dated 12 April 1967. We hope to arrive at a satisfactory solution with you which will fulfil the aspirations of the Mahra people, namely preservation of order and security and the provision of economic and financial means to promote progress and prosperity for our unfortunate people. We look forward to negotiating with you with a view to learning your views concerning the future of the Mahra State.

We deeply feel that you have undertaken international responsibilities concerning the fate of all under-developed and backward peoples which are totally deprived of economic, social and administrative development. We consider you responsible before God and human conscience for supporting the rights of these deprived people. This delegation is accredited to discuss and negotiate with you and submit whatever it deems significantly important for the fate of both our State and people.

Finally we wish our delegation success in its mission and we earnestly request you to do everything to promote the legitimate right of our deserving people. May God help you to uphold justice.

(Signed) Sultan Khalifa Bin Abdullah BIN AFRAR
President of the Mahra State Council

Appendix VI*

LETTER DATED 31 AUGUST 1967 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALGERIA, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT. LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND YEMEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6828.]

Appendix VII*

Telegram dated 28 August 1967 from the South Arabian League to the Secretary-General

In the name of our people in South Arabia we refuse the British suggestion to isolate Perim island from South Arabia and transfer its administration to United Nations. Britain suggestion contradicts General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and with United Nations resolutions passed in 1963, 1965 and 1966. We condemn the British proposal and demand the Secretariat to reject it. Kindly convey this cable to Member States and United Nations Special Mission on Aden.

SOUTH ARABIAN LEAGUE

Appendix VIII

EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENTS BY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT APPEARING IN THE PRESS ON THE SPECIAL MISSION'S ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT

[Original text: Arabic]

A. From An-Nahar (Beirut), 2 September 1967

The NLF spokesman said that the Mission was now biased towards British imperialism, and therefore the Front would not meet with that Mission; the spokesman charged that the United Kingdom and the United States took advantage of the circumstances arising from the Arab set-back and were using the Special Mission on Aden to resume the dialogue between the nationalists on one hand and British imperialism and the Sultans on the other hand. This implied a disregard of the United Nations resolutions.

The aims of the Front, the spokesman continued, were to throw out the Sultans' colonial régime, and the elimination of the political, military and economic systems supported by the British and world imperialism, and to build up revolutionary systems through the peoples' struggle in Aden.

Mr. Awad and his colleague announced they were remaining for a while in Lebanon, and said that the present situation in the area had passed the stage of negotiations.

In a private interview with An-Nahar, the NLF delegates stated that their presence here was not the result of a planned arrangement to meet with the Mission, and that it was a mere coincidence.

Mr. Awad denied having had any contacts with the Mission in Geneva. The Front had protested against the meetings between the Mission and the Sultans by proclaiming a strike in Aden on 11 and 12 August. The Front had a basic objection to the interference by the United Nations in the question of South Arabia.

Referring to the differences in concepts held by FLOSY and the Front, Mr. Awad said "we conceive of liberation as having a political, military and economic basis, while FLOSY considers it as having only a political and perhaps a military basis".

He labelled FLOSY as a "bourgeois" Front depending on external propaganda and diplomatic activities, while in fact it had no base among the masses inside the country.

[Original text: Arabic]

B. From Al-Hayat (Beirut), 2 September 1967

Mr. Jaafar Awad, the representative of the NLF, in an interview with Al-Hayat, stated today that the United Nations Mission was seeking only a political settlement, which should be rejected by the revolution. The question of South Arabia could be solved only through the peoples' armed struggle. Any political settlement, or any negotiation with British colonialism could therefore be achieved only when the revolution was fulfilled and the colonial, military, political and economic systems and institutions were eliminated, and only when authority was transferred to the people throughout the south.

The spokesman of the NLF then charged that the United Nations Mission was biased towards the British colonialism; that this was the reason why the NLF decided to boycott it. The United Nations resolutions represented only the minimum of the people's demands; the United Nations was unable to secure to any country true independence. Negotiations, he added, were not possible with the British and the Sultans.

After having accused FLOSY of negotiating with Britain and meeting with the international mission in Geneva, he added however, that he did not accuse FLOSY of being an agent, but that there were differences in their views; FLOSY and the United Arab Republic had respect for the Sultans because of a certain tribal position they had.

Mr. Awad denied any participation by the Front in negotiations with FLOSY to form a government.

He indicated that the Front was willing to co-operate with FLOSY, provided FLOSY showed willingness to work within the Front's concepts of liberation. He answered another question saying that the Front was interested in the establishment of strong relations with all revolutionary liberation movements.

The Front's statement charged that the United States and the United Kingdom were trying to liquidate the revolution in South Yemen; colonialism was also attempting after the Arab set-back to impose ancient political settlement plans, which would allow them to maintain their economic interests in the area. The statement charged that the international Mission disregarded the texts of the United Nations resolutions to which it was committed when it came to Aden last April.

C. Extract from the Daily Star (Beirut), 2 September 1967

The National Liberation Front said on Friday that it would not meet the three-member United Nations Mission on Aden-

An NLF spokesman, announcing this at a press conference here, said "We consider the mission to have become aligned to British imperialism and we do not agree to meeting it".

The spokesman, Mr. Jaafar Awad, said that the decision to boycott the United Nations Mission, "which resumed its mission by meeting the sultans in Geneva", was taken by the NLF "in harmony with its former attitude that United Nations resolutions on Aden represented only a minimum of the people's basic demands . . .".

Mr. Awad said that the Front believed that "through popular struggle the people will realize all their rights to liberation without any conditions or bargaining".

In a statement read out at the conference, Mr. Awad attacked Britain and the United States and accused the mission of aligning with "world imperialism".

^{*} Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/PET.699/Add.2.

"It is not new for the revolution", he said in his statement, "that Britain and America exploit the circumstances of the setback and utilize the United Nations mission on Aden to re-start a dialogue between the nationalists on the one hand, and British imperialism and the sultans on the other."

He said that "this means ignoring provisions of United Nations resolutions to which the mission committed itself" when coming to Aden last April and which led to its withdrawal from there at the time.

This change, he went on, "affirms the extent of the power of world imperialists to dominate the United Nations".

Mr. Awad said that he and his colleague "are now staying behind in Lebanon".

Asked if he would agree to negotiate directly with Britain, he said that this "is possible only when the revolution's conditions are realized and after Britain liquidates its interests in the region".

In answer to another question, Mr. Awad said that the situation in the region had surpassed the negotiations stage. The NLF claimed control over twelve of the seventeen member States of the federation.

He criticized the Egyptian-backed FLOSY, the NLF's rival, and said that "it does not enjoy any popularity at home . . .". He said that Cairo was "one of the tributaries of the Arab revolution. . . We are keen that our relations with Cairo be sound"

Mr. Awad said that the NLF was not aspiring to take over rule shortly "because we are not seeking power".

Appendix IX

Press extract handed to the Special Mission by Sheikh Mohamed Farid on 6 September 1967

"Britain is making a big mistake in thinking that one party can control South Arabia", South Arabia Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohamed Farid said tonight.

Commenting on the announcement earlier by Aden High Commissioner Sir Humphrey Trevelyan that the British were willing to start negotiations with the NLF, he said "this would lead to another Yemen".

"The only solution is a coalition between various parties which the United Nations is now working on. It is a big mistake to ignore these efforts", Sheikh Mohamed Farid told Reuters.

He warned that five of the seventeen States in the Federation would resist and the three States of Eastern Aden Protectorate would refuse to join the new State which was due to become independent on 9 January.

Asked what the chances were of the NLF taking over South Arabia, he said, "If they get everything they will lose everything".

He concluded by saying that the best way would be for them to work for a coalition which should include FLOSY, federal rulers and even the South Arabian League, a moderate party with waning support.

Appendix X

LETTER DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1967 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

In thinking over our discussions since the return of the Special Mission from Cairo, I thought it might be helpful to you and your colleagues if I set out in writing the reasons and background to our recent actions in South Arabia in confirmation of the full account given to you by Lord Shackleton in Beirut.

It may be helpful if I first present a resumé. You and we have all along shared a common goal: to achieve a stable and representative Government by the time of independence. It has never been easy to know how this aim could be realized. We have, as we have pointed out repeatedly in the

United Nations, never had administrative authority in the Protectorate and have had to take full account of the political realities in South Arabia at any given time. But we have steadily insisted that the basis of the Governments there must be broadened. From 1963 onwards we sought to arrange negotiations for constitutional advance. We encouraged the Federal Government in their decision to commission proposals for constitutional reform which would make co-operation by other elements easier. We arranged for the termination of all remaining Exclusion Orders in 1966 and did our best to encourage those other elements, as well as the Federal Government, towards negotiation. When the Federal Government, in 1966, accepted the United Nations resolutions, we welcomed this and did likewise, subject to certain stipulations enforced by our remaining responsibilities in some fields and our lack of constitutional power outside Aden State.

In the spring of 1967, when FLOSY was failing to respond to our repeated initiatives for conversations and our repeated request to FLOSY to deal with your Mission, we welcomed your Mission's intention to try to tackle FLOSY in Cairo and to secure their co-operation with the Mission. We were not able at that time to get into contact with the NLF (to this day the only direct contact with them has been when a Federal Minister introduced to a British official two men claiming to be the NLF whose identities were not made known to the official). But we did inform the Mission in March that our assessment was that the NLF was a growing factor, both absolutely and in relation to FLOSY, and urged you to take account of this.

We welcomed it when your own efforts finally included FLOSY representatives to visit you in New York in July. Our regret then was that the NLF, still growing in relative strength, made no response to your representations and that the FLOSY representatives, though they always spoke of negotiations with Britain, refused to meet me and refused any serious negotiation with Her Majesty's Government whether under the Mission's auspices or separately. Similarly they left New York before Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, of whose visit they knew, reached the United Nations, to have discussions with your Mission. You will recall that he assured you of all help he could give in what he regarded as a problem common to Britain and your Mission and in which the essential desiderata of each were the same.

We continued to give all help we could in your later discussions in Geneva and Beirut in August and September, and Lord Shackleton joined the Mission for discussions and consultations in both places. We regretted only that FLOSY, the NLF and SAL all failed to join in the discussions in Geneva.

In the last week of August, however, the situation in South Arabia was transformed in a manner beyond the control alike of the Mission and of my Government, and in a very short time became extremely dangerous. In Aden, the NLF and FLOSY continued to contend for position. Central authority collapsed outside Aden, with persons acting in the name of the NLF taking over in most States. By the end of August the Federal Government had come to have virtually no control in the Federation and had ceased to be effective at the political level, though the civil service and the South Arabian Forces continued to cohere and function. The Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council (many leading members of the Federal Government being in Geneva for talks with the Mission) on 28 August called on the South Arabian Army to take over. The Army refused but, together with the Arab civil servants who were trying to keep the administration running, pressed Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to negotiate with the nationalist groups. There were British troops still in Aden but no longer in any of the States of the Protectorate. The South Arabian Forces, for their part, made it clear that, if we could not at once agree to deal with the insurgents in the territory, they could not be responsible for the consequences. The threat to order and public security was a matter that had to be dealt with very rapidly. Indeed, it was simply not physically within our power to hold the situation locally while efforts were continued outside the territory to get all the parties to agree to share power. This was particularly so since the dominating insurgents of the NLF flatly refused all suggestions, including that of your Mission, of discussions outside South Arabia with the Mission or with other factions, while FLOSY and others were unwilling to negotiate in Aden on the only basis which seemed possible in the short term.

It was against this background (of which the Mission was informed on 30 August) that the High Commissioner returned to London on 3 September for urgent consultations. The assessment reached was that if we did not immediately make our position clear, there would be rapid disintegration on all fronts, growing confusion and heavy bloodshed and human suffering. The divisions within South Arabia would be deepened, perhaps irreparably. We regarded it as our duty to hold the situation so as to make it possible for negotiations to take place before it was too late. A quick decision was imperative.

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan was accordingly authorized to broadcast a statement recognizing that the Federal Government had ceased to function. He recognized the nationalist forces as representatives of the South Arabian people. Since one of the NLF leaders had just expressed readiness to negotiate with the British Government, Sir Humphrey referred to this in reaffirming his own readiness to meet the nationalist leaders for negotiations on the formation of a new government. He made no distinction between the nationalist parties: he was, and remains, ready to talk to any and all who will come forward (see para. 268 of this annex).

The situation was so urgent that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had to fly back to Aden on 5 September and make his statement the same evening. Lord Shackleton flew to Beirut immediately and met the Mission to tell you of the statement and to explain the necessity of our initiative. He and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, as Lord Shackleton reiterated in Beirut, remain continuously available for further talks with the Mission to discuss future action and co-operation in the light of events in South Arabia.

As we had hoped, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan's statement has injected the first elements of hope and peace into the changed situation in South Arabia which I have described above. The statement was warmly welcomed on all sides in Aden. The South Arabian Army have since taken positive steps towards getting some compromise between FLOSY and the NLF. On 6 and 9 September, they broadcast over Aden Radio a call to the leaders of the two Fronts to come together in any part of South Arabia to discuss an end to fighting between them and negotiation on the resolutions concerning independence for South Arabia: they asked for a reply by 20 September.^a The Army have arranged a local truce and the reciprocal release of prisoners and have some hope of extending this to the political field. They have stabilized the situation around Aden and protected the Federal capital. They are now taking over internal security in parts of Aden. At least for the moment, terrorism has diminished and there is some revival of commercial activity. As a direct result of the statement, the chances of an agreement between the factions or parts of them are better than they were previously. The improvement is sufficient to have enabled Sir Humphrey to resume and indeed increase the releases of political detainees which he had begun earlier, while the planned withdrawal of British forces has continued on schedule. In all these respects the purposes of the United Nations resolutions are being progressively ful-

A breathing space has been produced, which must be used by all concerned to achieve a stable settlement in implementation of the United Nations resolutions. It is our view, and we believe that the Mission share it, that any solution in accordance with the United Nations resolutions would be welcome. Both the United Nations Mission and the British Government may still be able to help towards negotiations between the parties, especially by exercising any influence which can help to modify intransigence and bring the parties into negotiation. For our part, we will continue to press all concerned to this end and we hope and believe the Mission will do the same.

A new Government is urgently necessary in South Arabia. Independence is drawing rapidly nearer. We foresee more, not less, need for the close involvement of the United Nations with

developments in South Arabia, especially in helping to ensure that the wishes of the people find their full and free expression in determining the future of the country. These will continue to be our aims.

I have written in some detail both because it seemed important for the Mission to know exactly what happened and why, and because I wished it to be clear that throughout the process that I have described the aims and motives of my Government and of the Mission have remained the same.

(Signed) CARADON
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

Appendix XI

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 2 NOVEMBER 1967

Just as in Asia the pattern of our interest and obligation is altering, so in South Arabia we move towards a more Europe-based policy; so this is also true of the Middle East. Our long-declared decision to bring South Arabia to an early independence must be seen as part of the progress of which I spoke at the beginning of my speech—the ending of the imperial era.

Conditions in South Western Arabia as a whole have been transformed since the summer. The Government of the United Arab Republic has decided to withdraw its forces entirely from Yemen by the middle of December and the movement is well under way. In South Arabia, the Federal Government threw away the last chance they had of broadening their base. In consequence, a ground swell of revolt owerwhelmed the Arab State authorities in the Protectorate, and the Federal Government ceased to function.

This was not the work of a single group. Many old divisions in tribes and States persist and it can be misleading to rely on political labels. In general terms, however, the National Liberation Front played the major part and has established ascendancy in most of the States.

The South Arabian forces and the federal civil service have held the structure of the Federation together. The forces refused to take over political control. Instead, they told the High Commissioner that the nationalists had in their view become representative of the country as a whole, and that it was imperative that Her Majesty's Government should recognize them as such and express readiness to negotiate with them. Her Majesty's Government accepted this judgement. The High Commissioner issued with my authority a statement accordingly on 5 September. The South Arabian forces immediately called upon the two factions to resolve their differences, and to form a common front for negotiation with the High Commissioner.

It is over eight weeks since that happened. It is a month since the groups finally started talks between themselves in Cairo. Despite appeals to them from many quarters there was no sign till, literally, yesterday evening that any progress was being made. On the contrary there was increasing tension between the factions in South Arabia itself, who continued to contest for supremacy. We had to take account of the consequences of this prolonged uncertainty, with its constant danger that the divisions in the country might divide the South Arabian forces. Last night, the groups negotiating in Cairo announced that they had reached agreement on matters they had discussed so far and would shortly be able to reach agreement on the composition of a delegation to negotiate with us. We welcome this, and look forward to negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

I to'd the House on 19 June of the measures Her Majesty's Government thought it right to take in the circumstances prevailing at that time. I warned the House, however, that events in Yemen, South Arabia and the Middle East in general could have effects which might make it essential to reconsider

a For the text of the Army broadcast, see footnotek of this annex.

fingerprint)

the proposals I was then announcing. I also made it quite clear that the Government had serious doubts about the soundness and durability of the Federation of South Arabia.

Events since have justified those warnings and reservations. We retain the objectives we have so often stated—to withdraw our forces in good order and to leave if possible behind us a united, stable and independent country. But the events since June have caused us to reconsider how best to achieve these objectives and to take new and firm decisions.

Our first decision is that the independence of South Arabia will now take place in the second half of November and all British forces will be withdrawn from South Arabia at that time. We shall, by the middle of this month, fix and announce the precise date for independence and withdrawal. The precise date which will be in the second half of November will depend on events and on whether a few days either way will help us to start negotiations with an emerging Government.

It is quite clear to us that the radical nationalists and other groups must face their own problems and resolve them themselves. We can complete the removal of our forces from the country at any time after mid-November. Early withdrawal will reduce any danger that our forces may become involved, and sustain casualties, in any renewed violence by or among the South Arabian factions. In these circumstances, some things which we had expected to settle before independence may have to be left pending, but that must in the circumstances be accepted.

Early withdrawal will also help the South Arabian forces. In the changed circumstances they are ready to take over fully now. The High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief are satisfied that the South Arabian forces will no longer expect the support of British units.

Secondly, the changed circumstances in Yemen remove the danger the Federal Government and federal armed forces faced in June, which was that, in the difficult period immediately after independence, there might be the threat of organized military attack across their frontiers supported by modern air power. Thus, our offer of deterrent naval and air forces for a period after independence has become irrelevant. Consequently, we have cancelled our plans for naval and V-bomber deterrent forces, though as the House will know, a substantial naval force is concentrated at Aden to cover the period of our withdrawal and independence.

Thirdly, there remain the questions of the financial support offered to the Federal Government for three years after independence and the offer of support for the Eastern Aden Protectorate forces which was made last June. Those offers always carried the condition that they were subject to review if political circumstances made their continuance inappropriate. I think, however—I hope that the House will agree with me—that it would be right to leave these questions for decision rather later, when the future may be clearer. The formation and attitude of a new Government will be important factors, but it is impossible especially in the light of what I have just said to prejudge these at this moment.

One other related question, that of the clear opinion of this House, which I represented to the United Nations, that the island of Perim should be internationalized under the United Nations. I am sorry to tell the House that though the Secretary-General is not yet in a position to reply formally to our approach to him, both he and the Chairman of the United Nations Mission have said that the latter could not entertain the proposal since in their view it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations resolutions which include Perim in what they call the Territory of Aden.

Moreover, the delegates of all Arab countries represented at the United Nations sent a joint, formal communication to the Secretary-General in August, opposing the separation of Perim from South Arabia. It is, on that basis, clear that when the question is debated at the United Nations, the proposal we made will be rejected. There is, as I told the House in June, no question of our retaining sovereignty or responsibility for Perim after the independence of South Arabia. The island will, unless its inhabitants against expectation were to demand otherwise, stay with South Arabia.

Appendix XII

PETITION AND EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE DETAINEES

A. Copy of letter dated 24 October 1967 to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary and communicated to the Special Mission

Based on the assurances given by the representatives of the Red Cross to us and our husbands that we will be allowed to visit the detainees in the normal manner, plus the fact that they will be permitted with all the facilities they had in Al Mansoura Prison, we were satisfied with their transfer to Steamer Point,

Since they have been transferred to Steamer Point we have not been allowed to see them in spite of our repeated inquiries from the Department of Labour and Welfare and the Red Cross representatives. Then the news came that they are being held in Fort Morbut and being tortured in the same manner of which Fort Morbut has become world famous. Their food is unhealthy and body torture is daily routine, which made them go on a hunger strike since the 20th instant. Such being the case we have started losing faith even in the Red Cross, which we think is in collaboration with the aims of the British Government to harm our husbands and sons.

We demand that our husbands and sons be released immediately in the same manner in which their colleagues were released, and in accordance with the United Nations resolution of 1965, which the British Government has recognized. We request all the world through the well-known organizations to protest against the latest British conspiracy in our country. (Signed with

Mother of Abdo Al-Sayed, detainee no. 289, on behalf of the families of fifty detainees

c.c. High Commissioner, Aden
Red Cross representatives, Aden
Amnesty International, London
Tripartite Mission on Aden, United Nations, New York
Arab League, Cairo
Reuters, Aden
The Observer, London

B. Letter dated 5 October 1967 from the Chairman of the Special Mission to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

On behalf of the Special Mission on Aden I am transmitting a copy of a communication from Aden on the question of the detainees. We are sure that it will receive urgent consideration by your Government,

The Mission would be grateful to receive any further information and observations which your Government may wish to furnish on this subject.

(Signed) M. Perez Guerrero Chairman United Nations Special Mission on Aden

C. Letter dated 20 October 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have now received information from my Government about the matters raised in the letter enclosed with your letter of 5 October concerning detainees in Aden.

As you and your colleagues in the Special Mission are no doubt aware, most of the detainees were released in September before the handover to the South Arabian Army on 24 September of the Sheikh Othman area, where the detention camp was situated. The remaining detainees, now only thirty in number, are the hard-core element whose release will have to take place later.

The remaining detainees were transferred from Al Mansoura to a new holding centre at Steamer Point. This is about half a mile away from the former interrogation centre at Fort Morbut. None of the remaining detainees is held at the Fort Morbut centre. The Steamer Point centre has never been used for interrogations which have now in any case ceased.

Visits to the new detention centre were suspended for a few days after the detainees were transferred there to allow the centre to settle down. But visits are now taking place normally. The detainee whose mother wrote the letter dated 24 October, a copy of which was received by the Special Mission, was in fact visited by his family on 1 October. The Red Cross representative visited the detainees early in October and seemed quite satisfied. There have been no complaints by the detainees themselves about their food. Any complaint from a detainee is recorded and examined by a High Commission officer under procedures established by the High Commissioner subsequent to the report made to the Foreign Secretary by Mr. Roderick Bowen, Q.C. I am authorized to say that the allegations of torture in the letter which you transmitted to me are completely baseless.

(Signed) CARADON

Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

D. Letter dated 27 October 1967 from the Chairman of the Special Mission addressed to the petitioner

The Special Mission on Aden, upon receiving the copy of your letter of 24 October 1967 to the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom concerning the treatment of the detainees at Steamer Point, requested the British representative in the United Nations to furnish it with further information and the observations of his Government on the subject. The Mission has just received the reply from the United Kingdom Government:

[For the text of the reply, see communication C above of this appendix.]

(Signed) Manuel Perez Guerrero Chairman United Nations Special Mission on Aden

Appendix XIII

PETITION AND EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING
THE EASTERN ADEN PROTECTORATE

A. Telegram dated 13 October 1967 from the Sultans of the Eastern States to the Secretary-General

As rulers of eastern Aden Protectorate States of Qa'iti, Kathiri and Mahra we must draw your attention to unwarranted air action by British Royal Air Force against loyal tribes which so far refrained from recognizing British backed minority group of terrorists collaborating with Whitehall policy-makers under name National Liberation Front. Since we have been virtually expelled by British Aden administration in August under pretence our presence in Geneva was required by UNations Committee on Aden, terrorists supported by British financed Hadhrami Bedouin Legion have been carrying out mass arrests in our States and killing or torturing innocent people. As Hadhramaut and Mahra which remained outside South Arabian federation represent almost two thirds of South Arabian region both in size and population we request you make arrangements for fact-finding mission to study situation on spot before widescale civil war breaks out. Between two terrorist groups NLF and FLOSY are in contradiction with UNation resolutions on Aden region and as such unbinding on us. Any reply may please be addressed care Jeddah Palace Hotel Jeddah.

> Sultan Ghalib of Qa'iti State Sultan Hussein of Kathiri State Sultan Khalifa of Mahra State

B. Letter dated 20 October 1967 from the Chairman of the Special Mission to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The attention of the Special Mission on Aden has been drawn to the enclosed telegram from Jeddah concerning the question of Aden. The Mission has received another communication from the National Liberation Front and other elements, which refers to some of the matters raised in this telegram. The Mission would be grateful to know what observations your Government may have concerning the problems raised in this communication.

(Signed) M. Perez Guerrero Chairman United Nations Special Mission on Aden

C. Letter dated 27 October 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have now received information from my Government about the matters raised in the telegram of 13 October from the three Eastern Aden Protectorate Sultans enclosed with your letter of 20 October.

The allegations in the telegram from the three Eastern Aden Protectorate Sultans are wholly unwarranted. I explained to you in my letter of 21 September (see appendix X above) the circumstances in which control in South Arabia was taken over by the nationalist forces and particularly by the National Liberation Front. This process which started in the Federation extended fairly quickly to the States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate. It is quite untrue that we gave backing there either to the National Liberation Front or to any other nationalist group, any more than we did in the Federation; nor do we now have any intention of intervening between the groups or in support of either of them against anyone else.

There was no question of the Sultans being expelled from South Arabia. They went to Geneva to meet the United Nations Mission of their own free will, although of course they were encouraged to do this by the High Commissioner following the agreement between him and the Mission during his visit to New York. Far from us keeping the Sultans out of South Arabia for this period, the Mission will remember that both they and we urged the Sultans to get to Geneva as quickly as possible. In the event however the Qa'iti and Kathiri parties took their time in travelling via Beirut and Cairo, arriving in Geneva only at the end of August.

The air action by the Royal Air Force to which the three Sultans refer in their telegram was limited to three fire power demonstrations on 24 September at the request of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in the vicinity of three forts in the northern area of Qa'iti manned by the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion. The Mission will remember that Lord Shackleton explained to them that the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion was not only the only force which could maintain security in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, but also provided the only administration in much of the northern desert areas of Qa'iti. The three Hadhrami Bedouin Legion forts concerned in this incident are in this area where Qa'iti administrative control never operated and were being attacked by hostile tribesmen, Such evidence as we have suggests strongly that these disorders were not of a political character as the telegram from the three Sultans might imply, but were an outbreak of attempted looting which followed upon the political upheavals in the area.

I do not feel that it is for me to comment on the other matters raised in the Sultans' telegram, which are more properly for the Mission to consider than for the United Kingdom Government.

(Signed) CARADON
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

CHAPTER VII*

FIJI

A. Action taken by the special committee in 1966 and by the General Assembly at its twenty-first

- 1. In 1963 and 1964, the Special Committee adopted resolutions concerning Fiji. After considering the question of Fiji at its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,2 chap. VIII, para. 120) in which it reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and called upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to implement immediately the following: the holding of general elections on the basis of one man, one vote, in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage, for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly which would be charged with the task of drawing up a democratic constitution; the formation of a representative government and transfer of full powers to that government; the fixing of an early date for the granting of independence to the people of Fiji; and the abolition of all discriminatory measures so as to foster communal harmony and national unity in the Territory. Moreover, it decided to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible.
- 2. At its eighteenth and twentieth sessions, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2068 (XX) of 16 December 1965 respectively concerning Fiji. It considered the report of the Special Committee on the Territory (ibid., chap. VIII) at its twenty-first session and subsequently adopted resolution 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

B. Information on the Territory³

General

3. The Crown Colony of Fiji, situated in the South-West Pacific, comprises some 844 islands and islets, including numerous atolls. Almost 90 per cent of the total land mass of 7,055 square miles is contained by the islands of Viti Levu (4,010 square miles) and Vanua Levu (2,137 square miles). About a hundred other islands are permanently inhabited. The island of Rotuma (18 square miles), added to the Colony in 1881, lies several hundred miles northwest of Fiji.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.5.

4. At the end of 1965, the total population was estimated to be 469,934, made up as follows:

Race	Number	Appropriate proportion of whole per cent
Fijian	194,998	41.49
Indian	235,338	50.08
European	10.755	2.29
Part-European	9,972	2.12
Chinese	5,531	1.18
Other Pacific races .	13,340	2.84
	469,934	

Constitution

5. Fiji's new Constitution, based on the agreement reached at the Constitutional Conference held in London from 26 July to 9 August 1965, was promulgated on 23 September 1966. The main features of the Constitution are set out below.

Governor

6. The Governor is appointed by the Queen on the advice of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Executive power is formally vested in the Governor. Defence, external affairs, internal security and the public service, inter alia, are reserved to the Governor at his discretion and as his special responsibility.

Executive Council

- 7. The Governor appoints the non-official members of the Executive Council, which has a membership of six elected and four official members. The non-official members of the Executive Council are drawn from among the elected members of the Legislative Council, and the Governor is to ensure appropriate representation of the various communities in Fiji. The Constitution provides that, at the appropriate time, the Governor may appoint members of the Executive Council to be ministers with executive powers. At that time, the Executive Council will become a Council of Ministers.
- 8. The Governor is required to consult the Executive Council and, in general, to accept its advice, except when he considers it necessary to act against such advice in the interests of public order, public faith or good government. In such cases, he is required to seek the approval of the Secretary of State. However, he is not required to consult the Council on subjects specifically reserved to him.

Legislative Council

9. The Legislative Council consists of thirty-six elected members and four official members nominated by the Governor. Subject to the restrictions imposed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and by any provisions of the Constitution itself, such as a Bill of Rights, the Constitution gives the Legislative Council full power to make laws on any subject. The Constitution has a provision which prevents bills from being introduced without the consent of the Governor if

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/ Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 165; ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIII, para. 119.

² Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

³ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports. Also used in the preparation of this section has been the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 12 August 1966, for the year ended 31 December 1965.

their effect would be to impose taxes or to increase expenditure or alter terms and conditions of service of public officers. The Governor is empowered to refuse assent, to reserve legislation, and to ensure that bills are passed by certification.

- 10. The Governor is required to reserve certain kinds of bills, e.g., bills which appear to him to conflict with international obligations or affect the Royal Prerogative, or bills which purport to amend the Constitution. The power of disallowance is retained by the Crown. Besides these restrictions on the powers of the Legislative Council, the Crown retains the power to revise or amend the Constitution and to make other laws for Fiji by Order in Council.
- 11. A Speaker, who has no vote, is elected by the Legislative Council either from within the Council or from persons qualified to be elected to the Council. The Council is also empowered to appoint a Deputy Speaker from among its members. The maximum life of the Council is five years. However, the Governor is empowered to dissolve the Legislative Council at his discretion. His power of prorogation is exercised after consultation with the Executive Council, though he is not bound by such consultation.

Electoral system

- 12. The thirty-six elected members of the Legislative Council are elected as follows: fourteen Fijians—nine elected on the Fijian communal roll, two elected by the Fijian Council of Chiefs and three elected according to the new cross-voting system; twelve Indians—nine elected on the Indian communal role and three elected by the cross-voting system; and ten who are neither Fijians nor Indians—seven elected on the general roll, and three by the cross-voting system.
- 13. The communal roll for Fijians includes the Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders. The Chinese and any other minority communities are included on the general roll with Europeans. For the election of the nine members by the cross-voting system, Fiji is divided into three constituencies, each returning one Fijian (or Rotuman or other Pacific Islander), one Indian and one European (or Chinese or member of another minority group), each member being elected by voters of all communities.
- 14. The new Constitution provides for universal adult suffrage by enfranchising minority communities such as the Chinese, the Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders, and by abolishing certain qualifications and disqualifications concerning candidates and electors, such as the requirements relating to property or income for candidates and the literacy tests for voters.

Political parties

- 15. The two major political parties are the Federation Party and the Alliance. No information is available concerning the present membership of either party. The Federation Party claims to represent most of Fiji's Indian population. This party, *inter alia*, advocates early independence and demands a common-roll vote (i.e., one man, one vote) for all the people of Fiji.
- 16. The Alliance was formed in March 1966 and is made up of a multiracial combination of organizations such as the Fijian Association, the Fiji National Congress, the General Electors' Association, the Rotuman Association and associate members. Its stated aims are racial unity and progressive development under the

direction of the United Kingdom Government. It believes that, whatever its form of government, Fiji should remain a member of the British Commonwealth. In a formal statement of policy in July 1966, the Alliance declared that the agreed decisions of the London Constitutional Conference of 1965 were a fair and just basis for the establishment of democratic rule in Fiji whereby the people might proceed towards internal self-government.

17. There are also a number of minor parties such as the National Democratic Party.

Recent developments

General elections

18. The first general elections for a Legislative Council under the new Constitution were held in Fiji from 26 September to 8 October 1966. Out of a population of approximately 474,000, there were 154,635 enrolled voters. For electoral purposes the voters were divided among three communal rolls:

	To represent	Approximate population	Voters enrolled
Indian Roll	Indians only	273,500	74,445
Fijian Roll	Fijians, Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders	210,000	73,850
General Roll	Europeans, part- Europeans, Chinese, and other minority		
	groups	26,500	6,340

19. The elections were the first to be fought mainly on party lines. The Alliance Party, which emerged as the strongest group with a total of twenty-two seats, gained all the Fijian communal seats, all but two of the general communal seats and all but one of the cross-voting seats. The Federation Party won all nine of the Indian communal seats. Independents gained three seats. About 90 per cent of the Indian electorate and over 80 per cent of the Fijian and general electorate voted.

Economic conditions

General

- 20. The economy of the Territory is predominantly agricultural, the most important products being sugar and copra. Droughts and hurricanes, as well as the downward trend in world sugar prices, have produced serious difficulties for the economy. However, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement enabled Fiji to dispose of 140,000 tons of sugar manufactured in 1965 at a price of £46.11.6d. per ton, which was approximately £26.0.0d. per ton more than the world market price.
- 21. Efforts to expand the tourist industry resulted in a record number of tourists visiting Fiji, whilst, in the sphere of secondary industry, several companies established local branches, such as a mill producing animal and poultry foods, a factory extracting fruit juices and packaging fruit for export, a sawmill, and a factory manufacturing packages, packaging materials and other paper products.
- 22. While domestic exports fell from an all-time high in 1964 of £23,120,846 to £17,575,078 in 1965,

re-exports at £3,441,783 were higher than the 1964 figure of £2,993,927. The economy of the Territory was further supported by tourist expenditure which, in 1965, was estimated to be at least £4,350,000.4

Fiji Development Plan

- 23. The Fiji Development Plan, 1966-1970, was published on 2 July 1966. The plan proposed capital expenditure of £20 million in the five years, with a further £1.8 million if that was financially and physically possible.
- 24. In addition to detailed proposals for government expenditure on agriculture (£580,000) and agricultural subsidies (£1,343,000), land development (£690,000), education (£2,068,000), medical services (£2,523,000), roads (£3,396,000), postal and telegraph services (£2,395,000), water supplies (£1,259,000) and government buildings (£1,567,000), the plan sets out a programme of surveys to give basic information on which future development can be based.
- 25. To meet the cost of the plan, it is hoped to draw £2,800,000 from general revenue, to obtain £7,700,000 from United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare funds and to raise £5,550,000 in local loans and £3,650,000 in overseas loans. It is expected that other sources of revenue will yield £800,000.
- 26. In a review of the plan by the Central Planning Office, it is stated that the traditional sugar and copra exports will not be able to support the long-term development of Fiji.
- 27. The plan looks forward especially to the development of tourism and forestry, and predicts that by the year 2000, Fiji's principal income earners will be wood products (£100 million), tourism (£35 million) and sugar (£20 million).
- 28. The new plan has been based on the general assumption that Fiji's population will increase from 450,000 to 1,200,000 between now and 2000 A.D., and that national production will rise from about £50 million to about £350 million. This implies an annual growth rate of 6 per cent in national income.

Survey of transport system

- 29. A survey of possibilities for a balanced, modern transport system to link the scattered islands of the Fiji group, as part of an over-all effort to promote economic and social growth, will be undertaken jointly by the Government of Fiji and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with the United Nations acting as the executing agency.
- 30. Ways of applying the latest advances in transport techniques will be investigated in an effort to obtain the maximum effectiveness with the minimum investment. For example, specialists will examine the possible use of air-cushion vehicles (hovercraft) for coastal and inter-island shipping and the development of services using large cargo containers carried by landing craft. The plan of operation for the £1 million, three-year project was signed in July 1966.

Social conditions

Labour

31. More than half the total labour force is covered by some form of collective bargaining machinery and

⁴ All monetary figures in this paper are in Fijian pounds. £111 Fijian equal £100 sterling or approximately \$280.

- their terms and conditions of employment are set out in agreements arrived at by the normal process of negotiation. The general level of wages paid to an unskilled worker under those agreements is approximately two shillings per hour, whilst the average working week is forty-four hours.
- 32. In September 1965, a new venture was inaugurated in the setting up of a Joint Industrial Council for all the unestablished workers of government. This provides machinery for bringing together representatives of workers from throughout the public sector to discuss wages and conditions of employment with government officials.

Housing

33. It is estimated that the Housing Authority will have spent £300,000 on flat developments from about the beginning of 1966 to December 1967. The development is being undertaken at Suva and Lautoka.

Public health

- 34. There are twenty-four local sanitary authorities (including Suva City and Lautoka Town) working with the assistance of a medical health officer, a health inspector and several assistant health inspectors. In remote rural or island areas where the formation of a sanitary authority is not practicable, the Central Board of Health has executive functions.
- 35. The main hospital is in Suva and district hospitals are located at the three centres of Lautoka, Labasa and Levuka. There are also fourteen smaller hospitals and forty-six rural dispensaries distributed about the Territory. The three special hospitals are the Tamavure Tuberculosis Hospital, the St. Giles Mental Hospital (both in Suva) and the Fiji Leprosy Hospital on the island of Makogai.
- 36. The total recurrent expenditure on public health in 1965 was estimated at £1,298,229, and capital expenditure at £293,978, compared with £1,040,643 and £254,600 respectively for 1964. Other notable items of estimated expenditure (some recoverable), were:

	£
South Pacific Health Service	9,070
Fiji School of Medicine	54,107
Fiji Leprosy Hospital, Makogai	60,956
Research Library	1,458
	125 501

Educational conditions

37. In 1965, the full-time school roll passed the 100,000 mark for the first time, the total of 102,498 being made up as follows:

Primary	93,983
Secondary	7,566
Technical and vocational	696
Teacher training	253

This represented an increase of 5,773 over the 1964 total of 96,725.

- 38. In 1965, excluding 27 kindergartens, there were 639 schools scattered over 55 islands, with 3,128 teachers, of whom 2,503, or 80 per cent, were trained.
- 39. Government gross expenditure on education for 1965 was about £2 million, compared with £1,748,921 for 1964.
- 40. Primary school teacher training is conducted in three colleges, one run by the Government and two

by missions. The combined roll of the three colleges in 1965 was 253. No secondary teacher training is as yet undertaken in the Territory.

41. In 1966, the Higher Education Mission to the South Pacific recommended the establishment of a University of Fiji, which would serve the interests of the whole of the South Pacific region. The initial capital cost was put at £1,375,000, and operating costs at £356,000 a year.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

42. The Special Committee considered the question of Fiji at its 546th, 555th, 558th, 560th and 561st meetings between 28 August and 15 September 1967.

Appointment of the Sub-Committee on Fiji

- 43. The Chairman recalled that, by its resolution of 7 September 1966 concerning Fiji (see para. 1 above), the Special Committee had decided "to appoint a subcommittee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible". After considering the report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VIII), the General Assembly, by its resolution 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, had endorsed the decision of the Special Committee and requested the Chairman of the Special Committee, in consultation with the administering Power, to appoint the sub-committee as early as practicable.
- 44. He had therefore been in consultation on the matter with the representative of the administering Power. However, in a letter dated 28 August 1967 (A/AC.109/261), the United Kingdom had stated that the United Kingdom Government did not regard a visit to Fiji by a sub-committee of the Special Committee as necessary. After receiving that reply from the administering Power, he had had further consultations with the members of the Committee, and many of them had felt that the sub-committee should nevertheless be appointed, in the hope that it would be able to assist the Special Committee in its consideration of the question.
- 45. He had therefore decided to appoint Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, India and the United Republic of Tanzania as members of the Sub-Committee. He hoped that the administering Power would reconsider its position in the matter, and he trusted that the Sub-Committee would be able to submit a useful report.
- 46. The representative of India thanked the Chairman for the confidence he had shown in India by naming it as a member of the Sub-Committee to examine the situation in Fiji. India would do its best to discharge its responsibilities as a member of the Sub-Committee, and it shared the hope that the administering Power would reconsider its decision and agree to a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee.

General statements by members

- 47. The representative of the United Kingdom said that at the 1652nd meeting of the Fourth Committee his delegation had described the background to the present constitutional position in Fiji. He would therefore only recall the salient features of the position.
- 48. The population of Fiji (477,000) could be divided into three main groups: the Indian community,

- representing 50.5 per cent of the population; the indigenous Fijian people and the Pacific Islanders (45 per cent); and the Europeans, Chinese and others (4.5 per cent). Because of the different distribution of age groups between the various communities, however, the pattern of actual enrolled voters was rather different and the Indians represented less than 50 per cent. The balance between the two largest communities was thus very delicately poised. For many years there had been only very limited effective integration on the political or social level between the two main communities. Until the introduction of the new Constitution in September 1966, political life had been based on the communities with exclusively communal representation and communal voting. The Constitutional Conference held in London in July-August 1965 had recognized that the aim should be a single common roll, regardless of community or race, but there had been wide divergencies of view about the rate and method of achieving that objective. The constitutional arrangements which had come into effect in September 1966 represented the best available compromise. Although there was still a substantial measure of communal representation and voting, three of the members drawn from each of the three main communities were elected on a cross-voting basis. In other words, each candidate for each of the nine cross-voting seats must seek election by the votes from all three communities. The aim was to encourage the political parties to develop a broader national, multiracial and multicommunal appeal. In view of the delicate communal situation in Fiji, the importance of those changes should not be belittled.
- 49. In the elections held in October 1966, as his delegation had already informed the Fourth Committee at its 1652nd meeting, some parties had sought and obtained support on a nation-wide rather than a communal basis. The Alliance Party, which had won twenty-two seats as against nine for the Federation Party and three for Independent members, had won all nine of the indigenous Fijian communal roll seats with 68 per cent of the vote in the contested seats and five out of the seven seats allocated to the third communal group, with 67 per cent of the votes cast. It had also won 40 per cent of the votes cast in the one third of the Indian seats which they contested, and obtained 47,309 votes in all the communal seats combined compared with 43,705 votes for the Federation Party. The Alliance Party won 57 per cent of the votes cast by all three groups voting together in the crossvoting constituencies. The figures showed beyond any doubt that the Alliance Party had obtained substantial support among all sections of the population and had secured a clear majority of all the votes cast in the elections, whether on a communal or cross-voting basis. Ratu Mara, leader of the Alliance Party, himself a Fijian, had appointed two Indian members of his party to the Executive Council, and an Indian member of the opposition Federation Party had been appointed Deputy Speaker of the Legislature. Other Alliance Party nominations to posts in the Executive Council had included Fijians and Europeans, so that the Council was in every sense multiracial, which was an encouraging sign. Thus, the new Constitution was already encouraging the growth of multiracial politics in Fiji.
- 50. In September 1967, a ministerial system had been introduced. Ratu Mara had become Chief Minister and the members of the former Executive Council

had become Ministers and had taken over full and formal charge of the departments for which they were responsible.

- 51. Another important development had been the unanimous adoption by the Legislature in 1966 of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, which should help to promote inter-communal cooperation and harmony. The question of land tenure had been a great source of tension between Fijians and Indians in recent years, since the landowner often belonged to one community and his tenant to another. The new law gave added protection to tenants with justice for landlords also and established a tribunal for the settlement of disputes.
- 52. The situation in Fiji was unique in many respects, since the indigenous inhabitants represented a minority, albeit substantial, of the total population, while the Indian majority formed a minority of the electorate. Each community had been apprehensive lest the other should secure a dominant position in the life of the country, to its own possible disadvantage. This apprehension lay behind much of the purely communal politics of the past. The problem was to find a framework in which people of different races, proud of their distinct cultural heritages and ways of life, could live together in peace, friendship and co-operation. The heritage of the past could not simply be swept away by a stroke of the pen, nor by a law of the Fiji Legislature, nor by a decree of the United Kingdom Government, nor by the application of a United Nations resolution which demanded that the problems should be solved by simply ignoring them. It would take time to solve such problems; to attempt to do so overnight would only accentuate them. The people of Fiji should be given time to grow accustomed to their new constitutional arrangements and to political parties with a multicommunal or non-communal approach, and time to build up trust and the habit of co-operation. Progress was, however, being made, as demonstrated by the introduction of non-communal voting arrangements, the success at the elections of a party approved by members of all communities, the formation of a multiracial government and the agreement of the legislature to a new law on landlords and tenants.
- 53. There was mounting evidence to show that the new Fiji Constitution was beginning to pave the way towards the objectives from which he was sure the Special Committee would not dissent. For that reason, his delegation had been unable to support General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), whose recommendations appeared to be misconceived and contrary to the declared objectives of communal harmony and national unity. Similarly, his Government did not agree that any useful purpose would be served by the visit of a United Nations mission to Fiji, especially in view of the unacceptable nature of recent resolutions concerning the Territory. Although the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Power, had taken the decision not to agree to such a visit, it had taken into account, inter alia, the declared view of the leader of the majority Party in Fiji, who had publicly stated that the Fiji Government did not agree that a United Nations mission should go to Fiji. He hoped that the honest differences of opinion which might exist on that question would not prevent the Committee from taking a fair and objective view of the declared objectives of the United Kingdom Government in the Terri-

- tory and of the substantial progress which had been and was being made. Fiji had embarked on a great experiment in political harmony and racial co-operation and its people had a right to expect the Special Committee to show understanding, patience and forbearance so that the experiment might succeed.
- 54. The representative of India asked whether the United Kingdom representative could give the breakdown by communities of the former Executive Council, now the Council of Ministers.
- 55. The representative of the Ivory Coast, referring to operative paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (c) of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), said that the United Kingdom representative had mentioned only one measure, namely, the introduction of a cross-electoral system, taken in that connexion. He wondered whether there had been any others.
- 56. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would comment on those questions at a later stage in the debate.
- 57. The representative of India said that the working paper on Fiji prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-41 above) was, inevitably, not as up to date as his delegation would have wished. The representative of the administering Power had described the most recent developments, but with some significant omissions.
- 58. The remarks made by his delegation in the Fourth Committee at its 1652nd and 1655th meetings, during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, were still valid. The administering Power had made very little effort to fulfil the provisions of various resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, concerning Fiji, in particular General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). It had not so far carried out any of the measures called for in operative paragraph 4 of that resolution, which were necessary to lead Fiji to independence as a unified and multiracial State, and had refused to allow a visiting mission to enter the Territory.
- 59. The present electoral system in Fiji discriminated against the indigenous Fijians and the Fijians of Indian origin to the benefit of the small but powerful European community. The latter, which represented less than 5 per cent of the population, had ten seats in the legislature out of the thirty-six filled by election. Moreover, under the electoral system, one European vote actually equalled nine indigenous Fijian votes and ten so-called Indian votes.
- 60. It was significant that the representative of the administering Power had not yet provided an answer to his question concerning the composition of the former Executive Council, now the Council of Ministers (see para. 54 above). However, he understood that, of the eleven members of the Executive Council, six had been members of the European community—or rather of the community which was neither Fijian nor Indian—three had been Fijians and two had been members of the so-called Indian community. In the Council of Ministers, the Europeans had four seats, the Fijians three and the so-called Indians one. The European community therefore retained a disproportionate share of power.
- 61. He agreed with the representative of the administering Power on the need to develop racial harmony in Fiji but differed from him with regard to the steps to be taken to achieve it. The administering Power

could not escape responsibility for the fact that there had been very little effective integration between the different communities on the political or social level. It had been its deliberate policy in Fiji, as elsewhere, to accentuate racial differences in order to retain its own position of dominance. The differences between the Fijian community and the community of Indian origin had been grossly exaggerated by the administering Power, and he was sure that, given the opportunity, the two communities would be able and willing to live in peace and harmony. In 1929, elections to the municipality in Suva had taken place successfully on a commonroll vote, yet the system had been discontinued. The success of the new cross-voting system was further proof that the communities could maintain a harmonious relationship.

- 62. His delegation submitted that it was wrong to refer to the people of Indian origin as the Indian community; they were no less Fijian than the indigenous Fijians themselves. Such unnecessary labels certainly did not promote communal harmony.
- 63. As the representative of the administering Power had said, both the main communities in Fiji agreed that the long-term aid should be a single common electoral roll, and his delegation had no reason to doubt that, if introduced immediately, it would be very beneficial for the people of Fiji as a whole. The Chief Minister, Ratu Mara, had already proved himself to be a very competent leader and was successfully working towards a multi-racial society.
- 64. Full powers had still not been transferred to the legislative and executive bodies in Fiji, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). No additional executive powers appeared to have been given to the members of the new Council of Ministers, and the Governor still retained very wide discretionary powers.
- 65. His delegation had been disappointed by the United Kingdom Government's refusal to agree to a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee on Fiji, since an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly had been of the opinion that such a visit to obtain first-hand information would serve a very useful purpose. A United Nations visit would also allay the fears which, according to the administering Power, some of the people of Fiji felt with regard to the possible repercussions of United Nations "interference". He was glad that the Sub-Committee on Fiji had been appointed despite the lack of co-operation by the administering Power. He hoped that the latter would reconsider its decision; otherwise, the members of the Special Committee would be entitled to draw their own conclusions.
- 66. The representative of Yugoslavia said that it appeared from the Secretariat's working paper (see paras. 1-41 above) and from the statement by the representative of the administering Power that there had been no change with regard to the decolonization of Fiji. The administering Power continued to pursue a policy which it alone considered useful and to disregard the provisions of the various relevant United Nations resolutions, especially General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). Such a situation was unacceptable and unsatisfactory. The administering Power's claims that its own policy of introducing a complicated constitutional and electoral system would solve the serious racial and communal problems in Fiji and bring the Territory to independence more swiftly and more effectively than the policy advocated in resolution 2185

- (XXI) were unconvincing. Such a system could not bring independence, communal harmony and national unity to Fiji, but might result in a widening of the gap between the communities, which could then be used by the administering Power to justify the perpetuation of the colonial régime. In the latest elections in Fiji, the Europeans and their allies, who numbered only 6,340 out of 156,683 registered voters, had won almost 30 per cent of the seats in the Legislative Council. In the Executive Council, the Europeans, representing only 4.5 per cent of the population, had an absolute majority, while more than 50 per cent of the population was represented by only two members. In addition, the Governor had extremely broad powers. In contrast, resolution 2185 (XXI), by recommending various specific measures in its operative paragraph 4, had outlined the course which alone could secure the strengthening of communal harmony and national unity in the Territory and the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of Fiji.
- 67. The negative attitude of the administering Power with regard to a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee on Fiji only increased the doubts already voiced by most delegations in the Special Committee and in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly concerning its readiness to facilitate the rapid attainment of independence by the people of Fiji. There could be no other reason for the United Kingdom to oppose the visit of the Sub-Committee, whose only purpose was to study the situation in the Territory at first hand. His delegation fully supported the Chairman's decision to appoint a Sub-Committee despite the administering Power's opposition; it would still be able to make a substantial contribution to the study of the situation in the Territory.
- 68. The Special Committee should express its strong dissatisfaction with the refusal of the administering Power to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and with its determination to pursue its colonial policy in Fiji, and should recommend to the General Assembly such measures as would ensure, without further delay, the implementation of resolution 2185 (XXI) and consequently of resolution 1514 (XV).
- 69. The representative of Chile said that his delegation had supported General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 3 of which provided for the setting up of a sub-committee to visit the Territory for the purpose of studying the situation there at first hand. He agreed with the Chairman's decision to appoint the Sub-Committee, despite the lack of co-operation from the administering Power. Chile was honoured to have been named as a member and would do everything in its power to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it.
- 70. Nevertheless, his delegation was not sure how the Sub-Committee was to operate. In his letter to the Chairman (A/AC.109/261), the representative of the United Kingdom had referred the Special Committee to the statement made by the United Kingdom delegation in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, which had made it clear that the administering Power did not consider it necessary for a sub-committee to visit the Territory. Chile believed that such a visit would be most useful, since it would allow the Special Committee to become fully cognizant of the situation in the Territory, and it could then recommend whatever measures it deemed appropriate to accelerate the process of decolonization there.
- 71. The situation in the Territory was very complex. The majority of the population was not adequately

represented in the legislature or in the Council of Ministers. An electoral system based on a single electoral roll should be adopted as soon as possible, so that each sector of the population would have the representation to which it was entitled. The representative of the administering Power had told the Special Committee at a previous meeting that progress was being made and that the different population groups were gradually becoming integrated. The Chilean delegation nevertheless considered that progress in the Territory had been inadequate.

72. The representative of Poland said it was evident from the statement made by the United Kingdom representative in the Special Committee that the situation in the Territory had remained basically unchanged during the past year and that the administering Power had been continuing its own policy aimed at the perpetuation of its domination over the Territory. That policy was also reflected in other available documents, such as the Fact Sheets on the Commonwealth concerning Fiji, which stated:

"A Conference was held in London from 26 July to 9 August 1965 to work out a constitutional framework for Fiji which would preserve a continuing association with Britain and within which further progress could be made towards self-government."

73. The premise that a "continuing association with Britain" was the only possibility open for the time being to the people of the Territory contradicted the position taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly on the basis of resolution 1514 (XV), which called for the granting of immediate independence to the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

74. The attitude adopted by the administering Power so far had been totally negative. It had rejected the recommendations of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), had refused to allow a United Nations mission to visit the Territory and had not made any declaration as to when the people of Fiji would be able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. In particular, the administering Power had failed to implement the measures called for in resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 4, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

75. Under General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), the Special Committee had been instructed to keep the question of Fiji under consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session; it must therefore make a pronouncement on whether the policy of the administering Power was consonant with the provisions and recommendations of that resolution.

76. The representative of Bulgaria welcomed the establishment of the Sub-Committee on Fiji and said that his delegation was highly honoured to have been asked to serve on it.

77. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, pointed out to the representative of Yugoslavia that the course which was being followed by the United Kingdom Government was not "considered useful" by that Government alone; it had the full support of the majority party in Fiji and coincided with the latter's views and wishes. In so far as General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI) called for the fixing of an early date for independence and the formation of a constituent assembly, it in no way reflected the publicly stated views of either the Alliance Party, which was supported by

the majority of voters, or the opposition party, the Federation Party, at the present time. His delegation could not accept that matters of such vital importance to the future of the Territory could be decided either in the Special Committee or in the General Assembly in isolation from and in disregard of the stated wishes of the representative organs of public opinion in the Territory.

78. At the next meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the representative of India had said that the immediate introduction of a single electoral roll throughout the Territory of Fiji would have been very beneficial. That was not the view taken by the United Kingdom, which felt that this system, if introduced prematurely or precipitately, would do more harm than good. It was better to concentrate on measures which, though possibly less spectacular, were more useful, and to act by stages. The electoral system which had been put into effect already represented considerable progress. It should also be pointed out that, following the local consultations which had been held in 1965 and 1966, steps had been taken to institute a single common roll in some municipalities in 1966, with the best of results. That system might shortly be extended to other municipalities, subject to local wishes and the necessary legislative proposals.

79. Another point raised by the representative of India concerned the Indian community in Fiji. He had stated that the first Indians to arrive in Fiji had been brought there forcibly by the Europeans. That assertion was totally at variance with the historical facts. The Indians who had gone to Fiji at that time had done so quite voluntarily after having, of their own free will, signed a contract on the expiration of which they were free to return to India with passages paid; only about one third of them had chosen to do so.

80. The representative of India had also asked why Fijians of Indian origin were always referred to as the "Indian community". Ninety per cent of the Indian community had been born in the Territory, but they were usually described as the Indian community and so described themselves, to distinguish them from the indigenous Fijians. These communal problems would not be solved by changing labels. He objected to the Indian representative's unwarranted assertion that the United Kingdom had deliberately fostered and encouraged tension between the two communities. Such statements were not calculated to promote the solution which both the United Kingdom Government and the Indian Government were seeking.

81. What must be done was to endeavour to promote inter-communal harmony and co-operation. The two main political parties in the Territory had avoided communal titles and had appealed for—and obtained—broad-based support. As he had already had occasion to stress, the situation in Fiji was not exactly comparable with any other, because of the near-equilibrium between the two main communities, although some rather similar cases—for example, Guyana and Mauritius—showed that such problems could be overcome. What was needed was time and patience.

82. The representative of the Ivory Coast had asked what had been done to abolish discrimination, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 4 (c). The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that discrimination based on race, origin, political or religious belief, or

colour was prohibited under section 13 of the 1966 Constitution. It was not clear what particular type of discrimination was referred to in resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 4 (c); if it was the 1966 Constitution that was being criticized, it was too soon to consider modifying it, because both the United Kingdom Government and the local party supported by the majority of Fiji voters considered that the Constitution must be allowed time to prove itself. If the representative of the Ivory Coast was referring to economic and social conditions, the difficulties experienced in those fields were not necessarily due to discriminatory legislation; in any case, steps had been taken to improve the situation, and mention might be made, in particular, of some legislative reforms, particularly those concerning relations between landlords and tenants, which he had described in detail in his earlier statement. Many primary schools were operated on a multi-racial basis, 231 of the 581 schools at primary level being interracial. The case of Fiji was unique, and barriers to intercourse inevitably existed because of the presence of two distinct societies, in almost equal numbers, one indigenous and the other established for at most three or four generations, whose culture, language and customs differed. That gave rise to difficulties, of a kind not confined to Fiji, that were not easy to overcome, but even so it could hardly be said that discrimination in social relations existed in the Territory. The barriers to integration were not the same thing as deliberate discrimination.

83. The representative of India, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the United Kingdom had replied, although somewhat unconvincingly, to several points which he had raised but had left aside two very important factors. The first was the preponderant share of power held by the small European community in Fiji. The European community constituted only 4.5 per cent of the population but had 55 per cent of the seats in the Executive Council, while the remainder of the population, or 91 per cent of the inhabitants, had the other 45 per cent. He had asked a question on that point which the United Kingdom representative had not answered. He had merely talked about the difficult situation which prevailed in the Territory, but had refused to acknowledge that that situation was due solely to the policy of the colonial Power. The results achieved in some cases by the United Kingdom in the matter of decolonization did not place it above all criticism, and there were other cases, especially Southern Rhodesia, where it had failed to take the necessary measures and where there was justification for doubting its goodwill. The United Kingdom representative's statement that the system of a common electoral roll had been successfully employed in some municipalities in Fiji only served to prove the validity of the Indian delegation's claim that the system would work well in Fiji. If the system had been found satisfactory in several cases there was no reason why it should not be employed throughout the Territory. The reply given by the United Kingdom representative to his objection to the people of Indian origin being called the "Indian community" was far from satisfactory. In addition to the example he gave earlier of an Englishman being called a Rhodesian in Rhodesia, the Englishmen who went to Gibraltar also became Gibraltarians and did not remain Englishmen. He paid a tribute to Chief Minister Ratu Mara and said that because of the leadership provided by people like him, his delegation was convinced that a common roll, if introduced in Fiji, would have only beneficial consequences for the Territory.

- 84. The United Kingdom apparently did not have any objection now in principle to visiting missions, as it had agreed to a visiting mission with respect to one of its colonies. In the case of Fiji, it had simply stated that the Special Committee had all the information it needed and that a visiting mission would not produce anything new. If the Sub-Committee would find that the facts in Fiji corresponded to the situation described by the administering Power, why was the United Kingdom afraid of having a visiting mission go to the Territory? As Fiji was not yet independent, it was the British Government which did not want a visiting mission to go to the Territory and not the people of Fiji. The reasons for the reluctance of the British Government were only too obvious.
- 85. Once again, he regretted that the United Kingdom representative had failed to answer those two important questions.
- 86. The representative of the United Kingdom said the comments made by the representative of India proved that any difference of views between the two countries related less to the objective than to the speed with which it could be attained.
- 87. The representative of India had said that 55 per cent of the members of the Fijian Council of Ministers belonged to the European community. Of the six Europeans members among the eleven members of the Council of Ministers, three were expatriate officials appointed by the Governor. These could not be regarded as members of the resident European community in Fiji. In addition to the three expatriate officials and one other official, there were seven members of the Council drawn from among the elected members of the legislature, chosen by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Minister, and three of these were also Europeans.
- 88. The representative of India said he was pleased to note that the United Kingdom representative had finally given the Committee the information concerning the composition of the Executive Council which he had previously refused to provide.
- 89. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, contrary to the implications of the Indian representative's statement, he had received the information in question only that very morning.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

- 90. At the 560th meeting, on 14 September 1967, the representative of Iraq introduced a draft resolution on Fiji (A/AC.109/L.429) jointly sponsored by Afghanistan, India, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Syria, United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. He urged the administering Power to reconsider its position and realize the benefits which could result from a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee on Fiji. The draft resolution contained neither drastic measures nor unrealistic requests, and the sponsors hoped that it would receive overwhelming, if not unanimous, support.
- 91. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the draft resolution was actually a reaffirmation of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI); the sponsors had decided to submit it because that resolution had not been implemented by the administering Power. His delegation believed that the measures recommended in resolution 2185 (XXI) were the only correct means

of accelerating the process of decolonization and realizing the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in Fiji. He hoped that the members of the Special Committee would give the draft resolution the consideration it deserved.

- 92. The representative of Syria said that the draft resolution, which reproduced the tenor of previous resolutions that the administering Power had failed to implement, was highly relevant and deserved the fullest support. It rightly drew attention to the administering Power's policy of maintaining national division and encouraging discriminatory practices, thereby hindering any kind of progress.
- 93. The representative of Chile said that the draft resolution under consideration reflected the concern felt by his delegation. It expressed regret at the administering Power's failure to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2185 (XXI) in the Territory and urgently appealed to the administering Power to reconsider its refusal to allow a visit by a sub-committee to the Territory. The draft resolution was a realistic one; his delegation fully endorsed the principles set out in it and would give it its unreserved support.
- 94. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). Having carefully studied the documentation prepared by the Secretariat and listened attentively to the statement of the administering Power, he regretted to note that the latter had not taken the necessary action to implement resolution 2185 (XXI). The draft resolution before the Committee clearly reflected that state of affairs. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of it and hoped that it would be supported by the great majority, if not all, of the members.
- 95. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had studied the draft resolution thoroughly and had also listened carefully to the statements of the representatives of Bulgaria, Chile, Iraq, Poland, Syria and Yugoslavia in support of it; he regretted, although he was not surprised, that the progress and the new and hopeful trends which his delegation had mentioned in its statement of 13 September (558th meeting) had been ignored, despite the fact that some delegates had recently met the Chief Minister of Fiji and heard from him at first hand of these facts and of his efforts to promote interracial harmony. He appreciated the respect felt for the General Assembly's resolution but it ought to be possible to acknowledge the hopeful experiment in train in Fiji and to allow some flexibility of opinion or at least a suspension of judgement. The United Kingdom had already clearly explained its position on resolution 2185 (XXI), and, in particular on paragraph 4 of that resolution, in the Fourth Committee. It had stated its belief that the recommendations made in the resolution failed to take account of the progress achieved and that it sought to impose a solution unacceptable to at least one of the main Fiji communities. It had therefore been unable to support it. The draft resolution had the same defects, and his delegation would have to vote against it for that reason.
- 96. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.429) was adopted at the 561st meeting on 15 September 1967 by a roll-call vote of 17 to 3, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Italy, Sierra Leone.

- 97. The representative of Australia recalled that, at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, Australia had voted against resolution 2185 (XXI) and had given a detailed statement of its views on the very complex question of Fiji. His delegation therefore regretted that the resolution which the Special Committee had adopted merely repeated what had already been said in resolution 2185 (XXI), without taking any account of the important changes in the Territory during the past year. In the course of the debate, the members of the Special Committee had not accorded due importance to the political advances which had been achieved in the Territory, particularly the results of the latest elections and the formation of a new Council of Ministers. Nor had they taken note of another important fact mentioned by the United Kingdom representative in his statement, namely, the unanimous adoption by the House of Assembly of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, which marked an encouraging advance towards the settlement of a most complex question that lay at the very heart of the difficulties experienced by Fiji. Australia was not opposed to the principle of "one man, one vote", on which its own political system was based, as was the electoral system it had introduced in New Guinea. It recognized, however, that in Fiji the problem was not quite the same, because of the existence of a number of distinct communities. For that reason, his delegation had hoped that the Special Committee would go deeper into the problem and not merely adopt a resolution similar to previous ones, without taking account of the actual situation.
- 98. The Chairman said that, following the adoption of the resolution concerning Fiji, he would like to make an appeal to the administering Power. At its previous session, the General Assembly had endorsed the decision of the Special Committee to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory, and had requested the Chairman of the Special Committee, in consultation with the administering Power, to appoint the sub-committee as early as practicable. The Chairman of the Special Committee had approached the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who had subsequently informed him, in a letter dated 28 August 1967 (A/AC.109/261) that the United Kingdom Government did not regard a visit to Fiji by a sub-committee of the Special Committee as necessary and was unable to agree to a visit by the sub-committee as then proposed. On behalf of the Special Committee, he urgently appealed to the administering Power to reconsider its position, and he wished to assure the people of Fiji that the Special Committee took a keen interest in their well-being and would do all in its power to protect their interests.
- 99. For several years, the Special Committee had been asking the United Kingdom to allow it to send a visiting mission to Aden. The United Kingdom had always refused, and what had happened in that Territory was now history. If the administering Power had acceded to the Special Committee's requests and

allowed it to send a visiting mission to Aden, the bloodshed could perhaps have been avoided. The United Nations was in a position to make a significant contribution to the process of decolonization. One need only mention as an example the case of Equatorial Guinea, and to some extent Aden. He therefore hoped that the inhabitants of Fiji would appreciate that it was in their interest that a visiting mission should go to the Territory and that they themselves would appeal to the United Kingdom to reconsider its decision and allow the newly established Sub-Committee to visit Fiji.

- 100. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would transmit the resolutions just adopted by the Special Committee and the Chairman's appeal to the United Kingdom Government, which would study them carefully.
- 101. The resolution (A/AC.109/274) adopted by the Special Committee on the question of Fiji at its 561st meeting on 15 September 1967 reads as follows:
 - "The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
 - "Having considered the question of Fiji,
 - "Having heard the statement of the administering Power,
 - "Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2068 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966.
 - "Noting with regret that the administering Power had not yet taken effective measures to implement

- the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
- "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "2. Reaffirms its view that the administering Power must expedite the process of decolonization in Fiji by holding elections on the basis of one man, one vote and by fixing an early date for independence;
- "3. Regrets that the administering Power has not yet taken measures to implement General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI);
- "4. Deeply regrets the negative attitude of the administering Power in refusing to agree to the visit by the Sub-Committee on Fiji to the Territory in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI);
- "5. Urgently appeals to the administering Power to co-operate with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to reconsider its decision concerning the visit of the Sub-Committee on Fiji in order to facilitate the work of the Special Committee;
- "6. Urges the administering Power to implement without further delay the provisions of resolution 2185 (XXI) and, in particular, operative paragraph 4 thereof;
- "7. Decides to keep the question of Fiji on its agenda."

CHAPTER VIII*

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

- 1. The Special Committee first considered Fernando Póo and Río Muni in 1963.1 The item was taken up again in 1964 and the Special Committee adopted a resolution which is contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.²
- 2. At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not specifically consider these Territories, but included relevant information on them in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.³
- 3. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2067 (XX) on 16 December 1965. In the fifth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the General Assembly noted that the Territories of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had merged and were named Equatorial Guinea. In the second operative paragraph of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the administering Power to set the earliest possible

- date for independence after consulting the people on the basis of universal adult suffrage under the supervision of the United Nations.
- 4. In 1966, the question of Equatorial Guinea was considered by the Special Committee at its meetings both in Africa and at Headquarters. At its 451st meeting, held on 20 June 1966, the representative of Spain, on behalf of his Government, invited the Special Committee to visit the Territory so that either the Committee or a representative group of its members could ascertain the conditions in the Territory.
- 5. At its 454th meeting, on 21 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Equatorial Guinea (A/6300/Rev.1,4 chap. IX, para. 79), the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:
 - "1. Notes with satisfaction the open invitation made to it by the administering Power to visit Equatorial Guinea;
 - "3. Decides to send to Equatorial Guinea, as soon as practicable, a sub-committee to ascertain the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2076 (XX)".

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.6.

document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IX.

³ Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. X.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. XIII.

2 Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/590/Pev.1, chap. IX

⁴ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

- 6. The Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea visited the Territory in August 1966 and subsequently submitted its report to the Special Committee (*ibid.*, chap. IX, annex).
- 7. At its 482nd meeting, on 18 November 1966, the Special Committee adopted the Sub-Committee's report and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein.
- 8. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2230 (XXI) on 20 December 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

- 9. On 16 May 1967, the Secretary-General submitted a preliminary report to the Special Committee (see annex to this chapter below).
- 10. In a letter dated 18 September 1967, addressed to the Secretary-General (A/6802), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain announced that the constitutional conference on Equatorial Guinea would commence on 30 October 1967.

B. Information on the Territory⁵

11. Information on constitutional development, as well as political, economic, social and educational conditions in the Territory, is contained in the report of the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea which visited the Territory in August 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IX, annex). Supplementary information which has become available since that report was issued is given below.

Constitutional developments

- 12. In a letter dated 27 December 1966 (A/AC. 109/217), the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that the Council of Ministers of Spain, in the course of a meeting held on 22 December 1966, had decided to appoint immediately an inter-ministerial commission entrusted with the task of preparing as soon as possible for the holding of a constitutional conference on Equatorial Guinea. The inter-ministerial commission was reported to have completed its work on 12 July 1967.
- 13. In the meantime various party leaders and officials of the autonomous régime visited Madrid for talks with Spanish Government officials on the constitutional issue. These included Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú, President of the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea; and Messrs. Pastor B. Torao Sikara, Atanasio Ndong Miyone and August Daniel Grange Molay, leaders of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE); and a special committee of the Territory's General Assembly headed by the Assembly's President, Mr. Enrique Gori Molubela. This special committee was reported to have drawn up draft amendments to the Basic Law governing the autonomous status of the Territory.
- 14. The referendum on the Spanish Constitution was held on 14 December 1966 in Equatorial Guinea, as in other Spanish Territories. The results were reported to be as follows: registered voters, 113,256;

votes cast, 91,031; in favour, 63,521; against, 24,354; invalid, 3,156.

Economic conditions

15. Cacao and coffee remain the most important crops cultivated in the Territory. Figures for the output of cacao in 1966 were 31,223 tons (28,570 tons for Fernando Póo and 2,653 tons for Río Muni). This compared with a 1965 output of 32,499 tons (28,931 tons and 3,568 tons for Fernando Póo and Río Muni respectively). Figures for the output of coffee in 1966 were 6,400 tons, of which 5,000 tons were produced in Río Muni and 1,400 tons in Fernando Póo. This compared with a 1965 output of 6,664 tons, of which 5,336 tons were produced in Río Muni and 1,328 tons in Fernando Póo.

Budget

16. Figures available for 1966 indicate a total expenditure of 2,021 million pesetas, of which 500 million pesetas come under the ordinary budget for Equatorial Guinea, while 1,521 million pesetas represent aid from the Government of Spain. The latter is divided between the Budget of State Aid and Collaboration (*Presupuesto de Ayuda y Colaboracion a la Guinea Ecuatorial*), and the Economic and Social Development Plan, accounting for 1,150 million and 371 million pesetas respectively.

Health

17. Figures for 1966 indicate a total of 1,635 beds in the four principal hospitals, the leprosarium in Micomeseng and other smaller hospitals in the Territory. The largest hospital is that of Santa Isabel, which at the end of 1966 had 425 beds and was served by nine doctors, three midwives and ninety-six nurses. It was reported that the School for Nurses at Santa Isabel was making good progress in the training of indigenous nurses.

Education

18. At the end of 1966, there were 147 elementary school centres and 32 primary school centres in the Territory, the corresponding figures for 1965 being 145 and 32 respectively. At the end of 1965, there was a total of 271 teachers, of whom 17 were Europeans and 6 were qualified indigenous teachers. The remainder were auxiliary teachers. Information on the total number of teachers in 1966 is not available. In the secondary schools there were 31 teachers and 986 pupils during the 1965-1966 school year, compared with 19 teachers and 691 pupils in 1964-1965. These figures do not include the "La Salle" Professional Centre for vocational and technical education which is maintained by the Provincial Council of Río Muni at Bata. It was reported that a School for Vocational Training was to be established at Santa Isabel under the administration of the Provincial Council of Fernando Póo, with aid in this respect from the Spanish State.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

- 19. The Special Committee considered Equatorial Guinea at its 551st to 554th, 556th and 557th meetings held at Headquarters from 5 to 12 September 1967.
- 20. In a letter dated 22 August 1967 (A/AC.109/259), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain

⁵ This section was previously reproduced in document A/AC.109/L.422. It is based on: (a) information collected by the Secretariat from published sources; and (b) information transmitted by Spain under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 June 1967 covering the year ended 31 December 1966.

⁶ The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$US0.0168; 60 pesetas = \$US1.00.

to the United Nations requested that he be authorized to participate in meetings of the Special Committee at which Equatorial Guinea would be discussed. The Committee decided without objection to accede to that request.

Written petitions and hearings7

21. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Equatorial Guinea:

Petitioner Document No. General Secretary, Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) A/AC.109/PET.578 Mr. Pastor Torao Sikara, President General, Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) A/AC.109/PET.702 Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga, Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecua-A/AC.109//PET.702/Add.1 torial (MONALIGE) Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecua-A/AC.109//PET.702/Add.2 torial (MONALIGE) Mr. Bienvenido Abaga On-A/AC.109/PET.897 djdigui

- 22. At its 552nd meeting on 6 September 1967, the Special Committee heard Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga and Mr. Rafael Evita, representatives of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE).
- 23. Mr. Ibongo, speaking on behalf of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE), congratulated the Spanish Government on its work of decolonization in the Territory of Equatorial Guinea, which was more or less in accordance with the directives of the United Nations.
- 24. MONALIGE desired the independence of the Territory and, faithful to the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI), as well as to the wishes of the people of Equatorial Guinea, it would oppose, by all available political means, any result of the constitutional conference which did not provide for independence as a minimum. MONALIGE deplored the inertia shown by the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea in dealing with reports submitted by groups representing various shades of political opinion in the Territory, as well as the unwillingness of the Governing Council to accelerate the process of independence. The irresponsibility, inactivity, incompetence and unrepresentative character of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea must have been obvious to those members of the Special Committee who had visited the Territory the previous year. There could be no justification for the delay in convening the constitutional conference.
- 25. A document which had arrived that very morning, September 6, addressed to the Special Committee and signed by high officials in Fernando Póo and Río Muni, denounced the manoeuvres to which the indigenous and Spanish authorities in Equatorial Guinea had resorted in order to slow down the process of independence. According to that document, the Spanish Government had made no official declaration indicating that it had taken into account the wishes

of the people concerning the holding of a constitutional conference and the fixing of a date for that conference, despite the fact that the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IX, annex, para. 292) clearly stated that the majority of the people wanted independence without delay. Moreover, although the representative of Spain had stated on 10 December 1966 at the 1665th meeting of the Fourth Committee, that a constitutional conference would be held early in 1967, that conference had still not materialized. According to the Spanish Press, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations had addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in December 1966 announcing the appointment of an inter-ministerial commission to prepare for the constitutional conference, but so far nothing was known about the progress made in that preparatory work. In a statement to the Spanish Press on 3 December 1966, Mr. Ondó Edú, the President of the Governing Council, had once again requested Spain to prepare the Territory for independence. In order to divert the attention of the people of the Territory, as well as world public opinion, the Spanish Government had invited the members of the Standing Committee of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea to Madrid in March 1967 and had persuaded them to set up a special committee to consult the population on the political future of the Territory; that had been done in an attempt to avoid convening the constitutional conference which would inevitably result in the independence of the Territory. The Guinean special committee had not made public any conclusions, although it had completed its consultations in May. It was known that the Spanish members of the Guinean special committee had destroyed part of the material collected, on the instructions of the Spanish Government, since the people consulted had been overwhelmingly in favour of independence. Such manoeuvres had given rise to a great deal of public indignation. It was understood that the Spanish Government had obtained the signatures of certain members of the Governing Council and the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea to a document requesting an extension of the timelimit for the submission of the Guinean special committee's report. It was also understood that the Spanish Government had obtained the signatures of certain members of the autonomous Government to a document requesting Spain to retain the present autonomous régime after July 1968 for economic reasons, as well as on the pretext that the people were not yet ready for independence. The Spanish Government was, in the meantime, encouraging subversive activities by certain capitalist groups in Fernando Póo which were trying to separate the latter from Río Muni, in complete disregard of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in particular resolution 2230 (XXI), operative paragraph 5. The Spanish Minister of Industry had visited the Territory from 27 July to 2 August 1967, but the reasons for his visit were not yet known. In paying tribute to him, the Vice-President of the Governing Council had reaffirmed the statement he had made to the Spanish Press on 16 May 1966, but the Spanish Minister of Industry had made no reference whatsoever to its contents. The document had gone on to say that the people of Equatorial Guinea were more than ever convinced that the Spanish Government, despite its promises to the contrary, did not wish to grant independence to the Territory and was using every means available to evade its responsibilities, although it was clear that the overwhelming majority of the people of Equatorial Guinea

⁷ The following petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had completed its consideration of Equatorial Guinea: A/AC.109/PET.702/Add.2 and A/AC.109/PET.897.

wanted independence. The Spanish Government would no doubt try to justify its position and would probably submit false testimony to the United Nations General Assembly signed by Guineans who had been paid vast sums of money to do so or perhaps, as it had done before, would bring some of them to address the General Assembly in terms dictated by the Spanish Government, while claiming to be the true representatives of the people of Equatorial Guinea. Such manœuvres had to be prevented. Negotiations with the Spanish Government were impossible in practice, and the only recourse left open to the people of Equatorial Guinea was to appeal to the United Nations, in the hope that independence could be achieved by peaceful means.

- 26. Another document had been received, signed by all the members of a commission from Fernando Póo. They rejected those representatives in the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea who claimed to represent the people of Fernando Póo but acted under the orders of the Spanish Government, and they denied the assertion that Río Muni wished to separate from Fernando Póo. The authors of the document claimed that their highest aspiration was that Equatorial Guinea should become independent immediately as a single and sovereign State, and they expressed implicit trust in the Special Committee to help them achieve that aim by July 1968.
- 27. Since the autonomous Government and the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea were subordinate to the Government of Spain, it was up to the latter to invite the various political groups to send their representatives to the constitutional conference. MONALIGE would be ready to participate by sending a delegation as soon as the date of the conference was announced. He invited Spain to set a date for the constitutional conference; to declare categorically that the conference would only decide upon the final date for independence, which should be not later than 1968; and to announce to the Special Committee that it would dissolve the present autonomous Government and allow the democratic election of a Government truly representative of the people. He appealed to members of the Special Committee to exert pressure on the administering Power to grant independence to the Territory.
- 28. In reply to a question, the petitioner said that the autonomous Government and Assembly were not representative. First, the political situation in the country when the Basic Law had entered into force in January 1964 had been very different from the present situation. At that time many of the country's leaders had been outside the Territory. They had now returned but were no longer members of the Government. Secondly, the electoral machinery employed at the time had not been truly democratic, as was clear from the report of the Visiting Mission.
- 29. The parties currently allowed by Spain to engage in political activities were MONALIGE, MUNGE and IPGE. Although all three parties advocated independence, only the President of the Governing Council and the Vice-President, a member of MONALIGE, had spoken out in favour of independence.
- 30. Many members of the Special Committee had visited Equatorial Guinea and knew that the Governing Council and almost all members of the Assembly were against independence, although the population was for it. Consequently, the Government did not represent the wishes of the people.

- 31. Speaking as a member of MONALIGE, Mr. Evita said that, although the members of the autonomous Governing Council, who were inhabitants of Fernando Póo (Mr. Enrique Gori, President of the Governing Council and Vice-President of the General Assembly, Mr. Gustavo Watson, Minister of Health, Mr. José Luis Maho, Minister of Information and Tourism, Mr. Ramón Borico, Minister of Industry and Mining, and Mr. Aurelio Itoha, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs) might claim to be the legal representatives of the people of Fernando Póo, they were merely individuals carrying out the orders of the Spanish Government, which had appointed them and was maintaining them in office against the wishes of the people, who had often sought to remove them. That could readily be proved, since none of them had been elected by the people of Fernando Póo.
- 32. In answer to a question concerning the representation of MONALIGE in the Governing Council or in the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea, Mr. Ibongo said that MONALIGE had no representatives as such in the Assembly or in the Governing Council. At the time of the elections, the party had not been officially recognized or allowed to present candidates. The present Vice-President of the Governing Council was a member of MONALIGE. With regard to other parties, he said that one member of the Governing Council was a militant member of the Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE). Before becoming a Council member, he had been Chairman of the political junta. To the knowledge of the petitioner, there were no members of MUNGE in the Assembly. The elections had not been conducted on a party basis. According to the Spanish principle of organic democracy, they had been conducted on the basis of representation of economic, social and professional groups. Political ties had only been taken into account later, when the political climate had changed. Any member of the Assembly who belonged to MUNGE did so by choice and not from expediency.
- 33. Replying to a further question on the subject of the alleged plan to separate Fernando Póo and Río Muni, the petitioner said that the manoeuvres for their separation dated back to 9 March 1965, when the present chairman of the Fernando Póo delegation had visited United Nations Headquarters and drawn up a ten-point document, demanding the separation of the two Territories. The document was probably in the hands of the Special Committee, since it was mentioned in that body's report. It was possible to believe that Spain would respect the unity of the Territories; however, the ten-point document had been written before the representative of Spain had made his statement. That time lapse might explain the doubts concerning current manoeuvres. Those manoeuvres existed, but were the work of certain members of the Governing Council from Fernando Póo, whose positions had been made clear. He noted that according to a statement made by the representative of Spain, the separation of Río Muni and Fernando Póo was not official Spanish policy because the unity of the Territory was recognized from the geopolitical standpoint. However, in Equatorial Guinea there were individuals and groups possessing certain interests, and the socio-economic realities of the country also had to be taken into account.
- 34. Asked for further information relating to alleged efforts to dismember the Territory, Mr. Evita said that the document he had submitted earlier stated that the people of Fernando Póo had no doubt whatever

that the manoeuvres were ordered and directed by the Spanish Government, hiding behind the Union of Cocoa Growers, a capitalist group to which all business firms in Fernando Póo belonged and among which, as the main ones most dedicated to these stratagems, were Frapejo, Mora, Vivanco, Amilivia, Cunha Lisboa, Potau, and so on. Those firms, under the protection of the Spanish Government, were endeavouring to transform Fernando Póo into another Rhodesia.

- 35. Commenting on the remarks of the petitioners, the representative of Spain observed that one of the petitioners, Mr. Evita, had been somewhat separated from the realities of Equatorial Guinea because he had lived outside the Territory for eight years as a student. That doubtless explained why he had made an unacceptable comparison between Equatorial Guinea and Southern Rhodesia. His delegation categorically rejected that accusation and all others tending to discredit the autonomous authorities of the Territory, because they were not supported by facts. Those members of the Special Committee who had visited the Territory were in a position to evaluate such accusations.
- 36. He was surprised at the flippant assertion that nothing but obstacles were being placed in the path of the people of the Territory to prevent their stating their views freely. The petitioners themselves had recognized that there were political parties; indeed, they had claimed to represent them, although his delegation maintained that they were acting as individuals. It was difficult to understand how, during an election, the people of Equatorial Guinea could be unaware of who was to represent them or how to make a choice between candidates.
- 37. The petitioners had described the Assembly and Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea in very harsh terms. That attitude was hardly in accord with their statement that both the President and Vice-President of that Council had publicly declared their support for the Territory's independence, and had been reported in the Spanish and local Press. It was difficult to understand how the President and Vice-President could be accused of dubious manoeuvres at the behest of the Spanish Government when they had defended points of view similar to those of the petitioners. Furthermore, some of the people to whom the petitioner had referred had previously appeared before the Committee as petitioners. That proved that his Government had not placed obstacles in the path of any political leader from Equatorial Guinea coming to the United Nations to express his views. As he had stated at an earlier meeting, his Government considered that, at the Fourth Committee's next meeting, a group composed of official persons and other political figures not members of the Assembly or Council should be invited to attend as representatives of Equatorial Guinea. He had expressed no reservations as to the number or nature of the persons composing such a group. That was apparently not the attitude of the petitioners, who had repeatedly said that they were the only true and valid representatives of the Territory.
- 38. The insinuation that the delay in holding the constitutional conference was an integral part of Spanish stratagems to prevent the people of the Territory from expressing their desire for independence, was a further blatant contradiction. If such was the case, why should the conference be delayed? His Government had repeatedly stated that it would abide by the decisions of the people of the Territory and had stressed that

- it did not intend in any way to oppose their independence.
- 39. The petitioners had said that the Spanish Government had unilaterally created the autonomous régime in 1963. Yet, it had been created to ensure that the people of the Territory would be properly represented and its existence must be recognized, since it had been approved by 62,603 votes to 29,986 in a popular referendum. As to the alleged manoeuvres to dismember the Territory, he had already explained to the Special Committee that his Government's policy was precisely the opposite. He had been gratified by Mr. Ibongo's explicit recognition of that fact.
- 40. The petitioners had received a letter dated 1 September 1967, posted in Equatorial Guinea and obviously intended to be read out to the Committee. That proved that there was no censorship and that the Territory's postal services were efficient.

General statements

- 41. The representative of Spain said that he wished to inform the Special Committee of the latest steps taken by Spain with a view to the holding of the constitutional conference which was to decide the future of Equatorial Guinea. In 1963, the Guineans had approved the autonomous régime which was now in effect and which formed part of the process leading to independence, and General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 had recalled the administering Power's intention to grant independence to the Territory as a single entity. He reminded the Committee that, once the Spanish Government had endorsed the idea of a constitutional conference, it had decided to set up an inter-ministerial commission to formulate the Spanish Government's position for the purposes of the conference and to hold talks with the elected representatives of the people of Equatorial Guinea and with the opposition leaders in the Territory. The Spanish inter-ministerial commission had completed its work on 20 May 1967. The Standing Committee of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea had set up a special committee to consult the population and the political organizations in the Territory and to prepare a report, so that the Assembly would be in a position to give instructions to the delegations to the constitutional conference. The Guinean special committee had been unable to complete its work by the dead-line which had been set, because so many people had had to be consulted and so much documentation had had to be studied. It had therefore requested a new dead-line, to which the Spanish Government had agreed.
- 42. His delegation acknowledged that there had been some delay in comparison with the original plans, but it felt that that did not affect the substance of the problem and that it was better to take some time, in order to allow certain Guinean leaders to spell out and reconcile their ideas, rather than to rush those concerned into taking positions which might run counter to the objectives set out in General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI).
- 43. The Spanish Government would set a date for the constitutional conference as soon as the official delegation of the Territory was ready to participate and would submit a detailed report to the Special Committee or to the General Assembly after the conference. If it had not been found possible to hold the conference by the time the Fourth Committee met, the Spanish Government hoped that a Guinean delega-

tion would be allowed to explain to the Fourth Committee why the constitutional conference had been delayed, so that its members might have some objective information concerning the situation in the Territory.

44. He reaffirmed his Government's intention to hold the constitutional conference. There was lively political activity and free expression of opinions in Equatorial Guinea. Spain maintained a balance between the Provincial Council of Fernando Póo and the Provincial Council of Río Muni, in order to avoid tensions which might divide the Territory. Measures had also been taken on 31 January 1967 to increase social and trade-union benefits for workers in the Territory, and the Spanish Government was trying to create conditions which would enable Equatorial Guinea to take over its own future in conformity with United Nations guidelines.

45. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation had supported resolution 2230 (XXI) in the General Assembly and had been convinced that efforts would be made to establish a favourable political climate for democratic elections, as the administering Power had promised, and that power would be transferred to the Government which was thereby elected. According to a document submitted to the Spanish Government in January 1967 by the leaders of MONALIGE (A/ AC.109/PET.702, annex C) the people of the Territory were unanimously in favour of attaining full independence as soon as possible, but at the same time hoped that the ties between Spain and Equatorial Guinea would be strengthened; they wished to form a single unitary State in which the natural aspirations of the different ethnic groups would be respected; and they requested the administering Power to convene the proposed constitutional conference without delay. The people of Equatorial Guinea had expressed a desire to attain independence not later than July 1968 and his delegation, which had always defended their right to self-determination and independence, deplored the fact that resolution 2230 (XXI) had not yet been implemented. He urged the administering Power to do everything possible to set an early date for the convening of the promised constitutional conference. Although he recognized the good faith of Spain, which had repeatedly expressed its readiness to allow the people of Equatorial Guinea to exercise their rights to selfdetermination and independence, he believed that it should take dynamic action in order to arrange for true representation of the people and should not wait patiently for the report of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea on that subject. If by the beginning of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly a date had still not been set for the constitutional conference, he suggested that representatives of the people of the Territory should be invited to appear before the Fourth Committee. It was imperative that the economic, social and educational development of the country should be encouraged, but their political progress towards self-determination and independence was the paramount concern.

46. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had always believed and still believed that the people of Equatorial Guinea, like any other people still under the colonial yoke, had the right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). According to that resolution, all colonial peoples should be granted independence immediately without any conditions or reservations. Seven years

had elapsed since the adoption of that resolution and yet the people of Equatorial Guinea had still not attained independence, despite the repeated assurances of the representatives of Spain that independence would be granted if the people wished it. From the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea, which had visited the Territory in 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IX, annex), it was clear that all political parties and all sections of the population contacted by the Sub-Committee in the Territory were unequivocally in favour of independence. There were some differences of opinion as to the date on which independence should be granted, but no political party, no section of the population and no official representative of Equatorial Guinea had felt that independence should be delayed beyond July 1968. The wishes of the population had been noted in the penultimate preambular paragraph of resolution 2230 (XXI), in operative paragraph 6 of which the General Assembly had requested the administering Power to set a date for independence and for that purpose to convene a conference in which the various political parties and sections of the population would be represented. The responsibility for setting a date for independence therefore lay solely with the administering Power and that date should be not later than July 1968. The Committee had now been told that the people of Equatorial Guinea were not ready to discuss the matter and that their so-called representatives had asked for the conference to be postponed sine die. That could only result in the postponement sine die of the granting of independence to the people of Equatorial Guinea, who had already declared themselves to be unequivocally in favour of independence not later than July 1968. The explanations given by the administering Power for the delay in convening the conference were not convincing and it was clear from the statement made by the petitioner at the previous meeting that MONALIGE was opposed to Spain's delaying tactics. His delegation fully shared that view and was opposed to any manoeuvres designed to delay the granting of independence to Equatorial Guinea. The Special Committee should ask the administering Power to implement General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) unconditionally and to set a date immediately for the granting of independence not later than July 1968.

47. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation, and indeed the Special Committee as a whole, had always striven to ensure the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) but all efforts in that direction had so far met with very little co-operation, and in some cases with complete defiance, on the part of the colonial Powers.

48. The Spanish Government's announcement in 1966 of its intention to convene a constitutional conference had been welcomed as a positive move, but the Committee's expectations had been short-lived. There still appeared to be no possibility that specific terms of independence could be settled or even defined in the near future. Before the Territory had been visited by the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea in August 1966, the Spanish Government had given the impression that all was well and that the people were content with the existing state of affairs. The Sub-Committee had found, however, that there was virtual unanimity among the people in favour of independence without delay. The reason why operative paragraph 7 had been included in General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) was simply that Equatorial Guinea was a colony and that, as the Sub-Committee had ascertained, the people

did not enjoy freedom of political activity. In some cases, fines had been imposed for displaying placards demanding independence, and it was clear that political activities along party lines were being strongly discouraged by the colonial authorities.

- 49. The autonomous Government of Equatorial Guinea had already been condemned by his delegation and others as unrepresentative of the people, and the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee at its 552nd meeting had confirmed that it was so. In a country where there were not more than three African lawyers and five African doctors, it was an insult to the Africans to say that there was an elected member of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea to represent the interests of lawyers and another to represent the medical profession. As stated in the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (A/6300/ Rev.1, chap. IX, annex, para. 289), the electoral system limited participation to only a small minority of the adult population in the election of representatives to governmental organs. It was distressing, therefore, to be told that the autonomous Government represented the masses of the people of the Territory, and at the same time it was understandable that some members of that colonial institution should try to impede the holding of a constitutional conference which might lead to independence. According to the representative of Spain, it was the autonomous Government, rather than Spain, which was delaying the holding of the conference. His delegation agreed with the petitioners that the autonomous Government should be dissolved, as it did not represent the people and was incapable of bringing about changes that could lead to independence, even though there were certain elements within it which were determined to serve the true interests of the people of the Territory as a whole.
- 50. His delegation had welcomed the attitude taken by Spain when it had invited the Special Committee to send a visiting mission to Equatorial Guinea and had later announced the convening of a constitutional conference which would lead the Territory to independence. Yet, seven years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Spain had still not decolonized a single territory in Africa. It would be in Spain's interests to ensure the peaceful decolonization of the Territories under its domination. Spain should remember that the autonomous Government did not represent the masses of the people, but rather the interests of Spain; consequently, the contention that the conference could not be convened because the autonomous Government had been slow in responding to the Spanish proposal was unacceptable. It was for the administering Power to set a definite date for the constitutional conference and to invite representatives of all political parties, as well as the autonomous Government, to participate.
- 51. It was doubtful whether Spain would in fact grant independence to Equatorial Guinea by July 1968, as had been requested. The people of Equatorial Guinea had their own political parties to represent them and they were dedicated to the cause of freedom. He appealed to Spain not to make the struggle for liberation a bitter one, but to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) without further delay and set an early date for the convening of the constitutional conference, which should fix a date not later than July 1968 for the independence of the Territory.

- 52. The United Republic of Tanzania would continue to support the people of Equatorial Guinea until final victory had been achieved, and he hoped that they would work towards that goal without fear or intimidation.
- 53. The representative of Chile said that there were no economic, social or educational obstacles to the early attainment of independence by Equatorial Guinea, but there were certain political difficulties. His delegation hoped that Spain would implement the provisions of operative paragraphs 4 and 6 of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) as soon and as fully as possible, so that the people of Equatorial Guinea would be able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 54. In his statement (see para. 41 above), the representative of Spain had indicated that some progress had been made towards the convening of a constitutional conference with the establishment of an interministerial commission, but the results had not been as positive as might have been desired. No date had yet been set for the convening of the conference, which was so urgently necessary. He appealed to Spain to do everything in its power to ensure that the conference was held as soon as possible, since it was only in such a forum that all differences of opinion could be discussed to the benefit of the Territory.
- 55. As for operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2230 (XXI), his delegation was gratified to note that to a large extent sub-paragraph (a) had been implemented, since there were practically no restrictions on political activities in the Territory and a number of political leaders who had been living in voluntary exile had returned and were now participating in political activities. He deplored the fact that, because the constitutional conference had not yet been convened, it had not so far been possible to institute an electoral system based on universal adult suffrage, in accordance with sub-paragraph (b)—a step which was essential before sub-paragraph (c) could be implemented.
- 56. The petitioners had said (see para, 27 above) that the sole purpose of the constitutional conference should be to set a date for independence; however, he did not think that that was realistic. The Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had found during its visit to the Territory that there were many different opinions concerning the purpose of the constitutional conference. In addition to setting a date for independence, it should draw up an adequate constitution for Equatorial Guinea and work out an electoral system in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. The conference should bring together all sections of the population and should include in its agenda all questions relating to the political future of the Territory, as the leaders of MONALIGE had stated in a document addressed (A/AC.109/PET.702) to the Head of the Spanish State (see para. 21, above).
- 57. The representative of Mali recalled that, when the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had visited Madrid, the Spanish Government and Press had made much of the fact that the administering Power, on its own initiative, was inviting a United Nations body to co-operate with it in promoting the independence of a people under its rule. Following the Sub-Committee's visit to the Territory, it had seemed that Equatorial Guinea was well on the road to independence. The administering Power and the people of the Territory

had stated their agreement that a date should be fixed for independence; the people had seemed to favour July 1968, and the administering Power had expressed no objections.

- 58. It seemed from the statement made by the representative of Spain (see para. 41 above) that the administering Power was more concerned about certain supposed difficulties faced by the population in assimilating documents than about its own responsibilities. The administering Power should take steps to carry out the undertakings it had made. Certain divergences of views among the population were not a reason for delaying progress towards independence and postponing the convening of a constitutional conference. The problems which faced the political leaders of a Territory during the period immediately preceding independence were minor, the major problem being that of accession to independence. Such problems could be resolved after Equatorial Guinea had become a sovereign nation. The administering Power must not encourage internal controversies in order to delay independence. It was the responsibility of the administering Power to take the initiative in convening a constitutional conference, while the people of the Territory must make whatever preparations were necessary for their participation in the conference.
- 59. There were other questions which might be raised, such as the administering Power's obligation to restore political rights and allow all opposition leaders to return to their country. With regard to designation of the delegations to a constitutional conference, the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had made specific recommendations. New methods of popular consultation must be used to ensure that the inhabitants were genuinely represented. He wished to assure the people of Equatorial Guinea of his country's support in their struggle for independence.
- 60. The representative of Uruguay said that the representative of Spain (see paras. 41-44 above) had attempted to justify the delay in convening a constitutional conference in pursuance of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI). He had described the difficulties which had arisen and had suggested that representatives of the people should be allowed to explain the situation to the Fourth Committee. He had also mentioned efforts to avoid tensions between Fernando Póo and Río Muni.
- 61. Other speakers had referred to the political advances that had been made in the Territory, and he did not think that the Spanish Government could be accused of trying to delay independence. What it had been doing was to consult the people and, having found differences of opinion among them, it was faced with the question what action to take when political, economic or social reasons hindered progress to independence. The administering Power was aware of its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. Spain could not be condemned for acting as it had done, even though it might be thought to have made mistakes. The explanations given should be recognized as valid; however, that did not affect the responsibilities of the administering Power vis-à-vis the United Nations, including its obligation to grant independence as soon as possible, even under conditions that were not perfect.
- 62. The administering Power had perhaps refrained from telling the Special Committee the whole truth out of an understandable desire to avoid aggravating the differences in the Territory. It was possible that some

- of the divergences of view reflected antagonisms between Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which could create difficulties for the emerging nation. Despite that, his delegation considered that Spain had an overriding responsibility to ensure the Territory's accession to independence, and he appealed to the administering Power to fix a date for a constitutional conference as soon as possible with that end in view.
- 63. Important political progress had been made and, now that a stage of political maturity had been reached, the Territory should receive its independence.
- 64. The representative of Mali noted that the representative of Uruguay had referred to differences between Fernando Póo and Río Muni. As a member of the Sub-Committee which had visited the Territory, he could state that no such differences existed. The unitary nature of the Territory was established in the Basic Law. The Sub-Committee's discussion both with political leaders and with the people had shown that the people of Equatorial Guinea wished to achieve independence as a single entity. While there might be certain factions within both the recognized political parties dominated by one ethnic group or another, that did not affect the basic principle of the national unity of Equatorial Guinea.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

- 65. At the 556th meeting, the representative of Mali introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.427) cosponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.
- of the sponsors, said that the draft resolution was largely a reiteration of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI), taking into account the views expressed during the debate. The dominant concern of members of the Committee was that the administering Power should be firmly committed to a continuation of the normal process of liberating Equatorial Guinea, and the stage had now been reached where independence was the immediate, short-term goal. The Committee was therefore entitled to expect the administering Power to take such practical steps as the convening of the constitutional conference referred to in resolution 2230 (XXI), and the main purpose of the draft resolution was to help Spain to take that essential step.
- 67. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
- 68. In operative paragraph 3, the Special Committee expressed regret that the constitutional conference called for in General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) had not yet been held and that, contrary to the expectations of the majority of delegations, and especially the members of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea, the administering Power had not followed up the welcome initiative it had taken in asking for the co-operation of the United Nations with a view to hastening Equatorial Guinea's attainment of independence.
- 69. Since resolution 2230 (XXI) laid down what was virtually a step-by-step procedure for the administering Power to follow—including the institution of an electoral system based on universal adult suffrage

and the holding, before independence, of a general election for the whole Territory on the basis of a unified electoral roll—operative paragraph 3 contained an appeal to the administering Power to comply with that resolution without further delay. While he recognized that Spain had begun to put some of the practical provisions of that resolution into effect, the time factor was all-important.

- 70. In view of the imperative need for the Committee to ensure that a constitutional conference was held, operative paragraph 4 urged the administering Power to convene such a conference immediately. In view of the sponsors, the steps taken so far by the Spanish Government which had been described by the representative of Spain in his statement (see paras. 41-44 above), such as inter-ministerial meetings and the preparatory activities already under way, should be integral parts of the process of convening the conference and not preliminaries to it. Such activities could very well continue after a date had been set for the convening of the conference.
- 71. Operative paragraph 5 set July 1968 as the latest date for independence. The Sub-Committee's consultations and hearings of petitioners in the Territory had seemed to indicate that that date had been agreed upon by all strata of the population and by the administering Power itself.
- 72. Lastly, operative paragraph 6 would maintain the item on the Special Committee's agenda because the Committee was the United Nations organ primarily responsible for decolonization and was in duty bound to follow developments in the Territory very closely as decolonization proceeded.
- 73. The representative of Yugoslavia said his delegation believed that the draft resolution took fully into account the actions previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly, the Committee's debates and the views of the petitioners and of the administering Power. The people of Equatorial Guinea, like all other peoples still under colonial domination, had the right to self-determination and the speedy attainment of independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Unfortunately, certain measures which the General Assembly had requested in its resolution 2230 (XXI) had not yet been taken, and the explanations given by the administering Power for the delay were unsatisfactory. The Committee should therefore make every effort to ensure that the people of the Territory would be able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and that was the purpose of the draft resolution.
- 74. The representative of Spain said that his Government had always given ample proof of its desire to co-operate with the Special Committee. It had, on its own initiative, granted the people of Equatorial Guinea an autonomous régime enabling them to prepare for political evolution; it had invited a Sub-Committee of the Special Committee to visit the Territory; and it had announced to the Committee its intention of convening a constitutional conference to examine the aspirations of the people and prepare the way for free and democratic elections on the basis of adult suffrage. There was no justification, therefore, for calling his Government's intentions into question because of the delay in convening the conference. The obstacles which prevented Spain from opening the conference on the date originally scheduled had been noted by the repre-

sentative of Uruguay. There were differences of opinion in Equatorial Guinea regarding the Territory's future and the way to prepare for it; to bring those differences into the open might make the positions of the political groups at the constitutional conference more inflexible. His Government had therefore preferred to seek some agreement among Guinean leaders before the conference, in order that positive and constructive results might be achieved at the conference itself.

- 75. The Special Committee had recently heard petitioners (see paras. 22-34, above) claiming to represent MONALIGE, a political party which had addressed a communication signed by 30,000 persons (A/AC.109/ PET.702, annex C) to the Head of the Spanish State (see para. 21, above). That document had stated the gratitude of all Guineans for the understanding shown by the Spanish Government concerning the people's desire for independence, expressed a desire for the maintenance of close ties between Equatorial Guinea and Spain in the future, and acknowledged that the autonomous Government set up by Spain, although not accepted as representing the entire people of Equatorial Guinea, was part of such representation and should participate in the constitutional conference along with representatives of MONALIGE, the MUNGE-IPGE coalition and other economic and cultural organizations. The opposition group therefore recognized the Spanish Government's good faith and regarded the procedure which had been set for holding the conference as adequate. There was no conflict of principle between the Spanish Government and the different political groups in Equatorial Guinea regarding representation of the people at the proposed conference; there were only differences of opinion. He could not agree with the position adopted by some delegations, which seemed to be asking the Spanish Government to overlook those differences of opinion and to convene the constitutional conference unilaterally, even at the risk of confronting the conference with extremely difficult situations.
- 76. It was worth noting that the Territory of Equatorial Guinea did not in any way benefit the Spanish economy or the Spanish State; on the contrary, it constituted a considerable financial burden, which Spain was willing to bear because it was aware of the grave responsibility it had assumed towards the people of the Territory.
- 77. Having received no instructions from his Government with regard to the draft resolution (A/AC. 109/L.427), he reserved his delegation's position, except to state that, in his Government's view, the date to be set for the independence of Equatorial Guinea was a matter for the constitutional conference to decide.
- 78. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said his delegation continued to believe that the Spanish Government had the responsibility to convene a constitutional conference regardless of the differences existing among the people; those differences represented non-antagonistic traditions and could be overcome only when the Territory's colonial status had been ended. The document cited by the representative of Spain indicated the people's anxiety for the early convening of a constitutional conference by the administering Power. He hoped that the Spanish Government would show its spirit of co-operation by accepting and implementing without further delay whatever resolution the Special Committee might adopt for the elimination of colonialism from Equatorial Guinea.

- 79. The representative of Iraq said that his delegation supported the draft resolution, which constituted a fresh attempt to promote the aims of previous resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI). His delegation had noted the Spanish representative's statements of Spain's goodwill, co-operative spirit and desire for a peaceful and just solution to the problem of Equatorial Guinea; it therefore hoped that Spain would do its best to implement the provisions of the draft resolution before the Committee.
- 80. The representative of India recalled that, ever since its independence, his country had consistently supported colonial peoples in their aspirations to freedom and independence. It was in that spirit that India had co-sponsored the draft resolution before the Special Committee. His delegation appreciated the co-operation extended by the Spanish Government to the Committee, by inviting it to send a visiting mission to the Territory, and extending all facilities to the Mission during its visit.
- 81. He had noted with satisfaction the Spanish Government's declaration recognizing the right of colonized peoples to self-determination and independence. It was precisely because of the expectations roused by that declaration that his delegation was disappointed to learn that the constitutional conference planned for early 1967 had not yet been convened, and that there had not been any tangible progress towards independence for the people of Equatorial Guinea. Since the purpose of the conference had been to set a date for the independence of the Territory, it was very disappointing that it had not been possible to convene it for various reasons. His delegation had considered carefully the reasons given by the administering Power which were somewhat different from the reasons given by the petitioners who had appeared before the Committee. He hoped the conference would be convened without any further delay. The Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had recommended that the Territory should become independent by July 1968, since that was the desire of the overwhelming majority of the population. He hoped that the Spanish Government would render every possible assistance to enable the people of the Territory to achieve their cherished goal within the time-limit they themselves had set.
- 82. The representative of Italy said that he was prepared to vote in favour of the draft resolution. However, with regard to operative paragraph 5, he was of the opinion that it was for the people themselves to set the date of their independence.
- 83. At the 557th meeting, draft resolution A/AC.109/L.427 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 19 to none, with 3 abstentions, as follows:
- In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

84. The representative of Australia, explaining his vote, said he regretted that his delegation had been unable to support the resolution because of its operative paragraph 5 which set the target date of July 1968 for the independence of Equatorial Guinea. No United Nations body could arbitrarily set a date for the in-

- dependence of a non-self-governing people; that must come as the result of a decision by the people of the Territory in co-operation with the administering Power.
- 85. The representative of Spain thanked the Special Committee for having allowed him to participate in its deliberations, and took note of the voting and of the draft resolution that had been adopted.
- 86. The representative of Mali said that his delegation had not been able to take part in the voting for reasons beyond its control and would like the summary record to indicate that it would have voted for the draft resolution.
- 87. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/270) adopted by the Special Committee on the question of Equatorial Guinea at its 557th meeting on 12 September 1967, reads as follows:
 - "The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
 - "Having considered the question of Equatorial Guinea,
 - "Having heard the statement of the petitioner,
 - "Having also heard the statement of the administering Power,
 - "Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
 - "Recalling further the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,
 - "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "2. Regrets that the constitutional conference as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2230 (XXI) has not been convened;
 - "3. Requests the administering Power to implement without further delay the provisions of resolution 2230 (XXI), in particular, paragraph 4 thereof;
 - "4. Urges the administering Power to convene immediately the constitutional conference referred to above;
 - "5. Further requests the administering Power to ensure that the Territory accedes to independence as a single political and territorial entity not later than July 1968;
 - "6. Decides to maintain the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda."
- 88. At the 564th meeting, on 27 September 1967, the Chairman drew attention to a letter dated 18 September 1967 (A/6802), in which the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that on 15 September 1967 the Spanish Government had decided that the constitutional conference to determine the future of Equatorial Guinea would convene on 30 October 1967.

ANNEX*

Question of Equatorial Guinea

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

- 1. Resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 on the question of Equatorial Guinea, adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, reads as follows:
 - * Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/237.

"Question of Equatorial Guinea"

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

- 2. By letter dated 19 January 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations. This letter is reproduced below:
 - "I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of your Government, the text of resolution 2230 (XXI) on the question of Equatorial Guinea, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting on 20 December 1966.

"In this connexion I wish to note that operative paragraphs 3 to 8 are addressed to your Government as the administering Power for the Territory in question, I wish also to refer to operative paragraph 9 by which the General Assembly requested me to take appropriate action, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to ensure the presence of the United Nations in the Territory for the supervision of the preparation for the holding of a general election and to participate in any other measures leading towards the independence of the Territory.

- "I note that, as you informed me in your letter of 27 December 1966, the Spanish Council of Ministers has decided to appoint immediately an interministerial commission entrusted with the task of preparing as soon as possible the holding of a constitutional conference of Equatorial Guinea. The text of your letter has been circulated as a document of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/217). I should appreciate it if your Government would inform me as soon as practicable of the results of the Constitutional Conference.
- "I should also welcome an indication from your Government as to the appropriate time for initiating the consultation envisaged in operative paragraph 9 of the resolution concerning the establishment of a United Nations presence in the Territory.'
- 3. At its 508th meeting on 6 April 1967, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples decided, in the light of its programme of work for 1967, to request the Secretary-General to expedite the consultations envisaged in operative paragraph 9 of the above-mentioned resolution. By a letter dated 11 April 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations that, having regard to this decision, he would appreciate receiving at an early date the information requested in his letter dated 19 January 1967.

- 4. By letter dated 18 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 January
 - "I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 January transmitting to me the text of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) relating to Equatorial

"In 1963, as you are aware, the inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea approved by means of a referendum the autonomous régime now in force, which is part of the process leading to independence. In order to enable the United Nations to verify the political progress being made by the Territory, the Spanish Government extended an invitation last year to a visiting mission, which sought the views of various persons concerning the future of Equatorial Guinea but was unable, as can be seen from the text of resolution 2230 (XXI) itself, to make a comprehensive survey of opinion in the Territory. It should be noted, in this connexion, that on 24 August 1966, the Assembly of Equatorial Guinea expressed its disagreement with the interpretation given to the visit,

"Last December, on instructions from the Spanish Government, my delegation announced in the Fourth Committee that a Constitutional Conference was to be convened in which the various political sectors and groups of Equatorial Guinea would be represented. A specially appointed Interministerial Committee has already initiated talks with representatives of those sectors and groups.

"The Constitutional Conference, which will be held very shortly, as soon as the preparations are completed, will determine what the people wish, and it is in accordance with those wishes that the procedures and time-table for completing the process begun in 1963 will be established. It should be noted that the Spanish Government promised some time ago that if a majority of the inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea wished to alter their present status, Spain would be fully prepared to consult with the Guinean people concerning their future.

"The decisions adopted by the Constitutional Conference will be submitted to the people of Equatorial Guinea for approval on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The Spanish Government will keep the United Nations Secretariat informed of the proceedings and results of the Constitutional Conference.

5. In submitting this preliminary report, the Secretary-General wishes to state that he will report to and consult with the Special Committee as appropriate in the light of further developments pertaining to the implementation of operative paragraph 9 of the above-mentioned resolution.

CHAPTER IX*

IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

- 1. Ifni and Spanish Sahara were first considered by the Special Committee in 1963.1 The item was taken up again in 1964 and the Special Committee adopted a resolution which is contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.2
- 2. At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not specifically consider these Territories, but in-
- cluded relevant information on them in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.3
- 3. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965, which urgently requested the Government of Spain to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories.
- 4. At its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee again considered these Territories and adopted a resolution which is contained in the Special Committee's

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.7.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Sesion, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/

Rev.1, chap. XIII.

² Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IX.

³ Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. X.

report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6300/Rev.1,4 chap. X, para. 243). The operative paragraphs of this resolution read as follows:

- "1. Invites the administering Power to expedite the process of decolonization of the Territory of Ifni and, in collaboration with the Government of Morocco, to make arrangements for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "2. Requests the administering Power to establish without delay appropriate conditions which will ensure that the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara is able to exercise its rights to self-determination and independence;
- "3. Invites the administering Power to make arrangements, in consultation with the population of Sahara, the Governments of Mauritania, Morocco and any other parties concerned, for a referendum which will be held under United Nations auspices to enable the indigenous population of the Territory freely to exercise its right to self-determination, and to report thereon to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples before the referendum is held;
- "4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the progress of the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Special Committee."
- 5. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966. In the eighth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the Assembly noted the decision of the administering Power to apply in full the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). The Assembly further noted, in the ninth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the statement of the administering Power on 7 December 1966 relating to Spanish Sahara, in particular with regard to the sending of a special United Nations mission to the Territory, the return of exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous population of its right to self-determination.5
- 6. The operative paragraphs of this resolution read as follows:
 - "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Ifni and Spanish Sahara to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "2. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, and endorses the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 16 November 1966;
 - "3. Requests the administering Power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "4. Invites the administering Power to determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity with the
- 4 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

⁵ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Fourth Committee, 1660th meeting, paras. 1-4.

- aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination and, to this end:
- "(a) To create a favourable climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, democratic and impartial basis, by permitting, inter alia, the return of exiles to the Territory;
- "(b) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that only the indigenous people of the Territory participate in the referendum;
- "(c) To refrain from any action likely to delay the process of the decolonization of Spanish Sahara;
- "(d) To provide all the necessary facilities to a United Nations mission so that it may be able to participate actively in the organization and holding of the referendum;
- "5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum and submitting a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;
- "6. Requests the Special Committee to continue its consideration of the situation in the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.'
- 7. At its 508th meeting, on 6 April 1967, the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General to expedite the consultations envisaged in the above resolution concerning the appointment of a special mission to Spanish Sahara. A report of the Secretary-General to the Special Committee containing correspondence between him and the Government of Spain relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) is reproduced as an annex to the present chapter.

B. Information on the Territories⁶

1. IFNI

- 8. Reports on the referendum held on 14 December 1966 on the Spanish Constitution indicated the following returns in Ifni: registered voters: 9,907; votes cast: 9,598; in favour: 8,229; against: 265; invalid:
- 9. A total of 39.2 million pesetas⁷ was spent during the period under review on housing and public works. Of this total, 12 million pesetas was spent on hospitals, schools and other public buildings; 23 million pesetas on the completion of port installations in Sidi Ifni; and 4.2 million pesetas on housing.

US0.0168; 60 pesetas = US1.00.

⁶ This section was previously reproduced in document A/AC.109/L.420. This information has been derived from published sources and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the administering Power under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 June 1967.

7 The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to

2. SPANISH SAHARA

Constitutional developments

- 10. Results of the voting in the referendum on the Spanish Constitution held on 14 December 1966 were reported to be as follows: registered voters: 19,724; votes cast: 18,423; in favour: 17,027; against: 960; invalid: 436.
- 11. On 11 May 1967, a decree was promulgated setting up a General Assembly or Yemā'a composed of tribal chiefs and forty representatives elected freely in the tribal units of the Territory. It would also include the president of the Cabildo and the mayors of El Aaiun and Villa Cisneros. The Yemā'a would have advisory functions on matters affecting the Territory, particularly those concerning economic and social development. It would meet every two months, but the Governor General and also the President of the Yemā'a, supported by one third of the membership, would have the power to summon extraordinary sessions on urgent matters.

Population

12. The population of Spanish Sahara at the end of 1966 was reported by the administering Power to be 33,512. Of this total, there was a reported urban population of 7,195; 4,188 for El Aaiun; 2,330 for Villa Cisneros; 381 for Semara and 296 for Guera. These figures apply to the indigenous population.

Economic and social developments

13. Expenditure for the 1966 budget totalled 621,870,521.98 pesetas, broken down as follows:

	Pesetas
Administration	68,044,539.60
Agriculture	13,292,114.33
Education	28,085,410.03
Communications	15,772,131.17
Health	24,968,756.30
Public works	213,918,151.66
Mining	17,092,478.34
Police	42,458,040.40
Other	198,238,900.15
Total	621,870,521.98

- 14. It was estimated that social and economic expenditure in the Territory amounted to 380,950,000 pesetas. This included roads, power and water supplies, telecommunications, irrigation works and the completion of port facilities in Villa Cisneros and El Aaiun, as well as expenditure on education and public health.
- 15. On 18 May 1967, Spain was reported to have taken the first formal step to begin the development of Spanish Sahara's phosphate deposits through an international consortium. The Spanish Government was reported to have granted a contract to the International Minerals Chemical Corporation of Illinois (IMCC), a fertilizer company, to become associated with the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) and European capital in the venture estimated to cost initially \$US175 million. The IMCC is reported to hold a 25 per cent interest in the Sahara enterprise, 20 per cent going to European firms and 55 per cent being held by the Spanish State through the INI. The consortium would have to develop a mining complex in the Sahara and build both a conveyor system and a loading port to process and move phosphate ore from the deposits, calculated at 1.4 thousand million tons.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

- 16. The Special Committee considered Ifni and Spanish Sahara at its 552nd, 553rd, 559th and 560th meetings held at Headquarters from 6 to 14 September 1967.
- 17. In letters dated 22 August (A/AC.109/259), 25 August (A/AC.109/264) and two letters dated 28 August (A/AC.109/262 and A/AC.109/265), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain, the Permanent Representative of Mauritania, the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Morocco and the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations respectively requested that their delegations be authorized to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. The Special Committee decided without objection to accede to these requests.

Written petitions

18. The Special Committee had before it the following petitions concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

Petitioner	Document No.
Comité de libération du Maghreb	
arabe	A/AC.109/PET.582
"The Representatives and Notables	
of Spanish Sahara"	A/AC.109/PET.583
Mr. Ezrolili Breika, Front de li-	
bération du Sahara sous domina-	
tion espagnole	A/AC.109/PET.692
~ ~	and Corr.1

General statements

- 19. The representative of Spain said that he believed the difficulties arising in connexion with the decolonization of Ifni could be solved through negotiations, which had already begun, between the Governments of Spain and Morocco, as his delegation had already stated in a letter dated 18 April 1967 addressed to the Secretary-General (see annex, below, para. 7).
- 20. As stated in a second letter, also dated 18 April 1967 (see annex, below, para. 4), respect for the wishes of the inhabitants formed the basis of his Government's policy concerning Spanish Sahara, and he reaffirmed that the principle of self-determination would be applied to the Territory. The Spanish Government had taken a very important step towards the political evolution of the Territory by establishing, pursuant to a decree of 11 May 1967, a General Assembly of Spanish Sahara, which included forty indigenous deputies elected directly by the indigenous inhabitants on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in addition to the representatives elected in accordance with the traditional procedures of the Territory. His delegation attached great importance to the offer made by his Government regarding the visit of a special mission to the Territory. The terms of that offer were reproduced in his delegation's second letter referred to above and it would be seen that the difference between that offer and what had been requested by the General Assembly was purely procedural. If a climate of peace, stability and tranquility prevailed, it would be possible to devise a satisfactory formula to overcome any differences which existed.
- 21. The representative of Morocco said that, although, for procedural reasons and in a spirit of conciliation, his delegation had agreed to the simultaneous discussion of the questions of Ifni and Spanish Saraha, these

Territories presented problems of a very different nature. The fact that Spain was making a series of statements on the various Territories under its administration should not be taken as an indication that all the Territories had the same character. The statement which had just been made by the representative of Spain deserved serious scrutiny and his delegation would comment on it at a later stage.

- 22. The representative of Venezuela reaffirmed his delegation's view that the process of implementing General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) must be accelerated. For that reason his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions concerning those Territories. In operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2229 (XXI), the General Assembly had made specific recommendations to the administering Power concerning the holding of a referendum in Spanish Sahara under United Nations auspices, but those recommendations had not so far been carried out. There were no doubt many difficulties arising from the special characteristics of the Territory. The statements made to the Fourth Committee during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly by petitioners from Spanish Sahara had been contradictory and, in addition, certain vested interests were at stake and other parties were involved without whose co-operation it would be difficult to set up an effective procedure for a referendum. It was regrettable, in the circumstances, that it had so far not been possible to implement operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2229 (XXI) concerning the appointment of a special mission. Spain had once again stated its intention of accepting a visiting mission provided that its mandate was merely to study conditions in the Territory and its political, economic and social development. The visit of such a special mission to Spanish Sahara would make an important contribution to the work of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, since it would provide first-hand information on the basis of which practical measures could be recommended to ensure the full implementation of the relevant resolutions. Every effort should be made to ensure that such a mission was appointed and sent to the Territory as soon as possible.
- 23. On the question of Ifni, he hoped that the consultations with the Government of Morocco, recommended in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 2229 (XXI), would be sufficiently constructive to allow the decolonization of Ifni in the near future, and he urged the parties concerned to implement that provision without delay.
- 24. The representative of Mauritania said that he had listened with close attention to the statements of the various delegations. His delegation had taken note of the decision of the countries concerned that they would seek a solution to the problem of Ifni on a bilateral basis; it found in that decision a confirmation of the fact that Ifni and Spanish Sahara represented two essentially different situations.
- 25. The position of Mauritania with regard to Spanish Sahara was well known. By reason of its geographical position, that Territory was an integral part of Mauritania. Moreover, from the ethnic and religious point of view, it did not differ from the independent portion of Mauritania. In fact, so-called Spanish Sahara was inhabited exclusively by Moorish tribes which were mostly nomadic and were in no way different from the other tribes living in the northwestern part of Mauritania. Their language derived from a dialect spoken only in Mauritania. Furthermore,

- those tribes were of the same race as the inhabitants of Mauritania and had the same religion, customs and culture. The frontier separating them was entirely artificial. The Mauritanian character of Spanish Sahara and the fact that it belonged to Mauritania were clear from the *White Book* issued in 1960 by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 26. For the Mauritanian Government and people, it was beyond doubt that so-called Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Mauritania's national territory. That position, adopted by Mauritania long before its accession to independence, was not, therefore, based on any political calculations; it represented the will of a nation anxious to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- 27. It should not, however, be concluded from that position that Mauritania opposed equitable application of the principle of self-determination to the peoples living in Spanish Sahara, because the Mauritanian people was convinced that its cause was just and had confidence in its brothers who still lived under colonial domination. In accepting the principle of self-determination, Mauritania was demonstrating its deep attachment to the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and its desire to facilitate the Special Committee's difficult task of decolonization.
- 28. Moreover, the firm and friendly ties existing between Mauritania and Spain enabled Mauritania to envisage the possibility that at the proper time it could work out, by agreement with the administering Power, the formula that would permit the people of so-called Spanish Sahara to exercise their right of self-determination.
- 29. Mauritania wished to live in friendship and maintain amicable relations with all the countries of the world, particularly with its neighbours. Furthermore, it believed in the value of dialogue and the need for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It was in that spirit that it had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI). That resolution, however, represented for Mauritania only a compromise between the different conflicting positions and did not make it sufficiently clear that, on the question of whom the Territory belonged to, Mauritania was the only country directly concerned. It was essential to take the necessary steps, in conformity with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants of so-called Spanish Sahara and by a procedure acceptable to all parties concerned, to liberate the Territory from colonial domination, so that it could become an element of stability in the region. Such a solution would ensure peace and harmony among the nations bordering on that part of north-western Mauritania.
- 30. The representative of Morocco recalled that he had already stated at a previous meeting the reasons why his delegation had accepted the compromise adopted by the Special Committee for the consideration of the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, a matter which closely involved Morocco's vital interests. Since an attempt might be made, however, to create a distinction in status between those two Territories, his delegation deemed it necessary to recall that the colonial Power held control over the various regions of Morocco by virtue of a "protectorate treaty" which invested that Power with administrative authority over the northern zone and, in the south, over the provinces of Tarfaya, Ifni and Río de Oro, although Morocco's sovereignty extended to all those Territories. After an initial series of negotiations, Spain had recognized the independence

- of the northern zone and effected a transfer of power. In 1958, new negotiations had been undertaken with a view to the return of so-called Spanish Sahara and Ifni to Morocco; unfortunately, although those negotiations had progressed far, they had not produced a final solution. Nevertheless, the fact that some parts of Moroccan territory remained under Spanish administration did not mean that Spain had restored to Morocco all of the territory over which Morocco had rights. Not all parts of that territory were under the same administration: some of them were administered by the Khalifate, others by the Spanish administration of Tetuan, by Spanish officials or by the military authorities. The difference in administration did not, however, alter in any way the terms of the treaties or the legal status of those Moroccan territories. That principle was recognized by the United Nations, which, whenever it had dealt with a Non-Self-Governing Territory, had expressly called upon the administering Power to do nothing that might violate the territorial integrity or alter the legal status of the Territory in question.
- 31. His delegation had been deeply gratified to hear the Spanish representative's statement that the problems involved in the decolonization of Ifni could be resolved through a frank and open dialogue between Morocco and Spain. Morocco, reaffirming its confidence in the administering Power, hoped that the two countries would be able to reach an amicable settlement of the problems still pending between them. In fact, the dialogue with Spain had already been undertaken; the two Heads of State had exchanged messages during the year and, in his last letter, General Franco had reaffirmed his desire to settle the problem of Ifni in a spirit of friendship and co-operation with Morocco.
- 32. With regard to Spanish Sahara, Morocco had already given a detailed explanation of its position to the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Since gaining independence, Morocco had been seeking the return of that Territory by every means possible. It had repeatedly expressed its desire that the problem should be settled in the same spirit of understanding which had already enabled Morocco and Spain to settle a number of problems in the past. Since the dialogue had not reached a successful conclusion, however, Morocco had been obliged to seek other solutions. In June 1966, at the Addis Ababa meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Morocco had stated its reasons for adopting that new attitude. It had not changed its basic position, but was simply searching for a new procedure that would enable it to obtain the liberation of the peoples of southern Morocco. It had therefore asked Spain to hold in so-called Spanish Sahara, under the auspices of the United Nations, a consultation of the people which would enable the inhabitants of the Territory to express their will. The unilateral measures taken by Spain in Río de Oro and the institutions it had established there no doubt provided grounds for optimism, but Morocco hoped that Spain would cooperate with the United Nations with a view to holding in complete honesty and sincerity and in complete freedom, a referendum which would enable the peoples concerned to make their wishes known. Morocco had always attempted to settle its problems with its neighbours by dialogue. Spain also had declared its willingness to adopt such a policy, and past events gave Morocco every reason to hope that useful co-operation with Spain could be established.

- 33. The representative of Algeria said that the discussions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara in the United Nations showed that problems could best be solved through mutual understanding. The United Nations had a duty, wherever possible, to facilitate the solution of problems through negotiation between the parties concerned, and the question of Ifni clearly lent itself to such a solution, the parties being the administering Power and Morocco. A similar approach should guide the settlement of the question of so-called Spanish Sahara. Any solution of that problem, as was generally recognized, must take into account the interests and aspirations of the people of the Territory. The statements which the Special Committee had heard from the representatives of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania encouraged the hope that a solution could be reached in conformity with the terms of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI). However, he wished to draw the Committee's attention to its responsibility for ensuring the strict implementation of that resolution. Although everyone recognized the delicacy of the task entrusted to the administering Power, to the other parties concerned and to the Special Committee, the Committee had a duty to consider what measures were necessary for the implementation of the resolution.
- 34. Many ethnic, economic and cultural ties linked Algeria with so-called Spanish Sahara, and his country had a keen interest in the matter, since the successful decolonization of the Territory was essential for the development of friendly relations among the independent countries of the region. The Committee must continue its task objectively and without undue timidity. In that connexion, he paid tribute to the diligence, patience and understanding shown by the Chairman in his consultations with the parties concerned.
- 35. Algeria remained open to all suggestions which would take into account the responsibilities of the administering Power, the nature of the positions adopted by Morocco and Mauritania, and the Charter principles of the liberation of peoples, peace and good-neighbourliness. There was a measure of common ground among the Powers concerned; it was recognized that the problem of Ifni and that of the Sahara were different in nature, and the parties had also agreed to take note of the statement made by the administering Power, although in so doing they were not expressing any value judgement regarding the measures taken by Spain in the Sahara, since those could only be assessed in the context of the implementation of resolution 2229 (XXI). Responsibility for the fact that the Special Committee had not been able to take the measures envisaged in that resolution must be borne by the various parties concerned. The Committee should now recommend that all interested parties, including the General Assembly, consider the short-term and longterm measures necessary for the implementation of resolution 2229 (XXI). In the light of the statement of the administering Power, it should be possible to ensure the dispatch of a mission to the Sahara, and the question of the implementation of the other provisions of operative paragraphs 4 and 5 could then be considered.
- 36. The representative of Morocco said he had already indicated his Government's reservations regarding the suggestion that Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara were different in nature. Morocco's position had always been that those areas formed a single territory. Two other portions of Morocco formerly under Spanish administration had already been returned,

and the problem of Ifni was in process of solution. It was his hope that the problem of so-called Spanish Sahara could represent the fourth stage in the process and be solved either in the same manner or differently. However, his delegation had always made it clear that the geographical situation of various areas did not affect their status as integral parts of independent Morocco. The attitude which his delegation had taken in order to facilitate the Special Committee's debates must not be taken to imply acceptance of the thesis that so-called Spanish Sahara had a status different from that of Ifni.

37. The representative of Spain welcomed the constructive tone of the statements of the preceding speakers and those made at the previous meeting. The views of his delegation on the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara had been stated in the past and were to be found in the Special Committee's reports and in the records of the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly. In the case of Ifni, what was important was that a dialogue had been initiated. With regard to Spanish Sahara, his delegation attached importance to the fact that the General Assembly had accepted the principle of self-determination for the Sahara—a principle advocated by the Spanish Government. That meant that, when the time came, the Saharans could choose to form an independent nation or follow whatever course they wished, since it was not only the interests of indigenous peoples, but also their aspirations, that must be paramount.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

Consensus adopted by the Special Committee

38. At its 560th meeting on 14 September 1967, the Special Committee decided, on the proposal of the Chairman, to adopt the following consensus concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples heard the statement of the representative of Spain in which he indicated that a dialogue had already been initiated at a high level between the Governments of Spain and Morocco with regard to Ifni. This dialogue is in line with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) which:

'3. Requests the administering Power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)'.

"The Committee hopes that the two parties will continue the dialogue in accordance with the abovementioned resolution.

"With regard to Spanish Sahara, the Special Committee notes with regret that the provisions of resolution 2229 (XXI) have not so far been implemented by the administering Power. In view of the limited time available to the Committee, it has not been possible for the Committee to have a full debate on this question.

"The Special Committee therefore agrees that the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara be referred to the Fourth Committee for consideration at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, in order to

envisage the necessary measures for the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution.

"Subject to any decisions by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, the Special Committee will further consider this item during its meetings in 1968."

ANNEX*

Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara reads as follows:

"Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara"

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

2. In a letter dated 19 January 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations. The letter reads as follows:

"I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of your Government, the text of resolution 2229 (XXI) on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting, on 20 December 1966.

"I wish to refer, in this connexion, to operative paragraphs 3 and 4, which are addressed to Spain as the administering Power for the Territories in question. I wish also to refer to paragraph 5, by which the General Assembly requested me, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Spanish Sahara. I should appreciate receiving at an early date the views of your Government concerning the proposed mission."

- 3. At its 508th meeting, on 6 April 1967, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples decided, in view of its programme of work as established for 1967, to request the Secretary-General to expedite the consultations envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) concerning the appointment of a special mission to Spanish Sahara. In a letter dated 11 April 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations that, having regard to this decision, he would appreciate receiving at an early date the information requested in his letter dated 19 January 1967.
- 4. In a letter dated 18 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 January 1967:

"I have the honour to refer to the topic of the Sahara, referred to in your letter of 19 January 1967. I have dealt with the subject of Ifni in a separate note, since the two matters are quite unrelated.

"As my delegation has repeatedly stated, respect for the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory forms the basis of Spanish policy concerning the Sahara.

"On 18 November 1966, a deputation of Saharians handed the (then) Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories two communications^a in which the representatives of the indigenous population stated that it was for the latter themselves to decide freely concerning their future. The first of these documents was signed by all the tribal chiefs. The second contained the signatures of the 14,000 Saharians who of a total population of 27,000 inhabitants, were of voting age at that time.

^a See A/AC.109/PET.583.

^{*} Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/239.

"However, Spain, which in taking this position is acting in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, cannot allow conflicting interests to interfere with the wishes of the people of the Sahara.

"Your Excellency wished to know my Government's views concerning the contents of paragraph 5 of resolution 2229 (XXI), in which the General Assembly requests Your Excellency 'in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Spanish Sahara'.

"Allow me, Your Excellency, to quote the exact wording of the Spanish proposal concerning a possible visit to the Sahara Territories. It may be of use to recall it. The representative of Spain stated in the Fourth Committee on 7 December 1966: 'As proof of its sincere intention of applying the principle of self-determination to this Territory (the Sahara), the Spanish delegation is willing to hold conversations with the Secretary-General with a view to considering the appointment of a commission to visit the Spanish Sahara.'

"And so that there should be no doubts concerning the scope and purpose of any such visit, Mr. Piniés made the following points, which we consider essential: "The Commission would observe the situation in the Territory directly and objectively, and would be able to form an opinion concerning the problem. A group of impartial and disinterested persons, not representing any countries that have shown a direct interest in Spanish Sahara or harbour any territorial ambitions concerning it, would assess actual conditions in the Territory, which would no doubt provide an opportunity for seeing what Spain has accomplished up till now, becoming acquainted with future plans and ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of the Sahara regarding their future destiny, which they will make known in due time by means of the process of self-determination.'

"If Your Excellency will compare Spain's very clear proposal with the wording of resolution 2229 (XXI), you will readily see that this is one of the reasons why we were obliged to vote against the resolution. We felt that we were entitled to expect a response more in keeping with the scope of our invitation.

"The Spanish Government is not withdrawing its proposal; but it does consider that our offer must be dealt with strictly as it stands, within the bounds clearly defined. I myself stated in the plenary that the United Nations visit should be made . . . in an atmosphere entirely free from passions and in the absence of any prejudices or preconceived attitudes. Unfortunately the situation created by extraneous elements is quite different from what we asked for. A veritable torrent of high feeling has been unleashed, creating acute tensions; and preconceived attitudes are becoming dangerously complex. In view of that situation, Spain cannot forget that under Article 73 of the Charter it has the duty to guarantee a system of peace and security in that Territory. And it hopes that reason will prevail so that our proposal of December 1966 may be carried out with the prudence and efficiency intended

"I can assure Your Excellency that, in keeping with its policy, my Government is resolved to allow the indigenous inhabitants—and them alone—to freely exercise their right

to self-determination. To this end steps are already being taken to apply the necessary practical measures to enable the people of the Sahara to decide their future in complete freedom"

5. In a letter dated 15 May 1967, the Secretary-General, in acknowledging the letter of the Permanent Representative of Spain, stated as follows:

"As you are aware, the above-mentioned resolution envisages that the appointment of the special mission would be made in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee. Accordingly I am now inviting the views of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

"When the views of the Special Committee are available, I shall in the light of those views and within the context of operative paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned resolution be ready to discuss with you all matters relevant to the appointment of the special mission."

6. In a letter of the same date addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, in transmitting the letter of the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, the Secretary-General stated as follows:

"As you are aware, operative paragraph 5 of the abovementioned resolution envisages that the appointment of a special mission should be made in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee. Accordingly I would appreciate receiving an indication of the views of the members of the Committee on the matter."

- 7. In another letter, also dated 18 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations dealt separately with the references in General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) to Ifni. The text of the letter reads as follows:
 - "I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 January 1967 enclosing General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI).

"I am replying separately with regard to the resolution's references to Ifni, which, as my delegation pointed out on more than one occasion during the last session of the General Assembly, presents an entirely different problem from that of Sahara.

"My Government's position with regard to Ifni has often been stated in the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee and the plenary General Assembly. It is a very clear position which is entirely consistent with the principles approved by the United Nations and is based on respect for the selfdetermination of peoples and the friendly co-operation of States.

"In view of the special characteristics of the Territory of Ifni—which distinguish it fundamentally from Sahara—the Spanish Government, as it has made abundantly clear on previous occasions, is prepared to enter into negotiations with the Government of Morocco 'bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population'—in the actual words of the resolution in question—in order that an agreement may be reached which satisfies all the interests involved and, at the same time, faithfully observes the guiding principles approved by the United Nations for dealing with this question."

CHAPTER X*

GIBRALTAR

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

1. The Special Committee began its consideration of Gibraltar in 1963 and 1964. On 16 October 1964, at its 291st meeting, the Committee adopted a consensus

in which it noted that "there was a disagreement, or even a dispute, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain regarding the status and situation of the Territory of Gibraltar" and invited the above-mentioned Powers to begin talks without delay, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, in order to reach a negotiated

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.9.

solution in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) giving due account to the opinions expressed by the members of the Committee and bearing in mind the interests of the people of the Territory. The United Kingdom and Spain were further requested to inform the Special Committee and the General Assembly of the outcome of their negotiations. The texts of notes exchanged between the two Governments were reproduced as appendices to the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

- 2. In resolution 2070 (XX), adopted on 16 December 1965, the General Assembly invited the Governments of Spain and of the United Kingdom to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the above-mentioned consensus and to inform the Special Committee and the General Assembly at its twenty-first session of the outcome of their negotiations.
- 3. The Special Committee again considered the question of Gibraltar at meetings held during November 1966 at which time it had available the texts of further correspondence between the two Governments.³ On 17 November 1966, it adopted a resolution whereby, taking into account the willingness of the administering Power and the Government of Spain to continue the negotiations, it: (a) called on the two parties to refrain from any acts which would hamper the success of the negotiations; (b) regretted the delay in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with respect to the Territory; (c) called on the two parties to continue their negotiations in a constructive way and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible, and in any case before the twenty-second session of the General Assembly; and (d) requested the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,4 chap. XI, para. 66).
- 4. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

B. Information on the Territory⁵

5. Information on the Territory is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first sessions. Supplementary information is set out below.

Constitutional developments

6. There were no constitutional changes effected during the period under review.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 209.

² Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XI, appendices.

⁸ Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, documents A/6242, A/6277 and A/6278.

4 Ibid., Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

⁵ This section was originally reproduced in document A/AC.109/L.419. This information has been derived from published sources and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 1 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

Negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom

7. An account of the state of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom appears in the report of the Secretary-General of 17 July 1967 (see annex I to the present chapter).

Economic conditions

- 8. Gibraltar, which has no agriculture or other primary resources, is largely dependent on tourism, re-exports and the work provided by the dockyard, the Departments of the Armed Services, the Government and the City Council.
- 9. In particular, efforts are being made to develop the tourist industry. They include the expansion of hotel and restaurant facilities, the promotion of various types of business and other conferences and festivals, the construction of an aerial ropeway to the top of the Rock, etc.
- 10. The main sources of government revenue are customs and excise. Revenue for the year 1965 totalled £1,848,407 and expenditure amounted to £2,536,800, which included expenditure met out of the Improvement and Development Fund amounting to £518,618. The largest item of expenditure in 1965 was on social services (including rehousing and town planning), amounting to £1,294,800.
- 11. Following a visit of the Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, and the Minister without Portfolio, Mr. Peter Isola, to London in July 1965, the United Kingdom Government announced that it was making available £1 million in Colonial Development and Welfare grants for development in Gibraltar over the next three years and also a further £200,000 in Exchequer loans, should they be required. In addition, £100,000 would be made available as a special grantin-aid. This was not actually brought to account until early 1966. The total of £1,100,000 in grants and £200,000 in loans during the years April 1965-March 1968 compares with a Colonial Development and Welfare allocation of £400,000 previously made available for the three years ending 31 March 1966. It was announced in November 1966 that the United Kingdom Government was allocating a further £600,000 in addition to the £1 million previously allocated in Colonial Development and Welfare grants for an expanded development programme. The United Kingdom Government had also agreed, subject to parliamentary approval, to provide a special grant-in-aid of £100,000 to Gibraltar's budget in 1967.

Social conditions

- 12. It is estimated that approximately two thirds of the labour force consists of alien non-domiciled workers, the majority of whom live in neighbouring Spanish territory and who enter daily by road from La Linea or by sea from Algeciras under frontier documents issued and controlled by the authorities on both sides of the frontier. Since 1964, however, the flow of workers from neighbouring Spanish territory has tended to diminish, while the influx of other non-Spanish labour has tended to increase.
- 13. In 1965, there were eight doctors practising under government and local authority services and eleven private doctors in Gibraltar. Recurrent expenditure on public health in 1965 was £274,875 by the Government and £33,691 by the local authority. Capital expenditure was £7,612 and £1,820, respectively.

Educational conditions

- 14. Education in Gibraltar is compulsory and free in government schools for children between five and fifteen years of age. As at the end of 1965, primary education was provided in twelve government schools and three private schools. In addition, there were six government secondary schools and two technical schools, the latter being the Gibraltar and Dockyard Technical College for boys and the Commercial School for girls. There is no higher education in Gibraltar, but Gibraltarians with the necessary qualifications are granted scholarships and grants for further study overseas, mostly in the United Kingdom.
- 15. Total enrolment in schools as at the end of 1965 was 5,125 children out of a total population of 25,270 civilian residents. Of this number, 3,315 were enrolled in primary schools, 1,686 in secondary schools and 124 in the technical schools.
- 16. Recurrent government expenditure on education in 1965 was £208,663, while capital expenditure relating to buildings amounted to approximately £20,000, with new works started but not completed estimated at about £90,000.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

- 17. The Special Committee considered Gibraltar at its 543rd to 550th meetings held at Headquarters between 22 August and 1 September 1967. It had before it a report by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 (see annex I below).
- 18. In a letter dated 22 August 1967 (A/AC.109/258), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations requested that his delegation be allowed to participate in meetings of the Special Committee at which Gibraltar would be discussed. The Committee decided, without objection, to accede to that request.

Written petitions

19. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Gibraltar:

Petitioner Mr. Julian Palomo Jiménez Sir Joshua Hassan, Chief Minister	Document No. A/AC.109/PET.645
of Gibraltar, Mr. P. J. Isola, Deputy Chief Minister, and others Mr. Daniel Fernandez Mr. Alfredo Bentino	A/AC.109/PET.704 A/AC.109/PET.705 A/AC.109/PET.706 A/AC.109/PET.714- 883
Mr. Carlos Manuel Larrea, President, and eighteen members of the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Cultura Hispánica	A/AC.109/PET.884
Mr. Andrés Townsend Ezcurra, Secretary-General of the Latin American Parliament	A/AC.109/PET.900

General statements

20. The representative of the United Kingdom said that most of the developments concerning the question of Gibraltar which had occurred since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) on 20 December 1966 were fully covered in the Secretary-General's

report (see annex I below). It might be useful, however, to recall the salient features of the current situation and to outline the main developments which had led up to it. Three main conclusions could be drawn—the first negative and the other two positive. The first conclusion was that, to his delegation's regret, the continued negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain called for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had not taken place. Secondly, by its decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar, the United Kingdom Government had made an important contribution towards the implementation of resolution 2231 (XXI) and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. Thirdly, the result of the referendum would be an important new factor in deciding on the appropriate steps to be taken thereafter. His statement would be in the nature of an interim account, and a fuller report to the Special Committee, as required under General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), would be made when the result of the referendum was known. The Special Committee might, therefore, wish to suspend any substantive judgement on the longer-term aspects of the Gibraltar question until then.

21. A few days before the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), the Spanish Government had rejected a United Kingdom proposal that the various legal issues which had emerged during the negotiations should be referred to the International Court of Justice and had reverted to its earlier proposal that Gibraltar should be incorporated in Spain under a bilateral convention and "statute". Following the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI), the United Kingdom Government had taken the initiative in proposing a further round of talks to discuss possible methods of decolonizing Gibraltar, and the Spanish Government had agreed that those talks should take place on or about 18 April 1967. Six days before the talks had been due to begin, however, the Spanish Government, without any prior consultation, had published an order establishing in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar a prohibited air zone in which all flying was banned, thus hampering access to Gibraltar. The timing of the announcement was clearly not accidental; indeed, similar restrictions on access to Gibraltar had been introduced on two earlier occasions: first in October 1964, the day after the Special Committee had adopted its consensus recommending negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain, and again in October 1966, five days before a further round of bilateral talks between the United Kingdom and Spain had been due to begin. It was with such acts in mind that the Special Committee, in its resolution of 17 November 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XI, para. 66), had called upon the two parties to refrain from any acts which would hamper the success of negotiations, and that the General Assembly had included in its resolution 2231 (XXI) the final preambular paragraph regretting the occurrence of certain acts which had prejudiced the smooth progress of negotiations. Since the declaration of the prohibited air zone in April 1967 had clearly and deliberately introduced a new element into the situation in Gibraltar and had been designed to prejudice the interests of the people of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom Government had considered it a matter of priority to establish the practical implications of that announcement before proceeding with the consultations, and it had therefore postponed the talks. The effects of the prohibited air zone on civil aircraft had already been discussed in the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the matter would be raised in that

organization by the United Kingdom as a dispute within the terms of article 84 of the Chicago Convention. In the course of discussions held at Madrid between 5 and 8 June 1967 at the suggestion of the United Kingdom Government, the Spanish representatives had declined to discuss the question of the prohibited air zone without prior acknowledgement by the United Kingdom Government of Spanish sovereignty over the territory on which Gibraltar airfield was situated. It was clear, therefore, that the prohibited air zone would in fact interfere with air navigation at Gibraltar. The Spanish Government's repeated allegations, during the past year, that United Kingdom aircraft had violated Spanish air space had all been fully investigated by the United Kingdom Government, and in only three instances had the allegations proved justified. Gibraltar airfield had been used by British aircraft for many years, yet, significantly, it was only in the past year that such allegations had been made so repeatedly and with such studied publicity.

- 22. Those were the reasons why the negotiations called for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had not taken place. His Government's position on the issue was clear and consistent; it favoured talks, it deplored the obstruction of talks by the Spanish Government, and it regretted the imposition by the latter of obviously unacceptable pre-conditions for the holding of further talks on political matters, or even on the prohibited air zone. After the referendum, there would still be a wide range of subjects for fruitful discussion between the two Governments.
- 23. The principal element in the present situation was the United Kingdom's announcement that a referendum would be held in Gibraltar. The terms of the referendum had been communicated to the Secretary-General and were reproduced in his report (see annex I below, paras. 15 and 16). There were two choices offered to the people of Gibraltar, namely, to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government on 18 May 1966, or voluntarily to retain their link with Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its present responsibilities. The announcement of the referendum had been immediately welcomed by the elected representatives of the people of Gibraltar and by public opinion generally in the Territory. It was most important that the people of Gibraltar should be asked to say where their own interests lay, since those interests, according to Chapter XI of the Charter, were paramount and since General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had called upon the United Kingdom and Spain to take them into account. The United Kingdom Government had offered the Spanish Government facilities to explain its proposals to the people of Gibraltar and try to convince them that the arrangements it proposed would be in their best interests, and had also expressed its readiness to welcome a nominee of the Spanish Government to observe the referendum, but so far the Spanish Government had declined both invitations as unacceptable and had stated its disagreement with the referendum and its unwillingness to concede any validity to its results. The Spanish Government had likewise rejected a further offer by the United Kingdom to consider any views it might wish to put forward on the formulation of the first alternative in the referendum. The United Kingdom still hoped, however, that the Spanish Government would decide to accept the offers, but

- even if it did so the position of the United Kingdom Government would remain one of complete impartiality as between the two alternatives presented in the referendum, in order to allow the people of Gibraltar a completely free choice.
- 24. The second alternative offered in the referendum was obviously a limited choice. Under the Treaty of Utrecht, Gibraltar could not be alienated from the British Crown without first being offered to Spain. Thus, the practical choices open to the people of Gibraltar were restricted. Similarly, the area of British responsibilities referred to in the second alternative reflected the United Kingdom Government's concern for legitimate Spanish interests in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar. It had been made clear, however, that if the people chose the second alternative the United Kingdom Government would be ready to discuss with their representatives any appropriate constitutional changes which might be desired.
- 25. The referendum would be held on 10 September, and the entitlement to vote would be restricted to persons of Gibraltarian origin resident in the Territory who were over the age of twenty-one years. Out of a total resident population of some 25,000 therefore, about 12,000 persons would be registered as eligible to vote in the referendum, and the United Kingdom Government hoped that a high proportion would in fact do so.
- 26. As for the purposes of the referendum, the United Kingdom Government regarded it as an important, though not necessarily a final, stage in the process of decolonization. Moreover, it did not represent a final and irrevocable option on the part of the people of Gibraltar regarding the issue of incorporation in Spain; for even if a majority elected to retain the link with the United Kingdom, the people of Gibraltar would still retain the right to express by free and democratic choice their desire to join Spain. That undertaking went beyond the requirements of the Treaty of Utrecht. His delegation could only regret that the Spanish Government had not so far welcomed or recognized that important new step by the United Kingdom Government.
- 27. The referendum could be considered a significant step forward in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), paragraph 2; for it sought to establish, by popular vote, whether the Spanish proposals of 18 May 1966 were in accordance with the interests of the people of Gibraltar themselves. That question could not be determined by any outside body without reference to those whose future was at stake. The United Kingdom Government believed that, once that point had been clarified, further progress could be made towards the realistic achievement of the objectives of the General Assembly resolution, and it was fully prepared to hold further talks with the Spanish Government on the subject of Gibraltar.
- 28. Because the referendum was such an important step towards decolonization, the United Kingdom Government was most anxious that it should be conducted in conditions of absolute impartiality. To that end, it would welcome the presence of a Spanish observer, and he was glad to say that the Governments of certain Commonwealth countries and certain States Members of the United Nations had agreed to nominate independent observers. The United Kingdom

had also informed the Secretary-General that it would welcome the presence of any observer whom he might wish to send to Gibraltar for the referendum. That seemed especially appropriate in the light of Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), and particularly of operative paragraph 3.

- 29. One reason advanced by the Spanish Government for its unwillingness to accept the referendum was that it would cause the reversion clause of the Treaty of Utrecht to come into operation, although in fact the holding of the referendum could not entail any interruption of British sovereignty over Gibraltar or any alienation of Gibraltar from the British Crown. However, the main criticisms of the Spanish Government seemed to centre on the unfounded assertion that the referendum violated resolution 2231 (XXI) and earlier resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee by implying that the people of Gibraltar were to say whether General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) did or did not apply to Gibraltar. It was clear from the terms of resolution 2231 (XXI) that almost all Member States agreed that Gibraltar was a Territory within the scope of resolution 1514 (XV). The referendum would simply ask the people of Gibraltar to state whether or not it would be in their interests to be incorporated in Spain, on the terms offered by the Spanish Government. The clarification of their wishes on that point was certainly a step towards decolonization and was entirely consistent with General Assembly resolutions 2231 (XXI) and 1514 (XV).
- 30. The Spanish Government's concern with resolution 1514 (XV) seemed to rest exclusively on paragraph 6 of the Declaration. However, it was clear that, in framing paragraph 6, its authors had been essentially concerned not with the risks of dismemberment in sovereign States but with the possibility of dismemberment of existing Non-Self-Governing Territories or of such countries as the Democratic Republic of the Congo which, in December 1960, had barely emerged from colonial status. If paragraph 6 of the Declaration had any relevance to Gibraltar, it could only apply to the attempts of the Spanish Government itself to disrupt the territorial integrity and unity of Gibraltar by laying a claim to the southern part of the isthmus, which had been a part of Gibraltar for more than 100 years.
- 31. The United Kingdom Government had no doubt as to its legal sovereignty over Gibraltar, and indeed had offered to refer the Spanish Government's claim to the International Court of Justice and abide by its ruling.
- 32. Even if paragraph 6 of the Declaration could be interpreted as referring to the national unity of mature sovereign States, the Spanish case depended entirely on the thesis that Gibraltar was not a Non-Self-Governing Territory but a part of Spain. That view had certainly not been endorsed by the United Nations. On the contrary, the United Kingdom Government, year after year, had submitted information on Gibraltar under Article 73 e of the Charter, and the status of Gibraltar as a Non-Self-Governing Territory had been accepted in every competent organ of the United Nations.
- 33. If the Spanish Government really believed that Gibraltar was under Spanish sovereignty, Spain should accept the offer to resolve the question in the highest

- judicial organ of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, the argument was that Gibraltar was geographically a natural part of Spain, then by the same token it must be accepted that Lesotho and Swaziland were natural parts of South Africa, or Ifni a natural part of Morocco.
- 34. Moreover, the United Nations had not accepted the proposition that in the case of Gibraltar decolonization could only be brought about by integration with Spain. It was true that the Spanish Government had a standing in matters affecting Gibraltar, and that standing was recognized in the resolutions and was accepted by the United Kingdom Government.
- 35. While the Treaty of Utrecht limited the possibilities for decolonization through the normal formula of independence, there were other avenues of decolonization consistent with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Integration with Spain would constitute decolonization only if it took place demonstrably in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Territory. To transfer Gibraltar to Spain against their wishes would not be decolonization, but a flagrant breach of all the principles of the Charter and of General Assembly resolutions.
- 36. There were other features of resolution 1514 (XV), besides paragraph 6 of the Declaration, that might be recalled. It was stated that all peoples had the right to self-determination and that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation was a denial of fundamental human rights, and the importance of the freely expressed will of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories was emphasized. It was against that background that one should view, first, the referendum, which allowed the people of Gibraltar to express their views as to where their interests lay in regard to one possible road to decolonization and, secondly, the Spanish proposition that such matters should be negotiated by the United Kingdom and Spanish Governments.
- 37. In implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), his delegation had endeavoured to present as full an account as possible of developments regarding Gibraltar on an interim basis. Its statement could not be considered a final report under the terms of the resolution, since that must await the outcome of the referendum. As for expediting the decolonization of Gibraltar, enough had been said to demonstrate that the referendum represented definite progress in that direction. The Spanish Government had been given an opportunity to explain its proposals to the Gibraltarians and had been invited to nominate an observer to the referendum. Moreover, the people of Gibraltar had been given a continuing option to modify their status by joining Spain. The United Kingdom Government had thus given full proof of its intention to take account of the interests of the people of the Territory. It would also be recalled that it had taken the initiative in arranging for a resumption of negotiations in April 1967. It could only regret that continued negotiations had been obstructed by the actions of others. Furthermore, whatever the results of the referendum, the United Kingdom Government still believed that there was a whole range of issues concerning Gibraltar that could be explored in direct talks with the Spanish Government within the framework of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). It would be ready to take part in such negotiations, once the referendum had been held.

- 38. The representative of Spain said that General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), taken in conjunction with resolution 2070 (XX) and the Special Committee's consensus of 16 October 1964, not only made it quite clear that Gibraltar should be decolonized but also specified the manner in which the process should be conducted.
- 39. The colonial situation in Gibraltar called for the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as the United Nations had requested. That resolution contained a Declaration consisting of seven paragraphs, the first of which stated that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation was contrary to the United Nations Charter. However, the United Kingdom and the petitioners appearing before the Committee had said that the inhabitants of Gibraltar were not subjugated by the United Kingdom. The second paragraph set forth the principle that all peoples had the right to self-determination; however, neither the Special Committee nor the General Assembly had specified that that principle should apply to the civilian inhabitants of Gibraltar. Indeed, the 1964 consensus and General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) merely stated that Spain and the United Kingdom should bear the interests of the inhabitants in mind. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 set forth principles for guaranteeing self-determination in cases to which paragraphs 1 and 2 applied. Consequently, only paragraph 6, supplemented by paragraph 7, offered a solution for the situation in Gibraltar. In connexion with paragraph 6, he would point out that the interpretation which the United Kingdom representative had placed on the implications of the scope given to it by the Assembly was not in keeping with the facts, as the records of the debates would suffice to show.
- 40. Continued British presence on a portion of Spanish soil was tantamount to the dismemberment of Spain's national unity and territorial integrity. As long as such dismemberment persisted, the colonial situation in Gibraltar would also persist, whatever formula was used to disguise it.
- 41. Although the United Nations did not consider the civilian inhabitants of Gibraltar to have the necessary qualifications for self-determination, it had laid down one important condition for the return of that Territory to Spain, namely, that the interests of the inhabitants should be respected by both the United Kingdom and Spain. That decision was quite in keeping with the statement contained in the report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.⁶
- 42. From the very outset, the Spanish Government had offered to respect the interests of the people of Gibraltar and had made a number of suggestions to the United Kingdom as to how those interests might be safeguarded. The United Kingdom Government had not stated what the interests of those inhabitants would be until 14 June 1967, when it had indicated that it considered one of the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar to be the right to take a decision regarding sovereignty over a Territory which it occupied. That decision by the United Kingdom had prompted Spain to request an opportunity to make a statement in the Special Committee.
- ⁶ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 87, document A/6230, para. 502.

- 43. When the negotiations recommended in General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) had opened in London on 18 May 1966, his Government had proposed to the United Kingdom that two agreements should be concluded, one governing the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar and the other safeguarding the United Kingdom's interests. On the signing of those agreements, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) would have become applicable, ending the dismemberment of his country's national unity and territorial integrity. The five meetings which had ensued had been negotiations in name only, and all the United Kingdom had done was to create obstacles to the process of decolonization, invoking legal and historical arguments and raising marginal issues. It had adduced new colonial rights over Spanish territory even more extensive than those conferred by the anachronistic Treaty of Utrecht, and it had finally proposed that the International Court of Justice should examine its colonial rights over the Rock before the United Nations resolutions were implemented. During the Special Committee's consideration of the situation in Gibraltar in November 1966, he had drawn attention to the United Kingdom's reluctance to negotiate and to the fact that it had gone so far as to claim sovereignty over a part of Spanish territory adjacent to the Rock, thereby committing a new act of aggression against Spain's territorial integrity.
- 44. The United Kingdom delegation had thereupon attempted to justify its proposal to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice by presenting a long list of accusations against Spain. Those accusations had already been advanced in 1965 as a pretext for refusing to negotiate, and again in 1966 to mask the United Kingdom's unwillingness to negotiate. It had come as no surprise that they had again been put forward during the present debate as an excuse for the United Kingdom's decision to break off the London negotiations on 13 April 1967.
- 45. His Government interpreted the Special Committee's resolution of 17 November 1966 as a clear indication that the United Nations felt that the decolonization of Gibraltar should proceed through negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom, and not through recourse to the International Court of Justice. His Government had therefore explained to the United Kingdom why the question could not be submitted to the International Court and had proposed the immediate opening of negotiations for the drafting of a statute to protect the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar. The statute was to have become a formal agreement between the two countries, duly registered with the United Nations.
- 46. General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had requested the United Kingdom to refrain from hindering the decolonization of Gibraltar, which should be undertaken "in consultation with the Government of Spain" and by means of negotiations "taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory". The provisions of the resolution were identical to those of the Spanish Government's proposal to the United Kingdom six days earlier. By that stage, it had been clear that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) provided the only means of solving the question of Gibraltar, bearing in mind the interests of its inhabitants. The United Kingdom had never told Spain what those interests were and had not allowed the Gibraltarians themselves to do so.

- 47. In 1963 and 1964, Mr. Hassan and Mr. Isola, petitioners from Gibraltar, had requested the Special Committee to safeguard the inhabitants' right to selfdetermination; however, that right was to be exercised exclusively in order to perpetuate the colonial situation in the Territory which, as the petitioners had admitted, did not affect them. It was not until 17 December 1966 that Mr. Hassan had told the Fourth Committee what rights the inhabitants of Gibraltar wished to see protected. That had been the first indirect information regarding those rights which his Government had received. Mr. Hassan's statement at the 1679th meeting of the Fourth Committee had confirmed the existence of two types of interests in Gibraltar: those affecting the Gibraltarians themselves, and those of the United Kingdom, which were best described as limited sovereignty over a military fortress on Spanish soil. On 18 May and 13 December 1966, his Government had proposed separate solutions to the problem of those different interests. If the United Kingdom had been ready to comply with General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), it would have been easier to solve the question of the purely Gibraltarian interests. At no time, however, had the United Kingdom given any indication that it was ready to open a civilized dialogue with Spain, as requested in the resolution. United Kingdom aircraft had continued to violate Spanish air space, and Spanish protests had been ignored. Furthermore, on 5 January 1967, the United Kingdom had informed his Government that it had acquired the right to avail itself of Spanish air space in the area of the Rock by virtue of its construction of a military airfield adjacent to Gibraltar. The United Kingdom had already attempted to colonize another part of Spanish territory on 12 July 1966, and its attempt to establish so-called rights in Spanish air space, on behalf of military aircraft operating from the Gibraltar airfield, had come sixteen days after the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI).
- 48. The United Kingdom's claim and its endeavours to encroach on Spanish air space had made it more urgent than ever that Spain should protect its air space against military use by foreign countries. His Government had previously requested the establishment of a prohibited zone for air navigation in Spanish military air space around the Straits of Gibraltar. The United Kingdom's insistence on maintaining its base in Gibraltar demonstrated the strategic importance of the region. His Government had therefore approved a ministerial order establishing the prohibited air zone in Algeciras on 11 April 1967. The United Kingdom had used the existence of the prohibited zone as a pretext for disrupting the London negotiations, and the United Kingdom representative had attempted to show that the prohibited zone was a further example of Spanish hostility which was allegedly preventing negotiations. Such tactics were merely a repetition of those used in 1965 and 1966, when the United Kingdom had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade ICAO to condemn the prohibited zone as illegal. By submitting the problem of a prohibited zone to a technical organization concerned exclusively with civil aviation, the United Kingdom had tried to disguise the exclusively military nature of the airfield, which was registered as a military airfield with ICAO. Moreover, the permission of the Royal Air Force was necessary for overflights of the area.
- 49. The United Kingdom had subsequently rejected a Spanish proposal for the joint modernization of the Gibraltar airfield, despite the fact that it was situated

- on territory usurped from Spain. By so doing, the United Kingdom had sacrified the civilian traffic through the airfield, which would have brought many advantages to all parties concerned.
- 50. The Middle East conflict had given clear proof of the need for Spain to establish the prohibited zone. The policies of the United Kingdom and Spain in regard to that conflict had been different, and if it had spread, the possibility of the military involvement of Gibraltar could not have been overlooked. The bombing of Gibraltar during the Second World War had caused many victims in the neighbouring Spanish city of La Linea. So long as a military base outside its control existed in Gibraltar, the Spanish Government must emphasize that it did not agree with the use made of that base.
- 51. It was common knowledge that the United Kingdom had interrupted the negotiations for the decolonization of Gibraltar and had decided to hold a referendum in the Territory, without previous consultations with Spain as required in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). The referendum was to be held in September 1967, and the United Kingdom had requested Spain and the United Nations to send observers. The questions to be put to the Gibraltarians amounted simply to asking them whether or not they wished to continue their present colonial status. The decision to hold a referendum violated not only the colonial Treaty of Utrecht but also the United Nations resolutions. It had been taken without consulting the Spanish Government, as operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI) required. The Spanish proposal that both countries should consult the Gibraltarians regarding the interests they wished to see safeguarded had met with no reply until 31 July 1967, although a Foreign Office spokesman had stated on 5 July 1967 that the United Kingdom would proceed with the referendum as planned. On 8 July the United Kingdom had indicated that it would not reply to the Spanish proposal; on 31 July, nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government had replied and had attempted to prove that the referendum was not a violation of General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI). The reply was the most curious document yet received by Spain in connexion with the decolonization of Gibraltar. It stated that Gibraltar could not be considered part of Spain until the International Court of Justice so decided and that operative paragraph 6 of the Declaration did not, therefore, apply to the colonial situation in Gibraltar. It was clear, however, that the United Kingdom had taken a step greatly affecting the decolonization of Gibraltar and directed more against Spain than towards helping the Gibraltarians.
- 52. The referendum was tantamount to a defiance of the United Nations, whose decisions were not only ignored by the United Kingdom but were also subjected to the decisions of the inhabitants of Gibraltar after the referendum.
- 53. In April 1964, the United Kingdom had granted the British inhabitants a constitution setting up a "government" by promoting the Mayor of Gibraltar to the rank of Chief Minister. His delegation had denounced that stratagem in documents submitted to the Secretary-General. The United Kingdom had thus attempted to create the impression that the principle of self-determination was being applied to Gibraltar, in the hope that the Special Committee would not renew its examination of the question. Although the adoption of resolution 2070 (XX) had marked the failure of

that attempt, the referendum which the United Kingdom was now organizing was nothing more than the culmination of the 1964 manoeuvre. The United Kingdom Government had published an Order in Council on 28 June in connexion with the referendum, in which it was stated that the Order in Council was to be construed as one with the Constitution set out in the Gibraltar Constitution Order of 1964. That was an admission that the referendum was a part of the Constitution of 1964, which had been designed to present the Special Committee with a fait accompli. His delegation was sure that the Committee would not be deceived by such shabby tactics. The so-called United Kingdom policy of decolonization in Gibraltar was merely a series of manoeuvres designed solely to guarantee the permanence of the United Kingdom presence on the Rock. The United Kingdom was attempting to obtain the United Nations approval for its policies; when it failed to do so, it defied the Organization's decisions.

54. The United Kingdom was linking its own interests in the referendum with the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock, by forcing the latter to defend the United Kingdom's military interests at the entrance to the Mediterranean, in order to defend a particular way of life which they wished to preserve.

55. Petitioners from Gibraltar had expressed a desire that the military base in Gibraltar should continue, and the United Kingdom was now attempting to have the perpetuation of that base requested by the majority of its subjects on the Rock. It was doing so because it had two specific political objectives in organizing the referendum: first, to defend its military base, and, secondly, to convert its dispute with Spain into a dispute between Spain and the inhabitants of Gibraltar. În an attempt to defend its base, and believing that Spain would agree to permanent United Kingdom sovereignty, the United Kingdom had been fully prepared to abandon the inhabitants. On 23 May 1966 the Foreign Secretary, speaking in the House of Commons, had excluded the inhabitants of Gibraltar from the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain, and on 12 July 1966 the United Kingdom had proposed to Spain the reduction of the so-called Gibraltar government to a municipality. Such action would have been tantamount to abandoning the stratagems employed in introducing the 1964 Constitution, which the United Kingdom was now trying to revive by means of the referendum. Moreover, when the Special Committee's resolution of November 1966 had completely ignored the inhabitants of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom had not protested but had merely abstained from voting. Yet, when Spain demanded the de-colonization of the Rock in accordance with United Nations recommendations, the United Kingdom immediately invoked the interests of the inhabitants. It was natural that it should do so, since the sovereignty over the military base which the United Kingdom was now forcing the inhabitants of Gibraltar to defend was an essential part of its interests. As recently as 25 July 1967, the United Kingdom Minister of Defence had told the House of Commons that his Government intended to maintain its garrison, the airport, the shipyard and other installations in Gibraltar. The United Kingdom's prime military objective could hardly have been better expressed. The second aim of the referendum—that of setting the inhabitants of Gibraltar against Spain—emerged clearly from a statement by the Foreign Secretary to the House of Commons on 23 May 1966 to the effect that the aim of the negotiations with Spain

was not the decolonization of Gibraltar, but rather the institution of civilized relations between Spain and Gibraltar. The United Kingdom was, in fact, employing its ancient tactics of "divide and rule". As in many other parts of the world, the United Kingdom was deliberately creating a complicated and explosive situation on the Rock. Its sole aim was to make sure that the dispute did not appear for what it was, namely, a colonial dispute between an occupying Power and a partially occupied country, but rather as a conflict between Spain and 25,000 peace-loving people who did not wish to be absorbed by Spain.

56. The referendum was based on the idea that the administering Power had obligations only towards colonized people who were in the process of being decolonized. In the eyes of the United Kingdom, the colonized people were the British inhabitants of the Rock, despite the fact that, in 1963, the latter had themselves told the Special Committee that they were not the victims of colonization.

57. The United Kingdom was attempting to persuade the United Nations and Spain that the Gibraltarians, subjects of Her Majesty installed after the occupation, should decide the future of the Territory. It was trying to prove that those subjects were the sole population of Gibraltar and the sole victims of the Gibraltarian colonial situation. According to that argument, Article 73 of the United Nations Charter would take priority over Article 2 (4), to which paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples conformed. The interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar, when bound up with the specifically military interests of the United Kingdom, were tainted with colonialism, and it was at that point that they were questioned by Spain.

58. When the Special Committee had considered the question of Gibraltar in 1964, it had been shown that the population established in Gibraltar after the British occupation had been virtually prefabricated by the United Kingdom. It was therefore important to know exactly who would be eligible to vote in the referendum. Of the current population of approximately 24,500, some 4,000 were United Kingdom or Commonwealth nationals, and approximately 2,000 were foreigners, mostly Spanish citizens. Thus, there were approximately 18,500 "true" Gibraltarians, all of whom were British subjects, entitled to vote in the referendum, a "true" Gibraltarian, according to the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance of 1962, being a person registered as a Gibraltarian. However, only persons born in Gibraltar on or before 30 June 1925, together with their wives and legitimate dependants, were eligible for inclusion in the register. The 1925 date was significant, since the first Indian child of parents who had settled in Gibraltar had been born after that date; naturally, the United Kingdom authorities had not wanted that child to enjoy the same privileges as the other British subjects who had come to the Rock to take the place of the expelled Spanish population, Furthermore, the same Ordinance provided that the Governor in Council might order the deletion from the register of any person if he was satisfied that such person had, within ten years of being registered, shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal towards Her Britannic Majesty. Although 13,572 persons had been eligible to vote in the election held in Gibraltar in May 1967, almost one half had abstained, despite the fact that the election had been vital for the future of the Rock. In the circumstances, the outcome of the referendum was already clear, and no useful purpose would be served by sending either Spanish or United Nations observers merely to prove that a population controlled by London voted as London had decided.

- 59. The persons inscribed in the register did not, however, constitute the entire population of Gibraltar. Five thousand Spanish workers worked in Gibraltar but were not permitted to live there. Many of them were the descendants of workers who had also worked in Gibraltar. However, they and their families, totalling some 60,000 persons, would not be allowed to participate in the referendum, nor would the descendants of the true Gibraltarians expelled in 1704 living in the town of San Roque or the neighbouring peoples of El Campo. As the Mayor of San Roque had stated in 1964, any decision which ignored the fact that the Campo de Gibraltar was united geographically, demographically and economically with the Rock would be nonsensical. In view of the composition of the electoral roll, the United Kingdom could hardly invoke Article 73 of the Charter while ignoring Article 2 (4) of the Charter and paragraph 6 of the Declaration.
- 60. Furthermore, many of those inscribed in the register had acquired a "pied noir" mentality and had become agents, rather than victims, of the colonial situation. The Gibraltarian publication Vox had intimated that the result of the discussions in the Special Committee on the question of Gibraltar was a foregone conclusion in favour of Spain; it had stated that Gibraltar must never disappear into "alien hands" and had called on the United Kingdom to adopt a "tougher policy". That was hardly the voice of a victimized people wishing to safeguard its interests.
- 61. In the circumstances, the United Kingdom's sole obligation towards the Gibraltarians was to facilitate free entry into the United Kingdom for those who did not wish Gibraltar to be decolonized—an obligation which the United Kingdom Government did not wish to assume. On the contrary, the United Kingdom immigration laws refused entry to the British subjects it wished to maintain on the Rock. An evasive reply had been given to a question asked in the House of Commons concerning the establishment of an entry quota for Gibraltarians, and the Home Secretary had clearly stated that Gibraltarians would not be allowed to enter the United Kingdom without restriction. Therefore, if the decolonization of Gibraltar took place in accordance with the foreseeable results of the referendum, it would be the first time that the loyal subjects of an occupying Power had decided upon the destiny of a colonial Territory, an arrangement which his Government expected that the United Nations would reject.
- 62. Fortunately, some Gibraltarians appeared to be more interested in preserving the cultural, social, religious and economic identity of the inhabitants of the Rock than in defending the military interests of the United Kingdom. According to a letter published in the Gibraltar Post of 12-13 August, the local Press had refused to publish a petition sent by a Gibraltarian to the United Kingdom Government concerning the untimeliness of the referendum. The tone of the letter gave some indication of the coercion probably exercised not only on the writer but on all Gibraltarians who felt that the best interests of Gibraltar would be served by Spanish-British understanding. The petition, which had been printed by Vox in its issue of 15 August 1967, had stated, inter alia, that no rational Gibraltarian

should be asked to accept alternative (a) of the referendum, since the proposals did not set out terms of settlement which could be effectively accepted, and that, with regard to alternative (b), the suggestion that a negotiated solution between the United Kingdom and Spain would result in a severance of the links between Gibraltar and Britain and the abolition of democratic institutions in Gibraltar and would absolve Britain of its responsibilities was alarming, since Gibraltar would have to look mostly to the United Kingdom, following a settlement, for guarantees of the settlement and for its continued protection. The petition had gone on to express serious doubts concerning the extent to which the interests of the Gibraltarians were being advanced by the referendum, and had stated that those interests lay in a negotiated solution of existing differences, a solution which appeared to be excluded by the terms of the referendum as it stood. It had concluded by requesting the United Kingdom Government to reconsider its decision to hold a referendum and by further requesting that, if the referendum must be held, it should be with the express approval of the United Nations and with the full participation of Spain, which should bind itself to accept the result. If neither of those alternatives were possible, it requested that the terms of the referendum should be redrafted to meet the objections expressed.

63. The Spanish Government could not in all honesty ignore the terms of that petition, and it was ready to protect the religious, cultural, economic and sociological identity of the inhabitants of Gibraltar from all the consequences of decolonization. With that end in view, the Spanish Government had, in May 1966, proposed to the United Kingdom the signing of an agreement to protect the interests of all the inhabitants of Gibraltar, whether or not they were inscribed in the register. In December 1966, it had reiterated that proposal and explained the need for establishing a statute for the inhabitants of Gibraltar. In July 1967, in its memorandum commenting on the United Kingdom referendum, the Spanish Government had proposed that the two countries should jointly consult the Gibraltarians on the interests they wished protected after the decolonization of Gibraltar. However, none of those proposals had been accepted, because they were based on the fact that Gibraltarian interests were distinct from the British interests involved. It was surely time to separate United Kingdom military and imperialist interests in Gibraltar from the specific interests of the Gibraltarians themselves. After that was done, Gibraltarian interests could be examined by Spain and the United Kingdom under the supervision of the Secretary-General and, once defined and guaranteed, they would fall within the scope of paragraph 6 of the Declaration. Needless to say, the United Kingdom referendum was not the most appropriate method of discovering what those interests were. The Special Committee and the General Assembly should therefore request it to refrain from holding the referendum. There were, after all, many interests involved; some non-Gibraltarian residents might well feel that they would wish to leave Gibraltar after decolonization, and Spain would be willing to examine their cases individually and to provide economic and other assistance if necessary. In addition, many British subjects, whether on the register or not, might not wish to remain in a Territory no longer under British sovereignty, and in that respect the United Kingdom Government had an obligation to allow them free entry to the United Kingdom. The interests of all who wished

to remain on the Rock would be fully protected under the statute proposed by Spain.

64. The representative of Venezuela recalled that his delegation had stated its views on the question of Gibraltar on many occasions in the Special Committee and the General Assembly. It considered that the problem was one to which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and particularly paragraph 6 of the Declaration, was applicable. Basing itself on that paragraph, the General Assembly had decided that the most effective way of solving the problem was to invite the parties concerned to negotiate, a decision confirmed in its resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI). If the colonial problem of Gibraltar had not fallen within the scope of paragraph 6, the United Nations itself would have had the responsibility of supervising the Territory's evolution towards self-determination. It was precisely because the problem affected the territorial integrity of a Member State that the General Assembly had asked the parties to negotiate, thus achieving the decolonization of Gibraltar through the recognition by the United Kingdom of Spain's rightful sovereignty over the Territory.

65. History offered many examples of the kind of territorial ambitions which had brought about the situation in Gibraltar. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration provided a safeguard for countries which were unable to defend their rights or had had to acquiesce in the annexation of a part of their territory. When that paragraph had been adopted, the sponsors had made it clear that it meant that the principle of self-determination could never affect the right of any State to territorial integrity. It had also been pointed out that many territorial disputes could not be resolved through the application of the principle of self-determination because an equally important principle—that of the territorial integrity of a country—would then be violated. The referendum which the United Kingdom planned to hold in Gibraltar contravened paragraph 6 of the Declaration, and also the provisions of the Charter guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Member States. The words "the interests of the people of the Territory" in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) were meant to indicate that the solution to the problem of Gibraltar could not be subject to the wishes of the population, because a colonial situation of the kind existing in Gibraltar affected the territorial integrity of a State. The principle of self-determination could not be used to set the seal of approval on the plundering and injustices of the past. The Special Committee would be acting contrary to the interests of the international community if it allowed that principle to be used to perpetuate a colonial situation so gravely affecting Spanish territorial integrity. The decolonizing activities of the United Nations were guided by two basic principles: the defence of the inalienable right of peoples to freedom, self-determination and independence, and defence of the equally essential right of States to claim territories seized from them by force.

66. It was surprising and paradoxical that, while the United Kingdom was planning a referendum in Gibraltar, it was persisting in its refusal to hold one in the six Caribbean Territories, whose peoples' right to self-determination did not affect the territorial integrity of any country. The referendum could never affect the General Assembly's definition of the problem of Gibraltar; its only possible purpose was to grant the population of Gibraltar the right to perpetuate a colonial situation which violated Spain's territorial in-

tegrity. The Spanish Government agreed that the interests of the people of Gibraltar must be adequately safeguarded in the decolonization of the Territory and had proposed the drafting of a special statute guaranteeing those interests.

67. The representative of Iraq said that his delegation had welcomed the Special Committee's decision to give the question of Gibraltar the priority it deserved. The statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Spain, and a study of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, showed the urgency and importance of that question, and the United Kingdom's request that detailed discussion of it should be postponed until after the referendum had been held could not, therefore, be entertained. If the Special Committee did not examine all pertinent information before the referendum was held, it would be helping the United Kingdom to disregard the role of the United Nations and frustrate the hopes of both colonial and freedom-loving peoples.

68. He agreed with the views expressed by the representative of Spain at the previous meeting in challenging the validity of the referendum, which violated the provisions of the General Assembly's resolutions and was based on a unilateral decision by the administering Power. Spain was right not to recognize the results of the referendum, and the presence of a United Nations observer would be pointless if the referendum was conducted in the manner proposed. Furthermore, the administering Power had not recognized the fact that the relevant resolutions required consultations between it and the Spanish Government. The questions to be put to the voters were unacceptable, in that they neglected the decisions of the United Nations and were tantamount to asking the voters to decide Gibraltar's constitutional future.

69. The administering Power had a duty to do its utmost to liquidate its powers in Gibraltar; to that end, it should be dismantling its military, naval and air base, instead of planning unilaterally to hold a referendum. The base was a real threat to Spanish sovereignty, to international peace and to neighbouring countries. It was easy to understand what the United Kingdom hoped to gain from the referendum, the results of which were a foregone conclusion, since the decision to hold it, the date, the type and number of voters eligible to participate and the issues to be voted upon had all been decided unilaterally without consultation with Spain. All that was needed to make the referendum appear legitimate and authentic was the presence of a United Nations observer, but to send one would be an act of capitulation to the administering Power and an endorsement of its defiance of the United Nations.

70. His Government had placed high hopes in the negotiations between the two countries. The Spanish Government's willingness to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2231 (XXI) in good faith had been made crystal clear in documents and statements to the Committee. Spain's numerous practical suggestions had been met by the evasive strategems of the administering Power. The referendum was a transparent manoeuvre threatening the whole future of the area. The United Kingdom's insistence on implementing similar illegal plans in other parts of the world, in defiance of United Nations decisions, had not ended in the victories which it had expected. He therefore hoped that the United Kingdom would reconsider its decision and negotiate an agreement with Spain, thus

proving to the world that it genuinely wished to assist in the liberation of all colonial peoples and areas in co-operation with the United Nations.

- 71. His delegation wished to stress that it considered General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in its entirety to apply to Gibraltar, the future of which was governed by paragraph 6 of the Declaration.
- 72. The representative of Chile said the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Spain showed clearly that General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) was not at present being implemented. Since the adoption of that resolution, no progress had been made in the process of decolonization in Gibraltar and negotiations had not been continued. That was a matter for serious concern. Furthermore, the forthcoming referendum did not comply with the terms of United Nations resolutions since the only alternatives offered to the population of Gibraltar were acceptance of the proposals of the Spanish Government as a basis for agreement, or a continuation of the present colonial status under the United Kingdom. In the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 16 October 1964, the United Kingdom and Spain had been invited to begin talks in order to reach a negotiated solution in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), giving due account to the opinions expressed by the members of the Committee and bearing in mind the interests of the people of the Territory. In resolution 2070 (XX) the General Assembly had invited the two Governments to begin the talks without delay, and in resolution 2231 (XXI) it had reaffirmed resolution 2070 (XX) and the consensus of October 1964.
- 73. From the decisions of the General Assembly, it was clear, first, that Gibraltar was a colonial Territory to which resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable; and secondly, that a certain territorial claim existed and that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) should be taken into account. None of those decisions had called for the speedy recognition of the principle of self-determination in respect of the population of Gibraltar, despite the fact that that was one of the basic principles proclaimed in resolution 1514 (XV). The reason for that was clear: the General Assembly was aware that self-determination could, in the case of Gibraltar, lead to the disruption of national unity and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the inhabitants were not like other peoples subject to the colonial yoke, to whom the United Nations gave the choice of freedom. The General Assembly had therefore called for negotiations between the two parties to the dispute, taking into account the interests of the people, rather than for a referendum to determine their wishes.
- 74. Regrettably, however, negotiations had not taken place and the United Kingdom had decided unilaterally to hold a referendum which had so many limitations that its validity could hardly be upheld, even if the United Nations had called for it. The United Kingdom had arbitrarily decided who should vote, since the voting register was subject to the will of the Government. For various obscure reasons, some of those who had been born and now resided in the Territory, as well as the Spanish workers who had to leave the Territory before nightfall, would not be allowed to vote. Moreover, of the alternatives offered in the referendum, one was based on preliminary considerations which should have preceded negotiations, and the other amounted to a maintenance of the status quo. The referendum was therefore contrary to the letter and spirit

of the General Assembly resolutions and the 1964 consensus of the Special Committee. It was important that negotiations should be held between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain with a view to the full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory, and his delegation would support any proposal reaffirming that opinion.

75. The representative of Syria said that resolution 2231 (XXI) reaffirmed that Gibraltar was a colonial Territory to which resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable, and that the process of decolonization should be expedited. The liquidation of the colonial presence in Gibraltar was essential in the interests of international peace and security, since it was used by the colonial Power mainly as a military base and posed a permanent threat to the independence and integrity of the developing nations of Asia and Africa, as well as to their sovereignty over their natural resources. Secondly, since the Territory belonged historically and geographically to a sovereign State from which it had been severed by conquest, the administering Power and the original owner of the Territory had been called upon to conduct negotiations concerning the process of decolonization, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory.

76. The United Kingdom had clearly been determined in advance to break off the negotiations and to ignore the provisions of resolution 2231 (XXI), yet it had claimed that its attitude had been precipitated by Spain's harassment of its Air Force. No United Nations resolution, nor any rule of international law compelled Spain to give up its sovereignty over its air space, especially when foreign air activities were admitted to be of a military nature. The fact that Spain had granted permission for such activities in the past did not mean that it had permanently abandoned its sovereign rights. The United Kingdom's argument was irrelevant and its intimidation of the Spanish population in the vicinity of the frontier, together with its attempts to link Spain's protests to the question of decolonization were no indication of its good faith.

- 77. The administering Power had then unilaterally announced the holding of a referendum, thus arrogating to itself a power not conferred upon it by the United Nations resolutions concerning Gibraltar, which had called for negotiations rather than a referendum. The people were to be offered a choice of allowing the United Kingdom to retain its present responsibilities, which appeared to indicate a new phase of colonization rather than decolonization, or of passing under Spanish sovereignty. The Territory was, however, fundamentally Spanish and Spanish sovereignty had only been suspended as a result of force; force could not eliminate sovereignty, if international relations were to be guided by the United Nations Charter.
- 78. The United Kingdom claimed that it cared for the interests of the population, yet it wished to perpetuate its conquest and retain Gibraltar as a military base for the purposes of colonial expansionism and imperialist domination, using the innocent inhabitants as manpower. The Government of Spain, on the other hand, pledged to respect the individual rights of the inhabitants, their freedom of religion, the freedom of their Press, their security of domicile and of employment, as well as to preserve their municipal institutions and to allow them to retain their British nationality.
- 79. The representative of the United Kingdom had claimed at the previous meeting that the Special Com-

mittee had been aware of the steps it had taken and had referred to the communication from his delegation to the Secretary-General reproduced in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Secretary-General's report (see annex I below). That was not, however, the proper way to consult the Special Committee. The referendum was, in fact, an ultimatum. In essence, the United Kingdom had announced that it had decided to hold a referendum, the results of which were a foregone conclusion because of the way in which it had been organized, and that its decision admitted of no appeal.

- 80. Perhaps the administering Power could explain why the electoral register of Gibraltar had been closed to all those born after 30 June 1925 and why the Governor in Council had been empowered to delete from the register the names of those who had proved by act or speech to be disloyal to the Queen, so that out of a total population of 25,000 or more, only some 13,000 would be consulted as to the future of the Territory. He wondered whether the Gibraltarians of Pakistani or Indian origin would be eligible to vote, and why the 5,000 Spanish workers who contributed daily to the economy of Gibraltar were denied any right of residence, and consequently of the vote. The representative of the United Kingdom accused Spain of prejudging the referendum, yet he himself had done that when he had asserted that the Gibraltarians did not wish to come under a Spanish régime. If he was sure of that, then the referendum was merely a formula to legalize the unlawful occupation.
- 81. The United Kingdom representative had stated that his Government was ready to negotiate with Spain after the results of the referendum were known. Since, however, the referendum involved a decision on sovereignty, which was Spain's major interest, there would be nothing left to be negotiated if the results of the referendum were favourable to the United Kingdom, as the United Kingdom representative expected. In the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory, and in the interests of Spain, justice should be done.
- 82. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it had emerged very clearly from the statements of the Spanish and other representatives that Spain's entire case rested on the central assumption that Spain had a right to Gibraltar. It was argued that, because of that right, the present status of the Territory was an infringement of Spanish territorial integrity and that, as a result, Article 2 (4) of the Charter and operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) were applicable. The great flaw in that argument was that Spain had no right to Gibraltar at all. Only if the United Kingdom were to relinquish sovereignty over Gibraltar to a third party would Spain have any such right. The relinquishment of sovereignty could not arise from the actual holding of a referendum.
- 83. Spain had no right to Gibraltar: no legal right, no political right, and no right in cultural, economic, social or human terms. The Territory did not belong to Spain and had not belonged to Spain for more than two and a half centuries. Gibraltar was British; before that it had been Spanish and before that Arab territory, as its very name showed. It had been British for longer than it had been Spanish and the United Kingdom's possession of it was not an infringement of Spanish territorial integrity; still less was it a threat to that country's political independence. Spain's whole case rested on a single spurious claim and if it was contended that the situation in Gibraltar conflicted with

Spanish territorial integrity, it was for Spain to explain its refusal to submit the question to the International Court of Justice.

- 84. A whole edifice of argument had been constructed on the claim that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) was enshrined in resolution 2231 (XXI). It was true that resolution 1514 (XV) was recalled in that resolution, but there was no reference to operative paragraph 6 of it. The consensus of the Special Committee adopted on 16 October 1964 affirmed that the provisions of the Declaration were fully applicable to the Territory. Yet, there was no prejudgement and no singling-out of one facet of the resolution to the total exclusion of others. Indeed, scrupulous care had been taken in framing the resolutions and the 1964 consensus to avoid making prior judgements. If any such judgement had been made, it had been to acknowledge Gibraltar's status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, which was clearly incompatible with Spain's assertion that Gibraltar was part of Spain's natural territory, illegally occupied by the United Kingdom.
- 85. There was no mystery in the fact that the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance set July 1925 as the deadline for birth in the colony as a qualification for Gibraltarian status. There was no justification for the unworthy insinuation which the representative of Spain had sought to make in that connexion. The Ordinance had been passed only five years earlier and had been intended to revise an Order in Council, much of which had been in force since 1885. When the Ordinance had been enacted, the opportunity had been taken to advance the qualifying date of Gibraltarian status by a convenient period, namely a quarter of a century, from 1900 to 1925. The intended effect had simply been to extend Gibraltarian status to various people, irrespective of their origin, who had settled in Gibraltar and made it their home since 1900 and before 1925.
- 86. As to the Spanish representative's suggestion that there was something sinister in the Governor's powers under the Ordinance, those powers were precisely parallel to those in the United Kingdom, whereby the Government was enabled to confer British nationality by means of naturalization and even, in certain circumstances, to revoke such naturalization. There was nothing unusual about such a provision. In actual fact, that power under the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance had never so far been used.
- 87. As to the suggestion that, because the 1967 Order in Council providing for the referendum contained a general reference to the 1964 Gibraltar Constitution, the referendum was in some way part of that Constitution, it was readily apparent that the connexion was solely on a plane of technical and verbal interpretation. The referendum was quite distinct in its provisions from the Constitution.
- 88. It was very clear from Chapter XI of the Charter and from the relevant United Nations resolutions that it was the interests of the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Gibraltar which mattered. The Special Committee's consensus on 16 October 1964 referred expressly to the "interests of the population of the Territory". Spanish citizens who worked in Gibraltar by day but slept in Spain at night were not inhabitants of Gibraltar and not, by any normal definition, part of its population. To allow them to vote in the referendum would accord neither with the Charter nor with the relevant United Nations resolutions. The existing regulations provided that persons of both United Kingdom and Spanish origin would be excluded from the

referendum. The omission of the United Kingdom personnel in Gibraltar, civilian and military, helped to account for the gap, to which the Syrian representative had drawn attention, between the figure of 25,000 and the figure of some 13,000 who were expected actually to be eligible to vote. Moreover, the figure of 25,000 included minors and children. He wondered whether those arguing that Spanish daily workers in Gibraltar should be allowed to vote would also advocate that United Kingdom residents there should be allowed to vote in a referendum to decide how the inhabitants of the Territory viewed their interests. Obviously, the proper and right course was to confine the vote to the true inhabitants of Gibraltar, which was precisely what had been done.

89. The allegation that the referendum conflicted with the United Nations resolutions was also unjustified. The mere fact that the resolutions did not specifically require a referendum did not mean that the referendum was contrary to them. Indeed, resolution 2231 (XXI) expressly required Spain and the United Kingdom to take account of the interests of the Gibraltarians. The sole purpose of the referendum was to give such people an opportunity to express their views. His Government had sought to conduct the referendum in co-operation with Spain, but the latter had refused. There would be impartial Commonwealth observers, and the United Kingdom would welcome a United Nations observer. The referendum was neither more nor less than a consultation of the Gibraltarian people, by democratic means, about their own view of their own interests-a matter on which clear and definite evidence was obviously needed if the requirements of the General Assembly resolutions in 1966 were to be met. The United Kingdom, as the acknowledged administering Power of an acknowledged colonial Territory, was holding a formal and democratic consultation of the peoples of that Territory, precisely in the manner so often advocated in the Special Committee.

90. The representative of Spain observed that the fact that Gibraltar still bore the imprint of its Arab past in its name was no justification for the United Kingdom's assertion that it did not belong to Spain. The names of many Spanish cities were the precious inheritance of a glorious Arab past whose treasures Spain preserved with pride. The United Kingdom might equally well suggest the return of Guadalajara or any other Spanish city to the Arabs. The United Kingdom's contention that Gibraltar had belonged to Spain for only two and a half centuries was surprising. The Hispanic nation had begun to take shape at the time of the Greek, Phoenician, Carthaginian and Roman settlements. It had grown accustomed to occupations and when the Arabs had arrived they had been welcomed. They had merged with the Spaniards to create a race which, to the benefit of mankind and history, had settled in Spain and spread to the Amer-

91. The shameful and deplorable history of Gibraltar showed how, in 1704, the United Kingdom had treacherously taken advantage of Spain's weakness to impose the Treaty of Utrecht. Nevertheless, the concessions under that Treaty had been limited by a series of conditions: there was to be no open communication by land and there would be no extension across the Territory; all that had been ceded was a military fortress. No jurisdiction had been involved. Yet, the first act of the United Kingdom on occupying the Terri-

tory had been to seize the Rock and then to expel the Spanish inhabitants. Although another population had started to take shape on the Rock, it had never been sufficient to satisfy the needs of the United Kingdom's military base. From the seventeenth century to the present day, the Spanish population, which still had to go to the Rock to earn its daily bread and to maintain the ties with the town which his country still considered Spanish, had not been allowed to sleep in the city and re-establish its roots on the Rock. In 1830, the United Kingdom had declared Gibraltar a Crown Colony and a gradual invasion of the surrounding area had taken place until, in 1909, the first wall of shame in Europe had been built. A municipal council had been established in 1923 and, in 1946, before Spain had joined the United Nations, the United Kingdom had started to submit information on the Territory, possibly as security for its own rights. If those rights had been truly legal, the United Kingdom would have overlooked Article 73 of the Charter, omitting Gibraltar from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories in its possession. When Spain had been admitted to the United Nations on 14 December 1955, it had expressed reservations regarding the submission of that information. It should not be forgotten that Gibraltar was not a Territory but a Rock, the mountain of Djebel Tarik, the Rock of Gibraltar.

92. The United Kingdom representative had tried to show that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) contained the principle of the maintenance of territorial integrity. That principle had been clearly defined to mean that no country whatever could be dismembered; it did not apply exclusively to countries which were still colonial possessions. In 1963, when the Special Committee had been debating whether Gibraltar should be included in its agenda, the United Kingdom had immediately requested that the Committee declare itself incompetent to deal with the question on the grounds that it was a matter in which the United Kingdom was sovereign. The United Kingdom had become a victim of its own actions. It had claimed that, by virtue of the Treaty of Utrecht, it was sovereign over the Territory whereas, in 1830 it had declared it a Crown Colony and in 1946 had stated that it was a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The aim of that skilful manoeuvring was to ensure a solution favourable to the United Kingdom's own interests.

93. When, in 1963, the Special Committee, through lack of time, referred the question to the General Assembly, the United Kingdom had informed the petitioners from Gibraltar who were then present that the Special Committee had decided not to take a decision on the matter. That had been a further manoeuvre by the United Kingdom to ensure that the people of Gibraltar would not be surprised to learn that the question was to be taken up again in 1964. The Committee had adopted a consensus in 1964 to the effect that a dispute existed, that Gibraltar was a colonial Territory and that it should be decolonized through negotiations, with due regard for the interests of its population. In April 1964, before the consensus had been adopted, the United Kingdom had announced its intention of naming a Chief Minister, who was also the President of the Assembly and the Mayor. The Committee, however, had reached its consensus despite the facts placed before it by the United Kingdom. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) in 1965 had been followed in 1966 by the adop-

tion of resolution 2231 (XXI). It was curious that the United Kingdom should now contend that it had an absolute right over Gibraltar, that Gibraltar was not part of Spain, and that Spain had no rights whatsoever in that connexion. It was the United Kingdom which decided who should have the right to vote and argued that the provisions of the law in Gibraltar were identical with those in the United Kingdom. But whereas the United Kingdom was not a colony, Gibraltar was and the circumstances were therefore not the same. Chapter 218 of the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance stated that the Governor in Council might, in his absolute discretion, order that the Registrar should delete from the Register the name of any person who had been registered by virtue of an order made by the Governor in Council, if the Governor in Council was satisfied that such a person had, within ten years of being so registered, showed himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty. That showed how the Governor of Gibraltar, subject absolutely to his own discretion, could do whatever he wished with the Register.

94. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said he would like to know whether, as reports in the Press indicated, the Government of Spain would be prepared to settle the question of Gibraltar on the following basis: the United Kingdom would recognize Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar and Spain would agree to the presence of a British base on Gibraltar.

95. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the logical consequence of the Spanish representative's assertion that Gibraltar was not a Territory but a Rock was that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) could not be applicable to it, something which revealed the inherent contradiction in the Spanish position.

96. The proposals to which the Soviet Union representative had referred had been made on 18 May 1966 by the Spanish Government and constituted the first of the two alternatives to be put before the inhabitants of Gibraltar in the referendum.

97. The representative of Spain recalled that Spain had become a Member of the United Nations in 1955, some ten years after the United Kingdom had declared Gibraltar to be a Non-Self-Governing Territory, and had only been able to express its reservations since that time. When, in 1963, the Special Committee had taken up the question of Gibraltar and the United Kingdom representative had invoked the Treaty of Utrecht, the Spanish delegation had merely observed that it wished the reversion clause in that Treaty to be borne in mind, and careful account to be taken of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

98. He reminded the Soviet Union representative that a copy of the Spanish Red Book had been transmitted to the Soviet Union delegation, including the proposals made by Spain, on 18 May 1966.

99. There were two elements at stake in Gibraltar: first, the interest of the inhabitants themselves, and secondly, the military interests of the United Kingdom. His delegation had expressed its surprise in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session that the Soviet Union proposal relating to the elimination of foreign military bases had not referred

to bases in Europe. Spain had then raised the specific case of Gibraltar. It had even stated that it was prepared to have the base in Gibraltar dismantled; since, however, the offer his Government had made to the United Kingdom had been turned down, it was ready to abide by any decision the United Nations might take.

100. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that the Spanish Red Book contained information only up to 1965 and that the proposals he had referred to had been made in 1966.

101. The representative of Spain said that the proposals made by the Spanish Government on 18 May 1966 had been described in the 1671st meeting of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

102. The representative of Syria said he was somewhat bewildered by the statement of the United Kingdom representative to the effect that Gibraltar was British and could be nothing else, and that Spain had no right whatsoever to the Territory. If that was so, logically there would be no need for a referendum nor for Spain to be a party to any negotiations. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had stated that it wished to assess where the interests of the population lay; however, United Nations resolutions called not for an assessment of those interests but for their protection; he would like to know whether the United Kingdom, like the Government of Spain, had pledged to respect those interests.

103. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, while his delegation considered that Spain had no rights with regard to Gibraltar, that did not exclude recognition of the fact that there were legitimate Spanish interests in Gibraltar and that within the framework of United Nations resolutions a dispute existed and negotiations were necessary.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

104. At its 546th meeting, the Special Committee had before it a draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/L.423). This draft resolution, after recalling the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) to take into account the interests of the people of the Territory and noting the declared intention of the administering Power to consult the people of the Territory about their view of where their interests lay by means of a referendum to be held on 10 September 1967, as well as noting the statement by the administering Power that in accordance with the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) it intended to make a full report to the Special Committee following the referendum, would have the Special Committee decide to resume discussion of the question of Gibraltar as soon as the full report of the administering Power was received.

105. At its 546th meeting, the Special Committee also had before it a draft resolution co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424), which inter alia would have the Special Committee declare that the holding by the administering Power of the envisaged referendum would contradict the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and would constitute an attempt to ignore the principle of national unity and territorial integrity embodied in paragraph 6 and the final part of paragraph 7 of resolution 1514

(XV). At the 548th meeting, a revised text of the draft resolution was submitted to the Special Committee, finally co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq, Syria and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1), the main change being that the second part of the abovementioned operative paragraph concerning national unity and territorial integrity would appear separately in revised form as a preambular paragraph.

106. The representative of Iraq, introducing the original resolution co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424), said it was not too late for the administering Power to come to grips with the realities of the situation and to realize that no practical benefits were to be expected from the execution of the unilaterally arranged referendum in Gibraltar, for it would be contrary to the very spirit of the United Nations Charter and the relevant United Nations resolutions. The three-Power draft resolution contained all the necessary elements for a peaceful and legally sound solution to the problem, through the process of negotiations and discussions that had been so strongly supported by an impressive majority of the General Assembly a few months before.

107. The representative of Uruguay said that the critical issue before the Special Committee was the referendum, which had been decided upon by the United Kingdom unilaterally and which represented a direct departure from the system of bilateral negotiations called for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

108. Turning first to the implications of the referendum with respect to the Utrecht Treaty, he recalled Professor Oppenheim's dictum that conquest consisted in taking possession of enemy territory by military force in time of war and was only a method of acquiring territory, when the conqueror, after having firmly consolidated the conquest, formally annexed the territory. On the basis of that statement, the 1704 occupation did not give the United Kingdom any rights over Gibraltar because: (a) Spain was not then in a state of war with Great Britain and Gibraltar was not an enemy territory; (b) the occupation of Gibraltar, far from having the character of a military conquest in time of war, was limited to a mere foreign violation of Spanish sovereignty; (c) there had been no intention of conquest on the part of Britain; (d) Admiral Rooke had acted on his own and taken possession of Gibraltar on behalf of Queen Anne; (e) Spain had reacted immediately by claiming its sovereignty over Gibraltar; (f) after having sought to recapture Gibraltar by force in 1704, 1727, 1779 and 1783, Spain had continued to maintain its claim, using the peaceful means of diplomacy and finally resorting to the United Nations; (g) Britain had never executed a formal act of annexation.

109. According to the *British Encyclopedia* of Adam and Charles Black, the conquerors of Gibraltar had defended the interests of Charles, Archduke of Austria, later Charles III, but even though on 24 July 1704 his sovereignty had been proclaimed over the Rock, Admiral Rooke, under his own responsibility, had given the order to raise the British flag. In other words, Great Britain, which was not at war with Spain and which intervened only to defend the rights of the pretender to the Spanish throne, had become the owner of the Rock which had been conquered on behalf of Archduke Charles.

110. Such was the title which appeared nine years later in the Treaty of Utrecht. Spain, vanquished and powerless, felt obliged to sign an instrument whereby it yielded, to the Crown of Great Britain, the city, the castle, the port and the fortress of Gibraltar. Despite that territorial segregation, conditions and limitations were established in the Treaty of Utrecht which seriously undermined the present claims of the United Kingdom. For example, in article X of the Treaty, the King of Spain maintained that the properties had been yielded to Great Britain without any territorial jurisdiction and without any open communication by land with the surrounding country. That article also stated that, if at any time the Crown of Great Britain deemed it appropriate to dispose of the property, the Crown of Spain would have the first choice to redeem the Rock of Gibraltar. Therefore, assuming that the Treaty of Utrecht could be applicable in the light of modern international law, the United Kingdom could not unilaterally change the status of Gibraltar. By doing so, it would be violating article X of the Treaty.

111. However, the Treaty of Utrecht was obsolete and completely at variance with modern international law. It dated back to the time when legal instruments were drafted in an atmosphere of prejudice and rancour and when armed battles were used as legitimate instruments in relations among States. As Professor Oppenheim had stated, the international situation had undergone major change because of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter. To the extent that those instruments proscribed war, Professor Oppenheim had continued, they also invalidated the conquest of a State which, running counter to its obligations, had recourse to war. Professor Oppenheim's view was confirmed by another Cambridge professor. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a member of the International Court of Justice, who had stated that, since in contemporary international law war was forbidden, the results of an illegal action, such as a treaty imposed as a result of the violation of international law, could not be valid.

112. It was therefore obvious that title to Gibraltar in favour of the territorial dismemberment of Spain could not be invoked on the basis of the violent conquest of 1704 nor on the basis of a treaty that was intended to render that conquest valid in 1713. There would still be an objection to the referendum in any case, because article X of the Utrecht Treaty gave a preferential option to Spain to recover the territory. Accordingly, any referendum organized by the British who inhabited the territory was devoid of legal or practical value.

113. Turning next to the implications of the referendum with respect to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), he observed that the latter laid down two criteria, based on different principles but having the same purpose of promoting and facilitating the freedom and independence of colonial countries and peoples. Although the principle of self-determination was the primary basis for the liberation of peoples, there were certain peculiar colonial situations, such as those of Gibraltar and the Malvinas Islands, to which the criterion of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a State must be applied. In some such cases, a referendum might serve to perpetuate, instead of abolishing, the rule of colonial Powers over territory belonging to other countries. Uruguay, whose devotion to law and justice was unquestionable, had taken that position at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolu-

tion 1514 (XV) and had therefore supported paragraph 6 of the Declaration. Even if the meaning of that paragraph had not been clear—which was not the case—the records of past debates would show that the intention of its sponsors and supporters had been to avoid the automatic and indiscriminate application of the principle to self-determination, which in exceptional cases could violate the principle of the territorial integrity of States recognized in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. The importance of paragraph 6 of the Declaration had been categorically reiterated by the General Assembly one year later, in its resolution 1654 (XVI), in which the Assembly had expressed deep concern that acts aimed at the partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity were still being carried out in certain countries in the process of decolonization. The Special Committee itself had been set up under the same resolution, one of the main reasons for its establishment being the need to defend national unity and territorial integrity in the course of decolonization.

114. Much more could be said concerning the implications of the referendum with respect to the provisions of the Charter and the well-established principles of contemporary international law. The vital point, however, was that the proposed referendum would constitute a violation of the principle of non-intervention in a domestic matter affecting the jurisdiction of Spain. Since the question of Gibraltar had been submitted to bilateral negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, any unilateral act by either party which could affect the political future of the territory in dispute was a departure from the agreed procedure and an unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of the other country. Paragraph 7 of the Declaration set out in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) made that point clear and left no room for ambiguous interpretation. Consequently, the referendum could not be regarded as a valid instrument of decolonization.

115. Turning lastly to the implications of the referendum with respect to General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), he noted that a reading of that resolution could lead to only one conclusion, namely, that the General Assembly wished Gibraltar to be decolonized through bilateral negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory. It was significant that the resolution in question, like resolution 2070 (XX), of which it was basically a reiteration, made no specific mention of the principle of self-determination and referred to the interests, rather than the will or the wishes, of the people, thus departing from the terminology normally used, the obvious purpose being to place the problem within the context of paragraph 6 of the Declaration. Thus, in the case of Gibraltar -paradoxical as it might appear-decolonization was intended to benefit, not the British inhabitants of the Rock, but the Territory itself or, in other words, the parcel of land of which Spain had been deprived in violation of its national unity and territorial integrity. The referendum was therefore contrary to General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), which provided the only practical means of a settlement through a bilateral understanding that would safeguard the interests of the people, without, however, confusing those interests with the political motive of perpetuating colonialism. That resolution had the unanimous support of the peoples of Latin America, as was evidenced by the Declaration adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Latin American Parliament in May 1967.

116. His delegation had often expressed its appreciation of the United Kingdom's contribution to decolonization, and it earnestly hoped to hear at the twentysecond session of the General Assembly that the last vestige of colonialism in Europe had been eliminated by agreement between the United Kingdom and Spain. Gibraltar might be insignificant in itself, but it constituted the southernmost geographical boundary of Spain, and the presence of an alien Power on the Rock was a scar on Spain's territorial integrity and an insult to its sovereign dignity as a State. The Treaty of Utrecht was no longer valid under contemporary international law, and his delegation was confident that the negotiations provided for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) would lead to the return of Gibraltar to Spain. Gibraltar could not escape decolonization, and the two Governments would surely be able to agree on provisions to protect all the interests of the inhabitants.

117. His delegation would not vote for any draft resolution condemning or censuring the United Kingdom, since to do so would not be constructive and would jeopardize the continuation of the bilateral negotiations.

118. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the position with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) was still unclear. The statement made by the administering Power at the beginning of the discussion of Gibraltar (see paras. 20-37 above) had not provided any information which would help the Committee to formulate constructive recommendations.

119. In approaching the colonial question of Gibraltar, his delegation was guided mainly by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), together with other relevant resolutions of the Assembly. Particular importance should be given to the interests of the people, including their long-term interests. The Committee must ensure that the colonial Power's activities did not jeopardize the future of the Territory and its residents. Such considerations had caused his delegation to support General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), which, in operative paragraph 2, called upon the two parties to continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the people, and asked the administering Power to expedite the decolonization of Gibraltar in consultation with the Government of Spain. The terms of that paragraph had clearly not been complied with. It was distressing that recriminations should have been given prominence in the debate, and that the United Kingdom representative had placed so much stress on the alleged establishment of a prohibited air zone in the vicinity of Gibraltar. The question of Spanish air space was solely within the jurisdiction of the Spanish Government, and such matters were in any case not within the purview of the Committee, which was concerned with the decolonization of Gibraltar.

120. Resolution 2231 (XXI) called for consultation between the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom, and the organization by the colonial Power of a referendum in Gibraltar would not further the implementation of that resolution. His delegation had always supported the principle of the consultation of colonial peoples; however, when a referendum was held, it was assumed that the object was to determine the interests of the people—both their immediate and their long-term interests. It was clear that the holding

of the referendum further jeopardized the possibilities of consultations between the United Kingdom and Spain which might lead to the decolonization of Gibraltar.

- 121. Secondly, all the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory should participate in any referendum. In the present case, as a result of the activities of the colonial Power, the indigenous population had been largely excluded. In any case, since the colonial Power had acted unilaterally, it was impossible to determine who would participate in the referendum and how large a part of the population would be excluded. The colonial Power had retained the right to exclude any individual who, in the view of the colonial authorities, might not support their interests.
- 122. Thirdly, the aim of a referendum must be decolonization. It was distressing to note that part of the referendum under discussion was aimed at perpetuating the colonial status of Gibraltar.
- 123. He had dwelt on the question of the referendum because it was essential for the Committee to ensure that the referendum procedure, which was one of the means by which decolonization could be effected, was not abused. The United Kingdom representative had said that the type of colonization best suited to Gibraltar could not be prejudged. That might be true, but the General Assembly had called upon the colonial Power to enter into consultations with the Spanish Government to ensure not only decolonization but also the type of decolonization and the process followed. The administering Power, utilizing a means of decolonization, had in fact jeopardized the process of the decolonization of Gibraltar. Thus the referendum would defeat the purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). He therefore agreed with those who called for the resumption of negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain to ensure the full implementation of the General Assembly resolutions, taking into account the interests of the people as a whole.
- 124. Another aspect of the problem was the fact that Gibraltar was a military stronghold of the United Kingdom. His delegation had always opposed the establishment of military bases in colonial territories. The question arose whether a free referendum could be held under such conditions; if the United Kingdom had been interested in the decolonization of Gibraltar, a first step would surely be the removal of the military base. In view of some of the powers that had been vested in the Governor, one could not but be apprehensive about the role that the presence of the base would play in the referendum.
- 125. The United Kingdom representative had tried to give the impression that the United Kingdom was concerned with the interests of the people. In fact, the administering Power was always interested in perpetuating its own interests. Thus the United Kingdom Government, because it suited its interests, had contended for many years that Southern Rhodesia enjoyed internal self-government when in fact it was only the small white minority which exercised power. The Committee should not be deceived by claims that the United Kingdom was seeking to ascertain the interests of the population. In the case of the Caribbean islands, the wishes of the people had not been ascertained before the proposed new arrangements came into effect, and those arrangements had now proved to be a failure. The appropriate lessons should be learnt from the

- troubles in the Caribbean area and in Southern Rhodesia. He urged the United Kingdom to consider the wisdom of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and realize that the proposed referendum would not lead to the complete solution of the problem.
- 126. The administering Power had invited the United Nations to send an observer to Gibraltar. That would be inconsistent with the expressed views of the Committee, since it had insisted that the United Nations should be involved in a positive way with regard to the remaining colonies and not just as a passive observer of activities with which it disagreed. It would therefore have been wrong for the Secretary-General to consent to the United Kingdom's request. In the case of other Territories, the administering Power had refused to allow visiting missions. The United Kingdom Government could not use the United Nations Secretariat to obtain approval for its actions from the United Nations.
- 127. It would undoubtedly be in the interests of the Committee if the terms of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) were to be faithfully implemented. He appealed to the United Kingdom to co-operate with the United Nations in deed and not merely in words.
- 128. The representative of Australia said that his delegation had been disappointed that the bilateral negotiations which were to have continued following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had come to nothing. Having listened to the statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom and Spain, he understood the Spanish case to be that Spain was the legitimate sovereign Power with respect to Gibraltar and responsible for its inhabitants. It was his understanding that, if Spain were to enjoy the full exercise of that sovereignty, it would respect the individual rights of the inhabitants of Gibraltar, their freedom of religion, the freedom of their Press, and their security of domicile and employment. The essence of the Spanish case was the assertion of sovereignty. The United Kingdom, for its part, maintained that it was the sovereign Power, and that it had primary responsibility for the future of the people of Gibraltar, although Spain had an interest in the situation by virtue of the Treaty of Utrecht.
- 129. The Australian view was that the United Kingdom exercised sovereignty over Gibraltar both de jure and de facto. Should Spain obtain a ruling from the International Court of Justice to the effect that Spain was the sovereign Power, that would naturally affect Australia's position. It must be borne in mind that the United Kingdom was prepared to submit the question of sovereignty to the International Court and that the Spanish Government had declined to accept that procedure.
- 130. Other Governments represented in the Committee took the view that Spain was the sovereign Power. That naturally led them to different conclusions from those of his delegation.
- 131. Australia did not consider that the Committee was competent to take decisions on questions of sovereignty, and would be unwise to attempt to assume such competence. The United Nations body competent to consider such disputes was the International Court.
- 132. There had been a tendency in the Committee to misinterpret General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). In the discussions in the Fourth Committee at the General Assembly's twenty-first session, a deadlock

had been avoided when Sierra Leone had submitted an amendment introducing the words "taking into account the interests of the people of the territory" in the draft resolution. That amendment had rendered the resolution acceptable to the Australian and other delegations.

133. Furthermore, the representative of Ceylon in the Fourth Committee had expressed some surprise that the sponsors of the draft resolution had forgotten to refer to the interests of the people and had been obliged to suspend the meeting to decide whether there should be such a reference. That representative had also reminded the Committee that every people had the right to self-determination and the right to decide their own future. Those views were still as relevant as they had been the previous November. The Fourth Committee's debate had demonstrated the importance which the General Assembly as a whole attached to the right of Gibraltarians to decide their own future. Resolution 2231 (XXI), and Spain's proposal that it should negotiate a statute with the United Kingdom, had obliged the latter to consult the people of Gibraltar regarding their future. The United Kingdom's decision to hold a referendum was entirely consistent with the General Assembly resolution and a transfer of sovereignty to Spain without the prior agreement of the people would have been a repudiation of it.

134. The representative of Spain had suggested that the people of Gibraltar were a "prefabricated population", but, whatever their origins, they did exist as a separate society and the General Assembly had acknowledged that by insisting that their interests should be properly safeguarded in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain. The Gibraltarians were neither Spaniards nor Englishmen but a people with its own customs, institutions and history. It existed as truly and fully as the population of Singapore, which had developed only after 1819. The Gibraltarians were as entitled to the right of self-determination as other similar groups elsewhere and that had been the view of the General Assembly in adopting resolution 2231 (XXI).

135. An important Spanish argument had been that the 5,000 Spanish workers formerly employed in Gibraltar had been denied voting rights in that colony. If that argument were accepted it could be taken to apply to other migratory workers employed temporarily in countries other than their own. As to the Spanish suggestion that the descendants of the residents of San Roque, expelled from Gibraltar in 1704, should be entitled to vote in the referendum, it was extremely difficult to understand how it could be implemented or justified.

136. Much had been said about Gibraltar's use as a military base, and some rather unfounded allegations had been made, but Gibraltar's contribution to the successful prosecution of the Second World War was noteworthy in that connexion. The allied Powers, later the United Nations, had been very thankful to have Gibraltar as a base for the maintenance of the free system of government which had produced the United Nations.

137. The representative of Spain, and those supporting his views, had claimed that the United Kingdom's retention of Gibraltar was a partial or total disruption of Spanish national unity and territorial integrity and, as such, incompatible with the Charter. Yet, operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) had been intended

to apply, not to historical territorial claims between sovereign Member States but to the disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of Non-Self-Governing Territories. If the Spanish interpretation of that operative paragraph were accepted, it would follow that every historic claim of one sovereign State against another would be a matter to be discussed by the Committee. It would mean that nearly every European country could lay claim to some part of another European country's territory on historic grounds. The dangers of such a doctrine were obvious.

138. Operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1514 (XV), concerning the right of all peoples to selfdetermination, was more directly related to the question before the Committee. By holding a referendum, the United Kingdom would be allowing the Gibraltarians to exercise that right. It had been argued that the absence of any specific reference to self-determination for the Gibraltarians in the relevant General Assembly resolutions implied that the Assembly had concurred with the Spanish contention that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable to the Gibraltar situation. The Assembly had, however, recognized that the United Kingdom was the colonial Power vis-àvis the people of Gibraltar and not vis-à-vis the people of Spain. Moreover, as a colonial Power the United Kingdom had responsibilities under Chapter XI of the Charter towards the people of Gibraltar which, while they might not be specified in every resolution, were nevertheless continuing responsibilities.

139. His delegation had welcomed the United Kingdom's arrangements for the presence of impartial Commonwealth representatives during the referendum and hoped that the Secretary-General would comply with the request that a United Nations observer should also be present.

140. His Government's view was that sovereignty over Gibraltar, both de facto and de jure, lay with the United Kingdom, which was therefore the colonial Power and responsible for the future of the people of the Territory. As the colonial Power, the United Kingdom was seeking to ascertain the wishes of the people by means of a referendum, while simultaneously seeking to ensure that its bilateral treaty obligations to Spain were respected. The United Kingdom's actions were quite consistent with the letter and spirit of resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2231 (XXI) and the referendum was a step forward in the process of decolonization. For those reasons, his delegation urged the Committee to await the results of the referendum before taking further action.

141. The representative of Tunisia said that the problem of Gibraltar, while undeniably colonial in nature, was exceptional in that two administering Powers were involved in the dispute. The United Kingdom had long recognized the Special Committee's competence to attempt to find an appropriate solution.

142. There were two essential provisions in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI); first, the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory must be taken into account in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain and, secondly, the United Kingdom must expedite the process of decolonization in consultation with the Government of Spain. The fact that Spain was named as the partner of the administering Power was of particular importance and went beyond the mere fact that Spain had a common frontier with

the Territory. It was not for the Special Committee to prove that Gibraltar belonged to Spain; the statements by the representative of Spain and the documents provided by that Government had given sufficient proof of that. The Committee was all too familiar with colonial claims to territories conquered by force and with the various political and legal arguments advanced in attempts to justify them.

143. While his delegation did not wish to level any accusations, the question arose as to why the negotiations indicated in resolution 2231 (XXI) had not been concluded. It was significant that Spain's adoption of a decree establishing a prohibited air zone in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar was in absolute conformity with its right of sovereignty. His delegation could not consider that decree as having jeopardized the success of the negotiations which were to have begun on 18 April 1967. The International Civil Aviation Organization had taken note of the matter but had taken no measures which could be construed as censure of Spain. The decree had, however, led to the disruption of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom and the latter had subsequently decided to hold a referendum in Gibraltar. That decision had particularly surprised his delegation since, when the United Nations had requested the United Kingdom to hold referendums on other occasions, it had refused to do so, alleging that the peoples of the Territories for which it was responsible had already determined their wishes through elected representatives. Furthermore, whereas the United Kingdom had requested the United Nations to send an observer to Gibraltar for the referendum, whenever the Special Committee had urgently requested the United Kingdom to allow visiting missions to go to Territories under its control, it had always met with a categorical refusal. His delegation did not believe that the referendum could provide a solution. It was apparently intended to enable United Kingdom citizens in Gibraltar to determine their future status and, consequently, could not be considered as fulfilling the requirements of resolution 1514 (XV). The referendum could in no way prejudge the final solution of the problem and the Committee could not take it upon itself to recognize it.

- 144. There were certain prerequisites for any solution to the problem of Gibraltar. First, such a solution must respect resolution 1514 (XV), particularly operative paragraph 6 of it; secondly, it must respect resolution 2231 (XXI) and especially the provision that Spain and the United Kingdom should continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory. Spain's assurances that those interests would be safeguarded were satisfactory and the process of decolonization should not be further delayed. The existence of a colonial enclave in an independent country was anachronistic and even dangerous, particularly when it was used for military purposes.
- 145. The representative of Spain observed that, whereas the Australian representative had stated that the question of Gibraltar was a dispute over sovereignty, the United Kingdom itself had conceded that the Special Committee was competent to examine the problem—a colonial problem with Spain as the sole victim.
- 146. As to the question of the interests of the people of Gibraltar which had arisen during the Fourth Committee's debate the previous year, he himself had pointed out at the time that it had been Spain which had first undertaken to safeguard those interests. It

was to those "interests" that resolution 2231 (XXI) had referred.

147. Although the Australian representative had raised the question of whether the Spanish population of Gibraltar should participate in the referendum, it appeared that he had not read the Spanish statement in that connexion with any care. As that statement pointed out, from the time when the Spanish population had moved to San Roque on its expulsion from Gibraltar and had later begun to work in Gibraltar, it had never been allowed to spend the night in the Territory. The Australian representative could readily imagine what would have happened had his own ancestors been forbidden to spend the night in Australia. The Spanish population lived outside Gibraltar and was forced to leave the city at night—a situation which had lasted for 260 years.

148. As to the references to the use of Gibraltar as a military base during the Second World War, the Australian representative must concede that nobody could know what would have happened had Spain decided to neutralize Gibraltar and prevent the establishment of a military base in the Territory. That base had been built, not in Gibraltar but on the isthmus which was under Spanish sovereignty. If the Australian representative was so anxious to defend the population of Gibraltar, his Government might well ask the United Kingdom to dismantle the military base there. It would then remain to be seen how the civilian workers at the military base could continue to exist.

149. The representative of the United Kingdom, introducing his delegation's draft resolution (A/ AC.109/L.423), said that he had no wish to be provocative or dogmatic. He was seeking an agreed way forward. He understood the concern of the members of the Committee but wished to make it clear that he was not asking them to reach a conclusion nor even to approve the proposals explained by his delegation. His immediate objective was a simple and limited one namely, that no decision should be taken until the voice of the people of Gibraltar had been heard. Indeed, it would be contrary to the most elementary principles of justice and to the fundamental principles of the Charter to deny the people concerned the right to speak in their own cause. He could not conceive that any United Nations body could take a decision that conflicted with that principle. The Special Committee, more than any other, had the duty to take account of the wishes of the peoples it was concerned with and not deliberately to refuse them an opportunity to be heard.

- 150. The issue was not a legal one and the United Kingdom Government had offered to submit any legal issues to judicial decision. There was no question of any action which would contravene the Treaty of Utrecht; nor was there any question of power politics or ideologies. He simply asked the Committee not to prejudge the question until the views of the people had been fairly given and heard.
- 151. He invited the Committee to reflect on the attitude adopted by the two Governments directly concerned. He felt that in the speeches made so far justice had not always been done to the policies pursued by the United Kingdom. There had been no welcome in the Committee for the United Kingdom's willingness to submit the legal questions to international judicial decision and to abide by the result. The United King-

dom Government had even declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with the Spanish Government with a view to Gibraltar's becoming a part of Spain, should the people of Gibraltar vote in favour of that solution. That new and very important commitment did not seem to have been accorded the recognition it deserved. The United Kingdom Government had gone even further in stating—and that was surely an act without precedent—that if the people of Gibraltar opted by a free and democratic vote to retain their links with the United Kingdom, they would be free at any time to change their minds and vote for joining Spain. However, he had not heard in the Committee any acknowledgement of the importance of that new pledge.

- 152. As to the referendum, the United Kingdom had invited the Spanish Government to participate in the formulation of the first alternative, to explain its own proposals direct to the people of Gibraltar and to send an observer—not the acts of a Government antagonistic to Spain. Unfortunately, the Spanish Government had not responded in kind.
- 153. There were close and long-standing ties between the British people and the people of Gibraltar, and public opinion in Britain on the question of Gibraltar was intense. However, the problem was not being approached in a spirit of narrow nationalism, and all political parties in Britain were agreed that the people of Gibraltar had the right freely to express their views and to have those views taken into account. Decolonization could never mean the incorporation of Gibraltar in Spain against the inhabitants' wishes. Their rights were not to be bartered away and a denial of those rights would be intolerable. The British people were no more prepared to see the Gibraltarians' liberties spurned than their own. The British people were determined to defend the liberties of the people of Gibraltar, including their liberty to choose the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain. The first necessity was that the people should be heard. When the choice had been made and the facts were thus before the United Nations, then whatever the result of the referendum there would be a wide range of matters for negotiation between Spain and the United Kingdom.
- 154. It had been said that the United Kingdom Government had not favoured the system of referendum elsewhere. That was quite true. In keeping with its parliamentary tradition, the United Kingdom preferred the method of adult suffrage, free elections and negotiation with the leaders so elected. That was good enough for the British people themselves, although others might find democratic parliamentary procedures strange. However, the case of Gibraltar was unique, and the wish of the people must be openly and freely expressed in the clear light of world publicity. The United Kingdom would have liked Spain and the United Nations to send observers; however, failing that, the presence of observers from Commonwealth countries would provide the necessary guarantees of the fair and proper conduct of the referendum to be held on 10 September,
- 155. While the United Kingdom Government had been very ready to report, to explain and to co-operate with the Committee and with the Spanish Government, it could not share or shirk its responsibility as the administering Power, and surely no one could dispute the United Kingdom's right to consult the

people of a territory under its administration on a matter of fundamental importance to their future.

156. The attitude of the Spanish Government, on the other hand, had been strangely and misguidedly negative. It had neither welcomed the offers of the United Kingdom Government nor taken the opportunity to put its case to the people of Gibraltar. Nor had Spain sought by generosity and understanding to win over the Gibraltarians. Instead it had deliberately sought to alienate them and to antagonize the United Kingdom. It seemed determined not to allow negotiation except under duress. Surprisingly enough, its policy seemed to be designed to alienate the sympathies of the people of Gibraltar. It was unfortunate that the Spanish Government should attempt to achieve its aims by such methods and pressure and coercion, which were out of place in the modern world, and especially unpopular at the United Nations.

157. In conclusion, he invited the Special Committee to remember the resolutions which nearly all had supported; not to deny the importance of the people's interests; and to reserve judgement until the voice of the people had been heard. Only after the administering Power had made its full report would the Committee be in a position to deliver a considered opinion, A vote for the resolution presented by the United Kingdom would not be a vote for Spain or the United Kingdom or even for the referendum, for which his Government took full responsibility. It would be a vote for reserving judgement until the missing factor was available-namely, the voice of the people concerned. It would be astonishing if the fundamental right of the people to be heard before a decision was taken were to be denied at the United Nations and by the Special

158. The representative of Spain, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he wished to make clear some particulars of his Government's policy. His Government was in no way opposed to letting the people of Gibraltar express their views. Four years previously, the Committee had heard some petitioners who had been officials of the United Kingdom administration, subject to the authority of the Governor and employed at the military bases which had been established in the Territory after its population had been expelled.

- 159. He was surprised that the United Kingdom representative should again refer to the proposal to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice. The truth was that the United Kingdom Government was trying to find loop-holes, for decolonization questions were not matters to be submitted to the International Court of Justice.
- 160. He read out an article, published in the United Kingdom Press on 25 August, which mentioned movements of United Kingdom air force and naval units to Gibraltar; the presence of those troops at the time of the referendum gave reason to wonder whether the people would be able to express their wishes freely.
- 161. He also read out a cable he had received from his Government stating that it had denied a Norwegian military aircraft permission to fly over Spain on its way to Gibraltar, where it was to have participated in NATO military manoeuvres on 9 September. His Government had declared that it did not allow overflights of its territory by NATO aircraft because Spain was not a member of NATO, which wished to make

use of military bases, such as Gibraltar, situated in usurped Spanish territory.

162. With regard to the referendum, he wondered what discretionary power the Governor had to manipulate the electoral rolls. In the first place, enrolment was subject to a cut-off on the date of birth, which had been set at 30 June 1925; in the second place, the Governor could decide to remove from the rolls the name of any person who had been disloyal to the Crown. Perhaps the United Kingdom had similar laws, but the United Kingdom was not the colony of anyone, whereas Gibraltar was a colonial Territory.

163. It was surprising to find that during the Second World War those loyal subjects of the British Crown had had to be completely evacuated from Gibraltar, while 13,000 Spanish workers had continued to go there to work and help the British. Apparently the United Kingdom Government had not considered it safe to allow those subjects to remain at their post when the Territory of Gibraltar was under attack. The use of the Territory for military purposes had resulted in the bombing of its railways, and there had been many victims.

164. The representative of Mali noted that the negotiations which had been held between the administering Power and Spain in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) had not yielded the expected results. His delegation regretted that the Special Committee had decided to apply the method of consensus in settling the Gibraltar problem; that was tantamount to referring the question back to the Powers concerned, which were, by definition, opposed to each other. By resorting to that method, the Committee, which should take jurisdiction in all decolonization questions—and the level of development of the Powers concerned did not change in any way the colonial nature of the case—seemed to be trying to relinquish its responsibilities under resolution 1514 (XV).

165. As to the referendum which the United Kingdom was proposing to hold in Gibraltar, his delegation doubted the usefulness of such a consultation, the results of which were quite predictable. The Special Committee should ask the administering Power to refrain at present from any new initiative which was not covered by resolution 2231 (XXI). If the parties could not reach agreement, consideration should be given to finding means by which the United Nations could facilitate the search for a negotiated solution.

166. He was surprised that the administering Power should have expressed willingness to invite United Nations observers to be present at the consultation of 10 September in Gibraltar, whereas the United Kingdom had recently rejected the dispatch of United Nations observers to another Territory under its administration. There was a blatant contradiction in the attitude of the United Kingdom Government; respect for the will of the people, which was being flaunted in Gibraltar, was scarcely consistent with the policy pursued in Southern Rhodesia, where the people of Zimbabwe had never had the opportunity freely to express their views on their future and where the democratic rights of the indigenous inhabitants were systematically trampled on. In reality, the United Kingdom was trying to maintain its domination over Gibraltar, which might be of negligible importance in the perspective of global thermo-nuclear strategy but which constituted an esential link in a chain of military bases directed against young developing nations.

167. The draft resolution sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay was, in his delegation's view, a minimum text. The unilateral breaking off of the negotiations recommended in resolution 2231 (XXI) was a fait accompli which the Committee could not accept. In any event, he attached particular importance to operative paragraph 2 of the proposed text, which he read out, and to operative paragraph 4. He believed, as did the sponsors of the draft resolution, that some United Nations machinery should be set up to facilitate the success of further negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom.

168. The representative of Syria supported the draft resolution sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay. The decolonization process in Gibraltar was at a standstill because the administering Power had failed to respect the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolution 2231 (XXI), which had been adopted without opposition. The United Kingdom would do better to comply with those resolutions instead of resorting to stratagems; it was in that spirit that the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom representative (A/AC.109/L.423) should be considered.

169. His delegation condemned the referendum which the United Kingdom was preparing to hold in Gibraltar. It did not, of course, oppose the idea of consulting the people; however, the proposed referendum was merely a trick designed to evade the real question, that of sovereignty.

170. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stressed the military aspect of the question of Gibraltar. The base and the military installations in the Territory were important parts of the strategic apparatus of the United Kingdom and its NATO allies. Moreover, the military aspects of the problem had been the central point of the discussions held between the United Kingdom and Spain, as was clear from the Secretary-General's report (see annex I below). No solution that served the interests of the peoples involved-either the inhabitants of the Territory or the peoples of the United Kingdom and Spain -could be reached so long as the Territory remained a military stronghold of imperialism, and the bastion for the suppression of the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Near East, Asia and Africa.

171. The question of eliminating the Gibraltar military base had never been raised by the parties during their negotiations concerning the future of the Territory. On 18 May 1966 Spain had expressed readiness to accept the presence at Gibraltar of the United Kingdom base, the status of which would be the subject of a special agreement, and to participate "enthusiastically" in the use of the base, in co-operation with the United Kingdom or with "the defence organization of the free world". That position of the Spanish Government obviously bore no relation to the interests of the Spanish people and the other peoples of the Mediderranean region, whose security would be seriously threatened by the presence of stockpiles of NATO rockets and atomic bombs in the Territory. The nuclear weapons which the NATO countries were preparing to install in the region would be used to support various forms of provocation and aggression against the peoples of Africa and the Middle East and the other peoples

as well. The fact that Gibraltar was torn away from Spain and converted into a British colony and then into a military base, which had been for centuries used for carrying out the colonial policy of the British ruling classes, did not raise any doubts in the Committee. But the deal which the Franco régime was proposing to make with the United Kingdom on the question of Gibraltar did not remove the possibilities of using the Gibraltar base for continuation of the same colonialist and imperialist policy, only now in interest of "the defence organization of free world" The representative of the United Kingdom claimed that the forthcoming referendum in Gibraltar was aimed at enabling the people of the Territory to exercise its right to self-determination. However, that statement was nothing else but manoeuvre. If the British Government cared so much about the self-determination of the people of Gibraltar, why did it withhold that right from the people of Zimbabwe? Moreover, there were no doubts about the validity of a referendum held under conditions of military occupation; the result of the proposed referendum would certainly be what the colonial Power wanted. The real purpose of the referendum was to maintain colonial rule over the Territory in one form or another, a fact which the United Kingdom representative did not trouble to conceal, and thus to preserve its military base in Gibraltar. The problem of decolonizing Gibraltar could not be separated from that of dismantling the military base and demilitarizing the area. Any effective measure to end the colonial status of the Territory implied first of all the liquidation of the base and the air and naval military installations now situated there.

172. The representative of Spain, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, pointed out that the Spanish Government's statements and proposals mentioned by the representative of the Soviet Union were no longer valid. The proposals of 18 May 1966, referred to by the Soviet representative, had been superseded by other proposals which he himself had formulated on 14 December 1966 in the Fourth Committee, at its 1671th meeting.

173. The new Spanish proposals made no mention of any joint use of the Gibraltar base by Spain and the United Kingdom. Indeed the Spanish Government had rejected the United Kingdom proposal of 12 July 1966 concerning joint use of the base. Similarly, on 17 June, as was indicated in the Secretary-General's report, the Spanish Government had formally invited the United Kingdom Government to renounce all military use of the airfield situated on the isthmus connecting Gibraltar with the rest of the peninsula.

174. Spain had asked the United Kingdom Government to draw a clear distinction between its military interests and the interests of the people of the Territory. Spain hoped that sovereignty over Gibraltar would be returned to it, but it understood the concern of the United Kingdom Government, which wanted to be able to use the military base during the transition period that would precede the restoration of Spanish sovereignty over the Territory. For its part, Spain held that it had complete freedom to make whatever proposals it deemed appropriate, so long as the United Nations had not adopted any resolution on the subject. He wished to assure the Soviet representative, however, that the granting of a military base to the United Kingdom had not been envisaged in the Spanish proposals of 14 December. Lastly, he stated that Spain would be prepared to support any proposal that might be submitted by the Soviet or any other delegation for the dismantling of the Gibraltar military base.

175. The representative of the United Kingdom, exercising the right of reply, said he wished to deal with the four points raised during the meeting. Naval manoeuvres took place constantly in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, as everyone knew; they included operations not only by United Kingdom vessels but also by NATO vessels and by vessels of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There was nothing exceptional about those activities, and the fact that a change of mine-sweeping personnel, arranged long before, was to take place at about the same time as the referendum was quite unconnected with the matter under discussion.

176. As to the question of the register for the referendum, the United Kingdom believed that the genuine inhabitants of Gibraltar, as distinct from those who were not permanent residents, should have the right to vote and so to express their views. The voting regulations were designed to bring this about. If there was any doubt about the fairness of the referendum, the Spanish Government and the United Nations were invited to send observers. In any case, the presence of Commonwealth observers should constitute a sufficient guarantee.

177. With respect to permission for Spanish workers to stay and spend the night in Gibraltar, there were certain restrictions regarding outside residents, as the restricted size and limited accommodation of Gibraltar required, but the necessary permission to enable Spanish workers to live and sleep in Gibraltar had been readily given for years. The number of such applications granted, which had for some time been about 1,500 a year, had begun to decrease only when the Spanish Government had created difficulties and imposed restrictions.

178. Lastly, in reply to the Malian representative, he said that the United Kingdom, far from clinging to its Territories in Gibraltar or elsewhere, had for twenty years made a greater contribution to ending colonialism than any other country; indeed 99 per cent of the inhabitants of the former British colonial empire now lived in independent countries.

179. The United Kingdom had always upheld the principle of consultation and consent, and it therefore believed that the inhabitants of Gibraltar should not be denied the right to express their views freely and to have those views taken into account.

180. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics took note of the Spanish representative's statement that the Spanish Government had withdrawn its proposal of 18 May 1966.

181. In his view, the demilitarization of Gibraltar depended not on Spain but on the United Kingdom, and so long as it had not been effected, the will of the people could not be freely manifested; a people in chains could not express its will.

182. The representative of Spain, returning to the question of permission for non-residents to stay overnight in Gibraltar, pointed out that permission was given only to domestic servants and to nuns working in hospitals and not to Spanish workers. Since the Immigration and Alien Ordinance had been passed in 1845, Spanish workers had been unable to reside per-

manently or stay in Gibraltar which, but for that fact, would have a typically Spanish population like the rest of the area.

- 183. The representative of Mali said that, while entirely agreeing with the United Kingdom representative's arguments concerning decolonization and the right of self-determination, he wished to state his delegation's position on certain points.
- 184. In the first place, while the United Kingdom might justifiably pride itself on having contributed to the liberation and decolonization of a large percentage of the peoples of States Members of the United Nations, the fact remained that, in doing so, it had merely given those people their due and rectified a state of affairs that was incompatible with the normal course of history.
- 185. Decolonization was an ineluctable process, in keeping with a new situation in which world problems and power relationships had to be viewed in the light of changed conditions. There were two possible attitudes: to withstand the tide of history, as some countries, like South Africa and Rhodesia, were still doing, or to go along with history, as many others had done.
- 186. His delegation had not accused the United Kingdom of seeking to cling to its colonial positions. As the result of the question raised by the representative of Uruguay, his delegation had simply been led to consider certain historical factors and to reflect on the strategic importance of the Mediterranean—known as Mare Nostrum at the time of the Romans—which had served as a justification for many conquests and military occupations. That consideration had prompted it to say that Gibraltar and the Suez Canal were the two keys to the control of the Mediterranean. His delegation had therefore been very disturbed to hear that British naval vessels were being fitted out there a few days before the outbreak of hostilities.
- 187. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he greatly appreciated the spirit in which the representative of Mali had spoken, but pointed out that it was not correct to say that the main concern of the United Kingdom was to maintain its position in Gibraltar. If the International Court of Justice found the United Kingdom's claim to be legally unsound, the United Kingdom would accept its judgement.
- 188. Furthermore, if the inhabitants of the Territory wished to be associated with Spain, immediate action would be taken to give effect to their wish.
- 189. The United Kingdom Government felt an absolute obligation to the people with whom it was associated. It believed that it had an obligation to consult them and to take their wishes into account. The circumstances of Gibraltar were certainly unique. But neither the Special Committee nor any other United Nations committee or council could ever say that the inhabitants of any territory, whatever the circumstances, had not the right to be heard before decisions were taken concerning them.
- 190. The representative of Iraq, introducing a revised text (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1) of the draft resolution submitted by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay, with the addition of Syria as a fourth co-sponsor (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1/Add.1), said that the sponsors had taken the suggestions of certain delegations into account and believed that the new text would be generally accept-

- able, since it contained no condemnation and asked for nothing that had not already been approved by the overwhelming majority of Member States. They trusted that the Spanish delegation would be able to accept the text and felt that it was now for the United Kingdom to show goodwill.
- 191. The draft resolution aimed only at the implementation of the existing resolutions and should therefore be readily accepted by the administering Power and unanimously adopted by the Committee.
- 192. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he opposed in the strongest terms the wholly partisan draft resolution set out in document A/ AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1. In purporting to deal with territorial claims, it exceeded and offended the mandate of the Special Committee. With regard to the referendum, it contravened the General Assembly resolution which required that the interests of the people should be taken into account. The revised draft reinforced his argument that no final decisions should be taken at the present time. It would be a grave departure from United Nations traditions and the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter, and from the principles of elementary justice, to deny a hearing to the people principally concerned. Their liberties should not be denied or betrayed but respected and protected. He accordingly urged that judgement should be reserved and impartiality maintained until the people of Gibraltar had been able freely to express their own
- 193. The representative of Afghanistan said that the interest of the inhabitants of Gibraltar demanded that the Special Committee should base its decision on resolution 2231 (XXI), in which the General Assembly had taken the view that under the prevailing circumstances the continuation of negotiations between the administering Power and Spain was the most effective means of achieving a workable solution to the problem of Gibraltar. No matter how great the difficulties, the Government of Spain and the Government of the United Kingdom should try to resume their negotiations in order to expedite the decolonization of the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Gibraltar. Since the revised version of the draft resolution (A/ AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) reflected more accurately the aims and purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), it had his delegation's general approval.
- 194. Nevertheless, he believed that the sponsors might be well advised to alter operative paragraph 2 to read: "Declares that the convening by the administering Power of the proposed referendum has not been envisaged by resolution 2231 (XXI)". In that way the paragraph would make a statement of fact instead of taking a negative approach to the holding of a referendum. A referendum held in conditions of justice and equity was the most effective means of ascertaining the will of the people living under colonial domination. In a United Nations text the use of the concept of referendum as it was at present intended in operative paragraph 2 of the four-Power draft resolution should be avoided. The General Assembly had asked for negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom. It was difficult to anticipate the results of those negotiations. If the holding of a referendum was the outcome, reached with the agreement of the Government of Spain, the decision should be respected.

195. For those various reasons he would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution but would abstain on operative paragraph 2 if it was put to the vote separately. He would abstain on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423) submitted by the United Kingdom.

196. The representative of Syria believed that the criticisms levelled against the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1), of which his delegation was a sponsor, had no justification. First, by conceding that the question of Gibraltar was a colonial question, the United Kingdom itself recognized that it came within the competence of the Special Committee. Thus, the Special Committee could not be reproached for dealing with the question. Secondly, operative paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution provided expressly for safeguarding the interests of the inhabitants. Thirdly, as the representative of Afghanistan had implied, the holding of a referendum was a unilateral step outside the process of negotiations stipulated so clearly in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

197. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the two main issues raised during the Special Committee's discussions on the question of Gibraltar had related, first, to General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), operative paragraph 2, and, secondly, to paragraph 6 of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

198. His delegation had sponsored the amendment which had led to the inclusion in resolution 2231 (XXI), paragraph 2, of the words "taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory" because it believed that the question of Gibraltar could not be simply a matter for negotiation between the United Kingdom and Spain. The interests of the people of any Territory could certainly be ascertained by consultation in the form of a referendum; in the case of Gibraltar, the question was whether the administering Power should have consulted Spain first. It had been stated that Spain had been invited to participate in the referendum and had rejected the opportunity to do so. Thus, the issue appeared to be one of interpretation by the two Powers involved. In any event, his delegation could not support the wording used in paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1).

199. With regard to paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, his delegation considered that that provision, like General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) as a whole, was directed specifically at Non-Self-Governing Territories; consequently, Spain's claim of disruption of its territorial integrity was not relevant and could not be discussed by the Committee, which was competent to discuss only colonial questions. If Gibraltar was a colonial Territory, the Committee was competent to discuss it, but it must treat it entirely as a colonial question. He could not, therefore, support the fifth preambular paragraph of the joint draft resolution.

200. His delegation could support the other paragraphs of that draft resolution; it naturally regretted that interruption of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain and hoped that those two Powers would resume negotiations in order to determine how to solve the problem. However, it could not support

the draft resolution as a whole and would abstain from voting on it.

201. His delegation also had difficulties with regard to the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423). While it could not reject the idea of a referendum, it questioned the way in which the referendum was to be carried out. However, it felt that the Committee was not yet in a position to pronounce itself on the Territory. Since the referendum was to be held on 10 September and the Committee envisaged closing its session by 15 September, it was unlikely that the full report envisaged would be available before the end of the current session. Consequently, he could not support that draft resolution and would abstain from voting on it.

202. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, while his delegation supported the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) in principle, it had certain reservations, particularly with regard to the fifth preambular paragraph. Its interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Declaration differed substantially from that given by the sponsors of the draft resolution, so far as its applicability to Gibraltar was concerned. In his delegation's view, paragraph 6 was applicable only to colonial Territories, and to link it with the question of the sovereignty of independent States would be bound to have far-reaching consequences. While his delegation had hoped that operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution could be improved, it would not press its objections and would support the draft resolution as a whole, subject to its reservations on the fifth preambular paragraph.

203. His delegation could not agree with the purpose of the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423), since it involved tactics far removed from the co-operation for which the Committee had repeatedly called. Moreover, the Committee had already described the proposed referendum as "untimely". His delegation would prefer to abide by the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

204. The representative of Australia said that there were three points in the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) which his delegation could not accept. First, since his delegation understood paragraph 6 of the Declaration to apply solely to the disruption of dependent Territories, it could hardly be taken to apply to Gibraltar, and the fifth preambular paragraph was therefore out of place in a resolution on that Territory. Secondly, with regard to operative paragraph 2, his delegation could not agree that the holding of the referendum would contradict the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI); it seemed a very sound idea to hold a referendum in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of Gibraltar at the present stage. Finally, his delegation felt that the words "safeguarding the interests of the population", which represented the essence of the matter, were not given sufficient emphasis in operative paragraph 3.

205. His delegation could not, therefore, support the joint draft resolution and would vote against it. In the belief that the referendum was one stage, and a necessary stage, in the process of decolonization, it would vote for the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423).

206. The representative of Mali said that his delegation would have to vote against the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423), the purpose

of which was simply to take the question of Gibraltar out of the Special Committee's hands. It was no accident that the draft resolution made no reference to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the charter of decolonization; that omission was evidence of the United Kingdom's desire to divest the problem of its colonial nature. Moreover, the United Kingdom text contained nothing positive which would promote a solution. To express regret that no progress had so far been made would be tantamount to an admission of failure, since it would emphasize that the negotiations recommended in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had not resulted in an agreement. Nor was it proper for the Committee to "note" the declared intention of the administering Power to consult the people, since many members of the Committee had criticized that intention; it would be more appropriate for the Committee to express its disapproval of the administering Power's intention. While the Committee did not oppose consultations-quite the reverse-everything depended on how they were carried out. With regard to the seventh preambular paragraph, it was precisely because the Committee had heard the views expressed concerning the referendum and other questions relating to Gibraltar that it must call on the administering Power to continue its negotiations, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), and not to embark on a course of action which the Committee could not fully endorse. The last preambular paragraph—the key paragraph of the draft resolution—was particularly dangerous, since it implied that General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had called for a report on the referendum, whereas in fact it had not even mentioned the possibility of a referendum. With regard to the operative paragraph, he agreed with the representative of Sierra Leone; it was no accident that the referendum was to be held just before the opening of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, to which the Special Committee must report. The Committee should take much more positive action than was recommended by the United Kingdom.

207. In his delegation's view, the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) represented the bare minimum that was acceptable, particularly since it overlooked the Committee's responsibility to urge the administering Power to refrain from any action which was not endorsed by the Committee. Nevertheless, his delegation would vote in favour of it.

208. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1), since it provided for negotiations between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population thereafter. It would vote against the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423) because the holding of the referendum would result in the perpetuation of United Kingdom domination in Gibraltar and the maintenance of its military base there.

209. The representative of Bulgaria thanked the sponsors of the joint draft resolution for their efforts to take into account the views of other members. His delegation would support that draft resolution, although it believed that no correct solution to the problem of Gibraltar could be found until the military bases in the Territory were dismantled.

210. With regard to the United Kingdom draft resolution, his delegation had always defended the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and insisted that an administering Power, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), should enable the people of a dependent Territory to exercise that right freely. However, a referendum organized and conducted under military occupation could have only one result, namely, the perpetuation of the colonial situation in one form or another and the continued presence of military bases in the Territory.

211. At the 500th meeting, the draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/L.423) was rejected by 10 votes to 3, with 11 abstentions. The revised draft resolution co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq, Syria and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2 with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Ethiopia, Finland, India, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, United States of America.

212. The representative of Italy, speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation's position on the question of Gibraltar, which had been made clear by its support of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), was that the best way to solve the dispute was through negotiations between the administering Power and Spain, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory. The fact that he had voted in favour of the joint draft resolution should not be taken as an unqualified endorsement of a certain interpretation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which, although worthy of further consideration, was not universally accepted either in the Special Committee or in the General Assembly. Rather, his delegation would emphasize the last preambular paragraph of resolution 2231 (XXI), regretting the occurrence of certain acts which had prejudiced the smooth progress of the negotiations. His delegation would have preferred a different formulation for operative paragraph 2 of the resolution which the Committee had adopted, in order to avoid creating obstacles to a resumption of the negotiations between the two Governments. He sincerely hoped that the decolonization of Gibraltar would not be a source of contention and controversy, but would help to promote harmony among all the countries in that region.

213. The representative of Tunisia said that his delegation was opposed, not to the holding of a referendum as a means of determining the views of the population, but rather to the manner in which it was being organized by the administering Power. General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had called for negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory, and had made no mention of a referendum. His delegation had therefore been unable to support the United Kingdom draft resolution. He hoped that the Special Committee would not recognize the results of the forthcoming referendum as valid and that a solution acceptable to all would be found.

214. The representative of Spain said that his Government fully accepted the results of the vote in the Special Committee. It hoped, in a spirt of co-operation

and friendship, to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom Government immediately with a view to the decolonization of Gibraltar.

215. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/266) adopted by the Special Committee at its 500th meeting on 1 September 1967 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined the question of Gibraltar,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965, and the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964⁷ by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Considering that any colonial situation which partially or totally disrupts the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and specifically with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

- "1. Regrets the interruption of the negotiations which were recommended in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI);
- "2. Declares that the holding by the administering Power of the envisaged referendum would contradict the provisions of resolution 2231 (XXI);
- "3. Invites the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain to resume without delay the negotiations provided for in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population upon the termination of that colonial situation;
- "4. Requests the Secretary-General to assist the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain in the implementation of the present resolution, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session."
- 216. By identical letters dated 1 September 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of this resolution to the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Spain, for the attention of their respective Governments.
- 217. The text of a communication dated 6 September 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, in reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 1 September 1967, is reproduced as annex II.
- 218. Subsequently, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed letters to the Secretary-General, dated 25 October and 30 October respectively, which are reproduced as annexes III and IV to the present chapter.

ANNEX I*

Question of Gibraltar

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

- 1. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 on the question of Gibraltar. The resolution reads as follows:
- [For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]
- 2. In identical letters dated 19 January 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain to the United Nations. The text of the letters reads as follows:
 - "I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of your Government, the text of resolution 2231 (XXI) concerning Gibraltar, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting on 20 December 1966.
 - "In this connexion I wish to note that operative paragraph 2 of this resolution is addressed to your Government and to that of [Spain/United Kingdom]. I wish also to note that the General Assembly has requested me to assist in the implementation of the resolution. In expressing the hope that the present negotiations between the parties concerned will prove to be successful, I stand ready to offer assistance, as requested by the General Assembly, in the implementation of the resolution."
- 3. In a letter dated 30 January 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 19 January 1967:
 - "I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 January 1967, in which you transmit for the attention of my Government the text of resolution 2231 (XXI) concerning Gibraltar, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting on 20 December 1966.
 - "The Spanish Government asks me to convey to you its appreciation for the help you are willing to give for the better fulfilment of resolution 2231 (XXI). My Government, for its part, is also willing sincerely to fulfil the recommendations in that resolution.
 - "In this connexion, it wishes to inform you of the following:
 - "1. On 14 December 1966, Spain—which had rejected the proposal that the question of Gibraltar should be submitted to the International Court of Justice, considering it to be contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2070 (XX)—proposed to the United Kingdom:
- "(a) That the two countries should without delay start negotiations on the 'statute' to protect the interests of the residents of the territory of Gibraltar after the end of the colonial situation in Gibraltar. This 'statute' would be registered with the United Nations.
- "(b) If Spain and the United Kingdom cannot reach agreement on the 'statute', the Spanish Government is willing to submit for the consideration and eventual approval of the Secretary-General of the United Nations a draft 'statute' for the inhabitants of Gibraltar, in which they would be granted all the rights of any human community, except the right to possess a piece of Spanish territory, since that would be contrary to resolution 1514 (XV), which in paragraph 6 advocates respect for the territorial integrity and national unity of colonized countries.
- "(c) In its desire to reach a constructive solution to the problem of Gibraltar, the Spanish Government is willing to negotiate with Her Britannic Majesty's Government a provisional agreed arrangement to safeguard the United Kingdom interests in Gibraltar which the United Kingdom wishes to protect, to the extent that the maintenance of these interests is not contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or

⁷ Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 209.

^{*} Previously reproduced under the symbols A/AC.109/254 and Add.1.

the resolutions which have been or may be adopted by the the General Assembly.

- "(d) As a further guarantee offered by Spain for United Kingdom and Gibraltarian interests, the Spanish Government undertakes to submit to the International Court of Justice any difference which may arise in the interpretation of any treaty or treaties between Spain and the United Kingdom constituting the new 'status' of Gibraltar, after paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) has been applied to it.
- "2. On 17 December 1966, after the text of resolution 2231 (XXI) had been adopted by the Fourth Committee—which already knew the position of my Government regarding the proposal that the question of Gibraltar should be submitted to the International Court of Justice—the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, said that the United Kingdom was ready 'to continue the negotiations'.

"The Spanish Government is therefore awaiting the reply of the United Kingdom to the latest proposal made to it on 14 December. As you will see, the Spanish proposal was in line with operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI), which called upon the two parties 'to continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory'.

"3. In operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI), the General Assembly asked the United Kingdom 'to expedite, without any hindrance and in consultation with the Government of Spain, the decolonization of Gibraltar'.

"In his statement before the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 11 November (document A/AC.109/SR.475), the representative of Spain had told the Committee how, after the start of the negotiations recommended by resolution 2070 (XX), on 12 July 1966 the United Kingdom had proclaimed its sovereignty over Spanish territory adjacent to Gibraltar, where it had illegally constructed an airfield that it was using for military purposes, with consequent violations of Spanish air space, against which the representative of Spain protested.

"The Spanish Government considers that the gesture made by the United Kingdom on 12 July 1966 constitutes aggression against Spanish sovereignty and is therefore a serious obstacle placed by the United Kingdom in the way of the negotiations on Gibraltar.

"Consequently, it regrets to inform you that, after the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI) by the General Assembly, on 5 January the United Kingdom sent the Spanish Government a note verbale, a copy of which is enclosed. As you will see, the United Kingdom rejects the just observations made by my Government in a note of 30 November 1966, which is also enclosed, and reveals its determination to continue using for military purposes an illegal airfield situated in Spanish territory adjacent to Gibraltar. For your information, I enclose a list of United Kingdom military aircraft which have used this airfield since 12 July 1966 and diagrams of the five latest violations of Spanish air space committed by the above-mentioned United Kingdom military aircraft.

"The Spanish Government, which replied to the United Kingdom Government in a note of 16 January 1967, also enclosed, requests me to draw your attention to the persistence with which the United Kingdom, by its attitude threatening Spanish sovereignty, is putting deliberate obstacles in the way of the negotiations on Gibraltar."

- 4. In a letter dated 23 February 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a photocopy of note No. 60 of 17 February from the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid addressed to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject of violations of Spanish air space. In the same letter, the Permanent Representative of Spain also transmitted a photocopy of note verbale No. 47 of 20 February from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid, protesting a violation of Spanish air space.
- 5. In another letter, dated 27 February 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted

- to the Secretary-General a photocopy of *note verbale* No. 49 of 24 February 1967, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain addressed to the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid, concerning violations by British military aircraft of Spanish air space.
- 6. In a note verbale dated 4 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of a note dated 16 March 1967, from the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid addressed to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to two notes of the Spanish Minister dealing with alleged violations of Spanish air space by British military aircraft.
- 7. In a letter dated 18 April 1967 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations stated as follows:

"Spain understands the need for decolonization, since my country was the first to experience a colonial phenomenon on its own soil. However, it cannot conceive of a different yardstick being used so that, while the Spanish Government is accelerating the political development of its African territories, the delays being placed in the way of the decolonization of Gibraltar are impassively allowed and accepted.

"In this connexion, I would remind you of my letter dated 30 January 1967, in which my Government, mindful of operative paragraph 3 of resolution 2231 (XXI), requested your assistance in overcoming peacefully and constructively the obstacles which the United Kingdom Government is creating during the course of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom, even after the approval of the above-mentioned resolution 2231 (XXI), for the decolonization of Gibraltar in agreement with Spain.

"Since 16 October 1964—the date on which the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples recommended the solution of this problem—my Government had to ask the United Kingdom Government nine times to start negotiations, before it agreed to do so; the offers made by Spain on 19 May 1966 have so far been ignored.

"The United Kingdom Government has still not replied to the latest Spanish proposals of 14 December 1966 and this is paralysing the negotiations. At the same time, this silence has been accompanied, on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by an attempt to remove the case of Gibraltar from the process of decolonization and from the competence of the United Nations General Assembly, by proposing instead that the International Court of Justice should pass judgement on the colonial legal titles on which the United Kingdom is basing its presence on a piece of our territory.

"This attitude towards the repeated decisions of the United Nations is serious but there is another fact to which the Spanish Government must draw your attention. After the start of the negotiations, on 12 July 1966 the United Kingdom proclaimed its sovereignty over an additional piece of Spanish territory, depriving it of its former neutral character and using it for military purposes in such a way that Spanish air space is being continually violated by United Kingdom aircraft. As it has repeated on various occasions, my Government therefore considers this to be not only a United Kingdom policy of opposition to the principle of decolonization but also a form of active colonialism which claims, in the middle of the twentieth century, that a State can seize a territory without so far having any legal title to authorize such an appropriation.

"My Government, which wishes to undertake the process of decolonization with the assistance of the United Nations, also hopes that the Organization will help us to eliminate from our soil a colonial situation which is already ripe to disappear and is threatening the territorial integrity and national unity of Spain."

8. On 21 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General the following communication:

"I have the honour to inform you of the position reached by Her Majesty's Government in seeking to meet the request in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) about Gibraltar, "On 29 March, Her Majesty's Government invited the Spanish Government to talks to be held in mid-April in pursuance of resolution 2231 (XXI). On 3 April, the Spanish Government accepted this invitation and agreed that the talks should start in London on 18 April.

"On 12 April, the Spanish Government published an Order declaring a new prohibited area for aircraft in the vicinity of Gibraltar. This measure appears to be designed to impede access by both civilian and military aircraft to Gibraltar. This is a further example of an act prejudicing the smooth progress of negotiations, the occurrence of which was regretted in resolution 2231 (XXI) and a hindrance to the implementation of that resolution. Her Majesty's Government were not consulted by the Spanish Government or informed of their intention in advance of the publication of the Spanish Order.

"The practical implications of the Spanish Order have yet to be established. But it has clearly introduced a new element into the situation. Her Majesty's Government therefore informed the Spanish Government on 13 April that they had decided to postpone the talks due to be held on 18 April.

"Her Majesty's Government intend to review the question of consultations in accordance with resolution 2231 (XXI) as soon as the implications of the measure announced in the Spanish Order are clear. Her Majesty's Government intend in any case to pursue the objectives recommended in resolution 2231 (XXI), having regard to that and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the obligations of Her Majesty's Government under the United Nations Charter, the interests of the people of Gibraltar, the obligations of Her Majesty's Government under the Treaty of Utrecht and the legitimate interests of Spain."

9. In a letter dated 20 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General of the position of the Spanish Government. The text of the letter reads as follows:

"My Government instructs me to inform you of the following:

"Primo—On 29 March 1967, the United Kingdom Government officially informed the Spanish Government, in the attached memorandum, a that it was willing to resume on 18 April 1967 the negotiations on the decolonization of Gibraltar recommended by resolution 2231 (XXI). These negotiations had been suspended since 14 December 1966, because since that date the United Kingdom has not replied to the Spanish proposal that discussions should start without delay on a statute which would protect the interests of the Gibraltarians, as a prerequisite for the decolonization of the Rock

"The protection of the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar, which Spain has always posed as a condition for ending the colonial situation in Gibraltar, was recommended by the United Nations.

"Secundo—On 3 April 1967, Spain accepted the date of 18 April for the resumption of negotiations with the United Kingdom for the purpose of decolonizing Gibraltar.

"On 12 April, the Spanish Government, in exercise of its sovereign right and for reasons of military necessity and public safety, in accordance with the Chicago Convention of 1944, declared that the air space over the Campo de Gibraltar and its territorial waters were prohibited to air traffic.

"You are already aware of the violations of Spanish air space denounced by my Government, since I informed you of them in my notes No. 14 of 30 January, No. 23 of 23 February and No. 24 of 27 February.

"When the Spanish Government was preparing to send its delegation to resume negotiations with the United Kingdom, the latter—taking as a pretext the above-mentioned Spanish declaration of 12 April and confusing the defence of our sovereignty with the problem of decolonization—

orally informed the Ambassador of Spain in London on 14 April that it had decided to adjourn the negotiations sine die.

"On 17 April, the Permanent Mission of Spain informed you of the Spanish decision to establish the above-mentioned prohibited area.

"Tercio—Spain's affirmation of sovereignty over this area provoked a reaction from the United Kingdom on which my Government will not comment; it believes, however, that the measure taken by Spain in no way justifies the interruption of the negotiations recommended by the United Nations General Assembly.

"Quarto—On behalf of the Spanish Government, I therefore request you to inform the United Kingdom that its suspension of the negotiations has created a serious obstacle to the decolonization of Gibraltar and urge it to resume negotiations without delay.

"My Government trusts that you will realize the importance we attach to this, because we hope thus to implement resolution 2231 (XXI) and at last really set in motion the promised decolonization of Gibraltar."

10. In a letter dated 21 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement concerning the British airfield at Gibraltar and the Order of the Spanish Government establishing a prohibited zone for air navigation in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar.^b

11. In a letter dated 15 May 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom a copy of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Spain dated 18 April 1967 and invited the views of the United Kingdom Government regarding the representations contained in it. In his letter, the Secretary-General reiterated his readiness to extend appropriate assistance in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

12. In a letter dated 15 May 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Spain that he had invited the views of the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the representations contained in the Permanent Representative's letter of 18 April 1967. In his letter, the Secretary-General reiterated his readiness to extend appropriate assistance in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

13. On 19 May 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Secretary-General the following communication:

"In my letter of 20 April, I informed you that the United Kingdom had adjourned the negotiations for the decolonization of Gibraltar sine die. The United Kingdom Government used as a pretext for this adjournment the establishment by Spain of a prohibited area for air navigation in Algeciras and asked the Council of ICAO to recommend to my Government the postponement of the entry into force of this prohibition.

"The Council of ICAO considered the United Kingdom complaint on 10, 11 and 13 May 1967 and decided to take no action on it. I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the discussions held on the aforesaid dates.

"Consequently, Algeciras duly became a prohibited area on 15 May, and my Government sent the United Kingdom Government a note verbale, dated 17 May, which I also have the honour to transmit herewith with the request that the present letter and its annexes should be circulated as working documents.^c

"Spain is willing to continue without any delay the negotiations for the decolonization of Gibraltar recommended in United Nations General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI)

the letter and its annexes were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a note verbale from the Secretary-General dated 22 May 1967.

^a At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the text of this letter and the memorandum attached to it were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a note verbale from the Secretary-General dated 25 April 1967.

b At the request of the United Kingdom representative, the letter and its annex were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a note verbale from the Secretary-General dated 1 May 1967.

c At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain,

and again requests you to remind the United Kingdom of its obligation to comply with this resolution."

14. In a letter dated 5 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of a note verbale dated 3 June 1967 from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid concerning a violation of the prohibited area of Algerias by British military aircraft.^d

15. In a letter dated 13 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter dated 15 May 1967:

"I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's letter No. TR 300 GIBR of 15 May 1967, with which was transmitted a copy of a letter dated 18 April 1967, addressed to you by His Excellency the Permanent Representative of Spain.

"The suggestion in Mr. Aznar's letter that Her Majesty's Government has created 'obstacles . . . during the course of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom' is a distortion of the facts. Rather it has been the Spanish Government which, by its declaration of a prohibited area relating to flying near Gibraltar on 12 April, has created such obstacles. This action was announced only six days before the Anglo-Spanish talks were due to open, upon the invitation of my Government, and thereby recalls in timing and evident intent the Spanish announcement of 5 October 1966, about the closure of Gibraltar's land frontier to vehicular traffic.

"The Spanish Government again criticizes the United Kingdom proposal that the legal issues in dispute over Gibraltar should be submitted to the International Court of Justice. But it was the Spanish Government which, in 1966, put forward a large volume of argument of a legal nature in support of its case over Gibraltar. My Government's proposal for a reference to the International Court of Justice was therefore not only in accordance with the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 171 (II) but also an appropriate response to the case put forward by the Spanish Government.

"I now wish to inform you that Her Majesty's Government, far from wishing to delay the fulfilment of the purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), have reached a decision which will assist and expedite this process. The decision is to hold a referendum at Gibraltar. The nature of the referendum, the background against which it will take place and the arrangements contemplated for it are all set out in the enclosed statement.

"In reaching this decision, my Government have had special regard to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter which expresses the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of a Non-Self-Governing Territory are paramount.

"Also they are acting in full accordance with the purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) which, as you will recall, called on the two parties to continue their negotiations, 'taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory' and asked Her Majesty's Government to 'expedite the process of decolonization'.

"The position as regards consultation with Spain is explained in paragraph 3 of the statement. Although it has not yet been feasible in the circumstances there described to hold talks on the decolonization of Gibraltar with the Spanish Government, my Government are currently informing the Spanish Government of their decision to hold a referendum and inviting them to make any suggestions which they may think fit on the formulation of Alternative 'A' in the referendum, and to explain more fully to the Gibraltarians the Spanish proposals for the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain.

"In your letter of 15 May you were kind enough to state, your readiness to extend appropriate assistance in the im-

plementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). My Government would much welcome the presence of any observer whom you might wish to send to Gibraltar for the referendum."

16. The text of the statement on Gibraltar enclosed with the letter dated 13 June from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom (para. 15) reads as follows:

"On 20 December 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 2231 (XXI), calling upon Britain and Spain to continue their negotiations about Gibraltar, taking into account the interests of the people of Gibraltar and asking Britain, in consultation with Spain, to expedite the decolonization of Gibraltar. Both Spain and Britain voted for this resolution. In explaining why Britain had voted for it, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations said that Britain could never agree that decolonization would mean the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain against the wishes of the people, and also that nothing could prejudge the question of the type of decolonization which would best fit the circumstances of Gibraltar.

"Her Majesty's Government have been considering their policy towards Gibraltar in the light of the resolution. In doing so they have regard to the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 73, which expressed the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of a Non-Self-Governing Territory are paramount. They have also had regard to their obligations under the Treaty of Utrecht.

"As is known, Her Majesty's Government duly arranged to hold talks with the Spanish Government in pursuance of the United Nations resolution. The first meeting between delegations of the two countries was to have taken place in London in April. Her Majesty's Government greatly deplore the action of the Spanish Government in announcing, on the eve of the talks, a prohibited area to flying in the vicinity of Gibraltar. This new restriction was plainly aimed against the economy of Gibraltar. Such action was in clear conflict with the terms of the General Assembly's resolution, which regretted the occurrence of acts which had prejudiced the progress of the previous Anglo-Spanish negotiations. The talks were postponed in order to enable Her Majesty's Government to consider the new situation. Her Majesty's Government raised the matter in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and have also attempted to resolve the problem in bilateral talks with the Spanish Government. But these talks ended in failure on 8 June, and Her Majesty's Government have therefore taken steps to bring the matter before the Council of ICAO once more, this time as a dispute under article 84 of the Chicago Convention.

"But Her Majesty's Government have not been deterred by the difficulties which Spain has made over the holding of talks from pursuing the objectives of the United Nations resolution.

"Her Majesty's Government firmly believe that decolonization cannot consist in the transfer of one population, however small, to the rule of another country, without regard to their own opinions and interests. Her Majesty's Government therefore think that the next step in pursuance of the United Nations resolution should be to give the people of Gibraltar an opportunity to express their views, by a formal and deliberate act, on what would best serve their interests,

"Her Majesty's Government have accordingly decided that a referendum should be held in Gibraltar in which the people of Gibraltar should be invited to say which of the following alternative courses would best serve their interests:

- "(A) To pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government to Her Majesty's Government on 18 May 1966; or
- "(B) Voluntarily to retain their link with Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its present responsibilities.

"If the majority of the people of Gibraltar vote in favour of the first alternative, Her Majesty's Government will be

[.]d At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the letter and its annexes were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a note verbale from the Secretary-General dated 6 June 1967.

ready to enter into negotiations with the Spanish Government accordingly.

"If the majority of the people of Gibraltar vote in favour of the second alternative, Her Majesty's Government will regard this choice as constituting, in the circumstances of Gibraltar, a free and voluntary relationship of the people of Gibraltar with Britain. Her Majesty's Government will thereafter discuss with the representatives of the people of Gibraltar any appropriate constitutional changes which may be desired.

"If the majority vote for the second alternative, provision would also be made for the people of Gibraltar to retain the right at any future time to express by a free and democratic choice the desire to modify their status by joining with Spain, in which event Her Majesty's Government would be ready to approach the Spanish Government accordingly.

"Her Majesty's Government attach great importance to the referendum being held impartially. They wish the people of Gibraltar to be able to think calmly where their interests lie and to express their choice free from pressures of any kind. They would greatly welcome the presence of any observer whom the Secretary-General of the United Nations might wish to nominate for the referendum. They are ready to welcome an observer from Spain too and to give the Spanish Government facilities to explain their own proposals to the people of Gibraltar if they so wish. Her Majesty's Government also have in mind to invite observers from one or two other Commonwealth countries.

"It is Her Majesty's Government's intention to hold this referendum in the course of this year and as soon as suitable arrangements have been made for the registration of persons entitled to vote. These arrangements will necessarily take some time and Her Majesty's Government's present expectation is that the referendum will be held early in September."

17. In a letter dated 19 June 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations that he was inviting the views of the Government of Spain on the proposals contained in his letter of 13 July 1967 and would communicate further with him when the views of that Government were available.

18. In a letter of the same date, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Permanent Representative of Spain a copy of the United Kingdom representative's letter dated 13 June 1967 and invited the views of the Government of Spain on the proposals contained in that letter.

19. In a letter dated 19 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of a note verbale from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in Madrid, concerning three violations of the prohibited zone of Algeciras by British military aircraft. In the same letter the Permanent Representative of Spain referred to the Anglo-Spanish talks held in Madrid from 5 to 8 June 1967 stating:

"I take this opportunity to inform you that on 5 June discussions between Spain and the United Kingdom opened in Madrid, at the request of the United Kingdom, to consider the possible effect on the operation of Gibraltar airport of the establishment of the prohibited area of Algeciras by the Spanish Government on 12 April, which I reported to you on 17 April.

"At these discussions, which ended on 8 June, the United Kingdom requested the assistance of Spain in ensuring the normal operation of the airport of Gibraltar, giving as a pretext for its request a desire to protect civil aviation. Yet on 5 June two United Kingdom fighter aircraft stationed in Gibraltar violated Spanish air space adjacent to the Rock by flying over the prohibited area.

"The Spanish Government expressed its agreement to the establishment of a practical system to permit the normal

• At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the text of this letter was circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a note verbale from the Secretary-General dated 29 June 1967.

operation of the airport of Gibraltar, provided that it was purely civilian in nature.

"The United Kingdom, determined not to sacrifice its military requirements—which, in the final analysis, are what it is defending in Gibraltar and what keeps it there—refused even to consider the Spanish proposal, announcing that it would refer the matter again to the Council of ICAO, under article 84 of the Chicago Convention."

20. In a letter dated 22 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a photocopy of a note verbale dated 20 June 1967 from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the United Kingdom Ambassador in Madrid concerning eight new violations of the prohibited area of Algeciras.

21. In a letter dated 5 July 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 19 June 1967:

"... I would inform you that the Spanish Government has delivered to Her Britannic Majesty's Government an aide-mémoire stating its views on the proposed referendum which the United Kingdom intends to hold in Gibraltar in September next. I am forwarding to you herewith a copy of the Spanish aide-mémoire with the request that it should, together with this letter, be circulated as a working document and taken into account and reproduced in the report which it is your intention to make to the Committee of Twenty-Four on developments in Gibraltar subsequent to the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI) by the General Assembly.

"1. As you will be able to confirm, Her Britannic Majesty's Government, after breaking off the Spanish-British negotiations recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations, has decided to hold a referendum in Gibraltar without first consulting the Spanish Government, thus contravening resolution 2231 (XXI), paragraph 2.

"Furthermore, the questions to be put in the referendum, by their essence, violate resolution 2231 (XXI) and earlier resolutions on this subject, in that they imply that the application or non-application to Gibraltar of resolution 1514 (XV), already decided upon by the United Nations, is subject to the wishes of the British civilian inhabitants of the Rock. The decisions of the General Assembly in this connexion are very clear. The colonial situation in Gibraltar must be liquidated by the United Kingdom in consultation and negotiation with Spain, the country which is the victim of this colonial situation, simply taking into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock, which the Spanish Government has always been willing to respect.

"The Spanish Government has given many proofs that it is favourably disposed towards the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock. I may remind you that on 18 May 1966 Spain proposed to the United Kingdom the conclusion, inter alia, of an agreement to be registered with the United Nations, under which the inhabitants of Gibraltar would be guaranteed the maintenance of their British nationality, of their individual rights—freedom of religion, freedom of the Press, security of domicile, security of tenure of their employment, and so forth—and of their municipal collective institutions.

"As Her Britannic Majesty's Government did not accept this offer and in its negotiations with the Spanish Government made no mention whatever of the interests of the Gibraltarians, the representative of Spain in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly proposed to the United Kingdom, on 14 December 1966, the immediate negotiation of a statute which would protect the interests of the Gibraltarians, as a step preliminary to the application to Gibraltar of resolution 1514 (XV).

"Her Britannic Majesty's Government, without replying to this proposal, now takes the unilateral decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar in which the Gibraltarians will ostensibly be voting on whether or not resolution 1514 (XV) applies to the Territory, when the fact that this resolution

At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the text of this letter was circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a note verbale from the Secretary-General dated 29 June 1967.

does so apply has been decided by the United Nations. In these circumstances, it would be improper for the United Nations to send observers.

- "2. The Spanish Government believes that it is your responsibility to oversee the implementation of resolution 2231 (XXI), which the United Kingdom has violated by breaking off the Spanish-British negotiations and deciding to arrange a referendum in the terms described in the United Kingdom document of 14 June 1967, which was forwarded to you by the representative of the United Kingdom. My Government therefore requests you to secure compliance with resolution 2231 (XXI).
- "3. I would also request you to inform the Committee of Twenty-Four that the Spanish Government does not agree to the referendum which is planned by the United Kingdom and does not concede any validity to the results of it.

"Spain, in its reply to the United Kingdom, suggests a formula whereby the negotiations would continue and the two countries would jointly ascertain what were the true interests of the Gibraltarians which should be protected at the conclusion of the process of decolonization.

- "4. Finally, I wish to inform you that the reasons given by Her Majesty's Government for breaking off its talks with my Government are invalid. The fact that the complaint which the United Kingdom believes it has with respect to the prohibited area for air traffic, established by Spain on 12 April, is to be submitted by the United Kingdom itself to ICAO shows that Spain's decision to prohibit the flight of military and civil aircraft over a part of Spanish territory has nothing to do with the decolonization of Gibraltar."
- 22. The text of the memorandum enclosed with the letter dated 5 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Spain reads as follows:
- "1. Her Britannic Majesty's Government, in a document dated 14 June 1967, informed the Spanish Government of its decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar, in which the civilian inhabitants of the Rock will be asked to decide:
- "(A) Whether they wish to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms of the proposals made by the Spanish Government on 18 May 1966, or
- "(B) Whether they wish to retain their link with Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its responsibilities in Gibraltar.

"These responsibilities, in the view of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, derive not only from the Charter of the United Nations, but also from the Treaty of Utrecht.

"In reply to the communication in question, the Spanish Government wishes to make the following observations:

"2. The United Kingdom's decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar in the manner proposed is a violation of both the letter and the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and of earlier resolutions on this subject.

"It contravenes the letter of the recommendations of the United Nations, since it was taken at a time when, by decision of the United Kingdom, the Spanish-British negotiations were in abeyance, and without there having been any prior consultation with the Spanish Government or with the United Nations itself. The mere fact of being advised of the measure after it has been taken does not, in the view of the Spanish Government, constitute consultation by Her Britannic Majesty's Government. The offer to Spain to send an observer to watch the referendum and explain its views to the inhabitants of Gibraltar is quite unacceptable, since it would imply the Spanish Government's approval of a unilateral decision by the United Kingdom that is contrary to the rights and interests of Spain and to the decisions taken by the United Nations.

"3. The United Nations has recommended that the decolonization of Gibraltar should be effected through the application to this Territory of resolution 1514 (XV) in its entirety, and consequently of paragraph 6 thereof, which states that 'any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations'. Furthermore, it was

recommended to Spain and the United Kingdom that, in the negotiations aimed at resolving the colonial situation in Gibraltar by mutual agreement, account should be taken of the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock, whose right of self-determination—since they did not fulfil the requisite conself-determination—take to the United Nations, despite the express request made to the Committee of Twenty-Four in 1963 and 1964 and to the Fourth Committee in 1966 by the petitioners representing them.

"In its proposal of 14 June 1967, the United Kingdom appears to be pursuing the same aims and policies as in April 1964, when it granted to Gibraltar the Lansdowne Constitution—namely, to ensure the British presence on the Rock and to use the inhabitants as a screen for its military interests.

"Such a policy has already been rejected by the United Nations. In October 1964, the Committee of Twenty-Four recommended that the decolonization of Gibraltar should be achieved by negotiation between the United Kingdom, as the colonial Power, and Spain, as the country a part of whose territory was colonized.

"Now, in 1967, the United Kingdom, persistently disregarding not only the political decisions of the United Nations but also the present legal status of the Rock, is taking a further, and the most serious, step in Gibraltar. Under resolution 2231 (XXI), it is not for the United Kingdom independently to consult the wishes of the Gibraltarians; it is for Spain and the United Kingdom to negotiate together, taking into account the interests of the Gibraltarians.

"4. The questions to be put in the proposed referendum also contravene the spirit of the recommendation of the United Nations on the manner in which the colonial situation in Gibraltar should be terminated.

"To ask the Gibraltarians whether they wish 'Great Britain to retain her responsibilities in Gibraltar' is tantamount to asking them whether they want the present colonial situation, which has been specifically and expressly condemned by the United Nations, to continue. This is an attempt to saddle them with the responsibility for the perpetuation of that situation, so that they—and not the United Kingdom—will appear to be the cause of the halt in the decolonization process.

"Again, to ask the Gibraltarians whether they wish to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms of the proposals made by Spain of 18 May 1966 is tantamount to leaving it to them to decide whether or not resolution 1514 (XV) should apply to the colonial case of Gibraltar-a matter which has already been decided by the United Nations. What is more, the Spanish Government, in its 1966 proposals, never envisaged that the Gibraltarians, individually or collectively, should be compelled to abandon either their status as subjects of Her Britannic Majesty or the Territory of Gibraltar. The sole purpose was that the Territory should be returned to Spain in a civilized manner through the application to it of resolution 1514 (XV), thus ending the dismemberment of Spain's national unity and territorial integrity. In order that this return of the Rock to Spain might be effected peacefully and to the benefit of all concerned, the Spanish proposals suggested the conclusion of certain agreements to prevent the decolonization from adversely affecting the interests of either the Gibraltarians or the United Kingdom.

"In the final analysis, the putting of these two questions means conferring on the civilian inhabitants of the Rock the responsibility for deciding, through their preference for one sovereignty or the other, whether or not the Territory they inhabit should be returned to Spain. This manoeuvre involves a clear violation—the most serious and decisive yet—of the present legal status, as laid down in article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, which unequivocally gives Spain a prior claim to recover Gibraltar in any circumstances where British sovereignty may cease, if only for a moment.

"5. The measure adopted by the United Kingdom on 14 June 1967 has nothing to do with the decolonization of Gibraltar. The decolonization advocated by the United Nations is not one which maintains privileged positions at the

expense of the natural populations but, on the contrary, one which eliminates imperialism and unjust situations.

"The Spanish Government believes that, as a result of the United Nations debates in which the process of decolonizing the Territory of Gibraltar was initiated, the civilian inhabitants of the Rock included in the roll of Gibraltarians were defined as having certain interests that ought not to be adversely affected by the termination of the colonial situation. These inhabitants replaced the true population of Gibraltar, which was expelled by England in 1704 and settled in the town of San Roque del Campo de Gibraltar, where its descendants still reside. Their interests, which have been stated to the Committee of Twenty-Four by their legitimate representatives, cannot be left out of account in the decolonizing process; for the fact is that the word 'Gibraltarians' means not only the British subjects established at the United Kingdom military base and subject to the jurisdiction of a fortress that is British because of the cession of sovereignty made by Spain, and not because it is the home of subjects of the United Kingdom, but also those dispossessed inhabitants and the 5,000 Spanish workers and their families who constitute a substantial proportion of the Rock's labour force and therefore of the life of Gibraltar. These Gibraltarian workers, who are prohibited by discriminatory colonialist legislation from residing in Gibraltar, should also be remembered in the decolonization process. Thirty-two million Spaniards are also affected by the perpetuation of the colonial situation at Gibraltar, and their rights, their interests and their security are ignored by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the document of 14 June

"Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations is completely misconstrued by the United Kingdom when it offers this referendum to the British civilian population included in the roll of Gibraltarians. It is true that this Article states that the interests of a people subjected to colonial domination are paramount, but in the case of Gibraltar what has been colonized is not a Gibraltarian population composed of British subjects, but a Spanish territory and Spaniards.

"6. The referendum which the United Kingdom proposes to hold is obviously based on the totally inadmissible premise that the interests of the Gibraltarians include that of deciding whether or not resolution 1514 (XV) should apply to Gibraltar. The Spanish Government holds the view that the inhabitants of Gibraltar should have the opportunity to inform Spain and the United Kingdom what their true interests are, in order that they may be safeguarded by the two countries to which the United Nations has entrusted this responsibility. However, these interests do not include the right to dispose of a piece of territory which must revert to Spain if the colonial situation in Gibraltar is to be truly ended.

"During the year which has elapsed since 18 May 1966, Her Britannic Majesty's Government, in its talks with the Spanish Government, has systematically avoided specifying what the interests of the Gibraltarians are and has not replied to the Spanish proposal of 13 December 1966, suggesting the immediate negotiation of a statute to protect those interests.

"The Spanish Government is therefore of the opinion that it is only within the framework of the Spanish-British negotiations that agreement can be reached on such a procedure as will enable Spain and the United Kingdom jointly to establish what are the interests that the inhabitants of Gibraltar wish to see protected at the conclusion of the process of decolonization. To this end, the formula proposed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in its document of 14 June 1967 should be replaced by another compatible with the decisions adopted by the United Nations.

"If Her Majesty's Government carries out its unilateral decision of 14 June 1967, it will have chosen a course contrary to that indicated by the United Nations, with all its attendant consequences. The Spanish Government will then have no further obligation towards Gibraltar, since the United Kingdom will have violated article X of the Treaty of Utrecht if, as a result of the manifestation of the wishes of the civilian population, the matter of sovereignty becomes

open to question. In this event, the devolution clause of article X of the Treaty of Utrecht would become operative. Thereafter, and until such time as this clause is brought into full effect, Gibraltar can only be for Spain a piece of Spanish territory illegally occupied by 18,000 aliens supported by the military force of the United Kingdom."

23. On 7 July 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in which were contained the views of his Government concerning the matters raised in the letters addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Spain on 19 May, 5 June, 19 June and 22 June 1967 (see paras. 13, 14, 19 and 20 above). Extracts from the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom are reproduced below:

"I have the honour to enclose a memorandum giving a balanced account of the ICAO Council's proceedings from 10 to 13 May and of the bilateral talks about the prohibited area between Britain and Spain which took place in Madrid from 5 to 8 June. I also enclose a copy of Her Majesty's Government's note No. 146 of 18 May which replied to the Spanish note No. 115 and explained the reasons for the postponement of the talks which had been due to start on 18 April.

"The Spanish notes Nos. 131, 142 and 146 contained allegations about flights by British military aircraft. I am authorized to say that the British authorities have investigated these allegations and that my Government is satisfied that on none of the occasions cited was there any infringement of Spanish rights. When formal replies are made to the Spanish allegations, copies will be communicated to you.

"Sr. Aznar's letter of 19 June gives a misleading account of the Spanish attitude during the bilateral talks in Madrid about the prohibited area from 5 to 8 June. As you will see from the first annex to this letter, Spain did not agree to establish a system to permit normal airport operations provided that it was purely civilian in nature. Rather the Spanish delegation refused to go on talking about aeronautical matters which the British delegation had gone to Madrid to discuss unless Britain first made far-reaching concessions in the political field. The first of these conditions was that Britain should agree to acknowledge Spanish sovereignty over the territory on which the airport is situated. The imposition of such an extreme (and, as the Spanish Government well knew, unacceptable) pre-condition for even continuing the discussions brought the talks to a premature and regrettable end."

24. In a letter dated 17 July 1967, the Secretary-General addressed the following communication to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom:

"I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 13 June 1967 in which you conveyed to me, *inter alia*, the decision of your Government to hold a referendum in Gibraltar on the basis set out in the enclosed statement, and informed me that your Government would welcome the presence of any observer whom I might wish to send there for the referendum.

"As you will recall, I stated, in my letter dated 19 June 1967, that I was inviting the views of the Government of Spain regarding the proposals contained in your letter and would communicate with you further when those views were available. I now transmit herewith for the information of your Government, a copy of a letter dated 5 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, in which are contained the views of the Government of Spain.

"Taking into account the differences of view between your Government and the Government of Spain as expressed during the current exchange of correspondence concerning

g At the request of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, the text of this letter and its annexes was circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a note verbale from the Secretary-General dated 11 July 1967.

the question, and having regard to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), I intend to submit a report on the whole matter to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."

25. In a letter dated 4 August 1967 the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom wrote to the Secretary-General in reply to his letter of 17 July 1967 (see para. 24 above). The text of the letter and its enclosures are as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge your letter No. TR 300 GIBR of 17 July 1967, with which were enclosed a letter and an aide-mémoire from His Excellency the Permanent Representative of Spain about the referendum which is to be held in Gibraltar on 10 September 1967.

"I now have the honour to enclose the text of an aidemémoire communicated by my Government to His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain in London on 31 July 1967.

"Since this is directly relevant to the exchange of correspondence concerning the forthcoming referendum incorporated in Your Excellency's report of 17 July 1967 to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/AC.109/254), I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and its enclosure also to be circulated in a documentary form to members of the Special Committee."

Text of British aide-mémoire communicated to the Spanish Ambassador in London on 31 July 1967 in reply to the Spanish aide-mémoire of 3 July 1967

"Her Majesty's Government regret that the Spanish Government has adopted a critical attitude towards their decision to hold a referendum at Gibraltar. They also note with regret the Spanish Government's refusal to accept their invitation to send a Spanish observer to follow the progress of the referendum and their offer to provide facilities to enable the Spanish Government to explain their proposals to the people of Gibraltar.

"2. Her Majesty's Government repeat that, as they have already explained, the referendum is the next step in pursuance of United Nations resolution 2231 (XXI). The referendum will not, as the Spanish Government suggests, violate either United Nations resolutions on decolonization in general or United Nations resolutions specifically concerning Gibraltar.

"3. On the contrary, Her Majesty's Government's decision to hold a referendum is in full accordance with the spirit and letter of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, which lays down the responsibilities of Members of the United Nations towards Non-Self-Governing Territories for which they have responsibility. Gibraltar is such a Territory and therefore, according to Article 73, Britain is under an obligation to recognize the principle that the interests of its inhabitants are paramount. The referendum will give the Gibraltarians an opportunity to express, by a formal and deliberate act, their views as to where their interests lie. It is essential to ascertain these views, since it would clearly be wrong for either Britain or Spain to determine arbitrarily, without reference to the people, where their interests lie. And in May 1966 (during the Anglo-Spanish talks about Gibraltar), the Spanish Foreign Minister himself said:

'No one better than the inhabitants themselves could explain their needs to Spain through the British Government that represents them.'

It is surprising, therefore, that the Spanish Government should now fail to support the British decision to consult these same inhabitants by means of a referendum.

"4. The Spanish aide-mémoire of 3 July invokes United Nations resolution 1514 (XV). But this invocation is based on one paragraph only of that resolution, a paragraph which is not in any case relevant to the situation in Gibraltar. It thus gives an incomplete and misleading interpretation both of the resolution and of its application to Gibraltar. The asserted relevance of paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) presupposes, on Spain's interpretation of the para-

graph, that Gibraltar is part of Spain—a disputed point. If the Spaniards draw legal inferences from this, we are ready to test such contentions in the highest judicial organ of the United Nations, but Spain refuses. Until Spain agrees to settle this crucial point by reference to the International Court of Justice, it cannot be argued that paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 is relevant to Gibraltar.

"5. The Spanish Government appears to have misunderstood the nature of the referendum, since it apparently supposes that its being held will signify the lapse, either permanent or temporary, of British sovereignty over Gibraltar.
What will in fact happen will be that the people of Gibraltar
will express their views as to where their interests lie, in
the knowledge that if they express the view that their
interests lie in passing under Spanish sovereignty the British
Government will negotiate with Spain to bring this about.
This expression of views involves no lapse in British sovereignty and therefore does not bring into operation the clause
of article X of the Treaty of Utrecht under which Spain
has a reversionary right to sovereignty over Gibraltar should
British sovereignty be terminated.

6. Article 73 of the United Nations Charter quite clearly refers to the interests of the 'inhabitants of non-self-governing territories', the United Nations Special Committee of Twenty-Four consensus of 16 October 1964 refers to the interests of the 'population of the Territory' and General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) refers to the interests of the 'people of the Territory'. It is therefore clear beyond any doubt that the United Nations Charter and the later consensus and resolution on Gibraltar are concerned specifically with the interests of the people living in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Gibraltar. These are the people whose interests, according to the United Nations Charter, must be paramount and these are the people who will be consulted about their interests in the forthcoming referendum. The Spanish claim that the term 'Gibraltarian' covers a wider category of people than the inhabitants of Gibraltar itself is not supported by the Charter, the consensus or the resolutions, and it is thus not relevant to the question of the application of United Nations resolutions to Gibraltar.

"7. The Spanish Government criticizes the formula by which Her Majesty's Government propose to consult the Gibraltarians about where they judge their interests to lie. It is regretted that the Spanish Government did not avail itself of the opportunity offered it by Her Majesty's Government to comment on the formulation of the alternatives by which the people of Gibraltar would pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government to Her Majesty's Government on 18 May 1966, and it is disappointing that the Spanish Government have put forward no alternative formula. The existing formula therefore stands. But Her Majesty's Government hope that, in the light of the clarification of the purposes and consequences of the referendum contained in the above paragraphs, the Spanish Government will now decide to accept Her Majesty's Government's invitation to send an observer to the referendum and to take up Her Majesty's Government's offer to make facilities available to the Spanish Government to explain their proposals to the Gibraltarians."

26. By a letter dated 15 August 1967 the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General additional information which was promised in his letter of 7 July (see para. 23 above). The text of this letter and its enclosures are as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to paragraph 3 of my note No. 110 of 7 July 1967, about Gibraltar, in which I undertook to communicate to you my Government's formal replies to the allegations contained in notes Nos. 131, 142 and 146 from the Government of Spain addressed to Her Majesty's Embassy at Madrid concerning flights by British military aircraft.

"I now have the honour to enclose copies of the notes delivered by Her Majesty's Embassy at Madrid on 22 July, 28 July and 11 August 1967, in reply to these communications from the Spanish Government,"

1

United Kingdom Government's reply dated 22 July 1967 to Spanish Government note No. 131

"Her Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in reply to the Ministry's note No. 131 of 3 June and the statement made by Sr. Sedo, Leader of the Spanish delegation at the Anglo-Spanish talks in Madrid on 7 June, has the honour to state the following.

"In the note it was alleged that on 26 May a formation of two Hunter aircraft of the Royal Air Force violated Spanish air space. This note was accompanied by a radar plan position map showing the tracks of three aircraft.

"In the statement of Sr. Sedo it was alleged that on 1 June a Valletta aircraft of the Royal Air Force violated Spanish air space.

"These two allegations have been carefully examined. As a result of these investigations Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the aircraft in question followed the established procedures and that no Spanish rights were infringed on either occasion.

"But Her Majesty's Embassy are instructed to take this opportunity to express the regret of Her Majesty's Government for an infringement of Spanish rights which took place on 2 June. On that date a Shackleton aircraft of the Royal Air Force overflew the northern part of the isthmus not for emergency reasons but because of an error of judgement by the pilot. Although the Spanish authorities have not complained about this flight, Her Majesty's Government wish them to be aware of what happened."

II

United Kingdom Government's reply dated 28 July 1967 to Spanish Government note No. 142

"Her Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in reply to the Ministry's note No. 142 of 15 June about the alleged violations of Spanish air space by British military aircraft on 2, 5 and 6 June, has the honour to state the following.

"All these allegations have been carefully examined. As a result of these investigations Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the aircraft in question followed the established procedures and that no Spanish rights were violated on any of these occasions.

"Her Majesty's Embassy is instructed to state that the British military authorities have carefully examined the photographs purporting to relate to the charts attached to the Spanish Government's note. Unfortunately, it is not possible to interpret these photographs because of excessive clutter and sea returns. Secondly, because of scale distortion in setting up the radar display it is not possible to establish an accurate reference point. Lastly, two of the photographs show times other than those quoted in the Spanish charts, and do not appear to relate to the flights listed in the Ministry's note."

Ш

United Kingdom Government's reply dated 11 August 1967 to Spanish Government note No. 146

"Her Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in reply to the Ministry's note No. 146 of 20 June about eight alleged violations of Spanish air space by British military aircraft on 7, 8 and 9 June, has the honour to state the following.

"All these allegations have been carefully examined. As a result of these investigations, Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the aircraft in question followed the established procedures and that no Spanish rights were violated on any of these occasions.

"Her Majesty's Embassy is instructed to state that the British military authorities have carefully examined the photographs purporting to relate to the charts attached to the Spanish Government's note. Unfortunately in three cases no

aircraft trace is visible. For the rest, the aircraft traces are in general indistinct and are not related to any clearly identifiable reference points."

27. By letter dated 17 August 1967, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations wrote to the Secretary-General transmitting information supplementary to the Spanish note of 5 July 1967 (see paras. 21 and 22 above). The text of this communication and its enclosure follows:

"As a supplement to our note No. 121 of 5 July on the question of Gibraltar, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the memorandum dated 14 August 1967 sent to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Madrid in reply to the aide-mémoire addressed to the Spanish Government by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom on 31 July 1967.

"I should be grateful if you would have this note and the memorandum circulated as a working document to all delegations and issued as an addendum to document A/AC.109/254 containing your report to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."

Memorandum

"1. Having studied the aide-mémoire of Her Britannic Majesty's Government of 31 July 1967 setting forth the views of the United Kingdom on the Gibraltar referendum and on its scope, the Spanish Government is more than ever of the opinion that the questions included in the referendum violate General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), the United Nations Charter and article X of the Treaty of Utrecht.

"2. The facts are as follows:

"(a) Her Britannic Majesty's Government, after unilaterally breaking off negotiations with regard to Gibraltar, has violated operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI) by deciding to hold the said referendum without previously consulting the Spanish Government.

"(b) The reference to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter is not pertinent. Article 73 certainly states that the interests of a people subjected to colonial domination are paramount, but what has been colonized in the case of Gibraltar—as may be seen from the last paragraph of resolution 2231 (XXI)—is not a Gibraltarian population composed of British subjects, but Spain and Spaniards.

"The interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar cannot lie in maintaining a disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Spain.

"(c) The Spanish Government cannot take seriously the United Kingdom assertion that a ruling by the International Court of Justice is necessary before Gibraltar can be regarded as part of Spain.

"The Treaty of Utrecht, article X of which the United Kingdom still invokes as giving it title to Gibraltar, was signed between Spain and England. Maintenance in force of this colonial Treaty jeopardizes the national unity and territorial integrity of Spain, and represents a colonial situation on Spanish soil. It was precisely in order to do away with such situations, past or future, that paragraph 6 was included in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and as the Committee of Twenty-Four agreed on 16 October 1964, that paragraph must be applied to Gibraltar.

"(d) If the referendum as phrased does not presuppose for a moment the transfer of British sovereignty over Gibraltar to the British inhabitants of the Rock—as Her Majesty's Government now maintains—it is impossible to understand why those inhabitants should be asked to choose between Spanish and British sovereignty in replying to the questions put before them.

"(e) The Spanish Government reminds the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that the reason why the 5,000 Spanish workers—in earlier times 14,000—and their families do not live on the Rock is that they have been prohibited from doing so by the British authorities under a discriminatory policy which dates far back and which is reflected in the Immigrants and Aliens Ordinance of 1885. These

workers are prevented from voting in the referendum by that prohibition, and not by General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI).

"3. In its memorandum of 3 July 1967, the Spanish Government stated that Spain and the United Kingdom should negotiate a procedure that would enable them to establish what are the interests that the inhabitants of Gibraltar wish to see protected at the conclusion of the process of decolonization called for by the United Nations. Those interests have nothing to do with the purely British interest in maintaining sovereignty over a military base on Spanish soil, which lies behind the questions the Gibraltarians are to be asked to vote on.

"Accordingly, the Spanish Government, while confirming the statements in its memorandum of 3 July 1967, takes this opportunity once again to invite Her Britannic Majesty's Government to agree on a formula which would replace the proposed referendum and enable the two countries to ascertain what are the interests of the Gibraltarians themselves, with a view to embodying safeguards of those interests in a Spanish-United Kingdom agreement, to be registered with the United Nations.

"Such an agreement would make it possible to preserve the social, cultural, religious and economic identity of the civilian inhabitants of the Rock, protecting it from the negative features of decolonization."

ANNEX II*

Letter dated 6 September 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. TR 300 GIBR of 1 September 1967, with which was enclosed the text of the resolution of the Special Committee adopted on 1 September and expressing the majority view of members of the Special Committee on the question of Gibraltar.

The referendum, which is to take place in Gibraltar on 10 September, is in no way invalidated by this opinion of the Committee of Twenty-Four. It will give the inhabitants of the Territory an opportunity to express their views on where

their own interests lie. It was decided upon by the United Kingdom Government in accordance with its powers and responsibilities as the acknowledged administering Power in Gibraltar. The right of the Administering Authority so to consult the inhabitants on a question vital to their future must be beyond dispute. Such a free and democratic consultation of the people of a Non-Self-Governing Territory about their interests is being undertaken with respect to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter under which the interests of the inhabitants are paramount.

I wish at the same time to invite attention to the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) that the interests of the people of Gibraltar should be taken into account, and to point out that a consultation of the people of Gibraltar about their own view of where their interests lie is fully consistent with the terms of that resolution and calculated to further its objectives. The result of the referendum will establish an important additional element required for the implementation of resolution 2231 (XXI), and my Government will consequently make its full report in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2231 (XXI) when the results of the referendum are available.

I shall be grateful if you will arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the Special Committee.

(Signed) CARADON

ANNEX III*

Letter dated 25 October 1967 from the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

[For the text of the letter, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6876.]

ANNEX IV **

Letter dated 30 October 1967 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[For the text of the letter, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6882.]

CHAPTER XI*

SWAZILAND

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

1. Until Botswana and Lesotho attained independence towards the end of 1966, it was the practice of the Special Committee and the General Assembly to consider Swaziland together with the two other former High Commission Territories, then known respectively as Bechuanaland and Basutoland. Among the various reasons for so doing were the administrative links formerly existing between them and the fact that certain problems, including problems arising from their landlocked position in southern Africa, were common to all three. Chief among the problems with which the Special Committee and the General Assembly were concerned were their great need for external assistance in the development of their economies and social services, their economic dependence on South Africa and the threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty resulting from this dependence and from the racial

policies of South Africa. In regard to the third problem, the General Assembly, in resolutions adopted in 1962, 1963 and 1965,1 solemnly warned that any attempt by South Africa to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of the Territories would be considered as an act of aggression. In the same resolutions, the General Assembly also drew attention to the unsatisfactory economic and social situation in the Territories and requested that additional economic, financial and technical assistance commensurate with their needs should be furnished to them through United Nations programmes of technical co-operation and the specialized agencies. In 1965, following the receipt of a report of an economic mission to the Territories, the General Assembly, in resolution 2063 (XX), decided to establish a Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland. Bechuanaland and Swaziland, to be made up of voluntary contributions. It also requested the Special Committee to consider what measures were necessary for

^{*} Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/268.

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^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.10.

¹ General Assembly resolutions 1817 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories and, in addition, requested the administering Power to return to the indigenous inhabitants all land taken from them.

- 2. At its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee again considered the three Territories together, bearing in mind the forthcoming independence of Basutoland and Bechuanaland, which attained independence on 30 September and 4 October respectively. On 9 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,² chap. VII, para. 237) by which, after drawing attention to the urgent need of the three Territories for United Nations technical and economic assistance and expressing grave concern at the threat to their territorial integrity and economic stability created by the racist régime in South Africa, it inter alia appealed to all States to contribute to the Fund established by the General Assembly, considered that continued efforts should be made to provide economic, financial and technical assistance through United Nations programmes and specialized agencies, and decided to establish a sub-committee with a view to studying and suggesting all necessary measures for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 2063 (XX).
- 3. On 9 September 1966, the Sub-Committee, composed of representatives of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Madagascar, Mali and Uruguay, unanimously approved its report, which the Special Committee adopted by consensus on 15 September, following its consideration of that report.
- 4. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Special Committee which included the text of its resolution of 9 June 1966 and the Sub-Committee's report,⁸ as well as a report, submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX), concerning the Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.4
- 5. Having examined these reports, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2134 (XXI) of 29 September 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

B. Information on the Territory⁵

General

- 6. Swaziland covers an area of about 6,700 square miles and is bordered on three sides by South Africa and on the fourth by Mozambique. The population at the date of the last census, taken in May 1966, was 374,697, comprising 362,463 Africans, 8,006 Europeans and 4,223 other non-Africans.
- 7. Under new constitutional arrangements which came into force on 25 April 1967, Swaziland is internally self-governing under United Kingdom protection, although certain powers are reserved to Her

2 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

8 Ibid., chap. VII and appendix III.

4 Ibid., agenda item 23, document A/6439.

Majesty's Commissioner pending the attainment of full independence. The Territory is a constitutional monarchy, with a Prime Minister and a cabinet and a bicameral Parliament, the lower House of Assembly being elected by universal suffrage. In elections held on 19 and 20 April 1967, all the seats in the lower House were won by the Imbokodvo, the party which represents the Swazi Nation under the Ngwenyama, who is the King of Swaziland. The opposition parties are the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) and the Swaziland United Front (SUF), the last having been formed at the time of the elections. The United Swaziland Association, which is largely composed of Europeans, did not contest the 1967 elections. Details of the present constitutional arrangements and proposals for independence are set forth in the following section.6

8. The economy of the Territory is predominantly agricultural, the principal industries being sugar, wood pulp and forest products, citrus, pineapples, rice and livestock. Iron ore and asbestos deposits are mined by two companies. The Territory is economically linked with South Africa, with which it shares a common currency and customs union. Apart from secondary industries concerned with processing the Territory's agricultural products, industrial development is limited to a few light manufacturing and service industries.

Relations with South Africa

- 9. For various reasons, including its close economic ties with the land-locked Territory, South Africa in the past sought unsuccessfully to incorporate Swaziland together with the two other former High Commission Territories. Since 1963, however, this claim has been abandoned and replaced by an offer of "guardian-ship" and economic assistance. The offer has, however, been regarded by many as suspect because of South Africa's racial policies.
- 10. The position of the majority Imbokodvo Party in Swaziland towards South Africa has been one of good-neighbourliness and independence. In May 1966, the leader of the Imbokodvo, now the Prime Minister, explained that his party's foreign policy after independence would be based on a "healthy, good understanding with neighbouring States and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries". He added that his party accepted the economic and geographical facts of Swaziland's position in southern Africa. It would maintain close economic ties with South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique and it would also seek membership of both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations. Commenting on South Africa's racial policies, he said that although the Swazis would not interfere in the internal affairs of another country, they would eliminate racial discrimination in their own country. In a statement to the Press of South Africa on 27 November 1966, he is reported to have said that he hoped to have talks with the South African premier upon Swaziland's independence so that he could explain plainly his country's policy towards South Africa. In the meantime, in preparation for independence, Swaziland is reported to have enlisted the aid of South Africans in training its administrative personnel.

⁴ Ibid., agenda item 23, document A/0439.
⁵ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports. Also used in the preparation of this section has been the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

⁶ For information on the constitutional provisions prior to April 1967, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/ 5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, paras. 146-153.

White paper of October 1966

- 11. Until 25 April 1967, Swaziland was governed according to a Constitution adopted in 1964. As previously noted, in the elections to the Legislative Council held in 1964, the Imbokodvo (the party which represents the Swazi Nation under the Ngwenyama) won all the elected seats except for six of the eight seats which, under the 1964 Constitution were reserved for Europeans. Following the election, the Imbokodvo called for the early emergence of Swaziland as an independent State with the Ngwenyama as its King.
- 12. In August 1965, the Swaziland Constitutional Committee, comprised entirely of members of the Legislative Council under the chairmanship of Her Majesty's Commissioner, was appointed to make detailed recommendations for a new constitution after hearing the views of political parties and groups not represented in the Council. The Committee's report was submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and was tabled in the Legislative Council for discussion in March 1966. The report, which largely reflected the views of the majority Imbokodvo, proposed a new constitution under which Swaziland would attain internal self-government. It envisaged that Swaziland should become a constitutional monarchy, with the Paramount Chief as Head of State and a bicameral Parliament, the lower house, or House of Assembly consisting of twenty-four members elected by universal suffrage from eight three-member constituencies, six appointed by the King and the Attorney-General as an official member; the upper house would consist of a Speaker and twelve members, half chosen by the House of Assembly and half appointed by the King. The Swazi National Council, a traditional body, would continue to advise the King on all matters regulated by Swazi law and custom, including questions relating to land belonging to the Swazi Nation and to mineral rights, control over both of which would be vested in the King in trust for the Swazi Nation. Details of the finally agreed constitutional proposals are given in paragraphs 24 to 43 below.
- 13. The Legislative Council unanimously endorsed the majority recommendations in April. Representations about various matters were made by members of the public and interested bodies, including the two opposition parties, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress and the Swaziland Progressive Party, which protested regarding their non-representation on the Constitutional Committee and rejected the Committee's recommendations on the ground that they were designed to entrench the conservative elements represented by the Imbokodvo. These parties, which had not gained a seat in the Legislative Council in the 1964 elections, called for the holding of a fully representative constitutional conference.
- 14. In a White Paper, published in October 1966, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that the United Kingdom Government had taken full account of these representations in considering the report. After further consultations held between him and the Swaziland Government, final agreement had been reached, without the necessity of convening a constitutional conference, both on the draft of the Swaziland (Protected State) Agreement and on the form of the internal self-government (Protected State) Agreement

- and on the form of the internal self-government constitution (except on the question of minerals).
- 15. According to the White Paper, the main issue on which it had not proved possible to reconcile the views of the Government of Swaziland and the United Kingdom related to the central control of the grant or refusal of mineral rights. Under the 1964 Constitution, the ownership of minerals in Swaziland was vested, subject to existing rights, in the Ngwenyama in trust for the Swazi Nation. The power to grant or refuse mineral rights was, however, vested in Her Majesty's Commissioner acting after consultation with the Ngwenyama and the Executive Council. The Legislative Council had power to legislate on minerals, as on all other matters, except those which the Constitution specified shall continue to be regulated by Swazi law and custom.
- 16. The Swaziland Constitutional Committee recommended that the power to grant mineral rights should be vested in the Ngwenyama and that for the purpose of advising him in the exercise of this power there should be a committee appointed by him after consultation with the Swazi National Council. The position of the Swaziland Government was that not only ownership but also control of Swazi Nation land was vested in the Ngwenyama. Therefore, the grant or refusal of mineral rights was similarly an inseparable function of the ownership of minerals. The Swaziland Government conceded that it would be possible to review the arrangements proposed by the Committee when the independence constitution was being considered.
- 17. The Secretary of State, while agreeing that under the new Constitution, the power to grant mineral rights should be vested in the Ngwenyama, held that since the Government would already be in the hands of a cabinet drawn from a Parliament mainly elected on the basis of universal suffrage, the Ngwenyama should exercise that power on ministerial advice. The Constitution could also provide that before giving its advice, the cabinet would be required to consult the Swazi National Council or a committee thereof. In the Secretary of State's opinion, the central Government, which was responsible for other aspects of the economic development of Swaziland, should also control mineral development. In the absence of agreement on the question under consideration, the United Kingdom Government decided to include in the Constitution provisions on the lines indicated by the Secretary of State.
- 18. The White Paper recorded that representations had been made urging that the Territory should be divided into single-member constituencies. The Secretary of State, however, accepted the Committee's proposal that under the new Constitution, Swaziland should be divided into eight constituencies, each returning three members to the House of Assembly, and that this should be done by dividing each of the four existing constituencies into two, each containing as nearly as practicable the same number of adult inhabitants. This proposal was a compromise between those who wanted to retain the existing number of constituencies and those who wanted single-member constituencies. The principal objection to the latter suggestion was that, with a total electorate of about 120,000 and twenty-four elected members, the number of voters in each constituency would be so small as to make the members subject to disruptive local pressures and to open the way to intimidation and corruption. The alternative

⁷ Swaziland Constitutional Proposals, Cmnd. 3119 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1966).

would have been to reduce the number of elected members, but this was not considered desirable.

- 19. Finally, reference was made in the White Paper to the provisions relating to the amendment of the Constitution. Under the draft Swaziland (Protected State) Agreement, Her Majesty would retain the power to amend or replace the Constitution, but before exercising this power there would normally be consultation with the Swaziland Government. The Constitution would set out the procedure to be followed by that Government before a request could be made to Her Majesty to exercise the power of amendment. The Swaziland Government had expressed the hope that except in abnormal circumstances Her Majesty would not exercise that power until the specified local procedure had been complied with, and that Her Majesty would favourably consider amending the Constitution at the request of that Government once the specified procedure had been carried out.
- 20. Following the publication of the White Paper, one of the opposition parties, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, issued a statement in Dar es Salaam on 26 October 1966. The party strongly condemned what it described as a unilateral action by the United Kingdom Government, done without consulting the people and the political movements of Swaziland in order to safeguard British interests and entrench reactionary and tribal forces. It repeated a demand, which it had previously made in August, for the holding of a constitutional conference representative of the broad masses of the Swazi people.
- 21. The following paragraphs (24-43) summarize the proposals contained in the White Paper which came into force on 25 April 1967.

Swaziland (Protected State) Agreement

- 22. The fundamental problem with which the Swaziland constitutional Committee was concerned was the restoration of what the Swazis regarded as the original treaty relationship between Swaziland and the United Kingdom established in the nineteenth century and the recognition of the kingship of the Ngwenyama. To meet the general wishes of the Swazis in these matters, the Secretary of State informed the Committee in the course of its deliberations that the United Kingdom Government proposed to grant Swaziland internal self-government in 1966 and that, subject to Her Majesty's approval, the United Kingdom Government would be willing to arrange for the conclusions of an Agreement with the Ngwenyama which would have the effect of turning Swaziland into a Protected State with the Ngwenyama recognized as King of Swaziland. The Secretary of State also made it clear that the United Kingdom Government wished Swaziland to attain independence by not later than the end of 1969.
- 23. The Agreement, which came into force on 25 April (see paras. 24-43, below), stipulates that Her Majesty will reserve to herself the power to amend or replace the Constitution, and powers and jurisdiction in respect of the United Kingdom's continued responsibility for external relations, defence and other matters specified in the Constitution. All powers and jurisdiction except those specified in the Agreement will be renounced. Provided that the United Kingdom is satisfied that conditions then prevailing in the Territory do not preclude the grant of independence at that time,

Swaziland will become independent by not later than the end of 1969.

Internal self-government constitution

- 24. Under the new Constitution as outlined in the White Paper and embodied in the Swaziland Constitution Order, 1967, the Ngwenyama is recognized as King of Swaziland and Head of State. The succession is governed by Swazi law and custom. The King appoints the Prime Minister and other ministers and has the right to be informed and consulted by his ministers on all matters of government. He acts on ministerial advice except where the Constitution or any other law specifically provides otherwise. However, he has the right to require the Prime Minister to reconsider in the cabinet any matter submitted to him.
- 25. Provision is made for the office of Her Majesty's Commissioner. Assisted by a deputy, Her Majesty's Commissioner retains responsibility for external affairs, defence and internal security. He is empowered, however, to delegate any part of these responsibilities to a minister designated by the Prime Minister; such delegation may be made subject to conditions and may be revoked.
- 26. Her Majesty's Commissioner will retain, until a date to be appointed by him, responsibility for the Public Service, in consultation with the Public Service Commission or the Judicial Service Commission; after that date, the two commissions will become executive and he will cease to have this function. The Public Service Commission is appointed by Her Majesty's Commissioner in his discretion, and after that date by the King in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
- 27. Her Majesty's Commissioner retains certain powers of financial control for the purpose of ensuring proper financial administration or securing compliance with a condition attached to a financial grant made by the United Kingdom Government to the Swaziland Government.
- 28. Her Majesty's Commissioner is also empowered to require the Swaziland Government to introduce and secure the passage of legislation which he considers necessary or expedient in the interests of any of his responsibilities. If the Government fails to do so, he has power to make an order which has the force of law. He also has the power to require the Government to take executive action which he considers necessary or expedient for the discharge of his responsibilities, or, if it fails to do so, he has the power to exercise any lawful function of the Government for that purpose.
- 29. The Constitution provides for the establishment of a Consultative Council, consisting of Her Majesty's Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, for the purpose of consultation between Her Majesty's Government and the Swaziland Government on the exercise of the reserved powers by Her Majesty's Commissioner.
- 30. The Swaziland Parliament has two houses: a House of Assembly and a Senate. The House of Assembly consists of a Speaker, twenty-four elected members, six nominated members, who are appointed by the King to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented, and the Attorney-General, who has no vote.

- 31. The Senate consists of a Speaker and twelve members, half elected by the members of the House of Assembly and the other half appointed by the King to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented.
- 32. All persons of the age of twenty-one years, except criminals and the insane, are qualified to register as voters, if they are citizens of Swaziland or citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies fulfilling a three-year residence qualification, or if their husband or parent possesses Swazi citizenship.
- 33. Swaziland is divided into eight three-member constituencies, delimited and kept under review by a Delimitation Commission consisting of a judge of the High Court of Swaziland as chairman and two other members appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
- 34. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Parliament has full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Swaziland, exercisable by bills passed through both houses and assented to by the King. The House of Assembly has exclusive power to initiate legislation on taxation and financial matters and is generally responsible for initiating legislation on other matters, but has no power to legislate in respect of Swazi law and custom, unless authorized by the Swazi National Council. The senate has power to initiate legislation on matters other than taxation and finance and Swazi law and custom.
- 35. Each house is empowered to refer a bill back to the other house for further consideration, but the Senate may not delay the passage of an appropriation bill. In the case of a "money bill" other than an appropriation bill, if the Senate fails to pass the bill within thirty days from the date it leaves the House of Assembly, the House of Assembly may submit the bill to the King for his assent.
- 36. Each Parliament will last for five years, unless dissolved earlier. The power to prorogue or dissolve Parliament is vested in the King, who will normally act on ministerial advice, but who may act in his discretion if the House of Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in the Government or if, in the event of the office of Prime Minister falling vacant, there is no reasonable prospect of finding a person for appointment who can command a majority in the House of Assembly.
- 37. Subject to the powers conferred on Her Majesty's Commissioner, executive authority is vested in the King. There is a cabinet consisting of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and up to six other ministers. There may also be assistant ministers. The function of the cabinet is to advise the King in the Government of Swaziland, and it is collectively responsible to Parliament for any advice given to him. The King appoints as Prime Minister the leader of the political party, or coalition of parties, enjoying the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly. The Deputy Prime Minister, other ministers and the assistant ministers are appointed by the King in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
- 38. The prerogative of mercy is vested in the King acting in accordance with the advice of a committee consisting of the Attorney-General and three ministers appointed by the King in his discretion to advise him on the exercise of this prerogative.

- 39. The Swazi National Council will continue to advise the King on all matters regulated by Swazi law and custom and connected with Swazi traditions and culture. Swazi Nation land will be vested in the King in trust for the Swazi Nation. Provisions relating to minerals will be made on the lines of those indicated in paragraph 17 above.
- 40. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and an integrated judicial system for the Territory. It contains a code of fundamental rights and freedoms, enforceable by the High Court.
- 41. Provisions relating to the position of the King, the code of fundamental rights, the judicature, the Public Service and Judicial Service Commissions and the procedure for amending the Constitution are entrenched and alterable only if supported by 75 per cent of the members present and voting at a joint sitting of both houses of the Parliament and thereafter supported by two thirds of all votes validly cast at a referendum.
- 42. Certain other important provisions are also entrenched and cannot be altered unless supported by 75 per cent of the members present and voting at a joint sitting of both houses of the Parliament. These include, *inter alia*, the composition and powers of the Parliament and the maintenance of the existing status and powers of the Swazi National Council.
- 43. According to the information transmitted by the United Kingdom, the position regarding the revision of the Constitution is that, so long as Swaziland remains a protected State, the Swaziland Government cannot submit to the United Kingdom Government any proposal for altering these provisions referred to above unless the specified degree of support has been obtained. However, the Constitution can still be amended by Her Majesty in Council, irrespective of whether the local procedures have been carried out, though there will normally be consultation with the Swaziland Government before any amendment is made. It is, of course, the intention that the local procedures described will be the necessary prerequisite for any amendment of the Constitution after independence.

Entry into force of new constitutional arrangements

- 44. On 24 April 1967, four days after a general election had been won by the Imbokodvo Party, the Ngwenyama signed an Agreement with the United Kingdom conferring on Swaziland the status of Protected State. The Agreement, the draft of which was contained in the White Paper of October 1966 (see paras. 22-23 above), came into operation on 25 April 1967. The internal self-government constitution, as outlined in the White Paper (see paras. 24-43 above), is set out in the Swaziland Constitution Order 1967, which was brought into force also on 25 April.
- 45. Having become the King of Swaziland and Head of State under the new Constitution, the Ngwenyama named Prince Makhosini Dlamini, leader of the Imbokodvo, to be the Territory's first Prime Minister. He also nominated six members of the House of Assembly to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented (one Swazi and five Europeans). The remaining member of the House is the Attorney-General, an official, who has no vote.
- 46. On 1 May, when it met for the first time, the House of Assembly elected a Speaker as well as six The remaining six members of the Senate were ap-

pointed by the King (four Swazis and two Europeans) to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented.

47. On 16 May, in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, the King appointed the remaining members of the cabinet (including the Deputy Prime Minister and six other ministers) and four assistant ministers.

1967 elections

- 48. In October 1966, the Government began to make preparations for the holding of elections to the new House of Assembly which was to be set up in accordance with the proposed Constitution. The elections took place on 19 and 20 April 1967, and the Imbokodvo won all twenty-four elected seats (representing eight three-member constituencies), gaining over 79 per cent of the votes cast. The Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) received 20 per cent and the few remaining votes were shared between the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) and the Swaziland United Front (SUF). [These three parties and the Swaziland Democratic Party (SDP)—which subsequently merged with the Imbokodvo-likewise failed to win any seats in the 1964 elections when the Imbokodvo won all the elected seats except for six which were won by the United Swaziland Association (USA). The latter did not put forward candidates in the 1967 elections.
- 49. The Imbokodvo, which describes itself as the political arm of the Swazi Nation and therefore a national movement, stated in a manifesto prepared for the latest election that its objectives were independence in 1968 with the Ngwenyama as King and Head of State; a free democracy based on the best Swazi traditions and modern constitutional law with an independent judiciary; a non-racial State with foundations of absolute equality and non-discrimination; internal peace and harmony; the maximum progress and development in all fields in the shortest possible time; the rapid expansion of free enterprise economy to enable as many citizens as possible to become economically active. The party further stated that its external policy would be based on the principles of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. It would cultivate friendly and mutually beneficial relations with other States and seek membership of the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity.
- 50. In their election manifestos, the three opposition parties, like the Imbokodvo, promised their supporters a modern non-racial and independent Swaziland with a democratically elected Parliament under the constitutional monarchy of the Ngwenyama. However, they called for major constitutional changes, to end the three-member constituencies and reduce the power of Swaziland's traditional forces, especially the King.
- 51. The NNLC further promised the Swazis that it would modify the present electoral system immediately after winning the election by introducing sixty single-member constituencies; expand educational and medical services in order to meet the needs of the Territory; embark on a policy of Africanization of the public services; achieve full employment within five years through the extension of industrialization and mechanization of agriculture; and continue to encourage the trade union movement. The NNLC also claimed

- that the Imbokodvo intended to turn Swaziland into a "Bantustan" satellite of South Africa.
- 52. At a pre-election rally held at Manzini early in April 1967, the NNLC adopted two resolutions which, among other things, accused the Imbokodvo of launching "a vicious campaign which encouraged chiefs to refuse permission for meetings of the opposition parties" and demanded freedom of speech and assembly.
- 53. Following the defeat of his party, Mr. Ambrose Zwane, leader of the NNLC, sent a cable to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, demanding suspension of the "fraudulent constitution" and fair elections. Mr. Zwane said that his party should have representation in the new legislature proportionate to the number of votes obtained. Subsequently, the Prime Minister of Swaziland made it clear that he would not recommend Mr. Zwane to the King for nomination to the House of Assembly, in spite of the fact that the NNLC's 20 per cent poll represented a proportionate increase of 8 per cent on a doubled electorate, since the 1964 election. The NNLC later reiterated its demand for a constitutional conference and further elections before independence.

Question of independence

- 54. On 2 May 1967, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations stated in a written answer to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons that it remained the intention of the United Kingdom Government, as stated in the White Paper of October 1966 (see paras. 22-23 above) that Swaziland should become independent by not later than the end of 1969.
- 55. On 11 May, Mr. Ambrose Zwane, leader of the NNLC, was reported to have renewed demands for a revision of the present Constitution before full independence. With no response from the United Kingdom Government to these demands, Mr. Zwane on 1 June called a Territory-wide strike to begin on 5 June.
- 56. Faced with his first potential crisis, the Prime Minister of Swaziland was reported to have warned civil servants that they would be dismissed instantly and lose all their retirement benefits if they joined the strike. He also warned strike organizers that intimidation would be regarded as a serious criminal offence. He said that there were constitutional channels through which people could agitate for a change in the Constitution.
- 57. On 2 June, Mr. Zwane announced that he would cancel the strike because he believed that the United Kingdom Government was ready to talk with the leaders of the NNLC about the revision of the Constitution. But he was told on 6 June by Her Majesty's Commissioner that his constitutional objections should be raised with the Swaziland Government.
- 58. On 7 July after he had formally opened the new Swaziland Parliament, the King announced that his Government was asking the United Kingdom to grant independence to the Territory in September 1968 instead of before the end of 1969.

Localization of the public service

59. On 17 May 1966, the Swaziland Government released the report⁸ of a special commission, headed

⁸ Swaziland, Report of the Localization Commission, Mbabane, January 1966.

- by Mr. T. C. Luke of Sierra Leone, which had been appointed to inquire into the localization of the civil service. At the same time the Government issued a statement announcing its acceptance of most of the commission's recommendations.
- 60. The main recommendations of the commission stressed the urgent need to find large sums of money for the expansion of education at all levels in order to meet the needs of a national public service. In the meantime, it recommended that in view of forthcoming independence, at least some of the higher policy-making posts and many more lower posts should be filled by Swazis. In 1965, out of 2,400 posts, 600 were occupied by European or African expatriates.
- 61. In its statement, the Government said, *inter alia*, that it fully recognized the need to provide extra posts whereby local officers could gain experience and training and that such posts would be created without delay. First steps had also been taken to improve secondary education.
- 62. In its first report on public service training programmes, which was published in April 1967, the Government stated that in 1966, sixty-seven local officers had been appointed to supernumerary training posts in the civil service. It had also sponsored 107 new trainees on courses abroad, financed by way of scholarships, and twenty-two others on correspondence courses. Nearly 2,800 persons had been enrolled in courses held by government training institutions in Swaziland. In addition, twelve private trainees had begun courses overseas. The Government also stated that the main difficulty had been the shortage of persons qualified to enter training institutions, and that financial stringency would apparently make it impossible to continue to expand certain training programmes in 1967, notably the supernumerary training grades scheme.

Economic conditions

General

- 63. Despite its small size, Swaziland is relatively well endowed with natural resources, possessing good soil, a favourable climate, a fairly abundant water supply and rich mineral deposits. Slightly more than half of the total land area is held by Swazis under communal ownership and nearly half is owned on individual tenure, mainly by Europeans.
- 64. The economy is predominantly agricultural, the principal cash crops being sugar, rice, citrus and pineapples, tobacco, and cotton. The first four are grown mainly in the European farming areas under irrigation. Apart from tobacco and cotton, other dry-land crops are maize, the staple diet of the Swazis, kaffir corn, millet, potatoes, vegetables and ground-nuts. Cattle-raising is traditional among the Swazis, the cattle being either exported alive or slaughtered at a recently established abattoir and cannery at Mbabane. There is also a large wood pulp industry based on three major forestry enterprises and two large mining undertakings engaged in the extraction of asbestos and iron ore. The iron mine, a joint project started in 1961 by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, a British company and the Commonwealth Development Corporation, operates under a contract calling for the supply of 12 million tons of ore to Japanese iron and steel companies over a period of ten years beginning in 1964. The iron ore is exported

- through Mozambique. Apart from secondary industries processing the Territory's agricultural products, such as two sugar mills, fruit and meat canning and cotton ginning, there are a number of light manufacturing or service industries. A government-financed industrial estate exists near Mbabane and other measures have been taken to encourage industrial investment.
- 65. As already stated, the Territory shares in a common customs union and currency area with South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, and much of its trade is by necessity with South Africa. Because of the free exchange, data on imports are not exact, but it is estimated that in 1965 Swaziland's imports, including cereals and other food-stuffs which are imported to supplement the Territory's own production, amounted to about £13.2 million. Exports, which can be ascertained more accurately, were valued at £15.1 million, an increase of 33 per cent over 1964 due mainly to increased mineral production. It may be noted that, of the total exports by value, 17 per cent went to South Africa, 37 per cent to the United Kingdom and 46 per cent to other countries. Statistics recently released by the Government show that exports in 1966 were worth £19 million, an increase of 27 per cent over the previous year resulting chiefly from the further expansion of the sugar, livestock and mining industries. As a result of the opening in 1964 of a railway line to the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique for the export of iron ore, the Territory's dependence on South Africa for its transit trade has decreased. A £2.15 million bulk sugar terminal and wharf at that port was opened on 3 December 1966, a project which was partly financed by loans from the Swaziland Sugar Association.
- 66. One of the two principal economic problems which face the Swaziland Government is the need to reduce the imbalance between the European farming sector, which is relatively heavily capitalized and oriented towards cash crops, and the Swazi agricultural sector, which is predominantly concerned with subsistence farming and has remained generally static despite substantial injections of development capital in recent years. Allied to this is the second problem, namely, a very substantial annual budgetary deficit amounting to an estimated £1.2 million or nearly one third of expected territorial revenue in 1966-1967, which was covered by grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom. According to a speech delivered by the then Secretary for Finance and Development to the legislative Council on 20 February 1967, the financial position of the Government has shown improvement as indicated by the fact that a smaller budgetary deficit, totalling about £960,000, is expected to occur in the current financial year. This deficit will again be met by the United Kingdom. Apart from these grants-in-aid, Swaziland also received financial assistance for its development expenditure in the form of funds made available by the United Kingdom under the Overseas Development and Service Act and its predecessors. In February 1966, the United Kingdom Government announced that development allocations under the Act had been made totalling £3.9 million for 1965-1968. representing an increase of £1,238,000 over the previous three years.
- 67. In recognition of the extensive need of Swaziland for development financing and technical assistance to improve the economic and social condition

of its people, the Special Committee and the General Assembly (see paras. 2 and 3 above), have in several resolutions recommended that the Territory should receive special consideration from the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the allocation of economic, financial and technical assistance under their programmes of technical co-operation. Details of such assistance rendered to Swaziland are given separately below. In addition, the General Assembly in 1965 decided to establish a fund for the economic development of Swaziland, together with the now independent States of Botswana and Lesotho, to be made up of voluntary contributions. So far, however, the contributions pledged have not been sufficient to enable the fund to be brought into operation.

68. Swaziland's developmental needs were also studied by an economic mission of the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development in late 1965, the report of which is not yet available. Replying to a question in the House of Commons on 5 May 1966, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. John Stonehouse, said that, pending consideration of the mission's recommendations, the Swaziland Government had prepared proposals for the use of the development funds made available for the period up to 31 March 1968 and that these were under consideration.

69. On 16 November 1966, the question of increasing the scale of economic aid to Swaziland was again raised in the House of Commons. Replying, the Minister of Overseas Development said that development aid from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund for 1965-1968 was at a considerably higher level than for the three previous years. No proposals for further economic aid were then under consideration, but the amount of budgetary assistance for 1967 would be considered shortly, and allocations of development aid for the period beginning on 1 April 1968 would be considered later.

70. According to a speech delivered by Her Majesty's Commissioner to the Legislative Council in October 1965, the development plan for 1965-1968 proposed by the Swaziland Government is concentrated on raising living standards, particularly those of the rural Swazi population, and on reducing the annual budgetary deficit. The steps being taken to achieve these objectives are set out in the following sections.

Development of agricultural production

71. The Swaziland Government has been seeking to raise the living standard of the rural Swazi population partly by promoting the rapid expansion of agricultural production in the Swazi areas. The main feature of the development programme for this sector is the establishment of rural development areas in which it is proposed to concentrate and co-ordinate intensive development projects based on self-help, and the introduction of pilot settlement schemes for selected Swazi farmers, which are designed for the production of high-value cash crops on a basis of leasehold tenure. The programmes also include: a major cotton-growing campaign for the coming season; encouragement of Swazi farmers to grow sugar-cane and pineapple; promotion of new forestry development and assistance to the declining tobacco industry in Southern Swaziland; creation of a statutory livestock producers' trust with the object of acquiring shares in the Swaziland Meat Corporation which operates an abattoir and cannery constructed in 1965; the possible establishment of a dairy control board; and enlargement of the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank's resources.

72. By August 1966, the Government had already established eight rural development areas and hoped to set up one additional area in each district per year. In announcing this, the Director of Agriculture said that there were possibilities of great improvement in agricultural production in view of the Swazis' desire for economic advancement and as a result of developments in other sectors, notably the improvement of communications, hydroelectric power, the expansion of local industries, improved credit facilities and the establishment of the Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre (SACUC).

Improvement of agricultural skills

73. The Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre, affiliated to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the former UBBS) was opened on 4 November 1966, as an expansion of the Malkerns Agricultural College and Short Course Centre. It was expected to cater for 134 full-time students and up to 32 short-term students. Three government certificate courses in agriculture, forestry and home economics, each with the duration of two years, had been offered at the Malkerns College since June 1966, and a full programme of short courses launched throughout the year. Moreover, the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had already decided to offer in 1967 a three-year diploma course in agriculture. By November, fourteen full scholarships had been awarded to agricultural students by non-governmental organizations in Swaziland and one by the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom. In addition, two commercial firms in the Territory, Usutu Pulp Company and Peak Timbers Limited, had provided twelve all-embracing scholarships for forestry

74. On 12 May 1967, the Principal of the SACUC was reported to have stated that since its establishment in late 1966, the institution had developed beyond expectations. It opened with an enrolment of 43 students, but within less than a year had acted as host to more than 1,200 people attending courses, seminars and meetings of all kinds. It had been involved not only in the teaching of agriculture and forestry but also in teaching other subjects ranging from geography to business management. In order to meet the increasing demands made upon it, the institution had acquired additional land and buildings. The Principal said that many of his students suffered from lack of basic education which, if they had received it, would have enabled them to understand more easily the seventeen different agricultural and related subjects offered at the institution.

Provision of agricultural credit

75. The Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank was opened at Mbabane on 14 August 1965, at a time when the agricultural industry was suffering the effects of severe drought and stock disease. By the end of November 1966, the Bank had received nearly 200 applications for loans totalling about £150,000. Of these, only about seventy applications totalling approximately £35,000 were either withdrawn or rejected for various reasons.

76. According to a statement by its Manager in November 1966, the Bank's capital resources consisted of a grant of £170,000 from the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Fund, £300,000 borrowed from the commercial bank and about £35,000 transferred from the Agricultural Revolving Loans Fund, a fund established to assist small farmers. These, with savings bank balances of £51,000, made a total of over £550,000, all of which, except for a loss on operations amounting to £20,000 and half of the savings bank deposits, was available for lending. Loans sanctioned so far, less repayments, totalled £60,400. Steps were taken in 1966 to establish two branches of the bank and two weekly agencies.

Development of water supplies

77. Swaziland is well watered compared with other parts of southern Africa, and water is therefore regarded as one of the Territory's more valuable economic assets. Five rivers, rising in South Africa, flow through the Territory and have been used for irrigated farming, especially of sugar and rice, and for hydroelectric power production. Owing to the rainfall pattern, however, the possibilities of further increasing the irrigated area are limited without the use of water storage and the study of water potential.

78. The Government is seeking to develop Swaziland's water resources on a large scale and is undertaking a comprehensive hydrological survey of the whole Territory. With the information already available, it is also investigating possible sites for storage dams on the main rivers. The Government is moreover studying the international implications involving the large-scale development of river resources and is considering the recommendations submitted to it by a commission established to review the existing law relating to the control and use of water throughout the Territory. An application for assistance in the preparation of a comprehensive water development plan for Swaziland was submitted to the United Nations Special Fund for consideration.

79. Early in October 1966, the Sand River dam, with a storage capacity of 33,000 acre-feet, was opened at Tshaneni. It was constructed by the Commonwealth Development Corporation at a cost of £1 million. The dam will expand the total area under irrigation in the Komati area from 20,000 to some 35,000 acres.

United Nations assistance to the Territory

80. In June 1966, the Special Fund component of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided \$US462,000 to meet part of the cost of an aerial geophysical survey of the Territory; this project, which will cost a total of \$US834,000, the difference to be paid by the Government, will be completed within four years.

81. In early 1967, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) approved a loan to Swaziland to assist in financing the expansion programme of the Swaziland Electricity Board. The programme is scheduled for completion in 1971 at a total estimated cost of \$5.45 million, of which the IBRD loan will cover \$2.75 million. Additional loans of \$750,000 will come from other sources and \$1.95 million will be provided by the Board. The programme will more than double the present capacity of the public power supply system in the Territory.

82. The representative of UNDP in Swaziland announced in June 1967 that the UNDP had earmarked £400,000 for a two-year study in Swaziland's Usutu River basin, which covers a large portion of the Territory, while the Swaziland Government would make a contribution of some £200,000. The object of the project was the appraisal of the land and water resources of the Usutu River basin and the preparation of a detailed plan for the development of its irrigation and power potential. In drawing up the plan, account would be taken of the effect of irrigation agriculture on the Territory's traditional pattern of land tenure and the settlement of Swazi farmers on irrigated allotments.

83. Details of projects approved for 1967/1968 under the Technical Assistance component of the UNDP are as follows:

	Cost (\$US)	Experts		Fellowships		Equipment, services
Approved category I programme		No.	Months	No.	Months	and supplies (\$US)
UNTA economic program- ming and projections ^a	44,000	1	24			
UNTA statisticsa	44,000	1	24			
UNTA public administration	3,600			1	6	
ILO human resources de- velopment	20,600	1	6	1	24	
FAO economic analysisa	47,600	1	24	1	6	
FAO rural institutions and						
services ^a	40,200	1	24	1	12	3,000
UNESCO teacher training	91,600	2	48	1	6	
WHO tuberculosis controla	63,055	4	48			500
Total	354,655b					

a Projects continuing from the 1965-1966 biennium.

84. In January 1967, the Administrator of UNDP authorized an allocation of \$US45,000 from the Revolving Fund for two additional experts in the fields of nutrition education and home economics and agricultural extension.

85. Under the 1966 Regular Programme of Technical Assistance, an expert was sent to the Territory, on a two-year appointment, to advise the Government concerning community development. In 1966, the United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance Opera-

b Representing an increase of \$76,119 over the previous two years.

tions also sent to Swaziland a Dutch associate economics expert and a Danish associate statistician, each on an initial assignment of one year, under the associate expert scheme. This scheme results from agreement between the United Nations and the donor Governments whereby experts with adequate educational qualifications but limited experience are supplied as assistants to senior United Nations experts at no cost to the United Nations or to the receiving Government.

Social conditions

Elimination of racial discrimination

86. In March 1967, on the basis of a proposal by one of its members, the Legislative Council unanimously adopted a motion, stating that "in view of the fact that it is common knowledge that forms of subtle discrimination still exist in Swaziland, the Government should investigate its extent and take what action it considers necessary to remedy matters". It is also provided that a race relations board be created by the Government as a permanent body comprising "three reputable citizens of Swaziland who will have the task of investigating reports of discrimination which are redressed to them or investigating discrimination where they think it might exist".

Labour

87. The principal occupations in Swaziland are agricultural, forestry, mining, construction and public service. Apart from a few small secondary or light industries, the chief industrial employers are the sugar mills, a wood-pulp factory and a fruit cannery. Since many Swazis are whole- or part-time farmers, the number seeking paid employment varies, depending especially on agricultural conditions. In 1965, which was a year of severe drought, about half the male Swazis of working age were in paid employment. Of these, 24,426 were registered as being employed in Swaziland and about 6,460 were working in the mines of South Africa. In addition, 4,555 foreign Africans were employed in Swaziland. Whereas there is a marked shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers, there is growing unemployment among unskilled workers. This is due partly to a decline in the number of Swazis who can obtain employment in South Africa, but mainly to a progressive increase in the number of unskilled Swazis seeking employment (averaging about 2,000 per year) which results from a movement into the urban areas. Another factor is the increasing mechanization of production which leads employers to seek skilled rather than unskilled workers.

88. In combating the problem of emerging unemployment, the Government has also stressed the urgent need for a comprehensive and intensified industrial training programme to enable the Swazis to play their full part in the Territory's industrial development. At the Government's request, Professor T. N. Tolani, a technical training expert from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was sent to Swaziland in 1965 to prepare such a programme.

89. Early in 1966, the Government was reported to have accepted Professor Tolani's recommendations, under which a national council would be set up to advise the Government on all industrial training matters. The council would consist of representatives of Government, employers and workers, and would absorb or replace existing bodies. The Council's first task would be to determine priorities for a national

training programme. The council's day-to-day work would be carried out by an industrial, vocational training and trade testing branch, which would be created in the Department of External Affairs and Labour.

90. Professor Tolani recommended that the Swaziland Trade Training Centre, which at present provides a three-year course for artisans, be up-graded into an Industrial Training Institute, with modern facilities for the training of all classes of industrial workers, from the apprentice to the supervisor. He also recommended the expansion of clerical training facilities, mainly at the Swaziland Staff Training Institute, as well as at the Mbuluzi Home Economics Teacher Training and Housecraft Centre. He emphasized the need to train instructors before the main training programme was initiated, Professor Tolani has since been invited to return to Swaziland to assist in the implementation of his proposals.

91. Apart from three brief disputes, involving 388 workers and resulting in a loss of 310 man-days in 1965, labour-employer relations were undisturbed, according to the information transmitted for that year. Because of a reported lack of support for the National Joint Consultative Council, particularly on the part of the trade union representatives, it was decided to replace it by a statutory Labour Advisory Board. A law establishing a Labour Advisory Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner (Chairman), four employrepresentatives, four employees' representatives and two other officials, was enacted in August 1966. Following an inquiry in 1964, which recommended that statutory wage regulation should be introduced in certain industries in which trade unions were not well established, wages councils have been appointed for the wholesale and retail distributive trade, the sugar milling industry and the building industry.

Educational conditions

92. The development of education poses a special problem for Swaziland because of the difficulty of reconciling two apparently conflicting requirements. On the one hand there is an urgently felt need to expand and improve educational facilities in order to increase the participation of Swazis both in the public service and in the economy, and on the other hand there is the desire to reduce the budgetary deficit which makes Swaziland dependent on foreign aid. To achieve the first objective within the severe financial limitations, the policy of the Swaziland Government is to expand secondary education while maintaining the existing primary system at the highest possible standard of efficiency; only under extraordinary circumstances, such as a localized increase in population, it is felt, can new primary schools be established or existing ones enlarged in the immediate future.

93. According to the report of the Director of Education, public expenditure on education amounted to £783,213 in the fiscal year 1964/1965 (an increase of £61,641 over the preceding year), of which £437,618 was budget expenditure and £159,730 a Colonial Development and Welfare grant. In addition, expenditure by religious missions totalled £163,268. The budget estimates for 1966/1967 show the allocation for expenditure on education under the ordinary budget, amounting to £630,368. On the basis of the information transmitted by the United Kingdom, budget expenditure on education, taken as a proportion of total territorial revenue excluding grant-in-aid, has remained constant at about 20 per cent, and the

actual amount of such expenditure has increased substantially. Expenditure on education from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund has also increased substantially, but a reliable estimate of such expenditure in 1966/1967 is not available.

94. The following table shows the situation in regard to schools and pupil enrolments during 1965:

	Schools	Enrolment	Teachers
Primary educationa	332	49,513	1,376
Secondary education ^b	32	2,930	182
Teacher training ^e	3	159	19
Technical and vocational training		106	19

^a Including 316 African schools with 47,631 students and 1,290 teachers.

^b Including 25 African schools with 2,383 students and 138 teachers.

c For Africans only.

95. Examination results obtained by students in the primary, secondary and teacher-training schools in 1965 were as follows:

	Entries	Passes
Standard VI	2,117	1,275
Junior Certificate	491	256
Standard for entry to University of Bots-		
wana, Lesotho and Swaziland	99	74
Overseas Cambridge School Certificate	. 99	96ª
Primary Lower Certificate	24	22b
Primary Higher Certificate	49	40c

^a Of these, 9 passed in the first class, 32 in the second, 33 in the third and the rest obtained G.C.E. "O" level.

bIncluding 13 passes, 8 partial passes and 1 supplementary

pass. c Including 21 passes, 10 partial passes and 9 supplementary passes.

96. In 1965, three primary schools were rebuilt or enlarged and several new ones constructed, mostly by private concerns. Capital improvements were completed at four secondary schools and plans were made for extensions at these and ten other schools. Facilities for primary teacher training at two colleges were expected to be considerably expanded in 1966.

97. The policy of progressive integration of the various races at the primary level introduced in 1962 has continued. The introduction of a common syllabus for all races was expected to reach Standards II-IV in 1966 and Standard V in 1967. It was decided that limited integration should begin in the secondary schools in 1966.

University education.

98. Swaziland shares with Botswana and Lesotho in a jointly owned university located in Lesotho. Established in 1964 by the acquisition of the premises of a Roman Catholic College, it is financed partly by the three Governments, partly by the United Kingdom and partly by funds from other sources, notably the United States of America. Apart from its courses for resident students, which are designed specifically to meet the needs of the three countries, the University has an extensive extra-mural programme and provides courses in Swaziland at the Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre, which is affiliated to it.

99. In 1965, the number of students in residence at the University was 220, of whom 30 were from Swaziland. For the first time, students who had completed their first two years of the four-year degree course, sat for the Part I examinations. Out of the total entry of 74 students, 54 passed and 6 were allowed to repeat.

100. As the result of the emergence of Botswana and Lesotho, a commission was established in 1966 to review the role of the University and the arrangements concerning its financing. The commission is composed of Sir Roger Stevens, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds, as its chairman, one ministerial representative from each of the three participating countries and five other members, mostly drawn from the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development. The commission's terms of reference were as follows:

- (a) To review the higher education needs of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland;
- (b) To recommend arrangements which would meet those needs, and in particular to advise on the role which could be played by the University;
- (c) To recommend to the three Governments and the United Kingdom Government the arrangements which they should adopt to provide the capital and recurrent financing required by the University during the period ending 31 March 1970.

The commission began its work on 1 August 1966, but its report is not yet available.

101. Apart from the necessity of changing the name of the University in view of the independence of Botswana and Lesotho, other changes were made in its charter and statutes eliminating the restriction whereby the University could previously award only bachelors degrees, and providing for the inclusion of the principal of the Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre as an *ex officio* member of the University Council.

102. During the year, the University Grants Committee, on which Swaziland is represented, recommended a recurrent budget of £270,000 for the provision of grants in 1966/1967, to which Swaziland was expected to contribute £81,000.

103. On 2 November 1966, the University was reported to have appointed a commission of inquiry into the causes of a one-day strike by almost all the 285 African students on 14 September. The Students' Representative Council had demanded the immediate resignation of the Dean of Students Affairs, Mr. Christopher von Nispen, who, it had been claimed, had done nothing to improve food and dining-room conditions.

104. The University closed for approximately six weeks on 15 September after a severe water shortage which had preceded the students' strike. When the University resumed lectures on 1 November, thirteen students, including all members of the Students' Representative Council, were barred from entering the campus. The Vice-Chancellor said that he had decided that they must be temporarily excluded from the University, as their return would not be conducive to the peaceful resumption of academic activities. On 25 November, it was reported that the water supply of the University had improved but that strict economy would be necessary until a new water storage dam could be completed.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee⁹

Introduction

105. The Special Committee considered Swaziland at its 561st, 568th and 569th meetings held in New York between 15 September and 23 October 1967. The Special Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General concerning the Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/273).

106. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that the total amount of contributions to the Fund as of 10 September 1967 was approximately \$18,560 made up of the following contributions: Cyprus, £100 (\$280); Democratic Republic of the Congo, \$2,500; Jamaica, \$980; Kuwait, \$2,000; Liberia, \$6,000; Libya, \$4,000; and Pakistan, \$2,800. Furthermore, two Governments (Denmark and India) had indicated that they would contribute to the Fund when it became operational. Finally the Secretary-General reported that as the contributions pledged had been insufficient, it had not been possible to bring the Fund into operation.

Written petitions

107. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions:

Petitioner

Document No.

 Mr. S. J. Zwane, Chief External Representative, Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC)
 Mr. Ambrose Zwane,

A/AC.109/PET.601 and Add.2

President, NNLC A/AC.1

A/AC.109/PET.601/Add.1

President, NNLC
Prince Mafahlefehle Dlamini, Chairman, Swaziland Immigrant's Association

A/AC.109/PET.623

General statements

108. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that, in the past, the Special Committee had always considered the question of Swaziland in conjunction with that of two former Non-Self-Governing Territories, Basutoland and Bechuanaland. Since those two Territories had achieved independence in 1966, under the names of Botswana and Lesotho, the Special Committee would now consider the situation in Swaziland separately for the first time.

109. Swaziland, which had recently become a Protected State, was bound on the north, south and west by the Republic of South Africa and on the east by Mozambique, to which it had access by road and rail. According to the census taken the previous year, Swaziland had 375,000 inhabitants, of whom all but 12,000 were Africans. The country was marked by a strong sense of ethnic unity and by vigorous national traditions and institutions, which had their focus in the King, until recently known as the Ngwenyama.

110. In the past twelve months there had been some very important political developments in the Territory, which augured well for Swaziland's future. Those twelve months had seen the introduction of internal self-government, the holding of general elec-

tions under a new constitution, the signature of a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and Swaziland whereby Swaziland became a Protected State and the Ngwenyama was recognized as King, and lastly, a declaration by the newly elected Government of its intention to seek independence for Swaziland in September 1968.

111. Those constitutional developments had been the outcome of discussions held by a constitutional committee that had met in 1965 and 1966 and represented all shades of opinion; the Committee's majority recommendations had been unanimously approved by the Legislative Council in being under the 1964 Constitution. In the course of the Constitutional Committee's deliberations, the United Kingdom Government had made it clear that it was ready to give Swaziland internal self-government and also wished to see Swaziland attain independence by 1969 at the latest. The United Kingdom Government had thus no difficulty in accepting the Constitutional Committee's proposals. Only one point had proved controversial, and that was the exercise of control over minerals in the Territory. Whereas the Constitutional Conference had recommended that the King should exercise that power in consultation with the traditional authority in the Territory—the Swazi National Council—the United Kingdom Government had taken the view that it would be proper for the Cabinet, which was the executive organ under the new Constitution, to tender advice in the matter to the King.

112. The only other question on which the two main political parties in the Territory had failed to agree was that of electoral constituencies. Under the 1964 Constitution, the Legislative Council was composed of twenty-four members, of whom twelve were elected on a national roll and returned from four constituencies. Each of the constituencies elected three members, one of whom had to be a European. One suggestion made to the Constitutional Committee was that the Territory should be divided into single-member constituencies, but the proposal had been rejected on the grounds that, if a constituency was too small, the candidate would be exposed to pressures and that that would encourage corruption and intimidation. The compromise solution proposed by the Constitutional Committee to the United Kingdom Government and accepted by the latter was that the number of constituencies should be increased from four to eight, and that each should return three members. That was the system embodied in the new Constitution, which had come into effect on 25 April 1967. It should also be mentioned that the 1967 Constitution abolished the earlier electoral system whereby the Swazi and European members had been elected from separate rolls and certain seats in the Legislative Assembly had been reserved for Europeans. The new House of Assembly, elected during 1967, had twenty-four members elected by universal adult suffrage, regardless of race. The voting had been restricted to Swaziland citizens and to the limited number of United Kingdom citizens who could establish a qualifying residential period in the Territory. In addition to the twenty-four elected members, the House of Assembly had six members appointed by the King of Swaziland, in his discretion.

113. Under the 1967 Constitution, Swaziland also had a Senate, half of whose members were appointed by the House of Assembly, and an Executive Cabinet whose ministers were appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister. The latter was appointed

⁹ This section includes those portions of the statements made on Swaziland in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the consensus adopted by the Special Committee are given in section D.

by the King as the elected member in the House of Assembly most likely to command a majority.

114. Although the Kingdom of Swaziland had become a Protected State on 25 April 1967, when the Constitution as a whole had come into effect, the constitutional provisions regarding general elections had been applied earlier, so that the elections for the new House of Assembly had been able to take place on 19 and 20 April. Two main parties had submitted candidates: the Imbokodvo and the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC). Eighty per cent of the electorate had participated in the ballot. The Imbokodvo, all of whose candidates were Swazis, had obtained 79.4 per cent of all votes cast, and won all the seats. The NNLC, which was the main opposition party, had polled only 20.2 per cent of the votes. It was impossible to tell whether, as its leaders claimed, the party would have gained seats in the House of Assembly under a single-member constituency system. In any case it was apparent that the Imbokodvo commanded the support of the overwhelming majority of the people and that the establishment of an Imbokodvo Government, under the leadership of Prince Makhosini Dlamini, reflected the wishes of the population. During recent weeks, the NNLC had apparently exchanged views on the subject with the Prime Minister of Swaziland and his colleagues. It might be that those direct contacts would lead to some agreement on the outstanding points at issue. At the present stage of Swaziland's development, it was clear that any change in the electoral system before independence could not be a matter for unilateral decision by the administering Power but must be a matter for the Swazi people.

115. On the subject of independence, it should be recalled that even before the Constitutional Committee had completed its work, the United Kingdom Government had made known its wish to see Swaziland independent by the end of 1969 at the latest. The Government that had taken office in April 1967 had declared its intention of seeking independence in September 1968. It had been part of the election programme of the Government party to apply, upon independence, for membership in the United Nations. According to the latest information available, it was very possible that the question of independence might be placed before the Parliament of Swaziland at its forthcoming session.

116. Until recently, the economic situation in Swaziland had been a source of concern, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX). However, Swaziland had a more broadly based economy than the other former dependent territories covered in that resolution. Swaziland had important deposits of asbestos and iron ore. An iron extraction plant opened in 1964 was due to supply 12 million tons of ore to Japan over the next ten years. Asbestos had for some time been an important source of government revenue. The demand for power had led to an increase in the hydroelectric power plant's capacity. Secondary industries had been developed in recent years, and included a meat cannery and a cotton ginnery. Sugar and forest products represented the most important export commodities for Swaziland, which had an assured quota under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement of over 130,000 tons a year. Most exports showed a steady rate of expansion.

117. The expansion and diversification of the economy, which had been most notable in the past two or three years, had been stimulated by the provision of

basic infrastructures in communications and power. Despite that economic expansion, the United Kingdom Government had to continue to subsidize Swaziland with grants to enable it to balance its budget, but in a few years Swaziland should be able to do so. Besides that budgetary aid (£1.5 million in 1966 alone) the United Kingdom Government furnished Swaziland aid in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance amounting in all to two-and-a-third million pounds sterling in 1966, of which £1 million was in grants and technical assistance. His Government expected to maintain its aid at that level until the end of the 1968-1969 financial year. After that, the amount and form of aid would be negotiated at the time of the Territory's independence.

118. That encouraging information showed that Swaziland had a very promising future. It had strong national traditions and unity, as the homeland of the Swazi nation. Those traditions and that unity would be great assets for the newly independent State. The new constitutional arrangements, which reflected the various shades of opinion in the country, represented an impressive attempt to blend with the traditional institutions of the Swazi people the requirements of modern democratic government based on universal adult franchise and responsible cabinet administration. It was now for the elected Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini Dlamini, and the members of the Swaziland Parliament to recommend a precise date for independence. Of course, economic independence should wherever possible go hand in hand with political independence. The expansion and diversification of Swaziland's economy augured well for the future of that Territory as an independent member of the world community.

119. The representative of Venezuela was happy to see that Swaziland had arrived at a turning point in its development and that it was on the road to independence. He thanked the United Kingdom representative for the valuable information he had supplied.

120. The representative of Tunisia requested details on the economic relations existing between Swaziland and its neighbours, South Africa and Mozambique. Difficulties might well arise in Swaziland's relations with those two countries when it became independent. He asked in particular whether South African capital was invested in Swaziland.

121. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the problems arising from Swaziland's geographical position were similar to those of Botswana and Lesotho. One difference was that Swaziland had access to the sea by the railway which connected the Territory to the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. The relations between Swaziland and South Africa paralleled those which South Africa had with Lesotho and Botswana. Some 6,000 Swazis were employed in South Africa.

122. The question of relations between South Africa on the one hand and Swaziland and the former Non-Self-Governing Territories of Basutoland and Bechuanaland on the other hand had been dealt with in the report of the Mission which had visited the three Territories in 1965. 10 He drew particular attention to chapter I, paragraph 2, of that report. Investments by South Africa in Swaziland were considerable but there was no exact statistical information available, partly because Swaziland belonged to the same

¹⁰ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/5958, annex.

currency and banking area as South Africa. Membership of the same currency area gave Swaziland the advantage of access to a source of international capital quite apart from capital of domestic South African origin. Moreover, private investment in Swaziland had been stimulated by large scale public investment and development aid, which had built up the infrastructure of the Swaziland economy to a point where the Territory had been able to attract private investment on a productive scale. The great bulk of the aid had come from the United Kingdom. He had given full information on that matter in an earlier statement and would only add that such aid had increased steadily in recent years; investments by the Commonwealth Development Corporation had totalled £2,109,000 in 1964 and £2,634,000 in 1965. The Commonwealth Development and Welfare grants allocation for the triennium 1965-1968 had been £3.9 million. In per capita terms, United Kingdom bilateral aid to Swaziland in 1965 had amounted to £18.49 per head of the population.

123. Swaziland had also received considerable aid from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). For example, in 1964 the Bank had granted a loan of about £1.5 million towards the establishment of hydroelectric plants and it had approved a further loan of nearly £1 million for the expansion of that project in April 1967. Swaziland also received a loan of £1 million from IDA during the period 1960-1963 for road construction purposes.

124. Thus, the basic expansion of Swaziland's economy in recent years had been financed mainly by funds from the United Kingdom and from international institutions rather than from South Africa. The investment of recent years, however, had had the effect of attracting private investment, much of which came from or through South Africa. In many cases, private investment was undertaken in partnership with public investment.

125. Again, there could be no precise figures for the volume of Swaziland's trade with South Africa. The great bulk of Swaziland's imports came from or through South Africa, a fact which was inevitable in view of Swaziland's geographical position. With regard to exports, whereas in 1961 more than half the total exports of the Territory had gone to South Africa, less than one fifth of its total exports had gone to South Africa in 1966; although Swaziland's exports had more than tripled in value, the level of exports to South Africa had remained steady.

126. The existence of the currency union also meant that Swaziland had virtually no foreign exchange problems. It was thus able to service external debts without regard to the balance of payments, and that had facilitated the raising of foreign loans for development purposes from places other than South Africa. Swaziland also benefited from being part of the South African customs union in that it received a fixed proportion of South African customs and excise duties. Available evidence suggested that income received by Swaziland from that source was no less than it would be if it levied duties itself. The customs union relieved Swaziland of the burden of administering its own customs and excise system. Moreover, the fact that there was no balance-of-payments problem did not affect the fairly large surplus which Swaziland earned in its trade balance.

127. Thus, the economic relations between Swaziland and South Africa were such as were inevitable between two closely adjacent countries at different stages of economic development. In certain fields, Swaziland had a special relationship with South Africa which appeared to be of benefit to both parties. There was no evidence to support the view that the relationship between the two countries made Swaziland the victim of exploitation by South African or other foreign firms. The Government of Swaziland regarded outside investment as an indispensable aid to further development.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

128. At the 568th meeting, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that, following informal consultations with a number of delegations, he had prepared a draft consensus on the question of Swaziland, which read as follows:

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the previous General Assembly resolutions relating to Swaziland, and having examined the petitions submitted to it, the Special Committee reaffirms its previous resolutions and recommendations and calls upon the administering Power to grant independence to the Territory without delay and in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples.

"The Special Committee also requests the administering Power to take immediate steps for the return to the indigenous inhabitants of all the land taken from them.

"Further, the Special Committee requests the administering Power to take all appropriate actions to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence and to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of the interventionist policy of the racist régime in South Africa.

"Moreover, the Special Committee urges the administering Power to take the necessary steps to bring about the economic independence of the Territory vis-à-vis South Africa, and in particular to implement fully, with the co-operation of the United Nations bodies concerned, the recommendations of the Secretary-General as endorsed in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

"Finally, noting from the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/AC.109/273 that the total amount of contributions to the Fund established by General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) has been insufficient to enable the Fund to become operative, the Special Committee recommends to the General Assembly that the Fund be dissolved, and that, subject to consent of the donor Governments, the funds outstanding be made available to the UNDP for expenditure in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland."

129. At the 569th meeting, the Chairman said that a revised text of the consensus he had previously introduced had been circulated to members. The last sentence of the text would now read:

"Finally, noting from the report of the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/273) that the total amount of contributions to the Fund established by General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) has been insufficient to enable the Fund to become operative, the Special Committee recommends that subject to the

consent of the donor Governments, the General Assembly should decide to transfer these contributions to the General Fund of the UNDP in the light of the latter's expectation and desire to provide increased assistance to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland."

- 130. The representative of the United Kingdom stated, with regard to the draft consensus before the Special Committee, that his delegation was somewhat surprised not to have been asked to participate in the consultations which had taken place. Perhaps as a result, the consensus did not seem to him adequately to reflect the view expressed by his delegation. In particular, the recommendation that the United Kingdom Government should grant independence without delay ignored the fact that the question of independence had already been decided. Moreover, the consensus made no mention of the recent achievement by Swaziland of full internal self-government and its attainment of the status of a protected State.
- 131. With regard to the reference in the second sentence to land taken from the indigenous inhabitants, his delegation had commented in the past on similar points in earlier resolutions and did not need to repeat those comments. He would point out, however, that the question of land ownership was now entirely within the competence of the elected Government of Swaziland and, under the agreed Constitution, the United Kingdom Government no longer had the power to carry out the request contained in that sentence even if it wished to do so. He understood that it was generally accepted in Swaziland that existing occupiers of land should not have their security disturbed, whatever the history of the acquisition of the land. The Constitution, moreover, included provisions for protection from deprivation of property. It also included provisions for protection from discrimination which might be equally relevant to the request in the draft consensus.
- 132. With regard to the request for action to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Territory, that was the responsibility of his Government until independence was reached, but his delegation had no reason to believe that the territorial integrity of Swaziland was threatened. With regard to the fourth sentence, he thought that the information which he had given showed that the whole tendency of the United Kingdom's aid and development policy recently had been in the direction advocated in the draft
- 133. In the light of those comments, his delegation could not but dissociate itself from the consensus. Moreover, the procedure of consensus hardly seemed suitable in such a case, and the right course might be for delegations which supported the draft to submit a draft resolution which could be put to the vote.
- 134. The Chairman, replying to the United Kingdom representative, said that he had yet to see either a resolution or a consensus of the Special Committee accepted by the United Kingdom delegation as representing its views. As for the question of whether the Special Committee should proceed by consensus or by a resolution, he pointed out that on several occasions in the past, decisions had been adopted by consensus with the Special Committee taking note of any reservations expressed. If, however, the United Kingdom representative insisted that the Special Committee should adopt a resolution in the present instance, and if he was supported by the majority of members, then the Special Committee would, of course, proceed accord-

- ingly. When he had originally submitted the draft consensus, after consultation with certain members, he had known that some delegations would express reservations concerning it.
- 135. The representative of Finland, without entering a formal reservation, said that his delegation had doubts concerning some points in the revised draft consensus, particularly the request to the administering Power to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Swaziland and to take appropriate action to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence. He pointed out that his delegation had abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 2134 (XXI).
- 136. The representative of Italy, also without entering a formal reservation, said that his delegation, too, had some doubts concerning the validity of the request to the administering Power to protect the territorial integrity of Swaziland in the face of the interventionist policies of South Africa. That was largely a problem for Swaziland after independence.
- 137. The representative of Venezuela said that, in general, he shared the views which had been expressed. He proposed that the order of the requests to the administering Power in the third sentence, after the words "to take all appropriate action", should be reversed.
- 138. The representative of the United States of America said that his country continued to support the right of the people of Swaziland freely to express their desires and, unhampered by outside influences, to govern themselves in accordance with those desires. He welcomed the fact that Lesotho and Botswana had already attained independence and had Governments elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage and full racial equality, and he hoped that, in contrast with South Africa, they and Swaziland would provide enduring examples of multiracial co-operation in achieving economic, social and political progress. The serious economic, social and political difficulties which would face Swaziland should not be minimized, but the future Government of Swaziland would be in the best position to determine how they could be overcome. The revised draft consensus did not take a full and realistic account of all the elements of the situation and his delegation did not entirely agree with its conclusions. It therefore asked that its reservations should be recorded.
- 139. The representative of Australia said that, in view of the brief debate that had been held on the question of Swaziland, it would probably be better to proceed by a draft resolution rather than by consensus. The revised draft consensus raised considerable difficulties for his delegation, since it did not take sufficient account of the great progress made towards independence during the previous year or give due weight to the geographical situation of Swaziland, which raised great economic and political problems. He failed to see how the administering Power could implement the substantive measures recommended. His delegation therefore wished to reserve its position.
- 140. The representative of India expressed his delegation's appreciation of the revised draft consensus and supported the amendment proposed by Venezuela. His delegation had no reservations concerning the revised draft consensus but would have preferred it to include an indication that the people of Swaziland had expressed the wish to become independent by September 1968, and not before the end of 1969.

141. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, although his delegation had frequently found it difficult to accept a consensus or resolution without reservations, it believed that, given the favourable omens and prospects in relation to Swaziland and its early achievement of independence, a form of consensus acceptable to all delegations including his own could have been achieved if there had been an opportunity for consultation with the administering Power. If it was the general wish of members to proceed by consensus instead of by a resolution, and to adopt the formulation under consideration, his delegation would not raise any formal objection, provided that it was made clear in the records that the United Kingdom felt obliged to dissociate itself from it.

142. The representative of Uruguay said that it was the responsibility of the Special Committee to seek international guarantees to ensure that Swaziland and the former Territories of Basutoland and Bechuanaland might achieve independence free from all pressure from or intervention by neighbouring States or Territories, especially those ruled by non-African minorities or majorities. That was an insuperable problem in the case of Territories entirely surrounded by enemies. It had been accepted that the responsibility of the administering Power extended only up to the time when the Territories achieved independence and it had been hoped that international guarantees would then be forthcoming. The Special Committee would like to ask the administering Power to do everything possible to protect those Territories. It had been argued, however, that it would be an insult to the newly independent States if undue emphasis was placed on the need for international assistance in solving their legal, political and economic problems and in defending them against their neighbours. The Venezuelan amendment clarified that point and made it possible for his delegation to support the revised draft consensus, on the understading that it was not a demand imposed upon the administering Power but simply a request to it to protect the people until they achieved independence. After that, it would be the responsibility of the international community to provide the necessary guarantees.

143. At its 569th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the revised draft consensus, as amended by Venezuela, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record of the meeting.

144. The text of the consensus concerning the question of Swaziland adopted by the Special Committee at its 569th meeting on 23 October 1967 reads as follows:

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the previous General Assembly resolutions relating to Swaziland, and having examined the petitions submitted to it, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples reaffirms its previous resolutions and recommendations and calls upon the administering Power to grant independence to the Territory without delay and in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

"The Special Committee also requests the administering Power to take immediate steps for the return to the indigenous inhabitants of all the land taken from them.

"Further, the Special Committee requests the administering Power to take all appropriate action to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Swaziland in the face of the interventionist policy of the racist régime in South Africa and to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence.

"Moreover, the Special Committee urges the administering Power to take the necessary steps to bring about the economic independence of the Territory vis-à-vis South Africa, and in particular to implement fully, with the co-operation of the United Nations bodies concerned, the recommendations of the Secretary-General as endorsed in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

"Finally, noting from the report of the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/273) that the total amount of contributions to the Fund established by General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) has been insufficient to enable the Fund to become operative, the Special Committee recommends that subject to the consent of the donor Governments the General Assembly should decide to transfer these contributions to the General Fund of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the light of the latter's expectation and desire to provide increased assistance to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland."

GENERAL

ASSEMBLY

(Part III)*

ANNEXES

NEW YORK, 1967

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

Official Records

Agenda item 23: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

DOCUMENT A/6700/REV.1

Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

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^{**} The present version of chapters XII to XXIV is a consolidation of the text of the following documents as they appeared in mimeographed form: A/6700/Add.11, dated 27 November 1967; A/6700/Add.12, dated 15 November 1967; A/6700/Add.8, dated 11 October 1967; A/6700/Add.13, dated 24 November 1967; A/6700/Add.14 (part II), dated 29 November 1967; A/6700/Add.14 (part II), dated 1 December 1967; and A/6700/Add.15, dated 29 November 1967. For a check list of relevant documents, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23.

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CHAPTER XII*

FRENCH SOMALILAND

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

- 1. In 1966, the Special Committee considered French Somaliland at meetings held in June and October. The Special Committee did not at that time adopt any recommendations concerning the Territory, but decided to transmit to the General Assembly the information contained in the relevant working paper prepared by the Secretariat, together with the statements made on the item by representatives and petitioners (A/6300/Rev.1,¹ chap. XII, para. 219).
- 2. The General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, considered the chapter of the report of the Special Committee relating to French Somaliland² and subsequently adopted resolution 2228 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, the operative part of which reads as follows:

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

3. On 23 February 1967, the Secretary-General submitted a report (see annex to this chapter below) as called for by paragraph 5 of resolution 2228 (XXI).

B. Information on the Territory³

Status of the Territory

4. French Somaliland is described as an Overseas Territory of the French Republic.

Present political structure

5. The main organs of government and administration are the Governor, the Government Council and the Territorial Assembly. The Governor is the head of the Territory (chef du territoire) and the representative of the French Republic. He is appointed by the French Government and is directly responsible for the administration of "State Services" (services d'Etat).

- * Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.II.
- ¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.
 - ² Ibid., chap. XII.
- ³ More detailed background information on the Territory is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (*ibid.*, chap. XII, paras. 1-66). The information presented in this section, which has been derived from published sources, deals mainly with political developments during the period 31 August 1966 to 31 July 1967.

- 6. The Government Council, under the presidency of the Governor, is composed of eight members, elected by the Territorial Assembly from within or outside its membership. Each of them has the title of Minister and the senior Minister has the title of Vice-President of the Government Council. The Government Council is responsible for the administration of territorial interests. It may not be dissolved except by decree of the French Government after consultation with the Territorial Assembly.
- 7. The Territorial Assembly consists of thirty-two members elected from seven multi-member electoral constituencies. The vote is based on universal adult suffrage. The Assembly is empowered to take decisions on territorial matters in the form of regulations.
- 8. French Somaliland is represented in the French Parliament by a deputy and a senator. It also has a representative in the French Economic and Social Council.

Political developments and the announcement of a referendum on the status of the Territory

- 9. Following the demonstrations held during the visit of President de Gaulle to Djibouti on 25 and 26 August 1966,⁴ three ministers of Somali origin announced their resignations, and Mr. Ali Aref, Vice-President of the Government Council since 1960 and leader of the Rassemblement démocratique Afar (RDA) left for Paris and agreed to confide his post in an acting capacity to Mr. Hassan Gouled. A new Governor of French Somaliland, Mr. Louis Saget, was appointed some days later.
- 10. On 21 September, following a meeting of the French Council of Ministers, it was announced that in view of the internal and external situation of French Somaliland and having regard to the provisions which could be made by law with regard to its status and destiny in relation to the general interest of the Republic, the Government had decided that the population of the Territory would be directly consulted on that subject by means of a referendum before 1 July 1967. The draft law concerning that consultation would be laid before the Parliament.
- 11. The Governor of the Territory, on his return from consultations in Paris, on 9 October, stated that in the forthcoming referendum the population would be offered a choice between complete independence and

⁴ Description of the events which occurred in the Territory in August and September 1966 can be found in *ibid.*, chap. XII, paras. 47-60.

approval of the principles which would be included in the new statute of the Territory. The new statute would be drawn up after the referendum by the representative authorities of the Territory. The main principles, however, would be determined before the referendum.

12. Mr. Ali Aref, Vice-President of the Government Council, submitted his resignation to the Governor in October, and on 5 November, the Territorial Assembly elected a caretaker Government Council⁵ headed by Mr. Mohamed Khamil, a leader of the Union démocratique Afar (UDA), one of the parties which was formerly in the opposition. The new Council, in which the various political opinions and ethnic groups in the Territory were represented, was composed as follows:

Vice-President and Minister of Public Works and the Port Minister of Finance Minister of Internal Affairs Minister in charge of the Civil Service Minister of Public Health and Social Affairs Minister of Education ... Minister of Labour Minister of Economic Affairs and the Development Plan

Mr. Mohamed Khamil Mr. Raymond Pecoul

Mr. Idriss Farah

Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed Bouraleh

Mr. Bourhan Abdallah Mr. Hassan Gouled

Mr. Abdi Ahmed Warsama

Mr. Ahmed Hassan Ahmed

Organization of the referendum

- 13. On 2 December 1966, the French National Assembly discussed and adopted the draft law organizing the referendum to be held on French Somaliland. The Senate discussed and adopted it on 14 December, and the law was promulgated on 22 December 1966.
- 14. The law provided that before 1 July 1967 the population of French Somaliland would be invited to state in a referendum whether it wished to remain part of the French Republic with a revised statute of government and administration or to be separated from it. The population would be informed in advance of the main features of the new statute.
- 15. If the population opted for the new statute, the latter would be submitted to the French Parliament, in accordance with the provision of article 74 of the Constitution, within four months from the date of the referendum.
- 16. The Parliament would be called upon to express its views on the choice made by the population. From the date of the referendum, and until the Parliament had reached a decision, the Government would, when necessary, be empowered to take by government order, in accordance with article 38 of the Constitution, any legal measure which might be required by the situation in French Somaliland. The bill for the ratification of the orders would, in this case, be submitted to Parliament before 1 December 1967.
- 17. All persons registered on the electoral rolls of French Somaliland who were able to provide evidence that they had been resident in the Territory for at least three years would be qualified to participate in the referendum.6

⁵ Following the referendum, a new Government Council was elected on 6 April 1967 (see paras. 40-42 below).

⁶ During the discussion of the draft law in the Senate, the Secrétaire d'Etat, Mr. Habib-Deloncle, declared that the revision of the electoral rolls of Somaliland, which began on 1 December 1966, would be completed by 28 February 1967.

- 18. In the case of a dispute regarding the residence requirement, the claim would be adjudicated by a commission composed of three judiciary magistrates appointed by decree of the French Government on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice.
- 19. A commission, to be known as the Returns and Adjudication Commission (Commission de recensement et de jugement) would adjudicate any claims arising from the poll and would draw up the final results of the referendum. The Commission would be composed of a conseiller d'Etat, a conseiller à la Cour de cassation and a conseiller maître à la Cour des comptes, appointed by decree of the French Government and adopted in the Council of Ministers.
- 20. The procedure for the application of the law of 22 December 1966 was established by decree of 26 January 1967 which contains, inter alia, the provisions indicated below:
- (a) The voters would be required to answer "yes" or "no" to the following question:
 - Do you wish the Territory to remain part of the French Republic with the new statute of government and administration which has already been outlined?
- (b) The choice of the electorate would be determined by the majority of votes cast.
- (c) Each voter would be provided with two ballot papers, one white paper bearing the answer "yes" and one blue paper bearing the answer "no".
- (d) A list of voters admitted to participate in the referendum would be prepared in each administrative district. The list would include all persons registered on the electoral rolls of the Territory who were able to provide evidence that they had resided in the Territory for at least three years, the date for calculating the period of residence being the date on which the electoral roll was closed.
- (e) Any person registered on the electoral rolls of the Territory might contest the inclusion of a voter on the list of voters entitled to participate in the referendum or his own omission from the said list. Compliance with the three-year residence requirement would be provided by the production of an identity paper used for administrative purposes.
- (f) Each political party would be entitled to designate a delegate to be present at each polling centre to supervise the voting, the sorting of the ballot papers and the counting of votes.
- (g) The supervisor of each polling centre would be appointed in the manner established by the laws and decrees in force in the Territory. The functions of scrutineer would be undertaken by a representative of each political party, selected on the eve of the poll by the delegates referred to above (f) from among voters registered in the administrative districts.
- (h) Each person entitled to participate in the referendum would be given a special card, known as "referendum participant's card", indicating the polling centre which the holder was required to attend on the day of the referendum.
- (i) All political parties which were duly registered would be entitled to participate in the campaign prior to the referendum. This campaign would open on the second Sunday preceding polling day and would close on the Friday preceding polling day.
- (i) During the campaign prior to the referendum. the representative of the Republic of France in the

Territory would take the necessary measures to ensure that the following documents giving information on the purpose and scope of the referendum were posted on boards reserved for such use and were supplied to each voter:

- (i) The text of the law organizing the referendum.
- (ii) The text of the decree establishing the procedure for the referendum.
- (iii) The document outlining the institutions which the Territory would have in the event of an affirmative answer.
- (k) A special commission, called the Commission de contrôle, composed of a president and five members appointed by decree of the French Government from the ranks of high officials and magistrates, would ensure that voters in the referendum can express their views freely and frankly. The Commission might be represented in each administrative district by one or more delegates.

Date of the referendum

21. On 18 January 1967, the French Council of Ministers fixed 19 March 1967 as the date on which the referendum would be held in French Somaliland.

Revised statute for French Somaliland

- 22. Following the meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 18 January 1967, the Minister of State for Overseas Departments and Territories announced that a text containing the main elements of a revised statute for French Somaliland had been approved.
- 23. The main elements of the revised statute, as contained in the statement of the Minister of State for Overseas Departments and Territories in the French National Assembly during the discussion of the law organizing the referendum include the following:
- (a) French Somaliland would have the status of an Overseas Territory within the French Republic endowed with a large measure of autonomy. Its population would be represented in the French Parliament and in the French Economic and Social Council. The organs of government and administration would be a Government Council (Conseil de gouvernement) and a Chamber of Deputies (Chambre des députés).
- (b) The Government Council, in which the various communities of the Territory would have equitable representation, would be elected by the Chamber of Deputies and would comprise a president, two vice-presidents and seven other ministers. The Council would be responsible for the administration of territorial services and would prepare draft laws to be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. The Council would assume the existing functions of the Governor in his capacity of head of the Territory (chef du territoire).
- (c) Members of the Chamber of Deputies would be elected by universal suffrage according to rules approved by the Chamber itself, bearing in mind the equitable representation of the various communities. Both organs, the Chamber of Deputies and the Government Council, would have the initiative in proposing legislation concerning territorial matters with the exception of financial matters in which only the Council would have the initiative.
- (d) The Government Council would be responsible before the Chamber of Deputies. A motion of censure of the Council could be proposed by the Chamber of Deputies. Conversely, on the advise of the Government

- Council, the High Commissioner (see (e) below) would be empowered to propose to the Government of France the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies.
- (e) The Government of France would be represented in the Territory by a High Commissioner, who would assume responsibility for external affairs, defence, currency, enforcement of laws and international accords and the safeguarding of individual rights and liberties.
- 24. A delegation which included Mr. Mohamed Khamil, Vice-President, Mr. Hassan Gouled, Minister of Education, and nine other members, elected by the Territorial Assembly, was reported to have gone to Paris for consultations on the new statute early in January 1967.
- 25. According to later reports, on 20 January, four members of the Government Council had sent their resignations to the Governor of French Somaliland. They were: Mr. Hassan Gouled, Minister of Education; Mr. Abdi Warsama, Minister of Labour; Mr. Idriss Farah, Minister of Internal Affairs; and Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed Bouraleh, Minister in charge of the Civil Service.

Political parties

- 26. Information on political organizations in the Territory is found in the paragraphs below.
- 27. Union démocratique Afar (UDA). Mr. Mohamed Khamil, Vice-President of the Government Council, and Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Issa are prominent members of this party. In October 1966, the party was reported to have declared itself in favour of independence, and to have formed, with the Parti du mouvement populaire, a co-ordinating committee under Mr. Mohammed Ahmed Issa.
- 28. In January 1967, after the consultations on the new statute mentioned in paragraph 24 above, Mr. Mohamed Khamil was reported to have made public a declaration announcing that he would campaign for a "yes" vote in the referendum. Having consulted the Committee of the UDA, it was reported, he considered that the draft statute, of which the main lines were examined in Paris with representatives of the French Government, constituted at present a satisfactory stage on the path towards independence. In his opinion, it represented an intermediate solution between maintaining the statute of 1957 which was outdated and a premature, immediate independence.
- 29. Rassemblement démocratique Afar (RDA). This party is led by Mr. Ali Aref, former Vice-President of the Government Council. Another prominent member of the party, Mr. Hamadou Barkat Gourat, is at present the Senator for French Somaliland. The party favoured a "yes" vote in the referendum.
- 30. Parti du mouvement populaire (PMP). Mr. Ahmad Idriss Moussa, its leader, was until April 1967 French Somaliland's deputy in the French National Assembly. The Secretary-General of the party is Mr. Hassan Gouled, former Senator and Minister of Education. The party was reported to favour a "no" vote in the referendum.
- 31. Union démocratique Issa (UDI). The leader of this party was Mr. Hassan Gouled. In February 1967, Mr. Umar Farah denied a report broadcast by Radio Djibouti, according to which the UDI had merged with the PMP, and announced that the party would shortly be issuing a manifesto declaring its stand on the coming referendum.

32. Representatives of the political movements outside the Territory, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS), centred in Mogadiscio, and Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD), centred at Dire-Dawa, were heard by the Special Committee in 1966.

The referendum

33. The official returns of the referendum in French Somaliland, which was held on 19 March 1967, were reported to be as follows:

Registered voters	39,312
Votes cast	37,221
In favour of continued association with France	22,555
Against	14,666

- 34. The eligible electorate totalled 39,000. French citizens over twenty-one years of age who could justify three years' residence in French Somaliland were eligible to vote. About 14,700 Somalis were registered, compared with 22,000 Afars. In addition, there were about 1,400 Arab and 900 French expatriate registered voters.
- 35. The total population of the Territory was reported to be 125,000 of which some 58,000 were Somalis while the Afars numbered approximately 48,000. The population also included Europeans and Arabs. Out of the total of 125,000, some 87,000 were considered to have French citizenship.

Disturbances after the referendum

- 36. On 20 March 1967, violent rioting broke out in Djibouti following the announcement of the referendum results. At least eleven persons were killed that day, as French troops were called in to crush rioting in the Somali quarter. The Governor declared a state of emergency, all meetings and gatherings of more than five persons were forbidden and a curfew was imposed from 6.30 p.m. to 6.30 a.m. On 26 March, it was reported that there had been more than twenty deaths since the riots broke out.
- 37. About 1,000 French paratroopers were flown in from France. More than 2,000 Somalis from Djibouti were reported to have been rounded up by French troops and taken to a deportation camp in the desert. On 22 March, the camp was reported to contain more than 4,000 people who were being screened to decide which of them would be expelled to the neighbouring Republic of Somalia, about twelve miles away.

Territory's political life after the referendum

- 38. On the morning of the referendum, the leader of the Parti du mouvement populaire (PMP), Mr. Ahmad Idriss Moussa, declared that his party would not take part in the Territory's formal political life. This stand was confirmed by Mr. Hassan Gouled, the Secretary-General of the PMP and a former government Minister, who declared that the party would not take part in any new government and would not participate in any discussion of the new statute. It was claimed by the party that the referendum had been rigged.
- 39. On 26 March, the Governor met with five Somali leaders, including Mr. Hassan Gouled, and asked them to reconsider their position on participation in the political life of the Territory. The Somali leaders were reported to have declared that they would consider joining the Government if France met several

conditions that amounted merely to rescinding the security measures imposed after the rioting broke out. The Governor said later that he had planned to cut back the security measures if calm continued. The Somali members of the Assembly subsequently agreed to the reconvening of the Assembly.

Meeting of the Territorial Assembly and election of the new Government Council

- 40. The Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland was convened in extraordinary session on 5 April 1967 and, on 6 April, it elected a new Government Council headed by Mr. Ali Aref, leader of the Rassemblement démocratique Afar as Vice -President. Mr. Ali Aref was also Vice-President of the Government Council from 1960 to 1966, when he resigned following the incidents accompanying the visit of President de Gaulle and was replaced by Mr. Mohamed Khamil, leader of the Union démocratique Afar.
- 41. None of the ministers in the new Council was Somali. The four Somali Ministers of the previous Government Council had resigned in January 1967. Somali deputies attended the extraordinary session of the Territorial Assembly with the exception of Mr. Ahmad Idriss Moussa, leader of the PMP, but refrained from designating candidates for election to the Government Council.
- 42. Later, on 7 July, a new Council was elected, also headed by Mr. Ali Aref. This Council included two Issa ministers but remained under control of the Afars.

Election of a deputy to the French National Assembly

43. The election of a deputy from French Somaliland to the French National Assembly took place on 23 April 1967. The successful candidate was Mr. Abdoulkadar Moussa Ali, an Afar who polled 20,167 votes compared with 11,052 votes for his chief rival Mr. Idriss Farah Abaneh, a Somali. These figures were released on the morning of 24 April. The previous deputy to the French National Assembly (see paragraph 30 above) had been Mr. Ahmad Idriss Moussa, a Somali who had decided not to run for re-election as a gesture of protest against the results of the referendum of 19 March which he contended had been rigged. Only inhabitants with valid French citizenship papers were allowed to vote.

Action of the French National Assembly on the results of the March referendum

- 44. On 13 June 1967, the French National Assembly passed a bill relating to the organization of the Territory. The bill gave effect to the results of the referendum held in the Territory on 19 March, according to which the Territory was to remain within the French Republic under a revised statute.
- 45. The provisions of the bill which were largely in conformity with the details announced prior to the referendum (see paragraphs 22-25 above) had been approved by the Territorial Assembly with certain amendments, some of which were accepted and some rejected by the French National Assembly.
- 46. Among these proposals, the National Assembly approved an amendment concerning the retention of authority of the French State over the aerodrome, the port of Djibouti and immigration. On the other hand,

⁷The President was Mr. Louis Saget, Governor of the Territory.

while accepting the principle of equitable representation in the Territorial Chamber of Deputies, the Assembly turned down a suggestion that representation of groups in the Chamber should be on a *pro rata* basis.

- 47. A proposal by the Territorial Assembly to change the name of the Territory to that of Territoire français des Afars (French Territory of the Afars) was replaced by an amendment changing the name of the Territory to Territoire français des Afars et des Issas (French Territory of the Afars and the Issas).
- 48. Following the adoption of the renewed statute by the French National Assembly on 13 June, the French Council of Ministers appointed Mr. Louis Saget as High Commissioner of the Territory. Mr. Saget had been Governor of the Territory since September 1966.

Lifting of the curfew

49. The curfew imposed as a result of the disorders which occurred after the referendum of 19 March was lifted on 22 June. It was reported that the announcement on the same day of the adoption by the French Parliament of the new law on the organization of the Territory had been received with no apparent reaction.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

- 50. The Special Committee considered French Somaliland on four separate occasions during 1967. It considered the Territory at its 499th, 500th, 502nd and 503rd meetings held at Headquarters between 9 and 15 March, shortly before the holding of the referendum.
- 51. During its consideration of this item, the Special Committee had before it, in additional to the petitions listed below, the report submitted by the Secretary-General in compliance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) (see Annex to this chapter below) and a letter on the question of French Somaliland from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/233).
- 52. In a letter dated 27 February 1967 (A/AC.109/225), the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations requested that his delegation be allowed to participate in the Special Committee's consideration of French Somaliland. The Committee decided without objection to accede to that request.

Written petitions

53. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning French Somaliland:

Petitioner	Document No.
Mr. Abdillahi Ardeye, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS)	A/AC,109/PET.579
Messrs. Ibrahim Egeh, exiled Secretary of Trade Union, Omer Abubakar Farah, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis, and Mohamed Ali Subakleh, exiled Treasurer, Parti du mouvement populaire	A/AC.109/PET.615
Messrs. Abdulrahman Ahmed Gabot, ex-parliamentarian and Vice-President of the Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis, and Mohamoud Obsiye, ex-Parliamentarian and Secretary-General of FLCS	A/AC.109/PET.616

Petitioner	Document No.
Mr. Ali Ahmed Udun, ex-Parliamentarian and member of the Union démocratique Afar	A/AC.109/PET.617
Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf, Secretary-General, Co-ordination Bureau of the Parti du mouvement populaire and Union démocratique Afar	A/AC.109/PET.618
Mr. Abdillahi Wabery, Vice-President, Parti du mouvement populaire	A/AC.109/PET.619
Mr. Abidllahi Osman and four others, Deportee Centre Committee, Zeilah	A/AC.109/PET.620

General statements

- 54. The representative of Somalia said that an explosive situation which was a potential threat to the peace of Africa had developed in French Somaliland, particularly since August 1966. In his report (annex, para. 4), the Secretary-General had informed the Committee that he had been unable to obtain a reply from the French Government regarding arrangements for a United Nations presence before and during the holding of the referendum, in accordance with operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI). The matter was urgent, as the referendum was to be held on 19 March 1967.
- 55. In October 1966, the Committee had heard petitioners from French Somaliland who had painted a sad picture of the irregularities in the 1958 referendum and of the situation of the inhabitants since that time. They had shown that the 1967 referendum would not be a true expression of the popular will unless the French colonial authorities drastically changed their policies, which included political arrests, the suppression of political activities within the Territory and arbitrary expulsions. Since November 1966, the number of refugees from the Territory in Somalia had risen to 8,000. The vast majority were bona fide citizens of the Territory who had been expelled because the local authorities believed that they would vote "no" in the referendum. Most of them were destitute and the Somali Government had been obliged to call on international humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for assistance. As the Somali delegation had repeatedly emphasized, the population of French Somaliland was relatively small, and measures which deprived even a few thousands of their right to vote in the referendum could, therefore, have a decisive impact on its outcome.
- 56. General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence and requested the administering Power, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to make arrangements for the United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the holding of the referendum. The nature of that presence was not prescribed, so that the wishes and sensibilities of the administering Power were taken into full consideration. It was most regrettable that the French Government had not seen fit to accede to the General Assembly's request.
- 57. The French Government was also disregarding other provisions of that resolution which were intended to ensure a fair referendum. The referendum was governed by Act No. 66-949 of 22 December 1966, adopted by the French Parliament and by a French Presidential

Decree, No. 67-73 of 26 January 1967. The voters were to vote "yes" or "no" to the following question: "Do you wish the Territory to remain part of the French Republic with the revised statute of government and administration, the essential elements of which have been brought to your knowledge?" There was no reference to independence, and the revised statute of government and administration had still been unavailable on 3 March 1967, when the Secretariat's working paper on French Somaliland (see paras. 1-49 above) had been circulated.

- 58. In order to vote, an elector had to fulfil three requirements. First, his name must appear on the electoral rolls. Secondly, he must prove at least three years' residence in the Territory by producing official documents, such as identification papers, an iniquitous and unreasonable requirement for a population which was largely nomadic and unfamiliar with written documents. Thirdly, his name must be on the special voters' list for the referendum, and additional stipulation which would undoubtedly cost many indigenous inhabitants their vote. Only persons already on the general electoral rolls could be put on the special list. Thus, anyone excluded from the general roll was automatically excluded from the special list. He was also denied the right to protest against his exclusion, as protests could be made only by persons on the general electoral rolls and there was no provision for complaints on behalf of third persons. Furthermore, the complaint had to be made within five days after the completion of the lists and in a strict legal form. Lastly, all complaints were considered by the Returns and Adjudication Commission, which was composed of three persons, all French nationals. He did not wish to suggest that they were biased, but he could not help regretting that the indigenous population was not represented on any of the bodies running the referendum.
- 59. The people's participation in the actual balloting was restricted also. Each authorized political party was, in principle, entitled to participate in the supervision of the voting and counting of the votes but it must be registered before the promulgation of the Decree of 26 January 1967 and have made its request not more than three days afterwards. In addition, the supervisor must himself be on the special voters' list for the area concerned. Thus, in areas where the pro-independence parties were weak and had no delegates registered, they would be unable to participate in the supervision of the balloting. The French colonial authorities were making participation even more difficult in other ways also. For instance, there were thirty-five new polling stations, all of which were located in remote and sparsely populated areas where the pro-independence parties could be expected to be weak. As had already been pointed out in the Committee, a colonial Power might well elude its responsibilities under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) by manipulating elections; the inhabitants of French Somaliland would view the referendum with greater confidence if the procedures for conducting it were such as to remove all doubts of its fairness.
- 60. Campaigning in the referendum was restricted in two ways. Firstly, only political parties fulfilling the requirements of the Decree of 26 January 1967 were entitled to campaign, which meant that campaigning by individuals or informal groups could be prohibited and punished. Secondly, even the authorized political parties

- could campaign only during a period of twelve days ending two days before the balloting. That was a severe handicap to the political parties, as campaigning in a country like French Somaliland was arduous and timeconsuming. In addition, political leaders who favoured independence had either been imprisoned on trumpedup charges or denied their democratic right to form political associations and hold public meetings. There was discrimination also in the registration of the voters, indigenous citizens being given less time to register than foreign residents who had no stake in the political future of the Territory. Furthermore, it was unjust that younger voters, who had not been old enough to be put on the electoral rolls when they had last been up-dated, should be excluded from participation in the referendum. Four Somali Ministers had resigned in protest against the French colonial administration's attitude towards different political groups and its preparations for the referendum.
- 61. There were, therefore, legitimate grounds for doubting the intentions of the French Government regarding the Territory's future. For that reason, the General Assembly had decided that a United Nations presence before and during the referendum was desirable. The fact that the French Government had not responded to the General Assembly's request did not relieve the United Nations of its responsibilities in the matter.
- 62. The Organization of African Unity had considered the latest developments in French Somaliland on 4 March 1967 and had appealed to France to do its utmost to ensure that the coming referendum was conducted in a just and democratic manner and to the people of the Territory to continue their united efforts to achieve self-determination and independence.
- 63. The Committee must express itself clearly and without delay on the situation in French Somaliland. It might wish, among other things, to set up a subcommittee to go immediately to the Territory and obtain impartial information about the situation there before, during and immediately after the referendum. If the sub-committee could not go to the Territory, he was authorized by his Government to invite it to obtain pertinent information in Somalia, in a place or places to be determined by the Committee or the subcommittee, as appropriate. He did not, however, wish to impose any solution on the Committee, which would doubtless know how to acquit itself of its urgent responsibilities under General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI).
- 64. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said it was regrettable that the Secretary-General had not yet received any response from the Government of France concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI). The question of French Somaliland had been before the United Nations for a long time and yet the administering Power had ignored a request from the United Nations made in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which was fully applicable to that Territory. It was true that, although the French Government had refused to participate in any discussion of the rights of the people of French Somaliland to selfdetermination and independence, it had decided to hold a referendum in the Territory. Unfortunately, however, the referendum had certain features which could only

be described as intimidating. As The Economist had pointed out, the French had been brutally frank about their judgement of the prospects of the Territory if it chose independence. It was well known that the people of French Somaliland had been told that if they chose independence, the administering Power would sever relations, discontinue aid and provide no assistance whatsoever. His delegation had always maintained that economic and territorial considerations should not be used to impede independence. Furthermore, the question which was to be put to the people was not at all clear. They were to be asked whether or not they wished the Territory to remain part of the French Republic with the new statute of government and administration which had already been outlined. There was no real choice and no guarantee that, if they did not vote "yes", they would obtain independence.

- 65. In addition, it had been reported that several thousand citizens of the Territory had been refused registration for the referendum because they had not participated in the French presidential elections and that thousands more who had recently reached voting age had also been refused registration. That was another form of intimidation. It was therefore the duty of the Committee to make provision for a United Nations presence in French Somaliland to see that the people of the Territory were given a free choice without any form of intimidation. The Committee should ask the Secretary-General to consider the possibility of sending a mission to French Somaliland for that purpose as soon as possible. He expressed the hope that, despite all intimidation, the people of French Somaliland would exercise its right to self-determination and independence.
- 66. The representative of Mali said that no response had yet been received by the Secretary-General from the Government of France to the request made in operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI). That recommendation was morally binding upon the administering Power and it should take steps to comply with it.
- 67. His delegation had always held that the people of the Territory concerned must always be consulted in any act of decolonization. In French Somaliland, however, the process of consultation had already begun. The people were to be asked a clear and specific question, namely whether they wished the Territory to remain part of the French Republic with the new statute of government and administration which had already been outlined to them. The decision now lay with the people themselves; if they voted in favour, it would mean that they agreed to remain part of the French Republic, and if they voted against, it would mean that they wanted total independence. He himself was entirely confident in the people of French Somaliland who alone were in a position to know their best interests, and his country would respect their decision. Moreover, it was confident that, as General de Gaulle had stated. France would have no objections if the people chose independence.
- 68. The Committee should therefore give new instructions to the Secretary-General regarding his report. There were two alternatives: either the Secretary-General could be requested through the Chairman of the Committee to urge the Government of France to furnish information as a matter of urgency regarding the steps taken or envisaged by it in implementation of

- General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI), or the Committee could implement the resolution adopted by the Organization of African Unity on 4 March 1967 appealing to the administering Power to allow the referendum to take place in freedom and justice.
- 69. From its own experience, Mali knew that when the French Government organized a referendum a clear question was put to the people; it had itself proceeded to independence by means of a referendum and the French Government had respected its decision. It believed that in French Somaliland, too, France would respect the decision of the people.
- 70. The representative of Somalia said that the first procedure outlined by the representative of Mali, while certainly desirable, was not sufficient. An invitation to the French Government at the present stage to furnish information on the preparations for the referendum would be a mere formality. Ever since the so-called referendum in 1958, France had taken the position that the people of French Somaliland had exercised their right to self-determination and that the Territory was no longer a Non-Self-Governing Territory. It had accordingly refused to submit information as required under Article 73 e of the Charter. The French Government had refused to participate in the debate on the question of French Somaliland during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly and it was clear from the Secretary-General's report (see annex below) that it did not intend to implement any of the relevant resolutions. Had France lived up to its responsibilities, the Committee would now be in a position to deal expeditiously with the question. However, unless it had all the facts before it, it could hardly make valid and reasonable recommendations.
- 71. The Committee should also bear in mind the time factor. Admittedly, the decision made in the referendum would be the people's decision. However, the Committee should ensure that the people were allowed to express themselves freely. One way of enabling the Committee to gain more information would perhaps be to ask the visiting mission which was soon to go to Aden to examine the situation prevailing in French Somaliland. At a recent meeting of the Committee (A/AC.109/SR.487), the representatives of Yugoslavia, Iran and Mali had expressed themselves in favour of the dispatch of visiting missions to examine the situation in small Territories. They had advocated a United Nations presence as a general method of helping the cause of colonial peoples, although, admittedly, their comments had related to the organization of the Committee's work and not to the situation of the kind now existing in French Somaliland. The Committee could not adopt a leisurely approach; a referendum was imminent and General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) not only requested United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the referendum, but gave the Special Committee particular duties and responsibilities, as was obvious from the fact that the Secretary-General had been asked to report to the Committee about the arrangements. In other words, the Committee should not confine itself to discussing the theoretical advantages of a United Nations presence and a visiting mission but should consider what it should do about the refusal of the administering Power to make such arrangements.
- 72. It was regrettable that the Committee had not dealt with the situation in French Somaliland with

the urgency it deserved. At the last session, every possible manoeuvre had been used to delay a debate on the question and the Committee had merely submitted all the evidence it had gathered to the Fourth Committee and had not formulated any recommendations. The situation at present was similar; the Working Group had considered the matter and had not thought fit to give the question of French Somaliland adequate priority. In view of the fact that ten days before the referendum was to take place France had still not made the arrangements requested by General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI), the Committee should take action and not merely issue a last-minute appeal for information. Such ineffective measures would damage the trust placed in the Committee by the peoples concerned and harm the reputation of the Committee within the United Nations. He had, in that connexion, been encouraged by the remarks made by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. He could not, however, agree with the remarks made by the representative of Mali concerning France. France was a colonial Power and would remain a colonial Power as long as it had colonial Territories in its possession. The Committee itself had recognized that French Somaliland was a Non-Self-Governing Territory, and, as such, it was entitled to the consideration of all members of the Committee.

- 73. While it would have been preferable for a United Nations presence to have been established in French Somaliland during the referendum—and the Committee might perhaps wish to make a last-minute appeal to that effect—he felt that the Committee should take all the necessary steps to dispatch a subcommittee to the border region of French Somaliland to investigate the situation for itself.
- 74. The representative of Mali said that his delegation was convinced that the process of decolonization had already begun in French Somaliland. Mali had always fought to ensure that people were consulted regarding their right to self-determination and their future, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). As a result of certain political events which had taken place in 1966, the Government of France had now put a clear and specific question to the people of French Somaliland. Therefore, it was for the people of that Territory to decide whether they wished to remain French or to become independent, and Mali would respect their decision. With regard to the conduct of the referendum, he reiterated that Mali had proceeded to independence in the same fashion and had complete confidence in the French Government.
- 75. The representative of Ethiopia said that Ethiopia continued to believe that French Somaliland had the right to be freed from colonial rule. It stood by the people of the Territory in the defence of their interests. It wished to maintain and strengthen mutual relations, interdependence and co-operation based upon mutual respect and benefit. It looked forward to the day when all the peoples of Africa would be able to put aside the petty differences and prejudices which were the unfortunate heritage of their colonial past and strive together in harmony for their mutual benefit.
- 76. The report of the Secretary-General (see annex) stemmed from operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI). When the resolution had been discussed in the Fourth Committee, a number of delegations, including his own, had felt

that, since France had already taken steps to hold a referendum in French Somaliland, it would be untimely to ask the General Assembly to recommend a United Nations presence at that particular stage. He himself had stated that, while it did support the general principle of a United Nations presence, his delegation did not think that a United Nations presence was necessary in each and every case of decolonization. In view of the fact that the referendum had been set for a specific date, and that preparations for it were well under way, it had been thought that insistence on a United Nations presence in French Somaliland might in fact hamper the movement towards freedom. Two other considerations had also been taken into account.

77. First, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, in its resolution of 9 November 1966, had merely noted the decision of the French Government to hold a referendum and expressed the desire that the voting should be on an entirely free, democratic and impartial basis. At a recent meeting, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had appealed to the administering Power to do its utmost to ensure that the referendum was conducted in a just and democratic manner in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity. It had also appealed to the people of the Territory to continue their united effort in achieving their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence. Both those bodies had recognized that the referendum should be given a trial and that the referendum was a decisive step forward in the process of decolonization.

78. The second consideration had been the knowledge that many countries in both Africa and Asia had achieved their freedom without a United Nations presence. It had been thought that, if the United Nations had insisted on such a presence, arguments about decolonization would still be going on in countries which were now independent, to the obvious advantage of the colonial Powers. Admittedly, freedom from colonial rule had not been achieved easily or without great sacrifice; the will and the determination of the peoples themselves had been the principal factors in the victory for freedom. Furthermore, such colonial Powers as Portugal and South Africa, which were blind to the dictates of justice and reason, had to be distinguished from those which recognized the need for a change from a relationship based on servitude to one based upon mutually beneficial relations between free and sovereign peoples. France itself, though regrettably and, in his view, unjustifiably absent from the Committee's deliberations, had given a commendable example of peaceful decolonization, which he hoped it would live up to in French Somaliland. He was, however, particularly unhappy about its lack of response to the Secretary-General's communication, and appealed to the Government of France to resume its place in the Committee and establish communication with the Secretary-General.

79. One of the major difficulties the Committee faced was the lack of full and accurate information on the prevailing situation, in particular with reference to political parties. It was difficult, and even dangerous, to rely on information derived from a single source. The Committee had to hear the views of all sides if its conclusions were to be valuable and just. That

was precisely why he would urge the administering Power to supply the supplementary information which would enable the Committee to draw fair and valid conclusions.

- 80. While he had reservations about the advisability of insisting on a United Nations presence in French Somaliland, he did feel that respect for General Assembly resolutions was of paramount importance. He therefore urged the Government of France to assist the Secretary-General in a spirit of positive co-operation and of dedication to the principles of the Charter.
- 81. The representative of Syria thanked the representative of Somalia for his very useful statement at the previous meeting which had helped to keep the Committee informed about French Somaliland. He did, however, feel some anxiety about the situation. The referendum called for by the French Government was to present the people with a choice between attaining total independence and remaining part of the French Republic with a new statute of government and administration. While his delegation welcomed the decision of the administering Power to hold the referendum, thus recognizing the right to self-determination and independence of yet another dependent Territory, it was important, as the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had confirmed in its recent appeal to the administering Power, that the right to selfdetermination and independence should be expressed freely and democratically, without intimidation or pressure. For that reason the General Assembly, in resolution 2228 (XXI), had urged the administering Power to create a proper political climate for the referendum. His delegation had voted in favour of operative paragraph 4 of that resolution recommending a United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the holding of the referendum in French Somaliland because it was convinced that that was the only way the people of the Territory would be able freely to determine their political status in accordance with operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 82. The representative of Sierra Leone recalled that General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) had urged the administering Power to create a proper political climate in French Somaliland for a referendum to be conducted on an entirely free and democratic basis. His delegation was disappointed at France's failure to co-operate, as reported by the Secretary-General (see annex). By its silence, France gave the impression of treating the United Nations with contempt. His delegation had always regretted France's refusal to supply information on the Territory under Article 73 e of the Charter and hoped that it would adopt a more enlightened approach in future.
- 83. The French Government's decision to hold a referendum, taken after demonstrations in French Somaliland during President de Gaulle's visit in August 1966, had been a tacit admission that the Territory had not been decolonized and that at least a sizable part of the population demanded some change. Such a move on France's part had been most welcome. But there were complaints about the choice to be offered to the inhabitants in the referendum, scheduled for 19 March 1967. When an administering Power was considering a form of association rather than independence, it was imperative that the people should choose freely and on the basis of absolute equality. But

- the people of French Somaliland had been informed that if they chose independence rather than association, France would pull out completely and sever all connexions, including financial assistance. That constituted a threat and a curtailment of the people's freedom of choice. Moreover, the people of the Territory should have greater latitude to opt for other kinds of self-determination. There had been complaints, too, about the way in which the electoral rolls had been compiled, the exclusion of certain voters, and the deportation of people who claimed to be inhabitants of the Territory.
- 84. In the circumstances, it might have been better for the administering Power to allow a United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the holding of a referendum. An administering Power should create a climate of confidence; instead, by its non-co-operation with the United Nations, France had given rise to controversy and fear for the free expression of the people's will. It was perhaps not too late for the Special Committee and France to agree to a United Nations presence in the Territory. But if France should refuse to accept a United Nations offer to supervise the referendum, his delegation would urge that the Committee should consider the Somali Government's invitation to send a mission to the area. Such a step would have a salutary psychological effect on the peoples of French Somaliland, reassuring them of the Organization's active participation in their struggle for independence.
- 85. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had voted for General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of French Somaliland to self-determination and independence. The resolution had also invited the administering Power to ensure that the right of self-determination was freely exercised and to create a proper political climate for a referendum to be conducted on a free and democratic basis. But the information received by the Committee indicated that the political rights and freedoms of the population, as well as the activities of political parties in favour of independence, were being curtailed. He expressed the hope that the administering Power would take the resolution of the General Assembly and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples into account and afford the people of French Somaliland a genuine opportunity to express their sovereign will concerning their future. The USSR delegation had indicated its position in the past and remained in favour of a United Nations presence in the Territory during the referendum.
- 86. The representative of Somalia said he was glad that the Ethiopian representative agreed that, if the Committee was to make a proper judgement on the situation in French Somaliland, it must have all the facts. It would be dangerous for the Committee to act on any representation by one State or party; that was why his delegation had invited the Committee to send a mission to the area. He did not agree with the representative who had said that, because his country had undergone the same process of decolonization which French Somaliland was experiencing, there should be no need for a United Nations presence. Particular situations required particular treatment.
- 87. During the debate on French Somaliland at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the representative of Ceylon had eloquently argued the case for a United Nations presence during the proposed

referendum. He had expressed doubt as to whether the question to be put to the people—whether they wished the Territory to remain within the framework of the French Republic under a remodelled Statute—would give them a genuine opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. Many former French Territories that had opted for limited selfgovernment within the French community in 1958 were now fully independent States, and it was hard to see why French Somaliland should be discriminated against. The French Minister for Overseas Territories had stated that if the people chose independence they would have to accept the "risks" of such a course: the likelihood of civil war and foreign invasion (A/C.4/ SR.1666, pp. 13 and 14). It was clear that the administering Power was pressuring the people on a matter of vital importance to their future. The withdrawal of all aid from the Territory merely because it opted for independence was scarcely a sign of goodwill on the part of the administering Power. It accorded ill with what General de Gaulle had said about the great assistance given by the Somalis of French Somaliland to the cause of peace and freedom during the Second World War.

- 88. The people of French Somaliland had paid dearly for their attempt to bring their situation before the United Nations. Many had been killed, wounded or rendered destitute in their demonstrations for freedom. Time was running out, and the Committee must take immediate action. He hoped that, concurrently with further representations to France, the Committee would establish a sub-committee to go to the area. If the people of French Somaliland should vote "no" in the referendum and France decided to withdraw in the same manner as it had withdrawn from Guinea, the people of a Non-Self-Governing Territory would be thrown onto the international market. The United Nations had a responsibility to exercise foresight, so that it would, if necessary, be in a position to give the Territory all the assistance it required until it was able to stand firmly in its own feet.
- 89. The representative of Somalia, pointing out that only a few days remained before 19 March, the date fixed for the referendum in French Somaliland, noted that the international Press, and even the French Press, had published reports, confirming the information which he had submitted to the Committee on the abnormal political situation in the Territory and demonstrating the urgent need for action to remedy that situation.
- 90. For example, a Reuters dispatch dated 10 March said that Foreign Legion troops had cordoned off the native part of Djibouti and had checked the identity cards of the people there. Similarly, Le Monde of 11 March had carried an Agence France Presse report which said that the armed forces and local police had instituted new identity controls, that streets had been blocked off and that inhabitants not carrying identity cards had been arrested and taken away in trucks, the soldiers being booed by bystanders. In its issue of 11 and 12 March, the newspaper Le Figaro had provided further details about the cordoning-off by troops of various sections of the town and had reported that in one incident six persons had been wounded by tear-gas grenades thrown by the troops into a group of students.
- 91. Djibouti lay on a peninsula connected with the mainland by a neck about seven kilometres wide. Barbed wire had been strung along the entire seven-kilometre

- line some time previously in order to prevent an influx of people from the interior into the town. Since the incidents of August 1966, according to *Le Figaro*, it had taken on the aspect of a military fortification and suspects, in other words, persons unable to prove that they were residents of the town, were being deported to the area outside that line.
- 92. In those conditions, it seemed doubtful whether the Territory would be able to exercise its right to self-determination freely and peacefully, particularly in view of the strict conditions that the inhabitants had to fulfil in order to participate in the referendum: they had to be enrolled on the electoral list, furnish proof of three-year residence and be enrolled on the special voters' list for the referendum. As those lists had long been closed, persons not possessing identity papers could not influence the outcome of the referendum, and it was, therefore, difficult to see why they were being harassed. It was also difficult to understand why Le Monde of 11 March should describe as anti-French the appearance of the slogan: "Let us struggle for freedom and independence".
- 93. Recent petitions from French Somaliland personalities who had been expelled or deported stressed the gravity of the situation in the Territory.
- 94. For example, a cable signed by the Secretary of a French Somaliland Trade Union, a member of the Front de liberation de la Côte des Somalis, and the Treasurer of the Parti du mouvement populaire, all three of them exiles, protested that 8,000 persons possessing all required documents had been refused registration on the electoral lists (A/AC.109/PET.615). The exiled Vice-President of the Parti du mouvement populaire referred to the illegal issuance of citizenship documents or voting cards to non-indigeneous persons, including their families, and newly arrived French soldiers, and denounced the establishment of bogus political parties (A/AC.109/PET.619). Five members of the Deportee Centre Committee at Zeilah asserted that the illegal deportation of citizens was continuing to take place and that mass arrests were deliberately designed to reduce the number of indigenous voters; they also referred to the unfair distribution of polling stations, citing as an illustration the fact that Djibouti had only twelve balloting stations, while in the smaller town of Tadjora, where a "yes" vote was expected, the number had risen from eight to twenty (A/AC.109/ PET.620). That complaint was also made by the Vice-President and the Secretary-General of the Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis, both former Parliamentarians of the Territory (A/AC.109/PET.616). According to another petition from a former Parliamentarian and member of the Union démocratique Afar the authorities had ruled that political parties would be forbidden to send representatives to polling stations as observers (A/AC.109/PET.617).
- 95. He recalled that the Parti du mouvement populaire and the Union démocratique Afar had united their efforts with a view to gaining independence. As he had said on 9 March 1967, the French Government Decree of 26 January 1967 specifically provided for the presence of authorized observers from the political parties as supervisors of the balloting; that system, although circumscribed by severe restrictions, was the only one under which indigenous persons could participate in the organization of the referendum.

96. Lastly, he quoted from the petition from Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf, Secretary-General of the Coordination Bureau of the same two parties. In his communication, the petitioner said that the Co-ordination Bureau had been destroyed by the local authorities, who had imprisoned 55 of its members, including its chairman, and had deported its Secretary-General, although he had been born and educated at Djibouti and had never been imprisoned; it was known that a provision not included in the Decree of 26 January 1967 excluded from voting all persons who had ever served a prison sentence of thirty days or more, irrespective of the date or cause of that imprisonment.

97. It was no wonder that the petitioners should appeal to the Committee to emphasize the need for a United Nations presence. Those French Somaliland Parliamentarians and public figures had been expelled in violation of articles 11 and 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX); he drew the Committee's attention to the preamble and operative paragraph 5 of the resolution. He recognized that the Committee was not obliged to accept without question the statements of the petitioners or even those in the Paris Press and he recalled that he had merely urged that the Committee should obtain as much information as possible and, to that end, send a sub-committee to French Somaliland or the adjacent border regions of Somalia.

98. In resolution 2228 (XXI), the General Assembly had solemnly urged that the referendum should be conducted on a democratic basis and had decided to retain the question of French Somaliland on its agenda; therefore, the Committee's responsibilities towards the Territory would not come to an end on 19 March.

99. In that connexion, he believed there was a possibility that disturbances and complications might arise following the referendum, and that possibility should be borne in mind by the Committee. The next few months would, in any case, be crucial for the future of the Territory and its people. In the event of a "yes" majority, it was clear from the revised statute which had been prepared by the French Government that the Territory would still be Non-Self-Governing within the meaning of resolution 1514 (XV). The revised statute differed very little from the present statute for the Territory which had been established by the Basic Law of 23 June 1956. In any case, only the outline of the revised statute was known and it would probably lead to protracted discussions in the event of a "yes" majority.

100. He pointed out that if the vote went in favour of independence, under the French Law of 22 December 1966, which spoke of "consultation" rather than "referendum", the results of the vote would be submitted to the French Parliament for further decision, and the French Government was, in the meantime, authorized to declare a state of emergency in the Territory and to issue any ordinances to repeal, suspend or change any existing statute, with the sole reservation that such ordinances must be ratified by the French Parliament. As a result, the French Government would have complete freedom of action in the Territory between 19 March and 1 December and would even be able to continue to legislate by ordinance after that date, with the authorization of the French Parliament. Alternatively, the Government could decide to withdrew suddenly from the Territory immediately after the referendum, if the result was in favour of independence. If that happened, his delegation hoped that the Committee would see that power was transferred in an orderly manner and would take all the necessary measures to ensure a proper transition.

101. His delegation did not claim to prejudge the outcome of the referendum of 19 March or to predict the events which would follow it. It only hoped that the referendum would be conducted fairly and justly but it considered it its duty to draw the Committee's attention to the present situation and to the unfortunate complications or crisis which might subsequently arise. The Committee should not close its eyes to the realities of the situation but should be prepared to discharge its functions in as constructive a manner as possible.

102. The representative of Bulgaria restated the position of principle of his country, which had always supported the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the granting of independence to all colonial Territories, large or small. Thus, at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, his delegation had voted in favour of resolution 2228 (XXI), in which the General Assembly had reaffirmed the right of the people of French Somaliland to self-determination and independence and urged the administering Power to create favourable conditions for the organization of a free and democratic referendum.

103. In that connexion, he endorsed the position of the Organization of African Unity which, in a resolution adopted at Addis Ababa on 4 March, had requested the administering Power to do everything possible to ensure that the referendum could be held in complete freedom and justice. In his delegation's opinion, it was certainly both necessary and appropriate that the Special Committee, which was quite properly considering the question of French Somaliland on the recommendation of the Working Group, should in its turn address a similar appeal to the administering Power to meet the needs of the present situation. Some previous speakers had mentioned restrictions imposed on the inhabitants of the Territory in the exercise of their rights and freedoms and on the activities of political parties which were in favour of independence. At the same time, there was every indication that the movement for independence was gaining strength. His delegation therefore hoped that the administering Power would create favourable conditions in order to enable the people of French Somaliland to exercise their right to freedom and independence in conformity with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

104. At its 502nd meeting on 14 March 1967, the Special Committee had before it a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383), sponsored by Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania.

105. At the same meeting, the Chairman drew the Committee's attention to a revised text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.1), sponsored by Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania. Later, in the course of the same meeting, the Chairman announced that after informal consultations, the sponsors had agreed upon a further

revision in the hope that it might help to ensure unanimous adoption of the text. The revised text was subsequently circulated as document A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.2.

106. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, introducing the draft resolution as first revised (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.1), said that he greatly deplored the negative attitude of the French Government which had refused to co-operate in any way and to allow a United Nations presence to prepare and organize the forthcoming referendum in French Somaliland. Such an attitude on the part of the administering Power was contrary to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) and to the letter and spirit of resolution 1514 (XV), which explicitly recognized "the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence".

107. The refusal of the French authorities to allow a United Nations presence before and during the referendum was all the more serious since United Nations help and supervision were necessary in the circumstances, in view of the situation prevailing in the Territory; indeed, there seemed to be every indication that the administering Power was not observing faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

108. In that connexion, his delegation could only condemn the measures of intimidation to which the administering Power had resorted, since the latter did not hesitate to use threats and to speak of the "harsh consequences" that might befall the people if they decided to sever the ties which bound them to the colonial Power.

109. The petitions which had been addressed to the Committee, and which were reproduced in documents A/AC.109/PET.615-620, denounced the gross irregularities which, according to the petitioners, characterized the organization of the referendum, and threw light on the many difficulties which the population had to overcome in order to exercise its legitimate rights.

110. The sponsors of the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.1) had taken full account of the realities of the situation. In the present circumstances, on the eve of the referendum, the Special Committee should encourage the people of the Territory by appealing to them to continue their efforts to achieve their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. It was also urgently necessary that the administering Power should comply with all the provisions of resolution 2228 (XXI), especially by ensuring that the forthcoming referendum was conducted in a just and democratic manner. Lastly, the sponsors of the draft resolution were convinced that the question of French Somaliland should be maintained on the agenda of the Committee until the conclusion of the referendum, since the Committee might be called upon to review the situation in the Territory.

111. The representative of Iraq said it was of the utmost importance that the Special Committee should adopt the draft resolution before it without delay and, if possibly, unanimously. The situation prevailing in French Somaliland—which the representative of Somalia had described to the Committee—called for urgent decisions. Only a few days before the refrendum, the administering Power had still not imple-

mented General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI), which requested it to make arrangements to ensure a United Nations presence before and during the referendum. The administering Power had also failed to reply to the communication addressed to it by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of that resolution and had refused to take part in the Committee's discussions on a question concerning a Territory under its administration. Moreover, as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania had pointed out, the administering Power was using intimidation and threats. The wording of the question put to the population was ambiguous and the inhabitants of the Territory had been told if they chose independence they would not receive any technical, economic or other assistance. The Committee should take the opportunity to point out that the Organization had a duty, under the Charter, to see that the people were given all the help they needed if they chose independence.

112. He drew the Committee's attention to operative paragraph 5 of the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.1), to which his delegation attached particular importance. He thought that the Special Committee should remain alert in the existing circumstances and maintain the question of French Somaliland on its agenda so that it could consider the situation at any time if the referendum was held in conditions and in a manner which did not comply with the decisions of the General Assembly.

113. The representative of Uruguay, speaking after the introduction of a further revised text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.2) said that General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) contained no innovations that could justify objections on the part of the administering Power. Its operative paragraphs were fully in keeping with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and it had been adopted by an overwhelming majority. The administering Power itself had not participated in the vote. Uruguay, in line with its consistent policy in favour of the liberation of colonial peoples, had voted in favour of the resolution, including operative paragraph 4, in which the administering Power was requested to make arrangements, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for a United Nations presence before and during the holding of the proposed referendum in French Somaliland.

114. Uruguay had always held that such procedures should be supervised by the United Nations. In the booklet Las Naciones Unidas y la Descolonización, former Ambassador Velazquez had stressed that, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the act of self-determination should take place in complete freedom and with all guarantees that the popular will was being authentically expressed; he had further suggested that the resolution opened the door to United Nations supervision over the procedures of popular consultation. The general principle that United Nations organs should supervise the procedures leading up to referendums and the actual holding of such referendums had been accepted by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly. The fact that there had been no United Nations supervision of the procedures leading to the recent constitutional changes in the territories of the Eastern Caribbean had led to protracted debate in the Committee, although the United Kingdom representative had co-operated fully with the

Committee and given full answers to all questions put to him.

115. In the case of French Somaliland, the attitude of the administering Power had been different. In his report to the Committee in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI), the Secretary-General reproduced the text of a letter which he had addressed to the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations on 10 January 1967 (see annex to this chapter below). The Secretary-General reported that he had not as yet received any response from the French Government. The General Assembly resolution and the present Committee had thus been totally ignored by the French Government.

116. Meanwhile, the French Government was proceeding with arrangements for a referendum in which, according to the Secretariat working paper (see para. 20 above), the voters would be required to answer "yes" or "no" to the following question:

"Do you wish the Territory to remain part of the French Republic with the new statute of government and administration which has already been outlined?"

It was not known what system would be imposed in the event of a negative result, although logically, and in accordance with the precedents in similar cases, that should mean independence for the Territory. In fact, the text of the new statute had not been published, although according to the decree governing the procedure of the referendum, the voters were to be provided with the text of the document outlining the institutions which the Territory would have in the event of an affirmative result. The same decree mentioned the appointment of a special commission by the French Government to supervise the holding of the referendum and other detailed arrangements, but it gave no recognition to the international organs which were responsible for assisting in the process of decolonization.

117. Without passing judgment on the merits of the arrangements made by the administering Power, he could not ignore the important revelations made by the representative of Somalia in his well-documented statement at the Committee's 492nd meeting. In the circumstances, the Committee was fully justified in deploring the situation. The French Government's attitude was disappointing to those who had always admired France. While he was inclined to share the view of those who expressed their faith in France's intentions with regard to French Somaliland, he could not forget Diderot's warning that it was as dangerous to believe everything as to believe nothing. Faith was a beautiful thing, but that did not make it incompatible with reason and healthy criticism. All might still end happily, as other speakers had prophesied and he joined in the hopes expressed by the representatives of Mali and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2228 (XXI) and other relevant United Nations resolutions had not vet been implemented in respect of French Somaliland, and the administering Power's attitude constituted a regrettable failure to comply with obligations which were binding on all Members of the United Nations, whatever doctrinal positions they might adopt regarding the functions inherrent in sovereignty and the competence of international organs in such a matter as the liberation of peoples from colonialism. While he fervently hoped

that France would yet adjust its conduct to the norms laid down by the United Nations, his delegation was bound to support the draft resolution as further revised (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.2).

118. The representative of Tunisia recalled that in its resolution 2228 (XXI) on the question of French Somaliland, the General Assembly had requested the administering Power, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to make appropriate arrangements for a United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the holding of the referendum on the constitutional and political future of the Territory and had requested the Secretary-General to report to the Special Committee on the implementation of the resolution. According to the Secretary-General's report (see annex), however, France had not replied to the General Assembly's request. The French Government's attitude, which seemed almost contemptuous of the United Nations, was a matter of regret to his delegation, particularly because it believed that France could play an important part in strengthening the Organization and bringing about a new world order based on justice and mutual respect. He had no doubt that France was engaged in an irreversible movement towards complete decolonization, but it would have been far better if France had endeavoured to carry out that movement in association and co-operation with the United Nations, which represented the international community.

119. France's attitude, like that of the United Kingdom in the case of the Carribean islands, might be invoked as a precedent by some colonial Powers whose intentions were less admirable. The United Nations had been entrusted by the overwhelming majority of its Members with a mission which it could better accomplish with the assistance and co-operation of all Powers. Such co-operation, if offered by France, in connexion with the Territory under consideration, would have raised the prestige of the United Nations without casting the slightest doubt on the good faith of the French Government. His delegation's concern about the situation was reflected in the wording of the newly revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.2).

120. The representative of Chile associated his delegation with those which had expressed uneasiness concerning the situation in French Somaliland. He did not doubt that the French Government intended to give the people of French Somaliland a full opportunity to exercise their legitimate rights in a fair and democratic referendum. Nevertheless, it was most regrettable that France's failure to reply to the Secretary-General's request had made it impossible for United Nations observers to be present during the referendum. Chile was convinced that the United Nations could play a useful role in such matters; it had, therefore, supported General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) and would support the draft resolution in its newly revised form (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.2). Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution was, in his delegation's view, simply a call for national unity and not a directive from the Special Committee to the people of the Territory on the way in which they should exercise their right of self-determination; any such directive would be completely improper and unacceptable, since the people alone had the right to decide their own future. With that understanding, his delegation supported the revised draft resolution and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

121. The representative of Poland said that his delegation believed that the future of Non-Self-Governing Territories should be decided solely by the peoples of those Territories in a democratic atmosphere, free from any pressure or intimidation and with full knowledge of the various possibilities open to them. The Special Committee, as the United Nations body entrusted with the task of decolonization, should play a prominent role in the emancipation of dependent peoples. Experience gained in connexion with the question of French Somaliland could be very useful to the Committee in the future in dealing with the particular problems of so-called small Territories. Moreover, his delegation believed that a United Nations presence before and during the referendum in French Somaliland would serve as an additional guarantee that the referendum was conducted in a just and democratic manner.

122. He hoped that the administering Power would do its utmost to ensure that the referendum was conducted in the manner provided for in operative paragraph 3 of revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.2), for an atmosphere of complete freedom without pressure or constraint was essential to a valid expression of a people's free will. With that understanding, his delegation would support the revised draft resolution.

123. The representative of Afghanistan said that a United Nations presence in French Somaliland before and during the proposed referendum, as recommended in operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI), was one of the most important steps by which the fairness of the consultation of the people regarding their future political status could be guaranteed. It would dispel any apprehensions as to the objectivity of the referendum and would make it difficult to cast doubt on the validity of its results. His delegation acknowledged the initiative of France in holding the referendum but deplored the French Government's failure to hold it in conformity with the provisions of resolution 2228 (XXI).

124. The revised draft resolution, of which Afghanistan was a co-sponsor, reflected his delegation's views on the question before the Committee. Afghanistan unreservedly supported the right of peoples to self-determination and independence and associated itself with the just demands of subjugated peoples.

125. The representative of the Ivory Coast recalled that his delegation had stated both in the Fourth Committee and in the General Assembly that a United Nations resolution on the question of French Somaliland would be untimely. The people of French Somaliland, like all the peoples of the former French territories, had had occasion to exercise their fundamental right of self-determination. They had been offered a choice in September 1958 and had chosen to retain the status of an overseas territory. The administering Power had now decided to hold a referendum to enable the people of the Territory to make a further decision about their future. That decision did honour to the French Government, which was certainly in a better position than the Committee to appreciate the aspirations of the peoples concerned, whatever one might think about its attitude towards the United Nations.

126. His delegation had therefore abstained from the vote on General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) and it was surprised that the revised draft resolution

before the Committee invoked the resolution. He remained convinced that it would be untimely for the Committee to adopt a resolution a few days before the referendum. Furthermore, certain provisions of the draft resolution might give the impression that the Committee was taking sides. The paramount consideration should be the desires of the people concerned regarding their future; yet the draft resolution appealed to the people of the Territory to continue their united efforts to achieve their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Admittedly, some of the people did desire independence; but others wished to maintain the status quo. It was for the people themselves to decide if and when they were to attain independence; the Committee should not seek to force their hand by means of a draft resolution. His delegation, therefore, would vote against the draft resolution.

127. At its 503rd meeting, on 15 March 1967, the Special Committee adopted the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.383/Rev.2) by a roll-call vote of 16 to 1, with 7 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Ivory Coast.

Abstaining: Australia, Finland, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

128. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/234) on French Somaliland adopted by the Special Committee at its 503rd meeting on 15 March 1967 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General concerning the question of French Somaliland (A/AC.109/223),8

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and 2228 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,

"Taking note of the appeal of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity in March 1967 relating to this question,

- "1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of French Somaliland (Djibouti) to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "2. Expresses its regret that the administering Power has not as yet complied with all the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI);
- "3. Urges the administering Power to ensure that the forthcoming referendum is conducted in a just and democratic manner in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI);
- "4. Appeals to the people of the Territory to continue their united efforts to achieve their inalienable right to self-determination and independence;

⁸ See annex to the present report.

- "5. Requests the Secretary-General to immediately transmit the present resolution to the administering Power:
- "6. Decides to maintain the question of French Somaliland (Djibouti) on its agenda."

E. Further consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

- 129. The Special Committee further considered the question of French Somaliland at the meetings listed below:
 - (i) At the 508th meeting, held at Headquarters on 6 April 1967;
 - (ii) At the 537th and 538th meetings, held at Dar es Salaam on 16 and 19 June 1967; and
 - (iii) At the 557th and 559th meetings, held at Headquarters on 12 and 13 September 1967.

Hearings by the Special Committee in April 1967 Hearing of petitioners

- 130. At its 508th meeting on 6 April 1967, the Special Committee heard Mr. Abdillahi Wabery, Vice-President of the Parti du mouvement populaire (PMP) and Secretary-General of the Central Committee for Deportees from French Somaliland, Mr. Abdulrahman Ahmed Hassan Gabot, Vice-President of the Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS) and former member of the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland, and Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf, Member of the Central Committee of the PMP and former Secretary of the Co-ordinating Bureau of PMP and the Union démocratique Afar (UDA).
- 131. Mr. Gabot, speaking as a Vice-President of the FLCS and former member of the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland, recalled the conditions under which France had decided to hold the referendum of 19 March 1967 in French Somaliland. In October 1966, the French colonialists had set in motion a plan to falsify the results of the referendum by means of assassination, internment in concentration camps and expulsion. Other measures, too, had been devised in order to rig the voting: parties favouring independence had been prevented from sending delegates into the interior, thousands of electors thought to be favourable to independence had been illegally struck from the rolls, four fifths of the population had been refused registration on the electoral rolls, women had been denied the right to vote, a United Nations supervisory commission had been refused entry, Europeans who failed to satisfy the residence requirements had taken part in the vote, a curfew had been imposed during the electoral campaign and meetings of more than five persons had been barred.
- 132. On 10 March, the French police, acting on orders from Governor Saget, had raided the premises of the UDA, which was calling for a negative vote in the referendum, and seized the party's files. The following day, the Governor had refused to amend a decree providing that political parties not registered in a region could not designate poll-watchers in that region.
- 133. Despite the wall of silence which surrounded the Territory, international opinion had been outraged by the rigging of the referendum and the attack on a defenceless crowd in which thirty-nine people had

- been killed and several dozen wounded. The proclamation of a state of emergency and accompanying measures left the people of French Somaliland with only the alternatives of yielding to violence or fighting.
- 134. He then analysed the causes of the Territory's deep-seated troubles. The desire for independence, which was voiced by the PMP, clashed with the interests of the colonial Power, whose proposals for selfgoverning status were merely coverings since the High Commissioner would continue to have the last word on foreign relations, the police, the maintenance of law and order, finances, the armed forces and censorship. France's objective was not to lead the Territory towards self-government or independence but to maintain itself there—for obvious economic reasons. In its efforts to deepen its economic penetration of Africa, starting from "friendly" Algeria, France was facing competition from the Anglo-Saxon countries in the extension of the Magreb that was Libya; it therefore wished to stay in Djibouti in order to keep its oil supply route open and was unwilling to grant independence to French Somaliland, even though the latter was a burden to the French taxpayer.
- 135. France's decision to hold a referendum in French Somaliland, even though article 86 of its Constitution provided that its colonies could attain independence by a simple vote of their legislative assemblies, was essentially prompted by two circumstances. Firstly, the Co-ordinating Committee of the UDA and the PMP represented more than two thirds of the elected members of the Territorial Assembly and therefore could have obtained a vote in favour of independence; secondly, the referendum had made it possible for France to be sure of the result. In the case of French Somaliland, the referendum had been a trick to deceive international opinion and enable President de Gaulle to continue to pose as a champion of independence.
- 136. In view of the conditions under which the 19 March referendum had been held and the inflexible designs of the French Government, the petitioners urged that a United Nations investigating committee should be sent to French Somaliland to study the conduct of the referendum and report on the situation in the Territory; they also called upon France to set a date for the independence of the Territory pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 137. He also wished to point out that by expelling more than 8,000 inhabitants from the Territory (Mr. Wabery, Mr. Youssouf and he himself had been expelled and, despite all their efforts, had been unable to return to the Territory to participate in the referendum), France had created in that part of Africa a new refugee problem which the United Nations could not ignore.
- 138. Mr. Abdillahi Wabery on behalf of the PMP and Central Committee for Deportees from French Somaliland said that the petitioners were being denied their civil and political rights and the right to live and work in their homeland. Their only crime had been to oppose colonial rule and to achieve independence for their country.
- 139. The French policy of mass deportations was not of recent origin; it dated from the referendum held in 1958, when the people had asked for independence. The Committee had been informed of that fact by petitioners during its visits to Africa in 1965 and 1966.

- 140. It was after President de Gaulle's visit that the situation had taken a very grave turn and repression had become rampant. Between August and December 1966, 5,870 persons had been deported under deplorable circumstances, without regard to their physical condition or family situation, and expelled from the Territory. After being halted for a time, the deportation had been resumed in February 1967 and had continued right up to the referendum. A total of 8,819 persons had been deported.
- 141. In order to deceive public opinion, the French colonial administration had given the impression that the deportees were not nationals of the Territory. That was wholly untrue. However, the authorities had taken advantage of the fact that the persons concerned had never had, or no longer had, identity documents in order to exert pressure on the people and discriminate against those who opposed a continued colonial presence. A United Nations investigating committee was thus highly desirable.
- 142. French Somaliland had been the victim of grave injustices. In addition to the approximately 9,000 deported, 5,000 persons had been interned outside Djibouti. Such a situation must not be permitted to continue, and he urged the Committee to come to the aid of the inhabitants of the Territory.
- 143. Mr. Youssouf, speaking as a member of the Central Committee of PMP and former Secretary of the Co-ordinating Bureau of PMP and the UDA, denounced the ingratitude shown by France, which was presently oppressing those who had once fought to save it. With the aid of Ali Aref, one of its henchmen, France was trying to make people believe that without its presence as an arbitrator the Afars and the Somalis, the two ethnic groups of the Territory, would have slaughtered each other and that the Afars favoured the French presence.
- 144. That was all untrue. At the time of General de Gaulle's visit on 25 August 1966, the entire population of Djibouti, responding to the appeal of the Territory's two main parties (PMP and UDA), had expressed their firm determination to achieve sovereignty. After General de Gaulle's decision that the inhabitants of French Somaliland would freely determine their future by means of a referendum, UDA had declared itself in favour of independence, since France had done nothing for the political, economic and social advancement of the Territory and there was every reason to believe that it would do nothing in the future. Inasmuch as the French presence could have only adverse effects, the Territory could not grow and flourish without national sovereignty. For that reason, the party of the UDA, believing that freedom was not a subject for bargaining, had demanded a vote in favour of independence. To the supporters of a continued French presence, who spoke of the Territory's economic weakness and the spectre of insecurity, he would point out that the nomads who formed the majority of the population lived as they had in pre-colonial days and that the Territory had substantial economic resources and possibilities, particularly the port of Djibouti. Surely, it should be added, neither the Somali Republic nor Ethiopia would want to violate the integrity of the Territory.
- 145. As to national unity, it must not be forgotten that Afars and Somalis had lived side by side for thousands of years and were quite capable of getting

- along with one another and merging into a single nation. Although the colonialists spoke of antagonism between the two groups, no such antagonism existed, and France had no need to set itself up as a policeman. The PMP denounced the schemes of the colonialists, who, in order to entrench themselves more firmly, were making every effort to create a climate of misunderstanding between the peoples. In spite of those manoeuvres, the population had recognized the need to unite and that was how the Co-ordinating Bureau of the PMP and the UDA had come into being.
- 146. When France had seen that its policy of continued enslavement was doomed to defeat, it had attempted to deceive international opinion with lies and had decided to strike a crippling blow at the Coordinating Bureau: five active members of the Bureau, including its Chairman and Mr. Youssouf himself, its General Secretary, had been expelled from their country for having tried to defend it.
- 147. In conclusion, he warned the Committee against the manoeuvres of certain opportunists who would stop at nothing to gain their ends. It would be unjust for the free world, particularly Africa, which had suffered the same fate as French Somaliland, to approve the position of France, which wanted to reduce the people of an entire Territory to slavery.
- 148. In reply to questions from members of the Special Committee Mr. Youssouf said that the main cause of the riots which had followed the announcement of the results of the referendum of 19 March had been the illegal manner in which the referendum had been organized. The population had shown its dissatisfaction and the French gendarmes and the legionnaires had intervened in order to prevent the peoples of Djibouti, 70 per cent of whom had voted "no", from making known their feelings to the world.
- 149. Another cause had been the provocative attitude of the French Government, which had brutally repressed by every possible means any activity in favour of independence.
- 150. As to the role of the Foreign Legion, the petitioner said that the Legion's intervention at Djibouti had taken two forms: first, as part of the French armed forces, it had participated in the repression; and, second, French legionnaires in mufti had taken part in the vote, as had the entire army.
- 151. Asked what France had done to train the people of French Somaliland, he said that after 105 years of French presence, the Territory had only two university graduates and no engineers or physicians. A lycée had been established at Djibouti in 1962, replacing a less extensive course of secondary studies (cours complémentaire), but there was discrimination in the award of diplomas and only two graduates had obtained the baccalauréat during the previous year.
- 152. Replying to a question concerning France's interest in the Territory, Mr. Gabot (FLCS) said that, in President de Gaulle's view, the Territory was an important strategic point for the control of the Red Sea. France wished to retain the Territory as part of its policy of "grandeur". Moreover, the port of Djibouti was an important outlet for Ethiopia and that was a further political reason for the maintenance of the status quo by France.
- 153. In reply to a further question, Mr. Wabery (PMP) said that restrictions had been imposed on the

categories of persons eligible to participate in the referendum. In particular, 70 to 75 per cent of the nationalists had not been allowed to register; women had also been excluded.

Statement by the representative of Somalia

154. In a letter dated 6 April 1967 (A/AC.109/225/Add.1) addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations requested that he be allowed to make a statement on the question of French Somaliland following the hearing of the petitioners. The Special Committee decided without objection to accede to that request.

155. In his statement, the representative of Somalia said that Somalia, which had many ties with French Somaliland, could not remain indifferent to the present events at Djibouti.

156. As it had heard the statements of the petitioners, the Committee should concern itself with the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to the Territory.

157. Members were aware that, by resolution 2228 (XXI), the General Assembly had called upon the administering Power "to ensure that the right of self-determination shall be freely expressed and exercised by the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" and "to create a proper political climate for a referendum to be conducted on an entirely free and democratic basis".

158. On 14 March, a few days before the referendum, the Committee had expressed its concern at the situation in French Somaliland and had urged the French Government to ensure that the referendum was "conducted in a just and democratic manner". Completely disregarding those resolutions, the administering Power had refused to have a United Nations presence in the Territory before or during the referendum and had tried, by applying various unjust and anti-democratic methods, to falsify the results. Out of a population of 125,000 inhabitants, less than 40,000 had been registered on the electoral rolls and approximately 36,000 had actually taken part in the vote. It could not, therefore, be said that the referendum had been carried out "on the basis of universal adult suffrage", as called for by the General Assembly. Furthermore, prior to the referendum, political parties opposed to French rule had been proscribed and their leaders imprisoned, and thousands of inhabitants convicted or suspected of favouring independence had been deported. Tens of thousands of others had been denied the right to vote by various devices on the part of the administration, ranging from the imposition of unduly strict residence requirements to the use of brute force. The authorities had made systematic efforts, by means of promises or threats, to incite the inhabitants of the northern regions, who were less sophisticated politically, against those of their compatriots who were calling for independence and to make them vote in favour of maintaining the French presence. Thus Mr. Gouled, a former Chief Minister and former Minister of Education of the Territory, had said: "This referendum was characterized by trickery and force". Despite all those endeavours, the so-called referendum had not produced a peaceful and definitive solution to the problem of French Somaliland; it was actually just one more episode in that

Territory's struggle for self-determination and independence. In that connexion, two points should be noted. Firstly, no significant change had been made in the statute of French Somaliland, as was clear from the working paper prepared by the Secretariat. Understandably, the proposals summarized in that document had been considered unacceptable by the representatives of French Somaliland when they had been submitted to them in Paris a few weeks prior to the referendum. In fact, those proposals had never been officially made public and the people had been asked to decide, so to speak, on a revised statute which did not exist. The representative of the Ivory Coast had expressed surprise about what was happening in Djibouti in the sphere of education; but what was happening in the political sphere was just as surprising.

159. Secondly, the events which had occurred since 19 March were ample proof that the non-self-governing status of the Territory still persisted. Where else but in a colony could the administering Power have resorted to brutal police methods and direct military intervention? In Djibouti, there were 10,000 soldiers for less than 100,000 inhabitants and army helicopters had dropped countless grenades on the population. Several thousand inhabitants had been transported into the desert and left there without any protection against the sun and without adequate sanitary and medical facilities. Where else but in a colony could the army break into people's houses, arrest and deport them and inflict on them indignities of every kind?

160. The situation was not only regrettable but anachronistic, incompatible with decolonization and contrary to the letter and spirit of resolution 1514 (XV), which the Committee was pledged to implement. The French law of 22 December 1966, which had laid down the rules for the referendum, had provided that security measures and the declaration of a state of emergency would not be subject to restrictions established by law but only to approval by the French Parliament. The local authorities had therefore decided to continue their policy of wholesale arrests and deportations against persons who favoured independence or were dissatisfied with the manner in which the referendum was conducted.

161. Since the referendum, some 5,000 people had been taken to "transit camps" in the open desert, whence they were to be deported to Somalia, in violation of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even if the nationality of some of those people was in doubt, their forced deportation to a neighbouring sovereign State, apart from being inhuman, was an unfriendly act towards that State.

162. The Government of the Somali Republic, justifiably concerned over the fate of the deportees, felt that it was their right to return at once to their homeland, where they should be protected from any persecution. In the meantime, their presence was creating a very difficult economic and political problem for the Somali Government. The French authorities policy of mass deportations and arrests might jeopardize the peace in the area and it would neither solve the problem of French Somaliland nor stabilize the régime of the administering Power. Somalia had at first admitted the deportees to its territory essentially for humanitarian reasons, while endeavouring without success to induce the French authorities to stop the expulsions and arrange for the return of the deportees before the referendum. In those circumstances, Somalia had concluded that

admitting new deportees to its territory might create an explosive situation and compromise its relations with France. Since 19 March, therefore, it had refused entry to thousands of other inhabitants of French Somaliland. By acting thus, in accordance with international law, it had endeavoured not to complicate the problem of the deportees' return, in order to prevent a tragedy similar to that of the Palestine refugees from being repeated in a part of Africa whose peoples had maintained the most friendly relations with one another throughout the ages.

163. Unfortunately, the French local authorities were using the internees living under frightful conditions in the transit camps as hostages to exert pressure on the major political party of the Territory and induce it to extricate the Government and the administration from the present dangerous impasse.

164. The representative of Ethiopia had said that the petitioners represented only a section of the population. That was true, but the fact was that they were a pro-independence section. If the representative of Ethiopia or any other member of the Committee was not satisfied with the statements it had heard, the Committee need only go to the scene and make its own inquiry, for it should not rely on a working paper which did not give a real picture of the situation. The Prime Minister of Somalia had certainly shown foresight when he had proposed at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly that there should be a United Nations presence in the Territory before and during the referendum. His proposal had indeed been accepted by the Assembly in its resolution 2228 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, but it had been categorically rejected by the administering Power despite the Secretary-General's efforts.

165. The Somali Government considered it essential that the Committee should obtain impartial evidence on the situation in French Somaliland and on the refugee problem in Somalia; in that way it would be in the best position to determine the policy to follow, for the present situation called for close attention and vigorous action. One of the members of the Committee had stated that his country endorsed the results of the referendum, whereby the people had allegedly decided against independence. There was not one people in Africa that was not up in arms against colonialism and all the evidence showed that the inhabitants of French Somaliland aspired to independence. The truth was that the outcome of the consultation had been predetermined and that the referendum had been merely a cruel masquerade. The Committee should also express its concern over recent developments in the Territory and it should call upon the administering Power to discontinue its present policies and: (a) to terminate police repression and abolish emergency regulations and martial law; (b) to release all those detained in the "transit" camps and all other political prisoners; and (c) to arrange with the Government of the Somali Republic, perhaps through the good offices of the Committee, for the return of the deportees of the Territory.

166. In his Government's view, it would be extremely useful to appoint a sub-committee to conduct an inquiry in the Territory. His delegation realized that the Committee intended to travel to Africa at the end of May, but it wondered whether the urgency of the situation would not justify earlier action. However, if the Committee did not find it advisable to send a sub-committee to French Somaliland, the Somali Gov-

ernment believed that it should take up the question as a matter of priority during its stay in Africa. The Somali Government would then give the Committee its full co-operation.

Hearings by the Special Committee at Dar es Salaam9

167. Although the Special Committee did not formally discuss the question of French Somaliland during its meetings in Africa, it nonetheless conducted hearings on this subject at its 537th and 538th meetings held in Dar es Salaam on 16 and 19 June 1967.

168. In a letter dated 19 May 1967 (A/AC.109/241), the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations requested that representatives of his Government be permitted to participate in the Special Committee's consideration of French Somaliland during its meetings in Dar es Salaam. At its 537th meeting on 16 June 1967, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to accede to that request.

Hearing of petitioners

169. At its 537th meeting on 16 June 1967, the Special Committee heard Mr. Abdillahi Waberi, Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf and Mr. Osmen Abubaker, Vice-President, Secretary for External Relations and Under-Secretary, respectively, of the Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS).

170. Mr. Youssouf (FLCS) said that in the memoranda submitted to the Special Committee at Mogadiscio on 1 June 1966 and in New York on 1 October 1966 and 6 April 1967, FLCS had tried briefly to describe the political and economic situation in the Territory. The situation was deteriorating daily. So-called French Somaliland was inhabited by two main ethnic groups: the Afars and the Somalis, who were members of the Hamitic race, speaking the Cushitic language. They had the same physical characteristics, the same culture, the same traditions, the same way of life and the same religion. They spread far beyond the artificial frontiers of the Territory. The pasture-land of the Somalis extended close to the country's main economic assets: the port of Djibouti and the first eighty-nine kilometres of the Franco-Ethiopian railway. The Afars were mainly nomads. There were only a few at Djibouti. The two ethnic groups were roughly equal in size—a fact which could have facilitated the introduction of a harmonious policy, especially as relations between the Afars and Somalis had been most cordial up to 1958. The alleged antagonism between Afars and Somalis was an invention of France. Indeed, the term "Afar" had been used only for the past ten years or so, and only at Djibouti.

171. In 1957, however, Western-type politics had been introduced into the Territory; that had led to the creation of a party for each population group. Yet in the 1957 territorial elections, the Rassemblement démocratique Somali (RDS), led by Mr. Mohamoud Harbi, had won thirty seats. All classes of society had been represented in that party.

172. Under the Loi-cadre of 23 June 1956, which still governed the Overseas Territories, the Territorial Assembly could deal only with questions of internal administration. The Government Council conducted the day-to-day business, as it still did. It was not competent

⁹ Additional comments on the question of French Somaliland are contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam (see chapter II of this report).

to deal with important matters such as defence, foreign affairs, justice, finance, territorial security, the Treasury, labour inspection and social welfare, meteorology services, civil aviation, maritime inspection, the police and the militia. The entire administrative machinery had therefore been and still was under "remote control" from Paris through the Governor, representing the colonial authority, who was assisted by European administrators acting as technical advisers.

173. Before the referendum of 28 September 1958, which was to be a landmark, the head of the Government, Mr. Mohamoud Harbi, had campaigned for "no". However, the French authorities had brought extensive resources into play and his efforts had failed, despite his large following among the indigenous population. The French Government had tried unsuccessfully to get rid of him. The Territorial Assembly had then been dissolved and Mr. Mohamoud Harbi had gone into exile.

174. At the next elections, Mr. Hassan Gouled, the new Deputy to Paris, who was of Somali origin, had been elected Vice-President of the Government Council. On 11 December 1958, the new Assembly had declared itself in favour of maintaining the *status quo*. Convinced that the "yes" vote did not constitute an obstacle to independence, Mr. Hassan Gouled had asked Paris to grant the Territory greater autonomy to manage its internal affairs. His efforts had been fruitless.

175. Most fortunately, the wave of nationalism which had swept over the African continent and in particular the creation of the Somali Republic had awakened the national consciousness. At the legislative elections of 18 November 1962, the Parti du mouvement populaire (PMP) had managed to have one of its candidates, Mr. Moussa Ahmed Idris, elected Deputy for Djibouti.

176. The French authorities had become alarmed at the upsurge of nationalism and decided to resort to new methods. They had put an Afar (Dankali), Mr. Ali Aref, into power. France had decided that in future it would exploit antagonisms between clans. In addition, in order to avoid further surprises when the new Territorial Assembly was elected, the French Government on 30 June 1963 had enacted a new electoral law under which the representation of the Somalis was reduced considerably in favour of the Afars (Danakils) and a number of candidates supporting Mr. Ali Aref were elected from among the Afars. However, an internal crisis had arisen in the Afar party and increasing opposition to Mr. Ali Aref had emerged. Many Ministers had broken with him. Yet Mr. Ali Aref had clung to his post, despite the coolness of the Afars towards the French Government.

177. When the French radio and television had announced on 21 July 1966 that the French Chief of State was to visit Djibouti, the PMP and the Union démocratique Afar (UDA), led respectively by Mr. Moussa Ahmed Idris and Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Isso, called "Cheko", had set up a Co-ordination Committee and decided to join forces to denounce the status imposed by force eight years previously and to obtain independence. During the visit of General de Gaulle to Djibouti on 25 August 1966, tragic incidents had occurred, in which 100 persons had been killed and 200 wounded. General de Gaulle had said that he was "surprised, to say the least", since the Governor's reports had described the Territory as "a haven of

peace" and had assured him of the people's undying loyalty to France. The Decolonizer of Africa had had no alternative but to promise a referendum in French Somaliland. However, the referendum had been only a sham designed to deceive international opinion.

178. In violation of the French Constitution, Somali women did not have the right to vote, while European women did. Over 12,000 persons holding French identity cards had asked to be included on the electoral rolls. Permission had been refused by the Constitutional Committee, composed of six Frenchmen. General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 had not been implemented.

179. Professor Berque, a Deputy in the French Legislative Assembly, had asked for observers with "freedom of action" to be sent to the Territory. The request had been denied. The total population of 105,000 included 58,000 Somalis and 45,000 Afars. Only 14,000 (4 per cent) of the Somalis had been able to vote, compared with 22,000 (47 per cent) of the Afars.

180. In the districts of Dikhil, Tadjourah and Obock, which were Afar strongholds, there had been twice as many voters as in the town of Djibouti. It was strange that in that part of the Territory, where the population was illiterate, there had hardly been any invalid ballots, while there had been many in the districts of Djibouti and Ali Sabiet, which were Somali strongholds and where the population was literate. That clearly showed that the ballot had been rigged. Assuming that two thirds of the population had been able to vote, as they had done in the districts of Dikhil, Tadjourah and Obock, there should have been 32,000 Somali voters in the town of Djibouti alone. If that had been the case, the result of the referendum would have been quite different. In the interior, the polling centres had been spaced out over large distances, so as to discourage nomads.

181. In order to persuade the Afar chiefs—since ultimately it was they who voted for their subjects—to vote "yes", the French had spoken of annexationist's designs on the part of the Somali Republic and Ethiopia and had tried to sow discord between the Somalis and the Afars. The French Government had arranged for the ballot papers to be different colours: white for "yes" and blue-blue was the colour of the Somali flagfor "no". The French had told the Afar chiefs that if they voted for blue they would be voting for the Somali Republic, which would absorb French Somaliland, and that argument had influenced the illiterate chiefs. In addition, for the nomads of the interior, who still led the same life as they had done before the arrival of the French, the so-called referendum had been meaningless.

182. He then read out an extract from the Moroccan newspaper L'Opinion, issue No. 648 of March 1966, which described many irregularities that had marred the conduct of the referendum. For France, the referendum had simply been a way of gaining time. Unfortunately, on 20 March, during a peaceful demonstration in which the people had expressed their dissatisfaction with the conditions in which the ballot had been held, the army had opened fire on the crowd, killing thirty-five and wounding twenty-five.

183. On 21 March, on the false pretext of searching for weapons, the army had raided the native quarters. No weapons had been found but 5,000 persons—men,

women, children, old people and invalids—had been taken to a concentration camp in the desert, called a "Transit Camp", where they had been left in the scorching sun, without shelter or water. That step had been taken under the law of 22 December 1966, which had provided for the proclamation of a state of emergency after the so-called referendum. The French authorities had arrested those persons as hostages, so that they could exert pressure on PMP.

184. The persons detained in the concentration camps had been subjected to inhuman treatment. Their only food had been a handful of rice cooked in water. Sometimes they had gone several days without food. The sanitary conditions had been equally deplorable. Most of those in custody had been suffering from tuberculosis and various skin diseases. For some, the ordeal had lasted until 26 April, when they had been deported to the Somali Republic or Ethiopia.

185. The referendum had done little to change the political climate in the Territory. Mr. Ali Aref had been protected by the French Government and remained in power, thanks to the decree of 22 July 1957 under which the Territorial Assembly, having appointed the Ministers, sometimes by a relative majority, could not subsequently dismiss them, even if they were the subject of a motion of censure. However, that puppet had not been able to dispel the political uneasiness reigning in the Territory. The French Government had had to recall him to France and had set up a caretaker Government, composed of equal numbers of Somalis and Afars, under the leadership of Mohamed Hagi Khamil, who was himself of Afar origin. It was then that the Governor had obtained discretionary powers, proclaimed the state of emergency and martial law in the Territory and imposed a curfew. Meetings of more than five persons had been prohibited. After the demonstration of 14 September 1966, the native quarters had been sealed off with barbed wire and steel plates. Houses had been looted, women and girls raped. Opponents of the régime had been expelled or put in concentration camps.

186. On the pretext of maintaining order, Paris had sent to French Somaliland three aircraft carriers filled with paratroopers and 600 riot police specializing in psychological warfare. Over 10,000 soldiers had been billeted at Djibouti, a town of 62,000 inhabitants. About 700 persons, including the President of UDA, Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Isso, called "Cheko", several influential members of the Co-ordination Committee and religious leaders, had been arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned. From August 1966 to March 1967, 8,819 persons had been deported to the Somali Republic.

187. Meanwhile, the caretaker Government, under Mr. Mohamed Hagi Khamil, which was to deal with day-to-day business until the next elections—in other words, during the two months following the referendum—had been dissolved. There had no longer been any question of giving the Territory a new statute granting it greater autonomy.

188. Faced with the refusal of PMP to take part in the Government, the French Government had again turned to Mr. Ali Aref. His first action had been to announce in the Press and on the radio that all those who had voted "no" in the referendum would be expelled from the Territory and that no Somalis would be given posts in the administration. The port of Djibouti had been paralysed by a strike. Large com-

panies had complained to Paris and the threat had disappeared as if by magic.

189. Then, at the instigation of Governor Saget, a motion had been introduced requesting that the name of the Territory be changed to "French Territory of the Afars and Issas". France had thus hoped to foster fratricidal strife which would justify its presence.

190. However, the Territorial Assembly was not competent to change the name of the Territory. Under the *Loi-cadre*, its functions were limited to internal matters. The vote on the change in the Territory's name had been obtained by intimidation.

191. Some time before the extraordinary meeting of the Assembly, one of the country's great figures—Mr. Abdurahman Adolé, former trade-union leader, member of the Committee of Wise Men—had been taken from his home to an unknown destination. He had been tortured and shot twice in the head. At his wife's request, an autopsy had been performed at Pelletier hospital. The French doctor had certified that he had been subjected to the most barbarous torture; his teeth had been pulled out with pincers and an eye had been put out; he had been covered with soapy water and given electric shocks. All his property had been confiscated. All the members of the Council of Government had been threatened with the same fate as Abdurahman Adolé.

192. That was the situation currently prevailing in the Territory. Yet the treaties concluded between the Afars and Issas and France clearly showed that French Somaliland was a protectorate and that consequently it had never renounced independence.

193. He urged the Special Committee to exert pressure on the administering Power to implement General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) and fix the earliest possible date for the accession of French Somaliland to independence, after a referendum on the basis of universal suffrage, under the supervision of international organizations. He asked the Committee to obtain the release of the detained political, trade-union and religious leaders and permission for the exiled political leaders and refugees to return to their country. He asked for the dispatch of a commission of inquiry to the concentration camps and assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the various specialized agencies. Lastly, he asked the Committee to intervene so that the peoples of French Somaliland could recover their freedom and their dignity.

194. The patience of the peoples of French Somaliland was exhausted and, if the United Nations could not help them, they were determined to fight for their sacred and inalienable rights.

195. Mr. Wabery (FLCS) said that the French National Assembly had recently confirmed the changing of the name of French Somaliland to Côte française des Afars et des Issas. To change the traditional and historical name of a Territory without the approval of its inhabitants was an illegal act that could not be justified by international law and practice. The Territory had had its former title for well over a hundred years, and the colonialists could not change it unilaterally overnight in defiance of the majority of the people. That tragic event should be denounced by world opinion and international organizations. FLCS urged the Special Committee to condemn very strongly that stratagem designed to prolong French domination and repression.

196. In reply to questions of Committee members, Mr. Wabery said that just before the referendum there had been a violent demonstration, during which forty persons had been killed. As a result, thousands had been put in concentration camps and tens of thousands had been deported. There had been many cases of killing, beating and rape in the concentration camps. During the state of emergency, some 6,000 military gendarmes and paratroopers were living in Djibouti and no one was allowed to pass through the town or to travel from Djibouti to other regions without a pass.

197. Replying to other questions, Mr. Youssouf said that in August 1966, when General de Gaulle had visited French Somaliland, PMP and UDA had decided to establish a Co-ordination Committee with the idea of merging the two parties. In September, the President of UDA, Mr. Khamil, who had assumed leadership of the Government, had been Honorary Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee. At that time, the parties had been able to engage freely in their political activities. They could no longer do so at present and the Co-ordination Committee had been decapitated by the French colonialists. He himself had been Secretary of the Co-ordination Committee and had been deported in February 1967. The French Government had feared the influence which the Committee might exert on the population. By the time of the referendum, the Coordination Committee and the two political parties had ceased to exist.

198. The petitioner said that France had used two tactics to persuade people to vote "yes": psychological warfare and violence. In order to influence the masses, the French had spread the rumour that, if the Territory became independent, the Somali Republic and Ethiopia would occupy it by force. However, that propaganda to justify the result of the referendum—which was a foregone conclusion—had had no effect on the population, except the French themselves. The population had not voted to maintain the French presence in the Territory. At Djibouti, where the population was literate, 72 per cent of the votes had favoured independence. As for the Bedouins, they would certainly not be influenced by the French.

199. With regard to the policy of FLCS, the petitioner said that, if the Special Committee did not find a way of persuading France to grant independence to French Somaliland, the Somali nationalists would resort to armed warfare.

200. Asked whether the voting had been by secret ballot, and whether FLCS officials had been allowed to witness the voting, the petitioner said that in theory the ballot had been secret. It had indeed been secret at Djibouti, where the political parties had been represented at the polling centres. Journalists in that town could have unmasked the dishonesty of the French authorities. In the rest of the country, however, there had been no ballot. The political parties had been denied the right to send representatives to the polling centres. The electorate had not voted; the ballot boxes had been filled by the cercle commanders and by administration officials. He did not claim that the entire population had favoured "no". Colonial history had shown that there were always people who were swayed by colonialist propaganda. In French Somaliland, however, there were not many.

201. Out of a total population of 105,000, only 36,000—about 30 per cent—had participated in the

referendum. Women and those who could influence the result of the referendum had been denied the right to vote.

202. There had been a great deal of intimidation before and after the referendum of 19 March. The French Government had conducted a powerful campaign for "yes". France had been both judge and party. Despite the intimidation, 70 per cent of the population of Djibouti had voted for independence. In the interior, there had been no vote; the ballot boxes had been filled by French officials.

203. He added that the political parties had asked to be allowed to send observers to the polling stations but, except in the case of Djibouti, the French authorities had refused. The authorities had, moreover, prevented 75 per cent of the inhabitants from registering and participating in the so-called referendum.

Statement by the representative of Somalia

204. The representative of Somalia said that it was very surprising to the Somali Government and to all who strove objectively to bring about the end of colonialism in Africa, that France was maintaining in the Territory of so-called French Somaliland all the worst features of colonial rule, which was all the more regrettable because France in the recent past had been praised for its role in the liberation of colonial peoples. The Somali Government earnestly hoped that, with regard to French Somaliland, wiser counsel would soon prevail and that France would practise the principles it had made famous—liberty, equality and fraternity.

205. In the meantime, an unsatisfactory colonial situation existed in so-called French Somaliland, which was necessarily the concern of the Special Committee. It had heard testimony in New York concerning the oppressive and undemocratic political conditions existing in the Territory before, during and after the referendum of 19 March 1967. In Africa, it had obtained further evidence from the petitioners to the effect that the political atmosphere remained unsatisfactory and that independence was still not in sight.

206. Ever since the visit of General de Gaulle in August 1966, when a series of popular demonstrations had occurred in favour of independence, the Government of the Somali Republic had striven for one thing only: to ensure that the people of French Somaliland, with whom it had the closest ties of history, geography and kinship, exercised their right to self-determination and independence. It had been a great disappointment not only that that sacred right, at present enjoyed by so many former colonial peoples, was still withheld from the people of French Somaliland but also that, through selfish interest or apathy, the glaring injustices of French rule in the Territory were being accepted with complacency by some States Members of the United Nations.

207. That attitude became even more incomprehensible when compared with other situations studied by the Special Committee, where there had been hardly any question of the intentions of the colonial Power or the wishes of the people involved, but where the Committee had indulged in lengthy debate and taken great pains to ascertain whether self-determination had actually been achieved. Yet, in the case of French Somaliland, where political and military intimidation was the order of the day, where democratic political procedure was flagrantly violated, and where more than

thirty inhabitants of the Territory had been brutally shot down by the armed forces of the administering Power because they had protested against the suppression of their democratic rights, it was with considerable difficulty that the Committee could be persuaded to debate the matter at all and there had been marked reluctance even on the part of some African States to censure France strongly and deservedly.

208. In spite of the clearest evidence, supported by reputable witnesses from the Territory and by reports in the international Press, that the referendum of 19 March was not a true expression of the wishes of the majority of the population, it had been suggested that the United Nations could accept the result of the referendum and consider the question of French Somaliland settled. But the United Nations could not ignore the question of French Somaliland even if some of its Members wished it to do so, without also ignoring its declared purposes to assist colonial peoples in their fight for independence.

209. In December 1965, the General Assembly had rejected the French delegation's contention that French Somaliland was fully self-governing and had therefore ceased to be a Territory in respect of which France had the responsibility to transmit information under Article 73 of the Charter. By including French Somaliland in its schedule of Non-Self-Governing Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable, the General Assembly had affirmed its belief that the people of the Territory had not yet exercised their right to selfdetermination in accordance with their freely expressed wishes. Since the referendum of 19 March, the situation in the Territory had not changed. The evidence showed that the referendum was not a free expression of the wishes of the majority of the people and the promised new statute had not yet been produced to give some basis to the claim that the constitutional status of the Territory had been altered. In any case, a careful examination of the text containing the main elements of the proposed new statute would show that the basis of the proposed government would be essentially the same as before. The powers of the High Commissioner which covered censorship, foreign relations, the police, law and order, national status, finance and the armed forces were so wide that they were practically the same as those of the former Governor. The question of French Somaliland was therefore still within the Special Committee's purview and merited its deepest concern.

- 210. He recalled the salient events in the Territory leading up to the present situation so that a proper assessment of the situation could be made and appropriate action taken.
- 211. A good starting point for reviewing the situation in so-called French Somaliland was General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) of 21 December 1966, in which the General Assembly indicated that France's promise to hold a referendum in the Territory was not of itself a sufficient guarantee that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples would be properly implemented in so-called French Somaliland. Having regard to the irregularities of the situation in the Territory, the General Assembly had called on France to ensure that the right of self-determination would be freely exercised by the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for funda-

mental human rights and freedoms, had urged it to create a proper political climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free and democratic basis, and had requested it to arrange for a United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the holding of the referendum. Not one of those provisions had been carried out by the French authorities.

212. The General Assembly, through the Secretary-General, had tried to persuade the French Government to comply with its request for a United Nations presence in the Territory but had received a negative response. The practice of having an impartial United Nations presence to supervise the process of selfdetermination in a colonial Territory was one which had generally been welcomed and adopted by the Special Committee on such occasions. For example, a United Nations presence in the Cook Islands had greatly contributed to the satisfactory referendum held. Even more important, the General Assembly had clearly endorsed and supported the general rule that United Nations bodies should control and supervise the processes preceding referendums and also the holding of such referendums to ensure strict respect for the principle of self-determination set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

213. The Somali Government firmly supported the principle and believed that, in the case of so-called French Somaliland, and indeed in all such cases, a United Nations presence would be in the interest of the Territory, of the United Nations itself and of the administering Power. Had there been such a supervisory body before and during the referendum in so-called French Somaliland, it would certainly have pointed out and done its utmost to eliminate the irregularities which had actually marred the referendum and its outcome would not have been open to so much criticism. It could only be assumed that the unwillingness of the French Government to co-operate indicated its awareness of the injustices that were being committed and its determination to persist along those lines.

214. Another important aspect of the matter was the creation of a proper political climate for the referendum to be held on a free and democratic basis. The political climate existing in the months before the referendum and on the day on which it had been held could only be described as undemocratic.

215. The policy of imprisoning or deporting political leaders who favoured independence had begun with the founding of the popular independence movement in 1957. It had been continued in the pre-referendum period and extended to unprecedented lengths. Political leaders had been deported and, between August 1966 and March 1967, over 8,000 citizens, whose only crime had been that they were likely to vote for independence, had been taken to the border in trucks and forced to cross over into Somalia, often at bayonet point.

216. The Special Committee had seen and heard evidence to disprove the allegation that those people were not bona fide citizens of so-called French Somaliland. It had been shown that many of the deportees actually had their identity cards: many had not been allowed to go home to obtain them; and many more had never held such cards because they had not been obliged to do so in the past.

217. The attempt by the French authorities to create divisions between the two ethnic groups in the Territory and to prevent them from forming a united political

front had been one of the most distasteful features of the pre-referendum period. Leading members of the Bureau for co-ordinating the political activities of the parties representing the two ethnic groups had been imprisoned and every opportunity taken to engender mistrust and suspicion. Lest it should be thought that that allegation was a fanciful one held only by the Somali Government, he quoted an extract from the United Arab Republic newspaper *Al-Goumhouria* of 21 March:

"France has flouted French Somaliland's wish for independence not only by jailing opposition party leaders but by resorting to the most vile methods used by colonialists, provoking conflicts between ethnic groups."

218. The French newspaper France Nouvelle of 21 March had commented in the same vein:

"General de Gaulle has dramatized to the utmost ethnic rivalries, inviting one group to Paris and sending others to jail, hoping to 'divide and rule'. . . . A few days before the referendum the situation is extremely tense. This is not due to international agitation. It is the result of the intimidation and repression perpetrated by the Gaullist authorities."

219. The intimidation referred to was another feature of the period before and during the referendum. Measures of military terror, which could only be compared to the police state methods of outmoded dictators, had been systematically applied to the inhabitants of Djibouti. That charge was substantiated by the Press of France itself. L'Humanité of 20 March thus described the day of the referendum:

"French Somaliland is completely cut off from the outside world; its frontiers and its harbours are closed; Djibouti is isolated from the rest of the country with barbed wire and minefields to prevent entry except at checkpoints guarded by soldiers. Inside the town the African districts have been completely encircled by the army. And it is inside this area that the great majority of Somalis who will vote 'No' can be found. This mass military presence undoubtedly constitutes pressure."

A sober comment on the results of that policy was given in the Tanzanian newspaper *The Nationalist* of 27 March:

"The so-called referendum was conducted with the country and the capital in particular in a virtual state of siege by French paratroopers. . . . France as a colonial Power has in the past earned the reputation of sublime indifference to nationalist campaigns for independence. But she has invariably lost, from Indochina to Algeria. This is a lesson which she should now recall."

Another method used by the French Government to create an atmosphere favourable to its own wishes was economic intimidation. The threat that France would immediately withdraw every kind of aid to the Territory if it voted for independence was a gesture that was not conducive to the free and democratic expression of the wishes of the people. Referring to that threat by the French Government, the French publication *Le Nouvel Observateur* of 22 March 1967 commented: "In this referendum 'under arms', blackmail has been added to intimidation."

220. To the complete lack of a free political atmosphere for the holding of the referendum should be added the denial to so many of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory of their right of self-determina-

tion on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for human rights. Thousands of citizens had been deported and so denied their right of selfdetermination, and the brutal conditions of their deportation constituted a denial of their fundamental human rights and freedoms.

221. The Scotsman, a newspaper known for its impartial reporting, had made the unequivocal comment: "The French made sure of the result by either removing the Somalis altogether—6,000 were sent back to Somalia—or declaring them 'foreigners' and depriving them of the franchise.

222. The deliberate rigging of the electoral procedures to produce a result favourable to France was a further cause of frustration and just anger on the part of the indigenous population. The period allowed for political campaigning was severely limited and accompanied by a curfew; the chief political parties which had their headquarters in Djibouti, the main centre for the independence movement, had not been allowed to campaign in the interior where the more unsophisticated tribesmen were considered to be pro-French; the political parties had not been allowed to have observers at the polling booths in the areas where they had not been registered; above all, unrealistic residential and other qualifications had ensured that thousands of eligible Somali voters would be denied their right to vote. That serious charge was clearly proved by the following extracts from the international Press. Roy Blackman of The Daily Express of 20 March had written:

"Today's referendum . . .was an elaborately contrived affair with a built-in bias. Not to put too fine a point on it, the pro-French communities were given bigger voting power. My own calculations show that likely pro-French voters received twice as many votes per hundred of the population as the anti-French Somali population. Indeed, thousands of Somalis have been refused a vote under the three-year residential qualification."

The unreality of expecting three-year residential qualifications from a population whose traditional way of life was nomadic had been pointed out to the Special Committee by several of the petitioners.

223. The Times of London, always considered a highly reputable source of information and comment, had noted in its issue of 30 March:

"The voting pattern in the electoral districts showed that in many areas where only Afars live, 100 per cent of the registered vote was cast for France. Such a result can only have been organised. No supervisory commission from the United Nations or elsewhere would have accepted the result without reserve."

224. The Daily Mail of 20 March included the following short but telling summary of the electoral arrangements:

"The electoral list of 39,000 out of 125,000 people includes only 14,000 of the 58,000 independent-minded Somalis, while 22,000 of the 45,000 pro-French Afar tribesmen are registered."

Out of a population of 125,000, only 39,000 male voters including over 2,000 non-indigenous people with no permanent stake in the country had thus constituted the universal adult suffrage of the indigenous inhabitants required by General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI).

225. The whole conduct of the referendum was summed up in the *Washington Post* of 23 March:

"In less time than a week France has demonstrated its determination to hang on to its last colony in Africa and has proved it can savagely crush any challenge to its authority. The very harshness of the crackdown-the machines-guns, the tear gas, the massive presence of troops, the knocks on the doors, the temporary concentration camps, the deportations, the shots in the dark during rigid curfews-has ensured that French Somaliland will remain a hot spot and an occupied territory. This solution bears little resemblance to the one prescribed by General de Gaulle last August when he promised the territory's rioting inhabitants self-determination and a free and fair choice for independence. Nor has its application in the last few days been pleasant to witness. . . . When voting requirements finally established and the list of eligible voters compiled it became clear that the French could not lose. Although Somalis comprise at least 50 per cent of the population, the rival Afar tribe was given a 60 per cent majority on the voting rolls. Not surprisingly the final returns from the referendum showed 60 per cent majority for continued French rule."

226. He had quoted at length from the reports and comments in the international Press because Somalia had been accused of championing the cause of its brothers in so-called French Somaliland out of self-interest. It was therefore particularly important that the accusations levelled against France for its conduct of the referendum should be made by other voices than that of Somalia. No one who had heard those voices could possibly maintain that self-determination had been exercised by the poeple of the Territory.

227. The holding of the referendum had not even brought to an end the sufferings of the indigenous people of so-called French Somaliland, let alone their mental frustration at the flagrant denial of their political rights. The brutalities inflicted on those who had shown their just dissatisfaction with the conduct of the referendum by making a public demonstration were well documented by reports and photographs in the international Press. While there had been no fatal casualties among the French forces ordered to quell the demonstration, more than thirty Somalis had been callously shot by the mercenaries of the Foreign Legion and hundreds more wounded when helicopters had dropped percussion grenades to disperse the crowds. Time magazine, reporting on those incidents, said:

"Bystanders as well as rioters were shot down, no questions asked."

The New York Times of 21 March commented:

"The French Somaliland referendum was confused, messy, and in the end bloody with familiar displays of brutality by the Foreign Legion."

228. Four thousand people had then been indiscriminately rounded up and taken to a detention camp in the desert. From there a further 2,500 Somalis had been taken by night to a desolate area on the border and forced to cross, at bayonet point, into Somalia in spite of the Somali Government's protests at the violation of its sovereignty, and in defiance of international law and human rights. The French authorities had claimed that law and order had been restored to the Territory—the Special Committee could judge for itself on what basis.

229. The last charge against the French Government was perhaps the gravest of all. It was attempting to do something which would have been considered reprehensible even in the heyday of colonialism. He had already mentioned its attempts to eliminate by deportation and to subjugate by political and other forms of oppression the major ethnic group of the Territory, because that group was particularly vociferous in its demand for independence. The attempt by the French authorities to create distrust and suspicion between the Somalis and Afars had been one of the most distasteful features of the pre-referendum period. That policy constituted an attempt to "de-Somalize" the Territory. The choice as leaders of the new Government of certain Afar politicians who held the most extreme and unrepresentative views on Somali-Afar relations, and the dissemination, through the information media, of the most inflammatory anti-Somali opinions by such politicians were further indications of the stepping-up of that policy.

230. Afars and Somalis had lived side by side in peace for hundreds of years with no more friction than that occurred normally between related families. They belonged to the same ethnic family; their languages were similar; they intermarried, had the same customs and way of life and shared a common religion. All Afars and Somalis of goodwill and good sense were aware of the attempt to divide them and knew where their common interests lay.

231. The original proposal that the name of the Territory should be changed to the "French Territory of the Afars" could not be justified on geographical, historical or technical grounds. When the French had first come to the area, they had given it the name which best expressed its ethnic composition and the purpose of the move to change the name of the Territory was to obscure its essentially Somali character.

232. The implication of that change, which went far beyond questions of nomenclature and ethnic majority, was brought out in a far-sighted editorial of the Tanzanian newspaper *The Nationalist*:

"What is unfortunate, however, is the possibility that this move will shift attention away from the crux of the political evolution of the territory. So much acrimony may enter on a change of name that the struggle for the political emancipation of the territory may be obscured."

233. The name of a Territory should only be changed at the express wish of the majority of the people after they had achieved real and complete independence.

234. The French Parliament had later approved the change of the name to "French Territory of the Afars and Issas". The first move had come from the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland which had recommended a change of the name to "French Territory of the Afars". The modification of the title by the French National Assembly to "French Territory of the Afars and Issas" was a vivid example of the inconsistency of French policy and the intention to perpetuate a divide-and-rule policy in the Territory regardless of the wishes of the people.

235. His delegation protested very strongly against a change motivated purely by France's desire to prolong its colonialist administration in the Territory and urged the Special Committee to condemn the French Government for adopting a measure contrary to the wishes of the people.

236. Observers of the scene in so-called French Somaliland had often asked why France had been willing to use all means, fair or foul, to retain the colonial status of that particular Territory, whereas it had allowed other Territories with far greater economic resources to obtain their freedom. The answer was not easy, but it was interesting to note that French Radio Television's information supplement No. 1337 of 1965 stated clearly that the decision of France to remain in the Territory could be attributed " . . . to the context of the over-all interests of the Western Powers in the Indian Ocean. . . . It follows, more precisely, from the fact that Djibouti constitutes a strategical and logistical staging-post for linking up with the Pacific Ocean settlement where there are plans to situate the experimental installation for the French nuclear bomb and where it is planned to remove the seat of government in the event of the occupation or destruction of metropolitan France". If that was the reason, it was a classic example of a type of colonialism which had been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations.

237. In view of the above comments by impartial observers, it was obvious that French Somaliland was still a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the purview of the Special Committee and merited its deepest concern. He suggested, first, that the Committee should retain the question of French Somaliland on its agenda. Second, the Committee should reject the referendum conducted by the French authorities, which had been a mockery and a farce. Third, the Committee should call upon the administering Power to discontinue its present policies and take appropriate measures to normalize all aspects of life in the Territory. It should call on France to ensure the termination of all special police, emergency and military measures and martial law; to release all detainees in the so-called transit camps and all other political prisoners; to arrange with the Government of Somalia-perhaps through the Committee's good offices—for the orderly return of the deportees from Somalia to the Territory. Fourth, the Committee, acting in the defence of human rights, should strongly censure the administering Power for the brutality and loss of life inflicted on the indigenous people by its military forces. The Committee could not ignore the fact that over thirty people had been callously shot down and hundreds more seriously wounded by those troops.

238. Finally, it was the earnest hope of the Somali Government that the Special Committee would agree to appoint a fact-finding sub-committee which could either visit the Territory, if it were permitted to do so, or visit neighbouring Territories to enable it to make its own impartial assessment, based on facts obtained by its own members concerning the situation in the Territory and the refugee problem in Somalia. That action had been strongly recommended by the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations in the weeks before the referendum, when such a visit would have been of even greater value. However, it still appeared essential that a fact-finding sub-committee should be appointed so that the General Assembly could obtain impartial information when the question of the Territory came before it again.

239. In conclusion, he thanked the Special Committee for the priority which it was according to the question of so-called French Somaliland and assured it of the Somali Government's fullest co-operation in its constructive efforts.

Consideration by the Special Committee at Headquarters

240. As stated in paragraph 129 above, the Special Committee further considered the question of French Somaliland at its 557th and 559th meetings held at Headquarters on 12 and 13 September 1967.

241. In a letter dated 11 September 1967 (A/AC.109/272), the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations requested that his delegation be permitted to participate in the Special Committee's consideration of French Somaliland. At its 557th meeting on 12 September, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to accede to that request.

Written petitions

242. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning French Somaliland:

ing written petitions concerni	ng French Somaliland:
Petitioner Mr. Abdillahi Ardeye, Secretary-General, and Mr. Omar Ahmed, Member of the Central Council, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis	Document No. A/AC.109/PET.579/Add.1
Mr. Abdillahi Ardeye, Secre- tary-General, Front de libé- ration de la Côte des Somalis	A/AC.109/PET.579/Add.2
Mr. Osman Aden Youssouf, Secretary for International Relations and Controller Gen- eral, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis	A/AC.109/PET.579/Add.3
Mr. Osman Aden Youssouf, Secretary for International Relations and Controller Gen- eral, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis	A/AC.109/PET.579/Add.4
Messrs. Ali Ahmed Ofdom, President, and Hagi Samod Farah, Secretary-General, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis	A/AC.109/PET.579/Add.5
Mr. Abdillahi Wabery, Vice-President of the Parti du mouvement populaire (PMP) and Secretary-General of the Central Committee for Deportees from French Somaliland, Mr. Abdulrahman Ahmed Hassan Gabot, Vice-President of the United National Front of French Somaliland and former member of the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland, and Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf, member of the Central Committee of the PMP and former Secretary of the Coordinating Bureau of the PMP and Union démocratique Afar	A/AC.109/PET.616/Add.1-3
Mr. Ali Ahmed Udun, President, Liberation Front for	,

French Somali Coast, on be-

half of the Parti du mouve-

ment populaire and Union

Démocratique Afar

behalf of the Somali Stu-

dents' Association in America

Mr. Mohammed Aborashid on

A/AC.109/PET.617/Add.1

A/AC.109/PET.626

?*****

Mr. Ali Jame, President of the Somali Community in Aden Messrs. Abdillahi Wabery, Abdillahi Yousouf and Osmen Abubaker Document No.

A/AC.109/PET.627

A/AC.109/PET.691

Statement by the representative of Somalia

243. The representative of Somalia said that much had happened since the Special Committee had last discussed the item at Headquarters. First, on 3 July 1967, the French Government had issued a new Statute for the Territory. Second, the Committee, while in Africa, had received additional petitions and heard more petitioners; his delegation hoped that appropriate conclusions would be drawn from the statements made. Third, those petitions and the new Statute were but two aspects of the deplorable situation in the Territory, which showed increasing dangers of deterioration. Many citizens were still in gaol, and the thousands who had been expelled to Somalia had not yet been permitted to return to their homeland and were consequently in great distress. His Government had always done whatever it could to improve their situation, but the fact remained that they were innocent victims of unfair police measures and possessed an inalienable right to return to their homeland. Furthermore, since the referendum of 19 March 1967, French authorities in the Territory had been pursuing a deliberate policy of discrimination and persecution against the Somali majority of the inhabitants. By systematically encouraging a small group of extremists and placing them in important positions, they had silenced all the nationalist and moderate elements of the population.

244. The spectre of colonialism, once thought to be gone for ever, had been raised again by the course of events. In August 1966, spontaneous demonstrations demanding self-determination and independence had been harshly suppressed and had been followed by punitive measures. A referendum on the future of the Territory had been arranged; mounting evidence that the refendum would not be fair had prompted the General Assembly, in its resolution 2228 (XXI), to request the administering Power to conduct it "on an entirely free and democratic basis" and to arrange for "a United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the holding of the referendum". The administering Power had, of course, completely disregarded that appeal, and thousands of eligible voters had been disfranchised. The outcome of the referendum could certainly not be considered genuine. When protests had been voiced, however, the oppression had been intensified. All the efforts and proposals of the Somali Government to solve the problem of the expellees had been of no avail. The Somalis in the Territory had been deprived of any means of political action through the dissolution of the party which many of them sup-

245. It was in that context that his delegation believed the new Statute for the Territory should be viewed. That Statute was incompatible with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the noble traditions of France. It gave the colonial Power unlimited authority in all matters of importance and was a scarcely disguised effort to turn back the clock. It precluded any possibility of the Territory's evolution towards self-determination.

246. The preamble stated that the Statute established a large degree of administrative autonomy, but

a cursory examination of it revealed how small that autonomy was. The spirit of the Statute was illustrated by the warning contained in article 3, which said that the President and the Ministers were liable to prosecution for crimes and misdemeanours committed in the exercise of their functions. The fact that the enactment of criminal laws and the administration of justice were entirely in the hands of the French Government showed what powers the latter possessed. In recent months, it should be noted, numerous leading personalities in the Territory had been imprisoned or expelled. The Statute also provided for a local Chamber of Deputies whose members did not enjoy parliamentary immunity. The Chamber could be dissolved at any time if the local government council so desired and the French Government agreed (article 37). It had virtually no right of initiative and could propose nothing which would create or increase a public expenditure (article 33).

247. Vast powers were reserved to the administering Power, which was represented by a High Commissioner in the Territory. The list of matters exclusively in its hands included foreign relations, external communications, the Treasury, credit, external trade, radio and television broadcasting, justice, nationality, civil status, control of immigration and the policing of foreigners. In general, the administering Power also had the exclusive prerogative to handle all matters pertaining to defence. The new Statute (article 38) defined defence as covering not only the external safety of the Territory but also general security and the maintenance of law and order. The scope of that definition was obvious.

248. The High Commissioner's powers were similarly wide and vague. Although he no longer presided over the local government council, his deputy could attend any meeting of the Council with the right to speak, thus taking away its privacy. Perhaps even more important, the High Commissioner possessed prerogatives which made him a veritable nineteenth-century viceroy in the Territory. He promulgated all laws and decrees and ensured their execution. He ensured respect for public freedoms. He supervised the legality of all the acts of the authorities of the Territory. He could, without having to give any reason, demand a second reading of any act of the local Chamber of Deputies and the reconsideration of any act of the local Government Council, Such a demand could not be refused. The High Commissioner could suspend the implementation of any act for ninety days. Neither the people nor the elected authorities of the Territory had any influence on the selection of the High Commissioner or his deputy. Both were appointed by the French Cabinet by decree.

249. In the light of those provisions, it was clear that the local authorities had no powers in the affairs of their Territory. Indeed, a deputy in the French National Assembly had pointed out that fact.

250. The arrangement governing the port of Djibouti, the largest economic asset of the Territory, was worth mentioning. After the referendum, the French Government had entertained the idea of taking the port altogether out of the Territory by making it a separate public institution, with a legal personality and financial autonomy of its own. The separate port authority was to be supervised directly by the French Minister for Overseas Territories and administered by a board of directors composed in equal numbers of representatives of France, of the Territory and of the users. That proposal had been withdrawn because it

went too far. Under the new Statute, however, the port would continue to be administered as a quasi-extra-territorial entity by a separate public authority under what was known as "régie directe". That decision was based on the Franco-Ethiopian Treaty regarding the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway. The financial provisions of the treaty, which were very unfavourable to the Territory, remained in effect.

251. The new Statute had been sharply criticized even in the French National Assembly. An Opposition spokesman, referring to the numerous prerogatives reserved to the French Government and the High Commissioner in the Territory, had asked what the Minister for Overseas Territories was leaving to the inhabitants. He had denied that the referendum of 19 March 1967 had yielded a true majority in favour of continued Territorial status, pointing out that, of the 87,000 "French citizens" in the Territory, only 39,024 had been permitted to vote. Those had included 22,000 of the 48,000 Afars and 14,000 of the 58,000 Somalis.

252. He then quoted the French Opposition Deputy's description of Djibouti during the referendum as a city under martial law and pointed out the concern of many prominent individuals in France at the policy of mass imprisonment and deportation.

253. His final important point had to do with the contrast between the promises made before the referendum and what had been done after it. That was basic to a proper evaluation of developments in the Territory. The very question on the ballot paper had been whether or not the voter preferred the Territory to remain within the framework of the French Republic under a remodelled Statute. His delegation reserved the right to submit a detailed comparative study of the promises made before the referendum and the instrument that had emerged on 3 July 1967. For the moment, it was sufficient to mention that, contrary to the promises made, the new Statute did not give the Territory's Chamber of Deputies the power to establish its own electoral rules, and that, in spite of the prior commitments, the Chamber was now under the threat of dissolution by the Territory's Government Council or the French Government. Furthermore, the High Commissioner had far-reaching powers. Under the new Statute, those contradictions had not been lost on the Territory's Assembly when the draft Statute was sent to it for discussion—but not for approval. It must be stressed that a majority of the Territory's population had been wholly unrepresented in the Assembly, since the Somali members had refused to take part in it. A new Assembly should have been elected in order to discuss the new Statute. Instead, the French Government had submitted the draft Statute to a local rump Assembly and accepted some innocuous changes demanded by it but had rejected the more important ones, such as the one relating to administration of the port.

254. Similarly, the voters had been warned before the referendum that a change was planned in the name of the Territory.

255. French Somaliland was a small and poor country, lacking in natural resources. All the energies of its people should be harnessed to improve their living standards, as it was all the more deplorable to stir up tribal antagonism as a support for a dying colonialism. It was untrue that the Afars constituted a majority of the population, that the desire for independence existed only among the Somalis in the Territory and

that that desire was due to agitation carried on by Somalia. If the referendum showed a slight majority in favour of continued territorial status, that was due, among other things, to the fact that tens of thousands of potential "no" voters had been denied the right to vote. The Afars and the Somalis were very closely related in language, religion, customs and culture. They had never been at war with each other, and they had been co-operating politically. After the demonstrations of August 1966, the principal Afar party, the Union démocratique Afar, had formed a coalition Government with the other majority party, the Parti du mouvement populaire, which had many Somali adherents. It was also interesting to note that the head of the coalition Government, Mr. Mohammed Kamil, had favoured independence. When he had changed his mind, the party had deposed him. A joint committee of the two parties had worked for independence until the colonial authorities arrested its members. Even the leader of the Afar party had been imprisoned during the referendum and thus prevented from campaigning. After the referendum, the Parti du mouvement populaire had been suppressed and outlawed. At present, there was no free political life in the Territory.

256. In conclusion, he pointed out that the draft Statute had proposed the name "French Territory of the Afars and the Somalis" for the Territory but an amendment had been introduced in the French National Assembly naming it "French Territory of the Afars and the Issas". The change of name had been decided upon in the National Assembly without any serious debate and without the knowledge of the people of the Territory, who had learnt about it as an accomplished fact. His delegation did not believe that an artificial name could change the character of a country, obstruct the course of history or deprive a people of their right to self-determination.

257. The situation in French Somaliland should be of the utmost concern to the Committee. The flagrant acts of discrimination and persecution against anyone suspected of desiring independence were based on an unfair referendum which, despite all the circumstances surrounding it, had nevertheless shown that forty per cent of those permitted to vote were unequivocally in favour of independence; under the circumstances, that was a very high percentage. Since the referendum, the local Government had been completely unrepresentative of the sentiments of the people; the new colonial Statute did not grant true local autonomy and, in addition, the very name of the Territory was to be obliterated.

258. The representative of Ethiopia said that her delegation would state its position in regard to the question of French Somaliland at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly.

F. Further action taken by the Special Committee

259. At its 559th meeting, held on 12 September 1967, the Special Committee decided to transmit to the General Assembly the information contained in the relevant working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-49 above), together with the statements made on the item by representatives and petitioners. It also decided that, subject to any decision that the General Assembly might take at its twenty-second session, the Committee would consider French Somaliland during its meetings in 1968.

ANNEX*

Question of French Somaliland

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Resolution 228 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 on the question of French Somaliland adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session read as follows:

"Question of French Somaliland"

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

2. By letter dated 10 January 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 2228 (XXI) to the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations. This letter is reproduced below:

"I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of your Government, the text of resolution 2228 (XXI) concerning French Somaliland, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting, on 20 December 1966.

"In forwarding this resolution, I would draw your attention, in particular, to operative paragraph 4, which 'requests the administering Power, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to make appropriate arrangements for a United Nations presence before, and supervision during, the holding of the referendum'.

"As the Secretary-General is requested in operative paragraph 5 of same resolution to report on this matter to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I would appreciate receiving from Your Excellency information regarding the steps taken or envisaged by the Government of France in this regard.

"Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration."

- 3. Taking into consideration the decision of the French Government fixing 19 March 1967 as the date for holding the proposed referendum in French Somaliland, the Secretary-General, subsequent to this letter of 10 January 1967, also discussed the matter with the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations.
- 4. The Secretary-General has not as yet received any response from the Government of France.

CHAPTER XIII*

OMAN

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

- 1. The question of Oman was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth sessions and was referred to the Special Political Committee for consideration. At the fifteenth session, the Special Political Committee considered the question but decided, owing to lack of time, to postpone further consideration of the question until the sixteenth session. At the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions, the Special Political Committee approved draft resolutions1 whereby the General Assembly, recalling its resolution 1514 (XV), would recognize the right of the people of Oman to selfdetermination and independence, call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Oman, and invite the parties concerned to settle peacefully their differences with a view to restoring normal conditions in Oman. The General Assembly, however, did not adopt these draft resolutions at its plenary meetings because they failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.
- 2. At the 1191st plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its seventeenth session, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, extended an invitation to a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to visit the Sultanate on a personal basis to obtain first-hand information on the situation there. Subsequently, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Herbert de Ribbing, Swedish Ambassador to Spain, as his Special Representative to undertake that task. Mr. de Ribbing visited Oman in June 1963 and submitted a report which was made available to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session.2

ment A/5562.

- 3. At the eighteenth session, the question of Oman was again included in the agenda of the General Assembly and referred to the Fourth Committee for consideration. A draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee was adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1963, as resolution 1948 (XVIII). By this resolution, the Assembly took note of the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and decided to establish an Ad Hoc
- Committee to Examine the question of Oman and to report to it at its nineteenth session. The Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report to the General Assembly on 8 January 1965.3
- 4. The question of Oman was one of the many items included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly, which it was unable to consider at its nineteenth session. At the twentieth session, the item was referred to the Fourth Committee for consideration. A draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee was adopted by the General Assembly at its 1399th plenary meeting on 17 December 1965 as resolution 2073 (XX). By this resolution, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman,3 and recognized the inalienable right of the people of the Territory as a whole to selfdetermination and independence. It considered that the colonial presence of the United Kingdom in its various forms prevented the people of the Territory from exercising their rights to self-determination and independence. The General Assembly also called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to implement a number of measures in the Territory and invited the Special Committee to examine the situation in the Territory.
- 5. The Special Committee considered the question of Oman at its meetings in 1966 and heard a number of petitioners from Oman. On 17 November 1966, the Special Committee decided that it would report to the General Assembly that due to lack of time it had

^{*} Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/223.

^{*}Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.12.

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/5010, para.10; and ibid, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 79, document A/5325, para.8.
² Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 78, docu-

³ Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 16, document A/5846.

not been able to complete its consideration of the item. It also decided that, subject to any further directives the General Assembly might wish to give during its twenty-first session, it would consider the question at its meetings in 1967 with a view to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2073 (XX).

6. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Committee covering its work in 1966 (A/6300/Rev. 1,4 chap. XIII), and adopted resolution 2238 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 which reads as follows:

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, supplement No. 16.]

B. Information on the Territory⁵

Introduction

7. Detailed information on the Territory is contained in the chapter on Oman in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XIII). This paper contains a summary of that information, together with supplementary information concerning recent developments.

1. SULTANATE OF MUSCAT AND OMAN

General

- 8. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman lies at the extreme south-east of the Arabian Peninsula, east of the Rub-al-Khali desert. It has a total area of approximately 82,000 square miles (212,000 square kilometres). The total population of Muscat and Oman is estimated at over 750,000.
- 9. Muscat and Oman has, in the past, been under two different political institutions. From the eighth century onwards, it was an independent State ruled by an Imam who exercised both spiritual and temporal authority. About 1775, with the death of Imam Ahmed bin Said, the first Sultanate was established in Muscat on the coast. Early in the nineteenth century, the predominant institution was the Sultanate, but the Imamate was revived in the interior of the country once in 1868 and again in 1913. According to the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman, the interior of Oman was an autonomous political entity under two successive Imams, Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi and Mohamed bin Abdullah al-Khalili, from 1913 until 1955 when it was occupied by the Sultan's forces with British assistance. Although the boundaries of the Imamate were not clearly defined, it included the Jabal al Akhdar, the Dhahirah, the Sharqiyah and the Ja'lan. The Imamate seemed to have had the normal attributes of a State, with a Head of State, a Higher Council, an Assembly and its own system of administration.
- 10. The Ad Hoc Committee stated that the Imam was considered by his followers as the Head of State and was elected by "the leaders, elders and notables of the people from various levels and tribes" in consultation with religious figures. The Imam's authority was exercised in all fields-religious, political and judicialin accordance with Islamic law. He was bound to consult the Higher Council in all major problems. The Assembly was composed of the members of the Higher

4 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

item 23.

⁵ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports.

- Council, walis and tribal leaders and met whenever the Imam decided to convene it.
- 11. The present Imam, Ghalib bin Ali, was elected in 1954. He lives in exile in Saudi Arabia. He has a Higher Council which includes several Sheikhs from the leading tribes in the area, and a Revolutionary Council whose aims are "to direct the struggle of the people to regain their independence, and to educate and train them, both inside and outside the country" (A/5846, para. 549). The Revolutionary Council has a Military Committee, a Financial Committee, a Cultural Committee and a Secretariat. It has appointed representatives to the Arab League and to several
- 12. The present Sultan has maintained that all the people of Oman are his subjects and that there have never been two States. His family has been in power in Muscat and Oman for over 220 years.

Relationship with the United Kingdom

- 13. British association with Muscat dates back to 1798, when a treaty was signed between Muscat and the East India Company. The written instruments on which the present relationship between the Sultanate and the United Kingdom is based, namely, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Exchange of Letters of 1951 and the Exchange of Letters of 1958, were reproduced in full in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twentyfirst session (A/6300/Rev. 1, chap. XIII, annex I).
- 14. There is a British Consul-General in Muscat who is responsible to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, whose headquarters is in Bahrein. The latter is responsible to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London. In addition to other duties, the Political Resident has an over-all responsibility for the postal services and telegraphic communications in the Sultanate and in other States in the area. He also controls exchange transactions effected through the
- 15. The administration of air fields which have been established in Oman under the 1934 Civil Air Agreement⁶ falls within the jurisdiction of the Political Resident. By this Agreement, the United Kingdom received permission to establish air fields in the Sultanate. The United Kingdom acts as the agent of the Sultan in all aviation matters. While the air field at Masirah Island is used for staging purposes, Salalah Airfield is considered as an international airport for civil airlines and is managed by the United Kingdom on behalf of the Sultan according to international rules and regulations. Use of the air fields by the Royal Air Force is governed by a separate agreement between the Sultan and the United Kingdom.
- 16. By an order in council which came into operation on 1 January 1967,7 the United Kingdom Government ceased to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Territory of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The order provided for the transfer of pending cases before the consular courts to the courts of the Sultan. The revocation of previous orders, rules and regulations relating to British jurisdiction and British courts does not have any retroactive effect over past cases settled by the courts.

Letters of 1958.

7 Statutory Instruments, The Muscat (Revoking) Order 1966, No. 1598.

⁶ The Agreement was reconfirmed in the Exchange of

The Sultan

- 17. The Sultan is a traditional ruler who exercises supreme authority over his subjects. His authority is based on customs and understandings which have their origin in the tribal system prevailing in most of the country. There is no constitution or elected representative institution. The present Sultan, Said bin Taimur, has ruled Muscat and Oman since the abdication of his father in 1932.
- 18. The capital of the Sultanate is Muscat, although the Sultan's normal residence is at Salalah in Dhofar. The administration of the provinces and main centres of population is in the hands of walis (governors) who are responsible to the Sultan through the Minister of the Interior.

Security

- 19. There have been unofficial reports of attacks on United Kingdom military units in Oman, mine explosions, and raids against military convoys and installations. Omani organizations abroad, particularly the Dhofar Liberation Front and the Omani Revolutionary Council, have issued communiqués on the operations carried out by "commandos of the Omani Liberation Army" in areas such as Salalah, Taqah, Bahlah, Uqbat Hamrus, Muscat, Al-Fuhud, Ubaylah, As-Suwayq, Nazwa and Rastaq. According to some reports, demonstrations have been held against oil companies in Oman. On 27 December 1966, the Omani Revolutionary Council announced that it would not recognize agreements concluded by the Shell Oil Company with any party other than the Government led by the Imam of Oman.
- 20. In April 1966, an attempt was made on the life of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman at a military parade in Salalah. The Sultan escaped unhurt but five other persons were reported killed, including the commanding officer of the Sultan's forces in Dhofar, and several were wounded.

Economic conditions

- 21. In general, the economy of the Sultanate is mainly pastoral and agricultural. The chief products are dates, fish and cereals (the latter being grown for local consumption), as well as limes and other fruit. Breeding of livestock, particularly camels, is widely practised.
- 22. The chief exports of Muscat and Oman are dates, dried limes, dried fish, tobacco leaf, hides, goat hair and vegetables. Imports include rice, wheat, flour, sugar, cement, vehicles and accessories, cotton piece goods and other consumer goods. A part of these imports is financed by the oil companies for their exploration and other operations.
- 23. In 1964, the value of total imports to the Sultanate was £2.4 million, excluding £500,000 of imports for government use. Exports were valued at £480,000. In 1965, trade with the United Kingdom was as follows:

	Thousand pounds sterling	
Exports to the United Kingdom	. 9	
Imports from the United Kingdom	. 2,207	
Re-exports from the United Kingdom	. 26	

24. The revenue of the Sultanate is derived mainly from customs receipts and annual payments by the oil companies. In 1965, total revenue was estimated at 11 million rupees.

Oil

- 25. The first oil concession was obtained by a foreign company in 1937, when a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd., was granted a seventy-five-year concession extending over the whole area except Dhofar. In 1953, a concession covering Dhofar was granted to Dhofar Cities Service Petroleum Corporation for a period of twenty-five years from the date of commercial production. In 1960, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd. was acquired by Royal Dutch Shell and Partex. In March 1966, an off-shore concession was granted to Wintershall A.G., a concern in the Federal Republic of Germany.
- 26. In 1964, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd. announced that drilling had proved the existence of sufficient reserves to go into commercial production. Export of crude oil was expected to start in the second half of 1967 at a rate of about 6 or 7 million tons a year. A pipeline was to be built through Wadi Sumail to an oil loading terminal at Saih-al-Malih, a few miles to the west of Muscat town.

Development

- 27. Subsidies are paid by the United Kingdom Government towards development. Under the agreement concluded between the Sultan and the United Kingdom in 1958, the latter agreed to assist in carrying out "a civil development programme which will include the improvement of roads, medical and educational facilities and an agricultural research programme" (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XIII, annex I).
- 28. In September 1966, a United Kingdom firm of architects and planners, John R. Harris, was commissioned by the Sultan to prepare a development plan for the region of Muscat and Matrah. The plan would include main transport services, a fresh water distribution system, electrical supply and drainage. The Sultan was reported to have asked the firm to begin construction work towards the end of 1967, the plan to be progressively carried out as exports of oil grew after the autumn of 1967.

2. TRUCIAL SHEIKHDOMS

General

- 29. The Trucial Sheikhdoms lie north of the Rubal-Khali, between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman; the area, also known as Trucial Oman or the Trucial Coast, extends for nearly 400 miles from the south-eastern end of the peninsula of Qatar along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. The boundaries of the Trucial Coast have not been clearly demarcated and in several places have been the subject of disputes with neighbouring countries. The total area is estimated roughly at 32,000 square miles (83,000 square kilometres).
- 30. No census has ever been taken of the population: the estimated total is 110,000, of whom about one tenth are nomads.
- 31. The Sheikhdoms consist of seven separate political entities each headed by a Sheikh or Ruler. They are (from west to east): Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Sharjah, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah.

Relationship with the United Kingdom

- 32. Contacts between the East India Company and the rulers of the Sheikhdoms date back to the seventeenth century, but it was not until 1806 that the first agreement was signed with the Sheikh of the Qasimi (Jaśimi) tribe. In 1820, following hostilities between a British naval expedition and local Sheikhs at Ras al Khaimah and other points of the Oman coast, a general "Treaty of Peace" was concluded between the Sheikhs and the British Government. In 1835, a "Maritime Truce" was signed by the Sheikhs providing for a temporary cessation of hostilities between them. The Truce was renewed several times in subsequent years until in 1853 a "Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity" concluded, whereby the United Kingdom acquired the right to watch over the maintenance of the peace and to take steps to enforce the treaty at all times.
- 33. In 1892, the Sheikhs signed identical "Exclusive Agreements" with the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, whereby they undertook not to "cede, sell, mort-gage or otherwise give for occupation" any part of their territory except to the British Government. The United Kingdom was also to become responsible for the conduct of their foreign relations. These agreements constitute the basis of the present relationship between the United Kingdom and the Trucial Sheikhdoms. In 1911 and 1922, further agreements were concluded whereby the granting of pearling and oil concessions respectively became subject to the approval of the United Kingdom Government. The full texts of these documents were reproduced in the Special Committee's previous report to the General Assembly (A/6300/ Rev.1, chap. XIII, annex II). The Rulers have also undertaken to recognize the right of the United Kingdom to fix their State boundaries and to settle disputes
- 34. There is a British Political Agent in Dubai and another in Abu Dhabi; both are responsible to the Political Resident in Bahrein. In addition to the conduct of the Trucial Sheikhdoms' foreign relations, the functions of the Political Resident include over-all supervision in certain administrative fields, together with that of international aspects or matters chiefly affecting foreigners and the implementation of international conventions such as the Sanitary Convention and the Dangerous Drugs Convention. These fields are mainly postal services, telegraphic communications, exchange transactions, control of immigration, imports of arms and narcotics and civil aviation.
- 35. Advice is given to the Rulers in the administration and development of their Sheikhdoms by the Political Agents. Relations between the oil companies and the Rulers are usually conducted through or with the knowledge of the United Kingdom authorities. Company officials are required to keep the British Political Agents or officers informed of important developments in their dealings with the Rulers.
- 36. The United Kingdom enjoys extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Trucial Sheikhdoms. The scope and machinery used in the exercise of this jurisdiction has been described in the Special Committee's previous report to the General Assembly (*ibid.*, chap. XIII, paras. 49-52).

Rulers

37. The Sheikh (or Ruler) is essentially a tribal leader and a descendant of a ruling family which has had the ascendancy among the tribes for several generations. On the death of a Sheikh, succession is decided

- according to custom by a meeting of the senior members of the ruling family. In recent times, the tendency has been to allow succession to pass from father to son. The Political Resident usually extends the recognition of the United Kingdom Government to the new Ruler at a formal ceremony.
- 38. The Rulers exercise authority over their subjects in conformity with local customs and traditions. Their rule is entirely personal and there are no constitutions or elected representatives of the people.
- 39. On 6 August 1966, Sheikh Shakbut of Abu Dhabi was deposed by leading members of his family and replaced as Ruler by his brother—Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan. The new Ruler was immediately recognized by the United Kingdom Government. A statement by the British Political Resident in Bahrein reported that the family decision had been taken "in the public interest because of Sheikh Shakbut's manifest inability, despite all their advice, to govern Abu Dhabi State properly or use the country's increasing wealth in the interests of the people".

Armed forces

- 40. In 1952, the United Kingdom established a joint Arab Force in the Sheikhdoms—the Trucial Oman Levies—now called the Trucial Oman Scouts. In 1953, the Scouts were expanded from 100 to 500 men, and in 1958 to 1,000 men; there are about thirty-nine British officers and ninety non-commissioned officers in the Scouts. The headquarters of the Trucial Oman Scouts is at Sharjah, although squadrons are stationed in various points inland and along the coast. The Scouts are under the control and direction of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and their costs are borne by the United Kingdom Government. Their duties include the maintenance of peace and good order in the Trucial States, the providing of escorts for British Political Representatives and the execution of warrants. orders and judgements issued by the British courts. A special wing of the Scouts has been formed to carry out police duties.
- 41. At the end of June 1966, a new agreement was signed between the United Kingdom and the Ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Khaled bin Muhammad, to provide additional land for new facilities and accommodation for British forces in Sharjah. An initial payment of £100,000 was to be made to the Sheikh, and subsequently an annual payment of a similar amount beginning January 1967.

Economic conditions

General

- 42. Economic activity has been confined, in the past, to ocean trade, off-shore fishing, pearl diving and the growing of date palms in the few existing oases. Since 1930, the pearl industry has lost its importance because of foreign competition; at the same time, however, the search for and exploitation of oil resources have gradually become the leading concern and most important economic activity in the Trucial Sheikhdoms.
- 43. In addition to oil, the chief exports of the Trucial Coast are dates, vegetables, hides and fish products (including pearls). The port of Dubai is a commercial centre serving both the Trucial Sheikhdoms and the northern part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. It has a relatively large entrepôt trade, particularly with Iran and other neighbouring areas. In 1965, United Kingdom trade with the Sheikhdoms, with the exception of Abu Dhabi, was as follows:

	Thousand pounds sterling
Exports to the United Kingdom	. 2,535
Imports from the United Kingdom	. 2,708
Re-exports from the United Kingdom	. 69

Exports to the United Kingdom from Abu Dhabi totalled £19.6 million against £17.3 million in 1964; imports from the United Kingdom were worth approximately £15 million against £2.3 million in 1964; re-exports from the United Kingdom amounted to £7,000 as against £14,000 in 1964.

44. The revenue of the Sheikhdoms is derived principally from customs duties and income from the oil companies. No accurate figures on revenue are available. Oil income in Abu Dhabi and Dubai has been increasing rapidly.

Currency

45. Following the devaluation of the Indian rupee, in June 1966, six Trucial States adopted a new currency, the Saudi rial, while the seventh, Abu Dhabi, adopted the Bahrein dinar. The "Gulf" rupee had formerly been tied to the Indian rupee at the old exchange rate of Rs. 13.33 to the pound sterling.

Oil

- 46. In 1965, on-shore and off-shore output of crude oil in Abu Dhabi reached 13.5 million tons, an increase of 50 per cent over 1964. In 1966, production was expected to exceed 17.5 million tons; Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd.—owned jointly by British Petroleum and Compagnie française des pétroles-increased the output of its Umm Shaif field (which is about twenty miles from Das Island off the coast of Abu Dhabi) to 5 million tons in 1966. A submarine pipeline carries the crude petroleum from the oil field to Das Island where an export terminal has been constructed. The land concession in Abu Dhabi is held by the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Co. This company was reported to be planning to export 10 million tons in 1966. According to press information, total annual output in Abu Dhabi should reach 60 million tons in a few years.
- 47. Abu Dhabi received £10,750,000 in royalties in 1965 and about £25 million in 1966. It has been estimated that Abu Dhabi's oil revenue would reach £45 million by 1970. Royalties are now computed on the basis of equal division of profits. In January 1967, Abu Dhabi granted a new oil concession to a consortium of three companies, Phillips Petroleum of America, the American Independent Oil Co. and the Italian Agip Group.
- 48. In June 1966, it was reported that Dubai Petroleum had struck oil in commercial quantities off shore in Dubai Sheikhdom. The company holds 35 per cent of the concession. In the remaining Sheikhdoms, the exploration concessions are held by several other companies, mainly from the United States.

Development

49. According to press reports, the new Ruler of Abu Dhabi has initiated the preparation of development plans which would include the building of a road network, schools and hospitals, sewerage schemes, cor-

niches, housing and barracks and power stations. Contracts have already been given to United Kingdom firms for building three hospitals and dispensaries, and eight schools. A United Kingdom consortium of town planners, civil and structural engineers, architects and surveyors named Arabicon has reportedly started work on projects for 100 miles of road between Abu Dhabi town and Buraimi, 60 miles of urban roads, a new sea-wall and land reclamation scheme, sewerage works, a water pipeline system and a new covered market. Private contracts for other projects have been granted and plans have been worked out for a new airport and harbour. Another consortium reported to be advising the Ruler on development is Cansult, a group of Canadian companies. Recently a Development Council has been formed. It includes the Sheikh, five other members of his family, including the Minister for Public Works, Education and Health and a Financial Director who is a United Kingdom citizen. The Financial Director has been appointed in order to organize a modern budget for the State.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

- 50. The Special Committee considered the question of Oman at its 564th meeting on 27 September 1967.
- 51. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland recalled that his delegation considered the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman to be an independent State. Since Article 2 (7) of the Charter prohibited the United Nations from intervening in the domestic affairs of any State, the United Kingdom could not take part in the discussion of that question.
- 52. The representative of the United States of America said that its Government had maintained official relations with the Sultanate, whose sovereignty and independence it fully recognized, for 133 years. Consequently, its delegation could not take part in the discussion of the item, whose inclusion in the agenda was open to serious objections of both a legal and a substantive nature.
- 53. The representative of Australia stated that the Sultanate was not a colonial Territory and did not fall within the Committee's competence.
- 54. The Chairman pointed out that the General Assembly, in its resolutions 2073 (XX) and 2238 (XXI), had characterized the Oman régime as a colonial one and had referred the question to the Special Committee.
- 55. On the proposal of the Chairman, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to report to the Assembly that, in view of the limited time available to it, it had not been able to complete its consideration of the question of Oman and that, subject to any further directives the General Assembly might wish to give during its twenty-second session, it would consider the question at its meetings in 1968 with a view to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2238 (XXI).
- 56. The representative of Syria said he would like it to be made quite clear that lack of time, and not any lack of interest, was the sole reason for the Committee's not having completed its consideration of that question, which in fact it regarded as a matter of great importance.

CHAPTER XIV*

MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

- 1. In 1964, the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XIV, paras. 154-159). The three Territories were considered at two meetings in 1966 by the Special Committee, which also had before it the report of Sub-Committee I concerning these Territories (A/6300/Rev.1,² chap. XIV, annex). At the second of two meetings, the Special Committee adopted the report without objection and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein.
- 2. In these conclusions and recommendations, the Sub-Committee stated that the administering Power had failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and expressed regret at the slow pace of political development in the three Territories. In particular, it noted that the complicated electoral arrangements devised for Mauritius had apparently been the subject of great controversy between the various groups and political parties, and that the people of Seychelles were still deprived of the right of universal adult suffrage. The Sub-Committee therefore recommended that the Special Committee should reaffirm the inalienable right of the peoples of the three Territories to self-determination and independence; that they should be allowed to exercise their right of selfdetermination without delay; that any constitutional changes should be left to these peoples themselves; and that free elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage should be conducted in these Territories as soon as possible with a view to the formation of responsible governments to which all power could be transferred.
- 3. Taking into account the creation of the British Indian Ocean Territory, composed of islands detached from Mauritius and Seychelles, and the reported activation of a plan to establish military bases in the three Territories, the Sub-Committee recommended that the administering Power should be called upon, in fulfilment of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly to respect the territorial integrity of Mauritius and Seychelles and to refrain from using all three Territories for military purposes. The Sub-Committee further recommended that the Special Committee should urge the Assembly to state categorically that any bilateral agreements concluded between the administering Power and other Powers affecting the sovereignty and fundamental rights of these Territories should not be recognized as valid.
- 4. Concluding that the economies of the Territories were characterized by diminishing revenue, increasing unemployment and consequently a declining standard of living, and that foreign companies continued to exploit the Territories without regard to their true interests, the Sub-Committee recommended that the administering Power should be called upon to preserve the right of the indigenous inhabitants to dispose of their national wealth and resources and to take effective measures for diversifying the economies of the Territories.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.8.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

² Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

5. The General Assembly, at its twentieth session, adopted two resolutions, one on the question of Mauritius (resolution 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965) and the other concerning twenty-six Territories, including Seychelles and St. Helena (resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965). At its twenty-first session, the Assembly adopted resolution 2232 (XXI) on 20 December 1966 concerning twenty-five Territories, including Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena. The resolution called upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It reiterated the Assembly's declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It urged the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. It decided that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of the Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to pay special attention to the Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

B. Information on the Territories³

1. MAURITIUS

General

- 6. The Territory of Mauritius consists of the island of Mauritius and its dependencies, Rodrigues, Agalega and the Cargados Carajos. The island of Mauritius lies in the western Indian Ocean, about 500 miles east of Madagascar; Rodrigues, the main dependency, lies a further 350 miles to the east; and the Cargados Carajos 250 miles to the north and Agalega 850 miles to the north of Mauritius. Situated 1,200 miles northeast of Mauritius is the Chagos Archipelago, which according to the administering Power, is no longer part of Mauritius and is included in the "British Indian Ocean Territory".
- 7. The island of Mauritius is of volcanic origin; its total area is approximately 720 square miles. The northern part of the island is a flat plain rising to a fertile central plateau. There are several small chains of mountains, the principal peaks reaching about 2,700 feet. There are numerous short, swift rivers with waterfalls, some of which are used to generate hydroelectric power. Rodrigues, a mountainous island of volcanic origin, covers an area of about 40 square miles. All the island of Agalega and the Cargados Carajos are coral islands with an area of approximately 27.5 square miles.
- 8. The estimated population of Mauritius at the end of 1965, excluding the dependencies, was 751,421 (compared with 733,605 at the end of 1964), divided into a general population comprising Europeans, mainly

³ Section B of this working paper is based on: (a) information collected by the Secretariat from published sources; and (b) information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations by the United Kingdom for the year ending 31 December 1965.

French, Africans and persons of mixed origin, 220,093; Indo-Mauritians, made up of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and their descendants, 506,552 (of whom 383,542 were Hindus and 123,010 Muslims); and Chinese, consisting of immigrants from China and their descendants, 24,776. According to the latest estimates (January 1967), the population is expected to rise to about 800,000 by the end of 1967.

9. The Territory, which is already very densely populated, is beset with a rapid growth of population resulting in a reduction of living standards among certain sections of the people and an increasing level of unemployment.

Constitution and Government

- 10. Under the Mauritius (Constitution) Order, 1964, the Government of the Colony of Mauritius is vested in a Governor, with a Council of Ministers and a Legislative Assembly. The Council of Ministers consists of the Premier and Minister of Finance, the Chief Secretary and not less than ten and not more than thirteen other ministers appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier from among the elected or nominated members of the Legislative Assembly. The Governor appoints to the office of Premier the member of the Legislative Assembly who appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of members. The Council is the principal instrument of policy and, with certain exceptions, the Governor is obliged to consult it in the exercise of his functions. The Legislative Assembly consists of the Chief Secretary, forty elected members and up to fifteen other members nominated by the Governor.
- 11. The status of the political parties in the Legislative Assembly has remained the same since October 1963 general elections: Mauritius Labour Party (MLP), which represents mainly the Indo-Mauritian and Creole (Afro-European) communities, 19; Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (PMSD), which traditionally represented the Franco-Mauritian land-owning class and the Creole middle class, and which now claims to draw support from all communities, 8; Independent Forward Bloc (IFB), which is to the left of the MLP, 7; Muslim Committee of Action (MCA), which has the support of a substantial proportion of Muslims, 4; and independent, 2.
- 12. The Government formed by Sir Seenoosagur Ramgoolam, leader of the MLP, is a coalition composed of all the parties represented in the Assembly, with the exception of the PMSD.

Recent constitutional developments

13. As previously reported by the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XIV), a Constitutional Conference attended by representatives of all the parties in the Mauritius Legislature was held in London from 7 to 24 September 1965. The main point at issue was whether the Territory should aim at independence or association with the United Kingdom. The MLP and the IFB advocated independence, and the MCA was also prepared to support independence, subject to certain electoral safeguards for the Muslim community. On the other hand, the PMSD favoured a continuing link with the United Kingdom. At the end of the conference, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced the decision that Mauritius should go forward to full independence, subject to an affirmative resolution passed by a simple majority of the new Assembly after elections and a period of six months' full internal self-government.

He also hoped that the necessary processes could be completed before the end of 1966.

- 14. In January 1966, an electoral commission, with Sir Harold Banwell as chairman, visited Mauritius to formulate the electoral system and the method of allocating seats in the Legislature. The report⁴ was published on 13 June 1966 and accepted by the parties participating in the present Government and the Opposition PMSD after certain amendments to the recommendations of the report had been made, following the visit of Mr. John Stonehouse, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Mauritius between 16 June and 4 July 1966.
- 15. Under the electoral arrangements now accepted by the four main parties, sixty members will be returned for the island of Mauritius by block voting (each elector being obliged to cast three votes) in twenty three-member constituencies, and two members returned for Rodrigues (the principal dependency of Mauritius) by block voting in a single constituency. The members elected for Rodrigues will also represent the interests of the two lesser dependencies, namely, Cargados Carajos and Agalega.
- 16. In addition, eight specially elected members will be returned from among unsuccessful candidates who have made the best showing in the elections. The first four of these seats will be reserved, irrespective of party, for the "best losers" of the communities that are under-represented in the Legislative Assembly after the constituency elections. The remaining four seats will be allocated on the basis of party and community. Parties or party alliances will be permitted to qualify for the "best loser" seats if registered with the Electoral Commissioner before nomination day.
- 17. The Constitution of Mauritius set out in the Mauritius Constitution Order, 1966, on 21 December 1966, incorporated the proposals agreed upon at the 1965 constitutional conference and the subsequent agreement on electoral arrangements. The Order in Council provides that the new Constitution will come into effect on a date to be appointed by the Governor. It also provides for the appointment of an Ombudsman, at a later date.

Election arrangements

- 18. Subject to certain exceptions, such as convicted criminals and the insane, all Commonwealth citizens satisfying a two-year residence requirement who have attained the age of 21 years are qualified to register as electors. New registers of electors were prepared in 1966. They were published on 23 January 1967 and brought into force the following day. The total number of electors on the new registers is 307,908 for Mauritius and 7,876 for Rodrigues, making a combined total of 315,784. Four Commonwealth observers (with Sir Colin MacGregor of Jamaica as chairman) were appointed to observe the various processes involved in compiling the new registers; three of them arrived in Mauritius on 5 September 1966 and there was at least one observer present from then until 28 November.
- 19. Discussions took place in London in December 1966 between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premier of Mauritius about the date for the forthcoming general elections in the Territory. In a statement published on 21 December 1966, the Commonwealth Office said that the United Kingdom Gov-

⁴ Mauritius: Report of the Banwell Commission on the Electoral System, Colonial No. 362 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966).

ernment's view presented during the discussions was that it was most desirable that elections should be held at the earliest practicable time, bearing in mind that at the 1965 Constitutional Conference, the then Secretary of State had hoped that Mauritius could become independent before the end of 1966. Neither the United Kingdom Government nor the Government of Mauritius could avoid the subsequent delays, but the completion of the register of electors in the relatively near future would enable elections to be held in 1967.

20. The Commonwealth Office also said that the Secretary of State had expressed the hope that the Premier would share his wish to see early elections and that the Premier had confirmed that he would wish elections to be held in 1967.

Recent political developments

- 21. Following the issuance of the report of the Banwell Commission, the three parties participating in the present Government organized a common front, the Pro-Independence Front, under the leadership of the Premier, in protest against the Commission's proposals for electoral arrangements. Subsequently, the Front was reported to have been maintained for the forthcoming general elections.
- 22. On 5 September 1966, Mr. G. Duval, who later became the leader of the Opposition PMSD, was reported to have said that two important election issues were the constitutional future of the Territory and the inability of the Government to put the economy on a sound basis or to look after the destitute.
- 23. On the same day, Mr. Duval started a movement of passive resistance in Mauritius. Following the reported refusal by the Government to pay them the same amount of relief aid allocated to certain other categories of unemployed workers, some 200 unemployed licensees of the urban administration demonstrated in Curepipe and were arrested for the obstruction of traffic. Later, the Government took action to settle the issue in dispute.
- 24. At the end of October 1966, over 100 unemployed persons rejected an offer of work on sugar estates, alleging political discrimination. They demonstrated at various places between Mahébourg and Curepipe, and this culminated in the arrest of 105 persons on 29 October for obstructing the highway. On 4 November, they were tried and found guilty, but were discharged from prison after having received a warning from the Court of Curepipe.

External relations

25. During a visit to the United States of America early in December 1966, the Premier of Mauritius said that his Government was seeking to improve relations between the two countries, to raise the price of the two principal products of Mauritius, sugar and tea, and to secure aid for creating secondary industries, to increase the production of foodstuffs, notably rice and flour, to establish a new aerial link with Africa, Europe and the United States, to reduce population pressure and unemployment, and to set up a university. After discussions with the representatives of the United States Government and various private organizations, he expressed the hope that they would help Mauritius in finding solutions to many of its problems.

British Indian Ocean Territory

26. Reference is made in the last report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XIV) to the

British Indian Ocean Territory which comprises certain islands formerly administered by the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles, and which was created in 1965 for the construction of defence facilities by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. As compensation for the transfer of these islands to the new Colony, the United Kingdom Government paid £3 million to Mauritius in March 1966 with no conditions attached, and will build an international airfield for Seychelles. On 16 November 1966, the Secretary of State for Defence stated, in reply to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons, that no plan had been made for the creation of military bases in the British Indian Ocean Territory. Thus he could not give any figure for the cost of such a scheme.

Economic conditions

- 27. Mauritius is primarily an agricultural country. In 1960, it suffered a severe economic setback brought about by two disastrous cyclones. Subsequently, the economy made a good recovery, reaching a peak in 1963, which saw a bumper sugar crop combined with higher sugar prices. If these two years are not taken into account, the gross national product showed a steady growth, from Rs.681 million⁵ in 1959 to Rs.799 million in 1965. During this period, the population increased from 637,000 to 751,000. There was a slight downward trend in *per capita* income and a rise in the level of unemployment.
- 28. In 1965, sugar was still the mainstay of the economy, although tea had become the second most important export product. The distribution of the total area of land under cultivation, in acres, is as follows: sugar, 214,400; tea, 6,600; tobacco, 1,000; aloe fibre, 900; foodcrops, vegetables and fruits, 10,000.
- 29. In September 1966, the Chamber of Agriculture of Mauritius estimated sugar output for the full year at about 575,000 metric tons, representing a considerable decrease from 1965, when a total of 665,000 metric tons had been produced. Cyclone "Denise" and drought accounted for the decline in output.
- 30. Sugar is disposed of primarily in accordance with the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, which has been renewed until 1974. Under the Agreement, Mauritius exports a quota (380,000 tons per annum) to the United Kingdom at a negotiated price (£47.10s. a ton in 1966-1968). In addition, Mauritius may export to Commonwealth preferential markets (in fact the United Kingdom and Canada) a further agreed quota each year. The remainder of the sugar production is sold to non-Commonwealth countries at the world free market price, which in 1966 was substantially below the negotiated price. Exports of sugar to the United Kingdom, the Territory's principal customer, in the first ten months of 1967 totalled 307,786 tons (Rs.208.6 million), an increase of 59,350 tons (Rs.42.5 million) over the 1965 period. However, it was estimated that the gross income of the sugar industry might be moderately lower in 1966 than in 1965, when 569,400 tons of sugar (Rs.290.3 million) were exported.
- 31. Manufacturing is the second largest sector of the economy. The United Kingdom Central Office of Information reported in October 1966 that, since 1963, nearly fifty new secondary industries had been introduced on a small scale in the Territory. As previously noted (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XIV), the number

⁵ One Mauritius rupee is equivalent to 1s. 6d. sterling.

of such industries established in the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 was eight, eleven and twenty-five respectively.

- 32. Between the first and second quarter of 1966, imports increased from Rs.80.4 million to Rs.82.9 million, while exports decreased from Rs.56.7 million to Rs.6.3 million. No significant changes occurred in the structure of imports, but exports of sugar in the first quarter were Rs.47.3 million and in the second quarter Rs.0.5 million. The third quarter figure was Rs.134.6 million, making a total for the first nine months of Rs.182.4 million. As in the past, trade was conducted mainly with the United Kingdom, which received 73 per cent of the Territory's exports and provided 23 per cent of its imports in the first half of 1966.
- 33. In July 1966 the Government decided to increase both direct and indirect taxes in order to balance its budget.
- 34. Capital expenditure under the 1966-1970 Development Programme will be Rs.340 million and the fund will be allocated as follows: agriculture and industry, Rs.130 million; infra-structure, Rs.99 million; social services, Rs.82 million; administration, Rs.28 million; Rodrigues, Rs.1 million.
- 35. Premier Ramgoolam said in a recent address that an important economic problem for the Territory was that the price of sugar could not be stabilized at a remunerative level.
- 36. The Premier said that progress in the diversification of the Territory's economy had been slow. The Territory was putting 1,000 acres under tea cultivation annually, and its was the intention of the Government to extend this by a further 15,000 acres. The sugar industry had undertaken to provide capital out of its surplus for the erection of seven more tea factories. Businessmen were being encouraged to invest in Mauritius and, in recent years, a number of light industries had been established. Industrial expansion had been facilitated by the setting up of the Development Bank of Mauritius, the Advisory National Development Council and a marketing board. An East African Economic Community was under discussion and, if this were to materialize, it would give further encouragement to many smaller industries.
- 37. While aware that conditions such as the rapid rise in population, the scarcity of local capital and the paucity of technical knowledge had limited economic growth, the Premier nevertheless asserted that the Territory enjoyed a stability and prosperity unknown before in its history, through a better distribution of the national income. This was being achieved by a planned economy and a regulated fiscal policy. Recurrent and developmental annual expenditures totalled approximately over £22 million. The sum of £6 million was spent annually on the development programme alone, and 48 per cent of this was financed from local resources. Mauritius was a viable country and had never needed a grant-in-aid to balance its budget.
- 38. In December 1966, the Premier made a visit to the United States, the main purpose of which was to seek aid to tackle the economic and social problems confronting the Territory (see para. 25 above).
- 39. On 20 December 1966, Mr. John Stonehouse, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated, in reply to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons, that during the period 1961-1966, the United Kingdom had provided Mauritius with financial aid totalling £8.1 million, in addition to the compensation of £3 million paid for the in-

clusion of certain of its islands in the British Indian Ocean Territory and to a £2 million loan raised by the Government of Mauritius on the London market. For the period 1965-1968, total Colonial Development and Welfare grants and loan assistance given or envisaged amounted to £4.4 million. Aid to Mauritius after 31 March 1968 would depend on the total resources the United Kingdom could make available for overseas aid at the time and the Territory's needs in relation to those of other recipients of British aid.

40. In response to another question, Mr. Stonehouse stated that, in order to combat chronic and widespread unemployment in Mauritius, his Government was examining various ways by which the Territory's economy could be diversified, but he added that the economy was almost completely dependent on sugar and that there were problems in arranging for any new industrial development. These questions were being studied.

Social conditions

Labour

- 41. In recent years, the economy has not expanded fast enough to provide work for all the new entrants into the labour force. Between mid-1962 and mid-1965, the annual increase in the working-age population and unemployment was estimated at about 6,500 and over 4,000 respectively. During the period, the number registered as unemployed rose by 4,700 and that on relief work by 9,050, making a total of 13,750.
- 42. On 28 April 1966, the Government published the first of its bi-annual surveys of employment and earnings in large establishments.6 The main purpose of these surveys was not to find out figures of total employment but to provide a continuous series of comparable data which would show changes in employment from year to year, from one part of the year to another and between the various sectors of the economy. The survey covered 822 establishments which in April 1966 employed 119,270 workers (including 34,210 on monthly rates of pay and 85,060 on daily rates of pay). Agriculture accounted for 55,200 (including 51,870 employed by the sugar industry), services 45,850, manufacturing 6,850, transport, storage and communications 4,100, commerce 2,960, construction 2,730, electricity 1,310, mining and quarrying 160, and others, 110. The average monthly rates of pay ranged from Rs. 273 for agricultural workers to Rs. 500 for electricians. The average daily rates of pay ranged from Rs. 3.2 for miners to Rs. 8.8 for those engaged in miscellaneous activities.
- 43. In 1965, there were seventy-nine associations of employees (one more than in 1964), with a membership of 48,349 (120 more than in 1964). There were ten trade disputes involving 1,660 workers and resulting in a loss of 3,860 man-days. The main cause of these disputes was dissatisfaction with conditions of employment.
- 44. Labour relations in the sugar industry formed a subject of discussion in the Legislative Assembly on 29 November 1966. A member of the Assembly, Mr. J. N. Roy, introduced a motion which would have the Assembly express the view that the widespread and defiant opposition to Indo-Mauritian workers in the sugar industry, if not checked by legislation, threatened to wreck the industry.

⁶ Colony of Mauritius: A Survey of Employment and Earnings in Large Establishments (No. 1), 28 April 1966.

- 45. Commenting on the motion, another member of the Assembly, Mr. Jomadar, who was formerly the Minister of Labour, stated that it was very opportune and that a section of workers in the sugar industry were the victims of injustice. Having made an appeal for the elimination of all forms of discrimination and injustice, he proposed an amendment to the motion, which was then adopted unanimously.
- 46. Under this amendment, the Assembly expressed the view that a tripartite standing committee should be set up by the Government in co-operation with employers and employees in the sugar industry for the discussion of all matters of concern either to employers or employees or which could adversely affect the good relations between them or the efficiency of the industry. These would include steps to ensure equality of opportunity in recruitment and promotion, and especially the discussion and disposal of possible complaints of discrimination against any category of workers or employees for suspected political affiliation or for any other cause.
- 47. The Premier of Mauritius said in a recent address that the main problems confronting the Territory today were the rapid rise in population and widespread unemployment. For many years, the government machinery had been geared to tackle these problems at many levels of administration. However, time had been lost in the beginning because some people had opposed population control on religious grounds, but a change of attitude had come about. With the assistance of the Government and the International Planned Parenthood Federation, two voluntary associations were performing good work both in the urban and rural areas. Mauritius had also been promised considerable aid from the Swedish Government.
- 48. As to unemployment, the Premier stated, the Government was engaged actively in long-term development of the Territory and pursued a rationalized policy of emigration. It hoped to mobilize all local resources for the creation of more work and wealth. It had also decided not to place an embargo on the export of capital in order to attract foreign investors to Mauritius. But any Mauritian emigrating overseas was only allowed to remove his capital from the country over a number of years. At present, certain labourintensive projects which included projects in tea, textiles and edible oils production were being undertaken, which would provide employment for a large number of people. By 1970, it was hoped to provide work for most of the labour force.

Public health

- 49. There are three systems of providing medical services in Mauritius, of which the largest is the government medical services, administered by the Ministry of Health. Other medical services are provided by the sugar estates for their employees, as required by the Labour Ordinance, while maternity and child welfare services are provided partly by the Government and partly by a voluntary body—the Maternity and Child Welfare Society.
- 50. Recently, some important changes have occurred in these systems. Government expenditure on medical and health services in the financial year 1964-1965 was Rs. 19.7 million (an increase of Rs. 0.5 million over the previous year) or about 9.6 per cent of the Territory's total expenditure. In 1965, there were 137

government and 74 private physicians (compared with 118 and 65 respectively in 1964). There was, thus, one physician for every 3,400 persons. A total of twenty-four hospitals was maintained by the sugar estates, representing a reduction of one from 1964. The number of beds available for in-patients in the Territory decreased by fifteen to 3,339 and the number of general beds by forty-five to 2,706, which represented a proportion of one general bed per 361 persons.

51. During 1966, the Government began to construct a 600-bed hospital at Pamplemousses, the total cost of which was estimated at £2.1 million. On 25 November 1966, the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development announced that Colonial Development and Welfare allocations totalling £1.4 million had been made available towards this project. Early in 1967, the Ministry provided a gynaecologist to give instructions to medical, nursing and other staff in family planning work and a medical administrator to work in the Mauritius Ministry of Health; it is also supplying equipment to the value of approximately £4,000 for thirteen clinics. On 20 December 1966, Mr. Stonehouse said, in reply to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons, that the number of family planning clinics in Mauritius had recently been increased from 98 to 124 and that the programme was very successful.

Educational conditions

52. Enrolment in primary, secondary, teacher training and vocational training schools in 1965 was as follows:

	Schools	Enrolment	Teachers
Primary education	331a	134,534ь	4,015
Secondary education	135c	34,121	1,484
Teacher training	14	424	26
Vocational training	4d	234	19

a Comprising 160 government, 55 aided and 116 private schools. b Representing over 88 per cent of all children of primary school age (5-6 to 11-12 years).
c Comprising 4 government, 13 aided and 118 private schools.

d Government schools.

- 53. In 1965, the Government opened seven new primary schools, extended one secondary school and established the John Kennedy College. This college provides full-time training in technical and commercial subjects and also a variety of part-time and evening courses. Full-time, post-secondary education is provided by the Teachers' Training College and the College of Agriculture. The latter is managed by the Department of Agriculture and most of its students obtaining their diplomas enter the sugar industry. During 1967, there were over 1,200 students following full-time courses in institutions of higher education overseas.
- 54. In December 1965, the University of Mauritius (Provisional Council) Ordinance became law. The United Kingdom Government has made an initial pledge of Rs. 3 million from Colonial Development and Welfare funds to finance a development plan for the University. Dr. S. J. Hale of the University of Edinburgh has been appointed Vice-Chancellor. The Premier of Mauritius said in a recent address that steps were being taken towards the establishment of the University, where students would be taught and trained in technology and science.
- 55. Government expenditure on education in the financial year 1964-1965 totalled Rs. 28.9 million (an

increase of Rs. 0.6 million over the previous year), of which Rs. 26 million was recurrent and Rs. 2.9 million capital expenditure. Education accounted for 12.7 per cent of the Territory's total recurrent expenditure.

2. SEYCHELLES

General

- 56. Since 8 November 1965, when three of its islands were included in the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Territory of Seychelles has comprised eighty-nine islands situated in the western Indian Ocean approximately 1,000 miles east of the coast of Kenya. The islands, with a land area of some eightynine square miles, fall into two groups of entirely different geological formation, thirty-two being granite and the rest coral. The granite islands are predominantly mountainous. In some of them, and particularly in Mahé, the largest island, which has an area of about 55.5 square miles, a narrow coastal belt of level land surrounds the granitic mountain massif, which rises steeply to an elevation, at Morne Seychellois, the highest peak, of almost 3,000 feet. The coral islands are flat, elevated coral reefs at different stages of formation.
- 57. Most of the inhabitants of the Seychelles are descended from the early French and African settlers. Early in 1966, the population of Seychelles was estimated to be about 48,000 (compared with 47,400 at the end of June 1965), nearly all of whom lived in the granitic island group. Three quarters of the Territory's population lives on Mahé, and most of the remainder on Praslin, La Digue and Silhouette. There are very few permanent residents on the coral islands.
- 58. The present population is increasing at a rate believed to be in excess of 3 per cent per year. If this rate is maintained, the population will double in less than twenty-three years. The rapid growth of population has slowed down the rise in living standards among certain sections of the people and reduced employment opportunities.

Constitution and Government

- 59. The Government of the Colony of Seychelles consists of a Governor, a Legislative Council and an Executive Council. The Governor is empowered to enact laws with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, subject to the retention by the Crown of the power to disallow or refuse consent.
- 60. Under a 1960 Order in Council, the Legislative Council consists of the Governor, as president, four ex officio members (the Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, Administrative Secretary and Financial Secretary), five elected members and three nominated members, of whom at least one must be an unofficial member. General elections, on a broad franchise based on a simple literacy test, must take place every four years. The last elections were held in July 1963.
- 61. The Executive Council consists of the Governor, who presides, four ex officio members and such other persons, at least one of whom must be an unofficial member, as the Governor may from time to time appoint. The composition of the present Executive Council is identical with that of the Legislative Council.

Recent political and constitutional developments

- 62. At the 1963 elections, all except one of the five elected seats in the Legislative Council were contested to some extent on party lines between candidates broadly supported either by the long-established Seychelles Taxpayers and Producers Association, representing European planters' interests, or the newly formed Seychelles Islands United Party, drawing its support mainly from the middle and working classes. Both parties were able to claim two seats, and the remaining seat went to an independent candidate claiming support from both.
- 63. In 1964, the Seychelles Islands United Party faded out and two new parties emerged, namely, the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) led by Mr. J. R. Mancham and the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) led by Mr. F. A. René. About the same time, the Seychelles Taxpayers and Producers Association was reorganized into an ostensibly non-political Seychelles Farmers' Association designed to promote and defend the interests of the agricultural community.
- 64. The main differences between the two parties were reported by Sir Colville Deverell (see below) to be on the accent they placed on the speed of constitutional evolution and the nature of the ultimate status of Seychelles after a period of self-government. Mr. Mancham, the leader of SDP, advocated a cautious advance and an ultimate relationship with the United Kingdom as close as possible to integration, while Mr. René, the leader of SPUP, initially advocated a rapid, if not immediate, advance to self-government and the early attainment of a status of complete independence.
- 65. As previously noted by the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XIV), Sir Colville Deverell was sent to the Seychelles in February 1966 by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies to serve as constitutional adviser in the examination of the various paths of constitutional evolution open to the Territory, taking into account the wishes of the people and the realities of the local situation. The report prepared by Sir Colville,7 together with a covering dispatch from the Secretary of State to the Governor of Seychelles,8 was published on 14 October 1966. Following is a summary of Sir Colville's main observations and recommendations.

Problems of the Seychelles

66. Sir Colville stated in his report that the salient feature of the Seychelles was the relative poverty of its resources, and the magnitude of the task of providing an acceptable minimum standard of living for a too rapidly increasing population. The problem could only be overcome by a reorientation of agricultural practice, the encouragement of alternative sources of wealth, such as tourism and selective settlement, the continuance of emigration and a voluntary slowing down of the population growth rate.

Ultimate status

67. Sir Colville considered that, in the particular circumstances of the Seychelles, only three alternatives for the ultimate status of the Territory were possible after a viable form of internal self-government had

664/66.

8 United Kingdom Commonwealth Office: Dispatch No. 305

⁷ Report on Constitutional Developments in Seychelles, C.O./

been established (a) nominal independence guaranteed by treaty relations with some suitable power; (b) some form of free association with the United Kingdom; and (c) some form of close association or integration with the United Kingdom. However, he did not attempt to assess the merits of the various solutions which appeared to him open to the Seychelles.

Steps towards internal self-government Extension of the franchise

68. Sir Colville recommended that immediate steps should be taken towards introducing universal adult suffrage. He observed that this extension of the franchise would not materially alter the present situation and was generally favoured by the people of the Seychelles.

Form of representative government

- 69. Sir Colville recommended the continuation of the present single council situation in which the Executive and Legislative Councils were identically composed. He felt that there would be great advantage if the Territory's development programme did not become the subject of unnecessary and largely artificial party conflict, necessitated by the requirements of a constitutional obligation to oppose. He also felt that at this time it would be a disservice to the Territory to introduce a system of government which would put a premium on party divisions, when the number of persons with experience in public affairs was very limited and the main issues were not in dispute.
- 70. Sir Colville emphasized that it was wise to create an unofficial majority in the legislature immediately following the introduction of universal adult suffrage and that the single council should be small enough to carry out its policy-making functions as a committee of the whole. He therefore recommended that the number of elected members of the Legislative Council should be increased from five to eight before the next election and that, in the case of the two constituencies of Praslin and La Digue, the elected member should possess residential qualifications, a restriction which he thought to be desirable as a special measure for areas which might otherwise be neglected. He further recommended that the Legislative Council should continue to include four ex officio members and that the Governor should have the power to nominate not more than three other members, official and unofficial, if he deemed it to be necessary in the light of the results of the election.
- 71. After the new Executive Council had been constituted with a membership identical with that of the Legislative Council, he recommended that the Governor should entrust three of the unofficial members, who might be chairmen of appropriate council subcommittees, with responsibility for the administration of groups of departments designated by him, and that the Governor should retain responsibility for the remaining subjects which would include external affairs, law and order, the public service and, at least initially, finance.
- 72. Sir Colville also recommended the creation of new constituencies and unofficial policy advisory committees with unofficial chairmen. Finally, he envisaged that, in subsequent stages leading to full internal self-government, some or all of the *ex officio* members of

- the single council would be replaced by unofficial members and the Governor by a Seychellois Head of State.
- 73. In a dispatch of 13 October 1966, addressed to the Governor of the Seychelles, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies said that, broadly speaking, he accepted the recommendations contained in Sir Colville's report, but that he had made a number of modifications to and elaborations of these recommendations.
- 74. The Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed with the analysis of the economic and political scene which Sir Colville had given in his report. In particular, great importance was attached to his conclusion that there could be relatively little dispute and consequently no real basis for political division and rivalry about the steps needed to tackle the economic and social problems confronting the Territory. It was hoped that the wisdom of this approach would be widely recognized in the Seychelles.
- 75. He also agreed that for the present it was more important to concentrate on the progressive establishment of constitutional machinery which would eventually permit fully informed and representative discussion of all matters of serious concern to the Seychelles, including the question of ultimate status.
- 76. The Secretary of State for the Colonies supported certain specific constitutional measures which Sir Colville had recommended. These included an immediate move towards the adoption of universal adult suffrage, the continuation of the single council system, an unofficial majority in the legislature and the entrusting of responsibilities for the conduct of government business to unofficial members.
- 77. While recognizing that there was no need for a substantial increase in the number of elected members of the Legislative Council, he suggested that no restriction should be imposed on the selection of candidates for election to the Council. He also suggested a slightly different form of government representation in the Council which should consist of three *ex officio* and four nominated members.
- 78. His most important proposal, representing a considerable development and elaboration of Sir Colville's recommendations, concerned the introduction in the Seychelles of the committee system of government. Noting the suggestion by Sir Colville that the three unofficial members responsible for the administration of groups of departments might be chairmen of appropriate council sub-committees, he considered that this concept might usefully be further extended. He therefore proposed that an attempt might be made to ensure the participation by all the unofficial members of the Council in the excutive function of government through membership of council committees which would themselves have the responsibility, under the Governor and Council, for groups of departments.
- 79. The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that before this particular formula could be adopted, it had to be considered and accepted locally. He hoped that during his visit to the Seychelles, scheduled for October 1966, Mr. John Stonehouse, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, could discuss with the Governor and members of the Executive Council the recommendations contained in Sir Colville's report and the supplementary suggestions made in the present dispatch. He suggested that both documents should be published as soon as possible and

the widest possible publicity given to their contents.

80. Mr. Stonehouse arrived in Seychelles on 20 October 1966 for an eight-day visit. Before his departure from the Territory, he stated that he had found on all sides general acceptance of the new constitutional proposals for the Seychelles. These proposals would be implemented within 1968. There were certain details still to be settled, such as the delimitation of the new constituency boundaries, but this was the pattern for the future constitution for Seychelles. The formal agreement of the Government of Seychelles to the new proposals was communicated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Governor in his dispatch No. 232 of 1966 and in the meantime the new Constitution is being drafted.

Economic conditions

- 81. The economy of Seychelles is almost entirely dependent on its agriculture, most of which is based on the plantation system. Production is predominantly for export. The most important single product is copra, accounting for over 60 per cent of the Territory's exports. Next in importance is cinnamon, followed by vanilla. Almost everything else must be imported, the largest item being foodstuffs.
- 82. The concentration of production for export has arisen largely from the distribution of land in relatively large holdings. For many years, the arable land under coconut palms has remained at 23,000 acres, representing most of the total area under cultivation, while cinnamon and vanilla have occupied approximately 14,000 and 700 acres respectively.
- 83. In 1965, copra continued to dominate the export sector of the economy, but its exports totalled Rs.6.1 million⁹ as compared to Rs.6.6 million in 1964. The average price of copra, the most important factor governing the economic life of the Territory, rose by Rs.159 to Rs.1,093 per ton during this period. In view of this high price, no subsidies were paid from the Copra Price Stabilization Fund, which has in recent years ensured a minimum return of Rs.800 per ton to planters.
- 84. Cinnamon is the second most important export from Seychelles. Export of oil distilled from its leaves decreased from Rs.728,000 in 1964 to Rs.510,000 in 1965, while that of bark increased from Rs.834,000 to Rs.2,242,000 (a record figure) during these years. Cinnamon quills and quillings were also exported, their value being Rs.39,000 in 1964 and Rs.72,000 in 1965.
- 85. Although the production of vanilla is no longer of such importance to the economy as it once was, it is still the third and only other major export crop of the Territory. Exports of vanilla in 1965, which were the lowest for four years, earned Rs.48,000.
- 86. Faced with a rising population and a declining level of employment, the Government has endeavoured to modify the Territory's agricultural pattern so as to provide more opportunity for intensive production on small holdings in suitable areas. To this end, a land settlement scheme has been undertaken since 1961. The settlers, numbering 185 in 1965 as against 150 in 1964, lease from the Government a small plot of land of between 3.5 and 10 acres. They grow export crops such as coconut and cinnamon, cash crops such as sugar-cane, tobacco and patchouli and food crops

- such as sweet potatoes, yams and vegetables. They also keep one or two head of cattle.
- 87. Furthermore, the Government has promoted the development of the tea industry. The Seychelles Tea Company, organized in 1962 by a group of people from Kenya, has already started production. The company has leased 300 acres of Crown land to plant and it is also engaged in planting a further 150 acres of Crown land, with tea, on an agency basis, which it is hoped to lease to small holders eventually. By the end of 1965, a total of 225 acres of tea had been planted.
- 88. In his report, Sir Colville Derevell expressed the view that in order to obtain land for growing foodstuffs for local consumption and for other new crops, notably tea, it would be necessary to persuade or induce land owners to concentrate on growing more coconut on the lower plateau areas of the granite islands and in the coral islands, so as to permit the more intensive use of the lower granitic island slopes for other crops.
- 89. Certain other agricultural projects have been in operation during recent years. Four new small schemes were initiated in 1965, designed to stimulate fishery development in the Territory, which is believed to be well endowed with marine resources. Of these, three were financed by the United Kingdom Committee of the Freedom From Hunger Campaign and the fourth by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. A fisheries expert from the United Kingdom visited the Seychelles between September and November 1965 to study local fishing methods and to conduct a preliminary investigation into the possibility of establishing commercial fisheries in the Territory.
- 90. Efforts have also been made towards the expansion of non-farming sectors of the economy, especially the tourist industry. Full development of this industry (which is estimated to have earned Rs.745,000 in 1965) has been impeded by the worsening of already inadequate shipping links and the absence of an international airfield. With this in mind, it was announced in November 1965 that the Territory was to have such an airfield and that the cost of this project would be entirely met by the United Kingdom as compensation for the inclusion of three islands of the Seychelles in the newly established British Indian Ocean Territory.
- 91. Until 1958 Seychelles was able to balance its budget, though it received little external aid. Since then the combination of static agricultural production coupled with the marked acceleration of the population growth has changed the situation. For the period 1960-1965, the Territory received a grant-in-aid averaging about 13 per cent of its total expenditure. In 1965, recurrent revenue amounted to Rs.8.9 million and expenditure to Rs.9.9 million, thus giving rise to a deficit of Rs.1 million, which was met by a grant-in-aid.
- 92. During 1965, Colonial Development and Welfare grants for development totalled Rs.5.2 million in addition to loan expenditure of Rs.1.6 million. A development plan for 1966-1969 envisages an annual expenditure of nearly Rs.10 million (excluding international and technical assistance of various kinds), of which over 85 per cent will be financed by Colonial Development and Welfare funds. The main objects of the plan are to promote fishery development on a large scale, to expand land settlement and to accelerate the

⁹ The Seychelles rupee is valued at 1s. 6d. sterling.

development of the tea industry. Proposals have also been made for the encouragement of tourism and the expansion and improvement of the road system, power plants and social services. A detailed survey of a suitable site for the airfield to be built by the United Kingdom in Mahé is expected to be completed early in 1967.

93. In his report, Sir Colville stated that continued and considerable annual financial aid would be needed from abroad to support the Seychelles' budget for a long time to come. Because of the relatively low agricultural potential of the Territory and its remoteness, a modest degree of prosperity was the best that could be hoped for. While in general agreement with this view, Mr. Stonehouse said during his recent visit to the Seychelles that the Territory's economy could perhaps make good progress if political stability and industrial peace were maintained and if the communications system was improved.

Social conditions

Labour

- 94. The majority of the working population are engaged in farming, the Territory's main economic activity. But the efficient production of plantation crops requires relatively little labour, and while the population increases and tends to do so more and more rapidly, employment in agriculture shows a tendency to decrease. Unemployment in the Territory stood at 8 per cent of the working age group in 1960, the last year for which labour statistics are available. In recent years, there has been no large-scale emigration. During 1965, about 350 Seychellois found employment overseas, mostly fishermen and laborers who are recruited each year for work on contract in two dependencies of Mauritius. The number of persons employed in the United Kingdom indicated a substantial decrease, from 79 in 1964 to 35 in 1965. This decrease was attributed to the introduction of the quota system for emigrants to that country.
- 95. During 1964 and 1965, there were thirteen registered trade unions in the Territory. On 6 August 1966, the Seychelles Trade Union Congress, an affiliation of three unions, was established.
- 96. In 1965, upward adjustments were made in the statutory minimum wages for agricultural labourers of both sexes, resulting in an increase of some 20 per cent over those prevailing in 1961. As previously noted by the Special Committee, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated on 18 November 1965 that despite this recent increase, the normal level of agricultural wages in Seychelles remained extremely low. Therefore, he urged the general adoption of a 45-hour week in due course. He also proposed to raise the rates for government labourers as the first step towards improving the living standard of other workers earning very low wages.
- 97. In May 1966, the Government provisionally increased the wages of male labourers from Rs.72 to Rs.80 per month and those of female labourers from Rs.45 to Rs.50 per month for a 45-hour week. Subsequently, four other employers followed suit. A strike involving some 3,250 workers employed mainly by the Government occurred on 13 June 1966 at Victoria, the capital of Seychelles, following the rejection by their union representatives of the provisional pay increase of 11 per cent as inadequate to make up for

the recent rise of 100 per cent in the cost of living. These workers returned to work on 20 June 1966, after two British naval parties had landed in the Territory to help preserve public security there and after an agreement in principle between the Government and the principal unions involved that the final pay award would be retroactive to 1 May 1966. The final pay award, which was announced in December 1966, has raised the basic monthly wage for unskilled male labourers to Rs.92 and for female labourers to Rs.58.

98. On 7 January 1967, the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development appointed Sir Richard Ramage as Salaries Commissioner for the Territory. He was asked to examine the terms and conditions of public service in the Territory, with particular reference to the need to adjust salaries. His report was completed but had not been published by the middle of March 1967.

Public health

- 99. Government expenditure on medical services in 1965 was Rs.1,274,760 (compared with Rs.1,235,640 in 1964), or 12.8 per cent of the Territory's total recurrent expenditure.
- 100. According to the information transmitted by the United Kingdom, the main islands are reasonably well provided with hospitals and clinics, but there are no medical facilities for some 1,500 persons on the outlying islands. In 1964 and 1965, there were four hospitals with a total of 218 beds, the main one being located in Victoria with 155 beds. The ratios of medical officers and hospital beds to the population were 1 to 3,006 and 1 to 213 persons respectively.
- 101. Instruction in locally acceptable family planning methods, which was started in 1964, has continued at the main hospital in Victoria. Similar instruction is being planned for rural health centres. In addition, the International Planned Parenthood Federation has opened two clinics.
- 102. Although within the tropics, the Seychelles has few of the diseases usually associated with tropical climates. Intestinal infestations are a serious problem, however, owing mainly to poor conditions of sanitation and increased overcrowding. There has been no progress in the programme for improving sanitation in Victoria, which is the most crowded area. There is a high incidence of venereal diseases, with a marked rise in recent years of early syphilis. A clinic for venereal diseases under the Medical Officer of Health has been in operation and it was hoped to start a World Health Organization programme in 1967 to eradicate the disease.

Educational conditions

103. A new school system was established in 1965 to provide education for all children up to the age of 15 years. Hitherto, secondary schooling was available to a limited number of pupils at the end of their six years of free primary education. Under the new system, which gives all primary school leavers the opportunity of attending school for at least two more years, secondary schooling is divided into junior secondary and secondary grammar schools. The former provide three years of post-primary education for pupils not entering secondary grammar schools. The latter provide a five-year education up to and including the General Certificate of Education (advanced level) standard. Some of those completing their first two

years in the junior secondary schools are able to follow special courses in teaching, nursing, domestic science, secretarial work, agriculture and certain trades. Post-secondary education continues to include teacher, technical and vocational training.

104. During 1965, educational facilities were expanded by the addition of forty-two primary and six junior secondary classrooms. There were 352 classes (364 in 1964) in all schools with 8,809 pupils (8,516 in 1964) and 390 teachers (the same as in 1964). The 8,809 pupils were distributed as follows: primary, 7,341; junior secondary, 889; secondary grammar, 359; special courses, 134, and post-secondary, 86. In addition, thirty-nine Seychellois (twenty-four in 1964) were undergoing courses of higher study overseas, most of which were financed by the United Kingdom.

105. Of the 390 teachers, 190 were certificated or trained and the rest untrained. There is a serious shortage of trained teachers in the primary schools; the junior secondary schools are beginning to recruit new staff from the teacher-training college, which trained seven teachers in 1964 and eighteen in 1965, but it will be some years before an adequate body of trained teaching staff can be formed.

106. In 1965, the sum of Rs.1,595,969 (compared with Rs.1,396,341 in 1964), or 17.7 per cent of the Territory's total recurrent expenditure, was spent on education. Funds allocated under Colonial Development and Welfare schemes for education amounted to Rs.573,008 (compared with Rs.584,466 in 1964).

3. ST. HELENA

General

107. The population of St. Helena is largely descended from settlers of British origin and persons of Asian and African blood who were introduced by the East India Company. At the end of 1965, the estimated population of St. Helena was 4,702, compared with 4,676 in 1964. The population of Tristan de Cunha was 285. The population of Ascension Island at the end of 1964 was 581, of whom 401 were St. Helenians and 86 West Indians.

Constitution and Government

108. In November 1966, a new Constitution for St. Helena and its Dependencies was adopted, which replaced the Constitution of 1956. The new Constitution came into operation on 1 January 1967. Its main provisions are set out below.

Governor

109. The Governor is the head of the administration of the Territory and Commander-in-Chief of St. Helena and its Dependencies.

Executive Council

110. The Executive Council has been reconstituted. It now consists of two ex officio members (the Government Secretary of St. Helena and the Treasurer) and several unofficial members (the chairman of the council committees of the Legislative Council). The number of unofficial members depends on the number of the council committees, which is determined by the

Governor. Under the chairmanship of the Governor, the functions of the Executive Council are to advise the Governor in the exercise of his powers. Under the Constitution of 1956, the Executive Council consisted of three civil servants (Government Secretary, Treasurer and Education Officer) and three non-official members, who were local residents.

Legislative Council

111. Under the new Constitution, the existing Advisory Council has been renamed the Legislative Council. It consists now of the Governor, two ex officio members (the Government Secretary and the Treasurer), two official and four unofficial members appointed by the Governor and eight elected members. By the end of 1968, the Legislative Council will be reconstituted and will consist of the Governor, two ex officio members and twelve elected members. The Governor will preside at meetings of the Legislative Council. There will be at least one session of the Council every year. The Governor will dissolve the Council at the expiration of four years, However, the Governor may at any time prorogue or dissolve the Council. There will be a general election within three months after every dissolution of the Council.

Political parties

112. There are no political parties in the Territory.

Economic conditions

113. Until 1965, the Territory's economy depended mainly on the production of flax (phormium tenax), the most important foreign exchange earner, to which 3,350 acres of the total area of land under cultivation (3,990 acres) were devoted. From 1965, the major single source of income was employment in communication stations on Ascension Island. The principal crops are common and sweet potatoes and vegetables. Fish of many kinds are plentiful in the waters around St. Helena, but the catch is usually insufficient to meet the demand. In 1965, the only industry was the manufacture of hemp fibre, tow, rope and twine. Five flax mills were in operation in 1965 but their operation ceased under pressure of falling demand and scarcity and cost of labour. Almost all local requirements are met by imported goods.

114. Between 1964 and 1965, production of hemp fibre declined from 953 to 804 tons and that of tow from 455 to 251 tons, while that of rope and twine advanced from 2 to 39 tons. The production figures for other main crops (potatoes and vegetables) showed a moderate increase from 820 to 920 tons, the difference being accounted for by the rise of 100 tons in the output of common potatoes.

115. Measures have been taken to control range animals and to protect pastures. In 1965, all pasture areas (seven square miles) were fenced and subdivided, and brought under a system of grazing control. The Government has continued to encourage the breeding of pigs and poultry.

116. The number of trees planted rose from 10,500 in 1964 to 27,419 in 1965.

117. Exports were valued at £105,347 in 1964 and £74,341 in 1965. Imports totalled £309,974 in 1964 and £285,176 in 1965.

118. Estimated revenue for 1965 amounted to £309,673 (including a United Kingdom grant-in-aid of £137,363 and a Colonial Development and Welfare grant of £55,000), while expenditure amounted to £327,060. The 1964 estimates showed that revenue and expenditure each totalled £277,771.

Social conditions

Labour

119. During 1965, the principal categories of wage earners were: flax workers, 298; skilled and general labourers, 250; agricultural labourers, 182; and building tradesmen and apprentices, 53. A total of 342 St. Helenians (as against 323 in 1964) worked on Ascension Island. Of this total, 150 were employed by British Cable and Wireless Limited, 124 by United States construction companies at the guided missile range and 68 by the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works for the construction of a British Broadcasting Corporation relay station. There has been a certain amount of unemployment in St. Helena, alleviated by the provision of relief work, but with the opportunities for employment on Ascension Island, which have existed since 1965, there has been no unemployment among able-bodied men. During 1965, there were ninety-one men on unemployment relief (compared with 145 in 1964). The standard minimum wage is now £8 a week and, in consequence, the daily rates of wages for general labourers employed by the Government rose to between 16s.8d. and 19s.2d. (from 10s.6d. in 1964), and those by commercial firms to 16s.8d. (from 8s.4d. in 1964). There is one general trade union.

Public health

120. Government expenditure on medical and health services in 1965 was estimated at £27,363 (compared with £27,762 in the previous year), or 9 per cent of the Territory's total expenditure. In recent years, the Territory has been served by one general hospital with sixty beds and two medical officers (three since 1966). The ratios of medical officers and general beds to the population in 1965 were 1 to 2,350 and 1 to 78 respectively.

Educational conditions

121. Education is free and compulsory for all children between the ages of five and fifteen years. The average number of children attending school rose from 1,184 in 1964 to 1,208 in 1965. During this period, the Territory had eight primary schools, two of which provided all-age education, three secondary schools and one selective secondary school. In 1965, there were sixty full-time (fifty-eight in 1964) and six part-time (three in 1964) teachers. Selected young teachers are sent to the United Kingdom to follow a three-year course leading to a certificate in education conferred by the Ministry of Education. More experienced teachers are also sent there for further training. In 1965, a senior teacher departed for a year's course. The expenditure on educational services during the year was estimated at £24,561 (an increase of £1,666 over the previous year), or 10.6 per cent of the Territory's total expenditure.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee¹⁰

Introduction

122. The Special Committee considered Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena at its 535th to 539th meetings, held away from Headquarters between 15 and 19 June 1967. The Special Committee had before it the report of Sub-Committee I concerning these Territories (A/AC.109/L.398), which is annexed hereto.

Written petitions and hearings

123. The Special Committee had before it a written petition concerning Mauritius from Mr. A. H. Dorghoty, Second Secretary, Mauritius People's Progressive Party (MPPP) (A/AC.109/PET.689). It heard a petitioner concerning that Territory, Mr. T. Sibsurun, Secretary-General, MPPP, accompanied by Mr. Dorghoty.

124. Mr. Sibsurun (Mauritius People's Progressive Party) recalled that more than fourteen months had elapsed since the Special Committee had adopted certain resolutions and recommendations and had decided that the inalienable right of the peoples of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena to self-determination, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, should be reaffirmed. The most important of the recommendations were those to the effect that the administering Power should be urged to allow the population of the three Territories to exercise their right of selfdetermination without delay, constitutional changes being left to the people of the Territories themselves, who alone had the right to decide on the form of government they wished to adopt; that free elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage should be conducted as soon as possible; and that the administering Power should be called upon to respect the islands' territorial integrity and ensure that they were not used as military

125. The United Kingdom Government had not made the slightest effort to accede to the people's demands. In March 1966, he had stressed to the Special Committee the prevalence of bribery and corruption by the imperialists during the pre-election period. Under Mauritian law, a candidate was allowed to spend up to about Rs.5,000 on his electoral campaign but in most cases vast sums were lavished on canvassing votes, and he had pointed out that the Government should take steps to ensure that the law was respected. The general election was to be held in September 1967 and nothing had yet been done by the Government to enforce such a law. History was obviously repeating itself and the poor people who were asking for nothing more than their rudimentary rights were being exploited.

126. He had asked at the same time that supervisors from African and Asian countries should be sent to conduct the general election but, in September 1966, before the United Nations had had time to appoint

¹⁰ This section includes those portions of the statements made on Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the draft resolution are included in section D. It should be noted that additional comments on the question of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena were contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. These statements are included in chapter II (Part I) of this report.

them, the United Kingdom had dispatched observers from Commonwealth countries to supervise the registration of voters and the general election. It was evident that they would only be able to observe and could not investigate the true situation.

- 127. At the International Conference against War Danger, Military Pacts and Bases, Atomic Weapons and Colonialism, resolutions had been adopted calling for immediate and unconditional independence for Mauritius, with an immediate general election and moral, material, technical and financial support for a major propaganda campaign to rid Chagos Island of the nuclear military bases installed by the United Kingdom and the United States.
- 128. In February 1967, at its eighth session, the Council of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, meeting at Nicosia, had adopted a resolution on Mauritius asking that supervisors should be sent to conduct the general election which would lead to complete and unconditional independence for the island, that the United Kingdom and United States system of direct telecommunications, which had been transferred from Trincomalee to Vacoas, should be dismantled, and that moral support, and material, technical and financial aid should be provided in order to remove the United Kingdom and United States base on Chagos Island.
- 129. He had intended to ask the United Kingdom representative certain questions, but unfortunately he was not there to reply. It would have been interesting to know why the United Kingdom had decided to buy, without the consent of the Mauritian people, what it considered to be its own territory; why the reactionary Government had connived with the United Kingdom to deprive Mauritius of one of its dependencies; why the United Kingdom had always rejected, without explanation, all petitions for the holding of a referendum on the military bases. It was obvious that the United Kingdom wanted to grant the island independence, while maintaining a nuclear base on Mauritian soil. The Mauritians had always been a peace-loving people, had never been involved in any world war and did not want their innocent country blasted by a nuclear bomb. In the event of a third world war, Mauritius wished to remain neutral. No country could be truly independent if it remained linked with the great Powers, and the independence obtained years before by their African, Arab and Hindu brothers would also turn out to be illusory. He hoped the world would not witness such injustice without reacting against it.
- 130. The imperialists presented themselves as champions of human rights and democracy, yet challenged their subject peoples' rights to social, political and economic justice. The colonial countries would not flinch before the imperialists' impressive might and would demand their rudimentary rights.
- 131. The Special Committee should exercise its power and compel the United Kingdom and the United States to respect its decisions and resolutions. The nuclear base was a direct threat to Africa, Asia and the Middle East and to world peace. United Kingdom and United States experts were already in Mauritius putting the finishing touches to the Chagos Island base. Time was short; the general election was to be held on 17 September 1967 and he hoped the other countries would not turn a deaf ear to the justified pleas of Mauritius.

- 132. The reactionary Government had done nothing for the country; it had introduced illegal and exorbitant taxes to pay for the extension of Plaisance airport to enable it to accommodate the latest jet aircraft, to enable the Government to pursue its neo-colonialist policy after independence and to erect an imperialist bastion in the Indian Ocean to check the advance of socialism in Africa. It was not surprising, therefore, that, without the consent of the people, the same reactionary Government was supporting Israel in its war of aggression against the Arab States. He wondered how long the people of Mauritius were to be ignored.
- 133. The people had held a grand mass rally on world peace, organized by MPPP, on 11 June 1967, and had urged Prime Minister Wilson to reconsider the question of the Chagos Island base and accede to their demand that a referendum should be held on the matter, pointing out that they wanted to remain neutral in the event of a third world war.
- 134. In conclusion, he appealed to the Special Committee to ensure that the recommendations of the abovementioned conferences were implemented.
- 135. In reply to questions concerning his Party's membership, strength and activities to date, the petitioner stated that MPPP had been formed in 1963 after the last general elections and had been affiliated with the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee Conference at Moshi. The other parties were the Mauritian Social Democrat Party, the Mauritius Labour Party, the Independent Forward Bloc and the Muslim Committee of Action. A new Party, the Hindu Congress, had been formed in 1966. MPPP was the only political party to have its own offices open every day and to have a register of members. The other parties had no membership lists and only opened their offices for the election campaign. MPPP had about 50,000 supporters out of a total population of 786,000 and sympathizers among the working class. It would present candidates for the first time at the forthcoming elections.
- 136. Although not represented in Parliament, MPPP had been actively opposing the Government and holding daily meetings throughout the country to explain to the people the gravity of the situation created by the military bases on the island.
- 137. When invited to London to discuss the new Constitution, the Mauritian Social Democrat Party, which was in favour of association with the United Kingdom, had dissociated itself from the coalition Government because the other parties represented wanted independence, although they were also in favour of retaining the military bases. In 1965, the Government had sold Chagos Island for £3 million to the United Kingdom, which, in conjunction with the United States, was building a military base on it. The United Kingdom now denied buying the island outright, saying that the money had merely been given as compensation.
- 138. MPPP attended not only the meetings of the Special Committee but also international conferences throughout the world, for instance, the New Delhi Conference on War Danger in November 1966 and the Afro-Asian Council in Cyprus in February 1966. On 11 June 1967, it had asked the Mauritian people to attend a mass rally in favour of peace, especially in Viet-Nam, the dismantling of the military base and unconditional independence for their country.

- 139. Asked to supply more details concerning the size, number and type of bases and the use made of them, the petitioner regretted that he was unable to state the exact size of the bases. The base at Vacoas was used to house the direct telecommunications system which had been transferred from Trincomalee. The United States Government was providing funds to enlarge Plaisance airport so that jet aircraft could land there. The United Kingdom had always realized the strategic importance of Mauritius; it had taken the bases from France and had granted independence to the country only on condition that it could continue to use the key bases in the Indian Ocean. During the past year, the United States Air Force had been using Plaisance airport continuously. It had also been reported in the newspapers and confirmed by the United Kingdom itself that the United Kingdom and United States navies would continue to use the naval bases in Mauritius.
- 140. The petitioner was asked whether or not the administering Power was implementing the United Nations decisions, and whether he was in a position to give details regarding the establishment of a base by the United Kingdom and the United States on Mauritius. Replying, he stated that the United Kingdom had not implemented the 1966 resolution any more than it had many others adopted by the United Nations. The construction of the military bases was well advanced under the supervision of experts from the United Kingdom and United States, who were to stay until the completion of the bases.
- 141. In reply to a further question, the petitioner said that the election was to be held on 17 September 1967. The Prime Minister, fearing trouble in a multiracial country, had asked the United Kingdom to send troops as well as observers to supervise the general election. The opposition was divided into too many small parties and did not present a united front. Although all were in favour of complete independence, some were willing to retain the military bases, whereas MPPP demanded that independence should be unconditional. The Mauritian Social Democrat Party, on the other hand, wanted a continued association with the United Kingdom.

General statements

- 142. At the 536th meeting, the Chairman of Sub-Committee I (the representative of Ethiopia), presenting the Sub-Committee's report on Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena (see annex below), said that the Sub-Committee had considered the situation in these Territories during the period 5 April to 10 May 1967. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the United Kingdom representative had participated in the Sub-Committee's consideration of the three Territories.
- 143. The Sub-Committee had been guided by paragraph 16 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, which requested the Special Committee "to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully the right to self-determination and independence". The Sub-Committee had also taken into account paragraph 15 of the resolution which invited the Special Committee "whenever it considers it appropriate

- to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence to each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people and the provisions of the Declaration". Further, the Sub-Committee was aware that, as recognized by the Special Committee in paragraph 322 of chapter I of its 1966 report (A/6300/Rev.1), "their small size and population as well as their limited resources presented peculiar problems". However, the Sub-Committee was firmly of the opinion that the provisions of the Declaration were applicable to those Territories, and had examined the situation there within that context.
- 144. The report of the Sub-Committee consisted of four chapters. The Chairman drew special attention to the conclusions and recommendations of the report, contained in paragraphs 124 to 129 and paragraphs 130 to 139, respectively. The report had been adopted by the Sub-Committee at its 39th meeting on 10 May 1967. The representative of Finland had stated that since certain parts of the conclusions and the recommendations were not in accord with and did not reflect the views expressed by his delegation, it could not support all the conclusions and recommendations.
- 145. The representative of India said that the Indian delegation had carefully studied the valuable and instructive report of Sub-Committee I. It unreservedly supported its conclusions and recommendations and congratulated the Sub-Committee.
- 146. His delegation deeply regretted the slow progress towards the self-determination and independence of the Territories in question. In spite of repeated appeals, the administering Power had not taken steps to expedite decolonization. Progress in the Seychelles and St. Helena had been particularly slow. He hoped that the United Kingdom Government would respect the people's wishes and grant them the political status of their choice without further delay.
- 147. The United Kingdom Government's policy with regard to Mauritius was to delay independence as much as possible. For several years much had been heard of impending independence, but the United Kingdom Government had found one pretext or another to postpone the inevitable, giving the impression that it found parting with that rich colony extremely difficult. The Constitutional Conference had been held as early as September 1965, yet the country was not expected to become independent until about the middle of 1968. That long interval seemed totally unjustified. Considerable time had been wasted by the appointment of the Banwell Commission, whose recommendations had been unacceptable to the Mauritian political parties. They had had to be modified substantially following Mr. Stonehouse's visit, thus wasting more than six months. The electoral system under the modified Banwell proposals seemed unduly complicated; if, however, it was acceptable to the political parties in the island, his delegation would respect it, its only desire being that the people of Mauritius should become independent without further delay.
- 148. The independence of Mauritius was essential not only for the emotional satisfaction of its people but also to enable them to devote their energies to raising their level of living. Without political independence, real economic progress was impossible. Colonial Powers were not interested in doing anything for the people of their colonies that would not at the same time be in their own strategic or other interests. Mauritius pro-

vided an excellent example of that policy. It had an economy almost wholly dependent on the production and export of sugar. The United Nations had been urging the administering Power since 1964 to take effective measures to diversify the economy, but the United Kingdom Government's only response had been to take some half-hearted and haphazard steps without really trying to work out a well-co-ordinated programme. Its failure to develop other sectors of the economy had resulted in shortage of capital, a downward trend in per capita income and increased unemployment. The little progress that had been achieved had been due mainly to the efforts of the Government of Mauritius headed by Premier Ramgoolam, who was reported to have said that Mauritius was a viable country which had never needed a grant-in-aid to balance its budget. His delegation had no doubt that, once the country achieved its independence, progress in the diversification of its economy would be accelerated.

149. The administering Power in Mauritius, as in other colonies, such as Fiji, had been taking advantage of the differences in the Territory in order to maintain its own dominant position and protect foreign vested economic interests. Fortunately, the different communities had successfully resisted the administering Power's attempt to divide them. They had realized that their common interest lay in ridding themselves first of the colonial administration. His delegation wished Mr. Ramgoolam and his associates all the success they deserved in leading their country to independence as a unified nation.

150. His Government had been greatly perturbed at the reports of the establishment of military installations in the British Indian Ocean Territory that had been created artificially by detaching certain islands from Mauritius and Seychelles. That was a clear violation of General Assembly resolutions 2066 (XX) and 2232 (XXI) which asked the administering Power not to take any action that would dismember the Territory or violate its territorial integrity. Such dismemberment was also a clear violation of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and of the United Nations Charter. The creation of the new colony also ran counter to the declared wishes of the peace-loving peoples of Africa and Asia and must be regarded as contrary to the interests of those peoples in the immediate vicinity of the military installations. In that connexion, he quoted from a statement made by the Indian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Indian Parliament on 6 April 1967, as follows:

"The Indian Government's position has been made clear in the past and there is no change in our stand. We have subscribed to the Bandung Declaration of 1955. We have also signed the Cairo Declaration of 1964 on the subject of establishment of bases in the Indian Ocean, and we stand by those Declarations.

"We have also subscribed to resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, dealing with this subject. Resolution 2066 (XX) notes with deep concern that 'any step taken by the administering Power to detach certain islands from the Territory of Mauritius for the purpose of establishing a military base would be in contravention' of resolution 1514 (XV). It further invited 'the administering Power to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity'.

"We are opposed to the establishment of military bases in the Indian Ocean area, since it might lead to an increase in tensions in this region. We hope that, in the largest interest of peace, the British authorities will bear in mind our feelings and feeling of the countries in this region and desist from setting up a military base in this area."

151. The representative of Poland expressed his appreciation of the work of Sub-Committee I and, in particular, of the concise and objective manner in which its report was drafted. He also thanked the Sub-Committee's Chairman for her able presentation of the report.

152. In all three Territories, progress towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had been extremely slow. Though almost seven years had elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration on decolonization, the people of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena had not yet achieved the objectives sought by the United Nations, and the administering Power was still delaying the transfer of authority to the democratically elected representatives of the peoples of the three Territories.

153. As pointed out in paragraph 125 of the report, the United Kingdom, through the Governor, continued to exercise vast powers, particularly in the constitutional and legislative fields. Contrary to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the administering Power was insisting on an even longer constitutional process in Seychelles than in Mauritius, on the pretext that the people lacked political experience. In Mauritius, the elections had still not been held, and the United Kingdom Government, though well aware of the people's wishes for independence, was attaching conditions to the granting of it: for example, that there should be an interval of six months between self-government and independence, and that the demand for complete independence should be reiterated by the vote of a majority elected at the future general elections to be held under complex and controversial electoral arrangements.

154. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was openly violating the principles of the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) by dismembering Mauritius and the Seychelles for military purposes, with the help of the United States. The Polish delegation fully shared the concern expressed by the Special Committee at the establishment in 1965 of a new colony—the British Indian Ocean Territory and at reports that it would be used as a military base. In its resolutions 2189 (XXI) and 2232 (XXI), the General Assembly reiterated its earlier declaration that any attempt to disrupt the national unity and the terriorial integrity of colonial Territories and to establish military bases and installations in those Territories was incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and with Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Despite the warning of the non-aligned countries, at their Conference at Cairo in 1964, that such military bases would create tension and would be used to bring pressure against independent States in their vicinity and against national liberation movements, the United Kingdom had refused to give any assurance that the islands detached from Mauritius and Seychelles would not be used under any circumstances for military purposes. The Polish delegation firmly endorsed paragraphs 126 and 127 of the report of the Sub-Committee (see annex below) and strongly believed that the attitude

of the United Kingdom was incompatible with its obligations as the administering Power.

- 155. The data contained in the Secretariat working paper (see paras. 1-121 above) clearly indicated the administering Power's failure to diversify the economies of the three Territories, which were still dependent on a single crop, and, to an increasing extent, on external aid. Mauritius had to import 90 per cent of its needs for essential goods and foodstuffs. It was also clear from the document that unemployment was increasing in Mauritius and Seychelles and the per capita income in those Territories was tending to fall.
- 156. In the Polish delegation's opinion, the administering Power should take vigorous measures to assist the peoples of those Territories by grants-in-aid and development programmes to diversify their economy and create employment and opportunities for the growing populations. It should likewise take steps, without further delay, to ensure that the peoples of those Territories achieved independence in the best possible conditions.
- 157. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation had studied the report very carefully and associated itself with the conclusions and recommendations. He expressed his appreciation of the valuable work performed by the Sub-Committee. The administering Power was continuing without restraint to use the Territory for its own requirements, to behave as its undisputed colonial master, to disregard completely the inalienable rights of its population to freedom and independence, to exploit their natural resources, to dismember the Territories and to establish military bases with the participation of another great Power.
- 158. It was unbelievable that, seven years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the colonial Power could show such complete disregard for its provisions and for the United Nations as a whole. Bulgaria shared the concern of the neighbouring nations which considered the military bases established on the Territories to be detrimental to their security and were demanding the dismantling of all military installations and the discontinuance of military activity.
- 159. The representative of Madagascar said that he had carefully studied the report of Sub-Committee I on Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena. His delegation like the Sub-Committee, considered that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) should be speedily implemented in those Territories. Indeed, it had already supported in the Committee many of the ideas and principles set forth in the Sub-Committee's report. Madagascar, in view of its geographical situation, was certainly the country which was closest to Mauritius, a fact which had enabled it to maintain normal and cordial relations with that Territory. His delegation was particularly well placed to speak of the situation now prevailing in that island. It had noted the statements made by the United Kingdom representative in Sub-Committee I and had been pleased to learn that the United Kingdom Government had taken the necessary steps to enable the people of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. The statements of the United Kingdom representative were in accord with the actual facts in the three Territories concerned. The Malagasy delegation therefore welcome the attitude of the United Kingdom regarding the islands in the Indian Ocean and could not support all the conclusions

- and recommendations contained in the report of Sub-Committee I.
- 160. The representative of Finland said that, as a member of the Sub-Committee, he had already had the opportunity of expressing his Government's views on Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena. As he had said in the Sub-Committee on 13 April 1967, although the three Territories might have certain elements in common, there were striking differences between them in many important respects and it was difficult to visualize any common pattern for their future. He had added that Mauritius was well on the road towards full independence. That view had been substantiated by the Mauritian Prime Minister's statement of 13 May 1967 that elections would take place at the very latest before the end of September of the current year. The political development of the Seychelles seemed to be somewhat slower and it seemed not unlikely that some form of special constitutional arrangements might be advisable in the interim.
- 161. He re-emphasized that, whatever future course might be chosen by the three Territories, it was essential that the final choice should be made by the freely elected majority. Although there had been some regrettable delays, it appeared to him that the majority of the people in question had, in fact, the opportunity of deciding the future of their own countries.
- 162. A number of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the Sub-Committee's report were not in accordance with the views his delegation had expressed in the Sub-Committee, nor did they accurately reflect the progress towards self-determination which had taken place in the Territories in question.
- 163. The representative of Italy said that his delegation had not only examined with great care the report of Sub-Committee I, but had followed with close attention the political development of the Territories in question. It had noted with great satisfaction that significant steps had been taken to ensure for their populations the right and the means freely to express their preferences concerning their future status. In the case of Mauritius, it was noteworthy that the Prime Minister intended to organize elections not later than the end of September 1967.
- 164. Italy's chief concern was that the people of the islands should have the right to determine their future status by democratic means, and such appeared to be the case. Under the circumstances, he viewed with some misgivings the conclusions contained in the report which did not seem to coincide with his delegation's assessment of the situation.
- 165. The representative of Venezuela said that he had studied with interest the report of Sub-Committee I on the question of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena. Unquestionably, the report gave a very complete account of the political, economic and social conditions prevailing in those three Territories. His delegation was in general agreement with the recommendations and conclusions of the Sub-Committee.
- 166. He did not, however, share the view expressed in paragraph 127 of the report (see annex below) concerning military bases and installations. There was insufficient proof of the existence of such bases to warrant the claim that they created international tension and aroused concern in neighbouring countries. Nor could it support paragraph 137 of the report, in which the Sub-Committee prejudged the question of

future military activities and claimed that they would constitute an act of hostility towards the peoples of Africa and Asia and a threat to international peace and security.

167. The representative of the United States of America said that he wished to comment on the sweeping and unsubstantiated statements made by a petitioner and some representatives with respect to his country. He wished to state categorically that his country had no plans to construct military bases in the British Indian Ocean Territory. In that connexion, he pointed out that a United Kingdom spokesman had recently given a similar assurance. Although there was an agreement between his country and the United Kingdom to permit the utilization of the British Indian Ocean Territory for refuelling or communications facilities, no decision had been taken to establish any such facilities.

168. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation had no intention of disputing the statement made by the United States representative. He wished, however, to know whether the statement had the approval of the United Kingdom also. Had it in fact been made on behalf of that country?

169. The representative of the United States of America replied that he had made no statement on behalf of the United Kingdom; he had simply referred to a similar statement made by a United Kingdom spokesman.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

170. The representative of Ethiopia introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.411/Rev.1) on the three Territories co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

171. The draft resolution was based on the report of Sub-Committee I (see annex below) and expressed the serious concern felt by the co-sponsors at the fact that, as stated in paragraph 124 of the report, the administering Power had still not implemented General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions concerning Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena. The co-sponsors urged the administering Power to expedite the process of decolonization in those Territories.

172. The representative of Iraq said that he seconded the draft resolution and urged all members of the Special Committee to vote for it. He drew attention to the operative paragraph concerning military bases which the administering Power, in co-operation with the United States, was proposing to establish in Mauritius and Seychelles which constituted a serious threat to the area, to the peace and security of Africa, Asia and the Middle East and to the national liberation movements operating in those areas.

173. The representative of Poland said that while his delegation supported the draft resolution in general, it regretted that the preambular paragraphs contained no reference to the Sub-Committee's concern that the administering Power was continuing to violate the territorial integrity of the Territories and to defy General Assembly resolutions 2066 (XX) and 2232 (XXI) and that the steps it was taking in the economic and social sectors to safeguard the interests of the peoples of the Territories were inadequate.

174. At the next meeting, the representative of Ethiopia submitted on behalf of the co-sponsors, an oral revision to the revised draft resolution (A/AC. 109/L.411/Rev.2), in which, in operative paragraph 7, the phrase "to dismantle such military installations" was replaced by the phrase "to desist from establishing such military installations". The co-sponsors considered that the revision would make it quite clear that the resolution also applied to existing military bases.

175. The representative of Bulgaria said that the draft resolution submitted by the African and Asian countries and Yugoslavia reflected the main recommendations of the Sub-Committee's report and contained the necessary requests to the administering Power to implement fully the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The delegation of Bulgaria had hoped that the original draft resolution would contain a reference such as that included in the Sub-Committee's report to the activities of the United Kingdom and to the demands addressed to it by the United Nations. It was therefore pleased that the sponsors had accepted the amendment proposed by the delegation of Poland to include a new introductory paragraph to express the Special Committee's deep regret that the administering Power had failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The General Assembly should pay particular attention to that matter and his delegation thought that, before the opening of the twenty-second session, the Special Committee should have another opportunity to examine the attitude of the administering Power. That had probably also been the sponsors' reason for drafting paragraph 8, requesting the United Kingdom to report to the Special Committee on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

176. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that he would have preferred, as a representative of an African country, not to make any comment on a draft resolution submitted by the Afro-Asian group, which regarded colonialism as a kind of cancerous tumour in the centre of Africa. His delegation was ready to give its full support to the Special Committee's efforts to deal with the last vestiges of the crumbling colonial system. The climate in the Special Committee must be such that all representatives without exception, and particularly the members of the Afro-Asian group, could associate themselves with the Committee's decisions, decisions which, in a general way, expressed the desire of all to help the peoples of the remaining dependent Territories. Such a spirit of co-operation and understanding was the vital factor which would enable the Committee to obtain the results expected of it.

177. His delegation would therefore have liked to be among the sponsors of the draft resolution, which, as a whole, reflected the aspirations of the international community as expressed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the basic resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Regrettably, however, it had been unable to join the sponsors because its request for a compromise on operative paragraph 7 relating to military installations had been rejected. The statement appearing in that paragraph was not necessarily in accordance with the facts. Moreover, even if bases existed in certain dependent countries, it was for those countries, when they obtained independence, to negotiate the removal of the bases with the former administering Power, as had happened in all the African countries which had become independent. The question was within the exclusive competence of the countries concerned. The Ivory Coast, which had subscribed to the doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, could not go back on the principles which it had endorsed and to which it intended to remain loyal.

178. There should be no misunderstanding of the significance of that reservation, for the Ivory Coast, which had fought against colonialism for many long years and would continue to do so, remained faithful to the principles of decolonization. It was aware that military activities created tensions in the world. It understood the concern of certain delegations and respected their position. The purpose of the Special Committee, however, was to promote decolonization, and it should make sure that its decisions could be applied. It should seek the most objective way of bringing the countries under foreign domination to self-determination and independence and not choose courses which, on the contrary, would tend to harden positions and delay the solution of the problem of decolonization. The Ivory Coast delegation, while expressing reservations on operative paragraph 7, supported the other provisions of the draft resolution and would vote for it.

179. The representative of Italy said that operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution was extraneous to the colonial issue and involved considerations outside the Special Committee's purview. His delegation would, therefore, abstain from voting.

180. The representative of Venezuela noted with regret that the draft resolution did not take into account the recommendation of Sub-Committee I that the General Assembly should set a time-limit for the granting of independence to Mauritius and accelerate the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of Seychelles and St. Helena. There was no reference either to the recommendation concerning the sending of a visiting mission to the Territories to ascertain the extent of the progress made in the direction of self-determination and independence. Although his delegation would have preferred a text which took greater account of realities, it would nevertheless vote for the draft resolution.

181. The representative of Chile said that he approved of the general lines of the draft resolution despite certain doubts about the wording. Although the language was somewhat exaggerated, his delegation was, nevertheless, able to support the draft resolution as a whole, in line with its constant policy of supporting any measures designed to further the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), irrespective of the size of the Territory concerned or its distance from world markets. The latter considerations could not, however, be entirely overlooked.

182. The representative of the United States of America said that he intended to vote against the draft resolution, which did not constitute a realistic and balanced appraisal of the situation in the Territories in question. The issue of Mauritian independence would be decided in the coming elections to be held this fall. If the population desired independence, it was possible that the Territory would become independent in early 1968. The Seychelles were also moving steadily and impressively in the direction of self-determination. Despite, therefore, his delegation's full approval of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, he was unable to accept later operative paragraphs which were

not consistent with the actual situation. It also had reservations concerning the Sub-Committee's report.

183. At its 539th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.411/Rev. 2), as orally amended, by a roll-call vote of 17 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Italy, Madagascar.

184. The representative of Australia said, in explanation of his vote, that the normal approach in such a matter would have been to ask the administering Power to explain anything that was not readily apparent in current developments. Not only had no such approach been made, but a statement by a representative of the administering Power had been completely ignored, as had the many practical steps which had been taken in the direction of independence for the Territories in question. Self-determination meant that a Territory was perfectly entitled to decide, by a majority vote, whether or not it desired independence. Operative paragraph 7 was completely unacceptable, especially in view of the statements that had been made by representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States that there was no intention of establishing military installations on the island. Appeals had been launched to the administering Power to grant immediate independence to the Territories on the principle of "Heads I win; tails you lose". If immediate independence were granted, without proper preparation, the administering Power would be blamed. That gambling attitude was not one which should be adopted where the future of nations and populations was at stake. Under the circumstances, his delegation had had no alternative but to vote against the draft resolution.

185. The representative of India remarked that he had been both surprised and disappointed that the delegations of Australia and the United States had voted against the draft resolution. He failed to realize what they had found in the text so obnoxious that they were forced to vote against it. It had reaffirmed the inalienable right of the peoples of those Territories to self-determination, freedom and independence; it had urged the administering Power to hold free elections and to grant to the Territories whatever political status their peoples should freely choose. It had deplored any dismemberment of the Territories and had declared that the establishment of military installations would be a violation of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI). He failed to understand that anything in those provisions could cause a freedom-loving country to vote against the resolution.

186. He particularly regretted the unfortunate "gambling" analogy used by the representative of Australia. The sponsors of the draft resolution had made a serious appraisal of the problems facing those Territories and he deplored the fact that the attitude of responsible representatives of responsible Governments should be described as "gambling".

187. The Chairman added that he was deeply disappointed that the representative of Australia should have used such an analogy, after all the work that Sub-Committee I had put into its report. It was regrettable that the administering Power had seen fit to be absent

from the Special Committee's deliberations, but that did not justify the use of such intemperate language.

188. The representative of the United States of America said he had made a statement explaining his vote and had been very much surprised by the unprecedented request of India for further explanation. He considered that the statement he had already made fully explained the position of his delegation and Government.

189. The representative of Yugoslavia said that some representatives had explained their abstentions on or opposition to the draft resolution on the grounds of operative paragraph 7. It was denied that either the United States or the United Kingdom had any intention of establishing such bases. In that connexion, he pointed out that The New York Times had reported a story to the effect that the United Kingdom was in the final stages of negotiations to purchase three islands in the Indian Ocean for defence purposes. Another paper had stated that the United States and the United Kingdom were planning to build an airstrip on one of those islands. Those two articles constituted sufficient proof for his delegation that the two Powers in question were intending to construct a military base and that operative paragraph 7 was fully justified.

190. The representative of Mali thanked all who had voted for the draft resolution which was directed towards speeding the process of decolonization in a particularly sensitive region of the world. He regretted that cold war considerations should have been introduced and he associated himself with the statements of the Chairman and the representatives of India and Yugoslavia. He was surprised that colonial Powers which claimed to support the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples should change their attitude when it came to taking concrete measures to give effect to that Declaration. He was particularly astonished by the words of the representative of Australia, a country which had exterminated its indigenous inhabitants and was sending troops to Viet-Nam to prevent the people of that country from enjoying their most elementary rights.

191. The representative of the United States of America said, in reply to the representative of Yugoslavia, that, excellent paper though it was, *The New York Times* was not an official organ of the United States Government and its reports in no way reflected the policy of his Government.

192. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the vote against the draft resolution by two delegations had demonstrated, beyond all reasonable doubt, the true position of their countries and their attitude towards the principle of self-determination. In view of the repeated statements by representatives of the United States Government that their country supported the cause of decolonization, that vote had come as a disagreeable surprise. As the representative of the United States had referred to the British Indian Ocean Territory, he pointed out that the United Nations had refused to recognize that Territory, the establishment of which was no more than a colonialist manoeuvre.

193. The representative of Australia, exercising his right of reply to the representatives of India and Mali, explained that his reference to gambling had been a strictly personal reaction. He had not meant to suggest that the Sub-Committee or the Special Committee approached its work in the spirit of a gambler. The representative of Mali had also referred to the

indigenous inhabitants of Australia. That was a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the Australian Government. Although Australia could not claim that it had no reason for self-reproach, the indigenous inhabitants were not being assassinated as the representative of Mali had stated. He added that the question of Viet-Nam was not within the Special Committee's terms of reference.

194. The text of the resolution on Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC.109/249), adopted by the Special Committee at its 539th meeting on 19 June 1967 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined the question of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena,

"Having heard the statement of the petitioner,

"Noting with regret the absence of the representatives of the administering Power,

"Noting with deep regret the failure of the administering Power to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Having examined the report of Sub-Committee I concerning these Territories, 11

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and other relevant resolutions concerning Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, in particular General Assembly resolutions 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,

"1. Approves the report of Sub-Committee I concerning Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena and endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;

"2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena to self-determination, freedom and independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"3. Urges the administering Power to hold, without delay, free elections in the Territories on the basis of universal adult suffrage and to transfer all powers to the representative organs elected by the people;

"4. Further urges the administering Power to grant the Territories the political status their peoples freely choose and to refrain from taking any measures incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"5. Reaffirms that the right to dispose of the natural resources of the Territories belongs only to the peoples of the Territories;

"6. Deplores the dismemberment of Mauritius and Seychelles by the administering Power which violates their territorial integrity, in contravention of General Assembly resolutions 2066 (XX) and 2232 (XXI), and calls upon the administering Power to return to these Territories the islands detached therefrom;

"7. Declares that the establishment of military installations and any other military activities in the Territories is a violation of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI), which constitutes a source of

¹¹ See annex below.

tension in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and calls upon the administering Power to desist from establishing such military installations;

- "8. Requests the administering Power to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- "9. Decides to maintain the question of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena on its agenda."

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.398]

Report of Sub-Committee I

Rapporteur: Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (Syria)

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Introduction

- 1. The Sub-Committee considered Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena at its 35th to 39th meetings held on 5, 13, 18, 20 April and 10 May 1967.
- 2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-121 of chap. XIV).
- 3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to participate in the consideration of the three Territories. Accordingly, the representative of the United Kingdom participated in the 35th to 39th meetings of the Sub-Committee.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

A. Statements by members

- 4. The representative of the United Kingdom gave an account of developments which had occurred since the twenty-first session of the General Assembly in the three Territories under consideration.
- 5. In Mauritius, constitutional discussions between the United Kingdom and representatives of the different political parties in the Territory had already set the stage for independence. At the end of the constitutional conference of September 1965, Mr. Greenwood, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had announced that Mauritius would achieve independence if a resolution asking for it was passed by a simple majority of the new Assembly resulting from a general election to be held under a new electoral system. In the course of 1966, a special commission had studied the question of the future electoral system and had recommended that the island should be divided into twenty three-member constituencies and one two-member constituency plus five extra "corrective" In that way, the interests of the main sections of the diversified population of Mauritius would be fairly represented. As those recommendations had given rise to disagreements among the political parties, the number of "corrective" seats had been raised to eight and the arrangements for such seats modified to take account of both party and community considerations; and an agreement had been reached between all concerned.
- 6. Thereafter, in September 1966, the preparation of new electoral registers had been initiated in the presence of a team of Commonwealth observers drawn from India, Malta, Jamaica

- and Canada. The registers had been published in January 1967 and included one-third more voters than previous lists. The matter now rested with the Government of Mauritius and general elections would be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage at a date still to be set. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies had said in the House of Commons in December 1966 that it was desirable that elections should be held at the earliest practicable time. Since the 1965 Constitutional Conference had agreed on a six-month interval between full internal self-government and independence, it would be possible, if a majority elected at the future general elections favoured such a step, for Mauritius to achieve independence six months after the elections. There were differing views among the political parties about the ultimate status of Mauritius, but it was for the people to express its views by democratic means. As stated in the Sub-Committee's report for 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XIV, annex, para. 21), a team of observers from Commonwealth countries would observe the elections.
- 7. With regard to the Seychelles, he recalled that following an initiative by the Legislative Council about the Territory's future relationship with the United Kingdom, a constitutional adviser had recommended the establishment of a single Council of twelve to fifteen members with both executive and legislative functions, elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, as a major step towards full internal self-government. The next elections were to be held in October 1967, and the legal instruments, including the new Constitution, required to implement the various proposals were being prepared.
- 8. The labour disputes which had occurred in 1966 had been resolved by a general wage increase of 20 per cent. A Government Labour Officer and a Trade Union Officer had also been appointed with the aim of improving labour relations.
- 9. Substantial progress had been made in St. Helena. On 1 January 1967, the former Advisory Council had been replaced by a Legislative Council, and a system of committees giving the members of the Legislative Council departmental responsibilities had been established; the Executive Council had also been reformed to include the chairmen of those committees in place of the former official members. Elections to the new Legislative Council would take place, as before, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, not later than 1 January 1968. The Council would consist of twelve elected members out of a total of fourteen, instead of eight out of a total of sixteen as at present.
- 10. The three Territories under discussion had certain features in common: they all were small, had limited resources and were far from the main lines of communication. In other ways they were different: Mauritius had 750,000 inhabitants and St. Helena only 4,600. These differences were bound to be reflected in the type of political institutions the Territories developed and also perhaps in their ultimate status. He emphasized that since the last session of the Special Committee, each of the three Territories had made substantial progress towards self-government and a final decision on their eventual status
- 11. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the situation in the Seychelles recalled the arrangement proposed by the United Kingdom for certain Caribbean Territories: the administering Power was contemplating a procedure which violated the legitimate interests of the population and contradicted the various pertinent General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
- 12. The working paper showed that the colonial Power was reluctant to implement the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. A colonial Governor had been sent to the Territory to advise on the future colonial status of the Seychelles and had recommended three possible courses: (a) that the Territory should achieve only nominal independence guaranteed by treaty relations with a suitable Power; (b) some form of free association with the United Kingdom; and (c) some form of close association or integration with the United Kingdom (chap. XIV, para. 67). In the first case, it was clear that the colonial Power was not prepared to withdraw from the

Seychelles and to concede unfettered independence. The second course would constitute a direct violation of the inalienable right of the people to achieve the independence it demanded. Finally, integration would be a violation of the territorial integrity of the Seychelles, as stated in General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

- 13. The economic situation in the Seychelles remained gloomy and was accentuated by the Territory's colonial status. In a Territory in which there had been a continued decline in agriculture and industry, it was highly regrettable that most of the arable land was being given to foreign monopolies in the form of concessions. He recalled that that aspect of the situation was to be the subject of special study by the Sub-Committee.
- 14. In Mauritius, too, there had hardly been any progress. At the twenty-first session, the Tanzanian delegation had stated that the United Kingdom Government was endeavouring to delay the attainment of independence and circumvent the wishes of the people. By its resolutions 2066 (XX) and 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965, the General Assembly had called upon the administering Power to dismantle the existing military bases and refrain from establishing new ones in the Territories under its domination. It had also invited that Government to take no action which would dismember the Territories or violate their territorial integrity. The United Kingdom Government had, however, completely ignored the Organization's decisions. On 25 March 1967, The Times of London had reported the measures adopted by the United Kingdom in its new Indian Ocean colony created in November 1965, which was to be used for military purposes by the United Kingdom and the United States Governments.
- 15. He protested against the creation of the new colony, which constituted a violation of the legitimate interests and inalienable rights of the inhabitants. It also showed how the colonial Powers were trying to impede independence by such devices as the concessions they granted to foreign monopolies. It was through such monopolies that the new colony had been set up and military installations established. The dismemberment of a Territory violated the express provisions of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and those of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the creation of the new colony and the establishment of military installations also ran counter to the declared wishes of the peace-loving peoples of Africa and Asia. It could be regarded as a hostile act against those peoples who were in the immediate vicinity of the military installations in the Indian Ocean.
- 16. It must be recognized that with regard to Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena, the administering Power had maintained a negative attitude and had refused to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly calling upon it to speed decolonization in accordance with Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Furthermore, the United Kingdom Government was continuing its economic exploitation of the Territories, and more and more foreign monopolies were establishing themselves there, to the detriment of the people's legitimate interests. Lastly, the United Kingdom was openly violating the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly by dismembering Mauritius and the Seychelles and building military installations there with the help of the United States.
- 17. It was not enough to reaffirm the right of peoples to self-determination and independence; immediate measures should be taken to ensure that those rights were respected. The colonial Power should without delay hold elections on the basis of universal suffrage, transfer all powers to the peoples and restore to them the land and natural resources which it had subjected to extensive exploitation. It must also desist from selling to private companies whole islands detached from the Territories and must instead preserve territorial and national entities. The United Kingdom's political manoeuvres to impose upon the peoples the political status it preferred must be condemned, and it must be called upon to refrain from taking any measures incompatible with the Charter and with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Sub-Committee should also recommend the sending of a visiting mission, especially to the Seychelles.

- 18. The representative of Syria said that the administering Power's statements had failed to answer a number of very important questions. Had the United Kingdom implemented without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly in Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena, as it had been called upon to do by Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966? If not, why not? The Sub-Committee must also know whether the administering Power had changed its attitude with regard to the sending of a visiting mission and whether it was prepared to co-operate with the Sub-Committee in the matter.
- 19. The General Assembly had expressed some concern regarding the preservation of the territorial integrity of colonial Territories. Did the administering Power still harbour its intentions, and did it realize that the establishment of military bases ran counter to the resolutions of the General Assembly and could not but create international tension and conflict?
- 20. The United Kingdom had stressed the poverty of Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena and the inadequacy of their resources. But what was it doing to utilize their hydroelectric potential or to remedy the growing unemployment or the balance-of-payments deficit? Had it endeavoured to diversify the economy of Mauritius, as the Prime Minister of Mauritius had repeatedly asked it to do, or was it adhering to the terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement? It was surprising that the United Kingdom, a technologically advanced country and a great source of capital, should permit the Territories under its administration to suffer from shortages of capital and technical skills, as indicated in the Secretariat working paper.
- 21. The Mauritius Legislative Assembly had called for an end to the discriminatory practices to which the workers in the sugar industry were being subjected. What measures had been taken to protect those workers? He would like particularly to have full information on the role of the Taxpayers and Producers Association.
- 22. The Sub-Committee should be better informed concerning the new electoral system in Mauritius and the coming elections. Would they be based on universal suffrage, and when would they take place? It was also desirable to know the role of the parties, to determine the extent to which they genuinely represented the people or, on the contrary, represented special interests. Most important of all, the elected representatives of the people should have adequate powers and the Governor should no longer play an unduly large role.
- 23. In conclusion, he hoped that the United Kingdom would stop giving the impression of wanting above all to safeguard the privileges of the settlers and to serve strategic interests which were of no concern to the people and that it would display a readiness to help the peoples under its administration to free themselves from discrimination and subjection.
- 24. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he wished to reply at once to some of the questions asked by the Tanzanian and Syrian representatives and that he would comment on other points later.
- 25. The Tanzanian representative had said that the three courses envisaged in paragraph 28 of the constitutional adviser's report (nominal independence, "free association" and close association or integration) would be imposed on the population of the Seychelles and excluded any real independence. Page 3 of the document on the Seychelles, however, contained a statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies noting that the adviser had wished to consider not final solutions but the progressive establishment of constitutional machinery aimed precisely at permitting the people to decide their ultimate status. The adviser himself stated in paragraph 27 that he had concerned himself with immediate measures. As to the elections in Mauritius, he referred the Syrian representative to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Secretariat working paper, which indicated inter alia that, in the view of the United Kingdom Government, it was most desirable that the elections should be held at the earliest practicable time and that neither the United Kingdom Government nor the Government of Mauritius had been responsible for the fact that it had been impossible to keep to the time-table

originally planned. The completion of the register of electors should in principle make it possible to hold elections in 1967.

- 26. He would have to consult his Government concerning the sending of a visiting mission if that was in accordance with the Special Committee's views.
- 27. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, according to the United Kingdom representative, the proposals in paragraph 28 of the constitutional adviser's report on the Seychelles were not final. Inasmuch as the people of the Seychelles had expressed a wish to achieve independence rapidly, the solutions outlined in that paragraph could only create confusion and were, in fact, an insult to the people of the Territory. As to the "political inexperience" of the electorate and the candidates, which the adviser noted with regret in paragraph 34, he wondered if it was not attributable to the fact that the United Kingdom was preventing the people from exercising their rights. Moreover, paragraph 47 shows clearly that the "free association" formula was regarded as final.
- 28. The possible solutions envisaged by the United Kingdom revealed the latter's neo-colonialist intentions. The administering Power had never shown any willingness to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and had taken care, in its statement, to make no mention of complete independence.
- 29. The representative of Syria asked whether the Legislative Assembly to be chosen in the elections which, according to the representative of the administering Power, were to be held in 1967, would really be in a position to decide the future of Mauritius by adopting a constitution and leading the Territory to independence if that was the wish of the population, or whether, on the contrary, it would be a passive body, content to pass minor legislation under the control of the Governor.
- 30. The representative of the United Kingdom, replying to the Syrian representative, said that the Legislature could lead Mauritius to independence, if the majority of its members so desired, after six months of self-government. The forthcoming elections would therefore be more than a mere formality.
- 31. The "free association" formula which the Tanzanian representative had criticized could not, in any case, be imposed. It was for the people of the Seychelles, acting through their representatives, to choose their ultimate status. However, it should not be forgotten that the people were divided, some wanting independence, some association, and others integration, and that the Territory's two political parties, the Seychelles Democratic Party and the Seychelles People's United Party, had different programmes in that regard.
- 32. The representative of Syria said that the current debate was enabling the Sub-Committee to form a clearer idea of the situation. He asked the United Kingdom representative whether, if most of the representatives opted for independence, Mauritius would become independent in 1968. The forthcoming elections were of the greatest importance, and it seemed advisable that United Nations observers should be present.
- 33. The representation of the United Kingdom confirmed that, under the present arrangements, not more than six months would elapse between the general election and the attainment of independence, if that was what the newly elected Igislature wanted. On this basis independence could take place by 1968, subject to the views expressed by a majority of the Legislature after the general election. The Government of Mauritius had agreed to the presence of Commonwealth observers to verify the electoral registers and supervise the voting procedures. If a formal request were made that the Sub-Committee should also send observers, he would have to consult his Government before replying.
- 34. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania observed that the United Kingdom representative had still not stated definitely whether his Government's policy was one which would permit the Seychelles and Mauritius to achieve full independence. Study of the documents as well as information available to him indicated that the people wanted full independence at an early date. He also wished to know when the machinery referred to in the documents, the operation of which had already been explained, would be set up. His Government did not wish to be confronted with a fait accompli or to see the administering Power impose a point of view which was at variance with the people's desires. He also noted that

- the United Kingdom representative had carefully avoided mentioning the dismemberment of Territories, which was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). A specific reply on that point would enable the Sub-Committee to make definite recommendations to the Special Committee and the General Assembly.
- 35. The representative of Syria said that if the new elections in Mauritius were to be held in 1967, after which there was to be a six-month delay, the island would presumably attain independence in 1968. As to the question of observers, he hoped that the United Kingdom Government would appreciate the need for a United Nations presence during the elections. Like the Tanzanian representative, he hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would clarify the question of the dismemberment of Territories.
- 36. The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out to the Tanzanian representative that, as the United Kingdom Government's report indicated, it was for the members of the future legislature of the Seychelles, elected by universal suffrage, to consider the Territory's future, and that there had been no decision as to its ultimate status. As to the content of the new constitutional proposals which were to be implemented in Seychelles, all relevant details were given on page 4 and in chapter V of his Government's report on the recommendations of the constitutional adviser, and in chapter V of the adviser's report. The proposed changes would take effect when the general elections were held, which would be in October 1967 at the latest.
- 37. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation would take note of the United Kingdom representative's explanations. The paramount question of sovereign rights had not, however, been clarified. The documents referred to gave no definite indication as to whether the United Kingdom planned to grant complete independence to the Territories in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). On the contrary, it appeared that the proposals in chapter IV, paragraph 28 (a), (b) and (c), of the United Kingdom Government's report would be implemented and that a solution involving independence would be discarded, as it had been in the case of the Caribbean Tertories.
- 38. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the discussion of the situation in Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena by the Special Committee in 1966 had clearly shown that the administering Power had not yet implemented the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant General Assembly resolutions, that the political development of the Territories was proceding very slowly, that the electoral arrangements devised for Mauritius had been the subject of serious controversy among various groups and political parties and that universal suffrage had still not been introduced in the Seychelles. The Special Committee had also expressed concern at the establishment of the new British Indian Ocean Territory and the reports that it would be used as a military base, and had called upon the administering Power to respect the territorial integrity of Mauritius and Seychelles and, in keeping with operative paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, to refrain from using the three Territories for military purposes. It had also called upon the administering Power to recognize the right of the indigenous inhabitants to dispose of the natural resources and to take measures to diversify the economy of the Territories. Those conclusions and recommendations had been confirmed by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session. In resolution 2232 (XXI) the General Assembly had, inter alia, urged the administering Power to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories to study the situation and make appropriate recommendations, and had reiterated its earlier declaration that any attempt to disrupt the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories and to establish military bases and installations in them was incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and with Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly had requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.

- 39. All three Territories were, however, still under United Kingdom domination and United Kingdom Governors still had wide powers: in Mauritius, the Governor still appointed the Premier and most of the Ministers, and in the Seychelles and St. Helena he presided over both the Executive Council and the Legislative Council. The people of Mauritius had long been asking for independence, but it seemed as if the administering Power still intended to delay granting it by imposing certain conditions such as that the people should first gain experience of managing their own affairs. A study of the new "Proposals for Constitutional Advance" in the Seychelles showed that they were not intended to prepare the people for independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but rather to perpetuate United Kingdom control of the Territory, and that independence was ruled out as a solution. Under the suggested "committee system of government", the Governor, in addition to his general reserved powers, would have direct responsibility for law and order, the public service and external affairs, and it appeared that he would retain the power to appoint the non-elected members of the Legislative Council and to nominate three other members. As the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania had indicated, the proposed new arrangement would impede the full exercise of the right to self-determination and independence by the population in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV). Of the three possible courses suggested for the Territory, the one recommended was not even "nominal independence" but some form of "free association with the United Kingdom", which indicated that the administering Power did not wish to relinquish control of the Territory. That had been confirmed by the fact that the United Kingdom representative had given no positive reply to the question of whether it did indeed intend to grant complete independence to the Seychelles. It was thus clear that the administering Power was impeding the political development of the three Territories.
- 40. As to the economic situation in the Territories, it was still as serious as before, if not worse. They remained a source of primary commodities and cheap labour for the metropolitan country, which prevented them from developing economic relations with other countries. According to the Secretariat working paper, as much as 73 per cent of Mauritius exports went to the United Kingdom, including most of the sugar produced, and, as the Premier of the Territory had said, progress in the diversification of the Territory's economy had been slow. A similar situation prevailed in the Seychelles and St. Helena. All three Territories depended on a single crop, and that made economic progress very difficult. They also depended increasingly on external aid. After the prolonged domination of foreign capital, the people of Mauritius were still without the means of production required to satisfy more than 10 per cent of their needs.
- 41. The social situation in the three Territories also continued to be distressing. There was chronic unemployment in all the Territories and the *Christian Science Monitor* of 23 January 1967 described the unemployment problem in Mauritius as "hopeless". The gulf between the planters and the peasants in the Seychelles had even been admitted in the document on the proposals for constitutional advance. Furthermore, there were still no facilities for higher education in the Territories.
- 42. The explanation for London's constitutional manoeuvres and the delay in granting independence appeared to be that the administering Power intended to turn the Territories into military bases. In spite of the United Kingdom representative's assurances during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly that the British Indian Ocean Territory would not be used for military purposes, there was continuing evidence that the United Kingdom and the United States did not wish to abstain from using the new colony as an important link in their "East of Suez" policy aimed at preserving the position of the British and other foreign monopolies which exploited the natural wealth of the Middle East, southern Africa and other regions. The military installations which the United Kingdom was planning to construct in the British Indian Ocean Territory would be a direct threat to the countries of Asia and Africa, as the Conference of Non-Aligned States at Cairo had pointed out. The Economist of 14 January 1967 had reported that the immediate aim was to station a mobile striking

- force in the new Territory. The United States still maintained military personnel to operate rocket-tracking stations on Mahé, in the Seychelles, and on Ascension Island, which had gained lamentable notoriety as a base for United States and Belgian intervention in the Congo in 1964. There was also evidence that the United States intended to establish a communications relay station on the island of Diego Garcia.
- 43. The United States was therefore acting as an accomplice of the United Kingdom in violating the General Assembly resolutions relating to the Territories. The Sub-Committee must condemn the militarist activity of the imperialist Powers, which was delaying independence, and which was clearly the reason for the United Kingdom's refusal to allow a visiting mission to go to the Territories.
- 44. He strongly supported the proposals made by the representatives of Syria and Tanzania at the previous meeting. Since the administering Power had failed to respond to the repeated appeals of the General Assembly and the Special Committee to grant immediate independence to Mauritius, the Sub-Committee should ask the Special Committee to recommend the General Assembly to set a time-limit for the granting of independence without any conditions or reservations. In view of the continuing use of Mauritius and Seychelles for military purposes and the creation of the "British Indian Ocean Territory" in violation of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX), 2189 (XXI) and 2232 (XXI), the Sub-Committee should recommend that a visiting mission be sent to the Territories to study the situation and make recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session. Lastly, the administering Power should be asked to inform the Special Committee before the opening of the twenty-second session on how the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Special Committee were being implemented, especially those concerning the immediate exercise of the right to selfdetermination by the population, the prompt holding of elections on the basis of universal suffrage in order to create representative organs in Seychelles and St. Helena, and the safeguarding of the people's right to dispose of their own resources and create a diversified economy. Such action would help the people of the Territories towards self-determination and independence and would show them that they had the moral support of the United Nations.
- 45. The representative of Yugoslavia said that, once again, the Sub-Committee must take note of the fact that the administering Power had done very little in the direction of allowing the peoples of the three Territories to decide their future status and form of government freely and democratically. The administering Power had shown that it was still not prepared to implement the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of General Assembly resolutions 2066 (XX), 2069 (XX) and 2232 (XXI).
- 46. Not only had there been no positive changes in the political and constitutional fields but all three Territories were also characterized by a steadily deteriorating economic situation. The Secretariat working paper spoke of a downward trend in per capita income and a rise in unemployment in Mauritius and Seychelles. The administering Power issued warnings about the deterioration in the economic and social situation but took no measures to remedy it. The chief reasons for the negative economic trends had been noted by the Sub-Committee on previous occasions: the single-crop economy, the large areas of arable land in the hands of a small number of plantation owners, and the concessions that continued to be granted to foreign monopolies under conditions which disregarded the interests of the Territories.
- 47. Another problem which was of extreme concern to his delegation was the violation of the territorial integrity of the the Territories. The establishment of the British Indian Ocean Territory was contrary to the basic principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and was an indication of neo-colonialist plans mentioned in the Cairo Declaration of non-aligned countries. On 10 November 1965, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies had confirmed in the House of Commons that the new Territory was to be used by the United Kingdom and the United States for the erection of defence facilities. The statement on 16 November 1966

by the Secretary of State for Defence that no plan had been made for the creation of military bases in the Territory had done little to remove the apprehensions regarding the future plans of the two Governments concerned. The fact that the reports concerning military bases had not been categorically denied, especially when it was known that certain military installations were already being constructed, was an indication to his delegation of the existence of plans which might have dangerous consequences for the whole area. According to The Baltimore Sun of 7 April 1967, a spokesman for the Indian Government had stated that that Government was strongly opposed to the establishment of military bases in the Indian Ocean and would raise the matter at the United Nations. The same paper stated that the United Kingdom, in co-operation with the United States, was planning to build an air strip in the Territory in order to assist in the movement of troops and aircraft from Europe to Asia.

- 48. The establishment of military bases could only be intended to check the process of decolonization and threaten the independence of African and Asian countries. The argument that the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles had agreed to the transfer of the islands concerned to the new Territory was without substance because Mauritius and Seychelles were still not independent. The fact that the United Kingdom had been in a hurry to detach the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius prior to the proclamation of independence spoke for itself.
- 49. With regard to recent constitutional developments in Mauritius and Seychelles, he could not accept the United Kingdom's contention that measures leading to the transfer of powers to democratically elected representatives of the people were being taken. In Mauritius, elections had once again been postponed. The statement published by the Commonwealth Office on 21 December 1966 was clearly intended to give the impression that responsibility for the delay did not rest with the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it was his view that the administering Power alone was responsible for delaying the process of self-determination and independence.
- 50. In Seychelles, the situation was even more disturbing. There, the administering Power was insisting on a longer constitutional process on the pretext that the inhabitants lacked political experience. Sir Colville Deverell's proposals for constitutional advance, contained in the document which had been made available to members by the United Kingdom representative, were inconsistent with the provisions of relevant United Nations resolutions. Sir Colville complained that the political parties were primarily preoccupied with the question of the ultimate status of Sevchelles rather than with constitutional evolution, but that was quite understandable. Sir Colville also stated that the question of the Territory's status could not be an immediate issue. Why not? Sir Colville went on to suggest three kinds of ultimate status which he said were the only possible kinds for a small, isolated island such as Seychelles. All three proposals involved some form of association or integration with the United Kingdom. In his delegation's view, the advancing of such suggestions was inadmissible in that it prejudged the people's decisions.
- 51. The United Kingdom apparently wished it to be believed that the measures proposed would significantly improve the constitutional situation. He could not agree with such a contention. It seemed that, under the new system, the ratio of elected to appointed members of the Executive and Legislative Councils would be eight to seven. That means little, however, in view of the influence exercised by the Governor in the councils. The administering Power was clearly delaying the transfer of power to the democratically elected representatives of the people.
- 52. The following conclusions could be drawn with regard to the three Territories: (a) the administering Power had failed to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and other relevant resolutions; (b) it was endeavouring to delay the transfer of power to elected representatives of the people; (c) it had created a new colony out of islands detached from Mauritius and Seychelles, thus directly violating the principle of territorial integrity; (d) it was putting into effect its plans for the establishment of military

- bases on the so-called British Indian Ocean Territory; (e) the economic and social situation in the Territories continued to deteriorate and concessions were being granted to foreign monopolies.
- 53. He believed that the Sub-Committee should, on the basis of these facts, recommend that concrete measures should be taken to guarantee the rights of the peoples of the Territories to self-determination and independence. The sending of a United Nations visiting mission should be recommended, particularly to Seychelles, so that the Special Committee would not be faced with the situation it had been confronted with in the case of the British Caribbean islands.
- 54. The representative of Finland said that, in view of the striking differences between the three Territories under consideration in terms of political development, economic conditions, and the ethnic background and size of population, it was hard to envisage any common pattern for their constitutional advancement. The largest of the Territories, Mauritius, seemed to be well on the road to full independence. Elections were to take place in the relatively near future at a date set by the Government of Mauritius, and if the newly elected Assembly decided in favour of independence, it could be attained after a six months' transitional period. After some regrettable delay, the people of Mauritius would thus be able to express their views regarding the future status of the Territory, and it seemed that, although there were some differences among the political parties, the majority favoured progress to full independence. As it neared independence, Mauritius faced certain difficult problems. Further action was needed to diversify its economy, and the problems resulting from the rapidly expanding population needed to be tackled, perhaps through an expanded family planning programme.
- 55. Political development in Seychelles seemed to be proceeding more slowly. There had been little demand for full independence and, in view of the smallness of the Territory in size and population and of its economic situation, some special constitutional arrangement might be called for, perhaps as an interim solution. He noted with satisfaction that elections were soon to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage and that a new constitution was being prepared. It was important, however, that plans for constitutional advance should not in any way exclude the possibility of full independence. Economic development was a problem also for Seychelles and it was obvious that the Territory needed outside help.
- 56. Whatever future course might be chosen by the three Territories, it was essential that the choice should rest with the freely elected representatives of the people. It was equally important that the people should retain the right in the future to choose an alternative political status.
- 57. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Sub-Committee had heard many familiar assertions from the representatives of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and his delegation had had to reply to them on past occasions. They ranged from the inaccurate to the fantastic. Since the general debate was not yet concluded, however, his delegation would prefer to defer its comments on the various statements which had been made to a later meeting.
- 58. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had always given close attention to factual material supplied by the administering Power and derived from other sources. If the United Kingdom representative wished, he could produce the sources on which he had based his statement; they consisted mainly of United Kingdom newspapers, such as The Times and The Observer. The United Kingdom representative would find that the Soviet delegation's statements were confirmed by dispatches in such newspapers.
- 59. The representative of Yugoslavia said that, if his assertions were "familiar", the reason was that the colonial Power had repeatedly postponed the accession of the people to self-determination and independence. As long as that remained the case, his delegation would be obliged to repeat its arguments.
- 60. The representative of Tunisia pointed out that, although General Assembly resolution 2066 (XX) concerning

Mauritius had invited the administering Power to take steps to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to take no action to violate the territorial integrity of Mauritius and to report to the Special Committee and the General Assembly on the implementation of Assembly resolution 2066 (XX), and although General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) concerning a number of Territories, including Seychelles and St. Helena, had called upon the administering Power to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories with its full co-operation and assistance, it appeared from the information provided by the United Kingdom representative that no progress along those lines had been made in the three Territories under consideration. He had asserted that the changes which had taken place or which were planned were such as to hasten the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but that was open to question since the administering Power had not complied with the General Assembly's request to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories. The colonial period was still too fresh in the minds of many representatives for them to believe everything an administering Power said about the administration of Territories under its control. If the United Kingdom believed that it had fulfilled the obligations imposed on it by the international community, why did it refuse to allow representatives of the United Nations to visit the Territories and ascertain the truth of its statements? It was necessary for the United Kingdom to permit the entry of visiting missions if the present deadlock was to be broken. Everything that had been said during the current debate, including the statements of the administering Power, had already been said in previous years. All that the Sub-Committee could do, therefore, was to recommend the adoption of another resolution, reaffirm the inalienable right of the people of the Territories to self-determination and independence and request the administering Power once again to comply with United Nations resolutions. That represented no progress and it was the administering Power which was to blame. If United Nations representatives were allowed to ascertain conditions in the Territories, it would perhaps be easier to achieve a just and equitable solution of their complex problems.

61. The representative of the United Kingdom, replying to questions which had been raised during the debate, said -with regard to the problem of unemployment in Mauritius and the need to diversify the country's economy—that it was the policy of the Mauritius Government to do everything possible to encourage the establishment of new industries and, to that end, a number of incentives had been provided in the shape of tariff concessions and financial assistance by the Government Development Bank. A number of new industries had already been established or were being considered; these included factories for the production of soap, margarine and edible oil, textiles and fertilizers, for the manufacture of stationery and watches and for the processing of synthetic jewels. Discussions had been held with representatives of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization on strengthening the local machinery for industrial production. In agriculture, the United Nations Special Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations were conducting a joint survey of land and water resources and were expected to recommend various projects which should lead to the improvement and greater diversification of agricultural production. An Agricultural Marketing Board had been in operation for the preceding three years and the Mauritius Government had just approved a number of new schemes for agricultural co-operative credit. It was clear, therefore, that the Mauritius Government was determined to do everything possible to diversify the economy of the Territory and reduce its dependence on the production of primary

62. Inevitably, the Mauritius Government, like most other developing countries, had sought, in promoting local industrialization, to attract foreign capital. It was unrealistic to regard such policies as continued concessions to foreign monopolies. His delegation knew of no arrangements for foreign investment in the Territory which were intended to

operate on a monopolistic basis or in a manner contrary to the interests of the people of Mauritius.

63. The representative of Syria had referred to allegations of discrimination in the sugar industry and had asked about steps being taken to protect the workers. Conditions of employment in the sugar industry were regulated by wage councils appointed by the Mauritius Ministry of Labour and there was no discrimination among workers in any form of employment. As to the matter of hydro-electric installations, there were at present eight hydro-electric power stations operated by the Central Electricity Board of Mauritius and a ninth was to be completed by 1969. With regard to the Seychelles Taxpayers and Producers Association, he said that that organization, as indicated in paragraph 62 of the Secretariat working paper (chap. XIV), had for some time ceased to exist.

64. The representative of Finland had invited attention to the problems of a rapidly expanding population and the desirability of an expanded family planning programme. There was now a much wider acceptance among all shades of religious opinion and communities in the Territory of the need for family planning and, with government support, certain voluntary agencies had already made a start.

65. With regard to the so-called dismemberment of Mauritius and Seychelles resulting from the establishment of the British Indian Ocean Territory, as alleged by the representatives of Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania, the new Territory was made up of a number of small scattered islands separated from both Mauritius and Seychelles by many hundreds of miles. The Chagos Archipelago, for instance, although previously administered as part of Mauritius, was geographically much nearer to the Seychelles. For nearly 100 years, all the islands, including Mauritius and Seychelles, had formed a single dependency, and thereafter, beginning about sixty years previously, the islands forming the new British Indian Ocean Territory had been attached either to Mauritius or Seychelles purely as a matter of administrative convenience. They could not be considered as a homogeneous part of either of those Territories in ethnic, geographical, economic or any other terms. The islands had no indigenous population, since they had been uninhabited when originally acquired by the United Kingdom Government and virtually all persons now living there were migrant workers. The administrative rearrangements which had been worked out freely with the Governments and elected representatives of the people of Mauritius and Seychelles and with their full agreement, in no sense, therefore, constituted a breach in the natural territorial and ethnic integrity of those Territories.

66. Some representatives, including the representative of the Soviet Union, had implied that there was a conspiracy to delay independence and impede political development in the Territories in order to turn them into military bases. The clear assurances given by the United Kingdom Government concerning independence for Mauritius and the information provided on constitutional progress in the Seychelles spoke for themselves. The steady progress towards full self-government and decolonization was irrefutable evidence against such allegations.

67. Some delegations had also made familiar allegations that the United Kingdom Government was planning to establish bases in the British Indian Ocean Territory. The allegations had been based exclusively on press reports, which were often highly speculative, since the role of the Press in the United Kingdom was not restricted to that of a subservient reflection of government policies. Those delegations should ignore such speculative comment and accept the clear statement made by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence on 16 November 1966 that his Government had no programme for creating bases in the British Indian Ocean Territory. Although the United Kingdom Government had announced as long ago as November 1965 that the islands might provide potential sites for defence purposes such as refuelling or communications facilities, no decision had in fact been taken to establish any such facilities. Such possible uses were very far removed from the fears of military bases threatening the independence of African and Asian countries which some delegations had sought to raise.

- 68. On the question raised by the representative of Syria concerning a United Nations presence during the forthcoming elections in Mauritius, his delegation would be prepared to seek instructions on any specific request which the Committee might make, but he pointed out that the Banwell Commission's report had recommended that a team of Commonwealth observers should be present during the elections and that that recommendation had been accepted by all political parties in Mauritius.
- 69. The representative of Syria had also asked about the need to take special account of the interests of the communities in the electoral arrangements in Mauritius. He pointed out that the Territory's population was of several different ethnic origins and that, among the political groupings and parties, there were bodies which claimed to represent the Hindu and Moslem communities. Under the previous system, it had been possible for as many as fifteen out of sixty-five members of the Legislature to be nominated by the Governor in order to protect under-represented sections of the community. Since it had been impossible at the Constitutional Conference in 1965 to reach agreement on an alternative procedure, the Banwell Commission had been appointed to make recommendations which would ensure that the main sections of the population should have an opportunity to secure fair representation of their interests. It was not the United Kingdom Government which had demanded that such special arrangements should be made, but the local political parties and especially the minority communities. Under the new electoral arrangements, there would be eight "best loser" seats out of a total of seventy. Four of those would be reserved for under-represented communities irrespective of party considerations, and the other four were intended to restore the balance of party representation in so far as it had been disturbed by the previous award of four seats on a purely communal basis. The arrangement was essentially a compromise. The United Kingdom Government had throughout not wished to impose any solution and the arrangements now in operation had been generally accepted by all sides. His Government had, however, while paying every regard to local wishes, sought to discourage political parties in the Territory from appealing exclusively to particular communities. Sixty out of the seventy members in the new Legislature would be elected in three-member constituencies in which each voter was obliged to cast his full three votes and the result of such an arrangement should be to minimize communal influences. There had, of course, been universal adult suffrage in Mauritius since 1958.
- 70. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that he would like to make some preliminary comments on the United Kingdom representative's statement. The United Kingdom representative, in attempting to justify the dismemberment of Mauritius and Seychelles, had spoken of distances of many hundreds of miles, but it might be pointed out that the islands in question were many thousands of miles from the United Kingdom. That fact showed the extent to which the United Kingdom regarded geographical proximity as a prerequisite for the existence of a nation. At any rate, the islands in question had always been treated as part of Mauritius and Seychelles. If the facts were as the United Kingdom presented them, one could only assume that the United Kingdom had been systematically misleading the United Nations in the information it had been submitting. If that was not the case, the United Kingdom must admit that it was now pursuing a policy incompatible with the United Nations Charter as well as contrary to the wishes of the freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples of Africa and
- 71. The United Kingdom representative had said that military bases were not now being built on the Indian Ocean islands, but the Tanzanian delegation would like to hear it stated that the United Kingdom Government did not intend to place any military installations, equipment or personnel on the islands, since any such installations and personnel could only be intended for aggressive purposes. The establishment by

- the United Kingdom of military installations in the Indian Ocean must be seen as part of the military strategy of imperialism. The installations were undoubtedly intended for use against people engaged in the legitimate struggle for liberation. The United Kingdom had refused to use force where it was justified, to oust Ian Smith's régime in Southern Rhodesia, but was using all the military means at its disposal against the struggling peoples of Aden and other areas. He would like to be told whether or not the United Kingdom had any military personnel or installations, including military transportation facilities, on the islands.
- 72. With regard to the reliability of press reports, the question was whether the United Kingdom Government had denied the reports. The Times of London had reported on 25 March 1967 that the United Kingdom was in the final stages of negotiations to buy three privately owned islands in the area for defence purposes. If the United Kingdom Government did not formally deny such reports, his delegation would assume that they were true.
- 73. The United Kingdom representative had dwelt at length on the need for the representation of the various communities in Mauritius. The United Kingdom, ever since it had controlled Mauritius, had pursued a systematic policy of isolating one group from another in accordance with the principle "divide and rule". Now, when the nationalists called for independence, the colonial Power claimed that the people were divided. The electoral system under which each voter would be obliged to cast three votes was one which had been tried in Tanganyika prior to its independence and had since been discarded. Such a system actually amounted to a denial of the right of vote, as he would show in more detail at a subsequent meeting.
- 74. With regard to Seychelles, the United Kingdom had still not indicated that it would accede to the people's demand for independence. "Decolonization" could mean anything, and the Special Committee had seen how the United Kingdom interpreted that term in the case of six Territories in the Caribbean. He would like to be told that under the policy of the United Kingdom Government the people's demand for independence would be granted.
- 75. The representative of the United Kingdom, replying to the remarks of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, said that that representative had claimed that the islands forming the British Indian Ocean Territory were part of Mauritius and Seychelles, but the only evidence he had adduced was that the islands had formerly been treated as part of Mauritius or of Seychelles for administrative purposes. That was true, but, in his view, irrelevant.
- 76. He formally repudiated the Tanzanian representative's unsubstantiated charge that the United Kingdom had misled the United Nations in the information it had provided on the Territories under discussion. The United Kingdom had never withheld any information relevant to the Special Committee's work, and had indeed gone much further than was strictly required by criteria of relevance. The Tanzanian representative might disbelieve the statements of official United Kingdom spokesmen if he wished, but his counter-assertions had no basis in fact. The matter referred to in The Times report cited by the Tanzanian representative had been dealt with in a statement by the Secretary of State for Defence on 12 April 1967, who had said that the freehold of the islands in question, which were part of the British Indian Ocean Territory, had been acquired by the Government in order to ensure that they would be available for any facilities, such as refuelling or communications, which the Government might wish to establish there. The United Kingdom had provided full information on the Territories every year from 1964 onwards. There was little purpose in continually furnishing information if it was to be continually ignored.
- 77. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he would like to comment on a number of matters touched on by the United Kingdom representative. That representative had asserted that the administering Power was making efforts to diversify the economy of the Territories under discussion. It was clear, however, that any such efforts had been inadequate. There was

chronic unemployment on the islands, and skilled workers were obliged to emigrate to find work. In a survey carried out by Barclays Bank, it had been stated that the United Kingdom had not been vigorous enough in its efforts to help the people of the Territories to help themselves. Basic goods required to meet the essential needs of the people had to be imported.

78. The United Kingdom representative's claim that his Government's military activities in the area were not impeding the progress of the Territories to independence could not be substantiated. Preparation for self-determination must include efforts to build up the economy, and the Secretariat paper showed that military activities were impeding economic development. In paragraph 113, for example, it was stated that, from 1965, the major single source of income in St. Helena had been employment in "communication stations" on Ascension Island which is a military base. Five flax mills which had been in operation in 1965 had been closed down, clearly because the labour force had been lured to the bases by advantages offered to them and diverted from normal activities essential for economic independence.

79. The administering Power had denied that it was dismembering the Territories of Mauritius and Seychelles. Clearly the United Kingdom was ignoring General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI), which stated unambiguously that any attempt aimed at the disruption of the territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in those Territories was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

80. The representative of the administering Power had cast doubt on the veracity of reports quoted from the United Kingdom Press. He did not think, however, that the United Kingdom delegation could dispute the fact that, on 15 June 1966, the British Prime Minister had indicated that it was his Government's policy to avoid establishing large bases in populated areas and instead to rely on staging posts such as those available in the Indian Ocean, where there was virtually no local population, so that United Kingdom forces could get speedily to where they were needed at minimum cost. That statement spoke for itself.

81. The assertion that the islands in question had no population of their own was questionable. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies had stated in 1965 that there were 1,400 people living on the islands. The inhabitants certainly did not wish to see their islands handed over to the United Kingdom for use as military bases.

82. It was asserted that the United Kingdom's military activities were not slowing progress towards independence, and that the local governments had agreed. But the agreement of governments which were not independent could not be considered valid. Under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), self-determination must not be subject to any conditions, and no form of pressure must be exercised on the people. Once independent, the new nations could enter into whatever arrangements they wished.

83. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that his delegation was one of those which had raised the question of the establishment of United Kingdom military bases in the Territories. The United Kingdom representative had once again referred to the statement made on 16 November 1966 by the Secretary of State for Defence that no plan had been made for the creation of military bases in the British Indian Ocean Territory. The Yugoslav delegation did not regard that statement as a categorical denial by the United Kingdom Government, since it left open the possibility of the establishment of such bases in the future. According to the United Kingdom representative, members were basing their views on press reports, which were often highly speculative. He pointed out, however, that when he had said at the Sub-Committee's 36th meeting that the Indian Government was strongly opposed to the establishment of military bases in the Indian Ocean, he had relied on a statement by a spokesman for that Government.

84. He regretted that the United Kingdom representative had not deemed it necessary to discuss the points raised in

his statement regarding the preoccupation of the political parties in Seychelles with the question of the ultimate status of the Territory. In his delegation's view, that preoccupation meant that the people of Seychelles were not interested in a prolonged process of constitutional evolution. Furthermore, his delegation considered that the changes in the ratio of elected to appointed members of the Executive and Legislative Councils did not represent a significant improvement in the constitutional situation.

85. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the United Kingdom representative's second statement had served to confirm what he himself had said earlier. The United Kingdom representative had informed members that his Government has been providing information on the new colony only since 1964. However, the Sub-Committee had been in existence for some time before that year. What the Tanzanian delegation wished to call into question, however, was not the transmission of information but the type of information transmitted. If the Territory in question had been a United Kingdom colony, why would that country pay £3 million to Mauritius as compensation for the inclusion of certain of its islands in the British Indian Ocean Territory? Colonialism under any guise was a crime against humanity and military aggression was even worse.

86. At a previous meeting, the United Kingdom Government had been called upon to indicate whether its policy was to lead the Territories to independence. The United Kingdom Government had ignored the demand of the people of Seychelles for unfettered independence. In his delegation's view, it was important that the United Kingdom Government should co-operate with the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee and agree to the sending of a United Nations visiting mission to Mauritius and Seychelles. It was essential that that Government should renounce its colonial policy in those Territories.

87. The representative of Tunisia recalled that a recent resolution of the General Assembly had called upon the administering Power to make it possible for the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territories under consideration. He stressed that the question of United Nations visiting missions was a matter of primary importance and the United Kingdom representative had not given a satisfactory reply in that regard. It was necessary for members to have a clear idea of the United Kingdom Government's position on the possibility of the sending of a United Nations visiting mission to Mauritius and Seychelles for the purpose of ascertaining the situation in those Territories. With regard to Mauritius, the United Kingdom representative had said that a group of observers from the Commonwealth would be invited to be present during the forthcoming elections. But he had said nothing about the Sevchelles or St. Helena. In any event, what was of concern to members was the role of the United Nations.

88. The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that the statement made in Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence on 16 November 1966 had been in reply to a question concerning the estimated cost of establishing military bases in the British Indian Ocean Territory. The Secretary had said that as no plan had been made for the creation of such bases, he could not give any figure for the cost of such a scheme. The Soviet Union representative had referred to a statement made by the United Kingdom Prime Minister on 16 June 1966. However, a careful reading of that statement would not reveal any inconsistency, since the Prime Minister had spoken of the possibility of establishing facilities for refuelling and communications purposes.

89. With regard to the question of population, he had pointed out that there was no indigenous population in the British Indian Ocean Territory and that most of the people living there were migrant workers. The Soviet Union representative had again claimed that military activities in the area impeded constitutional development. He himself did not think that they would be shared by the inhabitants of Malta or Singapore. In any event, his Government was not conducting any military activities in any of the Terri-

tories under consideration. The United Kingdom Government had provided a grant of £3 million to Mauritius and, in the case of the Seychelles, had undertaken to build an international airfield, which would contribute greatly to the economic development of the Territory. The Soviet Union representative had referred to figures in the Secretariat working paper and had claimed that the solution of unemployment in St. Helena was dependent on military activities. The United Kingdom delegation wished to point out that a total of 342 St. Helenians—as against 323 in 1964—had worked on Ascension Island in 1965 and that of that total, 150 had been employed by British Government Cable and Wireless, Limited, and 68 by the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works for the construction of a British Broadcasting Corporation relay station.

- 90. With regard to the Tanzanian representative's remarks concerning the transmission of information by the United Kingdom delegation, he wished to point out that his delegation had always provided full information on the Territories and that it was his understanding that the Sub-Committee had first begun to consider Mauritius, the Seychelms and St. Helena in 1964. Since then, his delegation had provided information on those Territories to the Sub-Committee and the Fourth Committee in 1965 and 1966.
- 91. His delegation took note of the comments of the Tunisian representative, and his Government would consider any request made by the Sub-Committee as a whole concerning the sending of visiting missions.
- 92. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said, with regard to British Government Cable and Wireless, Limited, that its activities were not solely concerned with civilian operations. The United Kingdom newspaper, The Observer, had said that the cable was likely to become the main channel for relaying data back to Cape Kennedy. It was obvious that such data would be of a military nature. With regard to St. Helena and Ascension Island, he noted that the United Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa had recently held negotiations concerning the Simonstown naval base. According to a report in The Times, it had been agreed that the United Kingdom would continue to enjoy the right to fly over South Africa in the event of trouble in the Middle East. It was thus clear that those negotiations had been designed to serve the interests of the United Kingdom and to enable that country to hinder the progress of the peoples of the Middle East towards independence.
- 93. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said it was obvious that the representative of the United Kingdom and he were not speaking the same language. The representative of the United Kingdom had said that his Government had made a grant to Mauritius. Yet, according to paragraph 39 of the Secretariat working paper (chap. XIV), on 20 December 1966, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies had said that the United Kingdom had provided Mauritius with financial aid totalling £8.1 million, in addition to the compensation of £3 million paid for the inclusion of certain groups of its islands in the British Indian Ocean Territory. That showed clearly that the United Kingdom had had to pay for those islands.
- 94. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation continued to hold the view that the statement made by the Secretary of State for Defence did not constitute a denial of any intention on the part of the United Kingdom to establish military bases in the new colony.
- 95. The representative of Mali noted that, in his initial statement at the 35th meeting, the United Kingdom representative had said that, in Mauritius, constitutional discussions between the United Kingdom and the representatives of the various political parties had already set the stage for independence—thus implying that there was no need for the Sub-Committee to consider whether General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was being implemented. That was an over-simplification of the situation. Indeed, if one examined the political and economic situation in Mauritius, as in the other two Territories under discussion, one found that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was not being implemented and that basic United Nations principles were being disregarded.

According to those principles, peoples had a right to self-determination and independence, decisions on constitutional changes must be left in the hands of the peoples themselves, territorial integrity must be respected and—a principle which was vital to genuine independence—the right of peoples to sovereignty over their natural resources must be guaranteed. All those principles were being flouted. In addition, military bases were being established in the Territories, despite the General Assembly decision that the establishment of such bases in colonial territories was incompatible with the United Nations Charter and Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

- 96. The United Kingdom representative had gone on to say that, at the end of the Constitutional Conference held in 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had announced that Mauritius would achieve independence if a resolution asking for it was passed by a simple majority of the Legislative Assembly resulting from a new general election. He found that condition surprising. He would have thought that a constitutional conference would represent the last step before independence; the requirement for new elections constituted a barrier in the path to independence. It was hard for him to conceive of a people deciding against independence, but apparently the United Kingdom hoped to ensure that the complexion of the new Assembly was favourable to it.
- 97. With regard to the arrangements for the elections he noted that, according to paragraph 18 of the Secretariat working paper (chap. XIV), the total electorate was about 315,000 or 48 per cent of the population. Since the rate of population growth was high and the population was predominantly young, the minimum voting age of twenty-one had the effect of excluding a large part of the population, and giving the electorate an unrepresentative character. That illustrated the danger of allowing the United Kingdom to organize the elections to a body which was to vote on the question of independence.
- 98. Paragraph 16 of the Secretariat paper (chap. XIV) revealed that a number of seats were to be filled by the "best losers" in the elections. He found such an arrangement extraordinary, since it meant seating people who had been rejected by the electorate and thus reversing the democratic decision of the people.
- 99. It was clear from the Secretariat paper that there had been no economic progress in any of the Territories and that no attempt was being made to alter the structure of the economy in order to ensure economic progress in the future. Mauritius depended essentially on the production of sugar and coffee. In view of the world market situation with regard to coffee, with severe fluctuations in prices and low price levels, coffee-producing countries were trying hard to redirect their production. It was clear that coffee provided no basis for economic development, and the situation was similar with regard to sugar. As far as employment was concerned, economic growth was not keeping pace with the rapid rise in population and chronic unemployment and underemployment resulted. No real solution to that problem was yet in sight.
- 100. The representative of Ethiopia said that very little had been accomplished towards implementing the provisions of relevant General Assembly resolutions in Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena. The Special Committee and the General Assembly had repeatedly reaffirmed the right of the people of those Territories to freedom and independence and had invited the administering Power to take effective measures to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Yet the Sub-Committee was obliged to take up the question once again. In September 1966, the United Kingdom delegation had informed the Sub-Committee that registration for the purpose of the new elections had been due to begin on 1 September 1966 but, because of Ramadan, the elections could not be held before February 1967; it had added that Mauritius could thus achieve independence during the summer of 1967.
- 101. At the 35th meeting, however, in reply to a question from the representative of Syria, the United Kingdom representative had said that independence would probably be obtained in 1968. For certain reasons, the elections due to be

held in February 1967 had been postponed. She regretted to have to say that her delegation was not satisfied with the reasons given for the delay. The Ethiopian delegation urged the United Kingdom Government to hold the promised elections at an early date. The people of Mauritius had expressed their wish for independence in 1965 at the London Constitutional Conference, but they were still waiting for the day of independence to arrive. Her delegation appealed to the administering Power to implement fully the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People.

102. With regard to Seychelles and St. Helena, developments were still very slow; hardly any progress had been made in either the political, economic or social situation. As could be seen from Sir Colville Deverell's report, the situation in Seychelles remained serious. Sir Colville had expressed the opinion that, in view of the political inexperience of the people, constitutional evolution should proceed "with reasonable deliberation", and had complained that the preoccupation of the political parties with the question of the ultimate status of Seychelles was distracting attention from the more immediate matter of the next steps along the path of constitutional evolution. Whatever Sir Colville's views on the people's preoccupation with the question of the Territory's ultimate status might be, her conclusion was that the people of Seychelles were anxiously awaiting full independence. She would therefore like to see the administering Power comply with the people's wishes on the basis of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions.

103. As to economic conditions, Seychelles had been unable to balance its budget without external aid since 1958, unemployment was increasing, the rate of population growth was rising and agricultural production remained static. That was a sad situation in a country soon to become independent, and her delegation urged the United Kingdom Government to take immediate steps to help Seychelles cope with its economic and social problems.

104. She also noted that very little progress had been made in St. Helena in the economic, social and political fields. Her delegation appealed to the administering Power to implement resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant General Assembly resolutions in respect of St. Helena. Most particularly, as far as all three Territories were concerned, it recommended that the administering Power should do its utmost to solve the educational, social and economic problems with which they were faced.

105. The representative of Syria, referring to the answers given to his questions by the representative of the United Kingdom, thought he was justified in asking what was the potential economic wealth of the Territories and to what extent that potential had been realized for the benefit of the population. There were indications that Mauritius had considerable potential in hydro-electric power, yet, according to the representative of the administering Power, there were only eight hydro-electric stations now in operation and a ninth under construction. He would be interested to know what the production was in kilowatts, to what use it was put and whether it was helping to raise the economic standard of the population.

106. The representative of the administrative Power had indicated that unemployment was decreasing, but he wondered why there was any unemployment at all in a place which was apparently so rich in natural resources and when a relatively extensive economic development project might absorb all available manpower, and even require more. The United Kingdom had both the capital and technical knowledge for such a project.

107. The representative of the United Kingdom had dwelt on the benign nature of the strategic installations on the islands, claiming that they were only refuelling stations. He wondered whether they had been constructed on Mauritian land with the express free consent of the people. If not, were they not impeding self-determination and independence?

108. He welcomed the assurance given that there was no discrimination in the sugar or other industries, but asked what were the salary scales for Europeans and indigenous

employees and whether the latter had access to managerial positions.

109. He urged the administering Power to give replies that provided a comprehensive picture of the islands under its administration and not merely partial answers. What was important was that the people should freely exercise their right to self-determination, that there should be social, economic and political progress and that the sovereignty of the people and the territorial integrity of their land should be respected. The Sub-Committee should not base its conclusions on the opinion of the administering Power as to what was reasonable.

110. The representative of the United Kingdom, replying to the comments made by the representative of Mali concerning the delay in granting independence to Mauritius following the Constitutional Conference in 1965 and the requirement that a new Legislature should approve a request for independence, referred him to the report of that Conference, which had made it very clear that there had by no means been agreement as to whether the issue of independence had been fully considered at previous general elections and that it had been decided by the parties represented at the Conference that steps should be taken to review the electoral arrangements before new elections were held. Two points of view had been expressed: one had been that there was no need to consult the people regarding the future status of Mauritius since their desire for independence had been demonstrated by their support in three general elections for the parties favouring independence, but that it would be appropriate to hold general elections before independence so that the newly elected Government could lead the country into independence; the opposing argument advanced had been that the question of independence had not been a prominent issue in previous general elections and it was therefore doubtful whether the voters really desired it.

111. Those had been the views not of the United Kingdom Government, but of the parties represented at the Conference. Agreement had therefore been reached on the procedure he had described and, if a majority of the newly elected Legislature so decided, independence could be granted within a period of six months. The reasons why the approval of a majority in the Legislature was required were perfectly clear to anyone familiar with democratic procedures. As he had made clear in earlier statements, the delay in holding general elections had been caused by the process of reviewing the electoral system and the initiative now lay with the Government of Mauritius. In December 1966, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, after discussions with the Prime Minister of Mauritius, had expressed the hope that the latter would share his wish for early elections and the Prime Minister of Mauritius had confirmed that he wished elections to be held in 1967. The United Kingdom could do no more; the initiative for holding elections lay with the Mauritians themselves.

112. On the question of the voting age, which had also been raised by the representative of Mali, the franchise arrangements had been reviewed at the Constitutional Conference in 1965 and the leaders of the parties represented had agreed to leave it unchanged. It had therefore been the decision of the Mauritian representatives themselves. There was, moreover, nothing unusual in a minimum voting age of 21; that was the case in many countries.

113. With reference to the salary scale in the sugar industry, he assured the representative of Syria that no sections of the population of Mauritius could be regarded as indigenous in the sense valid in other parts of the world. No distinction was made in the sugar industry between the Europeans and other sections of the population.

114. He repeated that no refuelling facilities had so far been constructed in the British Indian Ocean Territory and no decision had yet been taken to do so.

115. The representative of Mali said that he had been surprised by the United Kingdom representative's answer to his question concerning the delay in granting independence. In paragraph 19 of the Secretariat working paper (chap. XIV), it was stated that neither the United Kingdom Government

nor the Government of Mauritius could avoid the subsequent delays. Internal political difficulties alone could not be the cause for the delay; one cause appeared to be the requirement that a newly elected Legislature should first approve a resolution asking for independence. He believed that after the Constitutional Conference in 1965 the path to independence had been wide open. There was some doubt in his mind as to the United Kingdom's willingness to move towards the emancipation of the Territory.

116. On the question of the minimum voting age, it should be recognized that the population of Mauritius was a somewhat special case because of the age pyramid and the rapid growth of population. To give the franchise only to those over the age of twenty-one would favour the population of mixed and French descent who mainly supported the Parti mauricien social démocrate (PMSD), which was in favour of preserving the links with the administering Power. That indicated what the outcome of the proposed popular consultation would probably be. In many countries the minimum voting age was eighteen. If that were adopted in Mauritius, 75 per cent of the population, instead of 48 per cent, would be entitled to vote and the majority would then consist of young people who did not belong to the land-owning class. The situation presented complex problems which should be studied carefully since the future of a nation was at stake.

117. He was deeply concerned over the strict dependence of Mauritius on coffee and sugar. A country which was about to become independent should not depend on those two products alone. Mauritius, for instance, was entirely dependent on Madagascar for rice. If something could be done to make the Territory less dependent on the fluctuating prices for coffee and sugar, the United Kingdom should inform the Sub-Committee. It should also diversify agricultural production so that the Territory, which had a rich soil, could satisfy more of its own needs.

118. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the requirement that a request for independence should first be approved by a majority of the newly elected Legislature of Mauritius was no more than a guarantee of the democratic expression of the wishes of the people. It was true that the PMSD did not support full independence, but he pointed out that that party represented not only those of European or mixed descent but also many of African descent who were resident in the Territory. It was hoped, however, that the new electoral arrangements would cut across such communal or racial considerations.

119. In his statement at the Sub-Committee's 37th meeting, he had mentioned the various efforts being made to promote new industry and diversify the economy of Mauritius. Both the Governments of the United Kingdom and Mauritius fully realized the need for diversification.

120. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed with the representative of Mali that the administering Power should give some thought to lowering the minimum voting age, especially since the population of Mauritius did not have a long life expectancy. The explanation given by the United Kingdom representative was not convincing. What was good for other countries was not necessarily good for Mauritius. Some countries recognized that people already had opinions by the age of eighteen and were in a position to decide how to vote.

121. He had been glad to hear from the representative of the administering Power that there were at present no plans to establish military bases in the Territories, especially in the new colony. That would have been satisfactory if there had not been reports to the contrary. There was considerable concern in Africa and Asia on that point and there had even been discussion in the United Kingdom Parliament. He understood that the United Kingdom representative in New Delhi had been handed a statement pointing out that military preparations in the Indian Ocean were contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter. The spokesman for the Indian Government, to whose statement the Yugoslav representative had referred, was very well informed about the discussions in the Special Committee and in the United Nations in general; and was reported to have expressed the hope that the United

Kingdom Government would take those discussions into account and would give up any plans to establish military bases in the Territories. He still did not consider the United Kingdom statement definitive; but if it was, he welcomed it.

122. The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that it was the elected representatives of the people of Mauritius themselves who had decided to retain a minimum voting age of twenty-one. What was more important was that in Mauritius the voters had a free choice between various political parties and a free choice of candidates.

123. He had noted the USSR representative's comments concerning India's views. No doubt, when the question was discussed at a later stage by the plenary Special Committee, the Indian representative would make clear his Government's position on the matter,

B. Conclusions

124. The Sub-Committee notes with regret that the administering Power has still not implemented the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and of other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly concerning Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, and is still unduly delaying the achievement of independence by these Territories.

125. The Sub-Committee notes with regret the inadequacy of political progress in these Territories. The administering Power, through the Governor, continues to exercise vast powers, particularly in the constitutional and the legislative fields. In Seychelles, the administering Power is insisting on a longer constitutional process under the pretext that the people of the Territory lack political experience. Moreover, the new "proposals for consitutional advance" do not accelerate but, in fact, delay the transfer of power to democratically elected representatives of the people as provided for in resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly.

126. By creating a new territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory, composed of islands detached from Mauritius and Seychelles, the administering Power continues to violate the territorial integrity of these Non-Self-Governing Territories and to defy resolutions 2066 (XX) and 2232 (XXI) of the General Assembly.

127. The Sub-Committee notes with concern that, notwith-standing the denials by the administering Power, there is still evidence to indicate that the United Kingdom intends to use portions of these territories for military purposes in collaboration with the Government of the United States of America. The Sub-Committee is of the firm opinion that such military installations create international tension and arouse the concern of the peoples of Africa and Asia, especially those in the vicinity of the installations.

128. The economic situation in Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena remains unsatisfactory. The Territories suffer from shortage of capital and depend entirely on few crops and external aid. Efforts by the administering Power to diversify the economy of the Territories have been inadequate. Concessions to foreign companies continue and the interests of the peoples are not safeguarded.

129. The social situation in the Territories continues to arouse concern. There is a downward trend in per capita income and a rise in unemployment in Mauritius and Seychelles. In Mauritius, the workers in the sugar industry rightly complain of discriminatory practices. There are still no facilities for higher education in the Territories.

C. Recommendations

130. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee take concrete measures to insure that the right of the peoples of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, is respected by the administering Power.

131. The Special Committee should urge the administering Power to grant the Territories the political status their peoples freely choose. The administering Power should consequently refrain from taking any measure incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration

on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

- 132. The Special Committee should once again reaffirm that any constitutional changes must be left to the peoples of the Territories themselves, who alone have the right to decide on the form of government they wish to adopt.
- 133. The administering Power should without delay hold free elections in the Territories on the basis of universal suffrage and transfer all powers to the representative organs elected by the people.
- 134. The Special Committee should recommend that the General Assembly set a time limit for the granting of independence to Mauritius and accelerate the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) regarding Seychelles and St. Helena.
- 135. The Sub-Committee recommends that a United Nations visiting mission should be sent to the Territories to ascertain the extent of the progress achieved towards the goal of selfdetermination and independence.
- 136. The administering Power should once again be called upon to respect the territorial integrity of Mauritius and Seychelles and to return to these Territories the islands detached from them.
- 137. The Special Committee should urge the administering Power to refrain from any military activity in the Terri-

tories, especially in the islands detached from Mauritius and Seychelles and in Ascension Island. Such activity would constitute an act of hostility against the peoples of Africa and Asia and a threat to international peace and security.

- 138. The administering Power should once again be called upon to safeguard the right of the peoples of the Territories to dispose of the natural resources of their countries and to undertake effective measures for creation of a diversified economy.
- 139. The administering Power should be asked to inform the Special Committee before the opening of the twentysecond session of the General Assembly concerning the implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Special Committee.

D. Adoption of the report

140. This report was adopted by the Sub-Committee at its 39th meeting on 10 May 1967. The representative of Finland stated that certain parts of the conclusions and the recommendations were not in accord with and did not reflect the views expressed by his delegation at the Sub-Committee's meeting on 13 April 1967. His delegation therefore could not support all the conclusions and recommendations of the

tegrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of

military bases and installations in these Territories was

CHAPTER XV*

GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS, PITCAIRN AND THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly

- 1. In 1964, the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands (A/ 5800/Rev.1,1 chap. XX, paras. 80-96). After considering the Territories in September 1966, the Special Committee concluded that progress towards the implementation of the provisions contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 had not been significant, and that General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965 had not been adequately implemented. It reiterated the recommendations it had made in 1964 and expressed the opinion that a visit by Sub-Committee II of the Special Committee was necessary and would be most useful in assessing the political climate, economic requirements and aspirations of the people, and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power (A/6300/Rev.1,2 chap. XV, paras.
- 2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2069 (XX) concerning twenty-six Territories, including Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands. At its twenty-first session, it adopted resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, concerning twenty-five Territories, including Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands. The resolution called upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It reiterated the Assembly's declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial in-

incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It urged the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. It decided that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of the Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to pay special attention to the Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

B. Information on the Territories³

1. GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS

General

3. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands are situated in the south-west Pacific around the point at which the Equator crosses the International Date Line. It includes isolated Ocean Island and four groups of islands: the Gilbert, Ellice, Phoenix and Northern Line Islands. With the exception of Ocean Island, which has been raised by volcanic action to about 280 feet (85 metres) above sea level, all are low-lying coral atolls. They have a total land area of about 369 square miles (956 square kilometres), and are spread over more than 2 million square miles (5,180,000 square kilometres) of ocean. Canton and Enderbury Islands in the Phoenix Group are at present under the joint control of the United Kingdom and the United States. Both islands were

^{*} Parts A and B of this chapter were previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.363.

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session. Annexes, annex No. 8 (Part I).

2 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

item 23.

³ Information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 18 April and 1 and 26 August 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

uninhabited until the development of trans-Pacific aviation made them desirable as aviation stations. Canton Island became a fueling station for air services between Honolulu and Auckland and Sydney. It is now used as an emergency airfield and by military aircraft. Some aeronautical, meteorological and communication services continue to be maintained there.

4. On 30 April 1963, the census taken showed a total population of 49,879. By the end of 1964, it was estimated that the population had risen to over 50,000. About 85 per cent of the inhabitants of the Territory are Gilbertese and the remaining 15 per cent are Ellice Islanders. The great majority of the population live in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, which make up about one half of the total area of the Territory. Christmas Island, on the other hand, has an area of more than 140 square miles (426 square kilometres), but much of it is desert and it has only a few hundred inhabitants.

Status

5. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands came under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific in 1877 and were declared a British Protectorate in 1892. By an Order in Council of 10 November 1915, they were annexed and became the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. Subsequently its boundaries were extended to include the Phoenix and Northern Line Islands.

Constitution

6. The Territory is administered under the provisions of the Pacific Order in Council, 1893, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Order in Council, 1915, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Order in Council, 1963.

High Commissioner and Resident Commissioner

7. The responsibility for the administration of the Territory rests with the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, who resides at Honiara in the Solomon Islands. This responsibility is deputized to a Resident Commissioner, the chief administrative officer of the Territory, who resides in Tarawa (the capital) where the principal departments of the Administration are located. The High Commissioner and the Resident Commissioner are both empowered to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory with due regard to local custom. In cases where a proposed law might affect the lives of the local population, the island councils are consulted.

Executive Council

8. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands Order in Council, 1963, provided for the establishment of an Executive Council, presided over by a Resident Commissioner, with an Assistant Resident Commissioner as an ex officio member, and not more than three official and four unofficial members.

Advisory Council

9. The Advisory Council was established in 1963. It comprises the Resident Commissioner as president and first official and eleven unofficial members appointed by him. The Resident Commissioner is required to inform and consult the Council about matters the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific may determine.

Electoral system

10. The elected members of the island councils (see paras. 13-14 below) are elected by universal adult suffrage of all islanders over the age of thirty.

Judiciary

- 11. Under the provisions of the Western Pacific (Courts) Order in Council, 1961, a High Court of the Western Pacific was established in 1962, consisting of a Chief Justice and a number of puisne judges. The High Court possesses and exercises jurisdiction similar to that of the High Court of Justice in England. It has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the judgements of any other court in the Territory, and there is a right of appeal in respect to a judgement by the High Court itself to the Fiji Court of Appeal, and thereafter to the Privy Council in London.
- 12. In addition to the High Court, there is a system of local or Native courts which have wide jurisdiction over all indigenous inhabitants. These courts are presided over by the island magistrate, who can be assisted by four or more assessors. There are also island land courts which deal with local property, estate and land disputes. These are composed of the island magistrate and a panel of selected islanders.

Local government

- 13. There are twenty-six Native (or island) governments in the Gilbert, Ellice and Phoenix groups. These governments consist of island councils, a Native court with criminal and civil jurisdiction and a lands court. The head of each Native government is the island magistrate, an islander selected and appointed by the district commissioner who combines executive and judicial authority. He is the central Government's representative on the island, responsible for local administration, the chairman of the island council and the magistrate of the Native Court.
- 14. Island councils consist of selected members, nominated members and ex officio members. There is a majority of elected members in all the island councils. In addition to appointing certain members of the island governments, the island councils have power to make local regulations covering a wide range of subjects, and provide services for the general health, security and well-being of each island. The councils have full financial responsibility and make their own estimates of revenue and expenditure; in most cases they pay for the various island services out of local revenue but, in cases where they are not financially self-supporting, they receive a subvention from central government funds.

Political parties

15. In October 1965, the first political party in the Territory, the Gilbertese National Party (GNP) was formed. Its aim, *inter alia*, is reported to be "to speed up the present rate of constitutional development, aiming at a more representative and democratic form of government". Membership is reported to be ordinarily limited to Gilbertese. However, exceptions to this rule may be made in favour of part or non-Gilbertese who have spent much of their lives in the Gilbert Islands. A second political party, the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), was formed at Tarawa in November 1965. No account is taken of religion or race for membership in the party. Its aims are reported to be

to ensure more involvement in territorial affairs; to further the welfare of and promote harmony between the people of the Territory; to improve copra production; to improve education and to examine land tenure in order to ensure individual rights and increase production.

Constitutional developments

- 16. During its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee was informed that proposals for constitutional advancement had been published by the Government of the Territory and were under discussion by the Advisory Council. These proposals were the following:
- (a) To replace the Executive Council by a governing council which would exercise executive and legislative powers, and would consist of five official members and five elected members chosen by a House of Representatives;
- (b) To replace the Advisory Council by a house of representatives consisting of seven officially appointed members and twenty-three members elected by adult suffrage from all parts of the Territory.

The Resident Commissioner would preside over both these bodies and would be required to consult the governing council on virtually all policy and legislative matters. The House of Representatives in turn would advise the governing council on major policies and on proposed legislation.

Economic conditions

- 17. Ocean Island has rich deposits of phosphatic rock, which are worked conjointly with the deposits on the Trust Territory of Nauru, about 160 miles westward, by the British Phosphate Commissioners. The economy of the islands is based on the extraction of phosphate on Ocean Island and the production of copra on the other islands. The phosphate deposits are expected to become exhausted within fourteen years. The islands are subject to severe droughts. On most of them the soil is only a few inches deep and consists largely of coral sand. These conditions make cultivation difficult. Copra is the only commercial crop, produced on the Gilbert, Ellice and Phoenix Islands by indigenous cultivators, and on the Line Islands by large commercial plantations.
- 18. During 1965, there was a return to normal growing conditions following the severe drought of 1963, and the production of copra showed a marked increase. Total production of copra was 9,733 tons, valued at £A801,330,4 compared with 5,442 tons, valued at £A387,666 in 1964. Phosphate exported from Ocean Island totalled 360,800 tons, valued at £A883,960, compared with 325,350 tons, valued at £A805,474 in 1964.
- 19. Exports and imports in 1965 were valued at £A1,685,290 and £A1,825,524 respectively, compared with £A1,201,296 and £A1,623,863 the previous year. Most imports came from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and they received most of the Territory's exports.
- 20. During 1965, ordinary revenue amounted to £A994,479. The chief sources of revenue were a tax on phosphate, which the British Phosphate Commis-
- ⁴ Australian currency is used. In February 1966, the Australian Government changed to a decimal monetary system. A new \$A1.00 is equivalent to 10 shillings in the old Australian currency, or \$US1.12.

- sioners paid on all phosphate exported from Ocean Island, and custom duties. Expenditure, excluding grants, totalled £A917,817. An additional amount of £A108,707 was expended on Colonial Development and Welfare schemes.
- 21. During 1965, an Economic Development Committee was established as a result of a recommendation of the Executive Council. The Committee includes two members appointed from among the nominated members of the Advisory Council. The Committee held its first meeting during the month of November. Its terms of reference are as follows:
- (a) To promote and co-ordinate all economic development projects in the Territory and to advise on all proposals for colony resettlement;
- (b) To co-ordinate the policies of the Agricultural Department, Copra Board, Co-operative Societies, Loan Board and Wholesale Society in relation to the economic development of the Territory;
- (c) To evaluate and advise on ways and means for actively encouraging the development of local industries and commercial enterprises;
- (d) To consider inter-Territory and overseas communications and transport needs in relation to the future development of the Territory.

Social conditions

Labour

22. All matters concerned with the recruitment, contracting and care of workers are undertaken by administrative or other officers appointed by the Resident Commissioner. In 1965, local governments employed approximately seventy part-time senior and 280 subordinate officials, either Gilbertese or Ellice Islanders. The central Government employed permanently approximately 700 persons (excluding about 350 unestablished labourers) of whom fifty-four were Europeans. In addition to the Government, the chief employers are the British Phosphate Commissioners and the copra plantations. During 1966, the British Phosphate Commissioners employed 587 Gilbertese and Ellice Islanders at Ocean Island and 822 at Nauru. Conditions of employment for Gilbertese and Ellice Islanders in the Trust Territory of Nauru are the same as for those islanders employed in Ocean Island. In the Line Islands, the copra plantations employed approximately 249 Gilbertese and Ellice Islanders.

Public health

- 23. The Territory has 2 general hospitals, 1 cottage hospital and 27 dispensaries. The Central Colony Hospital is located at administrative headquarters. The other general hospital is maintained on Ocean Island by the British Phosphate Commissioners. The two general hospitals have 279 beds. The government medical staff includes 3 registered physicians and 22 assistant medical officers. There are also 2 physicians employed by the British Phosphate Commissioners on Ocean Island. They are paid retainer fees to act as government medical officers. Medical attention for indigenous persons and government officers (with the exception of confinements) is free.
- 24. In 1965, estimated expenditures on public health totalled £A84,748 and amounted to about 11 per cent of all expenditure.

Educational conditions

25. In 1965, there were 12,489 primary school pupils, mainly in mission schools. Four secondary schools had 353 pupils, and 3 teacher-training colleges had 89 trainees. Seventeen students were studying under scholarships at secondary schools and universities in Australia and New Zealand. Thirty-five others were abroad taking professional or technical training courses. Expenditure on education totalled £A67,278, or 7.3 per cent of all expenditures.

2. PITCAIRN

General

26. The Territory consists of four islands. Only Pitcairn, a volcanic island situated in the South Pacific about midway between Australia and South America, is inhabited. It has a land area of about two square miles (5.18 square kilometres). The inhabitants of Pitcairn, numbering eighty-eight at the end of 1965, are descendants of British sailors and Tahitians who settled there in 1793 after the mutiny of H.M.S. Bounty.

Status

27. The Territory of Pitcairn is a British colony which came under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific in 1898. By the Pitcairn Order-in-Council, 1952, it was transferred to the administration of the Governor of Fiji when this office was separated from that of the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific.

Constitution

Governor

28. The Governor of Fiji is ex officio Governor of Pitcairn and legislates for the Territory.

Island Council

29. The Local Government Ordinance of 1964 constituted a council of ten members to replace the existing three-member Island Council. The Island Council is composed of the Island Magistrate (elected for three years), three members elected annually, the Island Secretary ex officio, one member appointed by the Governor, two members chosen by the elected members and two non-voting advisory members, one chosen by the Governor and one by the rest of the Council.

Judiciary

30. The Island Court sits twice a month to hear breaches of the Island Rules. Cases of a serious nature come within the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Western Pacific.

Economic and social conditions

31. Pitcairn Island is isolated and its population is practically all of common stock and related through inter-marriage. The small community is able to meet its basic needs from the soil, the sea and private trading and it is self-sufficient. Pitcairn's revenue and expenditure for the year 1965-1966 were £39,437 and £19,472 respectively. Revenue for the year 1966-1967 was estimated at £46,782 and expenditure at £33,434. Its main source of revenue is from the sale of postage stamps to collectors. Some fruits and handicrafts are sold to passing ships.

- 32. The population is self-employed. There is no permanent labour force although the local administration sometimes hires workers for limited communal services.
- 33. There is a government clinic, run in co-operation with the Seventh Day Adventist Church. The Government meets the cost of medical supplies and drugs. Professional advice and assistance may be obtained from surgeons on passing ships and, if medical treatment is required in New Zealand, compassionate grants or loans may be obtained from public funds.

Educational conditions

- 34. Education is controlled and financed entirely by the Government. It is free and compulsory for all children between six and sixteen years of age. Instruction is in English and the New Zealand standard curriculum is used as the basis of instruction. Post-primary education on the island is conducted at the school by correspondence courses arranged through the New Zealand Department of Education.
- 35. In 1965, the school roll comprised 27 children. Expenditure on education was £3,825, representing 19.6 per cent of the total expenditure.

3. Solomon Islands

General

36. The British Solomon Islands consists of a double chain of islands in the South West Pacific stretching approximately 900 miles (1,400 kilometres) in a south-easterly direction and have a total land area of 11,500 square miles (29,785 square kilometres). The six major islands are Choiseul, New Georgia, Santa Isabel, Guadalcanal, Malaita and San Cristobal. They are characterized by precipitous, thickly forested mountain ranges, intersected by deep, narrow valleys. It is the largest United Kingdom Territory in the Pacific. The total population at the beginning of 1965 was estimated at 136,750, of whom about 128,200 are Melanesians, 5,100 Polynesians and the remainder of mixed races. The only township is Honiara, the administrative capital, with approximately 6,684 inhabitants. Most of the people live in small scattered villages throughout the islands. Those who live on the larger islands are often cut off from their neighbours on the same island by high mountain ranges and dense jungle.

Status

37. The Territory of the Solomon Islands is a British Protectorate which was established in 1893 over the Southern Solomons and by 1900 over the remainder of the group which now make up the Territory.

Constitution

38. The present Constitution is contained in the British Solomon Islands (Constitution) Order in Council, 1960, under which the Territory is administered by a High Commissioner, who is advised by an Executive Council and who legislates with the advice and consent of a Legislative Council. Before 1960, the High Commissioner was assisted by an advisory council only.

High Commissioner

39. The Solomon Islands Protectorate is one of the Territories administered by the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, whose headquarters are at Honiara.

Executive Council

40. The Council consists of the holders of the three principal offices, namely, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the Financial Secretary of the Western Pacific High Commission, and also such other official and unofficial members as the High Commissioner may appoint. There are at present five official members and five unofficial members in the Executive Council.

Legislative Council

41. The Council consists of the High Commissioner as president, three ex officio members (the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary of the Western Pacific High Commissioner), eight official members and ten unofficial members. Eight of the unofficial members are elected. The other thirteen members are either ex officio or appointed by the High Commissioner.

Local councils

- 42. There are local government councils in all areas except for some very small outlying islands. A new local government ordinance which was enacted in 1963, provides that membership of councils is elected entirely by universal adult suffrage, instead of being nominated as formerly. By the end of 1965, seventeen councils had been established under the new ordinance, and all but one of them had held elections. A council can make and pass resolutions concerning the government of the district over which it has authority. The councils prepare and debate their own annual estimates of revenue and expenditure; their range of subjects includes administrative services, communications, dispensaries, schools, water supply and economic development.
- 43. The Honiara Town Council, which has an entirely nominated membership with an unofficial majority, operates under the chairmanship of the District Commissioner, Central Solomons. This Council has specific responsibilities and duties and has the power to pass by-laws. The Council also has powers to raise revenue, but its main source of income is an annual subvention from the central Government.

Judiciary

44. The Judiciary consists of the High Court of the Western Pacific and Native courts. The High Court possesses and exercises jurisdiction similar to that of the High Court of Justice in England. It has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgements of any other courts in the Territory, and there is right of appeal in respect of a judgement by the High Court itself to the Fiji Court of Appeal, and thereafter to the Privy Council in London. Native courts are usually constituted according to local custom. They have limited civil and criminal jurisdiction and their decisions are subject to review by magistrates.

Electoral system

45. Elections of eight of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council are by electoral colleges composed of elected members of the local authorities (who are themselves elected by universal adult suffrage) in seven of the constituencies, and by direct election on the basis of universal adult suffrage in the Honiara constituency. Elections for the present Legislative Council were held on 7 April 1965.

Political parties

46. In June 1965, the eight elected members of the British Solomon Islands Legislative Council announced that they had formed a political party to be known as the Democratic Party of the British Solomon Islands. The main aims of the party are reported to be self-determination for the Territory within the Commonwealth; free education for all; improved industrial relations and improved machinery for the settlement of disputes; unification of all peoples of the Solomons and greater participation by women in territorial affairs.

Recent developments

47. In the course of its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee was informed that the Legislative Council was to be dissolved in April 1967 and that proposals concerning constitutional advance in the Solomon Islands had been published and were to be submitted to the Legislative Council of the Territory in December 1966. It was proposed to increase the number of elected members from eight to fourteen and, in so far as it was administratively possible, to have all fourteen members elected by direct elections in their constituencies. However, the Special Committee was further informed that in certain remote constituencies, scattered over a large area of sea, it would be impracticable to arrange direct elections for the time being. It was also proposed to define the High Commissioner's legislative and other powers and to establish a Public Service Commission. No further information is available concerning these proposals.

Economic conditions

- 48. The economy of the Territory is at present based mainly on subsistence agriculture and on the production of copra for export. However, cocoa is being developed as a second cash crop, and in 1964 field trials in rice, soya beans and oil palms were also made, which it was hoped would lead to the mechanized cultivation of rice and soya beans on a large scale by 1966. Large-scale lumbering operations have also begun and timber exports are expected to reach 10 million cubic feet in the next few years, or more than ten times the amount exported in 1964. There is no large-scale mining, but small amounts of gold are extracted. A few limited industries are directed to meet some local needs.
- 49. Cash crops are confined almost entirely to the coastal areas, river valleys and foothills of the larger islands. Food crops are grown generally on the basis of shifting cultivation, and principally in forested areas. There is practically no permanent arable or mixed farming, largely because of the dense afforestation of areas not planted with coconuts and cocoa.
- 50. The value of all domestic exports in 1965 totalled £A2.37 million, compared with £A1.99 million in 1964. Copra accounted for 88 per cent and timber for 8 per cent of all exports. Imports were valued at £A3.30 million, compared with £A2.73 million in 1964. The United Kingdom, Japan and Australia received 98 per cent of all exports; 69 per cent of all imports came from Australia and the United Kingdom.
- 51. Revenue is derived mainly from import and export duties, income tax and a company tax. In 1965, the estimated revenue, including grants-in-aid and transfers from special funds, totalled £A3.09 million,

- compared with £A2.74 million in 1964. Estimated total expenditures amounted to £A3.07 million, compared with £A2.61 million in 1964. The budget is balanced by a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom.
- 52. A third development plan for the Territory covered the period from 1 January 1963 to 31 March 1966. Development funds for this plan were estimated to total £A3,015,800.
- 53. A further development plan for the period from 1 January 1965 to 31 March 1968 was drawn up and presented to the Legislative Council in 1965 which accepted it as a general framework for planning purposes subject to approval of individual projects. Colonial Development and Welfare funds available for the plan amounted to approximately £A4.28 million, and development funds from all sources were estimated to total £A6.2 million. The objective of the plan is reported to be the development of natural and human resources in order to strengthen the Territory's economy and to raise the standard of living of all sections of the community and to raise the general standard of education.
- 54. The agreement signed in 1965 by the administering Power and the United Nations Special Fund for a mineral survey of the Territory was described in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

Social conditions

Labour

55. The total labour force of the Territory in 1965 was estimated at 10,000. A large proportion of the labour force is unskilled and there is an acute shortage of skilled workers. Most of the workers are engaged in agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce, or are employed by the Government. There are two registered trade unions. During the latter part of 1965 a general decline of interest among workers in trade union matters was reported and the two trade unions temporarily suspended activities.

Public health

- 56. Malaria and tuberculosis are the two major health problems in the Territory. At present, the concentration of resources and attention on the eradication of malaria precludes any major attack on tuberculosis. The success of the Malarial Eradication Pilot Project, with the guidance and active assistance of the World Health Organization (WHO), has been the outstanding achievement in public health in the past two years. The Government, in conjunction with WHO, planned to proceed in 1965 to a pre-eradication programme, and a major allocation of funds was approved for the purpose.
- 57. The Territory has six government hospitals with a total of 370 beds and one leprosarium. Hospitals and other medical facilities maintained by missions have 543 beds. In 1963-64, the medical staff, public and private, included eight registered medical officers and sixteen registered assistant medical officers. In 1965, expenditure on public health was estimated to total £A230,377 compared with £A202,462 the previous year, and amounted to 8.28 per cent of all government expenditure.

Educational conditions

- 58. Education is largely in the hands of missions. The Government maintains 6 primary schools, besides 1 secondary and 1 teacher-training school. It assists the churches and local councils in providing primary education. In 1965 there were 404 registered primary schools and an additional ninety-two schools exempt from registration for a period of 2 years. The total enrolment of these schools was 19,600. The 5 secondary schools had 325 students and 2 teacher-training schools had 56 students.
- 59. Both the Government and churches provide scholarships for secondary and higher education overseas; scholarships from other countries are sometimes available. At the end of 1965, 27 students were awarded government scholarships for secondary education overseas and 95 students were awarded church scholarships.
- 60. In 1965, recurrent and capital expenditure on education totalled £A302,931, compared with £A224,209 in 1964, and was estimated to be 5.45 per cent of all government expenditure.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

- 61. At its 562nd meeting on 22 September 1967, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands which appears as an annex to this chapter.
- 62. The representative of the United Kingdom said he wished to record the fact that, in his delegation's view, the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on the Territories administered by the United Kingdom did not adequately reflect the substantial progress that had been made over the past twelve months in those Territories and were regrettably begrudging and negative in tone. Accordingly, his delegation would reserve its position on the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on those Territories.
- 63. The representatives of Australia and the United States also expressed reservations with regard to the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on these Territories.
- 64. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation reserved its position regarding the conclusions in paragraph 43. In particular he considered that, instead of stating that the recommendations of the Special Committee and the General Assembly had "not been adequately implemented", the paragraph should state that they had "not been implemented".

D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II

65. At its 562nd meeting on 22 September 1967, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II concerning the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record. These conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

Conclusions

- 66. (a) The Special Committee notes: that although the administering Power has proposed to replace the Advisory Council by a House of Representatives in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, this Council would still be an advisory body only; and that in the case of the Solomon Islands, under the features of the new Constitution, which came into force on 1 April 1967, the enlarged Legislative Council could continue to have a minority of elected members and the Executive Council would continue to remain nominated to a large extent.
- (b) The Special Committee concludes that, although some progress has been made towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it has not been very significant and should be speeded up; that the recommendations of the Special Committee in 1964 and of General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) have not been adequately implemented; and that the economic base of the Territories needs to be strengthened.
- (c) The Special Committee is aware of the peculiar problems of these small and isolated islands.

Recommendations

67. The Special Committee reiterates to the administering Power the recommendations it made concerning these Territories in 1964.

ANNEX*

Report of Sub-Committee II Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

- 1. The Sub-Committee considered the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands at its 57th to 60th and 62nd and 63rd meetings held between 14 March and 12 May 1967.
- 2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-60 of the present chapter).
- 3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of the United Kingdom to participate in the consideration of the three Territories.
- 4. In his statement to the Sub-Committee the representative of the United Kingdom said that in 1966 his delegation had provided the Sub-Committee with very detailed information on the situation in the Territories under discussion. Further information had been furnished at the 1669th meeting of the Fourth Committee in December 1966. Since the recent publication of the working paper, prepared with the help of that information, there had been no important event to report. His delegation would, however, be happy to comment if necessary on the Sub-Committee's discussions at a later stage.
- 5. The representative of India pointed out that in 1966 the United Kingdom delegation had informed the Special Committee that proposals for constitutional advancement in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had been made by the Government of the Territory and considered by the Advisory Council, that the number of elected members in the Legislative Council of the Solomon Islands was to be increased from eight to fourteen and that it had been proposed to establish a Public Service Commission in the latter Territory. She asked the United Kingdom representative what had happened thereafter.
 - * Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.395/Add.1.

- 6. The representative of the United Kingdom said that at the 1669th meeting of the Fourth Committee, his delegation had indicated that the proposals for constitutional advancement in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had been considered and approved by the Advisory Council and submitted for consideration by the United Kingdom Government. Similarly, the proposals for the Solomon Islands had been discussed and formally approved by the Legislative Council and were being considered by the United Kingdom Government.
- 7. The representative of Chile said that, while in some respects it was understandable that for the administering Power there was nothing new of importance to report on the Territories that had been dealt with in the working paper, the pace of constitutional advancement did seem to be lamentably slow and should be speeded up.
- 8. With regard to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the working paper indicated that proposals for constitutional advancement had been under discussion by the Advisory Council. He would like to have more information from the administering Power regarding the current status of those proposals. The working paper also indicated that the Legislative Council in the Solomon Islands was to be dissolved in April 1967 and that it was proposed to increase the number of elected members. On those points, too, he would welcome further information from the administering Power.
- 9. The representative of Poland said that the question of small Territories required special attention from the Special Committee and consequently from the Sub-Committee. In view of the particular circumstances of the islands, resulting from their remoteness, their small size and population, the nature of their economy and the lack of communications with the ouside world, the Special Committee had a duty to seek, by all means at its disposal, a solution which would enable the peoples to determine their political future in complete freedom and with full knowledge of the various possibilities open to them. Poland, for its part, would not reject a priori any solution which might be adopted by the peoples. It could not, however, agree that the Special Committee should play the kind of role some administering Powers would like it to. The Sub-Committee could not confine itself to taking note of a series of faits accomplis, but had to make a constructive contribution and support the efforts of peoples seeking political emancipation. As to the administering Powers, one was entitled to expect them to recognize United Nations responsibility in the matter and extend full co-operation to the Special Committee.
- 10. The Polish delegation would like to know what measures had been taken by the United Kingdom Government to implement General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI), and particularly operative paragraph 4, concerning the national unity and territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the question of military bases. The working paper on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands stated that Canton and Enderbury Islands, in the Phoenix Group, were at present under the joint control of the United Kingdom and the United States of America and that Canton was being used as an emergency airfield and by military aircraft. His delegation attached great importance to that question since, in spite of the strict injunction contained in paragraph 4 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, certain Powers seemed to have little regard for the idea of self-determination when their strategic interests were
- 11. In that connexion, he wished to reaffirm the principles set out by his delegation in the General Assembly on 1 December 1965 (1386th plenary meeting), with regard to the question of small Territories, to the effect that military bases, merely by their presence and the possibilities which they offered for repressive action, were a serious obstacle to the achievement of independence, that the existence of such bases distorted the economic structure of the Territories in which they were situated, that the economic conditions which they created served as a pretext for the colonial Power to maintain its presence, that the bases unnecessarily placed the dependent peoples in the front line of any conflict that might occur and that they enabled certain Powers to pursue their strategic purposes in spite of the growing resistance of peoples to the arms race.

- 12. Thus the existence of such bases was a violation of the Charter and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was easy to see the vicious circle in which a dependent Territory found itself when its economy was geared to the needs of a base and the way in which such a Territory could be prevailed upon by the administering Power to "choose" association with it.
- 13. It was regrettable that the United Kingdom delegation, instead of providing information on the situation in the Territories in question, had merely referred to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative in the Fourth Committee on 13 December 1966. But, in any event, it would be noted that the text of that statement hardly bore out the optimistic assertion of the United Kingdom representative that the pace of development of the Territories under discussion was rapid and sure. On the contrary, the real situation in the Territories gave reason for serious concern.
- 14. The pace of political and constitutional advance in the Solomon Islands was slow indeed. It might be true that the number of elected members in the new Legislative Council was to be increased from eight to fourteen and that they were to be elected by universal suffrage, but those changes would have little effect on the legislative situation in the Territory. As stated in an earlier report, laws in the Solomon Islands were made by the High Commissioner acting with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, except for a few matters which were reserved for the High Commissioner. In those circumstances, it could hardly be said that the people of the Solomon Islands could now exercise a real influence on legislation in the Territory. His delegation would therefore be glad if the representative of the administering Power would provide the Sub-Committee with more details on the respective spheres of competence of the Legislative Council and the High Commissioner in that regard.
- 15. Economic and social development in the Territory could not be described as satisfactory. The public health picture was a sombre one. He need only point out that today, as in 1964, it was reported that "malaria and tuberculosis are the two major health problems in the Territory". In 1962, in the Solomon Islands, there had been 6 hospitals and 1 leprosarium with a total number of 463 beds and other hospital and medical establishments with 513 beds, giving a total of 976 beds. According to the working paper, the total number of beds today was only 913, representing a decrease of 6.5 per cent, while the the population had increased by 11 per cent. According to an article which had appeared the previous year in The New York Times, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate had then been one of the most backward Territories in the world. One might wonder whether the situation had changed greatly since then.
- 16. If one considered constitutional developments in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, it seemed that the people of the islands would have to wait many years before they could freely decide their future political status. The new arrangements admittedly gave the Territory a House of Representatives consisting of seven official members and twenty-three members elected by universal adult suffrage. However, the House would have no legislative powers, but would simply advise the Governing Council and the Resident Commissioner. The Resident Commissioner would be required to consult the Governing Council only on legislative matters.
- 17. His delegation hoped that the administering Power would reconsider those proposals and replace them by arrangements more in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Time was running short and the Territory's phosphate deposits would be completely exhausted within fifteen to twenty-five years.
- 18. In conclusion, he said that the administering Powers should speed up the economic, social and political progress of the people of the Territories under consideration, who had been neglected for so long. The Sub-Committee, for its part, should not relax its efforts to help the peoples achieve an independent life, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2232 (XXI).
- 19. The representative of India pointed out that since the adoption of the 1962 Constitution, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had had an Advisory Council consisting of eleven unofficial

- members and five official members appointed by the Resident Commissioner. Her delegation was waiting with great interest to see what action would be taken on the proposals to make the Advisory Council and the Executive Council more representative, which were now under consideration by the United Kingdom Government. It should be noted, however, that, even if the proposals were adopted, the new House of Representatives would remain a strictly advisory body, with the Resident Commissioner retaining absolute power in the legislative and executive fields.
- 20. The economic position of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands remained disturbing based as it was on the exploitation of a single item, phospate. Her delegation would like the United Kingdom representative to provide the Sub-Committee with detailed information on the activities of the Economic Development Committee, established in 1965 to promote the development of local industries.
- 21. The same observations applied to the situation in the Solomon Islands. It was hardly possible to comment at length on the constitutional poroposals which were still under consideration, although it should be noted that even if they were implemented, the Legislative Council would still have a minority of elected members, while the Executive Council would remain a wholly nominated body.
- 22. The representative of the United States of America said that exports were an important source of revenue for the Solomon Islands and Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Although the Solomon Islands still needed grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom, the intention in that Territory was also to diversify an economy traditionally based on agriculture and copra; a new export product, lumber, had just been added to the latter. On the other hand, poor conditions for cultivation were an obstacle to the diversification and development of the the economy of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Moreover, the likelihood that the phosphate deposits, which accounted for half the islands' exports, would be exhausted made it necessary to study carefully the economic problems which might arise. In regard to both the Solomon Islands and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, it was generally to be hoped that the long-term economic development plans which had been undertaken would gradually raise the standard of living of the populations concerned and make the islands less dependent on grants-in-aid from the administering Powers. The previous year, the United Kingdom delegation had indicated that new measures were being considered to give the indigenous population a greater role in the political life of the Territories. In addition, the Secretariat's working paper on the Solomon Islands referred to the dissolution, planned for April 1967, of the present Legislative Council and to proposals concerning constitutional advance. Those proposals provided for the introduction of universal adult suffrage and, in the longer term, for a majority of elected members in the Legislative Council. His delegation would like to know the current position in regard to those proposals. The same political development was taking place in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The previous year, the United Kingdom representative had referred to proposals, now under consideration, to replace the existing Executive Council by a Governing Council, composed of an equal number of appointed and elected members, which would have both executive and legislative powers, and also to replace the present Advisory Council by a House of Representatives consisting of twenty-three members elected by universal adult suffrage and seven nominated members. His delegation would welcome any new information on the proposals now being studied by the United Kingdom Government.
- 23. The representative of Iraq said that more information should be obtained from the administering Power on the constitutional reforms planned in the Solomon Islands and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.
- 24. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would endeavour to comment on all the questions put by representatives.
- 25. He said that he was surprised by the statements that had been made concerning military bases. Whether or not the runways installed on Canton and Enderbury Islands were sometimes used by military aircraft, those islands had previously been uninhabited and quite unconnected with the Gilbert and

Ellice Islands, and their use for aviation purposes could have no possible effect on the development of the Territories under consideration and had nothing to do with the matters with which the Sub-Committee was concerned.

- 26. With regard to the Territories' economies, only the Solomon Islands received direct assistance from the United Kingdom in balancing its budget. A distinction must be made between budgetary aid of an administrative nature, which was a sign of an inadequate economy, and development aid intended to finance the expansion of agriculture, exports and social services. Steps were being taken to broaden and diversify the Territory's economy to make it less heavily dependent on budgetary aid. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands did not need help in balancing their budget but received assistance for economic development. Because the islands' phospate deposits, their chief resource at present, were being exhausted, the diversification of their economy was being encouraged. Copra production had increased, but was largely dependent on factors which could not be controlled, particularly rainfall.
- 27. There seemed to be some misunderstanding about the constitutional provisions proposed for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and the Solomon Islands. It was true that the Gilbert and Ellice Islands still had only an Advisory Council, but the Administration had proposed its replacement by a house of representatives, and that proposal was at present being studied in London. The Solomon Islands already possessed a genuine Legislative Council, and there were proposals under consideration for a substantial increase in the number of its elected representatives. The fact that the High Commissioner and the Resident Commissioner were both empowered to make laws in those Territories did not alter the fact that proposed legislation was or would be considered and approved by the Councils. That system was similar to legislative procedures in the United Kingdom.
- 28. In accordance with the well-tried processes of constitutional advance in British Territories, the powers of the Resident Commissioner and High Commissioners were being gradually transferred to and shared with bodies with an increasingly elected large component and the Territories were making rapid strides towards self-government in accordance with the wishes of the leaders and the people. He regretted that some members of the Sub-Committee had not taken note of all the encouraging signs of progress in the Committee's report and the working documents. The rate of progress might seem too slow to some, but the only sound criterion for the pace of change and progress was the wishes of the populations themselves. The proposed new reforms would come into force in 1967, as had been decided in 1966. The exact dates would be fixed by decisions to be taken shortly in London.
- 29. At the next meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom outlined for the Sub-Committee the essential features of the new Constitution which had come into force on 1 April 1967 in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate after having been publicly discussed and unanimously adopted by the Legislative Council in December 1966. The membership of the Legislative Council had been enlarged, the number of non-official members having been increased from ten to a minimum of fourteen and a maximum of sixteen, and the number of official members from eleven to a minimum of four and a maximum of sixteen. Fourteen of the non-official members would in principle be elected by direct election, except perhaps in one or two constituencies, because of administrative and transport difficulties, they would be elected indirectly through electoral colleges elected by the local councils. In the rest of the Territory, a common electoral roll would be established. An Executive Council consisting of eight members (up to five non-official and not more than four official) would be created to advise the High Commissioner. The Constitution provided for adjustments to be made in the membership of the two Councils in order to make non-official majorities possible, and for the establishment of a system of collective responsibility in the Executive Council. On the basis of the new Constitution, general elections would be organized, probably in May and June 1967.

- 30. In reply to a question raised by the representative of India about the activities of the Economic Development Committee in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, he explained that the Committee was a statutory body with a widely based membership, including persons outside the official sphere, which was consulted on major development matters. At its most recent meeting it had discussed, for example, certain important questions concerned with the development of tourism in the Territory.
- 31. The representative of Afghanistan said that he had expected the representative of the administering Power to inform the Sub-Committee of new developments in the Territories under consideration; however, he had merely referred the Sub-Committee to his statement in the Fourth Committee during the previous session. The Afghan delegation therefore concluded that the situation in the Territories had not changed; their economic and social development was slow and could not be considered satisfactory. In the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, any progress achieved by the establishment of a more representative body to replace the Executive Council would lose its value if the Resident Commissioner retained an unlimited right of veto or if important decisions were removed from the competence of the House of Representatives. The economic situation of the Territory remained disturbing, and the administering Power should study ways of diversifying its economy.
- 32. With regard to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the representative of Sierra Leone said that the constitutional proposals—still under consideration—mentioned by the representative of the United Kingdom did indeed mark some progress, but much more could perhaps be offered. In economic affairs, attention should be paid to the possibilities of diversifying agriculture in order to alleviate the scarcity of existing resources, and the publication of the report of the Economic Development Committee would be awaited with interest. In addition, the growing development of the capital budget was an encouraging sign of the economic progress of the Territory and of its chances of attaining independence.
- 33. Pitcairn was such a small Territory with such a limited population that it was difficult to imagine that it could be independent, despite its favourable budgetary situation; but he hoped the administering Power would give the inhabitants an opportunity to make a final decision on their own future.
- 34. In the Solomon Islands, the constitutional measures which had been taken would be welcomed if they genuinely led to progress. He hoped that the number of elected members in the Legislative Council would be increased, and that such members alone would soon represent the people of the Territory.
- 35. The representative of Australia said that the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands had certain common features. All the islands were small and were spread over more than two million square miles of ocean. They were poor and their economic prospects were not encouraging. None of them was self-sufficient and most of them depended on assistance from the administering Power. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands had phosphate deposits, but those would be exhausted in twenty or thirty years. The Solomon Islands had only timber and subsistence crops.
- 36. The problem of distance and the lack of resources of the Islands complicated their administration and hindered their economic development. The administering Powers would have to give a great deal more before granting the Territories self-government. The Sub-Committee should fully realize the difficulties facing the administering Powers, and should recognize them in its reports.
- 37. In a further statement the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Sub-Committee that the United Kingdom Government had recently approved the amendments to the Constitution of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands prepared by the Resident Commissioner in co-operation with the Advisory Council. Whereas the legislative power had hitherto been entirely in the hands of the Resident Commissioner, who had chosen the members of both the Executive Council and the Advisory Council, the people could now participate more directly in the management of their own affairs. The Territory

would have two bodies: the Governing Council and the House of Representatives. The Governing Council would consist of not more than ten members, five of whom were official members, including the Resident Commissioner, and the rest elected; it would exercise full legislative power and would advise the Resident Commissioner on all executive matters.

- 38. The House of Representatives, composed of not more than thirty members, twenty-three of whom would be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, would be mainly an advisory body and the Governing Council would seek its advice on all legislative questions. In addition, it would appoint from among its members the five non-official members of the Governing Council.
- 39. The new Constitution was particularly interesting because it exemplified a new form of constitutional development in some of the smaller Territories administered by the United Kingdom, where, as an experiment, executive and legislative powers were being conferred upon a single body, although some features of the old system, where those powers had been separated, were still being retained. Although the House of Representatives had no legislative authority, it could nevertheless play a vital role in the constitutional development of the Territory. Moreover the United Kingdom Government had stated its willingness once there had been sufficient experience of working the new Constitution to convene a conference to consider what further constitutional advance might be desirable if and when the House of Representatives formally so requested.
- 40. He stated concerning the Legislative Council of the Solomon Islands that, apart from the High Commissioner, there would be three ex officio official members and other official members up to a maximum of twelve, two nominated non-official members, and fourteen elected non-official members. There was no discretion over the fourteen elected members, as in the case of twelve of the official seats. Therefore, if all the official seats were not filled, the elected members might well be in the majority. The Executive Council would be composed of three officials and up to five members of the Legislative Council, only one of whom might be an official; it was therefore likely that at least four members would

be non-officials. In addition, as his delegation had previously stated, the Constitution provided for adjustments so that both councils might have a majority of non-official members.

Adoption of the report

41. At its 63rd meeting on 12 May 1967, the Sub-Committee adopted the present report subject to reservations made by the representatives of Australia and the United States who were not convinced that a visiting mission would be useful, and who believed that General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) should be mentioned together with resolution 1514 (XV).

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

- 42. The Sub-Committee notes that, although the administering Power has proposed to replace the Advisory Council by a House of Representatives in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, this Council would still be an advisory body only; and that in the case of the Solomon Islands, under the features of the new Constitution, which entered into force on 1 April 1967, the enlarged Legislative Council could continue to have a minority of elected members and the Executive Council would continue to remain nominated to a large extent.
- 43. The Sub-Committee concludes that, although some progress has been made towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it has not been very significant and should be speeded up; that the recommendations of the Special Committee in 1964 and of General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) have not been adequately implemented; and that the economic base of the Territories needs to be strengthened.
- 44. The Sub-Committee is aware of the peculiar problems of these small and isolated islands.

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

45. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it again reiterate to the administering Power the recommendations it made concerning these Territories in 1964.

CHAPTER XVI*

NIUE AND THE TOKELAU ISLANDS

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly

1. In 1964 the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning Niue and the Tokelau Islands (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XV, paras. 111-115). After considering the Territories in 1966, it reiterated the recommendations it had adopted in 1964 and recommended, inter alia, that their people should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision, and that further and immediate economic measures should be taken to develop and strengthen the economic structure of the Territories in co-operation with the United Nations and the specialized agencies. It also recommended that a visit to the Territories by Sub-Committee II of the Special Committee was necessary, and would be useful in gathering information, and in familiarizing the people with the assistance that could be rendered by the United Nations in regard to the free expression of their wishes pursuant to the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). The Committee finally recommended that steps be taken to arrange a visit in consultation with the administering Power (A/6300/Rev.1,² chap. XVI, paras. 21-22).

2. At its twentieth session the General Assembly adopted resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning twenty-six Territories, including Niue and the Tokelau Islands. At its twenty-first session, it adopted resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, concerning twenty-five Territories, including Niue and the Tokelau Islands. The resolution called upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It reiterated the Assembly's declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It urged the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend

^{*} Parts A and B of this chapter were previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.357.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (Part I).

² Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

to them full co-operation and assistance. It decided that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of the Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to pay special attention to the Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

B. Information on the Territories³

1. NIUE

General

3. As at 31 March 1966, the population of Niue was estimated at 5,157. Each year, from 200 to 300 Niueans leave Niue. In 1965, the deficit between those leaving and returning was 103.

Status

4. Niue is included within the boundaries of New Zealand and is governed under authority of the Cook Island Act, 1915, and subsequent amendments. The inhabitants are British subjects and New Zealand citizens.

Executive and legislative government

- 5. Executive functions of government are carried out by a Resident Commissioner who is responsible to the New Zealand Minister of Island Territories. The Executive Committee, elected by the Niue Island Assembly, consists of four (formerly three) members with the Resident Commissioner as Chairman. It may report and make recommendations on any matter referred to it by the Commissioner or the Assembly.
- 6. Legislation is enacted by the New Zealand Parliament or by ordinances of the Niue Island Assembly which consists of fourteen Niueans and the Resident Commissioner, who is President. Ordinances require the assent of the Resident Commissioner or the Governor-General of New Zealand. The Niue Island Assembly has budgetary control of expenditure of all government moneys, including New Zealand grants and loans and moneys and funds raised locally.
- 7. As noted in a previous report (see A/6300/ Rev.1, chap. XVI, annex), the Niue Island Assembly in January 1966 supported the recommendations in a report on the constitutional development of Niue made by a team of constitutional experts in 1965. They had recommended, inter alia, to the Niue Island Assembly that earlier proposals for a fixed time-table of constitutional development leading to full cabinet government cease to be the basis of the constitutional discussions; and that the discussions be confined to the immediate step to be taken to give the Assembly a further measure of control over and responsibility for their own local affairs. The step recommended was the introduction of a "member" system under which individually elected members of the Executive Committee would be given responsibility for a particular department or departments of the Administration and the election of one of the members as Leader of Government Business. The Leader would be responsible for the central secretariat and would speak

for it in the Assembly. He would also speak for the Executive Committee as a whole.

8. In the recent elections the report was one of the issues before the electorate. The elections resulted in four changes in the membership of the Niue Assembly, which decided to proceed with the adoption of the member system. In September 1966, the member system was inaugurated. Under this system the four members of the Executive Committee have been placed in charge of some government departments.

Village councils

9. Village government has been largely in the hands of the local Assembly member, the pastor and the constable in each village. The Assembly has agreed in principle to the formation of village councils to be responsible for village affairs. A senior officer of the Niue Government undertook a study tour of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea in August 1965 under the sponsorship of the South Pacific Commission to study local government administration in that Territory. Legislation for the establishment of village councils was being drafted in 1966.

Electoral system

10. The members of the Niue Island Assembly are elected by universal adult suffrage. The last election was held in April 1966.

Economic conditions

11. Niue's economy is based on subsistence fishing and agriculture, as well as the production of a few cash crops, chiefly copra and bananas and handicraft articles for export. The rocky nature of much of the the island makes it unsuitable for agriculture or animal husbandry. Exports in 1965 amounted to £65,193, compared with £77,935 in 1964. Imports amounted to £250,993, compared with £228,210 the previous year. Approximately 73 per cent of all imports came from New Zealand which received 85 per cent of the island's exports. In 1965/66, expenditures were £617,542, compared with £523,981 the previous year. Niue's revenue from exports and taxes is insufficient to balance its budget, and New Zealand makes annual grants for general and capital purposes and for meeting budgetary deficits. In 1964/65, the subsidy amounted to £347,500, compared with £301,300 the previous year.

Social conditions

Labour

12. The basic wage rates in March 1965 were 1s.11d. per hour for unskilled labour, 2s.1d. for stevedores and a varying scale for skilled labour. No labour unions have been registered but a committee exists to determine special allowances for stevedoring, and workers have a voice on this committee.

Public health

13. Medical services are provided by the Government Health Department under the control of a chief medical officer. There are no private medical or dental practitioners. In March 1965, the staff of thirty-nine persons consisted of Niueans with the exception of the chief medical officer and four nurses recruited from New Zealand. Expenditures on health services for the year ending March 1965 were £53,111. All medical and dental treatment is free of charge.

³ Information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the New Zealand Government under Article 73 e of the Charter on 17 October 1966, for the year ending 31 March 1966.

Educational conditions

14. Education is free and compulsory between the ages of 6 and 14 years and most children remain at school until they reach 16. Post-primary education is available to all, and most students who leave primary school attend high school. On 31 March 1966, 32 students were attending New Zealand secondary schools under the New Zealand Government Training Scheme and 6 were taking a three-year course at the agricultural college in Western Samoa. Educational expenditures for the year ending 31 March 1966 totalled £123,544, compared with £100,000 the previous year.

2. THE TOKELAU ISLANDS

General

15. The population of the three Tokelau Islands totalled 1,861 on 25 September 1965.

Constitutional and political development

- 16. The High Commissioner for New Zealand in Western Samoa is the Administrator of the Tokelau Islands. The Administrative Officer who is also based in Western Samoa makes regular visits to the Tokelau Islands. In the three atolls of the Territory local public services are carried out by appointed Tokelau officials
- 17. In 1964, the Tokelau Islanders at a general meeting decided not to join the independent State of Western Samoa or the Cook Islands, but to remain linked with New Zealand. In January 1966, the New Zealand Minister for Island Territories visited the Tokelauans and obtained confirmation concerning this and their desire to retain the right to migrate to New Zealand.
- 18. In 1966, the New Zealand Cabinet agreed that a move towards fuller self-government should be undertaken by giving councils of elders and heads of families formal consultative status in the determining of priorities of government work, in the preparation of the annual budget, and that a pilot scheme to speed up the existing assisted migration projects should be set in motion. It also decided on improvements in the system of education and on an expanded public works programme. Subsequently a joint *fono* of Tokelauan representatives reconfirmed the islanders' wish to remain linked with New Zealand and expressed support for the pilot migration scheme and measures.

Economic conditions

19. The economy of the Tokelau Islands is based on subsistence crops, fishing and the production of copra for export. Revenue is derived chiefly from export and import duties, trading profits and the sale of postage stamps. The annual deficit between local revenue and expenditure is met by subsidies from the New Zealand Government. Expenditures in 1965 totalled £37,913. Information is not available on local revenue.

Social conditions

20. The Government of Western Samoa assists with the medical services of the Territory and regular visits are made by its medical staff. Two Samoan medical officers are stationed on Tokelau. In 1966, two Tokelauans were in training at the Suva Medical School in Fiji,

Educational conditions

21. School attendance in the Territory is reported to be very close to 100 per cent. The Tokelau Administration awards scholarships to enable children and public servants to receive secondary education in Western Samoa. The New Zealand Government assists students and public servants under the New Zealand Government Training Scheme. On 31 March 1966, there were 23 long-term students and trainees from the Territory in New Zealand. Thirty-one additional Tokelauans were being trained in Western Samoa and Fiji.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

- 22. At its 562nd, 563rd and 564th meetings on 22 and 27 September 1967, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on Niue and the Tokelau Islands which appears as an annex to this chapter.
- 23. In a letter dated 22 September 1967, the representative of New Zealand asked to participate in the Committee's debate on these Territories (A/AC.109/275). At its 563rd meeting, the Special Committee decided to accede to this request.
- 24. The representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Australia expressed reservations on the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II with regard to the Territories under consideration.
- 25. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggested that the words "and the hesitancy of the people of Niue to quicken their rate of progress" in paragraph 36 of the Sub-Committee's report (see annex) should be deleted, as those words might be interpreted to mean that it was the fault of the people of the Territory that they had not been granted self-determination. He could not agree with such a concept.
- 26. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would be opposed to that amendment since it disregarded the facts which had been presented to the Sub-Committee. As the members of the Sub-Committee had recognized, it was the Niueans themselves who had asked that the move towards cabinet government be slowed down.
- 27. The representative of Australia said that he too would oppose the amendment, since the statement in question was a statement of fact. The representative of New Zealand had explained the situation to the Sub-Committee and his explanation had been accepted by the members. He thought that other members of the Sub-Committee would agree that the words in question in paragraph 36 should be retained.
- 28. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania supported the Soviet Union amendment. The inclusion of the words in question in the Committee's conclusions would be dangerous. The majority of the members of the Special Committee had always felt that the Committee should be allowed to visit colonial Territories in order to appraise the situation there, but in most cases the administering Power had refused to allow such visits. His delegation found it hard to accept the statement of a colonial Power without being able to verify its accuracy, and the Committee had frequently in the past refused to rely on the statement of colonial Powers in such circumstances.

- 29. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the members of the Sub-Committee had felt that progress towards self-determination had been slow in Niue, and they had been informed that the people of Niue did not favour immediate independence. He thought that paragraph 36 accurately reflected the conclusions of the majority of the members of the Sub-Committee.
- 30. The representative of Mali supported the Soviet Union amendment. His delegation could not accept the suggestion that the people were hesitant about progress to independence. The problem was that the Special Committee had not been able to verify the situation on the spot. In such circumstances, the Special Committee should not agree to wording which appeared to excuse the policies of the administering Power.
- 31. The representative of Tunisia said that he had doubts regarding the proposed amendment since the purpose of the paragraph was not to excuse the administering Power but to criticize it for failing to ensure the adequate education of the indigenous inhabitants.
- 32. The representative of Australia thought that the best course would be to vote on the Soviet Union amendment immediately. The phrase had been included by the Sub-Committee after the administering Power had explained the situation at length, and it reflected the consensus of the Sub-Committee.
- 33. The representative of the United States of America opposed the Soviet amendment. The Sub-Committee had produced its formulation on the basis of the evidence available to it, and to delete it now for some tactical reason would be to call in question the objectivity of the whole report.
- 34. The Chairman said that he did not think the Soviet Union amendment called in question the Sub-Committee's objectivity; he recalled that in the past the Special Committee had frequently amended proposals submitted to it by its Sub-Committees.
- 35. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania proposed that paragraph 36 should be replaced by the following text:
 - "The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that the slow progress in Niue and the Tokelau Islands towards self-determination and independence is due, in part, to inadequate training and education of the indigenous inhabitants."
- 36. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics withdrew the amendment he had proposed and expressed his delegation's support for the Tanzanian amendment.
- 37. The representative of New Zealand said that, in his delegation's view, several judgements made in paragraph 36 were inaccurate and misleading. The Niueans were not "hesitant"—they had firm views on the rate at which they wished to assume further powers and they pursued their objectives with some vigour. In any event, the rate of progress in both Territories was, in fact, comparatively swift. Over the last five years Niue had assumed legislative powers encompassing full control of its own budget—including the New Zealand subsidy—and in the last year it had assumed executive control of half the government departments. New Zealand was willing to transfer control of the remaining departments whenever the islanders so desired.
- 38. Moreover, the pragmatic attitude of the Niueans to their constitutional advance did not spring, as the

- text before the Committee implied, from a lack of education or political sophistication; the discussions on the subject in the Legislative Assembly in January 1966, briefly summarized in the working paper (see para. 7 above), were evidence of that body's considerable political maturity. The Assembly had at that time expressed its opinion that the pace of development towards self-government was neither too fast nor too slow and had sought assurances from the administering Power that no further changes would be undertaken without full consultation with the Assembly and the people. The Secretary for Island Territories had given the Assembly those assurances and the New Zealand Government, in its annual report to Parliament on Niue, had reaffirmed its position that the pace of development was ultimately a matter for the people to decide. The Minister of Island Territories had told the Assembly that while, ideally, the people of Niue should take control of their own affairs as soon as possible, the New Zealand Government's attitude to their progress must naturally be tempered by its respect for the Niueans own wishes.
- 39. His delegation believed that the attitude of the New Zealand Government and of the people of Niue was completely consistent with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which, in calling for the transfer of powers to the people of Non-Self-Governing Territories, qualified this by adding "in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire".
- 40. The representative of Mali said that the New Zealand Government had accepted the Legislative Assembly's judgement on the inadequacy of the indigenous inhabitants' education and training but that the Assembly's judgement was not necessarily correct. Moreover, the firm support of the people of Niue for the current pace of constitutional advance could not be taken for granted if the entire people had not been consulted on the subject. His delegation accordingly supported the amendment proposed by the representative of Tanzania.
- 41. The representative of Venezuela said that the Tanzanian amendment would have the effect of deleting a phrase which implied a criticism of the attitude of the people of Niue and that his delegation therefore supported it.
- 42. The representative of New Zealand pointed out, in reply to the representative of Mali, that the people of Niue had made no final decision on the form of full self-government they would eventually choose, but that there had been several occasions when the question had been fully discussed. The New Zealand Government had had the Declaration translated into the local language and distributed throughout the island and a New Zealand Minister had outlined his Government's obligation under the Declaration to the Legislative Assembly as early as 1962. On that occasion, the choices available-full independence, partnership in a federation or association with neighbouring States, integration with a neighbouring State or any other Statehad been explained to the Assembly. In 1964, two experts on constitutional matters had visited Niue and discussed the island's future with representatives of the people—with participation by members of the public-and had drawn up a programme for a form of cabinet government by 1966. The Assembly of Niue, however, had rejected the programme and expressed a preference for a less precipitate time-table in which full self-government was to be preceded by a mem-

bership system (see para. 7 above); that decision had been confirmed by the people at elections held as recently as April 1966.

- 43. The proposed amendment to paragraph 36 implied that the education and training of the people of Niue were inadequate. It should be noted that free compulsory education was provided for all chidren between the ages of 6 and 14 and that high school had the standing of a New Zealand secondary school. In March 1967, there had been 53 Niuean students undertaking higher studies in New Zealand and 13 more had undertaken short-term training courses over the previous year. Educational opportunities were therefore very adequate for a population of 5,000.
- 44. The representative of Chile and the Ivory Coast supported the Tanzanian amendment.
- 45. The representative of India said that it appeared from the information available to the Special Committee that it was the Legislative Assembly and not the people of Niue which had expressed its views on the rate of progress towards self-determination and independence. He therefore suggested that paragraph 36 should be amended to read "... and the reported hesitancy of the Legislative Assembly of Niue to quicken the rate of progress...".
- 46. The representative of Tunisia noted that the Tanzanian amendment might conflict with the statement in paragraph 35 that political changes had occurred in Niue. In addition, it was not clear whether the words "slow progress" referred to political or other progress.
- 47. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that he saw no contradiction between his amendment and paragraph 35; the Sub-Committee would merely be noting that although political changes had occurred in Niue, progress had been slow.
- 48. He hoped that the representative of India would not insist on his suggestion, since any hesitancy to quicken the rate of progress was usually attributable to the administering Power, even if it tried to lay the blame at the door of the people or of legislative bodies.
- 49. The representative of Sierra Leone drew attention to paragraph 7 of the Sub-Committee's report. The statement referred to in that paragraph, like the statements of the New Zealand representative, clearly indicated that the Legislative Assembly of Niue was not eager to accelerate the island's progress towards self-determination and independence. That fact should be reflected in the report, and he therefore supported the suggestion put forward by the Indian representative.
- 50. The representative of New Zealand said that it would be quite wrong to suggest that the Legislative Assembly was showing any hesitancy. Its views had been expressed in May 1966, just a couple of weeks after an election in which the successful candidates had advocated a policy of gradual advance and the maintenance of links with New Zealand. Thus, the people as a whole, and their elected representatives in the Legislative Assembly, were firm in their conviction that they should pursue their political advance at a pace they determined themselves.
- 51. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the Legislative Assembly was not an organ of the people but a colonial institution and, as such, an instrument of the administering Power. The hesitancy to quicken the rate of progress should therefore be attributed to the administering Power itself rather than to any particular element in the colonial system.

- 52. The representative of India recalled that the paragraph in question had been drafted in order to show that any such hesitancy resulted partly from the administering Power's failure to prepare the people adequately for self-determination and independence.
- 53. The representative of New Zealand, replying to the representative of Tanzania, said that there could be no question of fixing "blame" in the situation. If an administering Power placed no obstacle in the way of progress towards self-determination and the people freely decided on what seemed to be regarded as a comparatively slow pace of advance, no blame attached to any institution or any person. This was perfectly consistent with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The suggestion that the Legislative Assembly of Niue was a colonial institution and was therefore not representative of the people would not be well received in Niue itself.
- 54. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that all institutions in colonial Territories were colonial institutions and only became organs of the people when the people had exercised their right to self-determination and independence.
- 55. The representative of Tunisia said that paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Sub-Committee's report showed clearly that there had been some progress in Niue. The Tanzanian amendment might seem inconsistent with those paragraphs.
- 56. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, in addition to the general reservation put forward earlier, his delegation wished to express a reservation regarding the reference to inadequate training and education of the indigenous inhabitants. Had there been a separate vote on the paragraph, the United Kingdom would have abstained.
- 57. The representative of the United States of America expressed his delegation's reservations about the Tanzanian amendment. The United States would also have abstained if a separate vote had been taken on the paragraph.
- 58. The Special Committee approved the amendment of the United Republic of Tanzania to paragraph 36.
- 59. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socalist Republics said that it would be wrong to state in paragraph 38 of the Sub-Committee's report that the assurance given by the administering Power regarding economic aid to the Territories was welcome, since such aid was an obligation incumbent upon the administering Power under the Charter. He therefore suggested that the Special Committee should merely note the assurance given by the administering Power and invite it to make efforts to lessen the economic dependence of the Territories.
- 60. In paragraph 39, the words "with satisfaction" should be deleted, since the willingness of the administering Power to receive a visiting mission to the Territories had been made conditional upon the agreement of other administering Powers to receive similar missions to Territories in the area.
- 61. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania suggested the replacement, in paragraph 38, of the words "thus widening the choice of self-determination by the people" by the words "on the administering Power". Since the right of self-determination could never be lessened by economic dependence, it followed that it could not be "widened".

- 62. Although his delegation had welcomed the cooperation shown by the New Zealand Government in indicating a willingness to receive a visiting mission to the Territories, he supported the suggestion to delete the words "with satisfaction" from paragraph 39, in view of the condition which had been placed upon that willingness.
- 63. The representative of Mali supported the reservations on paragraphs 38 and 39 expressed by the representatives of the USSR and Tanzania. In particular, the second half of paragraph 38 should be redrafted along the lines suggested by the representative of the USSR, since the expression of a hope was out of place in a section of the report entitled "Conclusions and recommendations". Moreover, it was not certain that the efforts referred to would in fact lead to a lessening of the Territories' economic dependence.
- 64. The representative of Venezuela said that he did not share the views of preceding speakers on paragraphs 38 and 39. It was well known that the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to small Territories involved certain difficulties, and the wording of paragraph 38 therefore seemed satisfactory. Similarly, the willingness of New Zealand to receive a visiting mission to the Territories was in marked contrast to the attitude taken by administering Powers in many other cases and should therefore be noted with satisfaction.
- 65. The representative of Madagascar supported the suggestion that the assurance referred to in paragraph 38 should be "noted". While the attitude of the New Zealand Government regarding a visiting mission to the Territories was a matter for some satisfaction, the fact remained that no mission would go to the Territories if other administering Powers refused to agree to a wider tour of the area.
- 66. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that since other administering Powers had consistently refused to allow visiting missions to other Territories in the area, it was unrealistic to expect that steps could be taken to arrange a visiting mission to Niue and the Tokelau Islands. He therefore suggested that the last sentence of paragraph 43 should be replaced by the words "The Special Committee should call upon the administering Power to change its attitude as regards the limitations placed on its willingness to receive a visiting mission to go to the Territories".
- 67. The representative of Bulgaria agreed with the members of the Committee who had expressed reservations concerning the drafting of paragraphs 38 and 39. With regard to paragraph 39, he wished to point out to the representative of Venezuela that the conditions set by the administering Power made it practically impossible to send a United Nations mission to the Territories, in view of the attitude of other administering Powers in the area. He therefore supported the Tanzanian proposal to redraft paragraph 39 so as to reflect the position of the administering Power more accurately.
- 68. The representative of Venezuela explained that in supporting the original wording of paragraph 39 he had felt that the members of Sub-Committee II must have had sound reasons for expressing satisfaction with the attitude of the administering Power towards visiting missions.
- 69. The representative of Madagascar suggested that paragraph 39 should be amended to begin with the words "The Special Committee notes the assurance given by the administering Power".

- 70. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed that paragraph 38 should be amended to read: "The Special Committee notes the assurance given by the administering Power of the continuance of economic aid to the Territories and invites the administering Power to undertake efforts with the United Nations specialized agencies to improve the economic structure of the Territories in order to lessen their economic dependence on the administering Power."
- 71. The representative of New Zealand said that he was puzzled by the attitude of members of the Special Committee towards the assurances of continuing assistance given by New Zealand. The representative of the Soviet Union, for example, had said that the Committee could hardly welcome New Zealand's assurance about continuing economic aid. However, if such an assurance had not been given, New Zealand would undoubtedly have been accused of bringing pressure to bear in order to influence a people's choice concerning their future. New Zealand certainly contemplated providing continuing aid to the Territories now under discussion since there were, for example, both ethnic and historical ties between the Polynesians of Niue and the Tokelaus and those in New Zealand itself. But to suggest that New Zealand had such a duty on economic grounds was absurd since its economic support of the Terirtories had been costing it dear for fifty years.
- 72. The attitude of the New Zealand Government towards visiting missions was stated correctly in paragraph 39. New Zealand had not sought the Sub-Committee's expression of satisfaction but acknowledged it. It felt that the dispatch of a visiting mission to two of the smallest Territories in the South Pacific might be misinterpreted in the area and suggest to the inhabitants that the United Nations was especially disturbed by the situation in these Territories.
- 73. The representative of Chile proposed, as a compromise, that paragraph 39 should remain as it stood, with the addition of the words "and urges it to eliminate the difficulties that place limitations on the visit and prevent a wider tour of the area". He pointed out that New Zealand was the administering Power that had afforded the greatest facilities to United Nations visiting missions in that part of the world.
- 74. The representative of Venezuela supported that proposal.
- 75. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania reminded the Committee of his suggestion that the words "thus widening the choice of self-determination by the people" in paragraph 38 should be replaced by "on the administering Power".
- 76. The representative of Venezuela thought that an allusion to economic dependence "on the administering Power" would give the impression of contradicting the first part of paragraph 38, which read "economic aid to the Territories, whatever their future". The Territories might not necessarily be dependent on the administering Power in the future.
- 77. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania asked whether, if the Soviet amendment was adopted, the USSR delegation would wish paragraph 42 to be retained or deleted.
- 78. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that it was not true to say, as was done in paragraph 38, that the people had a wider choice of self-determination; in fact, that choice was more limited. His amendment to paragraph 38 com-

bined the features of those proposed by Tanzania and Madagascar, which his delegation had supported. He had no objection to its being incorporated in the recommendations. He had no strong feelings with regard to paragraph 42, which in some degree reflected the views expressed in the Special Committee concerning the need for economic reforms in the Territories and the assistance which the specialized agencies of the United Nations should provide in co-operation with the administering Power.

- 79. The representative of Tunisia said he saw no inconsistency between the Malagasy and Tanzanian amendments and the Soviet amendment. He considered that paragraph 42 should be incorporated in the recommendations, as it was natural that the recommendations should repeat the views expressed in the conclusions.
- 80. The Special Committee approved the Soviet amendment to paragraph 38. It also decided that, as a consequence, it would not be necessary to put to the vote the amendments to that paragraph proposed by Madagascar and Tanzania.
- 81. The representative of Madagascar said that he had not formally submitted an amendment, but if the Committee so desired it could adopt the wording suggested by his delegation for paragraph 39.
- 82. The representative of Venezuela recalled that he had supported the Chilean amendment, which, in his opinion, summed up the arguments advanced in the Committee concerning the difficulties encountered in connexion with sending a visiting mission.
- 83. The Chairman said that some delegations which he had consulted had expressed the view that the Chilean amendment would change the meaning of paragraph 39, as it was the declared intention of the administering Power to agree to the visiting mission only if it were to form part of a wider tour of the area. Perhaps paragraph 39 could end at the words "a visiting mission".
- 84. The representative of Chile said that he found the Chairman's suggestion satisfactory and was prepared to accept it.
- 85. The representative of Venezuela said that he had no objection to the Chairman's suggestion but would have preferred the Chilean amendment, which specified the nature of the limitations placed on the visiting mission.
- 86. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, if the representative of Chile agreed to the compromise suggested by the Chairman, he would not press his own amendment.
- 87. The Special Committee then approved the Chilean representative's proposal, with the amendment which the Chairman had suggested.
- 88. The representative of New Zealand said that the fact that in a year in which there had been significant constitutional advances made in the Territories a report had been produced which referred to "slow progress" was both illogical and discouraging to the people of the Territories and the administering Power, which was doing all it could to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). During a few hours of discussion the Committee had made several substantive changes to the report of Sub-Committee II, which was itself a grudging document. But there had been few references in this discussion to the freely expressed views of the people, to the constitutional position

- reached, to the particular geographic circumstances of Niue and the Tokelau Islands or to their extremely limited economic prospects.
- 89. Furthermore, the amendment to paragraph 36 which suggested that "slow progress" had been made in Niue conflicted directly with the recognition in the preceding paragraph that changes had occurred which were acknowledged to represent an advance worthy of note.
- 90. His delegation was led to wonder, when subcommittee reports were substantially rewritten in plenary in this way, whether there was much point in making a full report to a sub-committee and participating in its work. His doubts were intensified by the lack of inclination of Sub-Committee members to defend a report which they had formally debated and adopted.
- 91. The situation in the islands did not call for adverse comment: the administering Government was ready to "transfer all powers", as required by resolution 1514 (XV), if this were the wish of the people; the people themselves, with full financial powers and feeling their way into the exercise of executive powers, had plainly stated, through freely conducted electoral processes, that they wished to maintain the current rate of constitutional progress. They were moving toward exercising their undenied right to self-determination in the comparatively near future.
- 92. But they faced a considerable dilemma. These were not extensive colonial Territories on the classical pattern where independence was the obvious choice for the future. These were very small and poor pieces of land: Niue was a mere 100 square miles in area, had only small pockets of fertile soil and was situated hundreds of miles from its nearest neighbour; the Tokelaus were strips of coral totalling only four square miles in area and had no economic future. The fact that they were tiny, isolated and permanently dependent on outside assistance did not lessen the rights of the 7,000 people involved to self-determination but the people themselves felt—and with undeniable realism—that their physical and economic circumstances restricted their choice somewhat and rendered their decision on the future more complex and difficult.
- 93. The New Zealand representative suggested that for people facing such a dilemma and seeking advice and guidance in the Special Committee's reports it was not enough simply to reaffirm rights which were undenied and to make vague and often inaccurate judgements and recommendations about accelerating political and economic progress.
- 94. The Chairman pointed out that, once the report of a sub-committee had been submitted to the Special Committee, it became the latter's property and members could express their views on it and submit amendments. He was surprised that the representative of New Zealand had seen fit to say that the report of Sub-Committee II on Niue and the Tokelau Islands was being adopted after only a few hours debate. In fact, it was the third time that it had been included on the agenda of the Special Committee, which could decide to introduce any amendments or suggestions it deemed appropriate.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II

95. At its 564th meeting on 27 September 1967, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II concerning Niue and

the Tokelau Islands, as amended, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record. These conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

Conclusions

- (a) The Special Committee notes the political changes that have occurred in Niue but observes that a corresponding advancement has not been made in the Tokelau Islands.
- (b) The Special Committee is of the opinion that the slow progress in Niue and the Tokelau Islands towards self-determination and independence is due, in part, to inadequate training and education of the indigenous people.
- (c) The Special Committee is of the opinion that the problems of size, isolation and limited resources, though important in themselves, should not in any way delay the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in these Territories.

Recommendations

- (d) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territories of Niue and the Tokelau Islands to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It is of the view that the question of size, isolation and limited resources should not in any way delay the application of that resolution to these Territories.
- (e) The administering Power should further increase the training of the indigenous people so that they could occupy all key positions in the life of the Territories and build the confidence so necessary for their future development.
- (f) The Special Committee notes the assurance given by the administering Power of the continuance of economic aid to the Territories and invites the administering Power to undertake efforts with the United Nations specialized agencies to improve the economic structure in order to lessen their economic dependence on the administering Power.
- (g) Further and immediate measures should be taken by the administering Power to develop the economic structure of these Territories; the United Nations and the specialized agencies should be asked to continue their co-operation.
- (h) A visit to the Territories by the Sub-Committee is necessary and could be useful in gathering all information and also in familiarizing the people with the assistance which can be rendered by the United Nations in regard to the free expression of their wishes pursuant to the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this connexion, the Special Committee notes with satisfaction the continued willingness of the administering Power to receive a visiting mission.

ANNEX*

Report of Sub-Committee II Niue and the Tokelau Islands

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

- 1. The Sub-Committee considered Niue and the Tokelau Islands at its 61st, 63rd, 65th, 66th and 69th meetings held from 14 April to 7 September 1967.
 - * Previously issued under the symbol A/AC,109/L,395/Add,4.

- 2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-21 of the present chapter).
- 3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of New Zealand to participate in the consideration of the two Territories.
- 4. The representative of New Zealand said that the inhabitants of Niue, who were related to the New Zealand Maori, had shown themselves to be highly pragmatic in deciding where their interests lay. The islanders made a living from planting the thin soils. Their most important customer and supplier was New Zealand, which subsidized more than half of the Niue budget. Control of the island's income (both the New Zealand subsidy and internal revenue) had been in the hands of the Niue Legislature itself for the past five years.
- 5. In 1962 a start had been made towards self-determination in the Territory when it had been suggested to the Niueans that several choices for the future lay before them; independence (alone or as part of a federation), integration with an independent State or self-government in free associa-tion with some other State. The Legislative Assembly, which was made up of representatives elected on a "one man, one vote" basis, with the Resident Commissioner as President, had made no final decision but had proposed that the Territory should advance towards a greater degree of self-government while retaining its links with New Zealand. The New Zealand Government had then drawn up a time-table providing for the establishment of cabinet government by about 1967. The members of the Assembly had, however, preferred postponing that step until after the establishment of a system under which the administration of one or more government departments would be entrusted to members of the Executive Committee (member system), and that decision had, in effect, been confirmed by the people at the elections held in April 1966.
- 6. In September 1966 an embryo Cabinet consisting of members of the Executive Committee responsible to the Legislature for their administration had assumed responsibility for the Departments of Public Works and Electricity, Post Office, Radio and Telephones, and Police and Prisons. The next step would be the assumption by the Leader of Government Business of responsibility for the Administrative Department. The pace at which the remaining portfolios would be allocated would be decided entirely by the Executive Committee itself, and New Zealand would endorse any such decision.
- 7. On 29 January 1967 a member of the Assembly, speaking on behalf of his colleagues, had stated in the presence of the Secretary of the New Zealand Department of Island Territories that the tempo of development towards self-government was neither too fast nor too slow and was completely in line with the Assembly's decision. He had asked that there should be no sudden assumption of new responsibilties, since members of the Executive Committee required time to gain knowledge of their executive roles. Furthermore, the Assembly believed that no new measure should be considered without full consultation with the Assembly, in order that development might keep pace with the wishes of the people. The Secretary of Island Territories had assured the Assembly that no further moves would be made before it had been fully consulted.
- 8. Thus, the Niueans were drawing up their own laws, controlling both their own revenue and the subsidy from New Zealand, and gradually assuming the executive powers formerly vested solely in the Resident Commissioner. For its part, New Zealand would not place any barriers in the way of their development.
- 9. Another event of constitutional significance was the adoption of an ordinance by the Assembly providing for the establishment of village councils, with a view to strengthening community pride and fostering community development activities at the local level.
- 10. In the economic sphere, the Assembly had set up a Development Board responsible for carrying out agricultural

and industrial projects and for making funds available for them. Seven of the nine members of the Board, including its Chairman, were Niueans. The Board had many serious problems on its hands. The after-effects of two hurricanes, fluctuating prices, insect pests, manpower shortages and infrequent shipping services, had all contributed to a decline in the exports of primary products. To seek solutions for these problems, a five-year plan had been drawn up which the Development Board had accepted in principle. A first move had been made towards developing the kind of combined coconut and cattle industry which seemed best suited to South Pacific Island conditions. There were also plans to develop honey production, and fruit and market-garden crops.

- 11. The Niueans had been encouraged by New Zealand to make use of the assistance which the United Nations and the specialized agencies could provide. It was hoped that, in addition to the aid already furnished, the international organizations would be able to supply a development economist and a harbour expert, and a fellowship that would enable a Niuean to study community development abroad, and that they would also participate in carrying out a water supply scheme.
- 12. With help from New Zealand and the United Nations and the display of initiative in Niue itself, the long-term prospects for raising production and living standards were not without promise, although it would probably be a long time before the Territory would be in any sense self-sustaining.
- 13. The economic prospects of the Tokelau Islands, isolated and infertile atolls having a total area of four square miles, were virtually nil. Under such circumstances, it was small wonder that many Tokelauans wished to migrate to New Zealand, the land of opportunity for many Pacific Islanders. When, several years previously, New Zealand had expressed itself as unwilling to see the colonial relationship with the islands perpetuated, the population had rejected the idea of an association with neighbouring island groups and had reaffirmed its desire for a continuing link with New Zealand. It would be for the inhabitants themselves eventually to choose among the different possibilities open to them. In the meantime, the fonos, the local island councils which were made up of heads of families, were being accorded formal consultative status in governmental work and the preparation of the budget. The draft estimates for the current financial year amounted to approximately \$215,000 compared with \$112,000 in 1966/67. Much of the funds would be directed towards modernizing the educational system, repairing damage caused by hurricanes and improving communications. Other projects under study were a rat-control programme and a programme for controlling an insect coconut-predator, to be undertaken in co-operation with a project in Western Samoa in which both the South Pacific Commission and the United Nations Special Fund were involved.
- 14. In 1966, New Zealand had indicated that at the request of the Tokelauan fonos, it had agreed to finance a pilot scheme for migration: under the two-year scheme, some ninety Tokelauans had already moved to New Zealand and many others wished to follow.
- 15. No final decision on the future had been taken in the Territories. It was for the inhabitants themselves to decide on their future. The Niueans and Tokelauans, who seemed sensitive to "the special circumstances of geographic isolation and economic conditions" mentioned in General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) and who had ethnic, historical and economic ties with New Zealand, appeared to want to retain a direct link of some sort and wished to safeguard their right of unrestricted entry to New Zealand's broader life. They were free to decide where their future lay, whenever they so wished through the "well-established democratic processes" available to them. The islands had no commercial or strategic significance for New Zealand and the islanders had been made aware some years earlier of the rights mentioned in the Declaration on colonialism, which had been distributed in the Niuean and Tokelauan languages.
- 16. The representative of Chile said that he was glad to note that the administering Power had in general respected the General Assembly's recommendations in resolution 2232 (XXI) concerning a number of small islands, including Niue

- and Tokelau, and that it intended to co-operate with the United Nations in regard to visiting missions, the dispatch of which had been recommended in operative paragraph 5 of that resolution.
- 17. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-21 above) and the statements of the representative of the administering Power had enabled members of the Sub-Committee to form a precise idea of the situation in those Territories, whose development was impeded by their geographical isolation and lack of natural resources. Niue had made considerable political progress and the Niue Island Assembly, which consisted of fourteen Niueans and the Resident Commissioner, had fairly extensive powers. It could promulgate laws by ordinance, without having to refer them to the Governor General of New Zealand and exercised budgetary control over all government expenditure, including New Zealand grants and loans and all funds raised locally. As far as constitutional matters were concerned, the recommendations of a team of constitutional experts had been approved by the Niuean electorate in April 1966. The proposed 'member" system had been adopted and under it each of the four elected members of the Executive Committee had been given responsibility for certain ministerial departments.
- 18. In paragraph 9 of the working paper, it was stated that legislation for the establishment of village councils was being drafted. His delegation would like fuller details. It was gratified to note that the administering Power had prepared a five-year plan for Niue's economic development and it considered that the United Nations and the specialized agencies could make a valuable contribution by providing technical assistance. The administering Power had already done much for education, although it might perhaps institute a system of scholarships to enable more Niueans to study at New Zealand universities, the agricultural college in Western Samoa and Viti University.
- 19. The situation in the Tokelau Islands was even more difficult, which explained why the inhabitants had decided to maintain their links with New Zealand. The working paper showed that the administering Power intended to grant them greater autonomy by giving councils of elders and heads of families formal consultative status in the determination of priorities in certain activities in the public sector and the preparation of the annual budget. His delegation hoped that the closest co-operation would be maintained between the administering Power and the inhabitants of the islands to ensure that they enjoyed the greatest possible degree of internal autonomy.
- 20. The representative of India noted the attempts being made by the administering Power to promote the development of the islands towards self-government and economic growth but thought that the pace of progress seemed rather slow.
- 21. The Niue Legislative Assembly considered that the time-limit set by the New Zealand Government for the establishment of a cabinet government in the Territory was too short and favoured a slower pace of development. However, the representative of the administering Power had himself told the Sub-Committee the previous year that the Assembly's cautious attitude was due to two factors: the people of Niue doubted their capacity to manage their own affairs and feared that political advance might prompt New Zealand to reduce or withdraw its subsidy. The attitude of the Legislative Assembly seemed to be the result of inadequate training and information and the Indian delegation would therefore urge the administering Power to make intensive efforts to provide training for the people of Niue, particularly in education.
- 22. On the subject of the economic fears of the Niueans, she noted that the administering Power had assured them that whatever form their future took, financial aid from New Zealand would not be affected. Nevertheless, Niue would also have to become more self-supporting. It was a matter of concern that in 1965 the value of exports had fallen by £12,742 while the value of imports had risen by £22,783, although it was true that the establishment of the Development Board and of a five-year plan would help to remedy the situation.

- It was also to be hoped that further measures to develop the economy of Niue would be undertaken in co-operation with the United Nations and the specialized agencies.
- 23. As for the Tokelau Islands, the fact that they had a population of only 1,861 should not prevent them from freely and democratically determining their future status.
- 24. The pace of political development was, of course, a matter for decision by the people themselves, as the representative of New Zealand had stated. However, it was also the responsibility of the administering Power to encourage and assist them in the development process in accordance with the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 25. The representative of Poland said that although it was the fourth time that the Sub-Committee had on its agenda Niue and the Tokelau Islands, unfortunately the conclusions and recommendations that it would adopt in 1967 were not likely to differ much from those of previous years.
- 26. He did not overlook the geographical isolation of the islands or their lack of natural resources, and he took note of the attempts made by the administering Power to promote their economic growth and their development towards selfgovernment. He found, however, on reading the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-21 above), that the process of political emancipation of Territories which had remained under New Zealand administration for approximately half a century was very slow and that the administering Power had not yet even fixed a date on which the people would be able to exercise fully their right to self-determination. He hoped that the establishment of a Development Board would lead to the development of the economy of Niue, and that the United Nations and the specialized agencies would give due consideration to the needs of the inhabitants of small Territories such as Niue and the Tokelau Islands. Since the Government of New Zealand had already expressed its readiness to terminate its colonial relationship with those Territories, it should now redouble its efforts to promote their political and social development and to assist the people to achieve self-government.
- 27. The representative of New Zealand, in reply, stated that he knew of no criteria by which the political progress of the islands could be called slow. In the opinion of his delegation, it had been far from slow in Niue, for example, where in the course of the last five years the population had assumed full control of the budget including the subvention from New Zealand, and was gradually taking over executive control of Government Departments. He observed that the inhabitants of Niue were far from lacking in political awareness or sophistication, as was shown by their pragmatic attitude towards their political future. Regarding the fixing of a date for self-determination-incidentally, no obligation of that kind was laid down in the Charter or General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)—he stated that the inhabitants of Niue and the Tokelaus could exercise their right to selfdetermination when they wished and that the New Zealand Government did not intend at this stage to assume the function of setting a date for them.
- 28. On the subject of the economy, he recognized that the decrease in Niue's receipts from exports was discouraging, but noted that the newly established Development Board was studying ways of improving the situation. In that connexion he pointed out that over the past five years Niue had become to a degree less dependent on New Zealand, New Zealand's contribution to its budget having fallen—over a period when total expenditure was rising—from 64 per cent in 1962-1963 to 53 per cent in 1966-1967.
- 29. Turning to the conclusions and recommendations in the draft report of the Sub-Committee, he wished to contest both the assumption underlying the statement in paragraph 35 that political advancement corresponding to that made in Niue had not been achieved in the Tokelau Islands and the judgement in paragraph 36 that progress made in the Tokelaus had been slow. While it was true, for example, that the Tokelau Islands had not, like Niue, moved towards the establishment

- of a cabinet system of government, the latter was not necessarily the most appropriate system for the atoll environment and tiny population of the Tokelaus. It had to be borne in mind that the 1,800 Tokelauans lived on three coral atolls with a total area of not more than four square miles, that the highest point above sea level was fifteen feet and that there was virtually no soil on the atolls. Despite the various attempts that had been made, it was difficult to grow anything but coconut and a few breadfruit trees there, the only other resource being fish. In this environment the existing political arrangements worked well. The Territory was run by the fonos, or councils made up of the heads of families. The people participated directly in this communal form of government. An elected indigenous official maintained liaison between the fonos and the New Zealand administration, which was not situated permanently in the Tokelaus but in nearby Western Samoa. In one of the few areas in which the Tokelauans did not run their affairs without direction or guidance from outside—the drawing up of the annual budget consisting largely of the New Zealand subvention—the fonos had recently been accorded formal consultative status. In short, although there was a minimum of formal institutions in the Tokelaus. a democratic form of self-government acceptable to the people existed. In these tiny communities a parliamentary mace and dispatch boxes would be as irrelevant as were a tractor and plough.
- 30. With regard to paragraph 36, it would remove the element of prejudgement in this formulation were the word "self-determination" substituted for "independence", which was one of several hypothetical end-results of self-determination. Furthermore, it was a miscalculation to imply that the people's wish to make haste slowly derived, as implied in this paragraph, from political unsophistication and ineptitudegiven the circumstances of the islanders, the opposite conclusion could equally well be drawn. Paragraph 41 also seemed to imply that the indigenous people's level of training was inadequate. It should be noted, in that connexion, that Niue had free, compulsory education for children between the ages of 6 and 14 and that the educational status of the Niue High School was equivalent to that of a similar secondary school in New Zealand. There were also a number of students attending higher education and in-service training courses in New Zealand and elsewhere in the South Pacific.
- 31. He noted that the phrase "though important in themselves", which had appeared the previous year after the words "the peculiar problems of size, isolation and limited resources" in the corresponding paragraph of the Special Committee's report (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XVI, para. 21 (d)), did not appear in the draft conclusions now under discussion. He did not feel that this qualification was less relevant and would like to know the reasons for the omission.
- 32. With regard to the Sub-Committee's recommendations, he noted that paragraph 40 reaffirmed a right which the administering Power had never denied and thus seemed to attribute to New Zealand an attitude which it did not hold. The same paragraph could also be read as implying that New Zealand was attempting to delay the application of resolution 1514 (XV), which would be quite untrue: New Zealand had always supported and attempted to apply faithfully the provisions of that resolution. As far as paragraph 41 was concerned, the administering Power was continuing to develop the educational system and the Niueans were gradually taking over the key positions.
- 33. Finally, with regard to paragraph 42, his delegation had already had occasion to describe in detail the measures which had been taken to develop the economic structure of Niue. As to the Tokelaus, the hard fact was that they had no economic future and were permanently dependent on outside financial assistance. The view of the Tokelauans themselves seemed to be that their future lay in emigration to the wider life offering in New Zealand.
- 34. He hoped that his comments on the draft report would be taken into account and recorded when the final text was drafted.

Conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee Conclusions

- 35. The Sub-Committee notes the political changes that have occurred in Niue but observes that a corresponding advancement has not been made in the Tokelau Islands.
- 36. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that the slow progress in the Tokelau Islands and the hesitancy of the people of Niue to quicken their rate of progress towards selfdetermination and independence is due, in part, to inadequate training and education of the indigenous inhabitants.
- 37. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that the problems of size, isolation and limited resources, though important in themselves, should not in any way delay the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in these Territories.
- 38. The assurance given by the administering Power of the continuance of economic aid to the Territories, whatever their future, is welcome; the Sub-Committee hopes that the efforts made to improve the economic structure by the administering Power and the United Nations specialized agencies will lessen this economic dependence, thus widening the choice of selfdetermination by the people.
- 39. The Sub-Committee notes with satisfaction the continued willingness of the administering Power to receive a visiting mission to the Territories were such a visit to form part of a wider tour of the area.

Recommendations

- 40. The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territories of Niue and the Tokelau Islands to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It is of the view that the questions of size, isolation and limited resources should not in any way delay the application of that resolution to these Territories.
- 41. The administering Power should further increase the training of the indigenous people so that they could occupy all key positions in the life of the Territories and build the confidence so necessary for their future development.
- 42. Further and immediate measures should be taken by the administering Power to develop the economic structure of these Territories; the United Nations and the specialized agencies should be asked to continue their co-operation.
- 43. A visit to the Territories by the Sub-Committee is necessary and would be useful in gathering all information and also in familiarizing the people with the assistance which can be rendered by the United Nations in regard to the free expression of their wishes pursuant to the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this respect, steps may be taken to arrange a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

CHAPTER XVII*

NEW HEBRIDES

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly

- 1. In 1964 the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning the New Hebrides (A/5800/Rev.1,1 chap. XX, paras. 89-96). After considering the New Hebrides in August and September 1966, the Special Committee recommended, inter alia, that the administering Powers should take urgent measures for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and that the people of the Territory should be provided with an early opportunity to express their wishes in accordance with that resolution through well-established democratic processes based on the principle of universal adult suffrage. It also recommended that the administering Powers should expedite the finalization of reforms in the administration of the Territory. It felt that the social and economic advancement of the Territory should be accelerated. It also felt that a visiting mission was necessary and would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the people and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Powers (A/6300/Rev.1,2 chap. XVII, paras. 23-24).
- 2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning twenty-six Territories, including the New Hebrides. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, concerning twenty-five Territories, including the New Hebrides. The resolution called upon the ad-

ministering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It reiterated the Assembly's declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories was incompatible with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It urged the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. It decided that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of the Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to continue to pay special attention to the Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

B. Information on the Territory³

General

3. The New Hebrides form an irregular chain of islands some 440 miles (704 kilometres) long in the south-western Pacific Ocean. They have a total land area of 5,700 square miles (14,763 square kilometres). In 1962, the population of the Territory was estimated to total 61,500 persons of whom 55,000 were Melanesians. The remaining 6,500 were British or French subjects and ressortissants (nationals of other countries who elect to come under the jurisdiction of either the United

^{*} Parts A and B of this chapter were previously reproduced

under the symbol A/AC.109/L.359.

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (Part I).

2 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

item 23.

³ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 22 July 1966 for the year ending 31 December 1965. The most recent information on the New Hebrides transmitted by France was received on 19 May 1966 for the year 1964.

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or France).

Status

- 4. The New Hebrides form a condominium which was established on 20 October 1906, jointly administered by France and the United Kingdom. By the Anglo-French Convention of 16 November 1887, these Powers appointed a Joint Naval Commission charged with the protection of the lives and properties of their subjects. In 1902, Deputy Resident Commissioners were appointed. By the Convention of 20 October 1906, the two Governments established the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides. This Convention was superseded by the Anglo-French Protocol of 1914.
- 5. Subjects and citizens of the Signatory Powers enjoy equal rights. Each Power "retains sovereignty over its nationals and over corporations legally constituted according to its laws", and neither Power may exercise a separate authority over the Condominium. Nationals of third Powers residing in the group opt for either the British or French legal system and to come, for all practical purposes, under the administrative protection and authority of the Power for whose legal system they opt. The 1914 Protocol does not define the national status of the indigenous inhabitants of the Condominium. It states that they cannot be dependants of either Power nor can they "acquire in the group the status of subject or citizen" of either Power.

Constitution

6. The Constitution of the Condominium is laid down in the Anglo-French Protocol of 6 August 1914, which was ratified in 1922 and proclaimed in the New Hebrides on 5 July 1923, and which has, with some modification, regulated the administration of the Condominium since that time.

Joint Administration

- 7. The Government of the Condominium is known as the Joint Administration, of which the joint and equal heads are formally the British and French High Commissioners, acting through their local representatives, the British and French Resident Commissioners, to whom they delegate their powers and to whom they give directions (the British High Commissioner resides at Honiara in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate and as High Commissioner for the Western Pacific his jurisdiction extends to other United Kingdom Territories in the area; the French High Commissioner resides at Nouméa in New Caledonia and is also the Governor of New Caledonia). The Joint Administration consists of the British National Administration, the French National Administration and certain joint or "Condominum" services. In addition to participating in the Joint Administration, each national administration under its Resident Commissioner deals independently with national affairs in so far as these are not of joint concern.
- 8. The national administration civil services consist of administrative, clerical, accounting and technical officers, including medical and education officers, since health and education, although subsidized from the joint (Condominium) budget, are primarily national subjects. Each civil service has its own set of estimates, the revenue of which is to a greater or lesser extent derived from the metropolitan Government.
- 9. The Joint Services, created under article 4 of the Protocol, include normal government departments such

as the Treasury (including customs and inland revenue), public works and transport, posts and telephones, radio, lands, survey, agriculture, meteorology and mines. They are financed from local taxation, the joint budget being prepared by the Resident Commissioners and assented to by the High Commissioners and the metropolitan Governments.

Advisory Council

10. The Territory has no legislative council. Since 1951 it has had an Advisory Council presided over by the Resident Commissioners. It consists of 6 official members and 20 unofficial members. Since 1964, 8 of the latter have been elected: 4 are New Hebridean, 2 are British and 2 are French. The other unofficial members are nominated: 6 are New Hebridean, 3 are British and 3 are French. The Standing Committee of the Council consists of 2 British, 2 French and 4 New Hebridean members.

Local government

11. There are 18 local councils throughout the islands which deal with most matters of local importance such as village amenities. Vila, the administrative capital, has a Town Planning Commission.

Electoral system

12. The Territory does not have universal adult suffrage. In rural communities the indigenous inhabitants elect the members of local councils. Electoral colleges composed of representatives of the various local councils in each district elect 4 of the Melanesian members of the Advisory Council of the Territory, and 4 of the European members are elected through the Chamber of Commerce. The other members are nominated by the Resident Commissioners jointly.

Judiciary

- 13. The New Hebrides has 3 types of courts: Condominium courts, British national courts and French national courts. The Condominium courts comprise the Joint Court, the courts of first instance and the Native courts. The Joint Court is the chief court. It hears appeals from the courts of first instance and from the Native courts which are established in each district of the New Hebrides. It is responsible for land registration, for law cases involving both French and British, Europeans and indigenous persons, and for cases between indigenous persons.
- 14. One of the two agents (administrative officers) of the district concerned sits in the Native courts with 2 local assessors. The agents are obliged to consult the local assessors. The Native courts have jurisdiction throughout their district over offences against New Hebridean regulations and customs. British or French national courts administer their own national laws where British or French subjects are concerned, except in cases reserved for the Joint Court.

Recent constitutional developments

15. At its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee was informed that ministerial talks had taken place in London in July 1966, at which time the British Colonial Secretary and the Minister of State for French Overseas Departments and Overseas Territories had met and exchanged views on administrative matters concerning the Condominium.

Economic conditions

- 16. Most of the New Hebrides is mountainous and heavily forested and large areas of the interior are uninhabited. Its economy is based mainly on subsistence gardening and the production of copra. Other cash crops include cocoa and coffee. The economy has recently become more diversified with the production of manganese ore for export (since 1962) and the growth of the frozen fish industry (since 1957). The only other industries are a few small factories and indigenous arts and crafts.
- 17. Copra, manganese and fish made up approximately 95 per cent of all exports in 1965, the value of which totalled £3,276,239.4 Import figures for 1965 are not available. Most exports went to France and Japan.
- 18. The budget of the Joint Administration finances the services that are operated jointly and contributes to the cost of medical and educational services operated separately by the British and French national administrations which have separate budgets.
- 19. Taxation is levied by the Joint Administration to provide revenue from which the Joint Public Services of the New Hebrides are financed and subventions for some national services are paid. Approximately 62 per cent of the total local revenue consisted of import and export duties; there is no income tax for indigenous persons. The main heads of expenditure are public works, medical and education services and the post
- 20. Revenue and expenditure of the Joint Government in 1965 totalled £984,309 and £940,193 respectively. Estimated revenue and expenditure of the British National Administration in 1965/66 totalled £A133,096 each. Most of this was contributed by the United Kingdom Government. No information is available on the revenue and expenditure by the French National Administration in 1965. In 1964, revenue and expenditure of the French National Administration amounted to 110,452,000 frs CFP⁵ and 103,146,000 frs CFP respectively. It is estimated that approximately 68 per cent of the revenue of the French National Administration was contributed by the French Government.
- 21. The Protocol provides that the currency and banknotes of either Power shall be legal tender, and in 1935, Australian currency was recognized valid for payments in sterling. The currencies in use are the Australian dollar and the New Hebrides franc. The latter is convertible into Australian currency. Its issue is regulated by the French authorities, who also fix the rate of exchange with the metropolitan franc.

Social conditions

Labour

22. Most of the indigenous population is mainly engaged in producing subsistence and cash crops. Most employed labour works on copra plantations, on trading ships, in stores or government service. There is generally a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour. No information is available on the total number of persons working for wages. Wages vary according to the type of labour and whether or not rations are included. The work week averages forty-four hours. There are no trade unions, although provisions exist for them.

Public health

- 23. In addition to the medical facilities provided separately by the British and French national administrations, British and French medical officers run a condominium medical service providing preventive measures against malaria and epidemics, quarantine control, medical inspection of plantations and other labour, and free medical attention to the indigenous population.
- 24. In 1965/66, expenditure on public health by the Joint Administration totalled £174,324, approximately 8.3 per cent of its total expenditure. Excluding grants, expenditure for the same period by the British National Administration was estimated to be £A135,808, approximately 16 per cent of its total expenditure. A grant of £73,100 from British Colonial Development and Welfare funds was approved in August 1965 for the reconstruction of the hospital at Tanua. No information is available on expenditure by the French National Administration on public health for 1965. In 1964, such expenditure by the French National Administration was 21,874,000 New Hebrides francs.

Educational conditions

- 25. The great majority of all pupils attend mission schools. In addition to these, the French National Administration operates seventeen primary schools. In 1964, the British National Administration established a teacher-training college and in 1965 a grant of £104,000 was appropriated from British Colonial Development and Welfare funds for a new secondary school at Vila. The Condominium Government itself has no education service but gives an annual subsidy to the national administrations, which in turn give assistance to the mission schools. In 1965, this subsidy amounted to £48,000.
- 26. It is estimated that 65 to 70 per cent of the children of school-age receive primary education. Secondary education in the Territory is in its developmental stage and children are sent to secondary schools in neighbouring territories. In 1965, a grant of £126,000 was approved by the British National Administration for the construction of a post-primary school to accommodate 150 students. No information is available on expenditure by the French National Administration on education during 1965. Such expenditure was 63,895,000 frs CFP in 1964.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

- 27. At its 562nd meeting, on 22 September 1967, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on the New Hebrides which appears as an annex to this chapter.
- 28. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning the New Hebrides:

Petitioner Document No. Chief Buluk and Mr. Jimmy Tubo Stephens A/AC.109/PET.630 Chief Paul Buluk A/AC.109/PET.630/Add.1

29. The representative of the United Kingdom said he wished to record the fact that, in his delegation's view, the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on the Territories administered by the United Kingdom did not adequately reflect the substantial progress that had been made over the past twelve months in those Territories and were regrettably

⁴ One pound sterling equals 250 francs of the New Hebrides or £A1.25.

⁵ One franc CFP is a New Hebrides franc.

begrudging and negative in tone. Accordingly, he would reserve his delegation's position on the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on the New Hebrides.

30. The representatives of Australia and the United States also expressed reservations with regard to the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on the New Hebrides.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II

31. At its 562nd meeting on 22 September 1967, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II concerning the New Hebrides, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record. These conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

Conclusions

- (a) The Special Committee notes that there have been no constitutional changes or proposals concerning any changes by the administering Powers in the New Hebrides since it was considered by the Special Committee in 1966.
- (b) The Special Committee, aware of the peculiar problems of the Territory by virtue of its being a Condominium, recalls its conclusions in 1966 that very little progress had been made towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and that the political institutions and executive machinery were not representative of the people of the Territory.

Recommendations

- (c) The Special Committee reiterates to the administering Powers the recommendations it made concerning this Territory in 1966 and strongly urges them to implement these recommendations, which are as follows:
- (i) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (ii) The people of the Territory should be provided an early opportunity to express their wishes with regard to the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes based on the principle of universal adult suffrage.
- (iii) Urgent measures should be taken for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).
- (iv) The economic and social advancement of the Territory should be accelerated.
- (v) The administering Powers should expedite the finalization of reforms in the administration of the Condominium.
- (vi) A visit by the Sub-Committee is necessary and would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the people. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Powers.

ANNEX*

Report of Sub-Committee II New Hebrides

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

- 1. The Sub-Committee considered the New Hebrides at its 57th to 60th and 62nd meetings held between 14 March and 21 April 1967.
- 2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-26 of the present report).
- 3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of the United Kingdom to participate in the consideration of the Territory.
- 4. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in 1966 his delegation had provided the Sub-Committee with very detailed information on the situation in the Territory. Further information had been furnished at the 1669th meeting of the Fourth Committee in December 1966.
- 5. The representative of Chile said that the lack of information concerning the New Hebrides was a matter for concern, particularly as one of the administering Powers, namely France, had failed to supply the Sub-Committee with up-to-date information. It was to be hoped that that administering Power would adopt a more positive attitude in the future.
- 6. The representative of Poland said that in the New Hebrides no sign of political progress could be observed. Those islands, where there were no trade unions or political parties and where universal adult suffrage did not exist, were a typical example of a colony. It was unfortunate that the United Kingdom representative had not been able to furnish the Sub-Committee with information on the results of the consultations that had taken place between the French Government and his own on the New Hebrides. As to the information contained in the working paper, it was very disheartening.
- 7. The representative of India said that it was most regrettable that no constitutional progress had been made in the New Hebrides. The functions of the Advisory Council had not changed since 1951 and most of its members were still nominated. In 1965, however, the Council had asked the two administering Powers for a clear policy statement on the future of the Territory. They had apparently not yet replied. At the 1669th meeting of the Fourth Committee, the United Kingdom representative had said that the two administering Powers had examined, at the ministerial level, certain aspects of the administration of the Territory which impeded its progress. Her own delegation would like to have details of the action taken by the administering Powers to implement the Sub-Committee's recommendations concerning the reform of the Territory's administration.
- 8. In view of the relatively slow pace of political and economic progress in the New Hebrides, her delegation urged the administering Powers to implement General Assembly resolutions 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 in the Territory.
- 9. The representative of the United States wished first to point out, in connexion with the New Hebrides, that exports, which in 1965 reached £3.3 million, were a particularly important factor in the economy of the islands. Whereas, until the end of the Second World War, copra was virtually the only product exported by the Territory, there had since been a tendency towards diversification of the economy. It would be interesting to know to what extent that diversification had enabled the two administering Powers to reduce their grants-in-aid. With regard to education, the data in the Secretariat's working paper suggested that secondary education was still in the developing stage, only primary education being available to most of the children in the Territory. The Secretariat's report showed, however, that in 1965 a grant of £104,000 had been made for the construction of a new secondary school

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.395/Add.2.

at Vila and that, in the same year, a grant of £126,000 had been made for the construction of a post-primary school. Considering that the Territory had only 61,000 inhabitants, those figures, which concerned only one of the two administering Powers, appeared to augur well for the future. In that connexion, it would be interesting to know whether any part of the United Kingdom grants was used for the vocational training which had become necessary as a result of the diversification of agriculture and the economy in general.

- 10. The representative of Iraq said that more information should be obtained on the talks held in London in 1966 between the United Kingdom and France on the New Hebrides. In that connexion, the unhelpful attitude of France—which since 1964 had not provided any information on the archipelago—could only be regretted.
- 11. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the situation in the New Hebrides was rendered complex by the Territory's dual administration. Services administered jointly by the two administering Powers were financed from local taxation, derived mainly from import and export duties. National services which were separately administered, including public health and education, were subsidized by the metropolitan Powers, but the subsidies represented development and not budgetary aid, so that economic development would not necessarily tend to a decrease in this form of
- 12. He had no recent information on vocational education, but could state, on the basis of the latest annual report on the Territory, that the Administration had received expert advice on the subject and that certain types of practical and technical education had already been introduced in the schools.
- 13. Progress in the New Hebrides was the subject of ministerial talks, of which, he wished to explain, there were several series proceeding at different times and levels and which were gradually bearing fruit. Two specific results had already been obtained: the two administrations had decided to change the labour laws of the New Hebrides and to adopt a more effective system of registering births and deaths in the Territory. The question of land tenure was also being studied and the adoption of a land tenure code was contemplated.
- 14. The representative of Afghanistan said that the lack of constitutional progress in the Territory was most regrettable, and urged the administering Powers to implement without delay the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2232 (XXI).
- 15. The representative of Sierra Leone said that it was regrettable that France had supplied no information on the New Hebrides since 1964; it was difficult for the Sub-Committee to study the present situation in the Territory on the basis of information which was three years old. The United Kingdom's co-operation, on the other hand, was satisfactory. The situation of the Condominium was a little confusing because of the tripartite system of administration in which joint services existed side by side with separate services (education,

public health, social affairs and justice). The administering Powers should simplify the system so that all the islanders could work together for their own development and self-determination. Ten of the twenty members of the Advisory Council represented only 9 per cent of the population, and the representation of the remaining 91 per cent should be increased. In their development towards self-government and independence, the islanders should not be made to suffer from any differences of opinion between the two administering Powers; the discussions taking place between the latter on the future of the Territory were proceeding slowly, and the people were not being consulted sufficiently for them to be considered as participating as fully as they should in determining that future.

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

- 16. The Sub-Committee notes that there have been no constitutional changes or proposals concerning any changes by the administering Powers in the New Hebrides since it was considered by the Sub-Committee in 1966.
- 17. The Sub-Committee, aware of the peculiar problems of the Territory by virtue of its being a Condominium, recalls its conclusions in 1966 that very little progress had been made towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and that the political institutions and executive machinery were not representative of the people of the Territory.

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

- 18. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it reiterate to the administering Powers the recommendations it made concerning this Territory in 1966 and strongly urge them to implement these recommendations, which are as follows:
- (a) The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- (b) The people of the Territory should be provided an early opportunity to express their wishes with regard to the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes based on the principle of universal adult suffrage;
- (c) Urgent measures should be taken for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV);
- (d) The economic and social advancement of the Territory should be accelerated;
- (e) The administering Powers should expedite the finalization of reforms in the administration of the Condominium;
- (f) A visit by the Sub-Committee is necessary and would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the people. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Powers.

CHAPTER XVIII*

GUAM AND AMERICAN SAMOA

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly

1. In 1964, the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning Guam and American Samoa (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ Chap. XVI, paras. 64-71, and Chap. XVII, paras. 95-102). After considering the Territories in 1966, it recommended, *inter*

alia, that the further political development of the Territories should be accelerated by expanding the functions and powers of their legislatures and by vesting executive authority in the hands of the indigenous population. It urged that their economic growth be expedited further by fully developing their agricultural and industrial potential and, particularly in the case of Guam, by implementing as speedily as possible plans for the diversification of its economy. It requested that the educational and training facilities for the peoples of the Territories be increased. Finally it considered that a visit to the Territories by the Special

^{*} Parts A and B of this chapter were previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.364 and Add.1.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (Part I).

Committee was necessary and would be useful; it would familiarize the Committee with the needs and aspirations of the peoples, and would also increase the awareness of the peoples of their rights which have been guaranteed to them by the United Nations (A/6300/Rev.1,² chap. XVIII, para. 66).

2. At its twentieth and twenty-first sessions respectively the General Assembly adopted resolutions 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 concerning several Territories including Guam and American Samoa. Resolution 2232 (XXI) called upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It reiterated the Assembly's declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It urged the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend them full co-operation and assistance. It decided that the United Nations should render help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to pay special attention to the Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session,

B. Information on the Territories

1. Guam³

General

3. Guam, the southernmost of the Mariana Islands, lies in the western Pacific about 1,500 miles (2,400 kilometres) south-east of Manila, in the Philippines. It is a volcanic island thirty miles (forty-eight kilometres) long and ranges from four miles at its narrowest point to eight and a half miles at its broadest, with a land area of 209 square miles (541 square kilometres). The capital of Guam is Agana. The population, excluding military personnel, was 45,192 in April 1964, compared with an estimated 41,247 in 1961. The population in 1964 comprised:

"Statesiders"	(persons	from the		1,573
Filipinos				2,839
Hawaiians .				612
Others				1,799
			Total	45,192

Status

4. Guam was ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris in 1898, following the Spanish-American War. It is an organized but unincorporated Territory of the United States. Guamanians are citizens of the United States, but those who reside in Guam do not have the right to vote in United States elec-

² Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

tions and have no representation in the United States Congress.

Constitution

5. The Territory is administered under the Organic Act of Guam, 1950, as amended. Guam's relationship with the United States Government comes under the general supervision of the Department of the Interior.

Governor

6. The Governor is the chief executive and administrator of the affairs of the Government of Guam. He is appointed by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, to hold office for four years and until his successor is appointed and qualified. He is assisted by the Secretary of Guam who is also appointed by the President for a four-year term. The Secretary's position is similar to the position of the Secretary of State or Lieutenant Governor of a state of the United States. In the absence of the Governor from the island, the Secretary is empowered to assume the duties of the Governor. Under the Governor are ten departments, the directors of which are appointed by him with the advice and consent of the Guam Legislature.

Legislature

7. The unicameral Legislature of Guam, which is composed of twenty-one elected members, is empowered to pass laws on local matters, including taxation and appropriations for the fiscal operation of the Government. All laws enacted by the Legislature are reported to the Congress of the United States. If any such law is not annulled by the Congress within one year of the date of its receipt by that body, it is deemed to have been approved. Every bill passed by the Legislature becomes law unless the Governor returns it with his objections to the Legislature. If, after reconsideration, two thirds of the Legislature agree to pass the bill and the Governor still refuses to approve it, the latter must transmit the bill to the President of the United States. If the President fails to approve the bill, it does not become law.

Electoral system

8. There is universal suffrage for all citizens of Guam eighteen years of age or older. General elections are held every two years.

Political parties

9. Guam has two political parties: the Democratic Party, affiliated with the Democratic Party of the United States, and the Territorial Party, which is independent.

Recent developments

10. In 1966, the United States House of Representatives approved a bill providing for the election of the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor of Guam on 8 November 1966. Beginning with the year 1968 they would be elected every four years. In October the United States Senate returned the bill to the House for action with amendments which, *inter alia*, would provide for the election of the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor for four-year terms with the first election to be held on 3 November 1970. No action was taken concerning the proposal, which is

item 23.

The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States under Article 73 e of the Charter on 8 June 1966 for the year ended 30 June 1965.

to be resubmitted by the Executive Branch of the Government to Congress at its forthcoming session in 1967.

11. The most recent elections for members of the Guam Legislature were held in November 1966.

Economic conditions

- 12. Guam is relatively poor in natural resources. It is an important military base of the United States in the Pacific and its economy is supported primarily by the wages of Guamanians employed by the military. Agriculture is the other principal element in the economy, but its development is handicapped by the ready employment offered by the military installations and the civil government at relatively good wages.
- 13. The principal imports into Guam, chiefly from the United States, include food, vehicles, petroleum products, construction supplies and alcoholic beverages. The principal export is scrap metal. Imports were valued at \$41,414,026 and exports and re-exports were valued at \$9,323,056. Guam serves as a transshipping centre between the United States, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and other countries.
- 14. The total reserve for the fiscal year of 1965 totalled \$25,792,223, compared with \$22,821,794 in 1964. Expenditures totalled \$26,914,784, compared with \$22,215,542 the previous year.
- 15. Following typhoons in 1962 and 1963, Guam was declared a disaster area and approximately \$16 million was allocated by the Office of Emergency Planning for disaster projects. By 30 June 1965, 77 projects had been completed and 20 were still in progress.
- 16. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Congress made \$19 million available early in the fiscal year 1965, and an additional \$9,657,000 was approved to become available 1 July 1965. Construction on schools, utilities and other projects began with the release of funds. All major projects, with one exception, were to be completed in 1965 and 1966.

Social conditions

Labour

17. Guam continues to experience a shortage of competent labour, and off-island labour is recruited to meet the need for skilled workers. No information is available concerning the number of persons employed at military installations. The number of employees in the executive branch of the Government in 1965 totalled 4,582, compared with 3,888 in 1964. The number entering the service in 1965 totalled 1,207, compared with 417 in 1964.

Public health and hospital services

18. In 1964, the Department of Health and Welfare was created as a separate department from hospital services. It is now primarily concerned with preventive measures, the maintenance of safe and sanitary public and private health facilities, and the provision of social services and financial assistance. Under the new agreement a Board of Trustees was made the governing and policy-making body for the Guam Memorial Hospital. In 1965 the hospital was granted a full three-year accreditation ranking it with accredited hospitals in the United States. Renovation of the hospital was completed in 1965 at a total cost

of \$1,430,000 and it is now operating with a complement of 260 beds.

Educational conditions

19. The total budget of the Department of Education for the fiscal year 1965 was \$4,764,791. School attendance is compulsory between the ages of six and sixteen, inclusive. Public and private elementary and secondary schools had a total enrolment of about 23,000 in 1965. Expenditure on the College of Guam, which is not included in the Department of Education, totalled \$616,538 in 1965. During the year the college was awarded a three-year accreditation by the United States Western Association of Schools and Colleges. During the school year a total of 2,037 part-time and full-time students were enrolled at the college.

2. American Samoa⁴

General

- 20. American Samoa consists of the seven eastern islands of the Samoan Archipelago and is located about 1,600 miles north-east of New Zealand and seventy-seven miles east of Western Samoa. It has a total land area of 76.2 square miles. The headquarters of the Administration are located at Pago Pago on Tutuila, the main island of the Territory.
- 21. The inhabitants of the Territory are Polynesians. They have increased from 5,697 in 1900 to 20,051 according to the 1960 census. In July 1965, the population was estimated at 26,000.

Status

22. American Samoa is a Territory of the United States administered by the Department of the Interior by Executive Order signed by the President of the United States, effective 1 July 1951. The people of the Territory are nationals of the United States.

Constitution

23. The present Constitution of American Samoa was approved and promulgated on 27 April 1960, and came into effect on 17 October 1960.

Governor

24. The executive branch consists of the Governor, the Secretary and departmental and office heads. The Governor, who is the Chief Executive, is appointed by the Secretary of the Interior and exercises his authority under the latter's direction. The Secretary of American Samoa, also appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, assists the Governor in administering the Territory, serves as Lieutenant Governor, and represents the Governor during the latter's absence from the Territory. Heads of departments and officers of the executive branch are appointed by the Governor and are responsible to him.

Legislature

25. The Legislature of American Samoa consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Each of the fourteen political counties of the Territory elects, by Samoan custom, a *matai* (chief or talking chief) to the Senate to serve for four years. One additional

⁴ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 March 1967 for the year ending 30 June 1965.

senator, who serves for two years, is elected in rotation from four counties in the Western District.

- 26. The Constitution provides that the membership of the House of Representatives shall be elected by secret ballot on the basis of population, that the total number of representatives shall not exceed 24 and that each county shall have at least one representative regardless of population. At present the House of Representatives has 17 members elected by popular vote at the polls. There is one delegate from Swains Island which the adult permanent residents elect at an open meeting. He has all the privileges of a member of the House except the right to vote. Members hold office for two years. During the Eighth Legislature, all the members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, with one exception, were matais. Swains Island failed to elect a delegate to the Eighth Legislature.
- 27. The Legislature has the authority to pass legislation with respect to subjects of local application except that: (a) no such legislation may be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Territory or the laws of the United States applicable in American Samoa, or be in conflict with treaties or international agreements of the United States; (b) the annual budget shall be as presented to the Congress of the United States subject to such allocations among departments and activities as may be made by the Governor as a result of increases or decreases in the amount of grant funds approved by the Congress, and the Governor shall inform the Legislature of the Territory of his actions in this regard at its next regular session; (c) legislation involving the expenditure of funds other than as budgeted must include revenue measures to provide the needed funds.
- 28. All laws are enacted by bills which may originate in either House, and may be amended or altered or rejected by the other. The Governor may submit proposed legislation to the Legislature for consideration by it.
- 29. Every bill that has passed both Houses is presented to the Governor for his approval. On the Governor's signature, it becomes a law. If the Governor does not approve the bill, he returns it with his objections to the House in which it originated. If he fails to return the bill within twenty days, it becomes a law, whether signed by him or not, unless the Legislature by adjournment prevents such a return. If, however, the Governor signs the bill within forty-five days after adjournment of the Legislature, it becomes a law in the same manner as if it had been signed by him before adjournment.
- 30. A bill that has been vetoed by the Governor may be passed over his veto, provided that the action is taken by a different session of the Legislature from that in which the bill originated, and that it is passed by a two-thirds majority of the entire membership of each House within fourteen months of the date of the Governor's veto. Under the Constitution, a bill so passed must again be presented to the Governor for his approval. If he does not approve it within twenty days, he sends it, together with his comments, to the Secretary of the Interior. If the latter approves it within ninety days after receipt by him, it becomes a law; otherwise it shall not.
- 31. In the event of the Governor having submitted to the Legislature proposed legislation which he has

designated as urgent, and the Legislature having failed to pass it in its original form or in an amended form acceptable to the Governor at the session in which it was submitted, the Governor may himself, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, promulgate such proposed legislation as a law.

Electoral system

32. All residents of five years' standing over the age of 20 years who have resided for one year within the county in which they intend to vote, are eligible to vote in elections in American Samoa. All persons who are qualified to vote and who are at least 25 years old and are either United States nationals or citizens, are eligible to run for and to hold office in the House of Representatives. General elections are held every two years.

Public Service

33. At 30 June 1965, the Public Service consisted of 182 "stateside" employees (overseas officers) and 2,696 local officers.

Judiciary

- 34. Judicial power is vested in the High Court and five district courts. The High Court consists of an Appellate, a Probate and a Trial Division. It has 6 judges: the Chief Justice, the Associate Justice and 4 Samoan Associate Judges. The court system is under the general administration of the Chief Justice of American Samoa, who is appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. The fundamental human rights of the inhabitants of the Territory are protected both by the Constitution of the United States and by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Territory, the latter being patterned substantially after the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution.
- 35. All personnel of the judicial branch are American Samoans with the exception of the Chief Justice, the Associate Justice, and the Clerk of the High Court, the latter three being stateside United States citizens in the Federal Civil Service.

Local government

- 36. The Secretary for Samoan Affairs, the head of the Department of Local Government, is a Samoan appointed by the Governor. He is responsible for the proper administration of district, county and village affairs as provided by law, and for the supervision of all ceremonial functions.
- 37. Each of the District Governors serving at present as administrative head of the three political districts within the Territory is a Samoan. He is nominated by the district council chiefs and appointed by the Governor for a four-year term.
- 38. Each of the fourteen counties has a county chief nominated by the chiefs in his county council and appointed by the Governor for a four-year term. Within each county the village councils, consisting of the village chiefs, nominate one of their members as mayor who is appointed by the Governor for a one-year term. All local officials are responsible to their respective district, county and village councils.
- 39. A local Government Council composed of the three District Governors and the fourteen county chiefs is reported to be gradually assuming the role of a policy-making body within the local government or-

ganization. It appoints its own officers who form an Executive Committee. The Council maintains constant liaison with the Governor and the Secretary and acts as the co-ordinating body for all matters pertaining to local government.

Constitutional developments

40. The present Constitution, which came into effect on 17 October 1960, provided for its automatic revision or amendment at the end of five years. The representative of the United States informed the General Assembly at its twenty-first session that a Samoan Constitutional Review Committee had completed its work and that many of its proposals had been directed towards expanding the powers of the Samoan Legislature. The Committee had proposed, inter alia, that the Legislature should be given the right to review that portion of the proposed budget to be financed from Washington, before recommendations were sent to the Federal Government. It had also proposed that, where no financing from the United States Government was involved, except for funds normally availble to all States and Territories under United States legislation, the Governor would present the Samoan budget to the Legislature, which would have full authority to make the appropriations. The Committee had also made proposals to change the qualifications of members of the Legislature in order to render it more fully representative, and to expand the maximum length of its sessions. Other recommendations concerned further limitations on the prerogatives of the Governor with regard to legislative proposals. Those and other proposals had been considered at a Constitutional Convention convened in the Territory in October 1966. In conclusion, the representative of the United States stated that the Samoan electorate had already approved the recommendations of the Constitutional Review Committee, and that the proposed new Constitution would be transmitted to the Federal Government in Washington for review in the near future.

Economic conditions

- 41. The administering Power reports that in 1965 it continued to seek economic advancement for the people of the Territory in two principal areas: by assisting the American Samoan Development Corporation and by the encouragement, through the Bank of American Samoa, of new business and agriculture ventures. Territorial self-sufficiency has been a goal of the development programme. In attaining this goal, the report continues, the maximum effort has been made to assure that the economy does not become dominated by "absentee landlords". Samoan ownership is preferred in all enterprises. Where this is impossible, Samoan partnership is sought. And where outside capital is required for a development (for instance, in the multi-million dollar tuna canneries), Samoan interest is protected by agreements covering wages and hours calling for maximum promotional opportunities for local residents.
- 42. The Territory has limited arable land. The Administration is making extensive use of the new medium of educational television to improve agricultural methods, and its effectiveness has been proved through increased inquiries about and purchases of fertilizer by farmers. Fertilizer use in 1965 totalled 17,300 pounds, compared with 3,500 pounds in the previous

- year. Forestry resources of the Territory have not been utilized efficiently. More than one half of the Territory is covered with indigenous forest species.
- 43. Fish of a wide variety are abundant in the surrounding waters. Major commercial exploitation of the sea's resources is undertaken by tuna fishing vessels from the Republic of China, Korea and Japan, who are under contract to canneries operated by Star-Kist Samoa, Incorporated, and the Van Camp Company. These canneries, under agreement with the territorial Government, make fish available on the local market at cost. The administering Power reports that its efforts to interest local participation in commercial tuna fishing have not met with satisfactory response despite the possibility of excellent economic potential.
- 44. In 1965, export tonnage was the highest ever recorded from the Territory and canned tuna retained its dominance in both tonnage and value of exports. Tuna exports were valued at \$9,038,937. The value exceeded 90 per cent of total exports.
- 45. The economy was further strengthened in December 1965 when the Hotel Pago Pago Intercontinental was opened. The hotel is owned by the American Samoan Development Corporation whose shareholders are, by law, Samoan. It is expected that the new hotel, along with the new jet air terminal, will cause an increase in the number of tourists visiting the Territory.
- 46. As stated earlier, arable land is limited in total area and it is also highly fragmented in ownership. Types of land ownership include freehold, communal, family, individual and government. Only a very small amount of land is under freehold and government land holdings are also modest, though one large parcel does exist, the land occupied by Pago Pago International Airport on Tafuna.
- 47. Most land in the Territory is held communally or by families. Under the Samoa for the Samoans concept, the Government protects Samoan land ownership. Land may be rented by Samoans or to Samoans without difficulty. Land dealings involving non-Samoans are, however, subject to government approval. The Government's responsibility under the law is to prevent improvident alienation of communal lands and this policy is vigorously enforced.
- 48. Land tenure is generally vested in a village or family chief or *matai*. This method of land control and stringent government protection of Samoan land rights have prevented creation of large private plantations.
- 49. The Government of American Samoa is financed from grants-in-aid from the United States Congress, supplemented by local revenues. Direct appropriations are provided for the Governor's office, the Legislature and the Chief Justice of the High Court. In the fiscal year 1965, congressional appropriations and grants totalled \$5,314,001, compared with \$12,002,000 for the fiscal year 1964. Local revenues for the fiscal year 1965 were \$3,153,375, an increase of \$674,045 over the fiscal year 1964.

Social conditions

Labour

50. Federal and territorial statutes govern minimum wages for everyone employed in the Territory except domestic workers and agricultural workers, most of whom work on family or village lands. A Federal Minimum Wage Board sits in the Territory at two-year

- intervals. It fixes wages for persons employed in the canneries, stevedoring and maritime occupations, airlines and travel agencies and in petroleum distribution. In 1965, these workers received \$1.00 per hour. The territorial minimum was \$0.49 per hour for all other occupations.
- 51. The basic employment policy of the Government is that Samoans have the first right to any and all jobs. Persons are recruited from overseas only to fill positions for which no qualified local applicant can be found. They are hired on short-term contracts and are responsible for training their Samoan counterparts.
- 52. There are a considerable number of migrant labourers and craftsmen from neighbouring Western Samoa, the Kingdom of Tonga, the Cook Islands and Niue. The Administration has tightened the immigration legislation and its enforcement, and an active deportation programme has been undertaken to repatriate aliens whose skills are not essential to the Territory's economy.
- 53. The Social Security Act has been extended to American Samoa. At the end of 1964, some 264 beneficiaries were receiving approximately \$6,000 monthly. At the end of 1965, a large number of workers had amassed enough quarters of employment to qualify for disability benefits. Although there is no territorial law requiring workmen's compensation, disability compensation is available to government employees, and other major employers carry insurance disability claims.

Public health

- 54. During 1965, the medical services were provided by seven stateside physicians and thirteen Samoan practitioners. Dental care was provided by one stateside dentist and four Samoan dental practitioners. In nursing service and nursing education, five registered nurses supervised nursing care and gave instruction in the School of Practical Nursing. Training facilities consist of a School of Practical Nursing at the main hospital and on-the-job training programmes in x-ray, laboratory, pharmacy, sanitation and dental hygiene. A number of young Samoans are in colleges and universities in the United States pursuing studies in medicine, nursing and the related fields. Free medical and dental care is provided to American Samoans. There is a small charge for hospital care. The Territory has one general hospital with 154 beds, a leprosarium with 20 beds, and 4 dispensaries (outpatient with beds for minor cases) with 24 beds. In 1965, an architectural firm in the United States was placed under contract to design the proposed new American Samoa Tropical Medicine Centre to be built at Faja'alu.
- 55. The administering Power reports that the mass campaign against filariasis has been successful. In 1962, 28 per cent of the population was infected with filariae, while in 1965 the incidence had dropped to 3 per cent, and it is expected that the disease will be eradicated completely. In 1965, the Administration intended to to undertake a mass campaign against intestinal parasites which infect an estimated 80 per cent of the population.
- 56. The birth-rate of 49 per 1,000 persons is among the highest in the world. A family planning programme was instituted early in 1966 and women seeking assistance are given counselling by the Department of Medical Services.
- 57. Total expenditures for medical services in 1965 were \$988,190.50 compared with \$1,000,726 in 1964.

Educational conditions

- 58. Education is compulsory between the ages of 7 and 18 years, or until graduation from the ninth grade. In 1964-1965, there were 41 public and 4 private elementary schools; 5 public junior high schools; 1 public and 1 private high school; and 1 public teacher-training school. A total of 6,653 and 1,395 students were enrolled in public and private schools, respectively. The private schools are conducted by religious organizations and function with the approval of the Department of Education. They must meet the requirements for secular education set by the Department.
- 59. Under the Government's scholarship programme, young Samoans are sent to the United States and elsewhere for advanced training with the hope that they will replace mainland personnel on their return.
- 60. In 1965, land was acquired for all but three of the 26 new consolidated elementary schools and construction was substantially completed on 15 sites. New high schools for 600 students at Leone and for 300 in Manu'a were opened in the school years 1965-66 and 1966-67.
- 61. Educational television was introduced in October 1964, when a three-channel television station came into operation. The Michael J. Kirwan Educational Television Centre at Utulei is the centre for administration and production of broadcast lessons and printed material. Curricular specialists of the Department of Education and a special consultant, retained by the Government, have devised a programme in which children at the first level learn reading and writing in Samoan and then gradually begin their studies of oral English. Increasing percentages of instruction are in English until the last years of high school when there is no Samoan instruction.
- 62. In its report on the Territory, the administering Power reiterates its policy to conserve, in every way possible, the lands and traditions of the Samoan people. It believes that the introduction of educational television has provided new tools for the implementation of this policy. The report states that Samoan reading and writing and culture are now taught to children for the first time and that the entire Department of Education is being "Samoanized" as rapidly as possible. It is expected that adult literary programmes and other programmes concerning modern agricultural methods, public health, local self-government and world events will be introduced on the television networks.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

- 63. At its 562nd and 563rd meetings on 22 September 1967, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on Guam and American Samoa which appears as an annex to this chapter.
- 64. The representatives of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed reservations with regard to the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on these Territories.
- 65. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that it was evident from the documentation available to the Special Committee that the administering Power had done virtually nothing to promote the independence of the Territories; moreover, there seemed to be a categorical refusal on its part to comply with United Nations resolutions concerning the Territory of Guam. Not only had the United States not implemented General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI), it was violating it, other United Nations reso-

lutions and the United Nations Charter on the question of decolonization. It was transforming Guam and American Samoa into economic and military appendage of the United States, and in doing so was promoting not the interests of the people of the Territories but its own military and economic interests. In addition, it was repressing the aspirations of the peoples of the Territories and hampering the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

- 66. No progress had occurred in the political field, since the colonial Power was continuing to maintain its control of the population and prevent the establishment of real self-government. While legislative bodies did exist, they had no genuine power. Therefore, in not leading the people of the Territories to self-determination and independence, the administering Power was explicitly violating the Charter. Moreover, it refused to take any decision regarding the future of the Territories and to set a date for independence; it had plans to absorb the Territories and to convert them into a new state of the United States. In the economic sphere, all the policies of the administering Power were designed to transform the Territories into an appendange of the United States and into markets for United States goods. For agriculture in Eastern Samoa, according to to one observer, the same methods that had been used when the Territories had been discovered in 1722 were being used. Its economy was dominated by foreign monopolies. The Jones and Guerrero company played an important part in the economic life of Guam and its profits for the year 1966 had exceeded \$3 million. According to reports in The New York Times that company, as well as other United States companies, had been granted special tax privileges and immunities. Furthermore, the administering Power, in ignoring the relevant provisions of the Charter, had done little to improve working conditions in the Territories. There had been 2,000 unemployed Guamanians in 1967; a large number of workers had been forced to emigrate to the United States from Eastern Samoa, including many of the most highly skilled workers in the Ter-
- 67. The Committee should also not ignore the political role of the island of Guam as a military base of the United States. Its economy was to a great extent dependent on the base: reports in *The New York Times* had stated that 30 per cent of the labour force of Guam worked at the United States military base. Another observer had stated that many young people were drawn away from agriculture to work at the base. At present, the military establishment on the island apparently equalled the indigenous adult population in number.
- 68. More important still, according to the United States Press, heavy bombers were stationed on Guam, and were being used to bomb both North and South Viet-Nam. The New York Times of 2 December 1966 had stated that the Third United States Strategic Air Division was based on the island and also that bombers left Guam almost daily to bomb Viet-Nam and to carry out strategic tasks in the Far East. The importance of Guam to the United States was shown by the fact that it was a central base for the United States Pacific Command, which operated from the Arctic to the Antarctic with some 600,000 men and immense quantities of equipment. Another example of the misuse by the administering Power of the Territory of Guam was evident from a report in The New York Times that

- four young Guamanians had been killed while serving with United States forces in South Viet-Nam.
- 69. The representative of the United States, interrupting on a point of order, said he felt that the Soviet Union representative was straying far from the matter at hand. United States military activities in the Pacific and South-East Asia had nothing to do with the Sub-Committee's report on Guam and American Samoa.
- 70. The Chairman said that, in his view, the Soviet Union representative had been endeavouring to show how a colonial Territory was being used for military purposes and was therefore quite in order.
- 71. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, continuing his statement, said that in using the Territories of Guam and Eastern Samoa for its military and strategic purposes, the United States showed that it had no thought of granting them independence. It was concerned not with the interests of the people of the Territories but with setting up a beachhead to stifle national liberation movements in the Territories and was assigning a role to the islands which fell in with its own view of United States responsibilities in the Pacific. In doing so it was violating not only General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but resolution 2105 (XX) which had asked the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and to refrain from establishing new ones.
- 72. In the light of those considerations, his delegation was of the view that the Committee should make additional and more forceful recommendations to the General Assembly concerning the Territories. It should affirm the right of the peoples of the Territories to selfdetermination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and request the administering Power to create fully competent legislative bodies in the Territories reflecting the interests of the peoples, to return all the land used for military purposes and to eliminate its military bases. The Committee should also condemn the use of Guam as a military base, its use for aggression against Viet-Nam and all plans for merging the Territories with the metropolitan country, and it should call on the administering Power to uphold the right of the people to utilize their own natural resources, abolishing all laws granting privileges to foreign companies.
- 73. As they stood, the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations were unsatisfactory. His delegation was particularly surprised that the recommendation in paragraph 40 (c) of the report of the Sub-Committee indicated that the assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies could be utilized most effectively to help expedite the economic growth of the Territories. Such a recommendation would make a mockery of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), particularly when the United States was trying its best to stifle national liberation movements in the Territories. His delegation therefore would not be able to support that recommendation; it would abstain from voting on the other recommendations on Guam and American Samoa, since it felt they did not take account of the existing situation.
- 74. The representative of the United States said that he categorically rejected the additional recommendations proposed by the Soviet Union representative, as they bore no relationship to the existing situation in the Territories. The Soviet Union representative had made much of information gathered from the Press and other sources, but he had not shown that the infor-

reflected authoritatively the situation in the area, much less the plans and policies of the United States Government. He would flatly deny the charge that the United States military base in Guam was being used for purposes inconsistent with the United Nations Charter. The base had been used for decades in the defence of freedom in the area. He could not accept the assertion that the United States had done nothing to promote self-determination for the people of Guam. In the past year, Guam had held elections with full adult suffrage in which several political parties had been represented covering a wide range of views and the Guamanian people had elected a legislative body which reflected their own desires concerning their future. He did not consider that Soviet experience and policies with regard to the selfdetermination of countries and nations placed the Soviet delegation in any position to furnish advice to the United States Government on this subject. Nor could he agree with the claim that the United States was attempting to maintain economic supremacy in Guam through its military base. He had described in detail in the Sub-Committee the efforts being made to diversify the economy of the Territory including the establishment of an Economic Development Authority and steps to improve agriculture. An equally false assertion of the Soviet delegate was that the industrial development of Guam was being held back to preserve Guam as a market for United States goods; on the contrary, a number of small industries had recently been created on Guam which were exporting goods to the United States and Guam benefitted from advantageous import tariffs. Moreover, a substantial sum had been appropriated for designs to develop Guam's commercial port facilities.

75. American Samoa had also recently elected a legislative body through full adult suffrage. In 1964, Samoa had had an opportunity to make suggestions concerning constitutional change; among the proposals now being implemented was one providing for a larger measure of authority for the Samoan legislature. It was not true to say, as the Soviet delegate had, that Samoa was being monopolized by foreign interests; measures had been taken by the United States Government to ensure that the development of Samoa benefited the people of the Territory directly. The American Samoan Development Corporation, for example, had only Samoan shareholders; Samoan ownership in all enterprises was preferred, and if not possible, Samoan partnership was sought. Where outside capital was involved, Samoan interests were fully protected by special agreements.

76. The representative of Bulgaria said that, despite the statement of the United States representative, the members of the Special Committee were well aware that what the Soviet Union representative had said was true. The Soviet Union representative had referred to articles in The New York Times, which must be assumed to reflect the actual situation in the United States Territories concerned. The United States was adopting partial measures which gave the appearance of progress while in fact it retained effective control over the Territories. Guam had been transformed into a military base for aggression in South-East Asia and especially Viet-Nam. It was the Committee's responsibility to recommend measures to promote the decolonization process, and that was particularly the case with small Territories, which were often used by administering Powers for military purposes. He supported the Soviet Union proposals to strengthen the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee and to bring them into line with the true situation in the Territories concerned.

- 77. The representative of the United States said that it should be clear from what he had stated earlier regarding recent elections and constitutional changes in Guam and American Samoa that the United States was not seeking to retain control over the affairs of the Territories. In addition, he had referred in the discussions of Sub-Committee II to a proposal pending in the United States Congress for the introduction of a system under which the people of Guam would elect their own chief executive. That proposal had the support of the Federal Government, further evidence that it is not trying to retain control of the political life of the Territories.
- 78. The representative of Poland said that his delegation had drawn attention in Sub-Committee II to the fact that the administering Power was using Guam for purposes incompatible with the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). If the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee were endorsed as they stood, his delegation would have to reserve its position on the matter.
- 79. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation was prepared to approve the report and endorse the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee, but with strong reservations on paragraph 39 (c). The administering Power for the Territory of Guam was deeply involved in military activities in the area, which were not conducive to the welfare of the people and which, in fact, jeopardized their interests. The second sentence of the sub-paragraph, by stating merely that the dependence of Guam on the military activities of the administering Power should be reduced, appeared to condone those activities and was therefore unacceptable to his delegation.
- 80. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation reserved its position on the concluding section of the document. If, however, a separate vote were taken on paragraph 40, his delegation would vote in favour of it.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the Report of Sub-Committee II

81. At its 563rd meeting on 22 September 1967, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II concerning Guam and American Samoa, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record. These conclusion and recommendations are as follows:

Conclusions

- (a) The Special Committee recognizes that some of the positive steps it noted in its last report have been consolidated: however, it is of the opinion that progress towards full self-government and self-determination and independence continues to be slow.
- (b) Although some changes have taken place, the administering Power still retains considerable powers of control in executive and legislative spheres, thus restricting the exercise of self-government by the people of the Territories. The political institutions and executive machinery are not fully representative of the people.

- (c) The Special Committee notes the announcement by the administering Power of the establishment of development bodies in the Territories. It still feels that the development envisaged by these bodies should further be intensified by the administering Power to interest the local people, and that the primary dependence of the economy of Guam on the military activities of the administering Power should be reduced by greatly diversifying the economy of that Territory.
- (d) The Special Committee notes that the bill providing for direct election of the Governor of Guam has not yet been adopted by the Congress of the United States. It also notes that the proposals for a new draft constitution for American Samoa took effect on 1 July 1967. Notwithstanding these developments, the Special Committee notes that there is still no time-table of effective measures for a speedy implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

Recommendations

- (e) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of American Samoa and Guam to self-government and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (f) The administering Power should accelerate the further political development of the Territories by expanding the functions and powers of legislature and by vesting greater executive authority in the hands of the indigenous population.
- (g) The Special Committee urges the administering Power to expedite further the economic growth of the Territories by fully developing their agricultural and industrial and other potential and, particularly in the case of Guam, to implement as speedily as possible its plans for the diversification of the economy. In this regard, the assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies could be utilized most effectively.
- (h) The administering Power is requested to intensify the educational and training facilities for the people of the Territories so as to enable them to occupy more responsible positions.
- (i) A visit to the Territories by the Special Committee is necessary and would be most useful, for, in addition to familiarizing the Member States with the needs and aspirations of the people, it would also increase the people's awareness of their rights which have been guaranteed to them by the United Nations.

ANNEX*

Report of Sub-Committee II Guam and American Samoa

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

- 1. The Sub-Committee considered Guam and American Samoa at its 60th, 61st, 62nd and 64th meetings held on 5, 14, 21 April and 7 August 1967.
- 2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-62 of the present chapter).
- 3. The representative of the United States said that members would recall that the Samoan Constitution of 1960 had provided for its automatic review after a period of five years. In 1964, pursuant to a joint resolution of the Samoan Legislature, the Governor had appointed a Committee to carry out the task of review. The amendments proposed by that Committee appeared, *inter alia*, in the working paper prepared by the
 - * Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.395/Add.3.

- Secretariat (see para. 40 of the present chapter); the proposals included the right of the Samoan Legislature to review the portion of the budget to be financed by the United States Government and to appropriate local revenue, and further limitations on the prerogatives of the Governor, who would no longer have the power to promulgate legislation which he had designated "urgent" but which the Samoan Legislature had not approved during the legislative session in which the Governor had introduced the proposed legislation. The Committee's recommendations had been approved by the Samoan electorate in November 1966 and were now being considered by the Secretary of the Interior.
- 4. With regard to social and economic matters, the Territory had almost completely repaired the damage caused by the January 1966 hurricane. The basic structure of more than 600 new, permanent homes had been completed, and part of the housing fund appropriated in 1966 was being used as a revolving loan fund for home loans. A new hospital would be opened by the end of 1967, several months ahead of schedule.
- 5. Samoa had pioneered in the use of educational television to provide quality education for all. Since October 1965, courses had been regularly televised on six channels and could be received in the neighbouring islands.
- 6. The fishing industry, one of the major employers, had increased its production sixfold since 1962. Tourism, an important source of revenue, promised to continue to develop, thanks to the construction of hotels and the expansion of airline services.
- 7. As far as Guam was concerned, he said that the United States Congress was currently holding hearings on a bill relating to a future office of elective Governor of the Territory. Under the terms of the bill, the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governor would be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, i.e., by the persons qualified to vote for members of the Legislature. The Governor would be responsible for the administration of the laws of Guam and of United States laws applicable to the Territory. A comptroller appointed by the Secretary of the Interior would seek to improve the efficiency of programmes prepared by the Guamanian Government and to ensure the proper use of federal funds. The bill also reaffirmed the bill of rights contained in the territorial legislation and the Organic Act.
- 8. Out of a civilian population of 50,000, 20,000 persons had been eligible to vote in the general elections held in November 1966, and 17,124 (i.e., 91 per cent) had actually cast ballots. The Democratic Party had won all 21 seats in the unicameral Legislature, but the Territorial Party remained active, and a branch of the Republican Party had recently been organized. The population was informed about and encouraged to participate in the political life of the island by two independent daily newspapers and a radio-television station.
- 9. With a view to diversifying the Guamanian economy, an economic development plan had been drawn up in 1966. To promote agricultural production, the Economic Development Authority, which his delegation had described at some length last year, had recently concluded a contract under which an agricultural co-operative regularly sold its produce to the Government. Efforts were also being made to set up new meat and poultry processing plants.
- 10. During the financial year 1966, the Guamanian Commercial Port had handled nearly 193,000 revenue tons of goods, an increase of 38 per cent over 1963. A new port was under construction and nearly \$US5 million had been appropriated for that purpose.
- 11. Ten new schools had been built; school enrolment had increased by 1,000 students per year for the past 4 years and would probably grow by 1,500 students per year over the next 4 years. Guam had a vocational rehabilitation school and a school for mentally retarded persons. The College of Guam offered higher education courses in 8 major academic disciplines. There were at present 1,200 full-time students enrolled, and their number was expected to grow to 4,400 within the next 5 years.
- 12. The representative of Poland said that Guam was becoming a tragic symbol of the misuse of a Non-Self-Gov-

erning Territory. The almost daily references to it in press dispatches were not due to any progress in the economic and political spheres but to its use as a military base by the administering Power, a use which under the terms of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter and with resolution 1514 (XV). According to The New York Times of 20 and 21 March 1967, the Territory, in which 6 Polarismissile submarines and 50 B-52 bombers of the United States armed forces were based, looked to Washington for economic help, but it had not been until the President of the United States had visited the island that disaster relief amounting to \$US750,000 had been granted to it. Yet Article 73 of the United Nations Charter laid down that the interests of the inhabitants of a Non-Self-Governing Territory were paramount, and it listed among the tasks of administering Powers that of furthering international peace and security. In Guam, however, the economy was subordinated to the Territory's military usefulness.

- 13. There had been hardly any advance in the political sphere. In 1964 it had been promised that the Governor would cease to be appointed and would be elected instead. That had not yet happened. The Polish delegation expressed the hope that that step would be taken without delay, and it would like to know when and how the people of Guam would be enabled to pronounce on their future and thus exercise their right to self-determination.
- 14. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation had noted the facts given by the United States representative to show the economic progress of the Territories under consideration. It observed, however, that agricultural activity had declined in Guam. Recalling that in resolution 2189 (XXI) the General Assembly had invited the Special Committee to recommend a deadline for the independence of Territories, to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to see to their exercise of the right to self-determination and independence, he observed that if the economic progress of the Territories was as speedy as the administering Power said, there was good reason for asking the United States whether it had considered setting a date for independence.
- 15. Furthermore, some proof ought to be furnished to the Sub-Committee that the people of Guam and Samoa knew the various possibilities among which they would have to choose in exercising their right to self-determination, for according to the administering Power it would seem that full independence could not easily be achieved.
- 16. Referring to the Polish representative's comments on the use of Guam for military purposes, the Sierra Leonean delegation took the view that the continued presence of the bases merely provided reasons for delaying the Territory's independence. Although the people of Guam should be able to subsist economically without having to rely on the bases, not enough concern had been shown for them. At all events the administering Power should be asked to consider the possibility of removing the military base from Guam.
- 17. As to Samoa, the proposals accepted by the people of the islands in 1966 and still pending before the United States Congress seemed a step in the right direction. However, from the statements made by the United States representative, it would seem that progress was still slow. He asked whether there was any possibility of speeding it up. Whatever interpretation might be placed on the fact that there had not been any petitioners from Samoa before the Special Committee, if it appeared that the Samoans were satisfied with the progress of their Territory, then they should be immediately given an opportunity to opt for independence.
- 18. The representative of Chile said that the information on Guam given in the Secretariat working paper and in the United States representative's statements revealed positive elements for the Territory's development. It was most regrettable, however, that Guam's economy was largely supported by the salaries and wages paid by the military authorities of the base and that the attraction of work in the public sector was impeding agricultural development. The formation of the agricultural cooperative about which the United States delegation had spoken was nevertheless an encouraging sign. Guam's economy should

- come to depend less and less on the military base so that the people might soon be able to exercise their right to self-determination without facing any obstacle to normal political development. His delegation welcomed the fact that the present Governor of Guam would be the last to be appointed by the President of the United States.
- 19. He asked the United States representative why he had cited the figure of 50,000 for the population of Guam whereas the Secretariat document said that the population, excluding military personnel, was 45,192.
- 20. Regarding Samoa, it was regrettable that the Chief Executive of the Territory was still entirely subordinate to the United States Secretary of the Interior. The legislature, on the other hand, was operating smoothly enough to enable a large amount of legislation to be adopted without constantly incurring the Governor's veto. In that connexion, he asked how many indigenous persons were members of the House of Representatives and the Senate and whether they had a say in the appointment of the islands' administrative personnel; that information would help in assessing any correlation that might exist between the two major branches in administrative matters. It would also be helpful to know approximately how many high posts were held by indigenous persons in the administration, which, according to the Secretariat document, had a total of 2,696 local officers. In so far as local government was concerned, the participation of indigenous persons was satisfactory.
- 21. To judge from the information given to the Sub-Committee, genuine economic progress was being made. It was essential that economic development should benefit the Samoans. To be able to assess the distribution of wealth in the Territory, it would be necessary to know the approximate number of Samoans within the total population. Referring to the marked expansion of the tourist industry, he asked whether the shareholders—who had to be Samoans—in the American Samoan Development Corporation, which owned the Hotel Pago Pago Intercontinental, were indigenous persons or United States citizens who had settled in the Territory. In many small Territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean, large hotel firms were relegating the indigenous inhabitants to auxiliary or inferior positions, and in many cases were being used for the amusement of tourists.
- 22. That situation, however conducive to the development of the Territories, was undermining the social, intellectual and political progress of the people.
- 23. Although educational progress in Samoa was considerable at the primary and secondary levels, it was less so at the higher level. His delegation, in view of the risk that students who went to a university in the United States might never return home, hoped that the administering Power would consider establishing a regional university, without however giving up the present scholarship programme. Graduates of such an institution could obtain more advanced training in the United States or elsewhere and thus acquire the skills they would need to replace the officials of the administering Power. In addition, Samoan traditions could thus be more fully respected without checking the economic and social development of the Territory or the progress of its people.
- 24. Turning to the question of visiting missions, he expressed his support for sending of missions to Guam and American Samoa so that the progress being made might be assessed at first-hand and some idea might be obtained on how the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly were being applied.
- 25. The representative of India recalled that in 1966 the Special Committee had recommended the administering Power to speed political advancement in the Territories by expanding the functions and powers of the legislatures and vesting executive power in the indigenous population. That recommendation apparently had not been followed, and the Territories were still far from self-government. The proposals of the Constitutional Review Committee had been accepted by the Samoans, and it was hoped that they would be approved without delay by the United States Government. It would be helpful to the Sub-Committee to have more information on the proposals, particularly those concerned with increasing the powers of the

Samoan Legislature. Furthermore, under those proposals, the Governor still had too much power over legislative bills. As he still represented the administering Power, and not the people, arrangements should be made for his election by the people, as was proposed in the case of Guam.

- 26. The Special Committee had also recommended in 1966 that the administering Power should provide the people of the Territory with increased facilities for education and training. While the declared policy of the administering Power was to give Samoans priority in employment, the fact remained that it had taken no steps to establish in Samoa itself institutions at which Samoans could obtain the training required for employment as skilled workers.
- 27. Her delegation regretted that, despite the promise given by the United States representative in 1964, the bill providing for an elected Governor in Guam had not yet been passed. The question was particularly important to the Guamanians because the Governor held a veto power over bills passed by the Territorial Legislature. The powers of that Legislature were further limited by the fact that even a law approved by the Governor could be annulled by the United States Congress within one year.
- 28. Although the administering Power had endeavoured to develop the economy of American Samoa, it was a matter of concern that it had not fully succeeded in interesting the local population in commercial tuna fishing. In the working paper it was stated that United States appropriations and grants in the financial year 1965 had amounted to only \$5.3 million as against \$12 million in 1964. She wondered what the reason was for that reduction, which, in her view, could not be explained by an increase in income in 1965, and what its consequences were for the people.
- 29. The Sub-Committee had already observed that the economy of Guam depended primarily on the wages of the Guamanians employed at the United States military base in the Territory and had recommended that the Administering Power should implement as speedily as possible its plans for diversifying the economy. It appeared necessary to repeat that recommendation and request the administering Power to intensify its efforts in that direction.
- 30. In conclusion, her delegation urged the administering Power to take appropriate measures to implement General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) and the relevant resolutions of the Special Committee.
- 31. The representative of the United States said that he would obtain information from his Government concerning certain points that had been raised and would transmit it to the Sub-Committee. He categorically rejected the allegations concerning the purposes for which the military base at Guam was being used. That base had existed for several decades and had a long and distinguished record in the defence of freedom. It was used in compliance with the principals embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. The base did not in any way hinder the political, economic and social development of the Territory. As everyone knew, the indigenous population enjoyed universal suffrage. Out of 50,000 Guamanians, 22,000 had the right to vote, 18,000 were registered, and 17,000 had voted at the last elections. The people had been informed of all the choices open to them concerning their political future. A bill which would allow the Guamanians to elect their own governor had been introduced in Congress. The United States Congress had been holding hearings on that bill. With regard to financial assistance to the economy of Guam, the latest available information indicated that the total amount of grants authorized under the Rehabilitation Act by the Congress of the United States was \$45 million, of which \$30 million had already been appropriated for school construction, the establishment of public utilities and similar purposes. Those figures demonstrated the magnitude of United States economic assistance to Guam. In addition, the diversification of the Guamanian economy would be speeded by the recently established Economic Development Authority.
- 32. The representative of Poland pointed out that the figure he had quoted from *The New York Times* referred to only one grant and not to the total amount of grants to Guam. Furthermore, he believed that regardless of the purposes of

- the Guam military base, its very existence was contrary to the spirit of the Charter. Lastly, in his view, the election of the Governor represented only a minor advance, since all the laws passed by the Guamanian Legislature on local questions could be annulled by the Congress of the United States, as indicated in paragraph 7 of the working paper.
- 33. The representative of the United States, replying to various questions on American Samoa asked at previous meetings, said that in the 1960 census, the total population had been 20,051, of whom 17,732 had been born in American Samoa. The other inhabitants came primarily from Western Samoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands and Niue, and had been attracted to American Samoa because of its buoyant economy and its high wages. It was governmental policy to give Samoans primary rights to all jobs; outside recruitment was undertaken only when the workers needed could not be found locally. On 30 June 1965, the Samoan Government had 2,890 employees, of whom 182 were foreign contract employees in positions for which no qualified local staff could be found. Eighty Samoans worked part-time as district governors, judges, country chiefs, district clerks and mayors.
- 34. The Senate of American Samoa had 15 members: one member from each of the counties, plus one member representing the four counties in the western district in rotation. By Samoan custom, the 14 senators from the counties must be matais, i.e., hereditary chieftains. The 17 members of the House of Representatives were elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. During the eighth regular session, all senators and representatives had been native Samoans. Representatives must have lived in Samoa for at least five years.
- 35. The Governor of Samoa appointed most government officials. Before appointing a district governor, county chief or city administrator, he had to request recommendations from the appropriate district councils and officials, in other words, he must obtain the approval of the Samoans themselves.
- 36. In the economic sphere, the American Samoan Development Corporation had been organized both to speed up the development of Samoa and to make it possible for the people to invest. While the Government had helped the Corporation financially, all shareholders must be Samoans. Samoan ownership in all enterprises was preferred and if that was not possible then Samoan partnership was sought. Where outside capital was involved, Samoan interests were fully protected by agreements covering wages and hours and guaranteeing maximum promotional opportunities for local residents.
- 37. Therefore, any fear that Samoans held only menial jobs while outsiders held all the lucrative positions was absolutely groundless. For example, the new hotel, previously referred to during the discussion, was owned by Samoans.
- 38. With reference to the statement of the representative of India, who had expressed concern at the fluctuations in appropriations for the Territory, he pointed out that American Samoa had a population of only 26,000 and that its regular budget was therefore relatively small. The figures given in the working paper covered both the regular administrative budget and the capital development budget. A capital improvement of relatively moderate size might therefore create a false impression. In that connexion, he noted that it had been during the 1964 fiscal year that educational television had been established in the Territory, and land for school sites had been purchased. Those programmes alone had cost over \$3.5 million. In addition, a new international terminal building had been dedicated at Pago Pago before the end of that fiscal year.

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

- 39. (a) The Sub-Committee recognizes that some of the positive steps it noted in its last report have been consolidated: however, it is of the opinion that progress towards full self-government and self-determination and independence continues to be slow.
- (b) Although some changes have taken place, the administering Power still retains considerable powers of control in executive and legislative spheres, thus restricting the exercise of self-government by the people of the Territories. The poli-

tical institutions and executive machinery are not fully representative of the people.

- (c) The Sub-Committee notes the announcement by the administering Power of the establishment of development bodies in the Territories. It still feels that the development envisaged by these bodies should further be intestified by the administering Power to interest the local people, and that the primary dependence of the economy of Guam on the military activities of the administering Power should be reduced by greatly diversifying the economy of that Territory.
- (d) The Sub-Committee notes that the bill providing for direct election of the Governor of Guam has not yet been adopted by the Congress of the United States. It also notes that the proposals for a new draft constitution for American Samoa took effect on 1 July 1967. Notwithstanding these developments, the Sub-Committee notes that there is still no timetable of effective measures for a speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

40. (a) The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of American Samoa and Guam to self-govern-

- ment and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (b) The administering Power should accelerate the further political development of the Territories by expanding the functions and powers of legislature and by vesting greater executive authority in the hands of the indigenous population.
- (c) The Sub-Committee urges the administering Power to expedite further the economic growth of the Territories by fully developing their agricultural and industrial and other potential and, particularly in the case of Guam, to implement as speedily as possible its plans for the diversification of the economy. In this regard, the assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies could be utilized most effectively.
- (d) The administering Power is requested to intensify the educational and training facilities for the people of the Territories so as to enable them to occupy more responsible positions
- (e) A visit to the Territories by the Special Committee is necessary and would be most useful, for, in addition to familiarizing the Member States with the needs and aspirations of the people, it would also increase the peoples' awareness of their rights which have been guaranteed to them by the United Nations.

CHAPTER XIX*

TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1966

1. After considering the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in September 1966, the Special Committee reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. It recommended that the administering Authority should accelerate the further political development of the Territory by expanding the functions and powers of legislature and by vesting executive authority in the hands of the indigenous population. It urged the administering Authority to expedite further the economic growth of the Territory by fully developing its agricultural and industrial potential; in this regard it considered that the assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies could be utilized most effectively. It requested the administering Authority to increase the educational and training facilities for the people of the Territory. Finally, it considered that a visit to the Territory by the Special Committee was necessary and would be most useful, for, in addition to familiarizing the Member States with the needs and aspirations of the people, it would also increase the people's awareness of their rights which had been guaranteed to them by the United Nations.

B. Information on the Territory¹

Introduction

2. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands consists of about 2,100 islands situated in the Western

* Parts A and B of this chapter were previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.416.

¹ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from the information before the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-fourth session, in particular the report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966 transmitted under Article 88 of the Charter. United States of America, 19th Annual Report to the United

Pacific Ocean north of the Equator. These have a total land area of 687 square miles (1,779 square kilometres) and are scattered over some 3 million square miles of ocean (7,770,000 square kilometres) from east to west and 1,300 miles (2,080 kilometres) from north to south. They are classified broadly as "high" volcanic islands or "low" coral islands, and range in size from high islands to very small coral islets. Many of the small sand and coral islets are too small and lacking in resources to support human life. Ninety-six island groups are inhabited. In 1966, the population totalled 92,373 compared with 90,596 in 1965. With the exception of over 1,100 Polynesians, the indigenous people are broadly classed as Micronesians.

Constitutional development

- 3. The Congress of Micronesia, a bicameral legislature, held its first session in July 1965 during which it adopted a joint resolution designating its two chambers as the Senate and the House of Representatives. The former consists of 12 senators, 2 elected at large from each of the 6 districts of the Territory. The latter consists of 21 representatives who are elected from single-member election districts of approximately equal population. Members are chosen in biennial elections by secret ballot of residents of the Territory who are citizens of the Territory and eighteen years of age or over. The second general election to the Congress of Micronesia, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, was held in November 1966.
- 4. The legislative powers of the Congress of Micronesia provide, *inter alia*, that no legislation may be inconsistent with the following: (a) treaties or international agreements of the United States; (b) laws of the United States of America applicable to the Trust Ter-

Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, Department of State Publication 8205 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967). Transmitted to the members of the Trusteeship Council by a note of the Secretary-General (T/1661).

- ritory; (c) executive orders of the President of the United States and orders of the Secretary of the Interior; or (d) sections 1 through 12 (Bill of Rights) of the Code of the Trust Territory, which constitute the basic laws and regulations governing all residents of the Territory. The Congress has powers to levy taxes and to participate in the preparation of the annual budget of the Trust Territory. Bills passed by the Congress may be vetoed by the High Commissioner; however, legislation twice vetoed by the High Commissioner must be referred to the Secretary of the Interior for further action.
- 5. Money bills enacted by the Congress of Micronesia shall not provide for the appropriation of funds in excess of such amounts as are available from revenues raised pursuant to the tax laws and other revenue laws of the Trust Territory. The Congress has no power to appropriate funds in excess of internal revenue, but it has the authority to review the preliminary budget plan of the High Commissioner before his final submission of the budget to the Secretary of the Interior for federal funds. With respect to such portions of the preliminary budget plan, the High Commissioner shall adopt such recommendations of the Congress as he may deem appropriate, but he shall transmit to the Secretary of the Interior all recommendations he has not adopted.
- 6. At its thirty-fourth session, the Trusteeship Council was informed that as a transitional measure one or two representatives of the Congress of Micronesia would be asked to participate in budget presentations to the United States Congress. It noted, however, that over 95 per cent of the Trust Territory's central budget was provided by grants appropriated by the Congress of the United States. The Congress of Micronesia could not therefore exercise effective control over the larger part of government activities and this had created a certain feeling of frustration among Micronesian political leaders and legislators. The Trusteeship Council reiterated its expression of hope that steps would soon be taken to enlarge the financial responsibility of the Congress of Micronesia by progressively extending its powers to include appropriations of United States subsidies.

Public service

- 7. On 30 June 1966, Micronesian employees in senior, professional and executive positions numbered 151, an increase of 23 over the previous year. During the same period, Micronesians in professional, administrative and protective posts increased from 1,980 to 2,191. Non-indigenous employees over the same period increased from 318 to 327.
- 8. In its report for the year 1965, the Administering Authority stated that three senior administrative positions were filled by Micronesians, and one Micronesian Assistant District Administrator had been awarded a Parvin Graduate Scholarship in Public Administration for advanced academic graduate and internship training at Princeton University. In September 1965, a Micronesian was appointed District Administrator of the Marshall Islands District, the first Micronesian to receive such an appointment.
- 9. In March 1966, pursuant to the joint resolution of the Congress of Micronesia, requesting the High Commissioner to develop proposals for civil service regulations for Micronesian employees of the Trust Territory Government, a task force was established to develop proposals for a Civil Service Act. At present, Micro-

- nesians are employed in accordance with the policy and procedure established by the High Commissioner.
- 10. At its thirty-fourth session, the Trusteeship Council was informed of the following steps taken to bring Micronesian employees into the planning and decision-making process as well as to acquaint them with major problems and issues confronting the Administration: (a) a programme to rotate Micronesian district administrators to broaden their political and administrative experiences; (b) a plan to assign one Micronesian assistant district administrator as the administrative assistant to the High Commissioner; and (c) a policy to have representative Micronesian staff members participate in cabinet meetings.

Economic conditions

- 11. The economy of the Territory is based primarily on subsistence agriculture and fishing. Cash income is provided mainly through the production of copra, harvesting of trochus shell, government employment, employment by private businesses and the sale of handicrafts, fish and vegetable produce. In 1965-1966 the value of copra exports amounted to \$2,512,383, as compared with \$2,525,117 the previous year.
- 12. At its thirty-fourth session, the Trusteeship Council was informed that critical evaluation of the entire agricultural programme had been undertaken by the Administration with the purpose of determining ways and means for increasing production of both domestic and export crops and the subsequent increase in return to the producers, that consideration was being given to redirecting the emphasis of agricultural stations away from experimentation and in the direction of demonstration farming, and that the first Territory-wide contract had been awarded to a Micronesian firm (the United Micronesian Development Association) to purchase and market copra in the Territory.
- 13. The Territory possesses very limited mineral resources. Although there was some small-scale mining done before 1955, there has not been any since then. A small quantity of timber is processed on the high islands for local needs, but it is doubtful whether the forests of the Territory will ever be capable of providing a sufficient yield for export. No large-scale industries exist. Small processing and service industries are now being developed and are reported to be increasing in number.
- 14. At its thirty-fourth session, the Trusteeship Council was informed that the economic consulting firm which, in 1965, had undertaken a two-year economic development programme for the Trust Territory submitted its plan at the beginning of 1967. The plan, which follows a preliminary report submitted in 1966 identifying the areas the firm considered most promising, is based on the two-year study of various factors, conditions and policies affecting economic development prospects. The Administering Authority stated that with the exception of the proposals for land ownership by non-citizens and the large-scale importation of foreign labour, it accepted the validity of the other major recommendations of the report. Recommendations of that report were being evaluated to identify opportunities for action and to set priorities. However, the questions of power, water and sanitation had been given top priority, and surveys to provide reliable data and to identify the scope and cost of services had been conducted in various districts.

- 15. The principal private companies active in the Trust Territory are 34 import and export companies. All are owned by Micronesians except 2, which are owned by foreign residents. Until 1962, there was no permanent foreign investment in the Territory owing to the Administering Authority's policy of encouraging Micronesian investment and enterprise. That policy was changed in 1962 with the signing of an Executive Order directing that regulations be revised to facilitate outside private investment in order to stimulate new economic activity. The major non-indigenous private investment in the Territory is the development of commercial fishing in the Palau District by a United States sea food company. Other non-indigenous private investments in the Territory include two economic development projects in the Mariana Islands District, a hotel corporation and two insurance companies.
- 16. The Territory possesses substantial fishery resources, although these have not been exploited commercially to an appreciable extent. The first major development of fisheries resources came in Palau District in 1964 with the construction of plant facilities required to start fishing operations by a United States sea food company. Plans are under way to expand commercial fisheries operations as two other sea food companies have received permission to conduct six-month engineering and feasibility surveys in connexion with building a freezing plant and cold-storage warehouse and other necessary shore facilities on proposed sites in Truk. In anticipation of opening fisheries operations in this district, a number of trainees from Truk and Ponape are working on tuna vessels in Palau. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of the Interior, set up a fishery sampling station in Palau with the initial work being directed towards collection of statistics and biological samples in the tuna fisheries.
- 17. The Trust Territory depends largely on United States grants to balance its budget. In 1962, legislation was enacted by the United States Congress to raise the statutory limitation on appropriations for the Trust Territory from \$7.5 million to \$17.5 million. For the fiscal years 1963 through 1966 a total of \$64,844,000 was appropriated by the United States Congress for administration of the Trust Territory, and since 1964 its deficits have amounted to over \$20 million annually. During the year ending 30 June 1966, total expenditures increased by \$247,902 to \$23,755,638, of which only \$1,090,104 was financed from local revenue. In 1966 the United States Congress did not authorize the Administration's proposal for an appropriation of \$172 million for a five-year capital development plan, in addition to the expanded operating budget of \$152 million for the five-year period. The eighty-ninth Congress of the United States took the view that the proposal was too ambitious and that a scaled-down twoyear programme would be more realistic. A new bill raising the ceiling to \$25 million for 1967 and to \$35 million for 1968 and 1969 was passed by Congress and signed by the President on 10 May 1967.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1967

18. The Trusteeship Council at its thirty-fourth session in June 1967 completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966.²

19. In a letter dated 30 June 1967 (A/AC.109/255), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for submission to the Security Council. The report contains, in addition to the Trusteeship Council's conclusions and recommendations and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

- 20. At its 562nd and 564th meetings, on 22 and 27 September 1967, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands which appears as an annex to this chapter.
- 21. The representative of the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia expressed reservations on the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
- 22. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that his delegation had stated its position with regard to the Trust Territory during the thirty-fourth session of the Trusteeship Council. It had criticized the activities of the Administering Authority in detail and had indicated ways in which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) should be implemented. It had also criticized the Administering Authority's conduct in relation to various situations prevailing in the Territory.
- 23. The use of the word "considerable" in paragraph 12 of the Sub-Committee's report was ill-advised in that it could be taken to imply that certain powers had been transferred to the Micronesian Legislature. His delegation had shown during the Trusteeship Council debate that all power remained in the hands of the Administering Authority. The report would portray the situation with greater accuracy if the words "considerable powers" were replaced by "all powers".
- 24. The Trusteeship Council debate had further shown that not a single indigenous inhabitant of the Territory was allowed by the Administering Authority to occupy a higher administrative post and the statement in paragraph 13 of the report that progress in allowing indigenous people to take such posts was still very slow was therefore quite inaccurate. There had been no progress whatsoever in that direction and that should be stated in the report. Furthermore, the Administering Authority should be called upon to take immediate steps to transfer all power to the people of the Territory.
- 25. It was evident that the economic dependence of the Territory on the Administering Authority was complete and paragraph 14 should state that while the Sub-Committee was aware of the plans to strengthen the islands' economy, those plans were not sufficient to lessen the economic depedence of the Territory on the Administering Authority. His delegation would therefore reserve its position on that paragraph.
- 26. Among its conclusions, the Special Committee should note with regret that General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2189 (XXI) had not been implemented and that nothing had been done to dismantle military bases in the Territory. In addition, the Com-

² See foot-note 1.

³ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Special Supplement No. 1.

mittee should call on the Administering Authority to take immediate steps to implement those resolutions.

- 27. The representative of the United States said that the proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were based on allegations identical with those made by the Soviet delegation in the Trusteeship Council. Those allegations had been answered by his delegation, by representatives of the Micronesian Legislature and by members of the Trusteeship Council who had had the opportunity, which the Soviet representative had not had, to visit the Territory. He objected to the Soviet amendment to paragraph 12, which would detract from the accuracy and value of the report.
- 28. The Special Committee then adopted the Soviet amendment to paragraph 12 by 8 votes to 6, with 9 abstentions.
- 29. The representative of Australia, speaking in explanation of vote, said that he had voted against the Soviet amendment because it was a manifest contradiction of the facts. He himself had been a member of a visiting mission to the Territory and had had extensive interviews with members of representative bodies at various levels. In some cases the latter had very considerable powers and the Special Committee had placed itself in a curious position by stating that the Administering Authority continued to retain all powers.
- 30. The representative of the United States said that the Soviet amendment to paragraph 12 bore no relation to the facts, since the Territory's Legislature did have certain powers. The Soviet amendment to paragraph 13 was likewise misleading and his delegation objected to the USSR representative's attempts to change a report which was the result of much careful deliberation.
- 31. At the 564th meeting, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed the following amendments:
- (a) Replace the text of paragraph 13 by the following:
 - "13. The Sub-Committee notes that from the time when the last report was submitted to it no progress has been achieved in the Territory in allowing the indigenous people to take higher administrative roles."
- (b) After paragraph 14, add a new paragraph 15, as follows:
 - "15. The Sub-Committee notes that the Administering Authority has not given effect to the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2189 (XXI) which request the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new bases in those Territories."
- (c) After paragraph 19, add the following new paragraph:

"The Sub-Committee calls on the Administering Authority to take immediate steps for implementing the provisions of resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2189 (XXI) which request the colonial Powers to dismantle their bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones there."

32. At the same meeting, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, although

his amendments faithfully reflected the situation in the Trust Territory, it would be sufficient, if they were included in the records.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II

33. At its 564th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II concerning the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, as amended, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record. These conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

Conclusions

- (a) The Special Committee notes that, since its last report, minor advances have been made in the Territory, especially in health and education. It, however, believes these could be accelerated.
- (b) Even though there is a Legislature, the Administering Authority continues to retain all powers in the executive and legislative spheres, thus restricting progress towards self-determination and independence in the Territory.
- (c) The Special Committee notes that progress in allowing the indigenous people of the Territory to take higher administrative roles is still very slow and believes that the direction of education can be better directed towards this end.
- (d) While the Special Committee is aware of the plans to strengthen the islands' economy, it believes that more ought to be done to lessen the economic dependence of the Territory on the Administering Authority.

Recommendations

- (e) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (f) The Special Committee recommends to the Administering Authority that the Congress of Micronesia should be provided with greater powers for the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (g) Steps should be taken by the Administering Authority to ensure that the people of the Territory assume the highest positions in the executive and administrative sectors of Government.
- (h) The Administering Authority is requested to re-examine its educational and economic programme for the Territory to ensure that the plans are best suited to the needs of the Territory for a rapid rate of progress towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (i) The Special Committee reaffirms that a visit to the Territory by the Special Committee is necessary and would be most useful, for, in addition to familiarizing the Member States with the needs and aspirations of the people, it would also increase the people's awareness of their rights which have been guaranteed to them by the United Nations.

ANNEX*

Report of Sub-Committee II The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

- 1. The Sub-Committee considered the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands at its 65th, 67th and 69th meetings held from 10 August to 7 September 1967.
- 2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-19 of the present chapter).
- 3. The representative of the United States observed that the Territory had been the subject of detailed discussion in the Trusteeship Council quite recently and that the Council had taken note of the report^a of the United Nations Visiting Mission. In these circumstances he did not think that it would be useful to make a further statement.
- 4. The representative of Sierra Leone observed that it was probably accurate to say that there had been accelerated progress in the Territory in the previous five years. Nevertheless, the two essential considerations were, first, whether that progress had been sufficiently rapid and, secondly, whether the direction it was taking was in the best interests of the people of the Territory.
- 5. The 1967 United Nations Visiting Mission to the Territory had concluded that there had been material progress in education. At the same time, it had recommended that urgent attention should be given to vocational and technical education and had suggested that, to that end, the Administration might consider some reorganization of its present priorities. It had further recommended that more attention should be given in the primary and secondary curricula to subjects of more relevance to Micronesian conditions. It was clear that if the population was to be prepared for independence, education, particularly higher education, must be geared to contribute as much as possible to that end.
- 6. The 1964 Visiting Mission to the Territory had been surprised to find that of the fourteen most senior advisers to the High Commissioner, not one was a Micronesian. The situation had not greatly changed since then, and there were still no Micronesians at the most senior levels. More attention therefore had to be given to providing the indigenous inhabitants with the training necessary for them to lead the Territory to independence. Administering Authorities were inclined to assert that the people of the Territories for which they were responsible were poorly qualified to organize, for example, a modern civil service and would be unable to cope with modern conditions. If, however, indigenous populations were not given appropriate training, the administering Authorities had to be reminded of their responsibilities in that connexion.
- 7. There had been some political and constitutional progress in the Territory, but his delegation would urge the Administering Authority to increase its pace. He wondered whether the Administering Authority was providing the inhabitants of the Territory with sufficient information on the various types of administrative structure which would be available to them when they attained independence. In almost every colonial situation, a form of government closely adapted to that of the parent country was prescribed for use after independence. While it would be difficult for the Administering Authority to inform the population of alternative administrative structures, it was most important that the people should be free to work out a system best suited to their own interests and circumstances.
- 8. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation's failure to comment on each paragraph during consideration of the conclusions and recommendations in the draft report should not be interpreted as an indication that the

*Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.395/Add.5.

a Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 2.

- United States subscribed without reservation to its substance and language. The United States would not comment specifically on those paragraphs because it had discussed those points at great length in the Trusteeship Council and had provided factual material on the Territory itself as well as on the policies of its Government with regard to the Territory. That material was contained in the documents of the Trusteeship Council.
- 9. His delegation had to enter a general reservation regarding that section of the draft report. Under Article 82 of the Charter there might be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which might include part or all of the Trust Territory to which the agreement applied, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands had been, in fact, so designated. Article 83 of the Charter provided that all functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas should be exercised by the Security Council which might avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the Trusteeship System. The Security Council had, in fact, for a number of years delegated authority to the Trusteeship Council to scrutinize closely developments in the Trust Territory of of the Pacific Islands. In 1967, the situation in the Territory had received particularly careful scrutiny. A Visiting Mission, which had gone to the Territory early that year, had submitted a detailed and objective report to the Trusteeship Council. In addition, the Council had heard representatives of the Congress of Micronesia as well as the High Commissioner for the Trust Territory, members of his staff and officials of the United States Department of the Interior. After a study of that testimony and the reports submitted to it, the Council had prepared a number of conclusions and recommendations. His Government had already informed the Trusteeship Council that it would give those recommendations very careful consideration.
- 10. Subject to reservations expressed by the representatives of Australia and the United States of America, particularly on the sending of a visiting mission, the following conclusions and recommendations were adopted.

Conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee

Conclusions

- 11. The Sub-Committee notes that, since its last report, minor advances have been made in the Territory, especially in health and education. It, however, believes these could be accelerated.
- 12. Even though there is a Legislature, the Administering Authority continues to retain considerable powers in the executive and legislative spheres thus restricting progress towards self-determination and independence in the Territory.
- 13. The Sub-Committee notes that progress in allowing the indigenous people of the Territory to take higher administrative roles is still very slow and believes that the direction of education can be better suited towards this end.
- 14. While the Sub-Committee is aware of the plans to strengthen the islands' economy, it believes that more ought to be done to lessen the economic dependence of the Territory on the Administering Authority.

Recommendations

- 15. The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 16. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Administering Authority that the Congress of Micronesia should be provided with greater powers for the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 17. Steps should be taken by the Administering Authority to ensure than the people of the Territory assume the highest positions in the executive and administrative sectors of Government

18. The Administering Authority is requested to re-examine its educational and economic programme for the Territory to ensure that the plans are best suited to the needs of the Territory for a rapid rate of progress towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

19. The Sub-Committee reaffirms that a visit to the Territory by the Special Committee is necessary and would be most useful, for, in addition to familiarizing the Member States with the needs and aspirations of the people, it would also increase the people's awareness of their rights which have been guaranteed to them by the United Nations.

CHAPTER XX*

COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS, TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU, PAPUA AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly

- 1. In 1964, the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (A/5800/ Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 131-155). After considering the Territories in 1966, it recommended that the peoples of these Territories should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision. It also recommended that a visiting mission would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the peoples concerned, and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the Administering Authority (A/6300/Rev.1,2 chap. XIX, para. 73).
- 2. Concerning Nauru, it also recommended that the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the resettlement of Nauruans, being two distinct questions, should be settled independently, precedence being given to the first, as desired by the Nauruans themselves. It recommended that the Nauruans should be given full control over their natural economic resources, and hoped that the forthcoming discussions between the people of Nauru and the Administering Authority would resolve all outstanding questions in that regard. Moreover, it recommended that the Administering Authority should take concrete measures in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to fulfil the desire of the people of Nauru to become independent by January 1968.
- 3. With regard to Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, the Special Committee recommended that steps should be taken in the constitutional field to abolish the special and reserved seats in the House of Assembly and to speedily implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It also recommended that the local government councils be further strengthened in order to give the population the possibility of exercising self-government in municipal affairs, and felt that the efforts in the economic and educational fields should continue at an accelerated pace.
- 4. At its twentieth and twenty-first sessions respectively, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 2069

*Parts A and B of this chapter were previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.384 and Add.1 and 2.

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (Part I).

2 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

item 23.

- (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 concerning several Territories, including the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Resolution 2232 (XXI) called upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It reiterated the Assembly's declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It urged the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. It decided that the United Nations should render help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to pay special attention to the Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.
- 5. At its twentieth and twenty-first sessions respectively, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2111 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and 2226 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 concerning the Trust Territory of Nauru. Resolution 2226 (XXI) reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Nauru to self-government and independence and recommended that the Administering Authority fix the earliest possible date, but not later than 31 January 1968, for the independence of the Nauruan people in accordance with their freely expressed wishes. Furthermore, it recommended that the Administering Authority transfer control over the operation of the phosphate industry to the Nauruan people and take immediate steps, irrespective of the cost involved, towards restoring the island of Nauru for habitation by the Nauruan people as a sovereign nation.
- 6. Concerning Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 2112 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and 2227 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 at its twentieth and twenty-first sessions. Resolutions 2227 (XXI) called upon the administering Power to implement fully General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to inform the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-fourth session and the Special Committee of the action taken in this regard and to implement the following measures: removal of all discriminatory electoral qualifications; abolition of all discriminatory practices in the economic, social, health and educational fields; holding of elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage with a view to transferring power to the people of the Territories; and fixing of

an early date for independence. It further called upon the administering Power to refrain from utilizing the Territories for military activities incompatible with the Charter the United Nations.

B. Information on the Territories

1. Cocos (Keeling) Islands³

General

- 7. The Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands consists of twenty-seven small coral islands in two separate atolls with a total land area of about five-and-a-half square miles (14.3 square kilometres). It is situated in the Indian Ocean, approximately 1,720 miles northwest of Perth and 2,290 miles west of Darwin, Australia. Direction Island, West Island and Home Island are the only inhabited islands. The administrative headquarters of the Territory are located on West Island.
- 8. The islands were uninhabited until 1826, when the first settlement was established by Alexander Hare, an Englishman. The largest population group is formed by the descendants of the original Malayan settlers brought to the Territory in 1827 by John Clunies-Ross, a Scottish seaman. These people, known as Cocos Islanders, live on Home Island. Europeans form the other population group in the Territory, comprising the Clunies-Ross family, employees of government departments, the Shell Company of Australia, Qantas Empire Airways Limited and the Overseas Telecommunications Commission (Australia) and their families.
- 9. The population of the Territory at 30 June 1965 was estimated to be 675 made up as follows:

Place	Race	Number
West Island	European	167
Direction Island	European	38
Home Island	{Cocos Islanders (Malays) Europeans	
	Total	675

The comparative population figure for 1961 was 606, comprising 423 Cocos Islanders and 183 Europeans.

Status

10. In 1857 the islands were formally declared part of the British Dominions. On 23 November 1955, the islands ceased to form part of the Colony of Singapore and were accepted as a Territory under the authority of the Commonwealth of Australia, to be known as the Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands. The Territory is administered by the Government of Australia in accordance with the terms of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act, 1955-1963. Persons born in the Territory on or after 23 November 1955 are Australian citizens and British subjects. However, for those who, immediately before 23 November 1955, were British subjects ordinarily resident on the islands but not Australian citizens, provisions were made for them to become Australian citizens if they so wished. Thirty-nine Cocos Islanders have been granted Australian citizenship under these provisions.

Constitution

- 11. The basis of the Territory's legislative, administrative and judicial systems is the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act, 1955-1963, which is administered by the Minister of State for Territories. Under the Act, the laws which were in force in the islands immediately before the date of transfer have been continued in force, but may be amended or repealed by an ordinance or by a law made under an ordinance of the Territory.
- 12. Commonwealth acts do not apply to the Territory unless expressed to extend thereto. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act empowers the Governor-General to make ordinances for the peace, order and good government of the Territory. These ordinances are required to be tabled in the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia and are subject to disallowance in part or whole by the Parliament.
- 13. An Official Representative who is appointed by the Minister of State for Territories exercises such powers and performs such functions in relation to the Territory as are delegated to him by the Minister under the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act, 1955-1963, or otherwise conferred on him under the Act or by or under any other law of the Territory. At present, he is responsible for general administration, including health and education.
- 14. In addition to the Department of Territories, a number of other Commonwealth departments are represented in the Territory, either directly or through the agency of other departments. These include, *interalia*, the Prime Minister's Department, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Works.

Electoral system

15. There are no elected offices in the Territory.

Judiciary

16. The courts exercising jurisdiction in the Territory are the Supreme Court, the District Court, the Magistrate's Court and the Coroner's Court. The Supreme Court consists of a judge who visits the Territory and presides over sittings as and when required. It is a superior court of record and appeals against its judgement may be taken to the High Court of Australia.

Political parties

17. No information is available concerning political parties.

Economic conditions

- 18. The islands consist of coral and limitations of the soil and fresh water supplies impede the development of agriculture. Small quantities of vegetables are grown on Home Island. However, all supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables for the other two inhabited islands must be imported mainly from Australia and Singapore. Large numbers of fish are caught in the lagoon for local consumption.
- 19. The economy of the Territory is based on the aviation and other facilities maintained by the Australian Government and commercial organizations, and on the production and export of copra, which forms the staple local industry. Exports of copra during 1964-1965 were 654 tons, compared with 495 in 1961-1962. The Clunies-Ross Estate is currently

³ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by Australia under Article 73 e of the Charter on 28 February 1967 for the year ended 30 June 1965.

interested in the oil-producing possibilities of the dill and anise plants.

20. Expenditure on administration and on capital works and services is financed from funds appropriated by the Commonwealth Government and controlled by the various Commonwealth departments represented in the Territory. Some revenue is derived from messing charges and from other sources such as hospital and medical fees which, in 1964-1965, amounted to £A4,358, compared with £A3,624 in 1963-1964. Expenditures for 1964-1965 totalled £A47,041, compared with £A41,787 for 1963-1964.

Land

21. Under the indenture granted in 1886, all land in the Territory above the high water mark is held in perpetuity by the Clunies-Ross family. The grant was made subject to conditions allowing Her Majesty to resume any of the land for public purposes without compensation other than for the value of cultivated crops or buildings or other work on the land resumed; to provide for the establishment of a telegraph station; and to prevent alienation of land to other persons without assent of the Crown.

Transport and communications

22. An international airport with full radio facilities is established on West Island under the control of the Commonwealth Department of Civil Aviation. There is no wharf in the Territory where ships can berth. Most of the roads are essential for airport purposes and receive priority in maintenance over the few other roads which are primarily community roads. There is a telegraph station, operated and staffed by the Overseas Telecommunications Commission (Australia) on Direction Island.

Social conditions

Labour

23. The copra industry operated by the Clunies-Ross Estate provides the main source of employment for Cocos Islanders. The Estate provides housing, rations, medical services, clothing subsidies and pension benefits for its workers, in addition to a cash wage. Social services comprise pensions in excess of 50 per cent of wages for workers who have reached 65 years of age, and free health services and education.

Public health

24. A medical officer and two nursing sisters, provided by the Department of Territories, are responsible for public health matters in general. A four-bed hospital is equipped to handle most surgical and medical emergencies. Dental treatment is provided by a visiting dentist of the Australian Department of Health. There was one such visit during the year under review.

Educational conditions

25. There is a primary school on West Island which follows the Eastern Australian syllabus. The Western Australian Department of Education provides teachers and undertakes an annual inspection. The costs of education are met by the Department of Territories.

- 26. Pupils wishing to proceed to secondary studies may undertake correspondence courses under the supervision of the headmaster of the West Island School, or they may attend schools in Australia. The parents of pupils sent to Australia for secondary studies are assisted by an education allowance of £145 a year for each pupil. The allowance is paid by the Department of Territories, which also provides one return air fare each year to the capital city of the Australian state in which the child is placed at school. The cost of correspondence tuition (other than the cost of textbooks) for secondary studies undertaken by children of residents of the Territory is paid by the Department of Territories.
- 27. At the close of the year under review, 35 primary pupils and 4 pupils following correspondence secondary courses were in attendance at the West Island School. In addition, one pupil was attending secondary school in Australia.
- 28. Elementary education provided by the Clunies-Ross Estate for the children of its employees comprises two to three years' schooling in the vernacular (Malay). Trade training, suited to the local conditions is provided in such pursuits as boat-building, carpentry and mechanics.

2. Trust Territory of Nauru4

General

- 29. The Trust Territory of Nauru is a small island situated in the Central Pacific, in latitude 0° 32′ south, and longitude 166° 55′ east. It is roughly oval shaped, approximately 8¼ square miles in area and is about 12 miles in circumference. Completely surrounding the island is a coral reef which is exposed at low tide. It comprises an area of 5,263 acres, of which roughly two-thirds, i.e., 3,658 acres, are classified as phosphate bearing; a further area of 585 acres, classified as rocky land, is estimated to contain approximately one million tons of phosphate. Since the discovery of the deposits 1,453 acres have been mined and 37,403,991 tons of phosphate raised.
- 30. The total population of Nauru at 30 June 1966 was 6,048, comprising 2,921 Nauruans, 1,532 other Pacific Islanders, 1,167 Chinese and 428 Europeans. The total immigrant population at 30 June 1966 was 3,127 compared with 2,827 at 30 June 1965.

Political and constitutional proposals

- 31. At the conclusion of the discussions held in Canberra in June 1967 on the future of the phosphate industry, the question of the political advancement of the Territory was considered. During the discussions, the Nauruan representatives presented a statement describing their proposals for political and constitutional changes in Nauru.
- 32. The Nauruan statement sought agreement that Nauru should become an independent State on 31 January 1968, set out certain matters on which decisions

⁴ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information concerning Nauru before the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-fourth session, in particular the report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966 transmitted under Article 88 of the Charter (Commonwealth of Australia, Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Administration of the Territory of Nauru, 1 July 1965-30 June 1966, Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer. Communicated by the Secretary-General to the members of the Trusteeship Council (T/1659).

would have to be made, and expressed "a tentative opinion as to the form these decisions might take." The statement proposed, inter alia, that Nauru should become a republic, to be known as the Republic of Nauru, and that its form of government should be based on the British parliamentary system, but modified in certain ways to suit local circumstances. A constitution would provide for fundamental rights, a president, an executive, a legislature, a judiciary and a public service. The president, who would be elected by the Legislative Assembly, would perform the formal duties of a Head of State and also be the head of the executive government. The constitution would also provide for the vesting of executive power in the president and a cabinet of ministers. The role envisaged for the president in the executive government would be a dual one. He would perform certain formal acts, such as assenting to orders and regulations made by the cabinet or a minister in accordance with the powers delegated to them by law. He would also be the chief minister, selecting other ministers and presiding over meetings of the cabinet. The other ministers would be selected from members of the Legislative Assembly. The Nauruan statement mentioned that the dual position proposed for the president in the executive government presented some difficulties, but added that in view of the small size of Nauru it did not seem desirable to create two separate offices of president and premier respectively. The statement also considered in some detail the proposed legislative assembly, the judiciary and the public service. The Nauruan statement in regard to the judiciary expressed the hope that appeals from the Supreme Court of Nauru should lie to the High Court of Australia.

- 33. The statement emphasized that the proposals outlined did not represent the final conclusions of the Nauruan delegations or of the Nauruan people, but were submitted to demonstrate that the Nauruans had already given considerable thought to the way in which Nauru might be governed as an independent State, and to show that a solution of the constitutional problems of Nauruan independence was, in broad outline, at least, within sight.
- 34. The representatives of the Administering Authority, during the conference in Canberra, pointed out that a number of the proposals would require further clarification and examination. They submitted for the consideration of the Nauruan delegation some comments on proposals for constitutional changes for Nauru.
- 35. Among other things, the Administering Authority had agreed that it was appropriate that basic changes should be made in arrangements for the Government of Nauru, and expressed a sympathetic attitude in connexion with the Nauruans' wish to realize their political ambition by 31 January 1968. They also pointed out that, particularly in relation to external affairs and defence, there were special factors to be considered: that other smaller countries of the world had sought their political future in an association of legal form with a larger country of greater resources under which the larger country was responsible for such matters as external affairs and defence.
- 36. The representatives of the Administering Authority accordingly suggested that the Nauruans might consider an association with Australia under which an act passed by the Australian Parliament would provide for Australia to be responsible for the external affairs and defence of Nauru, but otherwise would leave the constitutional arrangements to be determined by the Nauruan people, as a suitable arrangement in the

particular circumstances of both Nauru and Australia. Such an association would give Nauru full autonomy in internal affairs of government, and there would be no question of the Australian Government being involved in those matters, except to render assistance specifically requested by the Government of Nauru. They stated that an association of this kind would provide, inter alia, the ready means whereby the Nauruan Government could receive many benefits, including those of international agreements designed to facilitate communications, provide common standards of safety, regulate services, etc., on an international basis, and that it would enable the Australian Government, if this were the wish of the Nauruans, to make arrangements for United Nations technical assistance services; Nauruan citizens travelling abroad would also be afforded assistance by Australian missions overseas which would automatically be able to render many other forms of assistance to the Nauruan Government and people. In regard to defence, an association of the kind suggested would place an obligation on Australia to defend Nauru. Under such an association, the suggestion of the Nauruan delegation that the final appeal from the proposed Nauru Supreme Court be to the High Court of Australia could more readily be that and there would be no difficulty in the way of admitting the Nauruan people to Australia for all purposes, including their permanent residence there if so required.

- 37. Following further discussion between the Nauruan representatives and the representatives of the Administering Authority, possible alternative arrangements for constitutional advancement were presented by the Administering Authority for discussion. These proposals considered the possibility that Nauru be accorded full independence and make a treaty of friendship with Australia under which responsibilities for the foreign affairs and defence of Nauru would devolve upon Australia. Such arrangements might meet some of the special problems which arose from a desire for independence by a people whose numbers, by comparison with the population of any other country, were extremely small. The devolution on Australia of responsibility for a defence and foreign affairs would not impose any limitation upon the powers and scope of the Government of Nauru in respect of Nauruan affairs in any other field whatever, and would have no effect on the powers of the Nauruan Government to make arrangements, for example, in regard to external trade and the disposal of phosphate.
- 38. In the single day available for discussions on political advancement, a firm decision could not be reached and it was agreed that discussions on political advancement be resumed at the earliest practicable date, and as early as possible after the conclusion of the thirty-fourth session of the Trusteeship Council.
- 39. At the thirty-fourth session of the Trusteeship Council, the Head Chief of Nauru stated in regard to the proposal of the Administering Authority, that there should be a treaty in which legal control over the matters of external affairs and defence should continue to be exercised by the Australian Government, that the Nauruans would prefer that their achievement of independence should not be conditional upon agreement in advance with Australia on these two questions. Mutually acceptable arrangements in regard to these two aspects could be worked out between the Nauruans and Australia after Nauru had gained full sovereign independence. He stressed that the Nauruan delegation understood that Australia did not object strongly to this

view, but would prefer rather that the question be decided by plebiscite of the Nauruan people on Nauru.

40. The Nauruan delegation to the Canberra Conference did not think that a plebiscite was necessary. This was not based on any fear that a plebiscite would reveal a Nauruan decision contrary to what the Nauru Local Government Council was presently pursuing. He also emphasized that the time factor was involved because by the time the delegation of the Nauru Local Government Council arrived in Australia to resume the adjourned talks on independence and to finalize necessary aspects of the agreement on the future of the phosphate industry, and by the time councillors would return to Nauru, there would be very limited time left between then and the target date of 31 January 1968. Moreover, in this already limited time, a general election was forthcoming on Nauru in December 1967 for the Nauru Local Government Council.

Nauru Phosphate Agreement

- 41. In April 1967 discussions between representatives of the Nauru Local Government Council and officials representing Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning arrangements for the future operation of the phosphate industry on Nauru were concluded. These are to be drawn up in a definitive agreement later in 1967 and appropriate action is to be taken in due course to effect the necessary legislative changes.
 - 42. The agreed arrangements provide that:
- (a) The Nauru Local Government Council (or its successor in any changed constitutional situation) will on consummation of the arrangements become the owner of the phosphate enterprise at Nauru and will take over its entire control and management.
- (b) The partner Governments, through the British Phosphate Commissioners, will purchase the entire output of phosphate from Nauru at a stated rate of production and at a price that is determined under machinery laid down in the Agreement. The Nauru Local Government Council will receive the total sale proceeds and will meet the costs of operation of the industry at Nauru together with the costs of administration at the island
- (c) A Nauru Phosphate Corporation is to be established by the Nauru Local Government Council. This Corporation will, until 30 June 1970, have certain specific consultative and policy control functions in relation to the phosphate industry and after 30 June 1970 it will undertake the complete control and management of the phosphate operations at Nauru. The British Phosphate Commissioners will manage and supervise the operations until 30 June 1970.

Rehabilitation of the mined phosphate lands on Nauru

43. In 1965 the Nauruans reaffirmed their desire to remain on Nauru and not seek another home, and requested the Administering Authority to assume responsibility for the restoration of the mined areas at no cost to the Nauruans. The Australian Government was not able to commit the other partner Governments to rehabilitation proposals, but it was agreed to establish a technical Committee of Experts, mutually acceptable to the Nauru Local Government Council and the Administering Authority, to investigate the possibility of the rehabilitation of the mined areas. In June 1966, the Committee submitted its report to the Nauru Legislative Council and the Administering Authority.

- 44. In its report the Committee of Experts concluded:
- (a) That while it would be technically feasible (within the narrow definition of that expression) to refill the mined phosphate areas of Nauru with suitable soil and/or other materials from external sources, the very many practical considerations involved ruled out such an undertaking as impracticable;
- (b) That it would, nevertheless, be practicable to undertake certain treatment of the mined areas, or parts of them, which would effectively induce a more attractive environment and would provide lands which would be suitable for habitation or other public purposes, including limited cultivation;
- (c) That any proposals for the Nauruans to continue to live on Nauru after the exhaustion of the phosphate deposits must include provision for an adequate water supply and facilities for outside communication and trade;
- (d) That the most effective use of large sections of the mined areas would be to use them for the construction, as a single project, of a water storage system and an airstrip;
- (e) That while it would be impracticable to completely restore the mined areas to provide an agricultural economy for the Nauruans, it would be valuable to revegetate some of them and to treat other limited areas for the growing of trees, vegetables, etc.;
- (f) That a system of land-use planning for the island is most desirable and would probably lead subsequently to the development of additional usable land which would become available as a result of the rehabilitation proposals.
- 45. In the various sections of its report, the Committee of Experts discussed in detail the considerations, financial and practical, which gave rise to its conclusions, and gave its assessment of the effectiveness of the various suggestions that had been made, together with estimates of the costs involved.
- 46. The Trusteeship Council was informed at its thirty-fourth session that the Nauru Local Government Council, though agreeing with some of the findings of the Committee of Experts, could not, in general, accept its conclusions. The views of the Nauru Local Government Council are set out in the report of the Trusteeship Council (see A/6704,⁵ para. 385).

Legislative and executive organs

- 47. The Legislative Council of Nauru has nine elected members and five official members appointed by the Governor-General. It may make ordinances for the peace, order and good government of the Territory, except ordinances dealing with defence, external affairs, the phosphate industry, phosphate royalties and the ownership and control of phosphate-bearing land. Ordinances on these matters may be made by the Governor-General of Australia. Ordinances passed by the Legislative Council are presented to the Administrator for his assent, which may be granted, withheld or reserved for the Governor-General's consideration.
- 48. The Executive Council consists of the Administrator, two elected members and two official members of the Legislative Council appointed by the Governor-General. The Executive Council advises the Administrator on any matter referred to it by the latter.

⁵ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4.

Economic conditions

- 49. Phosphate is the sole export of the Territory. The British Phosphate Commissioners are responsible for the direction and management of the phosphate industry, including the extraction and export of phosphate.
- 50. The tonnage of phosphate delivered for the year ended 30 June 1966 amounted to 1,528,295 tons compared with 1,688,998 tons for the year ended 30 June 1965; the value for the year ended 30 June 1966 amounted to \$A8,634,867 compared with \$A9,542,838 for the year ended 30 June 1965. Of the 1,532,650 tons exported from Nauru, 818,800 tons were shipped to Australia, 516,650 to New Zealand and 197,200 to the United Kingdom.
- 51. The total imports, chiefly from Australia, amounted to \$A6,366,248 in 1965-1966 compared with \$A4,595,798 in 1964-1965.
- 52. Public revenue for the year 1965-1966 totalled \$A1,940,704 of which the British Phosphate Commissioners provided \$A1,724,272. The total expenditure was \$A1,778,214.
- 53. On 1 January 1965 the phosphate royalties were increased from \$A1.35 (13s.6d.) to \$A1.75 (17s.6d.). During recent talks in Canberra it was agreed to increase further the royalties by \$A2.75 per ton.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1967

- 54. The Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-fourth session in June 1967, completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority on Nauru for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966.⁶
- 55. In a letter dated 30 June 1967 (A/AC.109/255), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of Nauru for submission to the General Assembly. The report contains, in addition to the Trusteeship Council's conclusions and recommendations and the observations of the individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.⁷

3. Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea⁸

General

56. Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea consist of that portion of the main island of New Guinea east of the 141 meridian of longitude and a large number of adjacent islands. The two Territories have a total area of approximately 178,260 square miles (286,882 square kilometres). On 30 June 1966 they had an enumerated indigenous population of 2,170,201 and a further estimated population of approximately 25,000.

Political and constitutional developments

57. Papua and the Trust Territory are administered jointly by an Administrator appointed by the Governor-

⁶ See foot-note 4.

⁷ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4, Part II, chap. II.

- General of Australia. He is assisted by an Administrator's Council which consists of the Administrator, 3 official members and 7 elected members of the House of Assembly who are appointed by the Minister of State for External Affairs on the nomination of the Administrator.
- 58. The legislature for the combined Territories, the House of Assembly, consists of 54 members elected on a common roll by adult suffrage, and 10 nominated official members. Forty-four of the elective seats are open to candidates of all races, and 10 are special seats reserved for non-indigenous candidates. The Administrator must ensure that general elections are held at intervals not exceeding four years.
- 59. The House of Assembly is empowered to make ordinances for the peace, order and good government of the Territory, but an ordinance does not have any force or effect until it has been assented to by the Administrator or, in certain cases, the Governor-General.
- 60. Every ordinance passed by the House of Assembly is presented to the Administrator for his assent. He may give his assent to an ordinance, withhold assent, or reserve the ordinance for the Governor-General's pleasure. Certain classes of ordinances set out in section 55 of the Papua and New Guinea Act must be reserved by the Administrator for the Governor-General's pleasure. The Administrator may return ordinances to the House of Assembly with recommended amendments, which the House then considers, and the ordinance, with or without the amendment, is again presented to the Administrator for assent.
- 61. The Governor-General must declare within six months after he assents to an ordinance reserved for his pleasure or that he withholds assent. He also may return an ordinance to the Administrator with recommended amendments, which is then considered by House, and with or without the recommended amendments is again reserved for the Governor-General's pleasure.
- 62. The Governor-General may, within six months of the Administrator's dissent, disallow an ordinance or part of an ordinance or may recommend amendments.
- 63. Ordinances passed by the House do not have any force or effect until they are assented to by the Administrator, or in certain cases the Governor-General. Each ordinance to which assent has been given or withheld is laid before each House of the Australian Parliament and where assent is withheld or where an ordinance is disallowed, the Minister for Territories must, in addition, cause a statement of the reasons for withholding assent or disallowance as the case may be, to be laid before each House.
- 64. A vote, resolution or proposed law for the appropriation of revenue or moneys may not be passed by the House of Assembly unless the purpose of the appropriation has in the same session been recommended by message by the Administrator.
- 65. At its thirty-fourth session the Trusteeship Council was informed that the second interim report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, which was set up by the House of Assembly in 1965, had been adopted by the House in 1966. Subsequently, amendments to the Papua and New Guinea Act to give effect to the recommendations in the report were made by the Commonwealth Parliament. All the recommendations were accepted. Under the new constitutional arrangements the number of open electorates has been increased from 44 to 69; the 10 special electorates

⁸ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information on Papua transmitted to the Secretary-General by Australia under Article 73 e of the Charter on 19 July 1967 for the year ending 30 June 1966, and the information concerning the Trust Territory of New Guinea before the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-fourth session, in particular the report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966 transmitted under Article 88 of the Charter (T/1960 and Add.1).

which were reserved for non-indigenous candidates have been replaced by 15 regional electorates which have an educational qualification consisting of the Territory's intermediate certificate or its equivalent. The 10 official members of the House of Assembly have been retained in accordance with the wishes of the people. The new electorates will come into practical operation with the March 1968 elections after which there will be 94 members in the House of Assembly.

- 66. The Select Committee on Constitutional Development was to present its final report to the House of Assembly in June 1967. This part of its report relates to the executive arm of the Government of the Territory and to what changes, if any, should be made to enable greater local participation in the Government.
- 67. The election of members of the House of Assembly is by secret ballot and by universal adult suffrage of all persons over 18 years of age from a common roll. General elections must be held at intervals not exceeding four years. The next election will be held in 1968,
- 68. In its report⁹ on the Trust Territory of New Guinea to the Trusteeship Council for the year ending 30 June 1966, the administering Power stated that resolutions of the General Assembly regarding New Guinea, including resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2112 (XX), had been noted by the Administering Authority and that the measures which had been taken in order to implement these resolutions were described in its report.
- 69. The administering Power went on to reiterate a statement made in the Australian Parliament on 31 March 1966 by the Minister for Territories when informing the House of Representatives that he had invited the Select Committee on Constitutional Development appointed by the House of Assembly for Papua and New Guinea to come to Canberra for discussions with members of the Government. The Minister said that: "The Government has no desire to press constitutional changes upon the people of the Territory which they do not want or for which they think are not ready; nor will the Government refuse to make changes if there is strong and widespread support for change in the Territory. This is the Government's attitude to the possibility of changes affecting the House of Assembly which the Select Committee referred to in its report, and it applies also to possible changes in the form of executive Government, i.e., in the arrangements for the Administration of the Territory to operate after the next elections for the House of Assembly."
- 70. In 1965 legislation came into operation which enabled non-indigenous persons to participate in local government through the establishment of councils with multiracial electorates and, by 30 June 1966, a total of 54 councils had been formed. The total number of local government councils at this time had increased to 125, compared with 109 the previous year, and covered an approximate population of 1,488,299 persons.

Economic conditions

- 71. Primary production is the basis of the economy of both Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Agriculture is the chief activity. In 1965-1966, agricultural products made up approximately 87 per cent of the total value of exports of Papua and 85 per cent of the Trust Territory's exports.
- 72. The principal agricultural exports of New Guinea are copra, cacao and coffee. Although the principal exports of Papua are copra and rubber, more cacao and coffee are also being exported. New Guinea has extensive forest resources and an important timber industry is being developed. Gold mining, although now declining, is still an important activity there. The mineral resources of Papua have not been fully explored; the administering Power stated that it was not possible to estimate the time required to complete the project.
- 73. A cattle industry is being developed. New Guinea, where increasing numbers of the indigenous people are raising livestock, had 34,913 head of cattle. Papua, which had almost 9,800 head, is still almost entirely dependent on imports for meat and animal products. The administering Power's policy is to improve the quality of stock, build up numbers and extend cattle ownership to the indigenous inhabitants.
- 74. Manufacturing industries are of minor though growing significance. Special taxation concessions exist to encourage the establishment of new secondary and service industries, and complete exemption from Territory income tax may be granted to companies engaging in approved new pioneer industries for their first five to six years of operation.
- 75. Although subsistence agriculture is still the predominant activity of the indigenous population, increasing numbers of Papuans and New Guineans are growing export crops or cash crops for local sale. During 1965-1966, indigenous growers produced approximately half the copra and three quarters of the coffee grown in Papua, while their plantings of cacao trees totalled 988,700. In New Guinea, indigenous growers produced over one quarter of the copra, one quarter of the cacao beans and slightly under two thirds of the coffee. They also produced about 18,000 tons of fruit and vegetables for town markets.
- 76. During 1965-1966, the total value of exports of the Territories was \$A49,828,585,¹⁰ compared with \$A49,140,462 the previous year. Imports had a total value of \$A110,431,203, compared with \$A86,846,022 the previous year.
- 77. The following table shows the public finances of the Territories:

¹⁰ The Administering Authority changed to a decimal monetary system on 14 February 1966. A new \$A1.00 is equivalent to ten shillings in the old currency (Australian pound) or \$US1.12.

	1964-1965		1965-1966			
	Papua	New Guinea	Total	Рариа	New Guinea	Total
	(In million Australian dollars)					
Internal revenue	13.02	14.90	27.92	16.86	18.45	35.31
Australian grant	22.12	33,86	55.98	23.82	38.17	61.99
Total revenue	35.14	48.76	83.90	40.68	56.62	97.30
Total expenditure	37.38	52.68	90.06	43,27	60.30	103.57

⁹ See foot-note 8 above.

- 78. The revenues of Papua and New Guinea are supplemented by a direct, interest-free and non-repayable grant from the administering Power. The grant for 1965-1966 was \$A61,999,743. Revenues raised in the Territories are derived chiefly from import tariffs and direct taxation. Expenditure on economic activity rose from approximately 25 per cent in 1963-1964 to approximately 33 per cent in the 1965-1966 budget. In addition to the direct grant, the administering Power, through government departments and instrumentalities not directly responsible to the territorial Administration, spent in 1965-1966 \$A33.7 million on essential works and services in Papua and New Guinea.
- 79. During 1965-1966, 180 companies having a total nominal capital of \$A13,073,000 were incorporated as local companies, bringing the total number of local companies to 997 operating with an aggregate nominal capital of \$A254,817,772. Thirty-two foreign companies registered, bringing the total number of foreign companies operating in the Territories to 204. No information is available on dividends and taxes paid in 1965-1966 by the companies active in the Territories.
- 80. The Administering Power informed the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-fourth session that another mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) visited the Territory in March 1967 to examine current developments there and to discuss with the administering Power a number of proposed development projects, some of which might qualify for loans from the Bank or its affiliate, the International Development Association.

Social conditions in Papua

Labour

- 81. The administering Power states that although there have been steady increases in the numbers of indigenous people engaged in wage employment in recent years, the proportion of wage earners to the estimated adult male population is still relatively small (approximately over one fifth). While large numbers of the Territory's labour force are still engaged in unskilled work on plantations or in towns, there is emerging a body of more highly skilled and experienced workers who are capable to a much greater extent than previously of negotiating their own wages and conditions of employment. Unemployment is not a major problem in the Territory. Such unemployment as occurs is mainly of a temporary nature as a result of voluntary changes of employment or reluctance to accept work in rural areas.
- 82. On 31 March 1966 there were 32,517 indigenous people in paid employment (including 1,016 members of the police force but excluding members of the defence forces), compared with 20,234 on 31 March 1965. Private industry employed 22,172 of whom 9,386 were general plantation workers.
- 83. On 30 June 1966, the Department of Labour had a field strength in Papua of three employment officers and five labour inspectors. Labour inspectors' regional workshops were held at Goroka and Rabaul and were attended by officers from Papua. A Research and Planning Branch was formed in the Department of Labour in February 1966. It is responsible for advising on all labour aspects of economic development and planning. The Branch carried out an income and expenditure survey covering a random sample

of indigenous officers of the Territory Public Service on the normal commencing salary range over a twomonth period in 1966.

Public health

- 84. Expenditure on health services totalled \$A3,385,561 in 1965-1966, compared with \$A2,996,710 in 1964-1965; expenditure on works and services of a capital nature and on the improvement and maintenance of hospital buildings and facilities amounted to \$A1,514,635 compared with \$A1,419,400 in 1964-1965. Local government councils reported an expenditure on health services of \$A55,027 from 1 January 1965 to 30 June 1966, compared with \$A4,418 for for the period 1964-1965.
- 85. Church missions are assisted in providing health services by the Administration through a system of grants-in-aid and by the supply of drugs, dressings and equipment. Grants-in-aid for mission hospital buildings totalled \$A11,334 in 1965-1966, compared with \$A31,220 the previous year. The ascertainable expenditure by missions from their own funds on medical services was \$A159,488 in 1965-1966 compared with \$A90,012 the previous year.
- 86. As of June 1966, there were 34 administration hospitals, including 2 hospitals of bush materials in the Southern Highlands, and 332 administration aid posts in the Territory. Maternal and child health services were carried out by 11 administration field clinic centres, including one rural health centre with 153 clinics serving 321 villages. Missions operated 142 clinics serving 1,088 villages; 60 of their stations submit regular reports to the Administration.
- 87. Malaria and tuberculosis continue to be major health problems in the Territory. As a result of the anti-malaria campaign carried out by the Administration, at the end of June 1966, all islands of the Milne Bay District as well as the coastal mainland strip opposite Goodenough and Normandy Islands were under protection.

Educational conditions in Papua

88. On 30 June 1966 there were 171 administration schools and 686 mission schools, compared with 171 and 668 the previous year. The number of pupils enrolled in these schools increased from 71,506 to 76,576. The following table gives the number of pupils in the various schools in 1966.

School	Indigenous pupils	No n- indigenous pupils
Primary	69,464	1,757
High	3,584	216
Technical	1,177	_
Teacher-training	378	
TOTAL	74,603	1,973

- 89. In addition to pupils in Papua, in 1966, 50 indigenous and 605 non-indigenous students were receiving educational assistance at Australian secondary schools. Of the 13 Papuan students who were undertaking higher education in Australia, 12 were at university and one at a technical college.
- 90. Departmental expenditure on education rose from \$A3,852,000 in 1964-1965 to \$A4,551,000 in 1965-1966, representing 10.5 per cent of total government expenditure. These figures include grants-in-aid totalling

\$A415,000 to missions for educational work, compared with \$A342,000 the previous year. Over the same period, expenditure of other departments on education and training declined from \$A984,000 to \$A558,000; building construction and equipment expenditures declined from \$A648,000 to \$A630,000. Expenditure by missions from their own funds increased from \$A522,000 in 1964-1965 to \$A625,000 in 1965-1966.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1967 on New Guinea

91. The Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-fourth session in June 1967, completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966.

92. In a letter dated 30 June 1967 (A/AC.109/255) the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for submission to the General Assembly. The report contains, in addition to the Council's recommendations and conclusions, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions in the Trust Territory and on institutions common to the two Territories.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

- 93. At its 562nd and 564th meetings, on 22 and 27 September 1967, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea which appears as an annex to this chapter.
- 94. The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia expressed reservations on the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee's report on the Territories under consideration.
- 95. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he wished to propose the following amendments to the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report. They consisted of the insertion of the following two new paragraphs after paragraphs 71 and 81 respectively:
- (a) "The Sub-Committee notes that General Assembly resolution 2227 (XXI) has not been implemented by the administering Power."
- (b) "The Sub-Committee calls on the administering Power to take immediate steps for implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX), 2189 (XXI) and 2227 (XXI), which request the the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones and also from utilizing the Territories for military activities incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations."

He stated, however, that it would be sufficient if the proposed amendments, as well as the opinions expressed by his delegation, were included in the records.

96. The representative of Bulgaria said that in future emphasis should be placed on the need to implement General Assembly resolutions concerning decolonization—2105 (XX), 2189 (XXI) and 2227 (XXI)—

11 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4, part II, chap. I.

particularly those provisions which called upon the administering Power to dismantle the military bases in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones. The existence of such bases undeniably impeded the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions.

97. The representative of Australia remarked that the allegations contained in the amendments proposed by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were completely unfounded. The military activities to which amendment (b) alluded were in no way incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, since their sole purpose was to ensure the defence of the Territory, a purpose which was deemed acceptable by the United Nations. Article 4 of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea stated that "The Administering Authority shall be responsible for the peace, order, good government and defence of the Territory and for this purpose shall have the same powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction in and over the Territory as if it were an integral part of Australia, and will be entitled to apply to the Territory, subject to such modifications as it deems desirable, such laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it deems appropriate to the needs and conditions of the Territory". Furthermore, article 7 stated that "The Administering Authority may take all measures in the Territory which it considers desirable to provide for the defence of the Territory and for maintenance of international peace and security".

D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II

98. At its 564th meeting on 27 September 1967, the Special Committee approved the report of Sub-Committee II on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations therein. These are as follows:

Conclusions

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

- (a) The Special Committee considers that the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) has been slow.
- (b) The Cocos Islands have special problems of size and economic viability, but that should not preclude the administering Power from complying with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

Trust Territory of Nauru

- (c) The Special Committee observes that the people of Nauru are steadfast in their declaration of becoming independent on 31 January 1968; it, however, awaits an assurance from the administering Power that the wishes of the people of Nauru will be respected.
- (d) The Special Committee records the desire of the people to remain in Nauru and for the rehabilitation of their island; but notes the statement of the administering Power on the practical impracticability of rehabilitation.
- (e) Though it is aware of the progress that has been made in the negotiation of ownership and control of the operation of the phosphate industry, the Special Com-

mittee hopes that the people of the Territory would obtain the maximum benefit from their sole and limited asset.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

- (f) The Special Committee considers that the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) continues to be slow.
- (g) The Special Committee, however, takes note of the political, social and educational growth in the Territory which constitute some advance, though it considers it inadequate for a consistent and rapid implementation of the Declaration.
- (h) The Special Committee observes that the economic potential of the Territory has still to be exploited. It considers that an exploitation of this potential for the benefit of the people of the Territory will relieve their dependence on the administering Power and enhance their movement towards self-determination and independence.
- (i) The Special Committee notes that discrimination in education, the wage structure and other fields still exist in the Territory, though the administering Power is making efforts to eradicate the problem.

Recommendations

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

- (a) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declararation contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (b) The peoples of the Territory should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision.
- (c) The Special Committee requests that the people of the Territory be given an opportunity to express their wishes with regard to their future status and in this regard the administering Power should avail itself of the assistance which the United Nations could extend.

Trust Territory of Nauru

- (d) The Special Committee recommends that the wishes expressed by the people of Nauru of attaining independence on 31 January 1968 be implemented by the administering Power in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (e) The Special Committee requests the administering Power to rehabilitate Nauru according to the expressed wish of the people so that they could continue to live there.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

- (f) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable rights of all the peoples in these two Territories to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- (g) The House of Assembly should be made a fully representative body with expanded functions, in order to transfer power to the people of the Territory.
- (h) The Special Committee feels that efforts in the economic and educational fields should continue at a more rapid rate to enable the peoples of the Territories to direct their own affairs and take over the administration of their territory.

- (i) The Local Government Councils should continue to be strengthened in order that the people could exercise self-government in municipal affairs.
- (j) Existing discrimination in the Territory, whether in education, wages or other areas, should be eliminated as quickly as possible.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

(k) The Special Committee reiterates its belief that a visiting mission to the Territories is necessary and would be most useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the peoples. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

ANNEX*

Report of Sub-Committee II

The Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

- 1. The Sub-Committee considered Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea at its 66th to 69th meetings held from 23 August to 7 September 1967.
- 2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-92 of the present chapter).
- 3. The representative of Australia reminded the Sub-Committee that the Trusteeship Council had recently held a thorough discussion of the situation in the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea. All the documentation prepared for the Council was available to members of the Sub-Committee, who should take due note of its contents.
- 4. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands, whose total area was only five-and-a-half square miles, had at present about 470 inhabitants. A large part of the population had emigrated to Borneo and Malaysia at the end of the Second World War for economic reasons. Those who had remained continued to exercise their right of self-determination within the context of their customs, traditions and religion. The Australian Government had undertaken to interfere as little as possible in such practices. Health services were provided by the Australian Government, Apart from a civil airport, the islands' only economic activities were coconut-growing, fishing and ship-building. Because of their small size, their limited resources and the constant need to provide for the emigration and resettlement of their surplus population, the islands remained dependent on the support and assistance of a larger country.
- 5. The Trust Territory of Nauru was administered by Australia on behalf of the joint Administering Authority, consisting of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. It was a small island, as limited in area and population as the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, but had the advantage of possessing an important economic asset, phosphate, which gave the Nauruans the highest per capita income in the world. Unfortunately, the deposits were gradually being exhausted. Since Nauru, had hardly any arable land and the rainfall was unreliable, it would not be able to provide for its own needs once the phosphate was exhausted. At the request of the Nauruans, the Administering Authority had therefore tried to find an alternative island where the Nauruans could resettle. An exhaustive search had been carried out. Various offers, including an offer of a large island off the coast of Queensland, had been made. At the last session of the Trusteeship Council the Nauruans had said that they had decided to remain on Nauru, despite the unfavourable report of the Committee of Experts set up in 1966 to inquire into the possibility of rehabilitating the workedout land when the phosphate was exhausted. The report had

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/AC,109/L.395/Add.6.

conceded that although it would be technically feasible to refill the land, there were many practical considerations which made such an undertaking impracticable.

- 6. Since the Committee last discussed Nauru, negotiations on the future of the phosphate industry on Nauru and the Territory's political progress had continued. An agreement on the phosphate industry had been concluded in June 1967. Under the agreement, the Nauru Local Government Council, or its successor in the event of a constitutional reform, would become the owner of the enterprise and would assume full control and management of the industry. The partner Governments, through the British Phosphate Commissioners, would buy Nauru's entire output of phosphate at a price and rate of production which would be fixed in accordance with procedures laid down in the agreement and the Nauru Local Government Council would receive all the proceeds and meet the operating costs. The Nauru Local Government Council was to set up a Nauru Phosphate Corporation, which would have certain specific consultative and policy control functions until 30 June 1970, when it would assume complete control and management of the phosphate operations at Nauru. The assets of the enterprise would be valued jointly on 1 July 1967 by representatives of the Nauruans and the British Phosphate Commissioners. The valuation would be based on the original and lower cost and was provisionally estimated at \$US22 million.
- 7. The agreement fixed Nauru's annual output at 2 million tons, at a price of \$12.80 per ton (f.o.b.), subject to adjustment in accordance with the price quoted for Florida phosphate, which was considered the world standard. The parties could request a review of the agreement with twelve months' notice. Since phosphate was the island's only economic resource, the partner Governments had decided to pay the net profits from the industry to the Nauruans. They would thus receive about \$US15.5 million per year as long as the deposits lasted. Under the new financial arrangement the Nauruans would receive \$21 million this coming financial year or \$40,000 for each family over its current earnings. Because of the extractive nature of the industry and because phosphate is the only economic asset, the partner Governments had agreed to give 100 per cent of the benefit of the phosphates to the Nauruans instead of only 50 per cent as was the usual practice in arrangements of this kind. If they had invested the money properly, their future would be assured for many generations to come.
- 8. Since the negotiations on the phosphate industry had occupied much of the time and attention of the Nauruan leaders and the Administering Authority, discussions on the political future of the Nauruans had been limited, but they would be resumed in the immediate future. The Nauruan leaders had submitted a paper which proposed that Nauru would achieve independence on 31 January 1968 and become a Republic headed by a President who would combine the functions of Head of State and Head of Government. The executive power would be exercised by the President and a Council of Ministers chosen by him. The Nauruan paper had expressed the hope that the Australian High Court would serve as the court of appeal from decisions of the Supreme Court of Nauru. The Nauruans had stressed that their proposition was not final and they had sought the reactions of the partner Governments.
- 9. The partner Governments were examining those proposals with great care. The Administering Authority had shown a sympathetic attitude towards the Nauruan wishes to resolve their political ambitions. However, it had suggested that there might be advantage in an association with Australia under which a law adopted by the Australian Parliament would make Australia responsible for Nauru's external affairs and defence. The Australian Government would not intervene in any way in Nauruan internal affairs unless the future Nauruan Government expressly requested it. Such an association would give the Nauruan Government many advantages in the field of international affairs. It would make Australia responsible for defending Nauru, whose approximately 600 adult males could scarcely offer a credible defence against external aggression.

- 10. The Administering Authority had put forward an alternative whereby Nauru would become fully independent and conclude a treaty of friendship with Australia which would make the latter responsible for Nauru's foreign affairs and defence. This proposal was also under study.
- 11. In conclusion, he believed, that the members of the Sub-Committee would agree that most of the major problems of Nauru had been resolved or were close to resolution and that the future of the Nauruans had been guaranteed to a large extent by the considerable financial benefits conferred upon them.
- 12. After referring to the tough geographical and climatic conditions prevailing in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the meagreness of their natural resources, he pointed out that they were jointly administered by Australia with United Nations consent. They had a single Parliament, a single judicial system and a single administration.
- 13. Considerable progress had been made in education. The number of indigenous pupils attending primary schools had increased from 41,000 ten years earlier to 205,000 today; similarly, whereas there had been 1,500 pupils in secondary schools ten years earlier, now there were 12,000. A university, at which 168 students were registered, had been established, as had other institutions of higher learning, such as the Goroka Teacher Training College, the Administrative College, and the Vudal Agricultural College. Instruction at those schools was almost completely free of charge. Australia had obtained aid in that field from the United Nations Development Programme, which was paying some \$A1.3 million of the approximately \$A4 million set aside for these projects, the rest being paid by the Administration. The specialized agencies and UNICEF were currently considering other forms of assistance to the Territories.
- 14. The public health situation was fairly good. A special effort was being made to eliminate malaria and tuberculosis by preventive measures. The hospital system was well developed, and public health expenditure had doubled during the past ten years, amounting today to about \$A11 million.
- 15. In the economic field, the Australian Government was endeavouring to develop production and trade in the Territories and to free them from dependence on Australia. During the past five years the Territories' exports had increased in value by 50 per cent. The quality of the products had also been raised, and harbour installations and airfields had been improved. A great deal of effort was being devoted to forestry and agriculture; in particular, the growing of tea and oil palms had been introduced. It was estimated that the Kieta copper deposits in the Solomon Islands would make it possible to double the Territories' export income within seven years. The Australian Government was trying to attract foreign capital but always guaranteed the indigenous inhabitants a considerable share in such investments. The Solomon Islands copper mining plan would provide many opportunities for the local population and would lead to the establishment of a port, roads, dams, a power station and a town. Australia had been accused in some quarters of unscrupulously exploiting the Territories. The simple answer to such a charge was to point out that in 1966 Australia had given the Territories \$A70 million, representing 58 per cent of their budget. During the current year the figure would be raised to \$A78 million. Such aid was freely given without strings and the people had been told it would continue as long as they wanted it. The Australian Government did not insist that the Territory should be economically viable or administratively self-sufficient at the time of self-determination. This requirement was set at the initiative of the Committee-not the Australian Government,
- 16. Progress had been made in the political field. The House of Assembly, which had met for the first time in June 1964, included 54 elected members and 10 nominated official members. Thirty-eight of the elected members were indigenous. The House of Assembly had established a Select Committee on Constitutional Development to determine what form of government the people wanted for the future. The Select Committee had an indigenous majority and an indigenous Chairman. As a result of its report at the 1968 elections,

the membership of the House of Assembly would be increased to eighty-four, including ten official members. The ten seats reserved for Europeans would be eliminated and replaced by fifteen regional seats. A modest minimum level of education (intermediate certificate) would be required of candidates for those seats. They would thus be able to make a contribution to the debates of the House of Assembly, in accordance with the wishes of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development. The Chairman of the Select Committee had recently stated that most of the people wanted the members of the House of Assembly to take a larger part in the administration of the country in 1968 but did not want any radical changes. He said that the Select Committee had been concerned only with the views of the people and not with those of the Australian Government or the United Nations or any outside body.

17. A system of parliamentary Under-Secretaries had been established in 1964 to enable some of the elected members of the House of Assembly to gain political experience. The Under-Secretaries, who had previously concerned themselves primarily with local problems, now met each month with the Administrator to consider questions of general policy. Their opinions were taken into account in the formulation of policy. The Administrator was also assisted by a Council consisting of three nominated official members and seven elected members of the House of Assembly. Thus, the members of the House of Assembly were directly associated with the day-by-day work of administration.

18. The political future of the Territories depended in large measure on the development of the local government councils. There were at present 128 such councils and their decisions directly affected the people. Regional conferences of local government councils were held and their recommendations on local and national issues were passed to the Central Administration for consideration and action. They provided an excellent training ground for future politicians. The local government councils worked out independent self-help programmes and several of them had a budget of about \$A100,000.

19. While economic viability and availability of all the necessary administrative staff were not essential for the Territories to be able to decide their future, the Australian Government was convinced that they should have a firm economic base and an effective system of government. Australia was working to build the balanced institutions which would enable the Territories to set up their own democratic government. The Australian Government believed that the people of the Territories should themselves choose the time to achieve self-government or independence.

20. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2227 (XXI) concerning Papua and New Guinea. In that resolution, which his Government had considered a poor resolution, the General Assembly had called upon Australia to abolish all discriminatory practices in the economic, social, health and educational fields, to hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage with a view to transferring power to the people of the Territories and to fix an early date for independence. It had further called upon Australia to refrain from utilizing the Territories for military activities incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations. He wished to state that there were no discriminatory electoral qualifications in the Territories except the minimum requirement for election to the regional seats introduced by the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, a body which had a majority of indigenous members. There was, of course, some discrimination in the Territories, as in any multiracial society, but the Australian Government was making the strongest efforts to discourage such practices and it had outlawed discrimination by legislation years ago. The House of Assembly was also aware of the danger of discrimination not only between Europeans and Papuans and New Guineans but between New Guineans and Papuans, and even between certain tribes and had set up a sub-committee to examine the effectiveness of existing legislation. There was no justification whatever for suggesting, as the resolution did, that elections were not held

on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Everyone over the age of 21 was registered on a common roll and had the right to vote. The date for independence was a matter to be decided by the people of the Territories. The people knew they could choose independence when they wished and the Select Committee on Constitutional Development had been told by the majority of the people that they did not want independence yet. Lastly, Australia's military activities were in no way incompatible with the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. His delegation therefore categorically rejected that resolution, which was not in keeping with the facts.

21. The representative of Poland said that, as a starting point for its discussion, the Committee should try to ascertain what steps had been taken by the administering Power to implement General Assembly resolution 2227 (XXI). That resolution reflected the feelings of the international community with regard to its responsibility for the peoples remaining under colonial domination and contained specific recommendations for the implementation in the Territories concerned of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

22. His delegation had been disappointed to note the position adopted by the Australian representative. While declaring his country's adherence to the goals of the Declaration, the latter had rejected various practical methods proposed in resolution 2227 (XXI) for the purpose of attaining those goals. Both in the Trusteeship Council and in the Sub-Committee, the Australian representative had challenged the validity of the resolution on the ground that it was not in keeping with the facts. Yet, he had failed to supply the Sub-Committee with any specific information to show that his Government had taken steps to correct the situation in the Territories in question.

23. The paramount considerations in the current debate were the right of the people of Papua and New Guinea to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the fixing of an early date for independence as recommended in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2227 (XXI). That date had, of course, to be determined by the people concerned, and the administering Power had a duty to create conditions in which they could freely express their wishes in full awareness of the various choices open to them. His delegation would therefore expect the administering Power to take the time factor into consideration and to do its utmost to assist the inhabitants in developing their political institutions and economic and social environment and in acquiring the skills and education necessary for them to manage their own affairs at the earliest possible time.

24. The pace of development in the Territories was too slow, however accelerated it had been in the past few years, even considering the complex and difficult circumstances prevailing. After half a century of Australian administration, only two indigenous students had received a university education, Moreover, the Legislature for the combined Territories of Papua and New Guinea-the House of Assembly-was apparently in an embryonic stage without substantial power. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat showed that it was the Australian Parliament and not the House of Assembly of Papua and New Guinea which, in the final analysis, approved all legislation for the Territories. The new arrangements proposed by the Select Committee on Constitutional Development would not alter that situation for they did not make any provision for broadening the powers of the House of Assembly. Paragraph 69 of the Secretariat working paper contained a statement by the Australian Minister for Territories to the effect that his Government would not refuse to make changes if there was strong and widespread support for change in the Territory. The question arose as to what the administering Power regarded as constituting "strong and widespread support" and how the population would be consulted. It was clear that the House of Assembly had no power to make an ordinance concerning such changes. Furthermore, there were no political parties which could advocate changes in political status, thereby creating the necessary "strong and widespread"

support for change. It was also relevant that the local Press had published a letter claiming that no one could express himself freely for fear that he would be reported to the Administration. In view of all those factors, the Committee might justifiably wonder how the administering Power intended to ascertain the wishes of the people. That was an important question; the administering Power had, on several occasions, argued that it was the will of the people not to attain independence at the present stage.

- 25. Resolution 2227 (XXI) also called upon the administering Power to abolish all discriminatory practices in the economic, social, health and educational fields. The administering Power had repeatedly denied that such discrimination existed, but it could not be denied that there was some "inequity" in the treatment of the indigenous people as compared with those described as expatriates. The Australian Administration had acquired some 3 per cent of the total available land, allegedly to protect the indigenous landowners from exploitation by entrepreneurs. The loans granted to expatriates by the Ex-Servicemen's Credit Board were considerably larger than those granted to indigenous ex-servicemen. The latter were entitled to 15- to 20-acre plots of land, while expatriate servicemen received 400- to 500-acre plots. It had emerged during the debate in the Trusteeship Council that same 70 per cent of the land acquired by the Australian Government was held by Australians, and it was obvious that if that process continued the Territory's economy, even after independence, would be in the hands of foreigners.
- 26. Resolution 2227 (XXI) further called upon the administering Power to refrain from utilizing the Territory for military activities incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations. His delegation would welcome any information from the administering Power showing how it was discharging its obligations in that connexion.
- 27. His delegation had carefully studied all the relevant documentation, together with the Australian representative's statement to the Sub-Committee on 23 August 1967. He did not deny that there had been some progress in the development of the Territory; his delegation's main contention was that the pace of that progress was too slow. The time factor was extremely important. Despite the administering Power's rejection of General Assembly resolution 2227 (XXI), his delegation held that it was justified and should be implemented.
- 28. There were various matters which required urgent action. The House of Assembly should be vested with greater legislative powers so as to enable it to deal with all domestic issues. Only in that way could the people acquire the knowledge and political skills they needed to prepare them for independence. In addition, all electoral qualifications should be abolished and replaced by the generally accepted practice of universal adult suffrage. The administering Power should immediately abolish preferential treatment for expatriates, especially with regard to the acquisition of land, and the unequal treatment of the indigenous population in the matter of education had to cease. The people also had to be made aware of their right to decide their future and not fear to express themselves freely. Whether such fears were justified was a secondary consideration; what was important was that the administering Power should dissipate them.
- 29. His delegation had been gratified to learn that the future of Nauru had been resolved, and it fully supported the Local Government Council's call for independence by the end of January 1968. The future policy and political institutions of Nauru had to be freely decided by its population. His delegation also hoped that a solution would be found to the problem of land rehabilitation, thus enabling the inhabitants to remain on the island and to preserve their national identity.
- 30. The representative of India said it was heartening to note that, following the long-awaited discussions with the Administering Authority, the representatives of Nauru had proposed that Nauru should become independent on 31 January 1968 and had suggested a form of constitution. However, while the Administering Authority had agreed that basic changes should be made in the Government of Nauru by that date,

- it had as yet given no categorical assurance regarding independence for the Territory and had, in fact, presented two alternatives: that Nauru should either become self-governing in internal matters, with Australia remaining responsible for defence and foreign affairs, or that the Territory should become fully independent, with Australia retaining responsibility for defence and foreign affairs on the basis of a treaty of friendship. She recalled that the Head Chief of Nauru had stated in the Trusteeship Council that his people preferred not to make the island's independence conditional on the conclusion of a prior agreement with Australia. The Administering Authority had frequently stated in the past that in determining the future status of the people, it would be guided solely by the wishes of the people themselves. Since the wishes of the people had been clearly expressed by the Head Chief, it was the duty of the Administering Authority to facilitate the transfer of power to the Nauruan people on the date set by them.
- 31. It was encouraging that a satisfactory agreement had been reached on the question of the ownership and future operation of the phosphate industry in the Territory, but she regretted that no agreement had been reached on the vital question of rehabilitating the mined areas of the island. The Local Government Council of Nauru had expressed reservations regarding the observation of the Expert Committee that re-soiling of the mined areas, while technically feasible, would be impracticable. Her delegation supported the view of the Nauruan people that it was the responsibility of the Administering Authority, which had derived great profits from the phosphate obtained at well below the world price, to restore the island for habitation, as had been recommended in General Assembly resolution 2226 (XXI).
- 32. With regard to Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, she noted that all the recommendations of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development had now been accepted by the administering Power. While the proposed increase in open electorates represented a measure of progress, it should be viewed in the light of the Visiting Mission's recommendation as early as 1962 that an elected parliament of 100 members should be established. The House would have only ninety-four members even after the 1968 elections. Moreover, the newly proposed constitutional changes fell far short of the recommendations of the Sub-Committee and of those made by the General Assembly in resolution 2227 (XXI). The Sub-Committee had urged the administering Power to take measures to ensure that the House of Assembly could function as a fully representative and effective body. The retention of ten official seats was contrary to its recommendations, and the new regional seats requiring educational qualifications might well not be open to the indigenous population. Moreover, the House of Assembly still had only limited legislative powers. Its power to initiate appropriation measures was also severely restricted.
- 33. The administering Power had not taken any steps to fix an early date for the independence of the Territories in accordance with resolution 2227 (XXI). It maintained that this was a matter for the people of the Territory alone to decide. Her delegation believed, however, that it was the obligation of the administering Power actively to prepare the people for exercise of their right to self-determination and independence effectively and expeditiously.
- 34. The representative of Sierra Leone observed that the Administering Authority had so far given no clear indication of its attitude towards the decision of the people of Nauru to seek independence by 31 January 1968 and had advanced alternatives to complete independence which had not been requested by the people. In his view, an administering Power should be guided solely by the expressed wish of the people of the Territory and should not propose alternative solutions if not requested to do so. He noted, in that connexion, that the Administering Authority for Nauru had found it quite easy to support the wishes of the people of another Territory not under its administration, and he failed to see why it could not do so in the case of Nauru.
- 35. He was also at a loss to understand what practical considerations ruled out the possibility of refilling the worked-

out land when it seemed that it was technically feasible. He noted that the Nauruans had rejected the proposal that they resettle on another island over which they would have no sovereignty. In his view, what was now required was a clear statement from the Administering Authority that the practical considerations rendering it impracticable to refill the land could be surmounted and that the wishes of the Nauruan people for independence by the end of January 1968 could be met.

36. With regard to the Trust Territory of New Guinea, he thought that very little progress had been made. The University had been expanded, but that was to be expected, since it had only recently been established. The opinions of the parliamentary under-secretaries were now being taken into account, although as yet they had no power to make administrative decisions. The Territory of New Guinea had a great potential which apparently was not yet being properly exploited for the benefit of the country as a whole. The Administering Authority should increase the rate at which the Territory's potential was being exploited and ensure that the people as a whole benefited from it and had a say in the administration of the Territory. All too often, in colonial Territories, only the lower echelons of labour benefited directly from the exploitation of their country's potential; Nauru, for example, had twice had to renegotiate the phosphate agreements to ensure that they benefited the people of the Territory as a whole.

37. The representative of Australia said that the burden of the criticisms of the administering Power which had been made seemed to be that progress in the Territories had been disappointingly slow during the previous year. Even if the assumption that the pace of political, social and economic progress could be increased yearly by government policy was disregarded, the reports made to the Trusteeship Council and the Sub-Committee showed that there had, in fact, been considerable progress in all the Territories.

38. General Assembly resolutions 2226 (XXI) and 2227 (XXI), in his delegation's view, set limiting conditions to discussion of the Territories; they created an incomplete, and in some instances seriously distorted, picture of what was happening in the Territories and some major points in the two resolutions were at variance with the facts.

39. Reference had been made to operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2227 (XXI), which mentioned discriminatory practices in Papua and New Guinea. There was no deliberate discrimination in the Territory; the New Guinea Administration had, in fact, introduced legislation in the House of Assembly to outlaw racial discrimination, not only as between Europeans and New Guineans but also as between Papuans and New Guineans, and a special House committee had been set up to investigate the effectiveness of existing legislation. The difference between the "A" schools and the "T" schools was based on their curricula; "A" schools were designed for English-speaking pupils, irrespective of race, whereas " schools were for those whose second language was English and were specifically adapted to conditions in the Territory. It was therefore unjust to criticize the Administering Authority, on the one hand, for introducing an Australian curriculum into the schools and, on the other hand, for adapting a curriculum to the needs of the Territory on the ground that the students were not being given the best kind of education the Administering Authority could provide.

40. The only feature of electoral practice which might be called discriminatory was the requirement that candidates for the 15 regional seats in the House of Assembly should possess certain educational qualifications and that provision had been laid down by the Select Committee on the Constitution of the House of Assembly—the representatives of the people—and not by the Australian Government or the Administration of New Guinea. The New Guinea House of Assembly was not, as had been stated, in an embryonic stage. It was a body elected by full adult suffrage—elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage had been held in 1964 and thereafter—and none of the legislation it had submitted for the assent of the Administration and the Australian Parliament had been rejected. No legislation submitted by the

Administration which required the expenditure of money could be passed without the approval of the House of Assembly and one such piece of legislation had, in fact, been rejected. The views of the people of the Territory were constantly sought; at present, the House's Select Committee on Constitutional Development was consulting the people in all areas on their wishes for the future. It was true that political parties had only recently made their appearance in the Territory, but the Administration had never discouraged the formation of political groups; the fact that they had developed so slowly was probably due to the physical difficulties of communications and transport. The fixing of a date for the independence of the Territory was, in his Government's view, the exclusive responsibility of its people and neither the Administering Authority nor the United Nations should interfere with the exercise of self-determination.

41. Of the 3 per cent of the New Guinea land alienated by the Administration, some had been used for public works, some had been leased to Australians or to companies for development purposes, and the remainder was being used by or held in trust for the people. It was therefore unjust to say that there was inequity in land distribution. Moreover, the representative of Poland, while making no referrence to the amount of money the Australian Government was spending on the Territory, had found it possible to criticize the Administering Authority for being slow in the development of the Territory and yet claimed that economic enterprises there were exploiting New Guinea's natural resources and its people for the financial benefit of Australian investors. Australian economic enterprises were doing a great deal for the development of the Territory and to claim, as the representative of Poland had done, that they were exploiting its natural resources in the interests of Australia, but not New Guinea, was illogical. It was interesting, and typical of the open society which Australia had, that the article to which the representative of Poland had referred, in which the Administration of New Guinea had been criticized, should have appeared in a periodical published by the Australian Council for New Guinea Affairs.

42. The alleged discrimination in government loans to exservicemen was not based on racial considerations. The loans were granted in recognition of valuable service, and the amount of a loan was decided on the purely objective criteria of ability to repay the capital and managerial capacity.

43. The standard of living of the people of Nauru was outstandingly high; one indicator of their prosperity was that, of the 1,025 motor vehicles in private ownership, 558 were owned by Nauruans. Under the recently negotiated phosphate agreement, it was expected that each Nauruan family would receive an annual income \$US34,000 higher than the current average income. Rents averaged \$1 per week, medical services and primary education were free and there was a generous system of scholarships for higher study in Australia. The allegation that the Administering Authority, by making two proposals on the Territory's future relations with Australia during the discussions with a Nauruan delegation in June 1967, was laying down conditions for the granting of independence was unjustified: it was Australia's responsibility under the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru to safeguard the future of the Territory and to propose arrangements for its defence and foreign affairs after independence for its representatives to consider. Negotiations on the proposals were still under active discussion by both parties which, for the purpose of the negotiations, were equals.

44. As the representative of Australia had said, the recent phosphate agreement was a very generous one, concluded to the mutual satisfaction of two equals. The provision of operative paragraph 3 of resolution 2226 (XXI) on restoring the island of Nauru for habitation, irrespective of the cost involved, was not particularly helpful. If restoring the island were taken to mean filling in the areas from which phosphate rock had been mined with quantities of phosphate rock obtained elsewhere and covering them with a few inches of rather poor topsoil, it was doubtful whether that procedure, even if feasible, would do more than produce only barren areas, and there were serious doubts among experts about

the practicability of filling the mined areas with soil imported from elsewhere. The people of Nauru were well aware that the remaining two thirds of their phosphate deposits would would probably be exhausted in less than thirty years; they have been advised of the possibility of building an airstrip or a water catchment system, and the generous terms of the phosphate agreement would enable them to decide freely all such matters after independence. In any event, the implications of the phrase "irrespective of cost" should be given further thought; it could hardly be interpreted to mean that restoration should proceed, even if the costs were considerably in excess of the actual value of the extracted and processed rock.

45. The Chairman said he was happy to note that the Australian representative considered the matter under discussion to be worthy of serious consideration, but he could not agree with him that one of the Sub-Committee's meetings had had to be cancelled because there had been no quorum. The last meeting of the Sub-Committee had had to be postponed because the summary record of the Australian representative's statement on the Territories in question had not been available. While, admittedly, ample information on the Territories was available in the extensive documentation which Australia had supplied to the Trusteeship Council, he himself had understood from members that the Australian statement at the 66th meeting had introduced a number of new elements.

46. The representative of Sierra Leone said that he fully endorsed the Chairman's comments regarding the organization of the Sub-Committee's work. Moreover, he would point out that the Australian representative himself had drawn attention to the amount of material avialable on the Territories; it was only reasonable for members of the Committee to request further time to give thought to any statements they might wish to make so that they could fulfil their responsibilities properly.

47. He was also surprised that the Australian representative had thought that the Sub-Committee expected progress to take place in all spheres each year. The Sub-Committee was really interested in observing what progress had been made over the long term in the social, administrative, economic and political spheres. He himself, while admitting that there had been progress in the educational field in New Guinea, had merely questioned whether the rate of progress in that field was rapid enough, as well as the rate at which the Territory's potential was being exploited. Furthermore, the Administering Authority could hardly take exception to his suggestion that it should ensure that the Territory as a whole benefited from the exploitation of its potential.

48. The representative of Australia had also observed that he considered the recently negotiated phosphate agreement for Nauru to be generous and that the Nauruans already enjoyed a very high standard of living. However, the point at issue was whether the people of Nauru were benefiting as much as they should under the new agreement, particularly in view of the fact that the phosphate desposits would be exhausted within twenty-nine years. He agreed with the representative of India that the Administering Authority should not seek to impose prior conditions for the independence of Nauru. The only way in which it could properly safeguard the interests of the people of the Territory would be to accept whatever decision they might make concerning the system of government they wished for themselves. The Administering Authority had indicated that it was ready to accede to the wishes of the people of New Guinea when and if they decided to seek independence; it would seem that the same was not being done in the case of Nauru. Moreover, he still found it difficult to believe that the legislature for Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea was anything more than a rubber stamp, since all ordinances required the assent of the Administrator or, in certain cases, the Governor-General, even though the Administering Authority argued that so far assent had never been withheld.

49. The representative of India regretted that the Australian representative had seen fit to criticize the way in which the the Sub-Committee was conducting its work. Surely, whether or not the Sub-Committee's work was fruitful or useful depended in large measure on the willingness of the Administering Authority to implement its recommendations, and the Ad-

ministering Authority's attitude towards General Assembly resolution 2227 (XXI) was hardly evidence of its willingness to do so.

50. In criticizing the lack of progress in Papua and the Territory of New Guinea, she had not wished to imply that progress each year was slow but that progress had not been fast enough throughout the term of administration of the administering Power. She still contended, moreover, that there were discriminatory practices in the Territories; for example, the fact that there were two salary ranges in the public service for overseas and for local officers in Papua and New Guinea was clearly discriminatory. The administering Power had tried to justify the educational qualification for the fifteen regional seats on the basis that it was recommended by the Select Committee on Constitutional Development. That argument would have been valid if the Committee had been a fully representative body. But that was not the case.

51. The Australian representative had asked for clarification of the meaning of operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2226 (XXI). "Restoring the island of Nauru for habitation" had already been defined by the Nauru Local Government Council as "replacing sub-soil and topsoil in the same proportions as phosphate bears to topsoil in the unmined areas".a With regard to the words "irrespective of cost", the Local Government Council's view was that it could not conceive that the United Nations could reconcile a "minimum cost" solution with the obligation for advancement of the Territory and that the Administering Authority should not try to avoid its responsibilities by attempting to recover the cost of restoring land mined in the past out of the proceeds of mining lands in the future. The United Nations position was, therefore, that cost should not be a factor in considering the restoration of the island for habitation.

52. She noted that, once again, no categorical statement concerning the attainment of independence by Nauru on 31 January 1968 had been forthcoming from the Administering Authority. Her delegation would have been heartened if the administering Power had given such an assurance. In conclusion, she observed that the recommendations of the 1962 Visiting Mission to Papua and New Guinea, to which she had referred in her statement at the previous meeting, had stated that a 100-member legislature would be practicable and could be established within one year; the membership of the legislature of the combined Territories would be ninety-six in 1968—six years after the recommendation had been made. This was indeed a slow progress.

53. The representative of Poland said that, in his view, certain misunderstandings might have been avoided if the Administering Power had allowed visiting missions to visit the Territories in question to observe conditions on the spot and to ascertain the wishes of the people. He could not agree with the representative of Australia that the House of Representatives for Papua and New Guinea had attained adulthood; the Secretariat's working paper on the Territories (see paras. 56-92 of the present chapter) clearly stated that ordinances required the assent of the Administrator or the Governor-General. As the situation stood at present, it was the Australian Parliament which, in effect, legislated for the combined Territories and it could not be argued that the House of Assembly had freedom of action. Whether or not assent had actually been withheld for any legislation was not important; the fact remained that the power of the legislature was seriously curtailed.

54. The Australian representative had not denied the existence of some inequality in the granting of loans to expatriate and indigenous ex-servicemen but had argued that such loans were a privilege and not a right. That might well be the case, but his delegation would urge the Australian Government to end the preferential treatment of expatriates. A large loan to such a person would eventually assure him of a sufficiently high standard of education to qualify him for election to the House of Assembly. It was readily apparent that the result would be a vicious circle in which, even after independence, effective power would be in the hands of

^a See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4, para. 385 (f).

expatriates. The differences in salaries paid to expatriates and indigenous workers were further grounds for the claim that inequality did exist.

- 55. The Australian representative had said that there was racial discrimination in the Territory and had observed that such discrimination existed in other countries. That was little consolation to his delegation, and it urged the administering Power to work for the elimination of such practices. The Australian Government needed no advice in that connexion; it was well aware how it ought to proceed.
- 56. Although he had made no specific reference in his statement at the previous meeting to the exploitation of the Territory by foreign economic enterprises, it would be most difficult, in view of the grants of land to Australians, to reject that contention that there was such exploitation.
- 57. The Australian representative had given no direct reply to the question as to how the administering Power proposed to ascertain the wishes of the population in regard to its future. Neither had he given any direct reply to the question as to how the Australian Government intended to discharge its obligation under resolution 2227 (XXI) to refrain from utilizing the Territories for military activities incompatible with the Charter.
- 58. As to the question of progress in the Territories, the Committee's debate was not concerned solely with progress during the previous year but also with developments since the adoption of resolution 1514 (XV). Arguments based on the number of indigenously owned bicycles and motor vehicles were no excuse for overlooking that basic fact.
- 59. The representative of the United States said that his delegation would not comment on the situation in Nauru since the local population and the Administering Authority were engaged in major negotiations affecting the entire future of the Territory. The fact that those talks were being held freely and openly reflected considerable credit on both parties, and his delegation was optimistic about their outcome.
- 60. There had been much discussion as to whether progress in New Guinea towards self-government was satisfactory and regarding the fact that the Australian Government exercised some control over the local legislature. It was natural that a completely independent country should permit no outside control over its legislature, but until the Territory in question was self-governing it followed that there would be some measure of control. To emphasize that aspect was merely to emphasize the fact that the Territory was not yet selfgoverning. It was wrong to dub the New Guinea legislature a "rubber stamp" and to ignore the power which it actually possessed. The essential question was whether the Australian Government used its power to inhibit New Guinea legislation; the Australian representative had presented factual information indicating that it had not done so. Furthermore, the passages in the Secretariat working paper which the Polish representative had read out showed that the House of Assembly was broadly empowered to make ordinances for the peace, order and good government of the Territory. His delegation's conclusion was that the New Guinea legislature was functioning effectively and actively and that legislative democracy was evolving at an impressive rate. It was relevant that the House of Assembly had established two Select Committees in the field of constitutional reform, which had made recommendations that had been adopted. There was reason to believe that good progress was being made in bringing the people of the Territory to the stage where they could express their wishes openly and effectively.
- 61. The representative of Iraq said that his delegation whole-heartedly endorsed the Chairman's statement in reply to the Australian representative's remarks on the organization of the Committee's work. A flexible time-table was of great benefit to delegations in that it gave them time to prepare written statements. His delegation had been grateful for the opportunity to hear the Australian representative's statement.

Conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee

62. Subject to reservations expressed by the representatives of Australia and the United States of America, particularly

on the sending of a visiting mission, the following conclusions and recommendations were adopted.

Conclusions

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

- 63. The Sub-Committee considers that the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) has been slow.
- 64. The Cocos Islands have special problems of size and economic viability, but that should not preclude the administering Power from complying with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

Trust Territory of Nauru

- 65. The Sub-Committee observes that the people of Nauru are steadfast in their declaration of becoming independent on 31 January 1968; it, however, awaits an assurance from the Administering Authority that the wishes of the people of Nauru will be respected.
- 66. The Sub-Committee records the desire of the people to remain in Nauru and for the rehabilitation of their island; but notes the statement of the Administering Authority on the practical impracticability of rehabilitation.
- 67. Though it is aware of the progress that has been made in the negotiation of ownership and control of the operation of the phosphate industry, the Sub-Committee hopes that the people of the Territory would obtain the maximum benefit from their sole and limited asset.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

- 68. The Sub-Committee considers that the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) continued to be slow.
- 69. The Sub-Committee, however, takes note of the political, social and educational growth in the Territory which constitute some advance though it considers it inadequate for a consistent and rapid implementation of the Declaration.
- 70. The Sub-Committee observes that the economic potential of the Territory has still to be exploited. It considers that an exploitation of this potential for the benefit of the people of the Territory will relieve their dependence on the administering Power and enhance their movement towards self-determination and independence.
- 71. The Sub-Committee notes that discrimination in education, the wage structure and other fields still exist in the Territory, though the administering Power is making efforts to eradicate the problem.

Recommendations

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

- 72. The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 73. The peoples of the Territory should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision.
- 74. The Sub-Committee requests that the people of the Territory should be given an opportunity to express their wishes with regard to their future status and in this regard the administering Power should avail itself of the assistance which the United Nations could extend.

Trust Territory of Nauru

- 75. The Sub-Committee recommends that the wishes expressed by the people of Nauru of attaining independence on 31 January 1968 should be implemented by the Administering Authority in accordance with the provision of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 76. The Sub-Committee requests the Administering Authority to rehabilitate Nauru according to the expressed wish of the people, so that they may continue to live there.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

- 77. The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable rights of all the peoples in these two Territories to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
- 78. The House of Assembly should be made a fully representative body with expanded functions in order to transfer power to the people of the Territory.
- 79. The Sub-Committee feels that the efforts in the economic and educational fields should continue at a more rapid rate to enable the peoples of the Territories to direct their own affairs and take over the administration of their territory.
- 80. The local government councils should continue to be strengthened in order that the people could exercise self-government in municipal affairs.
- 81. Existing discrimination in the Territory, whether in education, wages or other areas, should be eliminated as quickly as possible.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

82. The Sub-Committee reiterates its belief that a visiting mission to the Territories is necessary and would be most useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the peoples. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

CHAPTER XXI*

BRUNEI

Information on the Territory¹

General

- 1. The Territory of Brunei is situated on the northern coast of the island of Borneo. It comprises two enclaves in north-eastern Sarawak, separated from each other by the valley of the Limbang River. The capital of Brunei is Brunei Town. The area of the Territory is 2,226 square miles (5,765 square kilometres).
- 2. In 1966, the total population was estimated to be 100,000. At the 1960 census the population was approximately 84,000, consisting of the following:

Indigenous	
Malays	47,000
Other indigenous	12,000
Non-indigenous	
Chinese	22,000
Others (Indians, Europeans, etc.)	3,000
TOTAL	84,000

Status

- 3. Brunei became a British protected State following a treaty signed by the Sultan with the United Kingdom Government in 1888. Under this treaty, the Sultan agreed that the United Kingdom should be responsible for Brunei's defence and external affairs. A supplementary agreement in 1906 provided for a British Resident to represent the United Kingdom Government in Brunei. Between 1942 and 1945, Brunei was under Japanese military occupation. In 1946, civil government was re-established. Under a new agreement, signed in 1959, the post of British Resident was replaced by that of High Commissioner and the United Kingdom Government continued to be responsible for Brunei's defence and external affairs.
- 4. The High Commissioner represents the United Kingdom Government in the State of Brunei and exercises the United Kingdom's responsibilities for the defence and external relations of Brunei.

Constitution

5. Formerly, a State Council of twelve members, consisting of the Sultan as President, the British Resident and nominees of the Sultan advised the Sultan in the exercise of his executive and legislative functions. In September 1959, the Sultan promulgated Brunei's first written Constitution which replaced the State Council with three separate bodies: a Privy Council, an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The main provisions of the Constitution are set out below.

Sultan

6. Supreme executive authority is vested in the Sultan. His assent is required for all bills passed by the Legislative Council. The Chief Minister (Mentri Besar) is appointed by the Sultan and is responsible to him for the exercise of all executive authority in the State. The Chief Minister is assisted by his deputy and three senior key officials: the States Secretary, the Attorney General and the State Financial Officer, all of whom are appointed by the Sultan.

Privy Council

7. The Privy Council, presided over by the Sultan, advises the Sultan in matters concerning the amendment of the Constitution and on any other matters at the Sultan's request. It consists of the Chief Minister and five other *ex officio* members, the High Commissioner, and any other persons the Sultan may appoint.

Executive Council

8. The Executive Council, presided over by the Sultan, consists of seven ex officio members, the High Commissioner, and seven unofficial members appointed by the Sultan. Six of the latter are appointed from the elected members of the Legislative Council and one from its nominated members. The Constitution provides that in the exercise of his powers and in the performance of his duties, the Sultan shall, with certain exceptions, consult with the Executive Council. He may act in opposition to the advice given him by a majority of the members of the Council, but must record fully in the minutes of the Council the reasons for his decision.

Legislative Council

9. The Legislative Council has ten elected and eleven appointed members. The Speaker of the Legislative Council is appointed by the Sultan either from among

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.365.

¹ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 20 September 1966 for the year ending 31 December 1965.

the membership of the Council or from outside it. Subject to the assent of the Sultan, the Legislative Council may make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State. It may not proceed upon any bill, motion or petition concerning certain matters, particularly financial matters, without the prior approval of the Sultan. If the Legislative Council fails to pass a bill which has been introduced or carry a motion which has been proposed, the Sultan may declare such a bill or motion effective if he considers such action to be in the public interest. The Legislative Council has a a life of three years.

Electoral system

10. The elected members of the Legislative Council are elected by, and from among, the membership of the four district councils in the Territory. The elected members of the district councils are directly elected by persons who are subjects of the Sultan, have attained the age of twenty-one and fulfill certain residential qualifications. Elections were held in March 1965 when ten members were elected to the Legislative Council and fifty-five members were elected to the four district councils. More than 80 per cent of Brunei's 19,000 voters participated in the elections.

Local government

11. Brunei Town, Belait, Tutong and Temburing each has a district council with a majority of elected members.

Political parties

- 12. In the 1965 elections, nine of the elected candidates were independents. The tenth represented the Brunei People's Alliance Party (BPAP). This party, which was formed in 1963, was then reported as favouring Brunei's entry into the Federation of Malaysia, and subsequently it has advocated full independence for Brunei within the Commonwealth.
- 13. In December 1965, the formation of a new political party, provisionally named Brunei People's Front (BPF), was announced. It was reported to have the support of a number of elected members in the Legislative Council and the district councils. Its president was quoted as having said that Brunei needed a party which would help the people raise their standard of living and work hard for independence.

Constitutional development

- 14. An official statement issued on 23 December 1964, at the conclusion of discussions in London between the Sultan and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, referred to the proposals for constitutional progress, which were approved by the Brunei Legislative Council on 26 August 1964, calling for the holding of elections to the Legislative Council and district councils in March 1965, to be followed by the introduction of a ministerial system of government. The Executive Council was to become a Council of Ministers and include assistant ministers appointed from among the members of the Legislative Council, The statement added that it was the intention of both the United Kingdom Government and that of the Sultan that Brunei should "proceed progressively towards full parliamentary democracy".
- 15. A communiqué issued in London on 28 May 1965, following talks between the Sultan and the United Kingdom Government, announced the agreement of the

Sultan to proceed with the appointement of four assistant ministers from among the elected members of the legislature and later to convene a constitutional conference in Brunei. No further information is available concerning the progress made in implementing these constitutional proposals.

Economic conditions

- 16. The mainstay of Brunei's economy is the oil industry. Approximately 94 per cent of the value of total exports in 1964 consisted of oil exports. Oil mining is in the hands of the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (formerly the British Malayan Petroleum Company). In 1965, 365 wells were operating, and the annual production amounted to 28,991,000 barrels. Annual production by value was \$M193,912,000.2 Mining rents, royalties and taxes imposed on the oil industry form a large part of the total revenue of the Territory, and after the Government, the oil industry is the most important employer of labour (2,550 in 1965). Other sectors of the economy include rubber, subsistence agriculture, fishing, the collection of forest products and some small-scale industries.
- 17. The only other export of importance, besides oil, is rubber. The chief imports are food-stuffs, manufactured goods, machinery and transportation equipment. The total value of exports for the year 1965 was \$M199,747,812 and total value of imports was \$M114,062,621. The corresponding figures for 1964 were \$M187,383,007 and \$M102,181,131.
- 18. Brunei's annual revenue far exceeds its expenditure and this has resulted in a large invested surplus which in 1965 totalled \$M933,588,273, compared with \$M930,417,373 in 1964. The Territory's revenue is derived mainly from taxes, royalties, rents, interests and currency. The oil agreement between the Government of Brunei and the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company, signed at the end of 1963, provides for the taxation of the oil company on the basis of equal division of profits. There is no personal income tax at present, but an income tax of 30 per cent is imposed on the profits of companies operating in the Territory. In 1965, the territorial revenue amounted to \$M118,259,107 and expenditure totalled \$M83,694,806. The corresponding figures for 1964 were \$M134,724,059 and \$M63,367,499.

Transport

- 19. The biggest item in Brunei's Second Development Plan, the rural road project, is reported to be well under way. It is estimated that the cost to the Government will exceed £5.5 million. The project involves the construction of about 150 miles of roads in the hinterland which is yet to be opened up.
- 20. Among other major development projects in Brunei to be given priority are the planning and building of a new multi-million dollar airport, extension of wharf facilities for coastal shipping in Brunei River, and the construction of a new \$32 million deep-sea port at the coastal township of Muara, seventeen miles from Brunei Town.

Social conditions

Labour

21. No significant changes in problems and general policy were reported by the administering Power con-

² One Malayan dollar equals 2.4d. sterling or \$US0.327.

cerning wages and conditions of employment, or in the administrative organization responsible for governmental activities relating to labour. The total labour force increased from 7,094 persons in 1964 to 7,664 persons in 1965, most of whom were employed by the Government and the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company.

Public health

- 22. The Territory has two government hospitals and the company hospital with a total of 396 beds. The medical and health facilities have a total of twenty-two registered physicians, forty-eight medical assistants and twenty-nine trained or certified nurses. Brunei has no private medical practitioners. A firm of architects had been commissioned to design and construct a new State Medical Centre incorporating all facilities required in a large modern hospital. Approximately 4.97 per cent of the total government expenditure in 1965 consisted of recurrent and capital expenditure on public health. In 1965, a Flying Doctor Service to the rural areas was instituted. The method involves the use of helicopters and a team comprising a doctor and two nurse-midwives.
- 23. The Malaria Eradication Project is active; the pre-eradication programme was completed in 1965 and the WHO "attack" phase was started in 1966.
- 24. There was a cholera epidemic from 21 September to 29 October 1965. No deaths occurred among any patients admitted into hospital. Ninety per cent of the population was inoculated.

Educational conditions

- 25. In 1965, there were 89 primary and kindergarten public schools with a total of 712 teachers, compared with 86 and 652 in 1964. The total number of primary school pupils rose from 15,222 in 1964 to 16,860 in 1965. The seven public secondary schools increased their enrolment from 1,658 in 1964 to 2,284 in 1965. The number of teachers in secondary schools rose from 100 to 118. The public teacher-training school increased its enrolment from 249 in 1964 to 331 in 1965.
- 26. The number of independent primary and kindergarten schools remained fifteen, the same as the previous year. However, the primary schools increased their enrolment from 7,060 in 1964 to 7,234 in 1965. An additional independent secondary school was established in 1965, bringing the number to nine with a total enrolment of 1,601 in 1965 compared with 1,409 in 1964. In 1965, there were 231 teachers in independent primary and kindergarten schools and 91 in secondary schools, compared with 219 and 106 in 1964 respectively.

Adult education

- 27. Facilities for adult education were extended in 1965. A total of 4,889 students were enrolled in classes for adults, 3,760 receiving instruction in Malay and 1,129 in English.
- 28. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1965 amounted to \$M10,203,287, compared with \$M7,958,110 in 1964. Capital expenditure for 1965 was \$M1,548,447, compared with \$M230,798 for 1964.

CHAPTER XXII*

HONG KONG

Information on the Territory¹

General

1. The Territory of Hong Kong consists of the island of Hong Kong, numerous other islands and an adjoining area of the mainland on the south-east coast of China (Mainland). It has a total area of 398.25 square miles (1,031 square kilometres). In 1965, the population was estimated to be 3,823,200, an increase of 103,200 over 1964. Of this increase, 18,626 represented the estimated net balance of migration.

Status

2. Under the Treaty of Nanking of 1842, the island of Hong Kong was ceded to the British Crown, and in June 1843 it was declared a British Crown Colony. Subsequently, the Convention of Peking in 1860 extended the boundaries of the Colony to include Kowloon Peninsula, and the Convention of Peking in 1898 further extended its boundaries by a ninetynine-year lease to include areas which are known as New Territories.

Constitution

3. The formal documents which contain the principal features of the Constitution of Hong Kong are the Letters Patent which provide for the Office of the Governor, the Executive Council and the Legislative Council, and the Royal Instructions, which deal with other related matters.

Governor

4. The Governor, who is appointed by the Crown, is the Queen's representative and head of the executive in the Territory.

Executive Council

5. The Executive Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of five ex officio and seven nominated members. Its main function is to advise the Governor, who is required to report his reasons fully to the Secretary of State if he acts in opposition to such advice. The Governor-in-Council also has powers to make subsidiary legislation by way of rules, regulations and orders, and to consider appeals and petitions.

Legislative Council

6. The same five ex officio members of the Executive Council also serve on the Legislative Council of

^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.370.

¹ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 1 June 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

which the Governor is the President. In addition, there are seven other official members and thirteen unofficial members nominated by the Governor. Laws are enacted by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, which controls finance and expenditure through its Standing Finance Committee. The Standing Finance Committee has an unofficial majority. There are no elected members on the Legislative Council.

Local government

- 7. The Urban Council, for the areas of Victoria and Kowloon, consists of twenty-six members: six ex officio members and twenty ordinary members of whom ten are appointed by the Governor and ten are elected. The former temporary ex officio appointment of the Commissioner for Resettlement was made permanent in January 1965. With effect from 1 April 1965, the number of unofficial members was increased from 16 to 20 by the addition of 2 elected and 2 appointed members. The Council meets monthly to transact formal matters, but most of its work is done through seventeen select committees which meet at frequent intervals. The Council's responsibilities are carried out through the Urban Services Department and the Resettlement Department.
- 8. The New Territories are divided into four administrative districts, each under a district officer who is concerned with every aspect of government activity in his district and acts as the principal link between the government and the local inhabitants. A district Commissioner co-ordinates the over-all administration of the New Territories.
- 9. For local representation, villages are grouped under twenty-seven rural committees. Each rural committee has an executive committee which is elected by all village representatives.
- 10. The chairmen and vice-chairmen of the twenty-seven rural committees, together with the unofficial New Territories' justices of the peace and twenty-one elected special counselors, form the Full Council of the New Territories, called *Heung Yee Kuk* or the Rural Consultative Council. It serves as a forum for the opinion of leaders of New Territories and from which the Government seeks advice on New Territories affairs. It has an Executive Committee which meets monthly and which consists of the chairmen of rural committees, the justices of the peace and fifteen ordinary members elected by the Full Council. It also elects a chairman and two vice-chairmen who maintain contact with the District Commissioner.

Electoral system

11. The electoral franchise for the election of members to the Urban Council consists of all men and women over the age of twenty-one years who are on the lists of special and common jurors.

Judic**ia**ry

12. The courts in Hong Kong consist of the Full Court, the Supreme Court, the District Court, the Magistrate's Court, the Tenancy Tribunal and the Marine Court. The Full Court, consisting of at least two judges, hears appeals from the Supreme Court (final appeals lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London). The Supreme Court tries criminal cases with a jury and exercises an original

jurisdiction in a large number of civil matters. It also hears appeals from the Magistrate's Court and from the Marine Court. The District Court has both criminal and civil jurisdiction and also hears appeals in certain matters from the Tenancy Tribunal. The Magistrate's Court exercises a criminal jurisdiction similar to that of magistrates in England. It has a limited jurisdiction in domestic matters.

13. The Chief Justice is head of the judiciary. In 1965, the judiciary consisted of the Chief Justice and six puisne judges, seven district judges, thirty-one magistrates and the Tenancy Tribunal.

Public Service

- 14. On 1 April 1965, the Public Service totalled 68,474, an increase of 4,681 over the previous year. The administering Power states that the policy of the Honk Kong Government is to fill as many posts as possible with local candidates, particularly in more senior grades which have in the past been staffed largely by overseas officers. The percentage of administrative and professional posts filled by local officers increased from 46.3 per cent in 1964 to 46.6 per cent in 1965, compared with 38.6 per cent in 1960. The percentage of overseas officers in 1965 was 2.9 per cent.
- 15. A Government Training Unit, established in 1961 to train local officers for more responsible jobs, has been expanded and is responsible for co-ordinating and organizing local in-service training schemes. During 1965, the unit ran a total of ninety courses attended by 1,248 trainees. In addition, 148 local officers were sent overseas for training.

Economic conditions

- 16. The industrial economy of the Territory is based on exports rather than on its domestic market. In general, while heavy industry, such as ship-building and ship-breaking, continues to be important, the Territory relies primarily on the products of its light industries. The textile industry dominates the economy, accounting for 52 per cent of all domestic exports and employing 43 per cent of the industrial labour force; it is also a significant factor in international trade in textiles. In all sectors, the manufacture and processing of cotton goods predominates. The manufacture of garments remains the largest sector within the industry, employing 72,000 workers. From a total of \$HK862 million² in 1961, the value of exports of clothing rose to \$HK1,760 million in 1965, produced by some 1,100 factories.
- 17. The manufacture of plastic articles ranks next in importance. The industry manufactured exports worth approximately \$HK700 million in 1965. Various other light industries have continued to expand. These include the manufacture of air conditioners, aluminium ware, clocks and watches, cordage, electrical appliances and equipment, enamel ware, food and beverages, foot-wear, light metal products, optical equipment, paint, vacuum flasks and furniture and furnishings. There has been a marked growth in the electronics industry. The manufacture or assembly of transistor radios began in 1959, and since then exports of transistor radios have doubled in volume each year to reach a total of 5.7 million sets worth \$HK118

² One Hong Kong dollar is the equivalent of 1s.3d. stg. or \$US0.175.

million in 1965. The industry exports to sixty-four countries but its principal markets are the United Kingdom and the United States.

- 18. The Territory is one of the world's leading centres for ship-breaking. Much of the scrap is used in rolling mills, which produce thousands of tons of metal products used in building construction; the demands of the construction industry have resulted in the establishment of two new factories of potential significance for the future. In addition, a considerable quantity of rods and bars is shipped abroad, principally to South-East Asian countries.
- 19. In connexion with primary industries, the 1961 census showed just under 90,000 people employed in farming and fishing, and another 10,000 in mining and quarrying. Somewhat more than 5 per cent of the area of Hong Kong is classified as urban. Land is scarce and almost all of the cultivated land in Hong Kong is situated in the New Territories. Approximately 79 per cent of the total area of the Territory is marginal land.
- 20. Rice was formerly the most important agricultural crop but there has been a steady increase in market gardening and pig and poultry production. The area of land under permanent vegetable cultivation increased from 2,250 acres in 1954 to 8,100 acres in 1965. Six to eight crops of vegetables are harvested annually from intensively cultivated land.
- 21. Marine fish is one of Hong Kong's main primary products and the fishing fleet—nearly 10,000 vessels—is the largest of any port in the Commonwealth. The number of fisheries at the 1964 census was 76,000. In 1965, production of fresh oyster meat totalled 284 tons, valued at approximately \$HK1,490,000. Some of these oysters were processed into dried meat or juice and exported to markets overseas.
- 22. Iron ore—extracted at Ma On Shan—is the principal mineral production. Iron ore, wolframite and graphite are mined underground, and kaolin, feldspar and quartz are mined by open-cast methods. All the feldspar and quartz and about 25 per cent of the kaolin are used in local industry. In 1965 iron ore production totalled 131,954.81 tons, valued at \$HK5,937,967. The total production of minerals was valued at \$HK6,733,214.
- 23. Imports in 1965 were valued at \$HK8,965 million, an increase of 5 per cent over the previous year. The principal imports are food-stuffs. In 1965, they were valued at \$HK2,042 million, representing 23 per cent of all imports. Other imports were raw materials and semi-manufactured goods imported for use by industry, capital goods such as machinery and transport equipment, and mineral fuels and lubricants. In 1965, the People's Republic of China was the Territory's principal supplier, providing 26 per cent by value of all imports and 55 per cent of food imports. The value of goods imported from mainland China increased by 18 per cent compared with 1964. Imports from that country included textile yarn and fabrics, clothing and base metals. Imports from Japan, the second largest supplier, increased to 17 per cent. Textile goods represented 38 per cent of imports from Japan; other goods included machinery, base metals, chemicals and many manufactured articles. Imports from the United States decreased slightly from the previous year, while those from the United Kingdom showed a large increase. The principal imports from the United States were textile fibres, tobacco, machinery, plastic materials and

fruits and vegetables. The imports from the United Kingdom consisted mainly of machinery, motor vehicles and textile products.

- 24. Domestic exports were valued at \$HK5,027 million in 1965, representing an increase of 14 per cent over the previous year. Fifty-two per cent of this value was accounted for by manufactured textile products and 15 per cent by plastic goods. Fifty-one per cent of all domestic exports went to the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States remained the largest market, importing 34 per cent by value, thus increasing its purchases by \$HK492 million, or 40 per cent over the previous year. The value of goods sent to the United Kingdom was \$HK861 million (17 per cent of all domestic exports), or 11 per cent over the previous year. The Federal Republic of Germany, which became the third largest market as a result of increasing exports of woollen knitwear, imported Hong Kong goods value at \$HK371 million. Other important markets were Canada, Singapore, Australia and Japan.
- 25. Re-exports were valued at \$HK1,503 million in 1965, an increase of 11 per cent over the previous year. The principal commodities in the re-export trade were gems and jewelry, textiles, medicinal and pharmaceutical products and fruits and vegetables. Japan was the lead to an estimated deficit of \$HK60 million. Singapore, Indonesia, the United States and China (Taiwan).
- 26. The tourism industry showed a slow-down during 1965, although 446,743 tourists visited the Territory, representing an increase of 12.1 per cent over the previous year. Growth of the tourism industry between 1957 and 1965 showed an increase of 9.27 per cent. In 1964, it had showed an increase of 23.3 per cent over 1963.
- 27. Hong Kong is financially self-supporting apart from the cost of its external defence. To this, it makes a contribution which, since 1958, has been £1.5 million a year. In 1964 it was announced that an additional £6 million would be made available over the years up to 1970 as a contribution to the costs of army and air force building programmes in Hong Kong.
- 28. The Territory's revenue for 1964-1965 totalled \$HK1,518 million, \$HK136 million more than the original estimate. Its expenditure totalled \$HK1,440 million, which was \$HK56 million less than originally estimated. Capital expenditure totalled nearly \$HK547 million. For 1965-1966, it is anticipated that capital expenditure arising from the programme of non-recurrent public works, which are mainly for more schools, medical facilities and road and land development, will lead to an estimated deficit of \$HK60 million.
- 29. Under Regulation 7 of the Emergency (Bank Control) Regulations of 1965, sterling was declared legal tender in Hong Kong, in any amount, at the rate of \$HK16 for one pound sterling. Since 1935, the value of the Hong Kong dollar has been maintained at approximately 1s.3d. sterling.

Social conditions

Labour

30. It is estimated that more than one third of the million and a half people employed in Hong Kong are engaged in the manufacturing industries. The 1965 returns to the Labour Department indicate that the number of registered and recorded factories showed an increase from 8,215 in 1964 to 9,002 in 1965. The number of persons employed in such factories totalled

- 370,738, an increase of 20,564 over the previous year. The returns from the Labour Department are voluntary and do not include out-workers or people employed in cottage industries and construction industries, or agriculture and fishing. The textile industry, which employed 154,605 persons, remained the largest employer of labour. The plastics industry, in which a large number of out-workers are known to be employed, continued its expansion as the second largest employer of labour.
- 31. Wages and salaries continued to rise. It is estimated that industrial wages rose by 50 per cent during the years 1960-1965. The Salaries Commission, appointed in early 1965, was scheduled to review values of the main group of employees in the Public Service in the light of the 1965 consumer price index. In June, the Commission recommended an award of 12½ per cent increase in substantive salary for the period 1 July 1963 to 31 August 1964, to replace the interim non-pensionable allowance and children's allowance granted in 1964. This award did not apply to minor staff whose wages and salaries had been treated separately. The recommendation was later carried out. In the same month, the armed services and the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works granted their industrial employees a wage increase aimed at bringing wage levels broadly into line with minor staff wage levels in the government service following increases granted to such staff in December 1964.
- 32. The Factory and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance is the basis for the control of hours and conditions of work in industry. There are no legal restrictions on hours of work for men, most of whom work 10 hours a day or less in industry. Young people between the ages of 14 and 16 years may work only eight hours a day. Restrictions on the hours of work for women, introduced in the year 1959, have resulted in a decrease compared to the number of hours of work for men employed in the same concerns.
- 33. At the end of 1965, there were 309 registered unions, consisting of 239 workers' unions with a total declared membership of 6,471 and sixteen mixed organizations with a total declared membership of 9,371.

Public health

- 34. Including maternity and nursing homes, but not institutions maintained by the Armed Forces, there were 13,176 hospitals beds available in Hong Kong in 1965, compared with 11,989 in 1964. Of these beds, 11,146 were in government hospitals and institutions and in government-assisted hospitals, while the remaining 2,030 were provided by private agencies. Apart from beds assigned to the mentally ill and for the treatment of tuberculosis and infectious diseases, there were 9,450 beds available for all general purposes, including maternity cases. A total of 1,860 beds were specifically assigned for the treatment of tuberculosis in 1965.
- 35. Government medical officers totalled 527 in 1965. There were 56 government dental surgeons, 1,167 government nurses and 180 government midwives.
- 36. Births, which numbered 108,518 in 1964, declined to 102,195 in 1965; the birth-rate fell from 29.4 in 1964 to 27.0 per thousand of population. The infant mortality-rate dropped from 26.4 to 23.7 per thousand births in 1965.
- 37. The estimated expenditure of the Medical and Health Department for the year 1965-1966 was \$HK106,044,500. An estimated \$HK41,534,200 in medical subsidies was paid to private organizations.

The combined estimated expenditure of the Medical and Health Department represented 8.62 per cent of the Territory's total estimated expenditure of \$HK1,711,408,040.

Educational conditions

- 38. Education is not compulsory. Some of the places in government and government-aided primary and secondary schools are free. Grant schools are mainly secondary schools; the Government pays the difference between their approved recurrent expenditure and approved income, and may contribute part of the cost of capital expenditures. Subsidized schools are mainly primary schools which receive subsidies in order to enable them to keep their fees low. Private schools range from kindergarten schools to post-secondary schools. Some government assistance is given to selected non-profit-making secondary schools and awards are given to some students.
- 39. On the basis of the medium of instruction, schools are classified as Chinese, English and Anglo-Chinese institutions. Primary education is of six years' duration; in Chinese schools it begins at the age of 6 and in English schools at the age of 5. English is studied from the third year in the majority of Chinese primary schools.
- 40. In September 1965, there were 129 government schools, 22 grant schools, 559 subsidized schools, 1,559 private schools and 12 special schools. From October 1964 to September 1965, new schools and extensions were added as follows: 4 government, 53 government-aided and 16 private.
- 41. Total enrolment in primary schools was 627,621, which was 30,650 more than in 1964. Enrolment in all types of secondary schools had increased by 19,557 to 197,237. The number of pupils enrolled at all schools, colleges and education centres totalled 914,311, an increase of 60,032 over the previous year.
- 42. In March 1965, there were 25,643 full-time and part-time teachers employed in registered day schools, of whom 6,954 were university graduates and 11,792 trained non-graduates. Another 4,922 teachers were engaged in tutorial, evening and special afternoon classes, and 129 were in special schools. At the end of the 1964-65 school year, the ratio of pupils to teachers in all types of schools was 28.5:1.
- 43. In September 1965, there were 2,319 Hong Kong students pursuing further studies in the United Kingdom, compared with 1,863 in 1964. The number of students arriving in the United Kingdom was 889, compared with 750 in 1964. Hong Kong students in the United States, Canada and Australia were 981, 383 and 213 respectively.
- 44. Expenditure on education for the year ending 31 July 1965 was \$HK227,160,641, an increase of nearly \$HK37.5 million over the previous year.
- 45. A report of a working party appointed to advise on the recommendations of the 1963 Education Commission was tabled in the Hong Kong Legislative Council in April 1965 and formally adopted two months later. The main features of the proposals, the implementation of which began later in the year, were:
- (a) To provide as rapidly as possible a subsidized primary school place for every child of the right age who seeks one.
- (b) To add to the list of aided primary schools a number of non-profit-making private schools as well as private sessions of many existing subsidized schools.

- (c) To double the amount of money which the Government contributes annually to the provision of free places in primary schools; to return to the age of 6 years as the minimum age of admission to government and aided primary schools, and to introduce a new sixth year of basic education.
- (d) To provide government and aided secondary school places, or subsidized places in selected private schools, for 15 to 20 per cent of all primary school leavers, including a minimum of between 1,500 and 2,000 new subsidized places annually in private secondary schools.
- (e) To increase the standard tuition fees in government and aided secondary schools, and simultaneously to increase the rates of remission of fees.
- (f) To discontinue, eventually, Special Forms I and II for pupils completing their primary course, and to

- establish one-year to two-year courses in vocational training centres.
- (g) To standardize the length of full-time training for non-graduate teachers at two years, with facilities for a third year of specialized training in certain subjects, and to lengthen part-time in-service courses by one year.
- (h) To introduce fees of \$HK400 per annum for the two-year course in government teacher-training colleges, with a scheme of interest-free loans to students of up to \$HK1,200 per annum in addition to maintenance grants of up to \$HK1,600 per annum.
- (i) To introduce an 80 per cent capital grant for aided secondary schools approved by the Government.
- (j) To extend and qualify the amount of assistance to be given to private non-profit-making schools.

CHAPTER XXIII*

UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT, BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS, CAYMAN ISLANDS, FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) AND BRITISH HONDURAS

A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

- 1. United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands
- 1. The Special Committee first considered these Territories in 1964. The conclusions and recommendations reached by the Special Committee are contained in its report to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chapters XXIV and XXV).
- 2. In its conclusions and recommendations concerning the United States Virgin Islands, the Special Committee invited the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory be enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future political status of the Territory. The Committee also expressed the hope that the administering Power would provide it with all the revelant information concerning steps it had taken in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It further invited the administering Power to transmit to the General Assembly information concerning the elections, the Constitutional Convention to be convened in December 1964 and the resulting recommendations and developments, so as to enable the Assembly to take suitable decisions. To this end, the Special Committee recommended the sending of a visiting mission to the Territory in consultation with the administering Power.
- 3. With regard to the British Virgin Islands, the Special Committee noted that there seemed to be movements in this Territory in favour of remaining outside the proposed federation of Leeward and Wind-

*Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.14 (Parts I and II).

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (Part I).

- ward Islands and investigating instead the possibility of an association with other neighbouring Territories. The Special Committee invited the United Kingdom to accelerate the constitutional processs so that the people might decide their future in accordance with their own wishes and within the framework of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
- 4. In its conclusions and recommendations concerning Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Monserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, the Special Committee considered that since these islands possessed sufficient features in common it should be possible to form a union among them or at least among some of them, with a view to establishing an economically and administratively viable State. It noted that some of the Territories appeared to be in general agreement on the goal of immediate independence and the formation of a federation. The Committee further noted that there were differences of opinion on the form such a federation would take which it believed were explained by the differences in the economic levels of the islands. In its view, a more thorough investigation was needed of the facts and of the opinions of the leaders, as well as of the amount of assistance required after independence. The Special Committee, therefore, requested the administering Power to fulfill its obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration, to take all necessary measures for finding an adequate solution to the problem and to facilitate the fulfilment of the freely expressed wishes of the people. The Special Committee also considered that the best way to obtain direct information concerning the views and wishes of the people would be to send a visiting mission to the Territories.
- 5. With respect to Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands, the Special Committee, *inter alia*, invited the administering Power to take measures without delay to im-

plement the Declaration embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The Special Committee also considered the possibility of sending a visiting mission to these Territories with a view to obtaining additional information.

6. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, having examined the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning these Territories (A/5800/Rev.1, chapters XXIV and XXV; A/6000/Rev.1,² chapters XXIII and XXIV), adopted resolution 2069 (XX) on 16 December 1965. This resolution, which related to 26 Territories, including the 13 under consideration, endorsed the Special Committee's conclusions and recommendations; requested the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance; and decided that the United Nations should render all help to the people of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status.

7. In 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of its Sub-Committee III (A/6300/Rev.1,³ chapter XXII, annex) and adopted the conclusions and recommendations which are contained in the Special Committee's report to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly (*ibid.*, chapter XXII, para. 469).

8. In its conclusions and recommendations concerning the United States Virgin Islands, the Special Committee, inter alia, noted the information provided by the administering Power concerning the Constitutional Convention which met between December 1964 and February 1965 and which proposed a new Organic Act for the Territory providing for a greater degree of autonomy. It noted also that, so far, the administering Power had taken final action on only one of its proposals made by the Convention and that the proposal for an elected Governor had not yet been passed into law; regretted that despite some measure of advancement in the political field the adminstering Power had not yet implemented the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with respect to the Territory and urged it to do so without delay; reaffirmed the right of the people to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom; and reiterated its previous recommendation inviting the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory be enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future political status of the Territory. It also invited the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory were made fully aware of the various alternatives open to them, in their achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and reiterated its belief that the United Nations should be assured that the exercise of the right to self-determination was undertaken in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the available choices. It therefore considered that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination was indispensable, and regretted that the administering Power had not agreed to a visiting mission from the Special Committee to the Territory, affirming that a

visit to this Territory was both useful and necessary. Accordingly, it invited the co-operation of the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory, in order to obtain first-hand information concerning the Territory and to ascertain the views of the people and the extent to which they were aware of the options open to them, with regard to their future political status.

9. With regard to the British Virgin Islands, the Special Committee noted that a constitutional conference was due to be held in October 1966 and regretted that, despite a certain measure of constitutional advancement, the administering Power had not yet implemented the Declaration with respect to the Territory.

10. The Special Committee invited the administering Power to take the necessary steps to ensure that the people of the Territory were fully aware of the various forms of political status open to them and were enabled in complete freedom to express their wishes concerning the future political status of their Territory. The Special Committee also reiterated its belief that the United Nations must be assured that the exercise of the right of self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) would be undertaken in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the available choices. It therefore considered that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of self-determination would be essential. The Special Committee further invited the co-operation of the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory, in order to obtain first-hand information and to ascertain the views of the people.

11. With respect to Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Monserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, the Special Committee, having heard the statement of the administering Power and the statement by the petitioner from Grenada, did not find it possible to give the question of these Territories the detailed examination it required. It therefore decided to postpone consideration of this question and, subject to any decisions which the Assembly might take at its twenty-first session, to examine the situation in these Territories in detail at an early date during its meetings in 1967.

12. Regarding Bermuda, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands, the Special Committee, inter alia, reaffirmed that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applied fully to these Territories and urged the administering Power to implement the Declaration in these Territories without delay. The Special Committee considered that in view of the lack of sufficient information on these Territories, and, in the case of the Territory of the Bahamas, of conflicting statements concerning conditions, the administering Power should enable the Special Committee to dispatch a visiting mission to the Territory as soon as possible. It also considered that the administering Power should take immediate measures to transfer all powers to the peoples of these Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. It further expressed its belief that the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of those Territories were enabled to express them-

² Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda

item 23.

3 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

selves freely on their future status and in full knowledge of the options available to them.

13. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, having examined the chapters of the report of the Special Committee concerning these Territories, adopted resolution 2232 (XXI) on 20 December 1966. This resolution, which related to twenty-five Territories, including the thirteen under consideration, inter alia, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the peoples of these Territories to self-determination and independence; called upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly; and reiterated the Assembly's Declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in them was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. It also urged the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories, and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance; decided that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status; and requested the Special Committee to continue to pay special attention to these Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

2. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

14. Following the Special Committee's consideration of the Territory in 1964, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2065 (XX) on 16 December 1965, by which, after noting the existence of a dispute concerning sovereignty over the Territory, it invited the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the interests of the population of the Territory.

15. In letters dated 9 February 1966,4 the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General the pertinent part of a joint communiqué issued at Buenos Aires on 14 January 1966 by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina. The communiqué stated that both Ministers had agreed that the recommended discussions should be pursued without delay. In letters dated 22 August 1966⁵ the two Permanent Representatives concerned transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a further joint communiqué, issued on 20 July 1966. This communiqué stated that meetings on the problem had been held on 19 and 20 July 1966. The talks had been conducted in a cordial atmosphere and it was agreed that they should be continued.

- 16. On 16 November 1966, the Special Committee, at its 478th meeting, recalled the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and took note of the information provided by the two Governments con-
- 17. On 15 December 1966, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Argentina and the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted letters to the Secretary-General containing the text of a joint communiqué issued on the same date by representatives of the two Governments. The communiqué stated that, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and with previous announcements, meetings were held from 28 November between representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom. The two Governments reported that during these meetings certain ways of reaching agreement were considered. Both Governments would proceed with the talks in order to try to resolve the problem. In due course they would submit a more detailed report on the outcome of these talks to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly at its twentysecond session.
- 18. On 20 December 1966, the General Assembly decided, without objection (see 1500th plenary meeting) to approve a consensus formulated by the Chairman of the Fourth Committee. The consensus reads as follows:

"With reference to General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the Fourth Committee took note of the communications dated 15 December 1966 of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/C.4/682 and A/C.4/683). In this regard there was a consensus in favour of urging both parties to continue with the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, keeping the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the General Assembly duly informed about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960."⁷

B. Information on the Territories

1. United States Virgin Islands⁸

General

19. The United States Virgin Islands, which lie east of Puerto Rico, comprise about 50 islands and small islets, the most important of which are St. Thomas, St. John and St. Croix. The total land area of the 3 main islands is 132 square miles (341.9) square kilometres).

20. According to the latest annual report on the Territory, the Virgin Islands are in the midst of a

⁴ Ibid., Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, documents A/6261 and A/6262.

⁵ Ibid., documents A/6261/Add.1 and A/6262/Add.1.

⁶ Ibid., documents A/C.4/682 and A/C.4/683.

⁷ Ibid., document A/6628, para. 13.

⁸ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States of America under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 8 June 1966, covering the year ended 30 June 1965.

population explosion. In 1965, the resident population was estimated at 50,000, including alien workers and part-time residents, compared with 32,099 at the 1960 census.

Constitution

- 21. A Constitutional Convention met in St. Thomas from December 1964 to February 1965, and approved various amendments to the Revised Organic Act of 1954 for submission to the United States Congress. The Convention was composed of twenty-two delegates, elected at a general election held on 4 November 1964, and the eleven existing senators of the Virgin Islands. Recommendations in the form of a proposed Second Revised Organic Act were transmitted to the President and the Congress of the United States in July 1965. The major proposals for revision, which were indicated in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, para. 14), included proposals for reapportionment of the legislature and for an elected Governor. The action taken by the United States Congress in connexion with these proposals is outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.
- 22. The executive power is vested in the Governor of the Virgin Islands who is appointed by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. There is also a Government-Secretary similarly appointed who serves as Acting Governor in the absence of the Governor. Heads of government departments are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Virgin Islands Legislature. All executive power is exercised under the general supervision of the United States Secretary of the Interior.
- 23. The Revised Organic Act of 1954 established a unicameral legislature called the Virgin Islands Legislature. On 10 August 1966, the United States Congress approved a reapportionment bill (H.R. 13277) to become effective for the elections to be held in November of the same year, which enlarged the Legislature from 11 to 15 members.
- 24. The Legislature has full legislative powers under the United States Constitution on local matters, including, in particular, the power to appropriate funds and levy taxes. All legislation is subject to approval by the Governor who also has the power to veto bills. The Governor's veto may be overridden by a two thirds-vote of the Legislature. The power of the President of the United States to review legislation is limited to those situations in which a bill vetoed by the Governor and repassed by the Legislature is vetoed a second time by the Governor. The President may then take a final decision by confirming or overruling the action of the Governor.

Electoral system

25. Under the new electoral arrangements which came into force following the adoption of the new Reapportionment Act during 1966, each of the three main islands is regarded as an electoral district or constituency. St. Thomas and St. Croix return 5 members each and St. John returns 1. In addition, 4 members, called senators-at-large, are returned by the electorate of the Territory as a whole. Elections are held every two years.

- 26. To be eligible to be a member of the Legislature, a person must be a citizen of the United States who has attained the age of twenty-five years and has been a resident of the Territory for at least three years.
- 27. To be eligible to register as a voter a person must be a citizen of the United States who has attained the age of twenty-one years. The Revised Organic Act empowers the Legislature to prescribe other qualifications provided that no property, language or income qualification may be imposed and that no discrimination be made on the grounds of race, colour, sex or religious belief.
- 28. Under the electoral law of the Virgin Islands a primary election is required in cases where the number of candidates of the same party offering themselves for election exceeds the number of seats available.

Judiciary

- 29. The judicial power of the Territory is vested in the District Court of the Virgin Islands and its inferior courts. The District Court has original jurisdiction in cases arising under local law and appellate jurisdiction over inferior courts. As the District Court is a trial court of the federal system, appeal from its decisions is to the Appeals Court of the United States. The right to trial by jury is guaranteed to all who ask for it.
- 30. On 8 February 1965, the Governor approved an act which consolidated the former Municipal Court of St. Thomas and St. John and the Municipal Court of St. Croix into the Municipal Court of the Virgin Islands. By this Act, which came into effect on 1 March 1965, the jurisdiction of the Court in civil actions was increased from actions involving \$1,000 to those involving \$10,000.

Political parties

- 31. The Democratic and Republican parties of the United States have branches in the Virgin Islands. There is also a Virgin Islands Party, although it does not appear to be active at present.
- 32. Early in 1966 the number of voters enrolled as Democrats was estimated at 11,000, while the number enrolled as Republicans was estimated at 600.
- 33. The Democratic Party is divided into two factions, the Mortar and Pestle Democrats and the Donkey Democrats. At the recent elections, the Donkey Democrats formed an alliance with the Republican Party.

Recent political developments

1966 elections

- 34. On 1 September 1966, the Virgin Islands Legislature enacted a law making the necessary provisions for the new electoral arrangements set out in the Reapportionment Act. Included in this law is a provision requiring candidates for primary elections to subscribe to an oath of loyalty to their political party. The bill was passed by the Legislature by a vote of 6 to 5. The opposition claimed that the requirement of a party loyalty oath was designed to prevent a coalition between the Donkey Democrats and the Republicans at the forthcoming elections.
- 35. On 6 September 1966, the two factions of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party held conventions to nominate their candidates. The Donkey

Democrats and the Republicans endorsed a team of 15 persons as candidates which included 13 Donkey Democrats and 2 Republicans. The Mortar and Pestle Democrats nominated 15 candidates, and an independent candidate was also nominated.

- 36. On 11 September, when the coalition candidates filed their nominations, the Supervisor of Elections informed them that the nominations could not be accepted until the candidates had subscribed to the required loyalty oath. This, the candidates refused to do. The case was taken to the courts where it was held that the loyalty oath was not required, since this provision of the law applied only to party primary elections and, since there were only 15 candidates nominated, no primary elections could be held.
- 37. Elections were held on 8 November 1966. The number of registered voters was reported to be 16,887, which was 2,811 more than in 1964. As a result of the elections, the Mortar and Pestle Democrats won 9 seats, including all 5 St. Thomas seats and all 4 atlarge seats, while the Donkey Democrats and Republicans won 6 seats, including all 5 St. Croix seats and the 1 St. John seat. Neither of the two Republican candidates on the coalition ticket won a seat.
- 38. Following the elections, petitions charging irregularities were filed by defeated candidates and a recount was held. The recount did not affect the results.

Elective Governor bill

- 39. As noted in the Special Committee's report for 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, para. 16), following the recommendations of the Constitutional Convention of 1964, a bill to provide for an elective Governor was passed by the United States House of Representatives on 16 May 1966. On 10 October 1966, the United States Senate passed the House bill with a number of amendments. It was claimed, however, that there was insufficient time to hold the necessary conferences in order to reconcile the differences, and the 89th Congress adjourned without taking final action on the bill.
- 40. One of the members of the United States House of Representatives summed up the differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill as follows:
 - ". . The House provided for a two-year term; the Senate changed it to four years. The House set the election date for November 8, 1966—the Senate changed the date to November 3, 1970. The House would permit the Governor and Lt. Governor to be elected to as many 2-year terms as they could be elected. The Senate restricted them to two four-year terms, but they could be elected after a four-year intervention.

"The two versions are definitely at odds on provisions on the recall of the Governor. The House provided for an impeachment trial to be held by the Virgin Islands Legislature, before a panel selected by the judges of the Third Circuit Courts. The Senate amended the bill to provide for removal by 75% of the registered voters. Removal, however, would be subject to the approval of the President. The impeachment proceedings could be initiated, either by two-thirds vote of the Legislature, or through the Legislature via petition signed by 25% of the registered voters."

41. On 17 January 1967, a bill to provide for an elective Governor of the Virgin Islands was introduced

in the United States Senate. It is reported that this new bill is substantially the same as the bill passed by the Senate in 1966.

Economic conditions

- 42. Tourism continues to be the most important industry in the Virgin Islands. In 1965, 647,717 tourists visited the islands compared with 448,165 the previous year. Recognition is being given to the need for a broader base of industry and agriculture to maintain a stable economy, according to the latest annual report of the administering Power. A study of alternate uses for agricultural land has been conducted by the Caribbean Research Institute and a preliminary report issued recommending suitable crops of the type needed for export to the mainland during winter months and to meet a growing local demand. In the opinion of the administering Power, future growth in agriculture will require intensive land use with economically feasible crops rather than the extensive use with sugar cane and cattle grazing that has been the practice in the past.
- 43. Virgin Islands manufacturers of goods that contain not more than 50 cent of foreign raw materials are allowed duty-free entry of their products into the United States under the United States Tariff Act. The textile and watch assembly industries are the chief industries to have taken advantage of this provision. Difficulties have occurred when competing companies in the United States have charged unfair competition.
- 44. The watch assembly industry was established in the United States Virgin Islands in 1959 and since then has shipped its entire production to the United States free of duty. The rate of shipment from the Virgin Islands rose from more than 5,000 movements in 1959 to a rate in excess of 4 million in 1965.
- 45. In October 1965, the Virgin Islands Government, acting to guard against abuses of the duty-free system, established quotas for the watch assembly industry. Production within the limits of the quota would be subject to a small local tax, while production in excess of quotas would be taxed at a much higher rate. Early in 1966, a St. Croix watch company challenged the right of the Governor and the Virgin Islands Legislature to set such quotas. The courts subsequently declared the establishment of a local quota invalid. In January 1967, the Virgin Islands Legislature repealed its watch tax legislation.
- 46. On 11 October 1966, the United States Congress adopted an Act authorizing the United States Secretaries of Commerce and of the Interior, acting jointly, to allocate quotas among watch producers in the United States Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa. By this legislation, the annual quota for all three Territories, which was fixed at one ninth of the total United States watch consumption for the prior year, will be divided among the three Territories, with the largest share going to the Virgin Islands where the industry was already established. Specifically, seven eighths of the total quota will go to Virgin Islands, the remaining one eighth being divided between Guam and American Samoa, two thirds going to Guam and one third to American Samoa. Hearings to determine quotas for individual firms in the Virgin Islands began in Washington in February 1967.

- 47. It is reported that in 1966 there were 16 watch manufacturers employing about 800 workers in the Virgin Islands, 13 of these firms being situated on St. Croix.
- 48. An oil agreement with the Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation was signed into law by the Virgin Islands Government in September 1966. Under the terms of the agreement, the petroleum company would expand its facilities on St. Croix and, subject to approval by the President of the United States, would ship 25,000 barrels of petroleum products per day to the United States duty-free. Under this agreement, royalties to the Virgin Islands would amount to approximately \$12,500 per day or over \$4.5 million annually over a sixteen-year period. In a resolution, acknowledged by the Governor, the Virgin Islands Legislature called upon the Department of the Interior to recommend the requested Hess quota to the United States President. Information on the President's decision is not yet available.
- 49. The Territory derives its revenue from internal taxation and funds made available by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Organic Act. Under these provisions, a sum equal to the amount of revenue raised locally is made available to the Virgin Islands by the United States from duties collected on Virgin Islands' products entering the United States. These funds, called matching funds, are made available to the Legislature to expend as it sees fit, subject to presidential approval. The remainder of the duties collected is also made available to the Virgin Islands Legislature but it may be used only for emergency purposes or for essential public projects.
- 50. Public revenue for the fiscal year 1964-1965 amounted to \$40,648,000, an increase of \$10,654,000 over the previous year. This amount included contributions of \$10,506,000 from the United States made up of \$8,313,000 in matching funds and \$2,193,000 in grant-in-aid and other programme funds.
- 51. The budget introduced by the Governor in January 1967 called for a total expenditure of \$51 million for the fiscal year 1967-1968.
- 52. During 1964, imports from foreign countries continued to show an increase. They amounted to \$27.2 million compared with \$22.5 million in 1963 and \$21.2 million in 1962. Trade figures with the United States for that year are unavailable. However, according to the annual report of the administering Power, new records were set in external trade in 1965. For example, the Virgin Islands Rum Council announced that rum shipments to the mainland in 1965 had exceeded 1 million gallons for the first time.
- 53. In 1965, per capita income was estimated in excess of \$2,000, the highest in the Caribbean, compared with \$1,761 in 1964 and \$1,543 in 1963.
- 54. A comparative price survey of basic commodities in supermarkets in the Virgin Islands was made possible in 1966 through special appropriation by the Legislature. According to the survey, price increases on the United States mainland are reflected in the United States Virgin Islands, but at a higher level because of local shortages, the low density of population, inefficient marketing methods, the absence of competition and higher transportation and handling charges. As an island economy with limited natural resources, approximately 95 per cent of all its needs

- must be imported. The survey found that prices in Puerto Rico, New York and Washington, D.C., were much lower for almost all commodities. To remedy the situation, the survey recommended, inter alia, an extensive consumer education programme; a purchasing co-operative comprised of small grocers; free specialized services in the area of management and marketing to small grocers; small loans at low interest rates to be made available to small grocers for modernization purposes; and encouragement of other supermarket chains to establish themselves in the area.
- 55. The Virgin Islands Corporation, wholly owned by the federal Government, was chartered during the depression of 1934 to help stabilize the economy of the community. While its charter does not expire until 1969, steps were taken in 1965 to transfer some of the Corporation's responsibilities to the territorial Government. Management of the power generating facilities on St. Croix and St. Thomas, together with the seawater desalting plant on St. Thomas, was transferred to the newly constituted Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority. The Harry S. Truman Airport (St. Thomas) and commercially developed sections of the submarine base in St. Thomas were transferred to a custodial agency of the local government. Land formerly held by the Corporation in St. Croix was allocated to the local authorities for education, housing and health facilities.
- 56. The Virgin Islands Corporation was one of the principal producers of sugar until low prices and high wages helped to drive away this industry. The Governor recently announced a realignment of agriculture by which no farming activity requiring government subsidies will be permitted. The Corporation's operations had been centred on St. Croix, but rising labour and production costs and continuing dry spells resulted in deficits averaging \$387,000 a year from 1957 to 1962. In 1966 a private firm purchased 2,000 acres of sugar land and the mill. The new owners agreed to phase out sugar operations over the next two years. The mill was sold and shipped to Venezuelan interests in 1966. No special problems were created by the disappearance of the sugar industry, since the islands have a chronic labour shortage.
- 57. In 1966, the United States Federal Aviation Agency made grants totalling \$1.6 million for the repair and resurfacing of the Harry S. Truman Airport in St. Thomas and the Alexander Hamilton Airport in St. Croix. The three grants cover approximately 75 per cent of the total cost of the projects, the balance of the cost to be assumed by the Virgin Islands Government.

Social conditions

Labour

58. The employment requirements of the Virgin Islands' expanding economy continue to exceed the local labour supply. Consequently, it is necessary to supplement the labour force with workers from neighbouring islands and other areas. In 1965, local establishments employed 13,910 of these workers, compared with 16,016 in the previous year. Non-agricultural placements numbered 1,491, a gain of eighty-nine over the previous year. A total of 1,551 agricultural openings was certified in 1965, compared with 1,467 in the previous year.

Public health

59. There are two general hospitals and one clinic in the Territory. The first phase in the planning of two

new health centres was completed in 1965. Each centre will consist of a 250-bed general hospital, a 70-bed long-term facility, a public health centre and an out-patient clinic. The administering Power reports that because of the growth in population, the full health needs of the island cannot be completely met before the new health centres are completed. When the new centres are completed they are expected to provide adequately for the health needs of the Territory for the next twenty to twenty-five years.

- 60. Public health programmes were expanded during 1965. A programme for the eradication of the mosquito carrying dengue and yellow fever was in operation. Indications were that the complete eradication of the mosquito from the Territory within two or three years was highly probable. Nutritional, dental and sanitation programmes were either expanded or initiated.
- 61. A record number of births, 1,762, was registered in 1964, the birth rate rising from 39.5 per thousand in 1963 to 42.0 per thousand in 1964. The infant mortality rate rose slightly from 31.7 per thousand live births in 1963 to 31.8 per thousand in 1964. The death rate fell from 10.0 per thousand in 1963 to 8.2 per thousand in 1964.
- 62. Expenditure on public health in the fiscal year 1964-1965 was \$5,384,000 or 15.39 per cent of total budgetary expenditure.

Educational conditions

- 63. In 1965, the number of pupils in the public schools was 9,399, compared with 8,671 in 1964. Additional school construction projects in 1965 assured the opening of 14 elementary classrooms on St. Croix, 9 of them at the new Grove Place School and 10 high school classrooms on St. Thomas. The Virgin Islands Legislature has earmarked \$4.2 million from a bondissue programme for the construction of 129 new classrooms at primary and secondary level which were to be ready for occupancy by September 1966.
- 64. The College of the Virgin Islands, which provides two-year courses, held its first graduation ceremony in 1965. In its third year, beginning in the fall of 1965, the College was expected to have an enrolment of approximately 120 students. Plans were being made to establish four-year programmes in liberal arts and teacher education beginning in 1966, as the first of the College's programmes leading to a bachelors' degree.
- 65. Expenditure on education in the fiscal year 1964-1965 was \$5,004,000, or 14.3 per cent of total budgetary expenditure.

2. British Virgin Islands9

General

66. The British Virgin Islands comprise some forty islands and islets, of which eleven are inhabited. The total area of the Territory is approximately 59 square miles (153 square kilometres). The largest islands are Tortola (21 square miles or 54 square kilometres), Virgin Gorda (8.25 square miles or 21 square kilometres), Anegada (15 square miles or 39 square kilometres), and Jost Van Dyke (3.25 square miles or 8 square kilometres).

67. In 1964 the estimated population was 8,619, having risen from 7,340 in 1960.

Constitution

- 68. The present Constitution was introduced in 1954 and amended in 1959. Following a report by a Constitutional Commissioner appointed by the United Kingdom in 1965, a Constitutional Conference was held in London in October 1966 at which agreement was reached on a new Constitution. The main provisions of the present Constitution are set out below.
- 69. The head of the Government of the Territory is the Administrator who is appointed by the Crown. He exercises his powers in consultation with the Executive Council over which he presides.
- 70. The Executive Council consists of 2 official members, 1 member appointed by the Administrator from among the nominated members of the Legislative Council, and 2 members elected by the members of the Legislative Council from among the elected members of that Council. In addition to taking decisions on all internal matters, as the main executive body, the Council undertakes the supervision of certain departments of the Administration.
- 71. The Legislative Council, presided over by the Administrator, consists of 6 elected members, 2 unofficial and 2 official members nominated by the Administrator. The Council has the power to legislate for all aspects of the internal affairs of the Territory, subject to the assent of the Administrator.

Electoral system

72. Elections to the Legislative Council take place every three years; the six elected members are elected on the basis of universal suffrage in single-member constituencies. The last general elections were held in November 1963, when 13 candidates stood for 6 elective seats.

Judiciary

73. The Territory participates in the court system of the Leeward and Windward Islands.

Constitutional Conference and other political developments

- 74. A Conference to discuss changes in the Constitution of the British Virgin Islands was held in London from 4 to 10 October 1966. Attending on behalf of the British Virgin Islands were the Administrator and 4 members of the Legislative Council, 2 of whom were elected members of the Executive Council while the other 2 represented the group in the Council known as the Opposition.
- 75. The discussions at the Conference were based on the recommendations of Mrs. Mary Proudfoot, who in January 1965 was appointed Constitutional Commissioner for the British Virgin Islands to make recommendations for any constitutional changes deemed necessary. Mrs. Proudfoot submitted her report in June 1965. The Conference reached unanimous agreement on a new Constitution, the main features of which are outlined below.
- 76. The Legislative Council will consist of a Speaker, chosen from outside the Council; 2 ex officio members (the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary); 1 nominated member appointed by the Administrator after consultation with the Chief Minister; and 7 elected members.

⁹ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 10 March 1967 for the year ending 31 December 1965.

- 77. The Speaker will be elected by a simple majority of all members for the life of the Council and will have a casting vote only.
- 78. Apart from the Speaker, all members will have an original vote but only the votes of elected members will determine whether a motion of no confidence in the Government is carried or defeated.
- 79. There would be 7 single-member constituencies and a single Boundary Commissioner is to be appointed by the Administrator from outside the Territory to recommend constituency boundaries.
- 80. In general, the existing qualifications and disqualifications of electors and of members and the existing provisions relating to tenure of seats of members will be retained. However, as an alternative to the existing residence qualifications for electors, a person will be qualified to be registered as an elector if he was domiciled in the British Virgin Islands and has ceased to be resident there and taken up residence in the United States Virgin Islands within two years preceding the date of registration.
- 81. The Legislative Council will be required to meet at least once every three months, and its maximum life will be increased from 3 to 4 years. The Administrator will be empowered to prorogue the Council on the advice of the Chief Minister and to dissolve it after consulting him.
- 82. The Executive Council will consist of 2 ex officio members (the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary) and 3 ministers, one of whom will be Chief Minister, appointed from among the elected members of the Legislative Council. The Administrator will appoint as Chief Minister the elected member who in his opinion is best able to command the support of a majority of the elected members of the Legislative Council. The other 2 ministers will be appointed by the Administrator on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Administrator will normally preside over the meetings of the Executive Council.
- 83. The Administrator's special responsibilities will be defence and internal security, external affairs, terms and conditions of service of public officers, the administration of the courts and finance. The Conference noted that the closest co-operation would be needed between the minister responsible for economic planning and the Administrator, who will be responsible for finance.
- 84. In general, the Administrator will be bound to consult the Executive Council and act on its advice. The exceptions will be where it is provided that he act in his discretion or on the advice of, or after consultation with, some other person or authority or where, in respect of his special responsibilities, he considers that the public interest would sustain material prejudice if the Council were consulted. If, having obtained the advice of the Executive Council, he considers it in the interests of his special responsibilities not to act on that advice, he will report this to the Secretary of State.
- 85. The Administrator will continue to have legislative power but only in respect to legislation necessary in the interests of his special responsibilities. Before using this power he will be required to consult the Executive Council and if it does not agree, to report to the Secretary of State and, if time permits, to obtain his prior approval.
- 86. The Constitution will also provide for the appointment of a Public Service Commission, consisting

- of 3 members appointed for periods of up to three years by the Administrator. The Administrator will consult this Commissioner on matters relating to officers in the Public Service.
- 87. The Conference also agreed to take advantage of the suggestion that the Supreme Court of the West Indies Associated States might also serve the Virgin Islands.
- 88. The Conference agreed that a Boundary Commissioner should be appointed forthwith and an interim order-in-council should be submitted to make provision for extending the maximum life of the present Legislative Council and to enable the Administrator to fix the boundaries of the new constituencies. Once the electoral preparations had been completed, the main constitution order should be submitted, the existing Legislative Council dissolved and a general election held. After the general election the new Constitution would be brought fully into effect and a new government formed under it.
- 89. In November 1966, a Boundary Commissioner appointed by the United Kingdom arrived in the Territory. His report, delineating new boundaries for the seven constituencies, was approved by the Legislative Council on 14 December 1966. No date has yet been fixed for the general elections.
- 90. In April 1966, Mr. H. L. Stoutt, one of the elected members of the Executive Council and Mr. A. Scatliffe, an opposition member of the Legislative Council, answered questions put to them by newspaper reporters concerning the possibility of unitary statehood with the United States Virgin Islands. Both were reported to have stated that more than ten years ago there had been a very strong feeling that the islands should be linked with the United States islands for economic reasons, but that now there was no such feeling. The United Kingdom Government had undertaken the financing of several projects to improve the islands and, if it continued to assist financially, there would be no need to think of linking up with the United States Virgin Islands.

Political parties

- 91. Until recently, there were no political parties in the Territory, each of the elected members having stood for election as an independent.
- 92. The recent elections for the 7 seats in the newly constituted Legislative Council of the British Virgin Islands were contested by 3 political parties—the United Party (UP), the Democratic Party (DP) and the Peoples Own Party (POP). For the convenience of the electorate each Party adopted a symbol—a Dove, a Star and a Hand V respectively.
- 93. The aims of the parties, with minor variations, are identical. The general welfare of the people is their main consideration, with promise of better jobs and higher wages, improvement of all the social services, agriculture, fisheries and water supplies, the provision of better roads. communications and transportation, and improved supplies of electricity. Each Party stresses the need for economic development and encouragement of foreign investment.
- 94. The UP pledges itself "to work for better relations with neighbouring countries, particularly the United States Virgin Islands; continued good relations with the Mother Country" (the United Kingdom) "to encourage it to give greater financial assistance for the economic development of this Territory;" and to "en-

deavour to bring about the act of Social Security for our people".

95. The DP emphasizes the need to attract development capital, since it recognizes that political advancement is insufficient without economic advancement.

Elections

96. In the elections of 14 April 1967, the UP won 4 seats, the DP 2 and the POP 1. The number of votes cast for all 7 districts was 2,562, representing a 72 per cent ballot by the 3,500 registered voters.

97. On 17 April the majority Party, the UP, elected Mr. Lavity Stoutt as its leader. Mr. Stoutt subsequently assumed office as Chief Minister. On the advice of the Chief Minister, two other members of the UP were appointed Minister of Communications, Industry and Works and Minister of Agriculture, Lands and Social Services.

98. The provisions of the Virgin Islands (Constitution) Order, 1967, came into operation on 18 April 1967. The first meeting of the newly elected Legislative Council was scheduled for 24 April 1967.

Economic conditions

99. The economy of the Territory is closely related to that of the adjacent United States Virgin Islands. It is reported that over 30 per cent of the Territory's work force is employed in St. Thomas, one of the United States Virgin Islands. The principal occupations in the Territory in order of importance are public services, the hotel industry, building trades and agriculture. The principal crops are vegetables and fruit.

100. In 1965, the value of imports amounted to \$2,969,000,10 compared with \$2,436,000 in 1964. Exports in 1965 amounted to \$79,000, having declined from \$106,000 in 1964. The principal imports are lumber, food, machinery and automobiles and come mainly from the United States, Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands. The main exports are livestock, fresh fish and fruit. Exports are mainly to the United States Virgin Islands, Martinique and Guadaloupe.

101. Public revenue and expenditure in 1965 amounted to \$1,826,232 and \$1,987,105, respectively, compared with \$1,171,000 and \$1,183,000 in 1964.

102. In 1962, an economist of the University of the West Indies completed a comprehensive report on development in the Territory. This report recommended priorities for road construction and the extension of the airfield.

103. In a statement on the economy of the Territory made in October 1966, the Administrator drew attention to the growth of local revenue over the past ten years. Local revenue had increased 1,310 per cent and, in particular, had increased more rapidly than the United Kingdom grant-in-aid. The grant-in-aid had represented 73 per cent of total expenditure in 1961 but in 1966 represented only 31 per cent. The Administrator paid tribute to assistance from private British investors, Colonial Development and Welfare funds and, in particular, to the large investment by Mr. L. S. Rockefeller. He also drew attention to the potential for development of the tourist industry.

104. Recently completed development projects include a road spanning the island of Tortola from east

to west which was completed in 1965, a bridge linking Tortola with Beef Island, opened in February 1966, and the cable-telephone link with Bermuda. The Beef Island airfield, the point of entry for tourists coming to Tortola, is capable of handling light aircraft only and investigations are at present being made to determine the cost of extending and surfacing it. The United Kingdom Government has announced that when this examination is completed it will consider what financial contribution it is able to make.

105. In May 1966, Mr. L. S. Rockefeller, who proposed to invest \$1.5 million on expansion of tourist facilities on Virgin Gorda, requested the lease of government-owned lands at less than the usual economic rentals and the granting of special concessions or exemptions in respect of customs duties, income, land and house taxes and the requirements concerning the employment of stated proportions of local labour. In its reply, the British Virgin Islands Government announced that it was reviewing the whole question of incentives to investors and would consider these requests within the context of its new policy.

106. In July 1966, the Government published a White Paper setting out its proposals for improving and extending the incentives provided under existing legislation for new industries and hotels. These proposals were to be introduced in the Legislative Council in the form of three bills: the Pioneer Services and Enterprises Bill, the Hotels Aid (Amendment) Bill and the Income Tax Bill. The first of these bills was introduced in the Legislative Council in December 1966; the remaining two will be introduced at the Council's session in 1967.

Social conditions

Labour

107. As stated above, over 30 per cent of the Territory's labour force is employed on St. Thomas in the United States Virgin Islands.

Public health

108. There is a cottage hospital on Tortola with 35 beds where, in 1964, a total of 648 in-patients and 2,121 out-patients received treatment.

109. Expenditure on public health in 1965 amounted to \$99,875, compared with \$96,360 in 1964.

Educational conditions

- 110. Education is free and compulsory up to the age of fifteen. The Government maintains two primary schools and one secondary school. There are 12 private schools which receive grants from the Government and there are 3 unaided schools. In 1964, there were 1,239 boys and 1,271 girls enrolled. In 1965, expenditure on education amounted to \$210,829, compared with \$152,270 in 1964.
- 111. In December 1966, it was announced that a grant of \$220,780 had been approved from Colonial Development and Welfare funds for the construction of a new comprehensive school on Tortola.
- 112. An earlier decision to establish a separate Education Department headed by a Superintendent of Education came into effect on 1 January 1965, when a Superintendent was appointed from the United Kingdom.
- 113. During 1965 two head teachers returned from the United Kingdom and one returned from Antigua on completion of their training courses. Three other

¹⁰ Since 1958, United States currency has been legal tender in the Territory in addition to United Kingdom and West Indies currencies. These latter currencies, however, are not in fact used.

teachers began courses at the Training College in Antigua.

3. Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent

THE TERRITORIES IN GENERAL

General

114. Antigua, Montserrat and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla form part of the Leeward Islands. They lie roughly midway in the arc of the West Indian islands stretching from Jamaica to Trinidad, with the Caribbean Sea to the west and the Atlantic Ocean to the east. Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada form part of the Windward Islands. There are a number of smaller islands called the Grenadines, which lie between St. Vincent and Grenada; some of these are administered as part of St. Vincent and some as part of Grenada. Since the present systems of government in these Territories are basically similar, the principal features common to all Territories are set out in this section. Additional information is given in the separate section on each Territory which follows.

Present constitutions

Administrator

115. The Administrator in each Territory is appointed by the Queen and has the status of the Queen's representative. He is constitutionally required to act on the advice of the Executive Council, except as otherwise provided, for instance in the exercise of his powers to dispose of Crown or Government lands and property, to constitute offices and make appointments, and in the exercise of his powers of pardon.

116. The Administrator is not required to obtain the advice of the Executive Council in any case in which, in his judgement, the urgency of the matter requires him to act before the Executive Council can be consulted; however, he is required to communicate to the Council his action and reasons therefore. The Administrator may also act contrary to the advice of the Executive Council, "if in his judgement, he considers it necessary to do so in the interest of maintaining law and order in the West Indies, or in order to maintain the efficiency of the Judiciary or the Public Service". However, he must first obtain the approval of the Secretary of State, or, in cases of urgency, he must report to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable.

Executive Council

117. In each Territory, the Executive Council is responsible for the general control and direction of the Government, and is collectively responsible to the Legislature. In Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, the Executive Council comprises the Administrator who presides, five unofficial members (the Chief Minister and four other ministers) and one ex officio member, the principal law officer. In Montserrat, there are four unofficial members, two official members, the Financial Secretary and the principal law officer, as well as the Administrator. In all Territories, the Administrator appoints as Chief Minister the member of the Legislative Council who, in his judgement, is most likely to command a majority. The other unofficial members are appointed on the advice of the Chief Minister. The ministers may be assigned responsibility for any government business, including financial matters, with the exception, however,

of the maintenance of law and order, matters relating to the judiciary and the Public Service. Ministers assigned departmental responsibilities must be appointed from the elected members of the Legislative Council; the Minister without Portfolio may be appointed from either the elected or the nominated members of the Legislative Council.

Legislative Council

118. In each Territory the Legislative Council comprises a majority of elected members, one or two ex officio members and one or two nominated members. Montserrat excepted, the Legislative Council is presided over by a Speaker, elected from within or outside the Council's membership, who has a casting vote. In Montserrat the Administrator presides. The Legislative Councils have the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory.

Electoral systems

119. Elections to the Legislative Councils are held every five years. Elections are based on universal adult suffrage in single-member constituencies.

Public service

120. In each Territory there is a Public Service Commission whose members are appointed by the Administrator after consultation with the Chief Minister. The appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control of public service employees in each Territory is vested in the Administrator in his discretion, acting after consultation with the local Public Service Commission.

Judiciary

121. A Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal for the Leeward and Windward Islands (and for the British Virgin Islands) was established by an Order in Council in 1939. New provisions were made under an Order in Council in 1959, which also established a Judicial and Legal Service Commission. The Commission is composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Leeward and Windward Islands; a judge or ex-judge of a supreme court of any of the United Kingdom Territories and the chairmen of two of the advisory Public Service Commissions in the Territories served. The Chief Justice is appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and judges are appointed by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission with the approval of the Secretary of State.

122. The Supreme Court sits in each of the Territories under a resident puisne judge. It has original and appellate jurisdiction and may try cases of every type. Appeals from the Supreme Court of the Leeward and Windward Islands may in certain cases lie to the British Caribbean Court of Appeals. Each of the Territories also has circuit courts, a court of summary jurisdiction and magistrate's courts.

Negotiations for federation

123. Following the dissolution of the Federation of The West Indies in 1962, the representatives of the Governments of Barbados, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada began discussions among themselves and with the Government of the United Kingdom for the formation of a federation to be known as "The West Indies Federation". Late in 1962, Grenada opened discussions with Trinidad and Tobago on a possible association, but the remaining seven Territories decided to go ahead with plans for a federation.

124. Negotiations continued until April 1965, when the Chief Minister of Antigua announced that Antigua would not join the proposed federation. In August 1965, the Premier of Barbados announced that Barbados would seek separate independence.

Proposals for associated status

- 125. In December 1965, the United Kingdom issued a White Paper in which it proposed a new constitutional status for six Territories, namely Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. It was proposed that constitutional changes for the Territory of Montserrat be considered separately.
- 126. Under the constitutional arrangements, each Territory would become a State in association with the United Kingdom, with control of its internal affairs and with the right to amend its own constitution, including the power to end this association and to declare itself independent.
- 127. So long as the Territories remained States in association with the United Kingdom, that Government would accept responsibility for their external affairs and defence, and the British Parliament and the Queen-in-Council would have legislative power for the discharge of their responsibility. Apart from these powers and responsibilities, and powers concerned with the application in the Territories of the British Nationality Acts, the United Kingdom Government would have no power to legislate for the Territories without their consent and no responsibility for the conduct of their affairs.
- 128. The head of the executive government would be the Queen's representative appointed for a term of five years by the Queen on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies who would be guided by the Chief Minister (or Premier) concerned. A British Government representative in the area would be responsible for the conduct of relations between the United Kingdom and the Territories.
- 129. Safeguards for the preservation of democratic forms of government and for the protection of fundamental rights would be entrenched in the constitutions of the Territories. A superior court would be established for all the Territories whose functions would include securing the observances and interpretations of the constitutions. The President of the Court would be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Citizenship would continue to be governed by the British Nationality Acts unless a Territory established a separate citizenship.
- 130. The Territories would continue to be eligible to receive British aid, including budgetary assistance. These arrangements, if accepted, would provide the basis from which fresh forms of regional co-operation either among themselves or with neighbouring islands could be considered.
- 131. Each Territory was invited to consider these proposals and to prepare draft constitutions which could then be discussed at a constitutional conference.
- 132. These proposals were considered by the legislatures in each of the Territories early in 1966 and draft constitutions were prepared. A series of constitutional conferences then took place in London between 28 February 1966 and 26 May 1966, at which agreement was reached on the new status of association with the United Kingdom outlined in the White Paper and on the general outlines of new constitutions for each Territory. The Leader of the Opposition of St. Lucia signed the report but was recorded as stating that

because of the fundamental nature of the new arrangements, their introduction should be preceded by a general election. The Leader of the Opposition of Grenada also signed the report but was recorded as not agreeing to certain provisions of the new Constitution, including the transitional provisions. He also called for a general election before the new arrangements came into effect (see paras. 248 and 249 of the present report). A brief account of the constitutional conferences is contained in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, paras. 59-68).

Main features of the new arrangements

General

- 133. By the terms of the new constitutional arrangements agreed upon at the Conferences, each Territory will become self-governing in a new relationship of association with the United Kingdom. It was agreed that this would be a free and voluntary association, terminable by either side at any time, and that it would represent the termination of the colonial relationship between the Territories and the United Kingdom.
- 134. The new associated States will have full control over internal matters while the United Kingdom will retain powers relating to external affairs and defence. Each associated State will have power to amend its constitution, including the power to end the association with the United Kingdom and declare itself independent. The main features of the new arrangements are described below.

Responsibilities and powers of the United Kingdom

- 135. Almost identical agreements were reached at the three separate conferences on the question of the responsibilities and powers of the United Kingdom. The relevant portion of the Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference¹¹ (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) is reproduced in full below.
 - "12. It was agreed that the United Kingdom will in each case be responsible for defence and external relations. In discharging this responsibility, the United Kingdom will act in close consultation with the Governments of the associated states in matters which affect the territory. It was accordingly agreed that during the continuance of the association the relations between the United Kingdom and each associated Government should be governed by the arrangements described below.
 - "13. The United Kingdom legislation establishing the association should provide that the Government of the United Kingdom is to be responsible for the defence and external relations of each associated state and should have executive authority for this purpose.
 - "14. The United Kingdom legislation should also provide that the Government of the United Kingdom could confer a general or specific authority upon the Government of any associated state, subject to any exceptions, limitations or conditions that may be appropriate, to deal on their behalf with specified matters in the field of external relations.
 - "15. The United Kingdom legislation should contain provisions to the effect that no Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commence-

¹¹ Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, 1966, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1966 (Cmnd. 3021).

ment of the association would extend to any of these associated states as part of its law unless it is expressly declared in the Act that the associated state has requested and consented to the enactment of the Act.

- "16. Similarly, the United Kingdom legislation providing for the constitution of the associated state should reserve to Her Majesty a general power to make laws by Order in Council but no such Order in Council should have effect as part of the law of the associated state unless it is expressly declared in the Order in Council that the associated state has requested and consented to the making of the Order in Council.
- "17. For the purposes of the two preceding paragraphs, the request and consent of the associated state should be signified by resolutions of the Chamber or Chambers of its Legislature.
- "18. The legislative provisions described in paragraphs 15-17 above should be subject to an exception under which an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or an Order of Her Majesty in Council would have effect as part of the law of the associated state if it is expressly declared in the Act or Order in Council that in the opinion of the Parliament or Government of the United Kingdom the Act or Order in Council is required to have effect in the associated state in the interests of the responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom for defence and external relations. It would not be possible, by means of an Act of Parliament or Order in Council having effect by virtue of the exception, to amend, suspend or revoke the constitution of the associated state. (Nor of course would it be possible for the Parliament of the associated state to amend its own constitution by the insertion of provisions inconsistent with the United Kingdom legislation described in paragraphs 13-16 while the association exists.)
- "19. The Governments of Grenada, Saint Vincent and Dominica wish to have agreements relating to external affairs and defence on the basis of the heads of agreement set out in Annex D.¹² The Government of Saint Lucia would like to have an agreement on defence on the basis of paragraphs 3-6 of Annex D.
- "20. The Government of the United Kingdom, in pursuance of the provisions of the United Kingdom legislation referred to at paragraph 14 above, would at the commencement of the association entrust the Government of each associated state with authority in the field of external relations by means of a dispatch drawn up on the basis of the Draft at Annex E.¹³ The United Kingdom Government also undertook to examine ways of providing training and experience for officials of the associated states in the conduct of external relations.
 - "21. It was recognized on all sides that the operation of arrangements of this kind in respect of defence and external affairs depended upon a spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence. There would have to be the fullest consultation at all stages between both sides. The Government of the United Kingdom for their part acknowledge that, as the association is a voluntary one terminable by either country,

graph 136 below.

13 See paragraph 137 below.

every endeavour should be made to resolve any difference of view between the Governments by means of free negotiation and to maintain the spirit of co-operation and mutual confidence that now exists and that makes a voluntary association possible. The Government of the United Kingdom regard the legislative powers of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and Her Majesty in Council over the associated states in respect of defence and external relations as an ultimate safeguard of the legitimate interests of the United Kingdom, necessary because it would not be reasonable to expect the United Kingdom to bear a responsibility without having the means of discharging it whatever course events might take, but unlikely to be involved except as a last resort in circumstances that in practice seem likely to arise."

136. The heads of agreement which are to form the basis of agreements relating to defence and external affairs as contained in the Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference are reproduced below. These are the same as those for the other Territories.

"HEADS OF AGREEMENT ON DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

"General

- "1. There will be a preamble referring to the provisions of the Order in Council defining the responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government for defence and external affairs and the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament and Her Majesty in Council to legislate for the Territory.
- "2. This agreement will have effect as long as the association between the United Kingdom and the Territory lasts, but will be capable of modification by mutual agreement.

"Defence

- "3. The Government of the Territory will take all steps (including, where necessary, steps to secure the passage of legislation) to provide such facilities as may be required in the Territory by the United Kingdom Government for the fulfillment of their responsibilities or obligations with respect to the defence of the Territory or of the United Kingdom and its associated states and territories or the safety of any other part of the Commonwealth or of any of the allies of the United Kingdom.
- "4. The Government of the Territory will not, without the consent of the United Kingdom, grant access to any part of their Territory or territorial waters to, or allow the use of any of their airfields, communications or harbour facilities by the forces or agents of any other Government.
- "5. An agreement dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction over United Kingdom visiting forces and other matters normally dealt with in status of forces agreements will be entered into at the same time as this agreement.
- "6. Any United Kingdom forces introduced into the Territory for defence purposes under this agreement will not be used in aid of the civil power or for any purposes other than defence purposes except at the request of the Government of the Territory and with the agreement of the United Kingdom Government. Provided that the request of the Government shall not be necessary if at any time that

¹² The governments of Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla also subscribed to these agreements relating to external affairs and defence. The heads of agreement are reproduced in paragraph 136 below

Government is unable, through circumstances beyond its control, to make a request.

"External affairs

- "7. The United Kingdom Government will consult the Government of the Territory before entering into international obligations with respect to that Territory.
- "8. The United Kingdom Government will from time to time by dispatch define the extent to which the Government of the Territory will have authority to act in the field of external relations.
- "9. The Government of the Territory will take all steps (including, where necessary, steps to secure the passage of legislation) that, after full consultation between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the Territory, are required by the United Kingdom Government—
 - "(a) To secure the fulfilment of the Commonwealth or international obligations or responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government; or
 - "(b) In the interests of good relations between the Territory or the United Kingdom and another country.
- "10. The Government of the Territory will not introduce or support legislation which might affect the discharge of the United Kingdom Government's Commonwealth or international obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of good relations between the Territory or the United Kingdom and another country without prior reference to and consultation with the United Kingdom Government. The Government of the Territory will not proceed with or support legislation if the United Kingdom Government inform them that its passage would be detrimental to the discharge of those obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of such relations.
- "11. (1) Where in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government the enactment of legislation for the Territory is required in the interests of the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for the external affairs or defence of the Territory or of the United Kingdom and its other associated states and territories the United Kingdom Government shall invite the Government of the Territory either—
 - "(a) To signify their consent to the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council; or
 - "(b) To take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the Territory or other appropriate authority in the Territory.
- "(2) If the consent of the Government of the Territory to the enactment of legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council is signified under paragraph (1)(a) of this clause, the United Kingdom Government may take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation accordingly.
- "(3) If the Government of the Territory see difficulty in acceding to a request made to them by the United Kingdom Government under paragraph (1) of this clause, then the fullest consultation that is practicable in the circumstances of the case shall take place between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Territory with a view to resolving the difficulty.

- "(4) Where after consultation under paragraph (3) of this clause there is failure to reach agreement concerning the enactment of legislation, and the United Kingdom Government remain of the opinion that it is nevertheless necessary for legislation to be enacted in the interests of their responsibility for the external affairs and defence of the Territory or of the United Kingdom and its other associated states and territories, the United Kingdom Government shall give as much notice as possible to the Government of the Territory of their intention to take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council [and before taking such steps shall so far as is practicable afford the Government of the Territory the opportunity of considering whether, in all the circumstances, it would wish to take steps to secure the termination of the association between the United Kingdom and the Territory].14
- "12. In order to enable the United Kingdom Government to discharge their responsibilities for defence and external affairs, the Government of the Territory will keep the United Kingdom Government fully informed on matters relating to or affecting these responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government."
- 137. The draft dispatch setting out the means of entrusting authority in the field of external relations to the Governments of the associated States, as contained in the Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference is set out below. Identical draft dispatches are contained in the other reports.

"DRAFT DESPATCH

- "1. In carrying out their general responsibility for the external affairs of the Territory the British Government will seek the fullest consultation with the Government of the Territory and will at all times have special regard to the interests of the Government of the Territory and of the association between the two Governments.
- "2. Subject to the understandings set out in later paragraphs of this despatch Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hereby delegate executive authority to the Government in the Territory with respect to their external relations with other countries as follows:
 - "(a) Authority to apply for full or associate membership, as may be provided for in the Constitution of the organization concerned, of those United Nations specialized agencies or similar international organizations of which the United Kingdom is itself a member and for membership of which the Territory is eligible;
 - "(b) Authority to arrange or permit visits by representatives of or persons in the employ of any organization under sub-paragraph (a) above of which the Territory is a full or associate member;
 - "(c) Authority to negotiate and conclude trade agreements with other countries, whether bilateral or multilateral, relating solely to the treatment of goods. Agreements relating to establishment matters (i.e. those affecting

¹⁴ Would not be required by the Governments of Dominica and Grenada.

the rights of persons and companies of the contracting parties) will continue to be dealt with in commercial treaties negotiated by the British Government. The British Government will, however, be prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to delegate to the Government of the Territory ad hoc authority to conclude individual trade agreements in which establishment matters are included. Agreements affecting the Territory relating to civil aviation and shipping will continue to be dealt with in accordance with present practice whereby the British Government engage in the fullest consultation with the Government of the Territory and invite their participation in such negotiations as are necessary:

- "(d) Authority to arrange or permit visits of up to thirty days for trade or commercial purposes by representatives or residents of the Territory to any other country, and by representatives or residents of any other country to the Territory (though questions relating to the establishment of permanent or temporary representation of other countries in the Territory or of the Territory in other countries will continue to be determined by the British Government after consultation with the Government of the Territory);
- "(e) Authority to negotiate and sign agreements of purely local concern with any member of the British Commonwealth or any British Colony in the Caribbean area;
- "(f) Authority to negotiate and sign agreements for financial and technical assistance or of a cultural or scientific nature with any member of the British Commonwealth or with the United States of America or with any international organization of which the United Kingdom is a member;
- "(g) Authority to negotiate and sign agreements with other countries whether multilateral or bilateral relating to emigration from the Territory to those countries and to emigrant labour schemes.
- "3. In addition the British Government will give sympathetic consideration to any request by the Government of the Territory for authority to take action on individual questions of external relations not covered by this despatch.
- "4. In view of the general responsibility of the British Government for the external affairs of the Territory under the terms of the association mutually agreed between them the Government of the Territory have agreed to inform the British Government in advance of any proposal for the exercise of the authority to conduct negotiations delegated to the Government of the Territory in paragraph 2 (c), (e), (f) and (g) of this despatch and to keep the British Government informed of the progress of any such negotiations. The British Government will inform the Government of the Territory if it shall appear that there is any conflict between the actions or proposals of the Government of the Territory in this field and the international commitments, responsibilities or policies of the British Government. The Government of the Territory have agreed that after consultation they will accept the decision of Her Majesty's Government in such matters."

Termination of association

138. The procedure for termination of the association, which both the United Kingdom and the associated States will be free to initiate at any time, will require the approval of a two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament and a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum. However, in the event that the association is terminated for the purpose of joining with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean, either in union, federation or association, no referendum would be required. The delegates to the conferences on Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent who had expressed apprehension concerning the possibility of the arbitrary use by the United Kingdom of the power to terminate the association, received assurances that the United Kingdom would give six months' notice of intent to end the association, would seek the approval of the United Kingdom Parliament before doing so, and would also be prepared to hold a conference to discuss ending the association.

Internal constitutional arrangements

139. The main features of the new constitutions for each Territory were agreed upon at the conferences. They include provision for a parliament in each Territory: one house in Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and an upper house and a lower house in Antigua and Grenada. Amendment of the constitutions can only take place in the Territory concerned and requires either approval by two thirds of the members of parliament or two thirds of the electorate in the case of basic clauses of the relevant constitution, such as fundamental freedoms or the structure of the parliament. Each parliament will have a life of five years. An outline of each constitution is set out below in the sections relating to particular Territories.

Judiciary

140. The Governments of the associated States are to participate in a Supreme Court of Judicature whose jurisdiction could be extended to other interested Territories in the region. The Court will have jurisdiction over the following matters, among others: fundamental rights and freedoms, membership of the parliaments, and conflicts between parts of the constitution of each State. The jurisdiction of the high court will be prescribed by the parliaments of the respective associated States. Further details concerning the Supreme Court, agreed upon by the Territories at a conference held in September 1966, are set out in paragraphs 146 to 148 below.

Citizenship

141. Citizenship of the respective associated States will, as in the past, continue to be held in common with the United Kingdom and Colonies. However, should the association be terminated, separate citizenship for each State, provision for which will be inscribed in each constitution, will become operative and will apply to persons born there, those whose father is a citizen, and women married to citizens.

Economic aid

142. At the Antigua Conference, it was agreed that after the new constitutional arrangements come into force Antigua would continue to be eligible for United Kingdom aid.

143. Early in the Conference on Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, all the delegates pressed the United Kingdom delegation for assurances that the new status would not result in a less favourable position for the islands in respect of trade, aid and immigration. The United Kingdom delegation stated that, in view of other commitments, and as aid had been recently increased to the four islands, resulting in roughly £6 per head of population annually being made available, financial assistance could not be increased, but efforts would be made to spend it more effectively. Aid undertakings already given would be carried out in full and budgetary aid would be provided if necessary. With regard to trade and immigration the United Kingdom delegation explained that the new constitutional arrangement would not alter present trading arrangements, and that the United Kingdom Government could not offer specially favourable treatment to immigrants from the associated States over other Commonwealth immigrants.

Final meeting of the Regional Council of Ministers, August 1966

144. The Regional Council of Ministers, an organization established in 1962 to pave the way for an Eastern Caribbean Federation and which had not met since April 1965, held its final meeting in Barbados in August 1966. The Council decided to wind up its activities on 30 November 1966, the day Barbados became independent. The seven Territories of the Windward and Leeward Islands decided to establish a new organization, the details of which were to be discussed at a meeting in St. Lucia in September 1966.

Establishment of new regional organization, September 1966

- 145. Two separate conferences were held in St. Lucia between 12 and 23 September 1966, one concerned with the establishment of a regional supreme court, the other with the establishment of an organization to succeed the Regional Council of Ministers. These conferences were attended by the Chief Ministers of each Territory.
- 146. At the first conference, agreement was reached on the establishment of a court to be known as the West Indies Associated State Supreme Court. The court will consist of a Chief Justice, a High Court and a Court of Appeal. It will have its headquarters in Grenada and is expected also to serve Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands.
- 147. The Chief Justice will be appointed by the Crown. He will head both the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Legal Service Commission which will have the responsibility for appointing the other judges. The Commission will be made up of the Chief Justice, a justice of appeal or a puisne judge appointed by the Chief Justice, a retired judge appointed by the Chief Justice acting on the recommendation of a majority of the premiers of the States and two chairmen of the Public Service Commissions of the Associated States.
- 148. The High Court will consist of six or seven judges while the Court of Appeal will consist of the Chief Justice and two judges. Candidates for these positions from the Associated States will be given preference.
- 149. At the second conference, held in St. Lucia in September 1966, agreement was reached on a new organization to succeed the Regional Council of Ministers.

The new organization will have its headquarters in St. Lucia. The chairman will be the Chief Minister of one of the States and the office will be held in rotation. The Conference agreed to reorganize the existing Commission in London by strengthening it on the trade side, and pressing for its status to be raised to that of a High Commission. The Conference also agreed to investigate the possibilities of establishing a commission in Canada.

150. The Conference also discussed the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey. It was agreed that meetings with representatives of the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States would be held in Antigua between 2 and 5 November 1966 at which the Governments of the Windward and Leeward Islands would put forward their joint views on the regional aspects of the report (see para. 159 below).

Dates fixed for associated status

- 151. During the latter half of 1966 the agreements reached at the London conferences were ratified by the local legislatures. On 2 February 1967, the enabling legislation, paving the way for the necessary Orders in Council to be issued, was passed by the United Kingdom House of Commons.
- 152. On 16 January 1967, the dates on which the new Constitutions and associated status would come into force were announced as follows: Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, 27 February 1967; Dominica and St. Lucia, 1 March 1967; Grenada, 3 March 1967. On 2 February 1967, it was announced that St. Vincent would be granted associated statehood by 1 June 1967. St. Vincent will achieve its new status later than the other Territories because of a dispute connected with the recent elections (see paras. 381-386 below).

Regional economic developments

East Caribbean Currency Authority

153. A new currency board, the East Caribbean Currency Authority, was established in 1965 under the provisions of the East Caribbean Currency Agreement made on 18 January 1965 by the Governments of Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. The new unit of currency is the East Caribbean dollar (\$EC); its rate of exchange is the same as that of the West Indian dollar it replaced, namely, 4s.2d. (sterling) or \$US 0.5833.

Tripartite Economic Survey

- 154. Late in 1965, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States agreed to participate in a tripartite economic survey of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands. A summary of the report, which suggests a strategy for development in the islands, was published in June 1966.
- 155. The main points of the summary are as follows. The essential factors in the island economies are the high rate of population increase, the lack of land, capital and skills; the dominance of export agriculture—sugar, bananas, nutmeg, cocoa, citrus, arrowroot and coconuts—and the poor market prospects for these products. Ideal growth industries would require little land, be able to attract capital and skills from abroad

¹⁵ Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, January-April 1966, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1967.

and be major foreign exchange earners; and tourism fits all these requirements very well, provided that the import content of tourist expenditure is kept down. At present, tourism is a sizable industry in Antigua, smaller but flourishing in Grenada and St. Lucia and just beginning in the other islands. One adverse feature of tourism at present is its seasonal concentration from early January to the end of March and the idleness of hotels during the rest of the year. The islands should therefore be made year-round resorts by large-scale promotion carried out under a regional policy for tourist development. The number of hotel beds could be doubled between 1965 and 1970 and expenditure by visitors could rise from \$EC49 million to an estimated \$EC125 million.

- 156. Turning to agriculture, the report suggests that vigorous efforts should be directed towards improving the organization of the production and marketing of food crops and livestock, and that forestry in Dominica and fishing in all the islands have good prospects for development. The fishing industry, which could help to cut down the import bill, should be organized on a larger, regional scale.
- 157. Improvements in marketing techniques and storage and transport facilities are recommended, as is the development of new industry on a limited basis. Attention is called to certain weaknesses, including the lack of local capital, weak public administration and inadequate and unbalanced educational facilities.
- 158. The report's conclusions are not very optimistic about the prospects of spontaneous growth, with the possible exception of the tourist industry. According to the report, growth could be fostered by active development measures in the form of a well-integrated, longterm regional programme, which in the beginning would have to rely on outside sources for much of the initiative, finance and execution. The extent of this external participation could be phased out, as local resources were built up. The following development services would be needed and would be best planned and administered on a regional basis: industrial development and promotion; tourist development and promotion; market research; fisheries development; forestry and industrial minerals; agricultural development; and research and supporting technical services. A regional development agency should be established under the joint sponsorship of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and be divided into a technical and commercial services division and a development bank division. The bank would operate on strictly commercial lines, once interest-free or low-cost capital had been subscribed to it. The bank, as a regional agency, could deal with certain international development agencies, whose rules at present preclude consideration of individual islands because of their small size.
- 159. A meeting of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands took place in Antigua in November 1966. Speaking before the meeting took place, Mr. Herbert Blaize, Grenada's Chief Minister, said that there had been no official announcement from either Britain, Canada or the United States on the report. Grenada and the other islands regarded this meeting as an opportunity to hear the attitude and reaction of those countries to the report. He also said that the meeting would be concerned with the regional aspects of the report and that individual territorial requirements would be taken up later.

Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA)

- 160. In December 1965, the Governments of Guyana (then British Guiana), Barbados and Antigua signed an agreement to create a free trade area to be known as the Caribbean Free Trade Area. The agreement was expected to come into operation during 1966 but was postponed twice. Talks were held between the Governments concerned in Barbados and Antigua in August, in Barbados in November and in Guyana in December 1966. It was reported on 11 December 1966 that, at the talks held in Georgetown, final agreement was reached. The Barbados legislature ratified the agreement on 9 August 1966 and the Guyana Parliament on 30 December 1966. The scheme is now expected to come into force early in 1967.
- 161. The agreement provides for accession by any other Caribbean country or Territory, but, so far, none has applied. Support for free trade in the area was sought by a delegation representing the Incorporated Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the Caribbean, which visited ten Commonwealth countries and Territories in the Caribbean in September and October 1966.

Sugar industry

162. The present world market price for sugar is about £15 per ton, which is said to be about half the cost of production. However, by virtue of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement the United Kingdom buys West Indian sugar for a price which in 1966 averaged £45/1/11 per ton. Under the United States Sugar Act the United States paid £45/1/0 per ton in 1966, while in the same year Canada paid only £20/16/0 per ton. The low price paid by Canada was the subject of discussions in Ottawa in July 1966 and at the meeting of West Indies sugar producers in Puerto Rico in August, where producers agreed that a direct approach should be made to the Canadian Government with a view to securing a better price. At the conference held in Ottawa in July 1966 between the Governments of Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, the Canadian Government agreed to waive the £2 per ton duty on sugar (the preferential rate) imported from Commonwealth countries in the West Indies provided Commonwealth and other sugar suppliers agreed and subject also to agreement by GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). It was reported in December 1966 that the move to allow West Indian sugar into Canada duty-free had been successfully opposed within GATT and by Canadian refiners.

163. Speaking at the annual general meeting of the British West Indies Sugar Association in Bridgetown, Barbados, on 14 December 1966, the Chairman, Sir Robert Kirkwood, said that producers were likely to suffer further over-all losses in the coming year. Sir Robert said that the estimated production for the coming year was 1,227,678 tons, of which 1,080,000 tons would be available for export. Shipments to the United Kingdom up to October 1966 were 627,204 tons, to Canada 222,440 tons and to the United States 115,161 long tons. The total possible outlets in these three countries in 1966 were "just over 1,175,000 long tons". Sir Robert emphasized the value of the agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States but said that the negotiations with Canada had been of "scant benefit". He pointed out that, even with the removal of

customs duties, the price would still only be in the region of £20 per ton. Sir Robert paid tribute to the West Indian Governments for proposing in September that exports should be restricted to current levels with production cut-backs if necessary. Reviewing 1966 crop conditions, Sir Robert informed the Association that in St. Kitts only 351,738 tons of cane was ground and only 37,753 tons of sugar was produced, the smallest crop since 1949. In Grenada, the 1966 crop represented an increase of 13 per cent over the previous year and the 1967 prospects were "very good".

Banana industry

164. Representatives of the Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) took part in ministerial talks in London with representatives of Jamaica and the United Kingdom. At the conclusion of the conference the following communique was issued:

"The tripartite talks on bananas between the Governments of Tamaica, the Windward Islands and the United Kingdom were adjourned. The prospects for banana production in the West Indies and the marketing outlook in the United Kingdom and elsewhere were reviewed. There was a valuable exchange of views which recognized the importance of the banana industry to the economies of Jamaica and the Windward Islands and the mutual interest in satisfying requirements of the British consumer. There was general agreement on the desirability of avoiding a repetition of the supply conditions in the United Kingdom banana market in the winter of 1964-1965. Possible means to prevent such a recurrence were discussed and it was agreed to await the result of negotiations on which the producers are now engaged, after which, if requested by any of the three parties, the talks will be resumed later this year".

165. On 12 December 1966, Jamaica, the Windward Islands and the marketing agents for these two producers signed an agreement providing for a total of 368,000 tons of fruit a year. Mr. Keith Jones, Acting Chairman of the Jamaica Banana Board, said that under the terms secured, the banana industry would do well. He reported that Jamaica would forward about 192,000 tons, and the Windward Islands 176,000 tons. Mr. Jones said that in future the greenboat price for fruit would be fixed on the basis of retail prices in the United Kingdom. He also reported that, whereas the freight rate in the past had been between £17 and £21/10/0 a ton, under a new arrangement it would be £18 a ton. This would depend, however, on the industry being able to load ships at all times to capacity. Mr. Jones said that the Jamaica deliveries would vary, but if either country (Jamaica or the Windwards) fell short of its quota, the other could make it up. Also in the contract was an agreement with the shipping agents that the Banana Board would pay for the full capacity of the ship, whether this was used or not. This meant that the Board would have to endeavour to fill ships to capacity in order to effect the cheaper rates. If Jamaica and the Windwards delivered less than the joint quota, the agents could then import from outside sources. On the other hand, any surpluses would be accepted and consigned to the European market.

ANTIGUA¹⁶

General

166. The Territory comprises the island of Antigua and its dependencies, Barbuda, which lies twenty-five miles to the north, and the uninhabited island Redonda. The total area of the Territory is 170.5 square miles (442 square kilometres): Antigua has an area of 108 square miles (279.7 square kilometres), Barbuda 62 square miles (160.5 square kilometres) and Redonda 0.5 square miles (1.3 square kilometres). The islands lie in the hurricane zone and are subject to severe droughts.

167. In 1963 the population was estimated at 57,400, almost all of whom are of African or mixed descent.

Constitution

168. The provisions of Antigua's new Constitution which are also contained in those of the other five Territories, as well as a description of the new relationship of association with the United Kingdom, are set out in paragraphs 133 to 143 above. The main provisions of the new Constitution relating to the internal system of government are set out below.

169. The Parliament of Antigua will consist of the Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Queen will be represented by a Governor. The Governor will be appointed by the Queen.

170. The Senate will consist of ten senators appointed by the Governor, seven of whom will be appointed on the advice of the Premier and three after consultation with the Premier. Whenever there is an Opposition represented in the House of Representatives, it will be given representation through one or more of these three members. The Senate will have power to delay a money bill for up to one month and any other bill passed by the House of Representatives for up to two years.

171. The House of Representatives will consist of not less than ten elected members. The Speaker will be elected by the members of the House and if not already a member of the House will become one by virtue of his office. If the Attorney-General is not an elected member of the House of Representatives he will, by virtue of his office, be an additional nonvoting member of the House.

172. The Parliament of Antigua will have power to alter any of the provisions of the Constitution. A bill to alter the Constitution must be supported by two thirds of the members of the House of Representatives. In the case of a bill to alter a "basic clause" of the Constitution, three months must elapse between its introduction and the first debate on it. After the bill's passage by both Houses, or its rejection by the Senate for a second time, it must be submitted to a referendum and approved by two thirds of the electors. There will be no need for a referendum in connexion with a bill which terminates association with the United Kingdom and makes provision for Antigua to join any other Commonwealth country in the Caribbean.

¹⁶ The information on Antigua has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter on 6 December 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

- 173. The basic clauses of the Constitution will include such subjects as the status of the Territory, fundamental rights and freedoms, the structure of Parliament, including the composition of the legislature, electoral qualifications, the constituency commission, the judiciary, the Public Service and finance.
- 174. The Constitution will also provide for safe-guarding the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, irrespective of race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, or sex, subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest.

175. The executive authority of Antigua will be vested in the Queen and will be exercised on her behalf by the Governor. The Governor will exercise his functions on the advice of a Cabinet. The Governor will appoint as Premier the member of the House of Representatives who in his judgement is best able to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the House. He will appoint other ministers and parliamentary secretaries on the Premier's advice, provided that at least one minister is a member of the Senate. The general direction and control of the Government of Antigua will rest with the Cabinet.

Electoral system

176. The members of the House of Representatives will be elected in single-member constituencies. During the first five years, however, the Governor, on the advice of the Premier, may declare that two or more existing constituencies shall be two-member constituencies until additional constituencies are created through the operation of the procedures laid down in the Constitution. Under these procedures a constituency commission, to be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier, will review the number and boundaries of the constituencies at intervals of not less than two and not more than five years.

177. A Commonwealth citizen who has attained the age of twenty-one will be qualified for membership of the legislature if he was born and is domiciled in Antigua, or if he is domiciled in Antigua and has been resident there for at least five years.

178. A person will be qualified to be registered as an elector if he has attained the age of twenty-one years and is a Commonwealth citizen who was born in Antigua and is resident there or is a Commonwealth citizen who has resided there for a period of three years.

Public Service

179. In 1965 there were 36 expatriate officers (3 pensionable and 33 non-pensionable, including 26 teachers) and 1,653 local officers in the Public Service. During the year 12 officers were sent for training overseas.

Political parties

180. There are two political parties in Antigua, the Antigua Labour Party (ALP), the governing party, and the Antigua-Barbuda Democratic Movement (ABDM).

181. The last elections were held in the Territory on 29 November and 15 December 1965. The ALP retained all ten seats and is thus the only party represented in the present Legislative Council. Twenty-five candidates stood for election, including five inde-

pendents. During the campaigning for the election, which was reported to have been heated, the ALP called for "independence for Antigua along the lines of the Cook Islands".

Recent political developments

182. On 16 January 1967, it was announced that Antigua's new Constitution and its new status of association with the United Kingdom would come into force on 27 February 1967.

Economic conditions

183. The economy of Antigua depends on primary production and tourism. There are a few secondary industries which produce rum, clean cotton, cotton-seed oil, cotton-seed meal, corn meal, bran and arrow-root.

184. Price fluctuations and a severe drought throughout 1965 and 1966 severely affected the sugar and cotton industries. The sugar crop yielded only 14,040 tons in 1965, as against 21,000 tons in 1964, while in 1966 production declined further to 8,500 tons. Cotton production also declined from 154,000 lbs. of clean lint in 1964 to 98,459 lbs. in 1965.

185. The administering Power reports that during 1965, the Government took positive measures to sustain and revitalize the sugar and cotton industries. These measures included financial aid to the sugar company, the setting up of a commission of inquiry into the sugar industry, the construction of dams and experimentation in mechanical harvesting and cleaning of cotton.

186. The sugar factory in Antigua is owned partly by the Government, which holds 45 per cent of the shares. In July 1966, the factory ceased operations, and, in August, the Royal Bank of Canada exercised its right under a mortgage agreement and appointed a receiver. In September, the Chief Minister announced that the Government was negotiating with the Bank to take the factory out of receivership and begin preparations for the 1967 crop. The Chief Minister also said that further finance was being sought from the United Kingdom Government to replace obsolete equipment in the factory. In October, the Opposition party, the Antigua-Barbuda Democratic Movement (ABDM), called upon the Government to outline its plans to save the sugar industry. The factory was offered for sale in late October, and, in November. the directors of the factory successfully applied to the High Court for an injunction restraining the receiver from selling the factory. The Government of Antigua informed the Colonial Secretary that it intended to make an offer for the company on the ground that it considered it essential in the public interest for the sugar industry in Antigua to be continued for some time. In January 1967, the Chief Minister was reported to be having discussions in London concerning the sugar industry.

187. Water conservation and the construction of dams are being assisted by external aid. During 1966 the United Kingdom made a grant of \$EC1.5 million for this purpose and Canada agreed to make a grant of \$EC2 million. Aid in the form of a loan of \$250,000 was also promised by the United States in 1966 for the construction of a deep water harbour at St. Johns.

188. The administering Power also reported continued encouraging progress during 1965 in the development of the tourist industry and light industry.

The Government proposes to review its incentive legislation in these two fields from time to time to ensure that concessions granted are competitive with those of other Caribbean Territories. A new oil refinery was expected to be completed in November 1966, capable of handling 1,000 barrels of crude oil per day.

189. The number of tourists visiting the Territory increased from 13,000 in 1958 to 46,118 in 1964 and 60,427 in 1965. The runway at the airport was recently improved to accommodate large jet aircraft.

190. In the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey, it is stated that because of drought there is no long-term future for the sugar industry. It was believed, however, that if heavy expenditure was devoted to promotion and particularly to the extension of the season, the tourist industry could ensure an annual growth of 7 to 8 per cent in the gross domestic product.

191. The total value of imports for 1965 amounted to \$EC28,339,541. The main items imported were foodstuffs, clothing and fuel. Exports were valued at \$EC6,340,337, of which goods to the value of \$EC2,378,008 were domestic exports (sugar, molasses and cotton lint), the remainder being re-exports.

192. Local revenue in 1965 was estimated at \$EC9,183,598, the principal sources being customs duties and income taxes. In addition, the Territory was to receive \$EC42,300 under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, \$EC87,887 from Colonial Development and Welfare schemes and \$EC76,391 from the other sources, bringing the total estimated revenue to \$EC9,390,176, compared with \$WI 10,439,996 in 1964. Total expenditure estimated for 1965 was \$EC8,544,609, compared with \$WI 9,746,681 in 1964.

Social conditions

Labour

193. Almost half of the Territory's workers are employed in the sugar and cotton industries. Statistics on unemployment and on the effects of the drought on employment are not available.

194. During 1965, almost 200 workers went to the United States Virgin Islands and a similar number returned; the average length of absence was four months and most were employed in agriculture.

195. There are three organizations registered under the Trade Union Act: The Antigua Trades and Labour Union, the Antigua Port Seaman and General Workers' Union and the Antigua Employers' Federation.

196. The administering Power reports that the accelerated economic and social development which has taken place in the Territory resulting from the tourist industry and the diversification of the economy has caused severe pressures on the cost of living. The cost of such items as food, entertainment, fuel and lighting, housing, household items and services has risen considerably since 1960. The Government, however, controls the retail prices of certain items of food, meat and fish.

Public health

197. In 1965 there were sixteen Government registered physicians and one private physician. There was one general hospital with 180 beds.

198. In 1965, recurrent expenditure on public health amounted to \$EC1,391,291, compared with \$WI 1,334,095 in 1964. The proportion of public health expenditure to total expenditure for the Territory was 16 per cent.

Educational conditions

199. Education is compulsory between the ages of five and fourteen years. The Government runs its own schools where education is free, and, in addition, there are private schools, some of which receive Government assistance.

200. In 1965, all of the Territory's 16,872 children of school age (8,391 boys and 8,481 girls) were enrolled in schools. Of that total, 13,861 were in primary schools (12,162 in 34 Government schools and 1,699 in 9 private schools), and 3,011 were in secondary schools (1,174 in 3 Government schools and 1,837 in 6 private schools). Seventeen students were enrolled at the Teachers' Training College.

201. Estimated expenditure on education in 1965 was \$EC983,565, or 13 per cent of the Territory's total expenditure for the year.

DOMINICA17

General

202. Dominica is the largest of the Windward Islands, with an area of 289.8 square miles (750.5 square kilometres). It is located approximately 220 miles north-west of Barbados and 950 miles north of Trinidad.

203. The estimated population at the end of 1964 was 66,030, almost all of whom were of African or mixed descent.

Constitution

204. The provisions of Dominica's new Constitution which are also contained in those of the other five Territories, as well as a description of the new relationship of association with the United Kingdom, are set out in paragraphs 133 to 143 above. The main provisions of the new Constitution relating to the internal system of government are set out below.

205. The Parliament of Dominica will consist of the Queen and a House of Assembly. The Queen will be represented by a Governor. The Governor will be appointed by the Queen.

206. The House of Assembly will consist of three nominated members, eleven elected members and one ex officio member, the Attorney-General. The Speaker will be elected by the members of the House, and, if not already a member, will become one by virtue of his office. Of the nominated members, two will be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier and one by the Governor on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, or if he does not wish to be consulted, the Governor, in his discretion, may consult any other person. Non-elected members of the House may vote on any question except motions of no confidence and bills to amend the Constitution.

¹⁷ The information on Dominica has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 9 December 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

207. The provisions of Dominica's Constitution concerning alteration of the Constitution, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the exercise of executive authority are essentially the same as those proposed for Antigua (see paragraphs 172 to 175 above).

Electoral system

- 208. Elected members of the House of Assembly will be elected in single-member constituencies. There will be a boundaries commission, consisting of the Speaker as chairman, two members of the House appointed on the advice of the Premier and two members of the House appointed on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition.
- 209. A British subject who has attained the age of 21 will be qualified for election as a member of the House if he is domiciled and residing in Dominica or if he has resided in Dominica for one year and is able to speak English.
- 210. A person will be qualified to be registered as a voter if he is a British subject who has attained the age of 21 years and has such other qualifications regarding residence, domicile or registration as may be prescribed by the Parliament of Dominica.

Public Service

211. In 1965, there were 12 expatriate officers (2 pensionable and 10 non-pensionable) and 1,529 local officers, including 42 senior officers, in the Public Service. During the year, 68 officers were sent for training overseas.

Local government

212. Two of the main towns, Roseau and Portsmouth, have town councils. The number of village councils has increased in recent years and in 1965 there were 18 such councils. There are also 4 district council associations and a central organization, the Dominica Association of Village Councils.

Political parties

- 213. There are two political parties in Dominica, the Dominica Labour Party (the governing party), and the Dominica United People's Party.
- 214. The last elections were held on 8 January 1966, when the Labour Party was returned to power winning 10 of the 11 seats, 3 more than at the previous election. The United People's Party won 1 seat, 2 less than at the previous election. Eighty per cent of the electorate voted.
- 215. Both parties were represented at the Constitutional Conference in London in April and May 1966. The Leader of the Opposition signed the report but stated that he did not agree with the proposal for nominated members of the House of Assembly and that his party preferred a nominated second chamber of the legislature.

Recent political developments

216. On 16 January 1967, it was announced that Dominica's new Constitution and its new status of association with the United Kingdom would come into force on 1 March 1967.

Economic conditions

- 217. The economy of the Territory is based on primary production. The Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey described the economy as more diversified than that of most of the islands with a wider source of development and possibilities of expansion of the banana, citrus, food crops, livestock, forestry, timber, pumice, limestone and tourist industries.
- 218. In 1965, a number of entreprises were initiated, the most important being the pumice industry, which commenced productive operations towards the close of the year. In addition, the island's largest, most modern hotel was opened, and construction work was started on an oils and fats factory, which is intended to stimulate local production and increase the processing of coconuts. The poultry industry also made considerable strides, largely through the impetus of foreign private capital.
- 219. There was a record banana crop of 49,756 tons in 1965, but no corresponding increase in revenue, owing to the drop in banana prices. The number of tourists increased from 6,168 in 1964 to 6,897 in 1965. The Government has been considering the possibility of building a deep water harbour and has accordingly put in hand a geological survey of the harbour.
- 220. Trade figures for 1965 are not yet available. In the past, there has been a visible adverse trade balance, but this did not take into account expenditure in the Territory by tourists. Bananas and fruit juices have constituted the main exports.
- 221. Public revenue, derived principally from customs duties and income taxes, amounted to \$EC6,103,496 in 1965. This included a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom of \$EC715,740. Total expenditures amounted to \$EC8,445,627, including \$EC2,200,622 on capital works.

Social conditions

Labour

- 222. There were 6 trade unions registered in the Territory in 1965: the Dominica Trade Union, the Dominica Union of Teachers, the Dominica Civil Service Association, the Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, the Seamen and Waterfront Workers' Trade Union, and the Dominica Association of Public Health Inspectors.
- 223. Agriculture is the principal occupation and provides employment for about 7,000 wage-earners, in addition to about 5,000 peasant proprietors. It is estimated that 3,000 workers are employed in road and building construction, 2,500 in manufacturing, 900 in transport and 500 in commerce.

Public health

- 224. There are 6 government hospitals with a total of 262 beds, and 26 dispensaries distributed throughout the island.
- 225. The infant mortality rate for 1965 rose from 52.9 to 55.6 per thousand live births. The death-rate declined from 9.4 to 8.6 per thousand.
- 226. During 1965, 138,780 pounds of powdered milk supplied by UNICEF was distributed to infants, pre-school children, pregnant and nursing mothers.

227. Recurrent expenditure on public health amounted to \$EC886,698 in 1965, compared with \$WI 740,178 in 1964. In addition, \$EC19,584 was spent on public health from Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

Educational conditions

- 228. Education is free between the ages of 5 and 15 years and is compulsory in certain areas. The number of compulsory areas rose from 14 in 1964 to 21 in 1965. Secondary education is not free but, in 1965, 35 free places at secondary schools were awarded by the Government. Other scholarships are awarded by private organizations.
- 229. In 1965 there were 50 government primary schools and 2 private schools assisted by the Government. Enrolment in primary schools rose from 16,221 in 1964 to 17,200 in 1965. Secondary school enrolment fell from 1,569 to 1,152. A school building donated by the Canadian Government was opened in 1965 and over 900 of its 1,000 places were taken up.
- 230. Discussions were held during 1965 leading to proposals for the establishment of a university centre which, in addition to providing higher education for adults, could provide teacher training. The administering Power reports that the implementation of this idea would mean the gradual demise of the pupilteacher system in Dominica.
- 231. Expenditure on education in 1965 amounted to \$EC1,085,686, compared with \$WI 794,478 in 1964.

GRENADA¹⁸

General

- 232. Grenada is the most southerly of the Windward Islands in the Eastern Caribbean. The total area of the Territory is 133 square miles (344.5 square kilometres), including certain of the small islands known as the Grenadines, the largest of which is Carriacou with an area of 13 square miles (33.7 square kilometres). Approximately 10,000 acres are under forest.
- 233. The estimated population at 30 June 1964 was 93,911, almost all of whom were of African or mixed descent.

Constitution

- 234. The provisions for Grenada's new Constitution which are also contained in those of the other five Territories, as well as a description of the new relationship of association with the United Kingdom, are set out in paragraph 133 to 143 above. The main provisions of the new Constitution relating to the internal system of government are set out below.
- 235. The Parliament of Grenada will consist of the Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Queen will be represented by a Governor. The Governor will be appointed by the Queen.
- 236. The Senate will consist of nine members appointed by the Governor, five of whom will be appointed on the advice of the Premier, two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, and two on

- the advice of the Premier after he has consulted such organizations or interests as he considers should be represented. The Senate will have power to delay a money bill for up to one month and any other bill passed by the House of Representatives for up to two years.
- 237. The House of Representatives will consist of ten elected members. The Speaker will be elected by the House from among its members or from outside of the House.
- 238. The provisions of Grenada's Constitution concerning alteration of the Constitution, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the exercise of executive authority are essentially the same as those proposed for Antigua (see paragraphs 172 to 175 above).

Electoral system

- 239. The members of the House of Representatives will be elected in single-member constituencies. There will be a boundaries commission, which will consist of the Speaker, as chairman, two members nominated on the advice of the Premier, and two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition. The Commission will review the number and boundaries of constituencies at intervals of not less than two and not more than five years.
- 240. A person will be qualified for membership of the legislature if he is a British subject who has attained the age of twenty-one, is able to speak English and has either resided in Grenada for one year, or is domiciled and a resident in Grenada.
- 241. A person will be qualified to be registered as a voter if he is a British subject who has attained the age of twenty-one and satisfies such requirements as to residence or domicile in Grenada as may be prescribed by the legislature.

Public service

242. In 1965 there were 7 expatriate officers (4 pensionable and 3 on contract) and 2,245 local officers, 48 of whom held senior posts. Training schemes both within the Territory and overseas are provided for officers in the clerical and executive grades, for technical officers in the Public Works Department and for public health personnel.

Political parties

- 243. There are two political parties in the Territory, the Grenada National Party (the governing party), and the Grenada United Labour Party.
- 244. The last elections were held in September 1962, when the Grenada National Party won six seats and the Grenada United Labour Party won four.
- 245. Both parties were represented at the Constitutional Conference held in London in April and May 1966. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Eric Gairy, signed the report but recorded his disagreement with certain provisions of the new Constitution, including the transitional provisions. He also called for a general election before the new arrangements came into effect.
- 246. The position of the Grenada United Labour Party on this and other matters was outlined by Mr. Gairy in his statement to the Special Committee at its 463rd meeting on 7 September 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, paras. 328 to 355). The Labour

¹⁸ The information on Grenada has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

Party is opposed to unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. Its leader stated to the Special Committee that the party tries to pursue a socialist democratic ideology.

247. The Grenada National Party has stood for the achievement of unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. ¹⁹ In statements made during 1966, the Chief Minister and leader of the party, Mr. Herbert Blaize, said that he was pursuing the goal of unitary statehood and that the achievement of self-government under the proposed new Constitution would enable Grenada to move closer to its eventual position in a Caribbean Economic Community of which union with Trinidad and Tobago was a part.

Recent political developments

248. On 16 January 1967, it was announced that Grenada's new Constitution and its new status of association would come into force on 3 March 1967.

249. On 19 January 1967, Mr. Eric Gairy, the Leader of the Opposition, and the three other members of his party in the Legislative Council resigned their seats. Mr. Gairy was reported to have said that the resignations were in protest against the introduction of the new Constitution and the new status before general elections had been held. Mr. Gairy said that the present Government had no mandate to lead the Territory to its new status.

Economic conditions

250. The economy of the Territory is based on agriculture, the major crops being cocoa, nutmeg, mace, bananas, sugar, copra, limes and cotton. There are some secondary industries, including factories for the production of cigarettes, soap, edible oils, sugar, lime essence and soft drinks. There is also a distillery and a brewery. Tourism is becoming an important industry.

251. The administering Power reports that one of the outstanding features of 1965 was the deterioration of the cocoa market. There was a sharp decline in price, growers receiving prices almost equivalent to the cost of production. Other major crops such as bananas and nutmeg experienced better marketing conditions which offset the decline in the cocoa market. The establishment of a Cocoa Industry Board assisted growers.

252. In the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey it is stated that the main prospects of growth in Grenada were in tourism although considerable expansion and diversification could take place in foodcrops and livestock. According to the report, the main airport needed improvements and it was recommended that an airstrip be built on Carriacou.

253. In 1965, the value of imports amounted to \$WI 19,098,800 compared with \$WI 17,672,800 in 1964, while the value of exports, including a small quantity of re-exports, amounted to \$WI 10,872,500 compared with \$WI 7,220,800 in 1964. The main imports were foodstuffs, iron and steel, timber, textiles and cement. The principal exports were cocoa, spices and bananas. Cocoa exports rose from 42,200 cwts in 1964 to 56,500 cwts although the value fell from \$WI 2,162,200 to \$WI 2,088,100. The amount of

nutmegs exported rose from 12,400 cwts in 1964 to 28,500 cwts and mace rose from 3,220 cwts in 1964 to 3,700 cwts. The combined value of nutmeg and mace exports rose from \$WI 2,724,500 in 1964 to \$WI 5,491,400 in 1965. The amount of bananas exported rose from 1,151,900 stems in 1964 to 1,622,600 stems in 1965, the value rising from \$WI 1,845,300 to \$WI 2,417,100. The number of tourists increased from 21,634 in 1964 to 29,840 in 1965.

254. Total revenue, including Colonial Development and Welfare grants of \$WI 688,000 and a United Kingdom grant-in-aid of \$WI 1,650,400, amounted to \$WI 9,686,100 in 1965 compared with \$WI 8,377,000 in 1964. Apart from the grants, the main sources of revenue in 1965 were customs and excise duties, totalling \$WI 4,238,300, taxes amounting to \$WI 1,655,500 and \$WI 1,453,900 from other sources. Total estimated expenditure in 1965 amounted to \$WI 9,998,000, compared with \$WI 8,362,000 in 1964.

Social conditions

Labour

255. Agriculture provides the main source of employment in Grenada. The numbers employed in the main occupational groups, according to provisional figures for 1964, are set out below.

Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing	
Farm workers 4,828	
Farmers 1,408	
Fishermen	
Forestry workers	
TOTAL	8,058
Commerce	2,151
Construction	2,620
Manufacturing	2,109
Services	3,776
Transport and communication	1,244
Total	19,958

256. There were seventeen registered organizations in Grenada in 1965, including one employers' federation.

257. The labour laws of the Territory are being revised with the help of the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development.

258. According to the migrant labour statistics for 1965 supplied by the administering Power, 67 persons left for employment in agriculture in the United States (they were expected to be away for an average period of 5 months), 843 left for the United Kingdom (for an indefinite period), and 104 left on one-year contracts for Ascension Island.

Social services

259. A report on the establishment of a contributory pension scheme for retirement and disability benefits was prepared by a visiting United Kingdom expert in 1965. It is proposed to implement the scheme with technical assistance from the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

Public health

260. There are 3 general hospitals with a total bed capacity of over 300, and 28 medical visiting stations throughout the Territory with resident nurse-midwives in charge.

¹⁹ For further details see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23. document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 53 to 59 and Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, paras. 104 to 100

- 261. Information concerning government medical staff and vital statistics is not available.
- 262. Expenditure for 1965 on medical and sanitary services was estimated at \$WI 1,332,500, compared with \$WI 1,244,100 in 1964.

Educational conditions

- 263. Primary education is free to all children between five and seventeen years of age. Attendance is compulsory between the ages of five and fifteen but this is not enforced.
- 264. At the end of 1965, there were 56 primary schools (government and aided) with 28,315 pupils, and 10 secondary schools with a total of 2,592 pupils. There is also a local teacher's training college which was attended by 30 students in 1965.
- 265. Five new school buildings were completed during the year. Twenty primary schools are still housed in single-room structures. The administering Power reports that owing to economic strictures, it may be some time before the physical problems which beset education may be resolved.
- 266. Expenditure on education in 1965 was estimated at \$WI 1,392,500, compared with \$WI 1,274,300 in 1964.

MONTSERRAT²⁰

General

- 267. Montserrat lies twenty-seven miles south-west of Antigua and some forty miles north-west of Guadaloupe. It is the smallest of the East Caribbean Islands administered separately, having a maximum length of eleven miles, a maximum width of seven, and an area of 32.5 square miles (83 square kilometres).
- 268. In 1965, the population was estimated at 13,970, almost all of whom were of African or mixed descent.

Constitution

- 269. The main features of the Constitution have been outlined in paragraphs 115 to 122 above.
- 270. Montserrat was not included in the proposals set forth in the White Paper of December 1965 and did not participate in the series of constitutional conferences held in London between February and May 1966. At the time the White Paper was issued, it was stated that the future of Montserrat would be considered separately.

Public Service

271. In 1965, there were 10 expatriate officers (1 pensionable and 9 on contract), and 370 local officers, of whom 42 hold senior position. Twenty-five officers were on study-leave courses overseas. There were also in-service training schemes for teachers and other members of the Public Service.

Political parties

- 272. There are two political parties in the Territory, the Montserrat Labour Party (the governing party and the Workers' Progressive Party.
- 273. Elections were held in the Territory in March 1966 when the Labour Party was returned to office.

The Labour Party won four seats (a loss of one seat), and the Workers' Progressive Party won two seats.

Economic conditions

- 274. The economy of the Territory is based on agriculture with sea island cotton as the main export crop. In recent years, exports of bananas, vegetables and citrus fruits have been developed. Secondary industries are limited to the processing of local products and include cotton ginning, distillation of rum, lime juice and lime oil processing, soap manufacture and canning. Tourism is increasing.
- 275. The administering Power reports that the development which began to make an impact on the economic growth of the Territory in 1964 continued throughout 1965. Local revenue increased by over 25 per cent. In agriculture, the Government decided to increase the area of holdings rented to peasants to a size which would lead towards greater viability. The improvement in the gross domestic product reported in 1964 continued into 1965.
- 276. In the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey it was stated that the old estate agricultural system which had broken down in 1953 should be replaced by a new system of farms and farmers producing on a commercial basis. The main growth which had been in real estate development for retired persons from the United Kingdom and North America, should now be accompanied by hotel development and the completion of airport improvements.
- 277. Cotton continued to be the principal export in 1965. The 1965-66 crop was planted on 1,052 acres and yielded 465 bales of clean lint. Fortnightly shipments of bananas continued to be made to the United Kingdom via Dominica and a total of 15,082 stems valued at \$EC33,093 were exported. Sugar cane was rapidly declining. Exports of syrup to Dominica amounted to 8,800 gallons valued at \$EC7,752. Exports of fruits and vegetables to the Caribbean area and beyond were maintained throughout the year. Tomato exports were valued at \$EC13,806. The export trade in mangoes and peppers was revived during the year and exports of these commodities were valued at \$EC3,756 and \$EC6,727 respectively.
- 278. In 1966, the total revenue was \$EC3,056,756, derived mainly from customs duties (\$EC670,722) and from excise taxes and internal revenue (\$EC458,123). In addition, the Territory received a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom totalling \$EC849,665. Total expenditure was \$EC3,186,396.

Social conditions

Labour

- 279. During 1965, forty-five agricultural workers were engaged under contract for work in the United States Virgin Islands and four women were recruited for domestic work in Canada.. In addition, twelve persons received employment vouchers for work in the United Kingdom.
- 280. The membership of the three trade unions was approximately 620, the same as in 1964. There was no no change in the wage rates and hours of work in the principal industries and services during 1965. Owing to the increased activity in the real estate sector of the economy, there was little, if any, unemployment.

²⁰ The information on Montserrat has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 6 December 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

Public health

281. In 1965, there were two government registered physicians and one private physician. There was one general hospital with sixty-nine beds, and three health centres and eight outposts at which ante-natal and infant welfare clinics were held.

282. The birth-rate was 27.3 per thousand and the death-rate 8.5 per thousand. There was a considerable improvement in the health of mothers and children as a result of two World Health Organization (WHO)/United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) health programmes. In 1965, expenditure on medical and health services amounted to \$266,589, compared with \$247,200 in 1964.

Educational conditions

283. There were 2,969 children enrolled in the schools during 1965, including 2,698 in primary schools and 271 in the secondary schools, compared with 2,938 in primary schools and 265 in secondary schools during 1964.

284. Recurrent expenditure on primary education in 1965 was \$EC263,200, while that on secondary education was \$EC77,825. Capital expenditure amounted to \$EC4,084 for schools, furniture and the purchase of land for a new primary school in the Central District. School fees at the secondary school amounted to \$EC6,048. Recurrent expenditure on education was 12.05 per cent of the recurrent expenditure of the Territory.

ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA²¹

General

285. The islands of St. Kitts (which is also known as St. Christopher), Nevis and Anguilla are the most northerly of the islands in the Leeward group administered by the United Kingdom. St. Kitts and Nevis are separated by a three-mile-wide strait and Anguilla lies sixty miles to the north of St. Kitts. The Territory also includes the island of Sombrero, the administration of which was transferred from the British Virgin Islands to St. Kitts in 1956. The total area of the Territory is 155 square miles (401 square kilometres). The area of St. Kitts is 68 square miles, Nevis 50 square miles, Anguilla 35 square miles and Sombrero 2 square miles.

286. At the 1960 census, the total population of the Territory was 56,693 made up as follows: St. Kitts, 38,113; Nevis, 12,770; and Anguilla, 5,810. The estimated population in 1962 was 60,451, almost all of whom were of African or mixed descent.

Constitution

287. The provisions of the new Constitution for St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, which are also contained in those of the other five Territories, as well as a description of the new relationship of association with the United Kingdom, are set out in paragraphs 133 to 143 above. The main provisions of the new Constitution relating to the internal system of government are set out below.

288. The legislature of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla will consist of the Queen and a House of Assembly.

²¹ The information on St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 22 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

The Queen will be represented by a Governor. The Governor will be appointed by the Queen.

289. The House of Assembly will consist of a speaker, elected members and nominated members. There will be at least one elected member from Anguilla, at least two from Nevis and at least seven from St. Kitts. There will be two nominated members appointed on the advice of the Premier, and one appointed on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, or, if there is no Leader of the Opposition, by the Governor in his discretion. In addition, the Attorney-General will, if he is a civil servant, be an ex officio member. He may also be an additional nominated member. Nominated members will be entitled to vote except on motions of no confidence and on bills for the alteration of the Constitution. The Speaker will be elected by the House and if he is not an elected member, will be a member of the House by virtue of his office.

290. The provisions of the new Constitution of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla concerning alteration of the Constitution, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the exercise of executive authorities are essentially the same as those proposed for Antigua (see paras. 172 to 175 above).

Electoral system

291. The elected members of the House of Assembly will be elected in single member constituencies, of which there will be at least one in Anguilla, at least two in Nevis and at least seven in St. Kitts. There will be a boundaries commission which will consist of the Speaker as chairman, two members of the House appointed on the advice of the Premier and two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, or if there is no Opposition, appointed by the Governor in his discretion. The commission will review the boundaries at intervals of not more than five years.

292. A person will be qualified for election or nomination to the House if he is a Commonwealth citizen who has attained the age of 21 and was born and is domiciled in the Territory or is domiciled and has been a resident in the Territory for three years.

293. A person will be qualified as a voter if he has attained the age of 21 years and has such qualifications regarding residence and domicile as may be prescribed by the legislature.

Public Service

294. In 1964, there were 11 expatriate officers (4 pensionable and 7 on contract), and 1,281 local officers, including 97 in senior posts. The figures for 1965 are not available.

Local government

295. It was agreed at the 1966 Constitutional Conference that the new Constitution would provide for councils in Nevis and Anguilla. These councils will be the principal organs of local government in each island. At least two thirds of the members of each council shall be elected on the same franchise as members of the House of Assembly.

Political parties

296. There are three political parties in the Territory, the Labour Party (the governing party), the People's Action Movement (PAM) and the United National Movement (UNM).

297. The last elections were held in July 1966. There were twenty-four candidates for the ten elected seats; seven Labour Party, nine PAM, two UNM and six independents. At the elections, the Labour Party won seven seats, all in St. Kitts, PAM won two seats, one in Nevis and one in Anguilla, and UNM won a seat in Nevis.

298. All three parties were represented at the Constitutional Conference and all signed the report. The PAM representative was from Anguilla and the UNM representative from Nevis.

Recent political developments

299. On 16 January 1967, it was announced that the Territory's new Constitution and its new status of association with the United Kingdom would come into force on 27 February 1967.

300. It was reported that during the last week of January 1967, demonstrations took place in Anguilla. The demonstrators were reported as saying that they did not want to be united with St. Kitts. They had not been fairly treated by St. Kitts over the years and they now had no confidence in the Government. They also rejected the amount of autonomy given them.

301. On 27 February 1967 the Territory assumed the status of a State in association with the United Kingdom. During the next four months the inhabitants of Anguilla continued and increased their demands to be separated from St. Kitts, on the grounds that their interests had never been safeguarded by the government of that island.

302. Following demonstrations, on 29 May the small police force from St. Kitts was expelled from Anguilla. Mr. Peter Adams, sole elected member for Anguilla in the Associated State's House of Assembly, subsequently declared the secession of Anguilla from association with St. Kitts-Nevis. It was reported that a referendum was organized in the Territory, on 11 July, on the subject of the future status of the Territory. The results of the referendum were overwhelmingly against continued association with St. Kitts. Thereafter, Anguilla was reported to have sought assistance from the United Nations, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

303. Meanwhile the Premier of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Mr. Robert Bradshaw, appealed to the United Kingdom to send forces to put down the rebellion and addressed appeals for assistance to the Governments of Trinidad, Barbardos and Guyana. It was reported that the United Kingdom considered that the responsibility for internal security rested with the Central Government in St. Kitts and that the responsibility of the United Kingdom was confined to the State's external relations and security.

304. At the end of June a delegation from the four independent Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, visited St. Kitts. The members of the delegation continued negotiations with the government in St. Kitts and the leaders in Anguilla during July, in an effort to find an amicable settlement of the dispute.

305. On 30 July, Mr. Peter Adams attended a Caribbean Commonwealth conference in Barbados at which agreement was reached. On 31 July, Mr. Bradshaw of St. Kitts and Mr. Adams signed the agreement in Anguilla, by which the secession of Anguilla

from the State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla was ended.²²

306. Full details of the agreement are not yet available. It is reported, however, that the following are among the provisions agreed on:

- (a) Immediate return to constitutional rule in Anguilla;
- (b) Guarantees of increased financial aid and local self-government for Anguilla;
- (c) Establishment of a Local Council for Anguilla for which elections would be held as speedily as possible;
- (d) Provision by the United Kingdom, which was represented at the conference, of substantial economic aid, particularly for the development of tourism;
- (e) The granting of an amnesty to Anguillans charged with political actions against the State and the British Government since 30 May;
- (f) The stationing of policemen from Commonwealth Caribbean Territories in Anguilla until constitutional government is re-established, to be used only as a peace-keeping force.

Economic conditions

307. In St. Kitts the most important crop is sugar, which is produced on large estates. In Nevis, mixed farming is predominant and cotton is produced for export. In Anguilla, the majority of the inhabitants are proprietors and the main activities are stock-raising, salt production and fishing.

308. International trade figures for 1965 are not yet available. In 1964, however, imports were valued at \$WI 13,557,000 and exports at \$WI 9,965,000. The principal exports were sugar (40,800 tons valued at \$WI 8,880,000), molasses (1,274,000 gallons valued at \$WI 346,000), cotton (115,000 pounds valued at \$WI 89,000). The number of tourists decreased from 11,844 in 1964 to 11,766 in 1965.

309. Figures relating to public finance are not yet available for 1965. In 1964, however, revenue amounted to \$WI 5,210,000 and expenditure to \$WI 6,078,000.

310. In the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey it was stated that there did not appear to be much possibility of expanding the sugar industry and it was suggested that the main area for development should be tourism. However, a more vigorous approach to tourist development was essential and better transport to the Territory would have to be made available.

311. During 1965, there was a drought and poor crops of sugar and cotton were reported. An inquiry into the sugar industry was initiated in 1965 but the results of the inquiry are not available.

312. At the Constitutional Conference in London in May 1966, separate talks were held concerning problems relating to the economic development of the Territory. At these talks, it was recognized that the economy of the Territory would continue to be vulnerable so long as it was almost wholly dependent on sugar production, and there was therefore an urgent need to diversify it by introducing new industries. The St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government had in the past

²² Developments subsequent to those reported in this section are referred to in the statements in Sub-Committee III, during its consideration of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (see annex to the present report).

few years endeavoured to promote a tourist industry, which, it was agreed, offered the best means of broadening the economy of the Territory. The Government considered that such developments entailed attracting private investment for hotels and similar amenities. This in turn required the construction or provision by the Government of the necessary infra-structure (e.g., roads, and water and electricity services) as well as an airfield capable of receiving medium-haul jet aircraft, and a deep-water harbour. Until the Government were able to provide acceptable services of this kind the possibility of attracting investment for the development of the tourist industry would be greatly hampered. The St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government were anxious that the United Kingdom Government should assist them both financially and technically in their endeavour to provide such services.

313. In view of the high priority attached by the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government to the airfield project, the United Kingdom Government undertook that, provided there was a reasonable prospect that the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government would be able to negotiate a satisfactory scheme for tourist development, they would be willing to arrange a technical feasibility study of the airfield. Subject to the outcome of that study, they would in principle be willing to give the financial aid to the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government after March 1968 to make the necessary improvements to the airfield. An examination would be made of existing Colonial Development and Welfare schemes relating to St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla to see if savings could be effected which could be transferred to schemes of road improvement, particularly in Nevis and Anguilla, as the first immediate step towards producing the necessary infra-structure for tourist development.

314. The arrangements under which development assistance and budgetary aid would be made available to the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government after the new arrangements had been introduced were also discussed fully at the conference. The United Kingdom Government confirmed that so far as development assistance was concerned they would carry out in full the undertakings already given. This, in the view of the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla delegation, was not adequate. They considered that the United Kingdom Government should provide them with additional sources of aid because, owing to their size and other factors, they were not able to obtain aid from as many sources as larger, fully independent countries. The United Kingdom Government considered that the introduction of the new constitutional arrangements did not, of itself, affect the aid position, either as regards what the Territory could absorb or what the United Kingdom Government could make available.

315. The United Kingdom Government also confirmed that the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government would, if the need arose, continue to be eligible for budgetary aid after the new constitutional arrangements had come into force. The conference could not agree on the conditions under which this aid should be made avilable. The United Kingdom Government agreed to consider further a proposal made by the territorial government. It was explained, however, that if it did not prove possible to accept the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government's proposals, the arrangements for budgetary support under the new Constitu-

tion would have to be as proposed by the United Kingdom Government.

316. In August 1966, the Chief Minister was reported as stating that two large tourist developments had been planned, one at Frigate Bay in St. Kitts and one at Pinney's in Nevis. The developments, which would include hotels, marinas and homes, would be financed from British and European sources.

Social conditions

Labour

317. Approximately 7,600 workers are employed in the sugar industry on St. Kitts. There are seven registered trade unions with a total membership of approximately 4,500. The largest union is the St. Kitts-Nevis Trades and Labour Union with a membership of over 4,000. The retail price index for 1965 shows that there was little change in price since April 1964.

Public health

318. In 1965, there were two general hospitals with 157 beds and two cottage hospitals with 25 beds. A new hospital is being constructed in St. Kitts. There were also 21 health centres and clinics throughout the three islands. The administering Power reports that all aspects of preventive health work are carried out at these centres. There are 9 government medical officers and 4 private practitioners.

319. In 1965 the birth-rate was 31.3 per thousand, the death-rate 9.4 per thousand and the infant mortality-rate 59.1 per thousand live births. The administering Power reports that infant mortality is mainly due to gastroenteritis and broncho-pneumonia arising directly or indirectly as a result of nutritional deficiencies. An expanded nutritional programme was established in 1965 with the assistance of WHO and UNICEF to promote improved nutrition standards. Under the programme, instruction is given on diet improvement and powdered milk is distributed free to pre-school and school children.

320. Recurrent expenditure on public health in 1965 amounted to \$EC959,500, or 14.4 per cent of total government expenditure.

Educational conditions

- 321. Primary education is free and, since 1964, has been compulsory between the ages of 6 and 14.
- 322. There are 36 government primary and senior schools in the Territory with an enrolment of 15,732 pupils. A total of 414 teachers, including 4 pupil-teachers, are employed in these schools. Three of these schools are senior schools and offer facilities for practical work.
- 323. The administering Power reports a marked improvement in the equipment supplied to schools, but notes that there is still a need for more and better equipment. Progress was also being made in the liberalization and broadening of the primary school curriculum, and in the supply of more trained teachers.
- 324. In 1965, there were 4 government secondary schools and one private school. The number of students is not available.
- 325. In 1965 an in-service training course for uncertified teachers, instituted by the University of the West Indies Institute of Education, was run, jointly

by the Institute and the local Ministry of Education. Thirty-six students teachers were enrolled for the 1965-1966 course. In 1965, two teachers were awarded bursaries and were attending educational institutions in the United Kingdom.

326. The amount voted for education for 1965 was \$EC1,013,600 from local revenue and \$EC38,000 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

ST. LUCIA²³

General

327. St. Lucia lies about twenty miles north of St. Vincent and twenty-five miles south of Martinique. It is the second largest of the Windward Islands and has an area of 238 square miles (616 square kilometres). It lies in the hurricane zone.

328. In 1965, the population was estimated at 100,000, almost all of whom were of African or mixed descent.

Constitution

- 329. The provisions of the new Constitution for St. Lucia, which are also contained in those of the other five Territories, as well as a description of the new relationship of association with the United Kingdom, are set out in paragraphs 133 to 143 above. The main provisions of the new Constitution relating to the internal system of government are set out below.
- 330. The legislature of St. Lucia will consist of the Queen and a House of Assembly. The Constitution will contain provision for a Senate but this will remain dormant until brought into operation by the decision of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly. The Queen will be represented by a Governor. The Governor will be appointed by the Queen.
- 331. The House of Assembly will consist of ten elected members, the Attorney-General (so long as he is an official) and, until the provisions relating to a Senate are brought into operation, three nominated members. The House will elect a Speaker who, if he is not already a member of the House, will become one by virtue of his office.
- 332. Of the three nominated members, two will be appointed on the advice of the Premier and one after consultation with the Premier and such other persons as the Governor in his discretion may decide to consult. Nominated members will not be entitled to vote on motions of no confidence or on constitutional questions.
- 333. The provisions of St. Lucia's new Constitution concerning alteration of the Constitution, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the exercise of executive authority are essentially the same as those proposed for Antigua (see paragraphs 172 to 175 above).

Electoral system

334. The House of Assembly will appoint a standing committee, with the Speaker as chairman, to keep under review the number of constituencies and their boundaries.

- 335. A person who is a British subject, proficient in English and has reached the age of 21 years will be qualified for election if he was born in St. Lucia and is domiciled and a resident there or if he has been a resident for three years. The same qualifications govern eligibility for nomination except that the minimum age is 30 years.
- 336. A person will be qualified to vote if he has reached the age of 21 years and has such qualifications regarding residence or registration as may be prescribed by the legislature.

Public Service

337. In 1965, there were fifteen expatriate officers (three pensionable and twelve on contract) in the Public Service. The total number of public servants is not available.

338. In-service training was provided for clerical staff and executive and administrative officers attended local seminars organized with the assistance of the University of the West Indies.

Political parties

- 339. There are two political parties in St. Lucia, the United Workers' Party (the governing party) and the Labour Party.
- 340. The last elections were held in June 1964 at which the Labour Party, which had been in office for thirteen years, was defeated. The United Workers' Party won ten seats and the Labour Party won two.
- 341. Both parties were represented at the Constitutional Conference held in London in April and May 1966. Representatives of both parties signed the report, but the Leader of the Opposition was recorded as stating that because of their fundamental nature, the introduction of the new arrangements should be preceded by a general election.

Recent political developments

342. On 16 January 1967, it was announced that St. Lucia's new Constitution and its new status of association with the United Kingdom would come into force on 1 March 1967.

Economic conditions

- 343. The economy of the Territory is based on agriculture. The main crops are bananas, coconuts, cocoa, fruit, nutmegs and mace. There is also a fishing industry. The principal manufactures are rum, citrus products, coconut products, cigarettes and mineral waters. The tourist industry is expanding.
- 344. The administering Power reports that during 1965 general economic conditions continued to improve very gradually, with domestic exports increasing to \$EC11.4 million from the 1964 total of \$WI 9.7 million. Bananas continued to be the major export commodity, accounting for \$EC9.9 million of total domestic exports. Other important commodities were coconut oil (\$EC670,000) and copra (\$EC632,000). The volume of imports also showed an increase over 1964, amounting to \$EC22 million in 1965 against \$WI 20 million in 1964. The number of tourists increased from 17,424 in 1964 to 23,856.
- 345. Revenue for 1965 was estimated at \$EC9,690,100. The main sources of revenue were customs and excise duties and income taxes.

²³ The information on St. Lucia has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 1 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

- 346. The administering Power reports that an important addition to the machinery for general economic development was made in 1965 with the appointment of the Industrial Development Board with membership drawn from the business and professional community and operating under the aegis of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Board will advise the Minister on matters of industrial and general development as well as assist prospective investors in the Territory.
- 347. An agricultural bank was set up in 1965 to assist the development of agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and a marketing organization was being developed with the help of United Nations technical assistance and a Commonwealth Development and Welfare grant of \$EC212,270.
- 348. In the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey it was noted that the banana industry had been the main growth sector of the economy, and now accounted for 80 per cent of exports. According to the Report, however, future expansion would have to be mainly through tourism, which had been facilitated by the recent opening of the Beane Field Airport capable of handling medium-haul jets. The report also recommended that the competitive position of agriculture should be improved through land tenure reform and crop diversification.
- 349. In a statement reported on 24 December 1966, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr. George Mallet, said that St. Lucia, in a drive to expand industrial activity, had succeeded in attracting new ones, including a plant for making coconut and banana chips, which was expected to begin operation in 1967. A factory for the production of low-cost houses would also begin operation in 1967. The Minister said that the Territory's economy was buoyant and that business was on the increase. He also said that the island had made significant progress in tourism and he expected that the earnings from tourism in 1967 would double those for 1966.

Social conditions

Labour

- 350. The administering Power reports that among the general problems of labour administration are the dearth of statistics on average earnings and hours of work in the major areas of employment and the lack of information on manpower. Plans for an expert from the ILO to do a manpower survey in the Caribbean had been delayed.
- 351. In 1965, there were five workers' organizations, with a membership of 5,000, and one employers' organization registered in the Territory. In April 1965, a meeting was held to form a Trade Union Council to act as the representative body of the individual unions and to unify trade union activity. Since then, however, no further meetings have been held.
- 352. A number of trade union leaders attended overseas courses in trade unionism and industrial relations in 1965. The administering Power reports that these courses had helped to improve the low standard of trade union education in St. Lucia.
- 353. Twenty apprentices were selected for training in agriculture, auto-mechanics, printing and tailoring. The total number of apprentices in training during the period under review was forty-seven. Four apprentices

- completed training in 1965: one in agriculture, two in auto-mechanics and one in tailoring.
- 354. In 1965, 93 migrants were recruited for overseas employment to the United States, 250 to the United States Virgin Islands, 106 to Ascension Island, 16 to Canada and 38 to the United Kingdom, making a total of 503.
- 355. The cost of living index (base 100 in April 1964) rose from 102.8 in January 1965 to 105.1 in December 1965.

Public health

- 356. In 1965 there was one general hospital with 208 beds and 3 cottage hospitals with 89 beds. In addition, there were 16 maternity and child welfare centres, one tuberculosis hospital, one mental institution and one institution for the aged and infirm. There were 17 government medical practitioners.
- 357. In 1965, the infant mortality rate was 47.8 per thousand live births.
- 358. Recurrent expenditure on public health in 1965 amounted to \$EC1,130,000, of which \$EC112,800 was provided by Colonial Development and Welfare grants.

Educational conditions

- 359. At the end of 1965, there were 59 primary schools (one government and 58 private) with 23,362 pupils (364 government and 22,998 private) and 688 teachers. There were 3 secondary schools (one government and two private) with 1,032 pupils (178 government and 854 private) and 56 teachers and one teacher training institution with 40 students.
- 360. In his budget speech delivered in December 1965, the Chief Minister, Mr. G. M. Compton, said that St. Lucia faced an illiteracy rate higher than every other West Indian Territory, with perhaps one exception. Overcrowding in schools was deplorable and of the 700 teachers only 140 were trained. He indicated that teacher training was being intensified with the assistance of Peace Corps volunteers who were assisting with in-service training to prepare teachers for admission to the Teacher Training College. At the College, the course had been extended from one to two years.
- 361. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1965 amounted to \$EC1,160,000 and was to be raised to \$EC1,250,000 in 1966.

ST. VINCENT²⁴

General

362. St. Vincent lies about 100 miles west of Barbados and south of St. Lucia. The Territory also includes part of the Grenadines chain of islands, known as the St. Vincent Grenadines, including Bequia, Canouan, Mayreau and Union Island. The island of St. Vincent is about 18 miles long and 11 miles wide with an area of about 133 square miles (343 square kilometres). Including the St. Vincent Grenadines, the total area of the Territory is 150 square miles (388 square kilometres).

²⁴ The information on St. Vincent has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 23 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

363. In mid-1965, the population was estimated at 88,400, almost all of whom were of African and mixed descent.

Constitution

- 364. The provisions of the new Constitution for St. Vincent, which are also contained in those of the other five Territories, as well as a description of the new relationship of association with the United Kingdom, are set out in paragraphs 133 to 143 above. The main provisions of the new Constitution relating to the internal system of government are set out below.
- 365. The legislature of St. Vincent will consist of the Queen and a House of Representatives. The Queen will be represented by a Governor. The Governor will be appointed by the Queen.
- 366. The House of Representatives will consist of a speaker, thirteen elected members and, until the legislature otherwise provides, three nominated members. Two of the nominated members will be appointed on the advice of the Premier and one on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition. The speaker will be elected by the members either from among the members of the House or from outside. If the person holding the office of Attorney-General is not a member of the House he shall become an ex officio member and will be entitled to vote.
- 367. The provisions of St. Vincent's new Constitution concerning alteration of the Constitution, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the exercise of executive authority are essentially the same as those proposed for Antigua (see paras. 172-175 above).

Electoral system

- 368. The thirteen elected members of the House will be elected in single-member constituencies. Provision will be made for a constituency boundaries commission, consisting of a chairman and not less than two and not more than four other members, to be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The Commission will review the boundaries of constituencies whenever a census has been held and whenever the legislature has altered the number of constituencies.
- 369. The new Constitution provides for an increase of four in the number of elected members. As a transitional measure, the existing legislature will be authorized to provide for these additional members to be elected in existing constituencies.
- 370. A person will be qualified for election or nomination if he is a British subject who has reached the age of 21 years and, in the case of an elected member, if he has resided in St. Vincent for one year or if he is ordinarily domiciled and is a resident in St. Vincent.
- 371. A person will be qualified to vote if he is a British subject who has attained the age of 21 years and if he satisfies such requirements as to residence or domicile as the legislature may prescribe.

Public Service

372. In 1965, there were ten expatriate officers (one pensionable and nine on contract) and 2,118 local officers in the Public Service. Forty-six of the local officers held senior posts.

373. In-service training courses are conducted for clerical workers, teachers and public health personnel. In addition, 76 officers underwent training overseas during the year 1965.

Political parties

- 374. There are two political parties in St. Vincent, the Peoples' Political Party (the governing party) led by Mr. Ebenezer Joshua, and the Labour Party, led by Mr. Milton Cato.
- 375. Both parties were represented at the Constitutional Conference held in London. Representatives of both parties signed the report.
- 376. It has been stated in reports that there is less difference in the policies of the two parties than in the methods they advocate to deal with the Territory's problems. Both seek regional co-operation, industrial and agricultural development and an improved educational system. The closing down of the sugar industry, and the decline of arrowroot production have been cited by the Labour Party as indications that a new government is necessary. The governing party has pointed to the progress that has been made while it has been in office and has pointed to the new deepwater wharf, the new airport and the increase in banana production. It has also claimed that it has done much to encourage investment in tourism and industrial development.
- 377. The last elections were held in August 1966. The Peoples' Political Party was returned with five seats, a loss of one, and the Labour Party won four seats, a gain of one.

Recent political developments

- 378. Following the elections, which were held on 22 August 1966, the Labour Party filed two election petitions. The first claimed that in a constituency where the Peoples' Political Party candidate had won by four votes, *inter alia*, a number of unqualified persons had been allowed to vote. The second claimed that in another constituency the person declared elected could not read the English language with sufficient proficiency.
- 379. On 17 September 1966, the Peoples' Political Party filed two election petitions. The first claimed that in one of the constituencies the successful candidate and his supporters had offered bribes to induce persons to vote for that candidate. The second claimed that in another constituency the person declared elected could not read the English language with sufficient proficiency. The four petitions are still before the courts.
- 380. On 8 December 1966, Mr. Milton Cato, Leader of the Labour Party, requested a hearing before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. The request was granted but he did not appear before the Committee.
- 381. On 22 December 1966, the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Chief Minister that he had been considering the implementation of the proposals for associated status for St. Vincent in the light of representations made to him by both the Government and the Opposition, and also by other interested groups, since the elections of 22 August 1966. He had taken into account the fact that there were still four outstanding petitions arising from those elections. The results of those elections were, therefore,

not yet finally decided, and it was possible that the outcome of the petitions could lead to a change of government. The Secretary of State had decided to include St. Vincent in the bill before the United Kingdom Parliament which would empower the Queen to issue the necessary Order in Council to bring into force the new constitutional arrangement of associated status. He had decided, however, not to advise the Queen to issue the Order in Council until he had had further discussions with the parties represented at the Constitutional Conference in May. He therefore invited the Chief Minister, his Government and representatives of the Opposition to a meeting with him in London on 16 January 1967. The meeting would consider whether, in the light of developments since the Constitutional Conference, certain modifications should be made in the constitutional proposals which would not change the scheme in any fundamental respect but which would make it more acceptable to the people of St. Vincent generally. The meeting would also consider, inter alia, the transitional provisions for bringing the new arrangements into force.

382. The Chief Minister rejected the invitation but subsequently agreed to a meeting with the United Kingdom Minister of State at the Commonwealth Office. The meeting took place on 24 January 1967. The Minister also met separately with the Leader of the Opposition. On 1 February 1967, a joint meeting was held at which agreement was reached. The main points of the agreement were: the waiving of the clauses in the present draft constitution which gives the present Government the right to create four new seats; the appointment of a boundaries commission by the United Kingdom which will divide St. Vincent into thirteen constituencies instead of the present nine; the appointment of an electoral supervisor by the United Kingdom to prepare new electoral rolls; and the holding of elections under the new constituency system before the end of 1968 under United Kingdom supervision. It was also announced that St. Vincent's new status of association with the United Kingdom would come into effect before 1 June 1967.

383. New circumstances making it necessary to postpone Statehood Day for St. Vincent, which had been fixed for 29 May 1967, were explained by Mrs. Judith Hart, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, in answer to a question in the House of Commons on 12 April 1967.

384. The present difficulties, Mrs. Hart said, arose when an elected Minister crossed the floor on 16 March in the St. Vincent Legislative Council (the single chamber of the St. Vincent Legislature), thus depriving the Peoples' Political Party of their previous narrow 5 to 4 majority. The correct first step in the new situation seemed to be to test the confidence of the elected members in the Government; but it appeared from an exchange of messages with the Chief Minister that the business of the legislature was unlikely to be arranged so that a motion of no confidence would be given priority. An Order in Council was made on 5 April empowering the Administrator to summon a meeting of the Legislative Council to hear such a motion. On the same day a message was received from the Chief Minister advising the immediate dissolution of the Legislative Council to be followed as soon as possible by fresh elections on the existing nine-constituency basis. Mrs. Hart agreed that this was the right solution and the Legislative

Council was dissolved on 7 April. However, to ensure complete political impartiality during the election period, an Order in Council had also since been made dissolving the Executive Council and conferring sole responsibility for the administration of St. Vincent on the Administrator until the formation of a new Government after the elections which were expected to be held on 16 May. Till then the Administrator would consult with the leaders of both parties on all significant matters within the responsibilities hitherto allocated to Ministers.

385. Mrs. Hart recalled that in the agreement signed with the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition of St. Vincent on 1 February it was envisaged that Statehood Day for St. Vincent would be not later than 1 June 1967 and that provisional arrangements for 29 May had in fact been made; and explained that it would not now be practicable to keep to this date, though it remained the British objective that St. Vincent should become an associated State as soon as circumstances permitted.

386. In the event, a general election was held on 19 May. It resulted in victory for the Labour Party (six seats, 14,498 votes) over the People's Political Party (three seats, 12,466 votes), thus reversing the results of the 1966 elections in which the PPP won five seats to the LP's four. Mr. R. M. Cato, former Opposition Leader, was sworn in as Chief Minister on 22 May. Mr. Ebenezer Joshua, former Chief Minister, retained his seat.

Economic conditions

387. The economy of the Territory is based mainly on primary production for export. The main crops are bananas, arrowroot, copra and cotton. There is also a small fishing industry producing fish for local consumption. Secondary industries are limited to arrowroot processing and the production of cigarettes, rum and aerated waters. Tourism is of increasing importance.

388. Banana production increased during the period under review. During 1965, 2,365,302 stems or 31,787 short tons were exported, as against 2,177,796 stems, or 28,057 short tons, in 1964. The respective values were \$EC3,148,400 and \$WI 3,372,600. Despite the substantial rise in the quantity of exports, net earnings fell, owing to the lower prices that prevailed. Windstorms and inadequate rainfall also took their toll, as well as pests and diseases. The fierce competition with bananas from other countries was most damaging. Windstorm insurance benefits paid out to growers in 1965 totalled \$EC391,073, as against \$WI 308,161 in 1964.

389. Arrowroot production in 1965 fell back to 33,856 barrels, as against 59,600 barrels in 1964. Because of the large stocks still on hand it was hoped that the 1966 crop would not exceed 20,000 barrels. If production could be kept at this level for the next two years it was believed that the large stocks could be disposed of. After exhaustive negotiations, the United Kingdom Government eventually agreed to support the local Government in guaranteeing a loan from Barclays Bank to the Arrowroot Association to enable them to purchase the crop and to continue operation. This averted a disaster.

390. The administering Power reports that with improved pest control, the operation of a tractor pool,

and the gain in demand for sea island cotton, it had been hoped growers would respond favourably to increased cotton planting. The response was, however, most disappointing; only 600 acres were planted, as against 817 acres in 1964. The administering Power notes that the risks in cotton are high, and that faltering prices would depress interest in this crop. Moreover, competition from Egyptian long staples was becoming more severe every year. It was also reported that the government ginnery which was burnt down in 1964 was rebuilt and commenced operating in 1965. The Territory still lacks a power plant for processing oilseeds.

391. Cocoa plantings continued to increase during 1965 and exports rose from 521 cwts in 1964 to 821 cwts in 1965. The world price for cocoa, however, was very low. Because of unsettled conditions in the Far East, prices of nutmeg and mace rose and growers increased their production. As a result, exports rose considerably to 244,700 pounds, valued at \$EC221,400. Moderate plantings of Robusta Coffee continued and a drive was being made to increase planting of black pepper.

392. Despite a steady market and a strong demand for copra, production remained static. Exports were 2,428 long tons, as against 2,454 long tons in 1964 and 2,409 long tons in 1963. The value of copra exports in 1965 amounted to \$EC825,600, compared with \$WI 827,000 in 1964. Exports of dry coconuts fell to 461,505 cwts. This was due to the state of the copra market, which was glutted in 1963 and early 1964, and to irregular shipping opportunities to the United States.

393. The number of tourists visiting the Territory increased from 17,693 in 1964 to 21,041 in 1965. Two new hotels were opened in 1965 and electricity was to be installed in the island of Bequia, a promising tourist resort.

394. In 1965, internal revenue, of which over half was derived from customs excise and other duties, amounted to \$EC4.9 million, compared with \$WI 4.73 million in 1964. In addition, the Territory received United Kingdom aid totalling \$EC1.28 million, compared with \$WI 1.2 million in 1964. Expenditure under the capital budget amounted to \$EC1.25 million in 1965, compared with \$WI 617,953 in 1964.

395. In the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey it was noted that St. Vincent had the highest rate of natural increase and the lowest proportion of crop land per head of population of the islands. According to the Report, crops other than export crops and livestock could be developed and prospects for tourist development, particularly in the Grenadines, were excellent if the airport and airstrip were improved and more and better gas and water services were supplied.

Social conditions

Labour

396. Employment is mainly in or connected with agriculture. There is a slack period between July and October, during which the majority of agricultural and factory workers are underemployed.

397. In 1965, 146 workers were recruited for temporary employment abroad as cane-cutters; 66 in the United States and 80 in the United States Virgin Islands. Forty immigrants left for non-temporary employment overseas: 16 for Canada and 24 for the United Kingdom.

398. There were four trade unions in the Territory in 1965; the Federated Industrial and Agricultural Workers' Union, the Civil Service Association, the Teachers' Association and the Secondary School Teachers' Association.

Public health

399. In 1965, there was one general hospital with 208 beds, 3 cottage hospitals with 20 beds and 24 dispensaries and child welfare centres. In addition, there was a mental institution with 100 beds, a leprosarium with 20 beds and a pauper home with 125 beds.

400. There were 12 registered government physicians in the Territory in 1965 (one more than in 1964) and one private physician (one less than in 1964).

401. The birth-rate in 1965 was 40.5 per thousand (42.7 in 1964). The death-rate fell from 9.5 per thousand in 1964 to 8.9 in 1965, while the infant mortality-rate also declined from 75.3 to 73.4 per thousand live births.

402. Expenditure on public health amounted to \$EC897,400, compared with \$EC877,200 in 1964, which represented 11.3 per cent of the total expenditure for the Territory.

Educational conditions

403. Primary education is free but not compulsory between the ages of 5 and 15 years. In 1965, there were 56 government primary schools with 25,541 pupils. There were 3 government secondary schools and 7 private secondary schools with 624 and 1,876 pupils respectively. There is also a teacher-training institution conducted by the Government which, in 1965, had 299 students. In addition, 47 students were pursuing higher education overseas.

404. The administering Power reports that during 1965 two primary schools and one secondary school were enlarged. Lack of space and inadequate equipment were listed as major problems.

405. Expenditure on education in 1965 amounted to \$EC1,164,400, compared with \$WI 1,112,800 in 1964.

4. BERMUDA²⁵...

General

406. The Bermudas or Somers Islands are a group of small islands in the western Atlantic Ocean, about 570 miles (917 kilometres) east of the North Carolina coast of the United States. They consist of about 300 islands and islets. The 10 principal islands are connected by bridges or causeways and are about 22 miles (35.4 kilometres) long with an average width of between half and one mile. They have a total land area of about 20.5 square miles (53.33 square kilometres) of which 1.25 square miles (3.23 kilometres) is land reclaimed from the sea. An area of 2.3 square miles (5.59 square kilometres) is leased to the United States Government for naval and military bases.

407. In December 1965, the estimated total resident civil population was 48,799, compared with 47,612 in the previous year. About two thirds of the population is of African or mixed descent and the remainder is of European origin.

²⁵ The information on Bermuda has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 13 September 1966, for the year ended 31 December 1965.

Constitution

- 408. Bermuda's present Constitution is an unwritten one which has been built up over the last 300 years since 1620, when it was first granted representative institutions. Its main features are set out below.
- 409. The Governor is the chief executive and is appointed by the Queen. He is advised in the exercise of his functions by an Executive Council, but is not bound to accept the Council's advice.
- 410. The Executive Council, under the chairmanship of the Governor, consists of three official and six unofficial members nominated by the Governor. The three officials are the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney General and the Colonial Treasurer. The six unofficial members are drawn from the House of Assembly.
- 411. The Legislature is bicameral and consists of a Legislative Council and a House of Assembly. The Legislative Council (Upper House) has eleven members appointed by the Governor, three of whom are official members (the Chief Justice as President, the Colonial Secretary and the Attorney General), while the remaining eight are prominent citizens of Bermuda, the majority of whom have previously served in the House of Assembly. The Legislative Council reviews legislation passed by the House of Assembly and may itself introduce any bill other than a money bill.
- 412. The House of Assembly (Lower House) consists of thirty-six members elected for a term of five years. The Governor has power to dissolve the House of Assembly and the British Crown the power to disallow Acts of the colonial Parliament.
- 413. A number of government departments are controlled by executive boards which consist of unofficial members appointed by the Governor. The head of the department acts in an advisory capacity. The chairmen of most of the major boards are members of the House of Assembly.

Electoral system

- 414. The 36 members of the House of Assembly are elected from 9 constituencies, each of which returns 4 members. Under the provisions of the Parliamentary Elections Act of 1963, the voters must be British subjects of 25 years of age or over at the time of registration, and if not possessing Bermudian status, must have been resident in the Territory for the whole of the period of 3 years immediately prior to registration, registration being held every year. Candidates for election must qualify as electors and, in addition, must possess Bermudian status. In 1966, the voting age was reduced to 21 and the additional vote for property owners was abolished.
- 415. At the last general election held on 16 May 1963, 86.5 per cent of the registered electors voted. The Progressive Labour Party (PLP), the first political party to emerge in Bermuda, was successful in getting 6 of its 9 candidates elected. In August 1964, the United Bermuda Party (UBP) was formed by 25 of the 30 independent members elected to the House of Assembly in 1963, and now commands a majority in the House.
- 416. Since 1964 there have been a number of resignations from the two parties and the state of the parties in the House at present is as follows: UBP, 23 seats; Independents, 10 seats; and PLP, 3 seats.

Judiciary

417. The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, presided over by a Chief Justice, and two courts of Summary Jurisdiction, each presided over by a magistrate. Appeal from the Supreme Court lies to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.

Public Service

- 418. The Public Service is under the control of the Secretary of State for the colonies. According to the administering Power, all junior posts and many of the senior posts are filled by local inhabitants.
- 419. In 1965, the Government set up a training scheme with two main categories—administrative cadetships, and bursaries and scholarships. Under the former scheme, which is open to young men and women with a university degree or the minimal educational standard for university entrance, successful candidates are to be attached to various government departments to gain experience in administration. They may also undergo a period of secondment to the Civil Service in the United Kingdom. Under the latter scheme, bursaries and scholarships are being made available for professional and technical training, candidates being expected to undertake to serve the Government for a period proportionate to the period of training sponsored.
- 420. At the end of 1965 there were 118 local officers in the senior grades and 637 in the lower grades. Of the expatriate officers, 61 were on contract and 264 held permanent appointments.

Local government

421. The city of Hamilton and the town of St. George are each governed by a corporation, consisting of elected mayors, aldermen and councillors. The main sources of revenue are charges for water and dock facilities and municipal taxes. Elsewhere in Bermuda, the main unit of local government is the parish, of which there are nine in all. The parish vestries raise revenue by means of levies on land and personal property and are responsible for such functions as street lighting, road cleaning and certain welfare services.

Political parties

- 422. There are two political parties in the Territory: the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) formed in 1963; and the United Bermuda Party (UBP), the present governing party which was formed in 1964. Other organizations which participate in political activities include the Bermuda Constitutional Conference and the Bermuda Industrial Union (BIU).
- 423. The positions of the UBP, the PLP and the BIU with regard to constitutional development are outlined in paragraphs 428 to 443 below. Additional information on the views of the political parties in Bermuda is contained in the statement made by Dr. Barbara B. Ball, Secretary-General of the BIU, to the Special Committee in 1965 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 108-127) and by Mr. A. Hodgson, a member of the PLP, to the Fourth Committee in 1966 (1672nd meeting).
- 424. The views of the Bermuda Constitutional Conference are contained in the statement made by Mr. W. G. Brown, General Secretary of that organization, to the Special Committee in 1965 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 100 to 107). Mr. Brown has also

petitioned the Committee complaining of racial discrimination, supporting independence and protesting against the electoral system (A/AC.109/PET.223 and Add. 1, A/AC.109/PET.342 and Add.1 and 2, A/AC.109/PET.431 and Add.1).

Recent developments

Composition of the Bermuda delegation to the Constitutional Conference

- 425. As noted in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, para. 208), it was announced on 11 July 1966 that a Constitutional Conference on Bermuda would be held in London on 8 November 1966. The Conference was to discuss constitutional developments on the basis of the report of the Joint Select Committee which was adopted by the legislature in December 1965. This report consisted of a majority report and five minority reports, the details of which are set out in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (ibid., paras. 197-202).
- 426. On 22 July 1966, the Governor announced the names of the twenty delegates to the Conference. In addition to himself and the Attorney General, the delegation would consist of eighteen representatives of the legislature. Of these, eight were members of the United Bermuda Party (UBP), four were independent members of the House of Assembly, three were members of the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) and three were members of the Legislative Council.
- 427. Following the Governor's announcement, the Bermuda Industrial Union (BIU) issued a statement declaring its dissatisfaction with the basis of selection of the delegation to the Conference. According to the BIU, no individual or group would pursue the objectives of the workers as whole-heartedly as the BIU and it would continue to press for representation at the Conference.

Bermuda Industrial Union proposals

- 428. In a further statement issued in September 1966, the BIU announced that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had informed the Union that he was unable to accede to its request to be represented at the Constitutional Conference. The Secretary of State had replied that while he was satisfied that the choice of delegates should enable all points of view to be expressed, he would be very ready to receive a memorandum setting out the views of the BIU and to bear those in mind during the conference discussions.
- 429. On 30 July 1966, the BIU made public its constitutional proposals. According to these proposals, the BIU wanted a cabinet system of government with adequate provision in the constitution to lead to complete independence, which should be granted when the adult population expressed a positive desire for it by means of a referendum. Under the terms of the BIU proposals, the legislature would consist of a single House. The Executive and Legislative Councils and all government boards would be abolished. Until the people expressed a desire for independence, the Governor would retain powers in foreign policy and defence. The cabinet, composed of a Premier and eleven other ministers would be appointed by the Governor from the majority party in the House. The Governor's assent would be automatic on the passage of

bills through the House except for those relating to amendments to the constitution and his reserve powers.

430. The Island would be divided into forty single-seat constituencies "drawn up on the basis of population density alone, without regard to parish boundaries or any other factors". An impartial Boundaries Commission, composed in the first instance of persons from the United Kingdom, would review the boundaries every seven years. The voting age would remain at twenty-one, with only Bermudians being permitted to vote or be a member of Parliament or of the Cabinet. The Union's proposals also included a detailed Bill of Rights.

United Bermuda Party proposals

- 431. The position of the governing party, UBP, on constitutional reform was outlined in the party's new platform which was published on 30 July 1966. According to its new platform, the UBP endorsed the majority report of the Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Reform. Specifically, it supported the proposal by which the Executive Council would be composed of members of the majority group in the House of Assembly and would be responsible to the House for the operation of all government departments, including finance. The majority report had also proposed the retention of the Legislative Council (Upper House) with delaying powers and of the government boards, although they would be subject to the general control of the Executive Council.
- 432. On 21 October 1966, the UBP made public a number of amendments to the majority report which the party had decided upon after meetings between the UBP delegates to the conference and on the advice of Sir Ralph Hone, the Bermuda Government's constitutional adviser. A statement issued at the same time said that this might be regarded as the brief for the party's delegates to the London Conference.
- 433. The amendments included a proposal requiring the Governor to dismiss the Government Leader following a vote of no confidence in the House of Assembly and if, as a result of a general election, he considered that the Leader no longer commanded the support of a majority of the House. Another amendment would require the Governor to act in all matters in accordance with the advice tendered to him by the Executive Council, subject to any exceptions that were expressly provided in the new constitution, such as matters relating to defence, internal security and external relations.
- 434. With regard to external relations, the UBP was of the opinion that the United Kingdom Government should accord to the Bermuda Government a substantial measure of control in civil aviation, shipping and finance in relation to matters which were of vital economic interest to the Territory.
- 435. The UBP indicated that it would seek an assurance from the United Kingdom Government that the new constitution would not be revoked or amended without prior consultation with the Bermuda Government and the concurrence of the two Houses of the legislature of Bermuda, signified by resolution.

Progressive Labour Party proposals

436. On 18 October 1966, the PLP published a memorandum (see A/AC.109/PET.569), outlining its position on constitutional change in the Territory.

- 437. In its memorandum, the party attacked the present electoral system, which it claimed was based on a policy of segregating the working class and coloured voters into large constituencies and of reserving for white electors specially designed small constituencies. The PLP believed that the only way to avoid racial and industrial strife in Bermuda was for the United Kingdom Government to insist on the establishment of an electoral system which was not based on class or colour and which gave an equal value to the vote cast by an elector, irrespective of the colour of his skin or his social status in the community. In its view, a delegation determined largely on the basis of party strength in the present House, should have no function in devising a new constitution.
- 438. The PLP, therefore, proposed that the first item on the agenda of the Constitutional Conference should be the question of the reform of the electoral system. The memorandum declared further that if the Conference was unwilling to agree upon this then the PLP might make it clear that it would oppose any constitutional change increasing the power of the present "oligarchic, undemocratic and racially biased House of Assembly".
- 439. The PLP considered that the Conference should be divided into two parts, the first devoted to reaching agreement as to how the United Kingdom Government could provide for a fair method of choosing the House of Assembly and for the supervision of a general election; the second part of the Conference should be held only after the general election and—in the light of the verdict of the Bermudian people—should then devise the other appropriate constitutional changes. Under this proposal, the agenda of this part of the Conference would be confined solely to the following items: (a) constituency boundaries; (b) registration of electors; and (c) supervision of the elections by the United Kingdom Government.
- 440. Commenting on a number of proposals in the majority report of the Joint Select Committee, the PLP expressed its opposition to the retention of the second legislative chamber and suggested that the present boards might be replaced by committees of the House. It also believed that insufficient consideration had been given to possible alternative forms for a constitution under which the Territory could become independent, and suggested that it might be valuable, for instance, to study the constitutions of the Channel Islands.
- 441. The PLP recommended that Bermuda should be independent. It would be willing to discuss the matter at the Conference, but reiterated its view that the Conference, as at present constituted, was not the right body to come to any final decision on this or any other question of importance. That decision would have to be taken by the new and democratically elected House of Assembly.
- 442. Sir Henry Tucker, Parliamentary Leader of the UBP, in his comment on the PLP's memorandum, said that while it disclaimed any racial bias, it "simply reeks of it." The PLP had proposed a fundamental change in the electoral system by which one third of the members of the House would be elected by one central parish. Over a long period Bermuda had accepted the proposition that each parish should elect four members each, a system which had generally produced good members and had prevented control of the Assembly from being vested in the Central District. He believed that voters would refuse to be deluded into

- destroying the present system by stripping political power from eight parishes in order to concentrate it into one. Sir Henry did not believe that the majority of Bermudians wished to be led by the PLP.
- 443. After pointing out that Bermuda's economy depended on trade and investment, Sir Henry said that any general loss of confidence in the Government would persuade both local and overseas investors to curtail or abandon their plans for expansion. Acceptance of the PLP's proposals would, he said, unquestionably have this effect. Sir Henry concluded his statement as follows:

"We record our determined opposition to the Progressive Labour Party's recommendation for independence. Independence presupposes the ability of a government to protect the vital interest of its nationals at home and abroad. Quite clearly we do not possess this power. We are a tiny island of 20 square miles with less than 50,000 people, remotely located in the North Atlantic. Can we really imagine that independence is suitable for us? Is it not time that the Progressive Labour Party developed a healthy and realistic sense of proportion in these matters? It is our conclusion that independence can accomplish nothing of value for Bermuda and that its only results will be to increase the cost of government and to create fatly paid jobs to reward the politically faithful. While the Progressive Labour Party in their memorandum support independence, they have failed to produce any reasons-valid or otherwise-in support of their opinion."

Constitutional Conference

- 444. The Constitutional Conference on Bermuda took place in London between 8 and 22 November 1966. The final report was signed by the United Kingdom representatives, the Governor and the Attorney General, all the delegates from the Legislative Council, all the UBP delegates and one of the independents. Two other independent delegates signed the report subject to their dissent on certain points which was set out in a minority report. A further minority report was signed by the PLP delegates.
- 445. The Conference had before it the report of the Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Reform which had been approved by the Bermuda legislature in December 1965. It also had before it memoranda prepared by the UBP, the PLP, the BIU, the Speaker of the House of Assembly and others.
- 446. At the outset of its work, the Conference agreed, with the PLP delegates dissenting, that all shades of political opinion in Bermuda were represented and that it was competent to discuss the subject for which it had been convened. According to the report, it became clear at a very early stage of the Conference that the most important issue before it was the question of constituencies. The agreement reached by the majority on that question and on the other details of a new Constitution for Bermuda are set out below.

(a) Majority report

447. The Conference agreed that a Boundaries Commission should be established and that it should be composed of a chairman and four members to be appointed by the Governor. It was agreed that the chairman should be an eminent person from outside Bermuda, with a knowledge of Bermuda but with no vested interest in Bermudian affairs, and that one

member should be a person who held or had held a high judicial office in the Commonwealth. The remaining members would be members of the legislature; two appointed on the advice of the leaders of the majority party and one on the advice of the opposition leader.

- 448. The following terms of reference for the Boundaries Commission were agreed upon:
 - (i) The parish of Pembroke should be divided into four constituencies and each of the other parishes into two constituencies, each constituency to return two members;
 - (ii) No account should be taken of the racial distribution of electors;
 - (iii) Account should be taken of natural boundaries within a parish;
 - (iv) Subject to the foregoing, the Commission should ensure that the constituencies contain as near as may be equal numbers of adult persons, as determined by the immediately preceding census.
- 449. The Conference also accepted an offer by the Secretary of State to send an expert to Bermuda to see what improvements could be made to the existing registration system. According to the report, the Secretary of State made this offer in order to meet the criticism of the PLP representative that the existing system of registration resulted in many qualified persons not being registered.
- 450. It was further agreed that the next general election, which was due at the latest in mid 1968, should be held on the basis of the arrangements agreed upon concerning the constituencies. That part of the new Constitution relating to the legislature would be brought into operation shortly before the next general election, while the remainder would come into force immediately after the election.
- 451. The Secretary of State pointed out, on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, that the form of the new Constitution could be made an election issue and that if a majority of members were elected to the House of Assembly who were opposed to some or all of its features, the new Government would then have a mandate from the electorate to seek further constitutional changes which the United Kingdom Government would consider.
- 452. The Conference envisaged that their conclusions would be put to the Bermuda legislature for endorsement after which legislation would be enacted in Bermuda to establish the Boundaries Commission. The Commission would then be appointed and recommend new constituencies which would then be given the force of law and preparations for the next general election would be put in hand. In the meantime, the drafting of other necessary legislation in Bermuda and the drafting of the enabling Bill and the Order-in-Council in the United Kingdom could proceed.
- 453. Under the new Constitution agreed upon at the Conference, the Governor will continue to be appointed by the Crown and will retain special responsibilities for external affairs, defence, internal security and police. In these matters he will act in his discretion; on all other matters he will be required to obtain and act, in accordance with the advice of the Executive Council, subject to a power to act contrary to their advice in the interest of any of the matters for which he retains special responsibility. In general, the Governor will assent or withhold assent to bills passed by the legislature on the

- advice of its Executive Council. He will, however, be required to reserve for decision by the Crown any bill which appears to him, *inter alia*, to be inconsistent with the international relations of the United Kingdom or to affect the matters for which he retains special responsibility. The power of disallowance, at present unlimited, will be restricted to legislation affecting certain government stock.
- 454. The Executive Council will consist of the Government leader and not less than six other members who will be appointed from among the members of the legislature. The Governor will appoint as Government leader the member of the House of Assembly whom he thinks best able to command the confidence of a majority of the members of that House. The other members will be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Government leader. Not less than one nor more than two will be members of the Legislative Council. The Governor will normally preside at meetings of the Executive Council and members will be collectively responsible to the legislature.
- 455. Portfolios will be allocated by the Governor on the advice of the Government leader. Such portfolios will not include the subjects for which the Governor has special responsibility. The Governor, however, will be empowered to designate a member of the Executive Council whom he may consult on matters relating to the police force, and after informing the legislature and with the prior approval of the Secretary of State, to delegate a member such responsibility relating to internal security and police as he may deem fit.
- 456. In matters for which the Governor has special responsibility he will be assisted by a Chief Secretary who will be a civil servant and not a member of the Executive Council. The Attorney General, in whom will be vested power to institute and discontinue criminal proceedings, will similarly be a civil servant and not a member of the Executive Council. Both these officers will be appointed by the Governor in his discretion and their salaries will be paid from funds not subject to the control of the legislature.
- 457. The existing Government Boards will no longer retain their executive functions. Provision will be made to enable members of the Executive Council to be assisted in the exercise of their responsibilities by boards having consultative and administrative functions.
- 458. The Governor will appoint as Opposition Leader the member of the House of Assembly whom he thinks commands the support of the largest group of opposition members who are prepared to support one leader.
- 459. While the Conference agreed that the United Kingdom Government would continue to be responsible for the external relations of Bermuda, many delegates supported the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee that the Bermuda Government should be accorded a substantial measure of control in civil aviation, shipping and finance in relation to matters which were of vital economic interest to the colony. Reference was made to the delegation of powers in external affairs granted in the past to other dependent Territories. The Secretary of State promised that there would be an exchange of dispatches about the arrangements which the United Kingdom Government was prepared to make in this respect having regard to their existing international obligations. The Secretary of State also agreed that the United Kingdom Government would consider the inclusion of a representative of the Government of Bermuda in any United Kingdom delegation attending

international discussions about civil aviation, shipping or finance in which the interests of Bermuda were materially involved.

- 460. The legislature will be bicameral, consisting of an Upper House called the Legislative Council, and a Lower House called the House of Assembly. It will have a maximum life of five years.
- 461. The Legislative Council will consist of eleven members appointed by the Governor. Four will be appointed on the advice of the Government leader, two on the advice of the Opposition leader and five will be appointed by the Governor in his discretion. The Legislative Council will have no power to initiate money bills and may delay such bills for only two months. It will have power to delay other bills including taxation bills for at least twelve months.
- 462. The House of Assembly will consist of forty members elected in two-member constituencies by universal adult suffrage. As already noted, eight of the existing parishes will contain two constituencies each, while the ninth, Pembroke, will contain four. Constituency boundaries will be reviewed at stipulated intervals by the Boundaries Commission. The qualifications for electors will remain unchanged; electors must be British subjects of twenty-one years of age or over with either Bermudian status or three years' residence in Bermuda.
- 463. Control of the Public Service, previously vested in the Secretary of State for the Colonies, will be exercised by a Public Service Commission in Bermuda.
- 464. Provision will be made for a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and as many other judges as the legislature may prescribe, the former to be appointed by the Governor in his discretion after consultation with the Government leader, and the latter appointed by the Governor in his discretion after consultation with the Chief Justice. There will also be a Court of Appeals consisting of a President and two other judges to be appointed by the Governor at his discretion.
- 465. The Constitution will also make provision to safeguard fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, subject only to respect for the rights and freedoms of others. The rights and freedoms will be enforceable in the courts.

(b) Minority report issued by two independents

466. The present Speaker of the House of Assembly and another independent member of the House issued a minority report in which they stated that they could not subscribe to the new Constitution because it omitted or destroyed certain fundamental checks which, in their view, were vital if good government were to be maintained. In their opinion, the powers proposed to be vested in the Government leader should be transferred to the collective responsibility of the Executive Council. They also believed that the present method of electing the members of the Legislative Council, namely appointment by the Governor after consultation with the Executive Council, should be changed very little. They further believed that the present powers of the Legislative Council should be maintained, with the exception that the House of Assembly might be empowered to require a bill which has been rejected by the Council to be made the subject of a referendum. They also wished to restore the additional vote for property owners.

- (c) Minority report issued by the Progressive Labour Party
- 467. In their minority report, the PLP delegates stated that they were unable to sign the report and set out the points with which they disagreed and the reasons for their disagreement. They did not believe that the arguments they had advanced on the question of constituencies had been reported in sufficient detail and considered that the report should have indicated the reasons why some suggestions were accepted and others rejected. They were in almost complete disagreement with the proposed new Constitution, in general, on the ground that it was merely a copy of the Bahamas Constitution of 1963. In their view, experience of the working of that Constitution had not been such as to justify a similar Constitution being enacted for Bermuda. They also felt that it was necessary at least to consider whether an altogether different type of government than that appropriate for the Bahamas might not be established in Bermuda. Other types of constitutions which had proved satisfactory for small Territories, as well as constitutions providing for an elected Governor, should also have been examined. They further considered that the proposed redistribution of constituencies was so unsatisfactory as almost certainly to lead to the election of a House of Assembly not representative of the electorate. Among the principal objections raised by the PLP delegates to the detailed proposals for the new Constitution were the following:
 - (i) They did not consider that in an island as small as Bermuda a bicameral legislature was necessary and they were opposed to the type of nominated chamber proposed;
 - (ii) They were opposed to the Legislative Council being granted powers of delay in regard to taxation bills. In their view, it was essential to introduce income, property and inheritance taxes as soon as possible and these powers would delay and even frustrate essential fiscal reforms;
 - (iii) They were opposed to the new arrangements for constituencies which, according to their calculations would result in the three most populous parishes, which at the 1960 census contained a majority of the inhabitants of the Island, returning only sixteen members to the House of Assembly, while the remaining six parishes, containing a minority of the population, would return twenty-four members. They would not "be parties to inserting into the first written Constitution ever to be designed for Bermuda, a principle which, in our opinion, would only give one third of the value to a working class and coloured vote of that given to the election in the most favoured white constituency". They believed that, if there were equal size constituencies, the number of members in the House would be reduced rather than increased since even with thirty-six members, Bermuda's House already had more members per elector than any other comparable Territory;
 - (iv) They were opposed to the proposal that a person without Bermudian status but with three years' residence should be entitled to vote;
 - (v) They were not in favour of the present Government Boards being retained in any form.

 The maintenance of these Boards, of which

- there were at present twenty-one, was politically undesirable and financially wasteful;
- (vi) They were opposed to the provisions enabling the Governor to expend public funds without authorization by Parliament;
- (vii) They were strongly in favour of provisions in the Constitution for safeguarding fundamental rights. They believed, however, that these should be based on a complete code as drafted by the United Nations and not modelled on the limited provisions contained in the present Bahamas Constitution which had been submitted for consideration.

Question of independence

- 468. At a press conference held following the closing of the constitutional conference, Mr. Fred Lee, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was questioned on the topic of independence for Bermuda. He is reported to have replied that the PLP had apparently changed their minds in this matter and that it now seemed that none of the delegates wanted independence.
- 469. Mr. Walter N. H. Robinson, PLP Parliamentary Leader, in a letter to *The Times* of London, published on 29 November 1966, *inter alia*, said: "My party favours independence for our island. . . . However, the policy of my party is that the issue of independence should be submitted to the people of Bermuda and that it should only be decided after they have heard all the arguments in favour and against it and recorded their opinions through the ballot box. For this reason we did not raise the independence issue at the Bermuda Conference which has just ended."

Economic conditions

- 470. The economy of the Territory continues to depend primarily on the tourist industry, and most of the local inhabitants participate directly or indirectly in some aspect of it. The number of tourists visiting Bermuda in 1965 was 237,782, compared with 188,992 in 1964. Approximately 87 per cent of the tourists came from the United States.
- 471. Bananas, citrus fruits, vegetables, milk, eggs and meat are produced for local consumption. The cultivation of Easter lilies, although declining, is still undertaken for export to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The continued increase in population and the corresponding increase in housing and playing fields has further encroached on land available for agriculture, reducing it from 1,020 acres in 1964 to 915 acres in 1965.
- 472. There is a small fishing industry in Bermuda. It is estimated that 1,350,000 pounds of fish and 140,000 pounds of spiny lobster are landed annually, at a local value of about £250,000.
- 473. A retail price index was established in January 1961 and is computed quarterly. Taking January 1961 as 100, by October 1965 the index stood at 105.7.
- 474. In 1965, imports into the Territory were valued at £36,366,901, including those into Ireland Island Freeport, compared with £30,885,509 in 1964. Domestic exports were valued at £945,723 in 1965, compared with £726,928 in 1964. Re-exports were valued at £18,505,657 in 1965 as against £12,488,645 in 1964. The visible adverse balance of trade is offset by revenue from invisible items such as investment, the activities of international companies, the tourist industry, repairs to shipping sustaining damage at sea,

and the United States bases which results in a favourable balance of trade. The United States is Bermuda's principal trading partner, providing almost half of the imports in 1965.

475. Revenue and expenditure for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 were as follows:

	1963	1964	1965
	(Value in thousand pounds)		
Revenue	5,711	6,554	6,660
Expenditure	6.342	6.385	6.557

- 476. During 1966, the legislature endorsed a report by its Finance Committee which recommended, *inter alia*, the introduction of a progressive tax on real property. Subsequently a firm of surveyors and valuers began preparing an assessment of all property in the Territory. This work is expected to be completed by April 1967. In October 1966, the legislature made provision in its budget for 1967 for a land tax which was expected to come into operation in the second half of 1967 and to yield £250,000.
- 477. Bermuda has no income tax and attracts the registration of many international companies. It is reported that some 600 foreign firms are registered in Bermuda. The development of the Ireland Island Freeport was directed in part to attract foreign companies to establish manufacturing industries. It is reported that, so far, thirty companies have begun operations at Freeport but that development has been limited owing to the virtual absence of skilled industrial labour.

Social conditions

Social services

- 478. Social services are provided mainly by the local authorities and by charitable organizations. A government board provides financial assistance and co-ordinates activities.
- 479. In its recently announced party platform, the UBP, the governing party, declared its intention to make hospital insurance available to all and to introduce old-age pensions under a self-supporting scheme of contributions from employers and employees. At the recent Constitutional Conference in London, the PLP leader drew attention to the lack of social services, medical and hospital benefits, and working-class housing schemes. He described Bermuda as "the last territory on earth in which the sixteenth century Elizabethan poor law is still in force and effect".
- 480. An old-age and widows' pension scheme is being considered by a joint select committee of the legislature. The scheme it is considering is based on recommendations made by a United Kingdom expert in 1962.

Labour

- 481. The Territory's first Workmen's Compensation Law came into operation in August 1965. This law is based on the principle of employer's liability and is non-contributory.
- 482. In 1965, the Government's Labour Advisory Committee continued its consideration of such questions as imported labour and the establishment of an apprenticeship council. This Committee consists of representatives nominated in equal numbers by employers' and workers' organizations. The Committee also prepared a guide to the conduct of labour relations, setting out certain fundamental principles governing good labour relations.

483. In January 1965, there was a dispute between the Bermuda Industrial Union and the Bermuda Electric Light Company over recognition of the union as the bargaining agent for the hourly-paid employees. The administering Power reported that the dispute evoked widespread sympathy-action on the part of workers in other industries and culminated on 2 February 1965 in a clash outside the company's main plant in which seventeen policemen were injured. Following mediation, an agreement was reached on 18 February by which the union obtained some minor concessions. In a subsequent ballot the union failed to obtain recognition as the bargaining agent. Approximately 98 of the company's 260 employees struck. An estimated 17,672 man-hours were lost, exclusive of time lost through sympathy strikes.

484. In 1965, there were six employees' unions registered in the Territory, namely: the Bermuda Industrial Union, the Amalgamated Bermuda Union of Teachers, the Bermuda Dockworkers Union, the Association of Scientific Workers (Bermuda Branch), the Electricity Supply Trade Union and the Bermuda Civil Service Association which became eligible for registration following the enactment of the Trade Union Act of 1965. The Bermuda Federation of Variety Artists was registered early in 1966. There is one employers' organization, the Bermuda Employers' Council.

Public health

485. The Territory's hospital facilities include a general hospital with 225 beds, a geriatric hospital with 36 beds, and a mental hospital. A new wing of the general hospital was completed during 1965.

486. In 1965, the birth-rate was 22.9 per 1,000

486. In 1965, the birth-rate was 22.9 per 1,000 and the death-rate was 7.3 per 1,000. The infant death-rate was 30.4 per 1,000 live births. Total government expenditure for health in 1965 amounted to £877,490 compared with £895,793 in 1964.

Educational conditions

487. Education is compulsory between the ages of 5 and 14 years. The upper limit of the statutory school age is to be raised to 15 in 1967 and to 16 in 1968.

488. Under new legislation enacted in 1965 and 1966, the terms vested and non-vested have been replaced by the terms maintained and aided. Schools located in government buildings formerly called vested are now classified as maintained, while those located in buildings owned by the trustees of the schools are classified as aided.

489. There are 25 primary schools (20 maintained and 5 aided), 5 special schools, 10 secondary institutes (5 maintained and 5 aided) and one vocational school. In two of these schools after-school classes are available for further education. Beginning in September 1967, students at maintained and aided schools preparing for A level examinations are to receive instruction at a new Academic Sixth Form Centre. There is no university in Bermuda.

490. Education for those of school age is free for children at all maintained and aided schools, except for those in the fee-paying B streams of secondary schools. The highest fee payable is £195 a year at a private school.

491. Legislation has been adopted to ensure that race will cease to be a criterion for admission to maintained and aided schools.

492. As noted in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6300/Rev.1, chap XXII, paras. 228 to 229), the educational system of the Territory has been criticized by the Amalgamated Bermuda Union of Teachers and by the PLP.

493. In 1965, expenditure on education was £982,457, compared with £1,054,126 in 1964.

5. $BAHAMAS^{26}$

General

494. The Bahamas is an archipelago of about 700 islands, of which only 30 are inhabited, and over 2,000 rocks, extending from the Florida coast of the United States for over 500 miles (800 kilometres) to the south-east. The Grand Bahama, to the north of the group, lies 60 miles (96 kilometres) off the Florida coast. Andros is the largest island, but New Providence is the most important, with Nassau the capital city. The islands are generally long, narrow and lowlying. The total land area is 4,404 square miles (11,406 square kilometres).

495. The estimated population as at 31 December 1965 was 138,107, of which 85,967 was estimated to be in New Providence.

Constitution

496. The present Constitution of the Bahamas is set out in the Bahama Islands (Constitution) Order in Council, 1963, which came into force on 7 January 1964, giving the Territory full internal self-government.

Governor

497. The Governor is appointed by the Queen and exercises executive authority on her behalf. Generally, he is required to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet.

498. The Constitution reserves certain powers—external affairs, defence, internal security and control of the police—to be exercised by the Governor in his discretion, provided that he keeps the Cabinet informed of any matters relating to external affairs or defence which may involve the economic or financial interests of the Bahama Islands or the enactment of laws by the Legislature..

499. The Governor's assent is required to all bills, except the relatively few which require assent by the Queen. The Governor may prorogue both chambers of the Legislature and may dissolve the House of Assembly at any time.

Cabinet

500. The Premier and not less than eight other ministers constitute the Cabinet and are appointed by the Governor. The Premier is the member of the House of Assembly who, in the Governor's judgement, is best able to command the confidence of a majority of its members. At least one and not more than three ministers are members of the Senate; the others are members of the House of Assembly, including the Minister for Finance. Ministers are appointed by the Governor on the Premier's advice.

 $^{^{26}}$ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 16 February 1967, for the year ended 31 December 1965.

501. The Cabinet has general direction and control of the government of the Territory and is collectively responsible to the Legislature. It has, however, no responsibility with regard to courts and criminal proceedings, the audit of the Territory's accounts or the public service.

Legislature

502. The Legislature is bicameral and consists of a Senate (formerly the Legislative Council) and a House of Assembly. The Legislature may make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Bahama Islands, subject to the assent of the Governor. Legislation involving taxation or expenditure of public money is restricted; usually it may only be enacted on the recommendation or with the consent of the Governor.

Senate

503. The Senate consists of fifteen members appointed by the Governor—eight after consultation with the Premier, five on the advice of the Premier and two on the advice of the leader of the opposition. The Senate elects a President and Vice-President from from among its members. It has limited powers of delaying legislation passed by the House of Assembly. Those members of the former Legislative Council who were originally appointed to hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure will serve for ten years; others will complete the terms for which they have been appointed.

House of Assembly

504. The House of Assembly consists of thirtyeight elected members, of whom twenty-one represent Out Islands constituencies and seventeen represent New Providence constituencies. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House are elected from among its members.

Fundamental rights and freedoms

505. The Constitution contains provisions for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.

Political parties

506. There are four political parties in the Bahamas. The Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), the present ruling party, is led by Mr. Lynden O. Pindling, the present Premier. The PLP draws most of its support from people of African descent, who form some 80 per cent of the Territory's population. As a result of the recent general elections, the PLP assumed office for the first time. The opposition United Bahamian Party (UBP), led by Sir Roland Symonette, the present leader of the opposition, is generally described as representing the Islands' commercial and industrial interests. The Labour Party (LP), led by Mr. Randol Fawkes, gave its support to the PLP in the recent general elections. The National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed in 1965 by a group of former PLP members led by Mr. Paul L. Adderley.

Electoral system

507. Qualification for membership in the House of Assembly requires that a candidate shall be twenty-one years of age, a British subject, shall have been ordinarily resident in the colony for a period of not less than five years in the aggregate prior to the date of his nomination, and ordinarily resident in the co-

lony for not less than six months immediately preceding his nomination. Elections are on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

508. A Constituencies Commission has been charged with reviewing the boundaries, the number of constituencies and the number of seats within each constituency not less frequently than once every five years.

509. The most recent general election for the House of Assembly was held on 10 January 1967. The votes cast for the PLP numbered 18,895 and for the UBP, 18,820. Each of these two parties won 18 seats. However, two of the seats won by the UBP candidates were uncontested, and one of them was later declared invalid by an election court. The UBP candidate was re-elected in a subsequent by-election. Of the two remaining seats, one went to a Labour Party member and the other to an Independent.

Political and constitutional developments

510. Developments up to June 1966 were recorded in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, paras. 235-251).

511. On 2 September 1966, Mr. Fawkes (LP) tabled a motion for a select committee to consider the advisability of requesting the Government of the United Kingdom to convene a Constitutional Conference with a view to establishing the independence of the Bahamas (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, paras. 235-241). In a letter to the Governor, Mr. Fawkes asked what plans the United Kingdom Government had for the eventual independence of the Islands. In his reply, the Governor said that the aim of British policy for dependent Territories was to develop in each a full measure of self-government. The Governor further advised Mr. Fawkes that he had sent a copy of his letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. During the debate on his motion Mr. Fawkes warned members that independence for the Bahamas was inevitable and urged them to prepare for that day. He cited three paramount reasons for independence: (1) to enable the Bahamas to seek a customs agreement with other nations in the western hemisphere, to avoid having to pay high customs duties when ordering merchandise from countries outside the British Commonwealth; (2) to establish Bahamian citizenship ("We want to be able to have national pride, and we won't be able to have this as long as we are a subject people", he stated); and (3) to enable Bahamians to make adequate preparations for the inevitable future.

512. The Premier, Sir Roland Symonette, advised the House of Assembly that while independence could be requested and would no doubt be granted, it was none the less necessary to face the facts. "It would be extremely expensive, both in money and manpower, for the Bahamas to take on the task of establishing embassies and high commissions abroad, and of raising and equipping its own armed forces. Considerable government funds would have to be diverted for these purposes which, in the view of this Government, would be much better spent on the progress and development of the Bahama Islands for the good of all the inhabitants", he said.

513. On 5 September the House rejected Mr. Fawkes' motion. Mr. Fawkes subsequently addressed a petition on the subject to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/PET.544) and appeared before the Committee as a petitioner at its 467th meeting on 15 September 1966.

- 514. On 17 September 1966, Mr. Adderley (NDP) announced that his party proposed sending a delegation to the Secretary of State in London with the principal object of making representations to the Government of the United Kingdom and submitting recommendations for amendments to the Constitution of the Bahamas. He stated that his party had taken the position that no independence for the Bahamas should be granted until certain constitutional amendments had been made. The NDP considered it to be in the interest of the preservation of orderly government in the Bahamas that electoral reform should precede general elections, and proposed the following constitutional amendments:
 - (a) The size of the Cabinet should be limited;
- (b) The Governor's appointees to the Senate should be increased to ten; the Leader for Government Business in the Senate should be chosen from those members appointed on the advice of the Premier;
- (c) The number of members of the House of Assembly elected to represent New Providence and the Out Islands should be increased to reflect more accurately the distribution of population in the Bahamas;
- (d) No general elections should be held on the basis of the existing report of the Constituencies Commission. A new commission should be appointed by the Secretary of State to advise on the distribution of seats before a new general election; the Constitution to provide for single-member constituencies only;
- (e) Secret balloting should be assured, with certain exceptions;
- (f) Constitutional safeguards should be provided against conflict of interests.
- 515. The NDP hoped to convince the Secretary of State that the question of independence should be delayed until the proposals had been put into effect, and until that issue had been settled by a referendum. Before leaving for London on 9 November 1966, Mr. Adderley said that he regretted that the PLP and the LP had not agreed to join with the NDP in making a combined presentation to the British Government, thereby presenting the unified voice of the opposition forces in the Territory. In the course of the discussions in London, the NDP requested the Secretary of State to communicate its demand for a constitutional conference to all other political parties in the Bahamas.

Conditions at Freeport

- 516. An account of the opposition's attack on conditions at Freeport was included in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (see A/6300/Rev.1, paras. 248-251). On 14 October 1966 the NDP requested the Secretary of State to appoint a royal commission to investigate allegations against the operation of gambling casinos in the Territory. A similar request was addressed by the PLP to the Speaker of the House of Assembly, asking that the House be recalled immediately to debate a motion calling for the appointment of a royal commission.
- 517. The NDP suggested the following terms of reference for the royal commission:
 - "To investigate whether the employment of members of the Government and of the Legislature by gambling interests at Grand Bahama has adversely influenced the policy of the Bahamas Government

with regard to maintaining internal security and in its relationship with the Government of the United States.

"To investigate the conduct of certain members of the former Executive Council and the circumstances under which permission to operate gambling casinos at Grand Bahamas was granted.

"To investigate the circumstances under which the members of the Government and members of the Legislature accepted payments for services rendered to the Grand Bahama Development Company Limited, and any connexion between such payments and the granting of casino licenses to Bahamas Amusements Limited.

"To investigate whether the gambling casino operated at Grand Bahama is controlled by, or any interest in this operation is owned by, any person having a financial interest in gambling casinos in the United States".

- 518. The Governor of the Bahamas, in a speech on 2 November 1966 in Memphis, Tennessee (United States) was reported to have referred to some unfavourable publicity about the gambling at Freeport. In further reference to a statement in an American newspaper that gambling in the Bahamas was to some extent in the hands of organized crime in the United States, he said: "It is my duty to see that it is not true. And happily I have some means of ensuring that it is not true".
- 519. Mr. Pindling is reported to have stated, in a letter to the Governor, that the Governor's address to the Executives' Club in Memphis, attempting to vindicate his ministers, was uncalled for, unfortunate and most regrettable. "We have intended," Mr. Pindling continued, according to the report, "to lay before you upon your arrival full information regarding:
 - "(1) The dates of contracts with Bahamian ministers referred to in the article;
 - "(2) Where the said contracts can be seen;
 - "(3) The names and signatories to the contracts;
 - "(4) The consideration in each contract;
 - "(5) The duration of each contract;
 - "(6) The names of persons able to give sworn evidence as to the accuracy of the allegations contained in the article.

"Consequently we are making a direct request to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs for an early interview to demand your immediate withdrawal. . . ."

- 520. The leader of the NDP stated that he agreed entirely with the PLP in their views on the Governor's speech. He also said that the Governor had shown himself to be completely opposed to the opposition point of view.
- 521. On 28 November 1966, Mr. Pindling announced that his party had received a reply from the Secretary of State for the Colonies agreeing to meet a delegation in London on 9 December to discuss, among other things, the party's demand for the removal of the Governor, the appointment of a royal commission and constitutional reform.
- 522. On 20 December 1966, the Colonial Secretary stated in the House of Commons that a committee of outside experts was likely to be set up to examine allegations about irregularities in the running of the Bahamas casino. He also said that he had been informed by the Governor that the Bahamas Govern-

ment would welcome an authoritative inquiry by such experts. It was announced that consultations on the membership of the committee of inquiry were likely to be held while the Governor was in London. On his return to the Bahamas, the Governor said that he would discuss with his ministers what form an investigation into casino gambling should take. It was understood that the Constitution of the Bahamas, which guaranteed internal self-government to the Territory, precluded the appointment of a royal commission by the United Kingdom Government.

General elections

- 523. In a press statement on 1 December 1966, announcing that a general election would be held on 10 January 1967, the Premier, Sir Roland Symonette, said that his Government had decided on an election in order to stop ill-informed talk and unfounded charges and to allow voters to decide whether or not they wished to continue with a government that would bring further prosperity and an increasing standard of living to the people of the Islands.
- 524. The PLP announced that it would contest every single-member seat in New Providence and nominate at least one candidate in all the Out Island districts. The NDP declared that its candidates would contest seats in New Providence but not in all districts.
- 525. In a letter of 2 December 1966, addressed to Mr. Pindling and Mr. Fawkes, Mr. Adderley made an appeal to the opposition to join forces. The PLP decided not to contest the constituency in which Mr. Fawkes was standing but rejected the appeal to join forces.
- 526. Mr. Adderley sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies before the date of the election was announced, in an attempt to forestall a general election. The telegram asked that the Governor be instructed to refuse dissolution of the House of Assembly until full effect had been given to his proposed constitutional amendments and until more voters had had time to register. The Governor informed Mr. Adderley that when advice to dissolve the House was tendered to him by the Premier, no alternative government was in sight. The current Government, moreover, had made it clear to him that it would not carry on without a dissolution.
- 527. The UBP issued a twenty-point electoral manifesto on 21 December 1966. Subjects dealt with in the manifesto included: equal opportunity, education, Out Islands scholarships, pensions, low-cost housing, foreign bases, immigration, labour, health services, tourism, overseas investment, public utilities, roads, New Providence road traffic, agriculture, fisheries, sports facilities, beaches and parks, Out Islands mail boat service, the civil service, the police and the Constitution. The UBP pledged, *inter alia*, to retain the existing form of constitutional government without seeking independence.
- 528. On 10 January 1967, general elections were held in the Bahamas. The PLP strength in the Out Islands caused a deadlock with the UBP—the former ruling party. The two major parties each won 18 seats in the 38-member House of Assembly, with one seat going to a Labour Party member, Mr. Fawkes, and one to an Independent. Sir Roland Symonette retained his seat by a vote of 558 to 511.
- 529. The six-day constitutional crisis resulting from the deadlock was resolved when Mr. Pindling gained

- the support of the sole Labour Party member elected. The only Independent agreed to serve as Speaker.
- 530. On 16 January 1967, Mr. Pindling was sworn in as the new Premier. The number of ministerial posts in the new administration has been reduced from fourteen to eleven. At the same time, the portfolios of nine ministers have been enlarged.
- 531. On assuming office the new Premier said at a press conference: "Whenever an upset occurs in an election anywhere in the world those who have capital at stake are likely to react with doubt, even fear. Let me, therefore, reassure our friends abroad that my Government will foster the climate of free enterprise that they have come to expect in the Bahamas. Our plans for the pleasure of tourists call for more, not less. Our plans for the confidence of investors call for immediate person-to-person conferences with leaders both here and abroad."
- 532. Referring to foreign affairs, the Premier noted that his Government wished to assure the President of the United States that the Bahamas would remain friendly, would continue to play its role in the defence pattern of the Western world, and would no longer provide a haven for gangsters. "We are determined to be a good neighbour and a good partner", he emphasized.
- 533. The new House of Assembly was scheduled to meet on 9 February 1967.

Economic conditions

- 534. The economy of the Territory continues to depend on the tourist industry. A total of 720,420 tourists visited the Islands in 1965, compared with 605,171 in 1964. This record number marked the sixteenth consecutive year of increase. Expenditure on tourism in the 1965 approved estimates was £1,492,886, compared with £1,239,023 in 1964.
- 535. The tourist trade with North America has enabled the Territory to make commensurate increases in dollar expenditure for the purchase of food-stuffs and other consumer goods, and in education for Bahamians at schools or universities in the United States and Canada.
- 536. Exchange control statistics for the period 1960-1965 show that United States tourists spent a total of \$227,414,000 in the Bahamas. Expenditures by the Bahamas in the United States during the same period totalled \$382,720,000. Investments by United States companies and individuals, and dividends from Bahamian-owned United States investment portfolios more than offset this apparent dollar deficit.

Agriculture and forestry

- 537. Arable land at present under cultivation in the Bahamas is estimated at 35,000 acres. There are approximately 3,200 acres of improved pastures and slightly less than 800,000 acres of forest. Hurricane "Betsy", which struck the Territory in September 1965, immediately affected tree crops, such as citrus. Ninety-five per cent of the crop was destroyed. Its effect on vegetable gardens was to produce excess salinity in the soil. Although this condition did not materially reduce current production, it was expected to retard the rate of increase in 1966.
- 538. Livestock, with the exception of poultry, is largely owned by small farmers. Three dairy herds are run on a commercial scale. There is one large

herd at Eleuthera, which is a source of fresh beef for the local market.

- 539. It is estimated that 3,500 men are gainfully employed in the fishing industry. In 1965, exports of crawfish were valued at £361,631, compared with £251,631 in 1964. Scale fish is not exported. The export of edible conch was prohibited as a conservation measure.
- 540. The organized exploitation of forest products is confined to the yellow pine forests of Andros and Abaco Islands.
- 541. On Inagua Island there is a comparatively large salt industry. A United States company extracts the salt by solar radiation and exports it in bulk form to the United States.
- 542. As yet no oil has been found in the Bahamas, but in 1965 six companies held sixteen oil concessions for exploration.
- 543. Exports were valued at £4,520,797 in 1965, compared with £2,616,670 in 1964, mostly to the United Kingdom, Canada, Haiti and the United States of America. The value of total imports during 1965 amounted to £37,431,173, chiefly supplied by the United Kingdom, Canada, Jamaica and the United States, compared with £35,669,627 for the previous year.
- 544. The total revenue of the Territory continued to rise in 1965 to £14,953,369, compared with £12,163,983 in 1964 and £9,599,255 in 1963. Customs duties (£8,252,657 in 1965) and receipts from fees and public utilities were the main sources of revenue. Total expenditure amounted to £12,687,189, compared with £11,841,216 in 1964 and £9,834,388 in 1963.
- 545. On 16 January 1967, Mr. Pindling, referring to the question of economic prospects for the Islands, said that agriculture was one of the areas in which his Government planned to take expert advice, particularly from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Canada and the United States. Linked with this was the development of light industry in the Islands, and the promotion of tourism.
- 546. On 18 January 1967, addressing a gathering of more than a hundred international bankers, the Premier pledged his Government's intention not to impose either corporate or personal income taxes and to honour the financial commitments made by the previous Government. Projects of major importance which were already under way—such as the redevelopment scheme for Nassau harbour—would continue as planned, he stated. The Territory, he emphasized, was determined to develop its commercial, agricultural and industrial potentials, as well as its banking facilities.
- 547. The Premier disclosed that the Government further intended to institute a penetrating study of industrial development. Definite plans for this study would be announced at an early date, the Premier said. There had already been an instant and rising tide of offers of new investments, all of which would be closely investigated.
- 548. It has been reported that on 26 February 1967 the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. H. Humphrey, commissioned into service the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) at Andros in the Bahamas (see A/6300/Rev.1, para. 259). Mr. Humphrey is reported to have said that the centre had been established primarily for the purposes of national security but that the knowledge gained

would be of assistance in other ways. Anti-submarine weapons, such as air-to-sea torpedoes, the report continued, were already being tested over and under a 6,000-foot natural trench. The United States Navy was engaged in completing the sonar and acoustic ranges.

Social conditions

- 549. Prices in general in New Providence tend to be high, especially as local food production is extremely limited and was further reduced in 1965 by hurricane damage. The cost-of-living index at the beginning of 1965 was 190 (based on a datum of 100 in 1949). This index has now been abandoned; a new one was due to be established from 1 January 1966.
- 550. On 4 July 1966 several hundred marchers paraded through the city of Nassau in protest against the increase in the cost of living. The march was organized by the Bahamas Trade Union Congress (BTUC), with the object of bringing the dissatisfaction of the workers to the attention of the Government and merchants (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, paras. 272-274). The BTUC suggested in a letter of August 1966 that the Government should devote a great deal of time and effort to the problem of maintaining a stable price level, and proposed further that the Government and the BTUC work together in preparing a cost-of-living index.
- 551. On 1 September 1966, Mr. Clement Maynard, President of the Bahamas Civil Service Union (BCSU) said that his union's request for a general salary increase of 15 per cent for senior staff and 25 per cent for all other government workers had been based on figures published by the BTUC and the Ministry of Labour. The BCSU proposed that a pensionable salary increase would be the most equitable way to achieve this end. The Government decided to increase salaries and wages of members of the public service with effect from 1 September 1966. The pay increase of 7.5-12.5 per cent was approved in the form of a nonpensionable allowance calculated in relation to the basic emoluments of each member of the public service. Members of the opposition raised objections to the manner in which the Government had calculated the percentage increases and to the increase awarded to civil servants in the upper income brackets.
- 552. The Government issued a statement on 7 September 1966, to the effect that it would undertake a general review of the salary structure of the public service.

Labour

553. In 1965 there were sixteen trade unions and four employers' associations registered in the Bahamas. There is no minimum wage order at present. Wages are fixed by joint consultation and agreement in the various industries. Only two trade disputes involving stoppage of work occurred during 1965, covering a period of eight days. The report of the 1963 census (published in 1965) gave the total labour force as 51,948. During 1965 there were more than 800 agricultural workers employed in the United States, under arrangements sponsored by the Government. The employment of labour in the United States ceased in 1966.

Public health

554. Medical and health services are the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. There are four main

government hospitals, with more than 800 beds, including a new geriatrics hospital opened in 1965. In addition, there are several non-government medical institutions.

555. The death-rate was 7.9 per thousand in 1965 compared with 7.1 per thousand in 1964. The birthrate was 33.1 per thousand compared with 35.8 per thousand in the previous year. The infant mortality rate was 42.3 per thousand live births (40.3 per thousand in 1964).

556. Recruitment of all medical professional staff, including the Medical Officer of Health, was completed during 1964-1965. Shortage of nursing staff below the rank of sister remained a problem. There were 50 (three part-time) government and 37 (two part-time) private registered physicians, and one private licensed physician. There were also 54 government nurses of senior training, 168 government and 95 private certified nurses and 54 government midwives of senior training. In late 1965 the Government approved a Flying Doctor Service, using chartered and scheduled flights to furnish regular medical attention for those settlements without such service.

557. Capital and recurrent expenditure on health services was estimated to be £1,446,092 in 1965, compared with £1,240,355 in 1964.

Educational conditions

558. Education is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. It is compulsory between the ages of five and fourteen years. The number of schools, children and teaching staff for the school year ending August 1965 were as follows:

	Number of schools	Children enrolled	Teaching staff
	152ª	17,65 7 b	504
*****	63	9,452	384
	122e	5,580	133
	3	751	64
	16	1,380	81
		schools 152ª	schools enrolled

a Including all-age rural schools.

b Including pupils of secondary school age.

c Secondary sections of all-age schools were reclassified as separate schools in 1965.

559. The Teachers Training College offers a regular two-year course for beginners and a one-year course for experienced but unqualified teachers; it is affiliated with the University of the West Indies.

560. For Bahamians who want to further their education at the university level a special relationship has been established with the University of the West Indies. Other Bahamians seek admission to institutions in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. The Government provides scholarships and bursaries tenable at universities and colleges abroad. The number of students studying abroad during the school year ending August 1965 was: 161 in the United Kingdom, 17 in Canada, 66 in the United States, one in Europe and 13 in the West Indies. Forty government scholarships and ten Commonwealth bursaries were awarded during this period.

561. The estimated recurrent expenditure on education was £1,318,356 in 1965; the actual capital expenditure was £442,142.

6. Turks and Caicos Islands²⁷

General

562. The Turks and Caicos Islands are geographically part of the Bahama Islands. The group extends for a distance of seventy-five miles from east to west and fifty miles north to south. The land area is estimated at 169 square miles (430 square kilometres). Six islands of the group are inhabited.

563. The estimated population as of 31 December 1964 was 6,628.

Constitution

564. The present Constitution is contained in the Turks and Caicos Islands (Constitution) Order in Council of 29 October 1965, which revoked the Order in Council of 1962, and came into effect on 5 November 1965. The revocation of the 1962 Order in Council was necessary for technical reasons.

565. The 1965 Constitution remains the same as that of 1962, with two amendments. The first amendment provides that the Governor of the Bahamas shall also be Governor of the Turks and Caicos Islands. The second makes provision for appeals from the courts of the Turks and Caicos to lie in the Bahamas Court of Appeal rather than in that of Jamaica.

566. The main provisions of the Constitution were set out in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (see A/ 5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, C, paras. 59-66). For ease of reference they are summarized below.

Administrator

567. The Administrator, who is appointed by the Queen, exercises his functions according to instructions given to him by Her Majesty or by the Governor. He is required to consult the Executive Council on all important matters within the scope of his responsibilities. He may act otherwise than in accordance with the advice given to him by the Executive Council, but when he does so he must report to the Queen, through the Secretary of State and the Governor, with the reasons for his action. The Governor may, when he is present in the Islands, perform any of the functions conferred upon the Administrator.

Executive Council

568. The Executive Council, which consists of six members (two elected, one nominated and three official, including the Administrator, who presides), is the main executive authority in the Islands. As a first step towards ministerial government, the two elected members have been appointed members concerned, respectively, with public works and social services and with trade and production.

Legislative Assembly

569. The Legislative Assembly consists of nine elected members, two or three official members, and two

²⁷ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 16 February 1967, for the year ended 31 December 1965.

or three nominated members appointed by the Administrator. The Administrator presides. The Legislative Assembly can legislate on all aspects of the Islands' affairs, subject to the assent of the Administrator. Legislation may be disallowed by the Queen.

Electoral system

570. The Legislative Assembly is elected every five years by universal adult suffrage. The last elections were held in September 1962. Voters must either have resided in the Islands for at least twelve months before the date of registration or be domiciled in the Islands and residents at that date.

Political parties

571. There are no political parties in the Territory.

Judiciary

572. There are three courts in the Islands: the Grand Court, the quarterly Petty Court and the Petty Sessions Court. In the absence of the appointment of a judge on the Islands, the stipendiary magistrate has jurisdiction as judge of the Grand Court, except in cases of capital offence. Appeal from the Grand Court lies to the Court of Appeal in the Bahama Islands.

Economic conditions

- 573. In 1965, imports were valued at £360,922 and exports at £44,424, compared with £300,768 and £47,173 in the previous year. The principal imports are food, beverages and manufactured articles, and the principal exports are salt, valued at £10,799 in 1965 (£12,603 in 1964 and £37,000 in 1963); crawfish, valued at £25,989 in 1965 (£25,778 in 1964 and £27,906 in 1963) and conch shells.
- 574. The grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom amounted to £176,369 in 1965, compared with £159,116 in 1964. The principal sources of revenue are from customs dues and the sale of stamps, which amounted to £50,718 and £9,137, respectively, in 1965. At the end of 1965, Barclays Bank D.C.O. had agreed to open a branch in Grand Turk .
- 575. Early in 1965, Mr. B. A. W. Trevallion undertook a survey into the tourist potential of the Islands, and his proposals have been used as the basis for a plan which is being followed by the Government to develop tourism.
- 576. In June 1965 the Turks Head Inn, a ten-bed government hotel, was opened in Grand Turk, and during the year extensions were made to the Admirals Arms Hotel, a privately owned hotel in South Caicos.

Social conditions

577. Prices of basic food-stuffs are high, as very little food other than fresh fish is provided locally.

Labour

578. It was noted in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session that at the end of 1964 salt production, which was no longer economic, was closed down in the Islands of Grand Turk and South Caicos but continued on a reduced scale in Salt Cay—primarily to provide work for the inhabitants who had no alternative source of income (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, para. 291). Other sources of employment are provided by the two United States bases on Grand Turk and by the crawfish and conch industry in South Caicos. A number of the young men from the

Islands continue to find work in various shipping companies (60 persons in 1965 with National Bulk Carriers, Inc., New York) and young persons of both sexes seek work in the Bahamas (120 persons were employed in 1965 at Freeport and in lumber camps at Abaco and Inagua).

579. There is only one registered trade union in the Territory—the St. George's Trade Union in Cockburn.

Public health

- 580. The medical services within the Turks and Caicos Islands are under the control of the Government Medical Officer stationed in Grand Turk where there is a sixteen-bed hospital. In 1965 there were two government registered physicians and one dentist, seven government and five private nurses of senior training, three midwives of senior training, nine partially trained midwives and one sanitary inspector.
- 581. In 1965, the death-rate in the Islands was approximately 8.66 per thousand of the population. The highest percentage of deaths is still amongst infants under the age of one year. The general standard of health during the year was good, and there were no epidemics. Gastro-intestinal diseases continued to be the most common in the Islands owing to the difficulty of ensuring that the water supply, which is mainly rain water collected in tanks, is kept pure.
- 582. Government recurrent expenditure on medical and public health in 1965, including the cost of staff, was £26,638 (13 per cent of total government recurrent expenditure), compared with £22,321 in 1964 (11.3 per cent).

Educational conditions

- 583. Education is free throughout the Territory and compulsory for all children between the ages of seven and fourteen years in the Islands of Grand Turk, Salt Cay and South Caicos. There is a primary school in each of the thirteen settlements within the Islands, and a secondary school is situated in Grand Turk where the children are prepared for the Cambridge University Joint School Certificate and the General Certificate of Education, or the London University General Certificate of Education. In 1965 a commercial section was introduced, and by the end of the year work had started on the construction of a technical wing of the school.
- 584. Government scholarships were awarded to pupils in the Outer Islands to enable them to attend the secondary school. Other scholarships were awarded from private sources.
- 585. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1965 was £29,288 (14 per cent of total government expenditure), compared with £22,026 in 1964 (11 per cent). In addition, Colonial Development and Welfare funds are provided for the training of teachers in the United Kingdom and Jamaica.

7. CAYMAN ISLANDS²⁸

General

586. The Cayman Islands consist of Grand Cayman, Cayman Brac and Little Cayman (the latter two also

²⁸ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 16 February 1967, for the year ended 31 December 1965.

being known as Lesser Caymans). The total area is about 100 square miles (259 square kilometres). Grand Cayman is located about 180 miles west-northwest of the westernmost point of Jamaica and 150 miles south of Cuba; Cayman Brac lies 89 miles east-north-east of Grand Cayman and Little Cayman lies 5 miles west of Cayman Brac.

587. The population of the Cayman Islands was 7,622 in 1960, according to the census held that year. In 1966, it was estimated to be nearly 10,000.

Constitution

588. The present Constitution is set out in the Cayman Islands Order in Council of 29 October 1965, which came into effect on 5 November 1965. (This Order revoked the Order in Council of 1962 but reenacted its provisions. This was necessary for technical reasons.) The main provisions of the Constitution are set out below.

Administrator

589. The Administrator is appointed by the Queen and is the head of the administration. He is empowered to make laws with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly; legislation may be disallowed by the Queen. In the exercise of his functions, the Administrator is required to consult the Executive Council on all important matters. Should he act contrary to its advice, he must report to the Queen through the Secretary of State.

Executive Council

590. The Executive Council is presided over by the Administrator and consists of two elected members, chosen by the Legislative Assembly from among its elected members, two official members, and one nominated member appointed by the Administrator. The Executive Council is the main executive authority in the Islands. As a first step towards ministerial government, the two elected members and the nominated member have been appointed as members responsible for finance and development, social services and works and communications.

Legislative Assembly

591. The Legislative Assembly is presided over by the Administrator and consist of twelve elected members, two or three official members, and two or three nominated members appointed by the Administrator. The Legislative Assembly may legislate on all aspects of the Islands' affairs, subject to the assent of the Administrator. As noted above, legislation may be disallowed by the Queen.

Electoral system

592. Persons qualified to vote are those who are British subjects, over twenty-one years of age and who have either resided in the Islands for at least twelve months before the date of registration or are so domiciled in the Islands and are residents there on that date. Elections are held every three years. At the last general election, held on 16 November 1965, the Christian Democratic Party gained four seats, the National Democratic party one seat and the Independents seven seats.

Political parties

593. The two political parties known to be active in the Islands are the Christian Democratic Party (CPD) and the Cayman National Democratic Party (CNDP).

The latest information available on political developments is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, annex, paras. 198-199).

Judiciary

594. The courts of law in the Cayman Islands consist of the Grand Court of the Islands, the quarterly Petty Court and the Petty Sessions Court. A stipendiary magistrate deals with cases in the two Petty Courts, and in the absence of an appointed judge he also has jurisdiction as judge of the Grand Court in all cases except those of capital felony. Decisions of the Grand Court are subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal for Jamaica, and thence to the Privy Council.

Public service

595. There were 159 public service officers in 1965. Of this number, 148 were local officers and 11 were overseas non-pensionable officers.

Economic conditions

596. The economy of the Territory continues to depend mainly on the wages earned by Cayman Islands seamen. Another significant factor in the Island's economic development is the expansion of tourist trade. An estimated 4,437 tourists visited the Islands in 1965, compared with 3,319 in 1964. Other industries include the manufacture of thatch rope, and turtle and shark fishing. In 1965 an agricultural expert from the United Nations visited the Islands at the request of the Government to advise on agricultural development.

597. The New Banks and Trust Companies Law was passed by the Assembly. It was felt to be necessary for the good name and reputation of the Cayman Islands, which hitherto had had no banking law and no taxation. This Act was strongly resisted by the local lawyers, who argued that it would seriously impair the attractiveness of the Cayman Islands to international banks.

598. The value of imports amounted to £1,157,156 in 1965, compared with £958,120 in 1964. Exports were valued at £21,438 in 1965, compared with £31,900 in 1964.

599. The principal imports are food-stuffs, textiles and fuel oil. The principal exports are turtles and turtle products, rope and shark skins. Approximately two thirds of the trade of the Islands is with the United States of America. Sugar, coffee, cement, liquor, kerosene and condensed milk are imported almost exclusively from Jamaica.

600. Government revenue is mainly derived from the sale of postage stamps and from import duties. These together represent over 70 per cent of the Government's annual ordinary revenue. In 1965, the estimated revenue was £516,689 and expenditure £528,384, compared with £299,856 and £296,606, respectively, in 1964.

601. In 1963, the index of retail prices in Georgetown, Grand Cayman, was 116, taking the figure for 1959 as 100. It was based on a limited range of commodities used for comparison.

Social conditions

Labour

602. One trade union is registered in the Cayman Islands—the Global Seaman's Union. Membership is not restricted to Cayman Island seamen, but almost

all Caymanians serving on United States ships are members. There are about 6,100 members, of whom one third are Cayman Islanders.

Public health

603. The medical services in the Cayman Islands are under the control of the Government Medical Officer stationed in Grand Cayman. The average deathrate in the Islands is 7.6 per thousand. The principal causes of death are hypertension, respiratory diseases, senility and diseases of early infancy. The highest death-rate (25.9 per thousand live births) is found in infants of one year of age and under. Government expenditure on medical and public health in 1965 was £41,947 (14.2 per cent of total government expenditure), compared with £38,637 (13.0 per cent) in 1964.

Educational conditions

604. The educational system of the Islands is under the control of the Board of Education, of which the Administrator is chairman. Primary education is free and compulsory for all children between the ages of seven and fourteen. During 1965, eleven government primary schools, one secondary modern and one secondary grammar school were in operation. In addition, there were a number of church-sponsored schools. Many of the teachers in the Cayman Islands are recruited from Jamaica. The recurrent expenditure on education in 1965 was £47,553 (16.0 per cent of government recurrent expenditure), compared with £42,354 (14.3 per cent) in 1964.

8. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)29

General

605. The Falkland Islands (Malvinas), situated in the South Atlantic, lies some 480 miles north-east of Cape Horn. The numerous islands of which they are composed cover 4,618 square miles (11,961 square kilometres). The Dependencies now consist of only South Georgia, the South Sandwich group and a number of smaller islands. Those territories south of latitude 60°S which were formerly part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, namely, the South Orkney Islands, the South Shetland Islands and the Atlantic Peninsula, together with that sector of the Antarctic Continent lying between longitudes 20°W and 80°W constituted a separate colony in 1962 under the name of the British Antarctic Territory.

606. The population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) excluding the Dependencies at 31 December 1965 was 2,079. With few exceptions, all were of European descent and most were of British origin. The population of the Dependencies fluctuates with the whaling season.

Constitution

607. The present Constitution was introduced in 1949 and provides for a Governor, aided by an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The Constitution was amended in 1951 to give for the first time a majority to the non-official members in the Legislative Council, and was amended again in 1955 and 1964. The Executive Council now also has a majority of non-officials.

- 608. The Governor, the Queen's representative, is the head of the administration of the Territory. In the exercise of his powers he is advised by the Executive Council. Generally, he acts in accordance with the advice he receives from the Executive Council and may only act against this advice in certain specific circumstances.
- 609. The Executive Council is composed of two unofficial members appointed by the Governor, two elected members of the Legislative Council and two *ex officio* members. The two elected members of the Legislative Council are chosen by ballot of the elected and independent members of the Legislative Council.
- 610. The Legislative Council, presided over by the Governor, is composed of eight members, namely, the Colonial Secretary, the Colonial Treasurer (both ex officio members), two nominated independent members and four elected members. The four elected members are chosen by universal adult suffrage. General elections were held in 1964, and the next general election is due early in 1968.

Judiciary

611. The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court and a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, the former presided over by the Governor or Colonial Secretary and the latter by a bench of magistrates composed of two or more justices of the peace. On 1 July 1965, a Court of Appeal was set up for the Territory, sitting in the United Kingdom. The laws of the Territory are mainly based on English laws and precedents.

Local government

612. There is a Town Council in Stanley, consisting of six elected members and three members nominated by the Governor. Of the six elected members, three retire every two years and elections are held biennially for half the elected membership. The activities of the Council are financed mainly from rates and from grants from the central Government. Its responsibility consists of the normal range of local government services.

Political parties

613. The only political party in the Territory, the the Falkland Islands Progressive National Party, was formed in August 1964.

Economic conditions

614. The economy of the Territory continues to depend almost entirely on the wool industry. Practically all revenue is derived indirectly from sheep-farming.

615. The external trade figures over the last few years are as follows:

	(Value in thousand pounds)		
Year	Total exports	Wool exports	Imports
1962	 940	913	413
1963	 1.078	1.054	503
1964	1.050	1,024	545
1965	 1,026	1,004	514

The United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries absorb almost all of the Territory's exports and provide most of its imports (77 per cent in 1965).

616. Public revenue is derived mainly from companies tax, income tax, customs duties and the sale of postage stamps. The following table gives revenue and expenditure over the past few years for the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), excluding the Dependencies:

²⁹ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 17 August 1966, for the year ended 31 December 1965.

	(Value in thousand pounds)	
	Revenue	.Expenditure
1962-1963	294	337
1963-1964	287	350
1964-1965	413	387

617. Expenditure by the Territory from Colonial Development and Welfare funds amounted to £7,405 in 1965, compared with £497 in 1964.

Social conditions

Labour

618. There is a general shortage of labour in the Territory. In 1965, 416 persons left the Territory and 359 arrived, compared with 356 and 297 respectively in 1964.

Public health

619. The Government Medical Department employs one senior medical officer and three medical officers, of whom one each is stationed in Stanley, Darwin in Lafonia and Fox Bay on the West Falkland. There is a 32-bed general hospital in Stanley. Total expenditure in 1964-1965 was £36,670, compared with £35,590 in 1963-1964. The recurrent medical expenditure in 1965 represented 10.71 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure of the Territory, compared with 11.21 per cent in 1964.

Educational conditions

620. In 1964-1965, the number of children receiving education in the Territory was 328, compared with 333 in 1963-1964. There is no system of higher education and no advanced secondary education. In 1965, thirteen travelling teachers were employed among the ninety-one children outside Stanley, Darwin and settlement schools. Education is free except at Darwin Boarding School where a boarding fee of £12 a year is levied.

621. The Territory awards up to two scholarships annually to boarding schools in the United Kingdom. In 1964-1965, there were seven students from the Territory attending schools in the United Kingdom under this scheme. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1964-1965 was £44,178, representing 12.9 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure, compared with £44,204, or 13.9 per cent of the total expenditure in 1963-1964.

9. BRITISH HONDURAS³⁰

General

622. British Honduras lies on the Caribbean coast of Central America, bounded on the north and northwest by Mexico and on the south and south-west by Guatemala. Its land area is 8,866 square miles (22,563 square kilometres), which includes a number of islets lying off the coast. The estimated population at the end of 1964 was 104,450, consisting mainly of Creoles, American Indians (Maya) and Caribs.

Constitution

623. The present Constitution came into force on 6 January 1964. The main provisions of this Constitution are set out below.

Governor

624. The Governor, who is appointed by the Queen, is required to act in accordance with the advice of ministers in all matters except those specifically excepted. Special responsibilities are reserved to him under the Constitution, namely, defence, external affairs, internal security and the public service. The Governor also has special responsibility in the sphere of finance for as long as the Government of British Honduras continues to receive budgetary aid from the United Kingdom.

Cabinet

625. The Cabinet consists of a Premier and other ministers who are appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The person likely to command the support of the majority in the House of Representatives is appointed Premier. Only members of the Legislature are eligible for appointment as ministers.

626. The Constitution provides for a Security Council and a Consultative Committee on External Affairs to advise the Governor and to enable ministers to familiarize themselves with matters for which they will ultimately assume responsibility.

Legislature

627. The Legislature, called the National Assembly, is bicameral and consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

628. The Senate consists of eight members appointed by the Governor—five on the advice of the Premier, two on the advice of the leader of the opposition and one after such consultations as the Governor considers appropriate. A president is elected by the Senate either from among its members or from outside the Senate; a vice-president, however, is elected solely from and by senators. The Senate has power to initiate legislation, other than financial bills, on which its powers of delay do not exceed one month. In respect of other bills the power of delay is limited to six months, provided the bill in question has been sent forward in two successive sessions.

629. The House of Representatives consists of eighteen members elected by universal adult suffrage. There are no nominated or *ex officio* members. The Speaker is elected by the House either from among its own members or from outside.

Political parties and electoral system

- 630. There are two political parties in the Territory: the People's United Party (PUP) and the National Independence Party (NIP). The PUP, with Mr. George Price, the Premier, as its leader, has been active in the Territory since shortly after the Second World War. The NIP, now led by Mr. Philip Goldson, came into being in 1958 as the result of a merger between the Honduran Independence Party and the National Party.
- 631. The main issue separating the two parties at the most recent general election, held on 1 March 1965, was the timing of independence. The NIP advocated that independence be delayed until the colony is economically viable; the platform of the PUP calls for independence within the next few years.
- 632. The Constitution requires the holding of a general election at intervals of not less than five years. Members of the House of Representatives are elected

 $^{^{30}}$ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 December 1966 for the year ended 31 December 1965.

on the basis of universal adult suffrage. In the 1965 general election, the PUP won sixteen of the eighteen seats, the NIP the remaining two seats.

Judiciary

- 633. British Honduras has a Supreme Court which is a Superior Court of Record. Appeal lies in certain instances from the Supreme Court to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There are also courts of summary jurisdiction which deal with criminal and quasi-criminal matters, and district courts which deal with civil matters.
- 634. The judiciary consists of the Chief Justice, a puisne judge and two magistrates. Some district villagers have an *alcalde* (in effect, a headman) appointed by the Governor from among the villagers. Each *alcalde* has limited judisdiction in criminal and civil matters.
- 635. The Constitution provides for a Judicial and Legal Service Commission which is responsible for advising the Governor on all matters relating to the appointment, removal and discipline of certain judicial officers. It consists of the Chief Justice as chairman, the puisne judge and the chairman of the Public Service Commission.

Public service

636. Provision is made in the Constitution for the establishment of a Public Service Commission, which consists of a chairman and four other members appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Premier. The Governor must consult with the Commission on matters relating to the appointment, removal and discipline of officers in the public service, including senior officers in the police force.

Economic conditions

- 637. Forests and low scrub cover almost 90 per cent of the total land area of the Territory and, in the past it was on forest products—logwood, mahogany, chicle, cedar, rosewood and pine that the economy was based. The export of mahogany was a major industry for nearly two centuries. The Territory is now turning to agriculture and forest products are now third after sugar and citrus in the export table.
- 638. In 1952, exports totalled \$BH6.1 million³¹ of which mahogany and other timber exports represented 46.4 per cent while citrus exports represented 13.1 per cent and sugar 1.0 per cent. Exports in 1964 amounted to \$BH19.9 million, the percentage of the main products being sugar 31.3 per cent, citrus products 21.4 per cent and mahogany and other timber 14.0 per cent.
- 639. Tate and Lyle, a British firm, have taken over the existing sugar factory and are building another at Tower Hill in the north. The new factory is expected to come into operation in 1967. This expansion, it is hoped, will increase the total annual output of sugar to 150,000 tons. Sugar production of 37,000 tons during 1964-1965 exceeded the record output of 33,591 tons during 1963-1964 by some 3,400 tons. The total estimated acreage under sugar cane was 22,893.
- 640. In 1965 the area under citrus was 8,664 acres (6,414 acres for oranges and 2,250 for grapefruit). Expansion of citrus fruit acreage is planned.
- 31 The unit of currency is the British Honduras dollar which is equivalent to five shillings sterling or \$US.70.

- 641. The value of timber products fell from \$BH3.1 million in 1964 to \$BH1.9 in 1965 owing to the closing of the resin-extraction plant.
- 642. Foodstuffs are also produced for home consumption, of which the most important are maize, red kidney beans and rice. Livestock continues to be increasingly important, especially in the Cayo and Belize Districts. The coastal waters provide ample supplies of fish for domestic needs and there is a well-established fishing industry which makes a substantial contribution to the economy. Processing establishments have been developed during recent years with a view to increasing exports to the United States of America—the largest potential market.
- 643. The Government's new seven-year development plan, based on the United Nations Economic Survey Mission's report, was tabled in the Legislative Assembly in December 1963. It originally envisaged an expenditure of \$BH53 million, but this estimate has been revised in the light of prevailing circumstances, and is now \$BH48.5 million for the period 1964-1970. It is hoped that \$BH29.9 million will accrue from grants/and \$BH17.9 from loans.
- 644. In its efforts to accelerate economic development, the Government has relaxed import duties on agricultural and industrial machinery and on animal feeds. It has also announced increased duties on numerous consumer goods. A programme to attract tourists has been initiated and government expenditure on the development of tourist facilities is expected to increase substantially.
- 645. The Government's ordinary budget continued to be grant-aided in 1965 to the extent of \$BH500,000. In addition to this assistance, the United Kingdom Government provided \$BH1.5 million for Colonial Development and Welfare schemes. Customs duties continued to be the main source of revenue, contributing as much as \$BH5.3 million out of a total of \$BH10.3 million. Total expenditure in 1965 was about \$BH10 million.
- 646. As noted previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chapter XXII, para. 319), the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States jointly sponsored an economic survey of British Honduras. On 1 November 1966, the report was published by the Ministry of Overseas Development. It recommends the establishment of a development agency for the Territory to co-operate with the existing development bank in maintaining the increase in the national income at 9 per cent per annum throughout the period 1967-1970. The Mission considers that the expansion of the economy has been due to the growth of the citrus and sugar industries brought about by the decline of forestry. It is further of the opinion that large-scale agriculture is now self-supporting, and concludes that future investment should be channelled into tourism and the processing industries.

Social conditions

Labour

647. During 1965, there was a reduction in employment opportunities owing to the closing of some businesses. Many of the people who lost their jobs, however, were able to find employment in the northern districts of the country owing to the construction of a large sugar factory and to expansion in sugar-cane planting. In general, there was a steady demand for many categories of workers. The manpower expert from the International Labour Organisation (ILO),

who completed his mission at the end of 1965, subsequently issued a report on manpower assessment.

648. During the year under review, there were six strikes all in some phase of the sugar industry, resulting in a total loss of 1,900 man-days. Six collective agreements were negotiated between employers and trade unions during the year. There were ten registered trade unions in 1965 with a total membership of 3,657.

Public health

649. The Government maintains a general hospital, with 162 beds, in Belize City and small hospitals in each of the five districts, with a total of 142 beds. There is also a thirteen-bed private hospital in the capital. There are 20 government and mission rural dispensaries, each with a qualified rural health nurse in charge. Two health centres, a venereal disease clinic, an infirmary and a mental hospital are maintained by the Government in Belize City.

Educational conditions

650. Education is compulsory between the ages of six and fourteen years. Primary education is free. In 1965, there were 26,723 pupils enrolled in 160 primary schools, compared with 26,322 in 1964. Secondary education is provided in 16 fee-paying schools, all managed by various religious denominations. They are all fee-paying. The total enrolment in the secondary schools was 2,237, compared with 2,113 in 1964. The new education policy, approved by the Government in 1965, provides for the transfer of all children to secondary schools at the ages of eleven and twelve, and for the development of curricula and courses to meet the needs of children of varying abilities and interests. The Belize Technical College, a government institution, provides free technical education. There is no university in the Territory. Students desirous of taking post-secondary and university education must go abroad.

651. On the recommendation of the Educational Planning Mission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Belize Teachers' College was formed in 1965, with the aim of training a total of 160 teachers by the end of 1966.

C. Preliminary consideration by the Special Committee of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent

Introduction

652. At its 488th meeting on 20 February 1967, the Special Committee decided to consider the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent in its plenary meetings. The Special Committee considered these Territories at its 489th to 497th, 500th, 501st and 504th to 506th meetings between 21 February and 23 March 1967. At the conclusion of its consideration of these Territories, the Special Committee referred them to Sub-Committee III for further consideration. In the course of the detailed and intensive consideration the Sub-Committee gave these Territories, it availed itself of the opportunity of hearing certain individuals who wished to give information to the Sub-Committee. An account of the consideration of these Territories by Sub-Committee III and of the conclusions and recommendations reached by it are set out in the report of Sub-Committee III (see annex below).

1. Written petitions and hearings

653. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions:

Petitioner

Document No.

Mr. Eric M. Gairy, Leader	r
of the Opposition in	1
Grenada	
Mr Eric M Gairy Leader	_

A/AC.109/PET.573 and Add.1

A/AC.109/PET.573/Add.2 A/AC.109/PET.580 and Add.1-3

St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla

Two petitions from Mr. Ronald Webster

A/AC.109/PET.574 A/AC.109/PET.575

Mr. Atlin Harrigan A/AC.10

St. Vincent

Grenada

Two petitions from Mr. E. T. Joshua, Chief Minister of St. Vincent

A/AC.109/PET.584

Hearings concerning Grenada

654. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners at the meetings indicated below:

489th meeting

Mr. Michael Caesar (A/AC.109/PET.580/Add.2)

493rd meeting

655. Mr. Caesar, speaking on behalf of Mr. Eric M. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition in Grenada, said that when Mr. Gairy had addressed the Committee on 7 September 1966 (463rd meeting) he had stated that the political and constitutional situation in Grenada was volcanic. The people had been demonstrating in large numbers and calling for general elections before the new constitution came into force, not only because the Government had failed to implement its election pledge to take Grenada into unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago within one year after the last elections, but also because it had begun discussions with the United Kingdom Government on a new constitution without first consulting the people. Under that new constitution, Grenada would be granted full internal self-government and its status changed to that of a State in association with the United Kingdom.

656. When Mr. Gairy had attended the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference in May 1966, as Leader of the Opposition, he had signed the report of the Conference with certain reservations regarding portions of the text of the proposed constitution. Recent newspaper reports stating that the United Kingdom Minister for Commonwealth Relations had informed the United Kingdom Parliament that Mr. Gairy had fully agreed to the constitution were obviously false. He read out a letter addressed to the West Indian, a leading Grenada newspaper, and signed by the President of the Grenada Trade Union Council. It stated that Mr. Gairy had not agreed to clauses in the proposed constitution dealing with the Senate, the House

of Representatives, transitional provisions and the need for a referendum on certain issues. It also pointed out that assurances had been given by the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary at that Conference that the question of elections before the implementation of the constitution would be discussed. That had not happened. The Grenada opposition leaders had strenuously objected to the inclusion of a clause dealing with transitional provisions without a general election first being held. Mr. Gairy had accordingly reserved the opposition party's position on that clause, and on the other clauses dealing with the composition of the legislature, and his reservations were recorded in the report of the Windward Islands Conference 1966.³² The letter had urged the Minister for Commonwealth Relations to take immediate steps to correct the misunderstanding and had concluded that what was proposed for Grenada was the dissolution of the existing legislature and its replacement by an entirely new and differently composed legislative body with different functions.

657. Mr. Gairy himself had immediately sent a cable stating that the Minister had been misinformed and that he himself had never agreed that the constitution should be implemented without elections, adding that the situation in Grenada was still volcanic and that several protest demonstrations were being organized. Mr. Gairy's reservations to the draft constitution had related to four points, two concerning the internal organization of the legislature and two concerning transitional provisions and the question of arrangements for association. Regarding the transitional provisions, the opposition party had rejected the proposed draft, first because it would transform the elected onechamber legislature into a two-chamber legislature without the people being consulted; secondly, because it would mean that the provision of the existing constitution governing the life of the present one-chamber legislature would still be in effect after the new constitution providing for a two-chamber legislature had been enforced; thirdly, because the people of Grenada would be denied their fundamental right to elect the first two-chamber House of Representatives in Grenada in accordance with the democratic principles of selfdetermination.

658. Mr. Gairy had rejected the provision stating that there was no need for a referendum in connexion with a bill terminating the association between the United Kingdom and Grenada and giving constitutional effect to arrangements under which Grenada joined with an independent commonwealth country in the Caribbean. In Mr. Gairy's view, the real question was whether the people themselves had accepted or rejected the constitution. So far, they had not exercised that right.

659. The people of Grenada believed that the primary objective of the Special Committee was to ensure full implementation of the principles of self-determination and to assist oppressed peoples of the world in their struggle to rid themselves of the problems of colonialism in all its forms. Although the Committee did have a very successful record, they very much regretted that, despite the information which Mr. Gairy had provided in September, the Committee had not been able to give Grenada the urgent and necessary attention it deserved. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom Government now claimed that the matter was an internal affair and that therefore it could not post-

pone the enforcement of the new constitution. The people of Grenada could hardly believe that the administering Power was really incapable of delaying the enforcement of what were its own instructions, unless it was deliberately fanning the flames of civil disorder in Grenada. There were already reports of clashes with the police and of assaults upon clergymen. Indeed, the situation was such that all members of the opposition party had resigned from the Legislative Council because the people of Grenada were not to be given an opportunity to exercise their right to elect a new government of their choice. By the stroke of a pen, the structure of the legislature was to be changed and the power of full internal control thrust upon a Government committed to a course of action which ran counter to the wishes of the people.

660. Mr. Gairy had been asked by the people of Grenada to request the Special Committee to intercede with the United Kingdom Government on their behalf, with a view to postponing the enforcement of the proposed constitution until general elections were held. Any attempt to implement the constitution without general elections would be a most unfortunate miscarriage of justice on the part of the United Kingdom Government, which would be held responsible for whatever might transpire in Grenada.

661. At its 493rd meeting, the Special Committee heard Mr. Michael Caesar concerning Grenada.

662. Mr. Caesar said that enforcement by the United Kingdom Government of the new constitutional arrangements granting internal self-government and a new status as States in association with the United Kingdom to each of the six Territories under discussion was already half-completed, and it seemed impossible for the Special Committee to consider the question fully before it was too late. The situation had been brought about by the United Kingdom Government, which had refused to allow United Nations missions to visit the Territories, had submitted very lengthy background information while in the process of enforcing its own decisions, and had refused to postpone the enforcement of its decisions in order to give the Special Committee time to study them.

663. The United Kingdom representative and others had placed great emphasis on the fact that no proposals for individual independence had been put forward at the London Constitutional Conference. Yet it had been generally agreed, and the people of the Territories had recognized as early as 1945, that individual independence was impracticable. The former West Indian Federation had therefore been established, but it had subsequently been dissolved by the United Kingdom Government against the wishes of the people of all the constituent Territories. Both the Federal Prime Minister and the Federal Leader of the Opposition had visited London in March 1962 to protest against the manner in which the United Kingdom Government was preparing to dissolve the Federation, and Mr. Dennis Healey, then a member of the House of Commons, had stated that the United Kingdom Government had chosen to destroy all existing co-operation between the individual Territories without first seeking to achieve any agreement among the unit Governments about what should be put in its place.

664. Immediately following the dissolution of the Federation, the people of the eight Territories concerned had declared their wish to form a new Federation as an independent State within the Commonwealth.

³² See foot-note 11 above.

The question had been debated until 1965, when the United Kingdom had cited as an obstacle to the establishment of such a Federation the fact that, in September 1962, the newly-elected Government of Grenada had stated its intention of seeking association with Trinidad and Tobago, rather than membership of a new Federation. However, the previous Government of Grenada had been dissolved by the United Kingdom Government, after only eighteen months in power, on the basis of a report by a Commission of Inquiry on which the opinion of the electorate had not been sought. Thus, the decision to change the elected Government of Grenada in 1962 had been made by the United Kingdom Government, and not by the people of Grenada. During the 1962 elections, the United Kingdom Government had used tricks; the people had been told that their Government had been dissolved, their Constitution suspended and all grants-in-aid discontinued, and that they must elect a new Government. Since it was that new Government which had stated its preference for association with Trinidad and Tobago, there could be no doubt that the first obstacle to the "Little Eight" Federation had been created by the United Kingdom Government. It was clear from the way in which the question of unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago had been presented to the electorate, and from the fact that after four years the Government had failed to fulfil its promise, that the only purpose had been to give the United Kingdom Government time to work out and enforce its new proposals for associated statehood, which would permanently divide the Territories into separate States.

665. It was clear, therefore, that there had been an alternative to the new arrangements for "the West Indies Associated States"—namely, independence within a Federation—but that the people had not been allowed a choice. Whatever advantages, if any, the new arrangements might have, they would divide the people of the Territories against their expressed wishes; each new State would have, for instance, its own national anthem and flag. Even if the Special Committee was confronted by a fait accompli, it should condemn the United Kingdom Government's trickery in no uncertain terms. The people of the Territories were eagerly awaiting the Committee's decision, which would help them in their determination to continue the struggle against colonialism, to achieve unity and to take their rightful place among the free nations of the world.

666. In answer to questions from members of the Special Committee, the petitioner said that when elections had been called in 1962, the existing Government of Grenada had already agreed to form a federation with the other Caribbean Territories. With the change of government, however, the question of unitary state-hood with Trinidad and Tobago had arisen, although it had not been clearly presented to the people nor fully understood by them because of the situation created by the United Kingdom Government in dissolving the existing Government, suspending the Constitution and calling elections. The question of associated statehood had been decided upon later by the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Grenada, although the latter had been given no mandate to discuss the question of association, much less to enforce association arrangements. Nevertheless, the people of Grenada did not oppose the association arrangements as such, as was clear from the petition he had presented on behalf of the leader of the opposition party, but they opposed the procedure by which the arrangements were

to be implemented. He thought that if a referendum were held immediately, the people, because of the current circumstancs in Grenada, would decide upon associated statehood. However, the fact remained that the United Kingdom Government, in implementing the arrangements, had violated the principle of self-determination. If the people of Grenada were asked whether they wished to endorse the new arrangements for association with the United Kingdom or to unite with other Territories within a federation, they would choose the latter alternative. He also said that the results of the 1962 elections did not represent the wishes of the people because they had been held in abnormal circumstances created by the United Kingdom.

2. Statements by members

667. Commenting on the statement made on behalf of Mr. Gairy, the representative of the United Kingdom drew the attention of the Special Committee to the statement which his delegation had made when the Committee had heard Mr. Gairy on a previous occasion (463rd meeting). The main event of significance since that hearing had been the resignation of the members of the opposition party in the Legislative Council. As the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs had made clear in the House of Commons on 14 February 1967, the resignations did not change the position with regard to the timing of elections in Grenada.

668. The points raised by the petitioner did not in any way affect the acceptability of the new association arrangements which were due to come into force in Grenada on 3 March. At the Windward Islands Conference in 1966, Mr. Gairy had expressed reservations about portions of the internal constitution for Grenada which had been agreed to at the Conference. The reservations, however, did not affect the proposal that Grenada should become a State in association with the United Kingdom, to which the petitioner and his party had fully agreed, as had the representatives of the Government party. When the report of the Conference had been debated in the Legislative Council, however, Mr. Gairy had again maintained that there should be elections before Grenada became an associated State. despite the fact that he had signed the Conference report; he had, moreover, voted for the resolution of the Legislative Council approving that report. Furthermore, when Mr. Gairy had appeared before the Committee in September he had not opposed the association arrangements. The statement made by the United Kingdom Minister for Commonwealth Affairs to Mr. Gairy's petition had referred was thus fully accurate. He drew attention to a United Kingdom Commonwealth Office press release which stated that when Mr. Gairy had discussed the matter in London recently with the Minister for Commonwealth Affairs, the Minister had informed him that she had not been accurately quoted. While she was aware of the fact that Mr. Gairy had made certain reservations to the report of the Conference, she had reminded him that by signing the report he had signified his agreement that Grenada should proceed to associated statehood. The timing of a general election had been fully discussed at the Conference in 1966 and it had been made clear that the United Kingdom Government considered that it could not properly interfere in something which was an internal matter. The Chief Minister of Grenada had already announced that elections must be held before 15 January 1968.

669. Regarding the timing of the elections, the position under both the existing constitution and the new constitution was exactly the same as in most countries with a two-party parliamentary system: the Constitution laid down the maximum length of time between elections. Since the last election in Grenada had been held in September 1962, under the Constitution the legislature must be dissolved at the end of 1967 and elections held not later than January 1968. There were two circumstances in which elections could be held earlier; first, if the existing Government were defeated in the legislature on a vote of confidence and, secondly, if the Chief Minister decided for any reason to advise the Head of State in Grenada to dissolve the legislature earlier than was constitutionally necessary. There was no constitutional provision in Grenada, any more than there was in the United Kingdom, which would allow the Opposition Leader to decide when elections should be held, and the resignation of the four opposition members of the Legislative Council did not change the situation. It was too late for by-elections to be held under the present Constitution, and under the new constitution the Premier would have to advise the Governor, as was the case with all other internal matters, to issue writs for by-elections which would be needed.

670. The petitioner had called for elections to enable the people of Grenada to pronounce themselves on the new association arrangements and on the new constitution. However, that had in fact already been done; both parties in Grenada and their elected leaders had indidicated that they agreed in principle to the new system, The petitioner had also argued that the present Government had no mandate to take Grenada into associate statehood. However, under the association arrangements it would be perfectly possible for Grenada to enter into a union with Trinidad and Tobago, or with any other country, at a later stage, if that was the wish of the peoples and the Governments concerned. The question whether there was an early election or whether the life of the legislature should run its full course as laid down in the Constitution was therefore a purely domestic matter. It was quite legitimate for any opposition leader to argue in favour of early election; however, there could surely be no opposition to the constitutional principle that it was for the Government and not the opopsition to decide when elections should be held.

671. Commenting on the petitioner's own statement, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he had already dealt with the constitutional questions raised by the petitioner. The petitioner's use of the term "enforcement" in connexion with the introduction of Grenada's new status was quite unwarranted; both political parties in Grenada had fully endorsed the new arrangements and had participated in the Constitutional Conference which had devised them. Moreover, the leader of the opposition party in Grenada had signed the Conference report on the association proposal and had voted for the proposed new arrangements, when they had been debated in the Grenada legislature.

672. The petitioner had referred to the break-up of the former West Indies Federation and had expressed the hope that some of its members might form a new federation. However, that question was not before the Committee at the present stage. The same was true of the events which had taken place in Grenada in 1962, which were now matters of public record, rather than of current political relevance to Grenada on the eve of statehood.

673. The petitioner had not made it clear what he was advocating or what his attitude was to the mandate of the present Government of Grenada. If the petitioner wanted separate independence for Grenada, a new federation or union with Trinidad and Tobago, those were options which remained available to the peoples concerned under Grenada's new status. In that connexion, he was happy to hear that the people of Grenada were not opposed to the association arrangements, even though some of them seemed to have reservations regarding the methods used. Grenada's accession to associated statehood would therefore not prejudice or prevent any future development that the petitioner might wish to advocate, provided, of course, that the people of Grenada themselves shared his views.

674. Finally, the petitioner had given the impression that there had been undue haste in the introduction of the new arrangements in the Territory. However, the United Kingdom delegation had given early notification to the Special Committee, in September 1966, and had subsequently made full information available to the Committee. Moreover, the original proposal for association had been circulated to the Committee in December 1965.

675. In his general statement, the representative of the United Kingdom said that, during the week beginning 27 February 1967, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and St. Lucia would assume a new status as States in association with the United Kingdom. St. Vincent, where there had been certain special problems, would assume the same status not later than 1 June 1967. With the introduction of the new constitution in each of those Territories, the islands would be known as "the West Indies Associated States". The new arrangements represented a departure in the United Kingdom's decolonization policies. While the status of association was not completely without precedent in the world, certain features of the proposed arrangement with the six Territories in question were quite new. He would therefore explain them at some length and he hoped to be able to supplement the information which he was now giving by circulating the relevant United Kingdom White Papers to members of the Committee.

676. A detailed explanation of his Government's proposals and the processes by which they had been worked out had been given to Sub-Committee III in September 1966 and was summarized in document A/6300/Rev.1, chapter XXIII, annex, paragraphs 139-169. He had made clear in that statement that the new arrangements were to be brought into effect early in 1967. His delegation had also kept the Secretariat fully supplied with relevant material, and many of the basic documents were reproduced in the working paper (see paras. 133-143 above).

677. The first point he hoped to establish was that, under the new arrangements, the six Territories would enjoy a full measure of self-government. They would be completely autonomous in their internal affairs and his Government's obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter would thus be fully discharged. Secondly, the Territories would enter into a strictly voluntary association with the United Kingdom, an association under which each Territory would be entirely free to declare itself independent, in accordance with the agreed constitutional processes, at any time it might wish to do so. Similarly, each island would be entirely free to sever its association with the United Kingdom and enter into

an association with any other State. Thirdly, the new arrangements had been worked out in full consultation with the people of the particular Territory concerned and had been freely and willingly accepted by the people. Clearly, therefore, everything that had been done and was to be done was fully in accordance with his Government's obligations under the United Nations Charter and with the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

678. Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla (as well as Montserrat) formed part of the Leeward Islands, while Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada formed part of the Windward Islands. None of the six Territories had a population larger than about 94,000, and it had therefore been felt that the best hope of their future lay in association together. The Federation of the West Indies, including the Territories now under consideration and several other Caribbean territories, had come into being in January 1958 and a date for the Federation's independence (in May 1962) had been set, but it had been dissolved in 1962 following the withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Discussions had followed concerning a possible new federation to include Barbados, the six Territories now under consideration and Montserrat-though Grenada had withdrawn from the negotiations in 1962, declaring its intention to seek association with Trinidad and Tobago. By the end of 1964, a considerable measure of agreement had been reached but there had still been serious disagreements on a number of fundamental matters. In April 1965, Antigua had withdrawn from the discussions. Barbados had consequently decided to proceed to separate independence, and had become independent in November 1966. It had thus become evident that there was no immediate prospect of securing agreement on a federation in which the smaller Territories would become fully independent. The United Kingdom Government and many of the territorial Governments had made it clear that they still regarded some form of association between the Territories as the best course, but it had become obvious that, for the time being, some other way forward would have to be found.

679. Throughout the period which he had described, the six islands had already been largely self-governing, but the arrangements in force had not constituted full internal self-government.

680. The economic background against which the United Kingdom Government and the Governments of the six Territories had been considering the question of constitutional advance was fully described in his delegation's statement to Sub-Committee III (A/6300/Rev.1, chapter XXII, annex, paras. 146-149). The six Territories had received over \$US28 million in the last ten years in development grants, and there had been other forms of aid such as budgetary grants (\$3.5 million last year). The total amount of United Kingdom aid to the six Territories in the financial year 1965-1966 had been around \$US6.25 million, and in 1966-1967 it was likely to be about \$US9.15 million. In 1966, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada had sponsored a Tripartite Economic Survey of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands. The main recommendation of the Survey had concerned the need for full regional economic co-operation. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had been asked to sponsor a study of a possible regional development bank which would also include the independent Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean. The island Governments had also agreed to form a regional development

committee with which the Governments which had sponsored the Tripartite Economic Survey would be associated.

681. Reverting to the question of the constitutional proposals, he said that the islands had strong links with the United Kingdom, both of sentiment and economic interest, and were anxious to preserve those links. However, several of the island Governments had requested greater control over internal affairs. The United Kingdom Government had therefore sought to devise a new relationship between Territories which would be consistent with their political maturity but enable them to continue such links with the United Kingdom as they might wish to preserve. Under new proposals put to the Territories in the autumn of 1965, it had been suggested that each Territory should become a State in association with the United Kingdom, each with full control over its internal affairs, the right to amend its own constitution and the power to end its association with the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom would accept responsibility for the defence and external affairs of the Territories as long as the association continued. The States would continue to be eligible to receive United Kingdom aid. The Governments of the Territories had indicated their general acceptance of the proposals as a basis for negotiation, and in the case of each Territory a conference had been held with the Government of the Territory and members of all parties represented in the elected legislatures. At the first Conference, with Antigua, it had been agreed that, although the United Kingdom Government should have the ultimate responsibility in defence and external affairs, it would proceed throughout in consultation with the Government of Antigua, and the United Kingdom Government promised to delegate to Antigua a substantial amount of authority over Antigua's external relations. Full agreement had also been reached on an outline of the new internal Constitution of Antigua, under which the Antigua Parliament would be free to amend or replace the Constitution, which would be fully democratic and include safeguards for human rights. The Governor would exercise the powers of constitutional Head of State, acting in all respects on the advice of his ministers, and would not be in any way subject to the United Kingdom Government's instructions. The House of Representatives, like the existing Legislative Council, would be elected by universal suffrage, and executive authority would be exercised by a Cabinet under a Premier who commanded a majority in the House. The Senate would have limited delaying powers and its composition would represent broadly the position of the parties in the lower House. There would be certain entrenched clauses of the Constitution which could be amended only after approval by a two-thirds majority in a referendum. However, it had been agreed that there would be no need for a referendum in connexion with a bill that terminated the association between the United Kingdom and Antigua and brought into effect arrangements under which Antigua joined with other Commonwealth countries either by union or federation. There would also be no need for approval by referendum if Antigua were joining in some other form of constitutional association with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean under which the latter country would take over the United Kingdom's responsibilities for the defence and external relations of Antigua. Apart from that, Antigua would be free to terminate the association with the United Kingdom at any time by means of the same procedure as would

be applied for amending the entrenched clauses of the Constitution.

682. At the Conference with the representatives of the four Windward Islands, the Windward Islands delegates had called for a closer association in the economic sphere between the United Kingdom and the Territories. However, the United Kingdom delegation had been obliged to point out that such problems lay outside the scope of the Conference. The Windward Islands delegates had accepted that position and the Conference had gone on to work out a series of agreements, covering both the internal constitutions of the Territories and the arrangements for association between each Territory and the United Kingdom, on very similar lines to those worked out in the case of Antigua. The only important difference was that several Windward Islands delegations had asked for assurances that the United Kingdom's power to terminate the association unilaterally would not be exercised in an arbitrary or sudden way. The United Kingdom Government had given an undertaking—which also applied to Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla—that the United Kingdom would not terminate the association without giving six months' notice of its intention to do so, and would be willing to hold a conference with the Territory concerned at which all the implications of termination could be discussed. The United Kingdom Parliament's approval would be sought for any proposal to terminate the association on the United Kingdom side. The Territories themselves were of course free to terminate the association unilaterally regardless of the views of the United Kingdom Government or Parliament,

683. The conference with representatives of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla had also reached full agreement on lines similar to the two previous conferences. At all three conferences, it had been agreed that there should be certain joint arrangements for the courts of the six Territories. In September 1966, a conference had been held in St. Lucia to discuss arrangements for a regional Supreme Court. The conference had reviewed the statutory provisions to be made for the Supreme Court and approved the draft text of an agreement on administrative arrangements for the Court.

684. The arrangements agreed on at those conferences had been subject to the approval of the six legislatures concerned. The proposed arrangements had been approved by a formal resolution in each Territory. In Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, the relevant resolutions had been adopted unanimously. In St. Vincent, the resolution had been passed without a division, although the opposition members had left the Legislative Council before the vote in protest against the unwillingness of the St. Vincent Government to defer the introduction of the new arrangements while certain election petitions were pending. However, it should be noted that the opposition speakers in the debate had not attacked the association arrangements as such and that both Government and opposition leaders had signed the report of the relevant conference in London.

685. In four of the Territories, there had been an additional form of indirect consultation concerning the arrangements in the form of general elections held after the announcement of the United Kingdom's new proposals. In Antigua, a general election had been held in November 1965 at which it had been made clear that the government party, if elected, would seek to negotiate a relationship with the United Kingdom in-

volving increased internal self-government while leaving responsibility for defence and external affairs in the hands of the United Kingdom. The party had won all ten seats in the Legislature and the policy had thus been clearly endorsed by the electorate. In Dominica, elections had been held in January 1966, and the Dominica Labour Party, which had stated that it would seek to negotiate a new relationship with the United Kingdom on the basis of the new proposals, had won ten out of eleven seats. The opposition party had also accepted the new arrangements. In St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, elections had been held in July 1966 and members of all the parties winning seats at the elections had signed the report of the London Conference. In St. Vincent, representatives of both parties had signed the report of the relevant conference. The close results of the general election in August 1966, with election petitions contesting the results in several constituencies, had led to internal political difficulties. Those difficulties had now been resolved following discussions in London between the United Kingdom Ministers and the Chief Minister and Leader of the Opposition in the Territory. It had been agreed in those talks that certain features of the St. Vincent Constitution as agreed at the London Conference should be somewhat modified, that an independent boundary commission should delimit the constituencies, that fresh elections should be held not later than December 1968, and that St. Vincent should proceed to associated statehood not later than 1 June 1967.

686. In Grenada and St. Lucia, the position was slightly different. The Grenada legislature's term ran until the end of 1967 and the St. Lucia legislature's term until July 1969. In each Territory, both government and opposition parties had accepted the new arrangements, except that the Grenada opposition had made reservations on a number of points of detail in the proposed internal constitution. In both cases, the responsibility for recommending the date of new elections if held earlier than the time specified by the Constitution rested explicitly with the Chief Minister. The opposition in Grenada had pressed for fresh elections before the new association arrangements came into effect, and that had been resisted by the elected Grenada Government.

687. The third Territory in which particular difficulties had arisen was St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, where there had been some anxiety in the island of Anguilla about the relationship between Anguilla and the island of St. Kitts. The Anguilla member of the Legislative Council had attended the Constitutional Conference in London and signed the Conference report without reservation. He had subsequently been re-elected as member for Anguilla. It had been agreed at the Conference that a new system of local government should be set up in both Nevis and Anguilla and that that should be provided for in the new constitution. It had been agreed that the local legislature should decide upon the details of the system but that under the constitution there should be separate councils, one for Nevis and one for Anguilla. At least two thirds of each council would be elected. Suitable provisions had accordingly been included in the draft constitution. The special interests of Anguilla were thus fully protected. The recent difficulties in Anguilla had arisen mainly from a misunderstanding about the intentions of the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government. It was the hope of the United Kingdom Government and of the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government that the publication

- of the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Constitution would serve to reassure the people of Anguilla. He would add that the principle of association with the United Kingdom had been fully accepted by the elected representative of the Anguillan people.
- 688. The West Indies Bill to enable the six Territories to assume a new status of association with Britain and generally to give effect to the conclusions of the three London Conferences had passed through Parliament and received the Royal Assent on 16 February 1967. A number of Orders in Council under the West Indies Act would be brought into effect shortly to determine the dates on which the new associations would come into being, and to establish the Constitution of the Territories. The posts of Administrator in each of the six Territories would be abolished under the new Constitution, and a United Kingdom Government representative would in future be the channel of communication between the associated States and the United Kingdom Government. Further details on the agreements between the United Kingdom and the Territories governing the exercise of British responsibility for external affairs and defence, and on the agreed provisions for the internal constitutions of the Territories, were contained in the conference reports and White Papers which his delegation would circulate as soon as possible.
- 689. Thus, the six Territories would be fully selfgoverning. Each Territory's association with the United Kingdom would be entirely voluntary. The West Indies Act laid down that the legislature of any associated State might at any time terminate the status of association, unilaterally and by its own legislation; it was thus open to the associated States in future to proceed either to a declaration of independence or to some form of association with one or more other countries in the area. All those arrangements, both for the internal constitutions of the Territories and for the terms of their association with the United Kingdom, had been worked out in the fullest detail by consultation with the representatives of the peoples of the Territories, and had been fully accepted by those peoples. Indeed, the prime consideration throughout had been action in consultation with the people of the islands. He hoped that when the Special Committee had digested the large amount of information relevant to the matter, it would feel that the people of the Territories deserved to be congratulated on the hard work that had gone into their new status.
- 690. The representative of Mali said that he did not fully understand the relationship between the Governor and the Government of Antigua. If the Government should be out-voted in Parliament, would the Governor fall together with the ministers?
- 691. The representative of Syria remarked that the United Kingdom representative had seemed to give little weight to the reservations of Mr. Gairy, the Leader of the Opposition in Grenada. He asked for clarification of those reservations.
- 692. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that it was clear from the petitioner's statement that the talks on the future status of Grenada had taken place solely between representatives of the Government and the opposition, and that no attempt had been made to ascertain the views of the people. The last time the Special Committee had discussed the question of Grenada, the United King-

- dom delegation had said that there was no special procedure for consulting the people. His delegation was dissatisfied with that statement, and asked the United Kingdom representative what procedure there was for finding out the wishes of the people in regard to the future status of Grenada.
- 693. The representative of Iraq asked whether the financial assistance referred to by the United Kingdom representative came only from the United Kingdom Government or from other Governments as well. He would also like to know what part of such assistance was spent on the salaries of United Kingdom or other foreign officials in the Territories.
- 694. The United Kingdom representative had emphasized the right of the Territories to break away from the association whenever they wished, but he had placed no such emphasis on the way in which the association had been decided upon. He had referred to the two-thirds majority that was required to break away from the association. But four members of the legislative body had resigned over the question of association, leaving the six government members. He wondered whether six members out of ten constituted a two-thirds majority of the electorate or of public opinion in the Territory.
- 695. The representative of Iran asked whether any organic relationship was envisaged for the six Territories which were to be associated with the United Kingdom. Secondly, he would like to know whether the people of the Territories had ever had the opportunity to opt for independence as an alternative to free association with the United Kingdom, and whether they had been educated as to the values to that alternative before their representatives were consulted about their future status.
- 696. The representative of Uruguay pointed out the importance of ensuring that a Territory's emergence from colonial status was effected in accordance with the will of the majority, since the United Nations thereafter ceased to have any jurisdiction. Should the Territories under discussion opt for some form of association, declaration of absolute independence would thereafter be a matter for each associated government to decide, in accordance with the respective constitutions. But if there were special quorums laid down in those constitutions, and the principle of the simple majority was not observed, the decision might be in the hands of minorities and the freedom of the peoples concerned might be restricted. He would like an explicit assurance from the United Kingdom on that point.
- 697. The representative of Tunisia noted that the United Kingdom representative had made no reference to the United Nations when speaking of the Territories under consideration, and asked whether the Organization might not be invited to come and observe on the spot the decolonization process being carried out by the United Kingdom.
- 698. The representative of Bulgaria said that he, too, would like to know more about the procedures used to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of the Territories, and whether they had had an opportunity to opt for independence.
- 699. The representative of Venezuela noted that the Territories constituting the association would enjoy full internal self-government. He would like to know how their external affairs would be conducted.

700. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, said that in most of its Territories the United Kingdom had provided for elections before the passage from self-government to independence. Having negotiated a new status for the Territories under discussion, why had the United Kingdom Government not arranged for elections so that the people could express their views?

701. The United Kingdom representative had said that if the associated States wanted to opt for another status, a two-thirds majority would be required. Why, then, had it not been necessary for the United Kingdom Government to institute a two-thirds majority referendum on the assumption of the new status? He asked whether the United Kingdom Government could not postpone the coming into effect of the new status until the Special Committee had had time to report to the General Assembly.

702. The representative of the United Kingdom, in reply to the preceding questions concerning the new status of association about to come into force between the United Kingdom and five of the six Eastern Caribbean Territories, said that the answers to some of the questions could be found in the documents which his delegation hoped to supply to the Special Committee very shortly. Thus, the question asked by the representative of Mali concerning the precise relationship between the Governor and the Premier and ministers of each of the associated States once they had assumed their new status was answered in the reports of the three London Constitutional Conferences dealing with the internal Constitutions of the Territories. The Governor of each associated State would not in any way be subject to the control of the United Kingdom Government, whose relations with the associated States would be conducted through a separate officer, the United Kingdom Government representative. The Governor of Antigua, for example, would be a purely constitutional head of State, exercising his powers solely on the advice of the Premier and the ministers, and his position would be strictly analogous to that of the Queen in the United Kingdom or the Governor-General in Australia or Sierra Leone.

703. Similarly, the question asked by the representative of Syria about the reservations made by Mr. Gairy, the former Leader of the Opposition in Grenada, to the agreed arrangements for the internal Constitution of Grenada, could be answered by referring to the report of the Windward Islands Conference (mentioned above). Page 11 of that report stated that Mr. Gairy's reservations related to paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 17 of appendix IV, where the outline of the Constitution of Grenada was set out; those paragraphs dealt with the Senate and the House of Representatives, transitional provisions for the Legislature and provisions for union with another Commonwealth country without a referendum.

704. The representative of Uruguay had asked about safeguards to ensure that no change in the status of any island would be made by a minority Government, without satisfactory evidence of a widespread desire for the change among the population. Such safeguards were also described in the three Conference reports. For example, paragraph 20 of the Antigua Conference report³³ stated that termination of the association by Antigua would require a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives and a two-thirds majority in a referendum; however, no referendum would be

required where the association was terminated for the purpose of effecting any form of constitutional association with an independent Commonwealth country of the Caribbean or with one or more other associated States in a new independent unit. While it was now generally accepted that association with Commonwealth neighbours in the Caribbean would not be practicable at present, nevertheless hope was still cherished that such a union might be possible in the future; the requirement of a two-thirds majority in a referendum had therefore been dropped for such cases, with the full agreement of the representatives of the Territories at the three Conferences. A Government which gained only a minority of the votes cast might hold a majority in the Legislature but was unlikely to hold a two-thirds majority of the lower House; there was, therefore, an adequate safeguard against the risk mentioned by the representative of Uruguay.

705. The answer to the question asked by the representative of Venezuela, concerning the external relations of the new associated States, was, very broadly. that the United Kingdom Government would be responsible for the external affairs of each of the associated States but would delegate authority in appropriate fields to the State Governments as far as possible. The detailed arrangements for the administration of external affairs were set out in a Secretariat working paper (see paras. 135-137 above). Under their delegated powers, the State Governments could apply for full or associate membership in United Nations specialized agencies or similar organizations, negotiate and conclude certain types of trade agreements with other countries, arrange visits for commercial purposes, negotiate and sign agreements of purely local concern with any Commonwealth country or United Kingdom Territory in the area, and make various arrangements in matters of foreign aid and other external affairs.

706. The answers to the questions asked by the representative of Iraq about aid to the Eastern Caribbean were not readily available in New York at the moment, but inquiries had been made and he hoped to have the information available shortly.

707. The organic relationship between the six associated States and the United Kingdom, about which the representative of Iran had inquired, would be controlled and defined by the West Indies Act, the separate Constitution Orders containing the Constitutions of the Territories, the Order establishing the West Indies Associated States' Supreme Court, Orders concerning appeals to the Privy Council and compensation and retirement benefits, and a number of agreements between the United Kingdom Government and the States concerning defence and external affairs. Those agreements would be supplemented by dispatches such as those set out in the Conference reports.

708. The representative of Iran had also asked whether the people of the Territories had the opportunity to opt for independence as the alternative to free association. The answer was that once the association arrangements were in force, the people of each State would have the right to decide at any time in favour of independence. The alternative to the proposed association arrangements would have been the indefinite continuance of the islands' colonial status; that would no doubt have been unwelcome to the mem-

³³ Report of the Antigua Constitutional Conference, 1966, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1966 (Cmnd. 2963).

bers of the Special Committee and would certainly have been unacceptable to the United Kingdom Government, as indicated in paragraph 9 of the report of the Windward Islands Conference.

709. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, had asked why the United Kingdom Government had not arranged for a general election or a referendum before any change was made in the status of the Territories. It was indeed true that in a number of other colonial Territories, especially where the proposal to proceed to independence was a matter of local controversy, elections had been held before any final decision had been taken to grant independence. In the case of the six Eastern Caribbean Territories, however, no political party had sought independence and all had agreed in supporting the new association arrangements; furthermore, the decision taken was not final and irrevocable. The provisions for consultation of the whole people concerning their future, through referenda and through their elected legislatures, were embodied in the association arrangements themselves: the advocates of independence would be free under the Constitutions of the States and under the association arrangements to seek support in the Legislature and among the people for constitutional arrangements that would bring about independence.

710. He hoped that his explanation had also answered a number of questions raised by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Iraq, Iran and Bulgaria and by the Chairman.

711. With regard to the specific point raised by the representative of Iraq concerning Grenada, it was true that the six Government members of the Grenada Legislature had not constituted two thirds of the ten-member Legislature; however, the resolution endorsing the new association arrangements had been approved in that Legislature before the resignation of the Opposition members, not by a two-thirds majority but unanimously. The adoption of the resolutions in the other Legislatures had also been unanimous.

712. In four of the six Territories, elections had been held in the context of proposals for the association of the new States with the United Kingdom. In each case, either a party favouring the proposed arrangements had been returned to power with a substantial majority, or else both the Government and the Opposition had supported the arrangements; in the two Territories where no election had been held, there had been similar agreement between the Government and Opposition parties. It was clear, therefore, that the people of each Territory supported the proposed association arrangements.

713. Lastly, in connexion with the questions put by the representative of Tunisia, the United Kingdom Government had always fully recognized the legitimate interest of the United Nations and the international community in that Government's discharge of its responsibilities, under the Charter and otherwise, to the peoples of its dependent Territories. His Government had always co-operated fully with the Special Committee and had provided full and detailed information concerning United Kingdom policies and their execution, in relation to the Eastern Caribbean Territories as to others. Detailed information about the association proposals had been provided in the United Kingdom statement in Sub-Committee III on 8 September 1966; that statement had been incorporated

into the Sub-Committee's report to the Special Committee and the Committee's report to the General Assembly (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, annex); in addition, substantial amounts of information had been available to the Committee and the Secretariat in the form of published documents and other sources. In any event, the Territories were open societies which could be freely visited by anyone, so that it would be impossible to misrepresent the true situation in the Territories or to prevent certain kinds of information from reaching the United Nations.

714. Lastly, the Chairman, speaking as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, had asked whether any of the proposed arrangements might be postponed while the Special Committee considered the matter. It would be very difficult to justify any such postponement to the peoples of the Territories; they knew that all the proposals had been explained to the Special Committee in September 1966 and that in five of the six Territories the new arrangements were scheduled to come into force within a few days. The preparations for the celebration of their new status could clearly not be halted at the eleventh hour. Moreover, virtually all the relevant legislation either had been passed and completed or else was about to come into effect. However, the entry into force of the new association arrangements, with the incomparably wider range of choice open to the people of the new States, need not in any way prevent the Special Committee from continuing its study of the situation in the Eastern Caribbean, and his delegation would be glad to co-operate fully in in that study.

715. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the first statement made by the United Kingdom representative had given his delegation some cause for concern, particularly since it had glossed over some of the conflicts which existed between the aspirations of the people of the Territories and the plans of the administering Power. The pertinent questions which had been put to that representative were evidence of the Committee's anxiety. The United Kingdom representative had again failed to deal with the matters which were of primary concern to the Committee, namely the obligations of the administering Power under the Charter towards its colonized peoples, the responsibility of the United Nations vis-à-vis such peoples and, most important of all, the legitimate aspirations of the colonized peoples to take their rightful place in the world community by their own free choice.

716. The United Kingdom representative had stated categorically that, under the new arrangements, the Territories would attain a full measure of self-government. He himself, however, emphatically rejected that argument. The conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee regarding the six Territories (A/ 6300/Rev.1, para. 469) had reaffirmed that it was for the people of the Territories, and for them alone, to express themselves freely on the form of political status they wished to adopt in order to achieve the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those conclusions had also reaffirmed the right of the people of the Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the various forms of political status open to them and had expressed the belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of the Territories were enabled to express themselves freely on their future status and

in full knowledge of the options available to them. At the present meeting, however, the United Kingdom representative had stated that no arrangements had been made to consult the people as a whole because no irrevocable decision was being taken.

717. The United Kingdom representative had also stated that certain difficulties had arisen in Grenada because the opposition party disagreed with certain provisions in the new constitution and had called for election before the new arrangements came into effect. The administering Power, however, denied responsibility for the holding of elections in Grenada. That situation was reminiscent of other colonial situations in which the United Kingdom had sought to impose its innovations against the wishes of the peoples involved. The Tanzanian delegation continued to maintain that it was the duty of the administering Power to enable the peoples of colonial Territories as a whole to exercise their right to express their wishes fully and freely. That was a cardinal and inalienable right embodied in both the Charter and the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and it had not been safeguarded in Grenada. Also implicit in the Charter and the Declaration was the duty of the administering Power to ensure that the United Nations had a part to play in the exercise of that right. It seemed, however, that the administering Power was neither prepared nor willing to fulfil its obligation to call for elections in the Territories. Moreover, as the petition presented by the leader of the opposition party in Grenada had pointed out, the enforcement of the proposed arrangements would not only be unconstitutional but would deny to the people of Grenada their fundamental right to elect the first two-chamber legislature in their history in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

718. It was important to know, therefore, why the United Kingdom was refusing to change its position. Under the present Constitution, the term of the legislature expired in October 1967, and fresh elections would normally have to be called by the administering Power. However, under the new arrangements, the existing executive and administrative authority was to continue in office for a further five years, which would mean that the people of the Territory would not be consulted on their constitutional status, or fully informed about the situation, for a period of ten years. Indeed, the opposition party had resigned from the legislature to demonstrate the people's opposition to such a denial of their legitimate rights. The United Kingdom Government had therefore not fulfilled its obligation under the Charter and under the Declaration.

719. The United Kingdom representative had also observed that there were certain problems relating to Anguilla and had hoped that the publication of the St. Kitts Constitution, including the local government provisions for Anguilla, would serve as a reassurance to the people of that Territory. If that meant that the provisions it wished to bring into effect in the near future were not even published, then the situation was indeed very serious.

720. His delegation was also apprehensive about the economic aspects of the situation in the six Territories. The United Kingdom had taken pains to emphasize the importance of its economic channels to the Territories and, while he did not wish to discuss the kind of economic aid involved, it was disturbing that so much emphasis was being placed on that aspect at the present

stage. His delegation had always maintained that the right of peoples to self-determination should not be restricted by any economic considerations; the economic viability of any Territory was a matter for the people of that Territory alone. Economic interests had often been used in colonial Territories in the past as a "big stick" to intimidate peoples struggling for their legitimate aspirations.

721. The Special Committee itself also had obligations in respect of the Territories under consideration and was in duty bound to ensure that colonial Powers fulfilled their obligations and that colonized peoples attained self-determination. The situation in the six Territories showed that there were basic contradictions between the people and the colonial authorities which were the result of the attempts of the administering Power to deny the peoples their right to self-determination. The Special Committee should therefore immediately call upon the administering Power to refrain from taking any action to implement its plans which would further jeopardize the legitimate right of the peoples concerned to self-determination, and should also call upon the United Kingdom to consult the people of the Territories as a whole on their future status, through an election or a plebiscite. In that connexion, the Special Committee, as the representative of the United Nations, should decide that it had a part to play in such consulta-

722. The representative of Uruguay said that he wished to give some further clarification of what he had said previously. He had pointed out that, if the peoples of the Territories could not subsequently choose, by a simple majority, to abandon associated status and to assume complete independence, the freedom of the peoples concerned might be restricted. The United Kingdom representative, in his reply, had stressed that a decision in favour of complete independence would require a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives and a two-thirds majority in a referendum. That was precisely his point: those provisions would tend to protect the status quo and limit the possibility of self-determination. There would be no objection to any particular arrangements between a Territory and the former colonial Power provided that, under the Constitution, the indigenous people could opt for complete freedom by a simple majority, but, if not, their freedom of choice would be restricted. With a twothirds majority requirement, a minority could block any decision in favour of complete independence. He thought that that should be a matter of concern to all, and it would be helpful if the point could be clarified.

723. The past decisions of United Nations bodies were favourable to the concept of association, provided that the arrangement was freely chosen by the indigenous people and that their act of choice was supervised by the United Nations. It was not enough to say that no opposition had been expressed to the proposed arrangements; General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) required not merely the absence of opposition but the existence of a positive desire for a particular arrangement. If such a desire was shown to exist, and provided that the associated States could choose complete independence at any time by a simple majority, the Committee might well be happy to support an association arrangement.

724. The representative of Iraq wished to associate himself with the remarks made by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, and particularly with his emphasis on the need for compliance with relevant

United Nations resolutions. United Nations resolutions had repeatedly stressed that the unity of colonial Territories must not be disrupted, whereas the remarks of the United Kingdom representative seemed to leave the door open to fragmentation of the Territories. The Tanzanian representative had also commented on the great stress placed by the United Kingdom representative on its economic assistance to the Territories. He would welcome more detailed information from the United Kingdom representative regarding that assistance. In that connexion, the United Kingdom representative had asserted at the previous meeting that the Territories had strong links with Britain, both of sentiment and of economic interest. He would welcome an explanation of that statement, because he did not know what bonds of sentiment could exist between a former colony and the colonial Power.

725. The United Kingdom representative had also referred to provisions permitting any Territory to terminate its association with the United Kingdom and to join in some form of association with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean. He wondered what the procedure would be if one of the Territories wished to associate itself with a country which was neither a member of the Commonwealth nor situated in the Caribbean. Moreover, he noted that, according to information to be found in the Secretariat working paper, one particular country which was not a member of the Commonwealth was placed in a privileged position as far as scientific and cultural relations were concerned. He would like to know why that exception had been made.

726. The representative of Iran said that he appreciated the comprehensive statement made by the United Kingdom representative in answer to the questions put to him. However, that representative had laid stress on the fact that the decision in favour of association was not irrevocable. But the basic question related to the sovereign rights of the people. It might be possible to agree that the restriction on the sovereign rights of the people inherent in colonial status would be somewhat alleviated as a result of the new status. He noted, however, that the United Kingdom representative had refrained from asserting that the people of the Territory had exercised their right of self-determination. Had they exercised that right by choosing association with the United Kingdom, or had they merely advanced to a higher stage of political development? He would like to know whether the United Kingdom representative considered that the decision constituted an exercise of the right of self-determination. In regaining its full sovereign rights, a people might choose to join with another State, but the people must have an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination in absolute freedom, and there must be some kind of impartial international presence to ensure that that was so.

727. The representative of Syria said that he shared the preoccupations of the representative of Uruguay. A question relating to the destiny of a people should be put to a popular referendum. The United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) spoke of "self-determination" and of the "freely expressed will and desire" of the people. He therefore attached importance to the reservations of the opposition in the case of Grenada. The reservations did not relate to minor matters but, according to the United Kingdom representative, concerned such matters as the Senate, transitional provisions for the legislature and the provi-

sions for union with another Commonwealth country without a referendum. These matters were at the very basis of the proposed constitutional arrangements, which were perhaps intended, as the Uruguayan representative had suggested, to consecrate the *status quo*. He wondered why the simple procedure of self-determination was not applied and why complex procedures were laid down instead.

728. The representative of Venezuela said that he would like to put to the United Kingdom representative a further question concerning the external relations of the future associated States. The document quoted in the Secretariat working paper (see para. 137 above) gave a list of the limited matters in which authority was delegated by the United Kingdom Government to the Government of the particular Territory. In paragraph 2 (f) it was indicated that the Government of the Territory would have authority to negotiate and sign agreements for financial and technical assistance or of a cultural or scientific nature with any member of the Commonwealth or the United States of America or with any international organization of which the United Kingdom was a member. He wondered why the provision discriminated in favour of the United States and excluded, for example, Spanish-speaking countries in the same region.

729. The representative of the United States of America said that her delegation heartily welcomed the initiative taken by the United Kingdom Government and by the Governments of the six Caribbean Territories in drawing up plans for the proposed West Indies Associated States. The new arrangements had been devised through amicable consultations between the Governments involved and appeared to be a workable and appropriate solution to the special problems facing the small Territories. Equally important was the fact that the arrangements had been worked out in consultation with the elected representatives of the people of the islands concerned, and were therefore in accordance with the desires of the people.

730. The negotiations had been conducted by representatives elected through universal adult suffrage who had accepted the methods proposed for amending the new Constitutions. Moreover, the fact that members of opposition parties had attended the constitutional conferences had ensured that all views would be taken into account before definite arrangements were made. That the new arrangements were voluntary was also demonstrated by the fact that no proposal for individual independence had been put forward at the conferences. Furthermore, the representatives of the Windward Islands had requested that the United Kingdom should not terminate the association in an arbitrary or sudden manner, thus showing that there was a desire for continued close association with the United Kingdom.

731. The reservations expressed in the Special Committee on behalf of the leader of the opposition party in Grenada were, in her view, of essentially internal political interest. While there might possibly be some disagreement concerning the internal aspects of the Constitution for Grenada, that Constitution could be amended if a large enough proportion of the electorate so desired, and, in any case, elections would be held in Grenada by January 1968. In conclusion, she said that the formation of the West Indies Associated States represented a new and constructive approach to the problem of the small Territories.

732. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that the question under

consideration had important implications not only for the six Territories concerned but also for many other small Territories. After careful study of the Secretariat document on the six colonial Territories under discussion and of the statement by the United Kingdom representative, his delegation could not but conclude that the United Kingdom had worked out its plans for the future status of the Territories without consulting the people. The future status of any colonial Territory must be settled in accordance with the freely expressed will of its people. It was claimed that the approval of the people had been secured through the legislative organs of the six Territories. But those organs had been elected under the colonial system and were controlled by the United Kingdom administration. The fact that representatives of those organs had been invited to comment on the proposed constitutional reforms could not, therefore, be regarded as tantamount to participation of the people. He reminded the Committee of what Mr. Gairy, the leader of the opposition in Grenada, had said about the demonstrations in Grenada when the territorial government had begun Constitutional discussions with the United Kingdom Government without consulting the people.

733. The situation was complicated by the long-standing refusal of the United Kingdom to co-operate with the United Nations and to allow a mission of the Special Committee to visit the Territories in order to ascertain the views of the inhabitants concerning their future status. The United Nations had therefore been unable to ensure that the peoples of the Territories would be given an opportunity to exercise their sovereign will in conditions of relative freedom. The new status, which would come into effect shortly, had thus been worked out without the approval of the people and in circumvention of the United Nations.

734. The fact that the United Kingdom would retain control over external affairs and defence, which were principal attributes of sovereignty, clearly showed that there could be no question of the Territories being independent. Moreover, there were other provisions in the proposed arrangements indicating that the United Kingdom Government would retain the right to direct interference in the domestic affairs of the Territories (see para. 136 above). The contention that the Territories would enjoy full internal self-government and that the United Kingdom Government had accordingly discharged its obligations under the United Nations Charter was thus meaningless. If in addition it was borne in mind that the executive head of all the socalled associated states was to be appointed by the Queen, that the Territories would continue to be economically dependent on the metropolitan country, and that there would still be military bases in the Territories the measures taken by the United Kingdom Government could certainly not be regarded as putting an end, as claimed, to the colonial relations between those Territories and the United Kingdom. On the contrary, with the introduction of the new status the former colonial dependence would be continued in a new

735. The Special Committee should accordingly state that the peoples of the Caribbean Territories had not had an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence was fully applicable to the Territories, and that the United Kingdom was responsible to the United Nations for complying with the Declaration and with other decisions on the Territories

in particular General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI), which it had completely ignored. The Committee's decisions should also reflect the right of the United Nations to supervise the situation in the Territories for the purpose of assisting their peoples to exercise the right to self-determination and independence.

736. In view of its far-reaching implications, the situation in the Caribbean Territories confronted the Special Committee with a most important task: to recommend to the General Assembly that colonial Powers carry out a series of preparatory measures to ensure that the people of the Territories under their administration had an opportunity to express freely and without hindrance their wishes concerning their future. The measures must be such as effectively to frustrate all attempts by colonial Powers to use various forms of association, integration and so forth as a means either of annexing small Territories completely or of maintaining their former rule under a new label. Failing such measures in the Caribbean, the United Kingdom would have no difficulty in securing a solution in its own interest. There could be no guarantee that other colonial Powers would not follow suit and apply their own versions of decolonization having nothing to do with the true interests of the peoples under their rule. It was no accident that the United States representative had praised the measures taken by the United Kingdom in the Caribbean Territories as a model for the solution of similar problems in the future.

737. The working out of the measures he had suggested would demand great efforts from the Special Committee, since the colonial Powers could be expected to put up stubborn resistance. But such measures were obviously essential. In his delegation's view, the key points were the following:

- (a) Assurance to the indigenous population of all democratic rights and fredoms;
- (b) Withdrawal of the metropolitan country's armed forces and the elimination of foreign military bases;
- (c) Abrogation of all agreements with dependent Territories which could directly or indirectly entail a limitation of their future sovereignty, or which aimed at ensuring special rights and privileges for metropolitan countries, their citizens and enterprises in the Territories;
- (d) Refraining from activities designed to violate the national unity and territorial integrity of a Territory;
- (e) Repeal of all laws, regulations and practices permitting racial discrimination in the political, economic and other spheres of life in colonial Territories;
- (f) Preparation and conduct by the United Nations of elections, on the basis of direct universal suffrage and in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote", and the creation of representative authorities in the colonial Territories.

738. The representative of Bulgaria said that it was clear from recent developments in the six Caribbean Territories, and from the statements made by the representatives of the administering Power and the leader of the opposition party in Grenada, that the Territories had reached an important stage in their development. In view of the special obligations which the United Nations and the Special Committee had towards the Territories and their peoples under the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it was essential to ensure that the development of those Territories took place in conditions which were in conformity with the

democratic principles of the Declaration, the aspirations and interests of the peoples concerned, and their right to self-determination.

739. While it had been stated that as the West Indies Associated States the Territories would become selfgoverning under a new status of association with the United Kingdom, he could not really believe that the new constitutional arrangements, including the provision that the peoples involved were free to change their status at any time, would in fact discharge the obligation which the administering Power had under Chapter XI of the Charter. The main conclusions and recommendations relating to the Territories which the Special Committee had formulated as early as 1964, to the effect that the provisions of the Declaration should be applied in the Territories in accordance with the freely expressed will of the population, remained valid and had been reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI). In his view, constitutional conferences were not the best way of ascertaining the wishes of the people with a view to implementing paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Declaration. The consultations envisaged in the Declaration should not be mere formalities but the first sovereign act of a people exercising their right to self-determination. It was for the people themselves to appoint representatives to draft a new constitution for their new, independent and sovereign State. Any solution to the problems of the small Territories must ensure the correct implementation of the Declaration's provisions regarding the right to self-determination. Moreover, it was the duty of the administering Power and of the Special Committee to recommend measures to ensure that the peoples concerned could fully and freely exercise that right.

740. It was clear that political, economic and social conditions in most colonial Territories, including the small Territories, hampered the exercise of the right to self-determination. Furthermore, the increasing influence of foreign monopolies, which deprived the local population of the possibility of participating in economic life, as well as the existence of foreign military bases and the military arrangements of the colonial Powers, were serious obstacles to the implementation of the Declaration. He regretted that effective co-operation between the Special Committee and the administering Power regarding the six Caribbean Territories had not been possible and that the administering Power had not even agreed to allow a mission to visit the Territories.

741. In conclusion, he observed that the United Nations should not content itself with passively endorsing the decisions of the administering Power, but should, in the spirit of the Charter and of the Declaration, recommend measures that would enable the peoples of colonial Territories freely and fully to decide their future for themselves.

742. The representative of Chile said that his delegation recognized the special difficulties involved in the decolonization of small Territories. The small islands of the Caribbean, in view of their limited population, relative isolation and lack of economic resources, could hardly be viable as independent entities. It was for that reason that attempts had been made to establish federations in the area. In the modern world, where the trend was towards integration and the creation of larger economic units, mini-States were something of an anachronism. Colonialism, however, was also an anachronism and the problem of the economic viability of small Territories should not be used as a pretext to deny peo-

ples the right to self-determination, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

743. It was possible that some of the alternatives to independence mentioned in resolution 1541 (XV) might have practical advantages for particular Territories and might appear desirable as transitional arrangements preceding complete independence; however, according to principle VII in the annex to resolution 1541 (XV) free association with another State should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the Territory concerned, expressed through informed and democratic processes, and the people of the Territory should retain the freedom to modify the Territory's status through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes. In the case of the islands under consideration, he regretted that the association agreements with the United Kingdom had not been based on a referendum in which the peoples of the islands had specifically chosen association with the former administering Power in preference to independence or integration. If that procedure had been followed, the people would have exercised their right to self-determination, as in the case of the Cook

744. He did not doubt the statements of the United Kingdom delegation that the Government and opposition representatives in the various islands had consented to association with the United Kingdom, nor that the arrangement might be materially advantageous to the islands. However, consultation of the people might have led to the same result as that achieved by consulting political leaders and would have been more in accordance with the principle of self-determination. The importance of a United Nations presence before and during such a referendum had also been stressed by the Special Committee and the General Assembly. Reconciliation of those principles with the political reality of the association agreements presented a particularly delicate problem and his delegation would wish to give careful study to any draft resolution or consensus on the subject before taking a final position.

745. The representative of Italy said that in its consideration of the present item the Committee was breaking new ground. In the case of the Territories which it had considered in the past, the Committee's task had been theoretically rather simple, even though it had sometimes been complicated by lack of co-operation on the part of the administering Power. In each case, the two main parties to the problem had been the United Nations on the one hand and the administering Power on the other, and the people of the Territory had been left somewhat in the background. The six Territories under discussion, however, had been discussing their future over a long period and had made much progress towards self-government. There existed territorial Governments, established through democratic procedures on the basis of general elections, and there was no reason to believe that the legislative assemblies of the Territories did not represent the will of the peoples. The new status of association with the United Kingdom had been freely negotiated with the representatives of the Territories and approved by them. The legislative assembly of each Territory had accepted the proposals unanimously, and, in the case of four Territories, the decisions had been further endorsed in recent elections. That was the background against which the situation must be considered.

746. His delegation might have wished that all the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the area had joined

together in a federation, that a referendum had been held in each Territory before the introduction of the new arrangements, that the procedures laid down for subsequent modification of the Territories' constitutional status had been different, and that all the Territories had been economically independent and had not had to rely on financial assistance from the United Kingdom. But the point was not whether the situation was ideal. The Committee's responsibility was to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the new arrangements had been freely accepted by the people of the Territories through their elected representatives and had not been imposed upon them. He believed that that was the case. None of the petitions addressed to the Committee indicated any real opposition to the association arrangements. The case presented by the petitioner from Grenada did not indicate that the majority of the people of Grenada were opposed to the arrangements. In the case of Anguilla, there appeared to be some opposition to union with St. Kitts and Nevis; he hoped that the documents circulated at the present meeting would shed some light on that matter.

747. In conclusion, he said that while sharing some of the misgivings voiced by his colleagues, he felt that the constitutional arrangements agreed upon were along the lines set forth in the past by the Committee with regard to small Territories—it being understood that the populations concerned were free to change their constitutional status in the future as they desired. He wished to emphasize that his delegation considered that the best solution for the Territories in the area lay in some form of federation or association among themselves, and he hoped that some such arrangement would come into being in the near future.

748. The representative of Afghanistan said that the statements of the United Kingdom representative had shed light on some aspects of the question which had previously not been clear to his delegation. However, there were still points which remained somewhat obscure. His delegation was uncertain, for example, as to the effectiveness of the methods by which the population of the Territories had been consulted concerning the proposed new status for their homelands. Had the administering Power taken adequate measures to ensure that the wishes of the peoples of the Territories were respected? Could the Committee be sure that the peoples of the Territories had fully exercised their right to self-determination? Had the question of the economic viability of the new States been sufficiently taken into account? To what extent would it be possible for the new States to receive assistance from the United Kingdom if they subsequently chose complete independence? Could it be assumed that, before the adoption of the new arrangements, all avenues had been explored by the administering Power, in co-operation with all parties concerned, to find ways of bringing about a new union among the Territories and establishing a single economically and administratively viable State? In his view, those questions could have been answered and the Committee would have been in a better position to take a decision if a United Nations visiting mission had been sent to the Territories to ascertain the facts. The problem before the Committee was a colonial problem, and it was essential that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) should be carefully applied. The administering Power was solely responsible for the unconditional implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions and for guaranteeing the progress of the Territories towards genuine independence.

749. The representative of Syria said that, although the statement by the United Kingdom representative had shed some light on the background to the situation in the Caribbean islands under discussion, the Committee still felt that the arrangements made fell short of meeting the requirements of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Were the islands' resources subject to the foreign exploitation mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Declaration? Who controlled the agriculture and the various industries in the Territories? With reference to paragraph 2 of the Declaration, how had the new status of association with the administering Power been agreed upon? The Committee had been told that the the political parties and the elected representatives of the people had concurred, but to what extent were they representative and what had their mandates been when they were elected? What did the masses of the people feel about the new status? Those questions remained unanswered. One thing that was certain was that the elections in question had not taken place under United Nations supervision.

750. Contrary to paragraph 3 of the Declaration, economic and political difficulties were being invoked as a pretext for delaying the independence of the Territories. Special stress was being placed by the administering Power on the fact that the Territories were not economically viable. Yet the administering Power claimed to have fulfilled its obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter. How could it be explained that throughout the years of colonial rule nothing had been done to develop the resources of the Territories? The tripartite survey which had been carried out and the approach which had now, belatedly, been made to the United Nations Development Fund seemed tantamount to a confession that the Territories had been neglected in the past.

751. In view of those cardinal questions, his delegation found itself unable to assess the intentions of the administering Power and the measures which it was taking. Their ultimate effects were hard to predict, and the expectation that they would ameliorate the plight of the inhabitants was highly dubious.

752. The representative of Mali said that the Committee should give serious consideration to the measures it was entitled to propose regarding the full and proper application of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the six Caribbean Territories. The wind of change which had blown through the world after the Second World War had shaken the foundations of the colonial empires set up against the will of the peoples of the third world. The successes achieved in recent years in the struggle for self-determination and independence had given confidence to the peoples of the small territories, and the new developments in the six Caribbean Territories were but a logical development of that courageous struggle.

753. On 27 February, Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla had become States in association with the United Kingdom, and the other Caribbean Territories would assume the same status within a few days. Such developments certainly represented a step forward and the Committee should thank the United Kingdom for having made some concessions. According to the United Kingdom representative, the associated status offered

to the six Territories, together with substantial economic assistance, would bring progress to the islanders. But he himself failed to understand why they had never been consulted. Admittedly, the Governments of the Territories and the leaders of the various opposition parties had participated in the Constitutional Conference; but that should not necessarily exclude popular consultations on the future of the associated States, particularly since the United Kingdom had stated that a two-thirds majority in a referendum would be required for any State to withdraw from the association. He therefore could not agree with the United Kingdom representative that the Territories would be completely autonomous in their internal affairs and that the United Kingdom Government had fully discharged its obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter. The Charter imposed precise obligations upon administering Powers with respect to the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Moreover, the administering Power was not applying the principle enunciated in paragraph 2 of the Declaration, namely that all peoples had the right to selfdetermination and that by virtue of that right they freely determined their political status and freely pursued their economic, social and cultural development.

754. His delegation continued to think that, while some progress had been achieved, the six Territories still remained colonies, and it believed that the Special Committee would share that opinion by continuing to examine the situation in those Territories in the light of Chapter XI of the Charter. It hoped that the United Kingdom would soon fully discharge its obligations to the peoples of the Territories by enabling them freely to express their views according to their own aspirations.

755. The representative of the United Kingdom said that many members of the Committee had asked why the United Kingdom Government had not held referenda, or other means of direct consultation, to ascertain the wishes of the people of the six Territories regarding association with the United Kingdom. In reply, he pointed out, first, that his delegation had already described the exhaustive consultations which had taken place with the elected representatives of all political parties in the Territories—representatives who had been elected by universal suffrage. A referendum was not the only possible method of consultation and, moreover, it was not necessarily the best in all circumstances, since it was difficult to offer a simple "yes or no" alternative to peoples when detailed and complicated proposals were involved. Consultations had therefore been carried out with the people through their elected representatives and the results had been confirmed unanimously by the legislatures in each of the islands, and, in four out of six of the Territories, by recent general

756. Secondly, a referendum implied a choice between two alternatives; however, the option to become independent was inherent in the proposals for association. None of the peoples of the Territories desired immediate independence, although they were free to become independent whenever they wished under the new arrangements. Therefore, the only possible alternative to association would have been continued colonial status—something which the United Kingdom Government itself had made clear it was not prepared to offer to the peoples of the Territories.

757. Thirdly, the new association arrangements were essentially a form of free and democratic choice which was permanently available. Under the new status

the peoples of the Territories were to assume full control over their own destinies. It was surely not being suggested that formal popular consultations had to be held with colonial peoples before they were granted self-government; the Special Committee had never called for a popular referendum on the granting of independence to a colonial Territory. There was therefore no reason to demand a referendum before granting a new status which included full freedom to choose independence at any time and, moreover, gave the peoples concerned a wider area of choice for the future than full independence itself.

758. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the United Kingdom representative had again made it clear that the peoples concerned had not been offered a choice. He himself had pointed out that the United Kingdom Government had not fulfilled its obligations under the Charter and under the Declaration. Moreover, the situation in Grenada was becoming more and more serious, and an appeal had been made to the Committee to take urgent action because, according to the Leader of the Opposition in Grenada, the situation was volcanic.

759. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that he had not said that the peoples of the six Territories had been offered no choice—rather the reverse. Under the new arrangements, the peoples involved had complete freedom to decide upon their own future. With regard to Grenada, he pointed out that no political party in that Territory was opposed to the new association arrangements.

760. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation constantly bore in mind the principle that the people of any Territory under colonial domination had an inalienable right to self-determination and independence. While his delegation recognized that the administering Power had made efforts to achieve that goal in the six Caribbean Territories, it had been disturbed by the United Kingdom representative's emphatic statement that upon the attainment of statehood under the present arrangements the Territories would have attained a full measure of independence. His delegation had the impression that the administering Power was not prepared to go all the way, and he could therefore not agree that the Territories would be attaining a full measure of in-dependence, in accordance with the Charter and with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

761. The spirit of the Charter required complete sovereignty for all peoples under colonial domination; under the present arrangements, that did not seem to be the case with the six Caribbean Territories. If that was so, it was the sacred duty of the Special Committee not only to press for the complete independence of the six Territories but also to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in those Territories.

762. It might be well for the Special Committee to await the reports of its Sub-Committees on small Territories, so that the broad question of the future status of such Territories could be given more serious consideration than hitherto. In view of the current situation, such a procedure should not seriously affect the interests of the six Caribbean Territories.

763. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation had always felt that the United Nations bore a special responsibility towards the small Terri-

tories. The General Assembly did not distinguish between the fundamental rights of peoples to freedom and independence in small territories and large territories; the principles embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) were applicable to all Non-Self-Governing Territories, irrespective of size, population and circumstances. While it was true that the peoples of the small Territories were encountering difficulties in their struggle for independence, they had an inalienable right to express themselves freely regarding their rights under that resolution and the United Nations should assist them to do so. However, in the six Caribbean Territories the United Nations had not been able to fulfil all its obligations and it was regrettable that it had not been possible to send visiting missions there.

764. The six Territories were soon to change their status, although the people as a whole had not been consulted. No one could have questioned the new arrangements had the people of the Territories been an opportunity, under United Nations supervision, to express their views. His delegation could therefore not support the new arrangements since it was not convinced that they reflected the wishes of the peoples concerned; the fact that there had been no opposition on the part of political parties was no substitute for the free expression of the wishes of the people.

765. He, too, thought that the administering Power had failed to fulfil its obligations to the peoples of the six Territories. Although the new arrangements did represent some degree of progress, the United Kingdom continued to have an obligation to the peoples of the Territories and to the United Nations.

766. The representative of Tunisia said that, in replying to questions put by members of the Committee, the United Kingdom representative had confined himself to providing information—something which was hardly adequate in the circumstances. Admittedly, much could be said about the meaning of the obligations of the administering Power towards the Territories, the difference between the nature of Security Council resolutions and General Assembly resolutions, and about the relative merits of the various forms of popular consultation. However, the fact remained that many problems could have been prevented if the United Nations had been more closely involved in the process of decolonization of the six Territories, as it had been, for example, in the case of the association arrangements between New Zealand and the Cook Islands.

767. Certainly, the problems of the six Territories were very complex, and statehood in association with the United Kingdom might well be the best solution. The leader of the opposition in Grenada had not questioned the principle of association as such. However, as the Soviet Union representative had rightly pointed out, the methods used by the United Kingdom to implement the arrangements might set a precedent for the decolonization of other dependent Territories and mean that administering Powers would refuse to cooperate with the United Nations. The Special Committee would be failing in its duty if it endorsed the methods used by the United Kingdom. He therefore considered that the administering Power had not fully fulfilled its obligations towards the Territories, particularly since the United Nations had not been involved in the preparation of the new arrangements. It was to be hoped, however, that the new constitutional arrangements would not stand in the way of a popular consultation to determine the wishes of the peoples concerned.

768. The representative of the United States of America said that her delegation continued to believe that the formation of the West Indies Associated States represented a realistic and effective solution to the problems of the six small Caribbean Territories; indeed, few members of the Committee had presented evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, it was important to ensure that the proposed arrangements reflected the desires of the people involved. The association arrangements had been drawn up after painstaking consultation with the elected representatives of the Territories, but without referenda as such. In four of the six Territories, elections had been held in the context of the association proposals. In the light of the debate in the Committee, and the helpful evidence presented by Mr. Caesar, there seemed to be no reason to question the United Kingdom assertion that the association arrangements were in accord with the present desires of the peoples concerned. Moreover, no critical reaction had been heard from five of the six Territories which had had an opportunity to express themselves through the communications media and through their political organizations and Mr. Caesar's criticisms regarding Grenada had concerned matters of procedure rather than the association proposals as such.

769. Her delegation was satisfied that the elected representatives of the people of the Territories had been given ample opportunity to express their preference for alternative arrangements. Although Mr. Caesar had stated that the Government conducting negotiations for Grenada had had a mandate to arrange for unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago, she herself was no clear about the exact nature of that mandate and the extent to which it should be considered binding. In any case, it did not seem that union with Trinidad and Tobago would now be favoured over the association arrangements in Grenada, and, moreover, the people would now be in a position to decide their future for themselves. The alternatives which the people of the six Territories could consider included those spelled out in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), a resolution which was particularly applicable to small Territories.

770. If the Committee was to give further consideration to the question of the six Territories, she would support the view that the question should be referred to Sub-Committee III.

771. The representative of Poland said that the problems of the six Caribbean Territories did not seem to have been solved in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The primary objective of the Special Committee was to ensure the full implementation of the principles of that Declaration, and he agreed that the Committee should give serious consideration to the future status of the small Territories in question. It was quite obvious that politically the six Caribbean Territories were still far from selfgovernment and independence. Two cardinal attributes of sovereignty, namely foreign relations and defence, had been reserved to the United Kingdom. Therefore, the Territories could not be said to have attained a full measure of self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter and the principles of the Declaration.

772. Another point raised during the discussion had been the course of action taken by the United Kingdom to implement the association proposals. Free association as the term was understood by the Polish delegation meant that peoples of the Territories concerned should take a decision directly through the process of a referendum conducted in an atmosphere of complete freedom and with full knowledge of the various possibilities open to them. That was particularly important since association could lead to serious restrictions of the sovereign rights of the people of the associated Territory. The new arrangements had been devised at constitutional conferences attended by representatives of the United Kingdom Government and of the Governments and political parties of the Territories; however, the legal mandate of the representatives of the Territories was still open to question. Despite those shortcomings, the representatives of the Territories had relinquished a considerable part of the sovereignty of the Territories with regard to defence and external affairs.

773. Admittedly, it might be argued that lack of resistance in the Territories concerned to the new arrangements could be construed as consent. However, as the representative of Uruguay had pointed out, there must be a demonstration of the people's will in favour, rather than a mere absence of opposition. The Committee should threfore not endorse the proposed arrangements but should recommend measures to enable the peoples of the six Territories freely to decide upon their future.

774. The representative of Australia said that the fundamental question before the Committee was whether the six Caribbean Territories had attained a full measure of self-government in accordance with the Charter. Principle VII, contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), set out the requirements which should govern association between an administering Power and a Non-Self-Governing Territory.

775. He had no doubt that the first requirement, namely that free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes, had been fulfilled. No one could contend that the decision to be associated with the United Kingdom had not been voluntary; it had been made by a majority of the freely elected legislatures of the Territories, i.e., a majority of those bodies representing the opinion of the people, which in his view constituted "informed and democratic processes". While it might be argued that a clearer choice should have been given between independence, integration and association, it was a fact that the peoples of the Territories had not wished to seek independence and that all attempts to obtain integration through federation had been unsuccessful. Thus the only alternative to voluntary association would have been continuation of colonial status.

776. Principle VII also required that Territories in association should be free to modify the status of the Territory through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes. That requirement was fulfilled by the constitutional provisions enabling each of the Territories to have its independence, subject to a two-thirds majority. Admittedly, as had been pointed out by the representative of Uruguay, that might mean that a minority could prevail over the wishes of the majority; however, no constitutional instrument was

perfect and, moreover, such a situation was unlikely. In addition, a two-thirds provision for alteration of the Constitution could hardly be considered harmful to democratic constitutional processes since it was included in the constitutions of many independent States to prevent precipitate and irrevocable action on important questions. The General Assembly, too, required a similar two-thirds majority for important questions.

777. The other requirements expressed in Principle VII, namely that the associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people, had also been met by the administering Power. His delegation was therefore convinced that the association arrangements for the six Territories constituted a genuine act of self-determination.

778. The problems of the small Territories were so profound and complex that the Committee should be as flexible as possible in its approach and be cautious about introducing new and more stringent requirements which might delay or even halt the process of decolonization. It should, in particular, avoid laying down arbitrary preconditions which might prejudge the wishes of the people. The representative of Chile had drawn attention to the efforts made to establish a federation in the Carribean in which the chances of economic viability and continued prosperity for the Territories might have been greater. However, although the United Kingdom's attempts to bring the Territories into federation had failed, the possibility of federation still remained open; moreover, there was nothing to suggest that the administering Power had attempted to prevent the formation of such a federation. Petitioners from Grenada had continually spoken about their wish to associate with Trinidad and Tobago; so far, however, the people of Trinidad and Tobago had not given their approval, although it was quite possible that they would do so at some future date. Since federation had proved impossible, the United Kingdom appeared to have done the next best thing: in entering into an association with each of the Territories it would continue to provide economic and other assistance and would also assume many of the international responsibilities of the Territories in accordance with the wishes of their Governments. It seemed, therefore, that the United Kingdom had done as much as it possibly could in what were difficult circumstances.

779. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would now reply to the questions raised in the course of the debate on the Eastern Caribbean islands.

780. The representative of Iraq had asked whether any share of the aid received by the Territories came from sources other than the United Kingdom, and how much of the aid at present provided by the United Kingdom Government was devoted to the support of officials from outside the Territories. Some aid had been given in recent years by the United Nations and the Government of Canada as well as by the United Kingdom Government; in addition, the Territories had benefited directly from a number of schemes begun during the period of The West Indies Federation, financed by the United States Government and recently completed. Only 1.6 per cent of all United Kingdom aid given in 1966 represented payments of any kind to British or other non-

indigenous officials. The representative of Iraq had further suggested that the amount of United Kingdom development aid for the current three-year period (1965 to 1968) of \$13 million might be inconsistent with the figures for total United Kingdom aid to the Territories for the individual financial years 1965-1966 and 1966-1967; however, the latter figures represented the total amount of aid in the form of capital assistance, both grants and loans, budgetary help and technical assistance—whereas the figure of \$13 million represented only development aid in the form of grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. There was thus no inconsistency.

781. The representative of Iraq had inquired about the position of the Territories with regard to association with non-Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, or indeed generally with countries outside the Caribbean. Under the new arrangements the associated States would be entirely free to devise unions or associations with any other sovereign State, provided the necessary constitutional requirements were fulfilled. The only difference was one of procedure: the requirement for approval by a two-thirds majority in a referendum would not arise if the proposal concerned a Commonwealth country or a territory in the Caribbean.

782. The Venezuelan representative had drawn attention to the delegation of executive authority by the United Kingdom Government (see para. 137 above), which would authorize the associated State to negotiate certain agreements with any member of the Commonwealth or the United States of America, but which confined that authority to such countries; he had suggested that that might restrict the dealings of the associated States with their Spanish-speaking neighbours. But it was also stated in the document that "the British Government will give sympathetic consideration to any request by the Government of the Territory for authority to take action on individual questions of external relations not covered by this despatch". An extension of the existing authority to cover agreements with Governments other than those at present specified was thus not necessarily precluded.

783. A number of representatives, notably those of Uruguay and Syria, had criticized the requirements incorporated in the Constitutions of the associated States for two-thirds majorities in order to effect major constitutional changes. It had been suggested that simple majorities would be sufficient. But in many parts of the world the two-thirds majority requirement was a generally accepted safeguard against hasty, arbitrary or ill-considered constitutional change. Indeed, far from the principle of a simple majority being universally accepted for the purpose of determining major constitutional change, a requirement for a substantially larger majority-whether two-thirds, or, in some cases, three-fourths-was enshrined in the constitutions of many of the countries represented on the Special Committee. Article 18 of the United Nations Charter contained a very similar provision. One reason why the framers of those constitutions had decided aginst a simple majority was clearly a desire to protect the basic freedoms and human rights en-shrined in those documents. He appreciated the Uruguayan representative's concern at the possibility that a minority might be able to block major changes, but that was a risk which many other sovereign countries had taken in defence of basic human freedoms. While the associated States would not be completely independent, they would have full authority—unlike United Kingdom colonial territories—to amend their own constitutions and to change their own status. It was for that reason that the safeguards had been thought necessary. Furthermore, the two-thirds majority requirement had been accepted without reservation by all the West Indian delegations at the Constitutional Conferences, and had been subsequently endorsed by the six elected legislatures.

784. The representative of Iran had asked whether and when the Territories would have an act of selfdetermination. The answer was that in the elaboration of the new arrangements there had been not one single act of self-determination but rather continuous exercises of self-determination on several levels: at the level of the general populations, self-determination through the democratic processes of elections and all the other channels of political activity available in a democracy; self-determination through decisions of the elected legislatures, each of which had approved the new arrangements; and self-determination exercised by the elected parties and Governments of the Territories in their conferences and other consultations with the United Kingdom Government. Moreover, selfdetermination would not cease when the new arrangements came into effect, since they provided a permanent machinery for its continuing exercise.

785. The petitioner from Grenada had been asked whether the Grenada Government had received a mandate from the electorate for association with the United Kingdom. His delegation had two comments. First, in four out of the six Territories general elections had been held in the context of proposals for full selfgovernment and association with the United Kingdom; in each case, the result had been an overwhelming endorsement of the proposals. In the remaining two Territories, one of which was Grenada, there had been no recent elections but the political parties-Government and Opposition-had participated in drawing up the new association arrangements and had fully accepted them; their leaders had signed the Conference reports and the legislatures had voted unanimously for the formal resolutions endorsing them. The question of a mandate through a general election had not therefore arisen in those two Territories, since there was no dispute between the parties on that issue.

786. Secondly, under British constitutional forms a Government was elected by the people to govern according to its own best judgment; it was not tied down to a specific mandate, and its accountability lay in the power of the electorate to reject it at the next elections if it used its powers in an unacceptable way. Popular opinion on great issues of political importance naturally influenced Governments in many ways, not only at election time but also between elections, through all the media of communication, through the party organizations and through all the other institutions of representative democracy. It certainly could not be argued, just because in two Territories there had been no elections after the formulation of the association proposals, that there was therefore no evidence of popular acceptance of those arrangements. On the contrary, the evidence was overwhelming. There had been ample time and opportunity for any opposition to the proposals to make itself felt; nothing of the sort had occurred in any of the Territories. The people had expressed, freely and without pressure of any

kind, through their own elected representatives of all parties, their willing approval of the new status.

787. The representative of Sierra Leone had suggested that the six Caribbean Territories were not achieving full independence within the meaning of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). But it was necessary to look into the basic United Nations texts. First of all, there was Chapter XI of the Charter, which defined a dependent Territory or colony as one whose people had "not yet attained a full measure of self-government": the touchstone of decolonization was, therefore, "a full measure of self-government". Secondly, there was resolution 1541 (XV), which laid down the principles to be used in determining whether there was an obligation to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter-which was no mere technical matter, because if there was no such obligation, then the Territory concerned was not a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Chapter XI of the Charter. Resolution 1541 (XV) expressed the view that full self-government could be achieved by sovereign independence, free association or integration with an independent State; principle VII of the resolution described the characteristics of free association, and the new arrangements in the Caribbean Territories were fully consistent with those characteristics. Finally, there was resolution 1514 (XV), which was very familiar to all members of the Special Committee. As the representative of Uruguay had demonstrated, resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), adopted within hours of one another, must be interpreted so as to avoid inconsistencies between the two. Resolution 1541 (XV) laid down some of the alternative methods of decolonization in addition to full sovereign independence; paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) called for immediate steps for the transfer of all powers to the peoples of colonial Territories "in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire". That paragraph could have only one meaning: all powers must be offered to the people and those which they wished to assume and exercise for themselves directly must be transferred to them. In cases where they freely decided to request some other authority to exercise certain limited powers on their behalf, that fundamental recommendation in resolution 1514 (XV) was nevertheless satisfied, especially if, as in the present case, they had the opportunity to assume full powers themselves.

788. In its statement on 21 February (see para. 677 above) his delegation had sought to establish three points. First, that under the new arrangements the six Territories would have full self-government; second, that their association with the United Kingdom was completely voluntary and could be terminated by either side at any time by what was described in principle VII of resolution 1541 (XV) as "democratic means and through constitutional processes". Third, the new status of the Territories had been worked out in a process of prolonged and comprehensive consultation with the peoples and had been freely accepted by them, again through democratic means and due constitutional processes. He believed that his delegation had produced overwhelming evidence to bear out those three points.

789. The representative of Syria noted that the representatives of the United States of America, Australia and the United Kingdom had spoken of the status of association as though it were full association such as that referred to in resolution 1541 (XV). Yet

the administering Power itself spoke, in other respects, of a lesser degree of association in which the six islands would leave their defence and foreign affairs in the care of the administering power. Was that a true association, and would the islands be represented in the United Kingdom Parliament? Or would the United Kingdom Parliament legislate for them, at least in the fields of defence and foreign affairs, without their consent?

790. The next point to which he took exception was one made tacitly by the representative of Italy, and openly by the representative of Australia: that the islands were strictly limited to a choice between maintenance of the colonial status and association. He asked those representatives why the Islands should not be given a choice of association, federation or independence, as they wished.

791. The more his delegation heard about the socalled constitutional arrangements, the more confused it felt. It continued to have strong misgivings.

792. The representative of Italy said that he had spoken of a possible opposition between the ideas of association and federation only in connexion with the petitioner's statement that he would have preferred federation with Trinidad and Tobago. But Trinidad and Tobago was an independent and sovereign country, and unless there was a positive will on the part of that country to form a federation with Grenada, that alternative could not be submitted to the people of Grenada in a referendum. It followed that, even if the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Grenada could be persuaded to postpone the entry into force of the present arrangements, the only choice that could be presented in a referendum would be between association and simple colonial status.

793. The representative of the United Kingdom said that if the Syrian representative studied the text of his delegation's statement he had just made he would find that the association arrangements were indeed fully consistent with resolution 1541 (XV). Secondly, the detailed mechanics for the exercise of the United Kingdom's ultimate responsibilities for defence and external affairs were set out fully in his earlier statements and in the documents provided; those responsibilities would be undertaken always after full consultation, and with the maximum delegation of responsibility. The Syrian representative had asked why the people had not been offered the choice of independence; but such choice was an intrinsic element in the new status and was permanently open to each of the Territories.

794. The representative of Australia said that he would not attempt to answer the representative of Syria, but would simply refer him to the verbatim record of his statement.

795. The representative of Sierra Leone said that one of the points he had emphasized in his statement at the previous meeting was that the Territories would not achieve full sovereign independence under the new arrangements. He noted that the United Kingdom representative had himself admitted as much in the course of his statement at the present meeting.

796. The representative of Uruguay said that the debate had touched on a great many questions, including the validity of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). In that connexion, he quoted from a statement he had made in the Security Council at its 1287th meeting, on the occasion of

Guyana's admission to the United Nations.³⁴ In that statement, he had drawn attention to the changes brought about by the General Assembly through the adoption of resolution 1514 (XV), and had referred to the booklet Las Naciones Unidas y la Descolonización³⁵ by former Ambassador Velázquez, in which it was pointed out that, even if it might be argued that resolution 1514 (XV) went beyond the letter of the United Nations Charter, it was in keeping with its spirit.

797. Resolution 1514 (XV) undoubtedly had its roots in the provisions of Chapters XI and XII of the Charter. According to Article 73, Members of the United Nations having responsibilities for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories accepted the obligation, inter alia, to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples of the Territories, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each Territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement. According to Article 76, the objectives of the Trusteeship System included that of promoting the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants and their progressive development toward self-government or independence. Resolution 1514 (XV) also reflected the provision in Article 55 c of the Charter concerning the promotion of universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, and the reference in Article 1 (2) to the principle of selfdetermination of peoples. Resolution 1514 (XV) thus had its legal and political basis in the text and the spirit of the Charter.

798. In that connexion, it was argued in Las Naciones Unidas y la Descolonización that one of the distinctive features of resolution 1514 (XV) was its stress on the need for the act of self-determination to take place in complete freedom, without any prior conditions, so that the popular will could be authentically expressed beyond all shadow of doubt. It was further suggested that the resolution seemed to open the door to United Nations supervision over the procedures of popular consultation-and not only in the case of integration with an independent State, as provided by resolution 1541 (XV). He himself, in Sub-Committee III, had firmly maintained that there was no incompatibility between resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). He referred members to the summary records of the 52nd meeting of that Sub-Committee, in which he was recorded as arguing that the concept of self-government, in the case of small Territories, could take any of the forms defined in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), and that the procedure proposed in the case of the United States Virgin Islands was consistent with resolution 1541 (XV), which the Sub-Committee had a duty to interpret in conjunction with resolution 1514 (XV) in the case of Territories to which both resolutions were applicable. In the case of small Territories which would not be economically viable as independent States, complete independence would have no real meaning.

³⁴ See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, 1287th meeting, paras. 41-50.
 ³⁵ Carlos María Velázquez, "Las Naciones Unidas y la Descolonización," Anuario Uruguayo de Derecho Internacional 1963 (Montevideo, 1964), Vol. II.

Different arrangements were therefore required to allow them to emerge from colonial status.

799. In speaking of self-determination, resolution 1514 (XV) implied the holding of a referendum. The United Kingdom representative had argued that elections could be just as valid an act of self-determination as a referendum. Neither the Charter nor resolution 1514 (XV) stated how self-determination was to be exercised, but the latter text did specify that the freely expressed will and desire of the people must be respected. The question of the procedure followed might be of secondary importance if one could be sure that the people's elected representatives had a clear mandate to consent to the association of the Territories with the administering Power under the conditions laid down in the agreements. The ideal course was clearly a referendum held under United Nations supervision. As he had argued in his previous statement, it was not enough to say that no opposition had been expressed to the proposed arrangements; there must be a positive desire in favour. The United Kingdom representative seemed to agree with that view, since he had referred to the elections which had taken place. The difficulty for the Committee was that, as a result of electoral acts which the United Nations had not had an opportunity to supervise, it was faced with a fait accompli. What attitude was the Committee to take? As a lawyer, he was in favour of strictly juridical solutions. However, he realized that international law was in a state of development and was not clearly defined; moreover, there were no sanctions by which it could be enforced. Since the Committee was not a law court, what was it to do if resolution 1514 (XV) had in fact been ignored by the United Kingdom? In that regard he referred members to another statement which he had made in the Security Council.³⁶ He had drawn attention in that statement to the dangers of legal dogmatism and had urged that, without compromising principles, peace should be sought through understanding, goodwill and negotiation. That applied also in the task of decolonization. In the same statement he had referred to a comment by de Visscher, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, who had pointed to the danger of trying to make international law an absolutely autonomous system and of closing one's eyes to political and social factors.

800. The difficulty was that, now that the fait accompli had occurred, the United ingdom could not take into account any decision the Committee might take. In substance, the actual solution which had been adopted might be acceptable to the majority of the members of the Committee, and in keeping with the position taken on the question of small Territories by Sub-Committee III, the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly itself. With regard to the procedure which had been followed, however, there had been no United Nations supervision to ensure that the wishes of the people concerning their status had been freely expressed. Should the Committee, in those circumstances, take a decision which would be tantamount to a declaration of war against the United Kingdom? He did not think so. Although it could be said that the procedure followed had not been in conformity with resolution 1514 (XV), he felt that a solution could be sought in consultation with the new Governments of the Territories to which powers

³⁶ See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, 1274th meeting.

had been transferred by the United Kingdom. The political leaders of the islands, whether they belonged to the Government or opposition parties, could be invited to a conference and agreement might be reached on the holding of a referendum so that the act of decolonization could be brought into line with the norms established by the United Nations. The matter could be referred to Sub-Committee III, which would report back to the Special Committee. In that way a realistic and sensible solution could be found to the problem facing the Committee.

D. Preliminary action taken by the Special Committee

- 801. At the 495th meeting on 3 March 1967, of the Special Committee, the representative of Sierra Leone introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378) on the six Territories sponsored by Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.
- 802. The operative part of the draft resolution read as follows:
 - "1. Deeply regrets the failure of the administering Power to implement the relevant General Assembly resolutions, and in particular resolution 1514 (XV);
 - "2. Reaffirms that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) continues to apply to these Territories and calls upon the administering Power to expedite the decolonization of these Territories in conformity with the Declaration contained therein;
 - "3. Requests its Sub-Committee III to examine the situation in these Territories in all its aspects including the possibility of sending a visiting mission and to report to the Special Committee at an early date."
- 803. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the draft resolution incorporated certain broad principles which seemed to have emerged from the discussion. He did not think that there would be any disagreement with the contents of the four preambular paragraphs. Operative paragraph 1, regretting the failure of the administering Power to implement the relevant General Assembly resolutions, particularly resolution 1514 (XV), reflected a position taken by a substantial number of representatives in the debate. The administering Power itself had confined itself to claiming that the Territories had achieved a "full measure of self-government" but that was not the same as independence, even though the United Kingdom delegation had laid much stress on the new status of the Territories. As had been observed in the debate, it was not in the interest of the United Nations to interpret the Charter narrowly, and the spirit of the Charter and of the United Nations resolutions should always be taken into account.
- 804. Operative paragraph 2 re-emphasized that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) continued to apply to the Territories, and called on the administering Power to expedite their decolonization. Although it could be conceded that a change had taken place in the status of the islands, questions had been raised in the Committee concerning the validity of the change, in view of the method of consultation which had been used and the fact that there had been no guarantee of freedom of choice, a guarantee such as only the United Nations could provide.

- 805. Operative paragraph 3 asked Sub-Committee III to examine the situation in the Territories and to consider the possibility of sending a visiting mission. Sub-Committee III, which had already studied the case of the Caribbean islands, would be empowered to make recommendations on such questions as how the people of the islands could exercise self-determination, how their economic viability could be ensured, and how the United Nations could help them to move towards independence at an early date.
- 806. The representative of Syria said that the representative of Sierra Leone had ably demonstrated the need for the adoption of a resolution on the Territories under discussion. The arrangements introduced by the the administering Power clearly fell far short of the goals of resolution 1514 (XV). That fact particularly needed to be stressed in the light of the United Kingdom's surprising claim that it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 73 e of the Charter. The draft resolution should help to close the gap between the goals set forth in that Article and the actual state of affairs in the islands.
- 807. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation would require further time to study the draft resolution; however, on first reading, the text seemed_highly controversial. While asking Sub-Committee III to examine the situation further, it seemed to prejudge many of the main points which Sub-Committee III would have to consider. His delegation emphatically repudiated the suggestion that the six Territories under discussion had not been decolonized. His statement at the previous meeting on the question of resolution 1514 (XV) had not been taken into account, nor did the draft seem to contain any reference to the United Kingdom fulfilment of its Charter obligations in respect of Non-Self-Governing Territories. He would suggest that no vote should be taken on the draft resolution at the present stage, and that it should be referred to Sub-Committee III, which should be given an opportunity to consider the whole matter thoroughly.
- 808. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, despite the remarks of the United Kingdom representative, the validity and applicability of resolution 1514 (XV) could not be called in question. He was not surprised that the United Kingdom delegation should contend that the adoption of the resolution would be tantamount to prejudging the issue. However, the Committee had a mandate to consider all territories that had not achieved independence, whatever the administering Power might assert as to their status. It was undoubtedly correct to state that the United Kingdom had not complied with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of the Territories under discussion. If resolution 1514 (XV) was valid, and covered any Territory that had not achieved independence, it followed that the United Kingdom must be called upon to decolonize the six Territories. The reason why it was proposed that the case should be referred to Sub-Committee III was that there were other matters to be considered, such as the preference which had been given to certain of the countries in the area as far as economic relations were concerned.
- 809. The representative of Italy said that he would like to receive some clarification from the sponsors concerning certain points. His first question applied to operative paragraph 1. The crucial element in decolonization, at least as far as small Territories were concerned, was self-determination, or the consultation of the

populations of the Territories as to their future. Therefore, a failure to implement resolution 1514 (XV) could take two forms: the administering Power might refuse outright to allow the population of a Territory to exercise its right of self-determination, or it might recognize the right to self-determination in principle and try to circumvent it in practice, for example, through the manipulation of elections. He wondered whether the sponsors could indicate which of those possible forms of non-implementation was in question. Or did they consider that complete independence could be granted to the Territories, taking into account their small size and population, quite apart from the fact that the populations concerned had indicated no desire for separate independence.

- 810. His second question concerned operative paragraph 2, and particularly the second part of the paragraph. He wondered whether the sponsors were suggesting that no decolonization at all had taken place in the Territories. In similar resolutions in the past, some formula such as "further decolonization" had been used. He wondered what kind of measures the sponsors considered that the administering Power should adopt in order to comply with the second part of operative paragraph 2.
- 811. Finally, he would like to ask some questions about operative paragraph 3. If the assumptions set forth in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 were accepted, how could those paragraphs be reconciled with operative paragraph 3, and what would be the mandate of Sub-Committee III when the Special Committee had already adopted a radical decision on the situation in the Territories? As a member of Sub-Committee III, Italy feared that the mandate might be so restricted by operative paragraphs 1 and 2 as to make it almost unworkable.
- 812. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation was familiar with the problems under discussion, not only because it was represented in Sub-Committee III but also because of Venezuela's geographical proximity to the islands. It could not be said that the new arrangements for association with the United Kingdom represented a backward step in the political evolution of the Territories. When Sub-Committee III had discussed the Territories in 1966, the situation had been discouraging. Negotiations with a view to a federation had broken down and one of the larger islands in the area had decided to seek separate independence. A formula had now been found which, although it might not be completely compatible with resolution 1514 (XV), was an important step forward and fully in accord both with the provisions of Article 73 e of the Charter and with General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). While his delegation supported resolution 1514 (XV) without any reservations, it believed that a solution of the type envisaged in resolution 1541 (XV), which complemented resolution 1514 (XV), should be perfectly acceptable. Was it right to deplore a positive step forward in the lives of peoples who had been under colonialism for more than a century and a half, because that step did not correspond strictly to resolution 1514 (XV)?
- 813. It was quite correct to point to one shortcoming in the agreements which had been concluded between the administering Power and the representatives of the Territories. Significant decisions of the kind in question required popular consultation. The people had had no opportunity to express their preference among the alternatives open to them. Professor Rousseau, an un-

- questioned authority in the field of international law, had stated that a referendum was an indispensable element in self-determination. Nevertheless, Professor Rousseau had also remarked that a political solution was sometimes more practical than a strictly legal solution. He feared that the discussions in Sub-Committee III would be unduly restricted if the Committee was to state that resolution 1514 (XV) alone was applicable to the Territories.
- 814. His delegation had the highest respect for resolution 1514 (XV); however, in the case of small Territories lacking adequate resources, it was essential to find solutions which would ensure their well-being.
- 815. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the issue before the Special Committee was of great importance to the future work of the United Nations and his country in the field of decolonization. It was not just the future of the Caribbean islands that was at stake; the question was how the best interests of peoples in many other small Territories could be served. Thirty-one of the Territories on the Committee's agenda had populations of less than 100,000. What was done in the case of the Caribbean islands might affect the rest, and the Committee therefore had an obligation to give the whole matter careful thought before reaching any conclusion.
- 816. In the past twenty years colonialism had been largely liquidated, and his own country had played a leading part in that revolutionary development. Ninetynine per cent of the people of the Commonwealth now lived in independent countries. The United Kingdom was now dealing with the remaining 1 per cent. Though the percentage was small, the difficulties were varied and great. Each remaining colonial Territory presented a unique problem and demanded careful study. The problem to which the Special Comimttee must now direct its attention was that of countries too small, too poor or too isolated to stand alone as independent States. Not only were they unable to stand alone; often their peoples did not wish them to do so. There were perhaps thirty countries, many of them small islands, in that category. Their populations were small, but that was no justification for indifference; the problem of the right policy to be pursued in those remaining Territories was of the utmost concern to the United Kingdom, and he trusted that the Special Committee would consider the matter with full regard to the United Nations Charter and the purposes declared by the General Assembly.
- 817. Since the first West Indian Federation Conference at Montego Bay in 1947, the United Kingdom had worked to bring the West Indian colonies to self-government and independence as one united federation. At the last moment, when the date for independence had already been settled, a plebiscite had been called in Jamaica and the federation had been rejected by a narrow majority. Since then, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados had been admitted to the United Nations as separate and independent States. Having served in the Caribbean for nearly ten years, he regarded the collapse of the proposed West Indian Federation as the failure of a fine conception.
- 818. At the time of that failure, five years previously, there had been many Caribbean islands still under United Kingdom administration ranging in population from nearly 100,000 to less than 10,000. All had democratic institutions and long political experience, but many were clearly too small, too isolated

or too poor to carry the superstructure of an independent State. The possibility that many of the smaller islands might form a federation of their own had therefore been exhaustively explored, but, as consultations had proceeded, it had become clear that the islands were not at present prepared to federate. While a closer association perhaps leading to a wider Caribbean federation might still be possible in future, and the door to such a federation had deliberately been left wide open, it had been necessary to respect the wishes of the peoples themselves. Federation having been ruled out, for the present at least, the United Kingdom had then embarked on a series of consultations with the elected leaders of the separate islands, including the leaders of opposition parties. The disagreements arising from many matters of local concern had been resolved, and on the main aims there had been throughout complete agreement between government and opposition leaders. Indeed, all six of the legislatures had voted unanimously for the proposed constitutional advance. The United Kingdom regarded the unanimous vote of a parliament freely elected under full adult suffrage as an ultimate and unassailable expression of the popular will. The wishes of the people thus represented had been accepted by his Government, and put into effect in all the islands concerned except St. Vincent, where the new arrangements would go into effect on 29 May.

819. The principles by which his country and the elected representatives of the islands had been guided in that enterprise were as follows. First, that the islanders should be enabled to manage their own affairs, that the colonial era should be ended, that "a full measure of self-government" should be attained. Second, that in all the arrangements to that end the interests and wishes of the people should be paramount, and that they should be given "a free and voluntary choice . . . through informed and democratic processes". Third, that in each Territory the people should be given "the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people". Fourth, that the peoples should be guaranteed the freedom to modify the status of their Territories — including the right to choose full independence - whenever they wished "through the expression of their will by democratic means". Those aims and principles, maintained throughout the consultations, had been laid down by the United Nations itself, in the Charter and in the General Assembly resolution establishing the principles of free association. To the first two criteria - selfgovernment and free choice - the architects of that resolution had added two essential tests. Were the people free to change their constitution if they wished, and were they free to change their status of association at any time of their own free will? Those tests were the absolute guarantee that the people's wishes would be paramount now and in the future. The new constitutions in the Caribbean not only fully satisfied those tests, but incorporated full and permanent options for the future ranging from new federations or associations to full individual independence if ever the people of each territory should so desire. The United Kingdom could not more clearly have met the requirements which it, and indeed the Special Committee too, were bound to respect. No one who had studied all the documents and statements, particularly the speech made by the Minister of State, Mrs. Judith Hart, in the House of Commons on 31 January 1967, could doubt that

those aims and principles had guided both the representatives of the United Kingdom and the representatives of the islands at every step.

820. The United Kingdom had kept the Special Committee fully informed of its intentions. No one could question his delegation's readiness to co-operate fully with the Committee or its anxiety to place the full facts before it. But it was now faced with a draft resolution (A/AC./109/L.378) which deeply regretted what the United Kingdom had done, There was no acknowledgement of the purposes his country had pursued, no recognition of the processes of democratic consultation, no respect for the wishes of the peoples concerned, no welcome for the self-government achieved, no approval of the right given to the peoples concerned to change their constitutions and to proceed if they so wished to full independence, and no reference at all to the provisions for free association which had been explicitly authorized by the General Assembly. The only reaction in the draft resolution was regret. What deduction was his delegation to draw from the draft resolution? Was it to assume that the sponsors rejected the explicit provisions of Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) and the free expression of the peoples concerned? Did the sponsors wish to stipulate that all the remaining colonial Territories, however small, poor or isolated, must be required to abandon their own freely expressed aims and be forced into independence whether they wanted it or not? Any such arrogant intention would certainly be rejected by the peoples concerned.

821. Beyond expressing deep regret, the draft resolution proposed that Sub-Committee III should consider the whole question further. His delegation had already stated its readiness to co-operate with the Sub-Committee. But if the draft resolution were to be adopted, the United Kingdom would see no justification for further discussion in the Sub-Committee or in the Special Committee. If the Special Committee were to regret what had been done, and thus treat the wishes of the people with contempt, his delegation's cooperation with the Committee on those important issues would be at an end. He was not asking any member of the Committee to abandon his views. But the issues were of far-reaching consequence, and he therefore appealed to the Committee to allow further time for reconsideration of the whole problem.

822. The representative of Finland said that the Special Committee was faced with the complex question of how best to help the peoples of small, isolated Territories to fulfill their aspirations for the future. His delegation felt that the new arrangements outlined for the Caribbean Territories represented a reasonable and practical approach at the present stage. It was its understanding that the association agreement had not met with any real opposition either in the Territories concerned or in the Special Committee. Those arrangements were obviously an important step away from colonialism and towards independence in one form or another. It was not so much the results but the procedure that had been criticized in the Committee. Several delegations had asked why the peoples of the Territories had not been given the opportunity of expressing their choice through a referendum. His delegation would also have preferred a referendum, but it seemed that arrangements had been freely entered into by the elected representatives of the Territories, and that the latter represented the will of the people. He noted that under the new agreements the Territories might opt for full independence if they chose.

823. Draft resolution A/AC.109/L.378 failed to recognize that the new arrangements represented a step in the right direction. The suggestion that the question should be examined by Sub-Committee III was valuable, but the Sub-Committee should be enabled to proceed without the restrictions imposed by the rest of the draft. While appreciating the aims of the sponsors, his delegation would prefer not to vote on the draft resolution but to see the question referred to Sub-Committee III.

824. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the Committee had reached a stage where it should discuss small colonial Territories with particular care so as to ensure that it was not instrumental in selling out the interests of future societies. He rejected the United Kingdom representative's suggestion that the sponsors of the draft resolution had failed to give sufficient thought to the issues or had shown arrogance towards the peoples of the Caribbean Territories. It was the colonial Powers that showed arrogance. He had not been surprised to hear the United Kingdom representative lament the failure of plans for a West Indian federation. The people of the area had passed judgement on those colonial machinations when they had had an opportunity to express themselves; the result had been the emergence of sovereign independent States such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana.

825. The representative of Sierra Leone said that he had always had great faith in the United Nations in general and in the Special Committee in particular. Peoples under colonial rule looked to the Organization to bring them to freedom and independence. With those thoughts in mind, he wished to reply to various points which had been raised in the debate. First, he wished to say that he stood by his previous statement, when he had acknowledged that the administering Power had made efforts in the directions of self-determination and independence for the six Caribbean Territories; nor had he suggested that the problems in that regard were simple.

826. Objections had been raised to the second clause of operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/AC.109/ L.378, in which the administering Power was called upon to expedite the decolonization of the Territories concerned in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). As he understood it, it was argued that Her Majesty, the Queen, by an Act of Parliament, had divested herself of all jurisdiction over the internal affairs of the six Territories in question, and that the Territories had consequently been decolonized. That might possibly be the case de jure, but was it the case de facto? The constitutional text in respect of each Territory stated that executive authority was to be vested in Her Majesty and exercised on her behalf by the Governor, who would be appointed by Her Majesty and hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure. There was nothing in the text which indicated that the Premier, his Cabinet or the people of the Territory had any say in the appointment or removal of the Governor. That did not seem consistent with the basic principle that any association of the kind which had been established should be on the basis of absolute equality. In operative paragraph 6 of resolution 742 (VIII), the General Assembly had stated its view that self-government could be achieved by association with another State if it was done "freely and on the basis of absolute equality". According to operative paragraph 5 of the same resolution,

the validity of any form of association between a Non-Self-Governing Territory and another country depended on the freely expressed will of the people "at the time of the taking of the decision". In the present case, the will of the people had not been expressed at the time of the decision. In those Territories where elections had taken place, the people as a whole had been consulted after the agreements had been reached, and in two Territories they had not yet been consulted. In order to have removed all doubt, the administering Power should have complied with the terms of resolution 742 (VIII), as had been done in the case of the Cook Islands.

827. Those reasons alone would justify the adoption of the draft resolution. However, there was also the matter of defence arrangements. The Governments of the Territories were not to grant access to their territory or territorial waters to the forces or agents of any other Government without the consent of the United Kingdom. He would like to make three points in that regard. Firstly, the provision appeared to deprive the island Governments of the free exercise of the rights involved in a full measure of self-government. Secondly, there was not even a provision to the effect that consent to such an arrangement would not be unreasonably withheld. Thirdly, one would expect an association which was based on absolute equality to require consultation rather than to place one partner in a position of subservience. Clearly, the principle of absolute equality was disregarded. Was there not then a case for deep regret?

828. The Special Committee had been asked by the General Assembly to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in those territories which had not yet attained independence or a full measure of self-government. That was what the draft resolution sought to do.

829. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that his delegation had never compromised on colonial questions and had always given its full support to the cause of small Territories. However, in the case of the Territories under discussion, he found the situation confusing. In view of the new arrangements which had been introduced in the Territories, there was no need, in his view, for the Committee to take an immediate decision on the substance of the problem. The question should be referred to Sub-Committee III, which could study all the legal aspects of the new arrangements. Moreover, the Committee had not had an opportunity to ascertain the views of the islanders themselves about the problems raised. Without taking a position on the substance of the question, he felt that it was wrong, on the basis of present information, to reject whatever steps might have been taken by the administering Power in the direction of the decolonization of the Territories. He agreed that the process of decolonization had not been completed and that resolution 1514 (XV) consequently still applied to the Territories; but he did not think that the Committee should proceed to adopt a resolution such as that contained in document A/AC.109/L.378. He would propose that the question should be referred to Sub-Committee III for detailed study. If that proposal was rejected, his delegation would unfortunately find it very difficult to support the draft resolution before the Committee.

830. The representative of the United Kingdom said he was sure that the representative of Sierra

Leone recognized the particular force of the decisions of a free and sovereign parliament elected by adult suffrage, particularly when such decisions had been approved unanimously. He would ask that representative to consider carefully whether the United Kingdom had acted within the framework of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV); it was his own contention that the United Kingdom and the elected representatives of the Territories had carefully borne that resolution in mind. Moreover, the Committee also had an obligation to pay special attention to it.

831. He did not think that the representative of Tanzania, upon reflection, would wish to maintain his accusation that the endeavours to establish a federation in the Caribbean area had been the result of the machinations of the United Kingdom Government. He himself knew from personal experience that the proposals for a federation had come from the people themselves and from their elected representatives; the efforts made to establish a federation had been made in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people and had not been initiated by the United Kingdom Government, although it had fully supported and encouraged them. When, eventually, one of the entities which formed part of the federation had indicated its unwillingness to continue as a member, the United Kingdom Government had readily accepted the wishes of the peoples involved. The Committee could not disregard the wishes of the people, freely and unanimously expressed through the elected leaders of both majority and minority parties, in free parliaments. The Tanzanian representative had talked of selling out the interests of the colonial peoples. However, the question before the Committee was whether it wished to repudiate the wishes of the people expressed through a free parliamentary system.

832. He had accused neither the Committee nor the sponsors of arrogance. He had merely said that, if the Committee were to treat the wishes of the people of the Territories with contempt, that would be regarded by them as arrogance. In all processes of decolonization it was essential that the freely expressed wishes of the people should be taken into account, and in the six Caribbean Territories the wishes of the people had been freely expressed.

833. He agreed with the representative of the Ivory Coast that further time should be allowed for consideration of the draft resolution. Certainly, the question was not simple; all factors must be considered and due attention paid to the methods employed for consulting the people. The Committee would be losing nothing if it gave further time to Sub-Committee III for consultations, not only with the members of the Committee, but with other interested Member States. The future of the United Nations might well be affected by the status attained by the thirty or more scattered colonial Territories which remained on the Committee's agenda. He therefore proposed that, before proceeding to a vote on the draft resolution, the Committee should refer the question of the six Territories to Sub-Committee III for further consideration.

834. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania observed that the United Kingdom representative had indicated that the United Kingdom had sought to create a federation in the Caribbean and had nearly succeeded, and that only when a plebiscite had been called in Jamaica had the federation been rejected by the people. While he did not wish to interpret the actions of the people, he would assume that they had

rejected the proposals because they did not agree with them.

835. Draft resolution A/AC.109/L.378 provided that the question would subsequently be transmitted to Sub-Committee III. Adoption of the draft resolution would merely reflect the mandate given to the Committee by the General Assembly, namely to consider all Territories that had not yet attained independence; such Territories were covered by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and that fact was reflected in the first two operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. The third operative paragraph met the wishes of the many delegations which had requested that the question should be referred to Sub-Committee III. He would therefore strongly recommend that the Committee adopt the draft resolution, which would in no way prejudice consideration of the question by Sub-Committee III.

836. The representative of Uruguay said that there were a number of basic texts which referred to the issue before the Committee and they should be considered as a whole. It was incorrect to consider that the only text that should govern the Committee's deliberations was General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Admittedly, that resolution was a basic instrument of the international community from which all others flowed, but that did not mean that other texts should not be applied where appropriate.

837. The present debate concerned very small Territories and colonial issues affecting a number of islands which economically, demographically and geographically had limited importance. The total population of all the islands, large and small, which the Committee was now considering, amounted to 480,000. Only a few hours after adopting resolution 1514 (XV), the General Assembly had realized that an additional resolution was necessary to cover very small Territories which could not accede to independence by themselves and which might fall prey to Powers seeking to impose some new form of colonialism upon them. Furthermore, United Nations concern with small territories had not begun when resolution 1514 (XV) had been adopted; General Assembly resolution 742 (XIII) had laid down a list of factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a territory had or had not attained a full measure of self-government. General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) had referred to that resolution, and to resolution 1467 (XIV) which had established a Special Committee of Six on the Transmission of Information under Article 73 e of the Charter, and had stated that the principles proposed by the Committee should be applied in the light of the facts and the circumstances of each case to determine whether or not an obligation existed to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter. Principle III, in the annex to resolution 1541 (XV), indicated that the obligation to transmit information constituted an international obligation and should be carried out with due regard to the fulfilment of international law. Under principle VI, a Non-Self-Governing Territory was said to have reached a full measure of self-government by, inter alia, free association with an independent State. Principle VII stated that free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the Territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes, should respect the individuality of the cultural characteristics of the Territory and its peoples, and retain for the peoples of the Territory the freedom to modify the status of that territory

through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes. It added that the associated Territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people, without precluding consultations as appropriate or necessary. Therefore, the principles governing free association enabled the associated State to exercise its will and to choose complete political independence whenever it wished to do so. Since only General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was mentioned in draft resolution A/AC.109/L.378, the impression might be created that there was only one rule to be followed in respect of decolonization. That would contradict the recommendations of the General Assembly that the small Territories should seek a form of federation or free association which would enable them to develop fully and independently.

838. The fact that resolution 1514 (XV) was not the only relevant text, and that certain Territories were considered exceptions, was clear from what had happened with the former Territories of Basutoland and Bechuanaland. In that connexion, he had stated in the Security Council³⁷ that the accession to independence of Lesotho and Botswana constituted a further affirmation of the spirit of decolonization which was rapidly transforming the political map of the world. He had pointed out that the Sub-Committee set up to study the measures necessary for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland had done all that was necessary to promote the achievement of secure and effective independence in the two countries that were ready and able to enjoy independence, namely Basutoland and Bechuanaland. Both of those Territories were located in a region of southern Africa which was politically in the hands of a non-African minority. The Sub-Committee had therefore taken into account General Assembly resolution 1817 (XVII) and 1954 (XVIII) according to which any attempt to annex Basutoland, Bechuanaland or Swaziland, or to encroach upon their territorial integrity in any way, would be regarded by the United Nations as an act of aggression violating the Charter of the United Nations. He had further stated that there was an urgent need to adopt international guarantees that would effectively protect countries exposed to neighbours whose expansionist aims and objectives were notorious and whose policies of apartheid were repudiated by all civilized people.

839. It was therefore clear that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was not the only resolution applicable to the small Territories. Accordingly, he could not agree that draft resolution A/AC.109/L.378 should refer only to resolution 1514 (XV) and make no mention of the other relevant resolutions. In his view, further consultations should be held before a vote was taken on the draft resolution; Sub-Committee III should give further consideration to the question not only because of its implications for the six Caribbean Territories but also because it might serve as a precedent for similar Territories which had yet to be decolonized. The Committee should certainly be enthusiastic about its task of decolonization, but it should also proceed with caution.

840. In his previous statement, he had drawn attention to the disadvantages of a de facto situation and

37 Ibid., Twenty-first Year, 1306th meeting, paras. 22-34.

had indicated that the Committee could not take a decision that might be tantamount to imposing a casus belli upon the administering Power. That view had acquired added significance because of the request made by the representative of the United Kingdom to refer the item to Sub-Committee III. No one could deny that Uruguay was tirelessly and fearlessly devoted to the cause of decolonization. However, it did feel that the special features of each particular case must be weighed and that, in view of its great responsibilities, the Special Committee must act with prudence. For that reason, the Committee should suspend its debate on the six Caribbean Territories and refer the item to Sub-Committee III for further consideration.

841. The representative of Tunisia said that he realized that one consideration which had led to the submission of a draft resolution was the time factor. The sponsors had been anxious to see the Committee take a decision before the new arrangements came into force. Another consideration was the United Kingdom delegation's statement that, after the new provisions came into force, the administering Power would not consider itself obliged to transmit any further information to the United Nations or to co-operate with the Special Committee. However, as far as the first consideration was concerned, the arrangements had now entered into force for all the Territories except St. Vincent. Secondly, he understood from the statement of the United Kingdom representative at the present meeting that the United Kingdom delegation was ready to continue to co-operate with the Special Committee and to provide it with all necessary information for the study of the question now before it. He was therefore led to wonder whether there was still an urgent need to adopt a draft resolution before the submission of the question to Sub-Committee III. Without prejudice to the position of his delegation on the draft resolution, he wondered whether the United Kingdom delegation could assure him that it would continue to co-operate with the Committee in the study of the question before it and provide all information necessary for that study.

842. The representative of Madagascar said that his delegation had always given its enthusiastic support to all measures adopted in the Committee to hasten decolonization. In the present case, however, he felt that the question should be considered on its merits, free from doctrinaire considerations. The issue was whether certain constitutional changes introduced in certain Territories represented progress in the direction of decolonization. His delegation considered that the best path to independence was the granting of a greater measure of self-government to the elected representatives of the population. The steps taken by the administering Power seemed clearly to constitute a step forward towards self-determination and self-government, and called not for regret but for appreciation or at least for some kind of objective assessment. Many countries had acceded to independence following a process in which they had gradually been given more power over local affairs, a process which had itself stimulated their desire for independence. He was convinced that it would not be long before the population of the islands under discussion would ask for independence, and he was convinced that the United Kingdom would grant that independence when it was requested.

843. He recalled that the constitutional arrangements were not completely in line with resolution 1514 (XV).

As the representative of the United Kingdom had said, there was much still to be done. Improvements were perhaps needed, as for example with regard to the appointment of the Governor, to which reference had been made. It was precisely because of the need for improvements that his delegation supported the proposal of the representative of the Ivory Coast that the question should be referred to Sub-Committee III.

844. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation had no objection to the proposal in the draft resolution that the question should be referred to Sub-Committee III. It disagreed, however, with the statements in operative paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as with the generally negative tone of the draft resolution. Besides referring the question to the Sub-Committee, the draft resolution also appeared to suggest what the outcome of the Sub-Committee's consideration should be. His delegation shared the view expressed by numerous speakers that the association represented a positive step forward. No one had challenged that view, and it therefore seemed inappropriate to begin the operative part of the draft resolution with an expression of deep regret. Furthermore, his delegation had never accepted the view that independence was the only means of terminating non-self-governing status. It continued to believe that the various alternatives set forth in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) were also applicable. In their consultations with the United Kingdom Government, the elected representatives of the Territories under discussion had shown no preference for independence over the present arrangements. In any event, now that they were self-governing, the people of the Territories would have a full opportunity to make future choices for themselves, and could opt for independence whenever they desired. It was not for the Committee to dictate the people's choice. The draft resolution, with its emphasis on a supposed failure to implement resolution 1514 (XV), seemed to suggest that the only acceptable solution was independence. If the matter was to be referred to Sub-Committee III for further examination, it should be done without any such prior findings.

845. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, in reply to the question asked by the representative from Tunisia, he wished to make clear his delegation's attitude with regard to co-operation with the Committee and the Sub-Committee. He did not wish to add to or subtract from what his delegation had already said on that point. If a draft resolution in the terms proposed was adopted, further participation or co-operation by his delegation on the matters under discussion, either in the Sub-Committee or in the Special Committee, would not be possible. If, however, his proposal was adopted and it was decided that the matter should be further considered by the Sub-Committee, he could give an assurance that his delegation would participate fully in the discussion in the Sub-Committee in order to assist it in reaching its conclusions.

846. The representative of Sierra Leone did not think that it was proper for the United Kingdom representative to attempt to influence the vote by a threat. The United Kingdom representative had also asked him to considere the new arrangements in the light of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). But resolution 1541 (XV) dealt with the principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation existed to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter. In any case, the principle of equality, to which he had referred earlier, was en-

shrined in that resolution. According to principle V, if there were elements affecting the relationship between the metropolitan State and the Territory in a manner which arbitrarily placed the Territory in a position or status of subordination, they supported the presumption that there was an obligation to transmit information under Article 73 e. The substance of the case for the draft resolution was that the element of absolute equality was absent in the present arrangements.

847. The Chairman said that he also felt obliged to refer to the statement of the United Kingdom representative concerning the co-operation of his delegation with the Committee. The obligations of the United Kingdom and of other members of the Special Committee flowed from obligations under the Charter and under resolutions of the General Assembly, although it was natural for each delegation to interpret the Charter and United Nations resolutions for itself.

848. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that he wished to associate himself with the remarks made by the representative of Sierra Leone and the Chairman. It would be a sad day for the Committee when its actions were determined by threats of non-co-operation from colonial Powers.

849. His delegation rejected the position of the United Kingdom Government concerning the Territories under discussion and considered that the action called for in the seven-Power draft resolution was correct and necessary. It was therefore strongly opposed to the United Kingdom proposal that the matter should be referred to Sub-Committee III without any action by the Committee, especially in view of the time that had already been spent debating the question. He proposed that the Committee should proceed to the vote on the draft resolution.

850. The representative of Iran said that, following consultations with other members of the Committee, he wished to propose certain amendments to the draft resolution which he hoped would meet the views of a number of delegations which had participated in the debate. Firstly, he proposed that operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution should be deleted. That should satisfy those representatives who felt that there should be no expression of regret in view of the fact that there had been some advance in the Territories' status. Secondly he proposed that present operative paragraph 2 should be amended to read: "Reaffirms that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions continue to apply to these Territories". The administering Power had been asked to expedite decolonization in other relevant resolutions, and there was therefore no need for the last part of the paragraph. In present operative paragraph 3, he proposed the addition of the words "in the light of the recent constitutional developments" after the word "examine". The Sub-Committee must naturally study the situation in the light of the important constitutional developments that had taken place. He hoped that the sponsors of the draft resolution could accept those amendments, and that the United Kingdom delegation would find it possible to withdraw its proposal for referral of the question to Sub-Committee III. In that way the Committee might be able to come near to unanimity.

851. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the sponsors of the draft resolution accepted the amendments submitted by the Iranian delegation. They did so not because of the unfortunate threat which had been made by the United Kingdom delegation at a recent

meeting, but in furtherance of the interests of the Committee and of the peoples of the Territories under discussion. He hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would find the amendments acceptable, and offer its full co-operation to the Committee and the Sub-Committee.

852. The representative of Italy said that the new text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1) resulting from the acceptance by the sponsors of the Iranian amendments went a long way to meet his delegation's point of view. He was glad to note that there was general agreement that the problem should be examined in detail by Sub-Committee III. However, the present wording of the draft resolution still left some doubt in his mind. He felt that the new operative paragraph 1, in reaffirming that resolution 1514 (XV) and other resolutions continued to apply to the Territories, was anticipating the conclusions of the Sub-Committee's deliberations, Resolution 1514 (XV) was certainly the Committee's main guiding resolution, but the question whether resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions had been implemented in the Territories, and to what extent, was one which had not yet been resolved. He therefore proposed that new operative paragraph 1 should be deleted and that new operative paragraph 2 should be amended to read "Requests its Sub-Committee III to examine the situation in these Territories in all its aspects in the light of recent constitutional developments and in the light of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions" (A/AC.109/ L.381). That would give Sub-Committee III the widest possible mandate.

853. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in discussing the important question of the six Caribbean Territories the Committee should adopt an attitude of co-operation without prejudgement. Clearly, General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) were complementary not contradictory and the Committee should take account of both. Free association was a permissible, acceptable, and duly authorized alternative to full independence. The stipulations on that subject in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) had been fully met after the widest consultation between the United Kingdom Government and the islanders and with the unanimous support of the legislatures of the Territories which had been freely elected under full adult suffrage. His delegation had asked whether the sponsors of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378) rejected the explicit provisions of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) and the free expression of the peoples concerned, and whether they wished to stipulate that all the remaining colonial Territories, however small, poor or isolated, must be required to abandon their own freely expressed aims (see para. 820 above). Those important questions remained unanswered.

854. The revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1) did not acknowledge the purposes which the United Kingdom Government and the elected legislatures of the islands concerned had pursued. It did not recognize the processes of democratic consultation which had been so fully and freely employed. It did not respect the wishes of the peoples concerned freely and plainly expressed. It did not welcome the self-government which the United Kingdom Government had granted by its policy and in conformity with its obligations under the Charter. It did not express approval of the right given to the islanders to change their Constitutions and to proceed by their own free will, if

they so wished, to full independence. And it made no reference at all to the provisions governing free association which were explicitly authorized by the General Assembly. Those shortcomings certainly deserved reconsideration.

855. His delegation continued to believe that the issues before the Committee had far-reaching implications not only for the Caribbean Territories but for other Territories as well. He urged the Committee not to make a final judgement at the present stage, but to allow further time for reconsideration of the question and for fruitful co-operation. Full discussion and full co-operation were still possible and still necessary, but without prejudgement. Mrs. Judith Hart, the Minister of State in the Commonwealth Office, who was primarily responsible for the matters now under discussion, would shortly be arriving in New York and was looking forward to holding informal discussions with many delegations in the United Nations. It would be a pity if the Committee took a decision which might preclude such discussions.

856. The Committee must bear in mind the wider question of the future of the scattered and often small colonial Territories that remained throughout the world. What it did in respect of the six Caribbean Territories must necessarily have some influence on its future decisions in respect of those remaining Territories. In proposing that the question should be referred to Sub-Committee III for further consideration, he was not asking any member of the Committee to alter the opinions he had expressed, although he hoped that in listening to further arguments representatives would keep an open mind.

857. While he welcomed the fact that the sponsors of the original draft resolution had taken account of the arguments put forward in the Committee and had made important changes in their revised draft (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1) they were still doing something which should not be done at the present stage, namely, making a prejudgement. The final recommendation to the General Assembly was entirely a question for the Committee itself. It would retain its full powers and full freedom of action. The amendment (A/AC.109/L.381) to the revised draft resolution submitted by the representative of Italy would be acceptable to his delegation.

858. It might well be that the draft resolution as it it stood was not wholly satisfactory to any member of the Committee. After further reflection and consideration a fuller text might emerge that would more adequately reflect the general view. He was not asking for the withdrawal of any of the proposals before the Committee. The consequences of any decision the Committee might take were so far-reaching that it would be well to allow Sub-Committee III to review the entire matter. It had been his experience in the United Nations that, even in cases where opinions were very far apart, and even if only one member believed that there was advantage in further consideration of an issue, such a course would not be precluded. He therefore asked the Committee, in a spirit of the fullest cooperation, to give that opportunity to Sub-Committee III so that an attempt could be made to find a common basis for agreement.

859. He was certainly not offering threats, as had been claimed, but rather co-operation. He would certainly be sorry if the Committee were to reject that co-operation. He was quite ready to discuss the question at full length with Sub-Committee III before a conclu-

sion was reached. He therefore hoped that further time for discussion would be allowed, that Sub-Committee III would be allowed to review the question, that the United Kingdom would not be prevented from cooperating with that Sub-Committee and that the Committee would reserve its judgement on the draft resolution and on the amendment to it.

860. The representative of Uruguay said that the Committee should deal with the matter before it with the required realism. It should be borne in mind, in particular, that free association or complete integration with another State, and political federation or economic union were perfectly legitimate methods of decolonization, the adoption of which might, in some cases, overcome otherwise insurmountable obstacles. General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) should in no case be considered as contradicting the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV), of which it was, in fact, a natural corollary. It was accordingly most important to reaffirm the principle that resolution 1541 (XV) should probably be considered to apply not only to the six Territories with which the Committee was currently dealing but to various other Territories in a similar situation. It would be remembered that when the draft Declaration on the granting of independence was being discussed, some countries had objected to the fact that the text treated complete and immediate independence as the only acceptable goal, which seemed to them to be contrary to the provisions of the Charter concerning the attainment of self-government within broader political associations. On that occasion the United States representative, in particular, had questioned the wisdom of embracing a principle the application of which might, in some cases, lead to undue territorial and political fragmentation, and had stated that full self-government within a broader political system was sometimes more appropriate than complete independence. Mr. Velazquez, a former Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee, commenting on those reservations in an important article in the Anuario Uruguayo de Derecho Internacional,38 stressed the fact that the two resolutions (resolution 1514 (XV) and resolution 1541 (XV)) had been adopted by the same Assembly session with only a few hours' interval and concluded from that that they could not be mutually contradictory. Mr. Velazquez had gone on to consider the hypothesis that independence, as defined in the text of resolution 1514 (XV), was to be considered as a first and absolutely indispensable step, after which—and only then—the Territory which had acquired independence could enter into such commitments as those concerning its association with another State. The hypothesis was, in short, that a people would have to possess, if only for a single instant, the sovereign and complete power of decision characteristic of independence before undertaking further commitments. However, Mr. Velazquez had advanced that hypothesis only to refute it immediately because, as he had said, if it were accepted, all acts of self-determination performed in various territories while they were still subject to colonial rule, in other words, almost all acts so far performed in the colonial sphere, even after the adoption of the Declaration on the granting of independence, would have to be considered null and void. In that way, purism, carried to to the extreme, could eventually negate the very principles underlying the original concept. If that interpretation were accepted, the integration of Greenland with Denmark, for example, and of Surinam with the Netherlands, both of which had occurred prior to the Declaration on the granting of independence, and the integration decisions involving Malaysia, Zanzibar, Kenya and many other cases which had occurred since December 1960 would have to be considered invalid.

861. His delegation rejected that theory and believed that the political and historical facts of the current situation in the British West Indies, despite its obscurities, would have to be faced directly. In fact, a hostile attitude would have much more serious results than a more flexible but more constructive attitude, which would have the advantage of channelling decolonization in the direction desired by the United Nations, while working in harmony with the administering Power.

862. Throughout the debate, his delegation had at all times tried to secure the adoption of a formula which gave equal weight to three fundamental factors: the desire for decolonization, political realism and devotion to the principles of law. The solution adopted at the London conferences were undoubtedly legitimate, since it met the interests of the people concerned. Moreover, it was in accordance with the conclusions and recommendations contained in the reports of Sub-Committee III for 1964, 1965 and 1966, which were adopted by the Special Committee, by the Fourth Committee and by the Assembly itself. The following passage was an extract from the conclusions and recommendations drawn up by the Committee in 1964, as reproduced in the report on its work during 1966:

"The Committee noted that these islands seemed to possess sufficient features in common . . . to make some form of union possible among some, if not all of them. The Committee stated that there appeared to be general agreement among the 'little seven' . . . concerning immediate independence and the formation of some sort of federation." (A/6300/Rev.1, Chap. XXII, para. 2)

Those same formulae of "union" and "federation" had served, in the London constitutional agreements, as a basis for free association between the small West Indian islands and the United Kingdom. The proposed relationship between the United Kingdom and the Territories in question was described in the following terms in the report of the Sub-Committee III on its work in 1966:

"The United Kingdom Government recognized that those requests . . . could not be met merely by the devolution of additional powers upon the local governments in a colonial context and had set out to devise a new relationship that would be consistent with the political maturity of the Territories but would enable them to continue voluntarily such links with the United Kingdom as they wished. . . . The United Kingdom Government had proposed that each Territory should become a State in association with the United Kingdom, with control of its internal affairs and with the right to amend its own constitution, including the power to end the association with the United Kingdom and declare itself independent." (Ibid., chap. XXII, annex, paras. 150 and 151)

Sub-Committee III had therefore taken that situation into account when it drew up its recommendations on completing its work.

863. In those circumstances, the formula agreed upon during the London constitutional conferences was not only not contrary to the principles governing decolonization but also demonstrated, to some degree, a desire to apply the recommendations made by Sub-Committee

³⁸ See foot-note 35 above.

III and therefore, by the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly.

864. It had to be pointed out, however, that the administering Power had not, in fact, organized a referendum to determine the wishes of the people concerning the new arrangements. The United Kingdom delegation had put forward the view that, under the Charter, the referendum was not the only means of applying the principle of self-determination. On that point it was apparently supported by Mr. Velazquez, from whose article in the Anuario Uruguayo de Derecho Internacional he had already quoted. In that article Mr. Velazquez pointed out that when the draft Declaration on the granting of independence was being discussed at the fifteenth session of the Assembly, the colonial Powers had been opposed mainly to paragraph 5 of that Declaration, which referred to immediate measures to be taken to transfer all powers to the people of Non-Self-Governing Territories. In his commentary on that question Mr. Velazquez said it was obvious that wherever such a transfer was mentioned in the Declaration, it could only refer to transfer to the representatives of the people, since modern constitutional law recognized no other system than that of representation, and he had added that the important thing was to ascertain what conditions should be met by those representatives so that the sovereignty transferred to them might be considered to have been transferred to the peoples themselves.

865. Without restating his own personal position, which was in favour of a referendum, he did not feel that the validity of Mr. Velazquez's reasoning could be denied, especially with regard to Territories dependent on the United Kingdom, a country where the will of the people was expressed only through elections, since the formula of a referendum was alien to the British system.

866. It should also not be forgotten that, according to all the versions of the facts, including those put forward by various petitioners, the people of the six Territories were apparently in favour of the system which had been adopted, so that if the people were consulted, a large majority would probably vote "yes".

867. With those considerations in mind the Uruguayan delegation had studied the various proposals which had been submitted on the question before the Committee. As it had not been possible to reach unanimous agreement on the seven-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1) or on the single paragraph proposed by the representative of Italy (A/AC.109/L.381), a number of delegations had proposed the adoption of a new text in place of operative paragraph 1 of the seven-Power draft resolution which would read: "1. Reaffirms that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and other relevant resolutions must be satisfied in these Territories;".* Such a wording would take into account both the principles and the facts: in adopting it, the Committee would remain faithful to resolution 1514 (XV) without ignoring the fait accompli. The adoption of that text would also make it possible to avoid an unfortunate conflict with the administering Power, whose firm desire to collaborate should be recognized. If the situation was considered objectively, it could be asserted that the United Kingdom had taken posi-

tive steps, during the conferences in London, towards the decolonization of and granting of self-government to the Territories in question. The Committee, for the its part, had for several weeks stressed the need for full respect for the principles involved. It was true that it had done so because of its attachment to those principles, but it was also true that, by its insistence, it was, without wishing to do so, opposing their implementation. It would be absurd to attack a state of affairs over which those mainly concerned, namely the people of the Territories under consideration, were apparently rejoicing. In the opinion of the Uruguayan delegation, Sub-Committee III should try to seek a formula which would reconcile what had been accomplished under British law with the principles of international law, and should try to correct a situation which had already been firmly established instead of seeking, puritanically so to speak, to reverse the situation. Decolonization must follow its course and it would be absurd to delay it on the pretext of perfectionism. When, in any instance, that process had already escaped action by the Special Committee, the latter must try to channel and not hinder it.

868. Uruguay had no colonies and was therefore not motivated by any selfish interest in the present instance. It was merely seeking to promote the application of law with respect for political and historical situations which were based on the true will of the people. For that reason, the Uruguayan delegation felt that it must submit its amendment, and urged the co-sponsors of the draft resolution to accept it.

869. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, said that his delegation would try to approach the question from a realistic, but not solely from a legal point of view. The African countries knew very well that the problem of decolonization had to be approached on the basis of experience and it was precisely because there were still subject countries in Africa that the views of the African delegations could not fail to be realistic. At the same time, however, when they cast their votes the African delegations committed themselves more than did other delegations and their votes took on a special importance for them when they considered that they might set a precedent.

870. The United Republic of Tanzania thought that the moment had come to take a decision, if possible, during the current meeting. When the Committee had decided to include the question of the six Territories on its agenda immediately, it had found itself faced with a fait accompli, since it was doubtful that the United Kingdom would have agreed to go back on the arrangements which it had made concerning the status of the Territories under consideration, and that status had become effective while the Committee was debating the question. The Committee should therefore now say what it thought of the new status and judge it in relation to United Nations principles. It was a fact that certain Territories had obtained their independence before the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but, since that resolution had been adopted, it had been called upon to serve as a guiding principle. Tanzania had certainly no intention of telling colonial peoples how they should conduct themselves; nevertheless, it examined any step which might be taken, especially in the present instance, in the context of resolution 1514 (XV). The United Kingdom representative had stated that the six Territories would be completely autonomous in their internal

^{*}Subsequently issued as document A/AC.109/L.387. In the course of the debate the text was orally amended by substituting the word "fulfilled" for the word "satisfied".

affairs and that the United Kingdom Government's obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter would thus be fully discharged (see para. 677 above). That had never been the opinion of Tanzania, which considered that one of the most important points was in fact whether the United Kingdom Government had the right to make such a claim for itself. Without going into the question of whether the new status was agreeable to the people or not, he thought that the Committee should ask itself only whether the United Kingdom had discharged its obligations and whether resolution 1514 (XV) still applied to the case under consideration. If it did, paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1 was almost superfluous since the problem would then, without any doubt, have to be referred to Sub-Committee III. It had emerged from the many consultations held between the United Kingdom and Tanzania that the only difference of opinion between the two countries, although a fundamental one, was whether resolution 1514 (XV) was still applicable to the Territories in question, and that that difference of opinion could not be resolved by further consultations; hence the necessity of taking a decision without further delay.

871. Certain colonial Powers refused to describe their African Territories as colonies and declared that they were an integral part of the metropolitan country. It might happen therefore that one day the Committee might be told that the traditional leaders of those Territories had agreed to the integration of their Territories. For that reason, the Tanzanian delegation wanted a principle to be formulated which would be applicable to all Territories, however small. Of course, Tanzania did not consider independence as the only expression of the right to self-determination: for example, in the Fourth Committee, it had supported the status of the Cook Islands, after making sure that the population had genuinely been able to exercise that right and despite the fact that they had not in that case chosen independence. He wished to make it clear that the Tanzanian delegation's support for the draft resolution now before the Committee was in no way dictated by a feeling of hostility towards the United Kingdom. The Tanzanian delegation had more than once recognized the spirit of co-operation shown by the United Kingdom Government in its relations with the Committee of Twenty-Four. But that did not justify the blind abandonment of principles. He was, moreover, convinced that the United Kingdom Government would continue to co-operate with the Committee of Twenty-Four.

872. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1) considered that in its present form it represented the minimum that the Committee should do for the people of the six Territories. The Tanzanian delegation hoped therefore that the Committee would take an immediate decision, since further consultations seemed useless, and that, when the matter was referred to Sub-Committee III, the United Kingdom would give the latter the benefit of its co-operation

873. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that his delegation had already stated its position on the question before the Committee and that that position remained unchanged.

874. He wished, however, to make a few comments on the draft resolution submitted to the Committee and on the amendments to that draft resolution submitted by the Italian delegation.

875. The importance of the decision which the Committee must take on the question of the six colonies under United Kingdom administration could escape no one: the future of the population of those Territories was at stake. For three weeks the Committee had discussed the question of whether the changes introduced in the constitutional status of those Territories by the administering Power were in keeping with the requirements of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and with the provisions of the Charter and of other documents which recognized the right of any people to selfdetermination and independence. The Committee must also decide whether the administering Power had discharged all its obligations under those documents and under the General Assembly decisions on a question of such importance as the future situation of States, although that was a question which must finally be decided by the people and by the people alone.

876. To answer those questions, the Committee should first examine the conditions under which the people of the Territories in question had exercised their right of self-determination with a view to determining whether they had made a free and unobstructed decision regarding the constitutional changes and their future status. It was clear from the information submitted to the Committee that that had not been the case or, at all events, that the methods employed by the administering Power had not been in keeping with the principles set out in the Charter and the Declaration. It was not merely by chance that a majority of the Committee's members had, after careful consideration, concluded that the assurances offered in that regard by the administering Power were without any real basis. The peoples of the Territories under consideration had not been given an opportunity to make a direct choice. The only alternative offered to them had been that of rejecting or accepting the status of associated States, and the possibility of independence had not even been debated by the Constitutional Conference. Since conditions under which the people could make a free choice had not been created, it was reasonable to conclude that the provisions of the Declaration relating to the opportunity to make that choice had not been complied with. That was an essential point which the Committee should consider in deciding whether or not the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) had been implemented.

877. Negotiations held with members of the legislative bodies of the Territories under consideration could in no sense be described as constituting a popular consultation. Under the conditions of colonial administration, such bodies could not be regarded as speaking for the people. That had been apparent during the events which had occurred in Grenada in connexion with the constitutional reforms introduced by the colonial Power; in that instance, the elected representatives of the people had negotiated on the basis of principles completely different from those which the voters had asked them to uphold and the people's wishes had thus been flagrantly disregarded. It had been argued in the Committee that the fact that the people of Grenada wished to be united with the other Territories did not mean that Trinidad and Tobago, for example, also wished to enter into such an association. However, that was not the point at issue; what concerned the Committee was the fact that the representatives of Grenada had not taken the people's wishes into account, By choosing the path of association with the United

Kingdom, they had disregarded the instructions which they had received from the Territory's inhabitants.

878. The explanations given by the United Kingdom representative made it clear that the administering Power had no intention whatever of holding a genuine popular consultation. It was true that provision had been made for permitting the inhabitants of the islands to unite, through certain constitutional procedures, with other British Commonwealth Territories in the area. The constitutional agreements that had been entered into also reserved the people's right to become independent, but that decision would have to be taken by a two-thirds majority. In actual fact, there was no question of a referendum, unless perhaps on some remote and hypothetical future occasion. For the present, the people had been given no opportunity to make their opinions known; they had not been invited to express their views on association with the United Kingdom. As the representative of Uruguay had observed, the administering Power had employed a procedure to which the Committee could not give its approval. It was therefore not surprising that the United Kingdom refused to permit a United Nations visiting mission to be sent to the Territories.

879. With regard to the intrinsic value of the constitutional provisions which had been enacted, his delegation noted that the status of associated State did not in any sense terminate the colonial relationship between the Territories and the United Kingdom. For example, the United Kingdom Government reserved the right to intervene directly in the internal affairs of the Territories without even being requested to do so by the local government in matters of defence and foreign relations. It could not even be said that the Territories were being accorded internal self-government. There was therefore every reason to conclude that the United Kingdom had not implemented General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

880. In the present circumstances, the Special Committee could not simply refer the question to Sub-Committee III, as the United Kingdom and the United States wished it to do. If the Committee yielded to such pressure, it would delay still further a settlement of that important question and would betray the trust of the peoples concerned. On the contrary, the Committee must state clearly and unambiguously that the United Kingdom had not discharged its obligations, since association was not a first step towards independence and sovereignty.

881. It was therefore the Committee's duty to follow the situation and to make certain that the administering Power took steps in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations. That was why his delegation supported the draft resolution previously submitted by the Afro-Asian countries (A/AC.109/L.378). Unlike the revised version (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1), that text correctly described the Committee's position with regard to the status proposed for the Territories under consideration and stated unequivocally that the administering Power had failed to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. However, since the revised version also said that resolution 1514 (XV) continued to apply to the Territories in question, his delegation would vote in favour of the new text.

882. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that he deeply regretted the serious allegations just made against the peoples of the West Indies Associated

States. The Soviet representative had stated that the peoples concerned had not been given an opportunity to make a genuine choice, that they had not been consulted and, furthermore, that their elected representatives could not be regarded as actually speaking on their behalf. He wished to point out that all representatives, including both elected representatives and the leaders of opposition parties, had been duly consulted. One could only deplore the Soviet representative's remarks, which would certainly be regarded as an insult in the Territories concerned.

883. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said he wished to state once again that the peoples of colonial Territories must be called upon, in all parts of the world and under all circumstances, to decide their own political status, as was their inalienable right. That was the meaning of his delegation's statements.

884. The reply of the representative of the United Kingdom had not provided the Committee with any new information. The fact remained that the people had not had an opportunity to make a choice and that they had not been consulted in a direct, democratic manner. The administering Power had disregarded the General Assembly's decisions, especially resolution 2232 (XXI), which called upon it to permit the sending of a United Nations visiting mission to the Territories. Similarly, the administering Power had taken no steps to withdraw its troops from the Territories in question or to dismantle the military bases which it had established there. The examples of Ascención Island and Aden provided ample proof that in colonial countries the exercise of the sovereign rights of the people was incompatible with the maintenance of a foreign military presence. His delegation had merely wished to state again that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) continued to apply to the Territories under consideration, and its concern in that regard was shared by numerous representatives.

885. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he wished to point out once again the representative nature of the elected members of the government councils in the Territories under consideration, where the peoples had more experience of representative democracy than the Soviet Union.

886. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that the views of those persons, whatever might be their representative nature, did not necessarily reflect those of the population, as was shown by the example of Grenada.

887. The representative of Venezuela said that the Special Committee, which was devoted to the principles of resolution 1514 (XV), should always be mindful of the interests and well-being of the people of the Territories with which it was concerned. In the case of small Territories in particular, care must be taken to avoid granting a precarious, fictitious independence. In that connexion, operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1514 (XV) seemed to allow for certain special forms of self-determination and internal self-government.

888. In any event, the Special Committee could not take the place of the persons concerned, particularly the elected representatives—whose representative nature he did not in any sense dispute—in seeking the most appropriate solutions. On the contrary, it was the duty of the Committee to ensure that the will of the people was expressed freely and by democratic means in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV). The people

of the Territories, whose political future was at stake, should therefore—as the United Kingdom representative would perhaps agree—be consulted by means of a referendum in which the alternatives being offered were clearly indicated. Those were the considerations which would guide his delegation in voting on the various proposals before the Committee.

889. The representative of the United Kingdom said that there was general recognition in the Committee of the usefulness of the discussions some members had had with Mrs. Judith Hart, the United Kingdom Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, who was responsible for the Territories under discussion. She also had found the discussions valuable. Some members had also had an opportunity to hold informal talks with Mr. Southwell, Deputy Premier of St. Kitts, who had been Chief Minister when the new arrangements had been approved. He thought that all delegations would agree that the discussions held in recent weeks had been valuable and important. They had raised questions whose scope went far beyond the Caribbean and were at the core of the problem now before the Committee—how smaller, poorer Territories could find their right place in the world and be assisted to make a free choice regarding their future. There were few precedents to turn to. His delegation had given careful study to the principal recent precedent, that of the Cook Islands. The New Zealand Government had taken a wise initiative and the United Nations had played a valuable part in bringing about an agreed result, on the basis of respect for the wishes of the people concerned.

890. The United Kingdom had asked for more time to arrive at a satisfactory solution with regard to the Caribbean Territories; it wished for co-operation without prejudgement. His delegation maintained, first, that General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) were not contradictory but complementary and, secondly, that free association was an acceptable and duly authorized alternative to full independence. The stipulations in resolution 1541 (XV) concerning free association had been fully met with regard to the Territories under discussion, after the widest consultations between the United Kingdom Government and the peoples concerned and after unanimous votes by the legislatures of those Territories, which had been elected by full adult suffrage.

891. Some fundamental questions had been raised in the course of the debate. It was in order to study developments in the Caribbean Territories against the background of those questions that the United Kingdom Government had called for further discussion. One of those questions concerned the effect of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), operative paragraph 5 of which provided that immediate steps should be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of colonial countries and territories in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire. During the discussion of the Cook Islands in 1965, the representative of Iraq had demonstrated that that fundamental requirement would be satisfied if all the powers freely and openly desired by the people of a former colonial territory were transferred to them, including the power to proceed to independence immediately at any time they wished (A/ 6000/Rev.1, chap. VIII, paras. 106-113). That was exactly the situation in the West Indies Associated States.

892. The second fundamental question was whether the only way to comply with the pertinent General

Assembly resolutions was by granting full independence. He did not think that any member of the Committee would wish to answer that question in the affirmative, and the remarks of the representative of Tanzania at the previous meeting had been very relevant in that connexion. The important thing was that the peoples concerned should have independence of choice. That, too, was the case in the Caribbean Territories, where principle VII of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) had been fully respected. A related question was whether the Caribbean Territories should be allowed or encouraged to form a federation. The arrangements made in agreement with the peoples concerned had been deliberately framed to leave open the way to a future federation if the people so wished.

893. Another important question was what was the best method of giving peoples the right to proceed to full independence whenever they wished. In the present instance, provision had been made for a referendum. There might be differing views on the virtues of a referendum, but it had been readily accepted by all the peoples concerned. A further question was that of United Nations involvement. The United Nations had in some cases in the past supervised plebiscites and elections, but there was no prescribed form for United Nations involvement and none of the relevant General Assembly resolutions laid down any requirement of that sort. There was room for discussion of whether the United Nations might be called upon to play a new part in order to safeguard the interests and wishes of the people themselves. That might usefully be discussed in the Committee with the aim of finding an answer to the overriding question of the best method of consulting public opinion. At the previous meeting the Uruguayan representative had discussed the advantages of a referendum, which were many. It had been said by others that if a referendum had been held in the islands, the result might have been exactly the same as it was at present and the Committee would have been entirely satisfied. If that was so, all that was necessary now was evidence that in fact the arrangements made were in full accordance with the wishes of the people. As the Tanzanian representative had said, the choice of the people was for them to decide and not for the Committee to dictate. If the evidence available was not sufficient, further evidence could probably be procured. For instance, it might be possible to arrange direct contact between the Committee and the Associated States' elected leaders. He was sure that, given time, his delegation could lav the Committee's doubts to rest.

894. The United Kingdom had always strongly defended the parliamentary system. A referendum could answer a few simple questions but a new constitution was not a simple question, and it had to be worked out by negotiation between accredited representatives of the people. That could be done at a conference but not in a referendum.

895. The United Kingdom, which had the greatest remaining colonial responsibilities of any Power, had always favoured the closest co-operation with the United Nations, particularly with the bodies dealing with colonialism. Although it had not always shared the views of other delegations, it had always been willing to provide information to explain and justify its policies. He was most anxious that that relationship should continue; nothing but good could come from a continuation of such co-operation.

896. Another and wider question was that of the effectiveness of the work of delegations in the United Nations. In his view, the business of representatives to the United Nations was not merely to state differences but persistently to seek common ground on which agreement could be reached. In that respect there was still a possibility of progress on the matter under discussion. The problem was not only one of the actual facts of the situation; the Committee needed to be assured that what had been done was in accordance not only with the wishes of the people but also with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the other resolutions forming the mandate of the Committee. That being the case, he was convinced that everyone would wish to leave the door open for further consultation, including direct contact between members of the Committee and the elected leaders of the peoples concerned.

897. All the United Kingdom delegation was asking was that the Committee should suspend judgement while preserving freedom of action and decision. That could be done either by adopting the Italian amendment (A/AC.109/L.381) or the Uruguayan amendment (A/AC.109/L.387) or by accepting the United Kingdom proposal to refer the whole matter to the Sub-Committee before taking a final decision. He felt that agreement was close and that there was a general wish to avoid a breach. He appealed to the Committee not to prejudge the issue but to leave the door open for constructive action.

898. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, said that some of the remarks he had made previously had been quoted out of context in the statement just made by the United Kingdom representative and had been given a meaning never intended by his delegation. He hoped that members who wished to know the true meaning of the Tanzanian delegation's statement would read it.

899. The representative of Sierra Leone said that he did not doubt the sincere desire of the United Kingdom Government to fulfil the obligations of Chapter XI of the Charter and of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, paramount among which was General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). His delegation's views as to whether the elections held in the Caribbean Territories under consideration represented the type of consultation envisaged in that resolution had been made clear at an earlier meeting. What he wished to discuss today was operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1, reaffirming that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions continued to apply to those Territories, for he felt that a decision on that subject could affect the future of all the small islands remaining on the Committee's agenda.

900. In the case of the Cook Islands in 1965, a United Nations mission had supervised the elections and submitted a report to the Secretary-General, who in turn had submitted a report to the Committee; the Committee had discussed the item without making any definite pronouncement on the applicability of resolution 1514 (XV). It had been tacitly understood, however, that the resolution continued to apply, until the moment when the General Assembly at its twentieth session had decided that the administering Power need not transmit information concerning the Cook Islands.

901. The Committee seemed unwilling at present to make a definite pronouncement concerning the Carib-

bean islands, but since everyone apparently agreed that the matter should be referred to Sub-Committee III, it seemed obvious that the resolution and Article 73 of the Charter must be regarded as applicable to the Territories until such time as the Special Committee, having examined recommendations of Sub-Committee III, might decide that they were not.

902. The United Kingdom Government had cooperated with the Committee by complying with requests for information and had generally helped it in arriving at solutions; even its views on the question of visiting missions appeared to be closer to those of most members of the Committee than in the past. The United Kingdom's willingness to refer the matter to Sub-Committee III, in his view, indicated agreement that the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) applied until the Committee itself decided otherwise, and his delegation, among others, had expressed the view that any resolution adopted by the Committee should be regarded as temporary and could be superseded by a new decision.

903. A growing number of items before the Special Committee were connected with the difficulties of extremely small Territories. In such Territories the people should be given an opportunity to express their views on their political future, but independence of the kind that had become traditional for larger Territories did not appear feasible for them. The Special Committee must therefore examine very carefully the methods to be followed in dealing with the problems of such mini-territories, among which the Caribbean islands were practically the first to be discussed by the Committee. His delegation wished to avoid the adoption of a formula that some administering Power could misuse in the future. The adoption of operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution did not prejudge the ultimate decision of the Sub-Committee or close the door to any future negotiation.

904. His delegation believed that some progress had been made in the achievement of a new status by the Caribbean islands, and it had therefore agreed to delete a part of the draft resolution which might have been regarded as a condemnation of United Kingdom policies. He hoped that the United Kingdom would co-operate in enabling Sub-Committee III to consider all aspects of the question, including the sending of a visiting mission which could discuss the situation with the new constituent Governments.

905. The representative of Iraq said that the Iraqi delegation's statement in the debate on the Cook Islands, which had been mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, had related to a situation very different from the present situation in the Caribbean islands. First, the authorities of the Territories in the Caribbean had not been given full powers or offered the opportunity to assume them. Secondly, the people of the Cook Islands had been offered four alternatives: complete independence, integration with New Zealand, internal self-government, and federation with the Polynesian groups; he wondered whether a choice among such alternatives had been offered to the peoples of the Caribbean islands. Thirdly, there had been a United Nations Mission in the Cook Islands when the people had taken their decision, while no United Nations presence had been allowed in the Caribbean islands. The United Kingdom representative had spoken, after the final decisions had been taken, of the possibility of direct contact between members of the Special Committee and leaders of the Territories, but he wondered whether that suggestion implied the United Kingdom's agreement to the sending of a visiting mission or whether it meant only that some members of the local government would communicate with members of the Special Committee as petitioners or in some other capacity.

906. Mention had been made of the United Kingdom Government's willingness at all times to cooperate in answering questions and justifying its policy. What the Special Committee wanted, however, was that the United Kingdom should co-operate by changing its policy and helping the Committee in the implementation of United Nations resolutions.

907. The United Kingdom representative had also spoken of composing the differences that separated the administering Powers and the members of the Special Committee, but the most important party to a colonial question was neither the administering Power nor the Committee but the people of the Territory. The members of the Committee could not compromise with the administering Power; both must consider first and foremost the wishes of the people of the Territory and must work to give them the right to decide for themselves what they wanted.

908. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation found it hard to believe that the constitutional arrangements in the six Caribbean Territories were of such a nature as to discharge the obligations of the administering Power under Chapter XI of the Charter. The provision ensuring the people's freedom to decide at any time on a change in their status referred only to the future. His delegation appreciated the sincere efforts of members of the Committee to find a formula which would be acceptable to all and in keeping with the obligations of the United Nations in the historical process of decolonization, but the Organization could not be expected to seek co-operation and unanimity at the cost of abandoning a position of principle. Bulgaria believed that all colonial Territories, irrespective of their size or economic development, ought to be freed from foreign colonial domination and that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) must be implemented in all of them.

909. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1 and hoped that the administering Power would give the Committee its constructive co-operation when the question of the six Territories was discussed again.

910. The representative of Italy, reaffirming his delegation's earlier statement at the 500th meeting, said that the recent constitutional events in the six eastern Caribbean Territories had substantially followed the lines set forth in resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. His delegation welcomed the new arrangements worked out by the freely elected Governments of the six Territories and by the United Kingdom Government, regarding them as a positive step towards the objectives set by the United Nations in respect of colonial peoples and countries. It had proposed an amendment (A/AC.109/L.381) to draft resolution A/AC.109/ L.378 because it believed that operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution seemed to specify in advance one of the conclusions which Sub-Committee III might arrive at after its consideration of the item. The proposal had been intended not to modify the purpose and meaning of the draft resolution but rather to clarify

the issue, so that Sub-Committee III could study the problem without any limitations.

911. He agreed with the Tanzanian delegation that the question of the methods and procedures followed by the administering Power in introducing the new constitutional arrangements could have far-reaching implications affecting other Non-Self-Governing Territories and therefore justified further comprehensive consideration of the item by Sub-Committee III. The aim of the Committee's debate had been precisely that of determining whether, and to what extent, resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions had been implemented and whether, and in what form, they still applied to the Territories in question.

912. In view of the wide agreement as to the meaning of the debate, it might be unfortunate if a vote on the Italian proposal were to emphasize a division of opinion which did not in fact exist. His delegation had therefore decided to withdraw its amendment, provided that the Committee would vote on the Uruguayan draft amendment (A/AC.109/L.387), which could be regarded as a better effort to bridge certain gaps among the various delegations.

913. The representative of the United Kingdom said that if he had misinterpreted what the Chairman had said when speaking as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, he wished to apologize. But he had been greatly impressed by the Chairman's statement that it was for the people themselves to decide what their future should be; that, indeed, was the essence of the case his own delegation had been endeavouring to put to the Committee.

914. While he understood the Sierra Leone representative's anxiety to find a solution acceptable to all, he would again most seriously put to the Committee the basic point that there should be no prejudgement. If the Committee took up a position before hearing all the evidence, he could not see what value there would be in participation by his delegation in any further examination by Sub-Committee III.

915. He assured the representative of Iraq that in quoting from a statement made by his predecessor he had not suggested that the case now before the Committee was exactly comparable with that of the Cook Islands. He had in fact been referring to the principle that the requirements of resolution 1514 (XV) could be met if all the powers desired by the people of a former colonial Territory were transferred to them, including the power to proceed to independence at any moment.

916. The Committee had come a considerable distance towards the action which should now be taken. If the question was referred back to the Sub-Committee without prejudgement, good results could be achieved, and his delegation offered its co-operation on that basis. However strong members' views might be, he hoped that the door would not be closed to the exploration of whatever possibilities there might be for a satisfactory outcome.

917. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, repeated what he had said at the previous meeting: that while his delegation did not challenge the new status accepted by the people of the Caribbean islands, it considered that the obligations of the United Kingdom Government under Chapter XI of the Charter and resolution 1514 (XV) had not been fulfilled.

918. The representative of the United States of America said that it was essential that any further study of the question in the appropriate Sub-Committee be made in the light of the pertinent resolutions, but without an advance decision by the Committee on the outcome. To do otherwise would tie the hands of the Sub-Committee and hamper the effectiveness of its work. Her delegation would accordingly vote for the Uruguayan amendment.

919. The representative of India said that, after listening to the several statements of the administering Power, he felt that there was considerable common ground between the views of the latter and of his own delegation. For example, he agreed with the United Kingdom representative that the highest priority in these considerations should be given to the interests of the peoples of the Territory. He also agreed that resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), both highly respected by his delegation, were not contradictory. By that his delegation meant that in a case where resolution 1541 (XV) might still apply, though not necessarily in every case. However, where resolution 1514 (XV) had been applied, resolution 1541 (XV) could not apply.

920. His delegation also agreed with the United Kingdom that although a referendum might be the ideal way of ascertaining the wishes of the people, it was not the only way. However, all colonial Powers should endeavour to hold referendums in colonial Territories. Nor was a United Nations presence in all colonial Territories essential: if for some reason it had not been possible in a particular Territory, that by itself did not necessarily mean that the people had been unable to exercise their right of self-determination in full con-

formity with the pertinent resolutions.

921. His delegation's difference with the administering Power lay in the former's conviction that the fulfilment of resolution 1541 (XV) did not necessarily preclude the application of resolution 1514 (XV). In the Cook Islands, an election with the proposed constitutional arrangements as its central issue was held in the presence of a United Nations observer who was satisfied that the people had exercised their right of self-determination freely. In spite of these factors, the General Assembly had declared that the administering Powers' obligation to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter had terminated, but that resolution 1514 (XV) nevertheless continued to apply. That meant that should circumstances warrant it, it would be within the competence of the Committee or the General Assembly to reopen discussion on the Cook Islands. Even the administering Power had voted in favour of that resolution.

922. In the case of the Caribbean islands, there had been no elections in some of the Territories. In the others, it was not quite clear whether the proposed constitutional status was the central issue in the elections. However, his delegation was not making a judgement on the issue. Even if the Special Committee was satisfied that the present status was what the people desired, the administering Power still had to agree with the Committee that resolution 1514 (XV) continued to apply. In such a case, the administering Power would no longer be required to provide information about the Territories, but the Committee would still be entitled to reopen the question at a later date if circumstances so warranted.

923. He had been concerned to hear that the United Kingdom delegation was seriously considering the whole

question of its co-operation with the Committee. The United Kingdom had always displayed a very co-operative attitude towards the Committee and his delegation much appreciated it. But adoption of the seven-Power draft resolution would certainly not close the door to co-operation because of the very wide mandate given to Sub-Committee III—to consider whether or not the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) had been satisfied—offered ample scope for continuing co-operation between the United Kingdom delegation and the Special Committee. If Sub-Committee III should find that resolution 1541 (XV) had been implemented and if this finding was accepted by the Special Committee, it would be a considerable achievement.

924. His delegation would abstain on the Uruguayan amendment and vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

925. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that none of the Assembly resolutions pertaining to the Special Committee made any reference to resolution 1541 (XV). The terms of reference of the Special Committee were based exclusively on resolution 1514 (XV).

926. His delegation would vote for the seven-Power draft resolution, for reasons already explained. It would vote against the Uruguayan amendment, for it added nothing and implied that the Committee should take no position on what had happened in the Caribbean Territories. It was no accident that the delegations that were strongly opposed to the adoption of any resolution by the Special Committee and simply wanted to have the matter referred to Sub-Committee III were the ones that supported the amendment.

927. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation would vote against the Uruguayan amendment because it did not agree that the question was whether resolutions of the General Assembly should or should not be applied. Those resolutions, and in particular resolution 1514 (XV), continued to be applicable to all Territories that had not obtained independence. It was on the basis of that principle that his delegation had co-sponsored the draft resolution.

928. The representative of Mali said that he would be unable to support the Uruguayan amendment. If it adopted the amendment, the Committee might appear to extend *de facto* recognition to the situation now prevailing in the Territories. In spite of that situation, they were still colonial Territories, and resolution 1514 (XV) was as applicable to them as it was to Southern Rhodesia.

929. The representative of Iraq said he was glad to hear from the United Kingdom representative that the situations in the Cook Islands and in the Caribbean islands were different and that the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) would be satisfied if all the powers desired by the population were transferred to them. However, the Iraqi statement to which that representative had referred had been made in the context of General Assembly resoltion 2064 (XX) regarding the Cook Islands which had made it quite clear that resolution 1514 (XV) still applied to that Territory. Resolution 2064 (XX) had stated not that the responsibility of the administering Power in the Cook Islands had terminated, but that the transmission of information was no longer necessary. He therefore failed to see why the United Kingdom representative opposed a provision in the draft resolution mentioning the applicability of resolution 1514 (XV), particularly since the matter was to be referred to Sub-Committee III, which would report back in due course. In conclusion, he stated that his delegation would vote against the Uruguayan amendment (A/AC.109/L.387).

930. The representative of Uruguay said that he could not agree with the Soviet Union representative that the Uruguayan amendment added nothing and implied that the Committee should take no position. The amendment was a positive and constructive attempt to lead the Committee out of its impasse; it made no prejudgement nor did it commit the Committee in any way except to its avowed aim of decolonization.

931. The representative of Mali had also stated that he would not support the Uruguayan amendment. However, that position would seem to be at variance with the position adopted recently by the same representative in connexion with French Somaliland. His own delegation's position had remained completely consistent with regard to all the Territories the Committee had discussed.

932. He could also not agree that the Uruguayan amendment would curtail the powers of the Committee. Operative paragraph 2 of the seven-Power draft indicated that Sub-Committee III was to examine the situation. The Committee would therefore have to wait for the report of Sub-Committee III before it could take a final decision. Therefore, he failed to see why the Committee should issue directives in advance. Moreover, by allowing Sub-Committee III to examine the situation fully and freely, and without prejudgement, the Special Committee would not be curtailing its own powers.

933. The representative of the United Kingdom observed, with reference to the comments made by the representatives of India and Iraq, that his delegation would certainly be prepared to consider arrangements for the six Caribbean Territories similar to those adopted in respect of the Cook Islands. That would be a very suitable subject for discussion in Sub-Committee III. However, the real question before the Committee was whether the matter was to be prejudged before being referred to Sub-Committee III, i.e., whether there should be a verdict before the hearing.

934. The representative of Mali said that his delegation had in the past given adequate proof of the consistency of its policy with regard to decolonization. He remained convinced that the Uruguayan amendment was fundamentally different from operative paragraph 1 of the seven-Power draft. The question was not whether the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) should be applied—that would be misinterpretation of the resolution itself—but whether those provisions continued to apply to the Territories.

935. The representative of India welcomed the fact that the United Kingdom delegation was willing to consider applying the formula used in the Cook Islands to the Caribbean Territories. However, the seven-Power draft would not exclude that possibility. If Sub-Committee III found that the obligations of the administering Power under Article 73 e of the Charter had been fulfilled or had been terminated, and if that finding was accepted by the Special Committee, the formula applied to the Cook Islands could certainly be applied to the six Caribbean Territories.

936. The representative of Iraq said he could not agree with the United Kingdom representative that if the Committee adopted the seven-Power draft it would be reaching a verdict before the hearing. The Committee

had given that representative ample opportunity for a hearing. Furthermore, any decision regarding the applicability of resolution 1514 (XV) to the Territories in question was for the Committee itself to make; Sub-Committee III could only consider the situation, including the possibility of sending a visiting mission to the Territories, and then report back to the Special Committee. In addition, he failed to see how the United Kingdom representative could say that the situations in the Cook Islands and in the six Caribbean Territories were different and at the same time suggest that similar solutions should be applied.

937. The representative of the United Kingdom observed that he had said his delegation would be perfectly prepared to consider some arrangements similar to those accepted in the Cook Islands. However, he would reiterate his view that the question before the Committee should be considered without prejudgement by Sub-Committee III.

938. At its 506th meeting on 23 March 1967, the Special Committee voted on the three proposals before it, namely, the revised joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1); the Uruguayan amendment (A/AC.109/L.387), as orally amended; and the proposal by the United Kingdom to the effect that rather than proceeding to a vote on the draft resolution the Committee should refer the whole matter to Sub-Committee III.

939. The Special Committee voted first on the United Kingdom proposal, which was rejected by 16 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.

940. The Uruguayan amendment (A/AC.109/L.387) was rejected by a roll-call vote of 13 to 8, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Australia, Chile, Finland, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Ethiopia, India, Iran.

- 941. The Special Committee then voted on the revised joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1) as follows:
- (a) Operative paragraph 1 of the revised joint draft resolution was adopted by 17 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions.
- (b) The revised joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378/Rev.1) as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to 3, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Italy, Uruguay.

942. The representative of Chile, speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation had supported the Uruguayan amendment because it would have allowed the Sub-Committee to study the situation in the Territories without hindrance and made it possible to refer the question to the Sub-Committee without in any way prejudging the actions of the administering Power.

- 943. His delegation had abstained from voting on operative paragraph 1 because it prejudged the future work of Sub-Committee III on the question. Sub-Committee III would be presenting a report to the Special Committee in the near future and at that time the Special Committee would be able to consider the substance of the matter. However, his delegation had supported the revised joint draft resolution as a whole because it considered that the question deserved special consideration by the Committee.
- 944. The representative of Iran said that his delegation had abstained from voting on the Uruguayan amendment because its meaning was virtually identical to that of operative paragraph 1 of the revised joint draft resolution. However, his delegation had voted in favour of that operative paragraph since it had the merit of clarity and required no interpretation.
- 945. His delegation had suggested the deletion of operative paragraph 1 of the original draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.378), as well as the phrase in that draft resolution which would have called upon the United Kingdom to expedite the process of decolonization in the Territories, because such provisions would have constituted a prejudgement by the Committee. However, the resolution as adopted was not a prejudgement but merely a preliminary finding. There was nothing to prevent Sub-Committee III from making a recommendation in the light of new information and in the light of its detailed and full examination of the question. He therefore hoped that the United Kingdom would continue to offer its co-operation to the Committee.
- 946. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation had voted in favour of the Uruguayan amendment because it felt that it would help to ensure the widest co-operation from the administering Power—something which was most necessary if the Sub-Committee was to be able to carry out its task. It had supported the revised joint draft resolution as a whole because it did not feel that the Uruguayan amendment and the draft resolution itself were mutually exclusive, neither of the two texts calling for an abdication of the powers or functions of the Committee.
- 947. The representative of Tunisia said that his delegation had voted against the Uruguayan amendment because it had felt that the spirit of the amendment was already reflected in the text of the revised joint draft resolution.
- 948. The text of the resolution on the question of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (A/AC.109/235) adopted by the Special Committee at its 506th meeting on 23 March 1967, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"Having considered the oral and written petitions presented to it concerning Antigua, St. Lucia and St. Vincent,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power.

"Having examined the recent developments concerning these Territories,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,

- "1. Reaffirms that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions continue to apply to these Territories;
- "2. Requests its Sub-Committee III to examine, in the light of the recent constitutional developments, the situation in these Territories in all its aspects including the possibility of sending a visiting mission, and to report to the Special Committee at an early date."
- E. Consideration by the Special Committee of United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and British Honduras

Introduction

- 949. At its 488th meeting, on 20 February 1967, the Special Committee decided to refer the following Territories to Sub-Committee III for consideration and report:
 - (a) United States Virgin Islands;
 - (b) British Virgin Islands;
 - (c) Montserrat;
 - (d) Bermuda;
 - (e) Bahamas:
 - (f) Turks and Caicos Islands;
 - (g) Cayman Islands;
 - (h) Falkland Islands (Malvinas);
 - (i) British Honduras.
- 950. As set out in paragraph 948 above, the Special Committee, by adopting its resolution concerning Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, requested the Sub-Committee III "to examine, in the light of the recent constitutional developments, the situation in these Territories in all its aspects including the possibility of sending a visiting mission, and to report to the Special Committee at an early date".
- 951. Subsequently, Sub-Committee III made a detailed and intensive examination of the Territories referred to it, including the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. An account of this consideration is contained in the report of Sub-Committee III which is annexed to this chapter. In seeking further information on the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, the Sub-Committee availed itself of the opportunity of hearing certain individuals who wished to place before the Sub-Committee information concerning Anguilla. On the basis of this information, Sub-Committee III drew up its conclusions and recommendations which are set out in its report (see annex to the present chapter).
- 952. The Special Committee considered these Territories at its 548th, 564th and 565th meetings on 30 August, 27 September and 6 October 1967. At its 548th meeting, it heard a petitioner concerning British Honduras. At its 564th and 565th meetings, it considered these Territories on the basis of the report of Sub-Committee III.
- 953. The Committee had before it two letters dated 3 February 1967 (A/AC.109/219 and 220), addressed

to the Secretary-General, in which the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom to the United Nations stated that their Governments wished to reaffirm their willingness fully to implement the consensus approved by the General Assembly on the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), as also the terms of resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 which also invited their respective Governments to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a solution to the problem.

954. In a letter dated 30 August 1967 (A/AC.109/263), the Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations requested permission to participate in the Committee's discussion of the question of British Honduras. At its 548th meeting, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to accede to this request.

955. In a letter dated 2 August 1967 (A/AC.109/257), the Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations requested permission for his delegation to participate in the Special Committee's deliberations on matters affecting the Caribbean Territories, especially those relating to Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. At its 565th meeting, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to accede to this request.

Written petitions and hearings

Written petitions

956. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions, in addition to those listed above:

Petitioner	Document No.
Bermuda Mr. W. G. Brown, Secretary- General, Bermuda Constitu- tional Conference	A/AC.109/PET.577
British Honduras Mr. Compton Fairweather, Chairman, British Honduras Freedom Committee of New York, on behalf of the Hon. Philip Goldson, Member of the House of Representatives and Leader of the Opposition in British Honduras	A/AC.109/PET.696
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	
Mr. Daniel Fernandez Amor	A/AC.109/PET.703
Grenada Mr. E. M. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition in Grenada	A/AC.109/PET.573/Add.3
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	
Three petitions from Mr. Peter E. Adams Dr. Bertram Schaffner, Presi-	A/AC.109/PET.708
dent, U.S. Caribbean Aid to Mental Health	A/AC.109/PET.709
monds, Vice-President, and Richard L. Caines, Secretary, People's Action Movement	A/AC.109/PET.710
St. Vincent	
Mr. Milton Cato, Leader of the Labour Party in St. Vin- cent	A/AC.109/PET.628
trial and Agricultural Workers' Union, St. Vincent	A/AC.109/PET.646

Hearing concerning British Honduras

957. The Special Committee heard Mr. Philip Goldson, Leader of the Opposition in British Honduras, at its 548th meeting.

958. Mr. Goldson said that he wished to speak not so much as the Leader of the Opposition in British Honduras but as the representative of all its people; it was his hope that in the near future the Premier of his country would also have the opportunity to describe some of the serious problems facing British Honduras. After noting the geographical position of British Honduras, he pointed out that 80 per cent of its population of 110,000 were of Afro-European origin and 20 per cent of mixed Spanish and Maya Indian descent, the Mayas having left many traces of their occupation before they had left the area, for unexplained reasons, after the eighth century. The Territory had been uninhabited until 1638, when the survivors of a wrecked British ship had founded the first recorded European settlement at the mouth of the Belize river. That settlement had been constantly attacked by Spanish settlers from neighbouring territories, since Spain had claimed sovereignty over the whole Western Hemisphere, with the exception of certain regions of South America which were assigned to Portugal.

959. By the Treaty of Madrid of 1670, Spain had given de facto recognition to all British possessions in the Caribbean area with the exception of the settlement at the mouth of the Belize river. In 1763, under the Treaty of Paris, which had ended the Seven Years' War, Spain, while retaining sovereignty over the Territory, had conceded the right to engage in the logwood industry to the British settlers. Further treaties in 1783 and 1786 had confirmed that right. The British settlers, who had alternated between governing themselves and entrusting the management of their affairs to administrators from Great Britain, had by then managed to occupy the whole of the area which formed modern British Honduras. In 1798, they had won a decisive naval victory over the Spaniards off St. George's Caye and thereafter had maintained that the Territory had become British by conquest.

960. In 1821, Guatemala and other Central American republics had gained independence from Spain. Subsequently, Guatemala had claimed that it had inherited all lands contiguous to its frontiers which had formerly been owned by Spain. That was the basis for its current claim to British Honduras. The sovereignty of British Honduras had been guaranteed, however, by the Dalls-Claredon Treaty of 1850 and by the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1859, although the current difficulties had arisen from the last-named Treaty.

961. It was important to bear in mind that under that Treaty British sovereignty over British Honduras had not been explicitly proclaimed, although it had long been exercised in practice, that the boundaries of the Territory had not been defined by treaty or agreement since the Anglo-Spanish treaties of 1783 and 1786, and that, under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Britain had been precluded from extending its dominion in Central America. Moreover, Guatemala's claims had never been admitted by Great Britain or Spain.

962. Article VII, the most controversial article of the Treaty, had provided that the Contracting Parties should:

"... mutually agree conjointly to use their best efforts, by taking adequate means for establishing the easiest communication between the fittest place on the Atlantic coast near the settlement of Belize, and the capital of Guatemala, whereby the commerce of England, on the one hand, and the material prosperity of the Republic, on the other, cannot fail to be sensibly increased".

According to historians, the British negotiator had accepted that article on his own responsibility, to the great surprise of the British Government. Of course, if the article had been rejected, Guatemala would never have signed the Treaty. Its provisions had recompensed Guatemala for abandoning its rights to the territories unlawfully occupied by the settlers of Belize. The planned road had been intended to link Guatemala City and the Atlantic port of Izabal and would therefore not have run through British Honduras. It would, however, have contributed to the prosperity of the colony by facilitating trade between England and the whole of Central America. The intention had been that Great Britain should supply the technicians and Guatemala the materials and labour. The British engineer appointed to mark the boundary line and survey the proposed road had begun work in 1860. At the end of the year, however, he had stopped work because he did not know where the frontier of the north-west corner of the colony ceased to be contiguous to Guatemalan territory and began to be contiguous to Mexican territory. Since Great Britain and Guatemala had also disagreed on their respective financial obligations, a further agreement had had to be negotiated.

963. Under the Additional Convention signed in 1863, Great Britain had undertaken to pay to Guatemala £50,000 for the building of a road from Guatemala City to the Atlantic Coast "whether by land, or by partly making use of the River Montagua, or by any other route best calculated to communicate with the British Possessions in Belize". Provision had been made for the Convention to be ratified within six months, but that period had long since elapsed when Guatemala had asked that the exchange of instruments of ratification should be postponed for a year to enable it to be sure of being able to carry out its obligations "without sacrifice". More than a year later, in 1865, Guatemala had finally ratified the Convention but had proposed two clarifications, which had been formally laid before the British Government in 1866. The latter had refused to accept the clarifications and had declared that the Additional Convention had lapsed by reason of the Guatemalan Government's delay. Guatemala had replied that article VII of the 1859 Convention had provided for granting "a real compensation to Guatemala... for the abandonment of the territorial rights of Belize" and had stated that it was prepared to sign a new Convention identical with the former one. The British Government had energetically repudiated Guatemala's territorial claims, denied that the 1859 Convention had involved any cession of territory and maintained that it had been released from its obligations under the Additional Convention.

964. In 1884, British Honduras had become a Crown Colony.

965. In 1937, Guatemala had repeated its previous proposals, but, since they had again been rejected, it had proposed arbitration with the President of the United States as the sole umpire. The proposal for arbitration had been readily accepted; however, the

United Kingdom Government had considered that the Hague Court was the only tribunal competent to decide such an extremely complex legal question.

966. In 1948, the Guatemalan Government had once again proposed that the dispute should be mediated by the United States; the United Kingdom Government had again refused. Guatemala had then declared that all schools in Guatemala would teach that British Honduras was Guatemalan and that all maps would be altered accordingly. For its part, the United Kingdom Government had stated that it could not surrender any territory in which the inhabitants had repeatedly expressed the wish to remain within the Commonwealth without a decision by the International Court of Justice.

967. It was reasonable to suppose that, if Guatemala shrank from arbitration of the legal issues involved, it was because it was doubtful of the validity of its claims. It might even be suspected from its propaganda that the Guatemalan Government did not seek a legal decision at all but rather a political decision.

968. Despite its previous statements, the United Kingdom Government now found it expedient to accept United States mediation. However, it was generally known that the United States was heavily committed to Guatemala and therefore could not be impartial.

969. The people of British Honduras were unalterably opposed to integration, incorporation or political association with the Republic of Guatemala. They were united in their determination that their country should attain genuine independence. They had demonstrated unmistakably and repeatedly that they did not wish to be Guatemalans. In June 1966, there had been riots at Belize, the capital city, when news had leaked out of a United Kingdom-United States-Guatemalan plan to place the defence, foreign affairs and economic development of British Honduras under Guatemalan control. In recent weeks, United Kingdom newspapers had published details of a secret plan devised by the United Kingdom, under United States pressure, to sell out British Honduras to Guatemala. The people of British Honduras had shown their reaction in a series of demonstrations. Telegrams of protest had been sent to Queen Elizabeth and to various high officials. All of those messages had demonstrated the people's desire to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

970. British Honduras had sound reasons for not wishing to be absorbed into Guatemala. The latter had never controlled or possessed the territory known as British Honduras. British Honduras had existed as a self-governing territory more than 150 years before Guatemala had ceased to be a Spanish colony. Great Britain had brought it under colonial rule in 1884 and therefore had a legal and moral responsibility to ensure that the territory re-entered the community of free nations. Most important, for more than three centuries the people of British Honduras had experienced democracy. They had benefited from freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, equality before the law, trial by jury, freedom of religion, parliamentary democracy, a stable civil service and a 90 per cent literacy rate. The Government had never been overthrown by violence, and citizens had not been imprisoned without due process of law or compelled to flee into exile because of their political views or activities.

971. Those who sought integration with Guatemala argued that British Honduras did not have a viable economy which would enable it to sustain its independence. That was partly true; however, it was

certain that the economy of British Honduras would become less viable if it was under Guatemalan control. In fact, British Honduras was anxious for the threat of integration to be disposed of speedily, since it hindered its development and at present retarded both foreign and local investment.

972. He did not believe that Guatemala, which was financially dependent on the United States, could solve the financial and economic problems of British Honduras. The economy of British Honduras, like that of many small countries, had been blighted by imperialist exploitation. Therefore, at a time when even the tiniest nation could hope to develop its own resources through the process of decolonization promoted by the United Nations, British Honduras could not now agree to exchange British for Guatemalan colonialism.

973. That seemed to be the aim of the President of Guatemala, as was clear from an interview published in The Times of London of 12 March 1962 and from a letter of 13 August 1958 from the President to the editor of the newspaper La Hora. Guatemala hoped to accomplish recolonization of British Honduras by allowing it first to become independent. Guatemala had been preparing the ground for a long time. The breakdown of negotiations with the United Kingdom, which had been held in 1957 to discuss the question of funds for the development of British Honduras, could be explained as follows, as the Governor of British Honduras had stated at the time: the leader of the Honduran delegation, Mr. Price, had met the Guatemalan Minister unofficially; the latter had invited him to sever all connexions with the British Commonwealth and had proposed the establishment of a form of association with Guatemala, in exchange for which Guatemala would agree to give financial assistance to British Honduras until such time as the people decided, by means of a plebiscite, on the country's future régime. However, the Guatemalan Minister had implied that if that proposal was rejected the frontier would be closed and economic contacts would cease. The Minister had also stated that Guatemala would assume complete control over the external affairs of British Honduras, which would never be able to join the Federation of Central America unless it first became an associate state of Guatemala.

974. He also recalled that a Guatemalan postage stamp had been issued showing a map of the Republic including British Honduras and bearing the inscription: "Belize is Guatemalan".

975. Thus, Guatemala had over the years been conducting a massive indoctrination campaign. There was a reason for the fact that thousands of "Belizean" flags, in the blue and white national colours of Guatemala, had been introduced into British Honduras, that all public buildings had been repainted in blue and white, and that the Government-controlled radio spoke of Belize, since Guatemala did not recognize the existence of British Honduras.

976. Guatemalan maps distributed around the world showed British Honduras under the name of Belize and separated from Guatemala by a departmental rather than an international border. The maps bore the inscription: "Belize, Guatemalan territory unlawfully retained by England". Guatemalan school children learned that Belize was a department of Guatemala which they would be in duty bound to recover, and, throughout all those years the children of British Honduras could not learn their own history. In that connexion, he recalled that an opposition motion calling

for the preparation of new history textbooks had been defeated in the House of Representatives, as had another opposition motion calling for the training of Honduran nationals in the British Army so that they could defend the country after independence.

977. During the past few years, however, the people of British Honduras had begun to realize that they were the victims of a monstrous conspiracy. The opposition party's spectacular gains in the elections, despite the efforts of the Government party to falsify the results, were proof of that fact. The people had been horrified to discover that the United Kingdom Government, which had indignantly rejected Guatemalan recolonization of British Honduras in 1957, was now seeking to aid and abet Guatemala in that process.

978. In support of that statement, he referred to document A/AC.109/PET.528 containing a resolution adopted by the British Honduras Freedom Committee of New York in 1966 and listing the thirteen articles of a proposed treaty between the United Kingdom and Guatemala which would place the defence, the foreign affairs and, to a certain extent, the economy of British Honduras under Guatemalan control after independence. The proposed terms, reportedly concluded with the help of the American mediator appointed by the President of the United States, were substantially the same as those presented to the British Honduras delegation by the Guatemalan Minister in London in 1957.

979. Two articles published in two leading London daily newspapers, the Daily Express and The Times, on 5 August 1967, disclosed that the plan drawn up under United States pressure was, in fact, designed to place independent British Honduras under permanent Guatemalan control. Under the plan, British Honduras would not be allowed to become a member of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom and Guatemala would retain responsibility for foreign and defence affairs after it became independent, and it would be forced to accept a customs union with its neighbour, which would be allowed free access to its Caribbean ports and territorial waters. The United Kingdom would provide \$500,000 to Guatemala for the construction of a rail link between the Caribbean Sea and the Guatemalan border. The Times added that, in return for those concessions, Guatemala would probably accept the present disputed frontier.

980. The reason why the United States was fully supporting the Guatemalan claims was that it was defending its sphere of influence in Latin America.

981. He therefore urgently requested the United Nations to intervene so that the people of British Honduras could exercise their right of self-determination and, through a referendum organized by the United Nations, express their wishes concerning any form of political association with the Republic of Guatemala. Finally, he asked that the question of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute over British Honduras should be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

982. Speaking on the petitioner's statement, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he reserved his position and that of his Government on the statement which the petitioner had just made. He would refrain from any comment, since mediation between the United Kingdom and Guatemala was in progress. However, he wished to point out that the United Kingdom Government had already publicly denied allegations that there was any secret plan to hand over British Honduras to Guatemala. His Gov-

ernment's position with regard to sovereignty over British Honduras remained unchanged.

983. The representative of Guatemala said that his Government categorically rejected the statements of the petitioner, which were absolutely at variance with the truth. As the Committee was well aware, the Territory of Belize, also known as British Honduras, was the subject of a dispute between Guatemala and the United Kingdom; that was why the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV), with the exception of paragraph 6, were not applicable to it. Guatemala and the United Kingdom, which had both accepted the mediation of the Government of the United States of America, were continuing negotiations concerning the Territory which would probably result in a satisfactory solution.

984. He wished categorically to confirm that his Government had never renounced, and never would renounce, its inalienable rights over the Territory of Belize. His Government's traditional reservation with respect to its rights over the Territory in no way conflicted with the deep concern felt by Guatemala for the well-being and progress of the population of Belize. His Government would continue its current negotiations with the United Kingdom and, since mediation was in progress, would accept no other jurisdiction for the settlement of the dispute, unless both parties so decided.

985. Lastly, he reserved the right to submit to the Committee, if necessary, the legal arguments on which his Government's just case was based.

Consideration of the report of Sub-Committee III

986. The representative of the United States of America expressed her delegation's reservations regarding the conclusions and recommendations (see annex to the present chapter, para. 82) which, in her view, did not accurately reflect the situation in the United States Virgin Islands. As could be seen from the summary records of the meetings at which Sub-Committee III had discussed the item, the United States delegation had shown in what respects the conclusions were at variance with the actual facts.

987. The representative of Bulgaria felt that Sub-Committee III's conclusions and recommendations in general reflected the situation which continued to exist in the colonial Territory of the United States Virgin Islands, despite resolution 1514 (XV) and other General Assembly resolutions relating to small colonial Territories, particularly resolution 2232 (XXI).

988. His delegation had some reservations in regard to paragraph 82, sub-paragraph (5), which was not in line with the facts and was inconsistent with the other sub-paragraphs. It did not believe that any significant constitutional progress had been made since the situation in the Territory had last been considered by the Sub-Committee. As was clear from paragraph 42 of the report, even the proposal by the 1964 Constitutional Convention to increase the people's participation in the management of local affairs had not altered the basic relations between the Territory and the administering Power, and the proposed measures had not been put into effect.

989. His delegation also had reservations regarding the recommendation contained in sub-paragraph (8), which called for a United Nations presence in the Territory during the exercise of the right to self-determination. What was required at the present stage was a visiting mission to report on the situation. Only after the visiting mission had reported would it be

possible to consider other procedures. He was not, of course, opposed to the idea of a United Nations presence in the Territory; but he feared that in the circumstances a United Nations presence might be exploited by the colonial Power to the detriment of the interests of the population, and might lend an appearance of legality to a procedure which would only strengthen the authority of the administering Power. It should also be remembered that the Sub-Committee had refused to participate in a procedure which was in no way related to the exercise of the right to self-determination.

990. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed with the previous speaker. It was impossible to argue that any constitutional progress had been made, since the administering Power was still exercising the right of veto over legislation. A United Nations presence in the Territory would not contribute anything of value, until conditions existed in which the United Nations could play an active role. As a first step, a visiting mission should be sent to the Territory to study the situation. When the visiting mission had submitted its report, it would then be possible to take a decision regarding a United Nations presence in the Territory. At present, a United Nations presence would be premature.

991. The representative of the United States of America said that, in her delegation's view, statements to the effect that no political progress had been made since the Special Committee had last considered the situation in the Territory were unwarranted. They took no account of the facts communicated to the Sub-Committee by her delegation. There were two political parties in the United States Virgin Islands. Free elections had been held in the Territory in November 1966, and more than 80 per cent of the electorate had voted. The population had thus had an opportunity of expressing its views on its future.

992. Furthermore, her delegation had informed the Special Committee that it had complied with the recommendation made by the 1964 Constitutional Convention that the composition of the Territory's legislature should be changed and the legislature enlarged. In pursuance of another recommendation by the Convention, the legislature was now entitled to establish legislative salaries; and, as the Convention had also recommended, a bill providing for an elected governor had been introduced in the United States Congress, which had not yet dealt with it. The bill was supported by the Federal Government. In her view, all those measures represented progress towards self-determination. If the United States had been intending to annex the Territory of the Virgin Islands, it would not be taking steps to hold elections which might lead to self-government.

993. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation reserved its position on the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee III on the United States Virgin Islands.

994. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania was surprised that the word "independence" did not appear in the conclusions and recommendations in paragraph 82. Could the Committee reaffirm the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination, as it had done in sub-paragraph (6), without at the same time recognizing its right to independence? He suggested that the words "and independence" should be added after the words "to self-determination" in that sub-paragraph. With that single

exception, his delegation whole-heartedly supported the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee III.

995. The representative of Venezuela drew the Tanzanian representative's attention to the fact that the word "independence" appeared in sub-paragraph (2), in which it was stated that the Committee reaffirmed that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to the Territory. The idea of independence was also implicit in sub-paragraph (5), in which the Committee expressed its regret that the administering Power had not yet implemented the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly with respect to the Territory. The term "self-determination" was, of course, to be understood in the widest sense to cover all possibilities, including absolute independence, which was the highest form of self-government.

996. The representative of Iran said that his delegation would gladly support the Tanzanian representative's proposal, but wished to place on record his belief that the word "self-determination" was wide enough to embrace independence. It was out of respect for the freedom of the population that no reference was made to any particular form of self-determination. That was a matter for the inhabitants of the Territory themselves to decide.

997. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that it was precisely that idea which he had had in mind in suggesting an explicit reference to independence.

998. The Special Committee adopted, as amended, the conclusions and recommendations concerning the United States Virgin Islands as contained in paragraph 82 of the Sub-Committee's report.

British Virgin Islands

999. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he particularly deplored the negative character of the conclusions and recommendations concerning the British Virgin Islands (see annex to the present chapter, para. 160), since no account had been taken of the progress which the inhabitants of the Territory had made during the last few years. He consequently reserved the position of his delegation with regard to section III of the report.

1000. The representative of Australia expressed general reservations regarding the conclusions and recommendations, since they did not pay due attention to the recent political developments of the Territories.

1001. The representative of Bulgaria said that the report accurately reflected the situation in the British Virgin Islands. Nevertheless, he had reservations regarding sub-paragraph 9 of the conclusions and recommendations, since in his opinion the United Nations presence in small colonial Territories should take the form of visiting missions; otherwise the administering Powers could use the United Nations machinery in order to maintain their colonial domination. He asked for his reservations to be recorded in the Committee's report.

1002. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he was in general agreement with the Committee's conclusions and recommendations but he recalled the reservations that his delegation had expressed when the Special Committee had considered the Territories in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. The United Nations presence

in colonial Territories should be conditional upon a study of the situation and the adoption of certain measures by the administering Powers, so that the inhabitants could express their wishes freely; otherwise the United Nations presence might favour the continuation of colonialism.

1003. The representative of India said that the second part of sub-paragraph 8 repeated an idea that was already stated in sub-paragraph 7. He suggested that the last sentence of sub-paragraph 8, beginning with the word "Accordingly", be deleted.

1004. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics supported the Indian representative's suggestion.

1005. The representative of Sierra Leone said that he had no objection to the Indian suggestion but would propose that not only should the last sentence of subparagraph 8 be deleted but the present order of subparagraphs 7 and 8 should be reversed. Sub-paragraphs 1 to 6 were in fact conclusions, as was the first part of sub-paragraph 8, whereas sub-paragraph 7 was a recommendation.

1006. The representative of Iran said that he had no objection to the proposal by the representative of Sierra Leone in so far as the reversing of the order of the sub-paragraphs was concerned. He himself, however, would suggest that instead of the second part of sub-paragraph 8 being deleted it should be replaced by the following sentence: "Accordingly, it invited the administering Power to take the necessary steps in that respect, in accordance with sub-paragraph 8."

1007. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, if the deletion of the last sentence of sub-paragraph 8 was put to the vote, he would vote against it, for the intention seemed to be to delete all reference to resolution 1541 (XV).

1008. The representative of Venezuela agreed with the amendment proposed by the representative of Sierra Leone but he himself proposed that the last phrase of sub-paragraph 8, namely "and other pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly", should be inserted in sub-paragraph 7 after the words "resolution 1514 (XV)".

1009. The representative of Italy agreed with the representatives of Sierra Leone and Iran and supported the Venezuelan representative's proposal.

1010. The representative of India supported by the representative of Ethiopia proposed that the reference in the Venezuelan amendment should be worded as follows: "other resolutions of the General Assembly concerning this Territory".

1011. The Special Committee adopted the proposal made by the representative of Sierra Leone that the last sentence of sub-paragraph 8 should be deleted and that the order of sub-paragraphs 7 and 8 should be reversed.

1012. The Special Committee also adopted the proposal made by the representative of Iran that the following new sentence should be added to new subparagraph 7: "Accordingly, it invites the administering Power to take the necessary steps in this regard on the basis of sub-paragraph 8 below."

1013. The Venezuelan representative's proposal, as amended by the representative of India, that the words "and other resolutions of the General Assembly concerning this Territory" should be inserted after the words "resolution 1514 (XV)" in new sub-paragraph 8,

was adopted by the Special Committee by 13 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

- 1014. The representative of Iran said that he had abstained from voting since, in his view, the amended sub-paragraph did not accurately reflect the debates which had taken place in Sub-Committee III.
- 1015. The representative of the United States of America said that General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) was applicable to the Territory dealt with in that section of the report and could not be dismissed as a simple reference to the procedure for the transmission of information.
- 1016. The Special Committee adopted, as amended, the conclusions and recommendations concerning the British Virgin Islands as contained in paragraph 160 of the Sub-Committee's report.

Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent

- 1017. With regard to this section of the Sub-Committee's report, the representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government had already stated that the resolution of the Special Committee prejudged the situation of the associated States of the Eastern Caribbean and that it saw no point in collaborating with the Sub-Committee. He would abstain in the vote on that section of the report.
- 1018. The representative of Australia expressed general reservations regarding the conclusions and recommendations (see annex to the present chapter, para. 287), since they did not pay due attention to the recent political developments of the Territories.
- 1019. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria expressed reservations with regard to sub-paragraph 11 of paragraph 287, similar to those which they had expressed with regard to sub-paragraph 9 of paragraph 160 of the Sub-Committee's report.
- 1020. The representatives of India, Italy, Ivory Coast, Chile, Madagascar, Tunisia, Australia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan expressed reservations with regard to sub-paragraph 4 of paragraph 287, because they did not consider that Sub-Committee III was competent to hear petitioners.
- 1021. The representative of Iran pointed out, with reference to the reservations which had been expressed, that Sub-Committee III had not granted any hearings to petitioners. It had confined itself to giving certain individuals an opportunity to provide it with the information it needed for the discharge of its task. In so doing, it had not departed from established precedents, as the case of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea showed.
- 1022. The representative of Venezuela felt that the Sub-Committee had not exceeded its terms of reference by availing itself of the opportunity to obtain first-hand information on the situation in the Territories.
- 1023. The representatives of Madagascar, the United Kingdom and the United States of America expressed reservations with regard to paragraph 286.
- 1024. The Special Committee took note of paragraph 286 and decided to defer consideration of the question raised therein.
- 1025. The Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and

St. Vincent as contained in paragraph 287 of the Sub-Committee's report.

Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands

- 1026. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he deplored the negative character of the conclusions and recommendations regarding Bermuda, the Bahamas, Montserrat, the Turks, and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands, since no account had been taken of the progress which the inhabitants of those Territories had made during the last few years. He consequently reserved the position of his delegation with regard to this section of the report.
- 1027. The representative of Australia expressed general reservations regarding the conclusions and recommendations, since they did not pay due attention to the recent political developments in the Territories.
- 1028. The Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations concerning Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands, as contained in paragraph 352 of the Sub-Committee's report.

Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

1029. The Special Committee adopted the statement of consensus concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) as contained in paragraph 355 of the Sub-Committee's report.

General conclusions and recommendations on Territories under United Kingdom administration

- 1030. The representative of the United Kingdom reserved the position of his delegation with regard to the general conclusions and recommendations contained in the Sub-Committee's report.
- 1031. The representative of Australia expressed general reservations regarding the conclusions and recommendations.
- 1032. The Special Committee adopted the general conclusions and recommendations on Territories under United Kingdom administration as contained in paragraph 356 of the Sub-Committee's report.

F. Action taken by the Special Committee

1033. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee at its 564th and 565th meetings on 27 September and 6 October 1967 are as follows:

(a) United States Virgin Islands

- (1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territory which it adopted in 1966 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.
- (2) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to the Territory.
- (3) It recognizes that the small size and population of the Territory present peculiar problems which demand special attention.
- (4) It notes that no significant constitutional progress has taken place in the Territory since the item was last examined by the Special Committee.

- (5) Furthermore, it regrets that, despite advancement in the political field, the administering Power has failed further to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly with respect to this Territory.
- (6) It reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence, while emphasizing once again that the administering Power should enable the people to express their wishes concerning the future status of the Territory in full freedom and without any restrictions.
- (7) It also invites the administering Power to encourage open, free and public discussion of the various alternatives open to them in their achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and to ensure that the people of the Territory shall exercise their right of self-determination in full knowledge of these alternatives.
- (8) Recalling paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 that "the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status", it reiterates its belief that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the right of self-determination will be essential for the purpose of ensuring that the people of the Territory exercise their right of self-determination in full freedom and without any restrictions, in full knowledge of the various alternatives open to them.
- (9) It urges the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory and to extend to it full co-operation and assistance.

(b) British Virgin Islands

- (1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations on the Territory which were approved by the Special Committee in 1964 and 1966 and were confirmed by the General Assembly at its twentieth and twenty-first sessions.
- (2) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples continues to apply fully to the Territory.
- (3) It recognizes that the small size of the Territory and its sparse population raise particular problems which require special attention.
- (4) It takes note of the result of the Constitutional Conference of October 1966, and also of the elections which were held in the Territory on 14 April 1967.
- (5) It regrets that, despite the political and constitutional progress made in the Territory since the Special Committee last considered the matter, the administering Power has failed further to implement the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and other General Assembly resolutions relating to this Territory.
- (6) It reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination, and wishes to stress once again that the administering Power should enable the people to express its will regarding the future status of the Territory in complete freedom and without restrictions of any kind.
- (7) It reiterates the view that it should be possible for the Territory to unite with other Territories in the area in order to form an economically and administratively viable State. The Special Committee regrets that, since 1947, no effective steps have been taken to bring

- about a possible federation with other Territories. Accordingly, it invites the administering Power to take the necessary steps in this regard on the basis of paragraph (8) below.
- (8) It invites the administering Power to encourage open, free and public discussion of the possible options from which the people can make its choice in its efforts to attain the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other resolutions of the General Assembly concerning this Territory, and to ensure that the people of the Territory will be able to exercise its right of self-determination in full knowledge of the options open to it.
- (9) Recalling paragraph 6 of resolution 2232 (XXI), which states that "the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status", the Special Committee reiterates its belief that a United Nations presence during the procedures connected with the exercise of the right of self-determination will be essential to ensure that the people of the Territory can exercise this right in complete freedom, without any restrictions of any kind, and in full knowledge of the possible options open to it.
- (10) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not yet agreed to the sending of a visiting mission to the Territory, and affirms that such a visit will be useful and necessary. Therefore it urges the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory and to extend to it full co-operation and assistance.
- (c) Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent
- (1) The Special Committee recalls its previous conclusions and recommendations concerning these Territories, which were endorsed by the General Assembly.
- (2) It recalls the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 506th meeting on 23 March 1967, in particular, operative paragraph 2, under which the Sub-Committee was charged "to examine, in the light of the recent constitutional developments, the situation in these Territories in all its aspects including the possibility of sending a visiting mission, and to report to the Special Committee at an early date".
- (3) It notes with regret the attitude of the administering Power, which has refused to co-operate with the Sub-Committee in its efforts to obtain more complete information concerning the recent constitutional and political developments in the Territories.
- (4) It notes that Sub-Committee III, deeming it necessary for the discharge of its task, granted hearings to individuals who provided it with information on the recent political and constitutional developments in Anguilla.
- (5) It takes note of the constitutional developments that have taken place in these Territories, and considers that they represent a certain degree of advancement in the political field for the peoples concerned.
- (6) It further takes note of the recent political developments that have taken place in the island of Anguilla.
- (7) It reaffirms that resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions continue to apply fully to these Territories.
- (8) The Special Committee, bearing in mind resolution 2232 (XXI), reiterates that the small size and

meagre resources of these Territories present peculiar problems which demand special attention.

- (9) It reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of these Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and without any restriction. It requests the administering Power to ensure that the peoples of the Territories are informed of the various possibilities available to them in their achievement of the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV).
- (10) It requests the administering Power to promote the development of closer ties among these Territories through the building of a common political, economic and social infrastructure in accordance with the wishes of the population.
- (11) Recalling resolution 2232 (XXI), paragraph 6, which establishes "that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status", the Special Committee reiterates its belief that a United Nations presence during the procedures connected with the process of self-determination will be essential in order to ensure that the peoples of the Territories are enabled to exercise their right in complete freedom, without any restriction and in full knowledge of the options available to them.
- (12) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not agreed to the dispatch of a visiting mission to these Territories and affirms that such a visit would be useful and desirable. Accordingly, it again requests the administering Power to allow the dispatch of a United Nations visiting mission to the Territories and to extend to it full co-operation and assistance.

(d) Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands

- (1) The Special Committee recalls its earlier conclusions and recommendations relating to Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands, which were endorsed by the General Assembly.
- (2) It takes note of the statement of the administering Power containing additional information on these Territories.
- (3) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories.
- (4) It regrets that the administering Power has not yet taken effective measures to implement the Declaration in these Territories and urges it to do so without further delay.
- (5) It notes that financial interests unrelated to the political, economic and social development of these Territories may constitute an obstacle to the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territory of the Bahamas.
- (6) It considers that, in view of the lack of sufficient information on some of these Territories, the administering Power should make it possible for the United Nations to dispatch a visiting mission to the Territories as soon as possible.
- (7) It considers that the administering Power should take immediate measures to transfer all powers to the peoples of these Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete freedom and independence.

(8) It reiterates its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the peoples of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status, in full knowledge of the options available to them.

(e) Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Considering that bilateral negotiations are the best way of solving the problem of the decolonization of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), but having no information on the progress made in this direction since the approval of the consensus of 20 December 1966, the Special Committee recommends that the attention of the parties should again be drawn to General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus of 20 December 1966, with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, due regard being paid to the recommendation at the end of the consensus that the Special Committee and the General Assembly should be kept informed about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

(f) General conclusions and recommendations on Territories under United Kingdom administration

- (1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning these Territories which were adopted by the Special Committee in 1966 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.
- (2) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories. At the same time, it recognizes that the small size and population of these Territories, and the nature of their economies, present peculiar problems which demand special attention.
- (3) It reaffirms the right of the people of these Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the various forms of political status open to them. It also expresses its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status and in full knowledge of the options available to them.
- (4) It reiterates its previous recommendation concerning the need for visiting missions to these Territories and, to this end, urges the administering Power to enable the Special Committee to send visiting missions to the Territories.
- (5) It recalls its belief expressed in 1964 that it should be possible for these Territories to join with others in the area to form an economically and administratively viable State. It also recalls that, at that time, negotiations were being carried on between certain of these Territories with a view to establishing a federation. The Special Committee regrets that these negotiations were not successful and that, as a consequence, each Territory has been obliged to seek a separate solution. It expresses the hope that the administering Power will do everything possible to promote the development of closer ties among these Territories through

the building of a common political, economic and social infrastructure in accordance with the wishes of the people.

ANNEX*

Report of Sub-Committee III

Rapporteur: Mr. Gilberto Ignacio Carrasquero (Venezuela)

Introduction

Terms of reference

- 1. At its 488th meeting on 20 February 1967, the Special Committee, in approving the twenty-sixth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.368/Rev.1), decided to maintain Sub-Committee III with the same membership as in 1966. At the same meeting, the Special Committee confirmed the Sub-Committee's existing terms of reference, and decided to consider urgently and directly in plenary meetings the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. The Territories referred to Sub-Committee III are as follows: Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Honduras, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Falkland Island (Malvinas), Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Turks and Caicos Islands and United States Virgin Islands.
- 2. In addition to these terms of reference, the Special Committee requested the Sub-Committee to carry out the specific tasks assigned by the General Assembly in its resolutions concerning the Territories referred to Sub-Committee III. The decisions of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session relating to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee III are contained in General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and in the consensus on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) approved by the General Assembly on 20 December 1966. The operative paragraphs of resolution 2232 (XXI) read as follows:

[The General Assembly]

- "1. Approves the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to these Territories;
- "2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of these Territories to self-determination and independence;
- "3. Calls upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
- "4. Reiterates its declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nation and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- "5. Urges the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories, and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance;
- "6. Decides that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status;
- "7. Requests the Special Committee to continue to pay special attention to these Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session;
- "8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide all assistance in the implementation of the present resolution." The consensus on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) reads as follows:
- * Previously reproduced under the symbols A/AC.109/L.401/Rev.1 and A/AC.109/L.401/Add.1-4.
- ^a The members of the Sub-Committee are Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Uruguay and Venezuela.

- "With reference to General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the Fourth Committee took note of the communications dated 15 December 1966 of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/C.4/682 and A/C.4/683). In this regard there was a consensus in favour of urging both parties to continue with the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, keeping the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the General Assembly duly informed about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960."b
- 3. At the same meeting, the Special Committee authorized Sub-Committee III to submit specific recommendations without delay regarding the sending of visiting missions to the Territories with which it was concerned.
- 4. By a resolution adopted at its 506th meeting on 23 March 1967 (see para. 948 of the present chapter), the Special Committee requested its Sub-Committee III to examine, in the light of the recent constitutional developments, the situation in the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent in all its aspects including the possibility of sending a visiting mission.

Election of officers

5. At its 60th meeting on 23 February 1967, the Sub-Committee unanimously elected Mr. Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary (Iran) as Chairman and Mr. Gilberto Ignacio Carrasquero (Venezuela) as Rapporteur.

Meetings of the Sub-Committee

- 6. The Sub-Committee held a total of thirty-nine meetings between 23 February and 25 September 1967, and considered the questions referred to it in the following order:
 - (a) Question of visiting missions
 - (b) United States Virgin Islands
 - (c) British Virgin Islands
 - (d) Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent
 - (e) (i) Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat
 - (ii) Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands
 - (f) Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
- 7. Owing to lack of time, the Sub-Committee decided to defer consideration of the Territory of British Honduras.

I. QUESTION OF VISITING MISSIONS

- 8. The Sub-Committee considered the question of visiting missions at its 62nd and 63rd meetings on 7 and 9 March 1967. The Sub-Committee resumed the consideration of this item at its 87th meeting on 25 August 1967.
- 9. In considering this question, the Sub-Committee noted that it had been authorized by the Special Committee to submit specific recommendations without delay regarding the sending of visiting missions to the Territories with which it was concerned. It also noted that the Special Committee had decided that visiting missions to Territories should, if possible, be sent during the period preceding the fifth special session of the General Assembly.
- 10. The Sub-Committee was guided by the decisions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning the desirability of sending visiting missions to the Territories to which the Declaration applies, namely the decisions contained in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI). It also noted that in 1966, the Special Committee had decided

b See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6628, para. 13.

that visiting missions should be sent to the following Territories: United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands.

- 11. The Sub-Committee therefore decided to recommend to the Special Committee that it send visiting missions to all Territories as soon as possible, if necessary spreading the visits over two years. At the same meeting the Sub-Committee requested its Chairman to ascertain from the administering Powers whether they would be prepared to receive visiting missions in 1967 to the specific Territories proposed by the Sub-Committee, namely: United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, the Bahamas, Antigua, Cominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent.
- 12. At the 74th meeting on 9 May, the Chairman stated that the representatives of the United Kingdom and of the United States had replied to his inquiries concerning visiting missions.
- 13. In a letter dated 20 April 1967, addressed to the Chairman, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations stated that he had been instructed to say that "in existing circumstances, visiting missions to Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and St. Lucia, which now have the status of fully self-governing Associated States, would be inappropriate". He also stated that a reply concerning the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands and Montserrat would be sent in due course. Subsequently, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations informed the Chairman by letter, dated 7 June 1967, that his Government had considered this request, but had decided that it was unable to agree to the proposals.
- 14. In a letter dated 26 April 1967, addressed to the Chairman, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations stated that the position of his Government with regard to the proposed visiting mission to the United States Virgin Islands remained as communicated to the Sub-Committee in 1966. He further stated that "the United States Government believes that a United Nations visiting mission to the Virgin Islands would not be warranted at the present time, and regrets that it is therefore unable to concur in the Sub-Committee's recommendations".

Conclusions and recommendations

- 15. Recalling paragraphs 5 of General Assembly resolutions 2232 (XXI) and 2189 (XXI), the Sub-Committee notes with regret that the administering Powers, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, continue to maintain the same negative attitude towards the acceptance of visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee III.
- 16. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should strongly urge the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to these Territories at an early date.

II. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS

A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

Introduction

- 17. The Sub-Committee considered the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands at its 64th to 72nd meetings between 29 March and 19 April 1967.
- 18. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras, 19-65 of the present chapter).
- 19. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the representative of the United States of America, as administering Power, took part in the Sub-Committee's work at the invitation of the Chairman.

General statements

20. The representative of the United States said that his delegation had made a basic statement on the United States Virgin Islands to the Sub-Committee on 18 August 1966 at the 47th meeting and had discussed the Territory further in

- the Fourth Committee only three months previously, on 16 December 1966. In recent months there had been further political, social and economic developments which were of interest.
- 21. During the 1966 fiscal year and until mid-February 1967, the Territory had enjoyed continuing economic and social growth. Per capita income had increased by \$100 per year since 1965 and, by early 1967, stood at \$2,100 per year. Government revenue collections from local sources for the 1966 fiscal year had risen by approximately one third, compared with the previous year. The Government of the Territory had collected \$37.5 million locally during 1966, an increase of \$8.5 million over the preceding fiscal year. Collections for the first half of the 1967 fiscal year (from 1 July to 31 December 1966) had increased by an even greater percentage compared with collections in the first half of the previous fiscal year. Bank assets were now more than \$100 million, an 11 per cent increase over 1965.
- 22. The authorized ceiling for revenue bonds had been increased from \$10 million to \$30 million, explicitly recognizing the fiscal responsibility of the local Government and allowing it to act to meet the Territory's expanding requirements.
- 23. The Virgin Islands Development Authority, created to allow local ownership and management of properties formerly held by the Virgin Islands Corporation, had completed its first full year of operations and collected more than \$550,000 in revenue, compared with Virgin Islands Corporation receipts of \$406,000 during the previous year. Ownership of the Harry S. Truman Airport had been transferred from the United States Government to the Virgin Islands Government. There were now twenty-one jet return flights per week between the Territory and the United States mainland, compared with only three in 1965. The airport, which was managed by the Development Authority, was also used by three airlines operating in the Caribbean.
- 24. The island of St. Croix had continued to expand its industrial base with the completion of a large alumina plant in an industrial complex on previously unproductive wasteland. Rapid progress was also being made towards the completion of a large petroleum refinery on the island. When completed, it would aid the economic diversification of the Territory by attracting satellite industries to St. Croix.
- 25. On the island of St. Thomas, the Virgin Islands Planning Board has selected a site suitable for industrial development. The island's industrial development had previously lagged behind that of St. Croix because of the latter's natural physical advantages.
- 26. The housing problem had been partially alleviated by the recent opening of a 200-unit public housing project on St. Croix, although there was still a gap between available public housing and demand. More than 3,000 additional units, public and private, were now in planning or under construction. The "turn key" method, utilizing private enterprise for building low-cost housing with United States Government aid, was now being employed and the construction of more than 600 units by that method had recently been approved. Owing to population increase, existing hospital and medical care facilities remained taxed in comparison with United States standards. Two multi-million dollar medical care centres, each of which would include a general hospital, long-term care centre, public health centre, out-patient clinic and staff residence facilities, were now in the land acquisition stage; construction was expected to begin in early 1968.
- 27. Progress continued to be made in the educational field. During 1965 the Government had initiated an accelerated programme to build 113 additional classrooms, and the construction of a junior high school and a senior high school had already been completed. The student-teacher ratio compared favourably with the highest standards in mainland United States. The College of the Virgin Islands now had 229 full-time and 1,000 evening students, and the second graduation exercises had been held in June 1966. Full-time enrolment in 1967 was expected to be 75 per cent greater than in 1966 and a four-year programme for teacher-training, in conjunction with New York University, had been instituted in 1966.

- 28. The political climate in the Virgin Islands was informed and free. There were six newspapers, a monthly magazine, three radio stations and two television stations which provided coverage of local, national and international events. Universal adult suffrage had been introduced in 1936 and literacy requirements could be met in either Spanish or English. There was a two-party system in the Territory and in the last elections, held in November 1966, over 13,000 persons, representing more than 80 per cent of the registered voters, had cast ballots.
- 29. In 1966 his delegation had informed the Special Committee that the recommendation of the 1964 Constitutional Convention that the Legislature should be reapportioned had been passed into law. He was pleased to inform members that an enlarged and reapportioned Legislature consisting of fifteen members-five each from St. Thomas and St. Croix, one from St. John, and four senators-at-large-had been elected and had been meeting during 1967. As a result of a recommendation by the 1964 Constitutional Convention, the Legislature now had the power to establish legislative salaries and had, in fact, recently done so. Pursuant to another recommendation of the 1964 Convention, bills providing for an elected governor had been introduced in, and passed by, both houses of the United States Congress in 1966. The two bills passed had differed in minor points, such as effective dates, and, owing to lack of time, the differences had not been reconciled before the adjournment of the 89th Congress. As a pending bill lapsed at the end of a session of Congress in which it was introduced, the bills in question no longer had any legislative status. On 17 January 1967, a new bill providing for an elected governor had been introduced in the 90th Congress and had been referred to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which was now considering it. The bill provided for the governor of the Virgin Islands to be elected by a majority of the people entitled to vote for the Legislature. It also granted to the Legislature the authority to determine the length of its sessions and affirmed the applicability of certain portions of the Federal Constitution to the unincorporated Territory of the Virgin Islands. The protection afforded to United States citizens by those provisions had already been included in territorial legislation,
- 30. The representative of Venezuela was glad to note that the economic and social conditions in the Territory were among the most favourable in the Caribbean area. However, his delegation was also interested in the political developments in the Territory. Noting that on 16 May 1966 the United States House of Representatives had passed a bill to provide for an elected governor of the Virgin Islands and that on 10 October 1966 the United States Senate had passed the House bill with a number of amendments, he asked whether the United States representative could tell the Sub-Committee what those amendments had been and what was the present situation regarding 'the election of the governor. He would also like to know what the political platform of the Virgin Islands Party was and whether it had been absorbed by the Democratic or Republican Party.
- 31. The representative of Italy said that his delegation was particularly interested in political developments in the Territory within the framework of the resolutions that governed the Sub-Committee's work. With regard to the elections that had been held in the Territory on 8 November 1966, he asked the United States representative whether he could give some information concerning the main themes of the electoral campaign and the platforms of the political parties. It would also be useful if the United States delegation could provide the Committee with newspaper clippings so that members could see what issues had been put before the electorate and what the political climate had been in the Territory. Lastly, he asked whether the Legislature had begun its work and what political tendencies had been manifested within that body.
- 32. The representative of Uruguay said he would be interested to know what the views of the political parties in the Virgin Islands were regarding the future political status of the Territory.
- 33. The representative of the United States said in reply to the Venezuelan representative that the most important difference between the two bills passed by the House of

- Representatives and the Senate in 1966 had related to the date on which the governor was to be elected. Consultations were to have been held between the two Houses to reconcile the differences, but there had not been sufficient time to do so before Congress had adjourned. New legislation had therefore been introduced, with the endorsement of the Executive Branch, at the present session of Congress.
- 34. With regard to one of the questions asked by the Italian representative, he could inform the Sub-Committee that the Legislature had in fact begun its work and had already met during the current year.
- 35. The representative of Bulgaria said that he would like to put some questions to the representative of the administering Power. First, the need had frequently been stressed for General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 to be publicized as widely as possible in colonial Territories. He imagined that the information media in the United States Virgin Islands were controlled by the United States Government and he thought it possible that the inhabitants might not be fully informed concerning resolution 1514 (XV) and other subsequent resolutions and recommendations of the Special Committee and the General Assembly. He wondered whether the United States representative could give the Sub-Committee some information on the question, and regarding the extent to which the people were informed of the various possibilities open to them in the matter of political emancipation.
- 36. Secondly, he would like some information regarding he ownership of the land in the Territory: did it belong, for example, to those who cultivated it, or to commercial concerns?
- 37. Thirdly, attention had frequently been drawn to the need for United Nations visiting missions to small Territories such as the Virgin Islands in order to examine the situation at first hand and ascertain the wishes of the population. Both in resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966 (operative paragraph 5), and in resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 (operative paragraph 5), the General Assembly had urged the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to be sent to the Territories under their administration. At its 63rd meeting, the Sub-Committee had decided to recommend the dispatch of visiting missions during 1967 to a number of Territories, including the United States Virgin Islands. One month had passed since that meeting and he wondered whether the Committee could now have some indication of the United States Government's attitude with regard to a visiting mission.
- 38. The representative of the United States said that, with regard to the dissemination in the Virgin Islands of information concerning General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the options open to the people, he wished to make it clear, first, that the information media in the Virgin Islands, as in the United States, were in private hands and not controlled by the United States Government as the representative of Bulgaria had said. However, resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) had been publicized in the Territory and all deliberations at the United Nations were followed with interest there. A press representative from the Territory had recently been at United Nations Headquarters, and editorials concerning the Special Committee had appeared in the Press of the Virgin Islands. In general, the Virgin Islanders were fully aware of the options set forth in resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). They were also aware of the developments in neighbouring Caribbean islands and of the new arrangements recently introduced in some of them.
- 39. The representative of Iran said that he would like to ask the United States representative what measures had been taken in the direction of self-determination and whether the people would be given an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination in the near future. He recalled that, at the previous meeting, the representative of Italy had asked for information on the platforms of the various political parties in the Territory. He would like to know, in particular, whether each party took a particular position regarding the future of the Territory. If so, he asked whether it would be possible to say which of the various possibilities for the Territory's future status enjoyed the widest support among the people.

- 40. The representative of Bulgaria noted that in its last report to the General Assembly (A/6300/Rev.1) the Special Committee had stated that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) were fully applicable to the small colonial Territories and had presented a number of conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territories appearing on the Sub-Committee's agenda. In its resolution 2232 (XXI), moreover, the General Assembly had reaffirmed the right of the peoples of those Territories to self-determination and independence and had called upon the administering Powers to implement the relevant resolutions without delay. It was therefore unfortunate that, in view of the position taken by the administering Power with regard to the sending of a visiting mission and the absence of petitioners, the Sub-Committee was once again obliged to consider the situation in the United States Virgin Islands with nothing to guide it but a working paper prepared by the Secretariat. His delegation felt that the Sub-Committee should draw the attention of the Special Committee and the Assembly to that improper situation and try to obtain all available information, including reports in the international Press. At the same time, it was to be hoped that the administering Power would promptly provide the information requested of it concerning political parties in the Virgin Islands and the debates in the United States Congress regarding the bill on election of the Governor and the amendments to that bill.
- 41. Although the representative of the administering Power had stated that progress had been made in the political, social and economic spheres, the fact remained that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had not yet been applied to the United States Virgin Islands.
- 42. His delegation did not reject a priori any decision that the people of the Territory might take regarding their future. The essential point was that the people must be given complete freedom to take their decision, and that proper economic, social and political conditions should be created so that their exercise of self-determination would be genuine and without any restrictions. It was, however, regrettable not only that the proposals of the 1964 Constitutional Convention to increase the people's participation in the management of local affairs had done nothing to change the basic relationship between the Territory and the administering Power but also that implementation of the proposed measures had been postponed. After more than two years the Constitutional Convention's proposals concerning election of the governor and abolition of the veto were still far from having been settled. It was therefore urgently necessary for the Special Committee to reaffirm its earlier recommendations and at last obtain compliance with those recommendations by the administering
- 43. While it was interesting to be informed of the Territory's average *per capita* income, he would like the United States delegation to indicate the actual distribution of income among the various social groups.
- 44. His delegation wished to state in conclusion that, instead of passively noting the decisions taken by administering Powers, the Special Committee should seek all possible means of helping the peoples of the colonial Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in a completely free manner and in full awareness of the various alternatives open to them and of helping them to advance the process of decolonization. It was to be hoped that the administering Power would fully recognize the responsibilities of the United Nations and give the Organization its complete cooperation in implementing resolution 1514 (XV).
- 45. The representative of the United States said he did not agree that the situation in the Territory had remained virtually unchanged since the last time the Sub-Committee had discussed it. Local government revenue for the financial year 1966 (a total of \$37.5 million for a population of less than 50,000) attested to the level of economic activity in the Territory. This was an increase of \$8.5 million over fiscal year 1965. It was also of some interest to note that 3,000 low-cost dwellings and 113 classrooms were planned or under construction, that more than 1,000 students were attending the College of the Virgin Islands and that several million dollars had been invested in hospital construction.

- 46. It was unfortunately not possible to provide information on the distribution (by population segment) of income in the Territory. Statistical data of that kind were unobtainable for many other areas, including even many parts of the United States.
- 47. The recommendations of the Constitutional Convention had been before Congress for only one year, not two. While it was true that congressional action in 1966 had yielded no results because of differences between the Senate and the House of Representatives regarding the length of the governor's term and the provisions relating to his recall etc., it should be added that the United States Government, which was anxious to arrive at a satisfactory solution, had once again brought the matter before Congress. His delegation was currently studying the bills which had been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate in 1966 and would give the Sub-Committee specific information on the subject of differences in the bills in the near future. In any event, he wished to draw the members' attention to the working paper (see para. 40 of the present chapter) which gave a rather brief but extremely clear account of the differences between the bills passed during the 89th Congress.
- 48. The representative of Uruguay said that because of the very heavy agenda of the Special Committee and other United Nations bodies in whose work his delegation took part and in view of the need to work out, in the light of the special situation of the smaller Territories, a policy governing the application to those Territories of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), his delegation would like to be able to prepare a documented, carefully considered statement without being subjected to the pressure of time.
- 49. The representative of Italy agreed with the Uruguayan representative that the Sub-Commmittee should give thought to the methods it should use in dealing with the small Territories. The best course would be to begin by defining a policy applicable to all the small Territories on the Sub-Committee's agenda and then decide how the General Assembly resolutions should be applied to each. Such a course would be necessary as the Special Committee's terms of reference had clearly been framed with the decolonization of larger and politically and economically viable Territories, whose peoples wanted independence, in mind.
- 50. So far as the United States Virgin Islands were concerned, he noted with satisfaction that there had recently been substantial progress towards self-government. During the campaign that had preceded the elections of November 1966, the people of the Territory had had every opportunity to express their views on the future of the islands, and the new Legislative Assembly, though its competence might be somewhat limited, was free to take up any political subject. It seemed that the people were inclined to make the best politically, economically, and otherwise, of the present situation which was encouraging, having regard, in particular, to the increase in per capita income (from \$1,543 in 1963 to more than \$2,000 in 1965).
- 51. The Sub-Committee should therefore recommend that the administering Power should continue to bring the Territory along the road to full self-government and should have the bill providing for the election of a governor passed as soon as possible. It should also ask the United States Government not to conceal from the people of the Islands that several options were open to them regarding their political future and to refrain from exerting any pressure on them in favour of one option rather than another. Lastly, the administering Power should be invited to disseminate information on the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization and to facilitate contacts between the United Nations and the elected representatives of the Islands, if the latter wanted such contacts.
- 52. In the case of Territories which, like the United States Virgin Islands, already enjoyed a large measure of political freedom, it could be argued that each free election was an act of self-determination. It could also be argued that no act of self-determination was valid unless the issues were clear. That was a point that deserved further consideration by the Sub-Committee in respect not only of the United States Virgin Islands but also of all the other Territories on its agenda.

- 53. The representative of Iran said with reference to the Uruguayan representative's observations that he thought the policy to be evolved should be based on the principles of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which were applicable to all the Territories studied by the Special Committee. For the small Territories, the Sub-Committee could also be guided by other General Assembly resolutions and, additionally, by the relevant views expressed by various United Nations bodies. He emphasized, however, that the right of self-determination could not be called in question and the whole policy hinged on it; the right must be exercised in absolute freedom, particularly in the case of the small Territories. The General Assembly had indicated in several resolutions that for that condition to be fulfilled a United Nations presence was essential. It was the task of the Sub-Committee, in seeing to it that those basic principles were applied, to observe the progress being made and, if it seemed too slow, to call for the pace to be quickened.
- 54. The representative of Bulgaria shared the view that the Special Committee and its Sub-Committees should base their work on General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and, at the same time, be guided by later resolutions, such as, in the present case, resolutions 2189 (XXI) and 2232 (XXI). All members of the Sub-Committee had voted for the latter resolutions, but that did not mean that they must refrain from discussing how those resolutions were applied.
- 55. The representative of Italy said that he had consulted independent sources before making the statement that the Sub-Committee had just heard.
- 56. The terms of reference of the Special Committee and of its Sub-Committees generally were obviously based on resolution 1514 (XV), which provided *inter alia* that "Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories". But that surely did not mean that the transfer of powers must be imposed upon the peoples in question even when the latter did not yet consider themselves ready for independence and preferred to wait. In his own view, decolonization was not only a political expedient for all Territories; it was also, and above all, a matter of conscience.
- 57. The representative of Iran said he believed that all peoples desired freedom and, in the case of the small Territories, that freedom was the right to choose the status that suited them best, free from outside pressure. It was therefore the task of the Sub-Committee and of the Special Committee, under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), to recommend, in accordance with resolution 2189 (XXI), the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully the right to self-determination and independence.
- 58. The representative of Uruguay said that the main difficulty, for the Special Committee and its Sub-Committees, was to place the problem raised by each colonial Territory in context and to determine which resolutions applied to it so far as their spirit was concerned. Different problems undoubtedly called for different solutions; that was why, after adopting resolution 1514 (XV), the General Assembly had supplemented it with resolution 1541 (XV), which some rejected but which offered many possibilities to the colonial peoples, particularly those of small Territories, regarding the exercise of their right of self-determination.
- 59. The Special Committee was not a court but a United Nations body, with the task of solving the problem of decolonization in peace and harmony—a difficult task which must not be carried out hastily if the new States were to be viable and were to have democratic institutions that would guarantee their freedom. The smaller the Territory the more complex the problems of decolonization and the reluctance of the administering Powers was often understandable. That was why he thought that an informed and serious discussion on the United States Virgin Islands would be useful.
- 60. The representative of Venezuela said it was true that certain advances had been made in the Virgin Islands, particularly with regard to the enlargement of the legislature; however, in view of the delay in considering the proposals for

- an elective governor, he could not express unreserved satisfaction.
- 61. In the economic sphere, too, progress had been made. Per capita income was indeed high, and economic and social conditions in the Virgin Islands were among the most favourable in the region. He did not know how the total income was distributed among the population, but, since the figure indicated was only an average, there might of course be disparities between different population groups. His delegation welcomed the efforts which had been made to give the Territory a sound industrial and agricultural base in order to help ensure that the economic structure of the islands acquired similar characteristics and that the system of tenure was favourable to the people, giving them a large share in the management of their own resources. It was urgently necessary, however, to reduce the volume of imports, which seemed abnormally high even if allowance was made for the conditions peculiar to an island economy.
- 62. Noteworthy progress had also been made in public health and education, but it would be useful for the Sub-Committee to have further information regarding the approach adopted in education, particularly secondary education, so that it could determine whether the system met the economic and social development needs of the Territory.
- 63. He hoped that the administering Power, in response to the General Assembly's appeal (resolution 2232 (XXI)), would extend full co-operation and assistance to the Sub-Committee so as to enable it to accomplish its mission.
- 64. The representative of Uruguay said that, in view of the limited time at the Sub-Committee's disposal, he would discuss only certain aspects of the situation in the United States Virgin Islands. In 1966, the Special Committee had noted the information provided by the administering Power concerning the Constitutional Convention which had met between December 1964 and February 1965 and proposed a new Organic Act providing for a greater degree of autonomy for the Territory. It had also noted that the administering Power had taken final action on only one of the proposals made by the Convention and that the proposal for an elected governor had not yet been enacted into law. In resolution 2232 (XXI), relating to twenty-five Territories, including the United States Virgin Islands, the General Assembly had called upon the administering Powers to implement its earlier resolutions without delay. The Sub-Committee should proceed from those three points mentioned in the report in considering the situation in the Territory with a view to determining whether progress had been made since 1966 in the direction indicated by the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The latter resolution was, of course, the basic text to be taken into account, but there were other relevant resolutions, such as 1541 (XV), which did not supersede it but were complementary to it. Resolution 1514 (XV) set forth absolute independence as a fundamental principle, but when the size or economic situation of a Territory prevented the attainment of that ideal, another formula had to be sought in keeping with the spirit of resolution 1541 (XV); such a formula could be free association with an independent State, integration with an independent State on the basis of complete equality, or federation with other small States.
- 65. If the decolonization of the Virgin Islands was proceeding slowly, it was not due to indifference or ill-will on the part of the administering Power. It was clear from the report that the administering Power was conscientiously discharging its responsibilities towards the Territory. Advances had been made in the economic and social fields and in education. There was less visible progress in the political sphere; it was true that universal suffrage had been introduced, but there had been no progress with regard to institutions because the United States Congress had not yet taken a decision. He noted in that regard that it was the complexity of the democratic system which caused delays in legislative action.
- 66. His delegation supported the suggestion made by the representative of Italy, who felt that, to assist the administering Power in complying with resolution 1514 (XV), the Sub-Committee might recommend that it should adopt the bill providing for the election of a governor as soon as possible and inform the people of the various options open to them,

giving them all the information they needed in order to make a wise choice. As the representative of Italy had also suggested, the administering Power should be asked not to exert pressure on the people in favour of one option rather than another and should inform them of the views of the United Nations.

- 67. The Government of Uruguay supported decolonization, but that process must be carried out in accordance with the real interests of the peoples concerned and with due regard for economic and political realities. It was not so much a question of decolonizing as many Territories as possible each year as of helping to create viable new States whose economic situation and political awareness permitted them to benefit from freedom. The Special Committee should therefore ask the administering Power to ensure the economic development of the Territory, to awaken the political awareness of the people and to inform them of the options open to them, so that they could make a fully informed choice in complete freedom.
- 68. The representative of the Ivory Coast recalled that his delegation had expressed its views on the question of the Virgin Islands during the consideration of General Assembly resolutions 2069 (XX) and 2232 (XXI). The Ivory Coast reaffirmed its support for the principles set out in those resolutions-texts based on resolution 1514 (XV), which was fully applicable, in his view, to the Territories now under consideration by the Sub-Committee. He thanked the United States representative for the information he had supplied on his Government's efforts to speed the economic, social and political development of the Virgin Islands; it was, however, essential that, in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2232 (XXI), the Committee should visit the Virgin Islands to obtain directly, with the full co-operation of the United States, first-hand information on the situation in the Territory and the wishes of the people. He hoped that the administering Power would take the necessary steps to ensure that the people would enjoy complete freedom to express their views regarding their political future.
- 69. The representative of the United States said that before complying with some of the requests for clarification and additional information made by members, he wished to point out that his Government did not collect information on political activities within either mainland United States or the Territory under consideration. Therefore, much of the information which he would present to the Sub-Committee would be either general or generally available. The Bulgarian representative had claimed that the administering Power was the only source of information on the Territory. In fact, the six newspapers and other information media in the Virgin Islands provided a considerable volume of readily accessible information on the Territory's affairs.
- 70. With regard to political parties, their platforms and goals, he said that the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 31-33 of the present chapter) contained a factual description of the party structure in the Virgin Islands and that the information given concerning the recent electoral campaign was correct. To the best of his knowledge, however, no petitions had been filed after the election of 8 November 1966. A recount had been held, but it had not affected the results.
- 71. One of the primary elements in the political life of the Virgin Islands was the preponderance of Democratic over Republican registration. The Democratic Party had developed into two "camps" and the major political issues were possibly a result of that split within the party. However, the issues were limited to basically local questions because both factions were part of the Democratic Party active in mainland United States and approved of the platform which that Party adopted at its national convention. The Territory possessed both voice and vote at the national political conventions. The Republican Party in the Territory also identified itself with the mainland Republican Party. The election issues in the Virgin Islands reflected to some extent the varying positions of the major parties in the United States. In addition, a wide variety of local issues, such as competition for the expenditure of public funds on roads and other objects, had been discussed during the most recent electoral campaign. An additional issue

- had concerned the "loyalty oath" law, which required candidates for primary elections to subscribe to an oath of loyalty to their political party. As the Virgin Islands community was small and the Government was close to the voters, elections often turned on personalities, reputations, and the capabilities of the candidates, rather than on issues.
- 72. The future status of the Territory had not been a political issue in the campaign. However, a recent and reliable indicator of the population's views on that question was the report of the Virgin Islands Constitutional Convention of 1964, which reflected the Islanders' desire for progress in local self-government, paralleled by increasing participation in the political life of the United States.
- 73. Members would agree that a requisite of self-determination was the existence of democratic institutions through which the people's will could be expressed. In the case of the Virgin Islands, such institutions were in a relatively developed stage, prominent among them being the Legislature, which was elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage and had recently been reapportioned to reflect more accurately the population of the various areas. In that connexion, he pointed out that over 80 per cent of the registered voters had cast ballots in the November 1966 election. The Legislature enjoyed broad powers. It was free to pass any law not inconsistent with United States laws applicable to the Territory. In recent years, the United States Congress had not passed any measures bearing on local issues, but had limited its legislation applicable to the Territory to the type of law which applied to all States, such as regulation of inter-state commerce. The Legislature was also able to make its will known by passing resolutions on any topic, including the Territory's future status, and its autonomy was shown by the fact that it had complete authority to appropriate local revenues.
- 74. Additional steps towards full self-determination were being taken. The bill for an elected governor was now before Congress, with the full support of the Executive Branch. With regard to the differences between the House of Representatives and Senate versions of the bill, he said that the statement in paragraph 40 of the working paper was correct and that some additional differences included the day of the year on which the governor would take office and the date on which the bill would have become effective.
- 75. Vocational training was offered in twelve disciplines at the high-school level. Since his delegation had last discussed the question, the Virgin Islands Employment Office and the Department of Labor had arranged a programme under the Manpower Development Act whereby students interested in vocational training not offered in the Territory could be given such training outside it.
- 76. The situation with regard to land ownership in the Territory was similar to that in the United States. Virtually all productive land was owned by small landowners and the only large plots were the desert area in St. Croix and the National Park in St. John.
- 77. The representative of Bulgaria hoped that it would be possible for the administering Power to inform the Sub-Committee at some time of its views concerning visiting missions.
- 78. He wished once again to reaffirm his delegation's position on the question of small colonial Territories and of colonial Territories in general. That position was based on the resolutions of the General Assembly, which reflected the anticolonialist policy of the United Nations. His delegation did not a priori reject any solution not excluded by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which might be adopted by colonial peoples in the process of political emancipation and decolonization. The important thing was that colonial peoples should be given full freedom to exercise their right to self-determination and that the necessary political, economic and social conditions should be created to enable them to do so. The Special Committee should be guided by the decisions of the General Assembly, including resolution 2232 (XXI) concerning small Territories.

B. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

- 79. The Sub-Committee considered its conclusions and recommendations on the Territory at its 70th to 72nd meetings on 14, 18 and 19 April 1967, and adopted them by consensus—subject to the following reservations:
- 80. The representative of Bulgaria expressed his delegation's strong reservations on the deletion of the words "some measure of" from between the words "despite" and "advancement" in sub-paragraph 5 of the conclusions and recommendations.
- 81. He further expressed reservations concerning subparagraph 8 of the adopted text. His delegation had had reservations concerning similar recommendations in the past. He thought that, in the present conditions prevailing in the United States Virgin Islands, such a United Nations presence would serve no useful purpose and might well detract from United Nations prestige in the Territory. He did not disagree with the idea of a United Nations presence, since it was right that the United Nations should be deeply involved and play an active part in the process of decolonization. Such a presence should, however, first be in the form of a visiting mission which could report on the situation. Consideration could then be given to some other form of United Nations presence.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 82. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it adopt the following conclusions and recommendations:
- (1) The Sub-Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territory which were adopted in 1966 by the Special Committee and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.
- (2) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to the Territory.
- (3) It recognizes that the small size and population of the Territory present peculiar problems which demand special attention.
- (4) It notes that no significant constitutional progress has taken place in the Territory since the item was last examined by the Special Committee.
- (5) Furthermore, it regrets that, despite advancement in the political field the administering Power has failed further to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly with respect to this Territory.
- (6) It reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination, while emphasizing once again that the administering Power should enable the people to express their wishes concerning the future status of the Territory in full freedom and without any restrictions.
- (7) It also invites the administering Power to encourage open, free and public discussion of the various alternatives open to them in their achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and to ensure that the people of the Territory shall exercise their right of self-determination in full knowledge of these alternatives.
- (8) Recalling paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 that "the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status", it reiterates its belief that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the right of self-determination will be essential for the purpose of ensuring that the people of the Territory exercise their right of self-determination in full freedom and without any restrictions, in full knowledge of the various alternatives open to them.
- (9) It urges the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory and to extend to it full co-operation and assistance.

III. BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

Introduction

- 83. The Sub-Committee considered the Territory of the British Virgin Islands at its 73rd to 78th meetings between 20 April and 16 May 1967.
- 84. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 66-113 of the present chapter).
- 85. At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the United Kingdom, as administering Power, participated in the work of the Sub-Committee on this Territory.

General statements

- 86. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would confine his remarks to the British Virgin Islands as he had only just learned that Montserrat would also be on the agenda and there had anyway been no significant developments in the Territory in the short period since the Sub-Committee had last examined it.
- 87. Very considerable progress had recently been made in the British Virgin Islands. Major constitutional decisions had been taken at the Constitutional Conference held in London from 4 to 10 October 1966. Before dealing with those decisions, which were summarized in the working paper on the British Virgin Islands prepared by the Secretariat, he recalled that the islands were a very small Territory (with a surface area of less than sixty square miles, and 8,619 inhabitants in 1965) which had long experience of democratic representation; an elected constitutional Government and Legislature had been set up as early as 1774. General elections had been organized in 1950. In 1954, shortly before the dissolution of the Federation of the Leeward Islands to which it had belonged, it had been granted a Constitution which had been amended in 1959.
- 88. The object of the 1966 Constitutional Conference had been to bring the Constitution up to date. The decisions taken had been largely based on the report by Mrs. Proudfoot, who had been appointed in 1965 as Constitutional Commissioner for the British Virgin Islands to make recommendations, taking into account the opinions expressed by the population, for any constitutional changes which might be thought desirable. Her report had been prepared after extensive consultations with all shades of opinion in the Territory.
- 89. It had been agreed unanimously at the Conference that the Legislative Council should consist of a Speaker chosen from outside the Council, two ex officio members (the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary), one nominated member appointed by the Administrator after consultation with the Chief Minister, and seven elected members. The Speaker would be elected, by a simple majority of all members, for the life of the Council and have a casting vote only. All the other members of the Council would have votes, but only the votes of the elected members would determine whether a motion of no confidence in the Government was carried or defeated. The elected members would represent seven constituencies approximately equal in population whose boundaries were to be established by a Commissioner appointed from outside the Territory. The Legislative Council would meet at least once every three months and its life would be extended from three to four years. The Administrator would be able to prorogue or dissolve it after consulting the Chief Minister.
- 90. It was agreed that the Executive Council would consist of two ex officio members (the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary) and three Ministers, one of them the Chief Minister, appointed from among the elected members of the Legislative Council. It had been proposed that the Chief Minister should be directly and separately elected but in the end the Conference had decided that it would be preferable to adopt a system similar to that in force in the United Kingdom: the Chief Minister would be appointed by the Administrator as the elected member best able to command support from the majority of the elected members of the

Legislative Council, and if it was doubted whether he had the support of the majority of the elected members of the Legislative Council, the latter would indicate their preference by vote. The other two Ministers would be appointed by the Administrator on the advice of the Chief Minister.

- 91. The Administrator would have certain special responsibilities: defence and internal security, external affairs, the terms and conditions of service of public officers, the administration of the courts and finance. He would have a reserved legislative power, although only in respect of his special responsibilities, but, before using those powers, he would have to consult the Executive Council, and in the event that he disagreed with the latter, he would have to report to the Secretary of State and seek his prior approval.
- 92. The Constitution would also provide for the appointment of a Public Service Commission, consisting of three members appointed by the Administrator for a maximum period of three years. The Administrator would have to consult the Commission on all matters relating to public officers. The Conference had also decided to take advantage of the suggestion that the Supreme Court of the West Indies Associated States might also serve the British Virgin Islands.
- 93. In accordance with the decision of the Conference, a Boundary Commissioner, who was a former Grenada Judge, had been appointed at the end of 1966 and had submitted recommendations to the Legislative Council, which had unanimously approved them. On 14 April 1967, elections had been held in the constituencies thus formed to fill the seven seats for elected members in the Legislative Council: four had been won by the United Party, two by the Democratic Party and one by the People's Own Party. Five of those elected had been members of the outgoing Council. The percentage of voters had been high and there had been no untoward incident. A Chief Minister, probably a member of the majority United Party, would be appointed under the prescribed procedure.
- 94. The Territory's economy was closely linked to that of the United States Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The rapid economic expansion in the latter Territories had had various effects on the economy of the British Virgin Islands, particularly in drawing away labour and forcing up local wage rates. Live-stock raising, which had been the backbone of the economy and was still important, had declined in recent years, but tourism was becoming of increasing importance. The funds which his Government provided for the Territory, including Colonial Development and Welfare grants, were devoted mainly to projects for the expansion of agriculture, communications, trade and tourism.
- 95. Education was compulsory until the age of fifteen. For a total school population of 2,536 pupils, there were sixteen primary schools and one secondary school, which were public, and three private schools, one of them assisted. As to public health, the Territory had one hospital and eight dispensaries. Recent figures for the aid provided by his Government had been provided to the Sub-Committee in 1966.
- 96. Lastly, he expressed the view that the rapid progress which had been achieved in the British Virgin Islands, particularly at the constitutional level with the entry into force of the new Constitution, placed in the hands of the inhabitants themselves the major part of the responsibility for governing themselves and deciding their future.
- 97. The representative of the Ivory Coast and the representative of Italy asked for details of the political parties to which the United Kingdom representative had referred, including their views on the Territory's future.
- 98. The representative of Madagascar asked for fuller details of the functions of the recently elected Legislative Council and its future relations with the Government. He also asked the representative of the administering Power whether there was a vocational school in the Territory and whether the secondary school pupils, on completion of their studies, had access to higher education. If so, he would like to know many young people in the Territory were receiving higher education.

- 99. The representative of Bulgaria inquired what the administering Power's attitude was to the dispatch of a visiting mission to the Territory.
- 100. The representative of Uruguay asked for information on the trends and attitudes of the political parties in the British Virgin Islands in regard to the future political status of the Territory. He asked whether the Territory considered forming some kind of federation with the United States Virgin Islands or with other territories in the area.
- 101. The representative of the United Kingdom referred the representatives of Italy and Uruguay to paragraph 138 of the Sub-Committee's report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, annex) where it was stated that the inhabitants of the British Virgin Islands had expressed no interest in joining any federation with the other Leeward and Windward Islands. The possibility had periodically been considered of the integration of the Territory with the neighbouring United States Virgin Islands. The United Kingdom Government would, as elsewhere, be guided by the wishes of the people concerned. The Constitutional Conference in London had devoted its attention chiefly to the Territory's immediate future, and the main concern of the representatives elected at the last elections—on the basis more of their personal qualifications than of distinctive political programmes-would now be to manage the country's affairs under the new ministerial system. The political parties had not yet evolved any clear distinguishing policies and had not formulated ideas about the Territory's eventual status.
- 102. In reply to the question put by the representative of Madagascar, he said that the Legislative Council of the British Virgin Islands would legislate on all questions within its competence. The Administrator would use his reserved powers only in exceptional circumstances-for example if the decisions of the Legislative Council were incompatible with United Kingdom law, or with the Constitution of the Territory, or his own responsibilities. That was a normal feature at this stage of the development of United Kingdom Territories towards autonomy. In the case in question, the Administrator's special responsibilities had been agreed upon at the Constitutional Conference. Moreover, any decision to use his reserved powers taken by the Administrator against the advice of the Executive Council must first be approved by the Secretary of State. Experience in other territories suggested that such conflicts would in practice rarely if ever arise.
- 103. He did not have detailed information on vocational training in the Territory. The population being small, there were few candidates for post-secondary education; those who had completed their secondary education and wanted to continue their studies, in many cases went to the College of the United States Virgin Islands or elsewhere.
- 104. His delegation had already informed the Chairman in reply to his letter about the possible sending of a visiting mission, about which the Bulgarian representative had inquired, that a further reply would be sent as soon as his Government's instructions had been received.
- 105. The representative of Venezuela asked for further information regarding the Administrator's powers. In what cases were they exercised and what happened when there was a conflict of interests between the Administrator and the local authorities? He asked also whether United Kingdom financial aid was mainly intended for the development of tourism and what was the percentage of secondary school students to primary school students.
- 106. The representative of the United Kingdom said that it was misleading to speak of a conflict of interests between the Administrator and the local authorities. The normal process of transfer of powers required that certain responsibilities, such as defence and foreign affairs, should continue to be borne by the administering Power for as long as the Territory remained non-self-governing. The Administrator also had special responsibilities in matters of internal security, the public service, the administration of the courts and finance. But over most of the field of government, the Administrator, the Ministers and the Legislative Council could be expected to work in close co-operation and consultation.
- 107. It was the local authorities which planned the distribution of United Kingdom financial aid among the various sec-

tors of activity, such as tourism, agriculture, health and education. Once these priorities had been agreed, any project within them which was considered sound was automatically approved. He had no information on the ratio of secondary to primary school students, but anyone interested could obtain detailed statistics of this kind from the information transmitted by the United Kingdom Government under Article 73 e of the Charter.

108. The representative of Iran asked why there were nonelected members in the Legislative Council and, also, whether the political parties and the population of the British Virgin Islands were aware of all the possibilities which would be open to them when the time came for them to exercise their right of self-determination.

109. The representative of the United Kingdom explained that two of the three non-elected members of the Legislative Council, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary, were official members, and that their functions consisted mainly in participating in the Council's proceedings on questions relating to their respective areas; the third, who would be nominated in consultation with the Chief Minister, would no doubt be either a prominent individual chosen for his experience and competence, or an individual representing a particular sector or interest-group of the population which for one reason or another, had not secured adequate representation at the elections.

110. There were three non-elected to seven elected members, and for the purpose of votes of confidence only the votes of the elected members would count.

111. The Virgin Islanders were fully aware of the possibilities open to them with regard to their future political status, but it was generally recognized that the immediate task was to lay the foundation for self-rule and to strengthen them gradually.

112. The representative of Uruguay asked the administering power to supply the Sub-Committee as soon as possible with information concerning the elections which had been held in the Territory on 14 April. That information could be published as an addendum to the working paper prepared by the Secretariat.

113. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation had carefully studied the relevant documents on the British Virgin Islands and had listened attentively to the statement of the representative of the administering Power.

114. There was no need for his delegation to review in detail the history of United Kingdom colonial rule in the Caribbean Territories. A full discussion of the question had been held in the Sub-Committee in 1964 on the basis of information provided only by the administering Power. However, positive and valuable conclusions had been reached regarding the situation in those Territories. A study of the relevant documents had shown that the administering Power was not only failing to implement the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the Territory, but that it was seeking to preserve its control there. No effective steps had been taken to consult the people of the Territory regarding their future political status. In the conclusions and recommendations which it had adopted in 1966 concerning the Territory, the Special Committee had reaffirmed that the Declaration applied fully to the Territory. It had also reaffirmed that the people were entitled to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom. Furthermore, it had regretted that the administering Power had not agreed to a visiting mission, and had affirmed that such a visit was both useful and necessary. Members were well aware of the United Kingdom's attitude to the question of visiting missions, as had just been demonstrated once again. The United Kingdom had reserved its position on the conclusions and recommendations which the Special Committee had adopted in 1966. He would point out, however, that those conclusions and recommendations had formed the basis for the Fourth Committee's consideration of the question and had been endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 2232 (XXI).

115. Although the position of the British Virgin Islands had much in common with that of the other British Caribbean

possessions, the pace of constitutional development had been much slower there than elsewhere. As the Constitutional Commissioner who had visited the Territory in 1966 had pointed out, the limited representative system which had been established by the 1773 Constitution had developed no further after the departure of the white ruling classes following the emancipation. The power to govern was, in fact, still largely in the hands of the Administrator, who was appointed by the Crown. The Constitutional Commissioner had made recommendations which were designed to modernize and to adapt the Territory to some extent to the conditions of the twentieth century, However, it was not a question of modernization or adaptation but of putting an end to colonial rule and implementing without delay the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The purpose of all the proposed changes was to maintain the colonial administration in the Territory. The economic and financial position of the Territory was similar to that of other Caribbean Territories in that its budget could not be balanced without substantial grants from the United Kingdom. In that connexion, his delegation reiterated its view that the colonial Power, which had exploited the Territory for centuries, must give back what it had taken from the Territory so that the people could exercise their right to self-determinaion in full freedom and not be placed in a position in which they had no choice but to remain under the control of the colonial Power.

116. His delegation considered that the Sub-Committee should reaffirm the conclusions and recommendations which it had adopted the previous year concerning the Territory and he expressed the hope that the administering Power would realize the need for more practical co-operation with the United Nations and would implement the various relevant resolutions which had been adopted.

117. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would add some further information to the statement made by his delegation at the 74th meeting.

118. Several delegations had requested fuller details regarding the elections held in the Territory on 14 April 1967; the Secretariat working paper (paras. 91-98 of the present chapter) which had just been circulated contained some information on this. He added that of the 3,641 registered voters 70 per cent had voted; the United Party (UP) had obtained 1,094 votes, the Democratic Party (DP) 800 and the People's Own Party (POP) 663. The party manifestoes were on similar lines. The United Party (UP) pledged itself to work for better relations with neighbouring countries, particularly the United States Virgin Islands, and continue good relations with the mother country (the United Kingdom).

119. It was interesting to note that the report submitted in June 1965 by Mrs. Proudfoot, Constitutional Commissioner for the British Virgin Islands, included a memorandum from Mr. Stoutt, now the elected Chief Minister, containing suggestions similar to Mrs. Proudfoot's own proposals; Mr. Stoutt had emphasized the need to put development before constitutional reforms. With a view to promoting economic development, the assistance provided by the United Kingdom Government had been increased considerably since 1940 and reached nearly \$US6.5 million; of that amount, \$1.9 million had been in the form of development grants. The average amount of the annual financial assistance for development was as follows: from 1940 to 1949, \$US14,000; from 1950 to 1959, \$47,000; from 1960 to 1963, \$137,000; from 1964 to 1966, \$235,000. Development projects planned for 1967 included a major expansion of electricity supply, and several new buildings including a court-house and Council chambers, Large-scale projects by private developers were also under study, in particular with regard to waterfront development at Road Town.

120. The representative of Venezuela remarked that members of the Sub-Committee were given only a very incomplete picture of the situation in the Territory. He deplored the fact that it had not proved possible to send a visiting mission there, because of the administering Power's refusal to cooperate.

121. He asked the United Kingdom representative to clarify certain points for him. According to the Secretariat working paper (para. 71 of the present chapter) the administering

Power had in a way a right of veto in the Legislative Council, for the decisions of that body were subject to the assent of the Administrator, who was appointed by the Crown. In those conditions, it could hardly be claimed that the Territory enjoyed a degree of self-government, since the Legislative Council was not free to legislate on all aspects of internal affairs.

122. Moreover, in a democratic régime, the Parliament represented the people; in the British Virgin Islands, however, the Speaker, who presided over the Parliament, was not chosen by the people. It would be useful to know how the Speaker was designated.

123. The powers of the Administrator seemed excessive: the Executive Council was practically under his control, and it might even be said that, according to the provisions in paragraph 83, his powers were almost absolute.

124. He expressed surprise at the fact that only some of Mrs. Proudfoot's proposals had been accepted.

125. Turning to the economic situation, he said that a comparison of the data for 1964 with those for 1965 showed that the total value of imports had tripled, whereas the value of exports had fallen 40 per cent. He deplored the fact that tourism was the only industry to have been encouraged in the Territory in recent years and that animal husbandry, which had traditionally been an important activity, was declining. The United Kingdom representative had himself indicated that the least development had occurred in the social field; education, in particular, was neglected; a single secondary school and three private schools were not enough to ensure free and compulsory education.

126. The representative of the United Kingdom regretted that the Venezuelan representative had spoken in such a negative way regarding the progress achieved by the British Virgin Islands. When he had mentioned the role of the Legislative Council and of the Administrator, that representative had referred to paragraph 83 of the Secretariat working paper; however, that paragraph related to the former Constitution and Mrs. Proudfoot's recommendations and the Constitutional Conference had led to the replacement of that Constitution together with many of the features of it which he had mentioned. He invited the Venezuelan representative to examine the new Constitution, as described in the Secretariat working paper beginning with paragraph 74.

127. As stated in paragraph 9 of the report of the Constitutional Conference, the Speaker was elected by a simple majority of all members of the Legislative Council for the life of the Council and had a casting vote only. The Deputy Speaker was elected in a similar manner; unlike the Speaker, he would be elected from among the members of the Council.

128. The question of the presence in the Legislative Council and the Executive Council of *ex officio* members, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary, had already been discussed and explained: all those at the Constitutional Conference had deemed this arrangement desirable for practical reasons.

129. The role of the Public Service Commission, as described in paragraph 24 of the report of the Constitutional Conference, was to advise the Administrator on all questions relating to officers in the public service—appointments, promotions, discipline, etc. There was also an independent Judicial and Legal Service Commission, as agreed at the Conference.

130. It was not the case that the Administrator controlled the Legislative Council. The Chief Minister was appointed by the Administrator, as the elected member having the support of the majority of the elected members of the Legislative Council. In case of uncertainty, they indicated their preference by a vote. The two Ministers were then appointed by the Administrator on the advice of the Chief Minister: in fact, it was the latter who really made the choice, in exactly the same way as in the United Kingdom, where the Queen appointed as Ministers persons nominated by the Prime Ministers

131. Not all of Mrs. Proudfoot's recommendations had been adopted by the Constitutional Conference; but the Conference,

including all shades of British Virgin Islands opinion, had been largely guided by those recommendations and had reached unanimous agreement on its own decisions.

132. The Venezuelan representative considered that the educational facilities in the Territory were inadequate; but the education statistics did not appear to support this view.

133. Lastly, if there was any conflict between the provisions of General Assembly resolutions and the desire of the people of the Territory, in the last analysis it must be for the people themselves to decide on their constitution and on their future and the United Kingdom Government would continue to be guided by the people's wishes.

134. The representative of Venezuela said that, despite the details supplied by the United Kingdom representative, the information available to the Sub-Committee was still too vague. Thus, it was difficult to judge the extent of the special powers conferred on the Administrator and to know in exactly what circumstance he could overrule the decisions of the Executive Council, thus exercising a right of veto. Moreover, despite the United Kingdom representative's attempt at justification, it was hard to see what freedom of action the seven elected representatives of the people could enjoy in a council which also had three official members.

135. The economic situation of the Territory, as described in the documents available to the Sub-Committee, was somewhat disturbing. It did not appear from the information received by the Secretariat that there was any attempt at industrialization. As the United Kingdom representative had admitted, in his statement at the 73rd meeting, live-stock raising, traditionally the backbone of the economy, had declined so that the development of the British Virgin Islands seemed to depend entirely on tourism, which was not enough.

136. As to the political parties in the British Virgin Islands, it was disappointing for Sub-Committee III, which was responsible for seeing to it that the Territories with which it was concerned exercised their right to self-determination, to note that the programmes of those parties did not embody political aims consistent with the resolutions of the General Assembly.

137. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Venezuelan representative's apprehension with regard to the Administrator's powers were unjustified, since those powers were precisely defined in the report of the Constitutional Conference. He read out paragraphs 20 and 21 of the report, from which it was clear that the Administrator could act without consulting the Executive Council only in urgent or very special cases: he emphasized that such a procedure was exceptional. As to the reserved legislative power conferred on the Administrator, that too could be exercised only in exceptional circumstances, in matters involving the Administrator's special responsibilities, and he could not as a rule obstruct legislation adopted by the Legislative Council.

138. If, in spite of the fact that they were entirely at liberty to do so, the political parties had not included in their programmes any statements regarding future constitutional evolution, the Sub-Committee might conclude that the question was not of immediate concern to the population. That was perfectly understandable, for the new Constitution had been in force for only a few weeks. The population of the Territory was obviously satisfied with the present status—which had indeed been worked out in full consultation with the people and accepted by them. When they wished for further change in future, the United Kingdom Government would always be ready to work this out with them once again.

139. The representative of Venezuela thought it a pity that, for want of adequate knowledge of the real state of affairs in the Territory, members were obliged to fall back on hypotheses which it was hard for them to verify. It was the Sub-Committee's duty to find out what the people of the British Virgin Islands wanted, and the attitude of the administering Power made that task difficult. Indeed, Mrs. Proudfoot, Constitutional Commissioner for the British Virgin Islands, had already drawn attention to that problem in her

report, stressing that the administering Power did not maintain sufficient contact with the population.

140. The representative of Iran said that the Venezuelan representative had raised some extremely important questions, especially with regard to awakening of political consciousness among the population of the British Virgin Islands. He recalled that, in answer to a question he had asked at the 73rd meeting, the representative of the administering Power had stated that the population was fully aware of the possibilities open to it with regard to its future political status. However, the extent to which the population was really aware of those possibilities was open to question, since it had not been consulted, either by the political parties or in any other way. The decisions taken by the Constitutional Conference certainly embodied the views of the Legislative Council, but it was by no means certain that they reflected the views of the population. The despatch of a visiting mission would undoubtedly facilitate the task of the United Nations, as assurances on that point could then be obtained from the population itself.

141. The representative of Venezuela observed that, according to paragraph 124 of the October 1966 report of Sub-Committee III (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, annex) when the people of the British Virgin Islands had been consulted in 1947, they had made it clear that they did not wish to become part of the proposed federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands. He inquired how the situation had evolved since 1947.

142. The representative of the United Kingdom replied that, although the British Virgin Islands were a small territory, the mass media (free Press, publications of every sort, radio) were not lacking. For example, apart from their links with the United States Virgin Islands, the other countries of the West Indies and the United Kingdom, the people no doubt heard the full accounts broadcast by the BBC of what went on in the outside world, including the activities of the United Nations, the Special Committee and the Fourth Committee. The Territory would soon have its own broadcasting system. He therefore thought that the people could hardly be described as uninformed, and they had a long history of representative government behind them. The fact that neither they nor their elected representatives had raised the question of the Territory's political future might lead the Sub-Committee to conclude that they were not as yet concerned about it.

143. With reference to the Venezuelan representative's question, he regretted that he could not supply precise details about the events of 1947. However, it had been quite clear that the Virgin Islanders had not been interested in joining a federation of the other Leeward and Windward Islands and to the extent that they looked outward at all it had been more in the direction of the United States Virgin Islands. On all these matters, the United Kingdom Government would be guided solely by the wishes of the population.

144. The representative of Iran said that it was certainly odd that a people fully aware of the political possibilities open to it should not take an active interest in them. No administering Power could ask the United Nations to accept its unsupported word. He therefore continued to believe that the direct contacts with the population of the British Virgin Islands which would be established by a visiting mission would be useful in all respects. Perhaps the United Kingdom representative would state how the assistance which the British Virgin Islands were receiving under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) could help them to achieve the aim of decolonization more rapidly.

145. The representative of Venezuela said that, in view of the negative attitude of the administering Power with regard to the dispatch of a visiting mission to the Territory, which was plain from the letter read out by the Chairman at the 74th meeting, the Sub-Committee had every reason to doubt the accuracy of the information supplied by the administering Power. He would like to know whether, at the time of the 1964 Constitutional Conference, the representatives of the British Virgin Islands had participated in the discussions regarding the possible creation, at some future time, of a

federation of the Eastern and Western Caribbean Territories and, if so, what views they had expressed.

146. The representative of Bulgaria remarked that the remarks of the Iranian and Venezuelan representatives gained added importance from the fact that they were applicable to all small Territories, especially those of the Caribbean region. The administering Power ought to realize that the United Nations, and especially the Special Committee and its sub-committees, needed the most detailed information possible, since they had special responsibilities towards the colonial Territories both under the Charter and under resolution 1514 (XV) and other resolutions of the General Assembly and could not therefore passively accept the views of administering Powers. As he had said at the 74th meeting, it was not a question of modernizing or adapting the Territory to the conditions of the twentieth century but of putting an end to colonial rule, and it was the duty of the United Nations to promote actively the political emancipation of colonial peoples.

147. The representative of the United Kingdom said that reports of the various organs of UNDP no doubt contained detailed information regarding any aid supplied to the British Virgin Islands under the Programme. The great bulk of the aid received by the islands certainly came from the United Kingdom Government. The Virgin Islanders had not participated, or wished to participate, in the discussions which had taken place after the failure of the West Indian Federation on the subject of a possible new federation of the Caribbean Territories.

148. In reply to the Bulgarian representative, he stated that it was the practice of the United Kingdom Government not only to discharge fully its obligations as an administering Power under Article 73 e of the Charter but also to supply to the Secretariat, the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee on a voluntary basis, detailed information which went well beyond its strict Charter obligations, especially with regard to the political and constitutional evolution of the Territory. His delegation thought that the information supplied was abundantly sufficient to enable the Sub-Committee to form a sound and balanced judgement.

149. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation had already stated its position concerning the British Virgin Islands, In its view, the Sub-Committee, in recommending independence for such small Territories, should satisfy itself that the best conditions prevailed. Any decolonization process which led to dismemberment and was not based on economic realities would be injurious and doomed to failure. Because they were so small in area and in population and had very limited natural resources, the British Virgin Islands, which had always been dependent, could not survive on their own. Association or federation with other groups of islands seemed to be the best solution. In the modern world, moreover, coexistence necessitated integration; Europe provided an example with the Common Market, and Latin America had recently embarked on a similar course with the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este. The conclusions of the report of Mrs. Proudfoot, the Constitutional Commissioner for the British Virgin Islands, pointed in the same direction. Such small West Indian Territories could only survive in a federation or an association, and they must be encouraged to choose the status best suited to them.

150. He noted that, in the case of the British Virgin Islands, there was in fact a programme for the improvement of general conditions, but under the subordination of the administering Power.

151. The Secretariat working paper (paras. 92-98 of the present chapter) showed that the various parties saw no alternative to a continuation of the colonial presence. The people of the Territories must have an awareness of the possibilities open to them and must give consideration to association or federation which, in his view, should be their choice.

152. The representative of Bulgaria agreed that an excellent solution for the smaller West Indian Islands, which were similar in many respects—for instance, in size, in ethnic origin and culture and in economic conditions—would be to join together in a federation, which might also include Puerto Rico. Moreoever, federation was fully in conformity with the

resolutions of the General Assembly. The administering Power did not seem to favour such a solution, however, and the Federation of the West Indies had encountered many difficulties as a result of United Kingdom policy.

153. He deplored the fact that the administering Power did not allow the smaller Territories any other choice than to remain subordinate to it.

154. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation had always expressed the view that special solutions must be found in the case of the smaller Territories; they should not be encouraged towards an independence which would prove to be extremely precarious. Once a Territory became independent, it should not find itself compelled to go cap in hand for assistance from the former administering Power or from other countries. The Sub-Committee should therefore try to recommend a solution which fitted the special problems of the smaller Territories. It would particularly be helpful if a United Nations visiting mission could be sent to hold on-the-spot consultations with the representatives of the people and to evaluate the progress achieved. The administering Power's refusal to allow a visit to the Territories under its administration was disturbing. The prime essential was that the people should be allowed freely to express their views on the future political status of their Territory.

155. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had listened carefully to the suggestions concerning the establishment of a federation. The Federation of the West Indies had not broken down because of United Kingdom hostility to the project, as the representative of Bulgaria had said. On the contrary, the constant and declared policy of the United Kingdom Government ever since 1946 had been to encourage and establish an independent West Indies Federation and no one had worked harder for this than the United Kingdom. An independence date had even been fixed for the Federation. The breakdown of the Federation had been due to many complex factors, including conflicts of interest among those involved on such questions as financing, economic development and political powers.

156. There had been no discussion of the inclusion of the British Virgin Islands in a federation because the people had not indicated any interest in that solution. On this as on other matters the United Kingdom Government would be guided by the wishes of the people of the Territory.

157. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that both the administering Power and the members of the Sub-Committee deserved credit for the steps that had been taken to help the people of the British Virgin Islands to independence. The United Kingdom, however, would do the Sub-Committee a service if it would provide more information. The information it had provided so far was undoubtedly valuable, but for an equitable solution more was needed, particularly on the participation of the indigenous inhabitants in economic and social affairs and the efforts made by the administering Power to inculcate a sense of social responsibility. The United Kingdom's refusal to accept a visiting mission was regrettable. He would therefore urge that Government to co-operate by providing all the necessary information and allowing a mission to visit the Territory.

B. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

158. The Sub-Committee considered its conclusions and recommendations on the Territory at its 78th meeting, and adopted them by consensus—subject to the following reservations.

159. The representative of Bulgaria expressed his delegation's reservations on the question of a United Nations presence referred to in sub-paragraph 9. In the view of his delegation, a United Nations presence should take first the form of a visiting mission and following that, the question of considering other forms of presence might arise.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

160. The Sub-Committee recommends the following conclusions and recommendations for approval by the Special Committee:

- (1) The Sub-Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations on the Territory which were approved by the Special Committee in 1964 and 1966 and were confirmed by the General Assembly at its twentieth and twenty-first sessions.
- (2) The Sub-Committee reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples continues to apply fully to the Territory.
- (3) The Sub-Committee recognizes that the small size of the Territory and its sparse population raise particular problems which require special attention,

(4) The Sub-Committee takes note of the result of the Constitutional Conference of October 1966, and also of the elections which were held in the Territory on 14 April 1967.

(5) The Sub-Committee regrets that, despite the political and constitutional progress made in the Territory since the Special Committee last considered the matter, the administering Power has failed further to implement the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and other General Assembly resolutions relating to this Territory.

(6) The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination, and wishes to stress once again that the administering Power should enable the people to express its will regarding the future status of the Territory in complete freedom and without restrictions of any kind.

(7) The Sub-Committee invites the administering Power to encourage open, free and public discussion of the possible options from which the people can make its choice in its efforts to attain the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and to ensure that the people of the Territory will be able to exercise its right of self-determination in full knowledge of the options open to it.

(8) The Sub-Committee reiterates the view that it should be possible for the Territory to unite with other Territories in the area in order to form an economically and administratively viable State. The Sub-Committee regrets that, since 1947, no effective steps have been taken to bring about a possible federation with other Territories. Accordingly, it invites the administering Power to take steps to ensure that the population of the Territory is fully aware of the various possibilities open to it in its efforts to attain the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV) and other pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly.

(9) Recalling paragraph 6 of resolution 2232 (XXI), which states that "the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status", the Sub-Committee reiterates its belief that a United Nations presence during the procedures connected with the exercise of the right of self-determination will be essential to ensure that the people of the Territory can exercise this right in complete freedom, without any restrictions of any kind, and in full knowledge of the possible options open to it.

(10) The Sub-Committee regrets that the administering Power has not yet agreed to the sending of a visiting mission to the Territory, and affirms that such a visit will be useful and necessary. Therefore it urges the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory and to extend to it full co-operation and assistance.

IV. Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Angulla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent

A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

Introduction

161. The Sub-Committee considered the question of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent at its 79th to 89th meetings between 8 and 28 August 1967.

162. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (paras. 114-405 of the present chapter) and the text of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 506th meeting on 23 March 1967 (see para. 948 of this chapter).

163. In reply to its request for information concerning the situation in Anguilla, the Sub-Committee was informed by a

letter dated 11 August 1967, from the representative of the United Kingdom, that in view of the Special Committee's resolution which in his Government's view prejudged the further examination of the situation in the Eastern Caribbean Associated States, the United Kingdom delegation could not assist the Sub-Committee in its further studies concerning those States.

164. Requests for hearings in connexion with the question of Anguilla were submitted by Mr. J. Gumbs, an Anguillan, and Mr. Roger Fisher, a Harvard law professor and "Legal Adviser to the Provisional Government of Anguilla". The Sub-Committee granted a hearing to Mr. Gumbs at its 79th meeting on 8 August 1967, and to Mr. Fisher at its 85th to 87th meetings on 24 and 25 August 1967.

General statements

165. The Chairman said that, by referring the question of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent to Sub-Committee III, the Special Committee had entrusted it with a great responsibility, since the action to be taken by the Sub-Committee might have far-reaching consequences for the future of all small Territories.

166. Unfortunately, the Sub-Committee was hampered by the fact that, contrary to the usual practice, the United Kingdom representative was not attending its deliberations and had decided not to furnish such additional information as the Sub-Committee might need. The United Kingdom representative had maintained that, by choosing associated status with the United Kingdom, the Territories under consideration had attained a full measure of self-government and, furthermore, that the elected representatives of the people had been duly consulted. Most members of the Special Committee had considered, however, that since the United Nations had not been able to ascertain the wishes of the population of the six Territories concerned, the Committee had not been able to ascertain whether the people had really been able to express their wishes.

167. Since the Special Committee had been considering the question, the developments which had occurred in three of the six Territories—Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and St. Vincent—had only strengthened the doubts expressed in the Special Committee. So far as Anguilla was concerned, The New York Times of 8 August 1967 had made the surprising statement that "The United Nations turned down today a request that a fact-finding mission be sent to Anguilla". Since Sub-Committee III was the only United Nations body currently dealing with Anguilla, one could not see how Anguilla's request could have been turned down, since it had not even reached the Sub-Committee.

168. Sub-Committee III was confronted with a request for independence from a so-called associated State which rejected its status. While it obviously could not ignore that request, it could not endorse it without first studying the feasibility of Anguilla surviving as an independent State. Anguilla covered an area of thirty-five square miles and had 6,000 inhabitants. In view of the size of the island, the Sub-Committee, while following the well-established principles which guided the United Nations, in the task of decolonization, should seek new precepts consonant with the particular circumstances of the small Territories. Sub-Committee III should therefore undertake a systematic and scientific study in order to determine the criteria on the basis of which rights of the population of small Territories could in future be suitably protected.

169. The representative of Venezuela recalled that, in resolution 2189 (XXI), the General Assembly had mentioned the special situation of small Territories. It had also emphasized the usefulness of visiting missions but the appeals to the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to be sent to their Territories had often been rejected. When the Special Committee had decided to refer the question of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent to the Sub-Committee, the latter had asked the United Kingdom for additional information but none had been provided. It was therefore impossible for the Sub-Committee to progress further than the Special Committee had been able to do in its consideration of the question, since the Sub-Committee was no better informed.

170. It seemed doubtful whether the administering Power had fully implemented resolution 1514 (XV) in the six Territories in question. It was stated in the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (para. 132 of this chapter), that, when the report on the new status of association with the United Kingdom had been signed, the Leader of the Opposition of St. Lucia had called for a general election; the Leader of the Opposition of Grenada, for his part, had not agreed to certain provisions and had also called for general elections. The recent events in Anguilla confirmed that the population was not satisfied with the status of association worked out at the constitutional conferences held in London between 28 February and 26 May 1966.

171. The Chairman should ask for the Sub-Committee to be given access to every possible source so that it might obtain the information it needed to make recommendations.

172. The representative of Uruguay recalled that his delegation's position regarding the six Territories had been stated in the Special Committee at the end of 1966. At that time, the Committee had tried to determine, firstly, whether the constitutional changes resulting from the London conference had met the wishes of the peoples and, secondly, whether they had represented progress towards the self-determination of the six Territories. The Committee had felt that it needed first-hand information to answer those questions and had referred the matter to Sub-Committee III so that the latter might obtain that information. Sub-Committee III was thus the body at present competent to consider the request of Anguilla; in that connexion, the article in *The New York Times* to which the Chairman had referred was quite uncalled for.

173. Sub-Committee III should seek the information it needed from every possible source but it should not infringe the powers of the Sub-Committee on Petitions if it wished to hear an Anguillan.

174. The representative of Bulgaria said that he supported the remarks made by the Chairman at the beginning of the meeting; he too was aware of the great importance of the matter for the future of the small Territories. He also endorsed the Chairman's remarks about the article in *The New York Times* concerning Anguilla's request for a visiting mission.

175. The task entrusted to Sub-Committee III by the Special Committee was specified in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution (see para. 948 of the present chapter). It was regrettable that, in the performance of that task, the Sub-Committee could not have the benefit of assistance from the United Kingdom, which was not even attending the deliberations.

176. It was difficult to believe that the constitutional arrangements adopted for Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent were in conformity with Chapter XI of the Charter and the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV). The events which had just occurred in Anguilla confirmed the doubts which most of the members of the Special Committee had voiced. Sub-Committee III and the Special Committee should now see that the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV), and particularly those in operative paragraphs 2 and 5, were fully implemented.

177. At the 79th meeting of the Sub-Committee on 8 August 1967, the Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories informed the Sub-Committee that Mr. J. Gumbs, an Anguillan, had called upon him the day before and had asked that the United Nations send a visiting mission to Anguilla. He had explained to Mr. Gumbs what procedure he should follow, stating that the competent bodies in the matter were the Sub-Committee on Petitions, the Special Committee and the General Assembly. He also suggested that Mr. Gumbs should get in touch with the Chairman of Sub-Committee III.

178. The representative of Madagascar said that he had listened carefully to the statements made by the Venezuelan, Uruguayan and Bulgarian representatives and the Under-Secretary. However, he reserved his position on the question of hearing Mr. J. Gumbs of Anguilla, since the Sub-Committee on Petitions was the body competent to decide whether the Special Committee should consider any particular petition. He suggested that the Sub-Committee should postpone any decision on the subject until its next meeting and should in the meantime get in touch with the Sub-Committee on Petitions.

179. The Chairman pointed out that the Special Committee was not currently in session and that the only one of its bureau Members present in New York was the Rapporteur, who had no power to call a meeting. Moreover, in the resolution of 27 March 1967, the Special Committee had requested its Sub-Committee III to examine, in the light of the recent constitutional developments, the situation in the Territories in all its aspects. Since Mr. J. Gumbs was certainly a very important source of information, the Chairman thought that the Sub-Committee would be justified in inviting him to make a statement, an action which would not, however, set a precedent.

180. The representative of Uruguay agreed that Sub-Committee III should avoid any jurisdictional conflict with the Sub-Committee on Petitions. Subject, however, to that reservation, he thought it would have much to gain by drawing on all sources of information in carrying out its task.

181. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that he supported the reservation made by the Uruguayan representative. While it was true that the Sub-Committee on Petitions had precise terms of reference, it should be borne in mind, firstly, that the members of the Special Committee were absent from New York and, secondly, that the representative of the administering Power, which was in a position to inform the Sub-Committee, was not willing to take part in the Sub-Committee's debate.

182. The Chairman said that the Sub-Committee's terms of reference were very clear. Moreover, it was given broad powers under the resolution adopted. He proposed that the Sub-Committee should invite Mr. J. Gumbs to make a statement, with the undertsanding that that did not establish a precedent.

183. Mr. Gumbs said that, contrary to the information appearing in *The New York Times*, the United Nations had not rejected the request of the Anguillan people. The Anguillan delegation had been well received by the Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, who had explained to it what procedure it must follow to be granted a hearing. The Anguillan people ardently hoped that the United Nations would champion their cause and would send a mission to the island at an early date.

184. After 300 years of colonial domination and seventy-five years of association with St. Kitts and Nevis, Anguilla had no drinking water, roads, electricity or proper schools. There was not a single telephone in the country for communications either within or outside the island. As far as the schools were concerned, hundreds of children were crammed into each classroom. The Anguillan people knew that that state of affairs would not be changed unless they themselves had the necessary authority to improve their lot and that the only way they could acquire that authority was by becoming independent.

185. With regard to the incidents of the past few days, contrary to the information published in *The New York Times*, which had alleged that 250 Anguillans had fired on the police, the policemen had dispersed at the bidding of a single Anguillan, who had rapidly brought them over to the common cause despite the threat of prison. In fact, a number of policemen had been arrested and what the people now feared was an invasion of the island by the forces of the central Government.

186. Anguilla's status of association with St. Kitts and Nevis had been for the Anguillan people only a source of oppression from which they were trying to liberate themselves. That was proved by the fact that, on 11 July 1967, when the people had voted in a referendum to establish whether they wanted (a) to withdraw from the association and (b) to form a provisional government, their response had been unmistakably affirmative and unanimous. The following day, the people's representatives, with the assistance of a world-renowned jurist, had begun to draft a constitution and to fix a date for future elections. Unfortunately, as could have been expected, the central Government had taken severe measures. In reprisal, all mail, medicines, remittances and so on intended for the Anguillans were being held at St. Kitts, where a half million dollars belonging to them was virtually frozen. The Anguillan delegation to a conference recently held at Barbados had not been allowed to raise the question of secession and had been subjected to pressure to sign the conference's report without even having read it.

187. Consequently, the Anguillan people were now turning to the United Nations asking it to intercede in their behalf. The Anguillans were a peaceful people who fully realized that law and order must be maintained, but they could not tolerate having their future decided without being allowed to express their wishes through their representatives.

188. Anguilla was only a small island of some thirty-five square miles and 6,000 inhabitants, but it was economically viable. In addition to tourism, which could become a flourishing industry because of the island's natural beauty, the Anguillans knew that they could rely on external assistance in developing all their natural resources. In fact, offers had already been made to them for that purpose.

189. In reply to a question on Anguilla's position at the Barbados Conference asked by the representative of Uruguay, Mr. Gumbs, read out the following text:

"Statement to the people of Anguilla by their Government "The recent Conference in Barbados and the resulting situation has been seriously misunderstood. The facts are as follows.

"(1) The conference report is not binding on the people of Anguilla

"The Anguillan delegates made clear their limited authority at the beginning of the Conference. Under the provisional constitution, and under the referendum, no agreement to return Anguilla to St. Kitts could be binding, except one approved by the people. In the opening statement for Anguilla, which is recorded on tape, Walter Hodges stated:

"'Any of the heads of agreement discussed or reached cannot commit the people of Anguilla, until the people have the opportunity to see and agree to them'.

"The people of Anguilla have not yet seen the conference report. They have not agreed to it, It is not now binding on Anguilla.

"(2) The effect of signing the conference report

"The four members of the Anguillan delegation who signed the conference report believed that these were the best terms that could be obtained from that conference, and that they should be brought home for serious study by the people. On the last day, the delegates were faced with a report that was already duplicated, with warnings of various kinds, and with a take-it-or-leave-it situation. The report contains many advantages as well as disadvantages. On such an important matter, there were strong reasons to sign the report, and to bring it home for people to consider.

"(3) The conference report has not been rejected by the people of Anguilla

"The conference report is a complex document of twentyone pages, with four appendices and numerous statutory
references. It contains intricate proposals concerning a Commonwealth peace-keeping force, economic aid, local selfgovernment, and proposed legislation. We owe it to Anguilla,
and to those from Britain and the other islands, not to reject
the proposals out of hand without understanding them. If the
people are unwilling to accept them as they stand, we should
come back with specific proposals of our own, designed to
provide adequate self-government for the people of Anguilla.

"(4) Our future course of action

"The Government of Anguilla, operating under the provisional constitution, will continue to administer the independent island of Anguilla, pending a peaceful settlement. In the meantime we shall:

- "(a) Explain the conference report to the people and discuss it with them.
- "(b) Invite others to come to the island to discuss the report with them.
- "(c) Seek a consensus of the report, and on what counterproposal, if any, Anguilla should make.
- "(d) Request all other parties to allow us time for our constitutional deliberations. A hasty use of force by any other island would be most unwise.

"(5) Acting Chairman of the Council

"Under the present constitution, the Chairman is at all times subject to the decision of the majority of Council. For the time being, Ronald Webster shall continue as Acting Chairman. All other members remain on the Council.

"(6) Unanimity of the Council

"This statement to the people of Anguilla is unanimously approved by all the available members of the Council.

"Signed on 7 August 1967.

"Ronald Webster Emile Gumbs Peter Adams John Rogers Walter Hodge John Hodge."

190. The Chairman recalled that, at its previous meeting, the Sub-Committee had requested him to get in touch with the United Kingdom delegation and ask it to furnish information on the situation in Anguilla. He had done so and, in response to his inquiry, he had just received a letter dated 11 August 1967, which he would read, from Sir Leslie Glass, the United Kingdom representative. The substantive part of the letter read as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to your enquiry, made in accordance with a decision of Sub-Committee III of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, about the possibility of the United Kingdom delegation participating in the Sub-Committee's discussions on the situation in Anguilla, which forms part of the Associated State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla.

"In reply to this request, I am instructed to confirm the United Kingdom Government's position as indicated by my delegation to the Special Committee in March 1967, namely that in view of the terms of the Special Committee's resolution of 24th March, 1967, which in my Government's view prejudged the further examination of the situation for which the resolution provided, no purpose would be served by continuing the United Kingdom delegation's collaboration with the Special Committee on these matters. In these circumstances, I regret that my delegation cannot assist the Sub-Committee in its further studies concerning the Eastern Caribbean Associated States.

"In so far as the Sub-Committee contemplates in particular discussion of events in any of the Eastern Caribbean Associated States which occurred after their achievement of Statehood, I wish to recall that on becoming States in association with Britain, the territories attained a full measure of self-government. Accordingly, Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations ceased at that point to apply, and subsequent events affecting the territories, including the purported secession of Anguilla from St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and developments connected therewith, are no longer within the competence of the Special Committee or its Sub-Committees

"In this connexion, the United Kingdom Government regrets that despite the attainment of a full measure of self-government by the Associated State of St. Kitt-Nevis-Anguilla on the 27th of February, 1967, the Sub-Committee nevertheless agreed to hear a person in the capacity of a petitioner to the Special Committee on a matter concerning the Associated States.

"I am therefore instructed fully to reserve my Government's position both on the hearing of petitioners concerning St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla or any other Associated State and on any proceedings in the Special Committee or its subordinate organs concerning events in the West Indies Associated States which occurred after the achievement of Associated State-

"The United Kingdom Government would particularly regret any actions or proceedings by the Sub-Committee that might tend to prejudice the peaceful implementation of the settlement of the Anguillan problem recently negotiated in Barbados through the good offices of representatives of the Governments of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and with the participation of the United Kingdom Government."

191. The representative of Venezuela said that the problem of the West Indies was extremely important. The letter which

the President had read out at the beginning of the meeting was a further proof of the administering Power's failure to cooperate. No decisions by the General Assembly had authorized it to disregard the obligations set forth in Article 73 e of the Charter. Contrary to the implications of that letter, the Sub-Committee was competent to take up the question of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla under the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. While there were, of course, small territories whose economic and political viability must be ensured, a satisfactory solution could be found in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). He categorically rejected the United Kingdom reply.

192. The documents prepared by the Secretariat and the statements made by Mr. J. Gumbs at previous meetings showed that, after more than 300 years of colonial domination, the Anguillans lacked even the minimum economic and social infrastructure they needed to improve their lot in the immediate future. The island had been exploited only to serve foreign economic, political and strategic interests. Anguilla's secession from the Associated State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla proved that the process of decolonization had been started in that Territory without allowing the 6,000 Anguillans to exercise their right to self-determination. Significantly, the administering Power had then brought pressure to bear on the Anguillan representatives to make them sign the report of the Barbados Conference and, according to the latest information, a frigate was preparing to land police forces on the island in order to bring its inhabitants into line. It might well be asked why the United Kingdom had not taken the same action with regard to the rebellious white régime of Southern Rhodesia. In any case Venezuela is opposed to the unilateral use of force.

193. The problem of Anguilla was not a local one; it must be seen in the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the wishes of the Anguillan people must be taken into consideration if that resolution was to be fully implemented.

194. The representative of Bulgaria stressed the importance of the item on the six Territories under discussion by the Sub-Committee. During the Special Committee's 506th meeting, his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution submitted in that connexion (see para. 948 of the present chapter) and had expressed the hope that the administering Power would cooperate constructively with the Sub-Committee when the item on the six Terirtories was taken up again.

195. The responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, was something which could not be overlooked. The latest letter from the representative of the administering Power questioned the Organization's competence to deal with the problems of the Territories under consideration—an attitude which was harmful to the decolonizing process and could only be regretted. His delegation fully shared the Venezuelan representative's views that only a decision by the General Assembly could absolve the administering Power of its responsibilities under the Charter. As members were aware, the United Kingdom was persisting in its refusal to allow a visiting mission to go to the Territories, despite the decisions of the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee. Such an attitude was, of course, in keeping with the administering Power's position on the question.

196. Current developments in Anguilla must be interpreted, not as an isolated incident but as clear proof of a lamentable state of affairs inasmuch as the administering Power was endeavouring, in one way or another, to maintain its control of the colonial Territories for whose administration it was responsible. The information reaching the United Nations, together with recent events in certain of the Territories, confirmed the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the Special Committee and of the Sub-Committee that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was still applicable to the Territories in question and that the recently introduced constitutional arrangements did not free the administering Power from its obligations under the Charter.

197. As his Government had at various times stated, all colonial Territories must be liberated and resolution 1514 (XV) must be applied to them whether they were large or small. It was obvious that, in the case of the six Territories under con-

sideration the administering Power had failed to create conditions favourable to the exercise of the right of self-determinanation, as it should have done. Article 73 stressed the "principle that the interests of the inhabitants are paramount" in such Territories. Whatever solution they might propose, the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee must therefore bear in mind the objective of resolution 1514 (XV), particularly operative paragraph 2. It was important to establish whether the population of the Territories had had an opportunity freely to express their will concerning the constitutional arrangements affecting them and their future status. The available information indicated that such had not been the case in the six Territories under discussion. They had not been given a choice; they had simply been offered association with the United Kingdom.

198. During the Special Committee's discussion of the item, the administering Power had stressed that the constitutional arrangements included provisions whereby the population would, at a future date, have the right to terminate the status of associative State and join other territories in the region, or even opt for independence. But that right related only to the future. The population had already shown its dissatisfaction with the new status.

199. Furthermore, the administering Power had ignored the appeals made to it to authorize a visiting mission to go to the Territories. By so doing, it was preventing the United Nations from confirming at first hand the people's wishes regarding their future status. The status of associated State was such that the United Kingdom retained the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Territories, even without waiting for their Governments to request it to do so. That alone showed that the new status has not ended the United Kingdom's control of its former colonies.

200. The United Kingdom's responsibilities for the Territories stemmed from the fact that they had been under British colonial domination for centuries. It should not be forgotten that that responsibility had been a decisive factor in the dissolution of the former Federation of the West Indies, as well as in the current constitutional arrangements.

201. The administering Power and the Special Committee had a duty to prepare and recommend appropriate measures to promote the conditions necessary for the exercise of the right to self-determination in all colonial Territories and in the small ones in particular. It was evident that the present economic, social and political conditions in the Territories in question, together with the bases and the military agreements were an obtacle to the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). The United Nations must continue to keep a very close watch on the situation in all colonial Territories and must pursue its endeavours to help their populations achieve independence.

202. The representative of Italy wished to make some remarks on the special political criteria that should be taken into account in considering small Territories. In that respect, General Assembly resolutions 1541 (XV) and 2189 (XXI) were binding complements to resolutions 1514 (XV) because they had laid down the legal basis on which the General Assembly and the Special Committee had been able to discuss and adopt resolutions on some of the major colonial problems still pending. The necessity of applying special methods and policies in the case of the small Territories had been explained at length by the Uruguayan representative. That explanation and the remarks made by his delegation and other members of the Sub-Committee might be helpful in devising a more subtle and articulated policy to solve the problems arising from the decolonization of the small Territories.

203. His delegation thought that four considerations should be borne in mind in discussing the special criteria to be adopted for the small Territories. The first was the form and timing of independence and the organization of the new State, in accordance with the size and economic conditions of the Territories concerned. According to principle VI of resolution 1541 (XV), it should also be possible to achieve independence by the union of a number of Territories in one State or by that State's association with the former administering Power. Self-determination should, in the first place, lead to the creation of economically viable units, because that was a condition for

stability and social progress and would prevent a resurgence of any form of imperialism. The Sub-Committee should consider whether that condition was met by the integration of small Territories into larger political units or by their association with the former administering Power. The latter possibility should not be rejected out of hand. It might offer considerable advantages, in that the former administering Power could, as one State to another, give the Territories the economic help that it might have neglected in the past and that would enable the Territory to avoid having to seek help from private enterprises, whose activities were often speculative and socially dangerous. Association seemed to be a good solution, particularly in the case of the small Territories with which Sub-Committee III was concerned. As Mr. Fisher had pointed out, the people of Anguilla had no fixed ideas about possible solutions and if Mr. Bradshaw, the political leader they opposed, stepped down, Anguilla might even wish to join St. Kitts-Nevis.

204. Secondly, consideration should be given to ways and means by which the colonial peoples could exercise their independence. The relevant resolution did not limit them to any particular forms and United Nations practice was consistent with the principles of international law, under which political entities were free to adopt the proper methods to determine the form of their independence. The practice of States also showed that there were a great variety of forms and methods for exercising self-determination and for establishing a political régime. In the case of small Territories, the question was whether provision should not be made for special methods of self-determination that would permit, with independence, a certain amount of political and economic integration in larger units. The trend towards federation and integration was a proof of the maturity of States. The attainment of independence by new States was always very naturally accompanied by trends towards separatism. Anguilla was a good example in that respect. However, the fear that such separatist trends might lead to the fragmentation of small Territories and their social and economic decline had always led the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee to require the administering Powers to organize the Territories in larger and more viable political units.

205. Thirdly, special attention should be given to the fact that each small Territory belonged to a particular region of the world. The United Nations must be respectful of local situations and practices and avoid any action, even if inspired by good intentions, that might damage a region's balance and stability. That was particularly true for the small Territories and especially for the islands, which needed the support of regional organizations, but which, if encouraged in their natural trend towards particularism and insularity, might disrupt regional ententes and bring about secession and fragmentation in other States recently established in the region. There again, Anguilla was an excellent example. The United Nations should always pay attention to regional situations and should develop a practice of close consultation with representatives of the countries concerned.

206. Fourthly, the Sub-Committee should be concerned with the co-operation of the administering Powers and the question of visiting missions. While visiting missions were in most cases necessary, they should not be considered an essential and universal instrument of decolonization. Other means such as consultations with Member States in the regions concerned and the dispatch of observers to the Territories or their attendance at negotiations affecting them, should be considered. As far as co-operation with the administering Powers was concerned, the Sub-Committee should, above all, avoid taking any negative or radical attitude that could lead to a deadlock. Thus, it would be perhaps well advised to find other ways and means of securing the co-operation of the United Kingdom without prejudice, for the time being, to its position. By creating the associated States, the United Kingdom had become responsible for their relations with the United Nations and those of its organs whose activities fell within the field of foreign relations. In other words, the six Territories were represented at the United Nations by the United Kingdom, which should be invited to take part in the Sub-Committee's meetings and which should therefore furnish information on all external and internal events affecting the position of the six Caribbean Territories.

207. The representative of Uruguay observed that the smaller a country was, the more complicated its problems were. One problem, however, had not received the attention it deserved, and that was the problem of the form of government for which a country was suited. In addition to establishing whether a country had a historical tradition and a viable economic and political system, it was essential to determine whether it had the national identity fitting it for a particular form of government and that determination should be the criterion applied, so that, irrespective of the size of a Territory's population, the Special Committee could never be accused of having impelled into international life small nations quite unaware of the problems which it entailed.

208. He believed that, from a rational point of view, it would be a mistake to try to make a State or nation out of every small island. That did not by any means signify that he was opposed to the granting of independence to countries with populations smaller than, for instance, those of the great Powers. Nevertheless, it was a fact that the greatest inequity was to treat two unequal things as equal: a distinction had to be made between objective and theoretical equality and subjective equality founded on facts. Otherwise the United Nations, by artificially creating States, might attenuate its own purpose and power and jeopardize its future work.

209. He had already made a number of statements on the question of small Territories in the Special Committee. All aspects of the question had been analysed and discussed at length, and the only reason why Sub-Committee III was again dealing with it was that it wanted to be certain that the will of the people had been correctly interpreted when the constitutional agreements were drawn up in London. It was essential to be sure that the Government of the islands as it now existed was a legitimate result of those agreements.

210. The Sub-Committee should take a positive attitude towards political and historical realities in the British West Indies and should never lose sight of the wishes and wellbeing of the peoples concerned. It should strive to apply to them the provisions of both resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), which complemented each other.

211. The formula agreed upon by the London constitutional conferences did not appear to be incompatible with the resolutions of Sub-Committee III, the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly. On the other hand, it was true that the administering Power had not followed certain procedures in connexion with the referendum by means of which the wishes of the population concerning the new institutions had been ascertained. The use of the referendum was, of course, linked to the problem of the transfer of powers: operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) provided that immediate steps should be taken in the Territories concerned to transfer all powers to the peoples of those Territories. In his article on decolonization, Mr. Velasquez, Uruguay's representative on the Special Committee, had written that when the Declaration on the granting of independence spoke of the transfer of powers to the "peoples of those Territories", what was meant was clearly the representatives of those peoples, since in modern constitutional law there was no system other than that of representation, at least in the case of the principal public powers. The only question remaining was that of the qualifications to be possessed by those representatives in order that the sovereignty so transferred to them might be considered as having been transferred to the people they represented.

212. The position in the case under discussion was that the United Kingdom applied to the Territories it administered a process of constitutional development which did not include a referendum. There were several stages in that process, from internal self-government to constitutional conferences at which the final details of independence were settled. In other words, in the case under discussion decolonization would have been completed with the intervention of the United Nations and without resort to a referendum. The process was none the less a democratic one, since the local legislative bodies had to approve the constitutional agreements drawn up by

the elected representatives of the Territories and the United Kingdom Government.

213. Although he personally favoured the referendum, he considered that the validity of that process was indisputable. All that remained was to determine whether the elections establishing the local legislative body were valid.

214. There was no need to question the whole process of constitutional development under English law: that would force a number of large decolonized countries to re-examine the very basis of their independence where that independence had not been the result of a referendum. The fact was that if the constitutional agreements relating to those countries had been concluded between the United Kingdom Government and the legislatures which were representative of the peoples concerned, they were unassailable.

215. In Anguilla the subject of the referendum had not been full independence but the island's wish to be separated from St. Kitts without thereby ending its association with Great Britain. Two questions had been asked, the first on the separation of Anguilla from St. Kitts and the second on the possible establishment of a provisional government of Anguilla. As the matter of relations between Anguilla and the United Kingdom had not been raised it had been an incomplete referendum, with the same defects as those characterizing the referendum which France had organized in French Somaliland.

216. Moreover, the situation in Anguilla was such that the members of Sub-Committee III could do no more than recall what they had said in the Special Committee. There was no new information available on the Jamaica conference and the Sub-Committee was not in a position to say that it had any proof that the people of Anguilla had not indeed given their consent to the existing form of government.

217. There was now an indisputable political fact which had to be faced. The Sub-Committee therefore should not turn backwards but should endeavour to find a way of correcting the present situation rather than trying, in an excess of zeal, to destroy what did exist. Decolonization had to take its course and if at times it appeared to remain outside United Nations control an effort should be made to participate in it, not to halt it. Even if Anguilla had gained independence under constitutional agreements, the value of its independence was not thereby diminished. The Sub-Committee should not censure the expression of a people's will if it had been freely expressed.

218. The representative of Venezuela said that he was not by any means casting doubt on the validity of the process applied in the decolonization of the six Territories. However, when decolonization took a form other than absolute and total independence—such as that of an associated State, as in the present case—the United Nations should study the matter very closely to prevent the emergence of neo-colonialism in a disguised form. In extreme cases, alleged decolonization might be nothing but a change of labels.

219. The representative of Uruguay remarked that he was strongly in favour of the referendum, a procedure which was, moreover, firmly established in his country; but he none the less recognized that many countries which were now Members of the United Nations had not acceded to independence by that means. No resolution expressly stated that the referendum was the only means by which peoples could exercise their right to self-determination.

220. The Sub-Committee's task was simply to satisfy itself that the people had expressed their will in full freedom and without constraint. It could not discharge its task unless it had direct proof that such was the case; for that purpose it would have been preferable if it had been able to visit the Territory. The Sub-Committee should ascertain whether, in the present instance, the election of which the local legislature was the result had performed the same function as a referendum. If so, the Sub-Committee's task would have been completed, for it was not called upon to create difficulties where none existed. There was enough trouble in the Middle East and Viet-Nam, and there was no need to encourage it in the West Indies.

- 221. The representative of Venezuela said that although that was not specified in either resolution 1514 (XV) or resolution 1541 (XV) of the General Assembly, the doctrine of popular consultation, i.e., the referendum, was universally recognized. In the absence of adequate information the Sub-Committee could not, of course, make any categorical assertions. Nevertheless, when a constitutional conference organized by the administering Power with reference to a colonial territory did not ultimately lead to the complete independence of that territory, it was permissible to question whether the inhabitants had been fully consulted.
- 222. As for the use which was made of the United Nations flag, he knew full well that it had never been employed except to defend the sacred right of peoples to be masters of their own destiny.
- 223. The representative of Bulgaria deplored, like the representative of Uruguay, the grave injustices which existed throughout the world and particularly in Viet-Nam where so-called freedom was being imposed with bombs and napalm and in Southern Rhodesia where 4 million Africans were oppressed by a white minority. Little attention was paid to the wishes of the people and the reactionary forces of imperialism and colonialism were seeking to maintain their domination by methods which they sought to adapt to the standards of modern society.
- 224. With particular reference to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, he did not think that a constitutional conference was the best form of popular consultation. Indeed, a popular consultation must be considered not as a simple formality but as the first sovereign act of a people in the exercise of its right to selfdetermination. It was doubtful whether the people of the six Caribbean Territories had been given the opportunity to express their wishes fully and freely, as laid down in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In the case of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, the only choice which had been discussed at the London Constitutional Conference had been that of an associated State. Without rejecting a priori a given political status, the United Nations should ensure that the people were fully aware of their right to choose the status which best conformed to their aspirations.
- 225. The facts and the principles at issue were clear and he wished to reaffirm once again that in his opinion: (a) the people of the Territories had not been consulted; (b) the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples continued to be applicable to them and (c) the United Kingdom continued to be responsible for them. Finally, he expressed the hope that the administering Power would show a better spirit of comprehension and co-operation.
- 226. The representative of Uruguay wished to make clear, in order to dispel any misunderstanding, that he had nothing against referenda; quite the contrary. However, there were other means by which the people could express their wishes freely; in particular, they could do so just as legitimately through their democratically elected representatives.
- 227. The important question was not whether such and such a form of popular consultation had been used rather than another but whether the people had made known their aspirations without any coercion. The Sub-Committee would be ill-advised to formulate conclusions and recommendations in categorical terms without being certain that they corresponded exactly to the facts.
- 228. The representative of Iran said that as a rule self-determination was the primary procedure by which decolonization was achieved. But just as there is an exception to every rule, there is also an exception to this rule. In cases where it was evident that self-determination might produce a result inimical to the nature and objectives of decolonization, a different procedure must be used to bring about decolonization. Despite its consistent reaffirmation of the right of self-determination, the Committee of Twenty-Four, in cases where self-determination might serve to perpetuate a colonial situation, has decided to recommend a different procedure for decolonization. Thus, we have seen how the Committee, in the cases of Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and Ifni,

- instead of self-determination, has deliberately urged negotiation as the means for decolonization.
- 229. By the same token, if self-determination should prove to be inimical to the purposes of decolonization in the small territories which, because of their peculiar circumstances, require special attention, an approach other than self-determination might more genuinely serve the purposes of decolonization. Since freedom from subjugation of any kind, political, economic and others, is the fundamental purpose of decolonization, we should examine carefully the question of whether a non-viable territory could in fact attain freedom even though the people concerned had expressed the wish to become independent. Under these circumstances the United Nations, because of its over-all responsibility and broad perspective, might be in a position to secure to a non-viable territory, aspiring for freedom and independence, the best means by which they could, in reality and not in name, attain and enjoy such a status. It has been with this view in mind that the majority of members in this Sub-Committee have often urged the creation of a federation or confederation for the territories in the Caribbean. The assistance and co-operation of the administering Power in this regard is obviously most essential in the fulfilment of the aspirations of the peoples of small territories to genuine freedom and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV).
- 230. The Chairman said that, in accordance with the decision taken by the Sub-Committee at the previous meeting, Mr. Fisher would be heard in a private capacity.
- 231. Mr. Fisher said that he was appearing before the Sub-Committee on behalf of the Provisional Government of Anguilla. He was a professor of law at Harvard and specialized in questions of international law, although he sometimes dealt with criminal law and procedure. Before taking up teaching, he had practised law for ten years. His relations with Anguilla were of quite recent date; he had visited the island for the first time in July 1967. At the end of June, one of his friends and the wife of Mr. Gumbs whom he had met two years earlier had asked him to help the Anguillans. He had agreed to do so with the understanding that he would treat it as a case like any other, i.e., his expenses and travel would be reimbursed and he would be paid a fee, if only a nominal one. He had no links with any potential investors or any United States interests and his only client was the Provisional Government of Anguilla. He had made altogether three trips to Anguilla, each of about one week's duration, and while there he had met the members of the Council and the Chairman, first Mr. Adams and later Mr. Webster.
- 232. Early in July the island had been placed under the control of a peace-keeping committee set up by the inhabitants of the island after the departure of the St. Kitts police in May. On 11 July the committee had organized a referendum in which the people had been asked whether they wished (a) to terminate the association with St. Kitts and Nevis and (b) to form a provisional government. The replies had been almost unanimous in both cases.
- 233. Anguilla was a small, impoverished island, with a population of about 6,000, without any telephone or electricity services and with barely a mile of paved roads. The problem was what was to become of the island. At present, several representatives of Anguilla, who were members of the opposition, were under arrest in St. Kitts, Mr. Bradshaw, the Prime Minister of St. Kitts, was threatening to turn Anguilla into a desert if it did not submit. Weapons had been imported into St. Kitts for the purpose of subduing Anguilla by force if necessary. The United Kingdom had imposed on Anguilla a constitution tying it to two islands too remote for the arrangement to prove satisfactory.
- 234. The question was whether Anguilla was bound by past solutions, and, if not, what solution might be envisaged and how it could be reached. Of the two past solutions which, it was argued by some, were binding on Anguilla, the first was the constitution which had been imposed on the island by the United Kingdom in circumstances with which the Sub-Committee was familiar. The Anguillans considered that they were not bound by the constitutional arrangements adopted in London, since they had not been consulted as they should

have been. If they had been consulted, the arrangements would have provided a measure of autonomy for Anguilla, and that was not the case. They also considered that it was not for the former administering Power to decide the most appropriate form of self-determination for a Territory. Furthermore, they objected to being under the control of St. Kitts. The second solution which some regarded as binding on the Anguillans was the solution proposed at the Barbados Conference. In his opening statement at that Conference, however, on 29 July, Mr. Walter Hodges has stated on behalf of the Anguillan delegation that its authority was limited and that any agreements discussed or reached at the Conference could not commit the people of Anguilla until the latter had seen and approved them. He had made that point in order to avoid a repetition of what had happened at the London Conference, namely, the adoption of arrangements without consultation of the Anguilla population. In reply to that reservation, Lord Shepherd, Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, had stated that everything had been done during the Conference to take into account the point of view of the Anguillans and that a refusal on their part to accept the conclusions of the Conference would be an extremely serious act which would oblige the United Kingdom to consult the Governments of the other Caribbean States to see what measures should be taken.

235. On 31 July, four members of the Anguillan delegation had signed the report of the Barbados Conference. Six other members had chosen not to sign. All the members, whether they had signed or not, had made it known that they did not consider the Conference report to be binding on the people of Anguilla until they had studied it and approved it.

236. The conclusions of the Barbados Conference were as follows: Anguilla was to agree to submit once again to the authority of the St. Kitts Government, peace-keeping machinery was to be established to protect its population, and it was to be granted some measure of self-government. The only clear element in that conclusion was the return of Anguilla to St. Kitts. The rest was obscure, complex and ambiguous. Following the Conference, the Council of Anguilla had met and decided that Mr. Webster, who had been appointed Chairman of the Council in the absence of Mr. Adams, should remain in office. The Council had subsequently published a statement explaining to the people the position taken by the Anguillan delegation at the Barbados Conference, According to that statement, the conference report was not binding on the Anguillans; Anguilla did not reject the report out of hand but would study it at leisure in order to make constructive proposals and find a peaceful solution. The response to that statement had been the dispatch by the United Kingdom of a frigate carrying marines who were ready to land on the island. On 9 August, Mr. Webster had addressed an appeal to the Minister for External Affairs of Barbados, on behalf of the Council of Anguilla, confirming the telephone conversation they had had that morning and assuring him that the Anguillan population was ready to study the report carefully and to co-operate in any just solution; he urged the Minister not to resort to force and not to send marines to the island, and, lastly, asked for advisers to be sent to Anguilla who could explain to the population the tenor and meaning of the report of the Barbados Conference. Later, two officials of Commonwealth countries had arrived in Anguilla where they had taken part in meetings attended not only by the Government leaders but also by several thousands of people who had followed the deliberations and asked questions. The two officials had departed with the impression that the Anguillan population found the report of the Barbados Conference unacceptable and that many changes would have to be made in it. The Council's position was thus that Anguilla was not bound either by the constitutional arrangements reached in London or by the conclusions of the Barbados

237. Some had compared the developments in Anguilla with events in Southern Rhodesia. It had been said that in both cases there had been unilateral declaration of independence and that the United Kingdom should act to restore legality. He thought that any comparison of the situation in

the two territories was quite inappropriate. In the case of Anguilla, it was not a question of a minority or majority Government, but of the fact that the whole population of the island wanted to terminate its association with St. Kitts.

238. Consequently, if past solutions did not commit Anguilla, other solutions must be considered. The island was clearly not large enough to be left to its own devices. In view of the number of problems which a modern State had to face and the administrative structure required, the entire population of the island would be needed for the civil service. On the other hand, the Anguillans wanted to govern themselves, to be free and above all not to be subject to St. Kitts. They were not concerned with prestige: they were not interested in having ambassadors or in seeing their country become a Member of the United Nations; they simply wanted to manage their own affairs. They would be ready, indeed, to consider an association with St. Kitts, provided that such an association permitted them to have an autonomous government.

239. Another solution might be a form of trusteeship under the supervision of the Commonwealth countries, or an association with other entities, such as some of the French-speaking islands of the Caribbean or St. Martin, with which Anguilla enjoyed excellent relations. There was also the possibility of complete independence, with the development of natural resources and of tourism, and preferential international assistance. The Council of Anguilla had also asked him to mention to the Sub-Committee the possibility of Anguilla, as a self-governing and independent entity, accepting some form of association with the United Nations; such a course would require no amendment of the Charter and there was no reason why the United Nations could not accept such a situation.

240. The third question was how to arrive at a solution. Admittedly, the fragmentation of small Territories created problems and the United Nations should not encourage secessionist tendencies. On the other hand, a committee dealing with problems of decolonization should concern itself with the problems of a small Territory as much as with those of the colonies of a great Power. On the whole, Anguilla would rather be a colony of the United Kingdom than of St. Kitts.

241. The Provisional Government of Anguilla hoped that a United Nations representative would go to the island to see the situation for himself and that the Sub-Committee would recognize in some manner that the Constitution imposed by the United Kingdom did not settle the matter and was not in keeping with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV). It also hoped that the United Nations would urge all parties not to resort to force. Lastly, it believed that the Sub-Committee might ask the Secretary-General to appoint someone to look into the problem and ascertain what administrative support, technical advice and economic assistance could be furnished to Anguilla.

242. He was convinced that a solution could be found for Anguilla which could thereafter serve as a model for many other islands and small Territories, and he hoped that the Sub-Committee would adopt Anguilla's motto: "One does not have to be big in order to be free".

243. The representative of Uruguay sought information on two of the main protagonists of Anguilla's peaceful revolution, Mr. Peter Adams and Mr. Ronald Webster. How did it happen that Mr. Webster today presided over the Council of Anguilla, when it had been Peter Adams who had started the course of events and organized the referendum and had represented Anguilla at the Barbados Conference, whose proposals he had accepted? He was also surprised to find that Mr. Adams had expressed fear for his family's safety, and would like to know the source of the threats against Mr. Adams's family. He also wondered why the Anguillan people now seemed opposed to what Mr. Adams had accepted in Barbados. Was it public opinion in the island that had changed or was it Mr. Adams himself?

244. Mr. Fisher stated that Mr. Adams had not changed and that his behaviour during the past months and his attitude at the Barbados Conference were easy to explain. At the Conference, Mr. Adams had stressed the fact that his delegation was not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of the

people of Anguilla. Faced with Lord Shepherd's attitude and the quasi-ultimatum of the Conference, Mr. Adams had felt that his best course of action was to sign the Conference report but express reservations with regard to his delegation's powers. He had thought it best to gain time, avoid a crisis, and return to Anguilla with the report, and to make observations and comments later, if necessary. In that way he had avoided a test of strength and a return to the harsh rule of St. Kitts.

245. The fact that Mr. Webster was Chairman of the Council of Anguilla was explained as follows: Mr. Adams had been absent on several occasions, and Mr. Webster had served as Acting Chairman of the Council, When Mr. Bradshaw had stated over the St. Kitts radio, three or four days after the Barbados Conference, that Anguilla would be returned to St. Kitts as a result of the Conference, that there would be an amnesty, and that the island would receive appropriations, the residents of Anguilla had believed that Mr. Adams had betrayed them. There had even been talk of hanging him. Consequently, as soon as Mr. Adams had returned to the island, the Council of Anguilla had met and had decided, in Mr. Adams' presence and with his consent, that it was better to have Mr. Webster continue as Chairman of the Council. There had certainly not been a palace revolution.

246. The representative of Uruguay asked under what conditions the referendum had been held and whether those conditions had provided the necessary guarantees, in particular with regard to the secrecy of the ballot.

247. Mr. Fisher replied that the committee governing the island until 10 July had published on 8 or 9 July a proclamation stating all the details of how the referendum would be held. Only electors registered for the last general elections would be allowed to vote. Voting would take place from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. There would be five polling places, the same that had been used in the general elections of July 1966. The vote would be supervised by the electoral staff of the last general elections. He had personally visited two of the polling places and seen for himself that no difficulties had arisen. The ballot papers had a detachable slip which was signed by the voter and served as a voting receipt. The ballots were marked with a "Yes" and the corresponding symbol, a hat, or with a "No" and the corresponding symbol, a shoe. Those symbols had been selected from five symbols commonly used in the island. In the evening the ballots had been counted by the person who had performed that task at the last elections. The entire operation had taken place in a fair and orderly manner. Moreover, representatives of a half dozen newspapers had been in Anguilla at the time and had been able to see for themselves the legality of the balloting.

248. The representative of Uruguay asked what was the source of the statement that the Anguillan people did not consider itself bound by the decision, taken at the London Conference, to make the island a unitary State with St. Kitts and Nevis.

249. Mr. Fisher replied that the statement came from the Anguillan Provisional Government Council, which had sent a telegram to the United Kingdom Government after the 11 July referendum, informing it that the Anguillan people had decided to separate from St. Kitts and Nevis, but wished to explore the possibility of establishing new ties with the United Kingdom within the Commonwealth.

250. The representative of Uruguay noted that, in his statement at the previous meeting, Mr. Fisher had stressed the difficulties which would face a small, poor island trying to survive as an independent nation. He agreed with Mr. Fisher's remarks on that point, and he also agreed that there was no reason why Anguilla should be subject to St. Kitts if the people wished otherwise. However, the picture of the situation presented by Mr. Fisher seemed over-dramatized. No lives had been lost in Anguilla, and no troops had been landed there. The difficulties of the island arose from its particular circumstances, and not from the recent political events. Fact should be separated from fantasy. The United Nations had reason to be concerned with the plight of the people, but matters extraneous to the principle of decolonization should not concern the Sub-Committee.

251. Mr. Fisher had analysed various possible solutions to Anguilla's problems and had referred, *inter alia*, to the possibility of association with St. Martin which was partly under French and partly under Netherlands jurisdiction. He would like to ask Mr. Fisher whether there had been any discussions with the authorities of either part of that island regarding the possibility of such an arrangement.

252. He had been somewhat surprised at Mr. Fisher's suggestion concerning some form of association of Anguilla with the United Nations. It was true that the innovations of today were the commonplaces of tomorrow, but it was difficult to envisage such a solution in practice. In any event, it was hardly conceivable in the immediate future, and Anguilla needed immediate answers to its problems,

253. As he had stressed on previous occasions, the task of the United Nations was not to persuade the peoples of colonial Territories to make this or that choice, but merely to help them in the task of determining their own future by bringing to their attention the alternatives open to them—complete independence, or some form of federation or association with neighbouring islands, it being clearly understood that they must remain free to seek a further change in their status at any time in the future.

254. Despite Mr. Fisher's strictures on the constitution which he said had been imposed on Anguilla by the United Kingdom, his proposal was that a solution should be sought in co-operation with the neighbouring Caribbean countries; thus, he apparently recognized that those countries had no intention of imposing anything on the Anguillans. Mr. Fisher's plea that force should not be used was somewhat superfluous as far as the Sub-Committee was concerned, since all its members certainly shared that concern; the Sub-Committee's efforts were directed towards bringing an end to violence and colonization.

255. While recognizing the value of the opinions of Mr. Fisher as an authority on international law, he felt that what the Sub-Committee really needed was not so much advice as solid information, so that it could reach its own conclusions.

256. Mr. Fisher said that, to the best of his knowledge, no negotiations had taken place with the authorities of either part of St. Martin, and the possibility of association with that island had been discussed only in Anguilla itself. With regard to association with the United Nations, he agreed that such a solution would take time to work out and that some form of interim status would be needed. However, it was often easier to devise new procedures in terms of a particular case than in the abstract. There was general agreement that the decolonization of small island Territories presented problems, and Anguilla offered an opportunity to come to grips with those problems in a specific case.

257. As for the use of force, he did not, of course, fear that the United Nations would use force, but he was asking it to help to ensure that others did not do so. With regard to the difficulties which would face an independent Anguilla, the people had resolved that, whatever the difficulties, if the choice was between independence and subordination to St. Kitts, they would choose independence. He thought that it was a mistake to attach too much importance to the question of independence as such. In the modern world most countries, whether they were independent or not, had close ties with their neighbours. The task was to find a solution which would give Anguilla a substantial measure of self-government. Law was designed to serve the interests of peoples, and not vice versa. He might add that he had come before the Sub-Committee to request help, and not to attempt to provide answers.

258. The representative of Venezuela said that the information provided by Mr. Fisher on the situation in Anguilla was extremely useful. One point that had emerged from his statement and from the Sub-Committee's discussions with Mr. Gumbs was that, although the United Kingdom had repeatedly stated that it had no authority to intervene in the internal affairs of the Territory, some of its recent actions had obviously been intended to bring pressure on Anguilla. The statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the Government would not accept the situation that had devel-

oped in Anguilla, the sending of a Royal Navy vessel to patrol certain areas of the Caribbean, and the recent remark by an official spokesman that the whole population of the island was liable to be imprisoned unless its leaders accepted the conclusions of the conference of Commonwealth countries, were clear instances of coercion.

259. The fact that the political authorities of the island had authorized Mr. Fisher to suggest that some form of association with the United Nations might be a solution appeared to indicate that the United Kingdom Government had not fully informed the people of the three forms of self-government—association, integration and independence—from which their choice had to be made. He asked Mr. Fisher whether, in his opinion, the people of Anguilla had been aware of those options prior to the establishment of the Associated State.

260. Mr. Fisher said that since early July the people of Anguilla had been discussing a variety of forms of independent status. He could not say whether the choices available had been fully understood prior to the separation from St. Kitts.

261. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the information available to the Sub-Committee, and in particular a recent communication from the People's Action Movement, showed that the current situation had arisen largely because of the failure of the central Government in St. Kitts to set up a local government council in Anguilla, as the Constitution required. There was also evidence that the central Government was trying to destroy the opposition party, the People's Action Movement, which was supported by most Anguillans. He asked Mr. Fisher whether he had any knowledge of the reasons given by the St. Kitts Government for its failure to organize the local government elections in Anguilla.

262. Mr. Fisher agreed that one of Anguilla's grievances was that no legislation had been enacted to enable local government elections to be held in Nevis and Anguilla, but said that he knew of no adequate reasons for the delay. It was true that the people of the island, as a whole, supported the opposition party.

263. The representative of Madagascar asked Mr. Fisher what the views of the authorities in Anguilla were on the recent Commonwealth discussions and which of the various solutions described in his statement was preferred by them.

264. Mr. Fisher said that he had no first-hand information on the Commonwealth discussions. He believed, however, that the long-term measures recommended at the discussions were of little interest to the Anguillan authorities, who wanted an immediate solution. What the people of Anguilla desired most of all was a system of substantial self-government, free from political connexions with St. Kitts. Failing that, the status of a self-governing unit associated with the United Nations would be acceptable. One interim form of participation in the British Commonwealth which was being considered was an arrangement whereby a Commonwealth committee approved by all the parties would provide the island with administrative assistance and secure the lifting of the embargo imposed by the central Government. He further said that whatever limited resources Anguilla had at the moment were derived from loans and gifts from well-wishers. It might be able in the near future to exploit its provisional status by issuing its own coins and stamps, but no substantial foreign investment could be expected until Anguilla had a stable, recognized

265. The representative of Bulgaria said that it was evident from Mr. Fisher's statements that the Anguillan people had been included in the Associated State status conferred on St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla without being consulted and that such a status was not what they wanted. In his view, the problem was not confined to the relations between St. Kitts and Anguilla and was attributable to the policy which the United Kingdom had pursued in the region for over three centuries and was still pursuing today. That policy was the source of all the economic and political difficulties confronting Anguilla; they would, no doubt, one day confront other islands in the region, including St. Kitts. According to The New York Times of 29 August, the United Kingdom's efforts to put an end to the secession of Anguilla had resulted in a deadlock. It was asserted that the United Kingdom frigate anchored in

the area was not a threat to Anguilla and that the administering Power wished only to maintain order, but it was not the first time that such a pretext had been advanced by colonial Powers, and the United Nations should not be misled by it.

266. He deplored the fact that the administering Power had refrained from participating in the Sub-Committee's discussions and had therefore failed to furnish the Sub-Committee with the information it had the right to expect from any administering Power concerning the Territories under its administration.

267. Mr. Fisher said that Anguilla was an example of inadequate decolonization. The article in *The New York Times* mentioned by the Bulgarian representative was wrong in referring to a federal State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla. There was no federation, since Anguilla had no separate government. The three islands were treated as if they were one.

268. The representative of Iran asked for more detailed information on certain points. What was the exact wording of the questions put to the Anguillan people at the 11 July referendum?

269. Mr. Fisher read out the two questions which had been published in *The New York Times*.

"1. Are you in favour of secession from St. Kitts? Yes? No?

"2. Are you in favour of setting up an interim government? Yes? No?"

The term "interim government" meant a peace-keeping com-

270. The Chairman asked what organic ties had existed between Anguilla and St. Kitts before the granting of Associated State status.

271. Mr. Fisher replied that, in general, the island of Anguilla had always been administered through St. Kitts during the 300 years of colonial domination.

272. The Chairman asked Mr. Fisher for his opinion on what would have happened in Anguilla if, in response to a single-vote referendum held by the administering Power, St. Kitts had chosen association with the United Kingdom and Anguilla had chosen independence.

273. Mr. Fisher said that it was difficult to answer such a question. What the Anguillans wanted was substantial self-government, probably under some form of association with the United Kingdom but certainly not with St. Kitts, They felt that they could manage their own affairs without having to be dependent on other islands more than seventy miles away.

274. The Chairman thought that the Anguillan people had ethnic and cultural ties with the people of St. Kitts. What was Mr. Fisher's opinion?

275. Mr. Fisher replied that such ties existed not only between Anguilla and St. Kitts but between all the islands of the region.

276. The Chairman asked whether Anguilla's association with the United Nations, as envisaged by the Provisional Government Council of Anguilla, would differ from the system of trusteeship in force under the League of Nations.

277. Mr. Fisher replied that Anguilla desired the status of an Associated State having full powers of self-government and free from all foreign domination. The international community would provide it with the necessary advice and technical, economic, legal and other aid. He realized that it would be a delicate and complicated task for the United Nations but, in his view, it was easier to deal with a particular case than to evolve a universally applicable standard solution.

278. The Chairman asked whether Mr. Fisher believed that the form of association he had just described would ensure for Anguilla the viability and progress which were the ultimate aim of decolonization.

279. Mr. Fisher replied that what was most important to the Anguillans was the right to manage their own affairs. No doubt they would not have the necessary capability from the start, but it might be better for them to solve their own

problems than to have them solved by others even if those others were to find a better solution.

- 280. The Chairman agreed that independence was, in a sense, an end in itself, but he continued to believe that it was primarily a means for achieving greater political freedom and economic prosperity. If a newly independent country underwent severe difficulties at first and was temporarily worse off than it had been under the colonial régime, that situation could be accepted if it was known at the outset that the country was capable, although at the cost of great effort, of achieving true economic and political independence which would ensure a better life for its inhabitants.
- 281. Mr. Fisher had also spoken of various forms of association, and even of trusteeship, a word which it was preferable not to use in a sub-committee dealing with decolonization. What measures did Mr. Fisher recommend in order to set up closer ties between Anguilla and the other islands in such a way that, while each enjoyed self-government, the islands would be united and, legally speaking, would constitute a single entity in the eyes of the world.
- 282. Mr. Fisher replied that he had mentioned some form of trusteeship among the possible solutions merely as a transitional measure, for there was no doubt that the present situation could not continue. Experience had shown that it was difficult to establish a federation in the West Indies; but a form of association was possible in which each island would be completely self-governing but would be dependent on the United Kingdom in some matters, such as defence. What was most important was to reach an agreement that would not create a situation of tension in an island or group of islands and would give each island a fair measure of self-government.
- 283. The Chairman, noting Mr. Fisher's remark that it was difficult to establish a federation in the West Indies, asked whether that difficulty was due to the presence of certain individuals in the Governments of the islands or whether the peoples of the islands opposed a federal system. Since the former administering Power seemed to constitute the only unifying factor, he also asked whether it would not be possible to introduce a system that could promote closer relations between the islands and make it possible to establish a federation or perhaps a confederation of associated States.
- 284. Mr. Fisher replied that there were indeed powerful cultural and historic ties which ought to facilitate relations among the islands, but at present lack of self-government made such relations difficult, since it aggravated trends towards insularity, which inevitably led to fragmentation.

B. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

- 285. The Sub-Committee considered its conclusions and recommendations on Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent at its 87th to 89th meetings on 25 and 29 August 1967, and adopted them subject to reservations concerning sub-paragraph 5 expressed by the representative of Bulgaria.
- 286. The Sub-Committee also considered a proposal made by the representative of Iran to the effect that the Secretary-General should be asked to initiate a study of the feasibility of arrangements under which the small Territories which may wish to be fully self-governing might be enabled to have available to them the status of a sovereign entity associated with the United Nations. At its 97th meeting, the Sub-Committee, in the light of the discussion that took place, decided to refer the matter for further examination by the Special Committee. The representative of Bulgaria reserved the position of his delegation.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 287. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it adopt the following conclusions and recommendations:
- (1) The Special Committee recalls its previous conclusions and recommendations concerning these Territories, which were endorsed by the General Assembly.

- (2) The Special Committee recalls the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 506th meeting on 23 March 1967, in particular, operative paragraph 2, under which the Sub-Committee was charged "to examine, in the light of the recent constitutional developments, the situation in these Territories in all its aspects including the possibility of sending a visiting mission, and to report to the Special Committee at an early date".
- (3) The Special Committee notes with regret the attitude of the administering Power, which has refused to co-operate with the Sub-Committee in its efforts to obtain more complete information concerning the recent constitutional and political developments in the Territories.
- (4) The Special Committee, deeming it necessary for the discharge of its task, granted hearings to individuals who provided it with information on the recent political and constitutional developments in Anguilla.
- (5) The Special Committee takes note of the constitutional developments that have taken place in these Territories, and considers that they represent a certain degree of advancement in the political field for the peoples concerned.
- (6) The Special Committee further takes note of the recent political developments that have taken place in the island of Anguilla.
- (7) The Special Committee reaffirms that resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions continue to apply fully to these Territories.
- (8) The Special Committee, bearing in mind resolution 2232 (XXI), reiterates that the small size and meagre resources of these Territories present peculiar problems which demand special attention.
- (9) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of these Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and without any restriction. It requests the administering Power to ensure that the peoples of the Territories are informed of the various possibilities available to them in their achievement of the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV).
- (10) The Special Committee requests the administering Power to promote the development of closer ties among these Territories through the building of a common political, economic and social infrastructure in accordance with the wishes of the population.
- (11) Recalling resolution 2232 (XXI), paragraph 6, which establishes "that the United Nations should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status", the Special Committee reiterates its belief that a United Nations presence during the procedures connected with the process of self-determination will be essential in order to ensure that the peoples of the Territories are enabled to exercise their right in complete freedom, without any restriction and in full knowledge of the options available to them.
- (12) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not agreed to the dispatch of a visiting mission to these Territories and affirms that such a visit would be useful and desirable. Accordingly, it again requests the administering Power to allow the dispatch of a United Nations visiting mission to the Territories and to extend to it full co-operation and assistance.

V. BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, MONTSERRAT, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS

A, CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

Introduction

- 288. The Sub-Committee considered the Territories of Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands at its 90th to 96th meetings between 30 August and 8 September 1967.
- 289. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (paras. 406-604 of the present chapter).

290. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as administering Power, participated in the work of the Sub-Committee on those Territories at the invitation of the Chairman.

General statements

(a) Bermuda, Bahamas and Montserrat

291. The representative of Bulgaria noted that, as the administering Power had once again refused to allow a United Nations mission to visit the Territories, the Sub-Committee had only limited information at its disposal.

292. Despite all the resolutions and specific recommendations adopted by the Sub-Committee and other United Nations bodies concerning the small Territories under discussion, no substantial progress had been made in implementing the Declaration on the granting of independence, and the pace of political advancement had been rather slow. The process of selfdetermination was not evolving, and the administering Power did not seem prepared to create the necessary conditions for the exercise of the right of self-determination. No particular changes had occurred since the Sub-Committee had last discussed the Territories; indeed, little progress appeared to have been made since 1964. Colonial rule persisted and, as could be seen from the relevant working paper (see para. 498 of the present chapter) the present Constitution of the Bahamas reserved certain important powers to be exercised by the Governor at his discretion.

293. It was also evident that the economic situation in the Territories remained unchanged. The testimony given by a petitioner from the Bahamas in 1966 had shown that the cost of living was very high and social services were inadequate. The economy, being based solely on tourism, suffered from weakness and instability, yet no efforts had been made to develop other industries.

294. The administering Power also appeared to be paying no attention to the important question of the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Centre. The establishment of a foreign military base in the Bahamas represented a serious threat to the peace and security of the population and of the entire area. Hundreds of United States sailors and civilians would be stationed at the base, which was situated in a sensitive area of the world. That development was certainly not in the interests of the people of the Bahamas, who had not been consulted in any way. Moreover, the attitude adopted by the administering Power, which enjoyed discretionary powers in the direction of foreign policy and defence, was contrary to the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

295. He also wished to draw attention to the question of the casinos and gambling establishments that had been opened in the Bahamas and other Territories with United States capital. Most of those casinos were controlled by United States interests, which enjoyed tax privileges.

296. The Special Committee should reaffirm that the Declaration on the granting of independence applied fully to the Territories under consideration and should be implemented by the administering Power. His delegation felt strongly that visiting missions should be sent to the Territories, in order to enable the Sub-Committee to carry out its task.

297. The representative of Venezuela said that after a careful perusal of the Secretariat's working papers he had come to the conclusion that the information which they provided on a number of questions was inadequate. In his opinion, the administering Power should provide the Sub-Committee with more complete and more accurate information in order to enable it to formulate its conclusions and recommendations. For instance, the working paper on Bermuda contained very little information on the Constitutional Conference held in London in November 1966. It mentioned the majority report and minority reports, which, however, reflected only the views of the political parties and did not show what concrete decisions had been taken regarding the electoral system. In a petition addressed to the Special Committee, the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) had complained that the electoral sys-

tem was based on a policy of segregating the working class and coloured voters, and it had urged the Government of the United Kingdom to insist on the establishment of an electoral system not based on class or colour. In addition, PLP had recommended that Bermuda should become independent. At the press conference which had been held at the conclusion of the Constitutional Conference, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies had been reported as saying that PLP had apparently changed its mind on that matter and that it now seemed that none of the delegates wanted independence. However, in a letter to The Times of London, the Parliamentary Leader of the Progressive Labour Party had said that his party favoured independence but felt that the issue of independence should be decided after the people of Bermuda had heard all the arguments pro and con. That was why the independence issue had not been raised by PLP at the Constitutional Conference. In any event, the Venezuelan delegation had the general impression that there had been very little political progress since the elections of 1963 and the General Assembly's last recommendations regarding Bermuda,

298. The Bermuda economy was almost entirely dependent on tourism. Gambling casinos helped to attract tourists, but they also had undesirable effects on the local population. It was not clear from the available information whether the administering Power had taken steps to diversify the economy and develop agriculture in order to make the islands self-supporting.

299. He would also like to have more precise information on education—for instance, on the number of school-age children so as to be able to judge whether there were enough schools, whether the government grants were adequate and so on. In the field of health, he was disturbed to note that infant mortality was extremely high in Bermuda. For that reason the administering Power should further obstetrical and child-care services.

300. It appeared from the documents before the Sub-Committee that the chief executive, who was the Governor appointed by the Queen, had very wide powers. He was advised in the exercise of his functions by an Executive Council, but he was not bound to accept the Council's views. The Governor had power to dissolve the House of Assembly, and the Crown had the power to disallow Acts of the colonial Parliament. He would like to know what changes had been envisaged in that area by the Constitutional Conference.

301. The representative of Uruguay pointed out that the scarcity of information was due to the silence of the administering Power. The Secretariat's working papers contained information culled from all possible sources but it was not enough to enable the Sub-Committee to make precise recommendations. He recalled that when he had last spoken on the item under discussion he had said that if the administering Power did not provide the essential information, the Sub-Committee should visit the territories and study conditions on the spot. The Sub-Committee must act without delay if the local people were not to be at the mercy of unscrupulous persons. Indeed, the magazines Time and Life had published articles denouncing the activities of gangsters, particularly in the Bahamas, where they trafficked in drugs, encouraged gambling and carried on all sorts of illegal activities under cover of fictitious companies. Although some of those activities had probably ceased in consequence of the publicity resulting from those articles, nobody knew how much political influence was still being exercised by such persons.

302. In September 1966, Mr. Fawkes, a member of the House of Assembly, had proposed that a constitutional conference be convened to consider independence for the Bahamas and had declared that independence was inevitable, for three paramount reasons. That, however, had only been a political party's manoeuvre, which had been in no way constructive and had not proposed any positive solution. Mr. Fawkes appeared to have called for independence more on economic than on constitutional grounds. During the debate on Mr. Fawkes' motion, the then Prime Minister had said that independence would be expensive to the Bahamas and that considerable funds would accordingly have to be provided,

which, in his Government's view, would be much better spent in developing the Bahamas for the good of all the inhabitants. When his motion had been rejected, Mr. Fawkes had addressed a petition on the subject to the Special Committee.

303. General elections had been held in December 1966, following which a new Government had been formed in January 1967. In assuming office, the new Prime Minister had taken steps to reassure tourists and investors about his Government's intentions, and had sent a message to the President of the United States assuring him that the Bahamas would remain friendly with the United States, would continue to play its role in the defence pattern of the Western world and would no longer provide a haven for gangsters. That had been an encouraging note, but the Sub-Committee had received no further information on the situation in the Bahamas since February 1967. He therefore proposed that the Sub-Committee should request the administering Power to provide additional information to enable it to base its recommendations on current data.

304. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the administering Power had already provided the Sub-Committee with a detailed report on Montserrat, which was summarized in paragraphs 121 to 125 of the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XXII, annex). Under the new Constitution, the Territory now had an Executive Council, headed by a Chief Minister, and a Legislative Council comprising seven elected members, two officials and one nominated member. In the elections of March 1966, the Montserrat Labour Party had once more obtained a majority. Constitutional questions had not been an issue in the electoral campaign, and only economic and social development had been discussed. The United Kingdom Government was nevertheless prepared to convene a conference on constitutional changes for Montserrat whenever the local political parties were ready.

305. In line with its electoral manifesto, the Montserrat Government had concentrated its efforts on the expansion of agriculture and tourism. During the last calendar year, the United Kingdom had supplied the Territory with aid totalling £274,000 for development and welfare schemes and improvements to Blackbourne Airfield.

306. Of the three Territories under discussion, Bermuda was the one in which the most important and far-reaching political and constitutional advances had been made. He reviewed the constitutional developments in Bermuda since the establishment of representative government in 1620 and pointed out that, as in the United Kingdom, the Constitution of the Territory consisted of a large number of written provisions and many unwritten conventions. The written provisions often gave a misleading impression of the actual situation. For instance, although in theory the Governor had very broad powers and the elected House of Assembly played practically no part in the administration of the Territory, in practice all expenditure and legislation needed the approval of the House of Assembly and there was close co-operation between the Executive, particularly the Governor, and the Legislature. In practice, therefore, Bermuda had for some time enjoyed a wide measure of internal self-government. There had been substantial progress also with regard to the franchise. In 1963, the franchise had been granted to all Bermudans over twenty-five years of age, and property owners, who had been entitled until then to vote in every parish in which they owned land, were restricted to a single additional vote. Early in 1966, the voting age had been reduced to twenty-one years, and the additional property vote had been abolished. Bermuda had thus in the space of three years gone through a complete transition to universal adult suffrage, one man one vote, which in the United Kingdom had taken over a century.

307. That had been the situation in Bermuda when, from 8 to 22 November 1966, the Constitutional Conference had taken place in London. The outcome of that Conference was outlined in the Secretariat working paper (paras. 444-467 of this chapter). The Conference report had not been unanimously adopted, and there were two minority reports attached to it,

one signed by two Independents and the other by the Progressive Labour Party representatives. The former had felt that the Conference's decisions went too far, and the latter that they did not go far enough. In view of the divergency between those extremes, the decisions reached appeared to be a satisfactory compromise and had in fact been accepted by the majority of the delegates. Under those decisions, Bermuda would now have a single written Constitution to be provided for in an Order in Council as in other dependent Territories of the United Kingdom. The Constitution would give Bermuda a responsible government, with the Governor retaining special responsibilities for defence, external affairs, internal security and the police. The Territory would have two chambers, an upper house to be called the Legislative Council with five members nominated by the Governor and six chosen by the two main party leaders, and a lower house, the House of Assembly, with forty members elected by universal adult suffrage. The former would have limited powers similar to those of the House of Lords. In preparation for the elections to the House of Assembly, a special commission with an outside Chairman had been established to define the boundaries of the new constituencies, with the number of adults in the constituencies being as nearly equal as possible, and without any distinction of race. Once the House of Assembly had been elected, a new Executive Council, composed of members of both houses, would be appointed on the advice of the member of the House of Assembly best able to command the confidence of his fellow members. The Governor would be required by the Constitution to act in accordance with the advice of the Executive Council on all matters except external affairs, defence, internal security and the police. The new Constitution of Bermuda would also provide safeguards for fundamental rights and freedoms and ensure the independence of the judiciary and the public service. It would thus provide for a modern form of government.

308. The report of the Conference had been duly endorsed by the Bermuda Legislature, and the Boundaries Commission had finished its work. Its recommendations were unanimous except in relation to one constituency where the recommendations of the majority resulted in more nearly equal constituencies than that put forward by the one dissenting member. The House of Assembly had accepted the Commission's recommendations and had also decided to relax the rules requiring certain government employees to resign before standing for election to the House of Assembly or when elected to it; it had also substantially increased payments to the members of the Legislature. This would allow the range of persons able to sit in the Legislature to be widened. An expert on electoral registration had also been appointed in accordance with a Conference decision and had made his report, whose conclusion was that the system was fair and efficient. The report's recommendations had been accepted by the House of Assembly with one minor exception relating to a mobile registration unit.

309. When the Constitution of Bermuda had been promulgated by an Order in Council, a good deal of local legislation would have to be amended or drafted. There would have to be a new registration of electors in the new constituencies, and other steps leading up to a general election would have to be taken. The probability was that registration would take place the next spring and that the general election would be held at the due time-about the middle of 1968. The new Constitution eliminated many of the archaic features of the old Constitution and embodied a number of important steps forward. Nevertheless, as the Minister of State in the Commonwealth Office had said in the House of Commons during the debate on the Bermuda Constitution Bill, constitutions were continually evolving and fresh amendments would probably be proposed in the future. The Government of the United Kingdom would always be willing to consider such proposals in due course, when there had been some experience of the new constitution.

310. Turning to the Secretariat working paper on Bermuda he pointed out that the paragraphs on the party political situation in Bermuda were somewhat out of date. A new party, the Bermuda Democratic Party, had been formed by

three former members of the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), and was now the second largest party in the House of Assembly. In addition, one former PLP member now sat as an Independent. As a result of those changes, the composition of the House of Assembly was as follows: United Bermuda Party, 23 seats; independent members, 8 seats; Bermuda Democratic Party, 3 seats; Progressive Labour Party, 2 seats.

311. The so-called "Bermuda Constitutional Conference" mentioned in paragraph 422 of the working paper and in petitions addressed to the Special Committee was not, as far as his delegation was aware, a political organization with any following. There was of course no connexion between it and the Constitutional Conference held in London in November 1966.

312. In paragraph 417 mention should also be made of the existence of a Bermuda Court of Appeal. The wording of paragraph 491 did not perhaps make it sufficiently clear that there was already no racial discrimination whatever in admission to maintained and aided schools.

313. Turning to the Bahamas, he recalled that internal selfgovernment had been introduced in 1964. The Governor had responsibility for foreign affairs, defence, internal security and the police; apart from those matters, he acted on the advice of his Ministers. Under the Constitution introduced in 1964, there was a cabinet, headed by a Premier and including at least eight Ministers, and a Legislature consisting of a Senate and a House of Assembly. In January 1967, for the first time in the Bahamas, general elections had been held on the basis of universal adult suffrage after abolition of the limited second vote for which owners and renters of property had been eligible. The membership of the House of Assembly had been enlarged, and thirty-eight constituencies had been delimited by a special commission. The number of seats for the island of New Providence (where Nassau, the capital, was situated) had been increased from twelve to seventeen. Representation for the other islands had remained the same (twenty-one seats), but the seats had been redistributed.

314. As a result of the elections, the Progressive Liberal Party, led by Mr. Lynden Pindling, had increased the number of seats it held from four to eighteen. The United Bahamian Party, also with eighteen seats in the new House, had lost a number of seats, and the Bahamas Labour Party had retained the one seat it held. The National Democratic Party, which had had three seats in the old House of Assembly, had not won any seats in the House, and, as in the previous House of Assembly, one independent member had been elected. The PLP and UBP thus had eighteen seats each but as the Labour Party and independent members had each declared their support for the PLP, the Governor had invited Mr. Pindling, as Parliamentary Leader of PLP, to form a government. The former Premier, Sir Roland Symonette, had become Leader of the Opposition. At a press conference on 16 January, the new Premier had indicated his Government's intention of encouraging tourism and investment and of continuing to maintain friendly relations with countries in the area.

315. The United Kingdom delegation was aware that the subject of gambling establishments in the Bahamas had been mentioned in the Sub-Committee, In that connexion, his delegation thought it appropriate to recall that the Colonial Secretary had announced last December in the House of Commons that the then Premier of the Territory would welcome an investigation by outside experts into the allegations concerning the administration of gambling casinos in the Bahamas. On 1 March 1967, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs had informed the House of Commons that a Commission of Enquiry was to be set up by the newly elected Government of the Bahamas, under the Bahamas Commission of Enquiry Act. A former Assistant Commissioner at Scotland Yard had agreed to lead the inquiry, and the other members of the Commission were a barrister and a detective superintendent from Scotland Yard. The Commission had begun its work at Nassau on 13 March. In view of those circumstances, it would be inappropriate for his or any other delegation to make any comment that might anticipate the Commission's report.

316. In the past the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee had shown interest in the question of activities of Ministers which conflicted with their ministerial duties. That question had been raised by Mr. Pindling, now Premier of the Bahamas, when he had appeared before the Special Committee as a petitioner. The new Government of the Bahamas had drawn up a code of ethics and communicated it to the House of Assembly on 15 June. The Government had earlier approved the payment of salaries and allowances to Ministers and other members of the Legislature; previously they had been unpaid and had therefore been allowed to continue with their private business interests. The new code required that Ministers should so order their affairs that no conflict arose between their private interests and their public duties. They were absolutely prohibited from taking an active part in any undertaking which had contractual relations with a government department. The code was based on the principles laid down by Sir Winston Churchill in 1952 in relation to the United Kingdom Government and also embraced the practice which had developed in Commonwealth countries. He had the full text of the new code available for the benefit of the members of the Sub-Committee.

317. Early in 1967 the Bahamas Government had commissioned the well-known economist Sir Arthur Lewis to make preliminary recommendations for an economic survey of the Bahamas which might lead to the preparation of a comprehensive development plan. Some of the recommendations made were the appointment of an industrial consultant to consider such matters as the existing use of skilled manpower and training facilities; the establishment of a development agency; the amendment of the law for encouraging industry; increasing local agricultural produce for home consumption; and the possibilities of the development of small industries for the local market. As a result of those recommendations, a firm of consultants in Puerto Rico had been appointed to carry out a technical assistance programme. The Bahamas Government had also pressed on with its plans for the expansion of educational facilities and had recently recruited about 100 teachers from the United Kingdom.

318. A number of points in the Secretariat's working paper called for some comment. Specifically, paragraph 502 seemed to indicate that the Governor's assent was required for all laws adopted by the Legislature, and in particular that laws concerning taxation or the expenditure of public money could be adopted only on the Governor's recommendation or with his assent. Such an account gave a misleading impression of the situation. Under section 22 of the Constitution, the Governor could act only on the advice of the Bahamas Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet. Apart from a very small number of questions referred to in section 53 (3) of the Constitution, which required a decision by the United Kingdom Government, the Governor acted on the advice of Bahamas Ministers. On such matters as assent to legislation involving taxation or public expenditure, for example, the Governor was required to act in accordance with ministerial advice.

319. Sub-paragraph 514 (e) of the working paper might be thought to imply that the voting in the recent elections had not been by secret ballot. However, voting in the Bahamas was by secret ballot. The proposal referred to in that sub-paragraph was designed merely to ensure that additional precautions were taken.

320. The representative of Venezuela noted that, during the recent elections in Montserrat, neither the question of constitutional development nor that of independence had been raised. It might, therefore, be wondered what had been done to implement the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in that Territory.

321. In the case of Bermuda and the Bahamas, he noted that the administering Power had not given the political parties an opportunity to express their views concerning the political status of the Territories. The Constitution of Bermuda dated back to 1620, and since that date there did not seem to have been many changes or advances, even towards internal self-government. The powers of the Governor had remained the same: he appointed the members of the Executive Council and of the Legislative Council, could dissolve the House of Assem-

bly, had to give his assent to laws and had extensive powers in matters relating to the external affairs and security of the Territory. He noted that, at the time of the elections, the Progressive Labour Party of Bermuda had published a memorandum attacking the electoral system, which, in its opinion, was based on a policy of segregation. The United Kingdom representative had just spoken about a new electoral system, and it would be useful if he would specify what measures had been taken to eliminate segregation. The Progressive Labour Party had also recommended that Bermuda should receive independence, in spite of what had been said by the Secretary of State for the Colonies at a press conference held following the closing of the Constitutional Conference. The Sub-Committee would welcome fuller details concerning the Constitutional Conference and the measures taken by the United Kingdom to meet the wishes of the people and help them to advance towards independence, a goal which seemed as far off as ever.

322. The representative of Bulgaria noted that since the Sub-Committee had last considered the question of the Territories the administering Power seemed to have taken no positive steps to ensure the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The fact that Bermuda's Constitution was one of the oldest in the British Commonwealth was of no great significance. The administering Power must take steps not to modernize the colonial administration but to ensure the process of decolonization in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Sub-Committee must co-operate with the other United Nations organs concerned and with the United Kingdom in taking the positive steps which would make it possible to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

323. The United Kingdom representative's statement was extremely useful to the Sub-Committee, but it could not be as useful as a visiting mission which could gather information on the spot. He would also like to know whether the people of the Territories were acquainted with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the other United Nations decisions.

324. The representative of Italy noted that some changes had taken place in the Territories. In constitutional affairs practice was more important than the official text of the constitution, and he would therefore like to have some details about the practical changes mentioned by the United Kingdom representative.

325. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the suggestions and comments concerning the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in Bermuda, the Bahamas and Montserrat seemed to indicate some misapprehensions about his Government's policy on those and other colonial Territories. There was, in fact, no conflict between operative paragraph 3 of that resolution and the procedures for constitutional development applied in the Territories: his Government acted in consultation with and by consent of the peoples and was guided by their wishes on the pace and direction of their political progress, freely expressed through democratic parliamentary procedures. This was clearly consistent with the emphasis in resolution 1514 (XV) on the freely expressed wishes of the peoples of the colonial territories as the yardstick of constitutional progress in the transfer of powers to local hands.

326. There was no requirement in resolution 1514 (XV) that colonial peoples should be forced to make decisions on their ultimate status before they wished to do so, and it would be improper for the United Kingdom Government or the Special Committee to bring pressure to bear on them. The view of the Bulgarian representative that constitutional and political progress before decolonization was not of interest to the Sub-Committee was thus contrary to resolution 1514 (XV) and disregarded the wishes of the colonial peoples themselves.

327. He had described the new constitutional arrangements for Bermuda in his statement at the previous meeting but subsequent comments by members of the Sub-Committee had indicated that clarification of the powers of the Governor was again required. The Governor would not, as had been stated, choose government Ministers; his function was to appoint as Government Leader, or Premier, the member of the House of

Assembly most likely to command the support of the majority. He was then bound to take the Government Leader's advice on the appointment of the remaining Ministers. A mistaken choice of Leader would, of course, be rejected by a vote of no confidence by the elected members of the House. Similarly, in the case of the Legislative Council, or upper house, the Governor was bound to appoint, out of a total of eleven members, six nominated by the leaders of the two main political parties. Moreover, the Governor's power to withhold his assent to bills passed by the Legislature was extremely limited; except in the case of his special responsibilities for external affairs, defence, internal security, police and certain other matters, he was bound to accept the advice of the Executive Council on granting or withholding assent. His power to dissolve the Legislature was subject to the restrictions normal in a parliamentary democracy whether in a dependent territory or an independent country.

328. The suggestion that the new electoral system for Bermuda contained elements of racial discrimination was absolutely unfounded. The report of the Constitutional Conference showed that the Boundaries Commission had explicit instructions to take no account of the racial distribution of the electors.

329. All three Territories had a free and active Press, and newspapers and other information media gave wide publicity to all United Nations resolutions and proceedings affecting the Territories which in the judgement of editors and journalists might be of local interest. The Press and other media were able to obtain information from the United Nations regional information office, the Government press office, and such other sources as were available to any independent country.

330. His delegation invited the Sub-Committee to revise the relevant parts of its draft conclusions and recommendations on the Territories in the light of the information he had provided.

331. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation agreed that limited constitutional progress had been made in the Territories under discussion; it was questionable, however, whether the fact that Bermuda, for instance, had until the current year been governed by seventeenth-century constitutional provisions was an example of satisfactory progress. It was the duty of the administering Power actively to encourage decolonization and to take specific measures to publicize the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV). The Sub-Committee could not therefore accept as satisfactory the assurance that the people of the Territories had full access to information about United Nations discussions and decisions on their affairs, or the administering Power's undertaking that there would be a constitutional conference for Montserrat when the parties there were ready for it. Moreover, in at least one Territory, the Bahamas, the Governor still retained substantial powers and controlled the main spheres of political life. His delegation hoped that the administering Power would in future co-operate more effectively with the Special Committee and that, in particular, it would allow a visiting mission into the Caribbean

332. The representative of Madagascar agreed with the observations of the representative of Bulgaria on the powers of the Governor of the Bahamas. He asked the United Kingdom representative to give the Sub-Committee the approximate date when the reserved powers of the Governor were expected to be transferred to the elected government and when the local legislature would be empowered to promulgate legislation without seeking the Governor's assent.

333. The representative of the United Kingdom, replying to the Bulgarian representative, pointed out that it was the Montserrat political parties themselves which would decide when the time had come to hold a constitutional conference.

334. As to the suggestion that the Governor of the Bahamas still controlled the main spheres of the Territory's political and economic life, the documentation available to the Sub-Committee made it quite clear that the Territory enjoyed full internal self-government under its Constitution. Furthermore, paragraphs 499 and 502 of the working paper (see corresponding paragraphs of the present chapter) required amendment. The Governor's powers to withhold assent to legislation were exercisable only on the advice of Bahamas

Ministers, except in a small category of unusual cases. His power in regard to appointments to the Senate had been agreed at the Constitutional Conference in 1963, the results of which had been discussed at length by the Sub-Committee in 1965 and 1966 and summarized in the Committee's reports. He wished only to point out once again that it was not correct that the Governor chose the whole membership of the Senate in his own discretion as had been suggested. On the question put by the representative of Madagascar about the Governor's powers in relation to legislation, which were incorrectly described in the Working Paper, he drew attention to his own statement at the Sub-Committee's 93rd meeting on the preceding day.

335. The representative of Venezuela said that the sparse information in the Secretariat working papers had given rise to doubts as to the freedom of the Territory's Legislature. Those doubts had been only partially resolved by the United Kingdom representative's statements. While the Governor's powers might not be absolute, he did have some power to restrict the action of the Legislature.

336. The Sub-Committee had not been established to note changes in colonial systems but to observe progress in the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), which had been adopted as a result of a general outcry against colonialism. While the United Nations could not force a Territory to choose any particular system, it could require that the people of that Territory should be aware of the alternatives open to them, and that they must be allowed to make their choice with complete freedom.

337. The representative of the United Kingdom, replying to the representatives of Bulgaria and Madagascar, referred to paragraphs 497, 498 and 503 of the working paper (see corresponding paragraphs of the present chapter) and said that the Bahamian Constitution provided that, in the exercise of his functions, the Governor should obtain and act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, except in the spheres described in paragraph 495 of the working paper. Although the Governor formally gave his assent to decisions, those decisions were taken by the Bahamian Ministers.

338. The provision that some members of the Legislative Council would complete the terms for which they had been appointed had been agreed at the 1963 Constitutional Conference. The decision at that Conference that a new lower house should be created had meant that certain transitional procedures, of which the provision in question was one, were necessary to enable the people appointed to the former house to complete their terms in the new Senate.

(b) Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands

339. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had described the general historical background of the Territories at length on previous occasions in the Sub-Committee. After the dissolution of the West Indies Federation in 1962, the Turks and Caicos Islands had considered the possibility of becoming a free associated overseas territory of Jamaica, but a propoal to that effect had received no seconder in the Legislative Assembly, and after Jamaica had become independent the Territory had come under direct United Kingdom administration. Since that time, the Territory had considered the possibility of merging with the Bahamas, and in 1964, a working party had been set up, composed of representatives of the Governments concerned, to consider what form any association might take. The general position on the question of closer relations with the Bahamas remained much as described in the Secretariat working paper of the previous year. In the summer of 1965, two members of the United Kingdom Parliament, one Labour member and one Conservative, had visited the Territory on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. They had recommended that the Governor of the Bahamas should become the Governor of the Territory, a change which had taken place soon after the visit, and that the existing Executive Council and Legislative Council should be replaced by a single State Council, a move which was still being discussed but which did not seem to be favoured by the Territory. They had also recommended that a land officer should be appointed to work out an efficient system of land registration on the basis of a

cadastral survey, and work was already under way to implement that recommendation.

340. With regard to constitutional changes in the Turks and Caicos Islands, the paragraphs of the Secretariat working paper before the Sub-Committee were out of date and should be redrafted. It should be indicated that the Administrator was appointed by the Queen and exercised his functions in accordance with instructions given to him by Her Majesty (which meant in effect the United Kingdom Government) or by the Governor of the Bahamas, that he was required to consult with the Executive Council on all important matters within the scope of his responsibilities and might act otherwise than in accordance with the advice of the Executive Council but must in that event report to the Queen through the Secretary of State on the reasons for his actions, and that the Governor might, when he was present in the Islands, perform any of the functions conferred on the Administrator. It should be indicated that the administration of justice was in the hands of a magistrate who was acting judge of the Grand Court, that the Grand Court also had jurisdiction in divorce and matrimonial proceedings and that appeal from the Grand Court lay to the Court of Appeal of the Bahamas.

341. The Cayman Islands had also considered the possibility of an association with Jamaica upon the dissolution of the West Indies Federation and had been offered independence in association with Jamaica. The Territory had chosen to sever all constitutional links with Jamaica and to remain with the United Kingdom. When a federation of the small Eastern Caribbean Territories had been proposed in 1962, the Legislative Assembly had voted in favour of continuing its association with the United Kingdom and negotiating for internal selfgovernment, taking account of the wishes of the people of the Territory as to timing, and had decided that any such negotiations should be deferred until after a general election. Those recommendations had been accepted by the United Kingdom. No proposals for negotiations on self-government had been made in 1962 and, as a result of the elections in November 1965, the party campaigning for rapid constitutional change had lost ground in the Assembly. The then United Kingdom Colonial Secretary had stated that the United Kingdom would be guided by local opinion in considering the future of the Territory. A committee of the whole of the new Legislative Assembly had been established to consider the question of constitutional advance and, after consultation by the elected members with their constituents, to put forward proposals for constitutional change. In January of the current year, the Committee had met and a majority of members had agreed on a number of proposals; they had proposed that the provision for nominated members in the Legislative Assembly should be deleted, that the stipendiary magistrate should be replaced by an attorney-general, and that the Assembly should be presided over by an independent speaker from outside the legislature rather than by the Administrator, who would retain the same special responsibilities as at present. It had also been proposed that the Executive Council should have five elected members, no nominated member, and three official members, the Assistant Administrator, the Treasurer, and the Attornev-General. The elected members in the Executive Council would be given executive responsibility and would have portfolios. The proposed changes would have given more power to the elected members. The proposals had been discussed by elected representatives with constituents at meetings throughout the Territory and in all but two of the constituencies the proposals had been opposed on the grounds that a substantial majority of people did not wish for any change at present in the existing constitutional arrrangements. The conclusion of the Constitutional Committee was that there was no mandate from the people for the proposed changes, despite the fact that they were supported by the majority of elected representatives. The Committee had therefore recommended no change, except that the stipendiary magistrates should be replaced by an attorney-general in 1968. Any political party or individual who disagreed with those recommendations would naturally be free to campaign on the issue in the next elections, which were due to take place by 1969. In conclusion, he pointed out that the United Kingdom Government had not requested the Assembly of the Territory to pass the New Banks and Trust Companies Law, and the working paper should be amended accordingly.

- 342. The representative of Madagascar thanked the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement. He would like to know, however, who the three official members of the Executive Council in the Turks and Caicos Islands were, since it appeared that of the total of six members, only two were elected. He would also like some further clarification of the statement that all legislation was subject to the assent of the Administrator. With regard to educational conditions in the Turks and Caicos Islands, he noted that no mention of higher education was made in paragraph 583 of that document and wondered whether the United Kingdom had envisaged establishing schools for training administrative cadres or giving scholarships to students who wished to receive university training.
- 343. The representative of Venezuela observed that the process of constitutional development in the Turks and Caicos and the Cayman Islands followed the pattern familiar from other Territories administered by the United Kingdom. In all those Territories the representative of the Queen continued to exercise wide powers and the functions of the local legislature were limited. In none of them, therefore, had there been any political advance of substance in the preceding year. Moreover, in the case of the Turks and Caicos Islands, it was difficult to see how the people could be properly consulted on future political development if there were no political parties.
- 344. The administering Power was, of course, also responsible for the economic and social development of the Territories and, in the matter of education at least, the situation was satisfactory in the islands. The high rate of infant mortality seemed to indicate, however, that public health and welfare services required improvement.
- 345. The representative of Bulgaria said that nothing in the information provided by the United Kingdom representative gave him reason to retract the conclusions he had expressed in his general statement on the Territories under discussion. There had been no new developments, except for the consultations held in the Cayman Islands, in the course of which no decision had been taken regarding any constitutional changes.
- 346. The representative of Uruguay thanked the representative of the United Kingdom for his valuable and informative statement on the Turks and Caicos and the Cayman Islands. While it was true that progress towards decolonization had not been as rapid and efficient as the Sub-Committee might wish, a slow process of political development was not inappropriate in very small Territories with limited natural resources. The extracts from the report of the Cayman Islands Constitutional Committee were evidence that practical steps were being taken to consult the people about their future status and he hoped that the United Kingdom could make the entire report available to the Sub-Committee.
- 347. The presence of a representative of the administering Power had proved extremely useful and members had been helped in their work by having the opportunity of hearing another point of view on decolonization problems.
- 348. The representative of Italy associated himself with the observations of the representative of Uruguay on the usefulness of having a representative of the administering Power present at the Sub-Committee's dicussions of the Territories. It might, in fact, be advisable to invite the administering Powers to be represented at all meeetings, as they were responsible in all cases for the external affairs of the Territories.
- 349. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would be happy to make a copy of the report of the Cayman Islands Constitutional Committee available to the Secretariat for distribution to members and suggested that it might be included in the Sub-Committee's report, since it provided evidence of a democratic process of extensive personal consultations with the people of a small Territory concerning their future. Similarly, there was a continuous process of consultation in the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the absence of political parties, to which the representative of Venezuela had referred, was not necessarily a disadvantage in a Territory with a population of under 7,000. In those islands the

possibility of union with the Bahamas had been the main theme of recent discussions.

350. In reply to the representative of Madagascar, he said that full details of the Legislative Assembly of the Turks and Caicos Islands were contained in the records of the Sub-Committee's proceedings in 1964 and in the Secretariat working paper of that year, which was reproduced in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.I, chapter XXIV, paras. 59-63). He was not in a position to give detailed figures on scholarships for higher education for students from the two Territories, but qualified students were eligible for the scholarships available under United Kingdom technical assistance provisions for dependent Territories. Moreover, the Territories had close links with Jamaica and the Bahamas and could draw on the extensive educational facilities available in the Caribbean, Britain and elsewhere. Neither had a population large enough to support a separate university.

B. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

351. The Sub-Committee adopted its conclusions and recommendations on these Territories by consensus at its 96th meeting on 8 September 1967.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 352. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it adopt the following conclusions and recommendations:
- (1) The Special Committee recalls its earlier conclusions and recommendations relating to Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands, which were endorsed by the General Assembly.
- (2) The Special Committee takes note of the statement of the administering Power containing additional information on these Territories.
- (3) The Special Committee reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories.
- (4) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not yet taken effective measures to implement the Declaration in these Territories and urges it to do so without further delay.
- (5) The Special Committee notes that financial interests unrelated to the political, economic and social development of these Territories may constitute an obstacle to the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territory of the Bahamas.
- (6) The Special Committee considers that, in view of the lack of sufficient information on some of these Territories, the administering Power should make it possible for the United Nations to dispatch a visiting mission to the Territories as soon as possible.
- (7) The Special Committee considers that the administering Power should take immediate measures to transfer all powers to the peoples of these Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete freedom and independence.
- (8) The Special Committee reiterates its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the peoples of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status, in full knowledge of the options available to them.

VI. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

- 353. At the 90th meeting of the Sub-Committee on 30 August 1967, the representative of Uruguay called attention to the fact that at its 1500th plenary meeting on 20 December 1966, the General Assembly took note of the consensus on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), which reads as follows:
 - "With reference to General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the Fourth Committee took note of the communications dated 15 December 1966 of Argentina and

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/C.4/682 and A/C.4/683). In this regard there was a consensus in favour of urging both parties to continue with the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, keeping the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the General Assembly duly informed about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960."e

- 354. Considering that bilateral negotiations are the best way of solving the problem of the decolonization of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), but having no information on the progress made in this direction since the approval of the consensus of 20 December 1966, the representative of Uruguay supported by the representative of Venezuela proposed that the attention of the parties should again be drawn to resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus of 20 December 1966 with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, due regard being paid to the recommendation at the end of the consensus that the Special Committee and the General Assembly should be kept informed "about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960".
- 355. At its 91st meeting on 31 August, the Sub-Committee adopted the following statement which it recommends for adoption by the Special Committee: Considering that bilateral negotiations are the best way of solving the problem of the decolonization of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), but having no information on the progress made in this direction since the approval of the consensus of 20 December 1966, the Special Committee recommends that the attention of the parties should again be drawn to resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus of 20 December 1966, with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, due regard being paid to the recommendation at the end of the consensus that the Special Committee and the General Assembly should be kept informed about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resoluton 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

c Ibid.

- VII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRITORIES UNDER UNITED KINGDOM ADMINISTRATION
- 356. At its 96th meeting on 8 September 1967, the Sub-Committee unanimously adopted the following general conclusions and recommendations on Territories under United Kingdom administration which the Sub-Committee submits for adoption by the Special Committee:
- (1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning these Territories which were adopted by the Special Committee in 1966 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.
- (2) The Special Committee reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories. At the same time, it recognizes that the small size and population of these Territories, and the nature of their economies, present peculiar problems which demand special attention.
- (3) The Special Committee reaffirms the right of the people of these Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the various forms of political status open to them. It also expresses its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status and in full knowledge of the options available to them.
- (4) The Special Committee reiterates its previous recommendation concerning the need for visiting missions to these Territories and, to this end, urges the administering Power to enable the Special Committee to send visiting missions to the Territories.
- (5) The Special Committee recalls its belief expressed in 1964 that it should be possible for these Territories to join with others in the area to form an economically and administratively viable State. It also recalls that, at that time, negotiations were being carried on between certain of these Territories with a view to establishing a federation. The Special Committee regrets that these negotiations were not successful and that, as a consequence, each Territory has been obliged to seek a separate solution. It expresses the hope that the administering Power will do everything possible to promote the development of closer ties among these Territories through the building of a common political, economic and social infrastructure in accordance with the wishes of the people.

CHAPTER XXIV*

INFORMATION ON NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED QUESTIONS

Introduction

- 1. In operative paragraph 5 of its resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee *inter alia* to study the information transmitted to the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter and to take it fully into account in examining the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
- 2. In order to discharge its functions under the above resolution, the Special Committee, at its 315th meeting on 17 November 1964, approved certain procedures which had been suggested by the Secretary-General (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ Chap. II, appendix I). These proce-
 - * Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.15.
- ¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

- dures were later also approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 2109 (XX) of 21 December 1965.
- 3. According to these procedures, the latest information transmitted by administering Powers is used in the preparation by the Secretariat each year of working papers on the individual Territories for the Special Committee. This information is taken into account by the Committee in its consideration of the Territories concerned and is reflected in the chapter of the Special Committee's report dealing with each of the Territories. In addition, the Special Committee considers each year, as a separate item on its agenda, a report by the Secretary-General on the information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter and on the action taken during the year in implementation of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII).
- 4. At the conclusion of its consideration of this item in 1966, the Special Committee, on 19 October 1966, adopted a consensus in which it deplored the fact that

whereas some administering Powers had transmitted information under Article 73 e of the Charter, others had not done so, or had done so insufficiently or too late.

- 5. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, on 20 December 1966, adopted resolution 2233 (XXI), operative paragraphs 2 to 4 of which read as follows:
 - "2. Expresses its profound regret that, despite the repeated recommendations of the General Assembly, including the most recent recommendation contained in resolution 2109 (XX), some Member States having responsibilities for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories have not seen fit to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter or have done so insufficiently or too late;
 - "3. Once again urges all Member States which have or which assume responsibilities for the administration of Territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government to transmit, or continue to transmit, to the Secretary-General the information prescribed in Article 73 e of the Charter, as well as the fullest possible information on political and constitutional development;
 - "4. Requests the Special Committee to continue to discharge the functions entrusted to it under General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) in accordance with the procedures referred to above."

A. Consideration by the Special Committee

General

- 6. In accordance with the procedures outlined above, the latest information transmitted by administering Powers under Article 73 e of the Charter was used in the preparation by the Secretariat of working papers for the Special Committee in 1967 and was taken into account by the Committee in its consideration of the Territories concerned. As in previous years, this information is reflected in the chapter of the Special Committee's report dealing with each of the Territories.
- 7. Also in accordance with the said procedures, the Special Committee, at its 557th to 559th meetings, on 12 and 13 September 1967, considered a report by the Secretary-General (see annex to the present chapter) on the information which had been transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter up to 13 September 1967, and on the action which had been taken in implementation of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII).

Statements by members

8. The representative of the United Kingdom observed that, according to the Secretary-General's report (see annex below), the United Kingdam had transmitted information on six of its Territories. He pointed out that his delegation had provided information on six further Territories—the Bahamas on 11 September, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands on 11 September, Mauritius on 8 September, and New Hebrides, St. Helena and Swaziland on 11 September-although the information had been sent too late for inclusion in the Secretary-General's report. He proposed that, in accordance with the procedure followed in previous years, the information in question should be included in the Committee's report to the General Assembly. His delegation expected to be able to transmit information on Bermuda, British Honduras, Hong Kong, the Seychelles and the Turks and Caicos Islands in the very near future, before the Com-

- mittee finally adopted its report to the General Assembly; the Committee might therefore incorporate the relevant references and dates in its report.
- 9. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania noted that certain colonial Powers had a negative attitude towards the efforts of the Committee in particular, and the United Nations as a whole, to implement the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He deplored the fact that certain colonial Powers had transmitted information in a manner which was inadequate and had done so too late for it to be of real use in the Committee's work.
- 10. He observed that the United Kingdom, the colonial Power administering Southern Rhodesia, had not yet transmitted any information on that Territory—by which he meant information relating solely to the activities of the United Kingdom Government in connexion with Rhodesia. The United Kingdom should transmit all the necessary information, for it was well known that several members of the United Kingdom administration had been sent to Southern Rhodesia to communicate with the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith. That was something that should be brought to light, but, of course, the colonial Power was seeking to hide it.
- 11. In addition, since its work was paralysed when the information it needed did not reach it in time, the Committee should consider the possibility of setting a time-limit for the submission of such information. In that way, those colonial Powers which were always complaining that certain members of the Committee were not informed about the situation would no longer be able to do so.
- 12. The Portuguese Government, once again, had refused to submit any information. In 1966, he himself had said that no condemnation could be too strong for a Government which mocked the rules recognized by the entire international community and was carrying out a policy of extermination in the Territories under its administration. That comment was still valid. The fascist colonial régime in Portugal was continuing its criminal war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). Many countries, in particular the members of NATO, were contributing materially to its efforts to maintain its domination over the peoples of those Territories. The activities of foreign monopolies in the Territories were well known, as was the fact that the African inhabitants possessed nothing. All such information should be submitted to the United Nations for consideration by the Committee.
- 13. It was now September 1967 and neither the United States of America nor France had so far submitted information on the Territories under their colonial domination. The Committee should bear that fact in mind. For its part, his delegation would seek, with other delegations, to prepare a text which would enable the Committee to conclude its discussion of the item in a constructive manner.
- 14. The representative of India observed that he was glad the United Kingdom representative had announced that his Government had just transmitted information on six further Territories and would soon provide information on other Territories for which it was responsible. He was not, however, commpletely satisfied with the way in which the United Kingdom Government and other Governments were discharging their responsibilities under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter. Like the Tanzanian representative,

he thought that the administering Powers should expedite the transmission of information on their colonies so that the Secretariat working papers for the Committee could be as up to date as possible.

- 15. The most glaring culprit in that respect was the Portuguese Government, which constantly defied the United Nations. The Territories, which Portugal euphemistically called overseas provinces, had been declared Non-Self-Governing Territories by the General Assembly in resolution 1542 (XV). Portugal therefore had an obligation to transmit information on them.
- 16. The United Kingdom delegation had taken an active part in the Committee's discussions on the question of Southern Rhodesia; he therefore could not understand why the United Kingdom Government was providing no information on that Territory, since it recognized it as a Non-Self-Governing Territory under its administration. It would seem that the United Kingdom delegation owed an explanation to the Committee, and he hoped that the United Kingdom Government would recognize that it was its responsibility to transmit information to the Committee on Southern Rhodesia.
- 17. In conclusion, he endorsed the suggestion made by the Tanzanian representative regarding the need to prepare a text to permit the Committee to conclude its consideration of the item constructively.
- 18. The representative of the United States pointed out that her Government regularly reported on the Territories for which it was responsible. The information which it had available had been transmitted to the Secretariat and had already been discussed by the relevant sub-committees of the Committee. Moreover, paragraph 2 of the Secretary-General's report (see annex below) indicated that the United States had submitted more information than Article 73 e of the Charter required, particularly concerning political and constitutional developments in the Territories. The information which had not yet been submitted for 1966 would be available to the Committee before the end of the week; thus, the delay would be negligible.
- 19. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that whenever the Committee considered the question of the information which administering Powers were required to transmit under Article 73 e, it always found that several colonial Powers provided no information or provided information which was of no value to it.
- 20. The representative of the United States had asserted that her country had transmitted more information than was required; the question was, however, whether that additional information really added anything.
- 21. The United Nations Charter clearly stated that the basic obligation of Administering Authorities was to promote the economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories and their development towards self-government or independence. Information on constitutional development must therefore be regarded as coming under the heading of information which should normally be provided. In any case, the information transmitted by the administering Powers was totally inadequate and was actually designed to disguise the real situation in the Territories. From what the Committee knew about the activities of international monopolies and the military activities of certain Powers in colonial Territories, it was clear

- that certain facts had been hidden from the Committee and from world public opinion. It was therefore quite reasonable to say that the information available to the Committee was not so valuable that it could not do without it.
- 22. Since Article 73 e of the Charter was not being complied with, he supported the Tanzanian representative's proposal that a time-limit should be set for the submission of information. He himself thought that the Secretariat should, in preparing documents for the Special Committee, use not only the information provided by the colonial Powers but also all information from other sources which might be of interest to the Committee.
- 23. Lastly, the Committee should indicate how United Nations decisions were being carried out and how the resolutions of the Special Committee were being implemented by the colonial Powers.
- 24. The representative of Tanzania had spoken of of the assistance given by certain NATO members to Portugal. The Committee should not wait for the administering Powers to provide information on that matter and for them to recognize that as members of NATO they were helping Portugal to crush national liberation movements but should request the Secretariat to obtain any information which would throw light on the machinations of the colonial Powers and to include such information in its reports instead of relying solely on information transmitted by the colonial Powers.
- 25. The representative of the United Kingdom salthat the critical remarks made by certain delegation about the adequacy of the information supplied by administering Powers could not apply to his Government, since it had always conscientiously fulfilled its responsibilities as administering Power. Moreover, he had the impression that the Secretariat did not rely exclusively on the information provided by administering Powers but drew widely on other reliable sources.
- 26. With regard to the timing of the transmission of information, he recalled that in 1964 the Committee had established and approved a time-limit of six months from the termination of the administrative year applying to the Territories in question. That time-limit was 30 June for the Territories under United Kingdom administration.
- 27. He also recalled that the procedures approved by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories had provided for the transmission of information every three years. In the intervening years, the administering Powers had been required to provide supplementary information only. The year 1966 was one of the years for which full and detailed information was required.
- 28. The United Kingdom was doing its best to adhere to the target date of 30 June. However, since assembling the large volume of information requested in the questionnaire approved by the General Assembly required substantial administrative effort and imposed a considerable financial burden on small Territories with limited resources, the United Kingdom could not invariably undertake to meet the deadline.
- 29. The submission of information on Southern Rhodesia was a complex question which had many ramifications. His delegation would certainly report the comments made by certain delegations, in particular those of India and Tanzania, to his Govern-

ment, and he could assure the Committee that the United Kingdom Government would give them consideration.

- 30. The representative of Sierra Leone noted that the information for 1965 in respect of some Non-Self-Governing Territories had been transmitted in 1967. He supported the view that administering Powers should try to submit the information more promptly, so that the data available to delegations were up to date. He also noted that France had not provided any information on French Somaliland and the Comoro Archipelago; Portugal, of course, had supplied no information at all. That failure to co-operate was to be deplored. The United Kingdom continued to provide no information on Southern Rhodesia. His delegation wished that the United Kingdom would find it possible to supply information on that Territory.
- 31. With regard to the adequacy of the material supplied, Article 73 e of the Charter had been interpreted in various ways, but it seemed to him essential that complete information should be supplied indicating what political progress had been made in the direction of independence. He therefore associated himself with previous speakers in urging the administering Powers not only to co-operate in supplying information, but to assist the Committee and the Secretariat by supplying fuller information and by recognizing that the kind of information required at the present day differed from the type of information which had been required in 1945.
- 32. The representative of Uruguay thought that a clear distinction should be made between obligations under Article 73 e and any other obligations that might arise. There were some administering Powers—notably Portugal—which had defied the United Nations by refusing to submit any information at all. France must unfortunately be included in the same group in view of its policy regarding French Somaliland. It was sad that France had refused to recognize the competence of the United Nations and withheld the information it required.
- 33. There was another group of Powers whose position was different. The United Kingdom, for example, according to the Secretary-General's report, had provided information for 1966 on only six Territories, but the United Kingdom representative had indicated that reports were being prepared on the other Territories. He had offered some explanations which might not be accepted by all but which at least revealed the United Kingdom's desire to co-operate. The Committee should not therefore adopt a resolution criticizing all the administering Powers equally. There was perhaps a case for a resolution directed against those States which had denied their obligation to submit information.
- 34. He considered that the representative of Tanzania had made a very pertinent suggestion concerning the fixing of a time-limit for the submission of information. It appeared from what the United Kingdom representative had said that there was already a time-limit which had been fixed by the General Assembly some years previously. All that seemed needed was to ask administering Powers to comply with the terms of the relevant General Assembly resolution—with the understanding that supplementary information covering additional developments could always be submitted later.

B. Action taken by the Special Committee

35. At the 558th meeting, on 13 September 1967, the Chairman stated that on the basis of the statements of representatives and informal consultations with delegations, he wished to suggest the following consensus:

"The Special Committee takes note of the report of the Secretary-General. The Special Committee also takes note of the fact that some administering Powers have transmitted information under Article 73 e of the Charter but have done so too late and in some cases insufficiently.

"In this connexion the Committee recalls that in accordance with General Assembly resolution 66 (I) of 14 December 1946, resolution 142 (II) of 3 November 1947 and resolution 218 (III) of 3 November 1948, the administering Powers are requested to send to the Secretary-General annually the most recent information at their disposal as early as possible and, at the latest, within a maximum period of six months following the expiration of the administrative year in the Non-Self-Governing Territories concerned.

"The Committee calls upon the administering Powers to comply with this decision. The Committee regrets that some administering Powers have not submitted any information under Article 73 e of the Charter. The Committee deeply deplores the fact that, in spite of the numerous decisions taken by the General Assembly, Portugal for all these years has not submitted any information with regard to its colonial Territories as required under Article 73 e of the Charter. The Committee also deplores the consistent refusal by the United Kingdom to submit information on Southern Rhodesia in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter."

- 36. The representative of Uruguay said that he was in general agreement with the draft consensus; however, he thought that, before considering it, the Committee should hear a further statement from the United Kingdom representative clarifying its position regarding Southern Rhodesia. It was true that the Committee had not received information on Southern Rhodesia in the ordinary way in pursuance of Article 73 e, but the question of Southern Rhodesia had been discussed in the General Assembly and the Security Council, and the United Kingdom had made it clear that it would in no circumstances support the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia and ignore the wishes of the majority. Perhaps the Chairman could consult the United Kingdom representative as to the possibility of his informing the Committee on the measures being taken by the United Kingdom to put down the rebellion of the racist minority. If the United Kingdom was willing to provide such information, the Committee could consider whether Southern Rhodesia should be mentioned in the consensus.
- 37. The Chairman said that what the Committee was concerned about was the formal submission of information to the Secretary-General under Article 73 e. The United Kingdom Government had never submitted information on Southern Rhodesia, having always contended that Southern Rhodesia could not be regarded as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. Should the United Kingdom decide, in the present circumstances, to change its mind and submit information in the future, that would be a welcome move, but the Committee would still have a right to regret what had happened up to the present moment, and he therefore

thought that it would be best to keep the wording of the consensus as it stood.

- 38. The representative of Australia said he did not think that the criticisms which had been levelled at administering Powers regarding the submission of information applied to Australia. Australia had submitted information as required under the Charter and, as indicated in paragraph 2 of the Secretary-General's report (see annex below), had also provided additional information in the annual reports of the Territories, and during meetings of the Special Committee. Consequently, his Government had filfilled its Charter obligations conscientiously, and had gone beyond those obligations. The consensus suggested by the Chairman stated that some administering Powers had transmitted information but had done so too late and in some cases insufficiently. The word "insufficiently" hardly applied to Australia, and whereas information had sometimes been submitted later than Australia would have wished, that had been due simply to the physical difficulties of assembling, processing, printing and transmitting the detailed statistical information. He thought that it was generally understood that the compilation of statistics sometimes took more time than the six-month period mentioned in some resolutions adopted at early sessions of the General Assembly.
- 39. The Chairman said, that, if the administering Powers had the right to defend themselves on the grounds that they had not had sufficient time to submit the necessary information, then they should have done so when the relevant resolutions on the transmission of information had been adopted by the Assembly. It was the task of the Special Committee to see that those resolutions were implemented and to adhere to the decisions it had taken in the past.
- 40. The representative of the United Kingdom said it was certainly the position of his Government that until the time of the illegal declaration of independence in November 1965 Southern Rhodesia did enjoy a full measure of self-government and therefore fell outside the scope of Article 73 e. The illegal declaration, however, created a situation which was both transitional and complex. His delegation did not wish at the present stage to go beyond that observation. The matter would be given full and careful consideration by the United Kingdom Government. Of course, his delegation could not at present accept the paragraph of the consensus referring to Southern Rhodesia and therefore could not be associated with the consensus as a whole.
- 41. The representative of the United States entered a general reservation concerning the consensus. Although it was within the Committee's province to express itself on the question of the deadline, it should be made clear that the United States Government also encountered considerable delays in the process of collating, analysing and checking information from remote areas and in preparing it for distribution. His delegation had sought to remedy those delays by presenting information on request in the Sub-Committees. Such information was up-to-date and generally went beyond the scope of the topics required under Article 73 e of the Charter.
- 42. The representative of Uruguay said that the Special Committee was not discussing the fulfilment of the obligation to submit information under Article 73 e of the Charter but the legal position taken by the United Kingdom in the specific case of Southern

- Rhodesia. The United Kingdom had formally stated that since the illegal assumption of power by the Smith régime it did not consider itself bound to submit information under Article 73 e. The Special Committee must consider that legal position, but it was improper to condemn the United Kingdom because it had not submitted information. His delegation was therefore bound to enter a legal reservation about that paragraph of the consensus dealing with Southern Rhodesia.
- 43. The Chairman said the representative of Uruguay was fully entitled to enter a reservation but he would remind him that in 1962 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1747 (XVI) affirming that Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Article 73 e of the Charter. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government had not submitted information, as could be seen from paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's report (see annex below). The real position of the United Kingdom was that it had not submitted information in the past because, in its view, Southern Rhodesia had obtained a large measure of self-government. That position had been contested by the majority of the Members of the United Nations. Since the unilateral declaration of independence the situation was extremely complex and discussion of it in the Committee might perhaps be unduly prolonged.
- 44. The representative of the United Kingdom said it was not the position of his Government that because of the existence of a de facto régime in Rhodesia the United Kingdom was no longer bound to transmit information. Up to the time of the illegal declaration of independence in November 1965 it had been the consistent position of the United Kingdom Government that Southern Rhodesia enjoyed a full measure of self-government and therefore fell outside the scope of Article 73 e. The illegal declaration clearly created a new situation and there were now in any case obvious practical obstacles to the provision of information.
- 45. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation had voted for the 1962 resolution affirming that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory and in its view Southern Rhodesia had certainly not achieved autonomy. The position of the administering Power in the light of the illegal declaration of independence was that it was powerless to act. It now stated that it no longer possessed the means to obtain the information required from Southern Rhodesia. In other words, the Committee could not place the United Kingdom in the same position as those countries which could submit information but refused to do so. With the legal reservation he had entered, he would be able to support the consensus.
- 46. At the 559th meeting, the representative of Venezuela suggested that the second sentence of the draft consensus should be replaced by the following paragraph:

"The Special Committee takes note of the fact that some administering Powers have transmitted information in conformity with Article 73 e of the Charter. The Special Committee also takes note that some administering Powers have transmitted this information too late. The Special Committee takes note furthermore that in some cases the information supplied was not sufficient."

In his opinion that text dealt more accurately with all aspects of the problem and thus correctly reflected the understanding arrived at by the members of the Committee.

- 47. The representative of Chile supported the Venezuelan representative's suggestion. He felt that the proposed changes brought out more clearly the various situations existing with regard to the transmission of information.
- 48. The representative of the United Kingdom said that since the proposed changes related only to the first paragraph of the text, he maintained the reservations which he had expressed at the previous meeting.
- 49. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania asked whether the other delegations which had expressed reservations at the previous meeting also maintained them.
- 50. The representative of the United States said that he appreciated the efforts made by the Venezuelan and Chilean representatives to improve the proposed text; however, since the changes in question did not relate to the main problem, namely that of setting a time-limit for the transmission of information, his delegation was compelled to maintain its reservations.
- 51. The representative of Uruguay maintained that while the paragraph proposed by the Venezuelan representative was useful in providing clarification, the text did not accurately reflect the situation. Certain administering Powers were not complying with their obligations under Article 73 e of the Charter, and they had been mentioned by name during the discussion. However, the proposed text referred specifically to only one Power which was not providing information on the Territories under its administration and one other Power which refused to provide such information on one particular Territory. Since Portugal and the United Kingdom were mentioned in the text, another administering Power, France, should also be mentioned, since it was refusing to comply with the rules of decolonization in the case of French Somaliland. Rather serious accusations had been made against France in connexion with the referendum which it had recently held in French Somaliland. Information from the administering Power might-and, it was to be hoped, would-show that the accusations were without foundation. In his opinion, all administering Powers, including France, should co-operate with the United Nations in ensuring decolonization and in dealing with the difficulties involved in integrating the various peoples of the colonial Territories. In conclusion, he wished to state that he agreed to the changes suggested by the Venezuelan representative with regard to the beginning of the text but maintained the reservations he had expressed at the previous meeting as far as the remainder of the text was concerned.
- 52. The representative of Australia reiterated that his Government had more than met its obligations with regard to the information to be provided on the Territories under its administration and that only technical difficulties had prevented it from submitting the requested information on time. He therefore maintained his reservations regarding the text of the proposed consensus.
- 53. The representatives of Finland and Italy wished to make it clear that they had not actually expressed any reservations at the previous meeting but had merely asked for an opportunity to study the text before taking a position. They could now inform the Committee that they accepted the text as well as the amendment suggested by the Venezuelan representative.
- 54. The Chairman, referring to remarks made earlier in the discussion, explained that, in preparing working

papers, the Secretariat was continuing to use all the information it could gather, including that transmitted to it by administering Powers under Article 73 e of the Charter. The working papers on the Territories under Portuguese administration and on Southern Rhodesia were entirely based on information assembled directly by the Secretariat.

55. At the 559th meeting, on 13 September 1967, the Special Committee decided, in the absence of objection, to adopt the text of the consensus suggested by the Chairman with the amendment suggested by the representative of Venezuela, it being understood that the reservations expressed by certain members would appear in the records of the meetings. The text adopted by the Special Committee reads as follows:

"The Special Committee takes note of the report of the Secretary-General. The Special Committee takes note of the fact that some administering Powers have transmitted information in conformity with Article 73 e of the Charter. The Special Committee also takes note that some administering Powers have transmitted this information too late. The Special Committee takes note furthermore that in some cases the information supplied was not sufficient.

"In this connexion, the Committee recalls that in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 66 (I) of 14 December 1946, 142 (II) of 3 November 1947 and 218 (III) of 3 November 1948, the administering Powers are requested to send to the Secretary-General annually the most recent information at their disposal, as early as possible and at the latest within a maximum period of six months following the expiration of the administrative year in the Non-Self-Governing Territories concerned. The Committee calls upon the administering Powers to comply with this decision.

"The Committee regrets that some administering Powers have not submitted any information under Article 73 e of the Charter. The Committee deeply deplores the fact that, in spite of the numerous decisions taken by the General Assembly, Portugal for all these years has not submitted any information with regard to her colonial Territories as required under Article 73 e of the Charter. The Committee also deplores the consistent refusal by the United Kingdom to submit information on Southern Rhodesia"

ANNEX*

Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter

- 1. The Secretary-General's previous report on this subject (A/6300/Rev.I,a chapter XXIII, appendix), listed the dates on which information was transmitted to the Secretary-Generay under Article 73 e of the Charter up to 29 September 1966. The table at the end of the present report shows the dates on which such information in respect of the years 1965 and 1966 was transmitted up to 13 September 1967.
- 2. The information transmitted under Article 73 e follows in general the standard form approved by the General Assembly and includes information on geography, history, population, economic, social and educational conditions. In the case of

^{*} Previously reproduced under the symbols A/AC.109/269 and Add.1.

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

Territories under the administration of Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, the annual reports of the Territories, which also include information on constitutional matters, were transmitted. Additional information on political and constitutional developments in Territories under their administration was also given by the representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America during meetings of the Special Committee.

3. No information has been transmitted to the Secretary-General concerning Territories under Portuguese administration, which, by resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, the General Assembly considered were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. Nor has the Secretary-General received information concerning Southern Rhodesia which, the Assembly affirmed by resolution

1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter.

Study of information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter

4. In compliance with the provisions of operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2109 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2233 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, which requested the Special Committee to study the information transmitted under Article 73 e, and in accordance with the procedure approved by the Special Committee in 1964, the Secretariat has continued to use the information transmitted in the preparation of working papers on each Territory for the Special Committee.

Dates of transmission of information under Article 73 e for 1965 and 1966

This table includes all Territories listed in annex II of the report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session, with the exception of Barbados, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, British Guiana, Gambia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malta, North Borneo, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Sarawak, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Zanzibar.

	1965	1966
Australia (1 July-30 June):b		
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	28 February 1967 5 August 1966	19 July 1967 19 July 1967
France (Calendar year): Comoro Archipelago ^c French Somaliland ^c New Hebrides	12 June 1967	
New Zealand (1 April-31 March):d		
Cook Islandse	17 October 1966 17 October 1966 17 October 1966	15 August 1967 15 August 1967
Portugal:		
Angola Cape Verde Archipelago	_	
Guinea (called Portuguese Guinea) Macau and dependencies	*****	40044
Mozambique	_	
cies Timor (Portuguese) and dependencies		
Spain (Calendar year):		
Equatorial Guinea Ifni Spanish Sahara	28 June 1966 28 June 1966 28 June 1966	29 June 1967 29 June 1967 29 June 1967
United Kingdom (Calendar year):		
Aden Antigua Bahamas Bermuda British Honduras British Virgin Islands Brunei	6 July 1966 6 December 1966 5 August 1966 13 September 1966 29 December 1966 10 March 1967 20 September 1966	11 September 1967
Cayman Islands	13 June 1966 9 December 1966	21 August 1967
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Fiji Gibraltar Gilbert and Ellice Islands Grenada	17 August 1966 12 August 1966 1 September 1966 26 August 1966 29 September 1966	28 August 1967 5 July 1967 24 August 1967 11 September 1967
Hong Kong Mauritius Montserrat	1 June 1966 22 July 1966 6 December 1966	12 September 1967 8 September 1967
New Hebrides Pitcairn Island	22 July 1966 18 April 1966	11 September 1967 2 June 1967

Representative:

H.E. Mr. Gopalaswami Parthasarathi

1965	1966
1 August 1966 22 September 1966 1 September 1966 23 September 1966 6 December 1966	11 September 1967
1 August 1966 —	14 July 1967 —
29 September 1966 19 February 1967	11 September 1967
29 March 1967 8 June 1966 8 June 1966	13 September 1967 13 September 1967
	1 August 1966 22 September 1966 1 September 1966 23 September 1966 6 December 1966 1 August 1966 29 September 1966 19 February 1967 29 March 1967 8 June 1966

- a Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 14, part I.
- b Period extends from 1 July of previous year to 30 June of year listed.
- ^e On 27 March 1959, the Government of France notified the Secretary-General that this Territory had attained internal autonomy and consequently the transmission of information thereon had ceased as from 1957.
 - d Period extends from 1 April of the year listed to 31 March of the following year.
- e In operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2064 (XX), adopted on 16 December 1965, the General Assembly considered that since the Cook Islands had attained full internal self-government, the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter was no longer necessary.

ANNEX

List of Delegations

Alternate Representatives: Afghanistan Mr. B. C. Mishra Representative: Mr. C. R. Gharekhan Mr. Abdul Samad Ghaus Adviser: Alternate Representative: Miss Shivaraman Mr. Mohammad Mirza Sammah Australia Representative: Representatives: H.E. Mr. Mehdi Vakil H.E. Mr. Patrick Shaw, C.B.E. Alternate Representatives: Mr. Kenneth Rogers Mr. Mohsen S. Esfandiary Alternate Representative: Mr. Farrokh Parsi Mr. B. B. Hickey Adviser: BULGARIA Mr. Kambiz Ahy (until June) Representatives: H.E. Mr. Milko Tarabanov Mr. Dimiter Sabev Representatives: H.E. Mr. Adnan Pachachi (since August) CHUE H.E. Mr. Kadhim Khalaf (until July) Representative: Alternate Representative: H.E. Mr. José Piñera Mr. Salim A, Saleem Alternate Representative: Mr. Javier Illanes Mr. Burhan M. Nouri Mr. Riyadh T. Ali Adviser: Mr. Jorge Huneeus Mr. Abdul Hussein Alisa ETHIOPIA ITALY Chief Representative: Representative: H.E. Lij Endalkachew Makonnen H.E. Mr. Piero Vinci Representative: Alternate Representatives: Mr. Kifle Wodajo Mr. Ludovico Carducci-Artenisio Alternate Representative: Mr. Massimo Castaldo Miss Konjit Sinegiorgis Mr. Alessandro Grandi IVORY COAST FINLAND Representative: Representatives: H.E. Mr. Max Jakobson H.E. Mr. Siméon Aké Mr. Matti Cawén Alternate Representative: Mr. Paavo Keisalo Mr. Kouamé Koffi MADAGASCAR INDIA

Representative:

H.E. Mr. Louis Rakotomalala

Alternate Representatives: Mr. Gabriel Rakotoniaina Mr. Raymond Raoelina

Representative:

H.E. Mr. Moussa Léo Keita Mr. Mamadou Moctar Thiam Mr. Yaya Diakité Mr. Mamadou Diarra

Representatives:

H.E. Mr. Bohdan Tomorowicz

Mr. Jan Slowikowski

Adviser:

Mr. Franciszek Czajkowski

SIERRA LEONE

Representative:

H.E. Mr. Christopher O. E. Cole

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Gustavus E. O. Williams

Mr. Ambrose P. Genda (until March) Mr. Malcolm O. Cole (since September)

Mr. Frank Karefa-Smart

Representative:

H.E. Mr. George J. Tomeh

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Rafic Jouéjati Mr. Adnan Nachabe Mr. Abdallah El-Attrash

TUNISIA

Representatives:

H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri Mr. Ahmed Chtourou

Mr. Mohamed Fourati (since May) Mr. Hamdan Ben Aissa (until July)

Mr. Hédi Drissi

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Representative:

H.E. Mr. N. T. Fedorenko

Alternate Representative:

Mr. P. F. Shakhov

Advisers:

Mr. F. D. Popov (until May) Mr. V. I. Ustinov Mr. A. V. Grodsky (until July)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Representative:

H.E. The Rt. Hon. Lord Caradon, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. C. P. Hope, C.M.G., T.D. Mr. J. D. B. Shaw, M.V.O.

Adviser:

Mr. Brian L. Barder

United Republic of Tanzania

Representatives:

H.E. Mr. J. W. Malecela

Mr. M. A. Foum

Mr. I. Mtingwa (until July)

United States of America

Representatives:

H.E. Mrs. Eugenie M. Anderson

H.E. Mr. Seymour M. Finger (9 February)

H.E. Mr. H. Garcia (5 December)

Alternate Representative:

Mr. Richard Johnson

Advisers:

Mr. William R. Brew Mr. Ernest C. Grigg, III Mr. Harry Roberts Melone

URUGUAY

Representative:

H.E. Mr. Pedro P. Berro

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Mateo Marques Seré (until August)

Mr. Felipe Montero

VENEZUELA

Representatives:

H.E. Mr. Manuel Pérez-Guerrero

Mr. Germán Nava Carrillo

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Gilberto Carrasquero

YUGOSLAVIA

Rebresentatives:

H.E. Mr. Anton Vratuša (from July)

H.E. Mr. Danilo Lekić (until June)

Alternate Representative:

Mr. Dragoslav Pejić

Specialized Agencies

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION

AND DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Federico Consolo

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION

Mr. William James Knight

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

Mr. Donald W. Woodward

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC

AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

Mr. Al Noor Kassum

Miss Ruth Barrett

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Mrs. Sylvia Meagher